COMBATING TERRORISM: OPTIONS TO IMPROVE

FEDERAL RESPONSE
JOINT HEARING
BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT,

PUBLIC BUILDINGS, AND EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT
OF THE

COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND

INFRASTRUCTURE
AND THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY,

VETERANS AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
OF THE

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

APRIL 24, 2001

Committee on Transportation
Serial No. 10711
Committee on Government Reform
Serial No. 10758

Printed for the use of the Committees on Transportation and Government

Reform

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 COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
DON YOUNG, Alaska, Chairman
THOMAS E. PETRI, Wisconsin, Vice-Chair JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota
SHERWOOD L. BOEHLERT, New York NICK J. RAHALL II, West Virginia
HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina ROBERT A. BORSKI, Pennsylvania
JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee WILLIAM O. LIPINSKI, Illinois
WAYNE T. GILCHREST, Maryland PETER A. DEFAZIO, Oregon
STEPHEN HORN, California BOB CLEMENT, Tennessee
JOHN L. MICA, Florida JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
JACK QUINN, New York ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
VERNON J. EHLERS, Michigan Columbia
SPENCER BACHUS, Alabama JERROLD NADLER, New York
STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey
SUE W. KELLY, New York CORRINE BROWN, Florida
RICHARD H. BAKER, Louisiana JAMES A. BARCIA, Michigan
ROBERT W. NEY, Ohio BOB FILNER, California
JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas
JOHN R. THUNE, South Dakota FRANK MASCARA, Pennsylvania
FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi
JERRY MORAN, Kansas JUANITA MILLENDER-MCDONALD,
RICHARD W. POMBO, California California
JIM DEMINT, South Carolina ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
DOUG BEREUTER, Nebraska EARL BLUMENAUER, Oregon
MICHAEL K. SIMPSON, Idaho MAX SANDLIN, Texas
JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, California
ROBIN HAYES, North Carolina BILL PASCRELL, JR., New Jersey
ROB SIMMONS, Connecticut LEONARD L. BOSWELL, Iowa
MIKE ROGERS, Michigan JAMES P. MCGOVERN, Massachusetts
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia TIM HOLDEN, Pennsylvania
MARK STEVEN KIRK, Illinois NICK LAMPSON, Texas
HENRY E. BROWN, JR., South Carolina JOHN ELIAS BALDACCI, Maine
TIMOTHY V. JOHNSON, Illinois MARION BERRY, Arkansas
BRIAN D. KERNS, Indiana BRIAN BAIRD, Washington
DENNIS R. REHBERG, Montana SHELLEY BERKLEY, Nevada
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania BRAD CARSON, Oklahoma
MIKE FERGUSON, New Jersey JIM MATHESON, Utah
SAM GRAVES, Missouri MICHAEL M. HONDA, California
C.L. (BUTCH) OTTER, Idaho RICK LARSEN, Washington
MARK R. KENNEDY, Minnesota
JOHN ABNEY CULBERSON, Texas
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania
JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas

(II)
SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDINGS AND EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT
STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio, Chairman
ROBERT W. NEY, Ohio JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois
JOHN COOKSEY, Louisiana MARION BERRY, Arkansas
MIKE ROGERS, Michigan ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
SHELLEY MOORE CAPITO, West Virginia, Columbia
Vice-Chair JAMES A. BARCIA, Michigan
DON YOUNG, Alaska JAMES L. OBERSTAR, Minnesota
(Ex Officio) (Ex Officio)

(III)
 COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
DAN BURTON, Indiana, Chairman
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
CONSTANCE A. MORELLA, Maryland TOM LANTOS, California
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
STEPHEN HORN, California PATSY T. MINK, Hawaii
JOHN L. MICA, Florida CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
THOMAS M. DAVIS, Virginia ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, Washington,
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana DC
JOE SCARBOROUGH, Florida ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
BOB BARR, Georgia ROD R. BLAGOJEVICH, Illinois
DAN MILLER, Florida DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
DOUG OSE, California JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
RON LEWIS, Kentucky JIM TURNER, Texas
JO ANN DAVIS, Virginia THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
DAVE WELDON, Florida WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
CHRIS CANNON, Utah
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida
C.L. BUTCH OTTER, Idaho
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
(Independent)

KEVIN BINGER, Staff Director

DANIEL R. MOLL, Deputy Staff Director
JAMES C. WILSON, Chief Counsel
ROBERT A. BRIGGS, Chief Clerk
PHIL SCHILIRO, Minority Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, VETERANS AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut, Chairman
ADAM H. PUTNAM, Florida DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
BENJAMIN A. GILMAN, New York BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida THOMAS H. ALLEN, Maine
JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York TOM LANTOS, California
STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio JOHN F. TIERNEY, Massachusetts
RON LEWIS, Kentucky JANICE D. SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
DAVE WELDON, Florida
C.L. BUTCH OTTER, Idaho
EDWARD L. SCHROCK, Virginia

EX OFFICIO
DAN BURTON, Indiana HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
LAWRENCE J. HALLORAN, Staff Director and Counsel
NICK PALARINO, Professional Staff Member
JASON CHUNG, Clerk
DAVID RAPALLO, Minority Professional Staff Member

(IV)
 CONTENTS
TESTIMONY
Page
Boyd, General Charles G., USAF(Ret.), Executive Director, U.S. Commission
on National Security/21st Century ..................................................................... 35
Clapper, Lieutenant General James, Jr., USAF(Ret.), Vice Chairman, Advi-
sory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involv-
ing Weapons of Mass Destruction ....................................................................... 35
Cilluffo, Frank J., Center for Strategic and International Studies ..................... 35
Decker, Raymond J., Director, Defense Capabilities and Management Team,
U.S. General Accounting Office, accompanied by Steve Caldwell, Assistant
Director ................................................................................................................. 21
Ellis, William W., Senior Specialist in American National Government and
Public Administration, Congressional Research Service .................................. 23
Gilchrest, Hon. Wayne, a Representative in Congress from Maryland .............. 8
Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative in Congress from Missouri ......................... 9
Smithson, Dr. Amy E., Director, Chemical and Biological Weapons Non-
proliferation Project, the Henry L. Stimson Center .......................................... 35
Thornberry, Hon. Mac, a Representative in Congress from Texas ...................... 11

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Clay, Hon. William Lacy, of Missouri .................................................................... 81
Costello, Hon. Jerry F., of Illinois .......................................................................... 93
Gilchrest, Hon. Wayne, of Maryland ...................................................................... 124
Gilman, Hon. Benjamin A., of New York ............................................................... 130
Oberstar, Hon. James L., of Minnesota ................................................................. 136
Shays, Hon. Christopher, of Connecticut ............................................................... 140
Skelton, Hon. Ike, of Missouri ................................................................................ 166
Thornberry, Hon. Mac, of Texas ............................................................................. 179

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED BY WITNESSES

Boyd, General Charles G ........................................................................................ 49
Clapper, Lieutenant General James, Jr ................................................................ 52
Cilluffo, Frank J ...................................................................................................... 84
Decker, Raymond J .................................................................................................. 97
Ellis, William W ....................................................................................................... 110
Smithson, Dr. Amy E .............................................................................................. 170

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

Shays, Hon. Christopher, of Connecticut:
Embassy of Israel, statement .............................................................................. 142
British Embassy, statement ................................................................................ 146
Embassy of Japan, statement ............................................................................. 151
Daniels, Hon. Mitchell E., Jr., Director, Office of Management and Budget,
statement .............................................................................................................. 164

(V)
 COMBATING TERRORISM: OPTIONS TO
IMPROVE FEDERAL RESPONSE

APRIL 24, 2001

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON ECO-

NOMIC DEVELOPMENT, PUBLIC BUILDING, AND EMER-
GENCY MANAGEMENT, COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION
AND INFRASTRUCTURE, JOINT WITH THE SUBCOMMITTEE
ON NATIONAL SECURITY, VETERANS AFFAIRS AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, COMMITTEE ON GOVERN-
MENT REFORM,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittees met, pursuant to notice, at 3 p.m., in room
2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Christopher Shays,
chairman of the Subcommittee on National Security presiding.
Mr. LATOURETTE. The subcommittees will come to order.
Todays hearing is the first held by my subcommittee during this
Congress. First, I would like to thank my fellow co-chairman of this
hearing, Congressman Chris Shays, for working with me to put
this hearing together. I am very pleased to be working with the
Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security, Veterans
Affairs and International Relations, of which I am a member, on
this issue.
I would also like to thank all of our witnesses for their participa-
tion in this important hearing to discuss proposals for improving
the Federal response to terrorism.
Work accomplished by the Transportation and Infrastructure
Committee during the last Congress has shown that in the wake
of the Oklahoma City bombing we have taken great strides to im-
prove the Federal efforts to combat terrorism. Unfortunately, we
still have a long road ahead before we will achieve preparedness.
Last week marked the passing of 6 years since 168 Americans
were killed and many more injured in the heinous attack. It is my
hope that through this hearing and our continued efforts in this
area we can prevent future attacksor at the very least, minimize
the injuries and disruption caused by terrorist attacks, including
those with chemical, biological or radiological agents.
Since the bombings of the World Trade Center in 1993 and the
Murrah Federal Building in 1995, Federal spending for terrorism
programs has increased without control. More than $11 billion will
be spent in fiscal year 2001 by at least 40 departments and agen-
cies administering counter-terrorism and preparedness programs.
This figure is nearly double the amount spent 3 years ago. And yet,
there is no single Federal entity in charge of this effort, no single
person who can be brought before Congress to discuss an overall
(1)
 2

approach to combating or responding to terrorism, and no com-

prehensive strategy to guide this massive spending effort.
In fact, the Federal Government does not even know what pro-
grams exist or what they are designed to accomplish.
Each of the proposals we will examine today is aimed at defend-
ing our country and communities against terrorist attacks.
The first proposal, H.R. 525, was introduced by Transportation
Committee member Wayne Gilchrest. It would create a Presi-
dential council to draft a national strategy and organize the Fed-
eral effort through the existing agency structure. It would elimi-
nate duplication and fragmentation of Federal efforts by coordinat-
ing with agencies during the budget process to bring programs in
line with the strategy. This proposal closely tracks a similar meas-
ure, H.R. 4210, introduced by former Representative Tillie Fowler,
that passed the House unanimously last Congress.
We will also address bills introduced by Congressman Ike Skel-
ton, H.R. 1292, and Congressman Mac Thornberry, H.R. 1158. The
Skelton bill would require the designation of a single individual
within the Federal Government to be responsible for this effort. It
would also require the drafting of a strategy to address terrorism.
The Thornberry bill would transform FEMA into the National
Homeland Security Agency which would include the Coast Guard,
Border Patrol, and Customs Service. This new agency would focus
on operational planning and coordination.
I look forward to hearing more about all of these proposals dur-
ing the course of todays hearing.
Today signifies another step toward adding some sense to this
Federal spending spree. It is our duty to impose accountability and
require a reasoned approach to this effort. We must determine the
threats and risks that exist in our communities and spend our tax
dollars addressing them. We simply cant wait another 6 years be-
fore we know that our local emergency personnel are prepared to
respond to a terrorist attack.
This hearing continues the process of reforming our
counterterrorism effort. It is my hope that we can accomplish some
significant reform during this session of Congress. Before we com-
mence, I want to commend the gentleman on our first panel for in-
troducing legislation to address this issue. I look forward to hear-
ing the testimony from all of our witnesses and Id now like to yield
to the chairman of the Government Reform Subcommittee, Mr.
Shays, for any comments he would choose to make.
Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. A joint hearing on these
important legislative proposals is particularly fitting, because ter-
rorism crosses so many jurisdictional and substantive domains.
Only a cross-cutting, unified approach will enhance Federal
counterterrorism efforts and help us to avoid the false choices often
posed by narrow legal and bureaucratic boundaries.
For example, the bills we consider today would appear to present
mutually exclusive options regarding the focal point of Federal
counterterrorism policy. One approach would place that respon-
sibility in the Executive Office of the President, leaving the current
agency structure in place. The other would consolidate key home-
land defense functions in a single cabinet level department.
 3

But for this hearing, these options would have been considered
by separate committees. Instead, we asked our witnesses this after-
noon to describe the relative merits and challenges of both concepts
in the hope that overall executive branch coordination and the role
of a lead homeland defense agency can be clarified and strength-
ened.
In January, the subcommittee wrote to Dr. Condoleezza Rice, the
Presidents National Security Advisor, concerning the need for
stronger leadership and a more coordinated Federal effort against
terrorism. She informed us a review of counterterrorism organiza-
tion and policy is underway. But we neednt wait for the results of
that review to begin consideration of proposals to correct longstand-
ing and widely noted deficiencies in Federal structure and coordi-
nation.
Previous subcommittee hearings led us to the conclusion the
fight against terrorism remains fragmented and unfocused, because
there is no one in charge to develop a coordinated threat and risk
assessment, articulate a national strategy, measure progress to-
ward defined goals or disciplined spending. Legislation to restruc-
ture the Federal effort to combat terrorism should address those
weaknesses.
Almost a decade after the dawn of a harsh new strategic reality,
international terrorism aimed at our military and civilian person-
nel abroad and here at home, these bills address todays equally
stark realities. As a Nation, we are not ready. As a Government,
we are not prepared.
Our witnesses this afternoon bring us the benefit of their sub-
stantive experience, substantial experience and expertise in this
area. On behalf of the Government Reform Subcommittee on Na-
tional Security, Veterans Affairs and International Relations, I
thank them for their time and their testimony. Again, Mr. Chair-
man, I thank you for this joint hearing.
Mr. LATOURETTE. I thank you, Mr. Shays.
Mr. Berry of Arkansas, filling in for the distinguished ranking
member of our subcommittee, Mr. Costello, indicates he has no
statement to make. Id now yield to the ranking member of Mr.
Shays subcommittee, the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Kucinich.
Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Good after-
noon. I want to welcome the distinguished members who will be
discussing their respective bills today. Let me also welcome the
other witnesses who took time out of their schedule to testify. I
would like to briefly raise several points.
First, GAO has stated in past hearings that Federal priorities in
spending should be based on a comprehensive threat and risk as-
sessment. The logic was that until we identify the threats, evaluate
their likelihood and craft a strategy to address them, we have no
basis upon which to build a national strategy, and we have no
guarantee that spending is properly apportioned among various
programs.
Id assume that such a threat and risk assessment would evalu-
ate all terrorist threats, foreign and domestic, and prioritize all
Federal counterterrorism programs. After reviewing the bills, how-
ever, it appears that some of the proposals are limited to domestic
preparedness programs alone. I wonder, therefore, how these pro-
 4

posals could escape the same criticisms made of the current struc-
ture. In other words, how do we know were spending the correct
amount on domestic preparedness vis-a-vis other counterterrorism
initiatives, such as border patrol, intelligence gathering and inter-
national law enforcement cooperation efforts.
Taking this one step further, focusing on terrorism alone, might
even be overly narrow. One could argue that a truly comprehensive
threat and risk assessment should take into account all threats, re-
gardless of their origin, whether our embassies are threatened by
military or rebel forces, for example, may have different political
implications. But the security concerns are very similar. As we
know, the line between state actors, state sponsored actors and in-
surgent groups continues to blur.
Related to this issue, in a recent National Security Subcommittee
hearing, a few of us had a candid exchange with some of our expert
witnesses about the perception of American citizens, American
Government and American corporations. These individuals, who
have spent many years living and working abroad, all cited the ex-
istence of anti-American sentiment that pervades many foreign
countries to various degrees.
For me, this underscores the need for discussion of the effects of
American foreign policy and American corporate activity on threats
to American interests. We cannot assess risk and develop national
counterterrorism strategies, divorced from the larger reality of our
role in this world, and the perceptions of our actions abroad.
In other words, we must look not only for responses to threats,
but also for ways to eliminate the currents of enmity from which
these threats arise. Diplomacy in this regard can provide as much
protection as strengthening our borders or hardening our embas-
sies.
GAO has stated that there is no single individual accountable to
Congress with authority to make counterterrorism decisions and ef-
fect budgetary priorities. Although some of the proposals create
new positions, some of which are subject to Senate confirmation, I
did not see any proposal that would confer power to direct the
spending of other agencies such as the Departments of Defense and
State, which both perform substantial counterterrorism functions.
Again, this relates to the need for a risk assessment that consid-
ers all manner of threats to American interests and a
counterterrorism strategy that articulates more than simply a plan
for domestic consequence management.
Finally, at the last terrorism hearing before our subcommittee, I
raised the issue of civil liberties. Other various proposals say they
would ensure the protection of civil liberties. I have yet to hear how
these proposals would do so. The protection of civil liberties must
be included in any of our discussions. I would be very skeptical of
any proposal that would jeopardize civil liberties. A properly con-
ducted and comprehensive risk assessment, threat and risk assess-
ment, is mandatory and preliminary to a proper assessment of the
impact on civil liberties. Civil liberties, freely exercised in a free so-
ciety, remain a strong protection against terrorism.
I would appreciate if our witnesses today could address these
fundamental concerns. I thank the chairman and Mr. Shays for
holding this hearing.
 5

Mr. LATOURETTE. I thank you very much. Id now like to yield

to Mr. Gilman of New York for his observations.
Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to commend our
chairmen, Mr. LaTourette and Mr. Shays, for bringing us together
on this important hearing. Im pleased to join our colleagues today
who will be making a further examination of the Federal effort to
confront and combat terrorism here in our own Nation.
Weve often focused on this grave threat to innocent persons and
property only when its been in the headlines as a result of an act
of terrorism, too much of a band-aid approach. The Federal Govern-
ment, pursuant to various Presidential directives, began over the
last decade to concentrate on this problem, and regrettably, well-
intentioned efforts too often have wound up being parochial, de-
signed to shore up security of a given agencys assets, their person-
nel and traditional functions. The effort to coordinate anti-terror-
ism planning among Government entities at the Federal, State and
local level has faltered, and the end result has been a fragmenta-
tion of responsibility that features turf protection and a prolifera-
tion of resources among some 40 Federal agencies.
The three legislative proposals before us today seek to correct
that situation by assigning a central authority to direct our govern-
ments anti-terrorism efforts. A similar effort has been underway
since the creation of the Office of the National Coordinator for Se-
curity, Infrastructure Protection and Counterterrorism in the mid
1988 period within the National Security Council. The national co-
ordinator of that program provides advice, but lacks any authority
to direct or to assign agency budgets for counterterrorism efforts.
And therein may be the problem.
I believe budgetary authority, and not just the amount of money
authorized and appropriated, is central to fixing the most impor-
tant problem in our plans to thwart domestic terrorism. Any solu-
tion that we propose must give the central coordinating entity re-
sponsibility to set terrorism related budgets in order to establish
clear lines of direction and responsibility. Without that kind of a
control, the anti-terrorism coordinator is at the mercy of agencies
focused on their own albeit virtuous interests, but pulling in too
many directions.
More generally, prevention should be at the center of any anti-
terrorism coordinators focus. Better human intelligence on possible
planned attacks is a key to foiling such threats. In our recruiting
to develop better human intelligence, our government has exercised
due responsibility and due caution over contact with persons in-
volved in human rights violations. There is a time, however, when
higher interests prevail, and such contacts become vital to prevent-
ing future violations of human rights resulting from any terrorist
attack.
In conjunction with the efforts to acquire better human intel-
ligence, our Nation should also put greater emphasis on inter-
national cooperation with police in other agencies in the fight
against terrorism. At this point, terrorists often turn to criminal
elements for stolen cars, for explosives and other ingredients in
planning any kind of a terrorist attack.
It seems to me that the FBI and other U.S. law enforcement
training for police forces overseas would serve to improve our inter-
 6

national cop to cop contacts, expanding our terrorist information

network. Mr. Chairmen, it is long overdue that we provide a cen-
tral authority with a comprehensive national strategy to direct and
coordinate our Nations fragmented anti-terrorism efforts.
I want to thank our chairmen again for continuing these hear-
ings, and we look forward to the testimony of our three distin-
guished witnesses from the House as we seek to craft appropriate
solutions.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. LATOURETTE. I thank the gentleman. Ms. Holmes Norton.
Ms. NORTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. If I may, Id
like to thank both of our chairmen, Mr. LaTourette and Mr. Shays,
for their very sensible beginning of a solution. If Members of two
subcommittees can see the problem and get together, perhaps we
can get the respective agencies together as well.
And may I thank the members who have devoted some consider-
able time and very deep thought to what, in my view, is the most
serious, major problem confronting our society today, and for which
there is no strategy: no one can doubt the rise of worldwide terror-
ism. We can all be grateful that as a matter of fact, we have experi-
enced so little of it.
I am constantly amazed that we have experienced so little of it,
and believe that the major reason for this has to do with the per-
sonnel who control our borders and keep people from entering this
country who might have been most inclined to engage in some such
terrorism. Although I do note that the only major act of domestic
terrorism in this country was the work of an American.
As the member who represents the Nations Capital, I am
ashamed of how our capital looks. When your constituents come to
visit you in our capital, I can assure you that they are, and they
comment upon, how astonished they are at how our capital looks.
The capital is being closed down in our midst. You dont see it be-
cause you come to work every day.
But your constituents see it. They came 3 years ago to bring a
sixth grade class, and they come back now and it looks different.
And they know it, and they say it. They see the barricades and
theyre troubled.
They will ask me, has there been an incident here? When I pass
by and they say, this is the member who represents the Nations
Capital, did you have something happen here? Can you imagine
what children think when they come to the Nations Capital and
every important building is surrounded by barricades of the kind
that might have been easily used in the 19th century if you were
trying to protect yourself against terrorism?
Because I dont see any advance over what might have been used
then over what we are using here. I believe what the members on
the dais are doing, the members who have prepared legislation are
doing, is most important. But I would like to suggest today that it
is time that we added a layer to our thinking about how to keep
an open society in a world of rising terrorism.
My friends, that is the challenge, not how to combat terrorism
alone. We can all get together and figure out ways to keep them
out. But would you want to live in a society that only figured out
 7

ways to keep them out? Or to keep enemies from within from com-
mitting acts of terrorism?
I believe that we need to look at terrorism in the context of main-
taining an open democratic society. If you want to really grapple
with this problem, you cannot simply deal with one aspect, albeit
a hugely important aspect of it. Because you can deal with that as-
pect and end saying, how could we have done this to ourselves? Is
there no better way to do this?
May I suggest that I think that beyond ourselves we have to, in
order to come to grips with what is a problem that has never faced
the world before, at some level and in some ongoing working forum
bring together the best minds in the society. And I do not simply
mean security minds, albeit they are indispensable minds. I mean
people who know how to think about the kind of society in which
we live, the societys intellectuals, the societys security people, the
societys police people, the people who understand what kind of a
society it is, and let them all help us gather this problem and think
this problem through.
Weve done this in the past, when we had problems we didnt
know what to do with. We did it in Los Alamos. We did it with the
Kerner Commission came forward. We realized that we did not
have all the answers, or that we were all grappling with one part
of the aspect of the beast.
We need an approach that takes full account of the importance
of maintaining our democratic traditions, while responding ade-
quately to a very real and very substantial threat that terrorism
poses. Are you proud that the best your country could think to do
after the outrageous, stunning bombing in Oklahoma City was to
close down Americas main streets? Is that the response of the
worlds greatest power, of its most advanced technological power?
If so, we are truly bankrupt. And I do not believe we are. But
I do not believe we have brought to the table all of those that are
necessary to help us think through this problem. We are called
upon to provide ever higher levels of security in public spaces,
while somehow remaining just as free and open as we were before
there was any worldwide terrorist threat. As yet, our country does
not begin to have, has not begun to do any of the thinking through
of a systematic process or strategy for meeting the dual challenge
of securing us against terrorist threats and maintaining the open
democratic society which is all that we stand for.
Before he left, I discussed with Senator Daniel Moynihan an ap-
proach that would put the people Im calling the best minds in soci-
ety together at a table. And he was very taken with it. Unfortu-
nately, he has retired. I am not giving up, and I regard this hear-
ing as one way of informing me about an indispensably important
aspect of this problem. I thank our Chairs and all who have been
involved in preparing legislation for their contribution.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. LATOURETTE. I thank the gentlelady.
If there are no further opening statements, I would now like to
call up todays first panel. This panel consists of three very distin-
guished Members of the House of Representatives, who are to be
commended for their work and their leadership in addressing the
problem.
 8

Were honored to have with us today Mr. William Gilchrest of

Maryland, Mr. Mac Thornberry of Texas and Mr. Ike Skelton of
Missouri. And wed now like to turn to you, Mr. Gilchrest, because
you are a long recognized champion of the Transportation Commit-
tee, a champion of wetlands environments everywhere, and now
youre showing your versatility with H.R. 525.
STATEMENT OF HON. WAYNE GILCHREST, A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MARYLAND
Mr. GILCHREST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Shays, for the
opportunity to testify here this afternoon. Part of this is in recogni-
tion of terrorist activities for the Nations ecosystems as well, Im
sure, and certainly for our wetlands.
I would like to very briefly respond to some of the comments that
have been made by the members of the committee toward our three
bills. I think that Mr. Skelton and Mr. Thornberry and myself rec-
ognize that each of us doesnt have all the answers to this problem,
and that a collaboration of our three proposals might be best at the
end of the day.
But my particular bill certainly doesnt deal with the comprehen-
sive problem of terrorism in an international way from lets say,
Chestertown, MD on the Eastern Shore to a city in Pakistan. But
it does deal specifically with the nature of the problem, with our
first responders here in the United States.
When someone sees a building blow up or a possible terrorist ac-
tivity, using, God forbid, radioactive material, germ warfare, chemi-
cal warfare, they call 911. And if you live in Chestertown, thats
probably a retired man in that 911 dispatch office thats going to
get the call. He will then call a volunteer at a local volunteer fire
department who will call the paramedics, who are also volunteer
people. And they will be the first people to respond.
Our effort is in some way small steps, immediate steps to take
provisions to coordinate as much as is possible all the resources of
this country to help those first responders. This bill is not a mas-
sive, comprehensive overhaul of Federal approach, this Nations ap-
proach to terrorist activity. And I recognize that is a good idea.
Also, Mr. Kucinich made a comment, very good comment about
civil liberties. I would suggest that in our three bills it is inherent
that constitutional rights of your civil liberties will certainly not be
denied by any of these bills. If anything, they will be enhanced be-
cause of the recognition of peoples education to respond to these
kinds of disasters.
And Ms. Norton, your comments about combating terrorism in a
free society are excellent comments. How do we do that? Do we
continue to increase the barricades and reduce the access to our
public buildings because of the threat, the real threat of terrorism?
So we do need to discuss that issue. And our U.S. Capitol must
continue to be the most accessible public building in the world,
which it has been for some time.
I think the legislation before you in the form of these three bills
makes those concerns about terrorism, about civil liberties, about
access to public buildings, about responding quickly and in a co-
ordinated fashion to those volunteers calling 911, thats going to
happen with and through these kinds of discussions.
 9

Mr. Chairman, what Id like to do is go through some very brief

points about what H.R. 525 does. 1, H.R. 525 establishes a Presi-
dents council within the Executive Office of the President to co-
ordinate Government-wide efforts for improving preparedness
against domestic terrorist attacks. The bill is the right approach
because it raises the profile of domestic preparedness by placing
the formulation of the national strategy into the Executive Office
of the President. We dont say specifically how this is to be done
or which agencies are to participate in it. This is up to the Presi-
dent.
The council will include representation from each Federal depart-
ment that has an important role to play in the development of that
strategy. The council will participate in agency budget processes,
making recommendations to accomplish the goals of a defined na-
tional strategy. It also improves accountability by directing the
council to provide clear budget recommendations to the Office of
Management and Budget. With those recommendations, it would
be required to follow the national strategy.
Weve increased the amount of money used for domestic terror-
ism by billions of dollars over the last few years. And yet, the mem-
bers on the committee have all testified in one way or another that
we still have a fragmented strategy. Well, its important for the
budget to be clear and succinct on how were going to spend those
dollars. H.R. 525 will help to better coordinate the Federal re-
sponse to other major disasters. Its not only for terrorist activities,
but major weather disasters.
And Id like to conclude with, the bill is designed to afford the
President the latitude and the flexibility to be able to work with
his staff to create domestic preparedness plans that incorporate the
recommendations of all the Federal agencies, streamlines the budg-
et process, incorporates needs of State and local first responders,
those folks in Chestertown that made that 911 call, and to find a
level of preparedness to guide our national efforts in order to deal
with the existing, emerging and evolving nature of domestic terror-
ism and natural disasters.
And I thank the chairmen for the opportunity.
Mr. LATOURETTE. We thank you.
Mr. Skelton.
STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN
CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MISSOURI
Mr. SKELTON. Thank you very much, Chairman LaTourette and
Chairman Shays, for this opportunity to appear before you today.
I think all of us today would agree that our country needs to im-
prove its ability to provide security for our citizens. Unfortunately
domestic terrorism is an increasing national problem. The sad
truth is that the various governmental structures at all levels now
in place do not operate in an efficient, coordinated and coherent
way to provide adequate homeland security for our citizens. As a
matter of fact, recent GAO reports indicate that some 43 different
Federal agencies deal with this issue.
Part of the reason for the lack of coherence in our domestic ter-
rorism prevention is that terrorist attacks can come in many forms.
They can be intercontinental ballistic missiles, crude home made
 10

bombs, computer intrusions that would disable either a power grid

or an air traffic control system, conventional chemical, radiological,
biological weapons may be involved. An attack could come at our
borders, our places of government, our military installations or
places where people congregate for lawful events.
The process of identifying and acquiring and planning the use of
resources needed to prevent, on the one hand, or respond, on the
other, are very complex and involve several executive departments
and agencies at the various levels, Federal, State and local. I do
not believe we presently have an adequate, comprehensive govern-
ment wide national strategy concerning the role of the U.S. Gov-
ernment and the many facets of homeland security.
This is a war. This is a war against terrorism. Many aspects of
it are unknown until we find out by way of intelligence or by way
of an occurrence coming to pass. In order to attack these threats,
just like we had an effort, a successful effort, against Nazi Ger-
many, there was a strategy before any decisions were made as to
how to conquer Nazi Germany in Europe.
The bill Ive introduced, H.R. 1292, recognizes the deficiency and
directs the President to develop and implement a national home-
land security strategy and points out in Section 4(b) that the Presi-
dent shall designate a single official in the Government to be re-
sponsible for and report to the President on homeland security.
The first thing we have to do is study the threats and inventory
our capabilities, our resources, and devise an overall strategy on
how to best address the problem. Ladies and gentlemen of these
committees, its premature to specify the organizational structure
and shape the Federal homeland security operations until we have
this strategy in place, until we know what we are going to have
to face.
At the same time, I know that any national strategy must in-
clude certain components. For instance, a strategy only makes
sense if you identify the threats against which you must be pre-
pared to respond. Any strategy will involve roles for existing gov-
ernmental agencies, and we must make those roles explicit. The
bill introduced tries to outline the broad perimeters and the compo-
nents of a national homeland security strategy without being overly
prescriptive about the specific strategy.
Thus, because in my view, we in Congress are not in the best po-
sition initially to know what should go into the homeland security
strategy, they will have to be carried out by the executive branch.
The President, as chief executive, initially is in a far better position
to make those determinations. And as ranking member of the
Armed Services Committee, I know that any homeland security
strategy will have to make use of our military assets, make use of
our military capabilities.
But I cant tell you specifically how to make best use of our mili-
tary, because those bureaucratic decisions are best left to the mili-
tary and executive branch to make those recommendations. The
President and his departmental secretaries are in the best position
to know those answers to those issues. As a result, this bill directs
the President to devise and implement this strategy.
However, I also recognize that Congress has obligations to the
country for homeland security. And we do, after all, authorize and
 11

appropriate the funds that will make execution of any strategy pos-
sible.
Therefore, my bill requires the President report to Congress on
the progress and the process and the time table for development
of homeland security strategy, so that we here in the Congress can
adequately have the opportunity to intervene legislatively should
that become necessary. We all recognize that domestic terrorism is
a growing problem. We all want our Government resources to be
used in the most effective way.
My bill simply reflects my effort to keep the horse before the cart
to require the development of a comprehensive national homeland
security strategy before we start implementing operational solu-
tions to the problems. We have to have the strategic thought in
mind before we can start adding up the techniques thereof. Thank
you.
Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you, Congressman Skelton.
Mr. Thornberry.
STATEMENT OF HON. MAC THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE
IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS
Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, and I appreciate the opportunity
to testify before both subcommittees. But I appreciate even more
your having the hearing. Because if you believe, as I do, that one
of the primary reasons we have a Federal Government to begin
with is to defend the country, then were all going to have to spend
a lot more time and effort discussing the issues around homeland
security.
There have been a number of studies over the past couple of
years which mostly all come to the conclusion that we are more
vulnerable here at home than we have been in the past. Others out
in the world have realized that you dont hit us where were strong,
you look for our weak points.
I noticed, for example, theres an article in last weeks New Orle-
ans paper which publishes a CIA translation of a Chinese report
which says, you dont hit the United States on conventional mili-
tary, you use computer viruses, information warfare and stock mar-
ket manipulation as ways to disrupt the country.
The Commission on National Security in the 21st Century, upon
which my bill is based, says that a direct attack on American citi-
zens on American soil is likely over the next quarter century. And
we spend a fair amount of time talking about chemical, biological,
nuclear weapons. We have the computer threat. These days, we
have to worry quite a bit about livestock diseases or something get-
ting into our food supply. There are all sorts of ways to complicate
our lives.
Let me give you one fact which certainly caught my attention.
Every day, $8.8 billion worth of goods, 1.3 million people, 58,000
shipments and 340,000 vehicles enter our country. And the Cus-
toms Service is able to inspect 1 to 2 percent of them. The volume
of trade has doubled since 1995. A lot of people think it would dou-
ble over the next 5 years.
We have got to do something, and you all have seen the reports
that say, we are not well organized to address this threat. Home-
land security is a big, complicated issue. Certainly my bill, none of
 12

the bills, solve all of the problems or address all the issues. But if
we wait around until we get all the issues studied and solved, then
we will do nothing. And I think that would be a great tragedy.
We absolutely have to have a strategy on how were going to deal
with these issues. But that strategy has to be evolving. Its never
going to be a final product. In the meantime, we have to make sure
that the efforts are getting adequate resources and, in my view, we
also have to deal with some of the organizational deficiencies.
President Eisenhower put it pretty well. He said, the right sys-
tem does not guarantee success, but the wrong system guarantees
failure. Because a defective system will suck the leadership into
the cracks and fissures, wasting their time as they seek to manage
dysfunction rather than making critical decisions. I think thats
where we are.
Again, my bill does not even try to deal with all of the organiza-
tional problems. But it does try to get our arms around some of the
key deficiencies. First, it would create a national homeland security
agency, building upon the existing FEMA structure. The reason it
builds upon FEMA are a lot of the reasons that Mr. Gilchrest just
talked about. The first people out there are going to be State and
local folks. FEMA already has a relationship with those people. It
already has 10 regional offices. It makes sense to have this integra-
tion from the Federal down to the State and local level, to build
upon that structure that is there.
This entity would be one focal point and one contact point for the
retired guy whos hanging out at the fire station who takes that
911 call, or for the National Guard at the State office or whoever
it is, theres one focal point so that somebody knows who to contact.
Its also one focal point, by the way, to coordinate other Federal
entities, like the Centers for Disease Control or the DOE labs, the
intelligence folks. It brings it together, and it puts priority on plan-
ning and coordination, to make sure that we are getting our act to-
gether and doing it well with one person whos responsible, which
is a point in Mr. Skeltons legislation.
What it would do then is bring several other agencies under that
umbrella. In addition to continuing the FEMA work, it would bring
the Coast Guard, Customs Service and Border Patrol as distinct
entities, in other words, it doesnt take them apart, it brings them
as distinct entities under the umbrella of the homeland security
agency. These are folks that are on the front lines of protecting our
border. Theyre people who could be on the front lines of respond-
ing.
We have to do a lot better in coordinating their efforts, not just
what they do day to day, although thats important, but giving
them the resources to be ready to do what they do. And if you go
down the line of each of those agencies, were not putting the
money, were not recapitalizing, were not giving them the vehicles,
the helicopters, the planes, the boats, that they need to do the job.
Finally, my bill would consolidate a number of information infra-
structure programs into one place. I mentioned the issue on China.
Clearly, this is an impressive array of charts down here. It is also
an impressive thing if you look at how many agencies are doing lit-
tle pieces of information infrastructure protection. Clearly, weve
got to get more coordinated and more focused on that. It seems to
 13

me to make sense to put that together with homeland security from

a domestic standpoint.
Last point, Mr. Chairman, I realize my time is up, but I want
to address one of Mr. Kucinichs other points. And that is, I think
civil liberties, actually it goes to Ms. Holmes Norton, too, civil lib-
erties and how we trade off these things, security versus freedom,
is a difficult but essential thing that weve got to talk about. One
of the benefits, I think, of doing the structure that Ive outlined, is
were talking about civilians, not military. Every year on the floor
we have this vote on a bill putting troops on the border, giving
them guns to perform kind of like law enforcement activities on the
border.
Thats troublesome. Its particularly troublesome in Texas, where
we had a very unfortunate incident a couple of years ago. But its
also that we are taking away from the FBI and some of those other
law enforcement people, making them less focused. FEMA is an
agency that has more of a preventive mission, and I think thats
a better approach.
If we wait until something bad happens, the country is just going
to say, come in and save us, whatever it takes, without having
thought through the consequences. I think its going to be very like-
ly that well call upon the military to come in then and assume the
role of law enforcement, and I think that would be a step beyond
which we ought to go. Thank you.
Mr. LATOURETTE. I thank you all. I thank all of our colleagues
for their excellent explanation of their legislation and also discus-
sion of this national problem.
Before beginning with questions from the panel, I want to ask
unanimous consent to enter two letters of support of H.R. 525, Mr.
Gilchrests legislation, into the record, one being from the Inter-
national Association of Fire Chiefs and the second from the Joint
Commission on Accreditation of Health Care Organizations. With-
out objection, so ordered.
Mr. Shays, would you care to ask questions?
Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.
Mr. Skelton, I believe that you have probably thought about this
issue more than anyone else over the years, but know all three of
you are very active in your concern about this issue, and all of you
have spent a great deal of time thinking about it. But I wanted to
start with you.
I have, during the course of the hearings weve held, become very
sympathetic to the concept of actually reorganizing rather than co-
ordinating. Im not looking for you to necessarily critique, Id like
a critique of the concept of reorganization where you literally have
a home office versus just telling the President to take charge ver-
sus havingId like you to kind of walk me through what you
think the pitfalls and the good points are of the three different ap-
proaches were seeing, particularly the two between you and Mr.
Thornberry.
Mr. SKELTON. This whole issue is somewhat like, its so com-
plicated, and Mac and I, both serving on the Armed Services Com-
mittee, can both testify to the fact that, Mark Twain once said, the
more you explain it to me, the more I dont understand it. It is
truly a complicated issue to get your arms around. There are two
 14

aspects to it. The first is fighting it. Its called anti-terrorism activi-
ties. It includes everything from forced protection to prevention and
detection of attack, including intelligence, networks and the like.
The second is the consequence management after it happens.
What do you do, what Government entities are designed to respond
to and to mitigate the damages. You have to keep those two as-
pects in mind. If you fuzz them together, you might very well end
up with some legislation that finds itself contradictory. So we have
to keep the anti-terrorism activity and the consequent management
of it both in mind when we make our decisions.
Frankly, I just want something to work. I introduced the legisla-
tion that I did so we could get a good handle on it, look at the var-
ious types of anti-terrorism activities that we can do, several types
of consequent management that we can do, with an overall strate-
gic thought in mind. There is one person, as you know, that is re-
sponsible to the President to put together this strategy, and the
President sends it over to us. Bottom line is, the buck stops with
us right here in the Congress to write whatever laws.
Mr. SHAYS. What Im basically hearing, I think, is that you be-
lieve this is a gigantic problem.
Mr. SKELTON. Oh, it is. It is.
Mr. SHAYS. And you believe that we havent responded to it ade-
quately. And so I sense an openness in terms of considering alter-
natives besides the one you mentioned. Im struck with the fact,
though, that you want ultimately the President to seize this issue,
take charge
Mr. SKELTON. And make recommendations. Ultimately, the buck
is going to stop with us, eventually, sooner or later. Since any ad-
ministration, this administration or any others will have to imple-
ment and glue these entitiesyou know, there are 43 agencies out
there, some $7 billion is going into this effort today. And its not
coordinated with an overall strategy at all.
Mr. SHAYS. Time is running out, but maybe the two of you would
just respond. It seems to me like we need to wake people up. It
may be one of the reasons why I like your proposal, Mr. Thorn-
berry, which is the one recommended by Senator Rudman and his
commission. I share the concerns that are expressed here about
what can we do about the possibility of terrorism coming into our
domestic experience.
Everyone of us who represents people has those same concerns,
and the members who have taken it upon themselves and have had
the opportunity to work closely with Mr. Skelton, more than the
other two members, who I respect greatly. But I know that Mr.
Skelton has a dedication to this country second to none. So your
articulation of your love for the country and your desire to defend
it I think is something that everyone in your district and my dis-
trict would applaud.
So while I think that this discussion is extremely important, I
would urge that we be very deliberate in our approach to coming
up with any kind of a solution. Because at this moment, were real-
ly looking at some territory that other Congresses have looked at,
other administrations have had to deal with, with varying results.
There is a piece here from the Air Force Judge Advocate General
 15

School, the Air Force Law Review, Mr. Chairman, that Id like to
submit for purpose of the record, without objection.
Mr. LATOURETTE. Without objection.
Mr. KUCINICH. And in this piece by Major Kirk Davies, its enti-
tled The Imposition of Marshal Law in the United States, its a
very interesting read. Because one of the things it talks about is
the tendency in recent years has been for the President and the
Congress to direct the military into more and more operations that
are traditionally civilian in nature. But then as he goes into his re-
view, he speaks of statutes and regulations that cover the mili-
tarys involvement in civilian affairs, and particularly focuses on a
discussion of 1878, the Posse Comitatus Act, which I know youre
all familiar with, because thats the act that forbids military per-
sonnel from executing laws or having any direct involvement in ci-
vilian law enforcement activities.
I think the concern of generations of lawmakers has been to,
while we want a strong military, the military presence in the civil-
ian life of the country sends quite a different message as to the
type of system that we have. And Major Kirk points out that when
the founders drafted the constitution, they weakened the possibility
of a military with a dominant role in society by subordinating the
military to civilian control.
And while we all appreciate greatly the role of the military in
protecting our liberties and keeping this a strong Nation, I think
weve had some concerns about how far the military would go in
terms of serving as a, as some of these bills would recommend, in
a coordinating role with State and local officials.
I mention this not in any way to denigrate the concerns that our
members brought to us, but as a cautionary note of how, as we get
into this idea of a homeland security act, we have to be very gentle
on the ground that were walking on. Because Ill go back to my
initial remarks, concerns about basic civil liberties. If we have a
cyber tax, for example, we know those are going on, and theyve
been going on, how would we devise a regimen for dealing with
that without compromising computer privacy, for example?
There are privacy issues.
Mr. SHAYS. Would the gentleman yield for a question?
Mr. KUCINICH. Of course I will.
Mr. SHAYS. When Ive been listening to your questions, because
youve done it in a previous hearing, Im left with the feeling that
somehow youre connecting reorganizing Government with threat-
ening civil rights. And I see that as a very valid concern whether
we reorganize it or not.
What I view this hearing as is an issue of our failure to have,
the fragmented reform of Government doesnt allow us to respond
to the real threat of terrorism that I dont see in any way would
move forward or backward the issue of civil rights.
Mr. KUCINICH. I would respectfully submit to my good friend, Mr.
Shays, who I am honored to be on this committee with, that there
are civil rights issues that are central to this discussion. As a mat-
ter of fact, if you read one of the proposals here, it may have been
Mr. Skelton, he specifically mentions that he would want, this is
in section 3, article 4, that providing for the selective use of person-
nel and assets of the armed forces, circumstances in which those
 16

personnel and assets would provide unique capability and could be

used without infringing on the civil liberties of the people of the
United States.
So there is a recognition that civil liberties could be at issue
here. Im saying with all due respect that, speaking as one member
here, youve raised the issue, Mr. Shays, about reorganization. Its
a valid concern. And Im raising the issue as one member about
civil liberties. And I will stand on that point and will not be moved
from it until I can see some assurances thats going to be dealt
with.
Mr. SKELTON. Could I comment on that?
Mr. KUCINICH. Of course, if we have the time, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. LATOURETTE. Sure.
Mr. SKELTON. Thats why its there. Thats why that language is
there. This country lawyer feels very strongly that in the anti-ter-
rorism activity and the consequent management of that is helping,
should a disaster come to pass, thats separate and distinct from
a fair trial, all the rights that go into protecting anyone that might
be accused of any type of crime. So thats why that language is
there, to recognize the fact that there is a limitation to what the
military can do, and the other agencies can do, without trampling
on individual human rights.
Thats very basic, as far as Im concerned, Mr. Kucinich.
Mr. KUCINICH. Well, Im glad to hear Mr. Skelton say that. Be-
cause I think its important as we move through this legislative
proposal that there be specific language that would make sure that
civil rights are not abrogated in any way. When youre talking
about, in this one bill, about the designation of responsible official,
theres also an issue as to whether or not, if the President des-
ignates a single official, on this issue of homeland security, in the
context of the military involvement, how does that compromise his
role as commander in chief?
These are questions that I think are legitimate and with no dis-
respect to the sponsors at all, with all due respect to the sponsors.
But again, you know, I think the just have to be raised. Im very
interested in how we can make this country more protected against
domestic terrorism. Im interested in how can we do that and pro-
tect civil rights. I think if we can do both, its a great idea.
Mr. GILCHREST. Mr. Chairman, if I could just make a very brief
comment to Mr. Kucinichs concerns. Its important for us to use all
the intelligence at our disposal, all our resources, to protect Amer-
ican citizens from terrorism and disasters. In line with certainly
our constitutional rights and protecting everybodys civil liberties,
I think we have the potential and the ability to do that.
I share your concern, interestingly enough. In the late 1960s, I
came to Washington with a group of Marines during the anti-war
demonstrations. And we used to stand there protecting the Penta-
gon or protecting the Capitol, protecting some other place, while
very often young women would come up and put flowers in the bar-
rel of our M14s. But I also came here in 1968, after Martin Lu-
ther King, Jr. was assassinated, to protect the Capitol. And we
walked the streets of this fair city, as Federal troops, armed with
rifles, hand grenades, gas, machine guns, helmets, flak jackets, pro-
tecting the Nations Capital.
 17

And we were carefully instructed and carefully trained to work

with the local police. But there was always that sense that there
was an intimidating factor by Federal troops that could cross the
line of civil liberties. In my district, we have Bloodsworth Island,
where the Navy comes in, and has been for a long time, they bomb
the island. Thats where people fish and canoe and things like that.
So the Federal presence has to be carefully balanced.
I think the legislation, the last comment Mr. Thornberry said is,
if were well prepared and well trained, then we wont cross the
line. If were not well prepared and well trained or fragmented,
thats when problems arise.
Mr. KUCINICH. Could I ask one final question?
Mr. LATOURETTE. All right, Mr. Kucinich.
Mr. KUCINICH. And that is, do you see then the homeland secu-
rity act, any of you, taking place within the context of a declaration
of marshal law or apart from it?
Mr. GILCHREST. I would say in most circumstances, I dont see
it enhancing or contributing to the increased use of marshal law.
I certainly know that in certain circumstances, in the 1960s across
the country, whether it was Newark, New Jersey or Detroit or
Washington, DC, that was put in place in a limited way to protect
citizens.
Mr. LATOURETTE. I thank you, Mr. Kucinich. I was going to
make the observation that you did before, I thought Mr. Thorn-
berry hit the nail on the head, that its important that not only this
committee but the Congress and the entire Federal Government
work on this activity. Because after something happens, the likeli-
hood of having a result or a measure that people will be screaming
for because of the emergency may not protect some of the things
that I think youre talking about, Mr. Kucinich.
Mr. Gilman, do you have questions you would like to ask?
Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ill be brief.
Let me ask our three panelists, who made some excellent sugges-
tions, what mechanism does each of you in your bill utilize to impel
coordination and coherence among the many agencies that are out
there in fighting domestic terrorism? And does each of you have in
your bill budgetary discipline as a role in forcing compliance?
Mr. SKELTON. My bill is preliminary to that. The President
would be in charge and dictate to the various directors, secretaries,
after a review was made as to their suggested role, but he would
bring it to us for us to implement or to change or to make better.
My bill has nothing to do regarding the budgetary process. My bill
costs nothing except the salaries of some folks that are trying to
put together a strategy that the President would recommend to us.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. THORNBERRY. My bill creates a homeland security agency
that would have budgetary authority over the entities that I men-
tioned. It would also be the single point of contact for the other
agencies that may be involved, depending on what kind of threat
or what kind of incident were talking about.
And it would create one single individual accountable to the
President whos responsible for homeland security. And I think
that gets back to what Mr. Shays was asking about earlier, the
 18

benefits of reorganization versus coordination. I really think thats

the shades of difference between Mr. Gilchrests bill and mine.
I was struck by the testimony that you all had before in your
subcommittee, the CSIS guy who says youve got to have three
things, authority, accountability and resources. If you just deal
with a coordination, you have to struggle and reach to figure out
how youre going to get the control over the money in this coordi-
nating agency, go through OMB back and forth. I think weve got
to be more direct than that. So thats the approach that my bill
takes for those agencies.
Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Gilchrest.
Mr. GILCHREST. What we do is set up a council in the executive
branch directly beneath the President. This council, at the direction
of the President, will then bring in the various myriad of agencies
to look at what everybody does. And I would guess, I would not
want to use the word reorganization, but to enhance the activities
and the coordination of those agencies to be much more effective.
Thereby, instead of the fragmented agencies not working to-
gether, we use the existing structure to create coordination so they
do work together, and thereby saving the taxpayers a lot of dollars
by coordinating the budget.
Mr. GILCHREST. I want to thank our three colleagues for giving
a great deal of thought to this. I think its incumbent upon all of
us in these joint committees, members of the joint committees who
are here today, to undertake a thorough, comprehensive review to
make a more effective program with regard to anti-terrorism.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you, Mr. Gilchrest. Thank you, Mr. Gil-
man.
Mr. Putnam, questions?
Mr. PUTNAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Based on the previous hearings that our subcommittee has had,
and the discussions that weve had so far today, were all having
this difficult time getting our arms around the implicit nature of
crime versus terrorism and what is what. I just wanted to pose a
question, as the new kid on the block.
If an 18 year old in a high school in my district and a 25 year
old radical anti-globalization protestor and an operative in the Bin
Laden operation are all simultaneously working to crash the New
York Stock Exchange, which one is the terrorist, and how do we
respond? Do we define terrorism based on the act, based on the
perpetrator, based on the geographic location from where they levy
their operations? Which of those individuals is the terrorist?
Mr. SKELTON. Both of them are in violation of the criminal law
of the United States, we know that. Both of them would be subject
to criminal sanctions of the United States. But that very question
that you pose is the very question that the President and his study
would have to make recommendations to us. True, its a fine line.
But one of them has a tail to it, Bin Laden, and the other is a
straight out and out criminal activity.
But thats the purpose of our study, that this bill would call for.
These are difficult questions. Theyre not cut and dry. Thats why
we have to do the first thing first, establish what the strategy is
going to be, and then start fitting, as a result of the recommenda-
 19

tions from the President, start fitting the pieces together. Were
going to get there. This Congress has to do something. But the first
step should be the right step in establishing the overall strategy
along with the help of the President.
Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Putnam, I would agree. I think the situa-
tion you pose is the kind of thing were going to be facing. Its not
going to fit in a nice, neat little box that we can put a label on and
make us feel better and say, yes, this is your problem, its not our
problem. Thats one of the reasons that weve got to do something
about all of these charts that you see up here. Theres got to be a
single focal point for the U.S. Government for dealing with home-
land security issues, even if you dont have all of the agencies in-
volved under his jurisdiction, there has to be one focal point ac-
countable to the President to deal with these things.
I think that is a very likely scenario, some outside entity wants
to smuggle something in to some Timothy McVeigh type to do
something horrible. Thats one reason we have to do better in get-
ting control of our borders, we have to have more focus in trying
to prevent these things and deal with the consequences of them.
And then the law enforcement, you know, finding them and pros-
ecuting them later, is a separate thing.
But I dont think you can divide very easily the terrorism versus
the consequence or the domestic versus the foreign. I think it is all
very fuzzy.
Mr. GILCHREST. I think we have to have the ability to determine
whether or not that single 18 year old acted alone to cause the
stock market to crash versus, which is a crime, plus a terrorist ac-
tivity, because it affects tens of thousands if not millions of people.
So if it affects large groups of people, not having a law enforcement
background, not being an attorney, I would as a layman say its a
terrorist act.
But we need the skill to find out if theres anybody else involved
in that, such as a Bin Laden. I think each of these bills makes that
attempt.
Mr. SKELTON. Mr. Putnam, if I may add, the recent kidnapping
and murder of a man, from my district, Sunrise Beach, MO, down
to Ecuador, posed that same question, were these mere criminals
or were they terrorists. It made a great deal of difference as to the
response from our country as to whether we could engage them as
terrorists.
Well, as you know, ransom was paid and the rest of those who
were kidnapped were returned, of course, with the very sad murder
of the very first one.
Mr. PUTNAM. Let me follow up, Mr. Skelton, if I may, with your
proposal. Should the design of your consequence management
strategy be apart and different from the design of the anti-terrorist
strategy?
Mr. SKELTON. Well, it has to be. The left hand has to know what
the right hand is doing. But one, youre trying to stop it before it
happens. And the other is, doing something after it happened, all
the way from helping people who are injured to catching the cul-
prits.
Mr. PUTNAM. This hearing sort of illustrates the problems that
Congress is having. We have a transportation and infrastructure
 20

and a government reform, obviously a lot of expertise from armed

services is required. Now were beginning to review the fact that
agriculture needs to be a part of this, and domestic law enforce-
ment. What does Congress need to do, institutionally, to better deal
with these issues?
Mr. THORNBERRY. Let me just mention that the Commission on
National Security in the 21st Century has a whole chapter on us,
about how were part of the problem and weve got to get our own
house in order. And they have some specific recommendations in
there about how we need to rearrange ourselves.
But I think that its a very real problem, if we allow jurisdic-
tional concerns and protectiveness to prevent something from hap-
pening, I think that will not be something that well be proud of
in the days ahead.
Mr. GILCHREST. Ill just make a quick comment, because cyber-
space has been mentioned here, agriculture has been mentioned
here, U.S. ports have been mentioned here today, along with a
myriad of other things. What we attempt to do in our bill is to have
the President bring all of those Federal entities together and de-
velop a very specific coordinating policy, planning, training activity
that can go from the Justice Department, the FBI, to Customs, to
the Department of Agriculture, down to all the medical, police and
first responders on the local level, to get all of this not only coordi-
nated, but to get the big picture.
Mr. PUTNAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the panel.
Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you, Mr. Putnam.
Mr. Platts, do you have any questions youd like to ask?
Mr. PLATTS. No, thank you.
Mr. SKELTON. May I add something to that?
Mr. LATOURETTE. Certainly.
Mr. SKELTON. The thing that worries me most is, we do nothing.
Another tragedy comes to pass, and then we rush to judgment with
legislation that might not work on the one hand, or be a great vio-
lation of our American civil rights, which consequently would be
struck down by the Supreme Court, and the end result is we have
done nothing. Thats why you need a step by step study, strategy,
to give direction both to the anti-terrorism activities and to the con-
sequent management of this.
It has to be thought out methodically and hopefully we can do
it before another tragedy comes to pass and we rush to judgment
and pass something thats not very good. That concerns me.
Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you very much. And we thank all of
you.
Mr. Gilchrest, if I could, before we let you go, ask you one ques-
tion. In looking at your legislation, I think Mr. Thornberry men-
tioned the three elements of legislation or a proposal that wed like
to have, accountability, authority and resources. The question is,
clearly in yours, with this council, I think its a good idea that it
raises the profile by putting it within the administration. Theres
accountability in that there is someone that can be responsible, the
buck stops here, I think Mr. Skelton indicated. And resources have
not been a problem, the figures go between $7 billion and $11 bil-
lion.
 21

Do you see, however, that there is the authority in this council

to enforce or cause the reorganization that may need to occur and
end some of the turf battles that now plague a coordinated effort
as we respond to domestic terrorism?
Mr. GILCHREST. I think turf battles in any bureaucracy is dif-
ficult to the degree of the makeup of the person in charge. If you
have a strong person, I dont think the difficulty in turf battles will
be much of an issue. Thereby, putting this in the Office of the
President, its not going to be under FEMA, its not going to be
under the Treasury Department, its not going to be under anybody
else but the leader of the free world, which is the President.
If you do that, I think turf battles will fade away like the morn-
ing fogover wetlands. [Laughter.]
Mr. LATOURETTE. Good analogy, and a good place to end. I want
to thank you all very much for not only your legislation, but your
patience with the committee, and your excellent testimony. Thank
you very much.
We will now welcome before the joint hearing the second panel
of witnesses. We have with us today Mr. Raymond Decker, who is
the Director for Diffuse Threat Issues for the Defense Capabilities
and Management Team of the General Accounting Office, and Mr.
William Ellis of the Congressional Research Service. We thank you
gentlemen for being here.
And Mr. Shays, you have a unanimous consent request?
Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I ask unanimous consent
to insert into the hearing record a series of charts depicting the
current organizational structure of the Federal Government dealing
with domestic and international terrorism that are around the
room.
Further, I ask unanimous consent to insert into the hearing
record the following prepared statements from the Embassy of
Israel concerning terrorist threats to Israel and how the Israeli
Government is organized to respond to such threats, the British
Embassy, concerning the terrorist threats to the United Kingdom
and the governments organization and coordination effort to
counter the threat. And from the Embassy of Japan concerning the
terrorist threat to Japan and measures taken by Japan to prevent
terrorism. And finally, from the Office of Management and Budget.
Id ask unanimous consent.
Mr. LATOURETTE. Without objection, so ordered.
Im also advised that we have Steve Caldwell, who is accompany-
ing Mr. Decker today, but wont be speaking or answering ques-
tions, which is OK.
Mr. Decker, wed invite you to begin.

STATEMENT OF RAYMOND J. DECKER, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE

CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT TEAM, U.S. GENERAL AC-
COUNTING OFFICE, ACCOMPANIED BY STEVE CALDWELL,
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
Mr. DECKER. Chairman LaTourette, Chairman Shays, Represent-
atives Gilchrest, Thornberry and Skelton, and members of the sub-
committees. Were pleased to be here this afternoon to discuss
three bills, H.R. 525, H.R. 1158 and H.R. 1292, which provide pro-
 22

posals to change the overall leadership and management of pro-

grams to combat terrorism.
As you indicated, sir, Mr. Steve Caldwell is here to assist. He has
managed much of our recent work in this area.
Given that our Government is spending approximately $11 bil-
lion this fiscal year to combat terrorism, and that over 40 Federal
agencies are involved, as indicated by all those place tags on the
table there, we view this hearing as a very positive step in the on-
going debate concerning the overall leadership and management of
this complex and cross-cutting issue.
Our testimony is based on our extensive evaluations of Federal
programs to combat terrorism, many of them done for your sub-
committees. Our experience is in evaluating programs to combat
terrorism and not the broader topic of homeland security, which in-
cludes terrorism and additional threats such as cyber attacks on
our critical infrastructure. The scope of both H.R. 1158 and H.R.
1292 focuses on homeland security issues, while H.R. 525 addresses
domestic terrorism and preparedness at the Federal, State and
local levels.
Mr. Chairman, in an attempt to direct our comments at the two
primary thrusts of this hearing, namely, how each bill might
produce a more effective and efficient organization in the Federal
Government to counter terrorism, and which provisions of each bill
could be used to enhance the others, we believe it would be bene-
ficial to provide our observations on five key actions we deem nec-
essary for any effective Federal effort to combat terrorism.
First, a single high level Federal focal point must be established
to lead and manage the national efforts in this area. Each bill, as
outlined by the three representatives, the sponsors of the bills, ad-
dresses the issue of whos in charge. H.R. 525 proposes a council
with an executive chairman within the Executive Office of the
President. H.R. 1158 places a Cabinet level official in charge of a
new proposed National Homeland Security Agency. And H.R. 1292
calls for a single official designated by the President for homeland
security.
Second, a comprehensive threat and risk assessment is essential
to underpin a national strategy and guide resource investments.
Both H.R. 525 and 1292 require some form of threat and risk as-
sessment. H.R. 1158 stresses the need for effective intelligence
sharing to identify potential threats and risks against the United
States.
Third, a national strategy to combat terrorism with a defined end
state must integrate plans, goals, objectives, roles and actions for
an effective overall effort. All three bills propose positive solutions
in this area, which generally follow the chief tenets of the Govern-
ment Performance and Results Act of 1993.
Fourth, an effective management mechanism must exist to ana-
lyze and prioritize Government-wide programs and budgets to iden-
tify gaps and reduce duplication of effort. Again, all three bills pro-
pose varied measures to effectively oversee program activities and
budget requirements.
Finally, the coordination of all Federal level activities to combat
terrorism must be efficient and seamless. All bills stress the need
 23

for enhanced interagency coordination and establish mechanisms to

achieve this goal.
In closing, as we have observed today, there is no consensus in
Congress, in the executive branch, in the various panels and com-
missions which you will hear after we speak, or the organizations
representing first responders on the ideal solution to this complex
issue. However, to the extent that these three bills or some hybrid
of them address the five key actions we have identified above, we
are confident that the Federal effort to combat terrorism will be
improved.
Sir, this concludes my testimony, and Mr. Caldwell and I will be
happy to answer any questions the subcommittees may have.
Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you, Mr. Decker.
Mr. Ellis.

STATEMENT OF WILLIAM W. ELLIS, SENIOR SPECIALIST IN

AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT AND PUBLIC ADMINIS-
TRATION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
Mr. ELLIS. Good afternoon, chairmen and members. Im Bill Ellis
of the Congressional Research Service.
The governmental structures and procedures for combating ter-
rorism have been a concern for the Congress for a number of years,
and the enactment of any of these three bills would represent a
new departure in this area. However, the proposals move forward
in different ways. H.R. 1292 would require little or no change; H.R.
525 would add a coordinating group to existing structures; and
H.R. 1158 would create a whole new Government agency.
As is the case with the others, Ive been asked to take two tacks
at this. But at the outset, let me just note that congressional guide-
lines on objectivity and non-partisanship for my agency, the Con-
gressional Research Service, require me to confine my testimony to
technical, professional and non-advocative aspects of the matters
under consideration.
First, how might these bills make our Government more effective
and efficient at combating terrorism? Weve been through the de-
tails of these acts, so I wont rehearse those. But let me just say
briefly that H.R. 525, the Preparedness Against Domestic Terror-
ism Act of 2001, would create a Presidents council on domestic ter-
rorism preparedness, and its a mechanism to coordinating existing
Federal agencies in the development and implementation of Fed-
eral policy to combat terrorism. In providing a specific mechanism,
this bill might increase the coherence of now fragmented national
policy and reduce interagency duplication.
H.R. 1158, the National Homeland Security Agency Act, would
also probably increase national policy coherence and reduce pro-
gram overlaps. Its approach is to combine many units from Federal
agencies rather than to work within the existing agency frame-
work.
H.R. 1292, the Homeland Securities Strategy Act of 2001, would
require the President to systematically coordinate the development
and implementation of national policy to combat terrorism, using
the existing organizational arrangements. The cost of this measure
would be minimal, as has been pointed out, and if vigorously imple-
 24

mented, it might also be effective, especially if it is conceived of as

a prelude to any major change.
The extent to which of these options would provide for better co-
ordination depends a great deal on its implementation. While Con-
gress will undoubtedly consider the costs and benefits of each of
these proposals, issues of implementation should be taken into con-
sideration in doing this. And of course, its important, if youre
going to do an analysis of the benefits and costs of any prospective
action, that you understand clearly and have a clear statement of
what the objectives are.
Turning to the second area, which specific provisions of each bill
could be used to enhance the others, I make seven points. One,
some have suggested that the kind of threat assessment required
for systematic policy development is lacking in our deliberations.
Both H.R. 525 and H.R. 1192 specifically address this, while H.R.
1158 does not. Perhaps it might.
Two, all three bills require the development of a national policy
to combat terrorism and an implementation plan for it. H.R. 1292
requires the President to develop a multi-year implementation plan
and the other bills may benefit from the addition of this longer
time dimension.
Three, H.R. 525 has specific requirements to guide the making
of Federal grants to the States. The other bills might benefit from
more specific language in this area.
Four, in the area of Federal to State liaison, H.R. 525 specifies
the creation of a State and local advisory board. Something on this
order might be considered for the other bills.
Five, in the area of standards for equipment, training and other
aspects of domestic preparedness, H.R. 525 and H.R. 1158 have
them, while H.R. 1292 does not. The addition of language on stand-
ards and guidelines might be appropriate.
Six, all three bills have requirements for the centralized develop-
ment of the budget to combat terrorism. The requirements of H.R.
525 and H.R. 1292 are more explicit than those of H.R. 1158. Per-
haps there might be more said about that in that measure.
Seven, and finally, all of the bills require reports to Congress.
But there are differences. There might be some benefit to compar-
ing these requirements to determine the best configuration for Con-
gress.
That concludes my testimony. Thank you for your attention. Of
course, Ill answer questions.
Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you very much, Mr. Ellis.
Mr. Decker, and Mr. Caldwell, if thats appropriate, in your ob-
servations and your testimonies, you indicated that there should be
five things that you would be looking for in any piece of legislation
or reorganization that the Government should undertake. You went
through those in great detail, and I began making a schematic,
looking fortheres a new show on called the Weakest LinkI was
looking for the weakest link of the three pieces of legislation we
discussed today.
But in response to each of the five observations or items that you
wanted to see, all three, you said, contained the five components
that you were looking at.
 25

When Mr. Ellis was talking, he sort of went through and indi-
cated that maybe H.R. 525 was good in terms of outlining how
grants are going to go to the States, and perhaps some standards
and guidelines discussions.
Would it be your recommendation to not only the two subcommit-
tees here today, but to the Congress, that all three of these bills,
we should just pass them and were done, or are there things that
you think are missing from the three pieces of legislation that
were considering today that you think, or Mr. Caldwell thinks, or
Mr. Ellis thinks, would help us do this better?
Mr. DECKER. Mr. Chairman, thats a very difficult question. Its
much like going to the grocery store which has apples, oranges, and
bananas, and being asked to pick which one is the best fruit. Clear-
ly, the scope of the three bills vary, and I think Dr. Ellis addressed
that as well as we did in our testimony and in our prepared state-
ment. Mr. Skeltons bill looks at a strategy, a homeland security
strategy, whereas Mr. Gilchrests bill looks at an amendment to the
Stafford Act to improve domestic preparedness at the State and
local level, primarily. And the bill from Mr. Thornberry looks at the
establishment of a new agency to deal with other issues besides
terrorism.
I can only go back to our foundation, and that is, regardless of
what mechanism, what organization, what model is used, there has
to be key elements to promote the effectiveness of the model. The
key elements deal with leadership, with strategy, with implementa-
tion, with interagency coordination, and with some ability to link
the effectiveness with some type of results.
Mr. LATOURETTE. And I understood that from your testimony. I
guess my question is, are there specific things, as you have re-
viewed these three pieces of legislation, specific suggestions that
you would want to share with the subcommittees that would im-
prove any of the three? I dont think any of the authors would take
umbrage by it. I think they want to have the best possible product
possible.
Are there specific suggestions that you would choose to offer or
can offer that might improve whats before us now?
Mr. DECKER. Sir, I think if we look at each of the five, I would
just simply make a comment or two about each. On the leadership,
I think each of the proposals outlined someone in charge. I think
a key aspect is accountability. And accountability to me would
mean, with the advice and consent of Congress, the individual
would work on, in the executive branch, toward these measures.
There would be visibility and accountability.
The national strategy is another important aspect. I think a key
to any program has to have a framework that pulls in all the key
components for an effective effort. As mentioned by Representative
Skelton, the threat and risk assessment is critical. Without that,
you cannot really structure a good national strategy to implement.
Each of the proposals did talk about a threat and risk assess-
ment. As I mentioned, it was H.R. 1158 that did not clearly stipu-
late or require threat and risk assessment. We think thats critical.
It gets a little bit more fuzzy when you talk about interagency
coordination mechanisms. That probably is one of the hardest as-
pects of the Federal efforttying together and linking the efforts
 26

of 43 agencies that are dealing with this at the Federal level. And
can you imagine the interagency coordination, if it were intra,
intergovernmental coordination as you get into the States and
local.
So I would only suggest that the language in any proposal has
to have more specificity in those five areas that we just outlined.
Mr. LATOURETTE. Mr. Ellis, your observations were not only dip-
lomatic, but I thought they were also very helpful in terms of
where you would choose to make adjustments. Are there others
that you didnt mention that you would like to add now, or was
that list pretty exhaustive?
Mr. ELLIS. Thank you for your kind words, sir. I would just make
these comments. The constitution of the United States of America
is one of the most astonishing documents that has ever been cre-
ated by the human mind. Im sure we can all agree on that, and
celebrate it. One of the things that virtually everyone has agreed
upon here is that there are some serious constitutional issues in
this. On the one hand, there is the need to protect the realm. And
on the other hand, there is the need to protect the liberties. And
I would think it would be very useful if the Congress could directly
engage that issue as it does these deliberations on this important
measure.
On the issue of threat assessment, of course, the logic of the
thing is that you must have a threat assessment that is adequate
if you are going to press forward with legislating in this vein. How-
ever, with the new kinds of threats that have been developed, in
terms of potential information warfare, in terms of the chemical
and biological threats and the scientific aspects of those things,
these are new things that are really very difficult to dimension in
terms of any real threat assessment. I would suggest that issue
might be engaged as you engage the issue of determining what the
threat is that is going to drive this whole thing.
I would also, sir, suggest, in all humility, and certainly it is not
my role to tell the Congress what to do, but I would just point out
that in a number of these reports it has been suggested that con-
gressional organization is part of the kind of thing that we must
deal with in considering reorganization of the Federal Executive.
And I would hope that the Congress would address that issue as
well.
Mr. LATOURETTE. Good. I thank you very much.
Chairman Shays.
Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. It is wonderful to have GAO here, and
it is wonderful to have you here, Dr. Ellis, as well. We usually do
not invite CRS to come in to testify but we usually get them into
our office so that we get all the good background before we go out
to the public. So, wonderful to give you a little public exposure for
your very good work.
I bring two basic assumptions to the table. One, there will be a
terrorist attack, be it chemical, biological, or nuclear, less likely nu-
clear, somewhere in the United States in the not too distant future
and it will be a pretty alarming event. I take that and that there
may be more than one. I just make that assumption because I be-
lieve it with all my heart and soul. I also believe that we are totally
and completely disorganized in how we respond to it.
 27

I am wrestling with my kind ofand I am not wrestling with

what Mr. Kucinich is right at this moment, because I see nothing
at all in this legislation that changes the status quo on civil lib-
erties; nothing at all. But I do know that, obviously, there is always
the danger, whether we have the status quo now or reorganize. But
I wrestle with the three levels: One is, to say to the President set
us a strategy and let us see what you recommend, to one where we
basically have an office within the White House, to one in which
we actually have a cabinet position. And I am wrestling with this
in terms of the so-called HomeLand office. That is, I see the
things that go in it and then I realize there are so many things
that are not in it that probably would need to go in it in order to
be truly comprehensive, and then I am wondering if I am getting
into the problem that we did with the Energy Department when we
decided what to put in and what not to put in.
So this hearing is not answering my questions. It is just raising
more questions, which is somewhat typical. But having said that,
what would I likely add to the Home Office that was not there if
I wanted to be more comprehensive? I mean, basically we have
FEMA in there, we have the Customs Service, we have the Border
Patrol, we have the Coast Guard, and critical infrastructure offices
of Commerce, and we have FBI, parts of FBI. Should INS be part
of it? Let me put it this wayI am doing a lot of talking here and
not listening to the answerwhat are the ones that you could go
back and forth on and have a wonderful argument and never come
to a conclusion?
Mr. ELLIS. Sir, it is very difficult to reckon that one. You have
to go just issue by issue. It is an agency by agency
Mr. SHAYS. Does that problem exist? Am I seeing something that
I should not be seeing? Or is there an issue of where you draw the
line?
Mr. ELLIS. Oh, yes, sir. No, I think there definitely is a question,
if you are going to take that kind of reorganization option and
begin creating a new agency, there is definitely an issue of what
should go in there and what should not. For example, and this is
not taking a position at all, it is quite remarkable that when you
look at these agencies that are placed into the new agency there
is not anything that represents biological science. And what has
been said by a number of these reports is that bioterrorism is real-
ly the most significant, or a most significant aspect of what it is
that we face. Now whether that means taking the Centers for Dis-
ease Control and the Veterans Administration and whatever else
components and putting them in there or not, certainly there ought
to be, if you take that option, some kind of representation of bio-
logical science.
Mr. SHAYS. So, you have given me one example of something you
would wrestle with.
Mr. ELLIS. Yes, sir. And that is just an example.
Mr. SHAYS. And would you be able to give me an example of
something that should have been there if you were going to
really
Mr. DECKER. Mr. Chairman, my sense is that the homeland secu-
rity proposals encompass a lot more capabilities than just to com-
bat terrorism. These proposals deal with other emerging threats.
 28

And that is where we have some difficulty evaluating them. Our

foundation has been built on evaluating Federal efforts to combat
terrorism and we have not looked at reorganizations of the Govern-
ment in a way to combat terrorism except to ensure that there are
certain key fundamental elements existing in any structure.
Mr. SHAYS. OK. Let me ask you this. If we do not go that route,
how do we deal with the very real issue that you want responsibil-
ity, accountability, and resources? I mean, I do buy into the fact
that those are three very powerful forces that you would want. So,
is it possible to have coordination and have the responsibility, ac-
countability, and resources?
Mr. ELLIS. Mr. Chairman, I believe it is. When Representative
Thornberry talked about authority, accountability, and resources
he talked about the authority, the leadership, the assignment of
that individual, that entity or body, the focal point; the accountabil-
ity to not just the executive branch, the President, but also to Con-
gress; and resources. And resources, the point that I did omit
would be some type of budget certification. As was mentioned ear-
lier, if you do not control some type of budget or some type of re-
sources, you are really without much leverage. If those three pieces
are given to whatever entity that is in charge, I think you would
have a more effective mechanism than we have today.
Mr. SHAYS. I am just wondering how you give resources to a co-
ordinating organization that actually has sway over the organiza-
tions it is trying to coordinate. But, sadly, I have to leave this hear-
ing, Mr. Chairman, and I am sorry. But I appreciate you all being
here.
Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you very much, Mr. Shays.
Mr. Kucinich.
Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
For any of the witnesses, rather than focusing on the number of
agencies with a role in counterterrorism, some critics have focused
on the lack of coordination among them. They point out there is no
single individual with authority to direct budget decisions across
all Federal agencies. Would any bill grant a single individual budg-
etary authority over other agencies engaged in counterterrorism?
And would this authority be exercised through recommendations or
direction? And would secretaries of other departments, such as
DOD or State, be required to abide by this persons requirements?
Anyone?
Mr. ELLIS. Mr. Kucinich, I would only suggest that perhaps the
wisest approach would be with the budget certification or rec-
ommendation. I think it would be very difficult for one entity, lets
say within the Executive Office of the President, to have almost
veto power or supreme authority over budget issues that involve
the other departments.
Mr. DECKER. To me, the coordinating power for the Federal
budget is lodged in the presidency. And that is as it should be.
Mr. KUCINICH. So, gentlemen, based on your understanding of
the proposals, how would the bills generally handle intelligence-
gathering in domestic settings?
Mr. DECKER. Sir, I think there are some very well established
guidelines with respect to domestic intelligence collection. The in-
telligence communitythat is, the CIA, the Defense Intelligence
 29

Agency, National Security Agency, and othersare prohibited from

collecting domestic intelligence; that is, intelligence involving U.S.
persons. This is outlined in Executive Order 12333. On issues that
involve domestic terrorism, obviously it gets into the law enforce-
ment area and the FBI has the jurisdiction on collecting informa-
tion that may lead to prosecution of a criminal act such as terror-
ism.
Mr. KUCINICH. So you do not see any implications of this legisla-
tion running into Executive Order 12333?
Mr. DECKER. Sir, my understanding, based upon our review of
the legislation, there are no indications from the language that the
intelligence apparatus of the United States would be directed at its
citizens.
Mr. KUCINICH. Is that precluded from this legislation, in your un-
derstanding?
Mr. DECKER. Yes sir. I think there are very strict guidelines and
it has been in effect for over 20 years as a result of hearings in
Congress based on the abuses of collecting on U.S. persons during
the Vietnam War and during the civil rights period of the 1960s
and 1970s.
Mr. KUCINICH. And since some of the legislation speaks in terms
of prevention, how would principles governing intelligence-gather-
ing against U.S. citizens be affected by each of the proposals?
Mr. ELLIS. That is one of the things, sir, that I think needs to
be made much more specific.
Mr. KUCINICH. Could you elaborate?
Mr. ELLIS. Well, I would just suggest that in each of the propos-
als, as I read them, the statements about intelligence gathering vis
a vis U.S. citizens are not as specific as they could be as the Con-
gress engages these important constitutional issues that are raised
by legislating in this area. So I would not say, sir, that either one
of them is better than the other. I think there is something of a
gap there that is manifest in all of them.
Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you. Do any of the bills that require a com-
prehensive assessment include within that assessment the impact
of U.S. Government actions on the likelihood of those threats?
Mr. ELLIS. I am sorry. Can you repeat your question, sir?
Mr. KUCINICH. The bills which would require a comprehensive
assessment, within that assessment is there anything about the
impact of U.S. Government actionsyou know, creating the threats
or
Mr. ELLIS. Sir, the specificity in the bills is not there with re-
spect to the division perhaps between domestic and international
threats. But, clearly, if current policies are followed, the FBI would
have jurisdiction over evaluating and providing against the domes-
tic threat, in concert with State and local inputs, and the intel-
ligence community, the CIA, DIA, and others, would have respon-
sibility for the international aspect. And those two components
would comprise the threat assessment piece for the United States.
Mr. KUCINICH. Just one final quick question, Mr. Chairman. And
I thank you for your indulgence.
In the hearing that we had a few weeks ago in our subcommit-
tee, we had a number of witnesses come up and explain to us about
how the United States is perceived in other countries. And in con-
 30

nection with that, I wonder if any of the bills would require an as-
sessment of actions of U.S. corporations operating abroad and the
effect of those actions on the likelihood of a threat?
Mr. ELLIS. There is nothing specific in the legislation at this
time, as I read these bills.
Mr. KUCINICH. Because certainly threats do not exist in a vacu-
um. I am just offering that for your consideration. They do not
exist in a vacuum. So, is this an area that maybe the legislation
ought to consider?
Mr. ELLIS. That is up to the committee, sir. Of course, it is one
of the things that legislation may very well consider.
Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you.
Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you, Mr. Kucinich.
Mr. Gilman.
Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank our wit-
nesses for their excellent analysis of these measures before us.
Let me ask, is there any way to reorganize our antiterrorism ef-
forts at home to avoid the creation of a new and large bureaucracy
and the significant organizational disruption that could occur in
properly responding to this problem? I note that H.R. 1158 provides
for a wholesale transfer of various agencies, assets, and authorities.
H.R. 525 details how parts of the Federal Government should be
reorganized. Is there any easier way to do this without providing
a significant disruption of our agencies? I propose that to both of
our panelist.
Mr. ELLIS. Well, of course, the two polar opposites are doing a
radical reorganization, a very fundamental reorganization, on the
one hand, and putting in place some coordinating mechanism de
minimis, on the other hand. And then you have a whole array of
things along the spectrum. What suggests itself is the logic of the
thing, sir, is that whatever it is that you contemplate doing would
well benefit from a consideration of the benefits of that change and
the costs of that change with respect to what it is that you are try-
ing to do.
So I would come at it from a different way. I would not say there
is a danger in creating this bureaucracy, that bureaucracy, or not
doing enough to reorganize. I would rather say whatever it is that
is contemplated one would benefit from considering what the costs
and benefits are in reckoning what would be most appropriate.
Mr. DECKER. Mr. Gilman, I would only state that, of the three
proposals, Representative Skeltons is to discuss the homeland se-
curity strategy. And a strategy may shake out some of the details
that might indicate a better approach to dealing with what he calls
antiterrorism and consequence management.
If you go back to Presidential Decision Directive No. 39 and No.
62, which deal with combating terrorism, they make a distinction
between crisis and consequence management to prevent, deter, and
then actually respond after an incident. I suspect that regardless
of the proposals of H.R. 525 or H.R. 1158, those issues of how you
actually prevent, protect, prepare, and respond might be clearer
based upon the mechanism that you select.
Mr. GILMAN. I think what you are both telling us is that there
probably is no easier way of approaching this problem than a major
reorganization. Am I correct?
 31

Mr. ELLIS. I would not necessarily say that, sir. Any time you do
a major reorganization there are costs that are incurred and you
just have to look at the benefits on the other side. On the other
hand, if one takes a coordinating kind of an approach, then it may
be the case that in the coordination the agencies that are com-
manded from the White House or whatever through this and that
may resist or may come here and seek to mobilize Members of Con-
gress on their behalf, and all kinds of things like that. So this is
not an easy problem to solve. There is no silver bullet.
Mr. GILMAN. That is why I am addressing the problem, to see if
there is any easier way of taking 40-some agencies where this prob-
lem has been proliferated and then $11 billion that we are talking
about and try to put it all into one easier method of addressing this
problem. And apparently, from what you are both saying, that is
not possible.
Mr. ELLIS. No, sir, I would not say that. I have not been clear.
What I would suggest to you is that in H.R. 525 and in H.R. 1292,
what you have is more coordinating approaches that do not have
within the many major reorganization and the costs that would be
incurred in such a reorganization. On the other hand, if you take
the one that does create the major new agency and does put a lot
of pieces of agencies together in doing that, there may be costs that
are incurred in doing that but the benefits may vastly outweigh the
costs. I do not know without considering that very, very carefully.
Have I been clear, sir?
Mr. GILMAN. Yes, you are clear. But it still leaves a major prob-
lem for all of us.
Mr. Decker, do you want to comment further?
Mr. DECKER. No, sir. I think the issue is complex as Dr. Ellis
said, there is no silver bullet. Whether you rework what is existing
and strengthen the mechanism that exists, or reorganize and cre-
ate a new organization, we would be unable to advise you which
is the better approach.
Mr. GILMAN. I want to thank both of you. Thank you, Mr. Chair-
man.
Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you, Mr. Gilman.
Mr. Putnam, questions?
Mr. PUTNAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the panel for
their insightful discussion of this issue, that all of us are led to
more questions than to more answers as a result.
Tell me how this country is inherently at greater risk today than
we were at the time of the 1984 Olympics, or the 1996 Olympics,
or the 1994 Trade Center bombing? What has substantively
changed that we are at a much greater risk today? And what have
been our successes in preventing terrorism and terrorist attacks
such that we have had as few as we have up till this point? In
other words, what is working?
Mr. ELLIS. Of course, Congressman, you will have an opportunity
to address those issues to representatives of some of these commis-
sions that have done this work in a subsequent panel, and I hope
very much that you will do that.
There are many things. There is the rapid advance of technology,
and not just the rapid advance of technology that is related to
weaponry, but the proliferation of some of that technology. So that
 32

while it could be said 20 years ago that it would be unlikely for

somebody who was a loner with just a few bucks here and there
to be able to create a biological weapon that could be effectively de-
ployed and cause extraordinary damage in terms of human casual-
ties and perhaps animal casualties, today the science we are given
to understand, and there still is controversy about this, has ad-
vanced to the point and proliferated to the point where it is no
longer impossible to think about somebody who is a loner with a
few bucks being able to do something like that. That is one thing.
Another thing is the increase, as has been pointed out by one of
the commissions, in the vast intercourse between different coun-
tries, there are a whole lot of things and people coming in here and
leaving here and it is really very difficult to watch all of that with
great care. And there are other things as well. But perhaps that
begins to give you some sense why some people believe that there
is more danger now than there was before. But I would urge you,
sir, to address that question again to the following panel.
Mr. DECKER. Mr. Putnam, I would only concur with Dr. Ellis. I
think when the representatives from the Hart-Rudman and the
Gilmore commissions speak, they have looked at that at great
length. I would only comment that when you talk about weapons
of mass destruction dealing with the biological, chemical, radiologi-
cal, nuclear, and high explosives, when discussing combating ter-
rorism, and then factor in cyber attack or cyber warfare, it is a
much different scenario today than it was in 1984. We are a much
more vulnerable country as a result of our computer reliance and
the way that the world is evolving with electronics.
I would only suggest that these new and emerging threats re-
quire new, probably non-traditional thoughts on how to solve these
issues. That is why this hearing is very refreshing, because it does
look at proposals other than what we have today which are not
working as well as they could or should.
Mr. ELLIS. And then you also have the issue of motivation in
which at least one of the commission reports pointed out there are
numerous persons and whole social elements that do not regard us
as friendly. But also inside the United States there are many peo-
ple who are hostile to the Government, not just to the particular
regime, but to this Government itself. And those things have
changed the nature of the dangers that confront us as a democracy.
Mr. PUTNAM. Mr. Caldwell?
Mr. CALDWELL. Let me address your question about some of the
successes now that my colleagues have talked a little bit about the
threat and how that has changed. There have been several success-
ful arrests of terrorists overseas related to certain terrorist attacks.
There is cooperation between the intelligence community and law
enforcement going on to carry out those kinds of arrests. There has
also been a greater preparation for high visibility special events
like the Olympics. The Atlanta Olympics is one that you men-
tioned. There was really a great deal of cooperation among Federal
agencies there in terms of coordinating security. I think more re-
cently agencies coordinated efforts on the cyber threat in terms of
preparing for the millenium and Y2K. And related to that, we had
the December 1999 arrests on the border with Canada of suspects
who intended to commit terrorist acts. And finally, there are activi-
 33

ties going on with the intelligence community to prevent terrorist

actions that are better suited to discuss in a closed session or to
be discussed by the intelligence community. We are aware of some
of those preventive actions, but we do not have the details. Thank
you.
Mr. PUTNAM. I am aware of the emerging threats, and our reli-
ance on computer technology, and the interconnectedness of impor-
tant functions of Government, and our reliance on a single power
grid, and things of that nature. But I also reflect on the fact that
the worst terrorist incident carried out on American soil was as
crude an incident as it could possibly be and could just as easily
have been committed 50 years ago as 50 years from now in the
sense that fertilizer and diesel fuel will be fairly common and wide-
spread. And so, just as the threat hierarchy did not register that
while we would be refueling a ship in Yemen as a major action to
be prepared for, I guess my point is that as we become more and
more sophisticated and develop a system to react to more sophisti-
cated threats, we cannot abandon the crude ones that have always
been around and are oftentimes the most accessible to small
groups. Affordability is a factor and the impact is often just as
deadly. Thank you.
Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you, Mr. Putnam.
Mr. Platts, do you have questions?
Mr. PLATTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To our witnesses, for your testimony and efforts on this impor-
tant issue, thank you. Actually, just one question. It regards Mr.
Thornberrys legislation, H.R. 1158, and the delineation of the spe-
cific offices or agencies to be included. And perhaps coming from
the State House of Pennsylvania and serving on our Veterans Af-
fairs Emergency Preparedness Committee and interact with our
Guard troops a fair amount, and wonder whether any of you would
see the Bureau of National Guard being an agency that should be
delineated as being included, maybe as a separate entity, as a dis-
tinct entity, but within the Homeland Security Agency, since we
rely on the Guard both for emergency response, disaster relief,
maintaining civil order when there are major incidents here in the
homeland, whether the Bureau of National Guard should be spelled
out as one of those agencies to be part of the Homeland Security
Agency?
Mr. DECKER. Mr. Platts, I cannot comment directly on the Na-
tional Guard being incorporated in the Homeland Security Agency
proposal. But I can state that currently there are a number of civil
support teams which are comprised of National Guardsmen that
support at the State level any assistance that would be required
from DOD. According to the DOD IG report, this program is not
as effective as it should or could be, however, there is hope that
it will improve with remedial attention.
If these civil support teams do turn out to be as effective as they
are hoped to be, they will be a benefit to the State authorities in
a terrorist incident involving a weapons of mass destruction inci-
dent.
Mr. ELLIS. I have no further comment.
Mr. PLATTS. The reason for whether it should be a distinct entity
and spelled out is because in many cases, as I said, they are our
 34

first kind of response team so often and they kind of have that dual
role of being DOD when they are federalized but really are State
entities. And when I think of coordination, here in this very agency
there needs to be great coordination because of their dual role to
begin with, let alone in this type of situation. So that is why I
throw that out. It is something that maybe we need to look at if
H.R. 1158 is to move forward.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you, Mr. Platts.
Before we let you gentlemen go, Mr. Caldwell, I have been told
that you are one of the smartest guys around on this issue. So I
want to avail myself of that wisdom before you leave. Specifically,
as the subcommittees think about marking up this legislation, I
understand you may have some observations about how the council
proposed by Mr. Gilchrests legislation, H.R. 525, is comprised and
how it operates, and specifically in section 651, where his legisla-
tion talks about the voting and the nonvoting members. Have I
been led astray, or do you in fact have some observations that you
think would be important to us?
Mr. CALDWELL. We provided some technical comments to your
staff in terms of that bill and some of its provisions. In terms of
the way H.R. 525 is set up now, there is an executive chairman
who would serve in the Presidents place and yet there is also an
executive director. Perhaps if both positions were filled by the same
person, it might add accountability. That person would be the focal
point but would also be responsible for the staff and the day to day
coordination. That was one aspect of H.R. 525 that we commented
on.
Also, in terms of the voting, there is a voting structure there in
H.R. 525 and we are not quite sure how that would work. If you
had the President voting, I think his vote would probably count
more than, say another person on the council who was the weak-
est link, just to use your analogy. We had some other technical
comments of a more specific nature and we can provide those for
the record.
Mr. LATOURETTE. If you could put those in writing for the record,
that will I think help us as we move forward to markups on the
legislation.
I want to thank all three of you for your wonderful testimony
today. And thank you for helping both subcommittees as we con-
tinue our work.
Mr. LATOURETTE. I now want to call to the table the last panel
of witnesses we have today. First, we will have General Charles G.
Boyd, who is the Executive Director for the U.S. Commission on
National Security for the 21st Century; General James Clapper,
who is the Vice Chairman of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic
Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass
Destruction; Mr. Frank J. Cilluffo, who is the director of the terror-
ism task force of the Center for Strategic and International Stud-
ies; and Dr. Amy E. Smithson, a senior associate with the Henry
L. Stimson Center.
Again on behalf of both subcommittees, we thank you very much
for attending today. Without objection, as with the other two pan-
els, your full and complete written observations will be included in
 35

the record. I would make this observation, because we want to hear

from you in a number of questions, if you could just summarize
your observations to us in 5 minutes. I think we are going to vote
at about 6 and we do not want to be cut short or keep you here
while we go over and do that.
So with that, General Boyd, I would invite you to begin.
STATEMENTS OF GENERAL CHARLES G. BOYD, USAF (RET.),
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, U.S. COMMISSION ON NATIONAL SE-
CURITY/21ST CENTURY; LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES
CLAPPER, JR., USAF (RET.), VICE CHAIRMAN, ADVISORY
PANEL TO ASSESS DOMESTIC RESPONSE CAPABILITIES FOR
TERRORISM INVOLVING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION;
FRANK J. CILLUFFO, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTER-
NATIONAL STUDIES; DR. AMY E. SMITHSON, DIRECTOR,
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS NONPROLIFERA-
TION PROJECT, THE HENRY L. STIMSON CENTER
General BOYD. Well, first of all, sir, as a citizen, may I com-
pliment you on this process that is underway here. I wish every
civics class in every school in America could be observing how the
Congress is wrestling with a very tough problem and providing the
forum for earnest debate. This is democracy at its best I think, and
you are to be congratulated. And I am honored by participating in
this process. I will, in fact, submit my written statement for the
record. But let me highlight a few quick points and then we will
get on to the question and answer period.
With respect to the three pieces of legislation that you have
under observation, I think they all have merit and they all are
working in the direction of an overall solution to this terribly dif-
ficult problem. I think they are all right in one degree or another.
I think Mr. Gilchrest is right in that the solution begins with the
President. I am not sure that a separate council needs to be created
in that this is a national security issue and it ought to be thought
as such. And, therefore, the National Security Council with the
President as its head is the place where the solution begins. Mr.
Skelton is right in the development of a strategy is the very first
step. Unless we know what it is that we are trying to do, it is pret-
ty difficult to figure out how to organize in order to get it done.
But I would be deeply dismayed if you stopped there and waited
until some future time to address the type of organization or the
organizational construct necessary to deal with the full dimension
of this problem. I think Mr. Thornberry goes to the hard part, that
of moving the existing capabilities into some kind of a coherent or-
ganizational construct vested with authority, responsibility, and by
that, I mean accountability, and resources. He said it eloquently
and I do not think I can improve on that.
But I would add, because it has been a separate discussion item,
that somehow collecting all of the capabilities that we now have
into a response structure is a radical solution. I do not see it that
way. I think it is no different than putting the existing capabilities
that we have, military capabilities into a Department of Defense in
1947. And if it is our choice to either disrupt existing bureaucratic
comfort levels or improving the security of our Nation, I think I
would opt for the latter choice.
 36

May I suggest, sir, a couple of other points that if you were to

put together a more comprehensive piece of legislation here that
you might want to consider.
None of the pieces under consideration now addresses directly
the role of the Department of Defense, tangentially yes, but not di-
rectly. And it is clear that DOD assets would have to be engaged
in any weapons of mass destruction attack on U.S. soil. The Hart-
Rudman Commission recommends the creation of an Assistant Sec-
retary of Defense for Homeland Security to pull together the in-
creased effort the Department must take in that area, and it also
recommends that the National Guard be given more responsibility
for homeland security missions without, of course, negating its
overseas expeditionary capabilities.
Second, none addresses completely the issue of intelligence, al-
though two of the pieces of legislation do address it in some way.
In our view, this is not adequate. I think that the Commissions
recommendation is that the National Intelligence Council include
homeland security and asymmetric threats as a dedicated area of
analysis and it assign that portfolio to a national intelligence offi-
cer, and that the community produce regular NIEs, or National In-
telligence Estimates, on these threats.
Third, none addresses adequately the issue of congressional over-
sight. Clearly, the reporting obligations embodied in these resolu-
tions do address the issue of oversight to some degree. But the
Commission believes that more needs to be done. It recommends
that Congress deal with homeland security more or less as it has
dealt with intelligence oversight. It should establish a special body
including members of all relevant congressional committees as well
as ex officio members from the leadership of the House and Senate.
Members should be chosen for their expertise in foreign affairs, de-
fense, intelligence, law enforcement, and appropriations.
The proper legislative branch vehicle to oversee homeland secu-
rity policy seems to us would go far to ensure that all homeland
security issues are managed in such a way as to protect civil lib-
erties. But because Mr. Kucinich has highlighted this terribly im-
portant concern, I would add that a complete bill would underscore
the oversight responsibilities embedded in this institution, estab-
lishing the standards and reporting requirements any national
homeland security agency must adhere to.
I await your questions respectfully, sir.
Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you, General Boyd.
General Clapper.
General CLAPPER. Mr.Chairman, members of the subcommittees,
I am pleased to be here today representing Governor Gilmore who
is out of the country on a mission for the Commonwealth of Vir-
ginia. I would like to offer three general comments.
First, before getting into the specifics of what you asked us to
talk to, like General Boyd, I would like to commend the two sub-
committees and the sponsors and cosponsors of the bills that are
under consideration for their recognition of the importance of the
issues and their dedication in keeping them visible to the public
and to the rest of the Congress. I would point out also that the fact
that these bills have been introduced is probably yet additional tes-
timony to the widespread discomforture with the current setup we
 37

have and the recognition that we as a Nation are not optimally

postured to combat terrorism in all its dimensions.
In the interest of truth in advertising, I would like to point out
a crucial characteristic of the Gilmore panel, which I represent
today, and that is that it is heavily populated and influenced by
professional representatives of the State and local levels whose per-
spective, in my view, is absolutely critical in any such deliberation.
They, in fact, represent our first line of defense against a terrorist
attack in this country, and the composition of our panel has driven
and shaped our approach accordingly.
To many at the State and local levels the structure and processes
at the Federal level for combating terrorism appear uncoordinated,
complex, and confusing. In fact, the charts on display here are ex-
tracted from our first annual report that we issued some 14 months
ago. I think they are illustrative of at least the perception of the
problem at particularly the State and local level. Many State and
local officials believe that Federal programs intended to assist them
are often created and implemented without their input. I would
hope that whatever legislation emerges from this body considers
that input first.
We acknowledge that a lot of good work has been done to foster
Federal interagency coordination in the last administration. As one
example, let me commend the national plan for combating acts of
terrorism in America developed by the Interagency Board for
Equipment Standardization and Interoperability. However, overall,
we believe the current structure and processes are inadequate for
the following reasons, a lot of which we have already talked to
today: Lack of political accountability, insufficient program and
budget authority, lack of staff resources, and, from our perspective
particularly, lack of State, local, and functional expertise.
For the purposes of this hearing, we used 12 major attributes of
the recommendations that we made as criteria for assessing all
three bills under consideration. In my written testimony I discuss
each bill in the context of these attributes. Also included is a func-
tional comparative matrix that we drew up to better illustrate
those differences and similarities visually, in comparison to what
the Gilmore panel has advocated.
One area where all three bills seem to agree, as do we, is on the
need for a true national strategy. We have talked about that quite
a bit already.
All three bills, again as we do, seem to endorse the need for im-
proved intelligence assessments and dissemination of critical infor-
mation, an area which is particularly near and dear to my heart,
having spent 37 years in one capacity or another in the intelligence
business.
I want to comment specifically on one aspect of H.R. 1158, intro-
duced by Congressman Thornberry, which endorses the rec-
ommendation of the Hart-Rudman Commission pertaining to the
organization of a Homeland Security Agency. The Gilmore panel
looked hard at several organizational models for the Government,
one of which was an embellished FEMA. In fact, we considered rec-
ommending FEMA as an 11th cabinet department but which, at
the end of the day, we rejected.
 38

We came to the conclusion that, given the wide range of capabili-

ties that must be included in the totality of thwarting and respond-
ing to terrorism horizontally across all the Federal departments
and agencies as well as vertically with the State and local levels,
we did not think it feasible, necessary, or appropriate for any of
these organizations necessarily to abrogate their responsibilities.
Furthermore, even if a Homeland Security Agency were estab-
lished, it would still be in the awkward position of attempting to
discipline or police those cabinet rank departments which have re-
sponsibilities for combating terrorism and would continue to do so
even with forming a Homeland Security Agency.
We have reservations about the concept of selectively moving
some law enforcement agenciesbut not allto a Homeland Secu-
rity Agency. This will disrupt the agencies being transferred and
will, we believe, jeopardize the tremendous working relationship
with FEMA. In the minds of some, such an organization begins to
suggest a ministry of interior, which potentially raises the specter,
if not the reality, of jeopardy to constitutional and civil rights.
Rather, what we contend is needed is a national strategy that
functionally synchronizes these elements and has someone who is
authoritatively in charge, who is politically accountable, and who
reports to the President or the Vice President.
After 2 years of pretty intense study and debate, the Gilmore
Commission has concluded the existing organizationsFederal,
State, and localpossess the respective capabilities needed to de-
fend our homeland. What we are missing are the vision, the strat-
egy, the leadership, and what I would call the authoritative coordi-
nation apparatus and processes to bring all these disparate pieces
together when the situation demands that we do so.
Finally, on a personal note, I got religion about terrorism as a
member of the commission which investigated the Khobar Towers
terrorist bombing in 1996. This is an issue, as you have heard
today, that is not partisan politically. It goes to the very heart of
public safety, our values, and our way of life.
On behalf of Governor Gilmore and the other members of our
panel, we urge the Congress and the executive branch to come to-
gether and bring some order to this issue. As I said when I testified
before Congressman Shays subcommittee last month, our most im-
posing challenge centers on policy and whether we have the collec-
tive fortitude to forge change both in organization and process. I
would again respectfully observe that we have studied the topic to
death and what we need now is action.
Thank you very much for this opportunity. I stand ready to ad-
dress your questions.
Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you, General.
Mr. Cilluffo.
Mr. CILLUFFO. Chairman LaTourette, distinguished members, I
appreciate the opportunity to be before you today on this important
matter. My parents taught me that if I do not have anything nice
to say about someone elses ideas then I should not say anything
at all. And that rule goes double if it comes from Congressmen. I
believe that by now my parents have forgiven me, and I hope that
after today you will too.
 39

These three legislative proposals and the recent set of hearings

on the subject clearly demonstrate the issues surrounding terror-
ism and homeland defense and are receiving the attention they de-
mand. Congress has recognized that a vacuum exists and is taking
active steps to fill it. I would especially like to commend Congress-
men Gilchrest, Thornberry, and Skelton for their leadership and for
subjecting their legislative proposals to public examination and
comment. We have before us a rare opportunity for cooperation, not
just within Congress but also with the executive branch, and we
should take full advantage of it.
Cooperation with the executive branch is crucial to turn concepts
into capabilities. I think we need to have the bumper sticker Need
to Cooperate, Not Mandate. The United States is now at a cross-
roads. As things presently stand, there is neither assurance that
we have a clear capital investment strategy nor a clearly defined
end state, let alone a clear sense of the requisite objectives to reach
this goal. The dimensions, as we have heard, are enormous. No sin-
gle Federal agency owns the strategic mission completely. At the
moment, however, many agencies are acting independently in what
needs to be a coherent response. Unfortunately, to date, the whole
has been less than the sum of its parts.
In considering how to proceed, we should not be afraid to wipe
the slate clean and take a fresh look at the issue. We must ask our-
selves what has worked to date, what has not worked, and what
are the gaps and shortfalls in our current policies, practices, proce-
dures, and programs. In so doing, we must be willing to press fun-
damental assumptions of our Nations security: Are our organiza-
tions and institutions adequate? We cannot afford to look at the
world through our current alphabet soup of agencies and their re-
spective organizational charts. In their proposed legislation, Con-
gressmen Gilchrest, Thornberry, and Skelton have done just that.
I offer these comments in the spirit of the hearing; namely, to de-
termine the best course of action. And in order to keep my remarks
within the time allotted, I am going to touch only on some of the
recommendations for improvement and not discuss their many
strengths. And ultimately, of course, it remains up to you, Con-
gress, and the executive branch to jointly decide which of these
avenues or combination thereof should be pursued.
First, some over-arching objectives. In short, our antiterrorism
and counterterrorism capabilities must be strengthened, stream-
lined, and then synergized so that effective prevention will enhance
domestic response preparedness and vice versa. A complete CBRN
(chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear) counterterrorism strat-
egy involves both preventing an attack from occurring, which in-
cludes deterrence, nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and pre-
emption, and two, preparing Federal, State, local, and private sec-
tor capabilities to respond to an actual attack.
All too often these elements of strategy are treated in isolation.
It must incorporate both the marshalling of domestic resources and
the engagement of international allies and assets. It also requires
monitoring and measuring the effectiveness of the many programs
that implement this strategy so as to lead to common standards,
practices, and procedures.
 40

The Homeland Security Strategy Act of 2001 might be improved

by requiring a series of threat assessments and a sequence of re-
views of the comprehensive strategy. The threat environment is a
moving target and will likely evolve. So too must our response.
Moreover, homeland defense cuts right to federalism issues. Any
legislation should ensure that State and local governments are at
the heart of the matter.
To focus the efforts of the various agencies with antiterrorism
and counterterrorism capabilities, we need a high level official to
serve as the belly button or the focal point to marry up the three
criteria that have now been discussed to deathauthority, account-
ability, and resources.
In our report, we recommend a Senate-confirmed position of as-
sistant to the President or Vice President for combatting terrorism.
The assistant would be responsible for issuing an annual national
counterterrorism strategy and plan that would serve as the basis
for recommendations regarding the overall level of
counterterrorism spending as well as how that money should be al-
located among the various departments and agencies with
counterterrorism responsibilities. The assistant would also be
granted limited certification and pass-back authority. After all, pol-
icy without resources is rhetoric. And I think this gets to the point
that Mr. Gilman brought up earlier.
The National Homeland Security Agency Act, introduced by Mr.
Thornberry, may be a wise course to pursue in the long term, but
a determination can only be made after a careful review. Presently,
we require a near-term solution.
Currently, many Federal agencies have a vested interest in com-
batting terrorism whether at home or abroad. Arguably, the great-
est breakdown does not occur at the operational level but at the
juncture where policy and operations meet. What is lacking is a
clear method of integrating these various responses, getting every-
one to pull in the same direction at the same time, if you will. We
need to recognize the cross-cutting nature of the challenge and not
think vertically within our respective stovepipes.
As a first step in this direction, FEMA needs to be empowered
to assume the lead role in domestic response preparedness. We
must capitalize FEMA with personnel as well as administrative
and logistical support and assign FEMA the training mission for
consequence management which now resides at the Department of
Justice. While FEMA has distinguished itself when responding to
a series of natural disasters, the same cannot be said of its national
security missions. Put bluntly, it has become the ATM machine for
chasing hurricanes.
An additional point that I wish to make concerns the role of the
Department of Defense, and I will be very brief here. Realistically,
only DOD even comes close to having the manpower and resources
for high consequence yet low likelihood events such as a cata-
strophic CBRN terrorist attack on the homeland. But, obviously,
their role should be entirely in support of civilian authorities.
Though we need to make sure that DOD has the resources to as-
sume this responsibility. We do not want to turn to the cupboard
and find it empty when we need it.
 41

Perhaps it is just me, but I find it difficult to believe that in a

time of genuine crisis the American people would take issue with
what color uniform the men and women who are saving lives hap-
pen to be wearing.
The Preparedness Against Domestic Terrorism Act of 2001, by
Mr. Gilchrest, might be improved by ensuring that it does not arti-
ficially divide international terrorism from domestic terrorism.
International diplomacy is an essential first step in preventing ter-
rorist attacks. We need not look further than what the Jordanian
authorities did last year during the millennium celebrationsthey
saved many American lives. It is a clear reminder that our efforts
must start abroad, and transnational problems must include some
form of transnational solutions. And, of course, the role of intel-
ligence cannot be underestimated.
Our first priority should always be to get there before the bomb
goes off. Yet we should also know that, no matter how robust, our
intelligence capabilities will never be robust enough to prevent all
acts all the time, and that those first on the scene to a no warning
event are State and local personnelpolice, fire fighters, and med-
icsand time is of the essence to turn victims into patients. The
value of training and exercising also must not be underestimated.
Hopefully, it is the closest we will get to the real thing, and, if not,
it allows us to make the big mistakes on the practice field and not
on Main Street, Somewhere, USA.
In closing, we must expand the national security policy planning
table to include everyone whose voice must be heard. Since bio-
terrorism is primarily a medical and public health issue, these com-
munities must be mobilized and integrated into our national ef-
forts. We should also work to leveraging the pharmaceutical and
commercial and biotechnology sectors, as we heard earlier.
The sixth anniversary of the Oklahoma City bombing and the re-
cent bombing of the USS Cole remind us that antiterrorism and
counterterrorism efforts must be a continued and sustained focus
of our Nations security efforts. We have learned lessons about ter-
rorism the hard way and the time has come to apply what we have
learned. If the President and Congress set their sights on develop-
ing, implementing, and sustaining such efforts, it will happen. And
I am confident that President Bush and Vice President Cheney, in
conjunction with these committees, can and will rise to the chal-
lenge.
Thank you for giving me the opportunity to express my views.
Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you, Mr. Cilluffo.
Dr. Smithson.
Dr. SMITHSON. Thank you. Comparatively few of those who have
been setting U.S. policies on how best to prepare this nation to con-
front the specter of unconventional terrorism have ever pulled vic-
tims from the rubble left behind by hurricanes, earthquakes, or for
that matter bombs, nor have they steered the implementation of
measures to contain the spread of an infectious disease like Ebola.
Since an unconventional terrorist attack would create a disaster
that has much in common with the calamities that this nations
HAZMAT teams, emergency department physicians and nurses, po-
lice, city emergency managers, and public health officials confront
on a routine basis, it stands to reason that their experience and
 42

pragmatism should be the driving force behind the Federal Govern-

ments approach to terrorism preparedness. These are the very in-
dividuals that I have been listening to. And if more people in
Washington would do the same not only would this nations Fed-
eral preparedness programs be streamlined, they would cost less
and the nations preparedness would be increased manifold.
My remarks today amplify the voices of public health and safety
officials that I interviewed from 33 cities in 25 states from Feb-
ruary of 1999 to September of last year. Since the publication of
the resulting report, which is titled Attacksia my coauthor Leslie-
Anne Levy and I have continued to interact with front-line officials
from these and other cities on an almost daily basis. For those inter-
ested in an unvarnished account of the level of preparedness in
Americas cities and a common-sense approach to readiness, I have
been told that Attacksia is not only an illuminating but an enter-
taining read. So, by all means, dig in.
Local and state officials would be immensely relieved if somebody
was definitively put in charge of Federal programs. They find the
current situation confusingover 90 training programs and mul-
tiple equipment grant programs, each with different deadlines,
areas of emphasis, hoops, and guidelines. They long ago lost track
of the number of Federal rescue teams that have been beefed up
or created from scratch.
The intent of the original architects of domestic preparedness
Senators Sam Nunn, Richard Lugar, and Pete Domeniciwas to
help the nations first responders get better prepared to grapple
with the aftereffects of an unconventional terrorist attack. Instead,
money has been buckshot across over 40 Federal agencies. Last
year the U.S. Government spent many billions on terrorism readi-
ness but only $315 million went to assist local responders. Clearly,
this effort has gone far off track.
Given this topsy-turvy state of affairs, local officials and I would
applaud your efforts to wrest order from the spaghetti-like maze
that now constitutes the Federal organizational chart. Of the three
bills introduced, H.R. 525 holds the most promise because of its
proposals to consolidate coordination and oversight to avoid re-
creating the wheel and to shut down superfluous programs.
In contrast, H.R.1158 would create a new government agency.
Among the things to keep in mind when considering this bill is a
twist on the maxim with which you are quite familiarall politics
are local. Well, so are all emergencies. If you study the case his-
tories of disaster responses, you will figure this out. What I wonder
is why Washington does not get this point.
The key to domestic preparedness lies not in bigger terrorism
budgets or in more Federal bureaucracy, but in smarter spending
that enhances readiness at the local level. Any improvements in
local preparedness would, I remind you, enhance the ability of
hometown rescuers to respond to everyday emergencies, and that
is a dual-use benefit that your constituents would no doubt wel-
come.
Although the best of the three proposed laws, H.R.525 would not
be a perfect solution, as if such a thing even existed. For brevitys
sake, I will simply list ways to enhance the bill, and I would be
 43

delighted to expand on the rationale behind these recommenda-

tions in Q&A.
First, ground the councils work in reality by specifying that its
executive chairman or director have extensive local disaster and
emergency management experience.
Second, broaden the councils elimination authority to apply to
spurious programsFederal rescue teams and federally-funded
state terrorism preparedness response teams.
Third, institute a government-wide moratorium on any new res-
cue teams and bureaucracies until the council completes its initial
assessment of the sufficiency of existing programs.
Fourth, assign the council to take the appropriate steps to see
that preparedness training is institutionalized in local police and
fire academies as well as in medical and nursing schools nation-
wide.
Fifth, mandate that the council articulate a plan to jump-start
Federal efforts devoted to public health and medical community
readiness. Such programming should feature regional hospital
planning grants and additional tests of disease syndrome surveil-
lance systems followed by plans to establish such capabilities na-
tionwide.
Sixth, and finally, require that the council develop a plan to sus-
tain preparedness over the long term.
With that, I will stop, echoing the comments by others that en-
courage Congress to coordinate its own oversight activities. I look
forward to your questions.
Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you, Dr. Smithson. I am glad that in
your testimony you brought up the notion of first responders. I
would note while this panel was testifying we have been joined by
some first responders. Chief Chepalo from the Chicago Heights Fire
Department and members of the National EMT Association have
been kind enough to join this hearing.
The first question I would have is for you, Dr. Smithson, and
then maybe you, General Clapper, relative to your observations
that our activities should be focused on State and local prepared-
ness. My first question was, and I think you answered it so I am
not going to ask it, but that is your view that first responder fund-
ing has been adequately addressed in previous budgets. And I as-
sume your answer to that would be no.
The next question then that I have is when we look at some of
the programsI just had all the fire chiefs in my district together
because of the fire bill that was passed in the last Congress and
President Bush has indicated that he will fund the $100 million
that is called for for fire equipment and trainingthe distribution
as I look at it is about half goes to new stuff, equipment, versus
half training. I understand why the need for new equipment is
there. We have fire departments in this country that are driving
around in 35 year-old vehicles, some, if they are lucky, some, those
35 year-old vehicles are their only and best piece of equipment. So
I certainly understand why the need for equipment is there. But
just any comment that you might have about the emphasis that we
place on new equipment versus training, because your observations
seem to talk more about training and getting people ready and pre-
 44

pared to deal with what is ahead than necessarily having the new
hook and ladder truck.
Dr. SMITHSON. One of the things I think you will find, as you
have, when you talk with the first responders is that they can be
quite resourceful with what they have. In fact, while the Defense
Department first approached them with all sorts of equipment to
decontaminate victims, one of the things that they came back with
was how they could use the equipment they already have to accom-
plish the same task. So while it is reasonable to expect that some
jurisdictions would want to buy and would need to buy specialized
equipment, especially personal protective gear, they would all point
out to you is that they need funds to exercise their skills in this
area. If they do not exercise their capabilities then they atrophy.
So a balance needs to be found there.
Another balance that needs to be found is between what the Fed-
eral Government funds and what local jurisdictions fund. The state
of Florida has passed a disaster preparedness tax. If other states
in this country would do the same then perhaps a strategy could
be found for maintaining disaster preparedness over the long term
without having the Federal Government foot the entire bill.
Mr. LATOURETTE. OK. Thank you.
General Boyd, General Clapper, observations on that?
Mr.Cilluffo?
General BOYD. I think I would agree. We were out last week to
talk to the Governor of Colorado on just these sort of issues, what
is the role in their view of the Federal Government and what do
they need, and explaining how we had in our report addressed our
view of how we should deal with the State and local level. Our own
discussion with people at the State and local level, clearly, they are
looking for some kind of centralizedthey would like to know one
number to call. They would like some kind of coherent system of
training where the marriage of Federal and State capabilities come
together. So I think there is much merit there. I do not know that
I disagree.
I do believe that a cabinet level organization, which we have
called for, in the National Security Agency, some agency of that
stature and that kind of clout within our own bureaucracy is abso-
lutely going to be necessary. If you can muster the capabilities at
the Federal level, then articulate the needs in a way and come over
here and be accountable to the Congress to get those capabilities
down to the State and local level, I think that is essential.
Mr. LATOURETTE. OK. Thank you.
General Clapper, anything you want to add?
General CLAPPER. I would vote, given the Hobsons choice of pick-
ing between equipment and training, from what I have been able
to glean, I would lean on the side of training and education and
the ability to draw on support on a mutual supporting basis from
others, other communities, from the State at-large, or, if required,
from the Federal level.
One of the features of our national office for counterterrorism is
a senior staff element that would focus specifically on the issue of
training and exercises.
Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you.
 45

Mr. Cilluffo, is there something nice you would like to say about
this question?
[Laughter.]
Mr. CILLUFFO. Just very briefly. I do not see the two as mutually
exclusive. Obviously, it comes down to how muchthe devil is in
the detailsspecifically how much you are allocating to one over
another. But I think that for starters you need benchmarks; you do
need standards, you do need common protocols, you do need com-
mon procedures. So then you can spend wiser. So I think it is an
issue of how do you best spend your money.
And there is just one conceptual point I want to make. I do not
see it as a top-down or a bottom-up approach when we look at this
holistically as a Nation. It is that box where the two come together.
Those are the real hard questions we need to grapple with. Wheth-
er it is a civil liberties issue, obviously, we should never infringe
upon our liberties in order to preserve them; or whether it is the
openness and security issue, you do not want to build up too many
walls or the bad guys win by default because our way of life has
been lost. But I do not see it as mutually exclusive. I do not see
these as either/ors. I see these as ways to augment one another.
Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you.
Mr. Kucinich.
Mr. KUCINICH. I would like to step back a minute and have kind
of a more general discussion. For anybody, what would you define
as terrorism? Anyone, since this is all about terrorism, define ter-
rorism.
General CLAPPER. It is an attack on the U.S./U.S. interests that
is not in the conventional mode of a military attack and may resort
to weapons of mass destruction or weapons of mass disruption, ei-
ther chemical, biological, nuclear, or cyber.
Mr. KUCINICH. So does this bill then have only to do with that
and no other kind of terrorism? Only to deal with weapons of mass
destruction?
General CLAPPER. Or disruption.
Mr. KUCINICH. Mr. Cilluffo?
Mr. CILLUFFO. Which bill specifically?
Mr. KUCINICH. Any of the bills that we are talking about here
in terms of this national homeland defense.
Mr. CILLUFFO. No. I do not see them as treating merely the
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear threat. The issue is how
do you amalgamate them all and how do you have the stars align-
ing where the different pieces can come together. I do see a possi-
bility where you can have this assistant to the President, give it
some teeth, give it some budget authority, then you have the coun-
cil that oversees that, and then you might have an organization
two years out.
Mr. KUCINICH. Let me be more specific. What do you define as
terrorism in terms of the meaning of these bills, as you understand
it?
Mr. CILLUFFO. On top of whatever else it may be, it is a criminal
act. I take sort of the top out. But on top of whatever else is moti-
vating it, whether it is politically, whether it is radically religious,
is it a criminal act. Shed the ideology from the definition.
 46

Mr. KUCINICH. And since we are talking about a coordination of

local, State, and Federal, would it be a criminal act that is commit-
ted locally against a government building, for example, or against
local law enforcement authorities?
Mr. CILLUFFO. Could be.
Mr. KUCINICH. General?
General BOYD. In the excellent staff work that your staff put to-
gether for this hearing, there are three different definitions, which
goes I guess in some ways to part of the problem: There is the
FBIs definition, the Department of States definition, the Depart-
ment of Defense definition. But they all deal at some level with the
intent that goes into the act. I will just read you this one sentence
which I think is representative: The calculated use of violence or
the threat of violence to inculcate fear intended to coerce or to in-
timidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are
generally political, religious, or ideological. That seems to be the
element. I think that the act is intended to coerce or persuade or
frighten people for a specific purpose and, whatever tools you use,
that is what is at issue.
Mr. KUCINICH. Right. Has anyone here ever read the Kerner
Commission Report, the National Commission on Civil Disorders?
Anyone? Do you even know about it? Did you ever hear about it?
Anyone know?
[No response.]
Mr. KUCINICH. The Kerner Commission Report actually exam-
ined the reasons for violence in American cities in the late 1960s.
And based on some of the definitions that are being bandied about
here, it would occur that this new national strategy could be taken
by some as a license to become involved in intelligence, deterrence,
prevention along the lines that the Kerner Commission explored in
terms of the civil disorders. Anyone want to comment on that? Are
we looking at these groups, focusing in on American cities where,
because of high poverty and a number of other social conditions,
people begin to express their discontent in very aggressive ways?
Anyone want to try that?
Dr. SMITHSON. Your concerns about infringement upon civil lib-
erties are ones that we should all take note of. The three pieces of
legislation do not really address that, but the appropriate firewalls
can be put in a bill so that those concerns are addressed. That
should be done. I do not think the intent was to have the CIA start
snooping on U.S. citizens, but to leave the apparatus that normally
handles intelligence-gathering in the United States within its cur-
rent powers, not to expand those powers through any of these bills.
So, put in the firewalls and I think you will find your concerns ad-
dressed.
Mr. KUCINICH. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
your indulgence. Just one final comment I would like to make.
Mr. LATOURETTE. Sure. Go ahead.
Mr. KUCINICH. In these hearings and in these discussions, it
seems that one of the problems that we have here is that we end
up raising the level of concern about terrorism out of proportion to
its incidence. There is an old Yiddish proverb: To a worm in horse
radish the whole world is horse radish. I am just offering some
horse radish for you.
 47

Mr. LATOURETTE. Thank you, Mr. Kucinich, very much.

Mr. Putnam.
Mr. PUTNAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Boyd, in your opening remarks you made the statement
about your three points and the third point was oversight and the
fact that more needs to be done. You made the analogy to the way
that we handle intelligence. The point that occurred to me, and I
would just like your observation or your feedback on it, is that real-
ly what we are talking about here, whether it is coordinated
through the Executive Office of the President or coordinated
through a new agency yet to be determined, we are talking about
some coordination or facilitation of information, of intelligence. We
are not really talking about training agricultural inspectors to dif-
fuse a nuclear weapon, or Customs inspectors to recognize foot and
mouth disease, but we are talking about some kind of collaboration
so that each knows what the other is looking for and that they can
identify it and that there can be some effort in a seamless manner
to protect our borders.
So, in addressing the institutional problem of how to coordinate
all of this, isnt the Intelligence Committee the proper place to do
that because most of what we are talking about is information or
intelligence, classified in some cases, in others it is not?
General BOYD. Certainly, that is where it begins. In the strategy
that we articulate, the components of the strategy that we rec-
ommend in our report are threeprevention, protection, and re-
sponse. In the prevention, at the outset you have to have a robust
intelligence capability to do exactly what you are talking about.
And that is not just domestic, that is overseas. That is identifying
and addressing the threats as they emerge, wherever they emerge
from. We call for, and believe fervently in, enhancing all of the lev-
els of intelligence that we now have. That is a fundamental piece.
But that is not where you stop. Then once you have some sense
of where the threats are coming from, you have to deal with them,
you have to address them in a variety of ways. And you drift right
on in through that prevention component into the protection com-
ponent. And if you fail, you have to have a robust capability to re-
spond in the aftermath, deal with the consequences. Intelligence is
key, but it is by no means where it all ends.
Mr. PUTNAM. So, again, with the protection and dealing with the
consequences, we are still talking about a facilitation of existing
agencies, whether it is beefing up and cross-training local first re-
sponders or coordinating the efforts of the FBI with local law en-
forcement and things of that nature. If you were to adopt the ap-
proach of a new agency, how large an agency would we be com-
prehending?
General BOYD. We need to keep in perspective we are talking
about using existing capabilities and organizations that now exist,
not creating new ones, and rearranging them in some coherent
fashion so they can deal with this issue exclusively. I do not see
agency growth. I do not know how much the Department of De-
fense grew when it was created by absorbing capabilities that al-
ready existed and putting them together in a more coherent struc-
ture. I do not know. Over time the Department grew but for rea-
 48

sons other than the fact that it was reorganized in that way to
begin with.
Mr. PUTNAM. Is there any other? Dr. Smithson?
Dr. SMITHSON. I think it would be quite optimistic to think that
they would not be building more jobs at the Federal level by creat-
ing a new agency. Even when some components are taken out of
one agency to put it in this new one, the agency that had personnel
moved over is still going to retain a staff because they still have
some responsibilities and they simply will not cede that turf 100
percent.
Think of homeland defense as something that is in every U.S.
community, not as something vested in Federal bureaucracies that,
in all likelihood, cannot get there in time to respond and save lives
for a chemical disaster. Federal personnel can certainly be there in
time to help cleanup and to help the communities recover in the
aftermath, but creating more Federal bureaucracy and layers of in-
terference does little, if anything, to assist the local and state agen-
cies that would be addressing this type of disaster. FEMA can go
in with its current capabilities and do what local officials want it
to do, as can HHS and the Department of Defense. Lets not create
a new agency, please.
Mr. CILLUFFO. Mr. Putnam, one point. I think that if you were
to prioritize what we need to do, we need to target those issues
that need to be fixed first. And I am not so sure it is where the
rubber meets the road at the operational level. Whether it is from
top down or whether it is from the bottom up, it is again where
the policy and operations come together. It is that convergence
right there. And I think that the agency may perhaps be a long
term solution and a viable one, but I do not think we know enough
to be able to determine whether in fact that is the case.
But I do see the three legislative proposals before us can in some
ways feed off one another. They are actually not that different. You
can build on one. The problem is we need to make sure that the
foreign and domestic all come as a whole because, you talked about
a Federal agency, but I think if you were to look at the Congress,
with all due respect, this cuts across every committees jurisdiction
and the disconnect between the authorizers and the appropriators
is another challenge, that how to put this all together is difficult.
But maybe if you guys come out in front, maybe the Executive
Branch will follow, or vice versa.
Mr. LATOURETTE. I thank you all. I want to thank all of our wit-
nesses today. Your observations are critical as both committees
move forward.
Before adjourning, I do want to ask unanimous consent that the
written observations and opening statements of our Ranking Mem-
ber of our subcommittee, Mr. Costello of Illinois, be submitted for
the record if he should so choose, and also the Ranking Member of
the full committee, Mr. Oberstar of Minnesota.
With that, this concludes the hearing. The meeting is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 6:02 p.m., the committee was adjourned, to re-
convene at the call of the Chair.]
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