Are Our Strategic Models Flawed?

Ends + Ways + Means = (Bad) Strategy

Jeffrey W. Meiser
2017 Jeffrey W. Meiser

ABSTRACT: Within the US defense community, strategy

making has become a narrow-minded exercise rooted in the
concepts of ends, ways, and means and the whole-of-government
approach. Strategic thinking can be improved by defining strategy as a
theory of success and understanding that the purpose of strategy is to
create advantage, generate new sources of power, and exploit
weaknesses in the opponent. This analysis of the 2009 Afghanistan
policy review and strategy-making process illustrates an approach to
overcoming dysfunctional strategic practices.

O ver the past two years, American military leaders have repeatedly
highlighted the need to develop leaders with strong critical and
creative thinking skills who will enable the United States to field
a superior joint force over the next decade. These efforts imply the US
defense community has failed to develop and utilize these skills over the
past 15 years. General Martin E. Dempsey, the recently retired chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, called for agile and adaptive leaders with the
requisite values, strategic vision, and critical thinking skills to keep pace
with the changing strategic environment.1 General Joseph Dunford, the
current chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recently told National
Defense University graduates: There is no substitute for leadership that
recognizes the implications of new ideas, new technologies and new
approaches and actually anticipates and effects those adaptations.2
These are praiseworthy goals; however, the challenge of achieving
them is profound. The military leaders quoted above generally focus on
the need to educate up-and-coming officers to be better strategic think-
ers. They do not seem to grasp the reality of fundamental flaws in the
dominant way of conceptualizing strategy in the US defense community.
Far too often strategy is an exercise in means-based planning; it is inher-
ently uncreative, noncritical, and limits new and adaptive thinking.
Our strategic problems have two main causes: a formulaic under-
standing of strategy and a simplistic understanding of means or
Dr. Jeffrey W. Meiser, an
Acknowledgements: The author gratefully acknowledges the critical comments of Andrew L. assistant professor at the
Ross and ongoing discussions about strategy with Thomaz Costa, Frank Hoffman, and Chris University of Portland,
Bassford arising from an earlier version of this article, which was presented at the International taught at the College of
Security and Arms Control-International Security Studies Section Joint Annual Conference in 2014. International Security
Affairs at the National
1Martin E. Dempsey, Desired Leader Attributes for Joint Force 2020 (memorandum, Defense University in
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 28, 2013), 1. See also Martin E. Dempsey, Joint Washington, DC, and
Education (white paper, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 16, 2012), 45. published Power and
2Jim Garamone, Dunford to NDU Grads: Embrace Change and Innovation, US Joint Restraint: The Rise of the
Chiefs of Staff, June 9, 2016, http://www.jcs.mil/Media/News/News-Display/Article/796366 United States, 18981941
/dunford-to-ndu-grads-embrace-change-and-innovation/. in 2015.
82 Parameters 46(4) Winter 201617

resources. First, the US defense community has a literal formula for

strategy: ends + ways + means = strategy. There is some value to con-
ceptualizing strategy in this manner; however, this model has become
a crutch undermining creative and effective strategic thinking. Like
any crutch, the supportive structure of the formula originally served
an important purpose of avoiding an ends-means mismatch. This
approach has become counterproductive because it has the effect of
neutering the ways.
Second, the concept of a comprehensive or whole-of-government
approach to solving strategic problems fosters an overemphasis on
simplistically applying resourcesthe means. By this logic, whatever
the problem is, simply apply all the elements of national power
diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and
law enforcement (DIMEFIL)and the problem is solved. Under this
approach, the strategist simply fills in each box or, better yet, creates
a diagram showing each element of national power as a line of effort
directed at an enemy center of gravity or critical vulnerability. This is
the stuff of PowerPoint nirvana but encourages strategists to avoid
thinking creatively and precisely about resources and power.
In sum, the ends + ways + means formula interacts with a simplistic
notion of means to create a situation where strategy is reduced to a per-
functory exercise in allocating resources. This approach is an excellent
way to foster policy stability, but it is not a recipe for critical and creative
thinking. The remainder of this article elaborates on the main failings of
the American way of strategy, suggests how a new definition of strategy
can overcome those failings, and discusses US strategy in Afghanistan
to illustrate these points.

The Lykke Model

In the decades following its publication in Military Review, the
so-called Lykke model of military strategy has become widely influential
among members of the US defense community, particularly those in the
US Army. Colonel Arthur F. Lykke Jr. provides this description of his
formula: Strategy equals ends (objectives toward which one strives) plus
ways (courses of action) plus means (instruments by which some end can
be achieved).3 This formula is deeply ingrained in the thinking of US
military officers and analysts. One author notes, It is no exaggeration
to say that the simple elegance of his model . . . influenced generations
of strategic thinkers.
The importance of the Lykke model became legendary among
graduates in senior positions in the US armed forces, as well as with
the AWCs [US Army War College] distinguished International Fellows,
many of whom went on to lead their nations military establishments.4
Another commentator pithily remarks, This formula is as recognizable
to modern strategists as Einsteins equation E=mc2 is to physicists.5
While it is difficult to determine exactly how influential the Lykke

3Arthur F. Lykke Jr., Defining Military Strategy, Military Review 69, no. 5 (May 1989): 3.
4Joseph R. Cerami, Introduction, in US Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, ed.
Joseph R. Cerami and James F. Holcomb Jr. (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute [SSI], 2001), 7.
5Antulio J. Echevarria II, Op-Ed: Is Strategy Really a Lost Art?, SSI, September 13, 2013, http://
strategicstudiesinstitute.Army.mil/index.cfm/articles//Is-Strategy-Really-A-Lost-Art/2013/09/13.
Are Our Strategic Models Flawed? Meiser 83

model is, many similar formulations of strategy permeate the broader

intellectual milieu of American strategic thinking.6
In theory, the equation seems to be a simple, logical, and practical
way to conceptualize strategy; however, there are several problems
in practice. First, the ways part of the equation tends to be relegated
to a supporting role as the undefined thing linking ends and means.
Lykkes model purposely highlights the connection between ends and
means because his approach to strategy was highly influenced by the
perception that Vietnam-era strategists overextended the United States
by not aligning goals with resources.7
As he explains, we should imagine a three-legged stool with ends,
ways, and means each represented by one of the legs. Legs with different
sizes cause the stool to tilt: If military resources are not compatible with
strategic concepts, or commitments are not matched by military capa-
bilities, we may be in trouble. The angle of tilt represents risk, further
defined as the possibility of loss, or damage, or of not achieving an
objective.8 Thus, risk is generated primarily by a deficiency in military
resources. From this perspective, Lykkes model is useful and sensible;
it keeps us from ignoring the constraint of resources, which in theory,
should prevent us from implementing unrealistic strategies.
There are significant costs, however, to highlighting the means
and the ends while sidelining the ways. Viewing strategy as a problem
of ends-means congruence is a seductive simplification. This kind of
thinking leads to infinitely repeating the question of how many boots
should be on the ground. A casual observer of American strategic
discourse over the past decade and a half could be excused for thinking
strategy is simply a debate about how many troops should be deployed
for combat operations. This approach misses the core function of
strategy, which is to figure out what to do with those boots on the
ground, or even better, what are the alternatives to boots on the ground.
The result of this analysis is what Lykke calls ways.
In practice, the ways element of the formula is much more difficult
to conceptualize than goals (the ends) and resources (the means). Most
discussions of ways treat it as a synonym for plan of action. In this
manner of thinking, ways are simply the actions to be taken using the
resources available to achieve a goal. For military strategists, falling back
on tactics and operational art is all too easy; if given an easy way out, we
will take it. If we can turn strategy into planning, we will.
The second problem is the overinclusiveness of Lykkes suggested
definition of strategyends, ways, and means. In practice, a specific
strategy will have a goal and it will use resources, but aligning resources
with goals is part of the strategic planning process, not the strategy itself.
Strategy is strategy, goals are goals, and resources are resources. Ends
and means do not belong in a definition of strategy. By conflating ends,
ways, and means with strategy, Lykkes approach makes it more difficult
to identify and understand the distinctive meaning of strategy. In terms
of the Lykke model, ways comes closest to capturing the true meaning of

6Simply typing the words ends, ways, means, strategy into an Internet search engine returns
thousands of hits.
7Lykke, Defining Military Strategy, 2.
8Ibid., 6.
84 Parameters 46(4) Winter 201617

strategy; however, defining it as a course of action minimizes the intel-

lectual burden of strategy and puts strategists in the position of applying
doctrine rather than the creative and critical thinking mind-set required
for effective strategic thinking.
In sum, under Lykkes formulation, strategy becomes simply a plan-
ning exercise whereby goals and means are aligned. Military strategists
receive the political goal and are tasked to align the relevant existing
resources, and combatant commanders use the resources according
to established doctrine.9 One element of our current strategy in Iraq
and Syria, for example, uses airstrikes to destroy command and control
targets, supply depots, and troop concentrations in order to degrade the
Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL). At the same time, US troops
are training and supporting various Sunni Arab and Kurdish factions,
hoping to get weapons in the hands of groups willing to fight ISIL.
The ways simply designates where the means should be allocated.
Approaches other than directing fires at ISIL targets do not seem to
receive much attention from Department of Defense strategists or
policymakers. Alternatively, the United States could use a political
approach to undermine the governing ability of ISIL in the territory
it controls.10 But instead of debating strategy, we debate the number
of sorties, the types of targets, and who to give weapons to. These are
important issues, but they miss the more fundamental issues of strategy.

The Whole-of-Government Approach

The concept of a comprehensive or whole-of-government approach
further encourages the transformation of strategy into means-based
planning. The whole-of-government concept is defined as using all
the elements or instruments of national power, typically expressed as
DIMEFIL for diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial,
intelligence, and law enforcement, to respond to a strategic challenge.11
The reason for introducing the whole-of-government concept was to
reflect the reality that military power alone cannot solve our national
security problems. In essence, the Department of Defense is asking
other government agencies for help handling complex problems like
postconflict stabilization and development. The types of missions given
to the US Armed Forces since 2001 have shown convincingly that
military power alone is not enough to meet contemporary national
security challenges.
Unfortunately, the whole-of-government approach fosters bad
strategy. In practice, applying the instruments of national power works as
a replacement for strategic thinking. A strategist does not have to think
about what should be done to solve a national security problem, the
answer is already there, no matter what the problem. The comprehensive
approach is a solution waiting to be applied to every problem. Far too

9The US Army designated an official functional area for strategists: FA59. The other services
are not quite so bold.
10Maciej Bartkowski, Can Political Struggle Against ISIL Succeed Where Violence Cannot?,
War on the Rocks, December 20, 2014, http://warontherocks.com/2014/12/can-political
-struggle-against-isil-succeed-where-violence-cannot/.
11For reporting on the introduction of the term into the national security lexicon see, Walter
Pincus, Pentagon Recommends Whole-of-Government National Security Plans, Washington Post,
February 2, 2009.
Are Our Strategic Models Flawed? Meiser 85

often strategists using the whole-of-government approach simply fill

in the seven boxes corresponding to each element of national power
to demonstrate their strategy is comprehensive. In truth, not every
problem actually requires all elements of national power. By trying to
do too much, we can end up unfocused and confused, a great recipe for
bad strategy.12
Ironically, specifying exactly seven types of power works against
the initial justification of a whole-of-government approach, which is
to broaden our understanding of the resources that can be applied to
strategic problems. As part of the process of analyzing strengths and
weaknesses, surveying how different elements of national power can be
utilized, indeed, thinking carefully about DIMEFIL makes sense and
can certainly generate insights into the types of solutions available to
solve national security problems. But, starting with the notion of seven
and only seven forms of national power and all of them should always
be utilized to implement a whole-of-government solution is infantile. In
fact, General Dempsey recently seems to have added another element of
national power to the list: energy.13 So now we have DIMEFILE? The
point is there is no set number of tools a government can use to solve a
problem, to think otherwise is foolhardy.

Rethinking Strategy
How can we do better? The first step is defining strategy in a manner
that captures its distinctiveness as a concept. There are a number of
possible definitions to choose from, but most of them suffer from sig-
nificant weaknesses. First, several prominent strategic thinkers define
strategy too narrowly in military terms. Colin Gray, for example, defines
strategy as the use that is made of force and the threat of force for
the ends of policy.14 This definition is insufficient even in the realm
of pure military strategy. In warfighting, a broad range of tools should
be considered beyond military force. Irregular conflicts, in particular,
highlight the need for a broader definition of strategy. Furthermore,
Grays definition does not give us any idea of what strategy actually is:
what does it mean to say that strategy is the use that is made of force for
the ends of policy?
A second common mistake is to be overly inclusive, and in so doing,
lose a clear sense of what is distinctive about strategy. As noted above,
this is the core problem with Lykkes definition of strategy. Others also
make this mistake. Business school professor Richard P. Rumelt defines
strategy as a coherent set of analyses, concepts, policies, arguments, and
actions that respond to a high-stakes challenge.15 Analyses, concepts,
policies, arguments, and actions are all potentially important parts of

12See Charles Dunlap, A Whole Lot of Substance or a Whole Lot of Rhetoric? A Perspective
on a Whole of Government Approach to Security Challenges, in Conflict Management and Whole
of Government: Useful Tools for US National Security Strategy, ed. Volker C. Franke and Robert H.
Dorff (Carlisle, PA: SSI, 2012), 185216, http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.Army.mil/pdffiles
/pub1102.pdf.
13Jim Garamone, Dempsey Talks Caution, Whole-of-Government Approach, US Department
of Defense, September 22, 2015, http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/618120
/dempsey-talks-caution-whole-of-government-approach.
14Colin S. Gray, Modern Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 17.
15Richard P. Rumelt, Good Strategy, Bad Strategy: The Difference and Why It Matters (New York:
Crown Business, 2011), 6.
86 Parameters 46(4) Winter 201617

formulating, communicating, and implementing strategy, but they are

not strategy. By including too many elements in a definition of strategy,
we risk obfuscating the meaning so much that the concept loses any
coherent meaning.
A third major problem with definitions of strategy is the propen-
sity to describe good strategy or to list the things that strategy should
do rather than to actually define what strategy is. Lawrence Freedman
defines strategy as the art of creating power.16 This is an excellent
definition of what strategy should do, but again does not help us under-
stand what a strategy actually is beyond telling us it is an art. Another
description of strategy by prominent defense community intellectuals
suffers from a similar problem: Strategy is fundamentally about iden-
tifying or creating asymmetric advantages that can be exploited to help
achieve ones ultimate objectives despite resource and other constraints,
most importantly the opposing efforts of adversaries or competitors and
the inherent unpredictability of strategic outcomes.17 Krepinevich and
Watts tell us what strategy should do, but not what it is.
The two definitions that come closest to articulating a distinctive
meaning for strategy are offered by Barry Posen and Eliot Cohen. Posen
defines grand strategy as a states theory about how it can best cause
security for itself.18 Cohen defines strategy as a theory of victory.19
The key insight by Posen and Cohen is the inclusion of the term theory.
If we define theories as statements predicting which actions will lead
to what resultsand why, we can move toward a better definition of
strategy that is general, but not too inclusive, and captures the essence
of the concept.20
If we use the Posen-Cohen approach with a more general definition
of purpose, we arrive at a sufficient working definition: strategy is a
theory of success. This creates the expectation that anything called a
strategy will be a causal explanation of how a given action or set of actions
will cause success. Most strategies will include multiple intervening
variables and conditions.21 Defining strategy as a theory of success
encourages creative thinking while keeping the strategist rooted in the
process of causal analysis; it brings assumptions to light and forces strat-
egists to clarify exactly how they plan to cause the desired end state to
occur.
Does the new definition of strategy improve upon the Lykke model?
Does it take us away from means-based planning? Yes, in two main
ways. First, defining strategy as a theory of success requires us to make
a claim about how our proposed actions will actually cause success to
happen. If the emphasis switches from applying means to an end, to
figuring out how to cause our preferred outcome, then the conversation

16Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), xii.
17Andrew F. Krepinevich and Barry D. Watts, Regaining Strategic Competence (Washington, DC:
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2009), 19.
18Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1986), 13.
19Eliot A. Cohen, Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime (New York:
Free Press, 2002), 33.
20Clayton M. Christensen and Michael E. Raynor, Why Hard-Nosed Executives Should Care
about Management Theory, Harvard Business Review 81, no. 9 (September 2003): 3.
21For examples, see Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 1997), 912.
Are Our Strategic Models Flawed? Meiser 87

is less about what resources we have available and more about what
actions will lead to success and how. This shift will inevitably lead to
the development of several rival theories of success, which is a crucial
part of the strategy-making process. This approach may seem overly
scientific or intellectual, but military commanders already have experi-
ence in the area of developing and choosing from multiple proposals.
The campaign planning method is based on developing and evaluating
alternative courses of action.22 This is also the basic logic behind the
scientific method and a form of intelligence analysis called hypothesis
generation and testing.23 The process can be applied at the levels of
military strategy and national strategy to clearly articulate and evaluate
alternative theories of success.
The second benefit of defining strategy as a theory of success
encourages us to think more effectively about power. A key principle of
the Lykke model is to work with the resources or power that you currently
have; however, more nuanced thinking about power suggests power
is not a set value and instead is determined by the strategy. Freedman
makes this point rather emphatically: strategy is about getting more
out of a situation than the starting balance of power would suggest. It
is the art of creating power.24 Like Freedman, Rumelt argues part of
the purpose of strategy is the discovery of power. The broader principle
is that good strategy is an insight that, when acted upon, provide[s] a
much more effective way to competethe discovery of hidden power
in the situation.25 To think of means only as existing resources dramati-
cally underplays the actual sources of power. Since one of the purposes
of strategy is to generate power, it does not make much sense to define
sources of power before developing a strategy.

Implications
Judging an abstract argument without an empirical example is
difficult; therefore, this section applies the Posen-Cohen model to the
Obama administrations strategy-making process for Afghanistan in
2009. The process was deficient in three ways: it was almost entirely
means based, there was only one real option presented, and the result
was bad strategy. This brief example suggests there are high costs to our
present approach and potentially significant benefits to a new approach
to strategy.
What emerges from journalistic accounts of the 2009 Obama
administration strategy-making process is the observation that the
entire discussion by civilian officials and military officers was about
the number of troops, not strategy. In August 2009, International
Security and Assistance Force Commander General Stanley McChrystal
presented President Barack Obama with two strategies and three levels
of troop deployment: 10,000 troops for a ramped up training mission
or 40,000 or 85,000 troops for counterinsurgency (COIN) operations.
The appearance of choice was a facade; there was only one genuine

22See Jack D. Kem, Planning for Action: Campaign Concepts and Tools (Fort Leavenworth, KS: US
Command and General Staff College / Army Combined Arms Center, 2012), 12952.
23Richards J. Heuer Jr. and Randolph H. Pherson, Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence
Analysis (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2011), 14776.
24Freedman, Strategy, xii.
25Rumelt, Good Strategy, Bad Strategy, 31.
88 Parameters 46(4) Winter 201617

option, the middle one40,000 troops for comprehensive COIN.26

Obama quickly understood the reality and was not happy; he wanted
more options. After months of discussion and debate, his refined
options were: 20,000 more troops for counterterrorism plus other
initiatives; 30,00035,000 more troops for COIN; 40,000 more
troops for COIN; or 85,000 more troops for COIN.27 After repeated
presidential requests for at least three distinct options, all Obama ever
got was slight variations of the original ones. All options were based on
the amount of resources being thrown at the problem.
The only possibility of a truly distinct option arose when former
Vice President Joe Biden attempted to challenge the proposed coun-
terinsurgency approach with what he called counterterrorism plus.28
This approach was pitched to Obama as the 20,000-troop option, but
when Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, Central Command Commander
General David Petraeus, and McChrystal insisted it was unrealistic,
Obama dismissed the option without question.29 Thus, in reality Obama
was presented two realistic options, both included COIN and at least a
30,000 troop increase. All of the leaders agreed increasing troop strength
by 85,000 was unrealistic. Even if the counterterrorism plus option was
considered viable, it was just as means-based as the counterinsurgency
options. Biden did not start with a concept and then figure out it would
require less troops, he decided less troops would be better and then
developed a possible concept.
How can you determine what is the best option when you have
only one option? How can you judge the strengths and weaknesses of
an approach when you have nothing to compare it to? All strategies
have tradeoffs; different strategies have different tradeoffs. Comparing
tradeoffs is impossible with only one option. Political science research
suggests people will not discard a policy idea unless there is a plausible
alternative.30 The point of the strategy-making process is to choose the
best alternative, which means insisting on multiple plausible options that
are presented equally and without bias.
What about the merits of the strategy proposed by McChrystal and
vigorously supported by Mullen, Petraeus, and Gates as well as Secretary
of State Hillary Clinton? From the perspective of the Posen-Cohen
model, McChrystals strategy is deficient due to its lack of clear causal
thinking.31 Instead of a clearly stated theory of success, there are pillars,
principles, and priorities including protect the people, understand
the peoples choices and needs, improve governance, improve the
Afghan National Security Forces, change the operational culture of the
International Security and Assistance Force, improve unity of effort

26Jack Fairweather, The Good War: Why We Couldnt Win the War or the Peace in Afghanistan (New
York: Basic Books, 2014), 287.
27Bob Woodward, Obamas Wars (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2011), 273. The other
initiatives or actions to be added to the basic counterterrorism approach were never exactly clear.
28Ibid., 159, 23236, 273.
29Ibid., 275.
30Jeffrey Legro, Rethinking the World: Great Power Strategies and International Order (Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2005), 2448.
31This analysis is based on McChrystals official assessment. See Stanley A. McChrystal,
Commanders Initial Assessment (Kabul, Afghanistan: Headquarters International Security Assistance
Force, 2009).
Are Our Strategic Models Flawed? Meiser 89

and command, gain the initiative, signal unwavering commitment,

address grievances, and gain the support of the Afghan people.32 The
elements identify many difficult objectives but no sense of the crucial
factors or likely causes and effects. These objectives are fine as ways,
defined as lines of effort, but they do not provide causal linkages between
actions and results.
Perhaps the most important flaw of McChrystals strategy is the
unspecified relationship between providing security, gaining support of
the population, and establishing governance good enough to earn the
trust of the people. If security could be established separate from gover-
nance, as Petraeus later argued, then the capabilities of the government
of Afghanistan did not matter and the surge was a sensible option.33 If
security was in any way contingent on governance, however, then the
surge would be a waste of time without steep improvement in the capac-
ity of national and local governance in Afghanistan.
Perhaps if McChrystal would have spent more time elaborating
the causal linkages in his strategy, the principal decision-makers would
have understood the United States cannot gain the support of the
Afghan people without good governance nor provide security without
the support of the populationthis is COIN 101. As Stephen Biddle
observes, combat and security alone will have difficulty sustaining
control if all they do is allow a predatory government to exploit the
population for the benefit of unrepresentative elites.34 This problem
materialized in the early days of McChrystals counterinsurgency effort
in Afghanistan. McChrystal found that when his government in a box
did not show up in Marjah after Operation Moshtarak (2010), security
rapidly deteriorated.35
The above analysis raises the question, Was the McChrystal strategy
successful? A comprehensive analysis requires more than the allotted
space, but the state of Afghanistan today bears a striking resemblance
to presurge Afghanistan; so one must ask, What was gained from the
additional blood and treasure? The Taliban is again resurgent, con-
trolling significant portions of almost every province in Afghanistan.36
Taliban attacks continue to take a large toll on Afghan National Security
Forces, local police, and Afghan civilians. ISIL is now active in eastern
Afghanistan. While the government of Afghanistan seems somewhat
stable, Afghan National Security Forces have barely been able to stem
the tide even with ever-increasing American assistance. At the very least,
the surge did not result in the durable disruption to the Taliban that it
was supposed to cause.37 If the effort opened up space for good gover-
nance to develop, we are still waiting for it to arrive.

32Ibid.
33Woodward, Obamas Wars, 220.
34Stephen Biddle, Afghanistans Legacy: Emerging Lessons of an Ongoing War, Washington
Quarterly 37, no. 2 (Summer 2014): 75, doi:10.1080/0163660X.2014.926210.
35Ben Anderson, The Battle for Marjah, directed by Anthony Wonke (New York: HBO
Documentary Films, 2011).
36Caitlin Forrest, Afghanistan Partial Threat Assessment: June 30, 2016, Institute for the
Study of War, July 14, 2016, http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/afghanistan
-partial-threat-assessment-june-30-2016.
37Woodward, Obamas Wars, 27071, 300, 31214.
90 Parameters 46(4) Winter 201617

There is no direct evidence that any of the players in the 2009 debate
acted or spoke in terms of ends, ways, and means, although there was
mention of a whole-of-governments approach and McChrystal later
coined the term government in a box. The obsession with means to the
detriment of strategy of all participants in the strategy-making process
is, however, abundantly clear. There was no debate about rival theories
of success. The uniformed military and Gates pushed one option and
Obama failed to compel anyone to provide multiple distinct options.
McChrystal provided lines of effort but not a theory of success. Biden
pushed a counterterrorism plus option, but never made a convincing
argument about how it would be implemented or how the goal of durably
disrupting the Taliban would be achieved. This outcome can only be
considered a massive failure of the strategy-making process.

Conclusion
The American way of strategy is the practice of means-based
planning: avoid critical and creative thinking and instead focus on
aligning resources with goals. Common definitions of strategy,
including the ever-present Lykke model, foster this way of thinking
because they do not clearly describe what makes strategy a distinct
concept. Too often definitions are overly inclusive and smuggle in
concepts unrelated to strategy. Other definitions tell us what good
strategy should do rather than telling us what it is. These weaknesses
make strategy hard to define and complicate the strategy-making process.
The problems with our current understanding of strategy are exac-
erbated by the whole-of-government approach encouraging us to define
national power as a discrete set of instruments that form a convenient
acronym. In practice, the whole-of-government approach is often used
as a substitute for, rather than an enabler of, strategy. The elements of
national power are presented as lines of effort directed toward a goal
without any clear sense of how exactly these efforts are related or how
exactly they will cause the goals to be achieved.
The US defense community needs a new definition of strategy.
Strategy is a theory of success, a solution to a problem, an explanation of
how obstacles can be overcome. A good strategy creates opportunities,
magnifies existing resources, or creates new resources. A good strategy
must have a clear goal and must be mindful of constraints, but must not
allow creativity to be crushed by overemphasizing available resources
and existing doctrine. True creative thinking is profoundly difficult but
worth the trouble because it wins wars, saves lives, and preserves nations.
Defining strategy as a theory of success gives a clear sense of how
strategy is distinct from means-based planning and facilitates a superior
strategy-making process. Without a clearly stated theory of success,
assumptions remain hidden and logic fuzzy. A strategy must describe
how and why proposed actions will cause the achievement of a goal.
The strategy-making process must be driven by the evaluation of rival
theories of success.
It is impossible to know how good a strategy is unless it is
compared to other strategies. The costs and benefits of one strategy
will be different than the costs and benefits of other strategies. The
tradeoffs, level of risk, and probability of success will be different. Rival
Are Our Strategic Models Flawed? Meiser 91

strategies should be evaluated based on current knowledge of the specific

situation, historical evidence of similar cases, well-supported theory, and
relevant experience. Comparative analysis has long been a part of the
military campaign planning process and is fundamental to intelligence
analysis and the scientific method.
A nation-state with a significant power advantage over all
competitors can do without strategy and can perhaps even afford bad
strategy. To a certain extent this position describes the United States in
the 1990s and early 2000s. During this period of time, problems could
be solved with massive funding or expensive solutions. We no longer
can assume such an envious position. Our resources are overstretched
and our economic base precarious. Our problems are complex and
multifarious. Now, and in the future, we will have to seek creative and
relevant solutions with fewer resources.38 In other words, we need good
strategy.

38F. G. Hoffman, Grand Strategy: The Fundamental Considerations, Orbis 58, no. 4
(September 2014): 4767, doi:10.1016/j.orbis.2014.08.002.