Defending America'S Transportation Infrastructure: Hearing

S. HRG.
107612
DEFENDING AMERICAS TRANSPORTATION

INFRASTRUCTURE
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME AND DRUGS

OF THE
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
OCTOBER 16, 2001
Serial No. J10744
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COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware STROM THURMOND, South Carolina
HERBERT KOHL, Wisconsin CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin JON KYL, Arizona
CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York MIKE DEWINE, Ohio
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
JOHN EDWARDS, North Carolina MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky
BRUCE A. COHEN, Majority Chief Counsel and Staff Director
SHARON PROST, Minority Chief Counsel
MAKAN DELRAHIM, Minority Staff Director
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME AND DRUGS

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware, Chairman
HERBERT KOHL, Wisconsin CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
MARIA CANTWELL, Washington SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky
GEORGE ELLARD, Majority Chief Counsel
RITA LARI, Minority Chief Counsel
(II)
CONTENTS
STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS

Page
Biden, Hon. Joseph R., Jr., a U.S. Senator from the State of Delaware ............. 1
Grassley, Hon. Charles E., a U.S. Senator from the State of Iowa ..................... 4
Schumer, Hon. Charles E., a U.S. Senator from the State of New York ............ 6
WITNESSES
Beatty, Jeffrey K., President and Chief Executive Officer, Total Security
Services International, Marietta, Georgia ......................................................... 19
Brown, Donald E., Professor and Chair, Department of Systems Engineering,
University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Virginia ............................................... 17
Chrestman, Tony, President, Ruan Transport, Des Moines, Iowa ...................... 22
Jenkins, Brian M., Senior Advisor to the President, RAND Corporation, Santa
Monica, California ................................................................................................ 14
Parker, Hon. Mike, Assistant Secretary of the Army (Civil Works), Depart-
ment of the Army, Washington, D.C. ................................................................. 10
(III)
DEFENDING AMERICAS TRANSPORTATION
INFRASTRUCTURE
TUESDAY, OCTOBER 16, 2001
UNITED STATES SENATE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME AND DRUGS,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D.C.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:37 a.m., in room
SD226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr.,
chairman of the subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Biden, Schumer, and Grassley.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., A U.S.
SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF DELAWARE
Chairman BIDEN. The hearing will come to order. I thank the
witnesses for their patience and for their willingness to be here.
Welcome to this mornings hearing on Defending Americas
Transportation Infrastructure. As you know, only the initial part of
this hearing will be open to the public. I want to explain straight
up front the reason for this for the press.
There is no classified information, there is no information that
I am aware of that any witness is about to tell us about any immi-
nent attack. They are not in a position to know that, even if there
were. I dont want you to think the closing of this hearing has any-
thing to do with the idea that we know something is about to hap-
pen and we have decided that we have to keep that quiet, because
some press have raised that question. It has nothing to do with
that.
What it has to do with is there is going to be an open statement,
a public statement made by each of the witnesses, but we want to
get into some detail about the vulnerabilities of the system. And al-
though it is probable that the full-blown terrorist organization or
organizations would understand what those vulnerabilities are and
would not learn much by anything we said publicly, what we are
concerned about is the prospect of copycat folks and screwballs out
there who have not thought of some of these vulnerabilities.
I realize it is a delicate balance here. I have been a Senator now
for 29 years. Other then the 10 years of being on the Intelligence
Committee, I dont recall closing many hearings at all, but I dont
want to make this a bigger deal than it is in terms of why it is
being closed.
The second reason that we have decided to close it, speaking for
myself, is that I think we are doing a pretty good job unintention-
(1)
2
ally of scaring the living devil out of the American people about
things that could happen.
Our job is to determine what could happen; our job is to look at
the worst-case scenario. Many of those worst-case scenarios are
highly, highly, highly improbable. Not a subject for this hearing
today is the issue of, for example, anthrax out of airplanes, and so
on.
The way we talk about it, most Delawareans think that all any-
body would have to do is get a hold of a crop duster and fill it up
with anthrax, like grass seed, and spread it over a large population
and tens of thousands of people are going to be affected. Putting
anthrax in aerosol form is incredibly difficult. They wouldnt be
sending it in the mail if they were able to do it otherwise.
It is the same way with smallpox. The prospect of an individual
terrorist getting access to smallpox and infecting tens of thousands
of people is highly unlikely. Is it a worst-case? Yes. Is it possible?
Yes, but it is about as possible as your being struck by lightning
twice in the same day.
Again, I think it is important that we not inadvertently, in doing
our job, which we have to do, unnecessarily alarm the American
people. I am going to say something that my staff will be very
upset that I say, but I believe very firmly that my granddaughters
are going to write about this in their school reports as an episode
in American history, not as a fundamental shift in American his-
tory.
So I just want to sort of keep this on the straight and narrow,
be level-headed about it and put it in perspective. But I do want
to be able to ask each of the witnesses, who collectively have a
great deal of experience dealing with these issues, some of the
worst-case possibilities.
Maybe it is appropriate in the sense that it need not be classified
and it is appropriate in the sense that Americans would have a
right to know it. There is nothing in particular that we are aware
of that is about to happen anywhere, but it just seems to me un-
necessary to do that now. We may decide after the hearing to de-
classify the whole hearingnot declassify, but take it all public
based on what we have learned.
So as I said, only the initial portion of the hearing will be open
to the public. Pursuant to Senate rules, we will close the hearing
after some initial testimony to allow the expert witnesses to speak
freely to the subcommittee regarding potential threats to the trans-
portation infrastructure.
It has now been over a month since the tragic events of Sep-
tember 11, and during that time we have heard many speeches me-
morializing the losses of that day. There is nothing more that I can
say, and I suspect Senator Grassley can say, to speak to the pro-
found loss that those thousands now of family members dealing
with the loss that occurred on the 11th are undergoing.
Many of us know from personal experience when you get that
phone call it is like your chest turns into a black hole and you are
being sucked inside it. And there is not much any of us can do, ex-
cept to express our sympathies and guarantee our support, not just
support but our long-term support and commitment to those fami-
lies.
3
What we can do and what we have been doing in the Senate and
the House, and the White House as well, is to work as hard as we
can to prevent future terrorist attacks and if, in fact, God forbid,
they occurred, to diminish the damage they can do.
We have recently passed bills to make life harder for those who
commit terrorist acts. We have passed the antiterrorism bill that
will help law enforcement suck the oxygen out of the air that these
sons-of-guns breathe. We have passed a law to make air travel
safer, and I am sure we will continue to improve on that so that
our own airlines will not again be turned into weapons against the
American people.
Now, we need to focus on the other areas of potential vulner-
ability. In so doing, we need to think ahead of the terrorists, think
of the next step and not just the last attack. The horse is out of
the barn when it comes to the airlines. We are backfilling now to
prevent it from happening, but we will hopefully get ahead of the
curve here before the horse gets out of the barn on some other
means of surface transportation. We need to stop it before it hap-
pens, if at all possible.
We need to think of the ways terrorists can attack. Before Sep-
tember 11, few people thought someone would use a commercial
airliner as a missile aimed at our buildings. But in light of the
events of September 11, much attention has been paid in the last
month to the need for enhanced security and criminal penalties in
our Nations aviation system. But as was noted in a recent New
York Times editorial, airports and airplanes are like Fort Knox
when compared to other forms of transport.
These hearings will focus on the extent to which security
vulnerabilities exist in non-aviation transportation. That is because
today we need to anticipate the threat that may come not just in
the belly of a plane, but in the hold of a ship or in the dark of a
tunnel or the span of a bridge.
Each day, tens of thousands of companies move tons of cargo,
much of it hazardous, over the Nations railroads, waterways and
highways. Countless additional tons of cargo arrive daily in U.S.
ports of entry. More importantly, millions of Americans use surface
transportation to reach their workplaces, visit their loved ones, and
return to their homes.
Our modes of surface and sub-surface transportation may not be
keeping up with the security advances that we are seeing in the
air. For example, it has recently been reported that 98 percent of
all cargo containers enter U.S. ports without any inspection. As one
commentator has noted, We are now experiencing the dark side of
a transport system in which efficiency has trumped public secu-
rity.
As I recently noted on the floor of the United States Senate,
when an Amtrak Metroliner train and an Amtrak AmFleet train
are in a tunnel at the same timeand this is often the casethere
are more people in that confined space than five full 747 aircraft.
I am not an expert on these issues and I am not prepared to
measure the extent of the problem for myself, and without respon-
sible inquiry I dont think it is possible. That is why I am glad to
welcome our panel of experts today to educate us, and I will be
happy to close this hearing to the public at the appropriate time
4
so that our witnesses may feel free to speak about any concern they
have.
I hope todays hearing will be a constructive step toward the goal
of shoring up our defenses against terrorism in all realms of our
transportation infrastructure. In the wake of September 11, we
need to reevaluate our rules of prevention because the rules of en-
gagement have changed.
Now, I would like to turn to Senator Grassley, the ranking mem-
ber of the subcommittee, and thank him for working so hard in
putting this together.
I look forward to hearing all the witnesses at the appropriate
time. I see my friend from New York has come in and we will give
him the opportunity to make an opening statement, as well.
What I will do at the appropriate time, which I will warn you
about ahead of time, is I am going to read a little about your back-
grounds, more than we usually do, so people can understand who
we have before us.
Senator Grassley?
STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, A U.S. SENATOR
FROM THE STATE OF IOWA
Senator GRASSLEY. Well, Mr. Chairman, in holding this hearing
you show your concern about the safety and the economic vitality
of our ground transportation system. Our waterways, highways,
rail systems, pipelines and more, are critical to the economy and
must be protected from terrorist attack.
Americans must be able to continue to travel by car, truck, train,
whether for business or leisure, and do it without fear. We have to
increase the confidence of the American traveling public in the
safety and integrity of our transportation system. By doing that, I
think we show the terrorists that they are not going to break the
spirit of America, as they try to put psychological trauma upon our
people.
I welcome Mr. Tony Chrestman, President of Ruan Industries, of
Des Moines, Iowa. Ruan is one of Americas largest trucking com-
panies. Mr. Chrestman has more than 30 years experience in logis-
tics and transportation services. He is active in the American
Trucking Association and Council on Logistics Management, and
we look forward to his advice.
I would also join the chairman in welcoming Mike Parker, the
Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works. The Corps is
heavily involved in maintaining river transportation infrastructure.
Of course, the importance of that infrastructure is underscored, I
think, by the appearance here this morning of the Assistant Sec-
retary.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, I have focused a great deal of my
time on the need for smaller airports, because that is how Iowa is
served. This mode of transportation is important not only to our
economy, but also to the people of Iowa and elsewhere who need
to travel. I realize that todays hearing will not focus upon aviation,
but I bring this to your attention in hopes that maybe sometime
we can do something in that area as well.
The hearing today is about the backbone of the transportation
system, an extensive interrelated network of public and private
5
roads, railroads, transit routes, waterways, terminals, ports, and

pipelines. It is a system that supported more than 2.7 trillion vehi-
cle miles in the year 1999, with a total tonnage miles of 3.1 trillion.
Together, these modes of transportation, without even considering
airlines, make up more than 65 percent of the value of U.S. inter-
national merchandise trade.
Grain is Iowas biggest commodity, and it is primarily trans-
ported by train and river barge. Iowa is the bread basket not just
for the United States, but for the world. To hit our means of trans-
porting grain would be to keep food from the hungry of the world
and to devastate our own economy.
As to trucking, more than 80 percent of the value and more than
74 percent of the weight of all goods originating in Iowa are trans-
ported by truck. Over 64 percent of shipping originating in Iowa is
transported to other States. These forms of transportation are im-
portant to my State, but also the rest of the country.
Air is not the only method of travel for the general public, obvi-
ously. In fact, in the aftermath of September 11, those Americans
who usually travel by air at least had the option of traveling by
car, train or bus.
So, Mr. Chairman, much is at stake. If we cant ensure the safety
of our transportation system, we will have an equally difficult time
sustaining the economic vitality of these industries for our econ-
omy, as well as instilling confidence in the traveling public.
We need to be focusing, then, on ways in which we can address
the issue of security for the trucking industry. I am sure we will
hear many recommendations here today, but I would want to sug-
gest looking at the trucking industrys ability to access background
checks and licensing requirements for operators of their vehicles,
tighter security and scanning methods at the borders, and the safe-
ty concerns of the communities and workers of this transportation
network.
Although I am confident that the various trucking industries will
rapidly take the necessary measures to ensure that operator licens-
ing requirements are rigorously developed and followed, I am con-
cerned about the coordination among the States in sharing this in-
formation.
At this time, Ruan Industries, of Des Moines, has no way of ac-
cessing a Federal criminal database to check on the backgrounds
of potential employees. Mr. Chrestmans employees have to rely on
other time-consuming and often unverifiable methods that usually
differ from State to State. So I hope that could change.
The other problems have to do with border and port security, es-
pecially with regard to inspecting shipments. As I understand it,
less than 5 percent of the entries at borders and less than 1 per-
cent of the entries at ports are randomly inspected. Consequently,
these statistics do not generate a great deal of confidence that our
borders are secure.
I am also concerned with the safety of our locks, dams and
bridges. My State is flanked on both sides by the Missouri, on the
west, and the Mississippi on the east, which have extensive sys-
tems of barge transport. This system carries grain from Iowa to ex-
port on the lower Mississippi. It also transports salt, fertilizer, pe-
troleum products, cement and other bulk commodities up river to
6
Iowa. There are also numerous bridges, obviously, over the rivers
that are critical to train and truck transportation. It is not unlikely
that terrorists would target them in an effort to disrupt transpor-
tation systems.
Finally, Mr. Chairman, one of the lessons of the tragic events of
Oklahoma City and the events of September 11 is that terrorists
find their weapons of mass destruction once they are here. They
rarely bring them with them. The tools that the hijackers used in
New York and elsewhere were box cutters and other crude instru-
ments, but their weapons of mass destruction were our jets. The
point is their weapons of mass destruction are all around our coun-
try, in trucks, in cargo trailers, in rail cars, in ports and pipelines,
and even recreation boats.
What is more, as the September 11 terrorist act showed, it had
a devastating effect on the general confidence of the public, particu-
larly in traveling, whether for business or leisure. Air transpor-
tation came to a grinding halt. The only thing that allowed Ameri-
cans to keep moving were our highways, waterways and railroads.
That is why this hearing is so important, and I thank you for hold-
ing it.
Chairman BIDEN. Thank you.
Senator Schumer?
STATEMENT OF HON. CHARLES E. SCHUMER, A U.S. SENATOR
FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Senator SCHUMER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too want to
thank you for holding this hearing on the critical issue of security
of our transportation infrastructure.
Unfortunately, we have learned a lot after September 11 and one
of the things we have learned is terrorists look for the weak pres-
sure points in our society and then they strike. Unfortunately,
many aspects of our transportation system are those weak pressure
points. We have lived in a free and open society, thank God, for all
these hundreds of years, and the transportation system reflects it.
But because people agglomerate at the transportation system, be-
cause, by definition, there is movement and they have to move
things to do what they want to domove bad things, explosives or
whateverit is really important that we examine our transpor-
tation infrastructure because it is one of the places where terrorists
will focus their attention. So nothing could be more timely than
holding this hearing and I thank you for it.
We are each focusing on areas that affect our States, although
we want to look at the whole Nation. Senator Grassley talked
about truck and barge and the things that are needed in Iowa. I
would like to focus a little bit on rail transportation because of its
importance to both the Nation and to New York.
I first want to say, Mr. Chairman, your leadership on rail trans-
portation, and on Amtrak in particular, is just exemplary, and I
think all of us who believe in rail transportation, its necessity and
the need to make it safe and secure, just thank you for everything
that you have done.
The aftermath of the attack on September 11 has made one sim-
ple fact clear, and that is that our Nations rail system is essential
and has to be made secure. Last month, when our airports were
7
shut down, it was rail that provided one of the only means of travel
available in many parts of the country. Amtrak added trains and
provided transportation to New York City for relief workers and
military personnel and public officials. They honored plane tickets
for stranded travelers.
Amtrak proved its worth, as more and more Americans relied on
its service during this crisis. In the week following the September
11 tragedy, rail ridership increased 17 percent nationally, and Am-
trak had to add 30 percent more seating capacity on the Northeast
corridor.
What we have learned in this brave new world in which we live
is that all our transportation systems are interdependent and we
need them all. You cannot simply say lets make one secure in the
preeminent part of the system. We have to work on all of them,
whether that be air, rail, road, or water or ship.
The Senate has already passed legislation, I am glad to say, ad-
dressing airline security. The next item of business must be legisla-
tion on the pressing issue of rail security. We need both, and we
need them now. That is why I am gladand I know Senator Biden
has joined me in this in playing his leadership and spearhead
rolethat Senator Hollings and Senator McCain introduced yester-
day a bill that was modeled on the amendment that we had worked
on to the airline security bill.
The Hollings bill will fill critical gaps in our system of security
for rails by providing $1.7 billion to provide new security equip-
ment, training and personnel to our railway system. Included in
this package would be something of great concern in New York,
and that is the tunnels under the Hudson River. That is also of
great concern in Maryland and in Washington, D.C.
We have, coming out of Penn Station, for instance, tunnels that
go on for more than a mile, sometimes as much as two. They dont
have good ventilation systems. They dont have good egress if, God
forbid, something were to happen. Before September 11, nobody
paid much attention to that, but now we are, and I think that is
extremely important and I am glad that we are looking at that
issue.
In addition to pressing for this legislation, I have asked Sec-
retary of Transportation Mineta to conduct a comprehensive study
of the Nations rail security and report back in two months regard-
ing the status of current Amtrak safety standards and procedures;
the most urgently needed upgrade throughout our rail system,
freight as well as passenger; the ability of our rail, Amtrak and
others, to respond and operate in the face of another terrorist at-
tack; and the methods of implementation and execution of new se-
curity and safety measures.
The information that we will receive from this study, coupled
with additional funds for railroad safety from the Hollings bill, will
allow us to put in place security measures designed to provide the
maximum security possible.
Let me say as somebody who takes the railsand I know my col-
leagues would agree with me because I know they have taken
them, or I certainly know Senator Biden haswe are more secure
today than we were before September 11. If you go ride the trains,
just as when you ride the planes, you will see much more security
8
personnel. But it is being done in an ad hoc way, in light of the

crisis, and we need a permanent regimen.
We may need to look at inspection of baggage and metal detec-
tors and things like that, which we do at airports. I am hopeful
that between the legislation that Senator Biden, myself and a num-
ber of our colleagues have been working on, embodied in the Hol-
lings bill, as well as the study from Secretary Mineta, we will get
quick answers and then move without delay to implement them.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman BIDEN. Thank you very much.
I am going to introduce the background of each of the witnesses
all at once and then I am going to start with you, Mike, and we
will work our way down.
Mike Parker is the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil
Works. Since 1996, he has been the owner and president of GFG
Farms Incorporated and Wells Resources Incorporated, companies
with timber and farming and leasing operations.
In 1999, he was involved in something he would like to forget,
the closest race I think that ever existed in Mississippi history for
governor.
Is that right, Congressman?
Mr. PARKER. It was close.
Chairman BIDEN. It was close; I mean, it was a heck of a race.
In 1989, he was elected to the 4th District of Mississippi and
served in the House for 10 years. He is a graduate of William
Carey College, in Hattiesburg, Mississippi, with a B.A. degree in
1970, and in 1985 he was awarded an honorary doctorate in hu-
manities from William Carey College. He has a lot of experience
and background here.
Mr. Brian Jenkins is one of the countrys leading authorities on
terrorism and sophisticated crime. He has been quoted in the
media almost daily since September 11. He is a senior adviser to
the president of the RAND Corporation, and serves as an adviser
to both government and industry.
A former deputy chairman of Kroll Associates, a prominent inter-
national investigative and consulting firm, Mr. Jenkins is also cur-
rently involved with the Mineta International Institute for Surface
Transportation Policy Studies.
Previously, from 1972 to 1989, he was chairman of the RAND po-
litical science department. In 2000, he oversaw a year-long RAND
study of security vulnerabilities in the California rail, tunnel, wa-
terway, highway and pipeline infrastructure carried out for the
California Office of Emergency Services. This report was embar-
goed on September 11 by Governor Davis in light of the attacks.
Mr. Jenkins served from 1996 to 1997 as a member of the White
House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security, and he is the
author of A Hundred Wars: International Terrorism, a New Mode
of Conflict, and Terrorism and Personal Protection.
A former captain in the Green Berets, he served in the Domini-
can Republic during the American intervention, and later in Viet-
nam from 1966 to 1970. He is a widely respected and often-quoted
analyst with over 25 years of experience. He comes highly rec-
ommended by a number of people who have testified before this
9
committee and the Congressional Research Service Transportation

Security Section.
Also, we have Professor Donald E. Brown. He is Professor and
Chair of the Department of Systems Engineering at the University
of Virginia. He is a nationally regarded expert in qualifying secu-
rity threats to surface transportation structures.
As such, he served as a consultant for the National Security Ad-
ministration on intelligence and threat analysis, and he has also
recently served on the National Academy of Sciences panel which
produced one of the definitive analytical studies on security
vulnerabilities in the Nations transportation system, entitled Im-
proving Surface Transportation Security.
Dr. Brown has also produced several studies on the asymmetric
threat posed to transportation infrastructure by terrorists; that is,
the ability of a small cell of dedicated radicals to inflict significant
blows against unprotected U.S. transportation targets, rather than
against the overwhelming superiority of U.S. military forces.
Prior to joining the University of Virginia, Dr. Brown served for
9 years as an officer in the United States Army, reaching the rank
of captain, including more than 3 years as a military intelligence
officer in Berlin in the late 1970s. He has also served as a visiting
fellow at the National Institute of Justices Crime Mapping Re-
search Center, and has been a co-principal investigator in over 50
research contracts with Federal, State and private organizations.
He has published more than 80 papers.
Dr. Brown is a graduate of the United States Military Academy
at West Point, and received his masters in engineering and oper-
ations research from the University of California at Berkeley and
a Ph.D. in operations engineering from the University of Michigan
at Ann Arbor.
Welcome, Doctor. Thank you for being here.
Jeffrey Beatty looks too mild-mannered to fit this description.
Jeffrey K. Beatty is a former U.S. Delta Force counterterrorism
unit officer, a special agent for the FBI, and an operations officer
for the CIA. He is currently president and CEO of Total Security
Services International, in Marietta, Georgia.
I might point out, to the best of my knowledge, no other indi-
vidual has served in all three of the most elite counterterrorism
units in the United States military. Mr. Beatty has appeared as a
commentator on CNN on terrorism and transportation infrastruc-
ture since September 11, and maybe before, but I have noticed him
since the 11th.
From 1981 to 1983, Mr. Beatty served as a Delta Force assault
troop commander, where he led a unit on several deployments and
was commended for saving lives. Subsequently, he became oper-
ations officer for the entire Delta Force.
From 1983 to 1985, Mr. Beatty served as a special adviser to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation Hostage Rescue Team, with an
emphasis on security for the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic. He also
flew surveillance missions for the Bureau, including a mission in-
volving the capturing of a Top 10 fugitive.
From 1985 to 1992, he worked at the Central Intelligence Agency
on Europe and the Middle East. In addition to traditional intel-
ligence operations, he developed counterterrorism training pro-
10
grams for Allied troops. He also mounted several successful intel-

ligence and security operations, including thwarting a terrorist at-
tack.
In 1992, Mr. Beatty founded Total Security Services Inter-
national, a security consulting firm serving corporate and govern-
ment clients. TSSI has managed large security projects, including
the security upgrade program for Fairfax County, Virginia. The
reason for that, I might add, was because of the trial of the gentle-
men who shot two people at the CIA headquarters in 1993.
Mr. Beatty specializes in the high-threat portion of the security
spectrum and has experience in three OlympicsLos Angeles, Bar-
celona and Atlantanot as a participant but as a consultant. It
would be kind of nice to be a participant, too, wouldnt it?
He has also done work on terrorism prevention with regard to
the Big Dig highway excavation project in Boston. He also devel-
oped antiterrorism procedures and training materials for Amtrak
and the Washington, D.C., Metro system. In addition, he has stud-
ied the vulnerabilities of Boston and New York Citys tunnels, and
has been a speaker at the Department of Transportations Con-
ference on Land Transportation issues. Mr. Beatty and TSSI have
most recently been hired by the Boston MBTA to beef up subway
security.
TSSI warned officials at the 1996 Summer Olympics in Atlanta
that their security procedures would leave crowds open to package
bomb attacks, a prediction that soon came true. In 1999, Mr.
Beatty conducted an exercise in Boston preparing for armed terror-
ists seizing a subway train and a bomb detonating in the train sta-
tion. In 1998, he went on record as stating that terrorists were
aiming for an attack leading to 5,000 or more casualties by the end
of 2001, a prediction unfortunately that has come true.
Tony Chrestman currently serves as the president of Ruan
Transportation Corporation, a business unit of Ruan Transpor-
tation Management Systems. Mr. Chrestman has more than 30
years experience in logistics and transportation services. Joining
Ruan in 1999, he was vice president of transportation services with
Ryder Integrated Logistics, and he is active in the American Truck-
ing Association and the Council for Logistics Management. Mr.
Chrestman attended Mississippi State University, and he is ex-
tremely welcome as well.
Having said that, gentlemen, why dont we proceed with your
public statements, if you will. If any of my colleagues want to ask
a question on the record here in the public portion, we can do that
and then we will go to the closed hearing.
Mike, welcome.
STATEMENT OF MIKE PARKER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF

THE ARMY (CIVIL WORKS), DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
Mr. PARKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the com-
mittee. For the last three weeks, I have had the privilege of serving
as Assistant Secretary of the Army for Civil Works. I appreciate
the opportunity to speak to you today, and also thank you for the
opportunity to provide information on Army Corps of Engineers ac-
11
tivities to address the infrastructure security issues resulting from

the events of September 11, 2001.
First, allow me to say how proud I am to be associated with the
Corps of Engineers, its record, and the manner in which it has
begun to move out to protect the large part of Americas infrastruc-
ture that is our responsibility. I want to assure you that the Corps
will prove itself worthy of the trust which that responsibility con-
veys.
Within two hours of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade
Center, Corps employees were at Ground Zero lending assistance.
Thousands of New York City residents were evacuated on Corps
civil works vessels from Lower Manhattan in excess of 2,000. We
provide expert structural assessments, emergency power to get the
stock market up and running, and provided technical assistance for
the removal of what will likely exceed one million tons of debris.
Within hours of the attack on the Pentagon, Corps structural en-
gineers were on-site providing expert advice. We are presently con-
ducting a comprehensive force protection analysis to make the re-
built Pentagon safer from terrorist intervention in the future, and
we continue to support local and military leaders with every asset
the Corps can muster.
In conjunction with its military construction mission, the Corps
has developed in-depth antiterrorism force protection expertise.
The Corps serves as the Department of Defense lead for public
works under national and departmental plans. The Corps labora-
tories and technology transfer centers were instrumental in the de-
velopment of the DoD antiterrorism/force protection standards now
used by all of the military services in military construction, major
repair and other programs.
These standards and the underlying technologies are being wide-
ly used by the State Department in their embassy program. For ex-
ample, we have world-class antiterrorism force protection engineers
at our Protective Design and Electronic Security Centers who are
supported by the best available research assets within the Engi-
neer Research and Development Centers six-laboratory network.
Expertise available there to the Corps and others includes,
among other things, survivability and protective structures,
sustainment engineering, battle space environment, military and
civil infrastructure, and environmental quality. We have hundreds
of employees trained by these engineers, along with experience
born of work on the Khobar Towers, Murrah Federal Building,
World Trade Center, the Pentagon and other sites, some well-
known and others not so well-known. The Corps centers and labs
are supported by the some of the leading antiterrorism/force protec-
tion engineering and construction firms through effective con-
tracting vehicles.
We are in the process of leveraging the expertise gained in the
Corps military mission areas to protect the Corps critical water re-
sources infrastructure from terrorist activities. Fortunately, we are
not starting from scratch. Over the past few years, the Corps has
been working diligently with other agencies, including the Bureau
of Reclamation, the Department of Energy, the Tennessee Valley
Authority, the Environmental Protection Agency and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation to develop a comprehensive security as-
12
sessment process to identify risks to critical facilities, such as locks,

dams and hydropower facilities. As the security assessments are
completed, we will apply the Corps and others antiterrorism/force
protection expertise to critical sites to mitigate security risks un-
covered.
Today, temporary protection measures are in place, including re-
stricted public access, increased stand-off distances to critical struc-
tures, increased patrol activities, additional contract guard support,
increased coordination with local law enforcement, and establish-
ment of early-warning telephone procedures.
A civil works infrastructure management team has been estab-
lished at headquarters and in the field, and the Corps has begun
the task of assessing the need for more specific, effective protective
measures. The centerpiece of this effort is the risk assessment and
protection of dams methodology, called RAMD, developed by the
Interagency Forum on Infrastructure Protection from the efforts
mentioned earlier. I have with me a copy of the training material
and workbooks that teams will be using over the next several
months to complete this comprehensive civil works security assess-
ment.
By using this Risk Assessment Methodology for Dams, security
risks to dams and other Corps infrastructure can be assessed
quickly in a structured, systematic manner, even though the struc-
tures to be assessed have been built at different times to meet a
specific set of criteria and sited in unique environments.
The Corps of Engineers has already put in place a plan to con-
duct these assessments on our critical dams and other infrastruc-
ture, and to cooperate with other agencies on still more dams. We
will also cooperate on other types of structures as requested. The
lack of standardizing tools may make for a slower process, but the
assessment should be no less accurate.
We are also actively involved with the Nations leading engineer-
ing and construction industry associations, professional societies,
and standards-writing organizations to improve the security and
survivability of public and private buildings throughout the coun-
try.
Your letter of invitation asked that I testify on the structural
vulnerabilities of our Nations surface transportation to terrorist at-
tacks. I must tell you that Americas water resources, including our
waterborne transportation infrastructure, locks and dams, are at
risk to terrorism.
Risk is everywhere and impossible to eliminate entirely. How-
ever, there are many forms of risk and many ways to minimize and
manage it. The Corps of Engineers has already begun the process
of protecting the resources entrusted to it and the people who work
and visit there. We have coordinated with the U.S. Coast Guard,
the American Waterways Operators, and other members of the ma-
rine transportation industry to address the risk and challenges be-
fore us in ensuring the safe and efficient movement of hazardous
cargoes on our inland rivers and waterways, while maintaining a
high level of diligence and concern for the possibility of a terrorist
act. I am proud of the Corps and confident in its ability to achieve
and maintain the results demanded by the American people and
their representatives in this august body.
13
The President, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Secretary of the

Army White and I are committed to providing the leadership and
resources for the Army Corps of Engineers to carrying out its vital
military and civil works missions in these difficult times.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my statement and I will be
pleased to address any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Parker follows:]
STATEMENT OF MIKE PARKER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY (CIVIL WORKS),
DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, WASHINGTON, D.C.
MR. CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE:
INTRODUCTION
I am Mike Parker, for the last three weeks, the Assistant Secretary of the Army
for Civil Works. I appreciate the opportunity to speak to you today.
Thank you for the opportunity to provide information on the Army Corps of Engi-
neers activities to address the infrastructure security issues resulting from the
events of September 11, 2001. First, allow me to say how proud I am to be associ-
ated with the Corps of Engineers, its record, and the manner in which it has begun
to move out to protect the large part of Americas water infrastructure that is our
responsibility. I want to assure you that the Corps will prove itself worthy of the
trust which that responsibility conveys.
Within two hours of the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center, Corps em-
ployees were at ground zero lending assistance. Thousands of New York City resi-
dents were evacuated on Corps civil works vessels from lower Manhattan. We pro-
vided expert structural assessments, emergency power to get the stock market up
and running and providing technical assistance for the removal of what will likely
exceed 1 million tons of debris. Within hours of the attack on the Pentagon, Corps
structural engineers were on site providing expert advice. We are presently con-
ducting a comprehensive force protection analysis to make the rebuilt Pentagon
safer from terrorist intervention in the future. We continue to support local and
military leaders with every asset the Corps can muster.
In conjunction with its military construction mission, the Corps has developed in-
depth anti-terrorism/force protection (AT/FP) expertise. The Corps serves as the De-
partment of Defense (DoD) lead for Public Works under national and departmental
plans. The Corps laboratories and technology transfer centers were instrumental in
the development of the DoD AT/FP standards now used by all the military services
in the Military Construction, major repair and other programs. These standards and
the underlying technologies are being widely used by the State Department in their
embassy program.
For example, we have world-class AT/FP applications engineers at our Protective
Design and Electronic Security Centers who are supported by the best available re-
search assets within the Engineer Research and Development Centers six laboratory
network. Expertise available there (to the Corps and others) includes, among other
things: Survivability and Protective Structures, Sustainment Engineering,
Battlespace Environment, Military and Civil Infrastructure, and Environmental
Quality. We have hundreds of employees trained by these engineers, along with ex-
perience born of work on the Khobar Towers, Murrah Federal Building, World
Trade Center, the Pentagon, and other sitessome well-known and others not-so-
well-known. The Corps Centers and labs are supported by some of the leading AT/
FP engineering and construction firms through effective contracting vehicles.
We are in the process of leveraging the expertise gained in the Corps military
mission areas to protect the Corps critical water resources infrastructure from ter-
rorist activities. Fortunately, we are not starting from scratch. Over the past few
years the Corps has been working diligently with other agencies, including Bureau
of Reclamation, Department of Energy, Tennessee Valley Authority, Environmental
Protection Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation to develop a comprehen-
sive security assessment process to identify risks to critical facilities such as locks,
dams and hydropower facilities. As the security assessments are completed we will
apply the Corps (and others) AT/FP expertise to critical sites to mitigate security
risks uncovered.
Today, temporary protection measures are in place, including restricted public ac-
cess, increased standoff distances to critical structures, increased patrol activities,
additional contract guard support, increased coordination with local law enforce-
ment, and establishment of early warning telephone procedures.
14
A civil works infrastructure management team has been established at head-
quarters and in the field, and the Corps has begun the task of assessing the need
for more specific, effective protective measures. The centerpiece of this effort is the
risk assessment and protection of dams methodology called RAM-D developed by the
Interagency Forum on Infrastructure Protection from the efforts mentioned earlier.
I have with me a copy of the training material and workbooks that teams will be
using over the next several months to complete this comprehensive civil works secu-
rity assessment.
By using this Risk Assessment Methodology for Dams, security risks to dams and
other Corps infrastructure can be assessed quickly, in a structured, systematic man-
ner, even though the structures to be assessed have been built at different times
to meet specific set of criteria and sited in unique environments. The Corps of Engi-
neers has already put in place a plan to conduct these assessments on our critical
dams and other infrastructure, and to cooperate with other agencies on still more
dams. We will also cooperate on other types of structures, as requested. The lack
of standardizing tools may make for a slower process, but the assessment should
be no less accurate.
We are also actively involved with the Nations leading engineering and construc-
tion industry associations, professional societies and standards writing organizations
to improve the security and survivability of public and private buildings throughout
the country.
You letter of invitation asked that I testify on the structural vulnerabilities of our
Nations surface transportation to terrorist attacks. I must tell you that Americas
water resources, including our waterborne transportation infrastructure (locks and
dams), are at risk to terrorism. Risk is everywhere, and impossible to eliminate, en-
tirely. However, there are many forms of risk, many ways to minimize and manage
it. The Corps of Engineers has already begun the process of protecting the resources
entrusted to it, and the people who work and visit there. We have coordinated with
the U.S. Coast Guard, the American Waterways Operators, and other members of
the marine transportation industry to address the risks and challenges before us in
ensuring the safe and efficient movement of hazardous cargos on our inland rivers
and waterways, while maintaining a high level of diligence and concern for the pos-
sibility of a terrorist act. I am proud of the Corps and confident of its ability to
achieve and maintain the results demanded by the American people and their rep-
resentatives in this august body.
CONCLUSION
The President, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Secretary of the Army White and
I are committed to providing the leadership and resources for the Army Corps of
Engineers to carrying out its vital military and civil works missions in these dif-
ficult times. Mr. Chairman that concludes my statement and I would be pleased to
address any questions that you or the committee may have.
Chairman BIDEN. Thank you very much, Congressman.
Mr. Jenkins?
STATEMENT OF BRIAN M. JENKINS, SENIOR ADVISOR TO THE
PRESIDENT, RAND CORPORATION, SANTA MONICA, CALI-
FORNIA
Mr. JENKINS. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, thank
you very much for giving me the opportunity to make a few re-
marks.
Let me take a cue from your opening comments, Mr. Chairman.
We must be realistic in our acceptance of risk. We know that ter-
rorists can attack anything, anywhere, any time. We cannot protect
everything, everywhere, all the time.
Trying to imagine all the potential scenarios that exploit the infi-
nite vulnerabilities in our society is not particularly helpful in allo-
cating security resources. Terrorists are always going to find some
vulnerability to exploit. Security to a certain extent is always going
to be reactive.
This obliges us to make choices based upon the likelihood that
terrorists will attack a certain target and the consequences of that
15
attack were to succeed. Fortunately, terrorists have shown some

clear preferences, although the fact that they havent done some-
thing in the past certainly is no guarantee that they will not do it
in the future.
We know, for example, that commercial aviation has been a pre-
ferred terrorist target for decades. Security at airports has been
augmented since September 11, but in my view not enough. Avia-
tion security still requires a complete overhaul.
But for those determined to kill in quantity and willing to kill
indiscriminately, which is a trend we have seen in terrorism over
the last decade, public surface transportation is an ideal target.
Precisely because it is public and used by millions of people daily,
there is necessarily little security, with none of the obvious check-
points like those at airports. Concentrations of people in contained
environments are especially vulnerable to conventional explosives
and, as we have seen in Tokyo, to unconventional weapons as well.
The threat here is real. We are not talking about hypothetical
scenarios. We have seen terrorist attacks in the subways of Paris
and Londons Underground, Tokyos subways, Moscows Metro and
Tel Avivs buses. In the United States, we have seen the deliberate
derailment of an Amtrak passenger train. We have seen a thwarted
plot to carry out suicide bombings on New York subways.
Terrorists see public transportation as a killing field. Now, it
may not be so dramatic in the shadow of more than 5,000 deaths
on September 11, but the statistics nonetheless are impressive.
Thirty-seven percent of all terrorist attacks on surface transpor-
tation have involved fatalities. That is significant when we realize
that the average for terrorist attacks in general is about 20 per-
cent. So when they go after public transportation, twice as many
of these attacks result in fatalities.
Indeed, two-thirds of the attacks have clearly been intended to
kill, versus 37 percent for terrorist attacks overall. So they are
twice as likely to be trying to kill people. Twenty-three percent of
the attacks with fatalities involve 10 or more deaths. Attacks on
public transportation, of course, also cause great disruption and
alarm, which are the traditional goals of terrorism.
Security on surface transportation fortunately can be signifi-
cantly improved without disrupting operations or even spending
vast sums of money. Potential casualties can be reduced both
through the design of stations and vehicles and through effective
and rapid response.
Disruptions resulting from unnecessary shutdowns can be mini-
mized with technology and procedures that permit prompt assess-
ment, accurate diagnosis, and rapid, well-rehearsed responses. Cri-
sis management is a critical component of this security.
We can apply the best practices learned from those systems that
have dealt with higher levels of threat. Fortunately, in this country
thus far we have seen only a small number of incidents. But other
countriesFrance, the United Kingdom, Japanhave dealt with
terrorist campaigns on their public transportation systems and we
can learn from their lessons. This has been the focus of ongoing re-
search by the Mineta Transportation Institute, and I have provided
members of the committee with advance copies of an executive
overview of this ongoing research.
16
One final thought. Much of our countrys critical infrastructure

dams, water systems, ports, transportation systemsis protected
by private security guards, and I think we often overlook the role
played by private security in this country. We spend over $100 bil-
lion a year on private security in this country. The industry cur-
rently employs more than 2 million persons. That is close to the
strength of the United States armed forces at the height of the
Cold War.
We can, of course, on a temporary basis, augment security at
critical facilities with police and National Guard, but that is not a
permanent solution. I think we should explore ways in which we
can better ensure high-level performance among private sector
guards, not just in airports, and ways in which we can more effec-
tively utilize this second line of defense in crisis situations. This
could be achieved through the certification of those companies in-
volved in protecting designated components of the Nations critical
infrastructure and improved professional training.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Jenkins follows:]
STATEMENT OF BRIAN MICHEL JENKINS, SENIOR ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT, RAND
CORPORATION, SANTA MONICA, CALIFORNIA
Terrorists can attack anything, anywhere, any time, while we cannot protect ev-
erything, everywhere, all the time. Trying to imagine all of the potential terrorist
scenarios that exploit the infinite vulnerabilities in our society is not particularly
helpful in allocating security resources. We can easily overwhelm security planners
with plausible threats. Terrorists will always find vulnerabilities to exploit. To a cer-
tain extent, security will always be reactive.
This obliges us to make choices based upon the likelihood that terrorists will at-
tack a certain target, and the consequences of that attack were it to succeed. Our
ability to protect certain categories of targets is also a factor. Terrorists seeking to
cause heavy casualties, can always set off bombs in public places that are by their
very nature difficult to protect. We must be realistic in our acceptance of risk.
Fortunately, terrorists have shown clear preferences. However, the fact that ter-
rorists have not done something in the past is no guarantee that they might not
try it in the future. Our security goal lies somewhere between ensuring adequate
protection at facilities that have been attacked by terrorists in the past and at-
tempting to eliminate every conceivable vulnerability to future attack.
The September 11 attack humbles any analyst attempting to forecast what terror-
ists might do in the future. While a growing percentage of attacks are clearly in-
tended to kill (as opposed to purely symbolic violence, sabotage, or hostage-taking),
of more than 10,000 international terrorist incidents in the past three decades, prior
to September 11 only 14 resulted in 100 or more fatalities. The September 11 attack
was unprecedented in the annals of terrorism, (although I strongly suspect that the
terrorists had hoped for a far greater number of casualties). The attack did conform
to the view offered years ago that tomorrows terrorist might not be the high-tech
adversary envisioned by many, but rather a more bloody-minded version of previous
low-tech terrorists.
Commercial aviation has been a preferred terrorist target for decades. Security at
airports has been augmented since September 11 but not enough. In my view, avia-
tion security requires a complete overhaul.
But our focus today is surface transportation. For those determined to kill in
quantity and willing to kill indiscriminately, public surface transportation is an
ideal target. Precisely because it is public and used by millions of people daily, there
is little security, with no obvious checkpoints like those at airports. Concentrations
of people in contained environments are especially vulnerable to conventional explo-
sives and unconventional weapons.
The threat is real. We have seen terrorist bombing campaigns against the sub-
ways of Paris, Londons Underground and railways, Tokyos subway, Moscows
Metro, and Tel Avivs buses. In the United States, we have seen the deliberate de-
railment of a passenger train, chemical attack scares on metro-rail systems, and a
thwarted plot to carry out suicide bombings on New Yorks subways.
17
Terrorists see public transportation as a killing field: 37 percent of attacks on sur-
face transportation have involved fatalities compared to 20 percent for all terrorist
incidents, and two-thirds of the attacks clearly have been intended to kill (versus
37 percent for terrorist attacks overall); 23 percent of the attacks on surface trans-
portation with fatalities involve 10 or more deaths. Attacks on public transportation,
the circulatory systems of our cities, also cause great disruption and alarm, which
are the traditional goals of terrorism.
Security of surface transportation can be significantly improved without dis-
rupting operations or spending vast sums of money. Potential casualties can be re-
duced both through the design of stations and vehicles and through effective and
rapid response.
Disruptions resulting from unnecessary shutdowns can be minimized with tech-
nologies and procedures that permit prompt assessment, accurate diagnosis, and
rapid, well-rehearsed responses. Crisis management is a critical component of secu-
rity.
We can apply the best practices learned from those systems that have dealt with
higher levels of threat. This has been the focus of on-going research by the Mineta
Transportation Institute. (I have provided committee members with advanced copies
of the executive overview of this project, which catalogues many of the security
measures.)
Terrorists have carried out fewer attacks in the maritime environment, although
they have sabotaged ships and port facilities, especially oil and gas facilities, and
the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole, indicates that this area of operations is not outside
the terrorists field of vision.
Other components of the critical physical infrastructure including power genera-
tion and distribution, oil and natural gas facilities, and water systems must also be
considered as potential targets. The transport of hazardous materials is another
area of concern. Power grids and pipelines have been the targets of sabotage in
guerrilla wars. In the realm of terrorism, however, fewer than two percent of all ter-
rorist attacks can be categorized as traditional sabotage as opposed to purely sym-
bolic attacks and attacks intended to kill, which together account for 82 percent.
One final thought: Much of the countrys critical infrastructure is protected by pri-
vate security guards. This industry currently employs more than 2 million persons,
close to the strength of the United States armed forces at the height of the Cold
War. We can, on a temporary basis, augment security at critical facilities with police
and the National Guard. It is not, however, a permanent solution. We should ex-
plore ways in which we can better ensure high level performance among private sec-
tor guards, and in crisis situations effectively utilize this second line of defense. This
could be achieved through the certification of those companies involved in protecting
designated components of the nations critical infrastructure and improved profes-
sional training.
Professor Brown?
STATEMENT OF DONALD E. BROWN, PROFESSOR AND CHAIR,

DEPARTMENT OF SYSTEMS ENGINEERING, UNIVERSITY OF
VIRGINIA, CHARLOTTESVILLE, VIRGINIA
Mr. BROWN. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Biden, Senator
Grassley and Senator Schumer. Thank you very much for offering
me the opportunity to discuss the issues surrounding surface trans-
portation security.
As each of you have already noted, surface transportation is crit-
ical to our Nations economy, defense, and quality of life. Few
Americans spend even one day without enjoying the benefits of our
open and easily accessed surface transportation system. However,
there can be little question that currently the surface transpor-
tation infrastructure is threatened by the potential of terrorist at-
tack, but we can take steps to address these threats.
That our surface transportation infrastructure is threatened can
be seen by a simple three-step analysis: what are the threats, what
are the vulnerabilities, and what are the impacts?
18
First, what are the threats? The events of September 11 clearly

showed that global terrorist groups provide significant threats to
facilities in the United States. Their willingness to use civilians, in-
cluding even 4-year-old children and their mothers, as human
bombs provides chilling evidence of both their lack of morality and
the seriousness of their intention as they pursue their objectives.
However, we should not lose sight of the fact that many of the ter-
rorist groups, including those spawned within this country, have
also targeted the U.S. infrastructure.
Second, what are the vulnerabilities? While I will not discuss
specific vulnerabilities in this forum, we need only look at the
record of accidents, natural disasters and past terrorist incidents
both here and abroad to recognize that vulnerabilities exist within
the surface transportation infrastructure. Further, if you talk with
the people traveling and working in this infrastructure, you gain
a sense of the perceived vulnerabilities. We need to recognize and
address these vulnerabilities to ensure the continued growth and
the use of surface transportation.
Finally, what are the potential impacts of attacks on the surface
transportation infrastructure? Again, specifics are best discussed in
a closed forum, but an objective assessment shows that the inher-
ent decentralized, redundant and distributed nature of much of the
surface transportation infrastructure makes it robust to many
forms of attack. Nonetheless, without going into details at this
time, attacks on this infrastructure can cause both significant loss
of life and severe economic consequences.
Given threats, vulnerabilities and impacts, what steps can we
take to improve security on surface transportation? The answer to
this question lies in our past record of success in the face of other
threats.
We have made great progress in reducing the threats from dis-
ease, environmental hazards, natural disasters and accidents.
Clearly, there is more work that needs to be done in each of these
areas, but it is difficult to argue that we are not measurably better
off today than we were 50 years ago. These successes derive from
government actions that provide safer environments in each area.
Additionally, many of these successes derive from one of Amer-
icas greatest strengths: its research and development community.
Forged in World II and institutionalized in the post-war years, this
alliance of industry, government and universities provides the ca-
pability for addressing national needs that are second to none. As
we face this newest threat to our transportation infrastructure, this
community can be mobilized to help address the needs for greater
security in the face of multiple threats.
Thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Brown follows:]
DONALD E. BROWN, PROFESSOR AND CHAIR, DEPARTMENT OF SYSTEMS ENGINEERING,
UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA, CHARLOTTESVILLE, VIRGINIA
Good morning Chairman Biden and Senator Grassley and thank you for offering
me the opportunity to discuss the issues surrounding surface transportation secu-
rity. Surface transportation is critical to our Nations economy, defense, and quality
of life. Few Americans spend even one day without enjoying the benefits of our open
and easily accessed surface transportation systems. However, there can be little
question that currently the surface transportation infrastructure is threatened by
the potential of terrorist attacks, but we can take steps to address the threats.
19
That our surface transportation infrastructure is threatened can be seen by a sim-
ple three-step analysis: what are the threats, what are the vulnerabilities, and what
are the impacts? First, what are the threats? Events of September 11 clearly showed
that global terrorist groups provide significant threats to facilities in the U.S. Their
willingness to use civilians, including four year old children and their mothers, as
human bombs provides chilling evidence of both their lack of morality and the seri-
ousness of their intention as their pursue their objectives. However, we should not
lose sight of the fact that many other terrorist groups, including those spawned
within this country have also targeted the U.S. infrastructure.
Second, what are the vulnerabilities? While I will not discuss specific
vulnerabilities in this forum, we need only look at the record of accidents, natural
disasters, and past terrorist incidents, both here and abroad, to recognize that
vulnerabilities exist within the surface transportation infrastructure. Further, if you
talk with people traveling and working in this infrastructure you gain a sense of
the perceived vulnerabilities. We need to recognize and address these vulnerabilities
to ensure the continued growth and use of surface transportation.
Finally, what are the potential impacts of attacks on surface transportation?
Again the specifics are best discussed in closed forum. On the positive side, an objec-
tive assessment shows that the inherent decentralized, redundant, and distributed
nature of much of the surface transportation infrastructure makes it robust to many
forms of attack. Nonetheless, without going into details at this time, attacks on this
infrastructure can cause both significant loss of life and severe economic con-
sequences.
Given these threats, vulnerabilities, and impacts what steps can we take to im-
prove security in surface transportation? The answer to this question lies in our
past record of success in the face of other threats. We have made great progress in
reducing the threats from disease, environmental hazards, natural disasters, and ac-
cidents. Clearly there is more work needed in each of these areas, but it is difficult
to argue that we not measurably better off today than we were 50 years ago. These
successes derive from government actions that provide safer environments in each
area. Additionally, many of these successes derive from one of Americas greatest
strengths: its research and development community. Forged in World War II and
institutionalized in the post war years this alliance of industry, universities, and
government provides the capabilities for addressing national needs that are second
to none. As we face this newest threat to our transportation infrastructure, this
community. Forged in World War II and institutionalized in the post war years this
alliance of industry, universities, and government provides the capabilities for ad-
dressing national needs that are second to none. As we face this newest threat to
our transportation infrastructure, this community can be mobilized to help address
the needs for greater security in the face of multiple threats.
Chairman BIDEN. Thank you.
Mr. Beatty?
STATEMENT OF JEFFREY K. BEATTY, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF

EXECUTIVE OFFICER, TOTAL SECURITY SERVICES INTER-
NATIONAL, MARIETTA, GEORGIA
Mr. BEATTY. Mr. Chairman, Senators and distinguished guests of
the Senate, my name is Jeff Beatty, President of Total Security
Services International, a company that specializes in advising
transportation systems on preventing terrorism. Thank you for the
opportunity to be with you today and to share some observations
and suggestions that might help improve our Nations security in
the transportation sector, specifically in surface and rail transpor-
tation. In this open session, I intend to make some very brief gen-
eral comments, and I will save the details of specific vulnerabilities
and remedies for the closed session.
It is the threat that dictates the level of security necessary for
the transportation sector. We must build our security based on the
threats capability, not on some interpretation of intention. Inten-
tions can change overnight and we cant change our defenses that
fast.
20
The current threat consists of 1 to 50 persons who either directly

or indirectly can launch a pre-planned attack or attacks that are
capable of causing mass casualties, destruction of property and se-
vere economic impact, using everything from mechanical weapons
to firearms to weapons of mass destruction.
The terrorists have, in fact, at their disposal over 50 different
types of weapons and special techniques. These attacks may be
pressed home by persons planning to die in the attack. The attacks
may have multiple stages, use multiple weapons, and may take
place at multiple locations.
Based on that threat, I believe that there is an immediate need
to conduct an incremental threat exposure and response analysis
for all places where people transit and travel nationwide. This is
being undertaken and done by some organizations now, but this
analysis is not an end in itself. It must be functional and fast.
This analysis would look beyond the threat of the day, to cover
over 50 different types of weapons and special techniques. The Fed-
eral Government can provide the guidance and some of the tools
to do this task to the tens of thousands of State and local law en-
forcement professionals who have a contribution to make in the
transportation sector. When the locals do the work, you will be im-
proving their capabilities in the war against terrorism. They are a
hugely untapped resource in this war and we need to get them
more involved.
In the meanwhile, I urge you to continue to deploy more security
than may seem necessary in the transportation sector, especially on
tunnels, and then adjust as results of the threat exposure and re-
sponse analysis becomes available.
In the closed session, I will discuss a form of security that is not
purely defensive and reactive, but rather is an active defense.
There are training and equipment requirements that are near-term
and need to be prioritized as a result of September 11. Much good
work was underway already. It will need your support and will
need to become accelerated. There are other technologies that
frankly have not yet been considered in this sector and they can
save a significant number of lives in the event of an incident. I
hope you will support their early adoption, also.
Public trust is key to the public continuing to use the transpor-
tation system. To this end, we must keep the public informed.
Right now, threat information is shared with the transit companies
and airlines, but not with passengers. The position that govern-
ment knows best really does not apply. We learned that on Sep-
tember 11.
We must consider requiring transportation providers to post on
a Web page or at some other location the same threat information
the Government gives those providers, providers such as the MTA
in New York, WMATA in D.C., the CTA in Chicago, the MBTA in
Boston, and Delta Airlines in Atlanta. Let the citizens use the
transportation system under the concept of informed consent.
There may be some initial reduction in travel, but soon travelers
will realize for themselves the credibility of the threat information
posted in this manner and put it into proper perspective. They will
make informed choices about traveling and the Government will
21
have demonstrated its openness and fulfilled its responsibility to

the citizens.
In conclusion, I must tell you that I am impressed and encour-
aged by the work our Government is now doing against terrorism.
Now is the time to be bold and decisive. There is no doubt in my
mind that we will prevail in this struggle, but what does prevail
mean?
This war on terrorism is not like World War II or Desert Storm
where victory means peace. It is more like the war on crime. You
can make great progress in the war on crime, but after your
progress some lower level of crime will still exist. So it is with the
war on terrorism. We will make great progress, but we must put
in place the tools to ensure that terror in the future, even in its
most virulent form, is only an occasional occurrence, with min-
imum casualties and minimum disruption to our way of life.
The work of this committee on protecting our transportation sec-
tor will go a long way to achieve that success for the American peo-
ple. I wish you good luck in your mission, and thank you for the
opportunity to address you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Beatty follows:]
STATEMENT OF JEFFREY K. BEATTY, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
TOTAL SECURITY SERVICES INTERNATIONAL, MARIETTA, GEORGIA
Mr. Chairman, Senators, and distinguished guests of the Senate. My name is Jeff
Beatty and I am President of Total Security Services International, a company that
specializes in advising transportation systems on preventing terrorism. Thank you
for the opportunity to be with you today to share some observations and suggestions
that might help improve our nations security in the transportation sector and spe-
cifically in surface and rail transportation. In this open session, I intend to make
some general comments, and I will save the details of specific vulnerabilities and
remedies I have identified for the closed session.
The threat dictates the level of security necessary for the transportation sector.
We must build our security based on the threats capability, not on some interpreta-
tion of intention. Intentions can change overnight, we cant change our defenses that
fast.
My company, TSSI, utilizes specialized analysis to evaluate terrorist threats to
public events and transportation systems. Using that analysis, TSSI was able to
predict a major attack on the United States by the end of 2001 in which the ter-
rorist goal was to create at least 5,000 casualties. We also predicted the breach of
security at the Atlanta Olympics. TSSI predicted that Atlanta would suffer a suc-
cessful package bomb attack after the 5 day and estimated that there would be
120 casualties. In actuality, there were 112 casualties. TSSIs assessment of the cur-
rent threat is detailed but can be summarized as follows:
The current threat consists of 1-50 persons who either directly or indirectly can
launch a preplanned attack or attacks that are capable of causing mass casualties,
great destruction of property and severe economic impact using everything from me-
chanical weapons to firearms to weapons of mass destruction. The terrorists have
at their disposal over 50 different types of weapons and special techniques. These
attacks may be pressed home by persons planning to die in the attack. They attacks
may have multiple stages, use multiple weapons and may take place at multiple lo-
cations.
Based on that threat, I believe there is an immediate need to conduct Incremental
Threat, Exposure and Response Analysis for all places where people transit and
travel nationwide. This is being done by some organizations now. This analysis
would look beyond the Threat of the Day to over 50 different types of weapons
and special techniques. The Federal Government can provide the guidance and some
of the tools to do this task, to the tens of thousands of the State and Local Law
Enforcement professionals who have a contribution to make in the transportation
sector. When the locals do this work, you will be improving their capabilities in the
war against terrorism. They are a hugely untapped resource in this war; we need
to get them more involved. In the meanwhile, I urge you to continue to deploy more
22
security than seems needed in the transportation sector, especially on tunnels, and
adjust as results of the Threat Exposure and Response analysis become available.
There are training and equipment requirements that are near term and need to
be prioritized, as a result of September 11. Much good work was underway already.
It will need your support and become accelerated. There are other technologies that
frankly have not yet been considered in this sector that can save significant num-
bers of lives in the event of an incident. I hope you will support their early adoption.
Public trust is key to the public continuing to use the transportation system. To
this end we must keep the public informed. Right now, threat information is shared
with the transit companies and airlines, and not with passengers. The position that
government knows best does not apply. We learned that on September 11. We
must consider requiring transportation providers to post on a web page the same
threat information the government gives those providers such as the MTA in NY,
WMATA in D.C., the CTA in Chicago, the MBTA in Boston and Delta Airlines in
Atlanta. Let the citizens use the transportation system under the concept of in-
formed consent. There may be some initial reduction in travel, but soon travelers
will realize for themselves the credibility of threat information posted in this man-
ner. They will make informed choices about traveling and the government will have
demonstrated its openness and fulfilled its responsibility to the citizens.
In conclusion, I must tell you I am impressed and encouraged by the work our
government is now doing against terrorism. There is no doubt in my mind that we
will prevail in this struggle. But what does prevail mean? This war on terrorism
is not like World War II or Desert Storm, where victory meant peace. It is more
like the war on crime. You can make great progress in the war on crime, but after
your progress, some lower level of crime will still exist. So it is with the war on
terrorism. We will make great progress. But we must put in place the tools to en-
sure that terror in the future, even in its most virulent form, is only an occasional
occurrence, with minimum casualties and minimum disruption to our way of life.
The work of this Committee on protecting our transportation sector will go a long
way to achieve that success for the American people. I wish you good luck in your
mission and thank you for the opportunity to address you.
I will save the details of specific transportation vulnerabilities and suggested rem-
edies for the closed session. Thank you.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Beatty.
Mr. Chrestman?
STATEMENT OF TONY CHRESTMAN, PRESIDENT, RUAN
TRANSPORT, DES MOINES, IOWA
Mr. CHRESTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator Grassley,
members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to
present Ruans perspective on transportation infrastructure secu-
rity.
As a highly diversified transportation company, Ruan is in a
unique position to address the many security issues currently fac-
ing the trucking industry. We are a Des Moines, Iowa-based com-
pany with operations throughout the infrastructure. Ruan provides
for-hire trucking services for a full range of commodities, including
hazardous materials. Our operations also include dedicated truck
fleets, logistic services, truck leasing, contract maintenance serv-
ices, and truck and trailer rentals.
I want to add that Ruan worked closely with the American
Trucking Association in preparation for this hearing to make cer-
tain that we are able to present the subcommittee with the broad-
est possible picture of the many challenges the trucking industry
has had to deal with in the wake of the tragedies that occurred on
September 11.
Mr. Chairman, the trucking industry has been working to com-
bat cargo theft and address other security concerns for many dec-
ades. As a result of the work that we have done in cooperation with
various Federal, State and local government agencies, the industry
23
has made great strides toward ensuring that the cargo and the
equipment we are responsible for does not fall into the wrong
hands.
However, recent events have caused many carriers, including
Ruan, to reevaluate the adequacy of our safety measures. We have
certainly made positive changes over the past few weeks, and be-
lieve we are using all of the tools at our disposal. However, there
are several measures that Congress can adopt which would help
Ruan and other trucking companies to both curtail security threats
within the trucking industry and help mitigate the impacts of a
transportation system disruption resulting from a terrorist act.
Specifically, Congress should take steps to mitigate the impacts
of a terrorist attack on the highway system: one, facilitate trucking
companies ability to run criminal background checks on employees;
two, give the enforcement community more and better tools to com-
bat cargo theft; three, direct additional resources toward land bor-
der infrastructure to facilitate more efficient trade flows; and, last,
improve oversight of the commercial drivers license program.
I will go into more detail now. As we have witnessed, a disrup-
tion to one part of the transportation system can have ripple effects
that impact the entire system from coast to coast. We also discov-
ered that a severe disruption to the transportation system will gen-
erate negative impacts throughout the economy.
The best way to deal with these disruptions is to build some re-
dundancy into the transportation system. This means ensuring
that if one bridge or one tunnel goes down, there is enough redun-
dancy in the highway network to ensure the continued flow of com-
merce. This also means prioritizing Federal investments to make
certain that the highways that are not critical to our military and
our economy are adequately funded.
Of course, it is better to avoid these problems in the first place.
Motor carriers have various tools at our disposal to ensure that
trucks and their cargo do not fall into the wrong hands and are not
used in a terrorist act. We are ready and willing to do more, but
we need Congress help to get there.
Ruan supports recent proposals by the American Trucking Asso-
ciation to authorize motor carrier access to national crime informa-
tion databases, thus allowing motor carriers to conduct nationwide
criminal background checks on current or prospective employees.
Congress has authorized such access to other industries with em-
ployees who have a demonstrated impact on public security or are
in a position of public trustbanking, credit unions, child care pro-
viders, nuclear facility operators, home health care agencies, and
airport operators.
While the trucking industry has dealt with cargo theft for many
decades, hijacked trucks and trailers are no longer simple economic
losses. They now present a national security threat. Even before
September 11, ATA proposed cargo theft legislation that would in-
crease the penalties and fines for cargo theft, and require uniform
reporting on cargo theft and provide increased funding to local,
State and Federal multi-jurisdictional task forces that have proven
effective in combatting cargo theft.
Mr. Chairman, it will come as no surprise that the most vulner-
able part of the highway system during times of a national security
24
crisis is at our border crossings with Canada and Mexico. After the
terrorist attacks, the Nations land borders were put on a Level I
alert, resulting in extreme border crossing delays and hampering
the delivery of parts and equipment.
The Level I alert at our borders continues today. As globalization
of manufacturing continues to expand, the need for consistently ef-
ficient border operations will grow. While we recognize and support
strong security measures, we also believe that greater investments
in technology and physical and human infrastructure at the bor-
ders will help to alleviate future problems.
As you know, Mr. Chairman, there has been great concern over
the fact that suspected terrorists were able to obtain commercial
drivers licenses with HAZMAT endorsements. This should be a
wake-up call to all of us. While we believe the CDL program is very
effective, it clearly has shown deficiencies particularly with regard
to CDL testers and examiners. More Federal personnel should be
dedicated to program evaluation and oversight, and Congress
should consider directing additional resources to States to improve
their own oversight processes.
Finally, we urge Congress to reject any legislation that would
curtail the use of Social Security numbers as personal identifiers
on national drivers licenses. While there are legitimate concerns
with Social Security numbers related to identity theft, the inability
of carriers and States to track drivers due to the loss of Social Se-
curity numbers as a personal identifier would compromise both se-
curity and highway safety.
This concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. I have provided
much more detail on these recommendations in my written state-
ment. I thank you once more for the opportunity and I am pleased
to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Chrestman follows:]
STATEMENT OF TONY CHRESTMAN, PRESIDENT, RUAN TRANSPORT, DES MOINES, IOWA
I. INTRODUCTION
Good morning Mr. Chairman and members of this Subcommittee. My name is
Tony Chrestman, and I am the President of Ruan Transport, the trucking arm of
Ruan Transportation Management Systems (hereafter referred to as Ruan) based in
Des Moines, Iowa. I sincerely appreciate the opportunity to provide testimony today
to this Subcommittee, which I have prepared in conjunction with the trucking indus-
trys leading trade group, the American Trucking Associations, Inc. (ATA).
Ruan is a full service ground transportation company that operates more than 200
service centers throughout the United States. The range of trucking-related services
Ruan provides include: common for-hire trucking of all types of commodities includ-
ing bulk transportation of hazardous materials (hazmat); dedicated truck fleets for
specific customers; logistics services including complete supply-chain management;
full-service truck equipment leasing; contract truck maintenance services; and truck
and trailer rentals.
Mr. Chairman, in the wake of the September 11 attacks, Ruan and the entire U.S.
trucking industry have worked diligently to support President Bushs goals of keep-
ing our country and our economy moving forward. I am very proud of the effort of
Ruans employees throughout the country, and the entire trucking industrys efforts,
to keep America moving. In doing so, we at Ruan, along with most companies in
the industry, have tightened operating security measures. Below, I will provide
some examples of these increased measures.
Trucking is a critical component of the United States economic strength, with 9
billion tons of freight transported by inter-city and local trucks, representing 68%
of the total domestic tonnage shipped. The trucking industry generates revenues of
$606 billion annually, equaling almost 5% of our Gross Domestic Product, and a fig-
25
ure that represents nearly 87% of all revenues generated by our nations freight
transportation industry. Our nations transportation infrastructure, in particular the
highway system, provides the opportunity for the trucking industry to play such a
large and important role in the U.S. economy. Preservation of and improvement to
the existing infrastructure will help to ensure a strong and vibrant economy both
now and in the future.
As in all businesses and all sectors of our countrys economy, the horrific attacks
have heightened security concerns in the trucking industry, and even more so after
it was recently reported by the FBI that some suspected terrorists had obtained
commercial drivers licenses (CDLs) to operate large trucks. It appears that motor
carriers involved in transporting hazardous materials (hazmat) may have been, or
may be, targeted for hijackings or theft for use in potential acts of terrorism. In fact,
just late last week the FBI issued a warning that it is very possible that a new ter-
rorist attack on U.S. soil very likely could involve truck bombs. Obviously, this is
a major concern to Ruan and the entire trucking industry. I commend you for hold-
ing this hearing today to identify ways to address these very real threats which may
be aimed at our transportation infrastructure.
In this testimony, I will communicate the trucking industrys longstanding in-
volvement in transportation security issues, and provide examples of increased secu-
rity measures the industry has taken since September 11. I will also provide some
background information on the transportation of hazmat, since much of the truck-
ing-related concern stems from the fact that suspected terrorists recently obtained
commercial drivers licenses (CDLs) to transport hazmat by truck. I will also rec-
ommend several potential legislative actions that that would improve our infrastruc-
ture, and that would assist Ruan, and hundreds of thousands of other trucking com-
panies, enhance driver, vehicle and cargo security in the industry.
II. THE TRUCKING INDUSTRYS INVOLVEMENT IN TRANSPORTATION SECURITY AND
RELATED ISSUES
SECURITY
Ruan and its fellow ATA members have long been actively involved in providing
safe and secure transportation of goods on behalf of customers and their consumers.
Since 1982, ATA has maintained a Council of members, like Ruan, dedicated to ad-
vancing security and loss prevention issues. The name of this organization has un-
dergone numerous changes since its inception, and today is known as the Safety &
Loss Prevention Management Council (Safety Council). The Safety Council has nu-
merous committees, but two in particular focus on security issuesthe Security
Committee and the Claims and Loss Prevention Committee. These Committees have
addressed many trucking security issues, including driver and vehicle security,
cargo security, and facility security. The Committees consist of security directors,
many of whom are former law enforcement personnel, from a broad array of Amer-
icas leading motor carriers. The Committees publish guidelines and educational ma-
terials to assist motor carriers enhance the security of their operations.
INCREASED SECURITY MEASURES SINCE SEPTEMBER 11
Ruan and other trucking companies throughout the trucking industry took a num-
ber of measures to increase the security of operations immediately following the at-
tacks. Some carriers have re-evaluated their overall security procedures for pick-up
and delivery, for their service locations, terminals and loading-dock facilities, for dis-
patch operations to vehicles in cities and on the road. In addition to requesting per-
sonnel to be extremely alert and to report any suspicious activity to law enforcement
personnel, other examples of actions taken include:
Initiating new background checks through systems available to motor
carriers;
Designating specific drivers for specific types of loads (particularly
hazmat loads) and studying the specific routes to be used;
Instructing drivers not to stop or render assistance except in the case of
a clear emergency, and alerting drivers of possible ploys to obtain vehicles
for hijacking purposes;
Emphasizing to all trucking company employees, not only drivers, to stay
alert and remain aware of their surroundings at all times, especially when
transporting hazmat;
Advising drivers transporting hazmat to, whenever possible, avoid highly
populated areas, and use alternate routes if feasible to avoid such areas.
Verifying seal integrity at each and every stop. Notifying central dispatch
immediately if the seal is compromised.
26
Advising drivers to notify supervisors/managers of any suspicious ship-
ments, and if deemed necessary, to contact local police or law enforcement
authorities to request inspection of shipment under safe practices.
These are just a few of the measures that Ruan and many other trucking compa-
nies around the country took to enhance their operational security. Now, I will turn
to some additional information concerning the transportation of hazmat, since much
of the security concern involving the trucking industry stems for suspected terrorists
obtaining licenses to operate hazmat trucks.
III. HAZARDOUS MATERIALS TRANSPORTATION
Transportation of hazmat is highly regulated by the U.S. Department of Transpor-
tation (DOT). In addition to the requirements in the Hazardous Materials Regula-
tions (HMRs), the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSRs) contain cer-
tain rules for transportation of hazardous materials. For instance, drivers of trucks
requiring hazmat warning placards need a CDL with a hazmat endorsement. If, the
hazmat is transported in a tank truck, then the driver also needs a tank endorse-
ment on the CDL to show proficiency in its operation. To obtain these endorsements,
drivers must pass additional exams administered by the state licensing agency. The
HMRs also require hazmat employees, including drivers, to receive periodic train-
ing in hazmat awareness and safety and in any specific function that the employee
performs. Also, the FMCSRs specifically deal with driving and parking of trucks
that contain certain hazmat, and highway routing requirements for both Highway
Route Controlled Quantities (HRCQ of Radioactive Materials (RAM) and non-HRCQ
RAM.
Hazardous materials are an integral part of American life and are used in the
manufacture of everything from automobiles to soap. They include ordinary house-
hold items such as bleach and fingernail polish remover, swimming pool chemicals,
and lawn and garden fertilizers and insecticides. Welding supplies, paint and var-
nishes, and gasoline are commonplace. Radiopharmaceuticals are included, as are
very highly regulated chemicals such as chlorine gas for water purification, sulfur
trioxide for the making of soap products, and, of course, radioactive spent nuclear
fuels.
Hazmat is transported in many forms of conveyance ranging from ocean-going su-
pertankers to handyman vans. By highway, hazmat is transported in tank trucks,
on flatbeds, and inside van-type trailers. These materials are packaged in drums,
boxes, bags, portable tanks, cargo tanks, and in a variety of other ways. These pack-
ages are clearly marked and labeled, and the transport vehicles display product
markings and hazard class placards in order to warn emergency responders of their
contents. Drivers carry shipping papers and emergency response information that
clearly identifies the hazmat on board their vehicle and provides emergency re-
sponders with immediate response information.
Annually in the U.S., there are at least 300 million hazmat shipments totaling
approximately 3.2 billion tons.1 The U.S. Department of Transportations Office of
Hazardous Materials Safety estimates the number of hazmat shipments in the U.S.
at more than 800,000 per day94% of these shipments are carried by truck. Ap-
proximately 500,000 daily shipments involve chemical and allied products; about
300,000 involve petroleum products; and at least 10,000 other shipments involve
waste hazmat, medical wastes and various other hazardous materials. Shipments
are defined as equivalent to deliveries, and in most instances may be distinguished
from the number of movements, trip segments, or other measures. The estimated
number of movements associated with these shipments exceeds 1.2 million per day.
As previously mentioned, all hazmat is highly regulated; however, certain mate-
rials demand an even higher level of oversight. For instance, high-level nuclear
wastes from power plants are closely monitored by several federal agencies, includ-
ing the Department of Energy (DOE) and DOT. Transportation of radioactive mate-
rials is highly regulated, and trucking companies involved in its movement are pre-
screened and approved by DOE. And, each truck is inspected prior to transporting
a specific shipment of nuclear waste. In fact, the trucking industry played an inte-
gral role in the development of the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliances Level VI
enhanced radioactive transporter inspection criteria, which specifically is designed
to afford a high level of driver, vehicle, and load scrutiny prior to the truck leaving
the shippers facility.
Type and condition of the transportation infrastructure affect hazmat risks. For
example, two-lane rural roads typically have much higher accident rates than di-
1 Department Wide Program Evaluation of the Hazardous Materials Transportation Programs,

Executive Summary, U. S. Department of Transportation, March 2000, p. v.
27
vided, multi-lane interstate highways. And similarly, interstate highway segments
with narrow shoulders and damaged pavement are generally more risky than inter-
state segments without these problems. One way of dealing with infrastructure con-
cerns is through highway routing of hazmat. Motor carrier and state requirements
for the transportation of HRCQ RAM are very detailed in the FMCSRs, while the
DOT gives more flexibility to the states on their non-HRCQ routing provisions.
Another step that a number of states have taken to ensure the safety of their citi-
zens, is to implement hazmat and/or hazardous waste transportation permit and
registration programs. These programs primarily are designed to monitor the move-
ment of hazmat into, out of, and through their jurisdictions. They also are designed
to fund hazmat incident emergency response training and to allow states to closely
scrutinize trucking companies involved in the transportation of hazmat through au-
dits of the applicants. In addition, approximately 37,000 trucking companies are
registered in the DOTs Hazardous Materials Registration Program that provides
funds for grants distributed to states and Indian tribes through the Hazardous Ma-
terials Emergency Preparedness Grants Program.
Hopefully, with this as background, it is plain to see that the transportation of
hazmat is highly regulated, as it should be. These controls have resulted in a very
safe and secure system. Additionally, the Subcommittee may be interested to know
that, according to DOT, the 800,000 daily shipments in transportation are generally
safer and more secure today than the 500,000 daily shipments were when they
moved in transportation during the 1980s.2 However, these shipments can be made
even safer and more secure in the future by expanding and improving our highway
infrastructure, and through the adoption of the additional proposals outlined below.
IV. LEGISLATIVE REMEDIES TO INCREASE SECURITY IN TRUCKING
Mr. Chairman, this hearing is both timely and necessary. We need to re-examine
the security of our nations infrastructure, and we should take the reasonably avail-
able steps to ensure the infrastructure will be there to allow companies like mine
to deliver goods to Americas consumers and manufacturers in a timely, efficient
manner. I would now like to suggest some specific legislative actions that would
help ensure Americas motor carriers ability to continue to supply Americas eco-
nomic engine.
INFRASTRUCTURE IMPROVEMENTS
While much attention has appropriately been directed toward aviation security,
if additional terrorist attacks occur in the U.S., the surface transportation system
is a more likely target, based on past history. Fifty-eight percent of terrorist attacks
worldwide are directed at transportation systems. Of these attacks, the surface
transportation system is targeted 92 percent of the time. Undoubtedly, it is an enor-
mous challenge to safeguard 3.8 million miles of highway, nearly 600,000 highway
bridges, and some 400 highway tunnels throughout the U.S. However, steps can be
taken to protect the most vulnerable of these assets, such as tunnels and major
bridges. Ruan and the trucking industry support reasonable measures to protect
these assets. It must be recognized, however, that any disruptions to truck travel,
whether as a result of a terrorist attack or restrictions placed on truck travel to pre-
vent such attacks, have economic consequences that will ultimately spread through-
out the national economy. Furthermore, because of the militarys heavy reliance on
truck transportation, any interruption to our industry also affects the militarys
ability to move troops and equipment. As the interdependence of the transportation
system grows, and as more manufacturers adopt time-definite delivery strategies,
the potential impacts of surface transportation system disruptions will increase.
We believe that long-term measures should be taken to mitigate these potential
impacts. As we have learned from natural disasters, the key to minimizing transpor-
tation disruptions is system redundancy. In the wake of a major earthquake that
shut down several major highways, San Francisco residents were able to adjust
their travel patterns relatively quickly due to the availability of other modes of
transportation and an extensive highway system. On the other side of the coin, the
closure of Route 93 over the Hoover Dam to trucks in the wake of the September
11 attacks has forced truckers in the Las Vegas area to take long detours. The clos-
est crossing point to the Hoover Dam is nearly 70 miles away. This is an example
of a lack of redundancy in the highway system, which is repeated throughout the
nation. Fortunately, an alternative crossing near the Hoover Dam is being planned,
but completion is not expected for several more years. Where alternate routes to
2 Hazardous Materials Shipments, Office of Hazardous Materials Safety, Research and Special
Programs Administration, October 1998, p. 10
28
vulnerable bridges and tunnels are being considered, or are under construction, the
trucking industry recommends that these projects be accelerated through additional
funding and the expedited approval of environmental reviews.
In addition, Congress should reassess the continuing trend toward a federal trans-
portation program that fails to prioritize spending on the National Highway System
(NHS). The NHS, which includes the Interstate Highway System and other prin-
cipal highways, carries 75 percent of the nations truck traffic. It serves 53 land bor-
ders and 242 military installations. Despite the obvious commercial and military im-
portance of the NHS, one-third of the system is in poor or mediocre condition, and
one-quarter of NHS bridges are deficient. Furthermore, the lack of system capacity
expansion over the past three decades has led to severe congestion on a large part
of this system. The NHS is the backbone of the commercial and military transpor-
tation infrastructure, and its many deficiencies will compound any system interrup-
tions that occur as the result of a terrorist attack. The trucking industry rec-
ommends that Congress should direct additional funds to the NHS and other high-
ways of national significance.
CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECKS
While trucking companies do not possess any authority over our nations high-
ways, there are certain actions motor carriers can take to play a role in safe-
guarding the roads, bridges and tunnels essential to our doing our job. One measure
to help prevent evildoers from using trucks to purposely harm transportation infra-
structure is to conduct criminal background checks. We at Ruan currently review
each drivers employment history, and we attempt to conduct criminal background
checks on drivers. However, our ability to conduct the criminal background checks
is limited to a slow, costly and cumbersome county-by-county search. All in the in-
dustry agree that a nationwide check under the present scheme is simply not fea-
sible. While Ruan and its fellow ATA members did not envision the evil wrought
on September 11 when the ATA Board of Directors in 1999 directed the ATA staff
to pursue cargo theft deterrence legislation that would enable motor carriers to ob-
tain criminal background information on all current and prospective employees,
such legislation would be an effective step in addressing the threats we now know
awaitboth to our people and our transportation infrastructure.
The possibility of a truck being used as a weapon of mass destruction, while un-
thinkable before, is now a reality. Numerous other industries with employees who
have a demonstrated impact on public security or are in a position of public trust
have been authorized by statute to access national crime information databases to
search criminal history records corresponding to fingerprints or other identification
information. The list includes federally chartered banks and credit unions through
the American Bankers Association, child care providers, nuclear facility operators,
nursing facilities, home health care agencies, and airports. Motor carriers are a glar-
ing omission.
A scenario in which a truck driver or motor carrier warehouseman could wreak
a similar level of destruction to a major freight corridor as the September 11 per-
petrators wrought through air transport means is no longer hard to imagine. Yet,
although ATA has sought authorization from Congress to allow motor carriers to
conduct criminal background checks of employees and potential employees, the
trucking industry remains without this basic tool. Ruan fully supports ATAs efforts
on behalf of the trucking industry, and I know that ATA stands willing to work with
this Congress to enact legislation that would enable motor carriers to access na-
tional crime information databases to conduct nationwide criminal background
checks. I truly hope that this Subcommittee and the full Committee will enact such
legislation and thus allow motor carriers to assist with the security of our nation.
Moreover, the recent events have highlighted the need to enhance communica-
tions between the various federal databases. Ruan supports federal efforts to en-
hance interoperability and communications between various federal criminal history
and immigration databases, which would assist in screening out potential threats.
There is some consideration being given in the Congress to have state licensing
agencies check criminal history and other relevant databases prior to issuing CDLs
to truck drivers. Ruan and its fellow members of ATA would support such require-
ments provided motor carriers still had the opportunity to conduct criminal back-
ground checks at the time of employment.
CARGO THEFT
I would like to now discuss another issue that falls within the full Committees
jurisdictioncargo theft. Hijacked trucks and trailers are no longer simply economic
losses; now, they may be direct threats to our security. What was once an issue of
29
great importance to the trucking industry before September 11 should now be an
issue of concern for this Subcommittee.
It is no secret that cargo theft losses in our country have a severe economic im-
pact on the trucking industry, the shipping public, businesses of all sizes and on
consumers. The losses being suffered by our industry from pilferage, theft and hi-
jackings continue to be substantial, with figures ranging from $10 billion to $12 bil-
lion annually. Therefore, for a number of years the trucking industry has looked for
various means to reduce and control the losses caused by such illegal acts. Ruan
has implemented many security measures to combat cargo theft, but without some
fundamental changes in the law, these measures cannot be fully successful.
The lax penalties associated with, and insufficient resources devoted to, cargo
theft have made it increasingly appealing to criminal elements as a source of fund-
ing. Further, some of the goods carried on behalf of Americas producers and manu-
facturers may be diverted for sinister purposes. Therefore, Ruan respectfully re-
quests that this Congress enact much-needed cargo theft deterrence legislation, as
proposed by ATA. In addition to allowing motor carriers to conduct criminal back-
ground checks, ATAs legislative proposal would: 1) increase the criminal penalties
and fines for cargo theft; 2) require uniform statistical reporting on cargo theft; and
3) provide increased funding local, state, and federal multi-jurisdictional task forces
that have proven effective in combating cargo theft. Further, in view of the possible
threat posed to the public by stolen commercial motor vehicles, any cargo theft legis-
lation should establish a mechanism within DOT to allow for immediate, around-
the-clock reporting of the theft. DOT should establish a toll-free hotline to receive
reports from motor carriers of commercial vehicle thefts and then disseminate that
information to federal, state, and local law enforcement personnel nationwide on a
timely basis. Today, no such mechanism exists.
Now, I would like to turn your attention to two other specific areas in which the
trucking industry plays crucial roles: international cargo movements, and commer-
cial drivers licenses.
BORDER INFRASTRUCTURE FOR INTERNATIONAL CARGO MOVEMENTS
As the members of this Subcommittee are probably aware, on September 11, ports
of entry at our international land borders were put on Level 1 alert, resulting in
extreme border crossing delays on, and severely hampering delivery of, parts and
equipment for just-in-time deliveries at manufacturing operations. Ruan and its fel-
low members of ATA would also ask the Subcommittee to look at technologies under
development that can facilitate enforcement efforts while at the same time expedite
the movement of cargo across our borders. One such system being designed pres-
ently by U.S. Customs is the International Trade Data System (ITDS). The ITDS
concept is simple: Traders and carriers submit commercially based, standard elec-
tronic data records through a single federal gateway for the import or export of
goods. As a single information gateway, ITDS distributes these records to the af-
fected federal trade agencies, such as U.S. Customs, INS, and the DOT, for their
selectivity and risk assessment.
I would urge the subcommittee to look at infrastructure needs of our ports of
entry, in conjunction with other Senate Committees and Subcommittees with over-
sight of border agencies, to establish appropriate levels of human resources in addi-
tion to investments in technology infrastructure, such as the ITDS. Both Canada
and Mexico, our largest and second largest trading partners respectively, play a crit-
ical role in our economic wellbeing through our economic interdependence. We can-
not overlook the critical link that motor carriers play in the success of our increas-
ing trade flows within North America. Therefore, we must continue to find solutions
that will continue to allow us to move the legal commodity flows among our three
nations, while at the same time improve our security relationships between the
trade community and law enforcement agencies at our borders.
COMMERCIAL DRIVERS LICENSE ISSUES
With the full support of the trucking industry, the U.S. Congress, DOT and the
states have been instrumental in establishing a generally successful CDL program.
However, the fact that suspected terrorists have illegally obtained CDLs with haz-
ardous materials endorsements should be a wake up call for all of us.
While the federal and state governments have done a good job putting the regula-
tions, programs, and information systems in place to administer the program, the
level of effort to actively monitor and oversee the personnel charged with admin-
istering the program has not been sufficient. The suspected terrorists illegally ob-
taining CDLs, and the number of recent CDL related scandals in several states, is
evidence that more oversight is needed, particularly as it relates to CDL testers and
30
examiners. More federal personnel should be dedicated to program evaluation and
oversight, possibly including dedicated federal CDL program personnel in each
state. The states licensing agencies should also consider increasing their program
oversight staffs, to work in greater cooperation with federal CDL oversight per-
sonnel. Congress should consider authorizing additional DOT positions for this func-
tion, and should also consider establishing a dedicated (and state matching) CDL
grant program to provide additional financial assistance to states for greater pro-
gram oversight.
An additional and more specific security-related issue concerning the CDL pro-
gram is the collection and use of a drivers Social Security Number (SSN) by state
licensing agencies. As part of the federally-required and state administered CDL
program, state licensing agencies are required by DOT to collect SSNs on the CDL
application. And, many states use the drivers SSN as the drivers state license
number on the CDL document. The SSN is one of several ways that states uniquely
identify truck drivers, which is an important aspect of the CDL program. With iden-
tity theft apparently playing a role in the recent attacks, the industry, the states
and the federal government must consider ways to safeguard and even enhance per-
sonal identification methods. Clearly, however, we should not make it more difficult
for the industry and the states to track the identities of truck driverswhich is
what would occur if recently sponsored legislation on SSNs was passed by the Con-
gress. Ruan knows that ATA stands ready to work with DOT and the Congress to
enhance truck driver identifiers, and calls upon Members of Congress to reject legis-
lation that would do away with SSNs as personal identifiers on driver licenses.
V. CONCLUSION
Mr. Chairman, Ruan and its fellow ATA members understand we are entrusted
with the secure transportation of goods that keep America moving forward. Law en-
forcement has frequently been a strong ally in the industrys longstanding efforts
to ensure the security of cargo, on Americas highways and across our international
borders. We look forward to continued cooperation with those authorities charged
with securing our nation against future terrorist threats. I know that ATA under-
stands the role trucking must play to ensure our national security in this newly
changed landscape. Ruan and the trucking industry ask that Congress consider the
proposals discussed above which will allow the trucking industry to better fulfill its
role to safely and securely transport our nations freight.
I would like to thank each of the witnesses for their opening
statements.
As I mentioned at the outset, we are now going to go into a
closed session. Such an act requires a motion, a second, and a re-
corded vote, with a majority of the members of the subcommittee
voting in favor. The reason for my motion is that the testimony we
will be hearing will disclose matters necessary to be kept secret in
the interest of national defense or confidential conduct of the for-
eign relations of the United States, as set forth in Rule XXVI, sec-
tion (b((5)(1).
I therefore move that we go into closed session. Is there a sec-
ond?
Senator GRASSLEY. I second it.
Chairman BIDEN. Obviously, we are all in favor, since there are
only two of us here, and the clerk will record the aye votes of Sen-
ator Biden and Senator Grassley.
I am told we need a roll call of the full subcommittee. Proxies
are appropriate. The clerk will call the roll.
The CLERK. Mr. Kohl?
Chairman BIDEN. Aye, by proxy.
The CLERK. Mrs. Feinstein?
The CLERK. Mr. Durbin?
31
The CLERK. Ms. Cantwell?

The CLERK. Mr. Grassley?
Senator GRASSLEY. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Hatch?
Senator GRASSLEY. We dont have a proxy.
The CLERK. Mr. Sessions?
Senator GRASSLEY. Aye, by proxy.
The CLERK. Mr. Brownback?
The CLERK. Mr. McConnell?
The CLERK. Mr. Chairman?
Chairman BIDEN. Aye.
The CLERK. Mr. Chairman, the votes are 9 yeas, no nays, and
one pass.
Chairman BIDEN. We are now in closed session. I ask the staff,
is everyone in here associated with the witnesses? If not, would the
staff clear the room?
[Whereupon, at 11:38, the subcommittee was adjourned, to recon-
vene immediately in closed session.]


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S. HRG.

DEFENDING AMERICAS TRANSPORTATION

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME AND DRUGS

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

OCTOBER 16, 2001

Serial No. J10744

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME AND DRUGS

STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 16, 2001

UNITED STATES SENATE,

roads, railroads, transit routes, waterways, terminals, ports, and

personnel. But it is being done in an ad hoc way, in light of the

committee and the Congressional Research Service Transportation

grams for Allied troops. He also mounted several successful intel-

STATEMENT OF MIKE PARKER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF

tivities to address the infrastructure security issues resulting from

sessment process to identify risks to critical facilities, such as locks,

The President, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Secretary of the

attack were to succeed. Fortunately, terrorists have shown some

One final thought. Much of our countrys critical infrastructure

STATEMENT OF DONALD E. BROWN, PROFESSOR AND CHAIR,

First, what are the threats? The events of September 11 clearly

STATEMENT OF JEFFREY K. BEATTY, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF

The current threat consists of 1 to 50 persons who either directly

have demonstrated its openness and fulfilled its responsibility to

1 Department Wide Program Evaluation of the Hazardous Materials Transportation Programs,

The CLERK. Ms. Cantwell?

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