CO

MPI
LAT
ION
OF
DIG
Submitted to:
Atty. Joseph Gideone Valencia, PHD
Professor

Submitted by:
Lorrie-del V. Albarico
LLB4 l02
TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page Number
Preservation/Analysis of Evidence--------------- 3-18
Examining Fingerprints------------------------------ 19-29

Page 1 of 68
 Other means of Identification---------------------- 30-40
DNA Testing--------------------------------------------- 40-68
Identifying Firearms----------------------------------- 41-73
Forensic Dentistry------------------------------------- 74-75
Forensic Autopsy-------------------------------------- 76-82
Traditional Methods of Identification------------ 83

A. Preservation/Analysis of Evidence

1. Case Title: JUAN DELA RAMA and EUGENIA DELA RAMA

vs.
OSCAR PAPA AND AMEUERFINA PAPA

Facts:

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 Petitioners were the registered owners of the subject parcel of land, acquired by way of sale from
Canlubang Sugar Estate (CSE). In 1992, petitioners were informed by the assessors office that their title
to the property had been cancelled, and a new title issued in favor of respondents Oscar and Ameorfina
Papa. Oscar Papa had been the Assistant Vice- President and Head of Marketing of the Laguna Estate
Development Corporation (LEDC), a marketing arm of CSE and the entity through which the property had
earlier been marketed and sold to petitioners. The property was transferred to and retitled in the name of
the spouses Papa pursuant to a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale, covering the subject property, and
identifying petitioners as the vendors and respondents as the vendees. Claiming that their signatures on
the 1985 deed of sale were forged, petitioners filed a complaint for "Cancellation of Title Obtained Under
Forged Deed of Sale."

Issue:

Whether the petitioners failure to present an expert handwriting witness was fatal to their case.

Ruling:

The petitioners had the onus probandi to establish such forgery. However, petitioners point out that
respondent Papa had admitted before the Court that he did not sign the deed of sale in front of the Notary
Public. The presumptions that attach to notarized documents can be affirmed only so long as it is beyond
dispute that the notarization was regular. We cannot ascribe that conclusion at bar to the deed of sale.
The Court of Appeals was unable to advert to anything on record as to how the deed of sale was
substantiated during trial by Papa. Respondents, before this Court, are likewise unable to offer any
convincing argument tending to verify the deed of sale that is independent of the now-debunked legal
presumption that the document was duly executed. We do not discount the fact that the petitioners could
have further bolstered their case either by presenting a handwriting expert, or Ameurfina dela Rama as a
witness. Still, their failure to do so is not fatal as the document in question is a private document, one
which carries no presumption as to its authenticity and due execution.

2. Case Title: BETTY GEPULLE-GARBO, et al,

vs.

SPOUSES VICTOREY AND JOSEPHINE GARABATO,

Facts:

Nick Garbo was married to Eduviges and they had a daughter named Florence who in turn had a
son out of wedlock, respondent Victorey. During the subsistence of Nick and Eduviges marriage, Nick
cohabited with petitioner Betty. On June 17, 1977, a Deed of Sale was executed between Eduviges and
Florence whereby the former sold to the latter a 303-square meter parcel of land, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 17986, in Pasay City. The deed of sale was signed by Nick Garbo. In 1996,
respondent Victorey, registered the subject property in his name by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed by
Florence in his favor. On October 15, 1996, respondent was issued TCT No. 136900.

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 On August 2, 2001, petitioner filed a petition for cancellation of TCT No. 136900 against
respondents. She impugns the validity of the June 17, 1977 Deed of Sale on the ground that the
signatures of Nick and Eduviges were forged by Florence. Petitioner also assailed the deed of sale
between Florence and Victorey. Petitioner claimed that Nick had previously sought the examination of his
alleged signature on the June 17, 1977 Deed of Sale by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The
NBI examiner allegedly found that the questioned signature and the standard signatures of Nick were not
written by one and the same person. Petitioner further alleged that Nick had filed a criminal complaint for
falsification against Florence though the case was dismissed due to lack of probable cause. Petitioner
presented as witness, Mr. Bienvenido Albacea, a handwriting expert and retired employee of the NBI, who
at the time of the conduct of the examination of the subject deed of sale was a Document Examiner II of
the NBI. Albacea stated that in 1992, he was requested to examine the signatures of Nick appearing in the
deeds of sale dated June 17, 1977 and June 15, 1977 and compared it with the specimen signatures
appearing in the Alien Registration Form No. 3, a document from the Treasurers Office of Pasay City and
several receipts issued by Nick to his lessees. After he conducted an examination of the signatures in
these documents, he concluded that the questioned and the standard signatures of Nick were not written
by one and the same person.

Respondent Victorey presented a document entitled Affidavit of Waiver dated June 17, 1977
executed by Nick stating that Eduviges acquired a parcel of land covered by TCT No. 17986 and that Nick
did not contribute a single centavo to buy the parcel of land. It further stated that Nick waived all his rights,
title and interest and possession to land in favor of his wife, Eduviges. In its August 7, 2006 Decision, the
RTC dismissed the complaint for cancellation of title filed by petitioner. On appeal, the CA affirmed the
RTC ruling that petitioner failed to prove by clear, positive and convincing proof of forgery in Nicks
signature in the deed of sale.

Issue:

Whether the signatures of Nick and Eduviges appearing on the instruments were forged.

Ruling:

Section 1, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides that the burden of proof is the duty of a party to
prove the truth of his claim or defense, or any fact in issue by the amount of evidence required by law. As
a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence, the
burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. One who alleges forgery has the burden to establish his
case by a preponderance of evidence, or evidence which is of greater weight or more convincing than that
which is offered in opposition to it. The fact of forgery can only be established by a comparison between
the alleged forged signature and the authentic and genuine signature of the person whose signature is
theorized to have been forged.

In Jimenez v. Commission on Ecumenical Mission, United Presbyterian Church, USA, the Court
identified and explained the factors involved in the examination and comparison of handwritings: x x x
[T]he authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its general characteristics,
similarities or dissimilarities with the genuine signature. Dissimilarities as regards spontaneity, rhythm,
pressure of the pen, loops in the strokes, signs of stops, shades, etc., that may be found between the
questioned signature and the genuine one are not decisive on the question of the formers authenticity.
The result of examinations of questioned handwriting, even with the benefit of aid of experts and scientific
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instruments, is, at best, inconclusive. There are other factors that must be taken into consideration. The
position of the writer, the condition of the surface on which the paper where the questioned signature is
written is placed, his state of mind, feelings and nerves, and the kind of pen and/or paper used, play an
important role on the general appearance of the signature. Unless, therefore, there is, in a given case,
absolute absence, or manifest dearth, of direct or circumstantial competent evidence on the character of a
questioned handwriting, much weight should not be given to characteristic similarities, or dissimilarities,
between that questioned handwriting and an authentic one.

The opinion of handwriting experts are not necessarily binding upon the court, the experts function
being to place before the court data upon which the court can form its own opinion. This principle holds
true especially when the question involved is mere handwriting similarity or dissimilarity, which can be
determined by a visual comparison of specimens of the questioned signatures with those of the currently
existing ones. A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimonies of handwriting experts,
because the judge must conduct an independent examination of the questioned signature in order to
arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity. The petitioner having not shown any reason for us
to disturb the ruling of the courts a quo, we are constrained to affirm the decision of the CA.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The May 20, 2011 Decision and the
January 5, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 87912 are AFFIRMED.

3. Case Title: MARIA LOURDES TAMANI, CONCEPCION TAMANI, ESTRELLA

TAMANI, TERESITA TAMANI, AZUCENA SOLEDAD, DOLORES GUERRERO, CRISTINA TUGADE

DAMIETA MANSAANG, MANUEL TAMANI, VALERIANA CASTRO, AURORA SANTIAGO and
ROSARIO CASTILLO,

vs.

ROMAN SALVADOR and FILOMENA BRAVO,

Facts:

Respondents and the Spouses Tamani, Demetrio Tamani and Josefa Caddauan, are co-owners of
an undivided parcel of land with an area of 776 sq. m. under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 8582.
On August 17, 1959, the Spouses Tamani allegedly sold the disputed property to Milagros Cruz (Cruz) as
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale for a consideration of Php 2,500.00. Petitioners herein are the
children of Spouses Tamani they contended that the signature of their parents were forged and thus assail
the validity of the August 17, 1959 Deed of Absolute sale between Cruz and their parents.

During trial, at the instance of petitioners, the signature of Demetrio Tamani appearing on the deed
of sale and his standard signatures were submitted for examination and comparison to the Questioned
Documents Division of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Bienvenido C. Albacea, a document
examiner of the NBI, filed a Report (NBI report) finding that the questioned and standard signatures

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DEMETRIO TAMANI are WRITTEN by one and the same person. Dissatisfied with the NBI report,
petitioners asked for another examination of the signatures, this time submitting the same to the Philippine
National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory Service. Mely Sorra, a document examiner of the PNP, filed a
Report (PNP report) finding that the questioned signature of DEMETRIO TAMANI appearing on the Deed
of Absolute Sale dated August 17, 1959 and the standard signatures of Demetrio Tamani marked S-1 to S-
11 and S-19 WERE WRITTEN BY TWO DIFFERENT PERSONS.

The RTC rendered a Decision ruling declaring the Deed of Sale as null and void and without legal
force and effect. The RTC gave more weight to the PNP report and testimony of Sorra because of her
educational, professional and work background.The CA issued a Decision ruling in respondents favor. The
CA, after examining the questioned and standard signatures of Tamani opined that the similarities of
strokes are more prominent and pronounced than the dissimilarities and the apparent dissimilarities are
overshadowed by the striking similarities in the questioned and the standard signatures.

Issue: Whether the purported signatures are authentic.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court granted the petition.

After painstakingly reviewing the testimonies of the expert witnesses and the documentary
evidence at hand, the Supreme Court is more inclined to believe that the signature of Tamani appearing
on the August 17, 1959 Deed of Sale was forged as can be gleaned from the testimony of Sorra, the
document examiner from the PNP Crime Laboratory. Sorra testified that the questioned signature was
executed in a slow and drawn manner, while the standard signatures were executed in a fast manner.
Moreover, the line quality of the questioned signature, particularly the letters o, m and n exhibited
hesitation and patchings, while the standard signatures exhibited equal distribution of ink line and had
good line quality. In addition, the lateral spacing of the questioned signature was crumpled, while the
lateral spacing of the standard signature is normal. Sorra was steadfast that the similarities between the
questioned signature and the standard signatures is attributable to the fact that the case involved a
simulated forgery or a copied forgery, such that there will be similarities, but the similarities will be
superficial.

The value of the opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere statements of whether
a writing is genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may afford in pointing out distinguishing marks,
characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of writing which would
ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed observer. While admittedly the Court was unable
to fully comprehend all the differences noted by Sorra given that her testimony was fairly technical in
nature and description, it would, however, not be amiss to state that it Court has observed a good number
of the differences noted by her.

4. Case Title: NORA T. JIMENEZ, JOSEFINA T. GAVINO, LIBRADA T. DINO and SUSAN T.
JOVEN,

vs.

Page 6 of 68
 COMMISSION ON ECUMENICAL MISSION AND RELATIONS OF THE UNITED PRESBYTERIAN
CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST IN THE
PHILIPPINES and POLICARPIO CARUNGIN,

Facts:

The petitioners are sisters and the children of Nicanor Teodoro and Francisca Ciriaco. They filed
their complaint in 1982 alleging that their mother was the owner of the subject property which was titled in
her name under OCT No. 11757. Said property is now covered by TCT No. 90689 in the name of
respondent United Church of Christ in the Philippines for this was donated to it by the Commission on
Ecumenical Mission in that Deed of Donation dated July 1, 1977. Petitioners claim that their parents never
sold the lot to anyone else, and that their purported signatures on the impugned Deed of Sale are
forgeries.

The petitioners asked for signature verification of the said deed of sale by the NBI and the PC. In its
Questioned Document Report No. 241-780 the NBI made the finding that the sample and questioned
signatures of Francisca were not written by the same person, while no definite opinion was given as to
Nicanors signatures because of the insufficiency in numbers of his sample signatures. The PC Crime
Laboratory examination came to the conclusion that the signatures of both Francisca and Nicanor were
written by persons other than the said spouses.

The RTC rendered its first decision of the case dismissing the complaint of petitioners on the
grounds of prescription and laches. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court. It ruled that there was
the case did not prescribe and that there was no laches and remanded the case back to the RTC. Upon
remand, the court a quo rendered the herein assailed judgment in favor of petitioners declaring the nullity
of the deed of sale and the TCT No. 90689 due to forgery. The CA reversed the RTC holding that the
signatures were not forged. The appellate court doubted the findings of the NBI and the PC handwriting
experts, because the documents from which the sample signatures were taken were either mere
photocopies, or dated years away from the questioned Deed of Sale of 1936.

Issue:Whether the signatures of Nicanor Teodoro and Francisca Ciriaco were falsified.

Ruling:

Resort to handwriting experts is not mandatory or indispensable to the examination or the

comparison of handwriting. A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimonies of handwriting
experts, because the judge must conduct an independent examination of the questioned signature in
order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity.

In the case of Gamido vs. Court of Appeals (citing the case of Alcon vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 162 SCRA 833), the Court held that the authenticity of signatures is not a highly technical issue in
the same sense that questions concerning, e.g., quantum physics or topology or molecular biology, would
constitute matters of a highly technical nature. The opinion of a handwriting expert on the genuineness of
a questioned signature is certainly much less compelling upon a judge than an opinion rendered by a
specialist on a highly technical issue. A judge must therefore conduct an independent examination of the
signature itself in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity.

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 After examining and analyzing the subject signatures, the SC found no substantial indicia or reason
to suspect their authenticity. Contrary to the findings of the NBI and PC, upon comparison of the
questioned signature of Francisca with her sample signatures the SC found resemblances but no stark
and distinguishing difference. The slight dissimilarities do not indicate forgery for these are natural,
expected and inevitable variations in genuine signatures made by one and the same person. Even the
sample signatures of Nicanor submitted by the appellees show clear variations in structure, flourish, and
style. It must be pointed out that the crux of the matter here is forgery and any positive assertion of it
cannot just be accepted blandly. Forgery cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence. Those who make the allegation of forgery have the burden of proving it since a mere allegation
is not evidence (Tenio-Obsequio vs. CA 230 SCRA 550). The evidence of the appellees failed to prove the
forgery they claim.

5.Case Title: SERCONSISION R. MENDOZA

vs.

AURORA MENDOZA FERMIN

Facts:

Leonardo G. Mendoza, allegedly married to petitioner Serconsision R. Mendoza, died on

November 25, 1986. In the testate proceedings of her fathers estate, respondent Aurora Mendoza
Fermin, being the legitimate and eldest daughter of Leonardo, was appointed as one of the administratix.
Sometime in 1990, when respondent was the one preparing an inventory of the properties of her late
father as directed by the probate court, she discovered that her father and petitioner purportedly sold the
said property to one Eduardo C. Sanchez as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale dated September 22,
1986. However, the Deed of Absolute Sale was registered with the Register of Deeds for the City of
Paraaque only on April 30, 1991, or five (5) years after the alleged transfer. Meanwhile, petitioner did not
inform the tenants of the property that a certain Eduardo C. Sanchez already owned the same; and in fact,
continued to collect the rentals of the property even after the alleged sale.

On March 19, 1992, convinced that the signatures appearing in the Deed of Absolute Sale did not
fit that of the genuine signature of her father, respondent filed a case for Annulment of Deed of Absolute
Sale, Transfer Certificate of Title and Damages. To support this allegation, she claims that she is familiar
with the signature of her father, because she was his private secretary during the period of 1972 to 1981,
when her father was still the Mayor of San Pascual, Batangas. Respondent also presented an expert
handwriting witness in the person of Noel Cruz, a National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Document
Examiner, who testified that in his opinion, the questioned signatures of Leonardo vis--vis the sample
signatures of the latter submitted by respondent were not written by one and the same person. This
conclusion was bolstered by respondents other witness, Teresita Rosales, who testified that she was a

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tenant of the subject property until July 11, 1990.14She presented a receipt dated November 24, 1986 of
the payment of her monthly rental with the signature of Leonardo, but claimed that it was petitioner who
signed the same by forging the signature of Leonardo. Petitioner even boasted to her that she has been
the one signing documents for Leonardo on account of the latters failing eyesight.

On the other hand, petitioner denied that the signatures of Leonardo on the Deed of Absolute Sale
were forgeries. To augment her position, petitioner presented an expert witness in the person of Zacarias
Semacio, Document Examiner III of the Philippine National Police (PNP) at Camp Crame, Quezon City,
who testified that there was no forgery upon comparison of the questioned signatures of Leonardo on the
Deed of Absolute Sale with the specimens submitted by petitioner. On April 14, 1999, the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) rendered its Decision finding that there was no forgery and declaring the sale of the property
as valid. On January 25, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision reversing the Decision of the RTC.

Issue:

Whether the court erred in its findings as to the authenticity and due execution of the questioned
deed of sale.

Ruling:

With regard to the issue on forgery, the general rule is, the same cannot be presumed and must be
proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence; the burden of proof of which lies on the party alleging
forgery. The best evidence of a forged signature in the instrument is the instrument itself reflecting the
alleged forged signature. The fact of forgery can only be established by comparison between the alleged
forged signature and the authentic and genuine signature of the person whose signature is theorized upon
to have been forged.

We, however, after examining the supposed signatures of Leonardo and comparing them with his
accepted standard, conclude that the questioned signatures were forgeries. A scrutiny of the comparison
charts of the NBI handwriting expert witness and the PNP handwriting expert witness, consisting of the
enlarged photographs of the questioned signatures of Leonardo and the specimen signatures submitted
by the parties, would revealthat there are marked differences between Leonardos signature on the Deed
of Absolute Sale vis--vis the specimen signatures submitted by the parties. As seen in the enlarged
photographs of both parties, the most telling differences between the questioned signatures and all the
specimen signatures offered in evidence, including the specimen signatures offered in evidence by
Serconsision, is in the initial and predominant letter which appears to be a letter O. Significantly, the
manner of execution of all the standard specimen signatures of Leonardo, reveal that the person who
signed the same used free rapid continuous execution or strokes in forming the letter O which is
indicative of the signatorys fluidity in movement. In the questioned signatures, the initial and predominant
letter was apparently written in a hesitating slow drawn stroke indicating that the person, who executed
the same as hesitant when the signatures were made. In short, we find that all specimen signatures
submitted in evidence by the parties were written gracefully whereas the questioned signatures were
written awkwardly. As such, the samples and the questioned signatures in the instant case were written by
two different persons.

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 A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimony of handwriting experts. Although
such testimony may be useful, the judge still exercises independent judgment on the issue of authenticity
of the signatures under scrutiny. The judge cannot rely on the mere testimony of the handwriting expert.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 25, 2007 and Resolution dated
March 28, 2007 of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED IN TOTO.

5. Case Title: MARITIME FACTORS INC., Petitioner, vs. BIENVENIDO R. HINDANG, Respondent.

FACTS OF THE CASE

Petitioner Maritime Factors, Inc., a manning agency, engaged the services of Danilo R. Hindang
(Danilo) to work as a seaman. On July 27, 1994, while within the territorial jurisdiction of the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia and on board the vessel, three of the vessels crew found Danilo's body inside the locker
(wardrobe) of his cabin. Danilo was found hanging by a strap on his neck in a kneeling position. They
turned over Danilo's body to the Saudi police authorities Dr. Ossman Abdel Hameed, the Medical
Examiner of the Eastern Region, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia conducted an autopsy on Danilo's remains and
concluded that Danilo committed suicide by hanging himself.Respondent Bienvenido R. Hindang, brother
of the deceased seaman Danilo, filed for death compensation benefits. Petitioner claimed that based on
Dr. Hameed's medical jurisprudence report, Danilo committed suicide by hanging himself; thus, his death
is not compensable. Petitioner submitted a photocopy of the fax transmission of the medical jurisprudence
report of Dr. Hameed.

The LA found that Danilo did not commit suicide, thus, the claim for his death benefit must prosper.
The NLRC rendered a Resolution which affirmed in toto the LA decision. The CA denied the petition and
affirmed the NLRC resolutions.

ISSUE OF THE CASE:

Whether Danilo committed suicide during the term of his employment contract which would exempt
petitioner from paying Danilo's death compensation benefits to his beneficiaries.

RULING OF THE CASE

The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the LA, NLRC, and CA.

The SC gave credence to Dr. Hameeds medical report establishing that Danilo committed suicide
by hanging himself. Dr. Hameed conducted the autopsy on Danilo's remains immediately after the latter's
death. He saw first-hand the condition of Danilo's body, which upon his examination led him to conclude
that Danilo died by hanging himself. His report was comprehensive and more detailed. In Dr. Hameeds
medical report, as well as Dr. Reyes post mortem examination, both reports did not mention of any

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showing of signs that there was struggle on the part of Danilo to defend himself from an intruder. Both
reports did not report any marks of violence in the other parts of Danilos body. Thus, Dr. Hameed's
medical report, corroborated by the written report of Danilo's fellow crew members that the door was
locked from the inside when they found Danilo hanging in his wardrobe, only shows that he committed
suicide. Thus the petitioner was able to prove that Danilo's death was attributable to his deliberate act of
killing himself by committing suicide.

7.Case Title: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, vs. GOMER S. CLIMACO, Appellant

FACTS OF THE CASE

The dangerous drugs seized from Climacoduring the buy bust operation were marked as TR-B and
TR-R. However, the Chemistry Report submitted to the trial court shows that the dangerous drugs
examined and confirmed to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu by the forensic chemist were
marked as GSC1 and GSC2.

The second level court found the appellant guilty of illegal possession and sale of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drugs. On appeal, the Court of Appeals, affirmed the RTC
Decision.

ISSUE OF THE CASE

Whether the guilt of Climaco for the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession of shabu, a
dangerous drug, was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT

Since what was seized (TR-B and TR-R) from Climaco at the time of the buy-bust operation was
different from the dangerous drugs submitted (GSC1 and GSC2) to the forensic chemist for review and
evaluation, the chain of custody over the dangerous drugs was broken and the integrity of the evidence
submitted to the trial court was not preserved, casting doubt on the guilt of Climaco.

To establish guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt in cases involving dangerous drugs, it is
important that the substance illegally possessed in the first place be the same substance offered in court
as exhibit. This chain of custody requirement ensures that unnecessary doubts are removed concerning
the identity of the evidence. When the identity of the dangerous drug recovered from the accused is not
the same dangerous drug presented to the forensic chemist for review and examination, nor the same
dangerous drug presented to the court, the identity of the dangerous drug is not preserved due to the
broken chain of custody. With this, an element in the criminal cases for illegal sale and illegal possession
of dangerous drugs, the corpus delicti, is not proven, and the accused must then be acquitted based on
reasonable doubt.

8. Case Title: SOLOMON ALVAREZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

FACTS OF THE CASE

Page 11 of 68
 The petitioner was charged with Homicide for the shooting of Aurelio Manalo, Jr. which resulted to
his death. Petitioner assailed the prosecution for its failure to conduct ballistics and paraffin tests. He
presumed that no such tests were made by the prosecution in order to "deliberately suppress" the results
thereof, which might exculpate him from the offense.

ISSUE OF THE CASE: Whether the failure to conduct ballistic and paraffin test is fatal to the prosecution
of the crime.

RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT

The petitioners contention is untenable. The choice of what evidence to present, or who should
testify as a witness is within the discretionary power of the prosecutor and definitely not for the courts to
dictate. In any case, the presentation of the weapon (or the slugs, as in this case) and ballistic
examination are not prerequisites for conviction. Further, paraffin tests have never been considered to be
foolproof.In the present case there are ample evidence on record to warrant petitioners conviction for the
crime of homicide.

9. Case Title: LEONORA CEBALLOS, petitioner, vs. Intestate Estate of the Late EMIGDIO
MERCADO and the Heirs of EMIGDIO MERCADO, respondents.

FACTS OF THE CASE

Petitioner Leonora EmparadoCeballos is the registered owner of a certain parcel of land consisting
of 53,301 square meters and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-948 of the Register of Deeds
for the Province of Cebu. Sometime in October 1980, petitionerobtained a loan fromEmigdio Mercado as
the latter was also known to be in the business of lending money. She was able to borrow the amount of
P12, 000.00 payable in two (2) months and to secure said loan, she executed in favor of Emigdio Mercado
a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the subject property. She was not able to pay her mortgage
indebtedness to Emigdio Mercado within the stipulated period. On February 13, 1982, a Deed of Absolute
Sale was executed whereby the mortgaged property was sold to Emigdio Mercado for the price of
P16,500.00. Said instrument contained the signatures of petitioner and her husband NarcisoCeballos and
was notarized. It appears that sometime in 1990, [petitioner] offered to buy back the property from
Emigdio Mercado for the price ofP30,000.00 but the latters wife refused since the same was already
transferred in their names under TCT No. TF-3252 issued on June 1, 1987. Emigdio Mercado died on
January 12, 1991.

Petitioner claimed that the said Deed of Absolute Sale is an absolute fabrication with the
signatures therein appearing to have been of hers and her husbands, were absolute forgeries. Petitioner
submitted said deed of sale to disinterested third parties to confirm its being spurious; she sought the
assistance of the Philippine National Police (PNP) which found that said document of sale is a forgery;
and hence, it is patent that the transfer of title on the property was done through fraud.

Both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals held that petitioner had failed to prove by
the requisite evidence her allegation of forgery in the subject Deed of Absolute Sale.The Ca had further
held that the trial court had observed the correct process of identification first, by not completely relying on
the findings or statements by the handwriting expert presented by appellant as to the existence of forgery
in the questioned document, and more important, in considering both similarities and dissimilarities

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between the questioned signatures and the standard signatures as to extract by such comparison
between the two (2) sets of signatures the habitual and characteristic resemblance which naturally
appears in the genuine writing. The apparent dissimilarities are overshadowed by the striking similarities
and therefore, fail to overcome the presumption of validity in favor of the duly notarized Deed of Absolute
Sale.

ISSUES OF THE CASE

1. Whether the questioned signatures are forgeries; and

2. Whether the appellate court erred in disregarding the finding of expert witness in ruling that the
signatures were not forgeries.

RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT

On the first issue, the courts a quo had sufficient factual basis in holding that the questioned
signatures were not forgeries. Although there were dissimilarities between the questioned and the
standard signatures, the CA also found between them "striking similarities as to indicate the habitual and
characteristic writing of the appellant. The apparent dissimilarities are overshadowed by the striking
similarities and, therefore, fail to overcome the presumption of validity in favor of the duly notarized Deed
of Absolute Sale.

Anent the second issue, well-settled is the rule that expert opinion is never conclusive. Courts may
exercise discretion in accepting or overruling the opinions of handwriting experts. Clear and convincing
evidence is required to overturn the presumption of validity of a notarized deed of absolute sale. Absent
such species of evidence, the presumption stands. The Supreme Court cited from the book of Justice
Francisco, a learned authority in Remedial Law that: Expert opinions are not ordinarily conclusive in the
sense that they must be accepted as true on the subject of their testimony, but are generally regarded as
purely advisory in character; the courts may place whatever weight they choose upon such testimony and
may reject it, if they find it is inconsistent with the facts in the case or otherwise unreasonable.

10. Case Title: NORA T. JIMENEZ, JOSEFINA T. GAVINO, LIBRADA T. DINO and SUSAN T. JOVEN,
petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ECUMENICAL MISSION AND RELATIONS OF THE UNITED
PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST IN
THE PHILIPPINES and POLICARPIO CARUNGIN, respondents.

FACTS OF THE CASE

The petitioners are sisters and the children of NicanorTeodoro and Francisca Ciriaco. They filed
their complaint in 1982 alleging that their mother was the owner of the subject property which was titled in
her name under OCT No. 11757. Said property is now covered by TCT No. 90689 in the name of
respondent United Church of Christ in the Philippines for this was donated to it by the Commission on
Ecumenical Mission in that Deed of Donation dated July 1, 1977. Petitioners claim that their parents never
sold the lot to anyone else, and that their purported signatures on the impugned Deed of Sale are
forgeries.

The petitioners asked for signature verification of the said deed of sale by the NBI and the PC. In its
Questioned Document Report No. 241-780 the NBI made the finding that the sample and questioned

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signatures of Francisca were not written by the same person, while no definite opinion was given as to
Nicanors signatures because of the insufficiency in numbers of his sample signatures. The PC Crime
Laboratory examination came to the conclusion that the signatures of both Francisca and Nicanor were
written by persons other than the said spouses.

The RTC rendered its first decision of the case dismissing the complaint of petitioners on the
grounds of prescription and laches. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court. It ruled that there was
the case did not prescribe and that there was no laches and remanded the case back to the RTC. Upon
remand, the court a quo rendered the herein assailed judgment in favor of petitioners declaring the nullity
of the deed of sale and the TCT No. 90689 due to forgery. The CA reversed the RTC holding that the
signatures were not forged. The appellate court doubted the findings of the NBI and the PC handwriting
experts, because the documents from which the sample signatures were taken were either mere
photocopies, or dated years away from the questioned Deed of Sale of 1936.

ISSUE OF THE CASE

Whether the signatures of NicanorTeodoro and Francisca Ciriaco were falsified.

RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT

Resort to handwriting experts is not mandatory or indispensable to the examination or the

comparison of handwriting. A finding of forgery does not depend entirely on the testimonies of handwriting
experts, because the judge must conduct an independent examination of the questioned signature in
order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity.

In the case of Gamido vs. Court of Appeals (citing the case of Alcon vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 162 SCRA 833), the Court held that the authenticity of signatures is not a highly technical issue in
the same sense that questions concerning, e.g., quantum physics or topology or molecular biology, would
constitute matters of a highly technical nature. The opinion of a handwriting expert on the genuineness of
a questioned signature is certainly much less compelling upon a judge than an opinion rendered by a
specialist on a highly technical issue. A judge must therefore conduct an independent examination of the
signature itself in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity.

After examining and analyzing the subject signatures, the SC found no substantial indicia or reason
to suspect their authenticity. Contrary to the findings of the NBI and PC, upon comparison of the
questioned signature of Francisca with her sample signatures the SC found resemblances but no stark
and distinguishing difference. The slight dissimilarities do not indicate forgery for these are natural,
expected and inevitable variations in genuine signatures made by one and the same person. Even the
sample signatures of Nicanor submitted by the appellees show clear variations in structure, flourish, and
style. It must be pointed out that the crux of the matter here is forgery and any positive assertion of it
cannot just be accepted blandly. Forgery cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence. Those who make the allegation of forgery have the burden of proving it since a mere allegation
is not evidence (Tenio-Obsequio vs. CA 230 SCRA 550). The evidence of the appellees failed to prove the
forgery they claim.

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Page 15 of 68
 B. Examining Fingerprints

1. Case Title: Bautista v. Court of Appeals

Facts:

The dispute involves a parcel of land previously owned and registered in the name of the late
Cesar Morelos. During his lifetime, Cesar sold and conveyed the above-mentioned parcel of land in favor
of petitioner Laura Morelos Bautista, as evidenced by a "Deed of Absolute Sale" notarized by Luis M. de
Guzman. Respondent Fernando Morelos, claiming to be the illegitimate child of Cesar Morelos, instituted
a complaint for the declaration of nullity of sale and title with damages before the Regional Trial Court of
Manila. At the trial, he presented testimonies of expert witnesses who claimed that the signature of Cesar
Morelos on the Deed of Absolute Sale and the fingerprint appearing on his Residence Certificate were not
his.

Issue:

Whether the decedents signature and fingerprint on the deed were forged, as attested to by the
expert witnesses presented by respondents.

Ruling:

In the case at bar, the presumption of validity and regularity prevails over allegations of forgery and
fraud. As against direct evidence consisting of the testimony of a witness who was physically present at
the signing of the contract and who had personal knowledge thereof, the testimony of an expert witness
constitutes indirect or circumstantial evidence at best. Carmelita Marcelino, the witness to the Deed of
Absolute Sale, confirmed the genuineness, authenticity and due execution thereof. Having been physically
present to see the decedent Cesar Morelos and petitioner Laura Bautista affix their signatures on the
document, the weight of evidence preponderates in favor of petitioners.

2. Case Title: ESTATE OF ROGELIO G. ONG, petitioner,

vs.

Minor JOANNE RODJIN DIAZ, Represented by Her Mother and Guardian, Jinky C. Diaz, respondent.

Facts:

A Complaint for compulsory recognition with prayer for support pending litigation was filed by minor
Joanne Rodjin Diaz (Joanne), represented by her mother and guardian, Jinky C. Diaz (Jinky), against
Rogelio G. Ong with the RTC. Jinky and Rogelio had cohabited with each while the former was still
married to a Japanese national. From this live-in relationship, minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz was conceived
and was born. Sometime after Joanne was born, Rogelio abandoned her and Jinky, and stopped
supporting them, alleging that he is not the father of the child.

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 The RTC ordered the defendant to recognize plaintiff as his illegitimate child and provide her with
support. Rogelio appealed to the Court of Appeals. During the pendency of the case with the Court of
Appeals Rogelio died. The CA remanded the case to the RTC for the issuance of an order directing the
parties to make arrangements for DNA analysis for the purpose of determining the paternity of plaintiff
minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz, upon consultation and in coordination with laboratories and experts on the field
of DNA analysis.

Issue:

Whether the CA erred when it remanded the case to the RTC for DNA analysis despite the fact that
it is no longer feasible due to the death of Rogelio Ong.

Ruling:

There are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which parties have to
face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance
between the putative father and child. A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is
presumed legitimate. As a guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167
of the Family Code.

Amidst the protestation of petitioner against the DNA analysis, the resolution thereof may provide
the definitive key to the resolution of the issue of support for minor Joanne. The alleged impossibility of
complying with the order of remand for purposes of DNA testing is more ostensible than real. Petitioners
argument is without basis especially as the New Rules on DNA Evidence allows the conduct of DNA
testing, either motu proprio or upon application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in
litigation. The death of the petitioner does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for as long
as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA. The term "biological sample" under the New
Rules on DNA testing means any organic material originating from a persons body, even if found in
inanimate objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing. This includes blood, saliva, and other body fluids,
tissues, hairs and bones. Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the biological samples as enumerated
above as may be available, may be used for DNA testing. In this case, petitioner has not shown the
impossibility of obtaining an appropriate biological sample that can be utilized for the conduct of DNA
testing.

3. Case Title: KOSOUL CHANTHAKOUMMANE, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS

FACTS:

On Saturday, July 8, 2006, real estate agent Sarah Walker was murdered in the D. R. Horton model
home where she worked in the "Craig Ranch" subdivision in McKinney, Texas. At approximately 1:10 p.m.,
Andy Lilliston and his wife came to look at the D. R. Horton model home. When they entered the model
home, Lilliston thought that it appeared to have been "ransacked." He observed a large pool of blood in
the dining room, where the sales desk was located. He followed a trail of blood into the kitchen, where he
saw Walker lying face-up on the floor, with the upper half of her body covered in blood. Lilliston directed
his wife to call 9-1-1, and they exited the model home. Lilliston ran into the street and flagged down a
vehicle for help. He briefly went back inside the model home to check on Walker, but she did not display

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any signs of life. Lilliston then went back outside and waited for emergency personnel to arrive. Appellant
was charged with intentionally and knowingly causing Walker's death while in the course of committing or
attempting to commit robbery.

ISSUE:

Whether the fingerprints and bite marks found was owned by appellant.

HELD:

Yes. Appellant's DNA profile was consistent with the DNA obtained from Walker's fingernails, the
window blind pull cords, the deadbolt lock and faceplate, and some of the swabs taken from the living
room, kitchen, and entryway of the model home. The DNA analyst testified that only a "partial profile" was
obtained from a swab taken from the kitchen sink because the DNA extracted from that swab "was of low
quality and degraded quality." However, the set of genetic markers that she was able to detect in the
partial profile "corresponded with the genetic markers observed in the DNA profile of appellant." Forensic
dentistry consultant Brent Hutson examined appellant and made impressions of his teeth. Hutson
compared appellant's teeth to the bite mark on Walker's neck and found enough similarities that he was
"unable to exclude [appellant] from that population of individuals that could have inflicted this injury."
Hutson concluded "within reasonable dental certainty beyond a doubt" that appellant was responsible for
the bite mark on Walker's neck.

4. Case Title: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.GERRICO VALLEJO Y SAMARTINO

Facts:

At around 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 10, 1999, Maria Nida Diolola sent her 9-year old
daughter Daisy Diolola to their neighbor's house. Ma. Nida saw her daughter go to the house of her tutor.
She was wearing pink short pants and a white sleeveless shirt. An hour later, Daisy came back with
accused-appellant. They were looking for a book which accused-appellant could copy to make a drawing
or a poster that Daisy would submit to her teacher. After finding the book, Daisy and accused-appellant
went back to the latter's house. When Ma. Nida woke up at about 5:30 o'clock after an afternoon nap, she
noticed that Daisy was not yet home. She started looking for her daughter and proceeded to the house of
Aimee, Daisy's tutor. Aimee's mother told Ma. Nida that Daisy was not there. Ma. Nida looked for Daisy in
her brother's and sister's houses, but she was not there, either Then, at about 10:00 o'clock in the
morning of June 11, 1999, she was informed that the dead body of her daughter was found tied to the root
of an aroma tree by the river after the "compuerta" by a certain Freddie Quinto. The body was already in
the barangay hall when Ma. Nida saw her daughter. At the barangay hall, Ma. Nida pointed to accused-

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appellant Gerrico Vallejo as the probable suspect since he was with the victim when she was last seen
alive.

NBI Forensic Biologist Pet Byron Buan took buccal swabs and hair samples from accused-
appellant, as well as buccal swabs and hair samples from the parents of the victim, namely, Ma. Nida
Diolola and Arnulfo Diolola. The samples were submitted to the DNA Laboratory of the NBI for
examination.

Issue:

Whether the DNA profile was that of the accused-appellant.

Ruling:

Yes. The court held that the totality of the evidence points to no other conclusion than that accused-
appellant is guilty of the crime charged.

In the case at bar, the bloodstains taken from the clothing of the victim and of accused-appellant,
the smears taken from the victim as well as the strands of hair and nails taken from her tested negative for
the presence of human DNA. It is the inadequacy of the specimens submitted for examination, and not the
possibility that the samples had been contaminated, which accounted for the negative results of their
examination. But the vaginal swabs taken from the victim yielded positive for the presence of human DNA.
Upon analysis by the experts, they showed the DNA profile of accused-appellant.

5. Case Title: Lumanog v. People of the Philippines

Facts:

Former Chief of the Metropolitan Command Intelligence and Security Group of the Philippine
Constabulary, now the Philippine National Police (PNP), Colonel Rolando N. Abadilla (Abadilla), was
ambushed and killed in broad daylight while driving his car along Katipunan Avenue, Quezon City. All the
accused in the instant case raised the defense of alibi and highlighted the negative findings of ballistic and
fingerprint examinations. The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals found the Appellants in the
instant case guilty.

Issue:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding exculpatory documentary evidence including
negative results of ballistic and fingerprint examinations.

Ruling:

As correctly held by the CA, the negative result of ballistic examination was inconclusive, for there
is no showing that the firearms supposedly found in appellants possession were the same ones used in
the ambush-slay of Abadilla. The fact that ballistic examination revealed that the empty shells and slug

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were fired from another firearm does not disprove appellants guilt, as it was possible that different
firearms were used by them in shooting Abadilla. To begin with, the prosecution never claimed that the
firearms confiscated from appellants, which were the subject of separate charges for illegal possession of
firearms, were the same firearms used in the ambush-slay of Abadilla. A ballistic examination is not
indispensable in this case. Appellants cannot escape criminal liability, as they were positively identified by
eyewitness Freddie Alejo as the ones who shot Abadilla to death. The negative result of the fingerprint
tests conducted by fingerprint examiner Remedios is likewise inconclusive and unreliable. Said witness
admitted that no prints had been lifted from inside the KIA Pride and only two (2) fingerprints were taken
from the car of Abadilla.

6. CASETITLE: ARNEL L. AGUSTIN vs. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:

Respondents Fe Angela and her son, Martin sued Martins alleged biological father, petitioner
Agustin, for support and support pendente lite before the RTC. The respondents alleged that the petitioner
impregnated her and bore a son Martin out of wedlock. The babys birth certificate was purportedly signed
by the petitioner as the father.

The petitioner denied having sired Martin because his affair and intimacy with Fe had allegedly
ended in 1998, long before Martins conception. He admitted that their affair started in 1993 but theirs was
an on-and-off relationship. He terminated the affair when he was unable to bear the prospect of losing his
wife and family.

The private respondents moved for the issuance of an order directing the parties to submit
themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of Court. The petitioner opposed
said motion invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination and stating that there was no cause
of action, considering that his signature on the birth certificate was a forgery and that under the law, an
illegitimate child is not entitled to support if not recognized by the putative father.

The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the parties to submit
themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of the applicants. CA affirmed the trial court.

Issue:

Whether DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a proceeding for support without violating
petitioners constitutional right to privacy and against self-incrimination.

Ruling:

Petition DENIED. The Court ruled that Compulsory DNA Testing is Constitutional and results are
admissible.

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 In 2001, the Court opened the possibility of admitting DNA as evidence of parentage, as enunciated
in Tijing v. Court of Appeals: Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt
the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA
test for identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research
Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short
tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two
(2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged
father and child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use
of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts
should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply
the results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result
is to deny progress.

Significantly, the constitutionality of compulsory DNA testing has been upheld and thereof admitted
in evidence. In the case of People vs. Yatar, DNA samples from semen recovered from a rape victims
vagina were used to positively identify the accused Joel Yatar as the rapist. Yatar claimed that the
compulsory extraction of his blood sample for DNA testing, as well as the testing itself, violated his right
against self-incrimination, as embodied in both Sections 12 and 17 of Article III of the Constitution. The
Supreme Court addressed this as follows: The contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not
against all compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion. The right against self-incrimination is simply
against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply
where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.

There is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the public respondent for upholding the orders
of the trial court which both denied the petitioners motion to dismiss and ordered him to submit himself for
DNA testing.

7. Case Title: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. JAN MICHAEL TAN and ARCHIE TAN

FACTS:

The respondents became suspects in the commission of parricide and two murders; their father,
their step-mother and stepsister. Respondents Archie and Jan-Jans defense is alibi. They claimed that
they were away when the crimes took place at the house. Based on Dr. Lebaquins forensic computation,
however, the victims probably died at about midnight, more or less. Their mother made capital of the
absence of respondents Archies and Jan-Jans fingerprints in any part of their own rooms, particularly the
light switches and the doorknobs. She cited the Investigating Prosecutors theory that either of the
accused used the wet red shirt hanging in Jan-Jans bathroom to erase all fingerprints at the crime scene.
ISSUE:
Whether the fingerprints were owned by the respondents.
HELD:
Yes. The evidence against respondents Archie and Jan-Jan is merely circumstantial. The
prosecution evidence shows that they had motive in that they had been at odds with their father and
stepmother. They had opportunity in that they were still probably home when the crime took place. Archie
took two pairs of new gloves from his car late that evening. Cindy was apparently executed inside Archies
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room. The separate rooms of the two accused had, quite curiously, been wiped clean even of their own
fingerprints. A trial, unlike preliminary investigations, could yield more evidence favorable to either side
after the interrogations of the witnesses either on direct examination or on cross-examination. What is
important is that there is some rational basis for going ahead with judicial inquiry into the case. This Court
does not subscribe to the CAs position that the prosecution had nothing to go on with.

8. MA. CRISTINA TORRES BRAZA, PAOLO JOSEF T. BRAZA and JANELLE ANN T. BRAZA,
vs.

THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF HIMAMAYLAN CITY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, MINOR PATRICK
ALVIN TITULAR BRAZA, REPRESENTED BY LEON TITULAR, CECILIA TITULAR AND LUCILLE
C. TITULAR

Facts:

Petitioner Ma. Cristina Torres (Ma. Cristina) and Pablo Sicad Braza, Jr. (Pablo), also known as
Pablito Sicad Braza, were married. Pablo died, and during his wake, respondent began introducing her
co-respondent minor Patrick Alvin Titular Braza (Patrick) as her and Pablo's son. Ma. Cristina thereupon
made inquiries in the course of which she obtained Patrick's birth certificate and a copy of a marriage
contract showing that Pablo and Lucille were married from the Local Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City,
Negros Occidental, drawing her and her co-petitioners to file before the Regional Trial Court of
Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental a petition to correct the entries in the birth record of Patrick in the
Local Civil Register.

Contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed marriage between Lucille
and Pablo, said marriage being bigamous on account of the valid and subsisting marriage between Ma.
Cristina and Pablo, petitioners prayed for (1) the correction of the entries in Patrick's birth record with
respect to his legitimation, the name of the father and his acknowledgment, and the use of the last name
"Braza"; 2) a directive to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor Patrick,
to submit Parick to DNA testing to determine his paternity and filiation; and 3) the declaration of nullity of
the legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and, for this purpose, the declaration of the
marriage of Lucille and Pablo as bigamous. The trial court dismissed the petition without prejudice, it
holding that in a special proceeding for correction of entry, the court, which is not acting as a family court
under the Family Code, has no jurisdiction over an action to annul the marriage of Lucille and Pablo,
impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test, hence, the controversy
should be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action.

Issue:

Whether the Trial Court had jurisdiction to order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test to establish
his paternity and affiliation.

Ruling:

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 The petition fails. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and
rule on legitimacy and filiation, let alone order DNA tests to be done to that end.

9. Case Title: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.

JOEY MANLANSING y AMBROSIO, and MARIO MANLANSING y AMBROSIO,

FACTS:

Appellants are brothers. For four years they were tenants of the spouses Magin and Jorja Soriano.
At around 8:00 A.M. on December 28, 1994, a concerned citizen informed the Cabanatuan City Police
Station of an alleged killing in a house at Bitas, Cabanatuan City. Immediately, a team of police went to the
place.When they arrived at the Soriano residence, they spotted bloodstains on the ceiling. Before they
entered the house, they waited for Nestor Villa of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) who was
tasked to take fingerprints at the crime scene. In the stockroom on the first floor, they found the lifeless
body of 70-year-old Magin in a pool of blood. There were several wounds on his hands and arms, as well
as cuts on his head. They took pictures of the corpse. Upstairs, they found the corpse of his 68-year-old
spouse, Jorja, on the floor, her throat slit and her neck hacked. When they turned her body over, they
found a six-inch bloodstained knife, with the initials "JF" carved in the handle. 11The police made rough
sketchesand took more photographs, while Villa lifted fingerprints from the scene and the knife. These
were sent to the NBI office in Manila. NBI fingerprint expert NESTOR VILLA took the fingerprints from the
crime scene and sent them to the office in Manila for examination.

ISSUE:

Whether the fingerprints were owned by Joey and Mario Manlansing.

HELD:
Yes. adactyloscopy expert, testified that a comparison of the prints from the crime scene showed
that two prints matched the left middle and ring fingerprints of appellant Joey Manlansing. And the
brothers' footprints and fingerprints were lifted from the crime scene. Before they fled they both tried to
wipe out traces of their foot and handprints. Both admitted that they ransacked the place for valuables
after the spouses were slain. Lastly, on their way out of the compound, a witness whom they threatened to
be butchered like a hog, saw them with their shirts bloodstained. All the foregoing details presented as
evidence by the prosecution more than suffices to show that the brothers were united and had cooperated
in a conspiracy to attack the spouses. In a conspiracy, the act of one conspirator is the act of the other co-
conspirator. Thus, Joey is equally responsible as his brother, Mario for the death of the Sorianos.

10. CASE TITLE: STATE VS. QUINTANA

FACTS OF THE CASE:

Raymond Michael Quintana appeals his convictions for burglary. Quintana first argues that
fingerprint evidence is inherently unreliable and thus inadmissible under rule 702 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence.

Page 23 of 68
ISSUE OF THE CASE:

Whether fingerprint evidence is admissible.

RULING OF THE COURT:

Rule 702 provides that "[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of
fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise." Admissibility under rule 702 hinges on "whether . . . 'the evidence will be helpful to the finder of
fact.' Quintana argues that lack of empirical research on fingerprint evidence requires us to apply the
Rimmasch test. If an expert testifies regarding "novel scientific principles and techniques," then the court
first applies the separate "threshold reliability test" of State v. Rimmasch. However, if the expert testifies
regarding scientific methods that have "'attained general acceptance in . . . the relevant scientific
community,'" the additional Rimmasch test does not apply.

The case of State v. Hamilton supports the notion that fingerprint evidence is not novel and raises
no special evidentiary concerns. In Hamilton, the defendant argued that fingerprint evidence was
insufficient to support his murder conviction because the prosecution presented no evidence establishing
that the fingerprints were left at the time the crime was committed. See id. at 236. However, the Utah
Supreme Court rejected this argument, holding that "we . . . treat[] fingerprint evidence like any other
evidence and [do not] evaluate[] its sufficiency to support a conviction by a separate, more stringent
standard." Id. at 237. Thus, the supreme court clearly indicated that fingerprint evidence is not "subject to
reliability problems" sufficient to justify special treatment. Id. In light of Hamilton and a longstanding
reliance on fingerprint evidence, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted the fingerprint
expert's testimony.

Page 24 of 68
 C. Other means of Identification

1. Case Title: UNITED STATES vs. GONZALES

FACTS: Juan and Jose Valenzuela-Obeso were the targets of a drug smuggling investigation that
finally led to search warrants resulting in the seizure of a pound of near-pure methamphetamine
and fifty-eight pounds of marijuana, among other things. While executing the searches, officers also
discovered a number of Western Union cash register receipts that suggested that Juan and Jose
were transferring money in a money laundering scheme. Juan and Jose and their "common law
wives," Patricia Lopez and Martha Gonzales, were federally indicted on multiple counts including
charges of money laundering. A large part of the proof of the money laundering charges involved
various Western Union "MTAs" (money transfer applications), and it was incumbent on the
prosecution to tie one or another of the defendants to those MTAs various witnesses testified on
the

ISSUE: Whether including Debra Springer, a handwriting expert who attributed the writing on
several of the MTAs to various defendants.

RULING: Gonzales and Lopez challenge the admissibility of the handwriting evidence. Having
reviewed their claims, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion.

2. CASE TITLE: SANDY WILLIAMS versus ILLINOIS

FACTS:

Sandy Williams was convicted of two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault and one count
each of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery. Illinois' appellate court affirmed Williams'

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conviction but reversed the trial court's imposition of a consecutive sentence. On appeal to the Illinois
Supreme Court, the defendant argued that the testimony of an Illinois State Police forensic analyst, who
relied upon a DNA report prepared by a nontestifying third-party analyst, lacked a sufficient evidentiary
foundation. Alternatively, Williams argued that this testimony concerning the report was hearsay presented
for the truth of the matter asserted and violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause
right. The state's high court affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that Williams' Sixth Amendment
rights weren't violated.

ISSUE:

Whether an expert witness be called as a stand-in for a lab analyst who actually did a test on
criminal evidence, but did not appear at the trial.

RULING:

Yes. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., writing for a four-justice plurality, announced the judgment of the
Court. The Court affirmed that the testimony of an expert witness that is based on a test the expert did not
personally perform is admissible and does not violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation
Clause right. The Court held that, because the evidence of the third-party test was not produced to prove
the truth of the matter asserted, but merely to provide a basis for the conclusions that the expert reached,
the prosecution had not infringed on the defendant's rights. The important issue was the conclusion that
the expert reached, and that the expert was available to the defendant for cross-examination. Additionally,
such a test does not fall within the bounds of the Confrontation Clause because the results were not
directed to prove the guilt of the defendant. Williams was not even a suspect at the time the test was
conducted.

Justice Stephen G. Breyer concurred and found that such DNA tests and their results fall outside
the scope of the Confrontation Clause so long as the lab procedures are reliable, and the defendant still
retains the right to call employees of the lab as witnesses. If the premise of a lab report's accuracy were
shown to be untrue, then the testimony of the expert would fall under the Confrontation Clause. Justice
Clarence Thomas also concurred on the basis that the evidence of the test was not "testimonial," as it
must to be governed by the Confrontation Clause.

Justice Elena Kagan dissented and found this case to be in the same vein as others where the
Court found that, in order to satisfy the requirements of the Confrontation Clause, the defendant must
have the opportunity to cross-examine an analyst who performed the test. Without such an opportunity, an
unreliable report is assumed to be true. Justice Antonin Scalia, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Justice
Sonia Sotomayor joined in the dissent.

3. Case Title: TED BUNDY CASE

FACTS: Ted Bundy was born November 24, 1946, in Burlington, Vermont. In the 1970s, he raped and
murdered young women in several states. He was connected to at least 36 murders, but some thought he
had committed one hundred or more. He was executed in Florida's electric chair in 1989. His charm and

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intelligence made him something of a celebrity during his trial, and his case inspired many novels and
films about serial killers. Theodore "Ted" Bundy started life as his mother's secret shame. Eleanor Cowell
was twenty-two years old and unmarried when she had her son Theodore, which scandalized her deeply
religious parents. She delivered the child at a home for unwed mothers in Vermont and later brought her
son to her parents in Philadelphia. To hide the fact he was an illegitimate child, Bundy was raised as the
adopted son of his grandparents and was told that his mother was his sister. Eleanor moved with Ted to
Tacoma, Washington, a few years later. In 1951, she married Johnnie Bundy and the couple had several
children together. From all appearances, Bundy grew up in a content, working-class family.

Bundy showed an unusual interest in the macabre at an early age. Around the age of 3, he became
fascinated by knives. Bundy was a shy, but bright child who did well in school, but not with his peers. As a
teenager, a darker side of his character started to emerge. Bundy liked to peer in other people's windows
and thought nothing of stealing things he wanted from other people.

In December 1977, Bundy escaped from custody again. He climbed out of a hole he made in the ceiling of
his cell and even dropped more than 30 pounds to fit through the small opening. Authorities did not
discover that Bundy was missing for 15 hours, giving the serial killer a big head start on the police. He
eventually made his way to Tallahassee, Florida.

There, on the night of January 14, 1978, Bundy broke into the Chi Omega sorority house at Florida State
University. He attacked four of the young female residents, killing two of them. On February 9, Bundy
kidnapped and murdered a twelve-year-old girl named Kimberly Leach.

ISSUE: Whether these crimes marked the end of his murderous rampage as he was soon pulled over by
the police.

RULING: In July 1979, Bundy was convicted for the two Chi Omega murders. The most damming
evidence came from his own viciousness. The bite marks on one of the bodies was a definitive match for
Bundy. He was given the death penalty twice for those crimes. Bundy received another death sentence
the following year in the murder of Kimberly Leach.

Bundy fought for his life, spending years appealing his death sentence. An infamous national figure since
his Florida trials, he remained a source of fascination for many. Actor Mark Harmon even played Bundy in
the 1986 television movie The Deliberate Stranger. Bundy tried to take his case as high as the U.S.
Supreme Court, but he was turned down. Bundy even offered information on some of unsolved murders to
avoid Florida's electric chair, but he could not delay justice forever.

On January 24, 1989, Bundy met his fate at the Florida State Prison. He was put to death around 7 a.m.
that morning in an electric chair sometimes known as "Old Sparky." Outside the prison, crowds cheered
and even set off fireworks after Bundy's execution. In the end, he had admitted to thirty-six killings, but
experts believe that the final tally may be closer to one hundred.

Death did not stop the public's interest with Ted Bundy. His life has been the subject of countless books
and documentaries, trying to shed some light on this brutal killer's crimes.

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 4. Case Title: ROMEO SISON, NILO PACADAR, JOEL TAN, RICHARD DE LOS SANTOS, and
JOSELITO TAMAYO, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and COURT OF APPEALS ,

FACTS:

On July 27, 1986, in the aftermath of the 1986 EDSA Revolution, a rally was scheduled to be held
at the Luneta by the Marcos loyalists. Despite being denied a permit, three thousand of them gathered at
the Rizal Monument of the Luneta and started an impromptu singing contest, recited prayers and
delivered speeches in between. When the authorities arrived and no permit could be produced, they were
told to disperse. One of the leaders, Atty. Oliver Lozano, turned to his group and said Gulpihin ninyo ang
lahat ng mga Cory infiltrators, and a commotion ensued. They eventually fled, and later, some of them
converged at the Chinese garden of Luneta. Another commotion ensued and the loyalists started
attacking persons in yellow, the color of the Coryistas, one of which was Salcedo. He was chased,
boxed, kicked and mauled. One Ranulfo Sumilang was able to tow Salcedo away from them, but several
accused came forward and resumed mauling Salcedo despite his pleas for mercy. He died upon arrival at
the Philippine General Hospital of hemorrhage, intracranial traumatic.

ISSUE:

Were the photographs of the incident presented properly given evidentiary weight despite lack of
proper identification by their respective photographers?

RULING:

Yes. Photographs, when presented in evidence, must be identified by the photographer as to its
production and testified as to the circumstances under which they were produced. The value of this kind of
evidence lies in its being a correct representation or reproduction of the original, and its admissibility is
determined by its accuracy in portraying the scene at the time of the crime.

The photographer, however, is not the only witness who can identify the pictures he has taken. The
correctness of the photograph as a faithful representation of the object portrayed can be proved prima
facie, either by the testimony of the person who made it or by other competent witnesses, after which the
court can admit it subject to impeachment as to its accuracy. Photographs, therefore, can be identified by
the photographer or by any other competent witnesses who can testify to its exactness and accuracy.

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 5. Case Title: United States v. Hines

FACTS: Someone robbed the Broadway National Bank in Chelsea, Massachusetts, using a demand or
"stick up" note, and escaped. The teller who was robbed, Ms. Jeanne Dunne, described the perpetrator as
a dark skinned black man with a wide nose and medium build. Ms. Dunne is white, and the court
characterized the description as "as close to a generic identification of an African American male as one
can imagine. Later, Dunne failed to pick Hines out of a mugbook where his picture appeared, and failed to
positively identify him from an eight-picture photo spread, though she said Hines "resembled" the robber.
Months later, however, she picked Hines out of a lineup, and positively identified him at trial. The main
corroboration of this eyewitness identification came from an FBI questioned document examiner who
compared the robbery note with exemplars of Hines's handwriting and concluded that Hines had written
the note. A trial on this evidence ended in a hung jury. Before the retrial, Hines moved to disallow the
document examiner.

ISSUE: Whether the testimony based on lack of sufficient reason to find it reliable under Daubert.

RULING: The court granted the motion in part, and wrote the published opinion during and after the
second trial, which also resulted in a hung jury, in order to explain its ruling and give guidance to the
parties in the event of a third trial. This opinion was finalized after the decision in Kumho Tire v.
Carmichael. In her opinion, Judge Gertner identified what she took to be a "mixed message" in both
Daubert and Kumho Tire, with the emphasis on reliability pointing in the direction of more rigor in the
evaluation of expertise under Federal Rule of Evidence and the emphasis on "the uniqueness of the trial
setting, the 'assist the trier' standard and flexibility" doing the opposite. Nevertheless, the court concluded
that the main emphasis is on insuring sufficient reliability, and that the Supreme Court "is plainly inviting a
reexamination even of 'generally accepted' venerable, technical fields" such as handwriting identification.
Judge Gertner accepted this invitation, but with a number of caveats. On what she had seen in writing,
and at the hearing which she held, she seemed inclined to bar the questioned document examiner
testimony in its entirety. However, this handwriting challenge was raised at the eleventh hour. The hearing
was necessarily constrained by the demands of the imminent trial and the schedules of the experts. The
Court is unwilling on this record to throw out decades of 'generally accepted' testimony. In addition, the
"compromise solution Judge Gertner accepted was derived "largely from case law that pre-dated Kumho.
In other words, the court could not confidently say that it had fully digested and applied the broader
implications of Kumho Tire which might have been inconsistent with this compromise. In any event, Judge
Gertner proceeded to distinguish between a questioned document examiner's testimony comparing the
robbery note with the exemplars and identifying similarities and differences, and testimony concerning the
document examiner's inferences of authorship based on those similarities. In sum, she allows the former
and bars the latter, essentially adopting the similar approach of Judge Matsch in Mc Veigh, which she
quotes. There is a certain commonsense appeal to this approach. The document examiner's extensive
experience looking at handwriting may have sensitized the expert to the perception and identification of
similarities or differences which an ordinary person might not notice, and at any rate the document
examiner will be free to spend more time isolating such similarities and differences than we could expect
jurors to do pursuant to their own examination during deliberations. Viewed this way, document examiners
appear to become summarization witnesses, and the notion of "expertise" becomes much less central to

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their function. However, there is a serious problem with this, especially if the document examiner is
allowed to recite his or her credentials, titles, and job descriptions. By identifying a similarity or difference,
the examiner is inevitably perceived as asserting the significance of those similarities or differences in
regard to assigning authorship, so that the conclusions which are barred are easily inferred. In practice,
this is profoundly true, since document examiners who believe they have identified the author of writing by
comparison will normally point out only similarities, and if differences are called to their attention they will
dismiss them as not being significant or "real" differences, but merely manifestations of "individual
variation. Nevertheless, the Solomonic compromise of Judges Matsch and Gertner is clearly an
improvement over surrendering the gatekeeping function entirely to the guild, as most other courts have
done.

6. Case Title: People vs. Nuevo

FACTS:

Roberta Cido recalled that about 9:00 oclock in the evening of

December 4, 1994, Nuevo passed in their house and invited her husband for the drinking spree at
Anselmo Sr., his father. She was left at home with her 10 month old daughter and her 9 years old niece. At
around 11:00 pm, appellant returned and entered their room. She was awakened when appellant held her
neck, pinned down her arms and took off her clothing. She struggled to extricate herself but to no avail.
Appellant lay on top of her and proceeded forcibly to have sexual intercourse with her, Gemma Atis who
was present, witnessed what was being done to her. Appellant threatened her and her niece. Roberta
testified that she did not see him because it was very dark that night; she identified him through his voice.

His husband corroborated part of his wifes story. He saw Sanico left his fathers place at around 11:00 pm
and returned only at around 1:00 pm. Dr. Esmeralda Nadela testified that there is no fresh injury found on
the victim, that only old lacerations were present. Sanico Nuevo, declared that he knew Roberta since
they were schoolmates in grade school and she was a former neighbor. He denied, he invited Anselmo Jr.
He denied raping Roberta. Trial court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt with aggravating
circumstances. The accused was sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of death.

ISSUES:

Whether or not appellant was sufficiently identified by the offended party based only on her
recognition of the sound of his voice;

Whether or not the prosecutions evidence suffices for the conviction of rape and the imposition of
the death penalty on him.

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RULING:

In People vs. Reyes, once a person gained familiarity with another, identification becomes quite an
easy talk even from a considerable distance. In a number of cases, it is ruled that the sound of the voice
of a person is an acceptable means of identification where the witness and the accused knew each other
personally and closely for a number of years. In People vs. Amadore, it is held that the attendance of any
of the circumstances under the provisions of Section 11 of R.A. No.7659, mandating the death penalty are
in the nature of qualifying circumstances and the absence of proper averment thereof in the complaint will
bar the imposition of that extreme penalty.While the decision of the trial court held that dwelling and the
use of a deadly weapon aggravated the crime committed, court find that these were not averted in the
information. Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, effective December 1, 2000, provides that every
complaint or information must state not only the qualifying but also the aggravating circumstances with
specify. This requirement has retroactive effect. The result is that the crime committed by appellant is only
simple rape, which under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code amended by R.A. 7659, the law
prevailing at the time of commission thereof, is punished only with Reclusion Perpetua.

7. Case Title: UNITED STATES vs. RUTH

FACTS: Some person or persons had put together the following get-rich-quick scam. Someone
opened a bank account in Lichtenstein in the fictitious name "William Cooper" using a falsified copy
of a passport. They then gained access to the personnel and pay records of 30 to 35 American
soldiers stationed at a base in Bamberg, Germany. Using the information on bank accounts in
those records, they sent letters to the (American) banks of the soldiers directing wire transfers of
the complete balance of their accounts to the "William Cooper" account at "one a.m. Eastern Time
Zone on 01 May 1992." The letters were apparently typed, with handwritten signatures. The
scheme was uncovered when the banks were told by their depositors that the letters were
fraudulent. (It is not completely clear whether this was before or after any transfers, but appears to
have been before, as a result of bank inquiries concerning these unusual balance transfer
directives. Suspicion fell upon Private Joseph M. Durocher and Specialist Jeffrey A. Ruth, who
were personnel action clerks in Bamberg with access to the relevant bank information. Durocher
was interrogated, and apparently cooperated with prosecutors, confessing to the scheme and
implicating Ruth. Durocher's testimony was the main evidence against Ruth. The only corroboration
of Durocher's story was a questioned document examiner's testimony that Ruth signed one of the
thirty-odd forged signatures on letters to banks, and that Ruth wrote one (but not all) of the
signatures of William Cooper on the applications used to open the bank account in Lichtenstein. By
now the reader will see the problem. Under a proper Kumho Tire approach.

ISSUE: Would have been:

What if anything establishes that questioned document examiners can reliably identify the writer of
a small sample of writing comprised of only 14-16 letters, under circumstances where the writing
might or might not represent an attempt to simulate the writing of the named signatory (since

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 whoever created the scam had access to records containing their actual signatures), and where
there is a high circumstantial likelihood of disguise of some sort being utilized in the writing in any
event?

This question was clearly neither asked nor answered by the court in Ruth.

RULING:

As authority for this the court pointed to no data of any kind, but to an unpublished pre Daubert
opinion in United States v. Buck, and concluded on this basis that the challenged handwriting
identification testimony was admissible as helpful to the trier of fact under Federal Rule of
Evidence. This unanalyzed global approach is now clearly inappropriate after Kumho Tire. What it
reflects, as much by implication as explicitly, is a combination of what may be called the "sufficient
experience" test, which emphasizes experience without testing to see if such experience has
actually resulted in the claimed skill, and the "guild" test, in which the existence of an organized
group which supervises accreditation and an expert's membership in it is taken as a sufficient
warrant to infer reliability for admissibility purposes. As we will see, elements of these two
approaches, usually conflated, 116 have commonly been invoked in an effort to justify admission of
claimed handwriting identification expertise, and I will henceforth refer to this conflated rendition
simply as the "guild test." It is important to note what application of expertise was being claimed
reliable in Ruth. It was not the ability to determine if a signature was genuine, as was the case in
Starzecpyzel. It was the much more questionable ability to attribute the authorship of a very small
sample of writing (like a forged signature) to a particular person based on comparison to examples
of the asserted forger's true writing.

10.CASE TITLE: STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA versus JEREMIE LABRANDON STEVENSON

FACTS:

On 24 March 2008, Defendant JeremieLaBrandon Stevenson (Stevenson) was indicted on one

count each of first-degree murder, first-degree kidnapping, robbery with a dangerous weapon, and
conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon. Stevenson pled not guilty to the charges and
was tried non-capitally before a jury at the 14 December 2009 Criminal Session of Iredell County Superior
Court, the Honorable Jerry Cash Martin presiding.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial court erred by admitting a picture of Stevenson holding a firearm.

RULING:

We disagree. The complained-of evidence was a properly authenticated picture of Stevenson lying
down with a silver revolver on his chest. The picture was offered by the State and admitted by the trial
court to illustrate Robinsons testimony that she saw Stevenson at her apartment with a silver gun with a
black handle. Indeed, just before the trial court received the picture into evidence, Robinson testified that

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the gun depicted in the picture appears to be the same firearm that [she] last saw . . . in [Stevensons] lap
on the day that [Barbone] was shot.

In a case involving murder and other charges, the trial court properly admitted a picture of the
defendant with a silver revolver to illustrate a witnesss testimony that she saw the defendant at her
apartment with a silver gun with a black handle. Before being received into evidence, the witness testified
that the gun depicted appeared to be the same gun that the defendant had at her apartment. (2) The trial
court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the prejudice caused by the photograph did not
substantially outweigh probative value.

D. DNA TESTING
1. CASE TITLE: SANDY WILLIAMS, Petitioner, versus ILLINOIS, Respondent.

FACTS:

Sandy Williams was convicted of two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault and one count
each of aggravated kidnapping and aggravated robbery. Illinois' appellate court affirmed Williams'
conviction but reversed the trial court's imposition of a consecutive sentence. On appeal to the Illinois
Supreme Court, the defendant argued that the testimony of an Illinois State Police forensic analyst, who
relied upon a DNA report prepared by a nontestifying third-party analyst, lacked a sufficient evidentiary
foundation. Alternatively, Williams argued that this testimony concerning the report was hearsay presented
for the truth of the matter asserted and violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause
right. The state's high court affirmed in part and reversed in part, finding that Williams' Sixth Amendment
rights weren't violated.

ISSUE:

Whether an expert witness be called as a stand-in for a lab analyst who actually did a test on
criminal evidence, but did not appear at the trial.

RULING:

Yes. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr., writing for a four-justice plurality, announced the judgment of the
Court. The Court affirmed that the testimony of an expert witness that is based on a test the expert did not
personally perform is admissible and does not violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment Confrontation
Clause right. The Court held that, because the evidence of the third-party test was not produced to prove
the truth of the matter asserted, but merely to provide a basis for the conclusions that the expert reached,
the prosecution had not infringed on the defendant's rights. The important issue was the conclusion that
the expert reached, and that the expert was available to the defendant for cross-examination. Additionally,
such a test does not fall within the bounds of the Confrontation Clause because the results were not
directed to prove the guilt of the defendant. Williams was not even a suspect at the time the test was
conducted.

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 Justice Stephen G. Breyer concurred and found that such DNA tests and their results fall outside
the scope of the Confrontation Clause so long as the lab procedures are reliable, and the defendant still
retains the right to call employees of the lab as witnesses. If the premise of a lab report's accuracy were
shown to be untrue, then the testimony of the expert would fall under the Confrontation Clause. Justice
Clarence Thomas also concurred on the basis that the evidence of the test was not "testimonial," as it
must to be governed by the Confrontation Clause.

Justice Elena Kagan dissented and found this case to be in the same vein as others where the
Court found that, in order to satisfy the requirements of the Confrontation Clause, the defendant must
have the opportunity to cross-examine an analyst who performed the test. Without such an opportunity, an
unreliable report is assumed to be true. Justice Antonin Scalia, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Justice
Sonia Sotomayor joined in the dissent.

2. Case Title: Maryland v. King

FACTS:

This case was a challenge to Marylands law requiring that buccal swab DNA samples be taken as
a routine part of booking for serious offenses. King was arrested in 2009 and booked on an assault
charge. As part of standard booking procedure under Maryland law, a swab of his inner cheek was taken
to obtain skin cells for a DNA test. Kings DNA was run against a database of unsolved crimes, and he
was connected to an unsolved rape in 2003 for which he later was convicted.

King was arrested in 2009 and booked on an assault charge. As part of standard booking
procedure under Maryland law, a swab of his inner cheek was taken to obtain skin cells for a DNA test.
Kings DNA was run against a database of unsolved crimes, and he was connected to an unsolved rape in
2003 for which he later was convicted.

ISSUE:

Police are allowed to take DNA samples from people they arrest on charges of serious crimes,
even if there are no plans to prosecute them for the offenses.

RULING:

When officers make an arrest supported by probable cause to hold for a serious offense and they
bring the suspect to the station to be detained in custody, taking and analyzing a cheek swab of the
arrestees DNA is, like fingerprinting and photographing, a legitimate police booking procedure that is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment,

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 The Court referenced the safeguards in the statute in support of its ruling. For example, the
Maryland statute provides the DNA sample is not to be processed or placed in a database until there is an
arraignment and a judicial officer ensures there was probable cause for arrest. If no probable cause exists
or the prosecution does not result in a conviction, the sample is to be destroyed. The law also contains
protections limiting the uses of the DNA, prescribing it may only be used for identification purposes, and
tests for familial matches are not permitted. The court found that under the statute DNA was obtained in a
minimally intrusive manner, and the collection was justified by the government interest in processing and
identifying persons law enforcement officers have taken into custody. Fully identifying persons in custody,
to include their criminal historyknown and unknownwas important in making decisions regarding the
safety risk such persons pose while in custody, the level of security to which they should be subject, and
whether to grant bail. In other words, if persons arrested for burglary can, in fact, be implicated in a rape
by their DNA, they should be handled while in custody with a level of security befitting their more serious
crime, and bail decisions regarding the safety of the community and likelihood of flight should consider the
more serious crime to which the individuals are linked. The Court further reasoned that a persons DNA
profile was another facet of their identity, like their fingerprints, photographs, or tattoos.

3. CASE TITLE: JESSE U. LUCAS versus JESUS S. LUCAS

FACTS:

Jesse U. Lucas (Jesse), filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion for the Submission of
Parties to DNA Testing before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Jesse narrated his mothers account of her
history with Jesus S. Lucas (Jesus) and attached several copies of his personal documents.

Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a
mere allegation pointing to him as Jesses father.

Acting on Jesus Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC dismissed the case and held that Jesse
failed to establish compliance with the four procedural aspects for a paternity action enumerated in the
case of Herrera v. Alba.

ISSUE:

Whether prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order.

RULING:

The statement in Herrera v. Alba that there are four significant procedural aspects in a traditional
paternity case which parties have to face has been widely misunderstood and misapplied in this case. A
party is confronted by these so-called procedural aspects during trial, when the parties have presented
their respective evidence. They are matters of evidence that cannot be determined at this initial stage of

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the proceedings, when only the petition to establish filiation has been filed. The CAs observation that
petitioner failed to establish a prima facie casethe first procedural aspect in a paternity caseis
therefore misplaced. A prima facie case is built by a partys evidence and not by mere allegations in the
initiatory pleading.

We agree, and find that, as a preliminary matter, before the court may issue an order for
compulsory blood testing, the moving party must show that there is a reasonable possibility of paternity.
As explained hereafter, in cases in which paternity is contested and a party to the action refuses to
voluntarily undergo a blood test, a show cause hearing must be held in which the court can determine
whether there is sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case which warrants issuance of a court
order for blood testing.

Thus, during the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie
evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.

4. ESTATE OF ROGELIO G. ONG, Petitioner, Vs.

Minor JOANNE RODJIN DIAZ, Represented by Her Mother and Guardian, JINKY C. DIAZ, Respondent
FACTS:

Minor Joanne Diaz, represented by her mother Jinky Diaz filed a complaint for compulsory recognition with prayer for
support against Rogelio Ong before RTC February 1993: Jinky married Japanese Hasegawa Katsuo November
1993: Jinky and Rogelio got acquainted and fell in love January 1994-September 1998: Jinky and Rogelio
cohabited February 1998: Joanne was born, Rogelio paid all expenses, recognized child as his September
1998: Rogelio abandoned them and stopped giving support, alleging that the is not the father of the child RTC ordered
defendant to recognize plaintiff as natural child and provide monthly support RTC granted Rogelios Motion for
New Trial (because he was declared in default before) RTC declared Joanne to be the illegitimate child of Rogelio
Ong with Jinky Diaz. Support to continue until she reaches majority age. Rogelio appealed to CA but he
died in February 2005 during its pendency December 2000: CA granted appeal and remanded case to RTC for the
issuance of an order directing the parties to make arrangements for DNA analysis for the purpose of determining the paternity
of Joanne.

ISSUE

Whether or not Court of Appeals erred in remanding the case for DNA analysis despite the fact that it is no longer
feasible due to Rogelios death

RULING:

No, the death of the petitioner does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for as long as
there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA. Even if Rogelio already died, any of his biological

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samples may be used for DNA testing Biological sample means any organic material originating from a persons
body, even if found in inanimate objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing. This includes blood, saliva, and
other body fluids, tissues, hairs, and bones.

Death of Rogelio cannot bar the conduct of DNA testing. According to jurisprudence, DNA testing, which
examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the
long dead parent could be resorted to. (People v. Umanito, citingTecson v. COMELEC)

5. Case Title: ARNEL L. AGUSTIN, vs.

HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND MINOR MARTIN JOSE PROLLAMANTE, REPRESENTED BY HIS
MOTHER/GUARDIAN FE ANGELA PROLLAMANTE,
FACTS:

Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martins alleged biological father, petitioner
Arnel Agustin, for support and support pendente lite before the Quezon City RTC.

In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe, after which they entered into an
intimate relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th birthday but despite Arnels insistence
on abortion, Fe decided to give birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin. The babys birth certificate was
purportedly signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but later
refused Fes repeated requests for Martins support despite his adequate financial capacity and even
suggested to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel also denied having fathered the child.

On January 2001, while Fe was carrying five-month old Martin at the Capitol Hills Golf and Country
Club parking lot, Arnel sped off in his van, with the open car door hitting Fes leg. This incident was
reported to the police. Several months later, Fe was diagnosed with leukemia and has, since then, been
undergoing chemotherapy. Fe and Martin then sued Arnel for support.

Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the parties to submit themselves to
DNA paternity testing, which Arnel opposed by invoking his constitutional right against self-incrimination
and moving to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action.

The trial court denied the MTD and ordered the parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity
testing at the expense of the applicants. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court, thus this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent court erred in denying the petitioners MTD

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 W/N the court erred in directing parties to subject to DNA paternity testing and was a form of
unreasonable search

RULING:

1. No. The trial court properly denied the petitioners motion to dismiss because the private
respondents complaint on its face showed that they had a cause of action against the petitioner. The
elements of a cause of action are: (1) the plaintiffs primary right and the defendants corresponding
primary duty, and (2) the delict or wrongful act or omission of the defendant, by which the primary right
and duty have been violated. The cause of action is determined not by the prayer of the complaint but by
the facts alleged.

2. No. In Ople v. Torres,the Supreme Court struck down the proposed national computerized
identification system embodied in Administrative Order No. 308, we said:

In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into
individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that
enhance public service and the common good... Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper
safeguards that enhance public service and the common good.

Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and seizures, and the infringement of
privacy of communication where the constitutional right to privacy has been critically at issue. Petitioners
case involves neither and, as already stated, his argument that his right against self-incrimination is in
jeopardy holds no water.

6. CASE TITLE: KELLY HARRINGTON, Petitioner,versusJOSHUA RICHTER, Respondent.

FACTS:

In March 1994, William Osborne was convicted of kidnapping, assault, and sexual assault in an
Alaska state court. After his conviction, Mr. Osborne sought access to biological evidence that was used to
convict him. He intended to use DNA testing that was not available at the time of the trial to prove he was
not the source. The District Attorney's Office (D.A.O.) in Anchorage denied access. Mr. Osborne
subsequently filed suit in a federal district court under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the D.A.O. alleging that
his 14th Amendment due process rights had been violated when he was denied post-conviction access to
potentially exculpatory evidence.

The district court granted the D.A.O.'s motion to dismiss and Mr. Osborne appealed. The United
States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit reversed and remanded the case. On remand, the district court
granted summary judgment for Mr. Osborne. The D.A.O. appealed arguing that Mr. Osborne need show

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 the disclosure of evidence would "affirmatively prove that he is probably innocent" in order to gain access.
Further, it argued that an oral confession given by Mr. Osborne after his conviction precluded him from
pursuing post-conviction relief.

The United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit affirmed the district court. It held that Mr.
Osborne had a limited due process right of access to the biological evidence for purposes of DNA testing.
The court dismissed the D.A.O.'s arguments. It reasoned that Mr. Osborne need merely show that
favorable DNA results would afford a "reasonable probability" that he could prevail in an action for post-
conviction relief. Further, it found that Mr. Osborne's oral confession did not foreclose his pursuit of post-
conviction relief, as exculpating evidence would raise serious questions about the validity of his
confession.

ISSUES:

1. May 42 U.S.C. 1983 be used to obtain post-conviction access to evidence when there is no pending
claim for which that evidence could be utilized?
2. Does the 14th Amendment's due process clause afford the plaintiff the right to obtain post-conviction
access to evidence when plaintiff's intended claim is foreclosed by evidence obtained through
confession?
RULING:

Maybe and no. The Supreme Court held that even assuming that Mr. Osborne could pursue his
claims using 1983, he had no constitutional right to obtain post-conviction access to the state's DNA
evidence used against him at trial. With Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority and joined
by Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas, the Court deferred to the
legislative branch in establishing rules by which convicts can obtain DNA evidence to pursue
postconviction relief. It recognized that while the Alaska legislature had yet to establish such procedures,
its court system was making progress. Moreover, the Court held that Mr. Osborne's due process rights
were not violated, reasoning that Alaska's postconviction relief procedures were adequate.

Justice Alito also wrote a separate concurring opinion and was joined by Justice Kennedy and in
part by Justice Thomas. He agreed with the majority's opinion, but also stated that Mr. Osborne's claim
failed for two other reasons. First, he argued that 1983 was an inappropriate mechanism for pursuing a
federal constitutional right claim when the claim had not been exhausted at the state court level. Second,
he argued that Mr. Osborne's claim should be rejected because a defendant who chooses not to have
DNA testing done at the trial level for tactical reasons should not have access to such testing in pursuing
post-conviction relief. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a separate dissenting opinion and was joined by
Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer, and in part by Justice David H. Souter. He strongly
disagreed with the majority holding that prevented Mr. Osborne from having access to evidence that could
conclusively prove his guilt or innocence, and thus could ensure justice had been achieved. Justice Souter
also dissented. He argued that Alaska had failed to provide sufficiently effective post-conviction relief
procedures to satisfy the Due Process Clause of the Constitution and thus Mr. Osborne should have had
access to the DNA evidence he sought.

7. Case Title: ESTATE OF ROGELIO G. ONG, Petitioner,

versus

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 MINOR JOANNE RODJIN DIAZ, REPRESENTED BY HER MOTHER AND GUARDIAN, JINKY C.
DIAZ, Respondent.

G.R. No. 171713, December 17, 2007

Chico-Nazario, J.

FACTS:

A Complaint for compulsory recognition with prayer for support pending litigation was filed by minor
Joanne Rodjin Diaz (Joanne), represented by her mother and guardian, Jinky C. Diaz (Jinky), against
Rogelio G. Ong (Rogelio) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City. As alleged by Jinky, she
and Rogelio got acquainted. This developed into friendship and later blossomed into love. At this time,
Jinky was already married to a Japanese national, Hasegawa Katsuo. Jinky and Rogelio cohabited and
from this live-in relationship, minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz was conceived. Rogelio abandoned minor Joanne
and Jinky, and stopped supporting minor Joanne, falsely alleging that he is not the father of the child.
Rogelio, despite Jinkys remonstrance, failed and refused and continued failing and refusing to give
support for the child and to acknowledge her as his daughter.

ISSUE:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in remanding the case to the trial court for DNA analysis
despite the fact that Rogelio Ong was already dead.

RULING:

There had been divergent and incongruent statements and assertions bandied about by the parties
to the present petition. But with the advancement in the field of genetics, and the availability of new
technology, it can now be determined with reasonable certainty whether Rogelio is the biological father of
the minor, through DNA testing. Amidst the protestation of petitioner against the DNA analysis, the
resolution thereof may provide the definitive key to the resolution of the issue of support for minor Joanne.
To the Courts mind, the alleged impossibility of complying with the order of remand for purposes of DNA
testing is more ostensible than real. Petitioners argument is without basis especially as the New Rules on
DNA Evidence allows the conduct of DNA testing, either motu proprio or upon application of any person
who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation. It can be said that the death of the petitioner does not
ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for as long as there exist appropriate biological samples
of his DNA. Therefore, petition was denied.

8. CASE TITLE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

versus

JOEL YATAR alias "KAWIT", Respondent.

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 G.R. No. 150224 May 19, 2004

FACTS:

On June 30, 1998, Kathylyn Uba stayed in her grandmothers (Isabel Dawangs) house, despite her
intention to go forth Tuguegarao City, as her other formers housemate-relatives left in the morning. At
10:00 am, accused-appellant Joel Yatar was seen at the back of the same house where Kathylyn stayed
during said date. At 12:30 pm, Judilyn, Kathylyns first cousin saw Yatar, who was then wearing a white
shirt with collar and black pants, descended from the second floor and was pacing back and forth at the
back of Isabel Dawangs house, Judilyn didnt find this unusual since Yatar and his wife used to live
therein. At 1:30 PM, Yatar called upon Judilyn, telling the latter that he would not be getting the lumber he
had been gathering. This time, Judilyn noticed that Yatar is now wearing a black shirt (without collar) and
blue pants; and noticed that the latters eyes were reddish and sharp.

Accused-appellant asked about the whereabouts of Judilyns husband, as the former purports to
talk with the latter. Then, Yatar immediately left when Judilyns husband arrived. In the evening, when
Isabel Dawang arrived home, she found the lights of her house turned off, the door of the ground floor
opened, and the containers, which she asked Kathylyn to fill up, were still empty. Upon ascending the
second floor to check whether the teenage girl is upstairs, Isabel found that the door therein was tied with
rope. When Isabel succeeded opening the tied door with a knife, and as she groped in the darkness of the
second level of her house, she felt Kathylyns lifeless and naked body, with some intestines protruding out
from it. Soon after, police came to the scene of the crime to provide assistance. Therein, they found
Kathylyns clothes and undergarments beside her body.

Amongst others, a white collared shirt splattered with blood was also found 50-meters away from
Isabels house. Meanwhile, semen has also been found upon examination of Kathylyns cadaver. When
subjected under DNA testing, results showed that the DNA comprising the sperm specimen is identical to
Yatars genotype. Yatar was accused of the special complex crime of Rape with Homicide and was
convicted for the same by the Regional Trial Court of Tabuk, Kalinga.Thereafter, he made an appeal to the
Honorable Supreme Court in order to assail the court a quos decision. On appeal, Yatar avers that: (1)
the trial court erred in giving much weight to the evidence DNA testing or analysis done on him, in lieu of
the seminal fluid found inside the victims (cadaver) vaginal canal; (2) the blood sample taken from is
violate of his constitutional right against self-incrimination; and the conduct of DNA testing is also in
violation on prohibition against ex-post facto laws.

ISSUE:

Whether the result of the DNA testing done on the sperm specimen may be used as evidence.

RULING:

The Supreme Court in this case ruled based on the US case of Daubert vs. Merrell Do was a
precedent. In the said US jurisprudence, it was ruled that pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid

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principles could be used, so long as the same is RELEVANT and RELIABLE. Hence, it was called then as
the DAUBERT TEST RULE: At present, SECTION 7, RULES ON DNA EVIDENCE may be used as the
legal basis.

APPLICATION

DAUBERT TEST: The Honorable Supreme Court in this case upheld the probative
value of the DNA test result yielded from the analysis of Yatars blood sample from that of
the semen specimen obtained from the cadavers vaginal canal. Accordingly, it held that the
DNA evidence is both reliable and relevant.

In giving probative value on the DNA testing result, yielded from the analysis of Yatars blood
sample from that of the biological sample (semen) obtained from the victims vaginal canal, the trial court
considered the qualification of the DNA analyst, the facility or laboratory in which the DNA testing had
been performed, and the methodology used in performing the DNA test. In the said case, the DNA test
was done at the UP National Science Research Institute (NSRI) . The method used was Polymerase
chain reaction (PCR) amplification method by Short Tandem Repeat (STR) analysis, which enables a tiny
amount of DNA sequence to be replicated exponentially in a span of few hours. Hence, sufficient DNA
analysis may be made easier even with small DNA samples at hand. The analyst who performed the
procedure wasMariaCorazon Abogado de Ungria, who is a duly qualified expert witness on DNA print or
identification techniques.

9. Case Title: THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
GERRICO VALLEJO Y SAMARTINO @ PUKE, accused-appellant.

FACTS

On July 10, 1999 9-year old Daisy Diolola went to her neighbors house to seek help in an
assignment. It was a Saturday. Gerrico Vallejo, the neighbor, helped Daisy in her assignment. At 5pm of
the same day, Daisys mom noticed that her child wasnt home yet. She went to Vallejos house and Daisy
wasnt there. 7pm, still no word of Daisys whereabouts. The next morning, Daisys body was found tied to
a tree near a river bank. Apparently, she was raped and thereafter strangled to death.

In the afternoon of July 11, the police went to Vallejos house to question the latter as he was one of
the last persons with the victim. But prior to that, some neighbors have already told the police that Vallejo
was acting strangely during the afternoon of July 10. The police requested for the clothes that Vallejo wore
the day Daisy disappeared. Vallejo complied and the clothes were submitted for processing.

The person who processed the clothing was Pet Byron Buan, a Forensic Biologist of the NBI. At the
instance of the local fiscal, he also took mouth/cheek swabs from Vallejo and a vaginal swab from Daisys
body for DNA testing. Dr. Buan found that there were bloodstains in Vallejos clothing Blood Type A, similar

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to that of the victim, while Vallejos Blood Type is O. Buan also found that the vaginal swab from Daisy
contained Vallejos DNA profile.

Meanwhile, Vallejo already executed a sworn statement admitting the crime. But when trial came,
Vallejo insisted that the sworn statement was coerced; that he was threatened by the cops; that the DNA
samples should be inadmissible because the body and the clothing of Daisy were already soaked in
smirchy waters, hence contaminated. Vallejo was convicted and was sentenced to death by the trial court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the DNA samples gathered are admissible as evidence.

RULING:

Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the findings of Dr. Buan are conclusive. The court reiterated that
even though DNA evidence is merely circumstantial, it can still convict the accused considering that it
corroborates all other circumstantial evidence gathered in this rape-slay case.

The Supreme Court also elucidated on the admissibility of DNA evidence in this case and for the
first time recognized its evidentiary value in the Philippines, thus: DNA is an organic substance found in a
persons cells which contains his or her genetic code. Except for identical twins, each persons DNA profile
is distinct and unique. When a crime is committed, material is collected from the scene of the crime or
from the victims body for the suspects DNA. This is the evidence sample. The evidence sample is then
matched with the reference sample taken from the suspect and the victim. The purpose of DNA testing is
to ascertain whether an association exists between the evidence sample and the reference sample. The
samples collected are subjected to various chemical processes to establish their profile.

10. CASE TITLE: DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, ET AL.,
Petitioner,
versus

WILLIAM G. OSBORNE, Respondent.

FACTS:

In March 1994, William Osborne was convicted of kidnapping, assault, and sexual assault in an
Alaska state court. After his conviction, Mr. Osborne sought access to biological evidence that was used to
convict him. He intended to use DNA testing that was not available at the time of the trial to prove he was
not the source. The District Attorney's Office (D.A.O.) in Anchorage denied access. Mr. Osborne
subsequently filed suit in a federal district court under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the D.A.O. alleging that

Page 43 of 68
 his 14th Amendment due process rights had been violated when he was denied post-conviction access to
potentially exculpatory evidence.

The district court granted the D.A.O.'s motion to dismiss and Mr. Osborne appealed. The United
States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit reversed and remanded the case. On remand, the district court
granted summary judgment for Mr. Osborne. The D.A.O. appealed arguing that Mr. Osborne need show
the disclosure of evidence would "affirmatively prove that he is probably innocent" in order to gain access.
Further, it argued that an oral confession given by Mr. Osborne after his conviction precluded him from
pursuing post-conviction relief.

The United States Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit affirmed the district court. It held that Mr.
Osborne had a limited due process right of access to the biological evidence for purposes of DNA testing.
The court dismissed the D.A.O.'s arguments. It reasoned that Mr. Osborne need merely show that
favorable DNA results would afford a "reasonable probability" that he could prevail in an action for post-
conviction relief. Further, it found that Mr. Osborne's oral confession did not foreclose his pursuit of post-
conviction relief, as exculpating evidence would raise serious questions about the validity of his
confession.

ISSUES:

1. May 42 U.S.C. 1983 be used to obtain post-conviction access to evidence when there is no
pending claim for which that evidence could be utilized?
2. Does the 14th Amendment's due process clause afford the plaintiff the right to obtain post-conviction
access to evidence when plaintiff's intended claim is foreclosed by evidence obtained through
confession?
RULING:

Maybe and no. The Supreme Court held that even assuming that Mr. Osborne could pursue his
claims using 1983, he had no constitutional right to obtain post-conviction access to the state's DNA
evidence used against him at trial. With Chief Justice John G. Roberts writing for the majority and joined
by Justices Antonin G. Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy, and Clarence Thomas, the Court deferred to the
legislative branch in establishing rules by which convicts can obtain DNA evidence to pursue
postconviction relief. It recognized that while the Alaska legislature had yet to establish such procedures,
its court system was making progress. Moreover, the Court held that Mr. Osborne's due process rights
were not violated, reasoning that Alaska's postconviction relief procedures were adequate.

Justice Alito also wrote a separate concurring opinion and was joined by Justice Kennedy and in
part by Justice Thomas. He agreed with the majority's opinion, but also stated that Mr. Osborne's claim
failed for two other reasons. First, he argued that 1983 was an inappropriate mechanism for pursuing a
federal constitutional right claim when the claim had not been exhausted at the state court level. Second,
he argued that Mr. Osborne's claim should be rejected because a defendant who chooses not to have
DNA testing done at the trial level for tactical reasons should not have access to such testing in pursuing
postconviction relief. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a separate dissenting opinion and was joined by

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Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Stephen G. Breyer, and in part by Justice David H. Souter. He strongly
disagreed with the majority holding that prevented Mr. Osborne from having access to evidence that could
conclusively prove his guilt or innocence, and thus could ensure justice had been achieved. Justice Souter
also dissented. He argued that Alaska had failed to provide sufficiently effective postconviction relief
procedures to satisfy the Due Process Clause of the Constitution and thus Mr. Osborne should have had
access to the DNA evidence he sought.

11. CASE TITLE: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. GERRICO VALLEJO, Petitioner,

versus

GERRICO VALLEJO, Respondents.

FACTS:

On July 10, 1999 (Rosario, Cavite), at about 1pm, 9-year old Daisy Diolola went to her neighbors
house to seek help in an assignment. It was a Saturday. Gerrico Vallejo, the neighbor, helped Daisy in her
assignment. At 5pm of the same day, Daisys mom noticed that her child wasnt home yet. She went to
Vallejos house and Daisy wasnt there. 7pm, still no word of Daisys whereabouts. The next morning,
Daisys body was found tied to a tree near a river bank. Apparently, she was raped and thereafter
strangled to death.

In the afternoon of July 11, the police went to Vallejos house to question the latter as he was one of
the last persons with the victim. The police requested for the clothes that Vallejo wore the day Daisy
disappeared. Vallejo complied and the clothes were submitted for processing.

The person who processed the clothing was Pet Byron Buan, a Forensic Biologist of the NBI. At the
instance of the local fiscal, he also took buccal swabs (mouth/cheek swabs) from Vallejo and a vaginal
swab from Daisys body for DNA testing. Dr. Buan found that there were bloodstains in Vallejos clothing
Blood Type A, similar to that of the victim, while Vallejos Blood Type is O.

Buan also found that the vaginal swab from Daisy contained Vallejos DNA profile.

ISSUE:

Whether the DNA samples gathered are admissible as evidence.

RULING:

Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the findings of Dr. Buan are conclusive. The court reiterated that
even though DNA evidence is merely circumstantial, it can still convict the accused considering that it
corroborates all other circumstantial evidence gathered in this rape-slay case.

The Supreme Court also elucidated on the admissibility of DNA evidence in this case and for the
first time recognized its evidentiary value in the Philippines, thus:

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 DNA is an organic substance found in a persons cells which contains his or her
genetic code. Except for identical twins, each persons DNA profile is distinct and unique.

When a crime is committed, material is collected from the scene of the crime or from the victims
body for the suspects DNA. This is the evidence sample. The evidence sample is then matched with the
reference sample taken from the suspect and the victim. Decision of RTC AFFIRMED.

12. EDGARDO A. TIJING and BIENVENIDA R TIJING, petitioners, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS (Seventh Division) and ANGELITA DIAMANTE, respondents.

FACTS:

Edgardo and Bienvenida Tijing are husband and wife; they have six children, youngest of who is
Edgardo Tijing Jr. In August 1989, Angelita Diamante fetched Bienvenida for an urgent laundry job.
Bienvenida left to Angelita her 4-month old child, Edgardo Jr. as she usually let Angelita take care of her
child while she was doing laundry. When Bienvenida returned from work to get her son, Angelita was
nowhere to be found, and despite her and her husbands efforts, they could not locate Angelita and their
childs whereabouts.

Four years later, Bienvenida read about the death of Tomas Lopez, the common-law husband of
Angelita, whose interment is in Bulacan. She went there and allegedly saw her son Edgardo Jr., now
named John Thomas Lopez. John is now being claimed by Angelita as her own son, sired by her
common-law husband Tomas Lopez during their cohabitation. Bienvenida now

alleges that the child cannot possibly be born to Angelita and Tomas for it was the latters own brother who
admitted that Tomas was rendered sterile, caused by an accident. Tomas begot no children from his legal
marriage or with the cohabitation with Angelita. Tomas brother even testified that Tomas himself admitted
to him that the subject child was adopted.

ISSUE

Who among the claimants is the true parent of the subject child.

RULING:

Bienvenida. She presented sufficient clinical records, presenting the proper and credible

witnesses who assisted her in her childs birth. Not to mention that it could be readily observed that
Bienvenida and the child have strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes.
Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and material evidence to establish
parentage.

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 Whereas, Angelita had been known to have undergone ligation years before the alleged birth of the
child and the admission of Tomas own brother that Tomas was sterile makes it impossible that he and
Angelita sired subject child. More importantly, the birth certificate of the child stated Tomas Lopez and
private respondent were legally married which is false because even Angelita had admitted she is a
common-law wife. This false entry puts to doubt the other data in said birth certificate. In this case, the
Supreme Court made mention of the DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The DNA from the
mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish parentage. The use of DNA test as evidence
is still open to challenge, but as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on its
admissibility. Though it is not necessary in this case to resort to DNA testing, in future it would be useful to
all concerned in the prompt resolution of parentage and identity issues.

13. Case title: ISIDRO LUSTAA, Petitioner,

versus

ARACELI JIMENA-LAZO, (ON BEHALF OF ROSCHEL J. LUSTAA), HON. REGIONAL TRIAL

COURT OF MARINDUQUE, BRANCH 38, Respondent.

FACTS:

Araceli Jimena-Lazo, respondent, on behalf of her minor daughter Roschel J. Lustaa, filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Marinduque a complaint for "Judicial Recognition, Support and Damages"
against Isidro Lustaa, petitioner.In his answer to the complaint, petitioner alleged that although he
employed respondent as a maid, they did not have any sexual relations. After hearing, both the trial and
appellate courts rendered a decision in favor of respondent, declaring inter alia that Roschel is the
illegitimate child of respondent and ordering him to recognize her as such.

ISSUE:

Whether the Court should be liberal in applying the technical rules of procedure and allow the case
to be reopened and that thereafter, respondent and her daughter Roschel be compelled to submit
themselves to a "DNA test".

RULING:

This petition should have been dismissed outright.

Records show that after the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, petitioner did not file a motion for
reconsideration, an appeal, or a motion for new trial within the reglementary period, which is 15 days
pursuant to Section 1, Rule 37 and Section 1, Rule 52 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
Rules of procedure are tools designed to promote efficiency and orderliness as well as to facilitate
attainment of justice, such that strict adherence thereto is required. Their application may be relaxed only

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when rigidity would result in a defeat of equity and substantial justice, which is not present here. Utter
disregard of the Rules cannot just be rationalized by harking on the policy of liberal construction. Petitioner
has only himself to blame. Had he been vigilant and truly believed in the justness of his case, he should
have hired immediately another lawyer upon the death of his first counsel, and then changed his second
counsel at once when the latter did not take any action at all.

14. Case Title: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appelle,

versus

RUFINO UMANITO, Appellant.

FACTS:

On appeal is the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 15 February 2006, affirming the Judgment
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bauang, La Union, Branch 67 dated 15 October 1997 finding Rufino
Umanito (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. In so doing, the court a quo held
that the discrepancies in victim AAAs testimony did not impair her credibility. Despite some
inconsistencies in her statement, the RTC observed that AAAs demeanor on the witness stand did not
indicate any falsehood in her narration. The trial court likewise rejected appellants defense of alibi, ruling
that he did not prove that it was physically impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime given the
testimonies that he and complainant were residing in the same barrio.

ISSUE:

Whether DNA testing is proper in resolving the instant case.

RULING:

Amidst the slew of assertions and counter-assertions, a happenstance may provide the definitive
key to the absolution of the appellant. This is the fact that AAA bore a child as a result of the purported
rape. With the advance in genetics and the availability of new technology, it can now be determined with
reasonable certainty whether appellant is the father of AAAs child. If he is not, his acquittal may be
ordained. The Supreme Court has pronounced that if it can be conclusively determined that the accused
did not sire the alleged victims child, this may cast the shadow of reasonable doubt and allow his acquittal
on this basis. If he is found not to be the father, the finding will at least weigh heavily in the ultimate
decision in this case. Thus, the SC directed appellant, AAA and AAAs child to submit themselves to
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing under the aegis of the New Rule on DNA Evidence (the Rules), which
took effect on 15 October 2007, subject to guidelines prescribed herein. Wherefore, the instant case was
remanded to the RTC for reception of DNA evidence.

15. CASE TITLE: ROSENDO HERRERA, Petitioner,

versus

Page 48 of 68
 ROSENDO ALBA, Respondents.

FACTS:

In May 1998, Armi Alba, mother of minor Rosendo Alba filed a suit against Rosendo Herrera in
order for the latter to recognize and support Rosendo as his biological son. Herrera denied Armis
allegations. In the year 2000, the trial court ordered the parties to undergo a (deoxyribonucleic acid) DNA
testing to establish whether or not Herrera is indeed the biological father of Rosendo Alba. However,
Herrera questioned the validity of the order as he claimed that DNA testing has not yet garnered
widespread acceptance hence any result there from will not be admissible in court; and that the said test
is unconstitutional for it violates his right against self-incrimination.

ISSUE:

Whether Herrera is correct in contending that DNA result will not be admissible in Court.

RULING:

Petition DENIED. The Court ruled that Compulsory DNA Testing is Constitutional and results are
admissible.

In 2001, the Court opened the possibility of admitting DNA as evidence of parentage, as enunciated
in Tijing v. Court of Appeals: Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt
the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA
test for identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research
Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short
tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two
(2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged
father and child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use
of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts
should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply
the results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result
is to deny progress.

Significantly, the constitutionality of compulsory DNA testing has been upheld and thereof admitted
in evidence. In the case of People vs. Yatar, DNA samples from semen recovered from a rape victims
vagina were used to positively identify the accused Joel Yatar as the rapist. Yatar claimed that the
compulsory extraction of his blood sample for DNA testing, as well as the testing itself, violated his right
against self-incrimination, as embodied in both Sections 12 and 17 of Article III of the Constitution. The
Supreme Court addressed this as follows: The contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not

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against all compulsion, but against testimonial compulsion. The right against self-incrimination is simply
against the legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not apply
where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of object evidence.

There is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the public respondent for upholding the orders
of the trial court which both denied the petitioners motion to dismiss and ordered him to submit himself for
DNA testing.

16. Case Title:

ROSENDO HERRERA, petitioner,

vs.

ROSENDO ALBA, minor, represented by his mother ARMI A. ALBA, and HON. NIMFA CUESTA-
VILCHES, Presiding Judge, Branch 48, Regional Trial Court,

FACTS:

On 14 May 1998, then thirteen-year-old Rosendo Alba (respondent ), represented by his mother
Armi Alba, filed before the trial court a petition for compulsory recognition, support and damages against
petitioner. On 7 August 1998, petitioner filed his answer with counterclaim where he denied that he is the
biological father of respondent. Petitioner also denied physical contact with

respondents mother.

Respondent filed a motion to direct the taking of DNA paternity testing to abbreviate the
proceedings. In her testimony, Dr. Halos described the process for DNA paternity testing and asserted that
the test had an accuracy rate of 99.9999% in establishing paternity. Petitioner opposed DNA paternity
testing and contended that it has not gained acceptability. Petitioner further argued that DNA paternity
testing violates his right against self-incrimination.

In an Order dated 3 February 2000, the trial court granted respondents motion to conduct DNA
paternity testing on petitioner, respondent and Armi Alba. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of
the 3 February 2000 Order. He asserted that under the present circumstances, the DNA test is
compelled to take would be inconclusive, irrelevant and the coercive process to obtain the requisite
specimen, unconstitutional.

In an Order dated 8 June 2000, the trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. On 29
November 2000, the appellate court issued a decision denying the petition and affirming the questioned

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Orders of the trial court. The appellate court stated that petitioner merely desires to correct the trial courts
evaluation of evidence.

Thus, appeal is an available remedy for an error of judgment that the court may commit in the
exercise of its jurisdiction. The appellate court also stated that the proposed DNA paternity testing does
not violate his right against self-incrimination because the right applies only to testimonial compulsion.
Finally, the appellate court pointed out that petitioner can still refute a possible adverse result of the DNA
paternity testing.

ISSUE:

Whether or not DNA test is a valid probative tool in this jurisdiction to determine filiation.

RULING:

Before discussing the issues on DNA paternity testing, we deem it appropriate to give an overview
of a paternity suit and apply it to the facts of this case. We shall consider the requirements of the Family
Code and of the Rules of Evidence to establish paternity and filiation. Filiation proceedings are usually
filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as
citizenship, support, or inheritance.

The burden of proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the putative father is the
biological father of the child. There are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action
which parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and
physical resemblance between the putative father and child.

In the present case, the trial court encountered three of the four aspects. Armi Alba, respondents
mother, put forward a prima facie case when she asserted that petitioner is respondents biological father.
Aware that her assertion is not enough to convince the trial court, she offered corroborative proof in the
form of letters and pictures. Petitioner, on the other hand, denied Armi Albas assertion.

He denied ever having sexual relations with Armi Alba and stated that respondent is Armi Albas
child with another man. Armi Alba countered petitioners denial by submitting pictures of respondent and
petitioner side by side, to show how much they resemble each other. Paternity and filiation disputes can
easily become credibility contests. We now look to the law, rules, and governing jurisprudence to help us
determine what evidence of incriminating acts on paternity and filiation are allowed in this jurisdiction.

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17. CASE TITLE: HENRY W. SKINNER, Petitioner,

versus

LYNN SWITZER, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, Respondent.

FACTS:

Skinner was convicted of murdering his girlfriend in 1995, and sentenced to death. The Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals (CCA) affirmed. On March 26, 1998, Skinner filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in Texas courts. It was subsequently dismissed as untimely and the CCA affirmed. In 1999, he filed
a federal habeas petition. At the same time, he began pushing for DNA testing of materials in the original
case by the District Attorney's office. The testing was conducted by a private office and resulted in mixed
results; however Skinner wanted what he called 'independent' testing.

He filed claims in Texas court for his own DNA testing but his attempts did not succeed. He also filed a
second successive federal habeas petition demanding DNA testing of all evidence; this was an
independent claim as well as a basis for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel (his attorney did not
request DNA testing of certain evidence at trial). A federal magistrate held a hearing, rejected the petition,
which a district judge eventually confirmed. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme
Court entered a stay of execution and granted a writ of certiorari to hear the case.

ISSUE:

Whether a convicted state prisoner seeking DNA testing of crime-scene evidence may assert that
claim in a civil rights action under 42 U. S. C. 1983 or may assert the claim in federal court only in a
petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U. S. C. 2254.

RULING:

In a 6 to 3 decision delivered by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, the Court held that federal-court
subject-matter jurisdiction existed over Skinners complaint, and that his claim was cognizable under
1983. Justices Thomas, Kennedy and Alito dissented.

18. Case Title: MA. CRISTINA TORRES BRAZA, PAOLO JOSEF T. BRAZA and JANELLE ANN T.
BRAZA, Petitioners,

versus

THE CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR OF HIMAMAYLAN CITY, NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, MINOR PATRICK
ALVIN TITULAR BRAZA, REPRESENTED BY LEON TITULAR, CECILIA TITULAR AND LUCILLE
C. TITULAR, Respondents.

Page 52 of 68
FACTS:

Petitioner Ma. Cristina Torres (Ma. Cristina) and Pablo Sicad Braza, Jr. (Pablo), also known as
Pablito Sicad Braza, were married. Pablo died, and during his wake, respondent began introducing her
co-respondent minor Patrick Alvin Titular Braza (Patrick) as her and Pablo's son. Ma. Cristina thereupon
made inquiries in the course of which she obtained Patrick's birth certificate and a copy of a marriage
contract showing that Pablo and Lucille were married from the Local Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City,
Negros Occidental, drawing her and her co-petitioners to file before the Regional Trial Court of
Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental a petition to correct the entries in the birth record of Patrick in the
Local Civil Register

Contending that Patrick could not have been legitimated by the supposed marriage between Lucille
and Pablo, said marriage being bigamous on account of the valid and subsisting marriage between Ma.
Cristina and Pablo, petitioners prayed for (1) the correction of the entries in Patrick's birth record with
respect to his legitimation, the name of the father and his acknowledgment, and the use of the last name
"Braza"; 2) a directive to Leon, Cecilia and Lucille, all surnamed Titular, as guardians of the minor Patrick,
to submit Parick to DNA testing to determine his paternity and filiation; and 3) the declaration of nullity of
the legitimation of Patrick as stated in his birth certificate and, for this purpose, the declaration of the
marriage of Lucille and Pablo as bigamous. The trial court dismissed the petition without prejudice, it
holding that in a special proceeding for correction of entry, the court, which is not acting as a family court
under the Family Code, has no jurisdiction over an action to annul the marriage of Lucille and Pablo,
impugn the legitimacy of Patrick, and order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test, hence, the controversy
should be ventilated in an ordinary adversarial action.

ISSUE:

Whether the Trial Court had jurisdiction to order Patrick to be subjected to a DNA test to establish
his paternity and affiliation.

RULING:

The petition fails. In a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages and
rule on legitimacy and filiation, let alone order DNA tests to be done to that end.

19. CASE TITLE: STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Petitioner,

versus

JOSEPH RAGLAND, Respondent.

FACTS:

Page 53 of 68
 Defendant Joseph Ragland appeals from his conviction of second degree rape, two counts of
second degree forcible sex offense, and sexual servitude. On appeal, defendant primarily contends that
the trial court committed plain error when it allowed the State's expert witness to testify that certain DNA
evidence could have come from no one else in the world other than defendant. We agree that this
testimony constituted the "prosecutor's fallacy" that the United States Supreme Court -2- found improper
in McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120, 175 L. Ed. 2d 582, 130 S. Ct. 665 (2010) (per curiam). Nonetheless,
given the State's overwhelming evidence, we hold defendant has failed to establish that the admission of
this testimony was plain error.

ISSUE:

Whether the trial court committed plain error in admitting certain expert testimony regarding DNA
evidence because that testimony amounted to a "prosecutor's fallacy."

RULING:

The trial court erred by admitting expert testimony regarding DNA evidence that amounted to a
"prosecutor's fallacy." That fallacy, the court explained, involves the use of DNA evidence to show "random
match probability." Random match probability evidence, it continued, is the probability that another person
in the general population would share the same DNA profile as the person whose DNA profile matched the
evidence. Citing, McDaniel v. Brown, 558 U.S. 120 (2010), the court explained that "[t]he prosecutor's
fallacy is the assumption that the random match probability is the same as the probability that the
defendant was not the source of the DNA sample." It continued, quoting from McDaniel:

In other words, if a juror is told the probability a member of the general population would share the
same DNA is 1 in 10,000 (random match probability), and he takes that to mean there is only a 1 in
10,000 chance that someone other than the defendant is the source of the DNA found at the crime scene
(source probability), then he has succumbed to the prosecutor's fallacy.

Here, error occurred when the States expert improperly relied on the prosecutors fallacy. However,
the error did not rise to the level of plain error.

20. CASE TITLE: IN RE: THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR REYNALDO DE VILLA VS. THE
DIRECTOR OF NEW BILIBID PRISONS

FACTS:

At about 10 in the morning, 12-year old Aileen Mendoza woke up to find De Villa on top of her. She
was unable to call for help because De Villa covered her mouth with a pillow and threatened to kill her. He
then proceeded to rape her and eventually Aileen became pregnant. Her mother noticed the pregnancy
and confronted her about it, and Aileen eventually admitted that she was raped by De Villa.

Page 54 of 68
 A criminal complaint was then filed against the petitioner by Aileens parents. Aileen was examined
by Dr. Cosidon, who confirmed her pregnancy (she was already 8 months pregnant at that time), and
found healed lacerations in her hymen.

During the trial, De Villa pleaded not guilty because at the time of the alleged rape, he was already
67years old, and was incapable of an erection. He also interposed an alibi that he was not in the scene of
the crime at the time of the rape. De Villa was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt by the trial court for
the rape of Aileen Mendoza, his niece by affinity, and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, as well as the payment of civil indemnity, moral damages, costs of the suit, and support for
Leahlyn Corales Mendoza the putative child born of the rape. Three years after the decision, June (the
son of Reynaldo) alleged that during the trial of the case, he was unaware that there was a scientific test
that could determine whether Reynaldo was Leahlyns father. They sought for DNA testing to resolve the
issue of paternity, but the same was denied. At the petitioners insistence, they gathered samples from
Leahlyn, from the grandchildren of Reynaldo, and from Reynaldo himself and was submitted to the DNA
Laboratory. The DNA Laboratory rendered a preliminary report showing that there was no match between
the DNA samples.

ISSUE:

Whether the DNA result a valid basis for habeas corpus, new trial, and acquittal.

RULING:

NO TO ALL COUNTS.

(1) As to Habeas Corpus: The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ, therefore, is that
the individual seeking such relief be illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under some
form of illegal restraint. If an individual's liberty is restrained via some legal process, the writ of habeas
corpus is unavailing. In the recent case of Feria v. Court of Appeals, the court ruled that review of a
judgment of conviction is allowed in a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus only in very
specific instances, such as when, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a
deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to
impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such
excess. This Court stated the general rule that the writ of habeas corpus is not a writ of error, and should
not be thus used.

Page 55 of 68
 (2) As to new trial: A motion for new trial based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted
only if the following requisites are met: (a) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that said
evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable
diligence; (c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the
evidence is of such weight that, if admitted, it would probably change the judgment. Petitioner-relator's
claim that he was "unaware" of the existence of DNA testing until the trial was concluded carries no weight
with this Court. Lack of knowledge of the existence of DNA testing speaks of negligence, either on the part
of petitioner, or on the part of petitioner's counsel. In either instance, however, this negligence is binding
upon petitioner.

(3) As to acquittal : Even with all of the compelling and persuasive scientific evidence presented
by petitioner and his counsel, we are not convinced that Reynaldo de Villa is entitled to outright acquittal.
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General, even if it is conclusively proven that Reynaldo de Villa is
not the father of Leahlyn Mendoza, his conviction could, in theory, still stand, with Aileen Mendozas
testimony and positive identification as its bases. The Solicitor General reiterates, and correctly so, that
the pregnancy of the victim has never been an element of the crime of rape. Therefore, the DNA evidence
has failed to conclusively prove to this Court that Reynaldo de Villa should be discharged. Although
petitioner claims that conviction was based solely on a finding of paternity of the child Leahlyn, this is not
the case. The courts conviction was based on the clear and convincing testimonial evidence of the victim,
which, given credence by the trial court, was affirmed on appeal.

E. Identifying Firearms

1. Case Title: SOLOMON ALVAREZ, petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

Facts:

The petitioner was charged with Homicide for the shooting of Aurelio Manalo, Jr. which resulted to
his death. Petitioner assailed the prosecution for its failure to conduct ballistics and paraffin tests. He
presumed that no such tests were made by the prosecution in order to "deliberately suppress" the results
thereof, which might exculpate him from the offense.

Issue:

Page 56 of 68
 Whether the failure to conduct ballistic and paraffin test is fatal to the prosecution of the crime.

Ruling:

The petitioners contention is untenable. The choice of what evidence to present, or who should
testify as a witness is within the discretionary power of the prosecutor and definitely not for the courts to
dictate. In any case, the presentation of the weapon (or the slugs, as in this case) and ballistic
examination are not prerequisites for conviction. Further, paraffin tests have never been considered to be
foolproof. In the present case there are ample evidence on record to warrant petitioners conviction for the
crime of homicide.

2. Case Title: LENIDO LUMANOG and AUGUSTO SANTOS, Petitioners,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Facts:

Former Chief of the Metropolitan Command Intelligence and Security Group of the Philippine
Constabulary, now the Philippine National Police (PNP), Colonel Rolando N. Abadilla (Abadilla), was
ambushed and killed in broad daylight while driving his car along Katipunan Avenue, Quezon City. All the
accused in the instant case raised the defense of alibi and highlighted the negative findings of ballistic and
fingerprint examinations. The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals found the Appellants in the
instant case guilty.

Issue:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding exculpatory documentary evidence including
negative results of ballistic and fingerprint examinations.

Ruling:

As correctly held by the CA, the negative result of ballistic examination was inconclusive, for there
is no showing that the firearms supposedly found in appellants possession were the same ones used in
the ambush-slay of Abadilla. The fact that ballistic examination revealed that the empty shells and slug
were fired from another firearm does not disprove appellants guilt, as it was possible that different
firearms were used by them in shooting Abadilla. To begin with, the prosecution never claimed that the
firearms confiscated from appellants, which were the subject of separate charges for illegal possession of
firearms, were the same firearms used in the ambush-slay of Abadilla. A ballistic examination is not
indispensable in this case. Appellants cannot escape criminal liability, as they were positively identified by
eyewitness Freddie Alejo as the ones who shot Abadilla to death. The negative result of the fingerprint
tests conducted by fingerprint examiner Remedios is likewise inconclusive and unreliable. Said witness
admitted that no prints had been lifted from inside the KIA Pride and only two (2) fingerprints were taken
from the car of Abadilla.

3. Case Title: LENIDO LUMANOG and AUGUSTO SANTOS, Petitioners,

versus

Page 57 of 68
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS:

Former Chief of the Metropolitan Command Intelligence and Security Group of the Philippine
Constabulary, now the Philippine National Police (PNP), Colonel Rolando N. Abadilla (Abadilla), was
ambushed and killed in broad daylight while driving his car along Katipunan Avenue, Quezon City. All the
accused in the instant case raised the defense of alibi and highlighted the negative findings of ballistic and
fingerprint examinations. The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals found the Appellants in the
instant case guilty.

ISSUE:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding exculpatory documentary evidence including
negative results of ballistic and fingerprint examinations.

RULING:

As correctly held by the CA, the negative result of ballistic examination was inconclusive, for there
is no showing that the firearms supposedly found in appellants possession were the same ones used in
the ambush-slay of Abadilla. The fact that ballistic examination revealed that the empty shells and slug
were fired from another firearm does not disprove appellants guilt, as it was possible that different
firearms were used by them in shooting Abadilla. To begin with, the prosecution never claimed that the
firearms confiscated from appellants, which were the subject of separate charges for illegal possession of
firearms, were the same firearms used in the ambush-slay of Abadilla. A ballistic examination is not
indispensable in this case. Appellants cannot escape criminal liability, as they were positively identified by
eyewitness Freddie Alejo as the ones who shot Abadilla to death. The negative result of the fingerprint
tests conducted by fingerprint examiner Remedios is likewise inconclusive and unreliable. Said witness
admitted that no prints had been lifted from inside the KIA Pride and only two (2) fingerprints were taken
from the car of Abadilla.

4. Case Title: Lumanog v. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 182555, September 7, 2010
Ponente: Justice Villarama Jr.

Facts:

Former Chief of the Metropolitan Command Intelligence and Security Group of the Philippine
Constabulary, now the Philippine National Police (PNP), Colonel Rolando N. Abadilla (Abadilla), was
ambushed and killed in broad daylight while driving his car along Katipunan Avenue, Quezon City. All the
accused in the instant case raised the defense of alibi and highlighted the negative findings of ballistic and
fingerprint examinations. The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals found the Appellants in the
instant case guilty.

Page 58 of 68
Issue:

Whether the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding exculpatory documentary evidence including
negative results of ballistic and fingerprint examinations.

Ruling:

As correctly held by the CA, the negative result of ballistic examination was inconclusive, for there
is no showing that the firearms supposedly found in appellants possession were the same ones used in
the ambush-slay of Abadilla. The fact that ballistic examination revealed that the empty shells and slug
were fired from another firearm does not disprove appellants guilt, as it was possible that different
firearms were used by them in shooting Abadilla. To begin with, the prosecution never claimed that the
firearms confiscated from appellants, which were the subject of separate charges for illegal possession of
firearms, were the same firearms used in the ambush-slay of Abadilla. A ballistic examination is not
indispensable in this case. Appellants cannot escape criminal liability, as they were positively identified by
eyewitness Freddie Alejo as the ones who shot Abadilla to death. The negative result of the fingerprint
tests conducted by fingerprint examiner Remedios is likewise inconclusive and unreliable. Said witness
admitted that no prints had been lifted from inside the KIA Pride and only two (2) fingerprints were taken
from the car of Abadilla.

5. Case Title: SOLOMON ALVAREZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.

FACTS OF THE CASE

The petitioner was charged with Homicide for the shooting of Aurelio Manalo, Jr. which resulted to
his death. Petitioner assailed the prosecution for its failure to conduct ballistics and paraffin tests. He
presumed that no such tests were made by the prosecution in order to "deliberately suppress" the results
thereof, which might exculpate him from the offense.

ISSUE OF THE CASE

Whether the failure to conduct ballistic and paraffin test is fatal to the prosecution of the crime.

RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT

The petitioners contention is untenable. The choice of what evidence to present, or who should
testify as a witness is within the discretionary power of the prosecutor and definitely not for the courts to
Page 59 of 68
dictate. In any case, the presentation of the weapon (or the slugs, as in this case) and ballistic
examination are not prerequisites for conviction. Further, paraffin tests have never been considered to be
foolproof.In the present case there are ample evidence on record to warrant petitioners conviction for the
crime of homicide.

F. Forensic Dentistry
KOSOUL CHANTHAKOUMMANE, Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS

Facts:

Page 60 of 68
 On Saturday, July 8, 2006, real estate agent Sarah Walker was murdered in the D. R. Horton model
home where she worked in the "Craig Ranch" subdivision in McKinney, Texas. At approximately 1:10 p.m.,
Andy Lilliston and his wife came to look at the D. R. Horton model home. When they entered the model
home, Lilliston thought that it appeared to have been "ransacked." He observed a large pool of blood in
the dining room, where the sales desk was located. He followed a trail of blood into the kitchen, where he
saw Walker lying face-up on the floor, with the upper half of her body covered in blood. Lilliston directed
his wife to call 9-1-1, and they exited the model home. Lilliston ran into the street and flagged down a
vehicle for help. He briefly went back inside the model home to check on Walker, but she did not display
any signs of life. Lilliston then went back outside and waited for emergency personnel to arrive. Appellant
was charged with intentionally and knowingly causing Walker's death while in the course of committing or
attempting to commit robbery.

Issue:

Whether the fingerprints and bite marks found was owned by appellant.

Ruling:

Yes. Appellant's DNA profile was consistent with the DNA obtained from Walker's fingernails, the
window blind pull cords, the deadbolt lock and faceplate, and some of the swabs taken from the living
room, kitchen, and entryway of the model home. The DNA analyst testified that only a "partial profile" was
obtained from a swab taken from the kitchen sink because the DNA extracted from that swab "was of low
quality and degraded quality." However, the set of genetic markers that she was able to detect in the
partial profile "corresponded with the genetic markers observed in the DNA profile of appellant."

Forensic dentistry consultant Brent Hutson examined appellant and made impressions of his teeth.
Hutson compared appellant's teeth to the bite mark on Walker's neck and found enough similarities that
he was "unable to exclude [appellant] from that population of individuals that could have inflicted this
injury." Hutson concluded "within reasonable dental certainty beyond a doubt" that appellant was
responsible for the bite mark on Walker's neck.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
GERALD SORIANO alias PEDRO, Accused-Appellant.

FACTS:

On December 31, 1998, Soriano had a drinking spree with his friends.Around that time, Vicky
Bearneza was grazing her carabao on a palm road when she saw Soriano, clad in a yellow t-shirt and
blue denim. At roughly 3:30 p.m. of the same day, Vickys sister BBB saw Soriano, pass by her house. It
was also around the same time that she was expecting her eight-year-old daughter, AAA, to take the
same shortcut on her way home from harvesting palay. Thereafter, BBB asked for help in looking for AAA.
The other residents assisted in the search, which lasted until midnight and turned out to be unsuccessful.

Page 61 of 68
On January 1, 1999, about 8:00 a.m., Tomas Bearneza, the husband of Vicky, found the lifeless body of
AAA in a canal along the shortcut. The victim was naked except for her shorts, which loosely hung below
her knees. Her face and breast revealed bite marks.

ISSUE:

Whether the prosecution failed to establish that Soriano had caused the bite marks found on AAA.

HELD:
No, the health physician of the Wao District Hospital, Dr. Calico Haji Ali, examined the body of AAA.
He observed the presence of human bite marks on the right side of her face and on her left
breast. According to his examination, she was raped and her death was caused by drowning. According
to the mayor of Wao, Elvino C. Balicao, Soriano confessed to being under the influence of alcohol when
the latter killed AAA, but denied having raped her. He admitted therein that he saw AAA near the canal.
She tried to run away, but he caught up with her. She then started shouting for help, prompting him to
panic and choke her. Thereafter, he removed her clothes, bit her left breast and threw her into the water.

G. Forensic Autopsy
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.

HENRY LUGARTO Y PETILLA and ERNESTO CORDERO y MARISTELA accused-appellants.

Facts:

At 5:10 p.m. on August 2, 1994, the police received an information that a dead body in a sack was
found floating in the flooded street of Del Pan,Tondo. Residents discovered the corpse wrapped in a round
yellow tablecloth tied with a nylon cord inside a sack. They untied the sack and nylon cord and saw the
victim, a young girl, wearing nothing but her duster, with gaping wounds on the left ear and chin, her
genitals lacerated, her eyes missing, and her head bashed in. A certain Romezen Alquiza called the
police station, inquiring about the body recovered from Del Pan, Tondo, Manila, whose description
matched his sister Angel who, had been missing. Together with his mother Zenaida and some family

Page 62 of 68
members, Romezen went to said mortuary to look at the body. Indeed, it was Angel Alquiza. He then
requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Medico-Legal Office to autopsy Angels body.
Appellants Lagarto and Cordero maintain that the fact of stabbing according to the post-mortem findings
was the cause of death of the victim was not adequately established.

Issue:

Whether the forensic autopsy is correct in determining the victims cause of death.

Ruling:

Yes. Dr. Lagat, the medico-legal expert said that there might be other causes of death, such as
Angel being hit by a motor vehicle. But then, this is a mere probability. If it were to stretch this line of
reasoning further, other possibilities may be apparent: Angel could have still been alive when she was ran
over by the motor vehicle, as suggested by the defense; on the other hand, she could have already been
dead at the time. Preliminary police findings showed that the sack wherein Angel's body was placed was
found along a truck route. In the flooded street, it could have easily been hit by a truck, thus, producing the
cranial injury which the might be the true cause of Angel's death.

MARITIME FACTORS INC., Petitioner,

vs.

BIENVENIDO R. HINDANG, Respondent.

Facts:

Petitioner Maritime Factors, Inc., a manning agency, engaged the services of Danilo R. Hindang
(Danilo) to work as a seaman. On July 27, 1994, while within the territorial jurisdiction of the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia and on board the vessel, three of the vessels crew found Danilo's body inside the locker
(wardrobe) of his cabin. Danilo was found hanging by a strap on his neck in a kneeling position. They
turned over Danilo's body to the Saudi police authorities Dr. Ossman Abdel Hameed, the Medical
Examiner of the Eastern Region, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia conducted an autopsy on Danilo's remains and
concluded that Danilo committed suicide by hanging himself. Respondent Bienvenido R. Hindang, brother
of the deceased seaman Danilo, filed for death compensation benefits. Petitioner claimed that based on
Dr. Hameed's medical jurisprudence report, Danilo committed suicide by hanging himself; thus, his death
is not compensable. Petitioner submitted a photocopy of the fax transmission of the medical jurisprudence
report of Dr. Hameed.

The LA found that Danilo did not commit suicide, thus, the claim for his death benefit must prosper.
The NLRC rendered a Resolution which affirmed in toto the LA decision. The CA denied the petition and
affirmed the NLRC resolutions.

Page 63 of 68
Issue:

Whether Danilo committed suicide during the term of his employment contract which would exempt
petitioner from paying Danilo's death compensation benefits to his beneficiaries.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the LA, NLRC, and CA.

The SC gave credence to Dr. Hameeds medical report establishing that Danilo committed suicide
by hanging himself. Dr. Hameed conducted the autopsy on Danilo's remains immediately after the latter's
death. He saw first-hand the condition of Danilo's body, which upon his examination led him to conclude
that Danilo died by hanging himself. His report was comprehensive and more detailed. In Dr. Hameeds
medical report, as well as Dr. Reyes post mortem examination, both reports did not mention of any
showing of signs that there was struggle on the part of Danilo to defend himself from an intruder. Both
reports did not report any marks of violence in the other parts of Danilos body. Thus, Dr. Hameed's
medical report, corroborated by the written report of Danilo's fellow crew members that the door was
locked from the inside when they found Danilo hanging in his wardrobe, only shows that he committed
suicide. Thus the petitioner was able to prove that Danilo's death was attributable to his deliberate act of
killing himself by committing suicide.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

DOMINADOR VELASCO alias ADOR, Accused

Facts:

The accused was indicted for parricide under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code. Accused
Dominador Velasco and victim Priscila Velasco were married way back on 24 July 1976. In the morning of
27 October 1990, witnesses saw the couple quarreling, where accused, armed with a piece of wood of
about 2 feet in length and 3 inches in diameter, aggressively pursued the victim. Later that afternoon,
Priscilla Velasco was found dead. Rumors quickly spread that she had killed herself by drinking poison.
Dr. David Villanueva, Jr., examined the remains of the victim and prepared the certificate of death stating
that the deceased had died of poisoning. He confessed, however, that he did not perform an autopsy on
the cadaver and that he had come up with his conclusion only after noticing a small amount of brownish
fluid oozing from the victim's mouth with the characteristic smell of insecticide. Although he did not notice

Page 64 of 68
any injury or external manifestation of abrasion or hematoma, Dr. Villanueva admitted, in any case, that
his findings were inconclusive.

The autopsy, conducted on 16 November 1990, revealed that the victim had suffered from
abrasions on the right side of the face, including the jaw; hematoma on the back portion of the head at the
left posterior portion; hematoma on the skull; contusions on the left side of the back portion of the body
and on the back portion of the left upper extremities; contused abrasion on the arm and forearm; and
contusion on the right forearm. Dr. Llavore of the NBI concluded that the victim died of shock, secondary
to multiple traumatic injuries, and opined that the wounds could have likely been caused by physical
contact with a hard object like a piece of wood or wooden club. Dr. Nieto M. Salvador, a medical specialist
of the NBI, conducted the histopathological examination and arrived at the finding that the victim had died
of congestion and edema of the visceral organs. Toxicology Report No. T-90-3324 prepared by NBI
Forensic Biologist II, Dr. Beverly A. Vidanez, indicated that no trace of poisonous substances was
detected in the body of the victim. The RTC rendered a judgment of conviction.

Issue:

Whether the trial court erred in disregarding the evidence supporting the fact that victim committed
suicide by poisoning herself.

Ruling:

It should bear to underscore that the individual qualifications of the medico legal officer and forensic
biologist, the expert witnesses presented, remained unassailed. The bundle of circumstantial evidence
has sufficiently established the malefactor, destroyed the presumption of innocence, and fulfilled the
standard of moral certainty to sustain a conviction. Even in the absence of direct evidence linking an
accused to the crime, circumstantial evidence can suffice to convict when (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences can be derived are proven; and (c) the combination
of all the circumstances is such as to produce finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The prosecution successfully came up with several pieces of evidence; to wit: (1) Barangay captain
Noel Basco was advised by Ped Velasco, a brother of the accused, of the squabble between the accused
and the victim in the early morning of 27 October 1990; (2) Crisanto Boado, while out on an errand in the
afternoon of that day, saw the accused chasing the victim, holding a piece of wood in his hand and yelling
that he was going to kill the victim; (3) the victim was found dead later that same afternoon; (4) the
autopsy report revealed abrasions and contusions all over the victim's body; (5) the toxicological
examinations of the specimens from the victim's visceral organs yielded negative indications of volatile,
non-volatile, or metallic poisons, including insecticides; and (6) the accused was not without propensity in
maltreating his wife.

WHEREFORE , the judgment of the trial court appealed from is AFFIRMED. Cost against accused-
appellant.

Visayan Stevedore and Transportation Company vs Workmens Compensation Commission

Page 65 of 68
 GR No. L-26657 September 12, 1974

Facts: The deceased, employed as engineer by Visayan Stevedore and Transportation Company with a
monthly salary of P235 was part of a 3-man over of the tugboat M/TDILIS. His main duty consisted in his
starting the engine and seeing to it that it functioned properly during the voyage, with the actual navigation
of the tugboat being the responsibility of his 2 other companions the patron who controlled the wheel and
a helper who operated the rudder. According to Federico Sespene Patron of the tugboat when the
deceased died, from February 10-17, 1964, they were given to tow barges to the ship and load it with
cargoes. They also had to shift or bring barges to dry dock at the companys compound in Iloilo. Aside
from that, their work was to bring the barges from Jordan to Iloilo City, from terminal to the middle of
Guimaras and back. As a consequence of this work, they were compelled to stay in the tugboat. On that
fatal day of February 17, 1964, they had received various orders and at about 4am of the same day, they
were towing barges from the shell wharf to Tabangao, and while they were navigating, Eduardo Libiyo,
visibly tired and in active duty asked for permission to take a rest. When the tugboat reach Tabangao,
witness Sespene was ordered by Orleans to start towing the barge but when Sespene called Libiyo to
start the engine, there was no answer from Libiyo. The quartermaster was the one who responded instead
and was the one who ordered to wake up Libiyo, who at the time was already dead. It was about 6:30am
of February 17, 1964. A subsequent autopsy report of the deceaseds remains conducted by Dr. Raymund
L. Torres, the assistant medico-legal officer of the Iloilo City police department, traced the cause of death
of Eduardo as bangungot.

Issue: Whether the death of Eduardo Libiyo is compensable and is supported by the autopsy report.

Ruling: Yes. We do not think that the main point pressed by petitioner, namely that death caused by
bangungot is not compensable, is at all decisive in the case at bar, what is not denied, and this is crucial in
so far as the compensability of Eduardo Libiyos death is concerned, is that when death came to the
deceased he was in active duty, of as an engineer-employee of the petitioner. This being the case, the
need to pinpoint the cause of his death as work-connected in order to render it compensable assumes
very little importance. It is to be presumed, under section 44 of the Workmens Compensation Act, as
amended that the employees death, supervening at the time of his employment, either arose out of, or
was at least aggravated by said employment. With this legal presumption, the burden of proof shifts to the
employer, and the employee is relieved of the burden to show causation. The mere opinion of doctors
presented by petitioner as evidence cannot prevail over the presumption established by law.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs. HENRY LUGARTO Y PETILLA and ERNESTO
CORDERO y MARISTELA @ "Booster," accused-appellants.

FACTS:

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 At 5:10 p.m. on August 2, 1994, the police received an information that a dead body in a sack was
found floating in the flooded street of Del Pan,Tondo. Residents discovered the corpse wrapped in a round
yellow tablecloth tied with a nylon cord inside a sack. They untied the sack and nylon cord and saw the
victim, a young girl, wearing nothing but her duster, with gaping wounds on the left ear and chin, her
genitals lacerated, her eyes missing, and her head bashed in. A certain RomezenAlquiza called the police
station, inquiring about the body recovered from Del Pan, Tondo, Manila, whose description matched his
sister Angel who, had been missing. Together with his mother Zenaida and some family members,
Romezen went to said mortuary to look at the body. Indeed, it was Angel Alquiza. He then requested the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Medico-Legal Office to autopsy Angels body. Appellants Lagarto
and Cordero maintain that the fact of stabbing according to the post-mortem findings was the cause of
death of the victim was not adequately established.

ISSUE:

Whether the forensic autopsy is correct in determining the victims cause of death.

HELD:

Yes. Dr. Lagat, the medico-legal expert said that there might be other causes of death, such as
Angel being hit by a motor vehicle. But then, this is a mere probability. If it were to stretch this line of
reasoning further, other possibilities may be apparent: Angel could have still been alive when she was ran
over by the motor vehicle, as suggested by the defense; on the other hand, she could have already been
dead at the time. Preliminary police findings showed thatthesack wherein Angel's body was placed was
found along a truck route. In the flooded street, it could have easily been hit by a truck, thus, producing the
cranial injury which the might be the true cause of Angel's death.

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 H. Traditional Methods of Identification
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA V. JEREMIE LABRANDON STEVENSON
NO. COA101313, MAY 3, 2011
JUDGE: STEPHENS

FACTS:

Defendant JeremieLabrandon Stevenson was indicted on one count each of first-degree murder,
first-degree kidnapping, robbery with a dangerous weapon, and conspiracy to commit robbery with a
dangerous weapon. Stevenson pled not guilty to the charges and was tried non-capitally before a jury at
the December 14, 2009. Criminal Session of Iredell County Superior Court, the Honorable Jerry Cash
Martin presiding.

ISSUE:

Whetherthe trial court erred by admitting a picture of Stevenson holding a firearm.

HELD:

No. The complained evidence was a properly authenticated picture of Stevenson lying down with a
silver revolver on his chest. The picture was offered by the State and admitted by the trial court to illustrate
Robinsons testimony that she saw Stevenson at her apartment with a silver gun with a black handle.
Indeed, just before the trial court received the picture into evidence, Robinson testified that the gun
depicted in the picture appears to be the same firearm that she last saw in Stevensons lap on the day
that Barbone was shot.

In a case involving murder and other charges, the trial court properly admitted a picture of the
defendant with a silver revolver to illustrate a witnesss testimony that she saw the defendant at her
apartment with a silver gun with a black handle. Before being received into evidence, the witness testified
that the gun depicted appeared to be the same gun that the defendant had at her apartment. The trial
court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the prejudice caused by the photograph did not
substantially outweigh probative value.

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