Networking For Better Value Chain Inclusion: Reflections On Oxfam's Work in The Raspberry Value Chain in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Networking For Better Value Chain Inclusion: Reflections On Oxfam's Work in The Raspberry Value Chain in Bosnia and Herzegovina
Networking For Better Value Chain Inclusion: Reflections On Oxfam's Work in The Raspberry Value Chain in Bosnia and Herzegovina
www.oxfam.org
1 INTRODUCTION
Bosnia and Herzegovina is a middle-income country in South-Eastern
Europe, with a population of 3.8 million and GDP per capita of about $4,000.
The country is still suffering politically and economically from the
consequences of the 19921995 war. Employment opportunities are limited;
the official unemployment rate is over 40 percent1 with youth
2 3
unemployment at 60 percent and one in five people lives in poverty . With
4
around 60 percent of the population living in rural areas, agriculture and
rural development projects have an important role to play in overcoming
unemployment and poverty.
This paper will discuss the networking approach taken by Oxfam in the multi-
stakeholder environment and present some of the lessons learned: both
positive and negative, and regarding the influencing of key stakeholders.
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2 ABOUT OXFAMS
PROGRAMME
The project target area comprised the three municipalities of Maglaj,
Zavidovii and epe, which all have very high levels of poverty and
unemployment. Project activities were implemented as follows:
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4. Targeting of poor farmers and selection of
farmer organizations
Targeting was carried out at several levels, as follows, but always with the
engagement of multiple stakeholders:
Selection of FOs: This began with consultation of municipal authorities,
active processors/exporters, and a local facilitator. The final selection of
FOs was based on score-card criteria developed by the project; an
extensive needs assessment was also conducted to inform project
interventions.
Focus on certain local communities (poverty pockets): Municipalities,
local communities, processors/exporters and FOs were involved in the
identification of villages with the highest unemployment rates, but also with
the right conditions for growing berries and in areas that could naturally be
covered by the existing FOs.
Targeting of poor households (maximizing inclusion of women and
youth): The project defined certain criteria for poverty categorization,
based on income per capita and land ownership. More importantly,
numerous value chain participants (municipal officers, FO representatives
and processors) were engaged to help identify possible project
beneficiaries at the farm level.
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3 WHAT DID WE ACHIEVE?
The pilot project earned the title of IFADs
Flagship Project
By the end of June 2015, the pilot project was largely complete. The pilot
activities not only produced effective methodology and helped to build the
capacity of PCU staff; they also resulted in an end investment of over 2m
and provided direct benefits to more than 300 poor households. These
results surpassed all expectations, and such was the pilot projects impact
that it earned the title of IFADs Flagship Project in 2015 for successfully
demonstrating inclusion of poor people in a value chain in a middle-income
country.
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At the FO level, the cooperatives and associations realized that their
organizations will benefit by helping poor families to join the value chain,
as a result of increased product quantities and reduced operational costs
per kilo. FOs became a strong advocate for the inclusion of these farmers
into the value chain. As well as welcoming the newcomers, FOs realized
that some of their existing members needed additional assistance to
improve their yields; some FOs therefore arranged in-kind loans for these
farmers and provided agricultural advisors for free.
The processors, in search of increased product volumes, also realized that
it makes sense to include new farmers in the value chain in the areas
where organized production already exists, rather than in brand new
production area. They therefore offered in-kind loans to the poor farmers,
together with long-term purchasing contracts.
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For example, the processors were willing to offer in-kind loans to the new
farmers, as they knew that these farmers have been carefully selected and
would be supported to succeed by the cooperatives and associations. One of
the processors also decided to invest a large amount of money into a local
cold-storage facility, as the number of new farmers will quickly translate into
larger quantities of berries for processing. The cooperatives also received
some support in small-scale mechanization and equipment, in order to
strengthen their capacity to absorb new members and greater product
quantities.
The municipalities also saw clear benefits in the new raspberry plantations,
which encouraged them to contribute 10 percent to the procurement of
starter packages, as a grant to small farmers. Some municipalities also
supported the FOs with new equipment and small-scale mechanization. All of
these examples translated into significant leverage, resulting in total
investment about five times higher than the funds spent by the PCU/IFAD.
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WHAT DIDNT WORK WELL
Pressure and challenges due to limited timeframe
As mentioned above, there was a very short timeframe for implementation of
both the pilot initiative and the autumn planting (nine and three months,
respectively). This created some challenges for the networking approach.
The presence of various stakeholders sometimes meant that more time was
needed for project implementation and time was simply not always
available.
There are two planting seasons per year in raspberry production (autumn
and spring) and different areas have different deadlines due to variations in
altitudes and micro-climates. In some cases, deadlines were not respected,
especially in the autumn planting. For example, in the process of selecting
the poorest local communities, a bottleneck was created at the municipal
level. Not all municipalities sent the required information on time to allow a
proper data analysis. In some cases, the selection of FOs was carried out too
quickly, without due diligence and based on the information provided by a
single source (a processor/exporter or municipal agricultural advisor).
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communications, enormous energy was spent before the beneficiaries could
be settled on.
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NOTES
1
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/bosnia-and-herzegovina/unemployment-rate
2
http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2013/02/14/improving-opportunities-young-
people-Bosnia-Herzegovina
3
http://www.ruralpovertyportal.org/country/home/tags/bosnia_and_herzegovina
4 http://www.tradingeconomics.com/bosnia-and-herzegovina/rural-population-percent-of-
total-population-wb-data.html
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Oxfam International October 2016
This case study was prepared by Fedja Begovic, Value Chain Expert, and
Stefano Baldini, Oxfam Country Director. It is part of a series of papers and
reports written to inform public debate on development and humanitarian policy
issues.
This publication is copyright but the text may be used free of charge for the
purposes of advocacy, campaigning, education, and research, provided that the
source is acknowledged in full. The copyright holder requests that all such use
be registered with them for impact assessment purposes. For copying in any
other circumstances, or for re-use in other publications, or for translation or
adaptation, permission must be secured and a fee may be charged. Email
[email protected].
OXFAM
Oxfam is an international confederation of 20 organizations networked together
in more than 90 countries, as part of a global movement for change, to build a
future free from the injustice of poverty. Please write to any of the agencies for
further information, or visit www.oxfam.org.
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