THE PROBLEM OF SPEAKING FOR OTHERS

Considerthefollowingtruestories:
1.AnneCameron,averygiftedwhiteCanadianauthor,writesseveralfirstpersonaccountsofthelivesofNativeCanadian
women.Atthe1988InternationalFeministBookFairinMontreal,agroupofNativeCanadianwritersaskCameronto,in
theirwords,"moveover"onthegroundsthatherwritingsaredisempoweringforNativeauthors.Sheagrees.2
2.Afterthe1989electionsinPanamaareoverturnedbyManuelNoriega,U.S.PresidentGeorgeBushdeclaresinapublic
addressthatNoriega'sactionsconstitutean"outrageousfraud"andthat"thevoiceofthePanamanianpeoplehave
spoken.""ThePanamanianpeople,"hetellsus,"wantdemocracyandnottyranny,andwantNoriegaout."Heproceedsto
plantheinvasionofPanama.
3.Atarecentsymposiumatmyuniversity,aprestigioustheoristwasinvitedtogivealectureonthepoliticalproblemsof
postmodernism.Thoseofusintheaudience,includingmanywhitewomenandpeopleofoppressednationalitiesand
races,waitineageranticipationforwhathehastocontributetothisimportantdiscussion.Toourdisappointment,he
introduceshislecturebyexplainingthathecannotcovertheassignedtopic,becauseasawhitemalehedoesnotfeel
thathecanspeakforthefeministandpostcolonialperspectiveswhichhavelaunchedthecriticalinterrogationof
postmodernism'spolitics.Helecturesinsteadonarchitecture.
Theseexamplesdemonstratetherangeofcurrentpracticesofspeakingforothersinoursociety.Whiletheprerogativeof
speakingforothersremainsunquestionedinthecitadelsofcolonialadministration,amongactivistsandintheacademyit
elicitsagrowinguneaseand,in
somecommunitiesofdiscourse,itisbeingrejected.Thereisastrong,albeitcontested,currentwithinfeminismwhich
holdsthatspeakingforothersevenforotherwomenisarrogant,vain,unethical,andpoliticallyillegitimate.Feminist
scholarshiphasaliberatoryagendawhichalmostrequiresthatwomenscholarsspeakonbehalfofotherwomen,andyet
thedangersofspeakingacrossdifferencesofrace,culture,sexuality,andpowerarebecomingincreasinglycleartoall.In
feministmagazinessuchasSojourner,itiscommontofindarticlesandlettersinwhichtheauthorstatesthatshecan
onlyspeakforherself.Inherimportantpaper,"DykeMethods,"JoyceTrebilcotoffersaphilosophicalarticulationofthis
view.Sherenouncesforherselfthepracticeofspeakingforotherswithinalesbianfeministcommunity,arguingthatshe
"willnottrytogetotherwimmintoacceptmybeliefsinplaceoftheirown"onthegroundsthattodosowouldbeto
practiceakindofdiscursivecoercionandevenaviolence.3
Feministdiscourseisnottheonlysiteinwhichtheproblemofspeakingforothershasbeenacknowledgedandaddressed.
Inanthropologythereissimilardiscussionaboutwhetheritispossibletospeakforotherseitheradequatelyorjustifiably.
TrinhT.Minhhaexplainsthegroundsforskepticismwhenshesaysthatanthropologyis"mainlyaconversationof`us'
with`us'about`them,'ofthewhitemanwiththewhitemanabouttheprimitivenatureman...inwhich`them'issilenced.
`Them'alwaysstandsontheothersideofthehill,nakedandspeechless...`them'isonlyadmittedamong`us',the
discussingsubjects,whenaccompaniedorintroducedbyan`us'..."4Giventhisanalysis,evenethnographieswrittenby
progressiveanthropologistsareaprioriregressivebecauseofthestructuralfeaturesofanthropologicaldiscursive
practice.
Therecognitionthatthereisaprobleminspeakingforothershasfollowedfromthewidespreadacceptanceoftwoclaims.
First,therehasbeenagrowingawarenessthatwhereonespeaksfromaffectsboththemeaningandtruthofwhatone
says,andthusthatonecannotassumeanabilitytotranscendherlocation.Inotherwords,aspeaker'slocation(whichI
takeheretorefertohersociallocationorsocialidentity)hasanepistemicallysignificantimpactonthatspeaker'sclaims,
andcanserveeithertoauthorizeordisauthorizeone'sspeech.ThecreationofWomen'sStudiesandAfricanAmerican
Studiesdepartmentswerefoundedonthisverybelief:thatboththestudyofandtheadvocacyfortheoppressedmust
cometobedoneprincipallybytheoppressedthemselves,andthatwemustfinallyacknowledgethatsystematic
divergencesinsociallocationbetweenspeakersandthosespokenforwillhaveasignificanteffectonthecontentofwhat
issaid.Theunspokenpremisehereissimplythataspeaker'slocationisepistemicallysalient.Ishallexplorethisissue
furtherinthenextsection.
Thesecondclaimholdsthatnotonlyislocationepistemicallysalient,butcertainprivilegedlocationsarediscursively
dangerous.5Inparticular,thepracticeofprivilegedpersonsspeakingfororonbehalfoflessprivilegedpersonshas
actuallyresulted(inmanycases)inincreasingorreenforcingtheoppressionofthegroupspokenfor.Thiswaspartofthe
argumentmadeagainstAnneCameron'sspeakingforNativewomen:Cameron'sintentionswereneverinquestion,but
theeffectsofherwritingwerearguedtobeharmfultotheneedsofNativeauthorsbecauseitisCameronratherthan
theywhowillbelistenedtoandwhosebookswillbeboughtbyreadersinterestedinNativewomen.Personsfrom
dominantgroupswhospeakforothersareoftentreatedasauthenticatingpresencesthatconferlegitimacyandcredibility
onthedemandsofsubjugatedspeakerssuchspeakingforothersdoesnothingtodisruptthediscursivehierarchiesthat
operateinpublicspaces.Forthisreason,theworkofprivilegedauthorswhospeakonbehalfoftheoppressedis
becomingincreasinglycriticizedbymembersofthoseoppressedgroupsthemselves.6
Associaltheorists,weareauthorizedbyvirtueofouracademicpositionstodeveloptheoriesthatexpressandencompass
theideas,needs,andgoalsofothers.However,wemustbegintoaskourselveswhetherthisiseveralegitimate
authority,andifso,whatarethecriteriaforlegitimacy?Inparticular,isitevervalidtospeakforotherswhoareunlike
meorwhoarelessprivilegedthanme?
Wemighttrytodelimitthisproblemasonlyarisingwhenamoreprivilegedpersonspeaksforalessprivilegedone.In
thiscase,wemightsaythatIshouldonlyspeakforgroupsofwhichIamamember.Butthisdoesnottellushowgroups
themselvesshouldbedelimited.Forexample,canawhitewomanspeakforallwomensimplybyvirtueofbeinga
woman?Ifnot,hownarrowlyshouldwedrawthecategories?Thecomplexityandmultiplicityofgroupidentificationscould
resultin"communities"composedofsingleindividuals.Moreover,theconceptofgroupsassumesspeciousnotionsabout
clearcutboundariesand"pure"identities.IamaPanamanianAmericanandapersonofmixedethnicityandrace:half
white/AnglaandhalfPanamanianmestiza.Thecriterionofgroupidentityleavesmanyunansweredquestionsforaperson
suchasmyself,sinceIhavemembershipinmanyconflictinggroupsbutmymembershipinallofthemisproblematic.
Groupidentitiesandboundariesareambiguousandpermeable,anddecisionsaboutdemarcatingidentityarealways
partlyarbitrary.Anotherproblemconcernshowspecificanidentityneedstobetoconferepistemicauthority.Reflection
onsuchproblemsquicklyrevealsthatnoeasysolutiontotheproblemofspeakingforotherscanbefoundbysimply
restrictingthepracticetospeakingforgroupsofwhichoneisamember.
Adoptingthepositionthatoneshouldonlyspeakforoneselfraisessimilarlydifficultquestions.IfIdon'tspeakforthose
lessprivilegedthanmyself,amIabandoningmypoliticalresponsibilitytospeakoutagainstoppression,aresponsibility
incurredbytheveryfactofmyprivilege?IfIshouldnotspeakforothers,shouldIrestrictmyselftofollowingtheirlead
uncritically?Ismygreatestcontributiontomoveoverandgetoutoftheway?Andifso,whatisthebestwaytodothis
tokeepsilentortodeconstructmyowndiscourse?
Theanswerstothesequestionswillcertainlydependonwhoisaskingthem.Whilesomeofusmaywanttoundermine,
forexample,theU.S.government'spracticeofspeakingforthe"Thirdworld,"wemaynotwanttounderminesomeone
suchasRigobertaMenchu'sabilitytospeakforGuatemalanIndians.7Sothequestionarisesaboutwhetherallinstances
ofspeakingforshouldbecondemnedand,ifnot,howwecanjustifyapositionwhichwouldrepudiatesomespeakers
whileacceptingothers.
Inordertoanswerthesequestionsweneedtobecomeclearerontheepistemologicalandmetaphysicalissueswhichare
involvedinthearticulationoftheproblemofspeakingforothers,issueswhichmostoftenremainimplicit.Iwillattemptto
maketheseissuesclearbeforeturningtodiscusssomeofthepossibleresponsestotheproblemandadvancinga
provisional,proceduralsolutionofmyown.ButfirstIneedtoexplainfurthermyframingoftheproblem.
Intheexamplesusedabove,theremayappeartobeaconflationbetweentheissueofspeakingforothersandtheissue
ofspeakingaboutothers.Thisconflationwasintentionalonmypart,becauseitisdifficulttodistinguishspeakingabout
fromspeakingforinallcases.Thereisanambiguityinthetwophrases:whenoneisspeakingforanotheronemaybe
describingtheirsituationandthusalsospeakingaboutthem.Infact,itmaybeimpossibletospeakforanotherwithout
simultaneouslyconferringinformationaboutthem.Similarly,whenoneisspeakingaboutanother,orsimplytryingto
describetheirsituationorsomeaspectofit,onemayalsobespeakinginplaceofthem,i.e.speakingforthem.Onemay
bespeakingaboutanotherasanadvocateoramessengerifthepersoncannotspeakforherself.ThusIwouldmaintain
thatifthepracticeofspeakingforothersisproblematic,sotoomustbethepracticeofspeakingaboutothers.8Thisis
partlythecasebecauseofwhathasbeencalledthe"crisisofrepresentation."Forinboththepracticeofspeakingforas
wellasthepracticeofspeakingaboutothers,Iamengagingintheactofrepresentingtheother'sneeds,goals,situation,
andinfact,whotheyare,basedonmyownsituatedinterpretation.Inpoststructuralistterms,Iamparticipatinginthe
constructionoftheirsubjectpositionsratherthansimplydiscoveringtheirtrueselves.
Onceweposeitasaproblemofrepresentation,weseethat,notonlyarespeakingforandspeakingaboutanalytically
close,sotooarethepracticesofspeakingforothersandspeakingformyself.For,inspeakingformyself,Iamalso
representingmyselfinacertainway,asoccupyingaspecificsubjectposition,havingcertaincharacteristicsandnot
others,andsoon.Inspeakingformyself,I(momentarily)createmyselfjustasmuchaswhenIspeakforothersI
createthemasapublic,discursiveself,aselfwhichismoreunifiedthananysubjectiveexperiencecansupport.Andthis
publicselfwillinmostcaseshaveaneffectontheselfexperiencedasinteriority.
Thepointhereisthattheproblemofrepresentationunderliesallcasesofspeakingfor,whetherIamspeakingformyself
orforothers.Thisisnottosuggestthatallrepresentationsarefictions:theyhaveveryrealmaterialeffects,aswellas
materialorigins,buttheyarealwaysmediatedincomplexwaysbydiscourse,power,andlocation.However,theproblem
ofspeakingforothersismorespecificthantheproblemofrepresentationgenerally,andrequiresitsownparticular
analysis.
ThereisonefinalpointIwanttomakebeforewecanpursuethisanalysis.ThewayIhavearticulatedthisproblemmay
implythatindividualsmakeconsciouschoicesabouttheirdiscursivepracticefreeofideologyandtheconstraintsof
materialreality.ThisisnotwhatIwishtoimply.Theproblemofspeakingforothersisasocialone,theoptionsavailable
tousaresociallyconstructed,andthepracticesweengageincannotbeunderstoodassimplytheresultsofautonomous
individualchoice.Yettoreplaceboth"I"and"we"withapassivevoicethaterasesagencyresultsinanerasureof
responsibilityandaccountabilityforone'sspeech,anerasureIwouldstrenuouslyargueagainst(thereistoolittle
responsibilitytakingalreadyinWesternpractice!).Whenwesitdowntowrite,orgetuptospeak,weexperience
ourselvesasmakingchoices.Wemayexperiencehesitationfromfearofbeingcriticizedorfromfearofexacerbatinga
problemwewouldliketoremedy,orwemayexperiencearesolvetospeakdespiteexistingobstacles,butinmanycases
weexperiencehavingthepossibilitytospeakornottospeak.Ontheonehand,atheorywhichexplainsthisexperience
asinvolvingautonomouschoicesfreeofmaterialstructureswouldbefalseandideological,butontheotherhand,ifwe
donotacknowledgetheactivityofchoiceandtheexperienceofindividualdoubt,wearedenyingarealityofour
experientiallives.9SoIseetheargumentofthispaperasaddressingthatsmallspaceofdiscursiveagencyweall
experience,howevermultilayered,fictional,andconstraineditinfactis.
Ultimately,thequestionofspeakingforothersbearscruciallyonthepossibilityofpoliticaleffectivity.Bothcollectiveaction
andcoalitionswouldseemtorequirethepossibilityofspeakingfor.YetinfluentialpostmodernistssuchasGillesDeleuze
havecharacterizedas"absolutelyfundamental:theindignityofspeakingforothers"10andimportantfeministtheorists
haverenouncedthepracticeasirretrievablyharmful.Whatisatstakeinrejectingorvalidatingspeakingforothersasa
discursivepractice?Toanswerthis,wemustbecomeclearerontheepistemologicalandmetaphysicalclaimswhichare
implicitinthearticulationoftheproblem.

I.

Aplethoraofsourceshavearguedinthiscenturythattheneutralityofthetheorizercannolonger,canneveragain,be
sustained,evenforamoment.Criticaltheory,discoursesofempowerment,psychoanalytictheory,poststructuralism,
feministandanticolonialisttheorieshaveallconcurredonthispoint.Whoisspeakingtowhomturnsouttobeas
importantformeaningandtruthaswhatissaidinfactwhatissaidturnsouttochangeaccordingtowhoisspeakingand
whoislistening.FollowingFoucault,Iwillcallthese"ritualsofspeaking"toidentifydiscursivepracticesofspeakingor
writingwhichinvolvenotonlythetextorutterancebuttheirpositionwithinasocialspacewhichincludesthepersons
involvedin,actingupon,and/oraffectedbythewords.Twoelementswithintheseritualswilldeserveourattention:the
positionalityorlocationofthespeakerandthediscursivecontext.Wecantakethelattertorefertotheconnectionsand
relationsofinvolvementbetweentheutterance/textandotherutterancesandtextsaswellasthematerialpracticesinthe
relevantenvironment,whichshouldnotbeconfusedwithanenvironmentspatiallyadjacenttotheparticulardiscursive
event.
Ritualsofspeakingareconstitutiveofmeaning,themeaningofthewordsspokenaswellasthemeaningoftheevent.
Thisclaimrequiresustoshifttheontologyofmeaningfromitslocationinatextorutterancetoalargerspace,aspace
whichincludesthetextorutterancebutwhichalsoincludesthediscursivecontext.Andanimportantimplicationofthis
claimisthatmeaningmustbeunderstoodaspluralandshifting,sinceasingletextcanengenderdiversemeaningsgiven
diversecontexts.Notonlywhatisemphasized,noticed,andhowitisunderstoodwillbeaffectedbythelocationofboth
speakerandhearer,butthetruthvalueorepistemicstatuswillalsobeaffected.
Forexample,inmanysituationswhenawomanspeaksthepresumptionisagainstherwhenamanspeaksheisusually
takenseriously(unlesshisspeechpatternsmarkhimassociallyinferiorbydominantstandards).Whenwritersfrom
oppressedracesandnationalitieshaveinsistedthatallwritingispoliticaltheclaimhasbeendismissedasfoolishor
groundedinressentimentoritissimplyignoredwhenprestigiousEuropeanphilosopherssaythatallwritingispoliticalit
istakenupasanewandoriginal"truth"(JudithWilsoncallsthis"theintellectualequivalentofthe`coverrecord'.")11The
ritualsofspeakingwhichinvolvethelocationofspeakerandlistenersaffectwhetheraclaimistakenastrue,well
reasoned,acompellingargument,orasignificantidea.Thus,howwhatissaidgetshearddependsonwhosaysit,and
whosaysitwillaffectthestyleandlanguageinwhichitisstated.ThediscursivestyleinwhichsomeEuropeanpost
structuralistshavemadetheclaimthatallwritingispoliticalmarksitasimportantandlikelytobetrueforacertain
(powerful)milieuwhereasthestyleinwhichAfricanAmericanwritersmadethesameclaimmarkedtheirspeechas
dismissableintheeyesofthesamemilieu.
Thispointmightbeconcededbythosewhoadmittothepoliticalmutabilityofinterpretation,buttheymightcontinueto
maintainthattruthisadifferentmatteraltogether.Andtheywouldberightthatacknowledgingtheeffectoflocationon
meaningandevenonwhethersomethingistakenastruewithinaparticulardiscursivecontextdoesnotentailthatthe
"actual"truthoftheclaimiscontingentuponitscontext.However,thisobjectionpresupposesaparticularconceptionof
truth,oneinwhichthetruthofastatementcanbedistinguishedfromitsinterpretationanditsacceptance.Suchaconcept
wouldrequiretruthtobeindependentofthespeakers'orlisteners'embodiedandperspectivallocation.Thus,the
questionofwhetherlocationbearssimplyonwhatistakentobetrueorwhatisreallytrue,andwhethersuchadistinction
canbeupheld,involvestheverydifficultproblemofthemeaningoftruth.InthehistoryofWesternphilosophy,there
haveexistedmultiple,competingdefinitionsandontologiesoftruth:correspondence,idealist,pragmatist,coherentist,and
consensualnotions.Thedominantmodernistviewhasbeenthattruthrepresentsarelationshipofcorrespondence
betweenapropositionandanextradiscursivereality.Onthisview,truthisaboutarealmcompletelyindependentof
humanactionandexpressesthings"astheyareinthemselves,"thatis,freeofhumaninterpretation.
ArguablysinceKant,moreobviouslysinceHegel,ithasbeenwidelyacceptedthatanunderstandingoftruthwhich
requiresittobefreeofhumaninterpretationleadsinexorablytoskepticism,sinceitmakestruthinaccessibleby
definition.Thiscreatedanimpetustoreconfiguretheontologyoftruth,fromalocusoutsidehumaninterpretationtoone
withinit.Hegel,forexample,understoodtruthasan"identityindifference"betweensubjectiveandobjectiveelements.
Thus,intheHegelianaftermath,socalledsubjectiveelements,orthehistoricallyspecificconditionsinwhichhuman
knowledgeoccurs,arenolongerrenderedirrelevantorevenobstaclestotruth.
Onacoherentistaccountoftruth,whichisheldbysuchphilosophersasRorty,DonaldDavidson,Quine,and(Iwould
argue)GadamerandFoucault,truthisdefinedasanemergentpropertyofconvergingdiscursiveandnondiscursive
elements,whenthereexistsaspecificformofintegrationamongtheseelementsinaparticularevent.Suchaviewhasno
necessaryrelationshiptoidealism,butitallowsustounderstandhowthesociallocationofthespeakercanbesaidto
bearontruth.Thespeaker'slocationisoneoftheelementswhichconvergetoproducemeaningandthustodetermine
epistemicvalidity.12
Letmereturnnowtotheformulationoftheproblemofspeakingforothers.Therearetwopremisesimpliedbythe
articulationoftheproblem,andunpackingtheseshouldadvanceourunderstandingoftheissuesinvolved.
Premise(1):The"ritualofspeaking"(asdefinedabove)inwhichanutteranceislocatedalwaysbearsonmeaningand
truthsuchthatthereisnopossibilityofrenderingpositionality,location,orcontextirrelevanttocontent.
Thephrase"bearson"hereshouldindicatesomevariableamountofinfluenceshortofdeterminationorfixing.
Oneimportantimplicationofthisfirstpremiseisthatwecannolongerdeterminethevalidityofagiveninstanceof
speakingforotherssimplybyaskingwhetherornotthespeakerhasdonesufficientresearchtojustifyherclaims.
Adequateresearchwillbeanecessarybutinsufficientcriterionofevaluation.
Nowletuslookatthesecondpremise.
Premise(2):Allcontextsandlocationsaredifferentiallyrelatedincomplexwaystostructuresofoppression.Giventhat
truthisconnectedtopolitics,thesepoliticaldifferencesbetweenlocationswillproduceepistemicdifferencesaswell.
Theclaimherethat"truthisconnectedtopolitics"followsnecessarilyfromPremise(1).Ritualsofspeakingarepolitically
constitutedbypowerrelationsofdomination,exploitation,andsubordination.Whoisspeaking,whoisspokenof,andwho
listensisaresult,aswellasanact,ofpoliticalstruggle.Simplyput,thediscursivecontextisapoliticalarena.Tothe
extentthatthiscontextbearsonmeaning,andmeaningisinsomesensetheobjectoftruth,wecannotmakean
epistemicevaluationoftheclaimwithoutsimultaneouslyassessingthepoliticsofthesituation.
Althoughwecannotmaintainaneutralvoice,accordingtothefirstpremisewemayatleastallclaimtherightand
legitimacytospeak.Butthesecondpremisesuggeststhatsomevoicesmaybedisauthorizedongroundswhichare
simultaneouslypoliticalandepistemic.Anystatementwillinvokethestructuresofpoweralliedwiththesociallocationof
thespeaker,asidefromthespeaker'sintentionsorattemptstoavoidsuchinvocations.
TheconjunctionofPremises(1)and(2)suggestthatthespeakerlosessomeportionofcontroloverthemeaningand
truthofherutterance.Giventhatthecontextofhearersispartiallydeterminant,thespeakerisnotthemasteror
mistressofthesituation.Speakersmayseektoregaincontrolherebytakingintoaccountthecontextoftheirspeech,but
theycanneverknoweverythingaboutthiscontext,andwithwrittenandelectroniccommunicationitisbecoming
increasinglydifficulttoknowanythingatallaboutthecontextofreception.
Thislossofcontrolmaybetakenbysomespeakerstomeanthatnospeakercanbeheldaccountableforherdiscursive
actions.Themeaningofanydiscursiveeventwillbeshiftingandplural,fragmentedandeveninconsistent.Asitranges
overdiversespacesandtransformsinthemindofitsrecipientsaccordingtotheirdifferenthorizonsofinterpretation,the
effectivecontrolofthespeakeroverthemeaningswhichsheputsinmotionmayseemnegligible.However,apartialloss
ofcontroldoesnotentailacompletelossofaccountability.Andmoreover,thebetterweunderstandthetrajectoriesby
whichmeaningsproliferate,themorelikelywecanincrease,thoughalwaysonlypartially,ourabilitytodirectthe
interpretationsandtransformationsourspeechundergoes.WhenIacknowledgethatthelistener'ssociallocationwill
affectthemeaningofmywords,IcanmoreeffectivelygeneratethemeaningIintend.Paradoxically,theviewwhich
holdsthespeakerorauthorofaspeechactassolelyresponsibleforitsmeaningsensuresthespeaker'sleasteffective
determinacyoverthemeaningsthatareproduced.
Wedonotneedtoposittheexistenceoffullyconsciousactsorcontainable,fixedmeaningsinordertoholdthatspeakers
canaltertheirdiscursivepracticesandbeheldaccountableforatleastsomeoftheeffectsofthesepractices.Itisafalse
dilemmatoposethechoicehereasonebetweennoaccountabilityorcompletecausalpower.
InthenextsectionIshallconsidersomeoftheprincipalresponsesofferedtotheproblemofspeakingforothers.

II.

FirstIwanttoconsidertheargumentthattheveryformulationoftheproblemwithspeakingforothersinvolvesa
retrograde,metaphysicallyinsupportableessentialismthatassumesonecanreadoffthetruthandmeaningofwhatone
saysstraightfromthediscursivecontext.Let'scallthisresponsethe"ChargeofReductionism",becauseitarguesthata
sortofreductionisttheoryofjustification(orevaluation)isentailedbypremises(1)and(2).Suchareductionisttheory
might,forexample,reduceevaluationtoapoliticalassessmentofthespeaker'slocationwherethatlocationisseenasan
insurmountableessencethatfixesone,asifone'sfeetaresupergluedtoaspotonthesidewalk.
Forinstance,afterIvehementlydefendedBarbaraChristian'sarticle,"TheRaceforTheory,"amalefriendwhohada
differentevaluationofthepiececouldn'thelpraisingthepossibilityofwhetherasortofapologeticsstructuredmy
response,motivatedbyadesiretovalorizeAfricanAmericanwritingagainstallodds.Hisquestionineffectraisedthe
issueofthereductionist/essentialisttheoryofjustificationIjustdescribed.
I,too,wouldrejectreductionisttheoriesofjustificationandessentialistaccountsofwhatitmeanstohavealocation.To
saythatlocationbearsonmeaningandtruthisnotthesameassayingthatlocationdeterminesmeaningandtruth.And
locationisnotafixedessenceabsolutelyauthorizingone'sspeechinthewaythatGod'sfavorabsolutelyauthorizedthe
speechofMoses.Locationandpositionalityshouldnotbeconceivedasonedimensionalorstatic,butasmultipleandwith
varyingdegreesofmobility.13Whatitmeans,then,tospeakfromorwithinagroupand/oralocationisimmensely
complex.Totheextentthatlocationisnotafixedessence,andtotheextentthatthereisanuneasy,underdetermined,
andcontestedrelationshipbetweenlocationontheonehandandmeaningandtruthontheother,wecannotreduce
evaluationofmeaningandtruthtoasimpleidentificationofthespeaker'slocation.NeitherPremise(1)norPremise(2)
entailreductionismoressentialism.Theyarguefortherelevanceoflocation,notitssingularpowerofdetermination,and
theyarenoncommittalonhowtoconstruethemetaphysicsoflocation.
Whilethe"ChargeofReductionism"responsehasbeenpopularamongacademictheorists,whatIcallthe"Retreat"
responsehasbeenpopularamongsomesectionsoftheU.S.feministmovement.Thisresponseissimplytoretreatfrom
allpracticesofspeakingforitassertsthatonecanonlyknowone'sownnarrowindividualexperienceandone's"own
truth"andthusthatonecannevermakeclaimsbeyondthis.Thisresponseismotivatedinpartbythedesiretorecognize
differenceanddifferentpriorities,withoutorganizingthesedifferencesintohierarchies.
Now,sometimesIthinkthisistheproperresponsetotheproblemofspeakingforothers,dependingonwhoismakingit.
Wecertainlywanttoencourageamorereceptivelisteningonthepartofthediscursivelyprivilegedandtodiscourage
presumptuousandoppressivepracticesofspeakingfor.Andthedesiretoretreatsometimesresultsfromthedesireto
engageinpoliticalworkbutwithoutpracticingwhatmightbecalleddiscursiveimperialism.Butaretreatfromspeakingfor
willnotresultinanincreaseinreceptivelisteninginallcasesitmayresultmerelyinaretreatintoanarcissisticyuppie
lifestyleinwhichaprivilegedpersontakesnoresponsibilityforhersocietywhatsoever.Shemayevenfeeljustifiedin
exploitingherprivilegedcapacityforpersonalhappinessattheexpenseofothersonthegroundsthatshehasno
alternative.
Themajorproblemwithsucharetreatisthatitsignificantlyundercutsthepossibilityofpoliticaleffectivity.Thereare
numerousexamplesofthepracticeofspeakingforotherswhichhavebeenpoliticallyefficaciousinadvancingtheneeds
ofthosespokenfor,fromRigobertaMenchutoEdwardSaidandStevenBiko.Menchu'seffortstospeakforthe33Indian
communitiesfacinggenocideinGuatemalahavehelpedtoraisemoneyfortherevolutionandbringpressureagainstthe
GuatemalanandU.S.governmentswhohavecommittedthemassacresincollusion.Thepointisnotthatforsome
speakersthedangerofspeakingforothersdoesnotarise,butthatinsomecasescertainpoliticaleffectscanbegarnered
innootherway.
JoyceTrebilcot'sversionoftheretreatresponse,whichImentionedattheoutsetofthisessay,raisesotherissues.She
agreesthatanabsoluteprohibitionofspeakingforwouldunderminepoliticaleffectiveness,andthereforesaysthatshe
willavoidspeakingforothersonlywithinherlesbianfeministcommunity.Soitmightbearguedthattheretreatfrom
speakingforotherscanbemaintainedwithoutsacrificingpoliticaleffectivityifitisrestrictedtoparticulardiscursive
spaces.Whymightoneadvocatesuchapartialretreat?Giventhatinterpretationsandmeaningsarediscursive
constructionsmadebyembodiedspeakers,Trebilcotworriesthatattemptingtopersuadeorspeakforanotherwillcutoff
thatperson'sabilityorwillingnesstoengageintheconstructiveactofdevelopingmeaning.Sincenoembodiedspeaker
canproducemorethanapartialaccount,andsincetheprocessofproducingmeaningisnecessarilycollective,everyone's
accountwithinaspecifiedcommunityneedstobeencouraged.
IagreewithagreatdealofTrebilcot'sargument.Icertainlyagreethatinsomeinstancesspeakingforothersconstitutes
aviolenceandshouldbestopped.ButTrebilcot'sposition,aswellasamoregeneralretreatposition,presumesan
ontologicalconfigurationofthediscursivecontextthatsimplydoesnotobtain.Inparticular,itassumesthat
onecanretreatintoone'sdiscretelocationandmakeclaimsentirelyandsingularlywithinthatlocationthatdonotrange
overothers,andthereforethatonecandisentangleoneselffromtheimplicatingnetworksbetweenone'sdiscursive
practicesandothers'locations,situations,andpractices.Inotherwords,theclaimthatIcanspeakonlyformyself
assumestheautonomousconceptionoftheselfinClassicalLiberaltheorythatIamunconnectedtoothersinmy
authenticselforthatIcanachieveanautonomyfromothersgivencertainconditions.Butthereisnoneutralplaceto
standfreeandclearinwhichone'swordsdonotprescriptivelyaffectormediatetheexperienceofothers,noristherea
waytodemarcatedecisivelyaboundarybetweenone'slocationandallothers.Evenacompleteretreatfromspeechisof
coursenotneutralsinceitallowsthecontinueddominanceofcurrentdiscoursesandactsbyomissiontoreenforcetheir
dominance.
Asmypracticesaremadepossiblebyeventsspatiallyfarawayfrommybodysotoomyownpracticesmakepossibleor
impossiblepracticesofothers.ThedeclarationthatI"speakonlyformyself"hasthesoleeffectofallowingmetoavoid
responsibilityandaccountabilityformyeffectsonothersitcannotliterallyerasethoseeffects.
Letmeofferanillustrationofthis.ThefeministmovementintheU.S.hasspawnedmanykindsofsupportgroupsfor
womenwithvariousneeds:rapevictims,incestsurvivors,batteredwives,andsoforth,andsomeofthesegroupshave
beenstructuredaroundtheviewthateachsurvivormustcometoherown"truth"whichrangesonlyoverherselfandhas
nobearingonothers.Thus,onewoman'sexperienceofsexualassault,itseffectonherandherinterpretationofit,
shouldnotbetakenasauniversalgeneralizationtowhichothersmustsubsumeorconformtheirexperience.Thisview
worksonlyuptoapoint.Totheextentitrecognizesirreducibledifferencesinthewaypeoplerespondtovarioustraumas
andissensitivetothegenuinelyvariablewayinwhichwomencanhealthemselves,itrepresentsrealprogressbeyond
thehomogeneous,universalizingapproachwhichsetsoutoneroadforalltofollow.However,itisanillusiontothinkthat,
eveninthesafespaceofasupportgroup,amemberofthegroupcan,forexample,trivializebrothersisterincestas
"sexplay"withoutprofoundlyharmingsomeoneelseinthegroupwhoistryingtomaintainherrealisticassessmentofher
brother'ssexualactivitieswithherasaharmfulassaultagainsthisadultrationalizationthat"well,formeitwasjust
harmlessfun."Evenifthespeakeroffersadozencaveatsaboutherviewsasrestrictedtoherlocation,shewillstillaffect
theotherwoman'sabilitytoconceptualizeandinterpretherexperienceandherresponsetoit.Andthisissimplybecause
wecannotneatlyseparateoffourmediatingpraxiswhichinterpretsandconstructsourexperiencesfromthepraxisof
others.Wearecollectivelycaughtinanintricate,delicatewebinwhicheachactionItake,discursiveorotherwise,pulls
on,breaksoff,ormaintainsthetensioninmanystrandsofthewebinwhichothersfindthemselvesmovingalso.WhenI
speakformyself,Iamconstructingapossibleself,awaytobeintheworld,andamofferingthat,whetherIintendtoor
not,toothers,asonepossiblewaytobe.
Thus,theattempttoavoidtheproblematicofspeakingforbyretreatingintoanindividualistrealmisbasedonanillusion,
wellsupportedintheindividualistideologyoftheWest,thataselfisnotconstitutedbymultipleintersectingdiscoursesbut
consistsinaunifiedwholecapableofautonomyfromothers.ItisanillusionthatIcanseparatefromotherstosuchan
extentthatIcanavoidaffectingthem.Thismaybetheintentionofmyspeech,andevenitsmeaningifwetakethattobe
theformalentailmentsofthesentences,butitwillnotbetheeffectofthespeech,andthereforecannotcapturethe
speechinitsrealityasadiscursivepractice.WhenI"speakformyself"Iamparticipatinginthecreationandreproduction
ofdiscoursesthroughwhichmyownandotherselvesareconstituted.
Afurtherproblemwiththe"Retreat"responseisthatitmaybemotivatedbyadesiretofindamethodorpractice
immunefromcriticism.IfIspeakonlyformyselfitmayappearthatIamimmunefromcriticismbecauseIamnot
makinganyclaimsthatdescribeothersorprescribeactionsforthem.IfIamonlyspeakingformyselfIhaveno
responsibilityforbeingtruetoyourexperienceorneeds.
Butsurelyitisbothmorallyandpoliticallyobjectionabletostructureone'sactionsaroundthedesiretoavoidcriticism,
especiallyifthisoutweighsotherquestionsofeffectivity.Insomecases,themotivationisperhapsnotsomuchtoavoid
criticismastoavoiderrors,andthepersonbelievesthattheonlywaytoavoiderrorsistoavoidallspeakingforothers.
However,errorsareunavoidableintheoreticalinquiryaswellaspoliticalstruggle,andtheyusuallymakecontributions.
Thepursuitofanabsolutemeanstoavoidmakingerrorscomesperhapsnotfromadesiretoadvancecollectivegoalsbut
adesireforpersonalmastery,toestablishaprivilegeddiscursivepositionwhereinonecannotbeunderminedor
challengedandthusismasterofthesituation.Fromsuchapositionone'sownlocationandpositionalitywouldnotrequire
constantinterrogationandcriticalreflectiononewouldnothavetoconstantlyengageinthisemotionallytroublesome
endeavorandwouldbeimmunefromtheinterrogationofothers.Suchadesireformasteryandimmunitymustbe
resisted.
ThefinalresponsetotheproblemofspeakingforothersthatIwillconsideroccursinGayatriChakravortySpivak'srich
essay"CantheSubalternSpeak?"14Spivakrejectsatotalretreatfromspeakingforothers,andshecriticizesthe"self
abnegatingintellectual"posethatFoucaultandDeleuzeadoptwhentheyrejectspeakingforothersonthegroundsthat
theirpositionassumestheoppressedcantransparentlyrepresenttheirowntrueinterests.AccordingtoSpivak,Foucault
andDeleuze'sselfabnegationservesonlytoconcealtheactualauthorizingpoweroftheretreatingintellectuals,whoin
theirveryretreathelptoconsolidateaparticularconceptionofexperience(astransparentandselfknowing).Thus,to
promote"listeningto"asopposedtospeakingforessentializestheoppressedasnonideologicallyconstructedsubjects.
ButSpivakisalsocriticalofspeakingforwhichengagesindangerousrepresentations.IntheendSpivakprefersa
"speakingto,"inwhichtheintellectualneitherabnegateshisorherdiscursiverolenorpresumesanauthenticityofthe
oppressed,butstillallowsforthepossibilitythattheoppressedwillproducea"countersentence"thatcanthensuggesta
newhistoricalnarrative.
Spivak'sargumentsshowthatasimplesolutioncannotbefoundinfortheoppressedorlessprivilegedbeingableto
speakforthemselves,sincetheirspeechwillnotnecessarilybeeitherliberatoryorreflectiveoftheir"trueinterests",if
suchexist.IagreewithheronthispointbutIwouldemphasizealsothatignoringthesubaltern'soroppressedperson's
speechis,assheherselfnotes,"tocontinuetheimperialistproject."15Eveniftheoppressedperson'sspeechisnot
liberatoryinitscontent,itremainsthecasethattheveryactofspeakingitselfconstitutesasubjectthatchallengesand
subvertstheoppositionbetweentheknowingagentandtheobjectofknowledge,anoppositionwhichhasservedasakey
playerinthereproductionofimperialistmodesofdiscourse.Thus,theproblemwithspeakingforothersexistsinthevery
structureofdiscursivepractice,irrespectiveofitscontent,andsubvertingthehierarchicalritualsofspeakingwillalways
havesomeliberatoryeffects.
Iagree,then,thatweshouldstrivetocreatewhereverpossibletheconditionsfordialogueandthepracticeofspeaking
withandtoratherthanspeakingforothers.Oftenthepossibilityofdialogueisleftunexploredorinadequatelypursuedby
moreprivilegedpersons.Spacesinwhichitmayseemasifitisimpossibletoengageindialogicencountersneedtobe
transformedinordertodoso,suchasclassrooms,hospitals,workplaces,welfareagencies,universities,institutionsfor
internationaldevelopmentandaid,andgovernments.Ithaslongbeennotedthatexistingcommunicationtechnologies
havethepotentialtoproducethesekindsofinteractioneventhoughresearchanddevelopmentteamshavenotfoundit
advantageousundercapitalismtodoso.
However,whilethereismuchtheoreticalandpracticalworktobedonetodevelopsuchalternatives,thepracticeof
speakingforothersremainsthebestoptioninsomeexistingsituations.Anabsoluteretreatweakenspoliticaleffectivity,is
basedonametaphysicalillusion,andofteneffectsonlyanobscuringoftheintellectual'spower.Therecanbenocomplete
ordefinitivesolutiontotheproblemofspeakingforothers,butthereisapossibilitythatitsdangerscanbedecreased.
Theremainderofthispaperwilltrytocontributetowarddevelopingthatpossibility.

III.

Inrejectingageneralretreatfromspeakingfor,Iamnotadvocatingareturntoanunselfconsciousappropriationofthe
other,butratherthatanyonewhospeaksforothersshouldonlydosooutofaconcreteanalysisoftheparticularpower
relationsanddiscursiveeffectsinvolved.Iwanttodevelopthispointbyelucidatingfoursetsofinterrogatorypractices
whicharemeanttohelpevaluatepossibleandactualinstancesofspeakingfor.Inlistformtheymayappeartoresemble
analgorithm,asifwecouldpluginaninstanceofspeakingforandfactoroutananalysisandevaluation.However,they
aremeantonlytosuggestthequestionsthatshouldbeaskedconcerninganysuchdiscursivepractice.Thesearebyno
meansoriginal:theyhavebeenlearnedandpracticedbymanyactivistsandtheorists.
(1)Theimpetustospeakmustbecarefullyanalyzedand,inmanycases(certainlyforacademics!),foughtagainst.This
mayseemanoddwaytobegindiscussinghowtospeakfor,butthepointisthattheimpetustoalwaysbethespeaker
andtospeakinallsituationsmustbeseenforwhatitis:adesireformasteryanddomination.Ifone'simmediateimpulse
istoteachratherthanlistentoalessprivilegedspeaker,oneshouldresistthatimpulselongenoughtointerrogateit
carefully.Someofushavebeentaughtthatbyrightofhavingthedominantgender,class,race,lettersafterourname,or
someothercriterion,wearemorelikelytohavethetruth.Othershavebeentaughttheoppositeandwillspeakhaltingly,
withapologies,iftheyspeakatall.16
Atthesametime,wehavetoacknowledgethattheverydecisionto"moveover"orretreatcanoccuronlyfroma
positionofprivilege.Thosewhoarenotinapositionofspeakingatallcannotretreatfromanactiontheydonotemploy.
Moreover,makingthedecisionforoneselfwhetherornottoretreatisanextensionorapplicationofprivilege,notan
abdicationofit.Still,itissometimescalledfor.
(2)Wemustalsointerrogatethebearingofourlocationandcontextonwhatitiswearesaying,andthisshouldbean
explicitpartofeveryseriousdiscursivepracticeweengagein.Constructinghypothesesaboutthepossibleconnections
betweenourlocationandourwordsisonewaytobegin.Thisprocedurewouldbemostsuccessfulifengagedin
collectivelywithothers,bywhichaspectsofourlocationlessobvioustousmightberevealed.17
Onedeformedwayinwhichthisistoooftencarriedoutiswhenspeakersofferupinthespiritof"honesty"
autobiographicalinformationaboutthemselves,usuallyatthebeginningoftheirdiscourseasakindofdisclaimer.Thisis
meanttoacknowledgetheirownunderstandingthattheyarespeakingfromaspecified,embodiedlocationwithout
pretensetoatranscendentaltruth.ButasMariaLugonesandothershaveforcefullyargued,suchanactservesnogood
endwhenitisusedasadisclaimeragainstone'signoranceorerrorsandismadewithoutcriticalinterrogationofthe
bearingofsuchanautobiographyonwhatisabouttobesaid.Itleavesforthelistenersalltherealworkthatneedstobe
done.Forexample,ifamiddleclasswhitemanweretobeginaspeechbysharingwithusthisautobiographical
informationandthenusingitasakindofapologeticsforanylimitationsofhisspeech,thiswouldleavetothoseofusin
theaudiencewhodonotsharehissociallocationalltheworkoftranslatinghistermsintoourown,apprisingthe
applicabilityofhisanalysistoourdiversesituation,anddeterminingthesubstantiverelevanceofhislocationonhis
claims.Thisissimplywhatlessprivilegedpersonshavealwayshadtodoforourselveswhenreadingthehistoryof
philosophy,literature,etc.,whichmakesthetaskofappropriatingthesediscoursesmoredifficultandtimeconsuming
(andalienationmorelikelytoresult).Simpleunanalyzeddisclaimersdonotimproveonthisfamiliarsituationandmay
evenmakeitworsetotheextentthatbyofferingsuchinformationthespeakermayfeelevenmoreauthorizedtospeak
andbeaccordedmoreauthoritybyhispeers.
(3)Speakingshouldalwayscarrywithitanaccountabilityandresponsibilityforwhatonesays.Towhomoneis
accountableisapolitical/epistemologicalchoicecontestable,contingentand,asDonnaHarawaysays,constructedthrough
theprocessofdiscursiveaction.Whatthisentailsinpracticeisaseriouscommitmenttoremainopentocriticismandto
attemptactively,attentively,andsensitivelyto"hear"thecriticism(understandit).Aquickimpulsetorejectcriticismmust
makeonewary.
(4)Hereismycentralpoint.Inordertoevaluateattemptstospeakforothersinparticularinstances,weneedtoanalyze
theprobableoractualeffectsofthewordsonthediscursiveandmaterialcontext.Onecannotsimplylookatthelocation
ofthespeakerorhercredentialstospeaknorcanonelookmerelyatthepropositionalcontentofthespeechonemust
alsolookatwherethespeechgoesandwhatitdoesthere.
Lookingmerelyatthecontentofasetofclaimswithoutlookingattheireffectscannotproduceanadequateoreven
meaningfulevaluationofit,andthisispartlybecausethenotionofacontentseparatefromeffectsdoesnotholdup.The
contentoftheclaim,oritsmeaning,emergesininteractionbetweenwordsandhearerswithinaveryspecifichistorical
situation.Giventhis,wehavetopaycarefulattentiontothediscursivearrangementinordertounderstandthefull
meaningofanygivendiscursiveevent.Forexample,inasituationwhereawellmeaningFirstworldpersonisspeaking
forapersonorgroupintheThirdworld,theverydiscursivearrangementmayreinscribethe"hierarchyofcivilizations"
viewwheretheU.S.landssquarelyatthetop.Thiseffectoccursbecausethespeakerispositionedasauthoritativeand
empowered,astheknowledgeablesubject,whilethegroupintheThirdWorldisreduced,merelybecauseofthestructure
ofthespeakingpractice,toanobjectandvictimthatmustbechampionedfromafar.Thoughthespeakermaybetrying
tomateriallyimprovethesituationofsomelesserprivilegedgroup,oneoftheeffectsofherdiscourseistoreenforce
racist,imperialistconceptionsandperhapsalsotofurthersilencethelesserprivilegedgroup'sownabilitytospeakandbe
heard.18Thisshowsuswhyitissoimportanttoreconceptualizediscourse,asFoucaultrecommends,asanevent,which
includesspeaker,words,hearers,location,language,andsoon.
Allsuchevaluationsproducedinthiswaywillbeofnecessityindexed.Thatis,theywillobtainforaveryspecificlocation
andcannotbetakenasuniversal.Thissimplyfollowsfromthefactthattheevaluationswillbebasedonthespecific
elementsofhistoricaldiscursivecontext,locationofspeakersandhearers,andsoforth.Whenanyoftheseelementsis
changed,anewevaluationiscalledfor.
Ourabilitytoassesstheeffectsofagivendiscursiveeventislimitedourabilitytopredicttheseeffectsisevenmore
difficult.Whenmeaningispluralanddeferred,wecanneverhopetoknowthetotalityofeffects.Still,wecanknowsome
oftheeffectsourspeechgenerates:Icanfindout,forexample,thatthepeopleIspokeforareangrythatIdidsoor
appreciative.BylearningasmuchaspossibleaboutthecontextofreceptionIcanincreasemyabilitytodiscernatleast
someofthepossibleeffects.Thismandatesincorporatingamoredialogicapproachtospeaking,thatwouldinclude
learningfromandaboutthedomainsofdiscoursemywordswillaffect.
IwanttoillustratetheimplicationsofthisfourthpointbyapplyingittotheexamplesIgaveatthebeginning.Inthecase
ofAnneCameron,iftheeffectsofherbooksaretrulydisempoweringforNativewomen,theyarecounterproductiveto
Cameron'sownstatedintentions,andsheshouldindeed"moveover."Inthecaseofthewhitemaletheoristwho
discussedarchitectureinsteadofthepoliticsofpostmodernism,theeffectofhisrefusalwasthatheofferedno
contributiontoanimportantissueandallofustherelostanopportunitytodiscussandexploreit.
NowletmeturntotheexampleofGeorgeBush.WhenBushclaimedthatNoriegaisacorruptdictatorwhostandsinthe
wayofdemocracyinPanama,herepeatedaclaimwhichhasbeenmadealmostwordforwordbytheOpposition
movementinPanama.Yettheeffectsofthetwostatementsarevastlydifferentbecausethemeaningoftheclaim
changesradicallydependingonwhostatesit.WhenthepresidentoftheUnitedStatesstandsbeforetheworldpassing
judgementonaThirdWorldgovernment,andcriticizingitonthebasisofcorruptionandalackofdemocracy,the
immediateeffectofthisstatement,asopposedtotheOpposition's,istoreenforcetheprominentAngloviewthatLatin
Americancorruptionistheprimarycauseoftheregion'spovertyandlackofdemocracy,thattheU.S.isonthesideof
democracyintheregion,andthattheU.S.opposescorruptionandtyranny.Thus,theeffectofaU.S.president'sspeaking
forLatinAmericainthiswayistoreconsolidateU.S.imperialismbyobscuringitstrueroleintheregionintorturingand
murderinghundredsandthousandsofpeoplewhohavetriedtobringdemocraticandprogressivegovernmentsinto
existence.AndthiseffectwillcontinueuntiltheU.S.governmentadmitsitshistoryofinternationalmassmurderand
radicallyaltersitforeignpolicy.

IV.Conclusion

Thisissueiscomplicatedbythevariablewayinwhichtheimportanceofthesource,orlocationoftheauthor,canbe
understood,atopicalludedtoearlier.Ononeview,theauthorofatextisits"owner"and"originator"creditedwith
creatingitsideasandwithbeingtheirauthoritativeinterpreter.Onanotherview,theoriginalspeakerorwriterisnomore
privilegedthananyotherpersonwhoarticulatestheseviews,andinfactthe"author"cannotbeidentifiedinastrictsense
becausetheconceptofauthorisanideologicalconstructionmanyabstractionsremovedfromthewayinwhichideas
emergeandbecomematerialforces.19Now,doesthislatterpositionmeanthatthesourceorlocatednessoftheauthoris
irrelevant?
Itneednotentailthisconclusion,thoughitmightinsomeformulations.Wecandeprivilegethe"original"authorand
reconceptualizeideasastraversing(almost)freelyinadiscursivespace,availablefrommanylocations,andwithouta
clearlyidentifiableoriginarytrack,andyetretainoursensethatsourceremainsrelevanttoeffect.Ourmetatheoryof
authorshipdoesnotprecludethematerialrealitythatindiscursivespacesthereisaspeakerorwritercreditedasthe
authorofherutterances,orthatforexamplethefeministappropriationoftheconcept"patriarchy"getstiedtoKate
Millett,awhiteAnglofeminist,orthatthetermfeminismitselfhasbeenandisassociatedwithaWesternorigin.These
associationshaveaneffect,aneffectofproducingdistrustonthepartofsomeThirdWorldnationalists,aneffectof
reinscribingsemiconsciousimperialistattitudesonthepartofsomefirstworldfeminists.Thesearenottheonlypossible
effects,andsomeoftheeffectsmaynotbepernicious,butalltheeffectsmustbetakenintoaccountwhenevaluatingthe
discourseof"patriarchy."
Theemphasisoneffectsshouldnotimply,therefore,thatanexaminationofthespeaker'slocationisanylesscrucial.This
latterexaminationmightbecalledakindofgenealogy.Inthissense,agenealogyinvolvesaskinghowapositionorview
ismediatedandconstitutedthroughandwithintheconjunctionandconflictofhistorical,cultural,economic,psychological,
andsexualpractices.Butitseemstomethattheimportanceofthesourceofaview,andtheimportanceofdoinga
genealogy,shouldbesubsumedwithinanoverallanalysisofeffects,makingthecentralquestionwhattheeffectsareof
theviewonmaterialanddiscursivepracticesthroughwhichittraversesandtheparticularconfigurationofpowerrelations
emergentfromthese.Sourceisrelevantonlytotheextentthatithasanimpactoneffect.AsGayatriSpivaklikestosay,
theinventionofthetelephonebyaEuropeanupperclassmaleinnowaypreemptsitsbeingputtotheuseofananti
imperialistrevolution.
Inconclusion,Iwouldstressthatthepracticeofspeakingforothersisoftenbornofadesireformastery,toprivilege
oneselfastheonewhomorecorrectlyunderstandsthetruthaboutanother'ssituationorasonewhocanchampionajust
causeandthusachievegloryandpraise.Andtheeffectofthepracticeofspeakingforothersisoften,thoughnotalways,
erasureandareinscriptionofsexual,national,andotherkindsofhierarchies.Ihopethatthisanalysiswillcontribute
towardratherthandiminishtheimportantdiscussiongoingontodayabouthowtodevelopstrategiesforamore
equitable,justdistributionoftheabilitytospeakandbeheard.Butthisdevelopmentshouldnotbetakenasanabsolute
disauthorizationofallpracticesofspeakingfor.ItisnotalwaysthecasethatwhenothersunlikemespeakformeIhave
endedupworseoff,orthatwhenwespeakforotherstheyendupworseoff.Sometimes,asLoyceStewarthasargued,
wedoneeda"messenger"toadvocateforourneeds.
Thesourceofaclaimordiscursivepracticeinsuspectmotivesormaneuversorinprivilegedsociallocations,Ihave
argued,thoughitisalwaysrelevant,cannotbesufficienttorepudiateit.Wemustaskfurtherquestionsaboutitseffects,
questionswhichamounttothefollowing:willitenabletheempowermentofoppressedpeoples?

LindaMartnAlcoff
DepartmentofPhilosophy
SyracuseUniversity
SyracuseNewYork13244
Endnotes:

1Iamgratefultothefollowingfortheirgeneroushelpwiththispaper:EasternSocietyforWomeninPhilosophy,the

CentralNewYorkWomenPhilosopher'sGroup,LoyceStewart,RichardSchmitt,SandraBartky,LaurenceThomas,Leslie
Bender,RobynWiegman,AnitaCanizaresMolina,andFelicityNussbaum.

2SeeLeeMaracle,"MovingOver,"inTrivia14(Spring89):910.

3JoyceTrebilcot,"DykeMethods,"Hypatia3.2(Summer1988):1.Trebilcotisexplaininghereherownreasoningfor

rejectingthesepractices,butsheisnotadvocatingthatotherwomenjoinherinthis.Thus,herargumentdoesnotfall
intoaselfreferentialincoherence.

4TrinhT.Minhha,Woman,Native,Other:WritingPostcolonialityandFeminism(Bloomington:IndianaUniversityPress,

1989),65and67.Forexamplesofanthropologist'sconcernwiththisissueseeWritingCulture:ThePoeticsandPoliticsof
Ethnographyed.JamesCliffordandGeorgeE.Marcus(Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1986)JamesClifford"On
EthnographicAuthority"Representations1.2:118146AnthropologyasCulturalCritiqueed.GeorgeMarcusandMichael
Fischer(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,1986)PaulRabinow"DiscourseandPower:OntheLimitsofEthnographic
Texts"DialecticalAnthropology,10.1and2(July85):114.

5Tobeprivilegedherewillmeantobeinamorefavorable,mobile,anddominantpositionvisavisthestructuresof

power/knowledgeinasociety.Thusprivilegecarrieswithit,e.g.,presumptioninone'sfavorwhenonespeaks.Certain
races,nationalities,genders,sexualities,andclassesconferprivilege,butasingleindividual(perhapsmostindividuals)
mayenjoyprivilegeinrespecttosomepartsoftheiridentityandalackofprivilegeinrespecttootherparts.Therefore,
privilegemustalwaysbeindexedtospecificrelationshipsaswellastospecificlocations.
Thetermprivilegeisnotmeanttoincludepositionsofdiscursivepowerachievedthroughmerit,butinanycasetheseare
rarelypure.Inotherwords,somepersonsareaccordeddiscursiveauthoritybecausetheyarerespectedleadersor
becausetheyareteachersinaclassroomandknowmoreaboutthematerialathand.Sooften,ofcourse,theauthorityof
suchpersonsbasedontheirmeritcombineswiththeauthoritytheymayenjoybyvirtueoftheirhavingthedominant
gender,race,class,orsexuality.ItisthelattersourcesofauthoritythatIamreferringtobytheterm"privilege."

6SeealsoMariaLugonesandElizabethSpelman,"HaveWeGotaTheoryForYou!CulturalImperialism,FeministTheory

andtheDemandfortheWomen'sVoice"Women'sStudiesInternationalForum6.6(1983):57381.IntheirpaperLugones
andSpelmanexplorethewayinwhichthe"demandforthewomen'svoice"disempoweredwomenofcolorbynot
attendingtothedifferencesinprivilegewithinthecategoryofwomen,resultinginaprivilegingofwhitewomen'svoices
only.Theyexploretheeffectsthishashadonthemakingoftheorywithinfeminism,andattempttofind"waysoftalking
orbeingtalkedaboutthatarehelpful,illuminating,empowering,respectful."(p.25)Thisessaytakesinspirationfrom
theirsandismeanttocontinuetheirdiscussion.

7SeeherI...RigobertaMenchu,ed.ElisabethBurgosDebray,trans.AnnWright(London:Verso,1984).(Theuseofthe

term"Indian"herefollowsMenchu'suse.)

8E.g.,ifitisthecasethatno"descriptive"discourseisnormativeorvaluefree,thennodiscourseisfreeofsomekindof

advocacy,andallspeakingaboutwillinvolvespeakingforsomeone,ones,orsomething.

9Anotherdistinctionthatmightbemadeisbetweendifferentmaterialpracticesofspeakingfor:givingaspeech,writing

anessayorbook,makingamovieortvprogram,aswellashearing,reading,watchingandsoon.Iwillnotaddressthe
possibledifferencesthatarisefromthesedifferentpractices,andwilladdressmyselftothe(fictional)"generic"practiceof
speakingfor.

10DeleuzeinaconversationwithFoucault,"IntellectualsandPower"inLanguage,CounterMemory,Practiceed.Donald

Bouchard,trans.DonaldBouchardandSherrySimon(Ithaca:CornellUniversityPress,1977):209.

11Seeher"DowntotheCrossroads:TheArtofAlisonSaar,"ThirdText10(Spring90),foradiscussionofthis

phenomenonintheartworld,esp.page36.SeealsoBarbaraChristian"TheRaceforTheory"FeministStudies14.1
(Spring88):6779andHenryLouisGates,Jr."Authority,(White)Powerandthe(Black)CriticIt'sAllGreekTo
Me"CulturalCritique7(Fall87):1946.
12Iknowthatmyinsistenceonusingtheword"truth"swimsupstreamofcurrentpostmodernistorthodoxies.This

insistenceisnotbasedonacommitmenttotransparentaccountsofrepresentationoracorrespondencetheoryoftruth,
butonmybeliefthatthedemarcationbetweenepistemicallybetterandworseclaimscontinuestooperate(indeed,itis
inevitable)andthatwhathappenswhenweeschewallepistemologicalissuesoftruthisthatthetermsuponwhichthose
demarcationsaremadegounseenanduncontested.Averyradicalrevisionofwhatwemeanbytruthisinorder,butif
weignorethewaysinwhichourdiscoursesappealtosomeversionoftruthfortheirpersuasivenessweareindangerof
remainingblindtotheoperationsoflegitimationthatfunctionwithinourowntexts.Thetaskisthereforetoexplicatethe
relationsbetweenpoliticsandknowledgeratherthanpronouncethedeathoftruth.SeemyRealKnowing,forthcoming
withCornellUniversityPress.

13Cf.my"CulturalFeminismversusPostStructuralism:TheIdentityCrisisinFeministTheory"SIGNS:AJournalof

WomeninCultureandSociety13.3(Spring1988):40536.Formorediscussionsonthemultidimensionalityofsocial
identityseeMariaLugones"Playfulness,`World'Travelling,andLovingPerception,"Hypatia2.2:319andGloria
Anzaldua,Borderlands/LaFrontera(SanFrancisco:Spinsters/AuntLuteBookCompany,1987).

14ThiscanbefoundinMarxismandtheInterpretationofCultureed.CaryNelsonandLawrenceGrossberg(Chicago:

UniversityofIllinoisPress,1988):271313.

15Ibid,p.298.

16SeeEdwardSaid,"RepresentingtheColonized:Anthropology'sInterlocutors"CriticalInquiry15.2(Winter1989),p.

219,onthispoint,whereheshowshowthe"dialogue"betweenWesternanthropologyandcolonizedpeoplehavebeen
nonreciprocal,andsupportstheneedfortheWesternerstobegintostoptalking.

17SeeagainSaid,"RepresentingtheColonized"p.212,whereheencouragesinparticulartheselfinterrogationof

privilegedspeakers.Thisseemstobearunningthemeinwhataresometimescalled"minoritydiscourses"thesedays:
assertingtheneedforwhitestostudywhiteness,e.g.Theneedforaninterrogationofone'slocationexistswithevery
discursiveeventbyanyspeaker,butgiventhelopsidednessofcurrent"dialogues"itseemsespeciallyimportanttopush
forthisamongtheprivileged,whosometimesseemtowanttostudyeverybody'ssocialandculturalconstructionbuttheir
own.

18Toarguefortherelevanceofeffectsforevaluationdoesnotentailthatthereisonlyonewaytodosuchanaccounting

orwhatkindofeffectswillbedeemeddesirable.Howoneevaluatesaparticulareffectisleftopen(4)arguessimplythat
effectsmustalwaysbetakenintoaccount.

19IlikethewaySusanBordomakesthispoint.Inspeakingabouttheoriesorideasthatgainprominence,shesays:"...all

culturalformations...[are]complexlyconstructedoutofdiverseelementsintellectual,psychological,institutional,and
sociological.Arisingnotfrommonolithicdesignbutfromaninterplayoffactorsandforces,itisbestunderstoodnotasa
discrete,definablepositionwhichcanbeadoptedorrejected,butasanemergingcoherencewhichisbeingfedbya
varietyofcurrents,sometimesoverlapping,sometimesquitedistinct."Seeher"Feminism,Postmodernism,andGender
Skepticism"inFeminism/Postmodernism

ed.LindaNicholson(NewYork,Routledge,1989),p.135.Ifideasariseinsuchaconfigurationofforces,doesitmake
sensetoaskforanauthor?