United Nations S/2017/165

Security Council Distr.: General

23 February 2017

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on Burundi

I. Introduction
1. The present report is submitted pursuant to resolution 2303 (2016), in which
the Security Council requested me to report to it on the situation in Burundi every
three months, including on any public incidents of incitements to hatred and
violence, as well as on steps to ensure the deployment of the United Nations police
component and on possible adaptations of the United Nations police component as
referred to in paragraphs 13 and 14 of the resolution. My Special Adviser briefed
the Council on the situation in Burundi on 8 November 2016. The present report
covers the period since the adoption of resolution 2303 (2016) on 29 July 2016 and
provides details about the status of the implementation of the resolution, as well as
the efforts of my Special Adviser and the United Nations system in this regard.

II. Major developments

A. Political developments

2. Nearly two years have passed since the beginning of the political crisis in
Burundi, which was sparked by the decision of the ruling party, Conseil national pour
la dfense de la dmocratie Forces pour la dfense de la dmocratie (CNDD-
FDD), to support President Pierre Nkurunzizas candidacy for a third term. Since
then, the political impasse has only deepened. Political space has been narrowed
further through repression. In lieu of meaningful dialogue, the exchange of political
views, primarily in the form of accusations and counter-accusations, is taking place
across social media and in public communiqus. In a new development, President
Nkurunziza suggested in a statement at the end of 2016 that he might seek a fourth
term in office if the Burundian people decide to change the Constitution according to
their wishes. This has the potential to plunge the country into an even deeper crisis.
3. Regional efforts to resolve the crisis through genuine, inclusive dialogue under
the auspices of the East African Community (EAC) have yet to achieve a
breakthrough. At the same time, there are serious concerns about the inclusiveness
and legitimacy of the national inter-Burundian dialogue process under the auspices
of the Government-established National Commission for the Inter-Burundian
Dialogue (CNDI). The conclusions contained in the August 2016 interim report of
CNDI included the removal of presidential term limits and other constitutional
amendments which, if adopted, would undermine the 2000 Arusha Peace and
Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi.

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4. While the Government has decided to withdraw from the Rome Statu te of the
International Criminal Court, suspend cooperation and collaboration with the Office
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and refuse
cooperation with the commission of inquiry mandated by the Human Rights
Council, human rights violations and abuses continue to be reported on a worrying
scale. Meanwhile, the Government has yet to sign the memorandum of
understanding with the African Union on the deployment of human rights observers
and military experts. In addition, the Governments relations with key bilateral
partners remain tense, as the Government continues to attribute the crisis to external
interference. While the Government insists that the situation in the country has
normalized, political opposition and civil society leaders continue to appeal for
urgent international action to avert the risk of further deterioration, widespread
violence and mass atrocities. Despite a decline in overt violence and fewer
incidences of armed confrontation, reports of human rights vio lations and abuses
continue, including killings, enforced disappearances, gender -based violence,
arbitrary arrests and detentions, torture and ill-treatment, along with the discovery
of unidentified bodies. The allegations of more than 200 cases of enforce d
disappearance since October 2016 are of particular concern. From April 2015 to
31 December 2016, OHCHR documented 593 violations of the right to life, and
hundreds of people continue to be arrested every month.
5. Many Burundians live in fear as a result of widespread repression and
increasing intimidation by the Imbonerakure, the ruling partys youth wing. There
are also unconfirmed reports of attacks and human rights abuses committed against
Government supporters and security forces. The socioeconomic and humanitarian
situation has grown increasingly dire and, as of early February 2017, some 387,000
Burundians had fled the country since the beginning of the crisis. According to the
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the
projections for 2017 are that this number will surpass 500,000.

Domestic developments
6. On 20 August 2016, CNDD-FDD held an extraordinary congress in Gitega to
restructure the leadership of the party, placing Major General Evariste Ndayishimiye
in the position of Secretary-General. The Congress also confirmed President
Nkurunzizas chairmanship over the partys Council of the Wise, which serves as
the partys main advisory body.
7. On 19 November 2016, in a speech delivered in Rutegama, Muramvya
province, President Nkurunziza called on CNDD -FDD party members to be vigilant
as the fight continues, warning that this term is from God, and anyone, whether a
foreigner or a national opposing the term, will be punished by God .
8. The inter-Burundian dialogue under the auspices of CNDI is close to
completion. To date, the 15-member commission has completed all dialogue sessions
held at the provincial and communal levels across the country, and also held meetings
with some Burundians living in exile. On 23 August 2016, the president of CNDI,
Monsignor Justin Nzoyisaba, announced the submission of the Commission s interim
report on the achievements of CNDI to the President and the National Assembly. The
interim report presented preliminary recommendations emanating from these dialogue
sessions, stating that the majority of citizens demanded an end to presidential term
limits and supported the Constitutions supremacy vis--vis the Arusha Agreement.
The report also stated that the Burundians do not want former presidents to remain
senators for life, that the citizens see shortcomings in the Constitution as the source
of political conflict and insecurity, and that citizens desire amendments to some
existing legislation concerning political parties and civil society. Many opposition
political leaders and civil society groups did not participate in the process, and most

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have voiced strong concerns over what they deem a lack of inclusiveness and
transparency, alleging that the process is controlled by the Government with the
objective of producing a predetermined political outcome.
9. On 11 October 2016 in Gitega, the Minister of the Interior convened a meeting
of political party representatives and political actors to discuss the role of political
leaders in the context of peace and dialogue in preparation for elections in 2020.
The conference participants signed a 29-article resolution, which included
recommendations on the repatriation of the inter-Burundian dialogue process
facilitated by EAC to create synergies with CNDI, and the establishment of a
national commission mandated to propose constitutional revisions in line with the
CNDI findings. It also recommended the reinforcement of mechanisms to monitor
non-governmental organizations.
10. On 16 November 2016, the Council of Ministers approved the establishment of
a constitutional review commission mandated to study amendments to the
Constitution. The commission is reportedly tasked with analysing articles of the
Constitution to be amended for Government consideration and, with the latter s
agreement, proposing an amended draft Constitution. It further stated that the
Councils decision had been informed by: (a) recommendations on constitutional
amendments contained in reports of the National Independent Electoral Commission,
the National Independent Human Rights Commission and CNDI; (b) the resolution
adopted at the 11 October meeting of political parties and leaders; and (c) the need to
harmonize certain articles with EAC law. Opposition political parties and civil society
criticized the Councils decision, warning that any deliberate violation of the
Constitution and the Arusha Agreement would only worsen the current political crisis.
11. During the reporting period, upon instruction by the Senate, the Mi nister of
Civil Service, Labour and Employment asked public administration services to
complete a survey to verify the respect for diversity required under the Constitution.
The survey asked, inter alia, for identification of the gender, ethnicity and regi onal
origin of all public servants. While article 143 of the Constitution requests that the
public administration reflect the diversity of the nation, the survey provoked
widespread concern about ethnic targeting.
12. A week of prayer led by President Nkurunziza in Rutana province
culminated in a statement on 30 December 2016 and an address to the nation on
31 December 2016. The President, inter alia, reiterated his refusal to enter into
dialogue with Burundian exiles under arrest warrant, and alleged th at conflicts
throughout the history of Burundi since independence had been instigated by the
same small group of people. He further stated that the facilitation by EAC would
be best served by assisting in the preparations for the 2020 elections. The Pres ident
said that the constitutional reform commission would study amendments to
harmonize the Constitution with international conventions, including the Treaty for
the Establishment of the East African Community, and would take into account the
recommendations of CNDI. He also referred to his possible candidacy in 2020,
pending constitutional reform and the support of the population.
13. The opposition remains largely divided between the political and the armed
opposition, as well as between those still resident in Burundi and those who are in
exile. Opposition members have accused the Government of targeted arrests and
other forms of intimidation, while also attempting to co -opt some elements of the
exiled opposition to return to Burundi.

Inter-Burundian dialogue led by the East African Community

14. There have been three meetings in the dialogue process led by EAC under the
leadership of the President of Uganda, Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, as mediator, and

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former President of the United Republic of Tanzania, Benjamin William Mkapa, as

facilitator: the first in Entebbe, Uganda, in December 2015, and the other two in
Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania, in May and July 2016. So far, the facilitator
has held separate consultations with the Government and some me mbers of the
political opposition. However, the different stakeholders have yet to sit together to
engage in face-to-face dialogue. Despite its stated commitment to the regional
dialogue process led by EAC, the Government of Burundi has repeatedly rejected
engagement with those alleged to have been involved in the failed May 2015 coup
dtat and civil society leaders of the Halte au troisime mandat (Stop the third
term) movement. The Government has been calling for the dialogue to be
repatriated to Burundi and merged with the CNDI process, a move rejected by EAC.
15. In the light of the difficulties in getting a genuine dialogue process off the
ground, facilitator Mkapa called on the region to apply pressure on the Government
and the opposition to commit to participate in the dialogue in good faith and without
preconditions. On 8 September, the Summit of Heads of State of the East African
Community convened in Dar-es-Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania, and endorsed
a set of recommendations proposed by the EAC facilitator, including the
imperative need for Heads of States personal engagement in getting the parties to
commit themselves to serious and inclusive dialogue without preconditions .
Following the summit, facilitator Mkapa developed a road ma p for the dialogue
process and presented it to the mediator, President Museveni, on 2 November. The
road map provides for a series of engagements between December 2016 and June
2017, which would culminate in a final agreement to be reached in June.
16. Facilitator Mkapa visited Bujumbura from 7 to 9 December 2016. The
facilitator consulted with President Nkurunziza, the CNDD -FDD Secretary-General
and other political stakeholders on the proposed road map. At a press conference
concluding his visit, the facilitator made a statement in which he asserted the
legitimacy of President Nkurunzizas third term and said that the dialogue should
focus on preparing for free and fair elections in 2020.
17. Some opposition leaders and members of civil society expressed dismay at the
facilitators statement. In a 9 December communiqu, the National Council for
Respect for the Arusha Agreement and the Rule of Law (CNARED) coalition
declared that the facilitator had disqualified himself by asserting President
Nkurunzizas legitimacy, thereby excluding most opposition members. It called
on all living forces of Burundi opposed to the third mandate to continue the fight
to safeguard the Arusha Agreement and the rule of law in Burundi . In a
12 December letter to facilitator Mkapa, CNARED President Jean Minani stated
that CNARED no longer recognized him as facilitator, as he had denied the cause
of the conflict in Burundi. Several civil society entities belonging to the Stop the
third term movement (Action by Christians for the Abolition of Torture, the
Association pour la protection des droits humains et des personnes dtenues, the
Forum pour le renforcement de la socit civile au Burundi, the Forum pour la
consience et le dveloppement, the Ligue burundaise des droits de lhomme ITEKA
and SOS Torture) accused the facilitator of bias in favour of the regime, and
requested a meeting with the EAC mediator, President Museveni.
18. Facilitator Mkapa convened a further session in Arusha from 16 to
19 February, to which an inclusive list of participants was invited. The Government
did not attend the session, but a delegation of the ruling party, CNDD -FDD, took
part. Also, a CNARED delegation headed by Jean Minani travelled to Arusha to
meet with Facilitator Mkapa. In Bujumbura, Gitega and other parts of the country,
large demonstrations took place against the Arusha consultations and the
participation of so-called putschists. While the dialogue session was ongoing, the
Government of Burundi requested the Government of the United Republic of

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Tanzania to arrest several participants in the dialogue who had been invited by the
Facilitator. Facilitator Mkapa, in his concluding statement on 19 February, called on
EAC to convene an extraordinary summit on Burundi so that the impediment to the
process could be discussed.

B. Security developments

19. The security situation remains fragile. While incidents of overt violence and
clashes between armed groups and Government security and defence forces ha d
ebbed for some time, daily allegations of arbitrary arrest, ill -treatment, torture and
enforced disappearance, along with the discovery of bodies, continue to be reported.
Search and cordon operations by police or joint police -military teams continued
almost daily in Bujumbura neighbourhoods, especially in Musaga and Nyakabiga,
which were widely regarded as hotspots for protests against a third term. While the
initial phase of the crisis in 2015 saw violent incidents largely concentrated in and
around the capital, throughout 2016 there were regular reports of incidents in other
parts of the country, particularly in provincial hotspots in Bururi, Cibitoke, Gitega,
Kirundo, Makamba, Muyinga, Ngozi, Rumonge, Rutana and Ruyigi provinces.
20. Importantly, there have been reports of increased activity by the
Imbonerakure, the ruling partys youth militia. This is contributing to a sense of
insecurity and a climate of fear. There have been regular reports of intimidation,
criminal activity, ill-treatment, nocturnal patrols and paramilitary training in a
number of provinces. The Imbonerakure reportedly also routinely participate in joint
operations with the police and intelligence services and are reported to have been
implicated in numerous cases of arbitrary arrest and disappearance, ill-treatment,
killings and some cases of sexual violence.
21. The fragility of the security situation was further underscored by the attempted
assassination of presidential adviser Willy Nyamitwe on 28 November, in which
Nyamitwe was injured and one of his bodyguards died. On 1 January, the Minister
of Water, the Environment and Planning, Emmanuel Niyonkuru, was assassinated.
The incident is still under investigation.
22. On 28 December, the Senate unanimously adopted the draft law on the
management and organization of the Force de dfense nationale (FDN). The law has
yet to be approved by the Constitutional Court and promulgated by the President.
The FDN spokesperson commented on the draft law, citing (a) the renaming of the
FDN to the Force de dfense nationale du Burundi, (b) the reorganization of
domestic command structures currently known as military regions and (c) the
reorganization of FDNB into multiple services. The law garnered criticism of the
envisaged creation of a system of reservists, as opposition voices fear this will
legalize the military use of the Imbonerakure and CNDD -FDD ex-combatants as a
partisan militia.
23. The cohesion of the security forces remains a key factor for the stability of the
country. Reports of increased targeting of ex-soldiers of the Forces armes
burundaises are a major concern. While cohesion has so far been maintained, it
could be tested by the further targeting of high-ranking officials, including FDN
officers, as well as unforeseen political or security events. Eighteen people,
including at least five ex-soldiers of the Forces armes burundaises, were arrested
and sentenced to 30 years in prison after allegedly attacking a military camp in
Mukoni, Muyinga province, on 23 January. The incident was qualified by
Government officials as an attempted robbery by an organized gang, but
opposition leaders alleged that it was a fabrication by the Government in order to
stage a crackdown. Of those convicted, eight said they had been severely tortured.

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Three bodies were also discovered near the base shortly after the incident, including
that of a warrant officer who had been arrested by police during the incident and
later found decapitated.

Regional security issues

24. Relations between Burundi and Rwanda remain tense. Throughout the
reporting period, isolated border incidents, as well as trade and movement
restrictions, were witnessed. On 29 July, the Council of Ministers decided to stop
the export of all food products to neighbouring countries, repo rtedly in response to
insufficient domestic production. On 23 August, the East African Legislative
Assembly decided to investigate issues affecting trade and free movement of
citizens between Burundi and Rwanda. Burundian security forces frequently
arrested individuals travelling to and from Rwanda, as well as the United Republic
of Tanzania.
25. Security incidents involving Burundian armed groups, which allegedly use
some areas in South Kivu province of the Democratic Republic of the Congo as a
rear base for launching operations from across the border into Burundi, continue to
be reported. During the reporting period, Gihanga commune, in the Bubanza
province of Burundi, on the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
continued to be the site of ongoing incidents between the Burundian Armed Forces,
the Burundian National Police and elements presumed to be from the armed faction
of the Forces nationales de libration (FNL) led by Aloys Nzabampema.

C. Human rights situation

26. During the reporting period, OHCHR documented and received allegations of
serious human rights violations and abuses, including extrajudicial killings,
arbitrary arrests and detentions, forced disappearances and cases of torture and ill -
treatment, along with allegations of illegal places of detention and restrictions on
freedom of association, expression and movement. OHCHR noted an increase in
allegations of enforced disappearance, with more than 210 allegations received
between October 2016 and January 2017, compared with 77 cases documented by
OHCHR between April and 10 October 2016. OHCHR reported at least 30 people
killed in the past four months, as well as an upward trend in the discovery of dead
bodies, with at least 22 corpses discovered in January 2 017.
27. Hundreds of people, including street vendors and children, continue to be
arrested each month. Most of them are arrested on suspicion of undermining internal
State security, participation in armed banditry, for investigation purposes or
simply because they are travelling to or from other provinces or neighbouring
countries. The Imbonerakure are reportedly increasingly acting as law enforcement
agents, including by illegally arresting people and handing them over to the police
or conducting joint operations with local authorities and sometimes the police.
Reports are also pointing to a strategy of transferring detainees from one province to
the other, sometimes several times over a short period of time, which carries a risk
of enforced disappearance.
28. On 23 January 2017, the President signed a decree pardoning certain
categories of detainees. The implementation of the decree, which according to the
Ministry of Justice will benefit approximately 2,500 detainees, will contribute to
relieving prison overcrowding in Burundi. As of 8 February 2017, a total of 1,033
prisoners, including 25 children, have been released pursuant to the decree.
Reportedly, at least 58 members of the Movement for Solidarity and Democracy
were pardoned, but not all of them have been released. Some offences, such as

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undermining internal security, were excluded from the presidential pardon. Such
offences have become the main justification for the arrest, prosecution and
sentencing of members of opposition parties.
29. Members of opposition political parties, as well as perceived opponents,
reportedly continue to be victims of arbitrary arrest, detention, ill -treatment and
enforced disappearance. In January 2017, at least 35 members of political opposition
parties were arrested (26 from the FNL-Rwasa, 1 from the FNL-Nzabampema, 1 from
the Union pour la paix et le Dveloppement (UPD)-Zigamibanga, 4 from Unit pour
le progrs national (UPRONA) and 3 from the Movement for Solidarity and
Democracy; at least 10 were ill-treated or tortured. Ex-soldiers of the Forces armes
burundaises were increasingly targeted by national security forces, with several
members arrested and becoming victims of enforced disappearance, torture and ill -
treatment, in particular following the alleged Mukoni attack.
30. Alleged perpetrators of human rights violations continue to benefit from total
impunity. Very little effort has been made to investigate human rights abuses
committed by State agents or the Imbonerakure.
31. While OHCHR has not been able to document cases of sexual and gender-
based violence during the reporting period, this could mainly be a result of the
ongoing climate of fear, distrust of the authorities and the judicial system and the
stigma generally associated with such violence, which prevents survivors from
reporting and accessing services. Information from open sources quoting Burundian
refugees suggests that women and girls have been subjected to sexual and gender -
based violence while fleeing the country.
32. A significant number of human rights defenders, lawyers, journalists and
members of civil society organizations fled the country, and those still operating in
Burundi face considerable risk. During the reporting period, freedom of expression
and freedom of the media in Burundi remained restricted. The activities of
Burundian media oversight organizations such as the Press Observatory in Burundi
and the Burundian Association of Radiobroadcasters continue to be paralysed, while
the Organization of Burundian Journalists was suspended by the Government on
24 October 2016.
33. Journalists working for private and independent media continued to face
harassment through arbitrary arrest, detention or enforced disappearance. In the
light of restrictions imposed on private media, social med ia has come to serve as an
alternative source and sharing platform of often unverified information on security
events and human rights violations, which has contributed to the circulation of
speculation and rumours.
34. Civil society organizations continue to be subject to repression. On 19 October
2016, the Minister of the Interior signed a ministerial order removing five
organizations from the register of civil society organizations: Forum pour le
renforcement de la socit civile au Burundi, Forum pour la consience et le
dveloppement, Action by Christians for the Abolition of Torture, Association pour
la protection des droits humains et des personnes dtenues and Rseau des Citoyens
Probes. On 24 October, the Minister of the Interior issued a second orde r
suspending a further five organizations for an undetermined period: Coalition de la
socit civile pour le monitoring lectoral, Coalition Burundaise pour la Cour
Pnale Internationale, Union Burundaise des Journalistes, Ligue Iteka and SOS
Torture Burundi. On 21 December 2016, Ligue Iteka, which is one of the oldest and
most respected human rights non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Burundi,
was permanently banned.

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35. Further restrictions were implemented on 23 December 2016, when the

National Assembly of Burundi adopted legislation that requires civil society
organizations that are based abroad or funded from abroad to deposit one third of
their operating budget into the central bank of Burundi, pay all their employees
(including international employees) in Burundian francs and respect ethnic quotas in
hiring local staff. The law was adopted by the Senate and promulgated by the
President in January 2017.

Cooperation with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Human Rights, other international human rights mechanisms and the
International Criminal Court
36. During the reporting period, the Government withdrew its cooperation from a
range of human rights mechanisms. The Committee against Torture convened a
special review session on Burundi on 28 and 29 July. Members of the Committee
and a Burundian delegation headed by the Minister of Justice were to discuss steps
taken to investigate summary executions, arbitrary detentions, torture and ill -
treatment of opposition members, journalists and human rights defenders, including
the attack against the President of the Association pour la protection des droits
humains et des personnes dtenues, Pierre Claver Mbonimpa, in August 2015, and
the murder of his son in November 2015. On 29 July, ho wever, in an unprecedented
move, the Burundian government delegation withdrew from the session. In a note
verbale dated 29 July addressed to OHCHR, the Government indicated that the
proceedings had been premised on reports to which the Government had no pr ior
access and requested additional time to respond. In response, the Committee
indicated that it regretted the Governments absence during the dialogue session of
29 July and stressed that established procedures had been followed.
37. On 20 September, the independent investigation on Burundi carried out
pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution S-24/1 released its final report, citing
a systematic pattern of gross human rights violations, some of which it identified as
possibly amounting to crimes against humanity, committed primarily by State
agents and those linked to them. The report also identified human rights abuses
reportedly committed by the armed opposition, including cases of murder, targeted
assassinations and grenade attacks, which had caused casualties among the
population. The Burundian authorities described the report as a political report
and full of lies. Similarly, the ruling CNDD-FDD party issued a press statement
on 22 September in which it rejected the findings of the report as unverified and
dangerously biased and requested the United Nations to consider the report void,
while reaffirming the partys attachment to human rights principles. Protests
against the publication of the report took place between 22 and 30 September,
mostly in Bujumbura Mairie, but also in several other provinces, including in front
of the OHCHR office.
38. On 30 September, the Human Rights Council adopted its resolution 33/24, in
which it established a commission of inquiry into human rights violations in
Burundi. The Government rejected the resolution as inapplicable in Burundi in a
press communiqu dated 3 October. On 10 October, the Government declared the
three experts of the independent investigation on Burundi personae non gratae in
Burundi.
39. On 11 October, the Government announced the suspension of all cooperation
and collaboration with the OHCHR office in Burundi for complicity in preparing
the report of the independent investigation on Burundi.
40. On 27 October, the Government formally notified the Secretary -General of its
withdrawal from the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

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41. On 14 November, the Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal

Court presented its annual report on preliminary examination activities. It affirmed
that, despite Burundis withdrawal from the Rome Statute, the preliminary
examination would continue and may also include any other crimes within the
same situation that could be committed in Burundi until the withdrawal becomes
effective, on 26 October 2017.
42. On 23 November, the Minister of Human Rights, Social Affairs and Gender
announced the Governments refusal to cooperate with the commission of inquiry
established by the Human Rights Council pursuant to its resolution 33/24, following
the appointment of the three members by the President of the Human Rights
Council. Peaceful Government-sponsored protests across the country resumed on
26 November against the commission of inquiry.
43. On 28 November, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,
acting under its early warning and urgent action procedure, express ed grave concern
at the human rights situation, reports of armed militia intimidating the population,
the issuance of a questionnaire by the Ministry of Civil Service on 8 November
requesting all public servants to state their ethnicity, the frequent use o f hate speech
and incitement to ethnic violence by government officials, and Burundians seeking
refuge in neighbouring countries. The Committee urged the Government to abide by
its international human rights obligations and refrain from taking any action t hat
would exacerbate ethnic tensions in the country.

Incitement to hatred and violence

44. Since the beginning of the crisis, political figures have used inflammatory and
hate-filled language in speeches, on social media, in communiqus and in the press,
calling on the population to protect the country against so-called traitors and
plotters allegedly trying to destabilize Burundi. Rhetoric has included incitement to
violence, as well as attacks on the opposition and against civil society, while
neighbouring countries have been accused of involvement in attempted
assassinations. On 26 November, during protests in Rumonge against the
appointment of the three members of the commission of inquiry in Burundi, the
Secretary-General of CNDD-FDD, Evariste Ndayishimiye, indicated that the
Burundian people as a whole were ready to seriously deal with whomever would
attempt to destabilize the regime. He called traitors the Burundians who were
outside the country, whom he accused of trying to destabilize the country with the
assistance of foreign powers. The Imbonerakure chanted slogans hostile to the
opposition and songs of victory for CNDD-FDD. Some members of the opposition
have in turn openly called for the use of force to remove the regime.
45. The United Nations is unable to monitor the use of hate and inflammatory
speech throughout the country owing to the restricted operations of OHCHR and the
limited capacity of the Office of the Special Adviser, which make it difficult to
present a full picture of the extent of hate speech in the country or to contextualize
individual statements.

D. Socioeconomic and humanitarian developments

46. The political crisis has had a negative impact on the socioeconomic and
humanitarian situation in Burundi. The key macroeconomic indicators show a
decline in gross domestic product growth, a significant loss of for eign exchange
reserves and a sharp drop in public investment. Public debt increased to over 50 per
cent in 2016. Unemployment rates are soaring, especially among youth.

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47. According to the Government budget for the 2016 fiscal year, security
spending increased, while allocations to social sectors such as health, education and
agriculture declined. In the health sector, there is a chronic shortage of essential
medicine. In 2016, the education, health and water/sanitation budgets decreased by
30 per cent, 54 per cent and 72 per cent, respectively. The Government broadened
and accelerated national and local revenue collection, including through the
introduction of local taxes and levies and the decentralization of payments to
teachers to the local level.
48. In 2016, the number of people in need of humanitarian assistance increased
from 1.1 million to at least 3 million (26 per cent of the total population); women,
children and youth were the most affected, particularly when in a situation of
displacement. The number of people in need of protection has almost doubled, from
1.1 million to 1.8 million. The sociopolitical crisis has had an impact on the rule of
law and on access to essential support services, thus exposing the most vulnerable to
multiple protection risks, including gender-based violence and other violations and
abuses.
49. There has been a four-fold increase in the number of people who are food
insecure from 730,000 to 3 million owing to the rising prices of basic food
items, the seasonal rain deficit during the 2016 agricultural season, chronic poverty
and poor harvests. According to the World Health Organization, some 8.2 million
Burundians (73 per cent of the total population) were affected by malaria in 2016;
3,826 died. The number of internally displaced persons is estimated at 170,000,
while the number of spontaneous returnees identified so far in some targeted
provinces is approximately 37,000. The monthly rate of arrival of refugees in
neighbouring countries from August to October 2016 do ubled from previous
months, and the increasing trend was confirmed in the first weeks of 2017. As of
early February 2017, the number of Burundians who had fled the country sin ce
April 2015 stood at 387,000.
50. The 2016 humanitarian appeal for Burundi for $62.3 million benefited from a
late surge in funding, making it 99 per cent covered by the end of the year.
However, timely humanitarian assistance has been hampered by the Government s
restrictive approach to the issuance of visas to staff of internationa l NGOs, as well
as the requirement that Government line ministries accompany daily field missions
and the withholding of donor funds earmarked for NGOs that were to be channelled
through the central bank of Burundi.

Peacebuilding activities
51. The Peacebuilding Commission continued its engagement in helping to
prevent the crisis from escalating further and restoring trust between the
Government of Burundi and its main international partners. In this regard, the Chair
of the Burundi configuration of the Commission engaged in policy discussions on
the economic impact of the political crisis in Burundi. This engagement included
discussions with government authorities in charge of finances and the economy and
briefings with officials from the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the
United Nations country team and the private sector in Burundi.
52. Following the discussions, the Chair, together with the United Nations
Resident Coordinator, organized consultations with multilateral partners of Buru ndi,
namely, the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the European Union, the
International Monetary Fund and the United Nations system, in Geneva on 7 and
8 November. The purpose of the consultations was to compare the partners
macroeconomic assessments, exchange information on their responses to the current
socioeconomic challenges, explore ways to address them and identify possible

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synergies. The Peacebuilding Commission has agreed with the Government to

pursue this engagement with multilateral partners in 2017.
53. The Peacebuilding Fund provided the Office of the Special Adviser with
resources to enable the Special Adviser to support dialogue efforts, including
support for the EAC facilitation of the inter-Burundian dialogue. It also continued to
provide direct funding to the African Union in support of the deployment of 32 out
of 100 authorized African Union human rights observers, who are mandated to
monitor and document the human rights situation in Bujumbura and other areas of
the country. This was the first such instance of the provision of direct funding to the
African Union. It was conducted in coordination with the European Commission,
which is providing sustained funding to the human rights observers. The
Peacebuilding Fund also continued to promote dialogue and conflict resolution
capacities at the local level. A network of more than 500 women mediators has
continued to address local conflicts and has brought together women of different
political affiliations, and urban youth are being pro vided with targeted
socioeconomic opportunities to improve social cohesion and community security.

III. Implementation of resolution 2303 (2016) and activities of

the Special Adviser
54. On 30 July, the day following the adoption of resolution 2303 (2016), some
1,000 people, including members of CNDD-FDD and allied parties, protested
against the adoption of the resolution in front of the French and Rwa ndan embassies
in Bujumbura and urged the Security Council to review its decision to deploy a
United Nations police component to Burundi. On 2 August, the Government issued
a communiqu stating that while it had previously consented to the deployment of
between 20 and 50 unarmed police officers, the current situation no longer
warranted such a deployment which, it said, would be better put to use in Rwanda,
where the armed opposition was being recruited and trained. In a press communiqu
issued on 15 August, the ruling CNDD-FDD party similarly criticized the Councils
decision to deploy United Nations police to Burundi as a violation of the country s
sovereignty.
55. On 18 August, the Minister of External Relations and International
Cooperation of Burundi, Alain Aim Nyamitwe, sent me a letter in which he
reiterated his Governments rejection of resolution 2303 (2016). The Minister
referred to the Security Councils alleged failure to seek the Governments consent
for the deployment of a United Nations police component and claimed a positive
change in the current situation, suggesting that a foreign presence was no longer
required. He stressed the Governments continued commitment to dialogue, support
for the deployment of the 200 African Union human rights observers and military
experts and the need for the Governments consent for any further strengthening of
the Office of the Special Adviser. On the same day, the National Assembly and the
Senate issued a statement and a resolution, respectively, rejecting the adoption of
resolution 2303 (2016) on the basis that the decision to deploy police officers in
Burundi was taken without Government consent.
56. Implementation of resolution 2303 (2016) has so far been made impossible by
the Governments continued rejection of the resolution. On 14 October, the Security
Council issued a press statement requesting me to dispatch my Special Adviser to
coordinate with the Government of Burundi on the modalities for the
implementation of resolution 2303 (2016), in particular with regard to paragraphs 8,
13 and 14 thereof, in accordance with United Nations practice.

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57. During his visit to the country, my Special Adviser urged the Government to
resume full cooperation with OHCHR. He also called on the Government to commit
to confidence-building measures, in particular, an unequivocal commitment to seek
an end to the current political crisis through an inclusive dialogue, the release of
political prisoners who had not used or advocated violence, the opening of political
space for opposition and civil society and a firm commitment not to introduce
non-consensual changes to the Constitution that would violate the Arusha
Agreement.
58. Upon his return from Burundi, my Special Adviser briefed the Security
Council on 8 November on the outcome of his visit, stressing the need for a new
compact between the Government and the international community, with both sides
engaging in a constructive effort to promote peace and stability, in full respect of
Burundis sovereignty. He also informed the Council that his interlocutors had
indicated openness to the deployment of up to 50 unarmed police officers. However,
it was subsequently learned that the Government was no longer willing to entertain
such an option and had decided to reject any kind of United Nations police
deployment.
59. As a result, the key elements of resolution 2303 (2016) remain
unimplemented, namely, the increase in the human rights monitoring capacity in the
country, support for the inter-Burundian dialogue, the swift implementation of the
strengthening of the Office of the Special Adviser, and the establishment of a Uni ted
Nations police component in Burundi and ensuring its progressive deployment.

A. Human rights monitoring

60. In paragraph 4 of resolution 2303 (2016), the Security Council urged the
Government of Burundi to continue to cooperate fully with OHCHR and requested
the Secretary-General, in conjunction with the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights, to take appropriate steps to reinforce the human rights
monitoring capacity to monitor the situation in Burundi. However, the monitoring
and reporting capacity of OHCHR has been eroded by the Government s decision to
suspend its cooperation, to the detriment of the situational awareness of the entire
United Nations system. As a result, OHCHR has had to put on hold its technical
cooperation with the Burundian authorities and has to rely in part on information
received from third parties for its reporting. While the sources are deemed to be
credible, OHCHR cannot independently verify the information.
61. The Government requested OHCHR to engage in negotiations to amend the
memorandum of understanding that has been in place since 1995 regarding the
mandate, size and duration of the OHCHR presence in Burundi.

B. Deployment of African Union observers

62. As of February 2017, only 45 African Union human rights observers, 32 of

whom are funded through catalytic funding provided by the Peacebuilding Fund,
have been deployed to Burundi. Twenty-three African Union military experts have
been deployed; however, owing to a scheduled rotation, there were only 10 African
Union military experts in the country at the time of reporting. Despite months of
negotiations, the Government has yet to sign a memorandum of understanding
guiding the African Union deployment in Burundi.
63. In this regard, the proposals for United Nations support for the deployment of
the African Union observers, which were requested in paragraph 11 of resolution

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2303 (2016), were submitted to the Security Council on 19 September 2016,

following extensive consultations with the African Union. The proposals included a
targeted package of operational support to the African Union, including office
premises, associated facilities management services, transportation, fuel,
information and communications technology equipment, medical and medevac
services and personal protection equipment, with a key defining principle being
parity of support between United Nations and African Union personnel. While
awaiting any further decision of the Council, the United Nations continues to
maintain a close working relationship with the African Union.

C. Support for the inter-Burundian dialogue

64. My Special Adviser and his team have engaged the EAC facilitatio n team on
several occasions and participated in facilitation activities when requested. During
the week beginning 6 February 2017, the Special Adviser s team travelled to Arusha
and worked together with the African Union and the EAC facilitation team on
preparations for another round of consultations with Burundian stakeholders.
Together, they developed the format, agenda and list of participants for the session.
The three teams agreed to form a joint technical working group to support the
dialogue process and are finalizing terms of reference to formalize cooperation and
support arrangements. This development marks a significant enhancement of
collaboration among EAC, the African Union and the United Nations.

D. Strengthening the Office of the Special Adviser

65. In resolution 2303 (2016), the Security Council requested the Secretary-
General to swiftly implement the strengthening of the Office of the Special Adviser,
as referred to in paragraph 10 of Council resolution 2279 (2016) and paragraph 7 of
Council resolution 2248 (2015), by substantially increasing the number of political
officers in Burundi in order to: (a) engage with all stakeholders to the crisis,
including the Government, opposition, political parties, civil society, religious
leaders and others; (b) provide substantive support to the inter -Burundian dialogue;
and (c) work with all Burundian parties to develop confidence -building measures to
improve the human rights and security situation and foster an environment
conducive to political dialogue. The Council also stipulated additional reporting
requirements. On the basis of its existing staffing levels, the Office of the Special
Adviser has a limited capability to fulfil these mandated tasks and to monitor and
report on the situation in the country, and has no capacity to do so outside of the
capital, Bujumbura.
66. Following extensive discussions in the Advisory Committee on Administrative
and Budgetary Questions and the Fifth Committee, on 23 December 2016, the
General Assembly, in section XIX, paragraphs 24-29, of its resolution 71/272,
decided to maintain the Offices budget at its 2016 level and not to authorize any
additional posts or resources, effectively preventing the implementation of Security
Council resolutions 2279 (2016) and 2303 (2016) in this regard.
67. The Office of the Special Adviser and OHCHR are not alone in experiencing
Government restrictions. Some members of the United Nations country team have
been affected by the Governments decision to require 10 days notification ahead of
any in-country travel. There have been delays in the processing of visas, and some
local staff have faced intimidation, including instances of arbitrary arrest.

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E. Police deployment

68. As mandated by the Security Council, the Secretariat proceeded with planning
and preparations for the deployment of up to 228 individual police officers in
accordance with the provisions of resolution 2303 (2016). Since my Special
Advisers previous briefing to the Council, there has been no progress in the
deployment of a United Nations police component. It is worth recalling that on
23 August, the Secretariat sent a note verbale to the Government of Burundi
regarding the dispatch of a technical assessment mission, in accordance with
standard United Nations procedures, in preparation for a new deployment. On
24 August, the Secretariat was informed by the Government in a note verbale that it
would not agree to the dispatch of such a mission. In the event of consent from the
Government, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations of the Secretariat stands
ready to deploy a police component within 15 days with a view to ensuring initial
operational capacity on the ground.

F. Contingency planning

69. On 6 January 2016, the Department of Peacekeeping Oper ations submitted to

the Security Council a contingency plan for the deployment of uniformed personnel
in Burundi. The plan envisages the deployment of a well-equipped and coercive
force, generated from within existing United Nations capacities, in response to
widespread and systematic human rights violations potentially amounting to
genocide, subject to Security Council authorization, the consent of the host country
and the agreement of troop-contributing countries. The plan is updated on a regular
basis. However, it is important to acknowledge that the United Nations is
ill-equipped to mount the type of peace enforcement operation that may be required
in the event of mass atrocities in Burundi. Identifying a country or a coalition of the
willing to carry out such an operation therefore remains a priority.

IV. Observations and recommendations

70. The foundational values of the Arusha Agreement, namely, justice, the rule of
law, democracy, good governance, pluralism, respect for the fundamental rights and
freedoms of the individual, unity, solidarity, equality between women and men,
mutual understanding and tolerance among the various political and ethnic
components of the Burundian people, have been undermined over the course of this
crisis.
71. The adoption of constitutional amendments that would reverse provisions of
the Arusha Agreement would, under the current circumstances, bear the risk of
plunging the country back into armed conflict, with unpredictable repercussions for
the region. I am very concerned about the Presidents recent statement alluding to
the possibility of seeking a fourth term in office, which would require amendments
to the Constitution. While Burundians have the sovereign right to amend their
Constitution in accordance with their own laws, it was President Nkurunzizas
decision to seek a third term that triggered the countrys most severe crisis since it
emerged from a bloody civil war more than a decade ago. Burundi has still not
recovered from the electoral crisis of 2015 and continues to face multifaceted
challenges, including ongoing serious human rights violations and abuses, economic
degradation and the mass displacement of people. An attempt by the President to
seek a fourth term in office under the current circumstances would risk intensifying
the crisis and undermining collective efforts to find a sustainable solution to the
crisis in the country.

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72. Burundis political leadership has the moral obligation and political
responsibility to make every effort to return the country to a path of peace and
economic and social development. The fact that the crisis in Burundi has not
escalated into a full-blown armed conflict so far is not an indicator that the worst
has been averted. On the contrary, potential triggers for an esc alation and violence
remain in place. I urge all Burundian stakeholders to place their country s interests
above their own and to commit in good faith and without preconditions to a truly
inclusive and credible dialogue led by EAC, based on respect for the Arusha
Agreement. This is the only way to address political differences in a peaceful
manner and find a durable solution to the crisis. I would like to reiterate the full
support of the United Nations to the regions peace efforts. To this end, the United
Nations system will continue to mobilize adequate resources and expertise to
support the mediation led by EAC.
73. The United Nations has sought to use its good offices role to work with the
Government and other stakeholders in a constructive manner, wit h the aim of
helping to open up political space. During my predecessor s visit to Burundi in
February 2016, President Nkurunziza expressed his commitment to a number of
confidence-building measures, such as the release of political prisoners who did not
use or advocate violence, lifting the ban on independent media and lifting the ban
on suspended NGOs. However, more needs to be done. It is crucial that the
Government deliver fully on its commitments. In this regard, it would be essential
to lift the restrictions on civil society, human rights and media organizations to
allow them to operate freely and participate in the political process and to foster the
promotion and protection of human rights, including full freedom of expression and
an independent media.
74. My Special Adviser and other United Nations officials continued to pursue
these efforts and repeatedly encouraged the Government to follow through on these
commitments. Despite these efforts, the Government has ultimately failed to take
the necessary steps to open political space and allow for the creation of a climate
conducive to a peaceful resolution of the crisis.
75. Reduced cooperation with the United Nations system, including the imposition
of restrictions on operations throughout the country, has further undermined efforts
to find a peaceful solution to the crisis. In particular, the suspension of cooperation
with OHCHR and other human rights mechanisms is of grave concern. I urge the
Government to renew its partnership with the United Nations system, including
OHCHR and the Office of the Special Adviser. I also call upon the Government to
sign a status-of-mission agreement with the United Nations, allowing the Office of
the Special Adviser to operate freely.
76. I note that the Government has yet to sign the memorandum of understanding
with the African Union on the deployment and activities of the African Union
human rights observers and military experts. I urge the Government to sign without
further delay this memorandum of understanding, which will allow the African
Union human rights observers and military experts to fully operate in the country in
fulfilment of their mandated responsibilities. I call upon Member States to support
their deployment, including through consideration of the prop osals submitted to the
Security Council on 19 September 2016. The United Nations will continue to
enhance its cooperation with the African Union in support of the dialogue process
facilitated by EAC.
77. The socioeconomic and humanitarian situation in the country is increasingly
dire. It is critical that the Government respect humanitarian space to facilitate the
delivery of humanitarian assistance. I would like to commend the region for its
generosity and hosting large numbers of refugees, and reiterate th e readiness of the

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United Nations to continue to provide required support. Humanitarian actors have

intensified their efforts in this regard.
78. The risk that a deterioration of the situation would represent for the country,
and potentially for the entire subregion, should not be underestimated. I am
convinced that there remains an urgent need to address the crisis. Failure to act
decisively now through inclusive dialogue would only lead to further suffering of
the population and threaten to undo more than a decade of peacebuilding work. The
region and the international community should put their full political weight behind
the dialogue process facilitated by EAC to prevent a situation that has the potential
to result in widespread violence, with a potential spillover into neighbouring
countries.
79. In the light of allegations of persisting human rights violations, urgent
measures must be taken to ensure accountability and prevent impunity. I call upon
the national authorities to cooperate fully with the commission of inquiry mandated
by the Human Rights Council and to hold all perpetrators of human rights violations
and abuses to account.
80. The United Nations has worked closely with Burundi for more than two
decades, and I trust we will continue our constructive engagement with the
Government and the people of Burundi. The path Burundi will follow will depend
on the commitment of the Burundians themselves. The Burundians must work
together, with the support of the international community, to build a str onger and
more stable future for the country.
81. Lastly, I thank my Special Adviser and the overall United Nations system in
Burundi for their continued efforts in support of peace and stability in Burundi. I
call upon the Security Council and the international community to remain engaged
and support all national and regional stakeholders in the search for durable peace in
the country.

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