Date Received: October 5, 2000

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The author(s) shown below used Federal funds provided by the U.S.

Department of Justice and prepared the following final report:

Document Title: Measures to Control Transnational Organized


Crime, Summary

Author(s): Yuriy A. Voronin

Document No.: 184773

Date Received: October 5, 2000

Award Number: 99-IJ-CX-0014

This report has not been published by the U.S. Department of Justice.
To provide better customer service, NCJRS has made this Federally-
funded grant final report available electronically in addition to
traditional paper copies.

Opinions or points of view expressed are those


of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect
the official position or policies of the U.S.
Department of Justice.
PROPERTY O f
Natisnal Criminal Justice Refsrence Seruice (NCJRS) 184773
Box 6900
aCcwi5, r s r ~2 o Q 4 m m c Yuriy A. Voronin
Visiting Fellow, N I J

SUMMARY

The Measures to Control Transnational Organized Crime

Defming and measurinp transnational organized crime

1. Transnational criminal activity has increased in scale and extent,


becoming a complex worldwide threat. Transnational criminals ignore
borders, they move sums of money through the international financial
system that are so huge they dwarf the combined economies of many
nations. They are often organized in multy-crime businesses, and they have
capitalized on growth in international communications and transportation to
expand their criminal operations and form potent alliances. The corrosive
activities of transnational criminal groups in the post-Cold War era no longer
threaten particular countries or regions. They threaten all nations.
Transnational organized crime is not only a law enforcement problem, it is a
fonnidable and increasing threat to national and international security.
Transnational organized crime is not somethmg completely new, but
there is no standard, universally accepted definition of these lund of
criminality in the criminological and criminal law theories. The problem of
definition is an important factor contributing to the inability of international
law enforcement bodies to identify the size and scope of transnational
organized crime accurately. Efforts to form a definition were made many
times, but they only made this problem more difficult or created new
problems. Some definitions of ths kmd came to light during the
international simposium on organized crime in Sant Claud (France), 1988,
which is where the headquarters of Interpol was situated. Just before this
event, 84 participants from 46 member-countries of Interpol agreed to accept
the worlung formula ((transnationalorganized crime))as a basis for further
discussion. It was designated to mean any concern or organized group of
people, which continiously practices its criminal activity and whose main
goal is to make a profit everywhere, without reference to national state
boundaries. Certamly, it was a criminological term, with no claim to
providing a juridical concept. But the transnational element of the mentioned
category (organized criminal activities across national boundaries) was

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report
has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those
of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the
U.S. Department of Justice.
essential and helped using it by the international organizations for their
programs and treaties.
We must admit, that a variety of other definitions, with all their diversity,
nevertheless include the following essential elements and features, whch are
typical for transnational organized crime communities.
First, the activity of such organizations is criminal by nature, breaks legal
taboos and must carry a penalty within existing procedures of law
enforcement organs. It is obvious that a majority of social systems consider
the so-called informal (hdden) economic activity, whch is the bulk of
organized transnational criminality, to be illegal and destructive to the
development of the formal, legal economy. It breaks business laws and
overturns normal economic activity. And thls ((essence))is a necessary
element of the defmition of transnational organized crime.
Second, despite the banality of h s statement, it is very important to fN
the fact that subjects in h s activity is expediently executed, by people, who
are intentionally united into a group (but more often cooperating groups)
under the guidance of their established leaders. Hereby, the fact that they are
well organized is not ephemeral and temporary. It is a key, constituent
element of the phenomenon and definition of transnational organized crime.
Third, an essential constituent feature of transnational organized crime is
the most important goal of the full spectrum of its activities. Any activity
must be gainful. Bank fraud, blakmail, prostituition, theft of automobiles,
drugs and weapons traffickmg are equally acceptable if it makes a profit.
The fourth essential element of the transnational criminal rings is in the
particular way they achieve their main goal, namely, in theyr readiness to
use violence and bribery for the accomplishment and protection of their
interests. Violence and bribery very often accompany each other, and are
used deliberately with premeditation, in particular circumstances and to
solve quite specific problems.
Thus, transnational organized crime rings act outside the law with the
goal to make a profit and use bribery and violence for the realization and
defence of group interests. These characteristics does not add anything
special into the description of the phenomenon that have existed many years
ago. At the same time, there are some distinctions mherent in it today, whch
increase to a new level the danger to the global social peace and stability. In
particular, the ability to carry out global operations differentiates
transnational criminal rings and organizations from traditional organized
crime groups. The last one are rooted in the national territory of specific
states, and even if they develop foreign connections in some cases, they do
not operate on the wide international level. They act on the territories,

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report
has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those
of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the
U.S. Department of Justice.
regions or cities mostly within the national jurisdiction of a single state. For
example, the American Mafia, which is also called La Cosa Nostra, is a very
well known example of such a criminal sindicate. La Cosa Nostra appeared
in the 1930s as a result of a conflict among Sicilian immigrant gangs in
American cities. Despite the fact that its members introduced their ethnic
traditions into the new community, La Cosa Nostra has never been a dummy
organization or instrument of the Cisilian Mafia. It is really an American
criminal organization. Although La Cosa Nostra was not without
transnational connections, m d y they were for the purchase of &coho1 and
heroin from foreign illegal structures.
New transnational criminal groups are essentially different from national,
domestic organizations more than anything else by the fact, that they were
either created or transformed especially for criminal activity at a high level
and international standard. The Colombian cartels are the most typical for
such organizatuions. They correspond to vertically integrated global
business, which has hundreds of thousands of employed specialists and
assosiated workers in sevice. The Cinese Triads equally belong to the
transnational generation of criminal groups, though they do not have such a
strict structure. But their foreign operations are very intensive, very often in
the flow of increasing Chmese immigration.
Transnational organized crime possesses a powerful potential and is
highly dynamical. Therefore it possesses a serious danger to the existence of
both single states and the world community as a whole. Transnational
criminal groups are very well organized and equipped. It is extremely
difficult for law enforcement organs to fiid their way into the organizational
structures of these groups, because many of them are based on ethnicity and
act in the spheres jo jurisdiction of different states. Transnational criminal
groups use violence and bribery. Their activity undermines the authority of
legal power and weakens democratic institutions. They destroy financial
markets and economies of many states. The governmental resources that are
designed to solve many social and economic problems are not enough to
offset the criminal organizations at all. Many of them consolidate their
connections with militant, ethnic, and religious movements.
A series of factors boosts the potential of transnational criminal rings.
They act as parasites, for example, in cases where there are weak
governments whch have neither the resources nor political power to oppose
them. They prosper on the fantastic amounts of money which they get as a
result of illegal activity, particulary the production and sale of drugs. They
are able to benefit from the increasing migration of people through countries
and continents. Modern sophisticated weapons and appropriate technologies,

3.

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report
has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those
of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the
U.S. Department of Justice.
which they have at their disposal, are effective means for the realization and
protection of interests of transnational criminal groups. The inability of
many states and international organizations to design and coordinate
effective anty-crimenal programs creates a favorable climate for the criminal
community to maneuver in their resistence to law enforcement organs. So it
is extremely important to develop the appropriate countermeasures to
transnational organized criminal activity.
The main lunds of transnational organized crime activity consist the
following illicit businessess: illegal migration, trafficlung in women and
chldren, traffickmg in body parts, corruption, theft and illegal export of
cultural property, theft and trsffickmg in automobiles, faunna and flora
trafficlung, computer crimes, software piracy, nuclear material theft and
trafficlung, traffickrng in frrearms, traffickrng in drugs, money laundering.
No dout, there can be identified other organized crime activities whlch have
a transnational charackter or transnational implications. But in any case, if
there is some uncertaity about the categorization of particular organized
criminal activities in the mentioned range, however, their most common and
distinctive feature is that it ivolvs the crossing of borders or national
jurisdictions. Therefore, control measures are especially important on the
international level and also within affected countnes if these measures have
international implications.

The national level of control transnational organized crime

1. Despite the necessity to design and realize measures to control


transnational organized crime at the state level, the timeliness and
effectiveness of a solution to this problem still leaves much to be desired. It
can be explained by a number of circumstances. This fall into the following
categories: the real state of fmancial and personnel resources of every state;
the degree of corruption of the administrative machine, especially law
enforcement agencies; and the specifics of mutual relations between criminal
groups and the separate links among political and economic systems in
concrete societies.
Nevertheless, the structure of methods to control transnational organized
crime within the framework of national jurisdictions (as well as on the
international level) consists of general preventive and special measures,
whch ideally are a united complex, but in practice are seriously flawed in
their completeness and systematization.

4.

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report
has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those
of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the
U.S. Department of Justice.
General preventive measures traditionally refer to the socio-economic
sphere and are designed with the concept of “dualism”, whrch is appropriate
for organized crime. It is expressed, on the one hand, in providing illegal
commodities and services, and on the other hand, in persistent penetration
into the legal economy.
Politics directed towards decreasing the demand of illegal commodities
and services inevitably limits the abilities of criminal rings and interrupts the
spread of their activity. Disintegration of the monopolization of markets,
which criminal societies traditionally dominate, can contribute a lot to
acheve thls goal. Unfortunately, both elements of such a strategy are rarely
realized in practice, because thls problem is very complicated.
However, concrete steps in tlus direction are quite real.
In particular, constriction of the possibilities for transnational and
national organized criminal activity can be achieved by providing such a
situation, where commodities and services monopolized by criminals appear
more and more on the legal market. It is to a great degree connected with
decreasing the vulnerability of the legal economy by a redistribution of
resources, and stimulation of employment in regions with an undesired
socio-economic situation. The steps in thus direction also are fraught with
certain costs and negative consequences in various regions of the world. But
their total effect will be promising in any case, on the condition that they are
carefully planned and realized.
In addition to the steps already mentioned, the experience of several
countnes has shown that strict regulation and licensing of all kmds of
economic activity, especially bank and other fmancial services, whch are so
attractive for transnational criminal organizations, are very effective. All t h ~ s
must be tied to careful control by banks of business, particularly foreign
economic, in order to block the laundering of duty money. New legislative
regulations directed towards maintaining civilized standards of economic
activity and preventing penetration by organized crime can have a powerful
prophylactic effect.
Specialists rightly state that recently general preventive measures are
more and more often used in order to control transnational organized crime.
But they look especially promising in combination with special measures,
which are conventionally called the “measures of special prevention”.
2. In the framework of special preventive measures against transnational
organized crime the importance of criminal legislation should be emphasized
first of all. h response to the increasing threat from transnational and
domestic criminal rings, a number of states passed substantial amendments
and changes into the norms of national criminal law. Their core is primarily

5.

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report
has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those
of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the
U.S. Department of Justice.
in the regulations: a) about criminal penalties for the creation, management
or participation in the activity of criminal organizations; b) on the seizure of
income from such activity by making it legally possible to bring a civil suit.
In this case the legislation of a number of countries differentiates the
criminal activity of criminal societies (organizations of Mafia type) and
crimes whch are committed in complicity, but without the creation of a
criminal organization. The letter is consequently characterized by a lesser
degree of public danger. Perhaps the most recent example of new criminal
legislation, whch demonstrates such an approach, is the Criminal Code of
Russia, which came into operation January 1, 1997.
In regard to categorizing certain kmds of crimes as organized, despite
their well-known variety, the majority of states are still rather unanimous
with their criminal legislation in the circle of crimes included. In particular,
the federal criminal law of the U.S. places in these categories illegal drug
trafficking, extortion by private people or state officials, illegal gambling,
interstate transportation or receiving of stolen property, and some other
publicly dangerous activities. In Germany a number of lunds of criminal
activity, whch, as a rule, criminal groups engage in, are forbidden. Illegal
drug trafficking, group piracy, receiving of stolen things, illegal fue-arms
trade, extortion, pimping, and the organization of illegal gambling fall into
this category. The status law of England labels as organized criminal activity
various lunds of fraud, falsification of accounts, storing of stolen property,
drug trafficlung, forgery, living on income from prostitution, as well as
various lunds of criminal attacks.
Italian legislation places in this category the distribution of illegal drugs,
kchapping people for a ransom, extortion, fraud, usury, and forgery of
money and securities. In the republics of the former Soviet Union banditism,
commodities contraband, extortion, theft, drug crimes, and assassinations are
the most widespread crimes categorized as organized criminal activity.
The presence of the feature “participation in an organized criminal
society” is a unifying theme for all these quite dissimilar crimes when they
are labeled as organized criminal activity. To fmd a subject guilty in these
cases it is necessary to prove the fact that he participated in a criminal
conspiracy of a group consisting of two or more people, whch exists for the
constant realization of their joint criminal designs.
Perhaps the most typical item corresponding to the peculiar model for
other law systems is the U.S. legislation of the 1970s on racketeering and
organized crime activity, whch is well-known as RICO, as well as the law
on constantly acting criminal business. In addition to these normative
regulations in the U.S. were enacted the law on the Prohibition of General

6.

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report
has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those
of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the
U.S. Department of Justice.
Criminal Collusion and the law on the Prohibition of Conspiracy for Drug
Trafficlung Purposes. Despite a certain differences in the defmition of the
minimum membership in a criminal society in every of named legislative act
(from 2 to 5 ) , the meaning of the terms “criminal conspiracy”, and
“participation in an organized criminal society” is worded clearly enough
and covers almost all kinds of the most widespread and dangerous criminal
activity. Included most of them in federal criminal legislation and criminal
codes of states are premeditated murder, drug trafficking, fraud and a
number of other serious crimes.
A little bit later Italy followed the example of the U.S., having experienced
serious difficulties in proving conspiracy using the old legislation. In 1982 a
new law was adopted in Italy, carrying a criminal penalty for participation in
any Mafia society with a membership of 3 or more people. A society is
considered to be Mafia if its members aim to provide management or control
of any lund of economic activity, public jobs, or services in order to make an
illegal profit or to get other illegal benefits. In addition to h s special
standard, the Italian legslation contains a general defmition of criminal
conspiracy whde committing other crimes, as well as special wording about
drug trafficking.
The enactment in the U.S. and Italy of these laws turned out to be a very
effective means in the fight with organized crime. The norms therein
allowed the implementation of criminal persecution of leaders and common
functionaries of criminal societies because of the fact of their participation in
a Mafia organization, whose activity is connected with committing crime. In
a number of trials during recent years, leaders of national and transnational
organized crime were sentenced to long terms of imprisonment.
We should admit that many countries with a comparatively low level of
organized crime still abstain fi-om following the example of the U.S., Italy
and Russia, in acknowledging as an independent crime the fact itself of
participation in a Mafia society. But the development of more and more
worrisome tendencies in organized crime allows one to suppose that in
many states such a legislative tome could give substantial results in the fight
with criminal rings.
Another considerable milestone in the transformation of criminal
legislation in many countries, related to the task of intensification of control
of different kmds transnational organized crime activity.
For kstance, this is the introduction of a criminal penalty for laundering
dirty money made through criminal means. These legislative changes were
in many ways stimulated by the UN Convention on the Fight against the
illegal distribution of narcotics and psychotropic substances of 1988, which

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report
has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those
of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the
U.S. Department of Justice.
recommended members of the world community to use such document
regarding drug addiction. The fight against dirty money laundering is
becoming one of the main components of the global strategy of o r g e e d
crime prevention. But the effectiveness of this strategy in many ways
depends on political support in concrete states, and the provision of
necessary resources on the international, regional, and national levels.
The following component of the legislative strategy in the fight with
transnational organized crime is the design of new and effective uses of old
criminal laws on responsibility for corruption. Corruption to a great extent
aids the activity of criminal groups and is a part of transnational dimension
of organized crime. That is why support by members of the international
community is so important for the recommendations on the fight against
corruption, formulated in Resolution #7 at the eighth UN Congress on the
prevention crime and treatment of criminals. They are being realized
successfiilly enough in legslation of the leading western countries - the
U.S., Great Britain, Germany, and a number of other states.
In particular, in the United States of America there is a direct legislative
ban on state officials to demand, extort, or receive bribes. To an equal
degree, the law forbids promising, offering or giving bribes. In addition to
this, the kinds of commercial activities, whch are allowed for a former state
official after hls retirement are restricted by a number of laws. There is also
a legislative directive on a number of subjects about the compulsory
submission of income declaration. The federal law of the U.S. contains
demands on certain officials to place their fiiancial investments into a trust
managed by other people during their state service.
In Germany, the giving and receiving of a bribe not only by a state
official, but giving a bribe to any official in connection with h s state
functions, including entering into and realization of a business contract,
carries a criminal penalty.
The quintessential development of legislation on corruption was acheved
in Italy. In particular, the criminal penalty for abuse of rank by a state
official, expressed in the extortion of a bribe in exchange for service, which
is in the sphere of competence of this official, was intensified. Other ways of
illegal enrichment of an official, including money appropriated as a result of
an action contradictory to h s official duties, are considered to be criminal
offenses.
The justice system of Great Britain, counter to the practice of the fight
with corruption in the mentioned countries, uses both norms of common law
and modem criminal legislation (statute law) pertaining to people guilty in
giving or receiving a bribe.

8.

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report
has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those
of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the
U.S. Department of Justice.
However, despite active legislative and executive practice in this sphere,
criminal prosecution is still very complicated. Unfortunately, in many
countries native businessmen who give bribes to foreign officials are not
punished. In thls way, international corruption is practically legalized. In
connection with tfus a special commission of the Organization for Economic
Collaboration and Development designed recommendations regarding
international corruption to influence the legislation of different countries: the
Council of Europe and the International Chamber of Commerce
recommended acceptance of appropriate conventions and the s i g m g of
bilateral treaties as effective means to prevent its spread.
Another direction of transnational organized crime control is a
harmonization of criminal legislation in many transit countries where alien
smuggling is not illegal. Serious initiatives have been taken to alter thls
situation in Central America, with Panama and Nicaragua joining Honduras
is imposing criminal penalties for alien trafficlung.
The fight with transnational organized crime must not exhaust itself by
using only traditional criminal law sanctions llke imprisonment or fmes.
That is the reason for the court practice of a number of states to use
restrictions on residency in certain places or membership in certain
organizations for guilty people. The confiscation of assets of criminal
organizations, their blockmg, or arrest is very important. The economic
method is one of the most effective means of restraint of growth of
organized crime, including transnational, because it deprives criminal groups
of the fmancial advantages of their antisocial activity. It is efficient to spread
confiscation measures to the maximum enumeration of property bought with
the profit from criminal business or used in any way for committing crimes
by organized criminal groups.
The confiscation practice must be widely legalized not only for national,
but also transnational corporations, which collaborate with organized crime,
because some of the perpetrator-officials very often appear to be beyond
national jurisdiction and avoid personal responsibility. In tlus sense, we
should pay more attention to the activity of legal f m s against the
background of growth of such crimes as various lunds of fiaud, which are
carried out by organized criminal groups. Organized crime aims to penetrate
into legal business, criminalizing the legal economy in b s way. It is
absolutely fair, that according to the legislation of a number of countries, in
particular the U.S., it is possible to apply criminal punishment, such as fmes,
property confiscation or deprivation of juridical rights against corporation
(aajuridical person) in cases where they commit criminal offenses.

9.

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report
has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those
of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the
U.S. Department of Justice.
The American practice indicates that such an approach, whch threatens
legal f m s with not only criminal penalties, but loss of their reputation
because of their connection with organized crime, is a powerful means of
prevention of economic crime and contributes to the decrease of the
defenselessness of economic systems.
3. The experience of many countries of the world demonstrably indicates
that criminal procedural methods, whch allow the police. Investigators,
attorneys and judges to properly and with hgh effectiveness carry out
investigation and court proceedings in this category of criminal cases play a
very important role in the fight against transnational organized crime.
T h ~ primarily
s concern the practice of the so-called mandatory criminal
prosecution. In particular, Italian and German justice keeps to the principal
of mandatory criminal prosecution. In this case police and the state
prosecutor’s oflice are obliged to bring a case before a court if they discover
enough evidence of a concrete crime. In the U.S., in contradistinction to h s
approach, there is provided a certain freedom of action for law enforcement
organs. They have the right to independently start an investigation regarding
a concrete person (physical or juridical) or submit a final decree for the
prosecutor’s consideration. The prosecutor has discretionary right, and may
forgo bringing a court action for a small offense in exchange for this
subject’s information about leaders of organized criminal groups. In Great
Britain investigative organs, that is leaders of investigative subdivisions,
have the right to decide about investigations at their discretion. In h s case
the Attorney General has the discretionary right at any stage of the
investigation. Of course, the effective use of such a right requires a hgh
level of professional responsibility. And, though the discretionary system is
flexible and effective, potentially there are more possibilities of violations of
the rights of defendants in this system. Both the pros and cons of tfus model
are quite reasonable.
The problem of proof is very real in the framework of criminal
processing regulations in the fight against organized crime. In practice, the
criteria of evaluation of evidence in cases of crimes committed by
transnational criminal groups are not different from those, applied to other
categories of criminal acts. And the prosecutor acts on behalf of the state,
which traditionally must carry out the process of proof. The problem of
evidence collection is more specific. In the majority of states, information
received with the help of electronic observation, secret agents, testimonies of
accomplices, and controlled deliveries is successfully used regarding
investigations of cases involving organized criminal activity.

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report
has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those
of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the
U.S. Department of Justice.
From the point of view of observing the right to privacy, the method of
electronic observation is the most delicate, and at the same time very
effective. Listening to a suspect’s conversation is carried out without
permission of any of the participants. To keep workers of law enforcement
organs fiom the temptation to use electronic observation without court
authorization, facts received through violation of law are not accepted in
court proceedings, and are excluded fiom the general mass of evidentiary
material.
According to German legislation, the use of electronic methods of
investigation is allowed, but the facts received this way are accepted with
certain limitations. For example, application of such a method of
investigation, which at any point affects the sphere of private life, is allowed
only in cases of a serious crime committing by suspect.
In Italy, connecting to the telephone network and listening to
conversations is also allowed only in serious criminal cases. The judge
participating in the investigation gives sanction for the application of ths
method at the request of the prosecutor. In special cases, the prosecutor has
the right by justified decree to allow the organization of wire-tapping.
However, within 24 hours he must turn to the judge with a written request to
sanction this decree. Withln 48 hours the judge must approve or cancel the
prosecutor’s authorization of electronic listening. The Italian legislation on
the fight against organized crime allows also preventive electronic listening,
which must be authorized by the state. But the lnformation received in this
way although used during the investigation, cannot be submitted as legal
evidence during court proceedings.
Regarding the services of secret agents and use of the method of
controlled deliveries, there are serious differences in the legal regulation of
these methods of obtaining of evidence in different countries; fiom direct
outright ban to widely accepted, though clearly reszicted by law and
practice. To an equal degree, it is true of testimonies of accomplices in the
same or related cases. In some countries, such testimonies are accepted as
legal evidence, but in other countries the law allows their use with certain
stipulations. In a number of states it is forbidden to use anonymous
testimonies of secret denouncers as legal evidence.
We should also note the presents in many countries of the world of an
appreciable tendency to the compulsory provision of testimonies, which is
especially important in cases of transnational organized crime. In particular,
in the U.S., in spite of the existence of the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution, which prohibits compulsory testimony against oneself, the
federal prosecutor, subject to a certain procedure, may be ordered by a

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report
has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those
of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the
U.S. Department of Justice.
federal judge to force the witness to give testimony. The refusal to testiQ in
this case carries imprisonment of up to 36 months, until the person testifies.
Legal action for false testimony might be brought against an obdurate
witness. In Germany, for refusal of a witness to testify without legal
grounds, the court imposes a disciplinary fine on the witness.
However, in the fight against organized crime, legislation and executive
practice of a number of states provide for not only forcible provision of
testimony. At the same time, they take measures for the effective defense of
witnesses to guarantee their physical safety, the possibility to change their
place of residence, last names, provision of a living allowance, employment
assistance, etc. In fact, witness protection programs today play a key role in
providing an effective fight against organized crime. Due to them, the
number of people, who agree to testify in court, is growing. As a rule,
witness protection programs are included in appropriate legislation. For
example, in the U.S. there is a detailed normative regulation of the grounds
and procedure for the realization of arrangements for the protection of
witnesses. On the list of such arrangements, in addition to the private safety
guarantee, the rendering of such services is included: temporary housing,
assisting in moving property to a new place; a living allowance, employment
assistance, and provision of other aide, with the goal to he3lp the witness
painlessly adjust to a new life. In addition, there is unofficial, but a
normatively well regulated procedure for the defense of informers who do
not openly testify in court. Comparatively recently in Italy there was
legislation whch regulates all questions connected with the defense of
witnesses. Although in Great Britain and Germany such legislation does not
exist, the workers of law enforcement organs may take appropriate measures
of safety, but on a more limited basis, than in the USA and Italy. This is
especially true of the limited possibilities of the German police services.
Finally, we should mention that in addition to programs for defense of
witnesses and dormers, there are measures for aid to those who are
aggrieved due to collection of strategic information about drugs. All this
data comes to the National service on collection of information about
criminal activity.
5 . Success in the fight against transnational organized crime to a great
extend depends on the effective resolution of problems of coordination and
the design of complex approaches to the solution of current problems facing
national law enforcement organs. It concerns the consistency of the spheres
of jurisdiction and concrete acts against Mafia societies of organs of various
territorial and departmental levels, between central and provincial structures.
Forms and methods of such coordination in various states are to a certain

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report
has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those
of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the
U.S. Department of Justice.
extent similar and different at the same time. But in the majority of cases,
the main responsibilities for investigations regarding organized criminal
activity and the design of a strategy in this sphere are assigned to the only
one organ.
As was already mentioned, the FBI is the main investigative organ of
organized crime cases in the U.S., but some other (already mentioned
earlier) law enforcement services contribute a lot to this. In addition, special
police units are created in the places where Mafia organizations are the most
active. Experienced federal investigators are attached to these brigades. In
the governmental district of Washmgton (District of Columbia) there is a
Bureau on organized Crime as a part of the Criminal Department of the
Ministry of Justice of the U.S. Tlus Bureau is manned by expert attorneys,
who go to the “places” for strategic investigation pertaining to Mafia
structures. The Council on organized crime under the Department of Justice
of the U.S. coordinates the activity of all these departments. The leaders of
various investigative organs and executive officials of the Department itself
staff it.
In Germany, the Commission on organized crime coordinates criminal
investigations pertaining to criminal groups on a national basis. The leaders
of the BKA (Federal Criminal Service) and territorial investigation brigades
man this Commission.
In Great Britain in the framework of the activity of so-called criminal
lnvestigation brigades, and municipal police brigades there is a continuing
collaboration during the investigation of criminal cases and collection of
strategic information, including information about transnational organized
crime.
In Italy, numerous police organizations, where the fight against criminal
b g s is also a part of their competence, regularly coordinate their activity on
the interregional and national level. In particular, they do thls by using a
jolnt database, which is situated in the appropriate center of the Ministry of
Interior Affairs. Responsibilities for the coordination of the preliminary and
court investigation are assigned to special district attorneys on the fight
against organized crime.
Thus, provision of close coordination of the activity of all law
enforcement organs at the national level positively influences the solution of
problems related to control of organized, including transnational, crime.

lnternational collaboration in the control transnational organized crime

2 3.

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report
has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those
of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the
U.S. Department of Justice.
1. The level of international collaboration in the fight against
transnational organized crime has substantially grown for the last two
decades. At the same time, a lot of problems are still unresolved, and there
are serious obstacles and restraints.
The inability of a single state or government to effectively oppose
transnational organized crime activity by itself is the main motivating factor
of the development of international cooperation in h s sphere. Transnational
criminal rings are becoming more and more powerful and universal, and
their mobility is growing. The means and resources of any state are not
enough to seriously harm them. Thus is especially the case, since
transnational criminal Societies understand the situation very well, and
choose countries with weak and corrupted systems of criminal justice as
places of their main deployment. And in cases where they start to experience
serious pressure from law enforcement agencies, the criminals relocate their
networks to countries with a more favorable “climate”.
What are the main difficulties constraining the so obviously necessary
interstate collaboration and creation of a powerful enough infrastructure of
international cooperation of law enforcement agencies in their fight against
transnational criminal communities?
First of all, it is necessary to adrmt that entering into cooperation in the
sphere of criminal justice depends very much (and until recently, in
particular) on the character of political relations between states, differences
in their ideology, and their approach to the observance of human rights. T h ~ s
fact is very often a stumbling block in the way of international cooperation.
In addition, despite the vital necessity of collaboration in the sphere of
criminal law, the hypertrophical understanding of sovereignty, including the
monopoly right of a singly state to use criminal-juridical constraint on their
own citizens according to the domestic legislation, has always been a serious
obstacle. For th~sreason, states seldom and very unwillingly extradite their
citizens to the jurisdiction of another country, even if there are strong
reasons for their criminal prosecution by the legislation of this country.
Serious differences in the juridical systems of different countries, in the
handling punishability or non-punishability of some acts, and in the culture
ofjustice make it much more Qfficult to enter into collaboration. In
particular, in a lot of countries the permissibility of evidence in court
received through using informants from the criminal relationship, still
provokes serious resistance. But this method is very important for the
successkl control transnational organized crime. Legislation on the fight
agahst drug addiction is another strdung example of aggravating
inconsistency. Despite the fact that a lot of countries signed the UN

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report
has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those
of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the
U.S. Department of Justice.
Convention of 1988 “On the fight Against the Illegal Circulation of Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances”, the normative acts whch regulate the
same questions are essentially differentiate in different countries. ms
makes implementation of comprehensive drug abuse prevention politics
difficult in many ways. Thls is why harmonization of national legislation is a
cornerstone, on whch an effective system of coordination of international
efforts to control transnational organized crime is based.
Another serious obstacle is the fact that in a number of cases the sides are
simply not interested in entering into collaboration. The corruption of
political a b s t r a t i o n of some countries is in the background of b s . A real
fight against drug business, and money laundering in cooperation with
another international subjects would torpedo the positions of corrupted
officials. For the same reason, law enforcement agencies themselves do not
very willingly participate in join operations with their colleagues from other
states, as they fear the leakage of information to criminals through corrupted
governmental officials.
2. Despite these difficulties, the problem of control of the developing
spheres of activity of transnational criminal rings may not remain unsolved.
States must be ready to waive some of the formal orders of sovereignty,
customs and traditions, whch have existed for hundreds of years.
Developing of collaboration in this situation does not have an alternative,
and the international community should take more fm measures to
overcome the difficulties, which are in its way.
Collaboration can be realized at different levels, in various directions, be
bilateral or multilateral, but in any case it must be objective and take into
account all aspects of the organized criminal activity.
One of the main goals of international cooperation in h s sphere is in the
provision of consistency in the systems of criminal justice of different
countries as much as possible, including aid to countries with a weak
normative basis or states whch are rebges for criminal business, and in the
development of national legislation on the fight against organized crime. It is
obvious that it is impossible to acheve complete identity of legal regulation
in this sphere for a number of reasons. However, to be able to take
coordinated effective measures against transnational criminal communities,
the rnaxlmum possible comparability of different national jurisdictions
involved in the realization of these measures is necessary.
Effective international collaboration today implies the maximum use of
the potential of existing structures and mechanisms, joining their efforts for
the purposes of employment of more efficient means against transnational
organized crime. The Interpol, the Special group on fmancial measures in

15.

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report
has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those
of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the
U.S. Department of Justice.
the framework in the fi-amework of fight against money laundering, created
by the seven leading industrially developed countries, the Council of
Europe, the Shengen group, the Commission on crime prevention and
criminal Justice, and some other organizations are among such structures.
For example, Interpol has established an Automatic Search Facility
International Stolen Vehicle Database that can be accesses by member states
in their efforts to identify and where possible recover stolen vehicles. Thls
database, however, needs to be augmented by national databases and by
information sharing arrangements at the bilateral, regional and subregional
levels. Together they posses a powerhl potential and that is why it is
necessary to actively stimulate the development of contacts between them.
Simultaneously, the governments of collaborating states should grant more
fmancial support to the international organizations in the framework of the
fight against transnational crime. It is very desirable for the provision of
effectiveness of such a collaboration to establish a strategic exchange of
information between states and cany out applications for aid in connection
with criminal investigations without delay. It also concerns the mutual
readiness to facilitate decisions of a court of another state and transfer
investigation and surrender the criminal himself from one jurisdiction into
another.
Such methods of international cooperation as programs of systematic
exchange of personnel of law enforcement departments, whch are directed
towards strengthening of connections between their workers,
implementation of joint actions against transnational criminal organizations,
exchange of infomation and expert opinions about current situation, and
mutual growth in accumulated experience in the fight against criminal rings
have been actively developing in recent years.
The experience of the creation of international bilateral and multilateral
target groups has shown itself to be especially advantageous. Intensification
ofthls process is a vital need today and produces obvious positive results. In
practice, as a rule, one country of the international community takes an
initiative on the creation of such groups during concrete operations.
Naturally a high enough level of professionalism of all the participants is
necessary in h s case. Coordinated measures also require attracting workers
with special knowledge and a wide education. In particular, specialists of
one country must be well acquainted with not only the methods of
transnational criminal activity, but with the financial and procedural law of
the appropriate states. They are also required to know international
conventions, agreements and other legal mechanisms which regulate

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report
has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those
of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the
U.S. Department of Justice.
extradition of criminals, transfer of prisoners, confiscation of property which
is purchased as a result of criminal activity, etc.
A program adopted by the U.S. Congress in 1986 to increase the
effectiveness of investigation of organized crime cases in the countries of
Latin America and the Caribbean basm, is an example of the organization of
such a task. Its main goal is the preparation and retraining of staff of law
enforcement organs, consolidation of cooperation networks and increasing
the regional collaboration of security services. Enhancing the capacity of
destination states to respond to the problem is a priority not only for the
United States, but also for the states of European Union, and would make it
more llkely for the former Soviet bloc countries. The United Nations is
trying to solve the same problems at the global level. So, the program of the
UN on the international control of drugs and the Sector on the prevention of
crirne and criminal justice of the UN Secretariat support the creation and
development of appropriate infrastructure by carrying out courses and
seminars, promoting information exchange, and preparing personal on
concrete issues. In addition, there are consultative services in the sphere of
legislative reform of criminal justice on issues in the realization of measures
provided by the UN Convention of 1988 “On the Fight against the Illegal
Circulation of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances”. Finally, there
are certain measures on t e c h c a l aid for developing countries and states
with transition economies, whch wdl allow them to more effectively oppose
international criminal activity. In particular, this means the provision of
computerization, technical means of detection of radoactive materials and
drugs. In other words, there is a certain progress in the accomplishment of a
high enough level of technical collaboration.
3. In adQtion to the comparatively informal kmds of international
cooperation already mentioned, the more formalized methods of
collaboration are used in the fight against transnational organized crime,
canied out only at the official level. Unfortunately, their accomplishment is
the most complicated.
First of all, this is the problem of extradition of criminals. The solution of
this problem, due to the very delicate attitude of states to their own
sovereignty, is sill very far from being achieved. In a number of countnes,
extradition of their citizens to other states is simply forbidden. In others
(even in the case when an agreement on extradition exists) in a number of
cases extradition is not used, partly because of different interpretations of the
criminal or non-criminal character of a concrete action. Trying to avoid
these obstacles to international cooperation in the fight against transnational
criminal organizations, some countries allow workers of their law

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report
has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those
of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the
U.S. Department of Justice.
agreement between the U S . and Italy, whch was put into operation in 1995,
grants the possibility of the so-called international subpoena. It concerns the
appeal of one of the countries, which signed the agreement to the other to
oblige a person to appear in the court of the applying state to testify. In
addition, th~sagreement allows the possibility of freezing and confiscation
assets to the advantage of the applying state. The agreement between the
U S . and Switzerland (of approximately the same content), whch in a
number of cases was a good legal basis for the collection of evidence and
confiscation of assets of organized criminal groups, is another vivid example
of such collaboration. To develop the mentioned and a number of other
agreements used in world practice the UN General Assembly adopted the
Model Treaty on mutual aid in the sphere of criminal investigation, which
obviously d be widely used as a basis for mutual agreement of members
of the world community about the named circle of issues.
4. The logic of the fight against transnational organized crime and certain
progress in the unification of international efforts in the framework of thrs
opposition, make the problem of design of an International Convention on
the control of transnational organized crime actual, and really solvable. Its
main advantage would be an exit beyond the framework of bilateral or
regional collaboration (whch is peculiar to the documents analyzed here)
and the provision of a global, multiform approach to the solution of existing
problems. The creation of an effective system of collection, analysis and
exchange of information about the illegal activity of transnational criminal
rings is first of all included in the number of advantages whch the creation
such a convention could give. This would be in accord with the global
character of such kind of criminality. Powerful potential possibilities are
established in h s step. And, obviously, the creation of an appropriate
international coordination center with secure t e c h c a l equipment would be
necessary for their realization. Second, the conclusion of the convention
would provide a standardrzed formula of collaboration for a wide
community of countries, which would sign it. This opens much bigger
possibilities in comparison with bilateral cooperation of states on the same
issues, which influence unification of national systems of justice much less.
Absolutely, the adoption of the convention will require diligent work, and
real readiness of states to unite their efforts for an active fight against
transnational organized crime.

Appendix 1

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report
has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those
of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the
U.S. Department of Justice.
enforcement agencies to go to the territory of another state (with its
approval) to arrest criminals if seekmg. Deportation of criminals from the
country, instead of their formal extradition, is another variant, as a result of
efforts to find a more conventional extradition solution.
But in h s case the problem is not solved really efficiently. It is necessary
to increase the level of interaction of states and unify procedures of
extradition. In b s connection, the adoption by the Council of Europe of
procedures to cut down the number of restrictions connected with the
disparate definition of the technical aspects of extradition of criminals in
different countries of Europe, is a serious contribution to the solution of
existing difficulties. The Model Treaty on Extradition and the Model Treaty
on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, adopted by the UN General
Assembly in 1995, is another step to improve the situation in h s sphere,
where the universal agreement of members of the world community was
acheved. T'lus Treaty sets the stage for a treaty about the extradition of any
person, whom the state applying for extradition is searching for, for further
prosecution for an offense, is punishable by imprisonment with a term of not
less than a year according to the legislation of both countries. In the Model
Treaty there is an optional possibility for the state applied to, in the presence
of certain grounds, to assign the case to its own law enforcement organs for
consideration of the question about court action against the person being
sought for extradition.
It is noticeable that the Model Treaty also contains regulations about the
possibility of devolution of property, gained as a result of committing a
crime. It is a good ground for bilateral agreements. For example, the United
States has signed a treaty with Mexico, which led to the tracking down of
5,000 stolen cars in one year. Ths has provided a model for further treaties
with countries in Central America and the Caribbean (Belize, Costa h c a ,
Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and
Panama) whch should help to identify, recover, and return stolen wheedles
to the United States.
The possibility to obtain evidence, including testimony of witnesses,
from other countries is very important for a successhl fight against
transnational organized crime. The main means of solution of this problem
are agreements of mutual help, whch in many ways destroy obstacles to
evidence collection on the territories of other countries and promote
progressive unification of the criminal procedure legislation. As a rule, the
agreements do not limit mutual aid of states to solution of just these issues,
and promote satisfaction of the more complicated and multiform needs in the
fight against transnational organized crime structures. In particular, the

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report
has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those
of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the
U.S. Department of Justice.
Major extradition treaties:

1. Pact of the League of Arab States, March 22, 1945;


2. The Benelux Extradition Convention, June 27, 1962
3. The Commonwealth Scheme Relating to the Rendition of Fugitive
Offenders, 1966;
4. The European Convention on Extradition, December 13, 1957;
5. Convention between the UK, Australia, New Zealand, South A h c q
India and Portugal as a Supplementary to the Extradition Treaty of
October 17, 1992;
6. The Montevideo convention on Extradition, December 26, 1935;
7. The Nordic States scheme Extrahtion Treaty of 1962;
8. The OCAM Convention Former French Territories in Equatorial and
West Afhca on September 12, 1962.
9. The Model Treaty on Extradition, UN, 1995

Major Conventions on Judicial and Legal Assistance:

1. The European Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters,


April 4, 1959;
2. The European Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal
Matters, May 15, 1972
3. The Model Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, UN, 1995

Appenhx 2.

International anti-money laundering documents:

1. The UN Convention Against Illicit Traffk in Narcotic Drugs and


Psychotropic Substances of 1988;
2. The Basle Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices
Statement of Principles of December 1988;
3. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Report of April 1990 (with its
40 recommendations for action);
4. The Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and
Confiscation of Proceeds of Crime of September 8, 1990;
5. The 61 recommendations of the Caribbean Drug Money Laundering
Conference of June 1990;

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report
has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those
of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the
U.S. Department of Justice.
6 . The Agreement on EC Legislation by the European Community’s
Mhsters for Economy and Finance of December 17, 1990;
7. The Organization of American States Model Regulations on Crimes
Related to Laundering of Property and Proceeds Related to Drug
Trafficlung of March 1992;
8. The FATF Supplementary Recommendations of I996

This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report
has not been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those
of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the
U.S. Department of Justice.

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