SALVADOR FLORDELIZ y ABENOJAR v.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 186441, March 3, 2010

NACHURA, J.:

For review are the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision [1] and Resolution[2] dated July 29, 2008 and
February 16, 2009, respectively, in CA-G.R. CR No. 30949. The assailed decision affirmed the Regional
Trial Courts[3] (RTCs) Joint Judgment[4] dated March 9, 2007, convicting petitioner Salvador
Flordeliz y Abenojar of nine (9) counts of Rape and one (1) count of Acts of Lasciviousness, with a
modification of the award of damages, while the assailed resolution denied petitioners motion for
reconsideration.

The case stemmed from the following facts:

Sometime in March 1995, ABC, the wife of petitioner and the mother of private complainants
AAA and BBB, left for Malaysia as an overseas worker.AAA and BBB were left under the care and
custody of petitioner. They resided in a small house in Quezon Hill, Baguio City.[5]

In April 1995, while sleeping with BBB and AAA, who was then eleven (11) years old, petitioner
woke up AAA, touched her vagina, then played with it. AAA cried and told petitioner that it was
painful. The latter stopped, but warned AAA not to tell anyone about it; otherwise, she would be harmed.
[6]
Petitioner allegedly committed the same acts against AAA repeatedly.

Petitioner and his daughters later transferred residence and lived with the formers siblings. Not
long after, petitioner was convicted of homicide and imprisoned in Muntinlupa City. Consequently, AAA
and BBB lived with their grandparents in La Trinidad, Benguet. [7] While petitioner was incarcerated, AAA
and BBB visited him and sent him two greeting cards containing the following texts, among others: happy
valentine; ur the best dad in the world; I love you papa, love BBB, Love BJ; till we meet again; portrait of
Jesus Christ with a heart, this is for you dad; flordeliz, AAA P., love AAA and Iyos. [8]

In 2001, petitioner was released on parole. He would frequently fetch AAA and BBB from their
grandparents house during weekends and holidays and they would stay with him in Gabriela
Silang, Baguio City.[9]

Unsatisfied with the abuses committed against AAA, petitioner allegedly started molesting BBB
in May 2002.[10] In 2003, BBB spent New Years Day with her father. On January 3, 2003, while they were
sleeping, petitioner inserted his two (2) fingers into BBBs vagina. [11] BBB did not attempt to stop
petitioner because of fear. Thereafter, they slept beside each other.[12] BBB suffered the same ordeal the
following night.[13]

On February 8, 2003, BBB visited petitioner. Again, petitioner held her vagina, played with it and
inserted his fingers, which caused her pain.[14]

The same incident allegedly took place on August 3, 2003.[15] On October 26, 2003, a day before
AAAs birthday, while BBB was with petitioner, the latter committed the same dastardly act. This time, it
was for a longer period.[16]

During All Saints Day of 2003, BBB spent two nights with her father and, during those nights
(November 1 and 2), she experienced the same sexual abuse. [17] The same thing happened on December
28, 2003.[18]

Notwithstanding the repeated incidents of sexual abuse committed against her, BBB did not
reveal her ordeal to anybody because of fear for her life and that of her mother. [19]

AAA and BBB had the chance to reveal their horrifying experiences when their mother ABC
arrived for a vacation. AAA immediately told ABC what petitioner did to her. When confronted by ABC,
BBB likewise admitted the repeated abuses committed by petitioner. ABC forthwith reported the
incidents to the National Bureau of Investigation. [20]

After conducting medical examinations on AAA and BBB, the attending physician remarked that
there was a disclosure of sexual abuse and she noted the presence of hymenal notch in posterior portion of
hymenal rim that may be due to previous blunt force or penetrating trauma suggestive of abuse. [21]

With these findings, petitioner was charged with the crimes of Acts of Lasciviousness,
[22]
committed against AAA, and nine (9) counts of Qualified Rape through Sexual Assault, [23] committed
against BBB, before the RTC. The crime of acts of lasciviousness was allegedly committed as follows:

That sometime in the month of April 1995 up to 1996 in the City of Baguio,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with lewd design and deliberate intent to cause malice and satisfy his lascivious
desire, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously touched and play the
private part of the offended party AAA, a minor 14 years of age against her will and
consent which act debeased (sic), demeaned and degraded the intrinsic worth and dignity
of the minor as a human being.
 CONTRARY TO LAW.[24]
On the other hand, except for the dates of the commission of the crime, each Information for Rape reads:

That on or about the 8th day of February 2003, in the City of Baguio, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by means
of force and intimidation and taking advantage of his moral ascendancy over the private
offended party he being the biological father of said offended party, did then and there
remove the pants and underwear of said offended party and thereupon fondles her private
part and forcibly inserted his finger into the vagina of the offended party BBB, a minor,
11 years of age against her will and consent, which acts constitute Rape as defined under
Republic Act 8353 and which acts demeaned, debased and degraded the intrinsic worth
and dignity of the minor as a human being.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[25]

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded Not guilty to all the charges. During trial, he interposed the
defense of denial and insisted that the charges against him were fabricated by his wife to cover up the
infidelity she committed while working abroad. [26] Petitioner also relied on the testimonies of Florabel
Flordeliz, Levy Hope Flordeliz and Roderick Flordeliz, whose testimonies consisted mainly of the alleged
infidelity of ABC; and petitioner, being a good father, was often visited by his daughters at his residence,
where the rooms they occupied were only separated by see-through curtains. [27]

On March 9, 2007, the RTC rendered a Joint Judgment [28] finding petitioner guilty as charged, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises all duly considered[,] the court finds that the
prosecution has established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt and hereby
imposes upon him the following penalties:

1. In Criminal Case No. 23145-R for Acts of Lasciviousness, the Indeterminate Penalty
of 6 months of Arresto Mayor as the minimum penalty to 6 years of Prision Correccional
as the maximum penalty and to indemnify the victim AAA the amount of P20,000.00 as
moral damages and to pay the costs.

The penalty shall also carry the accessory penalty of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage (Art. 43, Revised Penal Code)[.]

2. In Criminal Cases Nos. 23072-R to 23080-R, the Indeterminate Penalty of twelve

(12) years of Prision Mayor as the minimum penalty to twenty (20) years of Reclusion
Temporal as the maximum penalty for each case or nine (9) counts of sexual assault
considering the aggravating/qualifying circumstance of relationship against the accused
and to indemnify BBB the amount of P75,000.00 as moral damages and to pay the costs.

The penalties shall carry with them the accessory penalties of civil interdiction for life
and perpetual absolute disqualification (Art. 41, Revised Penal Code).
 The accused shall be credited with 4/5 of his preventive imprisonment in the service of
his sentences.

In the service of his sentences, the same shall be served successively subject to the
provisions of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code or the Three-Fold Rule.

SO ORDERED.[29]

On appeal, the CA affirmed petitioners conviction with a modification of the amount of his civil
liabilities.

Petitioner now comes before us, raising the following errors:

ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS

The Honorable Court A Quo gravely erred in affirming the judgment of

conviction of the Honorable Regional Trial Court for the crime charged despite the fact
that the guilt of the petitioner has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt with
moral certainty.

RAPES THROUGH SEXUAL ASSAULT

1. The Honorable Court A Quo gravely erred in affirming the judgments of

conviction of the Honorable Regional Trial Court in Criminal Cases Nos. 23075-R
(alleged rape through sexual assault sometime in May, 2002) and 23078-R (alleged rape
through sexual assault on August 3, 2003) respectively, despite the complete absence of
evidence to show how the alleged incidents of rape through sexual assault were
committed by petitioner on said particular dates.

2. The Honorable Court A Quo gravely erred in affirming the judgments of

conviction of the Honorable Regional Trial Court in the other alleged counts of rape
through sexual assault despite the fact that the guilt of the petitioner has not been
proven beyond reasonable doubt with moral certainty.[30]

Simply put, petitioner assails the factual and legal bases of his conviction, allegedly because of lack of the
essential details or circumstances of the commission of the crimes. Petitioner, in effect, questions the
credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution and insists that the charges against him were designed to
conceal ABCs infidelity.

We have repeatedly held that when the offended parties are young and immature girls, as in this
case, courts are inclined to lend credence to their version of what transpired, considering not only their
relative vulnerability, but also the shame and embarrassment to which they would be exposed if the matter
about which they testified were not true.[31]

It is not uncommon in incestuous rape for the accused to claim that the case is a mere fabrication,
and that the victim was moved by familial discord and influence, hostility, or revenge. There is nothing
novel about such defense, and this Court had the occasion to address it in the past. In People v. Ortoa,
[32]
we held that:

Verily, no child would knowingly expose herself and the rest of her family to the
humiliation and strain that a public trial surely entails unless she is so moved by her
desire to see to it that the person who forcibly robbed her of her cherished innocence is
penalized for his dastardly act. The imputation of ill motives to the victim of an
incestuous rape [or lascivious conduct] becomes even more unconvincing as the victim
and the accused are not strangers to each other. By electing to proceed with the filing of
the complaint, the victim risks not only losing a parent, one whom, before his moral
descent, she previously adored and looked up to, but also the likelihood of losing the
affection of her relatives who may not believe her claim. Indeed, it is not uncommon for
families to be torn apart by an accusation of incestuous rape. Given the serious nature of
the crime and its adverse consequences not only to her, it is highly improbable for a
daughter to manufacture a rape charge for the sole purpose of getting even with her
father. Thus, the alleged ill motives have never swayed the Court against giving credence
to the testimonies of victims who remained firm and steadfast in their account of how
they were ravished by their sex offenders.[33]
Neither can we sustain petitioners claim that the charges against him were products of ABCs
fabrication to cover up the infidelity she committed while working abroad. No matter how enraged a
mother may be, it would take nothing less than psychological depravity for her to concoct a story too
damaging to the welfare and well-being of her own daughter. Courts are seldom, if at all, convinced that a
mother would stoop so low as to expose her own daughter to physical, mental and emotional hardship
concomitant to a rape prosecution.[34]

We now proceed to discuss the specific crimes with which petitioner was charged.

Criminal Case Nos. 23072-R, 23073-R, 23074-R, 23076-R, 23077-R, 23079-R, and 23080-R for Rape
Through Sexual Assault

The RTC, affirmed by the CA, correctly convicted petitioner of Rape in Criminal Case Nos. 23072-R,
23073-R, 23074-R, 23076-R, 23077-R, 23079-R, and 23080-R.
In her direct testimony, BBB clearly narrated that, on seven (7) separate occasions, petitioner woke her
up, held her vagina, played with it, and inserted his fingers. During trial, the prosecutor presented a small
doll where BBB demonstrated how petitioner inserted his forefinger and middle finger, making an up and
down motion between the dolls legs.[35]

The insertion of petitioners fingers into the victims vagina constituted the crime of Rape through
sexual assault[36] under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353, or The Anti-Rape Law of 1997, which in part
provides:

Art. 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape is committed:

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or
is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be
present.

2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in

paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into
another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital
or anal orifice of another person.[37]

Aside from proving the fact that Rape was committed, the prosecution also established that petitioner is
the biological father of BBB and that the latter was less than twelve (12) years old at the time of the
commission of the crimes. Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), rape by sexual assault,
if attended by any of the aggravating circumstances under paragraph 1 [38] of Article 266-B, would carry
the penalty of reclusion temporal, ranging from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the indeterminate penalty shall
be that which could be properly imposed under the RPC. Other than the aggravating/qualifying
circumstances of minority and relationship (which are already taken into account to raise the penalty
from prision mayor to reclusion temporal),[39] no other aggravating circumstance was alleged and proven.
Hence, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period, or fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months.
On the other hand, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be within the range of
the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by the Code which is prision mayor or six (6) years
and one (1) day to twelve (12) years.

For each count of sexual assault, petitioner should be meted the indeterminate sentence of ten
(10) years of prision mayor as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal as maximum.
In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the victim of Rape through sexual assault is entitled to recover civil
indemnity in the amount of P30,000.00 for each count.This is mandatory upon a finding of the fact of
Rape.[40] Moreover, the award of moral damages is automatically granted without need of further proof, it
being assumed that a rape victim has actually suffered moral damages entitling her to such award. She is,
thus, entitled to recover moral damages of P30,000.00 for each count.[41] In addition, the presence of the
aggravating circumstances of minority and relationship entitles her to an award of exemplary
damages. The amount of P30,000.00 for each count is appropriate under the circumstances.

Criminal Case Nos. 23075-R and 23078-R

In Criminal Case No. 23075-R, it was alleged that petitioner sexually abused BBB on August 3,
2003. Indeed, the RTC and the CA stated in their narration of facts that on that particular date, while BBB
was visiting her father, the incident happened. A perusal of the transcript of the prosecution witnesses
testimonies, however, reveals that no such incident took place. No details were related by BBB herself as
to the circumstances surrounding the alleged incident.
In Criminal Case No. 23078-R, it was also stated in the Information that, from May 2002 to December
2003, petitioner committed the crime of Rape through sexual assault against BBB. The Court notes,
however, that the RTC decision is silent as to the sexual abuse allegedly committed in May 2002. The
RTCs narration of facts started only with the incident that occurred in January 2003. While the CA stated
that, in May 2002, petitioner started sexually abusing BBB, the statement was merely a conclusion
unsupported by proof of how the crime was committed. Assuming that acts of Rape were indeed
committed in 2003 (which is within the period from May 2002 to December 2003 as stated in the
Information), those instances could very well be the same incidents covered by the other Informations
discussed earlier.
 Absent specific details of how and when the sexual abuses were committed, petitioner should be
acquitted in Criminal Case Nos. 23075-R and 23078-R.

Criminal Case No. 23145-R for Acts of Lasciviousness

In Criminal Case No. 23145-R, petitioner was charged with and convicted of Acts of Lasciviousness and
sentenced to suffer the penalty prescribed by Article 336 of the RPC. While we sustain petitioners
conviction of acts of lasciviousness, we modify the assailed Decision in order to give the proper
designation to the crime committed and the law violated, and eventually to impose the proper penalty.
It is undisputed that at the time of the commission of the sexual abuse, AAA was eleven (11) years old.
[42]
This calls for the application of R.A. No. 7610 or The Special Protection of Children Against Child
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act, which defines sexual abuse of children and prescribes the
penalty therefor in its Article III, Section 5, to wit:

SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. Children, whether male or
female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon the following:

xxxx

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a
child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse: Provided, That when the
victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under
Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the
Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided,
That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of
age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period.[43]
Paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not only with a child exploited in
prostitution, but also with a child subjected to other sexual abuses. It covers not only a situation where a
child is abused for profit, but also where one -- through coercion, intimidation or influence -- engages in
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child. [44]
However, pursuant to the foregoing provision, before an accused can be convicted of child abuse
through lascivious conduct committed against a minor below 12 years of age, the requisites for acts of
lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC must be met in addition to the requisites for sexual abuse
under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610.[45]

The crime of Acts of Lasciviousness, as defined in Article 336 of the RPC, has the following elements:
 (1) That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;

(2) That it is done under any of the following circumstances:

a. By using force or intimidation; or

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or
c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age; and

(3) That the offended party is another person of either sex. [46]

In addition, the following elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of R.A. No. 7610
must be proven:
(1) The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
(2) The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse; and
(3) The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. [47]

Section 32, Article XIII of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7610 defines lascivious
conduct as follows:

[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus,
groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia,
anus or mouth of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to
abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person,
bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person. [48]

Based on the foregoing definition, petitioners act of touching AAAs vagina and playing with it obviously
amounted to lascivious conduct. Considering that the act was committed on a child less than twelve years
old and through intimidation, it is beyond cavil that petitioner is guilty under the aforesaid laws.
We are aware that the Information specifically charged petitioner with Acts of Lasciviousness
under the RPC, without stating therein that it was in relation to R.A. No. 7610. However, the failure to
designate the offense by statute or to mention the specific provision penalizing the act, or an erroneous
specification of the law violated, does not vitiate the information if the facts alleged therein clearly recite
the facts constituting the crime charged. The character of the crime is not determined by the caption or
preamble of the information nor by the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated,
but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information. [49]
In the instant case, the body of the Information contains an averment of the acts alleged to have been
committed by petitioner and unmistakably describes acts punishable under Section 5(b), Article III of
R.A. No. 7610.

It is also undisputed that petitioner is the father of AAA. The RTC did not appreciate the alternative
circumstance of relationship, because it was not alleged in the Information. We do not agree.
The resolution[50] of the investigating prosecutor, which formed the basis of the Information, a copy of
which is attached thereto, stated that petitioner is the victims biological father. There was, therefore,
substantial compliance with the mandate that an accused be informed of the nature of the charge against
him.[51]

In crimes against chastity, like acts of lasciviousness, relationship is considered aggravating.

[52]
Considering that AAA was less than twelve (12) years old at the time the crime was committed,
petitioner should be meted the penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period, or fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, petitioner should be meted the indeterminate penalty of thirteen (13) years, nine (9)
months and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal as minimum, to sixteen (16) years, five (5) months
and ten (10) days of reclusion temporal as maximum.

With respect to the lascivious conduct amounting to child abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
7610 committed by petitioner, we impose a fine of P15,000.00.[53]
Civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of P20,000.00 shall be awarded.[54] Additionally, upon a
finding of guilt of the accused for acts of lasciviousness, the amount of P15,000.00 as moral damages
may be awarded to the victim in the same way that moral damages are awarded to victims of rape even
without need of proof because it is assumed that they suffered moral injury.[55] In view of the presence of
the aggravating circumstance of relationship, the amount of P15,000.00 as exemplary damages should
likewise be awarded.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals July 29, 2008 Decision and February 16,
2009 Resolution in CA-G.R. CR No. 30949 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. The Court finds
petitioner Salvador Flordeliz y Abenojar:

1. GUILTY of seven (7) counts of RAPE Through Sexual Assault in Criminal Case Nos. 23072-
R, 23073-R, 23074-R, 23076-R, 23077-R, 23079-R, and 23080-R. He is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four
(4) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for each count. Petitioner is ordered to indemnify
BBB P30,000.00 as civil indemnity; P30,000.00 as moral damages; and P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages, for each count;

2. GUILTY of ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS in Criminal Case No. 23145-R. He is sentenced

to suffer the indeterminate penalty of thirteen (13) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days
of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years, five (5) months and ten (10) days of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. He is likewise ordered to pay a fine of P15,000.00 and to indemnify
AAA P20,000.00 as civil indemnity, P15,000.00 as moral damages, and P15,000.00 as exemplary
damages;

3. NOT GUILTY in Criminal Case Nos. 23075-R and 23078-R.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 202122 January 15, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
BERNABE PAREJA y CRUZ, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

LEOANRDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

The accused-appellant Bernabe Pareja y Cruz (Pareja) is appealing the January 19, 2012 Decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 03794, which affirmed in toto the conviction for Rape and
Acts of Lasciviousness meted out by Branch 113, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City in Criminal
Case Nos. 04-1556-CFM and 04-1557-CFM.2

On May 5, 2004, Pareja was charged with two counts of Rape and one Attempted Rape. The Informations
for the three charges read as follows:

I. For the two counts of Rape:

Criminal Case No. 04-15 5 6-CFM

That on or about and sometime in the month of February, 2004, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Bernabe Pareja y Cruz,
being the common law spouse of the minor victims mother, through force, threats and intimidation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit an act of sexual assault upon the person of
[AAA3], a minor 13 years of age, by then and there mashing her breast and inserting his finger inside her
vagina against her will.4

Criminal Case No. 04-1557-CFM

That on or about and sometime in the month of December, 2003, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Bernabe Pareja y Cruz,
being the stepfather of [AAA], a minor 13 years of age, through force, threats and intimidation, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of said minor against her will. 5

II. For the charge of Attempted Rape:

Criminal Case No. 04-1558-CFM

That on or about the 27th day of March, 2004, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, BERNABE PAREJA Y CRUZ, being the
common law spouse of minor victims mother by means of force, threats and intimidation, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the crime of Rape against the
person of minor, [AAA], a13 years old minor by then and there crawling towards her direction where she
was sleeping, putting off her skirt, but did not perform all the acts of execution which would have
produce[d] the crime of rape for the reason other than his own spontaneous desistance, that is the timely
arrival of minor victims mother who confronted the accused, and which acts of child abuse debased,
degraded and demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of said minor complainant as a human being. 6

On June 17, 2004, Pareja, during his arraignment, pleaded not guilty to the charges filed against
him.7 After the completion of the pre-trial conference on September 16, 2004, 8 trial on the merits ensued.

The antecedents of this case, as narrated by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

AAA was thirteen (13) years of age when the alleged acts of lasciviousness and sexual abuse took place
on three (3) different dates, particularly [in December 2003], February 2004, and March 27, 2004.

AAAs parents separated when she was [only eight years old 9]. At the time of the commission of the
aforementioned crimes, AAA was living with her mother and with herein accused-appellant Bernabe
Pareja who, by then, was cohabiting with her mother, together with three (3) of their children, aged twelve
(12), eleven (11) and nine (9), in x x x, Pasay City.

The first incident took place [i]n December 2003 [the December 2003 incident]. AAAs mother was not in
the house and was with her relatives in Laguna. Taking advantage of the situation, [Pareja], while AAA
was asleep, placed himself on top of [her]. Then, [Pareja], who was already naked, begun to undress
AAA. [Pareja] then started to suck the breasts of [AAA]. Not satisfied, [Pareja] likewise inserted his penis
into AAAs anus. Because of the excruciating pain that she felt, AAA immediately stood up and rushed
outside of their house.

Despite such traumatic experience, AAA never told anyone about the [December 2003] incident for fear
that [Pareja] might kill her. [Pareja] threatened to kill AAA in the event that she would expose the incident
to anyone.

AAA further narrated that the [December 2003] incident had happened more than once. According to
AAA, in February 2004 [the February 2004 incident], she had again been molested by [Pareja]. Under the
same circumstances as the [December 2003 incident], with her mother not around while she and her half-
siblings were asleep, [Pareja] again laid on top of her and started to suck her breasts. But this time,
[Pareja] caressed [her] and held her vagina and inserted his finger [i]n it.

With regard to the last incident, on March 27, 2004 [the March 2004 incident], it was AAAs mother who
saw [Pareja] in the act of lifting the skirt of her daughter AAA while the latter was asleep. Outraged,
AAAs mother immediately brought AAA to the barangay officers to report the said incident. AAA then
narrated to the barangay officials that she had been sexually abused by [Pareja] x x x many times x x x.

Subsequently, AAA, together with her mother, proceeded to the Child Protection Unit of the Philippine
General Hospital for a medical and genital examination. On March 29, 2004, Dr. Tan issued Provisional
Medico-Legal Report Number 2004-03-0091. Her medico-legal report stated the following conclusion:

Hymen: Tanner Stage 3, hymenal remnant from 5-7 oclock area, Type of hymen: Crescentic

xxxx

Genital findings show Clear Evidence of Blunt Force or Penetrating Trauma.

After the results of the medico-legal report confirmed that AAA was indeed raped, AAAs mother then
filed a complaint for rape before the Pasay City Police Station.

To exculpate himself from liability, [Pareja] offered both denial and ill motive of AAA against him as his
defense. He denied raping [AAA] but admitted that he knew her as she is the daughter of his live-in
partner and that they all stay in the same house.

Contrary to AAAs allegations, [Pareja] averred that it would have been impossible that the alleged
incidents happened. To justify the same, [Pareja] described the layout of their house and argued that there
was no way that the alleged sexual abuses could have happened.

According to [Pareja], the house was made of wood, only about four (4) meters wide by ten (10) meters,
and was so small that they all have to sit to be able to fit inside the house. Further, the vicinity where their
house is located was thickly populated with houses constructed side by side. Allegedly, AAA also had no
choice but to sleep beside her siblings.

All taken into account, [Pareja] asseverated that it was hard to imagine how he could possibly still go
about with his plan without AAAs siblings nor their neighbors noticing the same.

Verily, [Pareja] was adamant and claimed innocence as to the imputations hurled against him by AAA. He
contended that AAA filed these charges against him only as an act of revenge because AAA was mad at
[him] for being the reason behind her parents separation. 10

Ruling of the RTC

On January 16, 2009, the RTC acquitted Pareja from the charge of attempted rape but convicted him of
the crimes of rape and acts of lasciviousness in the December 2003 and February 2004 incidents,
respectively. The dispositive portion of the Decision11 reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the herein accused Bernabe Pareja y Cruz is hereby acquitted from the charge of
attempted rape in Crim. Case No. 04-1558, for want of evidence.

In Crim. Case No. 04-1556, the said accused is CONVICTED with Acts of Lasciviousness and he is
meted out the penalty of imprisonment, ranging from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day as minimum to 4 years
and 2 months of prision [correccional] as maximum.

In Crim. Case No. 04-1557, the said accused is CONVICTED as charged with rape, and he is meted the
penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The accused shall be credited in full for the period of his preventive imprisonment.

The accused is ordered to indemnify the offended party [AAA], the sum of P50,000.00, without
subsidiary imprisonment, in case of insolvency.12

The RTC, in convicting Pareja of the crime of Rape and Acts of Lasciviousness, gave more weight to the
prosecutions evidence as against Parejas baseless denial and imputation of ill motive. However, due to
the failure of the prosecution to present AAAs mother to testify about what she had witnessed in March
2004, the RTC had to acquit Pareja of the crime of Attempted Rape in the March 2004 incident for lack of
evidence. The RTC could not convict Pareja on the basis of AAAs testimony for being hearsay evidence
as she had no personal knowledge of what happened on March 27, 2004 because she was sleeping at that
time.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Wanting to reverse his two convictions, Pareja appealed13 to the Court of Appeals, which on January 19,
2012, affirmed in toto the judgment of the RTC in Criminal Case Nos. 04-1556 and 04-1557, to wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED and,
consequently, DISMISSED. The appealed Decisions rendered by Branch 113 of the Regional Trial Court
of the National Capital Judicial Region in Pasay City on January 16, 2009 in Criminal Cases Nos. 04-
1556 to 04-1557 are hereby AFFIRMED in toto.14

Issues

Aggrieved, Pareja elevated his case to this Court 15 and posited before us the following errors as he did
before the Court of Appeals:

THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONVICTING [PAREJA] OF THE CRIMES

CHARGED NOTWITHSTANDING THAT HIS GUILT HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING [PAREJA] BASED SOLELY ON THE
PROSECUTION WITNESS TESTIMONY.16

In his Supplemental Brief17 Pareja added the following argument:

The private complainants actuations after the incident negate the possibility that she was raped. 18

Parejas main bone of contention is the reliance of the lower courts on the testimony of AAA in
convicting him for rape and acts of lasciviousness. Simply put, Pareja is attacking the credibility of AAA
for being inconsistent. Moreover, he claimed, AAA acted as if nothing happened after the alleged sexual
abuse.

Ruling of this Court

This Court finds no reason to reverse Parejas conviction.

Core Issue: Credibility of AAA

Pareja claims that AAAs testimony cannot be the lone basis of his conviction as it was riddled with
inconsistencies.19

We find such argument untenable.

When the issue of credibility of witnesses is presented before this Court, we follow certain guidelines that
have overtime been established in jurisprudence. In People v. Sanchez, 20 we enumerated them as follows:

First, the Court gives the highest respect to the RTCs evaluation of the testimony of the witnesses,
considering its unique position in directly observing the demeanor of a witness on the stand. From its
vantage point, the trial court is in the best position to determine the truthfulness of witnesses.

Second, absent any substantial reason which would justify the reversal of the RTCs assessments and
conclusions, the reviewing court is generally bound by the lower courts findings, particularly when no
significant facts and circumstances, affecting the outcome of the case, are shown to have been overlooked
or disregarded.

And third, the rule is even more stringently applied if the CA concurred with the RTC. (Citations
omitted.)

The recognized rule in this jurisdiction is that the "assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a domain
best left to the trial court judge because of his unique opportunity to observe their deportment and
demeanor on the witness stand; a vantage point denied appellate courts-and when his findings have been
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, these are generally binding and conclusive upon this Court." 21 While
there are recognized exceptions to the rule, this Court has found no substantial reason to overturn the
identical conclusions of the trial and appellate courts on the matter of AAAs credibility.

Besides, inaccuracies and inconsistencies in a rape victims testimony are generally expected. 22 As this
Court stated in People v. Saludo23:

Rape is a painful experience which is oftentimes not remembered in detail. For such an offense is not
analogous to a persons achievement or accomplishment as to be worth recalling or reliving; rather, it is
something which causes deep psychological wounds and casts a stigma upon the victim, scarring her
psyche for life and which her conscious and subconscious mind would opt to forget. Thus, a rape victim
cannot be expected to mechanically keep and then give an accurate account of the traumatic and
horrifying experience she had undergone. (Citation omitted.)

Since human memory is fickle and prone to the stresses of emotions, accuracy in a testimonial account
has never been used as a standard in testing the credibility of a witness. 24 The inconsistencies mentioned
by Pareja are trivial and non-consequential matters that merely caused AAA confusion when she was
being questioned. The inconsistency regarding the year of the December incident is not even a matter
pertaining to AAAs ordeal.25 The date and time of the commission of the crime of rape becomes
important only when it creates serious doubt as to the commission of the rape itself or the sufficiency of
the evidence for purposes of conviction. In other words, the "date of the commission of the rape becomes
relevant only when the accuracy and truthfulness of the complainants narration practically hinge on the
date of the commission of the crime."26 Moreover, the date of the commission of the rape is not an
essential element of the crime.27
In this connection, Pareja repeatedly invokes our ruling in People v. Ladrillo, 28 implying that our rulings
therein are applicable to his case. However, the factual circumstances in Ladrillo are prominently missing
in Parejas case. In particular, the main factor for Ladrillos acquittal in that case was because his
constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was violated
when the Information against him only stated that the crime was committed "on or about the year 1992."
We said:

The peculiar designation of time in the Information clearly violates Sec. 11, Rule 110, of the Rules Court
which requires that the time of the commission of the offense must be alleged as near to the actual date as
the information or complaint will permit. More importantly, it runs afoul of the constitutionally protected
right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The Information
is not sufficiently explicit and certain as to time to inform accused-appellant of the date on which the
criminal act is alleged to have been committed.

The phrase "on or about the year 1992" encompasses not only the twelve (12) months of 1992 but
includes the years prior and subsequent to 1992, e.g., 1991 and 1993, for which accused-appellant has to
virtually account for his whereabouts. Hence, the failure of the prosecution to allege with particularity the
date of the commission of the offense and, worse, its failure to prove during the trial the date of the
commission of the offense as alleged in the Information, deprived accused-appellant of his right to
intelligently prepare for his defense and convincingly refute the charges against him. At most, accused-
appellant could only establish his place of residence in the year indicated in the Information and not for
the particular time he supposedly committed the rape.

xxxx

Indeed, the failure of the prosecution to prove its allegation in the Information that accused-appellant
raped complainant in 1992 manifestly shows that the date of the commission of the offense as alleged was
based merely on speculation and conjecture, and a conviction anchored mainly thereon cannot satisfy the
quantum of evidence required for a pronouncement of guilt, that is, proof beyond reasonable doubt that
the crime was committed on the date and place indicated in the Information. 29 (Citation omitted.)

In this case, although the dates of the December 2003 and February 2004 incidents were not specified, the
period of time Pareja had to account for was fairly short, unlike "on or about the year 1992." Moreover,
Ladrillo was able to prove that he had only moved in the house where the rape supposedly happened, in
1993, therefore negating the allegation that he raped the victim in that house in 1992. 30

While it may be true that the inconsistencies in the testimony of the victim in Ladrillo contributed to his
eventual acquittal, this Court said that they alone were not enough to reverse Ladrillos conviction, viz:

Moreover, there are discernible defects in the complaining witness testimony that militates heavily
against its being accorded the full credit it was given by the trial court. Considered independently, the
defects might not suffice to overturn the trial courts judgment of conviction, but assessed and weighed in
its totality, and in relation to the testimonies of other witnesses, as logic and fairness dictate, they exert a
powerful compulsion towards reversal of the assailed judgment. 31 (Emphasis supplied.)

It is worthy to note that Ladrillo also offered more than just a mere denial of the crime charged against
him to exculpate him from liability. He also had an alibi, which, together with the other evidence,
produced reasonable doubt that he committed the crime as charged. In contrast, Pareja merely denied the
accusations against him and even imputed ill motive on AAA.

As regards Parejas concern about AAAs lone testimony being the basis of his conviction, this Court has
held:

Furthermore, settled is the rule that the testimony of a single witness may be sufficient to produce a
conviction, if the same appears to be trustworthy and reliable. If credible and convincing, that alone
would be sufficient to convict the accused. No law or rule requires the corroboration of the testimony of a
single witness in a rape case.32 (Citations omitted.)

Improbability of sexual abuse

in their small house and in the
presence of AAAs sleeping siblings

Pareja argues that it was improbable for him to have sexually abused AAA, considering that their house
was so small that they had to sleep beside each other, that in fact, when the alleged incidents happened,
AAA was sleeping beside her younger siblings, who would have noticed if anything unusual was
happening.33

This Court is not convinced. Parejas living conditions could have prevented him from acting out on his
beastly desires, but they did not. This Court has observed that many of the rape cases appealed to us were
not always committed in seclusion. Lust is no respecter of time or place, 34 and rape defies constraints of
time and space. In People v. Sangil, Sr.,35 we expounded on such occurrence in this wise:

In People v. Ignacio, we took judicial notice of the interesting fact that among poor couples with big
families living in small quarters, copulation does not seem to be a problem despite the presence of other
persons around them. Considering the cramped space and meager room for privacy, couples perhaps have
gotten used to quick and less disturbing modes of sexual congresses which elude the attention of family
members; otherwise, under the circumstances, it would be almost impossible to copulate with them
around even when asleep. It is also not impossible nor incredible for the family members to be in deep
slumber and not be awakened while the sexual assault is being committed. One may also suppose that
growing children sleep more soundly than grown-ups and are not easily awakened by adult exertions and
suspirations in the night. There is no merit in appellants contention that there can be no rape in a room
where other people are present. There is no rule that rape can be committed only in seclusion. We have
repeatedly declared that "lust is no respecter of time and place," and rape can be committed in even the
unlikeliest of places. (Citations omitted.)

Demeanor of AAA
as a rape victim

Pareja asseverates that AAAs demeanor and conduct belie her claim that she was raped. He said that "the
ordinary Filipina [would have summoned] every ounce of her strength and courage to thwart any attempt
to besmirch her honor and blemish her purity." Pareja pointed out that they lived in a thickly populated
area such that any commotion inside their house would have been easily heard by the neighbors, thus,
giving AAA the perfect opportunity to seek their help. 36 Moreover, Pareja said, AAAs delay in reporting
the incidents to her mother or the authorities negates the possibility that he indeed committed the crimes.
AAAs belated confession, he claimed, "cannot be dismissed as trivial as it puts into serious doubt her
credibility."37

A person accused of a serious crime such as rape will tend to escape liability by shifting the blame on the
victim for failing to manifest resistance to sexual abuse. However, this Court has recognized the fact that
no clear-cut behavior can be expected of a person being raped or has been raped. It is a settled rule that
failure of the victim to shout or seek help do not negate rape. Even lack of resistance will not imply that
the victim has consented to the sexual act, especially when that person was intimidated into submission
by the accused. In cases where the rape is committed by a relative such as a father, stepfather, uncle, or
common law spouse, moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence. 38 In this case, AAAs lack
of resistance was brought about by her fear that Pareja would make good on his threat to kill her if she
ever spoke of the incident.

AAAs conduct, i.e., acting like nothing happened, after being sexually abused by Pareja is also not
enough to discredit her. Victims of a crime as heinous as rape, cannot be expected to act within reason or
in accordance with societys expectations. It is unreasonable to demand a standard rational reaction to an
irrational experience, especially from a young victim. One cannot be expected to act as usual in an
unfamiliar situation as it is impossible to predict the workings of a human mind placed under emotional
stress. Moreover, it is wrong to say that there is a standard reaction or behavior among victims of the
crime of rape since each of them had to cope with different circumstances. 39

Likewise, AAAs delay in reporting the incidents to her mother or the proper authorities is insignificant
and does not affect the veracity of her charges. It should be remembered that Pareja threatened to kill her
if she told anyone of the incidents. In People v. Ogarte, 40 we explained why a rape victims deferral in
reporting the crime does not equate to falsification of the accusation, to wit:

The failure of complainant to disclose her defilement without loss of time to persons close to her or to
report the matter to the authorities does not perforce warrant the conclusion that she was not sexually
molested and that her charges against the accused are all baseless, untrue and fabricated. Delay in
prosecuting the offense is not an indication of a fabricated charge. Many victims of rape never complain
or file criminal charges against the rapists. They prefer to bear the ignominy and pain, rather than reveal
their shame to the world or risk the offenders making good their threats to kill or hurt their victims.
(Citation omitted.)

Medical examination
not indispensable

Pareja avers that the Medico-Legal Report indicating that there is evidence of blunt force or penetrating
trauma upon examination of AAAs hymen, "cannot be given any significance, as it failed to indicate how
and when the said signs of physical trauma were inflicted." Furthermore, Pareja said, the findings that
AAAs hymen sustained trauma cannot be utilized as evidence against him as the alleged sexual abuse
that occurred in December, was not by penetration of the vagina. 41

This Court has time and again held that an accused can be convicted of rape on the basis of the sole
testimony of the victim. In People v. Colorado,42 we said:
[A] medical certificate is not necessary to prove the commission of rape, as even a medical examination
of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape. Expert testimony is merely corroborative in
character and not essential to conviction. x x x.

Therefore, the absence of testimony or medical certificate on the state of AAAs anus at the time she was
examined is of no consequence. On the contrary, the medical examination actually bolsters AAAs claim
of being raped by Pareja on more than one occasion, and not just by anal penetration. However, as the
prosecution failed to capitalize on such evidence and prove the incidence of carnal knowledge, Pareja
cannot be convicted of rape under paragraph 1 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code.

In People v. Perez,43 this Court aptly held:

This Court has held time and again that testimonies of rape victims who are young and immature deserve
full credence, considering that no young woman, especially of tender age, would concoct a story of
defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by being subject to a
public trial, if she was not motivated solely by the desire to obtain justice for the wrong committed
against her. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth. It is highly improbable that a girl of
tender years, one not yet exposed to the ways of the world, would impute to any man a crime so serious as
rape if what she claims is not true. (Citations omitted.)

Criminal Case No. 04-1557-CFM:

The December 2003 Incident

In Criminal Case No. 04-1557-CFM or the December 2003 incident, Pareja was charged and convicted of
the crime of rape by sexual assault. The enactment of Republic Act No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of
1997, revolutionized the concept of rape with the recognition of sexual violence on "sex-related" orifices
other than a womans organ is included in the crime of rape; and the crimes expansion to cover gender-
free rape. "The transformation mainly consisted of the reclassification of rape as a crime against persons
and the introduction of rape by sexual assault as differentiated from the traditional rape through carnal
knowledge or rape through sexual intercourse." 44 Republic Act No. 8353 amended Article 335, the
provision on rape in the Revised Penal Code and incorporated therein Article 266-A which reads:

Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. Rape is committed

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

a) Through force, threat or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious,

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present;
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an
act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument
or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.

Thus, under the new provision, rape can be committed in two ways:

1. Article 266-A paragraph 1 refers to Rape through sexual intercourse, also known as "organ
rape" or "penile rape."45 The central element in rape through sexual intercourse is carnal
knowledge, which must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. 46

2. Article 266-A paragraph 2 refers to rape by sexual assault, also called "instrument or object
rape," or "gender-free rape."47 It must be attended by any of the circumstances enumerated in
subparagraphs (a) to (d) of paragraph 1.48

In People v. Abulon,49 this Court differentiated the two modes of committing rape as follows:

(1) In the first mode, the offender is always a man, while in the second, the offender may be a
man or a woman;

(2) In the first mode, the offended party is always a woman, while in the second, the offended
party may be a man or a woman;

(3) In the first mode, rape is committed through penile penetration of the vagina, while the second
is committed by inserting the penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument
or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person; and

(4) The penalty for rape under the first mode is higher than that under the second.

Under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, rape by sexual assault is "by
any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of
sexual assault by inserting his penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or
object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person."

AAA positively and consistently stated that Pareja, in December 2003, inserted his penis into her anus.
While she may not have been certain about the details of the February 2004 incident, she was positive that
Pareja had anal sex with her in December 2003, thus, clearly establishing the occurrence of rape by sexual
assault. In other words, her testimony on this account was, as the Court of Appeals found, clear, positive,
and probable.50

However, since the charge in the Information for the December 2003 incident is rape through carnal
knowledge, Pareja cannot be found guilty of rape by sexual assault even though it was proven during trial.
This is due to the material differences and substantial distinctions between the two modes of rape; thus,
the first mode is not necessarily included in the second, and vice-versa. Consequently, to convict Pareja of
rape by sexual assault when what he was charged with was rape through carnal knowledge, would be to
violate his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. 51
Nevertheless, Pareja may be convicted of the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness under the variance
doctrine embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, 52 to
wit:

SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. When there is a variance between
the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is
included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense
proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the
offense proved.

SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. An offense charged necessarily includes the
offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the
complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the
offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting
the latter.

Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 336. Acts of lasciviousness. Any person who shall commit any act of lasciviousness upon other
persons of either sex, under any of the circumstances mentioned in the preceding article, shall be
punished by prisin correccional.

The elements of the above crime are as follows:

(1) That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness;

(2) That it is done under any of the following circumstances:

a. By using force or intimidation; or

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or

c. When the offended party is under 12 years of age; and

(3) That the offended party is another person of either sex. 53 (Citation omitted.)

Clearly, the above-mentioned elements are present in the December 2003 incident, and were sufficiently
established during trial. Thus, even though the crime charged against Pareja was for rape through carnal
knowledge, he can be convicted of the crime of acts of lasciviousness without violating any of his
constitutional rights because said crime is included in the crime of rape. 54

Nonetheless, the Court takes this case as an opportunity to remind the State, the People of the Philippines,
as represented by the public prosecutor, to exert more diligence in crafting the Information, which
contains the charge against an accused. The primary duty of a lawyer in public prosecution is to see that
justice is done55 to the State, that its penal laws are not broken and order maintained; to the victim, that
his or her rights are vindicated; and to the offender, that he is justly punished for his crime. A faulty and
defective Information, such as that in Criminal Case No. 04-1556-CFM, does not render full justice to the
State, the offended party, and even the offender. Thus, the public prosecutor should always see to it that
the Information is accurate and appropriate.

Criminal Case No. 04-1556-CFM:

The February 2004 Incident

It is manifest that the RTC carefully weighed all the evidence presented by the prosecution against Pareja,
especially AAAs testimony. In its scrutiny, the RTC found AAAs declaration on the rape in the
December 2003 incident credible enough to result in a conviction, albeit this Court had to modify it as
explained above. However, it did not find that the same level of proof, i.e., beyond reasonable doubt, was
fully satisfied by the prosecution in its charge of attempted rape and a second count of rape against Pareja.
In Criminal Case No. 04-1556-CFM, or the February 2004 incident, the RTC considered AAAs confusion
as to whether or not she was actually penetrated by Pareja, and eventually resolved the matter in Parejas
favor.

This Court agrees with such findings. AAA, in her Sinumpaang Salaysay,56 stated that aside from sucking
her breasts, Pareja also inserted his finger in her vagina. However, she was not able to give a clear and
convincing account of such insertion during her testimony. Despite being repeatedly asked by the
prosecutor as to what followed after her breasts were sucked, AAA failed to testify, in open court, that
Pareja also inserted his finger in her vagina. Moreover, later on, she added that Pareja inserted his penis in
her vagina during that incident. Thus, because of the material omissions and inconsistencies, Pareja
cannot be convicted of rape in the February 2004 incident. Nonetheless, Parejas acts of placing himself
on top of AAA and sucking her breasts, fall under the crime of acts of lasciviousness, which, as we have
discussed above, is included in the crime of rape.

Verily, AAA was again positive and consistent in her account of how Pareja sucked both her breasts in the
February 2004 incident. Thus, Pareja was correctly convicted by the courts a quo of the crime of acts of
lasciviousness.

Defense of Denial
and Improper Motive

Pareja sought to escape liability by denying the charges against him, coupled with the attribution of ill
motive against AAA. He claims that AAA filed these cases against him because she was angry that he
caused her parents separation. Pareja added that these cases were initiated by AAAs father, as revenge
against him.57

Such contention is untenable. "AAAs credibility cannot be diminished or tainted by such imputation of ill
motives.1wphi1 It is highly unthinkable for the victim to falsely accuse her father solely by reason of ill
motives or grudge."58Furthermore, motives such as resentment, hatred or revenge have never swayed this
Court from giving full credence to the testimony of a minor rape victim. 59 In People v. Manuel,60 we held:

Evidently, no woman, least of all a child, would concoct a story of defloration, allow examination of her
private parts and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she has not, in truth, been a victim of rape and
impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her being. It is settled jurisprudence that testimonies of
child-victims are given full weight and credit, since when a woman or a girl-child says that she has been
raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to show that rape was indeed committed.

Liability for Acts of Lasciviousness

The penalty for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code is prisin correccional
in its full range. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,61 the minimum of the indeterminate penalty
shall be taken from the full range of the penalty next lower in degree, 62 i.e., arresto mayor, which ranges
from 1 month and 1 day to 6 months.63 The maximum of the indeterminate penalty shall come from the
proper penalty64 that could be imposed under the Revised Penal Code for Acts of Lasciviousness, 65 which,
in this case, absent any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, is the medium period of prisin
correccional, ranging from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months. 66

In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the Court modifies the award of damages as follows: P20,000.00 as
civil indemnity;67 P30,000.00 as moral damages; and P10,000.00 as exemplary damages,68 for each count
of acts of lasciviousness. All amounts shall bear legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date
of finality of this judgment.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No.
03794 is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We find accused-appellant Bernabe Pareja y Cruz
GUILTY of two counts of Acts of Lasciviousness, defined and penalized under Article 336 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended. He is sentenced to two (2) indeterminate prison terms of 6 months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to 4 years and 2 months of prisi6n correccional, as maximum; and is ORDERED to
pay the victim, AAA, P20,000.00 as civil indemnity, P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P10,000.00 as
exemplary damages, for each count of acts of lasciviousness, all with interest at the rate of 6% per annum
from the date of finality of this judgment.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 211002 January 21, 2015

RICHARD RICALDE, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Even men can become victims of rape.

Before us is a criminal case for rape through sexual assault committed against a 10-year-old boy. Accused
Richard Ricalde (Ricalde) was charged with rape as described under the second paragraph of Section 266-
A of the Revised Penal Code, committed "[b ]y any person who, under any of the circumstances
mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another
person's mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another
person." 1

This is a Petition for Review2 assailing the Court of Appeals August 28, 2013 Decision3 affirming
Ricaldes conviction for rape through sexual assault and January 15, 2014 Resolution 4 denying
reconsideration.

The Provincial Prosecutor of Bian, Laguna filed an Information charging Ricalde of rape through sexual
assault:

That on or about January 31, 2002, in the Municipality of Sta. Rosa, Province of Laguna, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Richard Ricalde, prompted with lewd design, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously inserting [sic] his penis into the anus of XXX who
was then ten (10) years of age against his will and consent, to his damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5

Ricalde pleaded not guilty during his arraignment on August 21, 2002. 6 The prosecution presented the
victim (XXX),7 his mother, and the medico-legal as witnesses, while the defense presented Ricalde as its
sole witness.8

The facts as found by the lower courts follow.

On January 30, 2002, XXX requested his mother to pick up Ricalde at McDonalds Bel-Air, Sta. Rosa at
past 8:00 p.m.9 Ricalde, then 31 years old,10 is a distant relative and textmate of XXX, then 10 years old. 11

After dinner, XXXs mother told Ricalde to spend the night at their house as it was late. 12 He slept on the
sofa while XXX slept on the living room floor.13

It was around 2:00 a.m. when XXX awoke as "he felt pain in his anus and stomach and something
inserted in his anus."14 He saw that Ricalde "fondled his penis."15 When Ricalde returned to the sofa, XXX
ran toward his mothers room to tell her what happened. 16 He also told his mother that Ricalde played
with his sexual organ.17

XXXs mother armed herself with a knife for self-defense when she confronted Ricalde about the
incident, but he remained silent.18 She asked him to leave.19

XXXs mother then accompanied XXX to the barangay hall where they were directed to report the
incident to the Sta. Rosa police station.20 The police referred them to the municipal health center for
medical examination.21 Dr. Roy Camarillo examined22 XXX and found no signs of recent trauma in his
anal orifice23 that was also "NEGATIVE for [s]permatozoa."24

On February 4, 2002, XXX and his mother executed their sworn statements at the Sta. Rosa police
station, leading to the criminal complaint filed against Ricalde. 25

Ricalde denied the accusations.26 He testified that he met XXX during the 2001 town fiesta of Calaca,
Batangas and learned that XXXs mother is the cousin of his cousin Arlan Ricalde. 27 He and XXX became
textmates, and XXX invited him to his house.28 On January 30, 2002, XXXs mother picked him up to
sleep at their house.29 He slept at 10:00 p.m. on the living room sofa while XXX slept on the floor.30 He
denied the alleged rape through sexual assault. 31

The Regional Trial Court in its Decision32 dated June 20, 2011 found Ricalde guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of rape through sexual assault:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds accused Richard Ricalde guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape by sexual assault and, accordingly, sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from
four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as minimum, to eight (8) years of
prision mayor as maximum. Accused is ordered to pay [XXX] the sums of 50,000.00 as moral damages
and 50,000.00 as civil indemnity.

SO ORDERED.33

The Court of Appeals in its Decision34 dated August 28, 2013 affirmed the conviction with the
modification of lowering the amounts of damages awarded:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 20 June 2011 of Branch 34 of the Regional Trial Court of Calamba,
Laguna, in Crim. Case No. 11906-B, is AFFIRMED but with MODIFICATION as to the award of
damages. Accused-appellant RICHARD RICALDE is ordered to pay the victim civil indemnity in the
amount of Thirty Thousand (30,000.00) Pesos and moral damages likewise in the amount of Thirty
Thousand (30,000.00) Pesos, both with interest at the legal rate of six (6%) percent per annum from the
date of finality of this judgment until fully paid. 35

Ricalde filed this Petition praying for his acquittal. 36

Petitioner argues the existence of reasonable doubt in his favor. First, the medico-legal testified that he
found "no physical signs or external signs of recent trauma [in XXXs] anus," 37 or any trace of
spermatozoa.38 He contends that physical evidence "ranks high in [the courts] hierarchy of trustworthy
evidence." 39
Second, XXX did not categorically say that a penis was inserted into his anal orifice, or that he saw a
penis or any object being inserted into his anal orifice. 40 XXX was also able to immediately push him
away.41 Thus, no push and pull movement happened that would explain XXXs alleged stomach
ache.42 Petitioner submits that the alleged stomach ache was an attempt to aggravate the charge against
him.43

Petitioner argues that XXXs inconsistent testimony raises reasonable doubt on his guilt. 44 XXX claimed
that he immediately pushed petitioner away, but in another instance, he testified as follows: "I felt that he
was inserting his penis inside my anus because I was even able to hold his penis. He was also playing
with my penis."45 XXX also stated in his salaysay that "the penis reached only the periphery of his anal
orifice."46

Third, XXX testified that after he had pushed petitioner away, he saw that petitioner was wearing pants
with the zipper open.47 Petitioner submits that performing anal coitus while wearing pants with an open
zipper poses a challenge the risk of injuring the sexual organ or having pubic hair entangled in the
zipper. 48 Petitioner argues that the court must consider every circumstance favoring the innocence of an
accused.49

Assuming he committed an offense, petitioner contends that the court should have applied the "variance
doctrine" in People v. Sumingwa,50 and the court would have found him guilty for the lesser offense of
acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code. 51 The petition then enumerated
circumstances showing possible homosexual affections between petitioner and XXX. 52 These include the
fact that they were textmates and that petitioner played with XXXs penis. 53

Petitioner argues that this masturbation could have caused an irritation that XXX mistook as
penetration.54 XXX could also have mistaken the "overreaching fingers as a male organ trying to enter his
[anus]."55 Assuming these acts took place, these would only be considered as acts of lasciviousness. 56

The People of the Philippines counters that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt all elements
of the crime charged.

The Comment57 discussed that it is neither improbable nor contrary to human experience that XXXs
mother allowed her son to be left alone with a stranger.58 Petitioner was not a complete stranger, and she
could not have foreseen such abuse since "rape by sexual assault or any form of sexual abuse of a boy by
a grown man is fairly uncommon in our culture."59

Petitioners reliance on the medico-legals findings deserves scant consideration. 60 The Comment quoted
People v. Penilla61 in that "[a] medical examination of the victim is not indispensable in a prosecution for
rape inasmuch as the victims testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict the accused of the
crime."62 In any case, the medico-legal testified on the sphincters flexibility and how an insertion into the
anal orifice would not necessarily cause injury.63

Lastly, the prosecution established all elements of rape through sexual assault based on XXXs clear and
categorical testimony.64 Petitioners defense of mere denial cannot outweigh positive
testimony.65 Consequently, petitioners contention that the incident only amounts to acts of lasciviousness
lacks merit.66
The issue before us for resolution is whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt petitioner
Richard Ricaldes guilt for the crime of rape through sexual assault.

We affirm petitioners conviction with modification on the penalty imposed.

The Anti-Rape Law of 199767 classified rape as a crime against persons68 and amended the Revised Penal
Code to include Article 266-A on rape through sexual assault:

Article 266A. Rape; When and How Committed.Rape is Committed

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
circumstances:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present;

2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice,
or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person. (Emphasis supplied)

Rape under the second paragraph of Article 266-A is also known as "instrument or object
rape,"69 "gender-free rape,"70 or "homosexual rape."71 The gravamen of rape through sexual assault is "the
insertion of the penis into another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into another
persons genital or anal orifice."72

Jurisprudence holds that "the findings of the trial court, its calibration of the testimonies of the witnesses,
and its assessment of the probative weight thereof, as well as its conclusions anchored on said findings
are accorded respect if not conclusive effect." 73

The trial court found that XXXs "straightforward, unequivocal and convincing testimony" 74 sufficiently
proved that petitioner committed an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into XXXs anal
orifice.75 There was no showing of ill motive on the part of XXX to falsely accuse petitioner.76 The Court
of Appeals accorded great weight to the trial courts findings and affirmed petitioners conviction. 77

No cogent reason exists for this court to overturn the lower courts findings.

First, petitioners argument highlighting alleged inconsistencies in XXXs testimony fails to convince.

In a long line of cases,78 this court has given full weight and credit to the testimonies of child victims.
Their "[y]outh and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity." 79 XXX, then only 10 years old,
had no reason to concoct lies against petitioner.80
This court has also held that "[l]eeway should be given to witnesses who are minors, especially when they
are relating past incidents of abuse."81

Petitioner contends that XXX did not categorically say that a penis was inserted into his anal orifice, or
that he saw a penis or any object being inserted into his anal orifice.

This contradicts petitioners earlier statement in his appellants brief 82 that "[a]lthough it is true that the
Supreme Court, in a long line of cases, did not rule out the possibility of rape in cases where the victim
remained physically intact at the time she or he was physically examined, still, it bears stressing that in
the instant case, the private complainant testified that the accused-appellants penis fully penetrated his
anus."83

The trial court also quoted portions of the transcript of XXXs testimony in that he "felt something was
inserted in [his] anus."84

Q: That early morning of January 31, 2002, while you were sleeping at your house, do you recall
any unusual incident that happened to you?

A: Yes sir, I felt something was inserted in my anus.

....

Q: When you said that you felt something was inserted in your anus, what did you do?

A: I felt that he was inserting his penis inside my anus because I was even able to hold his penis.
He was also playing with my penis.

Q: So when you said he was inserting his penis to your anus and he was even playing with your
private part, who is this person you are referring to as "he"?

A: Richard, sir.85

In People v. Soria,86 this court discussed that a victim need not identify what was inserted into his or her
genital or anal orifice for the court to find that rape through sexual assault was committed:

We find it inconsequential that "AAA" could not specifically identify the particular instrument or object
that was inserted into her genital. What is important and relevant is that indeed something was inserted
into her vagina. To require "AAA" to identify the instrument or object that was inserted into her vagina
would be contrary to the fundamental tenets of due process. 87

Second, petitioners reliance on the medico-legals finding of no recent trauma in XXXs anal orifice, or
any trace of spermatozoa, lacks merit. The absence of spermatozoa in XXXs anal orifice does not negate
the possibility of an erection and penetration. This result does not contradict the positive testimony of
XXX that the lower courts found credible, natural, and consistent with human nature.

This court has explained the merely corroborative character of expert testimony and the possibility of
convictions for rape based on the victims credible lone testimony.88
In any case, the medico-legal explained that his negative finding of trauma in the anal orifice does not
remove the possibility of an insertion considering the flexibility of the sphincter:

Q: Now, a while ago you testified that he was sodomized and your findings states [sic] that you did not
find any congestion or abrasion, can you explain to this court why you stated in your findings that you did
not find any congestion or abrasion?

A: Again, based on my examination[,] there were no external signs of recent trauma to the anus. It should
be realized that the sphincter, that is the particular portion of the anus controlling the bowel movement, it
exhibits a certain flexibility such that it can resist any objected [sic] inserted and that area is very
vascular, meaning to say, it is rich in blood supply, such that any injuries would be healed in 24 hours or
less than 24 hours, sir?89

Lastly, we address petitioners invocation of the "variance doctrine" citing People v. Sumingwa. 90 Section
4 in relation to Section 5 of Rule 120 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the "variance
doctrine":

SEC. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof.When there is variance between the
offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in
or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is
included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.

SEC. 5. When an offense includes or is included in another.An offense charged necessarily includes the
offense proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the
complaint or information, constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the
offense proved, when the essential ingredients of the former continue or form part of those constituting
the latter.

In Sumingwa, the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 1649 and 1654 was charged with qualified rape but was
convicted for the lesser offense of acts of lasciviousness committed against a child under Article III,
Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 761091 since "there was no penetration, or even an attempt to insert [the
accuseds] penis into [the victims] vagina."92

In the instant case, no variance exists between what was charged and what was proven during trial. The
prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt all elements of the crime of rape through sexual assault.

XXX testified that he "felt something was inserted [into his] anus." 93 The slightest penetration into ones
sexual organ distinguishes an act of lasciviousness from the crime of rape. People v. Bonaagua94
discussed this distinction:

It must be emphasized, however, that like in the crime of rape whereby the slightest penetration of the
male organ or even its slightest contact with the outer lip or the labia majora of the vagina already
consummates the crime, in like manner, if the tongue, in an act of cunnilingus, touches the outer lip of the
vagina, the act should also be considered as already consummating the crime of rape through sexual
assault, not the crime of acts of lasciviousness. Notwithstanding, in the present case, such logical
interpretation could not be applied. It must be pointed out that the victim testified that Ireno only touched
her private part and licked it, but did not insert his finger in her vagina. This testimony of the victim,
however, is open to various interpretation, since it cannot be identified what specific part of the vagina
was defiled by Ireno. Thus, in conformity with the principle that the guilt of an accused must be proven
beyond reasonable doubt, the statement cannot be the basis for convicting Ireno with the crime of rape
through sexual assault.95 (Emphasis supplied)

People v. Bonaagua considers a womans private organ since most if not all existing jurisprudence on rape
involves a woman victim. Nevertheless, this interpretation can apply by analogy when the victim is a man
in that the slightest penetration to the victims anal orifice consummates the crime of rape through sexual
assault.

The gravamen of the crime is the violation of the victims dignity. The degree of penetration is not
important. Rape is an "assault on human dignity." 96

People v. Quintos97 discussed how rape causes incalculable damage on a victims dignity, regardless of the
manner of its commission:

The classifications of rape in Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code are relevant only insofar as these
define the manners of commission of rape. However, it does not mean that one manner is less heinous or
wrong than the other. Whether rape is committed by nonconsensual carnal knowledge of a woman or by
insertion of the penis into the mouth of another person, the damage to the victims dignity is incalculable.
Child sexual abuse in general has been associated with negative psychological impacts such as trauma,
sustained fearfulness, anxiety, self-destructive behavior, emotional pain, impaired sense of self, and
interpersonal difficulties. Hence, one experience of sexual abuse should not be trivialized just because it
was committed in a relatively unusual manner.

"The prime purpose of [a] criminal action is to punish the offender in order to deter him and others from
committing the same or similar offense, to isolate him from society, reform and rehabilitate him or, in
general, to maintain social order." Crimes are punished as retribution so that society would understand
that the act punished was wrong.

Imposing different penalties for different manners of committing rape creates a message that one
experience of rape is relatively trivial or less serious than another. It attaches different levels of
wrongfulness to equally degrading acts. Rape, in whatever manner, is a desecration of a persons will and
body. In terms of penalties, treating one manner of committing rape as greater or less in heinousness than
another may be of doubtful constitutionality.

However, the discriminatory treatment of these two acts with the same result was not raised in this case.
Acknowledging that every presumption must be accorded in favor of accused in criminal cases, we have
no choice but to impose a lesser penalty for rape committed by inserting the penis into the mouth of the
victim.98(Citations omitted)

We affirm petitioners conviction but modify the penalty imposed by the lower court to the penalty under
Article III, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610 known as the "Special Protection of Children Against
Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act":99

SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. Children, whether male or female, who for money,
profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group,
indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution
and other sexual abuse.

The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpertua shall be imposed upon the
following:

....

(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse: Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12) years
of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act
No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case maybe:
Provided, That the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall
be reclusion temporal in its medium period; (Emphasis supplied)

The Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 7610 defines "lascivious conduct": [T]he
intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh,
or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of
the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the
sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of
a person.100

In People v. Chingh,101 the accused was charged with rape "for inserting his fingers and afterwards his
penis into the private part of his minor victim[.]"102 The Court of Appeals found the accused guilty of two
counts of rape: statutory rape and rape through sexual assault. 103 This court modified the penalty imposed
for rape through sexual assault to the penalty provided in Article III, Section 5(b) of Republic Act No.
7610, discussing as follows:

It is undisputed that at the time of the commission of the sexual abuse, VVV was ten (10) years old. This
calls for the application of R.A. No. 7610, or "The Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act," which defines sexual abuse of children and prescribes the penalty
therefor in Section 5(b), Article III, to wit:

....

In this case, the offended party was ten years old at the time of the commission of the offense. Pursuant to
the above-quoted provision of law, Armando was aptly prosecuted under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, for Rape Through Sexual Assault. However,
instead of applying the penalty prescribed therein, which is prision mayor, considering that VVV was
below 12 years of age, and considering further that Armandos act of inserting his finger in VVVs private
part undeniably amounted to lascivious conduct, the appropriate imposable penalty should be that
provided in Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, which is reclusion temporal in its medium period.

The Court is not unmindful to the fact that the accused who commits acts of lasciviousness under Article
366, in relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, suffers the more severe penalty of reclusion
temporal in its medium period than the one who commits Rape Through Sexual Assault, which is merely
punishable by prision mayor. This is undeniably unfair to the child victim. To be sure, it was not the
intention of the framers of R.A. No. 8353 to have disallowed the applicability of R.A. No. 7610 to sexual
abuses committed to children. Despite the passage of R.A. No. 8353, R.A. No. 7610 is still good law,
which must be applied when the victims are children or those "persons below eighteen (18) years of age
or those over but are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or
condition."104 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Thus, "for Rape Through Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A, [the accused Chingh was]
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years, ten (10) months and twenty-one (21)
days of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months, and twenty (20) days of
reclusion temporal, as maximum."105

The imposable penalty under Republic Act No. 7610, Section 5(b) "for lascivious conduct when the
victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period." This penalty is
higher than the imposable penalty of prision correccional for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of
the Revised Penal Code.

In enacting Republic Act No. 7610, the legislature intended to impose a higher penalty when the victi m is
a child.

The fact that XXX was only 10 years old when the incident happened was established by his birth
certificate, and this was admitted by the defense. 106 His age of 10 years old was alleged in the
Information.107 The higher penalty under Republic Act No. 7610, as discussed in People v. Chingh,
applies in this case.

Having sex with a 10-year-old is child abuse and is punished by a special law (Republic Act No. 7610). It
is a progression from the Revised Penal Code to provide greater protection for children. Justice Velasco
suggests that this is not so. He anchors his view on his interpretation that Republic Act No. 7610 requires
a showing that apart from the actual coerced sexual act on the 10-year-old, the child must also be
exploited by prostitution or by other sexual acts. This view is inaccurate on grounds of verba legis and
ratione legis.

The first paragraph of Article III, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7610 clearly provides that "children . . .
who . . . due to the coercion . . . of any adult . . . indulge in sexual intercourse . . . are deemed to be
children exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse." The label "children exploited in . . . other
sexual abuse" inheres in a child who has been the subject of coercion and sexual intercourse.

Thus, paragraph (b) refers to a specification only as to who is liable and the penalty to be imposed. The
person who engages in sexual intercourse with a child already coerced is liable.

It does not make sense for the law not to consider rape of a child as child abuse. The proposal of Justice
Velasco implies that there has to be other acts of a sexual nature other than the rape itself that will
characterize rape as child abuse. One count of rape is not enough. Child abuse, in his view, is not yet
present with one count of rape.

This is a dangerous calculus which borders on judicial insensitivity to the purpose of the law. If we adopt
his view, it would amount to our collective official sanction to the idea that a single act of rape is not
debilitating to a child. That a single act of rape is not a tormenting memory that will sear into a childs
memory, frame his or her view of the world, rob him or her of the trust that will enable him or her to have
full and diverse meaningful interactions with other human beings. In my view, a single act of sexual abuse
to a child, by law, is already reprehensible. Our society has expressed that this is conduct which should be
punishable. The purpose and text of the law already punish that single act as child abuse.

Rape is rape. Rape of a child is clearly, definitely, and universally child abuse.

Justice Velasco further observes that the right to due process of the accused will be violated should we
impose the penalty under Republic Act No. 7610. I disagree.

The Information was clear about the facts constitutive of the offense. The facts constitutive of the offense
will suggest the crime punishable by law. The principle is that ignorantia legis non excusat. With the facts
clearly laid out in the Information, the law which punishes the offense should already be clear and the
accused put on notice of the charges against him.

Additionally, there is no argument that the accused was not represented by counsel. Clear from the
records is the entry and active participation of his lawyer up to and including this appeal.

On the award of damages, we maintain the amount of 30,000.00 in favor of XXX as a victim of rape
through sexual assault, consistent with jurisprudence. 108

This court has stated that "jurisprudence from 2001 up to the present yields the information that the
prevailing amount awarded as civil indemnity to victims of simple rape committed by means other than
penile insertion is P30,000."109

This statement considered the prevailing situation in our jurisprudence where victims of rape are all
women.1wphi1 However, as in this case, men can also become victims of rape through sexual assault,
and this can involve penile insertion.

WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision in CA-G.R. C.R. No. 34387 dated August 28, 2013 is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that for rape through sexual assault under Article 266-A,
paragraph 2, accused-appellant Richard Ricalde is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of twelve
(12) years, ten (10) months and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to fifteen (15)
years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum. He is ordered to pay the
victim civil indemnity in the amount of P30,000.00 and moral damages likewise in the amount
of P30,000.00, both with interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this
judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 210430 February 18, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
RONALD NICAL y ALMINARIO, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

On automatic review is the Decision1 dated April 26, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR-
HC No. 04072, which affirmed, with modification, the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Dasmarias, Cavite, Branch 90, in Criminal Case No. 4131-07 on June 5, 2009, convicting Ronald Nical
y Alminario (accused-appellant) of the crime of Rape and imposing on him the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and indemnity for the victim of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages
and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

The Information dated August 28, 2007 charged the accused-appellant with the crime of rape, as follows:

That on or about the 23rd day of August, 2007, in the Municipality of Dasmarias, Province of Cavite,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd
design and actuated by lust, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did, then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge to one [AAA], 3 by inserting his [p]enis into her genital
organ (vagina), against her will and consent, to the latters damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

The accused-appellant pleaded not guilty on arraignment, and when trial ensued, the prosecution
presented AAA, the victim, and Dr. Angelito Magno (Dr. Magno), a gynecologist at the Philippine
General Hospital (PGH) who examined her. The accused-appellant testified alone in his defense.

AAA worked as a maid for a certain "Ate Michelle", who owned two adjacent houses, one described as
"big" and the other "small", in Dasmarias, Cavite. At around 1:00 p.m. on August 23, 2007, AAA was
folding laundry in a room inside the big house when the accused-appellant, who was also a household
helper staying in the small house, suddenly entered the room and immediately proceeded to embrace her.
She tried to run but the accused-appellant grabbed her by her shorts and pushed her so hard against the
concrete wall of the room that she hit her head against it and became dizzy. Sensing the dark intentions of
the accused-appellant, AAA managed to stand up and kick him in the leg and run out of the room. The
accused-appellant gave chase and caught up with her in the sala, where again he embraced her. At that
point, AAA lost consciousness, and when she woke up, she was back inside the room she had fled, lying
naked with the accused-appellant on top of her and half naked. The accused-appellant inserted his penis
into her vagina and she felt pain, but she was able to muster enough strength to push him off with her
knee and make her escape. She ran to the other house and told Nelyn Nacion (Nelyn), another maid, what
the accused-appellant had just done to her. Nelyn then texted AAAs sister, BBB, who soon arrived, and
they reported the incident to the barangay officials. Two days later, AAA submitted herself for
examination by Dr. Magno at the PGH. From the hospital, BBB took her sister AAA away from her
employer.5
Dr. Magno testified that he examined AAA and he entered the results in a Gynecologic Emergency Sheet.
Hefound no signs of any injury, sexual abuse, lacerations, lesions and bleeding in the private parts of
AAA, whose hymen he noted was no longer intact. Dr. Magno clarified that AAA could have had prior
sexual intercourse months or years earlier, although his medical findings do not exclude the possibility
that AAA was raped or sexually abused by the accused-appellant a few days earlier.6

The accused-appellant in his testimony claimed that at 1:00 p.m. on August 23, 2007, he was resting in
the sala of the small house when AAA entered and sat on his stomach. Fearing that they might be seen by
his employer, the accused-appellant pushed and shooed her away. But as he chased her off, AAA ran into
a chair and tumbled. She hit her head on a hard object and lost consciousness. He lifted and carried her,
laid her on the sofa and revived her by fanning and swabbing her face with a wet towel. The accused-
appellant insisted that the reason AAA sued him for rape was because she was jealous of another maid,
Joan, whom he was courting.7 Ruling of the RTC

In its Decision8 dated June 5, 2009, the RTC gave full credence to AAAs narration of her ordeal and
found the accused-appellant guilty as charged:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of simple rape, as defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code and
hereby sentences the accused to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to pay the victim moral
damages in the amount of Php50,000.00, civil indemnity ex-delicto in the amount of Php50,000.00 and
exemplary damages in the amount of Php25,000.00. Costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.9

Appeal to the CA

On appeal to the CA, the accused-appellant maintained that the prosecutions evidence failed to meet the
quantum of proof required to convict him. He asserted that the medical examination results negate AAAs
claim that she was raped. They showed no physical injuries, sexual abuse and lacerations, and since her
hymen is no longer intact, it could mean that she had intercourse months before.

The accused-appellant also argued that the "loss of consciousness theory" advanced by the prosecution
was incompatible with the information which alleged that he committed rape through force, violence and
intimidation. Citing the case of People v. Gavina,10 the accused-appellant maintained that his right to due
process of law was violated because the element of unconsciousness was not alleged in the Information.

On April 26, 2013, the appellate court rendered judgment affirming the guilt of the accused-appellant, as
follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, We AFFIRM the June 5, 2009 Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Dasmarias, Cavite, Branch 90, subject to the modification that the award of exemplary damages is
INCREASED from Php25,000.00 to Php30,000.00; and, accused-appellant is further held liable to pay
interest of 6% per annum on the aspects of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages,
reckoned from the finality of this Decision until full payment.

SO ORDERED.11
 Automatic review by the Court

In this automatic appeal, both the accused-appellant and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) waived
the filing of supplemental briefs, since they would only be repeating their arguments in the court. The
Courts review of the assailed decisions yields no new matters that could prompt a reconsideration or
reversal of the accused-appellants conviction.

The medical findings on AAA did not preclude rape

In her testimony, AAA gave a clear, credible and complete narration of damning details showing that the
accused-appellant did in fact assault her sexually. Pertinent portions of her testimony are reproduced
below:

Pros. Jarlos: While you were inside the room of the other house, what transpired next?

A: Pagpasok ko po sa cuarto biglang pumasok si Ronald niyakap ako.

Q: Did you not lock the door when you were already inside the room?

A: Ini-locked ko po.

Q: How was he able to enter the room?

A: Mayroon po siyang susi.

Q: When he was already inside the room, what happened next?

A: Nagpumiglas po ako sa kanya. Lalabas na sana ako nahawakan niya iyong shorts ko kaya nahila ako
pabalik sa kwarto. Tinulak niya ako at nauntog ang ulo ko sa pader.

Q: What did you do when you accidentally bumped your head on the wall?

A: Nakabangon pa po ako at tinadyakan ko si Ronald lumabas ako at hinabol niya ako.

Q: So, you kicked him and then you ran outside the room?

A: Opo.

Q: What happened next?

A: Inabutan nya ako dun sa sala, niyakap nya ako ulit at nawalan na ako ng malay.

Court: Bakit ka naman nawalan ng malay sa pagyakap nya lang sa iyo?

A: Kasi po masakit ang ulo ko dahil nauntog ako. Noong nagising ako nasa kwarto na ako.

Pros. Jarlos: When you woke up, what did you find out?

A: Masakit po ang ari ko.

Q: What about him? Where was he when you woke up?

A: Nakapatong pa po sa akin.

Q: What was his attire when he was on top of you?

A: Nakasuot po siya ng t-shirt tapos iyong shorts niya ay nakababa hanggang tuhod po.

Q: What about you?

A: Nakahubad po.

Q: Nakahubot hubad ka?

A: Opo.

Pros. Jarlos: After you felt something painful, what did you do next?

A: Pumunta na po ako sa kabila tapos inutusan ko iyong pinsan ko na ipa-test ako.

Q: What about him, what did he do when you left the house?

A: Nandoon po sa bahay. Naiwan po siya doon.

Court: Papaano ka nakawala sa pagkakapatong sa iyo ni Ronald?

A: Tinadyakan ko po siya. Hindi na niya ako hinabol uli.

Court: Naramdaman mo ba noong nagising ka na nasa ibabaw mo pa siya?

A: Opo.

Court: Bakit nakaramdam ka ng masakit?

A: Kasi po pinasok niya iyong ari niya sa ari ko.12

The accused-appellant insisted that he could not be convicted of rape because the medical examination
results showed that AAA suffered no lacerations, abrasions or contusions. But while AAA testified that
she hit her head against the concrete wall and the hard knock caused her to pass out, Dr. Magno
apparently conducted only vaginal and bodily examinations, and did not examine her for concussion or
head contusion. Nonetheless, he admitted that while AAA had had previous sexual relations, it did not
preclude the fact that she was sexually abused. 13

It is settled that the absence of physical injuries or fresh lacerations does not negate rape, and although
medical results may not indicate physical abuse or hymenal lacerations, rape can still be established since
medical findings or proof of injuries are not among the essential elements in the prosecution for rape. As
held in People v. Campos:14

But a medical examination is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape. In fact, there can be rape even if
the medical examination shows no vaginal laceration. As we held in People v. Dreu

It is of no moment either that the medical certificate fails to show that Josephine suffered any contusion or
abrasion. Although the results of a medical examination may be considered strong evidence to prove that
the victim was raped, such evidence is not indispensable in establishing accused-appellants guilt or
innocence. In People v. Docena, we stated:

That there was no medical examination report presented, sign of resistance during the actual copulation,
or proof of violence committed against MARGIE does not detract from our conclusion that she was
raped. A medical examination is not indispensable in a prosecution for rape. Medical findings or proof of
injuries, virginity, or an allegation of the exact time and date of the commission of the crime are not
essential in a prosecution for rape.15(Citations omitted) In People v. Alicante,16 the Court held that the
accused may be convicted on the basis of the lone, uncorroborated testimony of the rape victim, provided
that her testimony is clear, positive, convincing and consistent with human nature and the normal course
of things.17 Truly, the absence of lacerated wounds in the complainants vagina does not negate sexual
intercourse.18 In fact, as used in our Revised Penal Code (RPC), "carnal knowledge," unlike its ordinary
connotation of sexual intercourse, does not require that the vagina be penetrated or that the hymen be
ruptured.19

The accused-appellant tried to impute jealousy on the part of AAA when she charged him with rape, yet
he also admitted that he was not courting her. His testimony is rendered more incredible when he claimed
that for a month before the alleged rape, the accused-appellant and AAA often exchanged kisses and
"played around with each other," and this was happening while he admitted to her that he was courting
Joan. The actuations of AAA immediately after the rape belie his story. Although no person observed
what transpired between him and AAA that afternoon of August 23, 2007, immediately after she managed
to flee from her assailant, AAA told Nelyn that she had just been raped by the accused-appellant, and she
asked her to text her sister BBB to come immediately. That same afternoon, after BBB arrived, they
reported the incident to the barangay officials.

No young woman would admit that she was raped, make public the offense and allow the examination of
her private parts, undergo the troubles and humiliation of a public trial and endure the ordeal of testifying
to all the gory details, if she had not in fact been raped. 20

While the Information does not allege that the victim was unconscious when the accused- appellant raped
her, it nevertheless alleges the element of use of force and violence by the accused-appellant which
facilitated the commission of the rape.
The accused-appellant insisted that the Information fatally failed to allege that he raped AAA while she
was unconscious, as required under Article 266-A(1)(b) of the RPC. From AAAs testimony, when she
regained control of her senses, she was aware of the accused-appellant lying on top of her and inserting
his penis into her vagina:

Pros. Jarlos: When you woke up, what did you find out?

A: Masakit po ang ari ko.

Q: What about him? Where was he when you woke up?

A: Nakapatong pa po sa akin.

Q: What was his attire when he was on top of you?

A: Nakasuot po siya ng t-shirt tapos iyong shorts niya ay nakababa hanggang tuhod po.

Q: What about you?

A: Nakahubad po.

Q: Nakahubot hubad ka?

A: Opo.

xxxx

Court: Naramdaman mo ba noong nagising ka na nasa ibabaw mo pa siya?

A: Opo.

Court: Bakit nakaramdam ka ng masakit?

A: Kasi po pinasok niya iyong ari niya sa ari ko.21

The accused-appellant now maintains that his right to due process was violated because he was convicted
of a crime which was not alleged in the Information, invoking Gavina. In the said case, the Court
overturned the conviction for rape because, while the Information alleged that the accused employed
force and intimidation, the victim testified that he used no force but gave her a drink which made her
unconscious, an element of the crime which the Information failed to allege. The Court said:

Second, in convicting appellant, the trial court relied upon a finding that complainant was unconscious
when the appellant had carnal knowledge of her. This contradicts the allegation in the information.
Appellant was charged with rape committed by means of force or intimidation. Otherwise put, his offense
fell under Article 266-A (1) (a) of the Revised Penal Code. But in convicting him of rape committed while
his victim was supposedly unconscious, the trial court applied Article 266-A (1) (b) of said Code. 22 The
element of unconsciousness on the victims part was not alleged much less specified in the information. It
cannot be made the basis of conviction, without violating appellants right to due process, in particular to
be informed of the nature of the accusation against him. x x x. 23(Citations omitted)

In another case, People v. Mendigurin,24 the victim had a heart condition such that when the accused
suddenly appeared and embraced her in a dark room, she was startled and fell unconscious. After the rape,
the victim awoke and felt pain in her abdomen and noticed blood in her private part. At that moment, she
saw the accused putting on his shorts with a smirk on his face. He then threatened her not to report the
incident or else he would kill her sister. In acquitting the accused, the Court stated:

As the prosecution failed to present evidence to substantiate the charge of rape through force, threat and
intimidation, we are duty-bound to uphold appellants innocence. It is an elementary rule in criminal
procedure that an accused cannot be convicted of an offense unless it is clearly charged in the complaint
or information. If the prosecution in this case sought to convict appellant by proving that complainant was
violated while in a state of unconsciousness, as provided under the 2nd paragraph of Article 355, the
information should have stated so. We find, however, that the element of unconsciousness was not alleged
much less specified in the information, which charged appellant for rape under the first circumstance.
Hence, it cannot be made the basis of conviction without violating appellants right to due process, in
particular to be informed of the nature of the accusation against him. We have ruled that this right is
accorded by the Constitution so that the accused can prepare an adequate defense against the charge
against him. Convicting him of a ground not alleged while he is concentrating his defense against the
ground alleged would plainly be unfair and underhanded.

The trial court, in holding for conviction, relied on the praesumptio hominis that no young Filipina would
cry rape if it were not true.1wphi1 However, its decision totally disregarded the paramount constitutional
presumption that an accused is deemed innocent until proven otherwise. Where the evidence gives rise to
two possibilities, one consistent with the accuseds innocence and the other indicative of his guilt, that
which favors the accused should be properly considered. 25 (Citations omitted)

On the other hand, although the Information below does not allege that the accused-appellant raped AAA
while she was unconscious, the prosecution however alleged and proved the use of force and violence
against her. Article 266-A(1)(a) of the RPC was satisfied because accused-appellant grabbed and pulled
AAA by her shorts and then pushed her hard against the concrete wall, and the impact of her head
bouncing against the wall made her dizzy, weak, and then unconscious, and this enabled the accused-
appellant to consummate his bestial design on her. Her unconsciousness resulted directly from the force
and violence employed by the accused-appellant against her.

The accused-appellant is being charged under Article 266-A(1)(a) of the RPC, and the element of use of
force is not in any way disproved when the RTC found that AAA was partly conscious when it said that
the "private complainant felt the penis of the accused[-appellant] inside her vagina and she felt
pain."26 The appellate court noted too that AAA was not totally unconscious, saying that this contradicted
the accused-appellant's insistence that the RTC found that she was unconscious during the rape. The OSG
also did not agree that AAA was totally unconscious, but as the Court has already noted, this point is
entirely irrelevant. What is clear is that sufficient force was used which facilitated the consummation of
the accused-appellant's lewd design when AAA became weak and momentarily unconscious.

Coming now to the imposable penalty, the lower courts correctly sentenced the accused-appellant to
reclusion perpetua pursuant to Article 266-B and Article 266-A 27 of the RPC. As to the monetary
damages, as held in People of the Philippines v. Adel Ramos y Abellana 28 and a long line of the latest
cases, the accused-appellant is liable to AAA for civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, moral
damages of P50,000.00, exemplary damages of P30,000.00, plus six percent (6%) per annum interest on
all these monetary awards29 from finality hereof until full satisfaction.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated April 26, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04072, finding accused-appellant Ronald Nical y Alminario guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Rape, is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
 [G.R. No. 142416. February 11, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO SORONGON alias Toto,

accused-appellant.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Accused-appellant Francisco Sorongon was charged with rape in an Information [1] which reads:

That on or about February 14, 1996, in the Municipality of Digos, Province of Davao del Sur, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with lewd designs, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, by means of force, violence and intimidation, that is, by then
and there pulling the offended party by the hand towards a grassy field, boxing her abdomen, covering her
mouth, pressing a knife at her abdomen and threatening to kill her should she resist, mashing her private
parts, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie with and have carnal knowledge of the
said offended party, Milagros Eyo, against her will and consent.

Complainant Milagros Eyo left her workplace on February 14, 1996 at around 6:00 in the
evening. While walking towards her home in Sampaguita, Kapatagan, Digos, Davao del Sur, she became
aware of someone following her. She looked back and saw accused-appellant Francisco Sorongon. Before
she could make any move, accused-appellant suddenly grabbed her left hand and pressed a knife against
her abdomen. Milagros tried to attract attention by repeatedly shouting for help but accused-appellant
silenced her by punching her in the abdomen, covering her mouth and pressing a knife at her.

Accused-appellant pushed Milagros to a grassy field beside the road where she was made to lie
down. In that position, accused-appellant touched her breasts and private parts. Despite resistance,
accused-appellant easily overpowered Milagros and rendered her unconscious when he stepped on her
face.

When Milagros recovered consciousness, she felt pain all over her body including her private
parts. She found accused-appellant lying on top of her repeatedly thrusting his organ into her vagina. It
was at this point that her neighbors, Francisco Ontalan and Nonoy Rosima, arrived and caused accused-
appellant to flee. Her neighbors took her home.

Dr. Salud dela Cruz, Rural Officer of Digos, Davao del Sur, conducted a genital examination two
days later and found a fresh lacerated wound about 0.5 cm. in diameter in the fourchette and a fresh
lacerated wound on the hymen at the 6:00 oclock position. [2]

Accused-appellant, on the other hand, claims that Milagros was his sweetheart. Because it was
Valentines day, he fetched her from her workplace. As they were walking home, they were carried away
by their emotion. They started kissing and hugging each other. The foreplay was suddenly interrupted by
a flashlight trained on them. To cover up Milagros embarrassment, she pretended that she was raped by
accused-appellant. She allegedly tried to show some resistance and even bit his small finger which caused
some blood to drip. She then filed charges of rape against him.
 The trial court gave credence to the prosecutions version and rendered a decision, [3] the dispositive
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in conformity with all the foregoing and considering that the crime of rape was
committed with the use of bladed weapon, and in order to serve the ends of justice, the Court is left with
no other alternative but to impose upon the accused the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA with the
accessory penalties provided for by law and to indemnify the victim the amount of P100,000.00 as moral
and exemplary damages.

Accused FRANCISCO SORONGON, being detained is entitled to full credit of the preventive
imprisonment he had undergone provided he has signed his conformity to abide by the rules and
regulations imposed upon inmates by the provincial jail authorities of Davao del Sur, otherwise he shall
be entitled to only 4/5 of the preventive imprisonment he had undergone.

Hence this appeal, raising the following errors:

I. The trial court erred in believing private complainants allegation of rape contrary to what she
reported at the Kapatagan Police Detachment that the accused merely attempted to rape
her.

II. The trial court erred in not finding that complainant lied when she testified that a sharp knife
was used and pressed on her stomach contrary to what the medical certificate shows that
there was no stomach injury and that her t-shirt showed no tear or perforation.

III. The trial court erred in not finding that private complainant lied and her testimonies were
incredible when she claimed that accused-appellant boxed her at the epigastric part of the
stomach 30 to 35 times.

IV. The trial court erred in not believing that they were sweethearts. [4]

In fine, accused-appellant assails the trial courts assessment of the credibility of Milagros.

Credible witness and credible testimony are the two essential elements for the determination of the
weight of a particular testimony. This principle could not ring any truer where the prosecution relies
mainly on the testimony of the complainant, corroborated by the medico-legal findings of a physician. Be
that as it may, the accused may be convicted on the basis of the lone uncorroborated testimony of the rape
victim, provided that her testimony is clear, convincing and otherwise consistent with human nature. [5]

In his first assignment of error, accused-appellant noted that Milagros testified in open court that she
was raped whereas she claimed before the Kapatagaan police that accused-appellant only attempted to
rape her. Hence, Milagros did not present the PNP blotter book in evidence.

On this score, we agree with the trial court when it held:

The minor inconsistencies in the private complainants statements during the time she was investigated by
the Barangay Captain of Kapatagan and at the time she was investigated by the police in Digos, Davao
del Sur are quite understandable for a barrio lass who was there present to air the acts of the accused
which are repugnant to her modesty. These inconsistencies pointed by the defense, however, were not
made during the trial proper or during the time she was presented in Court but inconsistencies which were
simply placed or put in writing in the blotter book by persons other than herself.

Entries in a police blotter, though regularly done in the course of the performance of official duty, are
not conclusive proof of the truth of such entries for they are often incomplete and inaccurate. They,
therefore, should not be given undue significance or probative value as to the facts stated therein. Blotter
entries are merely prima facie proofs of the facts stated therein. [6]

On the other hand, the trial court doubted the testimonies of the defense witnesses when it observed
that:

The testimonies of the defense witnesses, Barangay Captain Gidel Romero, Barangay Kagawad Benjamin
Benzuelo and Barangay Kagawad Cornelio Cometa (whose desire for acquittal is understandable
considering the fact that the barangay captain is related to the accused) which were all geared towards
attacking the credibility of the private complainant, appear to be fabricated, not credible and are not
enough to successfully assail the credible and straightforward testimony of the private complainant whose
deportment, behavior and manner of testifying during trial has been fully observed by this Court. The
private complainant even shed tears when asked to recount the harrowing experience she has had with the
accused and who even bit her lips when asked to identify the man who brutally ravished her body. [7]

The victims act of crying during her testimony bolsters the credibility of the rape charge with the
verity born out of human nature and experience. [8]

Well-settled is the rule that findings of facts and assessment of credibility of witnesses is a matter
best left to the trial court because of its unique position of having observed that elusive and
incommunicable evidence of the witnesses deportment on the stand while testifying, which opportunity is
denied to the appellate courts. For this reason, the trial courts findings are accorded finality, unless there
appears in the record some fact or circumstance of weight which the lower court may have overlooked,
misunderstood or misappreciated and which, if properly considered, would alter the results of the case. [9]

Significantly, Milagros testimony that she was in fact raped by accused-appellant was corroborated
by the medical examination which Milagros had undergone two days after the incident. The results of the
medical examination showed that Milagros suffered fresh hymenal lacerations consistent with the date of
the rape. This kind of evidence leaves no doubt in our mind that, indeed, Milagros was raped.

Accused-appellant next argues that the trial court erred in giving credence to Milagros testimony that
she was boxed on the abdomen 30 to 35 times and a sharp knife was used and pressed on her abdomen
considering that the medical certificate showed no abdominal injury and her t-shirt was not torn or
perforated.

This contention is without merit. Again, we agree with the trial courts finding that:

The accused contention that the private complainant lied when she testified that she was boxed and a
knife was pointed to her considering that the Medical Certificate shows no injury on the stomach and that
the T-shirt presented in Court was neither torn nor perforated, holds no water, for in the first place, there
was no testimony from the private complainant to the effect that she was injured or wounded. Besides, the
Medical Certificate reveals the fact that there was abrasion of her right thigh, contusion on the maxillary
area (left) and multiple abrasion on the face. The multiple abrasion on the face may have been the result
of the accused act of stepping on the private complainants face. [10]

Lastly, accused-appellant argues that the trial court erred in disregarding his testimony that he and
Milagros were sweethearts. We are not persuaded. This theory is inconsistent with Milagros act of
undergoing medical examination. Moreover, while accused-appellant insisted that he had a Valentines
card, no such card was presented in court.

In People v. Corea,[11] we held that:

x x x Moreover, even if such averment is true, it does not necessarily follow that no rape can be
committed against ones sweetheart. Such a relationship provides no license to explore and invade that
which every virtuous woman holds so dearly and trample upon her honor and dignity. That relationship is
held sacred by many x x x. A sweetheart cannot be forced to engage in sexual intercourse against her
will. As a matter of fact, proof even of a prior history of a common-law marital relationship will not
prevail over clear and positive evidence of copulation by the use of force or intimidation.

On the matter of damages, the trial court ordered accused-appellant to indemnify the victim
P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages. In People v. Padrigone,[12]it was held that civil indemnity
is mandatory upon the finding of the fact of rape. This is distinct from and should not be denominated as
moral damages or, in this case, moral and exemplary damages, which are based on different jural
foundations and assessed by the court in the exercise of sound discretion. Thus, in accordance with
current jurisprudence, accused-appellant is ordered to pay P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto.

The award of moral damages is in accord with jurisprudence. Moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00 are awarded in rape cases without need of proof other than the fact of the rape itself, because
it is assumed that the victim has suffered moral injuries entitling her to such an award. [13]

Likewise, the award of exemplary damages is justified. The circumstance of use of a deadly weapon
was duly alleged in the information and proven at the trial. In People v. Edem,[14] we awarded exemplary
damages in the amount of P25,000.00 in a case of rape committed with the use of a deadly weapon.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial of Digos, Davao del Sur, Branch 18, finding
accused-appellant Francisco Sorongon alias Toto guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that he is ordered to pay the offended party, Milagros Eyo
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-107819 December 17, 1993

EFREN ANCIRO, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Franco L. Loyola for petitioner.

The Solicitor General for the People of the Philippines.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The principal issue raised in this petition is the propriety of the trial court's denial of a motion to strike out
the testimony of the private complainant whose cross examination was not finished because she had left
for abroad.

The petitioner was prosecuted for the rape of Gloria Dalin, a 14-year old lass, allegedly committed on 23
February 1979 in Bangkal, Carmona, Cavite. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. BCR-79-154
of the then Branch 5 of the Court of First Instance, later Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of Bacoor,
Cavite. The case was subsequently transferred to Branch 21 of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite. 1

On 9 March 1988, the trial court promulgated its decision, 2 the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
as defined and penalized under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code, said accused is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment to an indeterminate term ranging
from six (6) months and one (1) day of prision correccional minimum, as minimum, to
eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor medium, as maximum, and to pay the
offended party P10,000.00 for moral damages and P5,000.00 for attorney's fees and the
cost of the suit.

It appreciated in favor of the petitioner the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority considering
that he was born on 13 August 1963, 3 and by reason thereof, it lowered the penalty prescribed in Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., reclusion perpetua, by two degrees and applied the Indeterminate
Sentence Law.

Petitioner appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals, which docketed the case as CA-G.R. CR No.
05592. In his brief, 4 he sought the reversal thereof on the ground that the trial court erred in convicting
him (a) "on the basis of the testimony of the offended party despite that [sic] there is no complete
testimony on record of offended party and that cross-examination was not terminated without the fault of
the accused-appellant," and (b) despite the absence of "evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt." In support of the first, he reiterated and amplified the arguments he had adduced before the
court a quo, and as to the factual issues, he asserts that:
 it is highly incredible for complainant to have been sexually abused when she was with
five other companions three of whom are males while three of them are females.
Moreover, why did her companions leave the place and left her alone? The answer is
because complainant and accused were intimate and have [a] love affair even before the
incident in question. The allegation regarding the use of force was merely an
afterthought. 5

In the Appellee's Brief, 6 the People traversed the petitioner's claim that his right to cross-examine the
complainant was denied. Thus:

On 08 March 1984, after the direct examination of complaining witness Gloria A.

Dalin, counsel for appellant requested continuance of the cross-examination (TSN, 08
March 1984, p. 25) since he was not ready to cross-examine the witness (Records, p.
147). The cross-examination was therefore reset to 24 April 1984 and 28 May
1985 7 (Id.).

On 23 April 1984, counsel for appellant filed a Motion for Postponement of the Hearing
(Cross-examination) set for 24 April 1984.

The hearing set for 28 May 1984 was likewise postponed and reset to 09 July 1984 due to
power failure (records, p. 163).

Eventually, on 09 July 1984, appellant's counsel was able to cross-examine the

complaining witness (Records, p. 172; TSN, 09 July 1984,
pp. 1-30).

On 11 July 1984, appellant's counsel continued his cross-examination of the complaining

witness (TSN, 11 July 1984, pp. 1-28).

On 20 August 1984, since complaining witness was "not yet in the Philippines, and there
are no other witnesses available (Records, p. 183; TSN, 20 August. 1984, p. 26) aside
from Dr. Dario Gajardo, Medico-Legal Officer of the PC-Crime Laboratory", the hearing
was reset to 10 October 1984, 22 October 1984, 20 November 1984 and 27 November
1984 (Id.).

xxx xxx xxx

On 28 October 1985, appellant filed a "Motion to Strike Out the Testimony of Gloria
Dalin" on the alleged ground that the "the cross-examination of Dalin was not yet
terminated" (Records, pp. 232-233).

On 20 June 1986, the Trial Court denied the foregoing Motion, holding that "the records
of this case will readily indicate that Gloria Dalin has already been sufficiently cross-
examined." Further, the court added, the defense had been given full opportunity
(actually, the cross-examination of Dalin by appellant's counsel was conducted in two
court sessions) to finish its cross-examination but it failed because of the way the same
was conducted (Records, pp. 257-258).
 On 01 October 1986, the "Motion for Reconsideration" of appellant with respect to the
foregoing adverse decision was likewise denied (Records, p. 270).

On 08 April 1987 and 12 October 1987, appellant presented evidence in his behalf and
thereafter, rested his case. 8

In its Decision of 25 June 1992, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the trial
court. As modified, the penalty of imprisonment was increased to an indeterminate sentence of 10 years
of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years 4 months of reclusion temporal, as maximum, while the
indemnity was increased to P50,000.00. It appreciated in his favor the privileged mitigating circumstance
of minority since he was over 15 and under 18 years of age at the time he committed the crime and
accordingly imposed a penalty one degree lower than that prescribed for the offense. In resolving the
issues raised in the appeal, it held:

The accused was not denied his right to cross-examination, albeit the same was not
entirely completed. The records of the case would reveal that the defense was afforded
ample opportunity for cross-examination. After the direct-examination of the offended
party on 8 March 1984, the trial court granted the motion of the defense for a continuance
of the hearing on another date to allow it to prepare for a thorough examination of the
offended party's testimony. On 9 July 1984, the date set for the continuation of the cross-
examination, the offended party was present and in fact was sufficiently interrogated by
the defense counsel:

xxx xxx xxx

The Supreme Court, in the case of People vs. Gorospe (129 SCRA 223) has ruled that:

xxx xxx xxx

"While cross-examination is a right available to the adverse party, it is

not absolute in the sense that a cross-examiner could determine for
himself the length and scope of his cross-examination of the witness. The
court always has the discretion to limit the cross-examination and to
consider it terminated if it would serve the ends of justice."

But even if in gratia argumenti, we sustain appellant's contention and exclude the
testimony of the offended party, there is still sufficient evidence on record to established
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. As the trial court emphasized in its
decision, the judgment of conviction was not based solely on the offended party's
testimony. 9

The evidence of the prosecution was carefully summarized by the trial court in its decision, thus:

The people's version of the case is that on February 23, 1979 complainant Gloria Dalin
(Dalin, for short), together wit five (5) companions, went to a "manggahan" at Bangkal,
Carmona, Cavite to rest and at the same time pick mangoes. While thus picking mangoes,
accused and a young male companion about ten (10) years old arrived. Frightened
by this sudden appearance, Dalin and her companions scampered away in different
directions. Accused shouted at them to come back which, Dalin and her companions, due
to fear, heeded. And return, they did.

On order of the accused, Dalin and Ruby Laurente were tied together to a hanging branch
of a mango tree with banana fiber locally called "saha". The other members of the group
were also tied with the same fiber but separately.

After a while, accused directed those tied separately to play a racing game promising the
one to reach him first to be set free. Thus, they were untied for this purpose.

While the game was in progress, Dalin and Ruby were busy trying to free themselves and
since the "saha" was fresh and slippery, they succeeded. Thus freed, they ran towards the
river. Accused who chased them was able to overtake Dalin. Ruby, on the other hand,
proceeded home and reported the matter to Dalin's mother.

Accused pulled Dalin by the hair in dragging her to a hut where he forcibly removed
Dalin's short pants. Thereafter, he used earthen pots which broke one after the other
due to the force of the impact to prop up the buttocks of Dalin for easy sexual
penetration. Accused succeeded having coition with Dalin four (4) times. Accused
desisted only upon the entreaties of his young male companion.

Taking advantage of the lull, Dalin rushed home. On the way, she met her mother who
was already looking for her as a result of the report of Ruby.

Immediately, Dalin and her mother went to a PC Detachment in the area and reported the
rape done to her by the accused. The PC authorities, however, directed them to proceed
instead to the police station of Carmona, Cavite which they did. The necessary
investigation was done therein. Thereafter, Dalin was brought to the PC Crime
Laboratory at Camp Crame for medical examination. As it was already quite late in the
evening, and there being no physician available at that date and time, the medical
examination was conducted the following day February 24, 1979 at about 10:30 in
the morning. The doctor, Dr. Dario Gajardo, who examined Dalin submitted the
following findings, to wit:

Findings:

GENERAL AND EXTRAGENITAL:

. . . The following injuries are noted:

[Here follows an enumeration of seventeen (17) abrasions and contusions

on different parts of the body, especially the buttocks and the hands.]

GENITAL:
 There is "lanugo-type" of pubic hair, labia majora are full, convex and
coaptated with dark brown, hypertrophied labia minora presenting in
between. On separating the same are disclosed a fresh, healing laceration
at the posterior commissure and vulvar mucosa and an elastic, fleshy
type hymen with a deep, fresh laceration at 6 o'clock position. External
vaginal orifice offers strong resistance to the introduction of the
examining index finger and the virgin-sized vaginal speculum. Vaginal
canal is narrow with prominent rugosities. Cervix is normal in size, color
and consistency with moderate amount of whitish secretions.

Vaginal and peri-urethral smears are negative for gram negative

diplococci and for spermatozoa.

REMARKS:

Findings are compatible with recent loss of virginity. 10

In his defense, the appellant contends that he and the private complainant had a love affair even before the
incident in question and were on intimate terms. On 29 February 1979, the private complainant came to
the "manggahan" to play "bahay-bahayan" with him. He played the role of the "father," while the private
complainant acted as the "mother." They repaired to a nearby hut where they apparently took their roles
so seriously that they engaged in some necking and petting. He, however, strongly denies that he had
sexual intercourse with the private complainant. 11

In convincing the petitioner, the trial court gave full faith and credit to the prosecution's version:

The injuries suffered by Dalin seventeen (17) in all belie the claim of voluntariness.
On the contrary, said injuries portrayed a picture of the accused and Dalin struggling and
fighting. Indeed, according to the doctor, the injuries suffered by Dalin in her forearm and
arm are defense wounds. Meaning, said wounds were suffered when she put up a fight.

Dalin's hymen was lacerated. And the doctor was positive that said laceration was caused
by the insertion of the male organ. It could not have been due to the insertion of a finger.

Differently stated, the evidence of the prosecution established beyond any reasonable
doubt that the accused succeeded in having carnal knowledge of Dalin by force.

Not only this. The flight of the accused to (the) Bicol Region after the commission of the
crime reveals his guilt. 12

In this petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner alleges that the Court of Appeals had no
"jurisdiction to decide and affirm [his] conviction on the basis of the direct examination of Gloria Dalin
alone without terminating the cross-examination due to the [sic] Gloria Dalin," and that in affirming with
modification the trial court's decision, the Court of Appeals "has departed from the accepted and usual
course of judicial proceedings when it overlooked facts of substantial consequences which establish the
innocence of petitioner from the offense charged."
In the Comment 13 filed on 27 July 1993 by the Office of the Solicitor General, the public respondents
asseverate that the petitioner was able to exhaustively cross-examine the complaining witness on 09 July
1984 and 11 July 1984, the transcripts of stenographic notes of which consist of a total of 58
pages, 14 which cross-examination the trail court found sufficient; they assert that the Court of Appeals did
not err in affirming with modification the judgment of conviction.

The petitioner filed his Reply to the Comment on 14 October 1993. 15

After deliberating on the allegations, issues, and arguments raised by the parties, we find the challenged
decision to be unflawed by any reversible error. Perforce, the petition must be denied.

We agree with the respondents and the trial court that the petitioner was not denied the right to cross-
examine the offended party. He was given ample and sufficient time to do so. His counsel, Atty. Loyola,
could have conducted the cross-examination on 8 March 1984 immediately after the termination of the
direct examination but did not allegedly because he was not ready. Counsel then spent two court sessions
(9 July and 11 July 1984) cross-examining the private complainant. On 9 July 1984, Atty. Loyola cross-
examined her for one hour, and when he was asked by the court if he was through with the witness, he
replied: "I think, I need one more hearing." 16 On 11 July 1984, Atty. Loyola continued the cross-
examination, 17 which was later stopped because the private complainant became indisposed.
Nevertheless, although the prosecution had announced that it was ready for the continuation of the cross-
examination on the following day, Atty. Loyola told the court that he would be at the Sandiganbayan and
suggested that the continuation be had on 20 August 1984. When the prosecuting fiscal informed Atty.
Loyola that the offended party would leave the country and might not be able to return to the Philippines,
the following exchange transpired:

Atty. Loyola

According to the witness, she will be returning. Because she

cannot answer, what will happen to the witness if we force her to
testify? We do not want to force her.

Fiscal Gervacio

She is available tomorrow.

Atty. Loyola

I will not be available tomorrow. I will not take advantage of

this. If she is not around on the 20th we will proceed with
another witness. 18

This clearly shows that Atty. Loyola was fully aware the private complainant was scheduled to leave the
Philippines, and that if she should be unavailable for the continuation of the cross-examination, he was
willing to forego further cross-examination and present another witness. Even if this were farthest from
his mind, we are further convinced that, knowing of the expected departure of the private complainant,
Atty. Loyola wanted a scenario wherein the private complainant either would be unable to testify or could
no longer be cross-examined in which case he would move that her testimony be stricken out from the
record. This is easily borne out by the counsel's dilatory tactics he neither cross-examined her on 8
March 1984 nor agreed that the cross-examination be continued on 12 July 1984. He also deliberately
dragged out his cross-examination on 9 July and 11 July 1984.

Fortunately, the trial court saw through this scheme; thus, in its 20 June 1986 Order 19 denying the
petitioner's motion to strike out the testimony of the private complainant, it stated:

The records of this case will readily indicate that Gloria Dalin [the private complainant]
has already been sufficiently cross-examined. Further, the defense had been given full
opportunity to finish its cross-examination but it failed because of the way the same was
conducted.

Our examination and evaluation of the transcripts of the stenographic notes of the proceedings of 9 July
and 11 July 1984 support this conclusion of the trial court.

It should also be noted that the petitioner took the witness stand. His direct testimony corroborated the
testimony of the private complainant on the incidents before the rape. He admitted hat he kissed the
private complainant and touched her breast but denied her allegations in the statement which she executed
before Judge Arvizu concerning the rape. 20 Wittingly or unwittingly, he thus rebutted the testimony of the
private complainant, thereby rendering moot, by waiver, his objection thereto.

Howsoever viewed, the testimony of the private complainant must stand. The petitioner had not only been
given sufficient opportunity to finish the cross-examination of the private complainant, by his conduct he
has, as well, waived his right to further cross-examine her. His constitutional right to meet the witness
face to face 21 was not impaired.

In United States vs. Anastacio, 22 this Court held that "the right of confrontation thus guaranteed and
secured to the accused is a personal privilege" which can be waived. We stated the purpose of
confrontation thus:

The chief purpose of confrontation is to secure the opportunity for cross-examination;

this has been repeatedly pointed out in judicial opinion, so that if the opportunity of
cross-examination has been secured the function and test of confrontation has also been
accomplished, the confrontation being merely the dramatic preliminary to cross-
examination. The second and minor purpose is that the tribunal may have before it the
deportment and appearance of the witness while testifying. But the latter purpose is so
much a subordinate and incidental one that no vital importance is attached to it;
consequently, if it can not be had it is dispensed with, provided the chief purpose, cross-
examination, has been attained. (Greenleaf on Evidence, vol. 1, par. 163). 23

In People vs. de la Cruz, 24 we held:

The fact that the cross-examination of the complainant was not formally terminated is not
an irregularity that would justify a new trial. The right to confront the witnesses may be
waived by the accused expressly or by implication. (U.S. vs. Anastasio, 6 Phil. 413; 4
Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., p. 201-2).
We reiterated this rule in Savory Luncheonette vs. Lakas ng Manggagawang Pilipino, 25 People
vs. Seneris, 26People vs. Gorospe, 27 De La Paz vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 28 Fulgado vs. Court of
Appeals, 29 and People vs. Carcedo. 30

In Savory Luncheonette, we said:

The right of a party to confront and cross-examine opposing witnesses in a judicial

litigation, be it criminal or civil in nature, or in proceedings before administrative
tribunals with quasi-judicial powers, is a fundamental right which is part of due process.
However, the right is a personal one which may be waived expressly or impliedly by
conduct amounting to a renunciation of the right of cross-examination. Thus, where a
party has had the opportunity to cross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it,
he necessarily forfeits the right to cross-examination and the testimony given on direct
examination of the witness will be received or allowed to remain in the record.

The conduct of a party which may be construed as an implied waiver of the right to cross-
examine may take various forms. But the common basic principles underlying the
application of the rule on implied waiver is that the party was given the opportunity to
confront and cross-examine an opposing witness but failed to take advantage of it for
reasons attributable to himself alone. 31

In fine, as we stated in Fulgado:

The principle requiring a testing of testimonial statements by cross-examination has

always been understood as requiring, not necessarily on actual cross-examination, but
merely an opportunity to exercise the right to cross-examine if desired. 32

We also agree with the Court of Appeals that even if the testimony of the private complainant were to be
stricken out, there is enough evidence on record to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the petitioner
committed the crime of rape. For one, there is the testimony of Ruby Laurente. She testified that she and
the private complainant were tied by the accused. The accused then told her that if she accorded to his
desire to rape her, she would be freed. She however managed to escape and forthwith went to Maria Paz
Dalin, the mother of the private complainant, and told her what happened. Then the two of them, together
with Perfecta Calex (the then Vice-Mayor of Carmona) and other persons, searched for the private
complainant whom they eventually found near a river. The private complainant, who was crying, told
them that she had been ravished by the petitioner. Ruby testified thus:

ATTY. GONZALES:

Q. And what was she doing when you saw her?

Witness:

A. She was crying, sir.

Q. Do you know why she was crying?

 A. No, sir.

Q. What did she say, if any, when you found her?

A. She told me that she was raped by Efren Anciro.

Q. To whom did she tell that?

A. To us and to her mother.

Q. And when that information was disclosed by Gloria Dalin, what did
you and the rest of your companions do, if any?

Witness:

A. We went home and we went to the Municipality of Carmona and

reported the incident.

Q. To whom did you report the incident?

A. To Rolando Melo, sir.

Q. Who is that Rolando Melo?

A. Station Commander, sir, of Carmona, Cavite.

Q. Was there any investigation conducted by the Station Commander

regarding the incident?

A. Yes, sir. 33

For another, there are the testimonies of the Station Commander, corroborating the fact of the immediate
reporting of the incident and the investigation he conducted, and of Dr. Gajardo whose medical findings
support the finding of rape.

The statement of the private complainant to Ruby Laurente that she was raped by the petitioner, which
was not objected to by counsel for petitioner, is part of the res gestae and is admissible under Section 42,
Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court. The requisites for the admission of evidence as part of the res
gestae are present, viz.: (1) the principal act or the res gestae which is the rape was a startling
occurrence, (2) the declaration by the complainant that she was raped by the accused was made before she
had the time to contrive or devise, and (3) the statement referred to the occurrence in question and its
immediately attending circumstances. 34

It is settled that when a woman says that she has been raped, she says, in effect, that all that is necessary
to constitute the commission of this crime has been committed. 35 Also, in the instant case, the
complainant immediately reported the incident and voluntarily submitted herself to an investigation by
the police authorities and an examination of her private parts by the medico-legal officer. It is difficult to
believe that she would tell a story of defloration, allow the examination of her private parts, and thereafter
subject herself to the rigors and embarrassment of a public trial if she were not raped. 36

Finally, there is the unrebutted finding of the trial court that the petitioner fled to the Bicol Region soon
after the incident. Flight evidences guilt and a guilty conscience; it strongly indicates a guilty mind or
betrays the existence of a guilty conscience. 37

Like the trial court and the Court of Appeals, we are convinced that the guilt of the petitioner for the
crime charged was proved beyond reasonable doubt.

The modifications made by the Court of Appeals are correct. Since the petitioner was a minor above
fifteen but less than eighteen years of age at the time he committed the crime, the penalty to be imposed
upon him shall be one degree lower than reclusion perpetua, the penalty prescribed by Article 335 of the
Revised Penal Code. The trial court would have been correct if the petitioner were less than fifteen but
above nine years of age at the time he committed the crime and had acted with discernment, in which case
he would not be exempt from criminal liability but would be meted a penalty at least two degrees lower
than that prescribed for the offense. 38 The increase of the indemnity to P50,000.00 is in accordance with
the current policy of the Court.

WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been committed by the respondent Court of Appeals, the
instant petition is DENIED and the decision of said Court of 25 June 1992 in CA-G.R. CR No. 05592 is
hereby AFFIRMED.

Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-44643 March 31, 1980

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
RUFO ADVINCULA, defendant-appellant.

ANTONIO, J.:

Automatic review of the decision of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, 13th Judicial District, Branch IV
(Criminal Case No. 1296), finding Rufo Advincula guilty of the crime of rape, with the use of a deadly
weapon, aggravated with the circumstance of dwelling, and sentencing him to the supreme penalty of
death and ordering him to indemnify the offend party in the sum of P12,000.00, Without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and pay the costs.

Complainant Gloria Silvano, 30 years of age and married to Rodrigo Silvano, testified that at about 7:00
o'clock in the evening of September 8, 1973, she was in her house in Barrio Limbuhan Dacu, Tanauan,
Leyte, cooking rice for supper, while her three children were playing in their yard. Her husband was, at
that time, in the house of his cousin trying to borrow money to replenish his capital in buying fish which
he retailed in the market. While she was seated on a trunk by the door of her house, appellant Rufo
Advincula surreptitiously entered and embraced her from behind. Completely taken by surprise, she tried
to escape from his embrace but to no avail. To free herself, she bit appellant's left hand, causing him to
loosen his hold. But he, in turned boxed her on the right temple, causing her to fall on the floor. She was
rendered momentarily unconscious as a result of the blow, and appellant succeeded in tearing her dress
(Exhibit "A") and panties (Exhibit "B"). Appellant then positioned himself on top of her and when she
regained momentary consciousness and shouted for help, he threatened to kill her with a small bolo
(pisaw), covered her mouth and succeeded in having sexual intercourse with her. He afterwards kicked
her, and after warning her, on pain of death, not to tell her husband what he had done, appellant fled from
the house. Crying with anguish, she immediately ran out to seek the assistance of the authorities. She
informed her husband, who had by then arrived, that she had been sexually abused by appellant. She and
her husband then proceeded to the house of Barrio Captain Dionisio Magnawa to report the incident.
Acting upon this complaint, the Barrio Captain requested assistance from the PC detachment at Olot for
the apprehension of appellant. Later, four PC soldiers arrived and went after the appellant. The following
morning, the offended party was examined at the Leyte Provincial Hospital by Dr. Pablo Aniceto.

Dr. Pablo Aniceto, resident physician of the Leyte Provincial Hospital, declared that he examined Gloria
Silvano on September 9, 1973 and found that she sustained the following injuries to wit:

Hematoma (1) right eye 3 cm. by 2 cm. orbital region lateral 2 chin 2 cm. by 2 cm.

Abrasionsions multiple linear

(1) left mandible

(2) anterior portion of neck

(3) distal 3rd left arm posterior aspect

 External exam:

(1) pubic hair sparse

(2) abrasions perineum

(3) vagina parcous

(4) abrasions labia minora. right

Smear of spermatozoa negative for spermatozoa

He further testified that the hematoma on the right eye and right portion of the chin of complainant might
have been caused by a blow from a closed fist, and the abrasions could have been caused by sharp objects
such as fingernails or other sharp instruments.

Dionisio Magnawa, Barrio Captain of Limbuhan Dacu, Tanauan, Leyte, corroborated the testimony of the
offended party to the effect that she and her husband went to see him in the evening of September 8, 1973
to report the incident. He testified further that he noticed that Gloria's face was injured, her hair
disarranged and her dress torn, and that she was crying. Acting on that complaint, he requested the PC
detachment in Tolosa to arrest Rufo Advincula. At about past 8:00 o'clock that evening, Rufo Advincula
was appealed in his (appellant's) hours.; at Barrio Limbuhan Dacu by three PC soldiers.

Appellant, while admitting that he had sexual intercourse with the offended party, however, denied having
boxed and raped her. He declared that they were already sweethearts during the years 1959 and 1960, but
their relationship did not ripen into marriage because she was hesitant, telling him to wait for the approval
of her parents. In the meantime, he left for Cebu in December 1959 to work as cashier on the store of his
aunt. After staying for one month in Cebu, he went to Manila to look for a better job. In 1960, while he
was in Manila, he learned that Gloria had gotten married. That same year he returned to Limbuhan Dacu
Tanauan, Leyte, and in the following year he married his present spouse, with whom he begot two
children.

He admits that in 1968 he was convicted and imprisoned for killing one Lorenzo Monte, and that he
served sentence in Muntinlupa in 1969, from where he was later transferred to the Iwahig Penal Colony.
Upon his release in November 1972, he returned to Barrio Limbuhan Dacu and stayed in the home of his
father. According to appellant, he met the offended party again sometime in June 1973, and that on
September 5, 1973, he met her in the house of his brother where they talked about old times, and after
kissing her, they made a love tryst in the coconut groves across Gunarona River in the afternoon of
September 7, 1973. As agreed, they met at the designated rendezvous and they had sexual intercourse.
She allegedly proposed to leave her husband and live with him (appellant) in Maria but he told her to wait
because he had no money. After their conversation, they parted and, to avoid suspicion, stayed to gather
firewood.

Appellant claims that she filed the charge against him because she was ashamed of what she had done.

We are in accord with the trial court's evaluation of the evidence, to wit:
 ... The story of the complainant is replete with details that could not ordinarily be
imagined or fabricated. The fact that the complainant sustained injuries on her face and
different parts of her body and immediately reported the outrage to the captain of her
barrio, without any sufficient intervening time for her to fabricate her account, is
convincing proof of the commission of the crime. This circumstance was testified to by
Barrio Captain Dionisio Magnawa of Limbuhan, Tanauan, Leyte. The accused insinuates
that the complainant instituted this case out of shame on being discovered that she had
amorous relations with him. The court cannot believe that this circumstance alone could
have forced the complainant to concoct a rape story. The accuse himself, in stating that he
had amorous relations with the offended party, gave no evidence that Gloria's husband
discovered their alleged affair. Besides, a country girl like the offended party herein
would not expose herself publicly airing acts repugnant to modesty and her honor as a
married woman unless she is urged by the force of sincerity and by the honest desire to
obtain redress for her grievance.

Although there is no direct evidence corroborating the testimony of the offended woman
regarding the very acts complained of, as there were on that occasion no witnesses
present, nevertheless there is circumstantial evidence to corroborate her story. We have
the testimony of Barrio Captain Dionisio Magnawa that at about 7 o'clock in the evening
of September 8, 1973, Gloria Silvano and her husband went to his house to report the
incident and requested him to have the accused Rufo Advincula arrested by PC soldiers
and Gloria, who was crying and with crumpled hair, showed to him injuries on her face.
No motive has been shown by the defense. (CFI Decision, pp. 11 to 12, Rollo, pp. 18-19).

In his brief, the counsel for appellant contends that "improbabilities and contradictions in the testimony of
complainant Gloria Silvano" have impaired seriously the credibility of her testimony. Thus, he contends
that in complainant's affidavit (Exhibit "1"), she declared that "... after Rufo tore my dress and my
underpants, and then took out his testicles and inserted it into my penis Rufo succeeded in having sexual
intercourse ..." The use of the term "testicles" instead of the word "Penis", or the word "penis" instead of
"vagina" in the affidavit of Gloria before the police (Exhibit "1") arose from the mistake committed by
Pat. Francisco Mendiola who translated the declaration of the offended party. Such an absurdity cannot be
attributed to the complainant. As the trial court observed: "It must be borne in mind that the statement of
the offended party was taken by Patrolman Francisco Mendiola who is apparently deficient or poor in
English ...".

Appellant's counsel further points out that the statement of the complainant in her affidavit is inconsistent
with her testimony in court. Thus, in her affidavit (Exhibit "1-B"), she stated that after the appellant had
raped her and left her house, her husband arrived and she informed him of what appellant did to her, while
in her testimony in Court on February 22, 1974 (Exhibit "3"), she declared that she went to the house of
Eusebio Silvano and met her husband on the way.

The fact is that complainant confirmed the statement in her affidavit (Exhibit "1-B") that her husband
arrived at their house after the appellant left when she testified, thus:

COURT:
 Q. After you were abused by Rufo Advincula, did you meet your
husband?

A. Yes, sir, because he already arrived at our house.

Q. Did you go down your house immediately after you were allegedly
abused by Rufo Advincula?

A. I went down only when my husband arrived at the house. (t.s.n., pp.
33-34, Hearing on August 19, 1974).

Q. So you are very sure now that you did not meet your husband on the
way but you only met him in your house, is that what you want to say?

a. Yes,sir. (t.s.n., p. 4, Hearing on October 3l, 1974).

Appellant's counsel further points out that when the complainant testified on February 22, 1974 (Exhibit
"3-B"), she made it appear that her children were with her husband in the house of Eusebio Silvano when
she was raped. But the offended party denied having answered in that manner. She affirmed in court that
her "children were downstairs in the yard playing" at the time she was raped. 1

Appellant further claims in his brief that it was improbable for appellant to have raped the victim at seven
in the evening when all "people in the neighborhood were still awake" and that he would have been a
every brave tresspasser, so lacking in elementary caution as to have committed the crime at that time.

As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, seven o'clock in the evening is already a late hour in the
barrio, considering its isolation from the poblacion. There is no iota of proof that all the people in that
barrio were still awake, much less is there any indication that the other residents of the place were so
situated that they could have heard the cries for help of the ravished victim. Considering that man's bestial
instincts sometimes ignore convention, time and place, it is not highly improbable that the crime of rape
was committed at that place and hour by appellant.

Differences between the sworn statement before the police, relating to minor details as to which the
perceptions and recollection of the witness may differ, and complainant's testimony in court, do not affect
her especially considering the shock, excitement and haste under which the complainant was laboring
when she executed the statement . 2

Finally, it is a general rule in criminal, as well as in civil cases, that where the findings of fact depend
upon relative credibility of witnesses who testified in open court, due consideration should be given to the
superior position of the trial judge, who saw and heard them, to appraise their credibility, and his findings
should not be disturbed unless it appears from the record that facts or circumstances of weight were
overlooked; or their significance misinterpreted; or there was inherent weakness in the supporting
evidence. Such contra-indications do not appear in the case at bar.

The imposable penalty is death, in view of the fact that the crime of rape was committed with the use of a
deadly weapon 3 and aggravated by the circumstance of dwelling. 4 However, some Members of the Court
are of the view that only reclusion perpetua should be imposed, as the appellant has been under detention
for a considerable period of time.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED but for lack of necessary votes, the death penalty is
hereby reduced to reclusion perpetua. SO ORDERED.
 [G. R. No. 143817. October 27, 2003]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. ALEJANDRO BAJAR, appellant.

DECISION

Per Curiam:

For the killing of his father-in-law, Aquilio Tiwanak, appellant Alejandro Bajar was found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty of death in the 17
July 2000 Decision[1] of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch 18, in Criminal Case No.
99-942.

Alejandro was charged under an amended information whose accusatory portion reads as follows:

That on or about the 16th day of August 1999, at about 8:00 oclock in the evening, at sitio Mohon,
Barangay Mambayaan, Municipality of Balingasag, Province of Misamis Oriental, Republic of the
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, then armed
with a sharp bolo, with intent to kill, and with evident premeditation, and treachery, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab one 85 year old Aquilio Tiwanak, accuseds father-in-law, hitting
him on the different parts of his body, which caused his instantaneous death, to the damage and prejudice
of the heirs of Aquilio Tiwanak in such amounts as may be allowed by law.

The aggravating circumstances of dwelling, taking advantage of superior strength, disregard of the respect
due the victim on account of his age, habitual intoxication and relationship attended the commission of
the crime.

CONTRARY to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation [to] Article 14, paragraphs 3 and 15,
and Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code.[2]

Upon his arraignment on 8 February 2000, Alejandro pleaded not guilty, and trial thereafter ensued.
The prosecution presented as witnesses Alejandros wife, Lolita Bajar, and their two children, Ana Bajar
Rabor and Alma Luna Bajar, to testify on the events surrounding the commission of the crime.

On 16 August 1999, Ana Bajar Rabor, a resident of Wao, Bukidnon, visited her parents in their house
in Sitio Mohon, Mambayaan, Balingasag, Misamis Oriental. [3] At around 3:00 p.m. of that day, her father
Alejandro arrived home already very drunk. At 5:00 p.m., Anas mother, Lolita Bajar, suggested that since
her father was very drunk, she should sleep at the house of her maternal grandfather, the victim Aquilio,
[4]
just one hundred meters away from the house of Lolita. [5]

That night, at around 8:00 p.m., Ana was listening to the radio while lying on the floor of the
bedroom in his grandfathers house. With her were her 1-year-old daughter, Maybe Ann; her 11-year-old
sister, Alma Bajar; and her 2-year-old niece, May Joy Labandia. [6] She was lying on the side of a wall that
separated the bedroom from the sala. This wall was made of bamboo splits with holes or gaps in between
such that she could clearly see her grandfather lying on his bed in the sala. [7] A gas lamp lit up the
bedroom, while another hung on the wall near the foot of the bed of her grandfather.[8]
 The scenario was broken by the voice of Alejandro, who was still obviously very drunk, inquiring
whether his wife was in the house. While speaking his demand, he pushed the main door to gain entry
into the house, but he was not able to enter. Aquilio answered that his wife was in their (Alejandros)
house. Alejandro accused Aquilio of lying and of hiding his daughter. Aquilio told Alejandro to go home.
[9]
Silence thereafter ensued.

Suddenly, Ana heard a sound and saw that Alejandro was able to enter the house through the kitchen
door. He was carrying a bolo and approaching her grandfather. She saw her father hack her grandfather,
who was lying on the bed. She got up, ran towards the sala, and saw her father still hacking his
grandfather. She yelled for her father to stop. While he was being stabbed and attacked, Aquilio stood up
to embrace his son-in-law. Ana shouted for help as she held down the hand which her father used to wield
the bolo.[10] Alma witnessed these two last scenes. She saw her sister Ana trying to stay the hand of their
father which held the bolo, and Aquilio embracing Alejandro while being hacked by the latter.[11]

Lolita, having heard the cries of her daughter, came to her fathers house. There, she saw Aquilio
embracing Alejandro. She then instructed Ana to hold on to Alejandro while she looked for a piece of
wood with which to hit him. With the piece of wood she found, she struck Alejandros head three times.
Alejandro fainted. By this time, Aquilio slowly sank down to the floor [12] and drew his last breath.
[13]
Lolita forthwith went outside to seek the help of neighbors. Anas uncle, Tating Aganap, arrived and
later brought two policemen, who handcuffed Alejandro.[14]

Lolita also testified that she spent P30,000 for her father Aquilios burial expenses. She felt sad about
the demise of her father and described how her sorrow could not be quantified by monetary consideration.
To prove the age of her father,[15] Lolita presented the latters Identification Card from the Veterans
Federation of the Philippines,[16] which indicated that he was born on 12 May 1914.[17] Aquilio was then
85 years old.

The prosecutions last witness was Dr. Angelita Enopia, the Health Officer of Balingasag, Misamis
Oriental. She confirmed the findings she made on the postmortem examination she conducted on the
cadaver of Aquilio[18] and on the death certificate she issued. [19] She claimed that Aquilio suffered three big
wounds: one on the maxilliary area on the right cheek which was slanting towards the mouth, one on the
anterior chest left side downwards to the armpit, and one straight to the scapular area at the back. She
opined that the injuries were probably caused by a sharp object such as a bolo or a knife. [20]

The defense presented Alejandro as its lone witness. Alejandro testified that on the date and time in
question, he left his two daughters, Ana and Alma, and his two grandchildren, Mary Joy and Ann-Ann, at
his house. He proceeded to his father-in-laws house to look for his wife. Upon arrival, he greeted Aquilio
with respect: Pa, good evening. The latter replied that Lolita was not there and invited him (Alejandro) to
go up and see for himself. Alejandro went up, and not finding his wife, said: She is not here Pa. Aquilio
angrily retorted: Everytime you are drunk you come here to ask me. Aquilio then suddenly clubbed
Alejandro on the head with a 2 x 3 coco lumber he saw near the door.[21]

Alejandro then touched his head, and saw blood on his hand. He felt dizzy. Seeing that Aquilio was
about to attack him again, he drew out his hunting knife and defended himself by moving his hand from
the right to left. He felt he hit something before he lost consciousness. He regained consciousness at
the Northern MindanaoMedical Center and discovered that a policeman brought him there for the
treatment of his head wound.[22] He was found to have sustained sutured wound 4 cm. left temporo-
occipital area; lacerated wound 3 cm. left alteral neck area and confluent abrasion 3 pts. 1 x 1 cm. 2 x 1
cm. and 1 x 1 cm., left knee, with seven days healing period. [23]

Alejandro was later brought to the Balingasag Municipal Jail, where he was visited by his two
children and wife. On their respective visits, they informed him that Aquilio was already dead. He cried
when he learned the news, and begged for his wifes forgiveness. [24]

In its decision of 17 July 2000, the trial court found Alejandro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged against him, with treachery as the qualifying circumstance. It concluded that his
uncorroborated and unsubstantiated self-defense theory was self-serving and could not stand over the
positive, categorical, spontaneous, and straightforward declarations of his daughters and wife on how
Aquilio was killed. It was convinced that no wife in her right mind would testify in a heinous crime
against her husband, and no daughter in her right mind would testify in a heinous crime against her father,
unless the crime charged is true. [25] Considering the presence of the generic aggravating circumstances of
dwelling, disregard of the respect due to the victim by reason of his age, relationship, and habitual
intoxication, the trial court sentenced Alejandro to suffer the penalty of death and to pay the heirs of the
victim P30,000 as burial expenses; P50,000 as death indemnity; and P25,000 as exemplary damages.

The case is now before us on automatic review.[26]

In his Brief, Alejandro claims that all the elements of self-defense are present in this case and that he
is, therefore, entitled to an acquittal. There was lack of sufficient provocation on his part, as he
respectfully greeted Aquilio and mildly asked him about the whereabouts of his wife. Hence, he was
surprised when Aquilio very angrily answered him and suddenly clubbed him on the head with a piece of
wood, causing wounds on his head. It was when he saw that Aquilio was about to club him again that he
took out his hunting knife, which was the only weapon available to him to parry the imminent blows by
Aquilio. There was, therefore, reasonable necessity of the means he employed to prevent or repel the
unlawful aggression.

Alejandro assails the appreciation of treachery as a qualifying circumstance in that the alleged
eyewitness Ana could not have seen how the attack commenced. Ana admitted that she was not with
Aquilio or beside him when he (Alejandro) allegedly entered the house through the kitchen door and
stabbed the unsuspecting Aquilio. In fact, she claimed that she was lying on the bedroom floor, with her
feet toward the door, about a meter from the wall which divided her room from the sala where her
grandfather lay. Even if the wall had gaps, she was still four to five meters from her grandfathers bed.
[27]
Further, her testimony on cross-examination was unclear about whether she witnessed the approach of
Alejandro, or whether she only saw how Alejandro, later on, thrust his hunting knife to parry Aquilios
attack. Treachery was, therefore, not proved because there was no direct evidence that the commencement
of the alleged attack on Aquilio was sudden and unexpected. In addition, even if treachery was present, it
was not specifically alleged in the information as qualifying the killing of the victim into the crime of
murder. Hence, it could only be appreciated as a generic aggravating circumstance.

Alejandro also maintains that, other than the fact that Aquilio was then 85 years old, no specific fact
or circumstance was proved showing disregard of age. In the same vein, there was no clear proof that his
alleged intoxication was habitual or intentional.
 The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters with these propositions: (1) the uncorroborated
plea of self-defense was inconsistent with the established evidence on record; and (2) the qualifying
circumstance of treachery and the aggravating circumstances of intoxication, dwelling, disrespect of the
victim on account of his age, and relationship were properly appreciated. The OSG argues that treachery
was properly, validly, and sufficiently alleged in the information. Citing People v. Aquino,[28] it claims that
the words aggravating/qualifying, qualifying, qualified by, aggravating or aggravated by need not be
expressly stated as long as the particular attendant circumstances are specified in the
information. Besides, Alejandro failed to raise during the trial this alleged defect in the information. Such
was a clear indication that the information properly forewarned him that treachery attended Aquilios
killing. The OSG then prays for the affirmance in toto of the questioned decision of the trial court.

We affirm Alejandros conviction.

Settled is the rule that when the credibility of witnesses is in issue, appellate courts generally defer to
the findings of the trial court, considering that the latter is in a better position to decide the question after
having heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial. There
are some exceptions to this rule, such as when the evaluation was reached arbitrarily or when the trial
court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance
which, if considered, would affect the result of the case. Not one of these exceptions is present in this
case.[29]

We affirm, therefore, the trial courts imprimatur of credence to the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses Lolita, Ana and Alma (all surnamed Bajar), who corroborated each others testimonies on
material points. Ana clearly saw through the gaps in the bamboo walls and by going to the sala how her
father stealthily entered her grandfathers house, surreptitiously approached his sleeping grandfather, and
surprised the latter to wakefulness by his bolo hackings. Lolita heard and then responded to Anas shouts
for help. Seeing how Ana was trying to prevent her father from further attacking her grandfather, Lolita
helped her by clubbing her husbands head with a piece of coconut lumber. Ana and Alma corroborated
their mothers account on this matter.

Thus, we agree with the trial courts observation that Alejandros uncorroborated self-defense theory
could not stand against the positive, categorical, spontaneous, and straightforward declarations of his
daughters and wife. A plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated, especially when
uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself. [30]

By invoking self-defense, Alejandro had the burden of proving the existence of the following
essential requisites: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the accused. This he miserably failed to do. In fact, the records clearly establish that he was the
aggressor. Without unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, there can be no viable self-defense. [31]

Besides, Alejandros version of their family tragedy invites only misgiving. His allegation that
Aquilio suddenly clubbed him with a piece of coco lumber he saw on the side of the door is not only
doubtful. It was also refuted as fictitious by the prosecution witnesses testimony that it was Lolita who
looked for a piece of wood to thwart him from what seemed a continuous attack on Aquilio. His alleged
use of the hunting knife was likewise disproved by the prosecution witnesses who testified to having seen
him use a bob to attack the defenseless Aquilio.
 Since an unsubstantiated self-defense is similar in many respects to a bare denial, we can say that as
between categorical testimonies that ring of truth on one hand, and an unsubstantiated self-defense on the
other, the former is generally held to prevail.[32] The veracity of this legal principle is enhanced in this case
by the fact that the wife and children of Alejandro were the ones who testified against him.

We shall now discuss the trial courts appreciation of the different aggravating circumstances.

For treachery to be appreciated, the offender must have employed means, methods, or forms in the
execution of any of the crimes against persons that tend directly and especially to ensure its execution
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make. [33] Two elements
must concur: (1) the means of execution employed gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend
himself or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted. [34]

Treachery was proved by Anas testimony. She narrated that there was an ensuing silence after
Aquilio told Alejandro to go home. It was apparent that Aquilio resumed his interrupted sleep. Even Ana
was undisturbed by the exchange of words, for she remained in the bedroom lying down and ready to
sleep. Aquilio and his grandchildren had no inkling that Alejandro would trespass his dwelling by
entering through the kitchen door. Aquilio was completely unaware of the impending attack and,
ultimately, his doom. And suddenly, Alejandro hacked him on the face as he was lying down resting on
his bed. The means, method, and form of the attack in this case were, therefore, consciously adopted and
effectively forestalled Aquilio from employing a defense against his attacker.

Contrary to appellants contention, treachery as a qualifying circumstance was sufficiently alleged in

the information. The information against Alejandro states in part that he, then armed with a sharp bolo,
with intent to kill, and with evident premeditation, and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously stab one 85-year-old Aquilio Tiwanak, accuseds father-in-law, hitting him on the different
parts of his body, which caused his instantaneous death. The information sufficiently warned him of the
circumstance of treachery which, once proved, qualifies the crime of murder. The first paragraph of its
accusatory portion, quoted above, satisfies the requirement of the Rules that qualifying circumstances be
specifically alleged in the information in order to comply with the constitutional right of the accused to be
properly informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. [35] The purpose is to allow the
accused to prepare fully for his defense to prevent surprises during trial. What properly informs the
accused of the nature of the crime charged is the specific allegation of the circumstances mentioned in the
law that raise the crime to a higher category.

In People v. Aquino,[36] the Court clarified and resolved, for the guidance of the bench and the bar, the
issue of how to allege or specify qualifying or aggravating circumstances in the information. We
explained therein that it is the specific allegation of the attendant circumstance, and not the use of the
words aggravating or qualifying circumstances, that raises a crime to higher category. Thus, the
words qualifying, qualified by, aggravating, or aggravated by need not be expressly stated as long as the
particular attendant circumstances are specified in the information. We reiterate our pronouncements in
said case that Sections 8 and 9[37] of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure merely require
that the information allege, specify, or enumerate the attendant circumstances mentioned in the law that
qualify or aggravate the offense.

Aside from treachery, the prosecution was able to prove three aggravating circumstances, to wit,
dwelling, relationship, and disregard of the respect due the offended party on account of age.
 Dwelling aggravates a felony where the crime was committed in the dwelling of the offended party,
who has not given any provocation. It is considered aggravating primarily because of the sanctity of
privacy the law accords to human abode. He who goes to anothers house to hurt him or do him wrong is
more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere. [38] Aquilio did not provoke Alejandro; it was Alejandro
who rudely and drunkenly interrupted the quiet and restful evening Aquilio was enjoying. He even
attempted to enter the house without being invited and without the door being opened for him. Clearly,
because of his drunken condition, he was not welcome. After Aquilio told him to go home, a certain
quietude descended into the night, a lull which Alejandro used as a cover to pursue his plan to kill
Aquilio. He doubly violated the sanctity of Aquilios abode when he trespassed it by entering through the
kitchen door and then killing Aquilio.

Anent the generic aggravating circumstance of disregard of the respect due the offended party on
account of age, it is considered present when the offended person, by reason of his age, could be the
father of the offender.[39] This is obvious in this case. Not only was Aquilio, by reason of his age,
considered old enough to be the father of Alejandro (who incidentally declared in open court that he was
58 years old),[40] he was also the latters father-in-law. The presence of this aggravating circumstance by
reason of their age difference is, therefore, reinforced by their actual relationship by affinity. Further, it is
ingrained in Philippine culture that those advanced in age are respected especially in the provinces.

Suffice it is to say that the alternative circumstance of relationship was correctly appreciated, the
victim being the father-in-law of the appellant.

With regard to the alternative circumstance of intoxication, which the trial court treated as
aggravating, we find that it has not been shown to be habitual or intentional as required by Article 15 of
the Revised Penal Code. Lolita testified that her husband would drink liquor once a week but was not a
frequent drinker. She also admitted that on that fateful day, there was a fiesta celebration at Barangay
Mambayaan.[41] As Alejandro insists, it was but natural for him to drink liquor during fiesta celebrations.
In the absence of clear and positive proof that Alejandros intoxication was habitual or subsequent to the
plan to commit the crime, it is improper to consider the same as an aggravating circumstance. Neither can
intoxication be considered mitigating in the instant case, there being no proof that the appellant was so
drunk that his will-power was impaired or that he could not comprehend the wrongfulness of his acts. [42]

Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death.
With the attendance of the generic aggravating circumstances of dwelling, disregard of the respect due to
the offended party by reason of age, and relationship without any mitigating circumstance to offset them,
the imposition of the death penalty is justified pursuant to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code [43]

On the matter of damages, we agree with Alejandros contention that the trial court erred in awarding
P30,000 as burial expenses for lack of receipts to prove the same. It is necessary for a party seeking the
award of actual damages to produce competent proof or the best evidence obtainable to justify such
award. Only substantiated and proven expenses, or those that appear to have been genuinely incurred in
connection with the death, wake, or burial of the victim will be recognized in court. Nonetheless, in line
with new jurisprudence,[44] we shall award temperate damages in the amount of P25,000 to the victims
heirs, since they clearly incurred funeral expenses.

We observe that no moral damages was decreed by the trial court. Lolita testified that no monetary
consideration could equal a daughters loss of her father. In recent jurisprudence, [45] we held that the award
of moral damages is mandatory in cases of murder and homicide, without need of allegation and proof
other than the death of the victim. We therefore award moral damages in favor of Aquilios heirs in the
amount of P50,000. We reiterate what we said in People v. Panado:

Unlike in the crime of rape, we grant moral damages in murder or homicide only when the heirs of the
victim have alleged and proved mental suffering. However, as borne out by human nature and experience,
a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the
victims family. It is inherently human to suffer sorrow, torment, pain and anger when a loved one
becomes the victim of a violent or brutal killing. Such violent death or brutal killing not only steals from
the family of the deceased his precious life, deprives them forever of his love, affection and support, but
often leaves them with the gnawing feeling that an injustice has been done to them. For this reason, moral
damages must be awarded even in the absence of any allegation and proof of the heirs emotional
suffering. Verily Hilda and her son Louie Gee would forever carry the emotional wounds of the vicious
killing of a husband and a father. With or without proof, this fact can never be denied; since it is
undisputed, it must be considered proved.[46]

We affirm the award of P50,000 as death indemnity, and the award of P25,000 as exemplary
damages by virtue of the attendance of three aggravating circumstances, pursuant to Article 2230 of the
Civil Code.

WHEREFORE, the 17 July 2000 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental, Branch
18, in Criminal Case No. 99-942 is hereby AFFIRMED with modifications. Appellant ALEJANDRO
BAJAR is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder and sentenced to suffer the
penalty of death. The awards of P50,000 as civil indemnity and P25,000 as exemplary damages in favor
of the heirs of the victim AQUILIO TIWANAK are affirmed. The award for burial expenses is deleted;
however, in lieu thereof, an award of P25,000 as temperate damages is hereby adjudged, payable to the
heirs of the victim. The appellant is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of the victim moral damages in the
amount of P50,000.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 109146 August 17, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ARIEL GOMEZ, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Accused Ariel Gomez was originally charged with the crime of homicide in an information filed on 7
April 1987 by Provincial Fiscal Augusto Zabala with Branch 39 of the Regional Trial Court of Camarines
Norte. 1 However, on 6 April 1990, State Prosecutor Santiago Turingan filed an Amended
Information 2 charging Ariel Gomez with the crime of murder, committed as follows:

That on or about 2:15 o'clock in the morning of February 11, 1987, at Barangay Sta.
Cruz, municipality of Jose Panganiban, province of Camarines Norte, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means of
treachery and with intent to kill, unlawfully, feloniously and criminally, did then and
there, assault, attack and stab one Rodil 3 Rieza with an icepick, thereby inflicting upon
the vital parts of the body of the latter mortal stab wounds which directly caused his
death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Rodil [Rodel] Rieza.

The accused pleaded not guilty to the charge when arraigned on 26 April 1990. 4 A pre-trial conference
was held on 19 June 1990.

After trial on the merits, the trial court promulgated on 22 December 1992 its decision 5 finding the
accused guilty as charged and specifically disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Murder and is hereby sentenced to serve the single penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The accused is furthermore, ordered to pay P12,600.00 for burial and funeral
expenses spent by the relative Rubio Rieza and the amount of P150,000.00 moral
damages to the latter; and finally to indemnify the victim's heirs the amount of
P50,000.00 for his death. 6

The accused filed a notice of appeal 7 a day after the promulgation of sentence.

The appeal is predicated on the following errors allegedly committed by the trial court:

I. The Court a quo erred in disregarding the plea of self-defense interposed by the
accused-appellant.
 II. The Court a quo erred in disregarding the facts and/or evidence pointing to the
innocence of accused-appellant herein. 8

The prosecution's evidence showed that on the night of 10 February 1987, Rodolfo Labella (a barangay
tanod of barangay Sta. Cruz, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte), Rodel Rieza, and Larry Natino were at
a dance party sponsored by a beauty queen. The party was held near the elementary school of barangay
Sta. Cruz. At around 11:00 p.m., Rodolfo admonished the accused from imbibing more liquor as he was
already drunk. 9

Some ten minutes later, the accused left the party. While the dance was going on at around 2:00 a.m. of 11
February 1987, a woman screamed that one Rosa Espaol had been stabbed. Rodolfo Labella asked Rodel
Rieza and Larry Natino to accompany him to check the outcry. Rodel and Larry agreed. After procuring a
torch, the three walked toward the direction of the scream. Rodel walked ahead holding the torch
borrowed from the store of Alberto Maderal while Rodolfo and Larry followed. They walked two meters
behind Rodel. When they were about twenty-five meters from the dancing hall, the accused came out
from nowhere and without any warning stabbed Rodel twice. As the latter fell slowly to the ground, the
accused ran away. 10

Rodolfo and Larry assisted Rodel and brought him to the Health Center where he was treated by a
midwife. Believing that Rodel's injury was serious, Rodolfo procured a banca to bring Rodel to the
poblacion of Jose Panganiban for further treatment. Seven other persons accompanied Rodel in the banca.
On board the banca, Rodel told Rodolfo that it was the accused who had stabbed him. Rodel, however,
died after they had sailed for about twenty minutes and before they could reach the poblacion of Jose
Panganiban. Thus, instead of proceeding to a doctor, they brought Rodel's body to the barangay captain of
barangay San Jose, Jose Panganiban, as Rodel is from San Jose. At around 8:00 a.m., Rodolfo reported
the incident to the Station Commander of Jose Panganiban. He told the latter that it was the accused who
had stabbed Rodel. 11

At 7:00 p.m. on 11 February 1987, Dr. Marcelino Abas, Rural Health Physician of Lobo, Camarines
Norte, conducted a post-mortem examination of the body of Rodel Rieza. He found stab wounds at the
5th intercostal space of the midclavicular line which pierced the heart, and at the left hypocardiac region
which pierced the abdomen. The first injury is 11 cm. in depth, 1 cm. in length and 0.5 cm. in width,
while the second is 10 cm. in depth, 1.5 cm. in length and 0.7 cm. in width. He opined that the first injury
at the left chest was more serious than the other and could cause instant death and that the wounds could
have been caused by a bladed instrument, such as balisong, dagger, small bolo, or any sharp-pointed
instrument with a length of about 8 to 10 centimeters. He prepared a sketch showing the injuries sustained
by Rodel (Exhibit "B") and also signed a death certificate indicating that Rodel died of cardio-respiratory
arrest secondary to shock and severe internal hemorrhage due to stab wounds (Exhibit "A"). 12

Rodel Rieza was an orphan and during his lifetime lived with his uncle, Rubio Rieza. The latter spent
P600.00 for the rental of the banca, P12,000.00 for funeral services, and P2,000.00 for food and drinks
during the wake. He also quantified his personal sufferings caused by the death of Rodel at
P150,000.00. 13

The defense presented a different version of the incident. In his testimony, accused Ariel Gomez declared
that on 11 February 1987 at about 2:00 a.m., while on his way home to barangay Sta. Cruz, he was
waylaid and ganged upon by more or less seven persons, four of whom he recognized to be Carlito
Tarosa, Edgardo Caldit, Larry Natino, and Rodel Rieza. At that time, only the stars illuminated the place
as there were no street lamps. Carlito hacked him on his back with the bolo, another struck him from
behind, Larry hit him with the stick, and Rodel hit him with a piece of wood. When somebody shouted
"kill," Rodel threw away the piece of wood he was carrying and drew a sharp object from his waist. So he
grabbed Rodel's arm and grappled for the possession of the sharp object until he was able to wrest it away
and thrust it on Rodel. 14 While grappling, he sustained wounds on his lower palm and lower arm. He had
no idea, however, what weapon he was able to grab from Rodel. 15 Thereafter, he ran away from the scene
and, instead of going home, went to the house of Rosita Alposeba, his aunt. 16 Upon arrival at Rosita's
house at 4:30 a.m., he told her, "nadisgrasya ako." Rosita dressed with a piece of cloth the wound on his
right arm. 17 He lay down and slept. When he woke up, he felt his whole body aching. His aunt advised
him to go to the hospital, but he failed to go because he lost consciousness. After he regained
consciousness in the afternoon, he decided not to go to the hospital anymore and instead requested his
aunt to go to the barangay captain to facilitate his voluntary surrender. The barangay captain, one Nena
Jurilla, acceded to his aunt's request, picked him up, and brought him to the police headquarters of Jose
Panganiban where he was detained. 18

At 2:45 p.m. on 12 February 1987, the accused was examined at the Labo District Hospital at Labo,
Camarines Norte, by Dr. Agnes Sinaon, a resident physician, who found some injuries in the accused's
body and who thereafter issued a medical certificate 19 (Exhibit "1") attesting to her findings of old incised
and superficial lacerated wounds, old hematoma and abrasions. On the line "DATE OF
INJURY/ILLNESS" in the said medical certificate, Dr. Sinaon made the following entry: "2/10/87." She
also declared that the wounds were two or three days old at the time of her examination, i.e., were
sustained two or three days earlier, and when she asked the accused how he sustained them, the accused
answered that he had a quarrel with someone. 20 On cross-examination, Dr. Sinaon stated that the injuries
were inflicted on 10 February 1987, because the accused told him so. 21

The lower court did not believe the version of the accused. It gave full faith and credit to the testimonies
of Rodolfo Labella and Larry Natino that the accused suddenly stabbed the victim while the three of them
were on their way to investigate an outcry of a woman. The lower court took into consideration the fact
that Rodolfo Labella was a barangay tanod who was well known to the accused and expressed the view
that the former "will not be motivated to lie" against the accused. 22

As to the qualifying circumstance of treachery, it considered the two sudden and successive stabbings of
the victim as a "treacherous assault upon the deceased who did not have a bit [of a] chance to repel the
aggression or defend himself." 23

The resolution of this appeal principally hinges on the merit of the accused's plea of self-defense.

It is hornbook doctrine that when self-defense is invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to the appellant to
show that the killing was justified and that he incurred no criminal liability therefor. He must rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution's evidence, for, even if the latter
were weak, it could not be disbelieved after his open admission of responsibility for the killing. 24 He
must prove the essential requisites of self-defense, to wit: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim, (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the aggression, and (c) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the accused. 25
The prosecution established that a few minutes before the victim was stabbed, the accused was
admonished by barangay tanod Rodolfo Labella to stop drinking as he was already drunk; the latter then
left and did not come back. Then, as Rodolfo Labella, Larry Natino, and the deceased were on their way
to investigate the cry of a woman that one Rosa Espaol was stabbed, the accused suddenly appeared
from the dark and attacked the deceased who was then carrying a torch. The unlawful aggression thus
came from the accused and the proximate cause therefor could be nothing less than the earlier admonition
of Rodolfo Labella which the accused must have resented, for which reason he left.

The accused's insistence that he was waylaid and mauled by seven persons, as evidenced by the injuries
he sustained, does not convince us. His own witness, Dr. Agnes Sinaon, testified that the injuries she
found on the accused when she attended to him on 12 February 1987 were already two or three days old
and, therefore, could not have been inflicted on 11 February 1987. As a matter of fact, she indicated in her
medical certificate that, per information from the accused, the injuries were inflicted on "2/10/87," or 10
February 1987. Dr. Sinaon further declared that when she asked the accused how he sustained his injuries,
he answered that he had a quarrel with someone therefore only one, not more.

If he were indeed ganged upon and mauled by seven, one of whom, Carlito Tarosa, hacked his back with
a bolo, another struck him from behind and Larry Natino and the deceased hit him with a stick and a piece
of wood, respectively, 26 then the accused should have been badly injured. Yet, his medical certificate
belies his claim.

Moreover, if it were true that the weapon he used to stab the deceased belonged to the latter which he
wrested from the deceased during the scuffle, the accused should have presented it to the police and if he
threw it away somewhere, pointed that out to the police. He did not.

Even if we accept his version on the issue of unlawful aggression, the accused failed, nevertheless, to
prove the second requisite of self-defense. If indeed he was able to obtain possession of the weapon from
the deceased, there is no further evidence that the latter or his companions persisted in their aggression.
Hence, there was no necessity to stab the deceased for aggression had already ceased. There was no more
aggression to repel.

In support of his second assignment of error, the accused attempts to engender doubt on his culpability by
pointing out the inconsistency between the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution and the Medico-
Legal Officer regarding the description of the weapon used to stab the victim. According to him, the
former declared that it was an icepick while the latter stated that it was a sharp-bladed instrument. This
contention is unmeritorious. Since he admitted having killed the victim in self-defense, the kind of
weapon used has become immaterial.

The accused likewise suggests that the prosecution is guilty of suppression of evidence because it did not
present Rosa Espaol as a witness in this case. He believes that she is the only one who could shed light
on the incident. The disputable presumption laid down in Section 3(e), Rule 131 of the Rules of
Court, 27 however, does not apply when the testimony of the witness is merely corroborative or where the
witness is available to the accused. 28 In this case, Rosa's testimony could not even qualify as
corroborative evidence because there was no showing that she was an eyewitness to the stabbing of the
victim. Even if she were, her testimony could be dispensed with. Moreover, in People vs.
Fernandez 29 and People vs. Pablo 30 this Court held that if an accused honestly believed that the
testimony of a witness would be adverse to the prosecution, he should have availed of the compulsory
process to have such witness produced as his witness, or even as a hostile witness.

Finally, the accused puts special significance on his voluntary surrender. According to him, such act
militates against the workings of a guilty mind and cannot be the natural reaction of a man who had cold-
bloodedly killed a person. While this Court agrees that he voluntarily surrendered to the authorities,
which would therefore mitigate his criminal liability, it cannot accept the proposition that such act is
indicative of his innocence. True, persons who kill another in legitimate self-defense almost often
surrender themselves to the authorities. But voluntary surrender may also be the spontaneous act of one
who acknowledges his guilt. Precisely, voluntary surrender is recognized by the Revised Penal Code as
one of the circumstances which mitigate criminal liability. 31

We agree with the trial court that the killing of the deceased is murder because of the qualifying
circumstance of treachery which is duly alleged in the amended information and proved beyond
reasonable doubt by the evidence of the prosecution. There was treachery in the sudden attack which the
accused consciously and deliberately adopted to ensure the accomplishment of his criminal objective
without risk to himself arising from the defense which the victim might make. 32

The penalty for murder at the time it was committed by the accused was reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death. 33 Since the ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender is present
and is not offset by any generic aggravating circumstance, the penalty to be imposed upon the accused
should be the minimum period of the prescribed penalty, which is reclusion temporal in its maximum
period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the accused may be sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty the minimum of which should be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree and the
maximum of which should be within the range of reclusion temporal maximum. The accused may thus be
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor maximum as minimum to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal maximum as maximum.

In respect of the civil liability imposed by the trial court, some modifications are in order. The award for
actual damages in the amount of P12,600.00 representing funeral and burial expenses is increased to
P14,600.00 as the prosecution had duly proved that P600.00 was spent for the rental of the banca,
P12,000.00 for funeral services, and P2,000.00 for food and drinks during the wake. The award of
P150,000.00 for moral damages is without basis as the deceased was single, an orphan, and survived only
by an uncle. The civil indemnity for death in the amount of P50,000.00 is affirmed.

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision in Criminal Case No. 4660 of Branch 39 of the Regional Trial
Court of Daet, Camarines Norte, is hereby AFFIRMED with the following modifications:

(1) the penalty imposed is hereby reduced from reclusion perpetua to an indeterminate
penalty ranging from Ten (10) years and One (1) day of prision mayor maximum
as minimum, to Seventeen (17) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of reclusion
temporal maximum as maximum.

(2) the civil liability of the accused is hereby fixed at P14,600.00 as actual damages and
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of the victim.
Costs against the appellant.

SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARCELO ALETA

G.R. No. 179708, April 16, 2009

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

On appeal is the July 9, 2007 Court of Appeals Decision [3] affirming with modification the
October 25, 2001 Decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ilocos Norte, Branch 19, with station at
Bangui, convicting accused-appellant Marcelo and his sons-co-appellants Ferdinand, Rogelio, Marlo and
Jovito, all surnamed Aleta, of Murder in two cases.

Two Informations dated June 21, 1994 for the death of Celestino Duldulao (Duldulao) and
Fernando Acob (Acob) were filed against accused-appellants:

The accusatory portion of Criminal Case No. 1102-19 reads:

That on about May 22, 1994, at about 3:00 oclock in the afternoon, all
the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, with intent to kill and with abuse of superior
strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously strike
and club with the use of hard objects one Celestino Duldulao y
Yadao inflicting upon the latter bodily injuries which caused his death as
a consequence thereof.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5] (Underscoring supplied)

The accusatory portion of Criminal case No. 1103-19 reads:

That on about May 22, 1994, at about 3:00 oclock in the

afternoon, all the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, with intent to kill and with abuse of
superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
strike and club with the use of hard objects one FERNANDO
ACOB inflicting upon the latter bodily injuries which caused his death as
a consequence thereof. (Underscoring supplied)

CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]

The victim Acob was the son of appellant Marcelos sister Marina Acob (Marina), while the other victim
Duldulao was the victim Acobs father-in-law.

Culled from the evidence for the prosecution is its following version:
 While the deceased Acobs mother Marina was at the community center of Barangay
Nagsurot, Burgos, Ilocos Norte on May 22, 1994, she heard a commotion at the yard of appellants. Soon
after returning home, she told Acob that there was a quarrel at appellants compound.

Against his mothers pleas, Acob repaired to appellants compound. Marina followed and upon
reaching appellants compound, she saw her nephew appellant Rogelio striking her son Acob twice at the
left cheek and at the back of his head with a piece of wood, causing Acob to fall on the ground. She
thereafter saw Rogelio striking Acobs father-in-law Duldulao twice on the face drawing his eyes to pop
up, and again on the head causing him to fall on the ground.

Rogelio then ran towards the family house whereupon Marina heard gunshots. Rogelios brothers-
co-appellants Jovito, Marlo and Ferdinand and their father Marcelo at once began clubbing Acob and
Duldulao with pieces of wood, mainly on the face and head, as well as on different parts of their bodies.

Even while the victims were already lying prostrate on the ground, Marcelo, Jovito, Marlo, and
Ferdinand continued to hit them. And when Rogelio emerged from the house, he got another piece of
wood and again clubbed the victims.

As found by Dr. Arturo G. Llabore, a medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation-
Regional Office, San Fernando, La Union who supervised the exhumation and autopsy of the bodies of
Acob and Duldulao on June 3, 1994, the two victims suffered multiple abrasions, lacerations, open
wounds, contusions and fractures on their face, head, scalp, arms, legs and thighs; that Acobs death was
due to hemorrhage, intercranial, severe, secondary to traumatic injuries, head while Duldulaos was due to
hemorrhage, intercranial, severe, secondary to traumatic injuries, head, multiple; that both victims could
have died within one (1) hour after the infliction of the injuries; and that because of the severity and
multiplicity of the injuries sustained, the same could not have been inflicted by only one person.
Upon the other hand, appellants Ferdinand and Marlo interposed self-defense and defense of
relative, respectively. Additionally, Marlo invoked voluntary surrender as a mitigating
circumstance. Marcelo, Rogelio and Jovito invoked alibi. Their version of the incidents follows:

At around 3:00 in the afternoon, while Ferdinand and Marlo were resting at their compound,
Acob arrived, uttering Oki ni inayo (Vulva of your mother) and drew out a knife about six inches long. As
Acob repeatedly uttered Vulva of your mother, I will kill all of you!, he thrust the knife at Ferdinand was
able to evade it. Acob and Ferdinand slipped and fell on the ground, After some struggle, Acob succeeded
in stabbing Ferdinand on the thigh. As Acob was about to stab Ferdinand again, Marlo took a piece of
wood and struck him three times on the face. Ferdinand thereafter fell on the ground at which instant
Marlo dropped the wood.

Duldulao soon emerged and at about 10 meters away from Marlo, he uttered Vulva of your
mother. As Duldulao looked as though he was going to strike Marlo with a piece of wood, Marlo took a
piece of wood and hit Duldulao twice on the left cheekbone, causing him to fall on the ground. He went
on to club Duldulao, as well as Acob, to make sure that they will no longer live. Marlo thereafter
pocketed the knife used by Acob in stabbing Ferdinand.

Marlo never noticed where prosecution witnesses including Marina were during the
incidents. Nor did he notice where his father Marcelo and his brothers Rogelio and Jovito were.

Ferdinand later went to the Batac General Hospital where Dr. Edgar Cabading treated his stab wound, to 1
centimeter deep, at his inner thigh.

The following morning, Marlo surrendered to the police. Marcelo and the other appellants also
surrendered days later.
Crediting the prosecution version, the trial court found appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of Murder in both cases and sentenced each of them to suffer the death penalty and to pay, jointly and
severally, P250,000 to the heirs of Duldulao, and another P250,000.00 to the heirs of Acob by way of civil
damages.

In arriving at its Decision, the trial court held that although what triggered the incidents was never
explained, Acob and Duldulao died as a result of the attacks on them, qualified by abuse of superior
strength and cruelty.

In brushing aside Marlos claim of self-defense and Ferdinands defense of relative, the trial court held that,
assuming arguendo that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victims, the same ceased when
the victims were already on the ground after Marlo hit them; and that force beyond what was necessary to
repel the aggression was employed when the victims were repeatedly clubbed.
The trial court also brushed aside Marcelo, Jovito and Rogelios alibi that they were inside their
house attending to a sick relative during the incidents, given their silence and failure to deny the
imputations against them, their alibi having been invoked not by them but by Ferdinand and Marlo on
their behalf.
 Also brushing aside Marlos claim of voluntary surrender, the trial court noted that there was no
conscious effort on his part to surrender or acknowledge his guilt; and that that he did not resist but went
peacefully with the police did not amount to voluntary surrender.

Appellants moved for a reconsideration of the trial courts decision, contending that there was no abuse of
superior strength as the same was not consciously adopted; and that the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, particularly Marinas, are incredible or inconsistent. The motion for reconsideration having
been denied by Order[7] dated January 29, 2003, appellants appealed to the Court of Appeals, before which
it raised the same issues as those in their motion for reconsideration before the trial court. Additionally,
they questioned the penalty imposed upon them.

By the challenged Decision dated July 9, 2007, the appellate court affirmed appellants conviction of
murder but lowered the penalty imposed from death to reclusion perpetua. And it modified the damages
awarded from P250,000.00 to the heirs of each victim to the following amounts: P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

In modifying the penalty from death to reclusion perpetua, the appellate court noted that in the absence of
any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the lesser of the two indivisible penalties should be imposed.

Hence, the present appeal, appellants maintaining that both the trial and the appellate courts erred in
giving full weight and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
As in most criminal cases, the present appeal hinges primarily on the issue of credibility of
witness and of testimony. As held in a number of cases, the trial court is best equipped to make the
assessment on said issue and, therefore, its factual findings are generally not disturbed on appeal,
unless: (1) the testimony is found to be clearly arbitrary or unfounded; (2) some substantial fact or
circumstance that could materially affect the disposition of the case was overlooked, misunderstood, or
misinterpreted; or (3) the trial judge gravely abused his or her discretion. [8]

From a considered review of the records of the cases, the Court finds that none of the above-
stated exceptions is present to warrant a reversal of the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts.

As held in a catena of cases and correctly applied by both lower courts, Marinas positive
identification of all appellants as the assailants and her accounts of what transpired during the incidents,
which were corroborated on all material points by prosecution witnesses Loreta Duldulao (Loreta) and
Willie Duldulao (Willie), as well as the findings of the medico-legal officer, carry greater weight than
appellants claims of self-defense, defense of relative and alibi. More particularly, that Marinas narration
was so detailed all the more acquires greater weight and credibility against all defenses, especially
because it jibed with the autopsy findings.[9]

Respecting the defenses questioning of Loretas testimony that Willie had told her that Duldulao
was already dead, but was later to claim that on reaching the scene of the crime, Duldulao was still alive,
lying on the ground and being clubbed by appellants, the same deserves scant consideration. Far from
being inconsistent, the same is in sync with the other witnesses claim and Marlos own admission that
appellants continued to club the two victims even as they lay motionless and helpless on the ground.

At any rate, inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses which refer to minor and insignificant
details, such as whether Duldulao was still alive or not, cannot destroy Loretas testimony. Minor
inconsistencies in fact even guarantee truthfulness and candor.[10]

A witness testimony deserves full faith and credit where there exists no evidence to show any
dubious reason or improper motive why he should testify falsely against the accused, or why he should
implicate the accused in a serious offense. [11] That the prosecution witnesses are all related by blood to
appellants should a fortiori be credited, absent a showing that they had motive to falsely accuse
appellants.

As to the claims of self-defense, defense of relative, and alibi relied upon by appellants, the lower
courts finding the same unsubstantiated is well taken.People v. Caabay[12] instructs:

Case law has it that like alibi, self-defense or defense of relatives are
inherently weak defenses which, as experience has shown, can easily be fabricated. If
the accused admits the killing, the burden of evidence, as distinguished from burden
of proof, is shifted on him to prove with clear and convincing evidence the essential
elements of the justifying circumstance of self-defense, namely: (a) unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed
by the accused to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the accused defending himself. Defense of a relative
requires the following essential elements: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed by the accused to prevent or
repel the unlawful aggression of the victim; and (c) in case of provocation given by
the person being attacked, the one evading the attack, defense had no part
therein. For the accused to be entitled to exoneration based on self-defense or defense of
relatives, complete or incomplete, it is essential that there be unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim, for if there is no unlawful aggression, there would be nothing to
prevent or repel. For unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there must be an actual,
sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof, not merely a threatening
or intimidating attitude. (Emphasis supplied)
 Assuming arguendo that Acob was indeed the aggressor, the aggression ceased the moment he
was disarmed and already lying on the ground after being struck by Marlo. Even if Marlos account that
Duldulao approached with a piece of wood above his head, the same, albeit intimidating, cannot be said
to reek of imminent and actual danger. When Marlo then continued to club Acob while in a prone
position, and struck Duldulao after he had fallen, self-defense and defense of relative no longer avail. [13]

It is settled that the moment the first aggressor runs away, unlawful
aggression on the part of the first aggressor ceases to exist; and when unlawful
aggression ceases, the defender no longer has any right to kill or wound the former
aggressor; otherwise, retaliation and not self-defense is committed. Retaliation is not
the same as self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression that was begun by the injured
party already ceased when the accused attacked him, while in self-defense the
aggression was still existing when the aggressor was injured by the accused.
(Emphasis supplied)

Besides, the self-defense claimed to have been employed by Marlo cannot be said to be
reasonable.

The means employed by a person claiming self-defense must be commensurate

to the nature and the extent of the attack sought to be averted, and must be rationally
necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression. The nature or quality of the
weapon; the physical condition, the character, the size and other circumstances of
the aggressor as well as those of the person who invokes self-defense; and the place
and the occasion of the assault also define the reasonableness of the means used
in self-defense.[14] (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, even if Ferdinands and Marlos accounts of what transpired were true, Marlos repeated clubbing of
the already unarmed and helpless victims inside their own compound is clearly unreasonable. Consider
the following admission of Marlo during his direct examination:

Q.: And what happened to him when you were able to strike him?
A: He fell down, sir.
Q.: And when he fell down, what did you do next?
A: I again clubbed him, sir.
Q.: And after clubbing him for the second time, what did you do next?
A: I clubbed them alternately, sir.
Q.: Why did you club them alternately?
A.: Because they might still live and will again attacked (sic) us, sir.
 Q.: Whom did you club alternately?
A.: Fernando Acob and Celestino Duldulao, your honor. (Emphasis supplied)

Marlo did not thus intend to merely repel the alleged attack. He wanted to be sure that the two victims
would not survive.

That Ferdinand sustained a to 1 centimeter deep stab wound in the thigh does not necessarily prove
that he acted in self-defense or that Marlo acted in defense of a relative.[15] Parenthetically, the knife,
allegedly used by Acob which Marlo claims to have taken, was not even presented in evidence.

As for the alibi of Marcelo, Rogelio and Jovito, for it to prosper, it must be shown that it was
physically impossible for them to have been at the scene of the crime at the approximate time of its
commission.[16] That they were in Marcelos house attending to a relative who was allegedly having
difficulty breathing, did not render it impossible for them to have been at the scene of the crimes, the
house being a mere 13.5 meters away,[17] more or less. Besides, it is impossible that they could not have
noticed the commotion that preceded and attended the incidents.
It bears noting that appellants enjoyed superiority in number (five) over the two victims, clearly
showing abuse of superior strength and that the force used by them was out of proportion to the means of
defense available to the victims.[18]

More. Contrary to the contention of appellants, conspiracy was present during the attack. When
two or more persons aim their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a
part so that their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative indicating
closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, conspiracy may be inferred. And where
there is conspiracy, the act of one is deemed the act of all. [19]

The appellate courts reduction of the penalty of death to reclusion perpetua in its July 9,
2007 decision is in order, there being no mitigating nor aggravating circumstance in the present cases. In
any event, in view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 or An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of
Death Penalty in the Philippines on June 24, 2006, the imposition of the death penalty could not have
been maintained. So too is the lowering of the civil indemnity for the heirs of Fernando and Duldulao.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 9,
2007 is, in light of the foregoing discussion, AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.