Defense Distributed v. Department of State - Order Denying Petition For Rehearing en Banc

Case: 15-50759 Document: 00513913565 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/15/2017
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-50759
DEFENSE DISTRIBUTED; SECOND AMENDMENT FOUNDATION,

INCORPORATED,
Plaintiffs - Appellants
v.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE; JOHN F. KERRY, In His

Official Capacity as the Secretary of the Department of State;
DIRECTORATE OF DEFENSE TRADE CONTROLS, Department of State
Bureau of Political Military Affairs; KENNETH B. HANDELMAN,
Individually and in His Official Capacity as the Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for Defense Trade Controls in the Bureau of Political-Military
Affairs; C. EDWARD PEARTREE, Individually and in His Official Capacity
as the Director of the Office of Defense Trade Controls Policy Division;
SARAH J. HEIDEMA, Individually and in Her Official Capacity as the
Division Chief, Regulatory and Multilateral Affairs, Office of Defense Trade
Controls Policy; GLENN SMITH, Individually and in His Official Capacity as
the Senior Advisor, Office of Defense Trade Controls,
Defendants - Appellees
Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Western District of Texas
_______________________
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC
(Opinion 09/20/2016, 838 F.3d 451)

No. 15-50759
Before DAVIS, JONES, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

The Court having been polled at the request of one of its members, and
a majority of the judges who are in regular service and not disqualified not
having voted in favor (Fed. R. App. P. 35 and 5th Cir. R. 35), the Petition for
Rehearing En Banc is DENIED. In the en banc poll, five judges voted in favor
of rehearing (Judges Jones, Smith, Clement, Owen and Elrod) and nine judges
voted against rehearing (Chief Judge Stewart and Judges Jolly, Dennis, Prado,
Southwick, Haynes, Graves, Higginson and Costa).
ENTERED FOR THE COURT:
/s/ W. Eugene Davis

W. EUGENE DAVIS
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT JUDGE
2
No. 15-50759
JENNIFER WALKER ELROD, Circuit Judge, joined by JONES, SMITH, and

CLEMENT, Circuit Judges, dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc:
The panel opinions flawed preliminary injunction analysis permits

perhaps the most egregious deprivation of First Amendment rights possible: a
content-based prior restraint. Judge Joness cogent panel dissent thoroughly
explores the flaws in the panel opinion. I write here to highlight three errors
that warrant en banc review. First, the panel opinion fails to review the
likelihood of success on the meritswhich ten of our sister circuits agree is an
essential inquiry in a First Amendment preliminary injunction case. Second,
the panel opinion accepts that a mere assertion of a national security interest
is a sufficient justification for a prior restraint on speech. Third, the panel
opinion conducts a fundamentally flawed analysis of irreparable harm.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the denial of en banc review in this
case.
Prior restraints are the most serious and least tolerable infringement
on First Amendment rights. Nebraska Press Assn v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539,
559 (1976). In the context of a party seeking a preliminary injunction, we have
stressed the importance of determining the likelihood of success on the
meritscalling it arguably the most important factor. Tesfamichael v.
Gonzalez, 411 F.3d 169, 176 (5th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, ten of our sister
circuits have held that the likelihood of success on the merits is a crucial,
indispensable inquiry in the First Amendment context. See Sindicato
Puertorriqueno de Trabajadores v. Fortuno, 699 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2012); N.Y.
Progress & Prot. PAC v. Walsh, 733 F.3d 483, 488 (2d Cir. 2013); Stilp v.
Contino, 613 F.3d 405, 409 (3d Cir. 2010); WV Assn of Club Owners &
Fraternal Servs. v. Musgrave, 553 F.3d 292, 298 (4th Cir. 2009); Liberty Coins,
LLC v. Goodman, 748 F.3d 682, 690 (6th Cir. 2014); ACLU of Illinois v. Alvarez,
679 F.3d 583, 58990 (7th Cir. 2012); Child Evangelism Fellowship of Minn. v.
3
No. 15-50759
Minneapolis Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 690 F.3d 996, 1000 (8th Cir. 2012); Verlo
v. Martinez, 820 F.3d 1113, 1126 (10th Cir. 2016); Scott v. Roberts, 612 F.3d
1279, 1297 (11th Cir. 2010); Pursuing Americas Greatness v. FEC, 831 F.3d
500, 511 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Strikingly, however, the panel opinion entirely fails
to address the likelihood of success on the merits, and in so doing creates a
circuit split. This error alone merits rehearing en banc.
Moreover, the panel opinions failure to address the likelihood of success
on the merits infects its public interest analysis. A court that ignores the
merits of a constitutional claim cannot meaningfully analyze the public
interest, which, by definition, favors the vigorous protection of First
Amendment rights. See Opulent Life Church v. City of Holly Springs, Miss.,
697 F.3d 279, 298 (5th Cir. 2012) ([I]njunctions protecting First Amendment
freedoms are always in the public interest.) (citation omitted); see also Gordon
v. Holder, 721 F.3d 638, 653 (D.C. Cir. 2013) ([I]t may be assumed that the
Constitution is the ultimate expression of the public interest.). The panel
opinions failure to address the likelihood of success on the merits denies
Defense Distributed a meaningful review of the public interest factor.
The panel opinions public interest analysis is also flawed because it
relies on a mere assertion of a national security interest. Defense Distd v. U.S.
Dept of State, No. 15-50759, slip op. at 10 (5th Cir. 2016) (noting that the
Government asserted a very strong public interest in national defense and
national security. (emphasis added)). Certainly there is a strong public
interest in national security. But there is a paramount public interest in the
exercise of constitutional rights, particularly those guaranteed by the First
Amendment: Any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court
bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity. The
Government thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the
4
No. 15-50759
imposition of such a restraint. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713,
714 (1971) (citations omitted). To justify a prior restraint, we have held that
the Government must show that the expression sought to be restrained surely
will result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage. Bernard v. Gulf Oil
Co., 619 F.2d 459, 473 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc); see also N.Y. Times, 403 U.S.
at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring). The Supreme Court has articulated similar
requirements: there must be a requisite degree of certainty [of danger] to
justify restraint, there must be no alternative measures available, and the
restraint must effectively . . . operate to prevent the threatened danger.
Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 562, 565, 56970. The Government contends that
the gun designs at issue could potentially threaten national security.
However, this speculation falls far short of the required showing under
Bernard and Nebraska Press, showing neither the immediacy of the danger nor
the necessity of the prior restraint. Allowing such a paltry assertion of national
security interests to justify a grave deprivation of First Amendment rights
treats the words national security as a magic spell, the mere invocation of
which makes free speech instantly disappear.
The panel opinions flawed analysis in turn infects its evaluation of
irreparable harm. The panel opinion justifies the prior restraint on speech
because any harm to Defense Distributed would be temporary. But
irreparable harm occurs whenever a constitutional right is deprived, even for
a short period of time. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (The loss of
First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of time, unquestionably
constitutes irreparable injury.). Even if the panel opinions temporary harm
theory were valid, the deprivation here has been anything but short. Instead,
as Judge Joness panel dissent notes, because of the lack of a preliminary
5
No. 15-50759
injunction, Defense Distributed has been effectively muzzled for over three
years. Defense Distd, slip op. at 17 (Jones, J., dissenting).
We have been warned that the word security is a broad, vague
generality whose contours should not be invoked to abrogate the fundamental
law embodied in the First Amendment. N.Y. Times, 403 U.S. at 719 (Black,
J., concurring). Unfortunately, that is exactly what the panel opinion has done.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc.
6
United States Court of Appeals

FIFTH CIRCUIT
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
LYLE W. CAYCE TEL. 504-310-7700
CLERK 600 S. MAESTRI PLACE
NEW ORLEANS, LA 70130
March 15, 2017

MEMORANDUM TO COUNSEL OR PARTIES LISTED BELOW:
No. 15-50759 Defense Distributed, et al v. U.S. Dept. of
State, et al
USDC No. 1:15-CV-372
Enclosed is an order entered in this case.
Sincerely,
LYLE W. CAYCE, Clerk
By: _________________________
Jamei R. Schaeffer, Deputy Clerk
Mr. Joshua Michael Blackman

Mr. Bruce D. Brown
Ms. Jeannette Clack
Mr. Matthew Goldstein
Mr. Alan Gura
Mr. David T. Hardy
Mr. Robert E. Henneke
Mr. John Devereux Kimball
Mr. Martin Simon Krezalek
Mr. William Bryan Mateja
Mr. Raffi Melkonian
Mr. Randal John Meyer
Mr. David Scott Morris
Mr. Leif A. Olson
Mr. Michael S. Raab
Mr. Ilya Shapiro
Mr. Daniel Bentele Hahs Tenny
Mr. Kit Walsh

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Case: 15-50759 Document: 00513913565 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/15/2017

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

DEFENSE DISTRIBUTED; SECOND AMENDMENT FOUNDATION,

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE; JOHN F. KERRY, In His

Appeal from the United States District Court

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING EN BANC

(Opinion 09/20/2016, 838 F.3d 451)

Before DAVIS, JONES, and GRAVES, Circuit Judges.

ENTERED FOR THE COURT:

/s/ W. Eugene Davis

JENNIFER WALKER ELROD, Circuit Judge, joined by JONES, SMITH, and

The panel opinions flawed preliminary injunction analysis permits

United States Court of Appeals

March 15, 2017

Enclosed is an order entered in this case.

Mr. Joshua Michael Blackman

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