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The Rise and Demise of PATCO Reconstructed

Richard W. Hurd
Cornell University, [email protected]

Jill K. Kriesky
University of New Hampshire

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The Rise and Demise of PATCO Reconstructed
Abstract
[Excerpt] In his article "The Rise and Demise of PATCO" (Northrup 1984), Herbert Northrup presents a
narrow and misleading explanation of the ill-fated air traffic controllers' strike of 1981. Northrup's thesis is that
the goal of the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) strike was to establish the right to
bargain over wages within a private sector framework. He attributes the failure of the strike to the union's inept
leadership and praises the Reagan administration for its firm response to the challenge presented by PATCO.

Although most of the facts he reports are accurate, Northrup omits crucial information regarding the
management style of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the internal dynamics of PATCO. Based
on this additional information, we will argue that PATCO'S primary goal was to address the work-related
problems of the rank-and-file specifically by reducing the work week and improving the retirement system;
that the primary cause of the strike was rank-and- file frustration with autocratic management; and that the
Reagan administration joined forces with career FAA managers to destroy PATCO without giving sufficient
consideration to less drastic alternatives.

Keywords
union, labor movement, Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization, PATCO, strike, Federal Aviation
Administration, FAA

Disciplines
Labor and Employment Law | Unions

Comments
Suggested Citation
Hurd, R. W. & Kriesky, J. K. (1986). The rise and demise of PATCO Reconstructed [Electronic version].
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 40(1), 115-122.
http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/318/

Required Publisher Statement

Reprinted with permission of Cornell University.

This article is available at DigitalCommons@ILR: http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/articles/318

 COMMUNICATIONS
"The Rise and Demise of PATCO" Reconstructed

N his article "The Rise and Demise of straining civil service system by forcing the
INorthrup
P A T C O " ( N o r t h r u p 1984), Herbert
presents a narrow and mislead-
privatization of the FAA. PATCO could have
attained the weaker form of private sector
ing explanation of the ill-fated air traffic wage determination by ratifying the ten-
controllers' strike of 1981. Northrup's the- tative contract signed on June 22, 1981. As
sis is that the goal of the Professional Air Northrup interprets the situation, the union
Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO) stubbornly refused to be satisfied with this
strike was to establish the right to bargain precedent-setting agreement and instead
over wages within a private sector frame- staged "the 'definitive strike' aimed at
work. He attributes the failure of the strike achieving PATCO'S basic aims of inducing
to the union's inept leadership and praises Congress to establish an independent FAA,
the Reagan administration for its firm permitting wage bargaining, and legitim-
response to the challenge presented by izing strikes" (Northrup 1984:174).
PATCO. T o support his thesis that this stronger
Although most of the facts he reports are version of private sector wage bargaining
accurate, N o r t h r u p omits crucial infor- was the objective, Northrup refers to five
mation regarding the management style of PATCO sources ( N o r t h r u p 1984:17ln).
the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Three of the five are not directly relevant
and the internal dynamics of PATCO. Based to the 1981 negotiations because they pre-
on this additional information, we will argue date Robert Poli's ascendancy to the pres-
that PATCO'S primary goal was to address idency of the union. The remaining two
the work-related problems of the rank-and- sources are fatally flawed. T h e article
file specifically by reducing the work week "Maybe It's Time to Dismiss the FAA," which
and improving the retirement system; that a p p e a r e d in the New York Times on
the primary cause of the strike was rank- August 16, 1981, is credited to Robert Poli
and-file frustration with autocratic man- by Northrup when in fact it was written by
agement; and that the Reagan administra- Robert Poole, who has no association with
tion joined forces with career FAA managers PATCO. Poole is a long-time advocate of pri-
to destroy PATCO without giving sufficient vatization of public services, and is clearly
consideration to less drastic alternatives. identified in an insert to the article as Pres-
ident of the Reason Foundation (Poole
1981). The July 13, 1981, UPI article ref-
T h e PATCO Bargaining Objectives erenced by Northrup in support of his
The weakest link in Northrup's analysis position in fact contradicts him quite clearly.
is his assertion that the basic objective of When asked to comment on a proposal to
the 1981 PATCO strike was "wage deter- establish a private company to provide air
traffic control services, PATCO officials
mination on a private sector model"
disavowed any association with the plan. In
(Northrup 1984:171). This theme is sub-
fact, PATCO'S eastern regional vice-president
ject to two possible interpretations. In its
specifically disassociated the privatization
weaker version the goal of PATCO could
proposal from the pending strike: "I'm sure
have been to stretch federal labor relations we'll devote all our efforts to obtaining a
law to the limit by bargaining over wages new contract and realistically . . . we cannot
subject to Congressional approval. In its rule out the possibility of a strike. So this
stronger version the goal of PATCO could [privatization] plan doesn't fit in at all under
have been to break away from the con-

Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 40, No. 1 (October 1986). by Cornell University.
0019-7939/86/4001 $01.00

115
116 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW

the present circumstances" (UPI 1981:16). (Shostak and Skocik 1986, Chap. 5).
In addition to the five PATCO sources, Although the wage package offered by the
Northrup refers to a bill, HB 1576, intro- Reagan administration was not as large as
duced by Representative William Clay on PATCO had hoped, both President Poli and
PATCO's behalf in 1981. The Clay bill would Chief Negotiator Dennis Reardon are firm
have established a separate salary schedule in their position that the wage improve-
for air traffic controllers, required the FAA ment would have been acceptable had the
to bargain over wages with the collective contract also addressed the other two key
bargaining agent of the controllers, and issues (Poli 1985; Reardon 1985). In terms
provided for adjustment of the salary of narrow bargaining objectives, the prior-
schedule to reflect any future collective ities at the time of the strike were to shorten
bargaining agreement. T h e bill also the workweek and improve the retirement
included language that would have allowed system (Leyden 1982; Maher 1985; Poli
the air traffic controllers to strike (U.S. 1985; Reardon 1985; Taylor 1985).
House of Representatives 1981a). In fact, the July 1981 UPl article refer-
Certainly HB 1576 would have enabled enced by Northrup, although it did not sup-
PATCO to negotiate under private sector port his thesis that PATCO's goal was to
rules, as argued by Northrup. What North- privatize its relations with the FAA. clearly
rup fails to report is that on July 30, 1981, reflected the true objectives of the union.
Clay introduced a revised version of the The article reported that the contract faced
legislation, HB 4332. The revised bill deleted likely rejection "by an overwhelming mar-
the provision for automatic adjustment of the gin on the grounds that it does not
salary schedule subject to collective bargaining, address . . . [controllers'] main concerns
and omitted the right to strike (U.S. House of a shorter work week and better retirement
Representatives 1981b). PATCO officials had benefits" (UPI 1981:16). By some accounts,
agreed to these changes because they rec- the shorter workweek became the more
ognized that the bill stood no chance of important objective as the strike deadline
serious consideration in its original form approached. As Business Week summarized
(Shostak and Skocik 1986, Chap. 5). The the situation, "Federal Aviation Association
PATCO leaders most certainly would not and union officials alike are now saying that
have accepted such revisions four days the membership is homing in on the
before the strike if bargaining under pri- reduced work week issue" {Business Week
vate sector rules had been their primary 1981:26).
objective.
Even when chastising the union for not
accepting the weaker version of private sec-
T h e Role of FAA Management
tor bargaining, Northrup focuses on wages:
"The willingness of the Reagan adminis- A second flaw in Northrup's analysis is
tration to bargain over wages . . . brought his omission of any careful evaluation of
PATCO close to its goal" ( N o r t h r u p management's role in the conflict. T h e
1984:183). This claim still misses the point. reports of three groups of neutral outside
The publicly stated negotiating demands experts, appointed by the Department of
of PATCO indeed included a substantial Transportation to assess the personnel dif-
wage increase. Besides inflicting consider- ficulties of the FAA and to recommend solu-
able damage on the union's public image, tions, contain a wealth of information on
the wage demands masked the key issues management's contribution to the recur-
in the conflict. In five surveys conducted rent hostilities. Northrup briefly mentions
for the union by Drexel University sociol- these studies, concluding that the reports
ogy professor Arthur Shostak during 1979, "criticized the FAA'S relations with its
1980, and 1981, PATCO members consist- employees, although pointing out that
ently reported that their primary concerns PATCO leadership was heavily to blame"
were (1) wage gains, (2) a shorter work- (Northrup 1984:168). As we read them, the
week, and (3) an improved retirement plan reports document in detail the failings of
 COMMUNICATIONS 117

FAA management and make only second- contributed to the PATCO strike (Jones,
ary references to PATCO'S role. Bowers, and Fuller 1982:10; Witkin 1982).
The Corson Committee was appointed The report describes the "rigid and insen-
after the PATCO job actions of 1968 and sitive system of people management within
1969. Its report, issued in January 1970, the FAA" (Jones, Bowers, and Fuller 1982:1).
documents a series of problems with work- It concludes that "the strike by air traffic
ing conditions and recommends numerous controllers [is] consistent with what might
changes in management policies. It includes have been expectednegative organiza-
stinging criticisms of management, such as tional conditions, treatment, and experi-
the following: ences, not peer pressure, caused most
individuals to decide to strike" (Jones, Bow-
[The] KAA cannot now command the full sup- ers, and Fuller 1982:68).
port of many members of the work force in its It is our impression that Northrup fails
terminals and centers. Indeed, members of this to recognize the provocative role played by
committee have never previously observed a sit- management because of his reliance on
uation in which there is as much mutual resent- interviews with FAA officials as the basis for
ment and antagonism between management and much of his analysis. The explanation of
its employees. (Corson 1970:97) the strike offered by top FAA managers is
reviewed in an article by David Bowers, a
It is true that the report also condemns member of the Jones Task Force and a
PATCO'S tactics, but it places substantial research scientist at the University of Mich-
blame for the poor relations on manage- igan Institute for Social Research. T h e
ment, decrying "the failure of FAA'S man- management assessment parallels North-
agement at all levels to truly understand rup's closely, FAA managers believed that
the role of the employee organizations" the key concerns of PATCO were much
(Corson 1970:108). higher pay and benefits, and Northrup
In 1973 the FAA commissioned a five- argues that the key objective was wage bar-
year study of the effect of the occupation gaining on a private sector model, FAA
on the health of employees u n d e r the managers believed that PATCO had unreal-
direction of Boston University psychiatrist istic expectations because of past FAA
Robert Rose. The 1978 Rose Report con- "indulgence" of the union's demands, and
cludes that air traffic controllers have an Northrup traces PATCO'S behavior to the
unusually high prevalence of hypertension "equivocal" response of the federal gov-
and that job stress contributes to the psy- ernment to past job actions, FAA managers
chiatric problems experienced by nearly believed that most controllers struck
half of the controllers. It also confirms the because of peer pressure, and Northrup
existence of a burnout phenomenon, con- identifies Poli's "adherents in the field" as
cluding that "the period of maximum pro- instigators "whipping up" strike support
ductivity as a controller is a limited one, (Bowers 1983:6; Northrup 1984:167, 177,
perhaps 10, 15, but not more than 20 years" 184).
(Rose 1978:16). The report ties the prob- Bowers emphatically rejects the FAA top
lem of hypertension, job stress, and burn- management version of what transpired,
out directly to the management practices noting that "the findings [of the Jones task
of the FAA. In its conclusion, the report force] stand in almost polar opposition to
notes "dissatisfaction among a large enough the views obtained in interviews and con-
group to warrant a review of management versations with a wide array of key man-
policies and practices" (Rose 1978:628). agers" (Bowers 1983:17). We also reject
Following the PATCO strike, yet another Northrup's version. Because he ignores the
task force was appointed. The Jones Report, rigidity of FAA management, N o r t h r u p
issued in March 1982 and endorsed by all misses the catalyst role it played in the strike.
three members of the task force, provides The frustration of working controllers with
direct evidence that the "para-military, their supervisors created a potentially
heavy handed style" of FAA management explosive situation.
118 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW

For its part, the FAA took a familiar man- a three-year contract signed earlier that
agement position. It blamed morale prob- year, President John Leyden established a
lems on PATCO and chose to ignore the committee to begin planning for the next
evidence offered in the Corson and Rose round of negotiations. Each of the seven
reports. Rather than correcting manage- regional vice-presidents selected a rank-
ment inadequacies, the FAA prepared for and-file leader (the seven original "choir
what Raymond Van Vuren, Director of Air boys") to be a member of the " '81 Com-
Traffic, described in 1980 as an "inevita- mittee," with Executive Vice-President
ble" strike (BNA 1980:11). If the agency Robert Poli representing the national office.
could weather the strike, PATCO would be Leyden asked the committee to plan a leg-
destroyed and the problems would islative agenda, conduct a public relations
disappear.' campaign, and (as a last resort) prepare for
Based on the information in the three a strike. To assure membership support in
consulting reports and the Bowers article, the event that a strike became necessary, a
we conclude that FAA management never new policy was adopted requiring that 80
accepted PATCO as a legitimate represen- percent of all air traffic controllers (or
tative of the air traffic controllers, and the roughly 90 percent of PATCO members) vote
union predictably responded with an in favor of any such action (Leyden 1982).
aggressive, confrontational approach. The After he ousted Leyden from the pres-
controllers' support for PATCO and its strat- idency in January 1980 as described by
egies is best viewed as a reflection of man- Northrup, Poli allowed the '81 Committee
agement's failures. to focus its attention more single-mindedly
on the mechanics of strike preparation
(Maher 1985). Once a strike plan was devel-
Internal Dynamics of PATCO
oped it was explained at regional PATCO
A third weakness in Northrup's article is meetings and in an April 1980 memo from
its lack of clarity regarding changes within Poli (Poli 1980). Additional choir boys were
PATCO that contributed to the events of selected by the '81 Committee to imple-
1981. 2 The unsavory work environment ment the plan locally. Eventually, there was
revealed in the task force reports enhanced one choir boy at each facility, or over 400
PATCO'S standing with air traffic con- nationally. The choir boys were typically
trollers. Membership increased steadily in activists chosen for their ability to articulate
the years preceding the strike, peaking at positions and for their influence with the
nearly 94 percent of those eligible in the rank-and-file. Although a commitment to
summer of 1981 (Spector and Beer strike if necessary was required of each choir
1982:13). The union actually began inter- boy, PATCO officials insist that "non-violence
nal strike preparation in the fall of 1978. was at all times primary and mandatory"
In response to rank-and-file discontent with (Maher 1984; Reardon 1985; Taylor 1985).
Each choir boy was instructed by the '81
'Predictably, however, the problems did not go away. Committee to organize seven local com-
T h e Jones task force conducted a follow-up study in mittees, with assignments ranging from
1984, and concluded that the FAA had not heeded the
commission's earlier advice to institute humane labor
picketing to family support. Most members
management techniques. Instead, the FAA has devel- of the union were assigned to a committee,
oped a human relations program "viewed [by the con- ensuring the broadest possible participa-
trollers] as inconsequential, as largely slogans and tion in strike preparation (Poli 1980; Vacca
superficial window dressing" (Feaver 1984).
1982; Maher 1985). The weakness in this
Given his reliance on anonymous FAA sources for
much of his information, it is not clear how Northrup system was the exclusive focus of the com-
developed his version of the internal dynamics of mittees on strike preparation. T h e tight
PATCO. We base most of this section and our prior internal cohesiveness became so powerful
discussion of the PATCO bargaining objectives on inter- that it developed a momentum of its own,
views with PATCO officials, some conducted in 1981
and 1982 as part of a prior research project and the increasing the likelihood of a strike. It also
remainder conducted in 1985 as we prepared this increased the confidence of PATCO'S lead-
piece. ership that the controller work force would
 COMMUNICATIONS 119

strike if necessary (Reardon 1985; Taylor this meeting to determine where they got
1985), contrary to Northrup's conclusion this idea were unsuccessful. Dominic Tor-
that the leaders "underestimated their abil- chia, the vice-president of the western
ity to hold their members in line" (North- region in which the meeting occurred, sug-
rup 1984:184). gests, however, that an enthusiastic attempt
As the contract expiration date to prepare the membership for a strike may
approached, the influence of the '81 Com- have produced this speculative scenario
mittee and the choir boy system increased. (Torchia 1985).
Because of the unusually high degree of On the tape, controllers from two loca-
membership involvement, PATCO essen- tions discuss how they intend to build sup-
tially became captive to the controllers' port in their workplaces for a future strike
frustration with management. As Bowers vote and which locals need to increase strike
has noted, the bargaining process was ill commitment. Although their conversation
equipped to address the employee dissat- takes place in July 1981, it contains only
isfaction with managerial behavior, and the vague allusions to using the June 22 con-
demands were "projected onto ' h a r d e r ' tract to build strike support.
economic issues" (Bowers 1983:8). When In short, based on the information that
bargaining with the FAA broke down, and Northrup provided us, it appears that he
the support from President Reagan that has linked together two isolated local
Poli had anticipated failed to materialize, sources, one referring to what would hap-
the '81 Committee's strike plan became the pen if the June 21 strike vote fell short of
only viable option. The high degree of the required 80 percent, the other refer-
internal organization assured PATCO'S ring to building support for the August 3
leaders of widespread member support for strike vote. But no logical connection exists.
a strike. In fact, the momentum was so Interviews with national union officials,
strong that aborting the strike would have including Poli and several other negotiat-
been difficult. As former PATCO president ing committee members, suggest that the
Leyden cynically put it, "Disproportionate following very different series of events
democracy led to a runaway ship" (Leyden took place. After negotiations with the FAA
1982). broke down in late April, a June 22 strike
According to N o r t h r u p , the PATCO deadline was announced, PATCO leaders
"script" called for Poli to accept the final believed that there was sufficient support
offer of the Reagan administration in June, for a strike. But when a strike vote con-
then have the executive board repudiate ducted under the auspices of the '81 Com-
the offer and use it to whip up support for mittee on the day before the deadline fell
a strike. The supporting evidence provided slightly short of the necessary 80 percent,
is exceedingly thin, consisting of "call-in the PATCO negotiating team was backed into
telephone recordings" and minutes from a a corner. Even though the final offer of
local union meeting in Sacramento (North- Secretary Lewis did not address the key
rup 1984: l75n). Northrup could provide issues of a reduced workweek and improved
us only with the meeting notes and a tape retirement system, it was accepted on
of a series of conversations between two June 22 by the negotiating team essentially
controllers in Memphis and Indianapolis. because the team felt that it had no other
T h e Sacramento meeting notes do not option (Poli 1985; Maher 1985; Trick 1985;
mention how PATCO intended to build strike Reardon 1981; Reardon 1985; Taylor
support. They do, however, quote the choir 1985).
boys conducting the meeting as stating, "If Torchia, the western regional vice-
we get into the strike hall and come up president and a member of the executive
short, . . . Mr. Poli will 'con' the media and board, recalls, however, that by the time
will probably call an 11th hour settlement the full executive board met in Chicago in
to try to 'save face.' " We can find no evi- early July, widespread rank-and-file oppo-
dence that this was national policy. Efforts sition to the contract had surfaced. Any
to contact the choir boys who presided at executive board member who had voted to
120 INDUSTRIAL AND LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW

support the contract might well have been in the event of a strike, to schedule more
forced by the members to resign (Torchia than twice as many flights as the Carter
1985), which contributed to the board's plan would have permitted. It also allowed
recommendation that the contract be the airlines to decide which flights should
rejected by the members. Poli specifically be canceled (FAA 1981; Meadows 1981;
denies the script described by Northrup, Richardson 1981). The revised plan was
claiming that there was no contingency plan endorsed in advance of the strike by the
for the event the strike vote came up short major airlines and the Air Transport Asso-
("We weren't that smart"; Poli 1985). ciation (Richardson 1980), but it was not
divulged to PATCO officials (Young 1981).
PATCO struck without knowing that the
T h e Reagan Administration Strategy strike plan had been greatly changed. In
Northrup applauds the Reagan admin- an interview after the strike, PATCO's chief
istration, which "unlike all its predeces- negotiator stated that prior knowledge of
sors . . . had the will when tested to meet the revised plan would have given union
the challenge" presented by PATCO (North- negotiators pause and forced them to reev-
rup 1984:183). We do not believe that the aluate their belief that a strike would vir-
resolve is worthy of such unrestrained tually paralyze the system (Reardon 1981).
praise. Instead, we are convinced that the The ultimate step in Reagan's hard-line
administration's actions actually contrib- strategy was his decision to fire all striking
uted to the difficulty of reaching a nego- air traffic controllers who did not return
tiated settlement. to their jobs within 48 hours of his back-
Although space limitations preclude a to-work ultimatum. Given the hostility felt
detailed review of the Reagan administra- by the striking controllers, and the union's
tion's negotiating tactics, even a brief sum- lack of knowledge of the revisions in the
mary reveals the underlying theme. Three FAA'S strike contingency plan, it is not sur-
particular actions exacerbated an already prising that most PATCO members ignored
hostile collective bargaining environment. the back-to-work ultimatum. Although
First, in February 1981 the Department of Northrup's praise of this "determination to
Transportation contracted with the law firm break with the past and to enforce the law"
Morgan, Lewis, and Bockius to handle bar- (Northrup 1984:184) may seem reasonable
gaining with PATCO (at an eventual cost of to some observers, we side with the labor
$376,000) (Hershow 1982). This firm relations experts who argue that less severe
advocates a noncompromising approach to alternatives should have been pursued.
labor negotiations, and is known in labor John Dunlop accurately summarized this
circles as a "union buster" (AFL-CIO 1981, position in the week following the walkout:
1983). Second, in March 1981 Reagan "The administration has decided . . . to
appointed J. Lynn Helms to head the FAA. leave no avenue of escape for the union.
While president of Piper Aircraft, Helms You just don't do that . . . [Such an
had developed a firm anti-union reputa- approach] is quite unusual, even going back
tion (Reinhold 1981 :B9; Carley 1981:22). to the turn of the century" (Taylor
Finally, the six-week hiatus between the 198LA1).
tentative contract agreement and the strike The Reagan administration's tactics were
was used by the FAA to secretly revise and clearly legal and perfectly acceptable if the
strengthen a strike contingency plan orig- goal was to severely weaken or eliminate
inally prepared and published under the PATCO. Our disagreement with Northrup
Carter administration. Had the strike on this point is essentially a difference of
occurred on June 23, the Carter plan (with opinion. As an alternative to firing the con-
minor changes published early in the trollers, Dunlop suggested that some type
Reagan administration) would have been of mediation could have been pursued
used. The revised plan implemented on beyond the pre-strike mediation by the
August 3 was considerably less restrictive FMCS. "What is absolutely without prece-
than the original. It permitted the airlines, dent, at least in modern times, is that [the
 COMMUNICATIONS 121

Reagan administration] has brought in no this combination of factors, the strike was
outside, dispassionate group to look at the virtually inevitable.
problem. T h a t ain't right" (Taylor A different conclusion could have been
1981.-A 1). reached. Had FAA management been more
Dunlop's position is similar to that taken responsive to the concerns of its employees,
by W.J. Usery, Jr., a former secretary of the situation would not have deteriorated
labor. Two weeks after the strike began, as it did and PATCO would not have been
Usery publicly suggested that a panel of able to adopt so militant a posture. The
three former labor secretaries be assem- strike could also have been averted had the
bled to mediate a settlement (Eaton and Reagan administration addressed the con-
Cimons 1981:1, 14; Los Angeles Times 1981). cerns of the controllers by seriously nego-
T h e Reagan administration, however, tiating over the issues of retirement and
rejected all recommendations to seek hours of work. On the other hand, PATCO
mediation and remained firm in its firing might have emerged from the negotiations
decision. We believe that the collective bar- victorious, or at least survived the strike,
gaining environment in the United States with a better strategy. Although the union's
was harmed by this hard-line attitude, which internal organizing efforts were extensive
encouraged anti-union managers in the and effective, its external relations were
public and private sectors to follow the largely ignored: coordination with other
president's example. unions was not pursued, public relations
were poor, and political activities were
misguided.
Northrup's analysis closely resembles the
Conclusion myopic assessment of the strike offered by
A complex set of circumstances contrib- career FAA managers. As such, it misses the
uted to PATCO'S ultimate decision to strike. flaws in management and the internal
Despite advice from i n d e p e n d e n t task dynamics of PATCO. We believe that the
forces to revise management practices, the information we have presented fills in the
FAA persisted in its autocratic treatment of gaps in his analysis and completes the pic-
controllers. In response, PATCO became ture of this complex, precedent-setting
increasingly militant, and by 1981 the confrontation.
internal activities of the union were nar- RICHARD W. HURD
rowly focused on strike preparation. The JILL K. KRIKSKY
hard line taken by the Reagan administra- Associate Professor of Economics
tion legitimized the stubbornness of FAA Teaching Fellow in Economics
Whittemore School of Business
management and presented the challenge and Economics
PATCO militants had been anticipating. With University of New Hampshire

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1982 Management and Employee Relationships 1982 "Air Traffic Controllers." Harvard Business
Within the Federal Aviation Administration. School, case study 9-482-056. Boston: Presi-
Washington, D.C.: Federal Aviation Admin- dent and Fellows of Harvard College.
istration. Taylor, Benjamin
Leyden,John 1981 "Labor Meets a Tough Presidential Foe." Bos-
1982 Personal interview, Washington, D.C., ton Globe, August 9.
June 24. Taylor, Bill (Former PATCO choir boy; current
Los Angeles Times director, PATCO Lives)
1981 "Usery Denies Mediation Report, Was Speak- 1985 Telephone interviews, April 3, June 6, 7, 10.
ing 'Hypothetically.' " Los Angeles Times, Torchia, Dominic (PATCO Western Regional Vice-
August 20, p. 14. President)
Maher, Jack (PATCO '81 Committee member) 1985 Telephone interviews, October 18, 31.
1985 Telephone interviews, June 12, 14. Trick, Dave (1981 PATCO Bargaining Committee
1984 Personal letter, October 27. member)
Meadows, Edward 1985 Telephone interview, June 13.
1981 " T h e FAA Keeps T h e m Flying." Fortune, United Press International
December 28, pp. 48-52. 1981 "Controllers Seek to Form Private Com-
Northrup, Herbert R. pany." Mancliester Union Leader, July 13, pp. 1,
1984 "The Rise and Demise of PATCO." Industrial 16:
and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 37, No. 2 United States House of Representatives
(January), pp. 167-84. 1981a House Bill 1576. 97th Cong., 1st sess.,
Poli, Robert E. February 3.
1985 Telephone interview, November 19. 1981b House Bill 4332. 97th Cong., 1st sess., July 30.
1980 "I'ATCO Educational Package." Washington, Vacca, James (1981 Boston Center choir boy)
D.C.: Professional Air Traffic Controllers 1982 Telephone interview, March 20.
Organization, April 15. Witkin, Richard
Poole, Robert 1982 "U.S. Agency's Handling of Controllers Crit-
1981 "Maybe It's Time to Dismiss the FAA." New icized." New York Times, March 18, p. A18.
York Times, August 16, p. El9. Young, Ted (FAA, Air Traffic Control Operations
Reardon, Dennis (1981 PATCO Bargaining Com- Division)
mittee Chairman) 1981 Telephone interview, September 15.

Reply

HE thesis of my article, "The Rise and

T Demise of PATCO," 1
in the first paragraph:
was clearly stated
t h e F e d e r a l Aviation A d m i n i s t r a t i o n (FAA), its
public sector e m p l o y e r ; of t h e weak r e s p o n s e
thereto by t h e federal g o v e r n m e n t until t h e later
years of t h e C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ; a n d of t h e
T h e strike was t h e inevitable result of PATCO'S failure of PATCO'S new l e a d e r s h i p to u n d e r s t a n d
l o n g - t e r m drive to "privatize" its relations with t h e greatly a l t e r e d political a n d e c o n o m i c envi-
r o n m e n t of 1981."
'Industrial and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 37, No. 2
(January 1984), pp. 167-84 (hereafter cited as "PATCO
2
article"). Ibid., 167.