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146. The Appeals Chamb er has concluded that in general international law, three tests may be
applied for determining whether an individual is acting as a de facto State organ. In the case
of individuals forming part of armed forces or military units, as in the case of any other
hierarchically organised group, the test is that of overall control by the State.

147. It now falls to the Appeals Chamber to establish whether, in the circumstances of the
case, the Yugoslav Army exercised in 1992 the requisite measure of control over the Bosnian
Serb Army. The answer must be in the affirmative.

148. The Appeals Chamber does not see any ground for overturning the factual findings made
in this case by the Trial Chamber and relies on the facts as stated in the Judgement. The
majority and Judge McDonald do not appear to disagree on the facts, which Judge McDonald
also takes as stated in the Judgement, 176 but only on the legal interpretation to be given to
those facts. 149. Since, however, the Appeals Chamber considers that the Trial Chamber
applied an incorrect standard in evaluating the legal consequences of the relationship between
the FRY and Bosnian Serb forces, the Appeals Chamber must now apply its foregoing
analysis to the facts and draw the necessary legal conclusions therefrom.

150. The Trial Chamber clearly found that even after 19 May 1992, the command structure of
the JNA did not change after it was renamed and redesignated as the VJ. Furthermore, and
more importantly, it is apparent from the decision of the Trial Chamber and more particularly
from the evidence as evaluated by Judge McDonald in her Separate and Dissenting Opinion,
that even after that date the VJ continued to control the Bosnian Serb Army in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, that is the VRS. The VJ controlled the political and military objectives, as well
as the military operations, of the VRS. Two factors emphasised in the Judgement need to be
recalled: first, the transfer to the 1st Krajina Corps, as with other units of the VRS, of former
JNA Officers who were not of Bosnian Serb extraction from their equivalent postings in the
relevant VRS units JNA predecessor 177 and second, with respect to the VRS, the
continuing payment of salaries, to Bosnian Serb and non-Bosnian Serb officers alike, by the
Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). 178 According
to the Trial Chamber, these two factors did not amount to, or were not indicative of, effective
control by Belgrade over the Bosnian Serb forces. 179 The Appeals Chamber shares instead
the views set out by Judge McDonald in her Separate and Dissenting Opinion, whereby these
two factors, in addition to others shown by the Prosecution, did indicate control. 180
151. What emerges from the facts which are both unc ontested by the Trial Chamber and
mentioned by Judge McDonald (concerning the command and control structure that persisted
after the redesignation of the VRS and the continuous payment of salaries to officers of the
Bosnian Serb army by the FRY) is that the VRS and VJ did not, after May 1992, comprise
two separate armies in any genuine sense. This is further evidenced by the following factors:

(i) The re-organization of the JNA and the change of name did not point to an alteration of
military objectives and strategies. The command structure of the JNA and the re-designation
of a part of the JNA as the VRS, while undertaken to create the appearance of compliance
with international demands, was in fact designed to ensure that a large number of ethnic Serb
armed forces were retained in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 181

(ii) Over and above the extensive financial, logistical and other assistance and support which
were acknowledged to have been provided by the VJ to the VRS, it was also uncontested by
the Trial Chamber that as a creation of the FRY/VJ, the structures and ranks of the VJ and
VRS were identical, and also that the FRY/VJ directed and supervised the activities and
operations of the VRS. 182 As a result, the VRS reflected the strategies and tactics devised by
the FRY/JNA/VJ.

(iii) Elements of the FRY/VJ continued to directly intervene in the conflict in Bosnia and
Herzegovina after 19 May 1992, and were fighting with the VRS and providing critical
combat support to the VRS. While an armed conflict of an international character was held to
have existed only up until 19 May 1992, the Trial Chamber did nevertheless accept that
thereafter active elements of the FRYs armed forces, the Yugoslav Army (VJ), continued to
be involved in an armed conflict with Bosnia and Herzegovina. 183 Much de facto continuity,
in terms of the ongoing hostilities, 184 was therefore observable and there seems to have been
little factual basis for the Trial Chambers finding that by 19 May 1992, the FRY/VJ had lost
control over the VRS. 185

(iv) JNA military operations under the command of Belgrade that had already commenced by
19 May 1992 did not cease immediately and, from a purely practical point of view, it is highly
unlikely that they would have been able to cease overnight in any event. 186 The creation of
the VRS by the FRY/VJ, therefore, did not indicate an intention by Belgrade to relinquish the
control held by the FRY/VJ over the Bosnian Serb army. To the contrary, in fact, the
establishment of the VRS was undertaken to continue the pursuit of the FRYs own political
and military objectives, and the evidence demonstrates that these objectives were
implemented by military and political operations that were controlled by Belgrade and the
JNA/VJ. There is no evidence to suggest that these objectives changed on 19 May 1992. 187

152. Taken together, these factors suggest that the relationship between the VJ and VRS
cannot be characterised as one of merely coordinating political and military activities. Even if
less explicit forms of command over military operations were practised and adopted in
response to increased international scrutiny, the link between the VJ and VRS clearly went far
beyond mere coordination or cooperation between allies and in effect, the renamed Bosnian
Serb army still comprised one army under the command of the General Staff of the VJ in
Belgrade. 188 It was apparent that even after 19 May 1992 the Bosnian Serb army continued
to act in pursuance of the military goals formulated in Belgrade. In this regard, clear evidence
of a chain of military command between Belgrade and Pale was presented to the Trial
Chamber and the Trial Chamber accepted that the VRS Main Staff had links and regular
communications with Belgrade. 189 In spite of this, and although the Trial Chamber
acknowledged the possibility that certain members of the VRS may have been specifically
charged by the FRY authorities to commit particular acts or to carry out particular tasks of
some kind, it concluded that without evidence of orders having been received from Belgrade
which circumvented or overrode the authority of the Corps Commander, those acts cannot be
said to have been carried out on behalf of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro). 190

153. The Appeals Chamber holds that to have required proof of specific orders circumventing
or overriding superior orders not only applies the wrong test but is also questionable in this
context. A distinguishing feature of the VJ and the VRS was that they possessed shared
military objectives. As a result, it is inherently unlikely that orders from Belgrade
circumventing or overriding the authority of local Corps commanders would have ever been
necessary as these forces were of the same mind; a point that appears to have been virtually
conceded by the Trial Chamber. 191

154. Furthermore, the Trial Chamber, noting that the pay of all 1 st Krajina Corps officers and
presumably of all senior VRS Commanders as former JNA officers continued to be received
from Belgrade after 19 May 1992, acknowledged that a possible conclusion with regard to
individuals, is that payment could well be equated with control. 192 The Trial Chamber
nevertheless dismissed such continuity of command structures, logistical organization,
strategy and tactics as being as much matters of convenience as military necessity and noted
that such evidence establishes nothing more than the potential for control inherent in the
relationship of dependency which such financing produced. 193 In the Appeals Chambers
view, however, and while the evidence may not have disclosed the exact details of how the
VRS related to the main command in Belgrade, it is nevertheless important to bear in mind
that a clear intention existed to mask the commanding role of the FRY; a point which was
amply demonstrated by the Prosecution. 194 In the view of the Appeals Chamber, the finding
of the Trial Chamber that the relationship between the FRY/VJ and VRS amounted to
cooperation and coordination rather than overall control suffered from having taken largely at
face value those features which had been put in place intentionally by Belgrade to make it
seem as if their links with Pale were as partners acting only in cooperation with each other.
Such an approach is not only flawed in the specific circumstances of this case, but also
potentially harmful in the generality of cases. Undue emphasis upon the ostensible structures
and overt declarations of the belligerents, as opposed to a nuanced analysis of the reality of
their relationship, may tacitly suggest to groups who are in de facto control of military forces
that responsibility for the acts of such forces can be evaded merely by resort to a superficial
restructuring of such forces or by a facile declaration that the reconstituted forces are
henceforth independent of their erstwhile sponsors.

155. Finally, it must be noted that the Trial Chamber found the various forms of assistance
provided to the armed forces of the Republika Srpska by the Government of the FRY to have
been crucial to the pursuit of their activities and that those forces were almost completely
dependent on the supplies of the VJ to carry out offensive operations. 195 Despite this
finding, the Trial Chamber declined to make a finding of overall control. Much was made of
the lack of concrete evidence of specific instructions. Proof of effective control was also
held to be insufficient, 196 on the grounds, once again, that the Trial Chamber lacked explicit
evidence of direct instructions having been issued from Belgrade. 197 However, this finding
was based upon the Trial Chamber having applied the wrong test.

156. As the Appeals Chamber has already pointed out, international law does not require that
the particular acts in question should be the subject of specific instructions or directives by a
foreign State to certain armed forces in order for these armed forces to be held to be acting as
de facto organs of that State. It follows that in the circumstances of the case it was not
necessary to show that those specific operations carried out by the Bosnian Serb forces which
were the object of the trial (the attacks on Kozarac and more generally within optina
Prijedor) had been specifically ordered or planned by the Yugoslav Army. It is sufficient to
show that this Army exercised overall control over the Bosnian Serb Forces. This showing has
been made by the Prosecution before the Trial Chamber. Such control manifested itself not
only in financial, logistical and other assistance and support, but also, and more importantly,
in terms of participation in the general direction, coordination and supervision of the activities
and operations of the VRS. This sort of control is sufficient for the purposes of the legal
criteria required by international law.

157. An ex post facto confirmation of the fact that over the years (and in any event between
1992 and 1995) the FRY wielded general control over the Republika Srpska in the political
and military spheres can be found in the process of negotiation and conclusion of the Dayton-
Paris Accord of 1995. Of course, the conclusion of the Dayton-Paris Accord in 1995 cannot
constitute direct proof of the nature of the link that existed between the Bosnian Serb and
FRY armies after May 1992 and hence it is by no means decisive as to the issue of control in
this period. Nevertheless, the Dayton-Paris Accord may be seen as the culmination of a long
process. This process necessitated a dialogue with all political and military forces wielding
actual power on the ground (whether de facto or de iure ) and a continuous response to the
shifting military and political fortunes of these forces. The political process leading up to
Dayton commenced soon after the outbreak of hostilities and was ongoing during the key
period under examination. To the extent that its contours were shaped by, and thus reflect, the
actual power structures which persisted in Bosnia and Herzegovina over the course of the
conflict, the Dayton-Paris Accord provides a particular insight into the political, strategic and
military realities which prevailed in Bosnia and Herzegovina up to 1995, and including May
1992. The fact that from 4 August 1994 the FRY appeared to cut off its support to the
Republika Srpska because the leadership of the former had misgivings about the authorities in
the latter is not insignificant. 198 Indeed, this delinking served to emphasise the high degree
of overall control exercised over the Republika Srpska by the FRY, for, soon after this
cessation of support from the FRY, the Republika Srpska realised that it had little choice but
to succumb to the authority of the FRY. 199 Thus, the Dayton-Paris Accord may indirectly
shed light upon the realities of the command and control structure that existed over the
Bosnian Serb army at the time the VRS and the VJ were ostensibly delinked, and may also
assist the evaluation of whether or not control continued to be exercised over the Bosnian
Serb army by the FRY army thereafter.

158. The Appeals Chamber will now turn to examine the specific fe atures of the Dayton
Accord that are of relevance to this inquiry.

159. By an agreement concluded on 29 August 1995 between the FRY and the Republika
Srpska and referred to in the preamble of the Dayton-Paris Accord, it was provided that a
unified delegation would negotiate at Dayton. This delegation would consist of six persons,
three from the FRY and three from the Republika Srpska. The Delegation was to be chaired
by President Milo{evi}, who would have a casting vote in case of divided votes. 200 Later on,
when it came to the signing of the various agreements made at Dayton, it emerged again that
it was the FRY that in many respects acted as the international subject wielding authority over
the Republika Srpska. The General Framework Agreement, by which Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Croatia and the FRY endorsed the various annexed Agreements and undertook
to respect and promote the fulfilment of their provisions, was signed by President Milo{evi}.
This signature had the effect of guaranteeing respect for these commitments by the Republika
Srpska. Furthermore, by a letter of 21 November 1995 addressed to various States (the United
States, Russia, Germany, France and the United Kingdom), the FRY pledged to take all
necessary steps, consistent with the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political
independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to ensure that the Republika Srpska fully respects
and complies with the provisions of the Agreement on Military Aspects of the Peace
Settlement (Annex 1A to the Dayton-Paris Accord). 201 In addition, the letter by which the
Republika Srpska undertook to comply with the aforementioned Agreement was signed on 21
November 1995 by the Foreign Minister of the FRY, Mr. Milutinovi}, for the Republika
Srpska . 202

160. All t his would seem to bear out the proposition that in actual fact, at least between 1992
and 1995, overall political and military authority over the Republika Srpska was held by the
FRY (control in this context included participation in the planning and supervision of ongoing
military operations). Indeed, the fact that it was the FRY that had the final say regarding the
undertaking of international commitments by the Republika Srpska, and in addition pledged,
at the end of the conflict, to ensure respect for those international commitments by the
Republika Srpska, confirms that (i) during the armed conflict the FRY exercised control over
that entity, and (ii) such control persisted until the end of the conflict.

161. This would therefore constitute yet another (albeit indirect) indication of the subordinate
role played vis--vis the FRY by the Republika Srpska and its officials in the aforementioned
period, including 1992.

162. The Appeals Chamber therefore concludes that, for the period material to this case
(1992), the armed forces of the Republika Srpska were to be regarded as acting under the
overall control of and on behalf of the FRY. Hence, even after 19 May 1992 the armed
conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina between the Bosnian Serbs and the central authorities of
Bosnia and Herzegovina must be classified as an international armed conflict.

References:

1. See Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge McDonald, para. 1: I completely agree with
and share in the Opinion and Judgment with the exception of the determination that Article 2
of the Statute is inapplicable to the charges against the accused. [176]
2. Judgement, para. 601. [177]
3. Ibid . [178]
4. Ibid ., paras. 601-602. [179]
5. As Judge McDonald noted: [ t ] he creation of the VRS [ after 19 May 1992 ] was a legal
fiction. The only changes made after the 15 May 1992 Security Council resolution were the
transfer of troops, the establishment of a Main Staff of the VRS, a change in the name of the
military organisation and individual units, and a change in the insignia. There remained the
same weapons, the same equipment, the same officers, the same commanders, largely the
same troops, the same logistics centres, the same suppliers, the same infrastructure, the same
source of payments, the same goals and mission, the same tactics, and the same operations.
Importantly, the objective remained the same [ ... ] The VRS clearly continued to operate as
an integrated and instrumental part of the Serbian war effort. [ ... ] The VRS Main Staff, the
members of which had all been generals in the JNA and many of whom were appointed to
their positions by the JNA General Staff, maintained direct communications with the VJ
General Staff via a communications link from Belgrade. [ ... ] Moreover, the VRS continued
to receive supplies from the same suppliers in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) who had contracted with the JNA, although the requests after 19 May 1992 went
through the Chief of Staff of the VRS who then sent them onto Belgrade. (Separate and
Dissenting Opinion of Judge McDonald, paras. 7-8). [180]
6. In the light of the demand of the Security Council on 15 May 1992 that all interference
from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina by units of the JNA cease immediately, the Trial
Chamber characterised the dilemma posed for the JNA by increasing international scrutiny
from 1991 onwards in terms of the way in which the JNA could: be converted into an army
of what remained of Yugoslavia, namely Serbia and Montenegro, yet continue to retain in
Serb hands control of substantial portions of Bosnia and Herzegovina while appearing to
comply with international demands that the JNA quit Bosnia and Herzegovina. [ ... ] The
solution as far as Serbia was concerned was found by transferring to Bosnia and Herzegovina
all Bosnian Serb soldiers serving in JNA units elsewhere while sending all non-Bosnian
soldiers out of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This ensured seeming compliance with international
demands while effectively retaining large ethnic Serb armed forces in Bosnia and
Herzegovina (Judgement, paras. 113-114). Additionally, the U.N. Secretary-General, in
commenting on its purported withdrawal from Bosnia and Herzegovina, concluded in his
report of 3 December 1992 that [ t ] hough JNA has withdrawn completely from Bosnia and
Herzegovina, former members of Bosnian Serb origin have been left behind with their
equipment and constitute the Army of the Serb Republic (Report of the Secretary-General
concerning the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina , U.N. Doc. A/47/747, para. 10). [181]
7. Judgement, para. 115: ?T ghe VRS was in effect a product of the dissolution of the old
JNA and the withdrawal of its non- Bosnian elements into Serbia. However, most, if not all, of
the commanding officers of units of the old JNA who found themselves stationed with their
units in Bosnia and Herzegovina on 18 May 1992, nearly all Serbs, remained in command of
those units throughout 1992 and 1993 [ ... ] . See further ibid ., para. 590: The attack on
Kozarac was carried out by elements of an army Corps based in Banja Luka. This Corps,
previously a Corps of the old JNA, became part of the VRS and was renamed the Banja
Luka or 1st Krajina Corps after 19 May 1992 but retained the same commander. See also
ibid . , paras. 114-116, 118-121, 594. [182]
8. Ibid ., para. 118 (Despite the announced JNA withdrawal from Bosnia and Herzegovina in
May 1992, active elements of what had been the JNA, now rechristened as the VJ [ ... ]
remained in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the May withdrawal and worked with the VRS
throughout 1992 and 1993) and para. 569 ( [ ... ] the forces of the VJ continued to be
involved in the armed conflict after that date). [183]
9. See in particular ibid ., para. 566: The ongoing conflicts before, during and after the time
of the attack on Kozarac on 24 May 1992 were taking place and continued to take place
throughout the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina between the government of the Republic
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the Bosnian Serb forces,
elements of the VJ operating from time to time in the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
and various paramilitary groups, all of which occupied or were proceeding to occupy a
significant portion of the territory of that State. See also para. 579: ?T ghe take-over of
optina Prijedor began before the JNA withdrawal on 19 May 1992 and was not completed
until after that date. See also the Dissenting Opinion of Judge McDonald who noted ?t ghe
continuity between the JNA and the VRS particularly as it relates to the military operations in
the Optina Prijedor area [ ... ] . (Separate and Dissenting Opinion of Judge McDonald, para.
15). [184]
10. Moreover, it is interesting to observe that while concluding that by 19 May 1992 effective
control over the VRS had been lost by the JNA/VJ, the Trial Chamber simultaneously
observed that such control nevertheless did not appear to have been regained by the Bosnian
authorities. In particular, the Trial Chamber found that the Government of the Republic of
Bosnia and Herzegovina [ ... ] faced [ ... ] major problems [ ... ] of defence , involving control
over the mobilization and operations of the armed forces (Judgement, para. 124, emphasis
added). [185]
11. In and of itself, the logistical difficulties of disengaging from the conflict and withdrawing
such a large force would have been considerable. With regard to the extent and depth of the
involvement of the large number of JNA forces engaged in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the
ongoing nature of their activities beyond 19 May 1992, see ibid . , paras. 124-125: By early
1992 there were some 100,000 JNA troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina with over 700 tanks,
1,000 armoured personnel carriers, much heavy weaponry, 100 planes and 500 helicopters, all
under the command of the General Staff of the JNA in Belgrade. [ ... ] On 19 May 1992 the
withdrawal of JNA forces from Bosnia and Herzegovina was announced but the attacks were
continued by the VRS. [186]
12. See in particular ibid ., para. 116 (citing the 1993 publication of the former Yugoslav
Federal Secretary for Defence, General Veljko Kadijevi}, entitled My view of the Break-up:
an Army without a State ( Prosecution Exhibit 30)): ?T ghe units and headquarters of the
JNA formed the backbone of the army of the Serb Republic (Republic of Srpska) complete
with weaponry and equipment [ ... ] ?F girst the JNA and later the army of the Republic of
Srpska, which the JNA put on its feet, helped to liberate Serb territory, protect the Serb nation
and create the favourable military preconditions for achieving the interests and rights of the
Serb nation in Bosnia and Herzegovina... . See also para. 590: The occupation of Kozarac
and of the surrounding villages was part of a military and political operation, begun before 19
May 1992 with the take-over of the town of Prijedor of 29 April 1992, aimed at establishing
control over the optina which formed part of the land corridor of Bosnian territory linking the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) with the so-called Republic of
Serbian Krajina in Croatia. [
187]
13. While the relationship between the JNA and VRS may have included coordination and
cooperation, it cannot be seen as limited to this. As the Trial Chamber itself noted: In 1991
and on into 1992 the Bosnian Serb and Croatian Serb paramilitary forces cooperated with and
acted under the command and within the framework of the JNA .( ibid ., para. 593; emphasis
added). [188]
14. Ibid ., para. 598: The Trial Chamber has already considered the overwhelming
importance of the logistical support provided by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro) to the VRS. [ ... ] [ I ] n addition to routing all high-level VRS
communications through secure links in Belgrade, a communications link for everyday use
was established and maintained between VRS Main Staff Headquarters and the VJ Main Staff
in Belgrade [ ... ] . [189]
15. Ibid ., para. 601. [190]
16. The Trial Chamber noted that: ? igt is clear from the evidence that the military and
political objectives of the Republika Srpska and of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro) were largely complementary. [ ...g The [ ... ] political leadership of the
Republika Srpska and their senior military commanders no doubt considered the success of
the overall Serbian war effort as a prerequisite to their stated political aim of joining with
Serbia and Montenegro as part of a Greater Serbia. [ ... ] In that sense, there was little need for
the VJ and the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to
attempt to exercise any real degree of control over, as distinct from coordination with, the
VRS. So long as the Republika Srpska and the VRS remained committed to the shared
strategic objectives of the war, and the Main Staffs of the two armies could coordinate their
activities at the highest levels, it was sufficient for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro) and the VJ to provide the VRS with logistical supplies and, where
necessary, to supplement the Bosnian elements of the VRS officer corps with non-Bosnian VJ
or former JNA officers, to ensure that this process was continued ( ibid ., paras. 603-604).
[191]
17. Ibid ., para. 602. On this point, the Trial Chamber noted, further, that: given that the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) had taken responsibility for the
financing of the VRS, most of which consisted of former JNA soldiers and officers, it is a fact
not to be wondered at that such financing would not only include payments to soldiers and
officers but that existing administrative mechanisms for financing those soldiers and their
operations would be relied on after 19 May 1992 [ ... ] . ( ibid. ). [192]
18. Ibid. [193]
19. See in this regard the testimony of the expert witness Dr. James Gow, transcript of hearing
in The Prosecutor v. Du{ko Tadi} , Case No.: IT-94-1-T, 10 May 1996, pp. 308-309; ibid ., 13
May 1996, pp. 330-338. [194]
20. Judgement , para. 605. 196 It was deemed insufficient by the Trial Chamber that the VJ
made use of the potential for control inherent in that dependence , or was otherwise given
effective control over those forces [ ... ] ( ibid .; emphasis added). [195]
21. The Trial Chamber noted that: the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro), through the dependence of the VRS on the supply of matriel by the VJ, had the
capability to exercise great influence and perhaps even control over the VRS [ ... ] ?However
g there is no evidence on which this Trial Chamber can conclude that the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and the VJ ever directed or, for that matter, ever felt the
need to attempt to direct, the actual military operations of the VRS [ ... ] ( ibid. ). [197]
22. See Report of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the International Conference
on the Former Yugoslavia on the establishment and commencement of operations of an
International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia Mission to the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) , S/1994/1074, 19 S eptember 1996, p. 3, where it is
noted that as of 4 August 1994, the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia
and Montenegro) ordered, inter alia , the breaking off of political and economic relations with
the Republika Srpska and the closure of the border between the Republika Srpska and the
FRY to all transport towards the Republika Srpska , except food, clothing and medicine.
International observers were deployed to monitor compliance with these measures, and it was
reported by the Co-Chairmen that the Government of the FRY appeared to be meeting its
commitment to close the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro) and the areas of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the control of
the Bosnian Serb forces. ( Report of the Co-Chairmen of the Steering Committee of the
International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia on the state of implementation of the
border closure measures taken by the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro) , S/1994/1124, 3 October 1994, pp. 2-3). [198]
23. As outlined below, this process culminated in the agreement of the Republika Srpska to be
represented at the Dayton conference by the FRY (below, at paragraph 159) . This appears to
have been in spite of intense opposition, within the Republika Srpska , to the peace
settlements proposed by the international community, as is evidenced by the overwhelming
rejection by the Bosnian Serbs of the international communitys peace plan for Bosnia and
Herzegovina in a referendum which took place in Bosnian Serb-held territory on 27 28
August 1994 ( See Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the Organization ,
UNGAOR, 49 th sess., supp. no. 1 (A/49/1), 2 September 1994, p. 95). [199]
24. This agreement stipulated th at the delegation of the Republika Srpska was to be headed
by the President of the Republic of Serbia Mr. Slobodan Miloevic (Article 2). Pursuant to
this agreement, the leadership of the Republika Srpska agreed to adopt the binding decisions
of the delegation, regarding the Peace Plan, in plenary sessions, by simple majority. In the
case of divided votes, the vote of the President, Mr. Slobodan Miloevic, shall be decisive
(Article 3). That Mr. Miloevic was head of the joint delegation was confirmed by Mr.
Miloevic himself in his letter of 21 November 1995 to President Izetbegovi} concerning
Annex 9 to the Dayton-Paris Accord. (Agreement on file with the International Tribunals
Library). [200]
25. This letter had been signed by Mr. Milutinovic, Foreign Minister of the FRY, following a
request of 20 November 1995 of the three members of the Delegation of Republika Srpska
to Mr. Miloevic. [201]
26. See the texts of the Dayton-Paris Accord (General Framework Agreement for Peace in
Bosnia and Herzegovina, initialled by the parties on 21 November 1995, U.N. Doc. A/50/790,
S/1995/999, 30 November 1995). [202]