Borlongan vs Pena

G.R. No. 143591 May 5, 2010 TEODORO C. BORLONGAN, JR., CORAZON M. BEJASA,
ARTURO E. MANUEL, JR., ERIC L. LEE, P. SIERVO H. DIZON, BENJAMIN DE LEON,
DELFIN C. GONZALES, JR., and BEN YU LIM, JR., Petitioners, vs. MAGDALENO M. PEA
and HON. MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO, JR., as Judge Designate of the Municipal Trial Court
in Cities, Bago City, Respondents

FACTS

Respondent Pena instituted a civil case for recovery of agents compensation and
expenses, damages and attorneys fees against

Urban Bank and petitioners before the RTC. Petitioners filed a Motion to dismiss,
including several documents as evidence. Atty Pena claims that the documents
were falsified. He subsequently filed his Complaint-Affidavit with the City Prosecutor.
The prosecutor found probable cause and the Informations were filed before MTCC.
Warrants of arrest were issued for the petitioners / accused.

Upon the issuance of the warrant of arrest, petitioners immediately posted bail

as they wanted to avoid embarrassment, being then officers of Urban Ban. On the
scheduled date for the

arraignment, despite the petitioners refusal to enter a plea, the court a quo entered
a plea of Not Guilty for

them.

The accused questioned the validity of the warrant of arrest

. However, the trial court ruled that

posting of bail constitutes a waiver of any irregularity

in the issuance of a warrant of arrest.

ISSUE

: Can the petitioners still question the validity of the warrant of arrest despite
posting bail?

YES
HELD

: The erstwhile ruling of this Court was that posting of bail constitutes a waiver of
any irregularity in the issuance of a warrant of arrest, that has

already been superseded by Section 26, Rule 114

of the Revised Rule of Criminal Procedure. The principle that the accused is
precluded from questioning the legality of the arrest after arraignment is true only if
he voluntarily enters his plea and participates during trial, without previously
invoking his objections thereto. Moreover, considering the conduct of the petitioner
after posting her personal bail bond, it cannot be argued that she waived her right
to question the finding of probable cause and to assail the warrant of arrest issued
against her by the respondent judge.

There must be clear and convincing proof that the petitioner had an actual intention
to relinquish her right

to question the existence of probable cause. When the only proof of intention rests
on what a party does, his act should be so manifestly consistent with, and indicative
of, an intent to voluntarily and unequivocally relinquish the particular right that no
other explanation of his conduct is possible. x x x. Herein petitioners filed the
Omnibus Motion to Quash, Recall Warrants of Arrest and/or For Reinvestigation on
the same day that they posted bail. Their bail bonds likewise expressly contained a
stipulation that they were not waiving their right to question the validity of their
arrest. On the date of their arraignment,

petitioners refused to enter their plea

due to the fact that the issue on the legality of their arrest is still pending with the
Court. Thus, when the court a quo entered a plea of not guilty for them, there was
no valid waiver of their right to preclude them from raising the same with the Court
of Appeals or this Court. The posting of bail bond was a matter of imperative
necessity to avert their incarceration; it

should not be deemed as a waiver of their right

to assail their arrest

BORLONGAN, JR VS PENA

GR NO. 143591 (NOV 23, 2007)

NACHURA, J.
Facts:

-Respondent Magdaleno Pea instituted a civil case for recovery of agents

compensation and expenses, damages, and attorneys fees, against Urban Bank
and the petitioners, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Bago
City.

- Respondent anchored his claim for compensation on the contract of agency,

allegedly entered into with the petitioners wherein the former undertook to perform
such acts necessary to prevent any intruder and squatter from unlawfully occupying
Urban Banks property located along Roxas Boulevard, Pasay City.

- Petitioners filed a MD arguing that they never appointed the respondent as agent
or counsel.

-Attached to the MD were the following documents:

1. A letter dated December 19, 1994 signed by Herman Ponce and Julie Abad
on behalf of Isabela Sugar Company, Inc. (ISCI), the original owner of the
subject property;

2. An unsigned letter dated December 7, 1994 addressed to Corazon Bejasa

from Marilyn G. Ong;

3. A letter dated December 9, 1994 addressed to Teodoro Borlongan and

signed by Marilyn G. Ong; and

4. A Memorandum dated November 20, 1994 from Enrique Montilla III.

- The above stated documents were presented in an attempt to show that the
respondent was appointed as agent by ISCI and not by Urban Bank or by the
petitioners.

- Respondent Pea filed his Complaint-Affidavit with the Office of the City
Prosecutor, Bago City. He claimed that said documents were falsified because the
alleged signatories did not actually affix their signatures, and the signatories were
neither stockholders nor officers and employees of ISCI. Worse, petitioners
introduced said documents as evidence before the RTC knowing that they were
falsified.

-City Prosecutors Report (Sept 23, 1998) : In the report, the Prosecutor concluded
that the petitioners were probably guilty of four (4) counts of the crime of
Introducing Falsified Documents penalized by the second paragraph of Article 172 of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC). The City Prosecutor concluded that the documents
were falsified because the alleged signatories untruthfully stated that ISCI was the
principal of the respondent; that petitioners knew that the documents were falsified
considering that the signatories were mere dummies; and that the documents
formed part of the record of Civil Case No. 754 where they were used by petitioners
as evidence in support of their motion to dismiss, adopted in their answer and later,
in their Pre-Trial Brief. Subsequently, the corresponding Informations were filed with
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Bago City. The cases were docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. 6683, 6684, 6685, and 6686. Thereafter, Judge Primitivo
Blanca issued the warrants for the arrest of the petitioners.

-Petitioners (Oct `1, 1998) filed an Omnibus MQ : They insist that they were denied
due process because of the non-observance of a proper procedure on preliminary
investigation prescribed in the Rules of Court; since no such counter-affidavit and
supporting documents were submitted by the petitioners, the trial judge merely
relied on the complaint-affidavit and attachments of the respondent in issuing the
warrants of arrest, also in contravention of the Rules. Moreover they claim that the
respondents affidavit was not based on the latters personal knowledge and
therefore should not have been used by the court in determining probable cause.

-On the same day that the Omnibus MQ was filed, the petitioners posted bail. Their
bail bonds expressly provided that they do not intend to waive their right to
question the validity of their arrest. On the date of arraignment, the petitioners
refused to enter their plea, for the obvious reason that the legality of their
information and their arrest was yet to be settled by the court.

-MTCCs answer (in response to Omnibus MQ filed by petitioners): They upheld the
validity of the warrant of arrest, saying that it was issued in accordance with the
Rules. Besides, (according to the MTCC) petitioners could no longer question the
validity of the warrant since they already posted bail.

Issue:

1) WON petitioners were deprived of their right to due process of law because of the
denial of their right to preliminary investigation and to submit their counter-
affidavit;

2) WON the Informations charging the petitioners were validly filed and the warrants
for their arrest were properly issued;

3) WON this Court can, itself, determine probable cause; and

4) WON the petitioners posting a bail constitutes a waiver of their right to question
the validity of their arrest.

Ruling: Petition granted; MTCC is ordered to dismiss criminal cases against

petitioners.

RD:

For issues numbered 1 and 3:

-The following sections of Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure are
relevant to the aforesaid issues:

SECTION 1. Definition. Preliminary investigation is an inquiry or proceeding for the

purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief
that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.

SEC. 3. Procedure. Except as provided for in Section 7 hereof, no complaint or information

for an offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court shall be filed without a preliminary
investigation having been first conducted in the following manner:

(a) The complaint shall state the known address of the respondent and be accompanied by
affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses as well as other supporting documents, in
such number of copies as there are respondents, plus two (2) copies of the official file. The
said affidavits shall be sworn to before any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official
authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or unavailability, a notary public, who
must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is satisfied that they
voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.

SEC. 9. Cases not falling under the original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts not
covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.

(a) Where filed with the fiscal. If the complaint is filed directly with the fiscal or state
prosecutor, the procedure outlined in Section 3 (a) of this Rule shall be observed. The Fiscal
shall take appropriate action based on the affidavits and other supporting documents
submitted by the complainant.

-Records show that the prosecutor relied merely on the affidavits submitted by the
complainant and did not require the petitioners to submit their answer. He should
not be faulted for doing such as this is sanctioned by the rules. Moreover, he is not
mandated to require the submission of counter-affidavits. Probable cause may then
be determined on the basis alone of the affidavits and supporting documents of the
complainant, without infringing on the constitutional rights of the petitioners.

-Regarding the issuance of the warrant of arrest, petitioners contend that the
warrants were illegally issued as they were solely based on the affidavits of the
complainant. Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution underscores the exclusive
and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of
probable cause. But the judge is not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he
shall (1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by
the prosecutor regarding the existence of probable cause, and on the basis thereof,
he may already make a personal determination of the existence of probable cause;
and (2) if he is not satisfied that probable cause exists, he may disregard the
prosecutors report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses
to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause. There is
no provision or procedural rule which makes the submission of counter-affidavits
mandatory before the judge could determine probable cause.

For issue number 2:

- For the issuance of a warrant of arrest, probable cause has been defined as the
existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet
and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person
sought to be arrested. It is one of the requisites for a warrant of arrest to be valid.

- On the basis of the above-stated documents (in the facts) and on the strength of
the affidavit executed by the respondent, the prosecutor concluded that probable
cause exists. These same affidavit and documents were used by the trial court in
issuing the warrant of arrest.

-The SC finds the complaint-affidavit and attachments insufficient to support the

existence of probable cause. The respondents claims of the falsity of the
documents were mere assertions.

- It must be emphasized that the affidavit of the complainant, or any of his

witnesses, shall allege facts within their (affiants) personal knowledge. The
allegation of the respondent that the signatures were falsified does not qualify as
personal knowledge. Nowhere in said affidavit did respondent state that he was
present at the time of the execution of the documents. Neither did he claim that he
was familiar with the signatures of the signatories. He simply made a bare
assertion

-A finding of probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence, or
on evidence beyond reasonable doubt. It does not require that the evidence would
justify conviction. Nonetheless, although the determination of probable cause
requires less than evidence which would justify conviction, it should at least be
more than mere suspicion. While probable cause should be determined in a
summary manner, there is a need to examine the evidence with care to prevent
material damage to a potential accuseds constitutional right to liberty and the
guarantees of freedom and fair play, and to protect the State from the burden of
unnecessary expenses in prosecuting alleged offenses and holding trials arising
from false, fraudulent or groundless charges.