HSM Programmers Manual - 1270A514-3 PDF

Host Security Module RG7000
Host Security Module

RG7000
Programmers Manual
1270A514 Issue 3
1270A514 Issue 3
HOST SECURITY MODULE RG7000

PROGRAMMERS MANUAL, REVISION STATUS
Revision Release Date HSM Functional

Revision
1270A514 Issue 1 January 1999 1.04 / 5.04
1270A513 Issue 2 May 2000 1.05 / 5.05 / Pre-release
1270A513 Issue 3 May 2000 1.05 / 5.05
This manual describes the functionality within the 1.05 and

5.05 base release of HSM firmware for all other versions
please refer to appropriate manual and associated HSM
firmware specifications.
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Zaxus.
1270A514 Issue 3
HOST SECURITY MODULE RG7000

PROGRAMMERS MANUAL
CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1 Programming Guide
CHAPTER 2 Host Commands
CHAPTER 3 PIN Block Formats
CHAPTER 4 Error Codes
1270A514 Issue 3
Host Security Module RG7000 PROGRAMMING GUIDE
CHAPTER 1
PROGRAMMING GUIDE
1 INTRODUCTION 1-1
2 GENERAL 1-2
3 TRIPLE DES 1-3
3.1 KEY USAGE 1-3
3.2 KEY ENCRYPTION SCHEMES 1-3
3.3 KEY GENERATE, IMPORT AND EXPORT 1-4
4 COMMAND MESSAGE FORMAT 1-5
4.1 START OF TEXT CHARACTER 1-5
4.2 MESSAGE HEADER 1-5
4.3 COMMAND CODE 1-5
4.4 DATA 1-5
4.5 MESSAGE TRAILER 1-6
4.6 END OF TEXT CHARACTER 1-6
5 RESPONSE MESSAGE FORMAT 1-7
5.1 START OF TEXT CHARACTER 1-7
5.2 MESSAGE HEADER 1-7
5.3 RESPONSE CODE 1-8
5.4 ERROR CODE 1-8
5.5 DATA 1-8
5.6 MESSAGE TRAILER 1-8
5.7 END OF TEXT CHARACTERS 1-8
6 DATA REPRESENTATION 1-9
6.1 ASCII CHARACTER CODES 1-10
6.2 EBCDIC CHARACTER CODES 1-11
7 TRANSPARENT ASYNCHRONOUS COMMUNICATIONS 1-13
7.1 MESSAGE FORMAT 1-13
7.2 HSM PROCESSING OF PACKETS 1-13
7.3 PARITY ERRORS 1-14
8 INPUT/OUTPUT FLOW CONTROL 1-15
9 ERROR HANDLING 1-16
10 USE OF MULTIPLE HSMS 1-17
11 USER STORAGE 1-18
11.1 ASSIGNING AND USING INDICES 1-18
11.2 SPECIFYING STORED DATA 1-19
12 PRINTING AT AN HSM-ATTACHED PRINTER 1-21
13 REJECTION OF WEAK AND SEMI-WEAK KEYS 1-22
14 LOCAL MASTER KEYS 1-23
15 LOCAL MASTER KEY VARIANTS 1-25
16 LOCAL MASTER KEY TRIPLE DES VARIANT SCHEME 1-27
1270A514 Issue 3 Chapter 1

1 INTRODUCTION
The Host Security Module (HSM) acts as a peripheral to the Host computer. It performs
cryptographic processing in a physically secure environment on behalf of the Host. The
processing is performed by the HSM in response to commands which it receives via a serial
data link.
Typically the HSM is used in a realtime, online environment performing key management, PIN
and MAC related functions as required by the system.
This manual contains programming notes to assist the application programmer and a complete
command reference section detailing each of the Host commands available. A glossary of
terms is included at the end of the Installation and Operation manual.
For commands that are entered manually at a Console terminal attached to the HSM, see the
associated Installation and Operation Manual.
1270A514 Issue 3 1-1

PROGRAMMING GUIDE Host Security Module RG7000
2 GENERAL
The application program sends commands to the HSM, and receives responses from the HSM.
Each command and response consists of a variable number of fields.
In order that the data can be sent via a serial data link, it is encoded as either ASCII or EBCDIC
characters (the choice is made during the HSM configuration).
Versions of the HSM can be configured to support asynchronous, bisynchronous, SNA, SDLC,
TCP/IP and IBM channel communications protocols. The HSM has no flow control support so
the programmer must ensure that the HSM input buffer is not exceeded.
The HSM returns an error code to the Host as part of the response message. The programmer
must ensure that a suitable response is made to each type of error.
In a typical system, a minimum of two HSMs are connected to the Host via separate Host ports.
The HSMs are independent, and the programmer should make maximum use of all the HSMs
to increase throughput, using one HSM if another is already processing data or is faulty. Also, it
is useful to ensure that the program allows for additional HSMs to be subsequently added as
throughput requirements increase.
Each HSM has a user storage area reserved for use by the programmer to store data required
by the HSM during processing. Typically it is used to store keys and tables. Instructing the HSM
to access data from user storage reduces the amount of data necessary in each command, and
thus reduces the communications time.
There is a facility to print data (e.g., account holder PINs) at a printer connected to an RG7X00
series HSM. The HSM must have format information for the data before sending it to the
printer. The program must send a print format command to the HSM before print commands
can be issued.
Normally the HSM responds to all data that it receives. However, in some environments, the
Host computer sends system messages to all attached devices. The HSM has support for two
IBM environments where this occurs; these are CICS and IMS.
The RG7X10 High-Speed HSM does not support printing functions in its standard command
set. The printing facilities can be made available to special order. It is recommended that an
RG7X00 series HSM is chosen to implement secure printing facilities.
1-2 1270A514 Issue 3

3 TRIPLE DES
The HSM host commands support single, double and triple length DES keys. The command
set is completely backward compatible with earlier versions of firmware. The commands
support extensions to enable the specification of key length and key encryption scheme to use.
3.1 Key Usage

If the first character of the key is a hexadecimal character (0 9 or A - F) or K or S the
commands will operate as previously specified. In most circumstances the key is single length
except for ZMKs when the ZMK length is configured for double length or for specific keys that
are double length by definition. This is the 16H or 32H length and types.
To support double and triple length keys throughout the command set key scheme tags have
been defined these enable the HSM to determine the key length and encryption mechanism
used for a key. The key scheme tag prefixes the key. This is the 1A+32H or 1A+48H length
and types.
3.2 Key Encryption Schemes

There are currently two key encryption schemes supported by the HSM.
ANSI X9.17 method

Each key of a double or triple length key is encrypted separately using the ECB mode of
encryption. This scheme is only available for import and export of keys and must be enabled
via the Configure Security (CS) command.
The tags for this scheme are:

X Double length DES keys.
Y Triple length DES keys.
Variant method
Each key of a double or triple length key is encrypted separately using the ECB mode of
encryption. For the second or third key, depending on whether it is a double or triple length key,
a variant is applied to the encryption key. There are five variants to enable the encryption of
each key distinctly. This application of variants enforces the key use as a double or triple length
key and the key order. This scheme is available for encryption of keys under the Local Master
Key and for import and export of keys.
Local Master Keys by definition are double length keys consisting of a left and right half. Each
half consists of 16 hexadecimal characters. Other keys, such as ZMKs may be of double or
triple lengths. Triple length keys are comprised of three parts; left, middle and right. Each part,
like double length keys, consists of 16 hexadecimal characters. The variant is applied to the
right half of double length encrypting keys, and to the middle part of triple length encrypting
keys.
The tags for this scheme are as follows:

U Double length DES keys.
T Triple length DES keys.
Double length key variants Key 1 of 2 A6

Key 2 of 2 5A
Triple length key variants Key 1 of 2 6A

Key 2 of 3 DE
Key 3 of 3 2B
Example:
1270A514 Issue 3 1-3
Given a double length encrypting key of: XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX YYYY YYYY YYYY YYYY
And a double length key of: AAAA AAAA AAAA AAAA BBBB BBBB BBBB BBBB
The variant A6 is applied to the first two hex characters of Y to encrypt A.

The variant 5A is applied to the first two hex characters of Y to encrypt B
Given a double length encrypting key of: XXXX XXXX XXXX XXXX YYYY YYYY YYYY YYYY
And a triple length key of: AAAA AAAA AAAA AAAA BBBB BBBB BBBB BBBB
CCCC CCCC CCCC CCCC
The variant 6A is applied to the first two hex characters of Y to encrypt A.

The variant DE is applied to the first two hex characters of Y to encrypt B
The variant 2B is applied to the first two hex characters of Y to encrypt C
Variants are applied by Exclusive Oring (XOR) the first two characters of Y with the Variant.
3.3 Key Generate, Import and Export

All the key management commands have extensions to enable the specification of key scheme
to use when encrypting a key. This also defines the key length to generate within key
generation commands. For import and export of keys the key schemes must be consistent as
far as length is concerned i.e. if a double length key is input the key scheme flag defining the
output must also be for a double length key.
The extension consists of a delimiter ; and three single character option fields. If the
extension is used all fields must be provided. If the command does not use an option 0 or any
valid value can be entered in that field. The option will be ignored during processing.
The option fields are:
Key scheme for encrypting the output key under ZMK.

Key scheme for encrypting the output key under LMK.
Key check value type.
The valid values for these options are:
Key under ZMK - Z, U, T Z Single Length, U Double Length, T Triple Length.

- X, Y Encryption under Transport Key
X ANSI X9.17 Double Length
Y ANSI X9.17 Triple Length
These follow key encryption schemes defined previously.
Key under LMK - Z, U, T Z Single length, U Double Length, T Triple Length.
Key check value -0 Is a backwards compatible and produces a 16 hex KCV
-1 produces a 6 hexadecimal character KCV
-2 Is for special cases and is defined where used.
1-4 1270A514 Issue 3

4 COMMAND MESSAGE FORMAT

To give the HSM an instruction, the Host application must assemble a message containing all
the necessary information and send it to the HSM as a sequence of characters on the
communications link. In general, each command consists of the following fields:
Start of text character.
Message header.
Command code.
Data elements.
Message trailer.
End of text character.
End of text character

Message trailer
Data elements
Command code
Message Header
Start of text character
4.1 Start of Text Character

The start of text (STX) character indicates the start of a valid message. The ASCII and EBCDIC
value is X'02. (Not used in SNA-SDLC, IBM channel or TCP/IP environments).
4.2 Message Header

The message header field can be any length from 1 to 255 characters (1 to 100 for
SNA/SDLC), and it is configured at HSM installation. It can contain any printable characters and
the HSM returns them unmodified in the response message.
It can be used to label commands and their responses for systems that implement batch
queues or which multi-thread commands.
4.3 Command Code

Every command has a unique two-character command code. The command codes are detailed
in Chapter 2, Host Commands.
4.4 Data
Most HSM commands require data, often including cryptographic keys. Details of the data are
shown for each command in Chapter 3, PIN Block Formats.
1270A514 Issue 3 1-5

4.5 Message Trailer

The message trailer (EM) is an additional variable-length field (to a maximum of 32 characters),
which can be used to pass additional details required by the Host for further processing. The
field should always be preceded by the EM control character; ASCII and EBCDIC value is X'19.
The data in this field can be any printable character, and it is returned in the response message
unchanged.
4.6 End of Text Character

The end of text (ETX) character indicates the end of command data. The HSM ignores any data
received after the ETX and before the next STX. (Not used in SNA-SDLC, IBM channel or
TCP/IP environments).
The ASCII and EBCDIC value is X'03.
1-6 1270A514 Issue 3

5 RESPONSE MESSAGE FORMAT

To inform the Host of the results of processing, the HSM sends a message containing all the
necessary information as a sequence of characters on the communications link. A response
message is generated for each of the following:
In response to a command.
As a second response to a print command after the HSM has finished sending the print
data to the printer.
In response to the entry of PIN solicitation data at the Console (but only after the Host has
enabled this function).
Each response from the HSM consists of the following:
Start of text character (if applicable).

Message header.
Response code.
Error code.
Data elements.
Message trailer.
End of text character (if applicable).
End of text character

Message trailer
Data elements
Error code
Response code
Message Header
Start of text character
5.1 Start of Text Character

The start of text (STX) character indicates the start of a valid message. The ASCII and EBCDIC
value is X'02. (Not used in SNA-SDLC, IBM channel or TCP/IP environments).
5.2 Message Header

The message header field is a copy of the field received in the command message from the
Host. The data is returned to the Host unchanged.
It can be used to label commands and their responses for systems that implement batch
queues or which multi-thread commands.
1270A514 Issue 3 1-7

5.3 Response Code

Every response has a unique two-character code. Normally this code has the same first
character as the command to which it is a response, and the second character is one greater
than the second character of the command: (e.g., if the command code is AA, the response
code is AB. The value of each code is detailed in Chapter 2.
5.4 Error Code

The two-character error code field is used by the HSM to report errors detected during
processing. The values are always numeric and the value 00 indicates that no errors have been
found. If an error (other than 00) is returned, subsequent fields, with the exception of the end of
text character, are not returned by the HSM.
5.5 Data
Many HSM commands return data as a result of the processing. Details of the contents of the
returned data are given in Chapter 2. Data is not returned for error codes other than 00.
5.6 Message Trailer

The message trailer (EM) field is present only if it was present in the command message, and it
is returned unchanged. It is not returned for error codes other than 00.
5.7 End of Text Characters

The end of test (ETX) field indicates the end of the response message from the HSM. In a
bisynchronous system its ASCII and EBCDIC value is X'03. (Not used in SNA-SDLC, IBM
channel or TCP/IP environments).
In an asynchronous system it can be configured to be one or two characters in length, and the
value of each of the characters is configurable (normally at installation time).
1-8 1270A514 Issue 3

6 DATA REPRESENTATION
With the exception of the STX (X'02), ETX (X'03) and EM (X'19) control characters, the HSM
expects all data to be encoded as either ASCII or EBCDIC characters. Where the HSM does
not try and interpret the data (e.g., in the message header and message trailer fields), it is
possible to include other control characters, but this is not good practice.
When sending data to the HSM, other than data that is already in character format, encode
each digit (0-9, A-F) as a character (e.g., to send the hexadecimal value 1234ABCD to the HSM
requires 8 characters).
1270A514 Issue 3 1-9

6.1 ASCII Character Codes

The table shows the ASCII characters and their hexadecimal values.ASCII
ASCII HEX ASCII HEX ASCII HEX ASCII HEX
NUL 00 SP 20 @ 40 ` 60
SOH 01 ! 21 A 41 a 61
STX 02 " 22 B 42 b 62
ETX 03 # 23 C 43 c 63
EOT 04 $ 24 D 44 d 64
ENQ 05 % 25 E 45 e 65
ACK 06 & 26 F 46 f 66
BEL 07 ' 27 G 47 g 67
BS 08 ( 28 H 48 h 68
HT 09 ) 29 I 49 i 69
LF OA * 2A J 4A j 6A
VT OB + 2B K 4B k 6B
FF OC , 2C L 4C l 6C
CR OD - 2D M 4D m 6D
SO OE . 2E N 4E n 6E
SI OF / 2F O 4F o 6F
DLE 10 0 30 P 50 p 70
DC1 11 1 31 Q 51 q 71
DC2 12 2 32 R 52 r 72
DC3 13 3 33 S 53 s 73
DC4 14 4 34 T 54 t 74
NAK 15 5 35 U 55 u 75
SYN 16 6 36 V 56 v 76
ETB 17 7 37 W 57 w 77
CAN 18 8 38 X 58 x 78
EM 19 9 39 Y 59 y 79
SUB 1A : 3A Z 5A z 7A
ESC 1B ; 3B [ 5B { 7B
FS 1C < 3C \ 5C | 7C
GS 1D = 3D ] 5D } 7D
RS 1E > 3E ^ 5E ~ 7E
US 1F ? 3F = 5F DEL 7F
1-10 1270A514 Issue 3

6.2 EBCDIC Character Codes

The table shows the EBCDIC characters and their hexadecimal values.
EBCDIC HEX EBCDIC HEX EBCDIC HEX EBCDIC HEX
NUL 00 SP 40 80 C0
SOH 01 41 a 81 A C1
STX 02 42 b 82 B C2
ETX 03 43 c 83 C C3
04 44 d 84 D C4
HT 05 45 e 85 E C5
06 46 f 86 F C6
DEL 07 47 g 87 G C7
08 48 h 88 H C8
09 49 i 89 I C9
0A 4A 8A CA
VT 0B .(period) 4B { 8B CB
FF 0C < 4C 8C CC
CR 0D ( 4D 8D CD
SO 0E + 4E 8E CE
SI 0F | 4F 8F CF
DLE 10 & 50 90 D0
DC1 11 51 j 91 J D1
DC2 12 52 k 92 K D2
DC3 13 53 l 93 L D3
14 54 m 94 M D4
15 55 n 95 N D5
BS 16 56 o 96 O D6
17 57 p 97 P D7
CAN 18 58 q 98 Q D8
EM 19 59 r 99 R D9
1A ! 5A 9A DA
1B $ 5B } 9B DB
1C * 5C 9C DC
1D ) 5D 9D DD
1E ; 5E 9E DE
1F 5F 9F DF
1270A514 Issue 3 1-11

EBCDIC HEX EBCDIC HEX EBCDIC HEX EBCDIC HEX
20 - (minus) 60 A0 \ E0
21 / 61 ~ (tilde) A1 E1
FS 22 62 s A2 S E2
23 63 t A3 T E3
24 64 u A4 U E4
LF 25 65 v A5 V E5
ETB 26 66 w A6 W E6
ESC 27 67 x A7 X E7
28 68 y A8 Y E8
29 69 z A9 Z E9
2A 6A AA EA
2B ,(comma) 6B AB EB
2C % 6C AC EC
ENQ 2D underscore 6D [ AD ED
ACK 2E > 6E AE EE
BEL 2F ? 6F AF EF
30 70 B0 0 F0
31 71 B1 1 F1
SYN 32 72 B2 2 F2
33 73 B3 3 F3
34 74 B4 4 F4
35 75 B5 5 F5
36 76 B6 6 F6
EOT 37 77 B7 7 F7
38 78 B8 8 F8
39 `(grave) 79 B9 9 F9
3A : 7A BA FA
3B # 7B BB FB
DC4 3C @ 7C BC FC
NAK 3D ' 7D ] BD FD
3E = 7E BE FE
SUB 3F " 7F BF FF
1-12 1270A514 Issue 3

7 TRANSPARENT ASYNCHRONOUS COMMUNICATIONS

In the standard asynchronous mode of communication, codes like STX (X'02) and ETX (X'03)
have a special meaning, but they can sometimes occur in a stream of binary data, where that
special meaning does not apply.
To avoid ambiguity, Transparent Asynchronous Communications mode is used.
7.1 Message Format

The Host port of the HSM must be configured for Transparent Async Communications and 8-bit
data transfers. The message format for Transparent Async Communications is:
STX COUNT COMMAND/DATA LRC ETX
Where:
STX is the Start of Text character (X'02).
COUNT is a two-byte hexadecimal value in the range X'0003 to X'03FB inclusive,

representing the number of bytes in the COMMAND/DATA field. The count excludes the
STX, COUNT, LRC and ETX.
LRC is a single-byte Longitudinal Redundancy Check character. It is calculated by

performing an exclusive-OR on each byte of the data sent over the communications link
excluding the STX, COUNT, LRC and the ETX.
ETX is the End of Text character (X'03).
7.2 HSM Processing of Packets

When the HSM receives a Transparent Async packet it:
Checks the LRC value with that computed over the input data and returns a response
message with Error 91 if a match is not obtained.
Checks that the Count value is between limits. If this check fails, the HSM responds in
one of two ways:
If Count > X'03FB,
it returns a response message with Error 92;
otherwise it responds with the following error message:
Message Header : 0000

Response Code : ZZ
Error Code : 92
e.g., for Message Header length 4, the response is 0000ZZ92.
1270A514 Issue 3 1-13

Checks that the number of characters received between the Count characters and the
LRC matches the value in Count. If this check fails, it returns a response message with
Error 92.
lf no errors are discovered in the Transparent Async packet, the HSM processes the
command and responds accordingly.
If the HSM discovers both errors (Error 91 and Error 92), it reports Error 92.
7.3 Parity Errors

If the HSM reports Error 90 there is a Data Parity Error. Check the HSM Host port settings
using the QH Console command and ensure that the correct parity is in use.
1-14 1270A514 Issue 3

8 INPUT/OUTPUT FLOW CONTROL

There is no flow control provided by the HSM. It is the responsibility of the application to ensure
that the input buffer in the HSM, which is 2048 bytes long, is not exceeded. (The buffer in the
HSM used in an SNA-SDLC environment is 1024 bytes long).
No single command contains more than 2048 bytes (1024 for SNA-SDLC) (including any STX
and ETX characters). The Async connected HSM operates in half duplex the response to a
command must be received before a new command request is sent.
1270A514 Issue 3 1-15

9 ERROR HANDLING
There are four types of errors generated by the HSM:
Fatal errors.
Non-recoverable errors.
Recoverable errors.
Programming errors.
Fatal errors indicate a hardware fault in the equipment. Such an error should be logged and
reported for user action to be taken (e.g., report to supervisor).
Non-recoverable errors cannot be rectified by the program and need user intervention (e.g.,
with the HSM set into the Authorised state). Such errors should also be logged and reported for
user action to be taken (e.g., report to supervisor). This type of error does not mean that the
HSM cannot action other types of commands.
Recoverable errors may be the result of data corruption or indicate that the HSM cannot
process a command because some other action is required first. The application should
attempt to recover by re-issuing the command, attempting to clear the corruption or by
implementing the missing action (e.g., the HSM reports that the print format definition is not
loaded, so the program should load it and re-issue the failed command).
Programming errors are normally found during testing, but if they occur at other times, they are
probably non-recoverable.
Additionally the application should monitor the HSM for timeouts on the interface.
In any of the above events, the application should try to continue processing by using another
HSM to action the command. Continued failure may indicate a catastrophic failure of all HSMs
(unlikely), a power failure or a program error.
The application should monitor usage of all HSMs and mark any unit as "out of service" if it has
given a fatal error, or where a unit repeatedly reports non-recoverable errors.
1-16 1270A514 Issue 3

10 USE OF MULTIPLE HSMS

A typical system has two or more HSMs connected as live units. This provides increased
capability where the processing requires more than one HSM, and provision for backup in the
event of an HSM failure.
Each HSM is normally connected to the Host via a separate Host port, although a port-sharing
unit can be used if the number of Host ports available is limited. The sharing configuration is not
capable of providing backup if the port or the port-sharing unit becomes faulty.
Optionally it is possible to have a backup unit not connected to the Host but ready for
connection in place of a faulty unit. (This is not the preferred practice because the unit may
remain idle for a long time and may itself have developed a fault).
In addition to the live units, a typical system contains at least one HSM connected to a test or
development computer system. This allows changes in the environment to be tested, without
disturbing the live system.
1270A514 Issue 3 1-17

11 USER STORAGE
The HSM areas of memory allocated to store data for use during processing. This facility allows
commonly-used data to be held within the HSM, and not transmitted with each command that
requires it. This reduces communications time and thus increases throughput.
User data is stored in 8-byte blocks, each block containing 16 hexadecimal digits. The size of
key to store in the user storage area is configured via the configure security (CS) command.
The user storage is indexed with reference to the key size. If keys of shorter lengths or
decimalization tables are to be loaded they should be padded with F to the key length
configured i.e. Filling the index location.
The memory available is shown in the following table:
Standard speed HSM High speed HSM

Memory 8192 98304
Maximum index
Single length keys 1024 (3FF) 4096 (FFF)
Double length keys 512 (1FF) 4096 (FFF)
Triple length keys 341 (154) 4096 (FFF)
11.1 Assigning and Using Indices

To load user data, provide an index which points to a particular memory location. A valid index
is expressed as 3 hexadecimal digits, and must be within the range X'000 to X'FFF .
An index points to a key block this varies in length depending on the key length specified in the
configure security command. For example, if loading two encrypted working keys and
specifying X'000 as the base index, the first encrypted key is stored in bytes 0-7; the second
encrypted key is stored in bytes 8-15.
Single Length Double Length Triple Length

Location 000 Byte 0 Byte 7 Byte 8 Byte 15 Byte 16 Byte 23
Location 001
Location 154
Byte Byte
Location 155
8184 8191
Location 1FE
Byte Byte
Location 1FF
8184 8191
Location 3FE
Byte Byte
Location 3FF
8184 8191
Location FFE
Byte
Location FFF
98303
Data can be stored in continuous bytes, or in discrete areas of memory. The only requirement
for index assignment applies to storage of the Diebold table. This table must be stored as 256
1-18 1270A514 Issue 3
contiguous bytes. Thus, X'3E0 is the highest possible base index that can be specified when
the Diebold table is loaded or accessed.
It is the programmer's responsibility to assign and keep track of the indices. When an index is
provided to load new data, the HSM does not check the memory location to determine if it
already contains data. If the wrong index is provided, the data overwrites the previous contents.
For example, if X'000 is specified as the base index when loading the Diebold table, and the
same index is then used to load an encrypted key, the table is invalidated.
11.2 Specifying Stored Data

To use the keys or other data in user memory, the HSM must have the index that points to the
appropriate storage location. The Host provides this index in place of the encrypted key (or
other data element) that would otherwise be required.
To indicate the substitution of an index for a data element, the data element in the transaction
must begin with the index flag K, followed by the 3-digit index value. These four characters
replace the key (or other data elements). A key of appropriate length will be extracted based
upon the key scheme and the key length expected by the command. The exception is if the
HSM is configured for single length keys and the command expects a double length key (32H)
for backwards compatibility the command will require two indices to be specified.
If the triple DES key schemes are used a number of scenarios exist.
1. All key lengths used configure for either single or triple length keys.
2. Single and double length keys used - configure for either single or double length keys.
3. Single and triple length keys used - configure for either single or triple length keys.
4. Double length keys used - configure for either single or double length keys.
5. Triple length keys used - configure for either single or triple length keys.
Examples
To supply a single length key to a command there is no key scheme and a single index. - K000
To supply a double length key to a command using the U scheme the key scheme and a single
index must be provided. - UK000
To supply a triple length key using the T scheme to a command the key scheme and the index
must be provided. - TK000
If the HSM is configured for single length keys a index will return a single length key if no key
scheme specified or an appropriate key if a key scheme supplied.
Example
To supply a single length key to a command there is no key scheme and a single index. - K000
To supply a double length Key to a command no key scheme (32H) two index must be
provided. - UK000
To supply a triple length Key to a command the key scheme and a single index must be
provided. - TK000
1270A514 Issue 3 1-19

User storage is erased when:
The HSM is opened.

If (the storage) is used for processing PIN solicitation data.
The HSM diagnostics function is issued from the Console.
Power is turned off.
The HSM is reset by the use of the RESET button.
The application should reload user storage if the HSM reports that the user storage has been
erased, or there is a key parity error.
1-20 1270A514 Issue 3

12 PRINTING AT AN HSM-ATTACHED PRINTER

A printer is connected to the HSM, then the Host instructs the HSM to print (when required)
(e.g., to print PINs to be sent to customers of a bank). The stationery should be of the multicopy
type which allows information to be read only after the stationery has been opened.
The HSM must also be in the Authorised state; if it is not, an error is returned. To enable the
HSM to format the data before sending it to the printer, the HSM must be given formatting
details by the Host. The HSM retains this information until new details are provided or until:
The HSM is opened.
The HSM diagnostics function is issued from the Console.
Power is turned off.
The HSM is reset by the use of the RESET button.
When the printer is connected, the HSM is in the Authorised state, and the formatting data has
been provided, the following sequence occurs:
The Host sends a print command with encrypted data to the HSM.
The HSM verifies the data and sends a response message to the Host. If there is an error
in the data, the next step does not occur.
The HSM formats the data and outputs it to the printer. On completion, the HSM sends a
second response message to the Host indicating that the printing is complete and the next
print command can be sent.
1270A514 Issue 3 1-21

13 REJECTION OF WEAK AND SEMI-WEAK KEYS

All HSM commands that generate keys ensure that the standard DES weak or semi-weak keys
can not be used. If the new key matches one of the listed weak or semi-weak keys it is rejected
and the key generation process is repeated.
DES Weak Keys
0101 0101 0101 0101

FEFE FEFE FEFE FEFE
1F1F 1F1F 0E0E 0E0E

E0E0 E0E0 F1F1 F1F1
DES Semi-Weak Keys
01FE 01FE 01FE 01FE

FE01 FE01 FE01 FE01
1FE0 1FE0 0EF1 0EF1

E01F E01F F10E F10E
01E0 01E0 01F1 01F1

E001 E001 F101 F101
1FFE 1FFE 0EFE 0EFE

FE1F FE1F FE0E FE0E
011F 011F 010E 010E

1F01 1F01 0E01 0E01
E0FE E0FE F1FE F1FE

FEE0 FEE0 FEF1 FEF1
1-22 1270A514 Issue 3

14 LOCAL MASTER KEYS

The HSM Local Master Keys (LMKs) are numbered from key 00 to key 99. They are used in
pairs and each pair has a function, as shown in the table.
LMK Pair Function

00 - 01 Contains the two Smart Card keys (Passwords if the HSM is configured for Password mode)
required for setting the HSM into the Authorized state.
02 - 03 Encrypts the PINs for Host storage.
04 - 05 Encrypts Zone Master Keys and double-length ZMKs.
Encrypts Zone Master Key components under a Variant.
06 - 07 Encrypts the Zone PIN keys for interchange transactions.
08 - 09 Used for random number generation.
10 - 11 Used for encrypting keys in HSM buffer areas.
12 - 13 The initial set of Secret Values created by the user; used for generating all other Master Key
pairs.
14 - 15 Encrypts Terminal Master Keys, Terminal PIN Keys, and PIN Verification Keys.
Encrypts Card Verification Keys under a Variant.
16 - 17 Encrypts Terminal Authentication Keys.
18 - 19 Encrypts reference numbers for solicitation mailers.
20 - 21 Encrypts not on us PIN Verification Keys and Card Verification Keys under a Variant.
22 - 23 Encrypts Watchword Keys.
24 - 25 Encrypts Zone Transport Keys.
26 - 27 Encrypts Zone Authentication Keys.
28 - 29 Encrypts Terminal Derivation Keys.
30 - 31 Encrypts Zone Encryption Keys.
32 - 33 Encrypts Terminal Encryption Keys.
34 - 35 Encrypts RSA Keys.
36 - 99 Reserved for future use.
There are Variants of some keys to suit particular requirements.
1270A514 Issue 3 1-23

LMK Pair Standard Test LMK Set
00-01 0101 0101 0101 0101 7902 CD1F D36E F8BA

02-03 2020 2020 2020 2020 3131 3131 3131 3131
04-05 4040 4040 4040 4040 5151 5151 5151 5151
06-07 6161 6161 6161 6161 7070 7070 7070 7070
08-09 8080 8080 8080 8080 9191 9191 9191 9191
10-11 A1A1 A1A1 A1A1 A1A1 B0B0 B0B0 B0B0 B0B0
12-13 C1C1 0101 0101 0101 D0D0 0101 0101 0101
14-15 E0E0 0101 0101 0101 F1F1 0101 0101 0101
16-17 1C58 7F1C 1392 4FEF 0101 0101 0101 0101
18-19 0101 0101 0101 0101 0101 0101 0101 0101
20-21 0202 0202 0202 0202 0404 0404 0404 0404
22-23 0707 0707 0707 0707 1010 1010 1010 1010
24-25 1313 1313 1313 1313 1515 1515 1515 1515
26-27 1616 1616 1616 1616 1919 1919 1919 1919
28-29 1A1A 1A1A 1A1A 1A1A 1C1C 1C1C 1C1C 1C1C
30-31 2323 2323 2323 2323 2525 2525 2525 2525
32-33 2626 2626 2626 2626 2929 2929 2929 2929
34-35 2A2A 2A2A 2A2A 2A2A 2C2C 2C2C 2C2C 2C2C
36-37 2F2F 2F2F 2F2F 2F2F 3131 3131 3131 3131
38-39 0101 0101 0101 0101 0101 0101 0101 0101
Password 1 = 0101 0101 0101 0101
Password 2 = NOW IS THE TIME FOR A
The check value is 2686 0474 4491 2422.
1-24 1270A514 Issue 3

15 LOCAL MASTER KEY VARIANTS

Variants of the Local Master Key in the HSM are used for encryption of defined keys or key
components. These variants are calculated as follows:
1. Select the appropriate LMK pair, for example:
0123 4567 89AB CDEF 3131 3131 3131 3131.
2. Identify which Variant of the LMK is required and select the appropriate offset value:
Variant 2: 5A.
3. Exclusive-OR add the selected offset to the first byte of the LMK pair (01 in the
example above).
4. Replace the left-most byte of the LMK pair with the result of Step 3 and use the resulting
key as the specified Variant:
Variant 2 = 5B23 4567 89AB CDEF 3131 3131 3131 3131.
The variants are:
Variant 1 : A6
Variant 2 : 5A
Variant 3 : 6A
Variant 4 : DE
Variant 5 : 2B
Variant 6 : 50
Variant 7 : 74
Variant 8 : 9C
1270A514 Issue 3 1-25

When the Variants are applied to the standard test LMK set, the left-most bytes of the sets are
as follows:
First byte of LMK

LMK Pair
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
00-01 A7 5B 6B DF 2A 51 75 9D
02-03 86 7A 4A FE 0B 70 54 BC
04-05 E6 1A 2A 9E 6B 10 34 DC
06-07 C7 3B 0B BF 4A 31 15 FD
08-09 26 DA EA 5E AB D0 F4 1C
10-11 07 FB CB 7F 8A F1 D5 3D
12-13 67 9B AB 1F EA 91 B5 5D
14-15 46 BA 8A 3E CB B0 94 7C
16-17 BA 46 76 C2 37 4C 68 80
18-19 A7 5B 6B DF 2A 51 75 9D
20-21 A4 58 68 DC 29 52 76 9E
22-23 A1 5D 6D D9 2C 57 73 9B
24-25 B5 49 79 CD 38 43 67 8F
26-27 B0 4C 7C C8 3D 46 62 8A
28-29 BC 40 70 C4 31 4A 6E 86
30-31 85 79 49 FD 08 73 57 BF
32-33 80 7C 4C F8 0D 76 52 BA
34-35 8C 70 40 F4 01 7A 5E B6
36-37 89 75 45 F1 04 7F 5B B3
38-39 A7 5B 6B DF 2A 51 75 9D
1-26 1270A514 Issue 3

16 LOCAL MASTER KEY TRIPLE DES VARIANT SCHEME

Variants are applied to the Local Master Key in the HSM for encryption of double and triple
length keys. These variants are calculated as follows:
1. Select the appropriate LMK pair, for example:
0123 4567 89AB CDEF 3131 3131 3131 3131.
5. Identify which Variant of the LMK is required and select the appropriate offset value:
Variant 2: A6.
6. Exclusive-OR add the selected offset to the first byte of the second key within the LMK pair
(31 in the example above).
7. Replace the left-most byte of the LMK pair with the result of Step 3 and use the resulting
key as the specified Variant:
Variant 2 = 0123 4567 89AB CDEF 9731 3131 3131 3131.
The variants applied are as follows:
Double length key Key 1 of 2 A6

Key 2 of 2 5A
Triple length key Key 1 of 3 6A
Key 2 of 3 DE
Key 3 of 3 2B
When the Variants are applied to the standard test LMK set, the first byte of the second key are
as follows:
LMK Pair First byte of second key of the LMK
Double length Key Triple Length Key
Scheme Tag U Scheme Tag T
1 of 2 2 of 2 1 of 3 2 of 3 3 of 3
04 - 05 F7 0B 3B 8F 7A
06 07 D6 2A 1A AE 5B
14 15 57 AB 9B 2F DA
16 17 A7 5B 6B DF 2A
18 - 19 A7 5B 6B DF 2A
20 21 42 5E 6E DA 2F
22 - 23 B6 4A 7A CE 3B
24 25 B3 4F 7F CB 3E
26 27 BF 43 73 C7 32
28 29 BA 46 76 C2 37
30 - 31 83 7F 4C FB 0E
32 33 8F 73 43 F7 02
34 - 35 8A 76 46 F2 07
35 37 97 6B 5B EF 1A
38 - 39 A7 5B 6B DF 2A
1270A514 Issue 3 1-27

Host Security Module RG7000 HOST COMMANDS
CHAPTER 2
HOST COMMANDS
CONTENTS Page
1 GENERAL 2-1
2 HOST COMMANDS 2-2
2.1 LIST OF HOST COMMANDS (ALPHABETICAL) 2-2
2.2 LIST OF HOST COMMANDS (FUNCTIONAL) 2-6
3 GENERIC KEY MANAGEMENT COMMANDS 2-12
3.1 KEY TYPE TABLE 2-12
3.2 KEY SCHEME TABLE 2-12
3.3 GENERATE A KEY 2-13
3.4 GENERATE AND PRINT A COMPONENT 2-14
3.5 GENERATE AND PRINT A KEY AS SPLIT COMPONENTS 2-16
3.6 FORM A KEY FROM ENCRYPTED COMPONENTS 2-18
3.7 IMPORT A KEY 2-19
3.8 EXPORT A KEY 2-20
3.9 TRANSLATE KEY SCHEME 2-21
4 ZONE MASTER KEY MANAGEMENT 2-22
4.1 GENERATE AND PRINT A ZMK COMPONENT 2-22
4.2 FORM A ZMK FROM THREE ZMK COMPONENTS 2-24
4.3 FORM A ZMK FROM 2 TO 9 ZMK COMPONENTS 2-25
4.4 TRANSLATE ZMK FROM ZMK TO LMK ENCRYPTION 2-27
5 ZONE PIN KEY MANAGEMENT 2-29
5.1 GENERATE A ZPK 2-30
5.2 TRANSLATE A ZPK FROM ZMK TO LMK ENCRYPTION 2-31
5.3 TRANSLATE A ZPK FROM LMK TO ZMK ENCRYPTION 2-33
6 ZONE ENCRYPTION, ZONE AUTHENTICATION KEY MANAGEMENT 2-34
6.1 GENERATE ZEK/ZAK 2-35
6.2 TRANSLATE A ZEK/ZAK FROM ZMK TO LMK ENCRYPTION 2-36
6.3 TRANSLATE A ZEK/ZAK FROM LMK TO ZMK ENCRYPTION 2-37
7 TERMINAL MASTER, TERMINAL PIN AND PIN VERIFICATION KEY
MANAGEMENT 2-38
7.1 GENERATE AND PRINT A TMK, TPK OR PVK 2-39
7.2 GENERATE A TMK, TPK OR PVK 2-41
7.3 TRANSLATE A TMK, TPK OR PVK FROM LMK TO ANOTHER TMK, TPK OR PVK 2-42
7.4 TRANSLATE A TMK, TPK OR PVK FROM ZMK TO LMK ENCRYPTION 2-43
7.5 TRANSLATE A TMK, TPK OR PVK FROM LMK TO ZMK ENCRYPTION 2-44
7.6 GENERATE A PAIR OF PVKS 2-46
8 TERMINAL AUTHENTICATION KEY MANAGEMENT 2-48
8.1 GENERATE A TAK 2-49
8.2 TRANSLATE A TAK FROM ZMK TO LMK ENCRYPTION 2-50
8.3 TRANSLATE A TAK FROM LMK TO ZMK ENCRYPTION 2-51
HOST COMMANDS Host Security Module RG7000
8.4 TRANSLATE A TAK FROM LMK TO TMK ENCRYPTION 2-52

9 PIN AND OFFSET GENERATION 2-53
9.1 DERIVE A PIN USING THE IBM METHOD 2-54
9.2 DERIVE A PIN USING THE DIEBOLD METHOD 2-56
9.3 GENERATE A RANDOM PIN 2-57
9.4 GENERATE AN IBM PIN OFFSET 2-58
9.5 GENERATE A DIEBOLD PIN OFFSET 2-59
9.6 GENERATE A VISA PIN VERIFICATION VALUE 2-60
10 PIN VERIFICATION 2-61
10.1 VERIFY A TERMINAL PIN USING THE IBM METHOD 2-61
10.2 VERIFY AN INTERCHANGE PIN USING THE IBM METHOD 2-63
10.3 VERIFY A TERMINAL PIN USING THE DIEBOLD METHOD 2-65
10.4 VERIFY AN INTERCHANGE PIN USING THE DIEBOLD METHOD 2-66
10.5 VERIFY A TERMINAL PIN USING THE VISA METHOD 2-67
10.6 VERIFY AN INTERCHANGE PIN USING THE VISA METHOD 2-68
10.7 VERIFY A TERMINAL PIN USING THE COMPARISON METHOD 2-69
10.8 VERIFY AN INTERCHANGE PIN USING THE COMPARISON METHOD 2-70
11 PIN TRANSLATION 2-71
11.1 TRANSLATE A PIN FROM ONE ZPK TO ANOTHER 2-72
11.2 TRANSLATE A PIN FROM TPK TO ZPK ENCRYPTION 2-74
11.3 TRANSLATE A PIN FROM ZPK TO LMK ENCRYPTION 2-75
11.4 TRANSLATE A PIN FROM TPK TO LMK ENCRYPTION 2-76
11.5 TRANSLATE A PIN FROM LMK TO ZPK ENCRYPTION 2-77
11.6 TRANSLATE PIN ALGORITHM 2-78
12 PIN MAILER PRINTING 2-79
12.1 PRINT PIN/PIN AND SOLICITATION DATA 2-80
12.2 PRINT A PIN SOLICITATION MAILER 2-82
12.3 VERIFY PIN/PIN AND SOLICITATION MAILER CRYPTOGRAPHY 2-84
12.4 VERIFY SOLICITATION MAILER CRYPTOGRAPHY 2-85
13 PIN SOLICITATION DATA PROCESSING 2-86
13.1 LOAD SOLICITATION DATA TO USER STORAGE 2-89
13.2 FINAL LOAD OF SOLICITATION DATA TO USER STORAGE 2-90
14 CLEAR PIN SUPPORT 2-92
14.1 ENCRYPT A CLEAR PIN 2-92
14.2 DECRYPT AN ENCRYPTED PIN 2-93
15 HOST WATCHWORD SUPPORT 2-94
15.1 GENERATE A W ATCHWORD KEY 2-94
15.2 TRANSLATE A W ATCHWORD KEY FROM LMK TO ZMK ENCRYPTION 2-95
15.3 TRANSLATE A W ATCHWORD KEY FROM ZMK TO LMK ENCRYPTION 2-96
15.4 VERIFY A W ATCHWORD RESPONSE 2-97
15.5 GENERATE A DECIMAL MAC 2-98
15.6 VERIFY A DECIMAL MAC 2-99
16 MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION CODE SUPPORT 2-100
16.1 GENERATE A MAC 2-102
16.2 VERIFY A MAC 2-103
16.3 VERIFY AND TRANSLATE A MAC 2-104
16.4 GENERATE MAC (MAB) FOR LARGE MESSAGE 2-105
Chapter 2 1270A514 Issue 3
16.5 GENERATE MAC (MAB) USING ANSI X9.19 METHOD FOR A LARGE MESSAGE 2-107
17 BASE24 BINARY MAC COMMANDS 2-110
17.1 GENERATE A BINARY MAC (BASE24) 2-110
17.2 VERIFY A BINARY MAC (BASE24) 2-112
17.3 VERIFY AND TRANSLATE A BINARY MAC (BASE24) 2-113
18 USER STORAGE SUPPORT 2-114
18.1 LOAD DATA TO USER STORAGE 2-114
18.2 READ DATA FROM USER STORAGE 2-115
18.3 VERIFY THE DIEBOLD TABLE IN USER STORAGE 2-116
19 PRINT OUTPUT FORMATTING 2-117
19.1 PRINTING PINS IN W ORD FORMAT 2-120
19.2 PRINTING PINS IN COLUMNS 2-121
19.3 LOAD FORMATTING DATA TO HSM 2-122
19.4 LOAD ADDITIONAL FORMATTING DATA TO HSM 2-123
19.5 LOAD A PIN TEXT STRING 2-124
20 TRANSLATE DATA AFTER CHANGE OF LOCAL MASTER KEYS 2-125
20.1 TRANSLATE A ZMK 2-125
20.2 TRANSLATE A ZPK 2-126
20.3 TRANSLATE A TMK, TPK OR PVK 2-127
20.4 TRANSLATE A TAK 2-128
20.5 TRANSLATE A PIN AND PIN LENGTH 2-129
20.6 TRANSLATE KEYS FROM OLD LMK TO NEW LMK 2-130
20.7 ERASE THE KEY CHANGE STORAGE 2-132
21 MISCELLANEOUS COMMANDS 2-133
21.1 CANCEL THE AUTHORISED STATE 2-133
21.2 GENERATE A KEY CHECK VALUE (NOT DOUBLE-LENGTH ZMK) 2-134
21.3 GENERATE A KEY CHECK VALUE 2-135
21.4 SET HSM RESPONSE DELAY 2-137
21.5 PERFORM DIAGNOSTICS 2-138
21.6 HSM STATUS 2-139
22 VISA CARD VERIFICATION VALUES 2-140
22.1 GENERATE A CVK PAIR 2-140
22.2 TRANSLATE A CVK PAIR FROM LMK TO ZMK ENCRYPTION 2-141
22.3 TRANSLATE A CVK PAIR FROM ZMK TO LMK ENCRYPTION 2-142
22.4 TRANSLATE A CVK PAIR FROM OLD LMK TO NEW LMK ENCRYPTION 2-143
22.5 GENERATE A VISA CVV 2-144
22.6 VERIFY A VISA CVV 2-145
23 VISA CASH SYSTEM 2-146
23.1 GENERATE AND EXPORT A *KML 2-147
23.2 IMPORT A *KML 2-148
23.3 VERIFY LOAD SIGNATURE S1 AND GENERATE LOAD SIGNATURE S2 2-149
23.4 VERIFY LOAD COMPLETION SIGNATURE S3 2-150
23.5 VERIFY UNLOAD SIGNATURE S1 AND GENERATE UNLOAD SIGNATURE S2 2-151
23.6 VERIFY UNLOAD COMPLETION SIGNATURE S3 2-152
24 CHIP CARD 2-153
24.1 ARQC (OR TC/AAC) VERIFICATION AND/OR ARPC GENERATION 2-154
24.2 DATA AUTHENTICATION CODE AND DYNAMIC NUMBER VERIFICATION 2-156
24.3 GENERATE SECURE MESSAGE WITH INTEGRITY AND OPTIONAL CONFIDENTIALITY 2-157
25 AMERICAN EXPRESS CARD SECURITY CODE 2-159
25.1 GENERATE A *CSCK 2-159
25.2 EXPORT A *CSCK 2-160
25.3 IMPORT A *CSCK 2-161
25.4 CALCULATE CARD SECURITY CODES 2-163
25.5 VERIFY CARD SECURITY CODES 2-164
26 RACAL TRANSACTION KEY SCHEME (RTKS) 2-165
26.1 TRANSACTION REQUEST W ITH A PIN (T/AQ KEY) 2-167
26.2 TRANSACTION REQUEST W ITHOUT A PIN 2-169
26.3 TRANSACTION REQUEST W ITH A PIN (T/CI KEY) 2-171
26.4 TRANSLATE KEYVAL 2-173
26.5 ADMINISTRATION REQUEST MESSAGE 2-174
26.6 TRANSACTION RESPONSE WITH AUTH PARA FROM CARD ISSUER 2-176
26.7 GENERATE AUTH PARA AND TRANSACTION RESPONSE 2-178
26.8 CONFIRMATION 2-180
27 DERIVED UNIQUE KEY PER TRANSACTION (DUKPT) SYSTEM 2-182
27.1 GENERATE AN BASE DERIVATION KEY (*BDK) 2-183
27.2 TRANSLATE A PIN FROM *BDK ENCRYPTION TO INTERCHANGE KEY ENCRYPTION 2-184
27.3 VERIFY A PIN USING THE IBM METHOD 2-185
27.4 VERIFY A PIN USING THE VISA PVV METHOD 2-186
27.5 VERIFY A PIN USING THE DIEBOLD METHOD 2-187
27.6 VERIFY A PIN USING THE ENCRYPTED PIN METHOD 2-188
27.7 TRANSLATE A BASE DERIVATION KEY FROM *ZMK TO LMK ENCRYPTION 2-189
27.8 TRANSLATE A BASE DERIVATION KEY FROM LMK TO *ZMK ENCRYPTION 2-190
28 AUSTRALIAN TRANSACTION KEY SCHEME (ATKS) 2-191
28.1 TRANSACTION REQUEST W ITHOUT A PIN 2-192
28.2 TRANSACTION REQUEST W ITH A PIN (T/AQ KEY) 2-194
28.3 TRANSACTION REQUEST W ITH A PIN (T/CI KEY) 2-196
28.4 TRANSACTION RESPONSE W ITH AUTH PARA GENERATED BY THE ACQUIRER 2-198
28.5 TRANSACTION RESPONSE W ITH AUTH PARA GENERATED BY THE CARD ISSUER 2-200
28.6 TRANSLATE A PIN FROM PEK TO ZPK ENCRYPTION 2-202
28.7 VERIFY A TRANSACTION COMPLETION CONFIRMATION REQUEST 2-203
28.8 GENERATE A TRANSACTION COMPLETION RESPONSE 2-205
28.9 VERIFY A PIN AT THE CARD ISSUER USING THE IBM METHOD 2-207
28.10 VERIFY A PIN AT THE CARD ISSUER USING THE DIEBOLD METHOD 2-209
28.11 VERIFY A PIN AT THE CARD ISSUER USING THE VISA METHOD 2-211
28.12 VERIFY A PIN AT THE CARD ISSUER BY COMPARISON 2-213
28.13 GENERATE AUTH PARA AT THE CARD ISSUER 2-215
28.14 MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION MODE NUMBERS 2-216
28.15 GENERATE A MAC ON A BINARY MESSAGE 2-217
28.16 VERIFY A MAC ON A BINARY MESSAGE 2-219
29 USING THE OPTIONAL RSA CRYPTOSYSTEM 2-221
29.1 GENERATE AN RSA KEY SET 2-225
29.2 LOAD A SECRET KEY 2-227
29.3 TRANSLATE A SECRET KEY FROM THE OLD LMK TO A NEW LMK 2-228
29.4 GENERATE A MAC ON A PUBLIC KEY 2-229
29.5 VERIFY A MAC ON A PUBLIC KEY 2-230
Chapter 2 1270A514 Issue 3
29.6 VALIDATE A CERTIFICATE AND GENERATE A MAC ON ITS PUBLIC KEY 2-231
29.7 TRANSLATE A MAC ON A PUBLIC KEY 2-234
29.8 GENERATE A SIGNATURE 2-235
29.9 VALIDATE A SIGNATURE 2-236
29.10 IMPORT A DES KEY 2-237
29.11 EXPORT A DES KEY 2-239
29.12 HASH A BLOCK OF DATA 2-240

1 GENERAL
The HSM provides a variety of functions to implement key management, PIN management
(including PIN verification) and Message Authentication Code (MAC) processing.
This Chapter details all the commands available with their responses and possible error codes.
A number of abbreviations are used throughout. They are:
L : Encrypted PIN length. Set at installation.

M : Message header length. Set at installation.
n : Variable length field.
A : Alphanumeric (can include any non-control type) characters.
H : Hexadecimal character.
N : Numeric Field.
C : Control character.
B : Binary data (byte), X00 to XFF.
For example:
32 H : Indicates that thirty-two hexadecimal characters are required.

mA : Indicates that the Host must send the number of alphanumeric characters that
has been set for the message header length.
For convenience, the STX and ETX control characters, which bracket every command and
response, are not shown in the details that follow.
In a command to the HSM, any key can be replaced by a reference to internal user storage. In
the details that follow, a key is always shown as if it is to be sent with each command; in every
case the key can be replaced by the index flag K and a three-digit pointer value.
The HSM can be used in systems where there may be Atalla security equipment at other
network nodes. This is achieved by the inclusion of an Atalla variant in those commands that
translate a key from/to encryption under a ZMK. This has the effect of modifying the ZMK
before it is used to decrypt/encrypt in accordance with the method used by the Atalla
equipment. The HSM can support 1 or 2 digit Atalla variants.
1270A514 Issue 3 2-1

2 HOST COMMANDS
2.1 LIST OF HOST COMMANDS (ALPHABETICAL)

Host
Command Function Paragraph Page
(Response)
A0 (A1) Generate a Key 3.3 13
A2 (A3) Generate and Print a Component 3.4 14
A4 (A5) Form a Key from Encrypted Components 3.6 18

A6 (A7) Import a Key 3.7 19
A8 (A9) Export a Key 3.8 20
AA (AB) Translate a TMK, TPK or PVK 20.3 127
AC (AD) Translate a TAK 20.4 128

AE (AF) Translate a TMK, TPK or PVK from LMK to Another TMK, TPK or PVK 7.3 42
AG (AH) Translate a TAK from LMK to ZMK Encryption 8.4 52
AS (AT) Generate a CVK Pair 22.1 140
AU (AV) Translate a CVK Pair from LMK to ZMK Encryption 22.2 141
AW (AX) Translate a CVK Pair from ZMK to LMK Encryption 22.3 142
AY (AZ) Translate a CVK Pair from Old LMK to New LMK Encryption 22.4 143
B0 (B1) Translate Key Scheme 3.9 21

BA (BB) Encrypt a Clear PIN 14.1 92
BC (BD) Verify a Terminal PIN Using the Comparison Method 10.7 69
BE (BF) Verify an Interchange PIN Using the Comparison Method 10.8 70
BG (BH) Translate a PIN and PIN Length 20.5 129

BI (BJ) Generate an Base derivation key (*BDK) 27.1 183
BQ (BR) Translate PIN Algorithm 11.6 78
BS (BT) Erase the Key Change Storage 20.7 132

BU (BV) Generate a Key Check Value 21.3 135
BW (BX) Translate Keys from Old LMK to New LMK 20.6 130
CA (CB) Translate a PIN from TPK to ZPK Encryption 11.2 74
CC (CD) Translate a PIN from One ZPK to Another 11.1 72

CE (CF) Generate a Diebold PIN Offset 9.5 59
CG (CH) Verify a Terminal PIN Using the Diebold Method 10.3 65

CI (CJ) Translate a PIN from *BDK Encryption to Interchange Key Encryption 27.2 184
CK (CL) Verify a PIN Using the IBM Method 27.3 185
CM (CN) Verify a PIN Using the VISA PVV Method 27.4 186
CO (CP) Verify a PIN Using the Diebold Method 27.5 187
CQ (CR) Verify a PIN Using the Encrypted PIN Method 27.6 188
CW (CX) Generate a VISA CVV 22.5 144

CY (CZ) Verify a VISA CVV 22.6 145
DA (DB) Verify a Terminal PIN Using the IBM Method 10.1 61

DC (DD) Verify a Terminal PIN Using the VISA Method 10.5 67
DE (DF) Generate an IBM PIN Offset 9.4 58
2-2 1270A514 Issue 3

Host
(Response)
DG (DH) Generate a VISA PIN Verification Value 9.6 60
DI (DJ) Generate and Export a *KML 23.1 147
DK (DL) Import a *KML 23.2 148
DM (DN) Verify Load Signature S1 and Generate Load Signature S2 23.3 149
DO (DP) Verify Load Completion Signature S3 23.4 150
DQ (DR) Verify Unload Signature S1 and Generate Unload Signature S2 23.5 151
DS (DT) Verify Unload Completion Signature S3 23.6 152
DW (DX) Translate a Base Derivation Key from *ZMK to LMK Encryption 27.7 189
DY (DZ) Translate a Base Derivation Key from LMK to *ZMK Encryption 27.8 190
EA (EB) Verify an Interchange PIN Using the IBM Method 10.2 63
EC (ED) Verify an Interchange PIN Using the VISA Method 10.6 68

EE (EF) Derive a PIN Using the IBM Method 9.1 54
EG (EH) Verify an Interchange PIN Using the Diebold Method 10.4 66

EI (EJ) Generate an RSA Key Set 29.1 225
EK (EL) Load a Secret Key 29.2 227
EM (EN) Translate a Secret Key from the Old LMK to a New LMK 29.3 228
EO (EP) Generate a MAC on a Public Key 29.4 229

EQ (ER) Verify a MAC on a Public Key 29.5 230
ES (ET) Validate a Certificate and Generate a MAC on its Public Key 29.6 231
EU (EV) Translate a MAC on a Public Key 29.7 234
EW (EX) Generate a Signature 29.8 235
EY (EZ) Validate a Signature 29.9 236

FA (FB) Translate a ZPK from ZMK to LMK Encryption 5.2 31
FC (FD) Translate a TMK, TPK or PVK from ZMK to LMK Encryption 7.4 43
FE (FF) Translate a TMK, TPK or PVK from LMK to ZMK Encryption 7.5 44
FG (FH) Generate a Pair of PVKs 7.6 46

FI (FJ) Generate ZEK/ZAK 6.1 35
FK (FL) Translate a ZEK/ZAK from ZMK to LMK Encryption 6.2 36
FM (FN) Translate a ZEK/ZAK from LMK to ZMK Encryption 6.3 37

FO (FP) Generate a Watchword Key 15.1 94
FQ (FR) Translate a Watchword Key from LMK to ZMK Encryption 15.2 95
FS (FT) Translate a Watchword Key from ZMK to LMK Encryption 15.3 96
FU (FV) Verify a Watchword Response 15.4 97

GA (GB) Derive a PIN Using the Diebold Method 9.2 56
GC (GD) Translate a ZPK from LMK to ZMK Encryption 5.3 33
GE (GF) Translate a ZMK 20.1 125

GG (GH) Form a ZMK from Three ZMK Components 4.2 24
GI (GJ) Import a DES Key 29.10 237
GK (GL) Export a DES Key 29.11 239

GM (GN) Hash a Block of Data 29.12 240
GY (GZ) Form a ZMK from 2 to 9 ZMK Components 4.3 25
1270A514 Issue 3 2-3

Host
(Response)
HA (HB) Generate a TAK 8.1 49
HC (HD) Generate a TMK, TPK or PVK 7.2 41

IA (IB) Generate a ZPK 5.1 30
JA (JB) Generate a Random PIN 9.3 57

JC (JD) Translate a PIN from TPK to LMK Encryption 11.4 76
JE (JF) Translate a PIN from ZPK to LMK Encryption 11.3 75
JG (JH) Translate a PIN from LMK to ZPK Encryption 11.5 77

KA (KB) Generate a Key Check Value (Not Double-Length ZMK) 21.2 134
KC (KD) Translate a ZPK 20.2 126
KQ (KR) ARQC (or TC/AAC) Verification and/or ARPC Generation 24.1 154
KS (KT) Data Authentication Code and Dynamic Number Verification 24.2 156
KU (KV) Generate Secure Message with Integrity and optional Confidentiality 24.3 157
LA (LB) Load Data to User Storage 18.1 114
LC (LD) Verify the Diebold Table in User Storage 18.3 116

LE (LF) Read Data from User Storage 18.2 115
LG (LH) Set HSM Response Delay 21.4 137
LI (LJ) Load a PIN Text String 19.5 124
LK (LL) Generate a Decimal MAC 15.5 98

LM (LN) Verify a Decimal MAC 15.6 99
MA (MB) Generate a MAC 16.1 102
MC (MD) Verify a MAC 16.2 103
ME (MF) Verify and Translate a MAC 16.3 104

MG (MH) Translate a TAK from LMK to ZMK Encryption 8.3 51
MI (MJ) Translate a TAK from ZMK to LMK Encryption 8.2 50
MK (ML) Generate a Binary MAC (Base24) 17.1 110

MM (MN) Verify a Binary MAC (Base24) 17.2 112
MO (MP) Verify and Translate a Binary MAC (Base24) 17.3 113
MQ (MR) Generate MAC (MAB) for Large Message 16.4 105
MS (MT) Generate MAC (MAB) using ANSI X9.19 Method for a Large Message 16.5 107
MU (MV) Message Authentication Mode Numbers 28.14 216
MW (MX Generate a MAC on a Binary Message 28.15 217

NC (ND) Perform Diagnostics 21.5 138
NE (NF) Generate and Print a Key as Split Components 3.5 16
NG (NH) Decrypt an Encrypted PIN 14.2 93

NO (NP) HSM Status 21.6 139
OA (OB) (OZ) Print a PIN Solicitation Mailer 12.2 82
OC (OD) (OZ) Generate and Print a ZMK Component 4.1 22

OE (OF) (OZ) Generate and Print a TMK, TPK or PVK 7.1 39
PA (PB) Load Formatting Data to HSM 19.3 122

PC (PD) Load Additional Formatting Data to HSM 19.4 123
PE (PF) (PZ) Print PIN/PIN and Solicitation Data 12.1 80
2-4 1270A514 Issue 3

Host
(Response)
PG (PH) Verify PIN/PIN and Solicitation Mailer Cryptography 12.3 84
QA (QB) Load Solicitation Data to User Storage 13.1 89

QC (QD) Final Load of Solicitation Data to User Storage 13.2 90
QQ (QR) Verify a PIN at the Card Issuer Using the IBM Method 28.9 207
QS (QT) Verify a PIN at the Card Issuer Using the Diebold Method 28.10 209
QU (QV) Verify a PIN at the Card Issuer Using the Visa Method 28.11 211
QW (QX Verify a PIN at the Card Issuer by Comparison 28.12 213

RA (RB) Cancel the Authorised State 21.1 133
RC (RD) Verify Solicitation Mailer Cryptography 12.4 85
RI (RJ) Transaction Request With a PIN (T/AQ Key) (RTKS) 26.1 167
RK (RL) Transaction Request Without a PIN (RTKS) 26.2 169

RM (RN) Administration Request Message (RTKS) 26.5 174
RO (RP) Transaction Response with Auth Para from Card Issuer (RTKS) 26.6 176
RQ (RR) Generate Auth Para and Transaction Response (RTKS) 26.7 178
RS (RT) Confirmation (RTKS) 26.8 180
RU (RV) Transaction Request With a PIN (T/CI Key) (RTKS) 26.3 171
RW (RX) Translate KEYVAL (RTKS) 26.4 173
RE (RF) Transaction Request Without a PIN (ATKS) 28.1 192

RG (RH) Transaction Request With a PIN (T/AQ Key) (ATKS) 28.2 194
RI (RJ) Transaction Request With a PIN (T/CI Key) (ATKS) 28.3 196
RK (RL) Transaction Response With Auth Para Generated by the Acquirer 28.4 198
(ATKS)
RM (RN) Transaction Response With Auth Para Generated by the Card Issuer 28.5 200
(ATKS)
RO (RP) Translate a PIN from PEK to ZPK Encryption (ATKS) 28.6 202
RQ (RR) Verify a Transaction Completion Confirmation Request (ATKS) 28.7 203
RS (RT) Generate a Transaction Completion Response (ATKS) 28.8 205

RU (RV) Generate Auth Para at the Card Issuer (ATKS) 28.13 215
RY (RZ) Generate a *CSCK 25.1 159
RY (RZ) Export a *CSCK 25.2 160
RY (RZ) Import a *CSCK 25.3 161

RY (RZ) Calculate Card Security Codes 25.4 163
RY (RZ) Verify Card Security Codes 25.5 164
1270A514 Issue 3 2-5

2.2 LIST OF HOST COMMANDS (FUNCTIONAL)
Function Command Paragraph Page
GENERATING A KEY
Generate a Key A0 (A1) 3.1 12
Generate and Print a Component A2 (A3) 3.4 14
Generate and Print a Key as Split Components NE (NF) 3.5 16

Form a Key from Encrypted Components A4 (A5) 3.6 18
Generate a CVK Pair AS (AT) 22.1 140
Generate a TMK, TPK or PVK HC (HD) 7.2 41
Generate and Print a TMK, TPK or PVK OE (OF) 7.1 39

(OZ)
Generate a Pair of PVKs FG (FH) 7.6 46
Generate a TAK HA (HB) 8.1 49
Generate a TMK, TPK or PVK HC (HD) 7.2 41
Generate a Watchword Key FO (FP) 15.1 94

Generate ZEK/ZAK FI (FJ) 6.1 35
Generate ZEK/ZAK FI (FJ) 6.1 35
Generate a ZPK IA (IB) 5.1 30

Form a ZMK from Three ZMK Components GG (GH) 4.2 24
Form a ZMK from 2 to 9 ZMK Components GY (GZ) 4.3 25

Generate and Print a ZMK Component OC (OD) 4.1 22
(OZ)
TRANSLATING A KEY (FROM ONE ENCRYPTION TO ANOTHER)

Import a Key A6 (A7) 3.7 19
Export a Key A8 (A9) 3.8 20
Translate Key Scheme B0 (B1) 3.9 21
CVK PAIR
Translate a CVK Pair from Old LMK to New LMK Encryption AY (AZ) 22.4 143
Translate a CVK Pair from LMK to ZMK Encryption AU (AV) 22.2 141
Translate a CVK Pair from ZMK to LMK Encryption AW (AX) 22.3 142
TMK / TPK / PVK

Translate a TMK, TPK or PVK AA (AB) 20.3 127
Translate a TMK, TPK or PVK from LMK to Another TMK, TPK or PVK AE (AF) 7.3 42
Translate a TMK, TPK or PVK from LMK to ZMK Encryption FE (FF) 7.5 44
Translate a TMK, TPK or PVK from ZMK to LMK Encryption FC (FD) 7.4 43
TAK
Translate a TAK AC (AD) 20.4 128
Translate a TAK from LMK to TMK Encryption AG (AH) 8.4 52
Translate a TAK from LMK to ZMK Encryption MG (MH) 8.3 51

Translate a TAK from ZMK to LMK Encryption MI (MJ) 8.2 50
2-6 1270A514 Issue 3

WWK
Translate a Watchword Key from LMK to ZMK Encryption FQ (FR) 15.2 95
Translate a Watchword Key from ZMK to LMK Encryption FS (FT) 15.3 96
ZEK / ZAK
Translate a ZEK/ZAK from LMK to ZMK Encryption FM (FN) 6.3 37
Translate a ZEK/ZAK from ZMK to LMK Encryption FK (FL) 6.2 36

ZPK
Translate a ZPK KC (KD) 20.2 126
Translate a ZPK from LMK to ZMK Encryption GC (GD) 5.3 33

Translate a ZPK from ZMK to LMK Encryption FA (FB) 5.2 31
ZMK
Translate a ZMK GE (GF) 20.1 125
Translate ZMK from ZMK to LMK encryption BY (BZ) 4.4 27
General
Translate Keys from Old LMK to New LMK BW (BX) 20.6 130
Erase the Key Change Storage BS (BT) 20.7 132
PIN SOLICITATION
Load Solicitation Data to User Storage QA (QB) 13.1 89
Final Load of Solicitation Data to User Storage QC (QD) 13.2 90
CLEAR PIN
Encrypt a Clear PIN BA (BB) 14.1 92
Decrypt an Encrypted PIN NG (NH) 14.2 93
GENERATING A PIN, PIN OFFSET, PVV

Derive a PIN Using the Diebold Method GA (GB) 9.2 56
Derive a PIN Using the IBM Method EE (EF) 9.1 54

Generate a Random PIN JA (JB) 9.3 57
Generate a Diebold PIN Offset CE (CF) 9.5 59
Generate an IBM PIN Offset DE (DF) 9.4 58
Generate a VISA PIN Verification Value DG (DH) 9.6 60
VERIFY AN INTERCHANGE PIN

Verify an Interchange PIN Using the Comparison Method BE (BF) 10.8 70
Verify an Interchange PIN Using the Diebold Method EG (EH) 10.4 66
Verify an Interchange PIN Using the IBM Method EA (EB) 10.2 63
Verify an Interchange PIN Using the VISA Method EC (ED) 10.6 68
1270A514 Issue 3 2-7

VERIFY A TERMINAL PIN

Verify a Terminal PIN Using the Comparison Method BC (BD) 10.7 69
Verify a Terminal PIN Using the Diebold Method CG (CH) 10.3 65
Verify a Terminal PIN Using the IBM Method DA (DB) 10.1 61
Verify a Terminal PIN Using the VISA Method DC (DD) 10.5 67
TRANSLATING A PIN
Translate a PIN and PIN Length BG (BH) 20.5 129
Translate a PIN from LMK to ZPK Encryption JG (JH) 11.5 77

Translate a PIN from TPK to LMK Encryption JC (JD) 11.4 76
Translate a PIN from TPK to ZPK Encryption CA (CB) 11.2 74
Translate a PIN from One ZPK to Another CC (CD) 11.1 72
Translate a PIN from ZPK to LMK Encryption JE (JF) 11.3 75
Translate PIN Algorithm BQ (BR) 11.6 78
PIN MAILER
Print PIN/PIN and Solicitation Data PE (PF) 12.1 80
(PZ)
Print a PIN Solicitation Mailer OA (OB) 12.2 82
(OZ)
Verify PIN/PIN and Solicitation Mailer Cryptography PG (PH) 12.3 84
Verify Solicitation Mailer Cryptography RC (RD) 12.4 85
MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION
Generate a MAC MA (MB) 16.1 102
Generate MAC (MAB) for Large Message MQ (MR) 16.4 105
Verify a MAC MC (MD) 16.2 103

Verify and Translate a MAC ME (MF) 16.3 104
Generate MAC (MAB) using ANSI X9.19 Method for a Large Message MS (MT) 16.5 107
Generate a Binary MAC (Base24) MK (ML) 17.1 110
Verify a Binary MAC (Base24) MM (MN) 17.2 112

Verify and Translate a Binary MAC (Base24) MO (MP) 17.3 113
PRINT FORMATTING
Load a PIN Text String LI (LJ) 19.5 124
Load Formatting Data to HSM PA (PB) 19.3 122
Load Additional Formatting Data to HSM PC (PD) 19.4 123
2-8 1270A514 Issue 3

USER STORAGE
Load Data to User Storage LA (LB) 18.1 114
Verify the Diebold Table in User Storage LC (LD) 18.3 116
Read Data from User Storage LE (LF) 18.2 115
WATCHWORD SUPPORT
Verify a Watchword Response FU (FV) 15.4 97
Generate a Decimal MAC LK (LL) 15.5 98
Verify a Decimal MAC LM (LN) 15.6 99
MISCELLANEOUS
Generate a VISA CVV CW (CX) 22.5 144
Verify a VISA CVV CY (CZ) 22.6 145
Cancel the Authorised State RA (RB) 21.1 133
Set HSM Response Delay LG (LH) 21.4 137
Generate a Key Check Value BU (BV) 21.3 135

Generate a Key Check Value (Not Double-Length ZMK) KA (KB) 21.2 134
Perform Diagnostics NC (ND) 21.5 138
HSM Status NO (NP) 21.6 139
VISA CASH SYSTEM

Generate and Export a *KML DI (DJ) 23.1 147
Import a *KML DK (DL) 23.2 148
Verify Load Signature S1 and Generate Load Signature S2 DM (DN) 23.3 149
Verify Load Completion Signature S3 DO (DP) 23.4 150
Verify Unload Signature S1 and Generate Unload Signature S2 DQ (DR) 23.5 151
Verify Unload Completion Signature S3 DS (DT) 23.6 152
CHIP CARD
ARQC (or TC/AAC) Verification and/or ARPC Generation KQ (KR) 24.1 154
Data Authentication Code and Dynamic Number Verification KS (KT) 24.2 156
Generate Secure Message with Integrity and optional Confidentiality KU (KV) 24.3 157
AMERICAN EXPRESS SECURITY CODE

Generate a *CSCK RY (RZ) 25.1 159
Export a *CSCK RY (RZ) 25.2 160
Import a *CSCK RY (RZ) 25.3 161
Calculate Card Security Codes RY (RZ) 25.4 163
Verify Card Security Codes RY (RZ) 25.5 164
1270A514 Issue 3 2-9

RACAL TRANSACTION KEY SCHEME

Transaction Request With a PIN (T/AQ Key) RI (RJ) 26.1 167
Transaction Request With a PIN (T/CI Key) RU (RV) 26.3 171
Transaction Request Without a PIN RK (RL) 26.2 169
Administration Request Message RM (RN) 26.5 174
Transaction Response with Auth Para from Card Issuer RO (RP) 26.6 176
Generate Auth Para and Transaction Response RQ (RR) 26.7 178
Translate KEYVAL RW (RX) 26.4 173
Confirmation RS (RT) 26.8 180
DERIVED UNIQUE KEY PER TRANSACTION

Generate an Base derivation key (*BDK) BI (BJ) 27.1 183
Translate a PIN from *BDK Encryption to Interchange Key Encryption CI (CJ) 27.2 184
Verify a PIN Using the IBM Method CK (CL) 27.3 185

Verify a PIN Using the VISA PVV Method CM (CN) 27.4 186
Verify a PIN Using the Diebold Method CO (CP) 27.5 187

Verify a PIN Using the Encrypted PIN Method CQ (CR) 27.6 188
Translate a Base Derivation Key from *ZMK to LMK Encryption DW (DX) 27.7 189
Translate a Base Derivation Key from LMK to *ZMK Encryption DY (DZ) 27.8 190
AUSTRALIAN TRANSACTION KEY SCHEME

Transaction Request Without a PIN RE (RF) 28.1 192
Transaction Request With a PIN (T/AQ Key) RG (RH) 28.2 194

Transaction Request With a PIN (T/CI Key) RI (RJ) 28.3 196
Transaction Response With Auth Para Generated by the Acquirer RK (RL) 28.4 198
Transaction Response With Auth Para Generated by the Card Issuer RM (RN) 28.5 200
Translate a PIN from PEK to ZPK Encryption RO (RP) 28.6 202
Verify a Transaction Completion Confirmation Request RQ (RR) 28.7 203
Generate a Transaction Completion Response RS (RT) 28.8 205
Verify a PIN at the Card Issuer Using the IBM Method QQ (QR) 28.9 207
Verify a PIN at the Card Issuer Using the Diebold Method QS (QT) 28.10 209
Verify a PIN at the Card Issuer Using the Visa Method QU (QV) 28.11 211
Verify a PIN at the Card Issuer by Comparison QW (QX 28.12 213
Generate Auth Para at the Card Issuer RU (RV) 28.13 215
Message Authentication Mode Numbers MU (MV) 28.14 216

Generate a MAC on a Binary Message MW (MX 28.15 217
2-10 1270A514 Issue 3

USING THE OPTIONAL RSA CRYPTOSYSTEM

Generate an RSA Key Set EI (EJ) 29.1 225
Load a Secret Key EK (EL) 29.2 227
Translate a Secret Key from the Old LMK to a New LMK EM (EN) 29.3 228
Generate a MAC on a Public Key EO (EP) 29.4 229
Verify a MAC on a Public Key EQ (ER) 29.5 230

Validate a Certificate and Generate a MAC on its Public Key ES (ET) 29.6 231
Translate a MAC on a Public Key EU (EV) 29.7 234
Generate a Signature EW (EX) 29.8 235
Validate a Signature EY (EZ) 29.9 236
Import a DES Key GI (GJ) 29.10 237
Export a DES Key GK (GL) 29.11 239

Hash a Block of Data GM (GN) 29.12 240
1270A514 Issue 3 2-11

3 GENERIC KEY MANAGEMENT COMMANDS

The HSM provides facilities to:
Generate keys.
Print key components.
Form keys from encrypted components.
Translate keys.
3.1 Key Type Table

LMK LMK 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Pair / Pair
Variant code
04-05 00 ZMK ZMK KML
(Comp)
06-07 01 ZPK
14-15 02 PVK CVK
TPK CSCK
TMK
16-17 03 TAK
18-19 04
20-21 05 PVK CVK
(NOU) (NOU)
22-23 06 WWK
24-25 07 ZTK KEK CMK
(CC) (CC)
26-27 08 ZAK
28-29 09 TDK MK-AC MK-MAC MK-ENC KME KMD MK-DAC MK-DN
BDK MK-SMI MK-SMC MK-DFA MK-EE
MK-DAK MK-DN
30-31 0A ZEK
ITK
32-33 0B
34-35 0C
36-36 0D
38-39 0E
Notes:
Comp - Component
NOU Not on us
CC Chip Card
Not all key type codes are available in all commands for security reasons.
The Key type code used within commands is formed by using the Variant code as the first character then
the LMK pair code as the second character. For example the code for a ZPK is 001.
3.2 Key Scheme Table
Key Scheme Notes

Tag
Z Single length DES key encrypted using ANSI X9.17 methods
U Encryption of a double length key using variant method. Used for encryption of keys under
LMK and can be used for import and export of keys.
T Encryption of a triple length key using variant method. Used for encryption of keys under
LMK and can be used for import and export of keys.
X Encryption of a double length key using ANSI X9.17 methods only available for import and
export of keys. This mode is enabled within configure security command
Y Encryption of a triple length key using ANSI X9.17 methods only available for import and
export of keys. This mode is enabled within configure security command
2-12 1270A514 Issue 3

3.3 Generate a Key

Command: To generate a key and optionally encrypt key under ZMK for transmission.
Notes: See key type table to find key type code.
See key scheme table for schemes available to encrypt keys.
Field Length & Type Details

COMMAND MESSAGE
Message header mA (Subsequently returned to the Host unchanged).
Command code 2A Value A0.
Mode 1H 0 Generate Key.
1 Generate key and encrypt under ZMK.

Key type 3H Key type.
Key Scheme (LMK) 1A Key length / scheme for encrypting key under LMK.
ZMK 16H or 32H or ZMK only present if mode = 1.

1A+32H or 1A+48H
Key scheme (ZMK) 1A Key scheme for encrypting key for export. Only present if
mode = 1.
Atalla Variant 1 N or 2 N Optional. Atalla variant; for use in systems with Atalla
equipment. Only present if mode = 1.
End message delimiter 1C Optional. Must be present if a message trailer is present.

Value X19.
Message trailer nA Optional. Maximum length 32 characters.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Message header nA Returned to the Host unchanged.
Response code 2A Value A1.
Error code 2N 00 : No errors.

10 : ZMK Parity error.
12 : No keys loaded in user storage.
13 : LMK error : report to supervisor.
15 : Error in input data.
21 : Invalid user storage index.
Key (LMK) 16H or The key encrypted under LMK.
1A+32H or 1A+48H
Key (ZMK) 16H or The key encrypted under ZMK only present if mode =1.
1A+32H or 1A+48H
Key check value 6H The key check value.
End message delimiter 1C Present only if present in the command message. Value
X19.
Message trailer nA Present only if present in the command message. Maximum

length 32 characters.
1270A514 Issue 3 2-13

3.4 Generate and Print a Component

Command: Generate a random component, print it at the HSM attached printer and return
the encrypted value to the host.
Notes: The HSM must be in the Authorised state.
A printer must be attached to the HSM Auxiliary port.
The HSM must have a print format already defined.
The Channel Attach option does not return the second response message and
its first response message is delayed until after printing has been completed.
(This is because the channel protocol allows only one response per request.
Not available as part of the standard command set in the RG7X10 series of
High-Speed HSMs.
See key type table to find key type code.

COMMAND MESSAGE

Print Field 0 nA The print field defined as Print Field 0 in the print format
definition (must not contain a ; character).
Delimiter 1A Value;
. . .
. . .
. . .
Last print field nA The last print field defined in the print format definition must
not contain a ; character).

Value X19.
2-14 1270A514 Issue 3


RESPONSE MESSAGE (before printing)
Error code 2N 00 : No Error.

13 : LMK error; report to supervisor.
16 : Printer not ready/not connected.
17 : Not in the Authorized state.
18 : Format definition not loaded.
Component 16H or ZMK component encrypted under a variant of LMK.
1A+32H or 1A+48H
X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE (after printing)
Message header NA Returned to the Host unchanged
Response code 2A Value AZ
Error code 2N 00 : No errors
13 : LMK error, report to supervisor
16 : Printer not ready/disconnected
End message delimiter 1C Present only if present in the command message. Maximum
length 32 characters
1270A514 Issue 3 2-15

3.5 Generate and Print a Key as Split Components

Command: Generate a random key, encrypt it under apropriate LMK, print it as two half
components or three third components at the HSM attached printer.
High-Speed HSMs.
See key type table to find key type code.
For a single length key the key is split into two 8 character values ^P and ^Q in
the print format denote the left and right halves respectively.
For a double length key ^P and ^Q in the print format denote the first and
second key respectively.
For a triple length key ^P ,^Q and ^R in the print format denote the first, second
and third key respectively.
^T in the print format denotes a key check value.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value NE.

Delimiter 1A Value;
. . .
. . .
. . .

Value X19.
2-16 1270A514 Issue 3


Response code 2A Value NF.

Key 16H or Key encrypted under appropriate LMK.
1A+32H or 1A+48H
X19.

Response code 2A Value NZ
1270A514 Issue 3 2-17

3.6 Form a Key from Encrypted Components

Command: To form a key from encrypted components.
The HSM must be in Authorised state.

COMMAND MESSAGE

Number of components 1N 2 9 Number of components.
Key type 3H See key type table
Key Scheme (LMK) 1A Key scheme for encrypting key under LMK
Key component 1 16H or Encrypted key component 1.

1A+32H or 1A+48H
Key component 2 16H or Encrypted key component 2.

1A+32H or 1A+48H
|
Key component n 16H or Encrypted key component n.
1A+32H or 1A+48H

Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE

03 : Invalid number of components.
10 : Component parity error.
17 : Not in authorised state.
Key (LMK) 16H or The key encrypted under LMK
1A+32H or 1A+48H
Key check value 6H The key check value
X19.

2-18 1270A514 Issue 3

3.7 Import a Key

Command: To import a key encrypted under a ZMK.
The command does not require the imported key to have odd parity, but odd
parity is forced on the encrypted output. Error 01 is returned and subsequent
fields are not inhibited.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Key type 3H See key type table.
ZMK 16H or 32H or ZMK.

1A+32H or 1A+48H
Key(ZMK) 16H or Key encrypted under ZMK.

1A+32H or 1A+48H
Key Scheme (LMK) 1A Key scheme for encrypting key under LMK.
equipment.

Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
01 : Key parity error, advice only.
Key (LMK) 16H or The key encrypted under LMK.
1A+32H or 1A+48H
X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-19

3.8 Export a Key

Command: To encrypt a key under a ZMK for export.

COMMAND MESSAGE

ZMK 16H or 32H or ZMK.
1A+32H or 1A+48H
Key 16H or Key encrypted under LMK.

1A+32H or 1A+48H
Key Scheme (ZMK) 1A Key scheme for encrypting key under ZMK.
equipment.

Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE

11 : Key parity error.
Key (ZMK) 16H or The key encrypted under ZMK.
1A+32H or 1A+48H
X19.

2-20 1270A514 Issue 3

3.9 Translate Key Scheme

Command: Translate an existing key to a new key scheme. This command supports the
translation from 32H, X and Y formats.
Notes: The HSM must be in Authorised state.
See key scheme table for schemes available to encrypt keys

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value B0.

Key type 3H See key type table
Key 32H or 1A+32H or The key encrypted under appropriate LMK
1A+48H
Key scheme (LMK) 1A Key scheme for encrypting key under LMK

Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value B1.

10 : Key Parity error.
Key 1A+32H or 1A+48H The key encrypted under LMK.
X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-21

4 ZONE MASTER KEY MANAGEMENT

The HSM provides facilities to:
Generate and print a random ZMK component.
Form a ZMK from three encrypted components.
Form a ZMK from 2 to 9 encrypted components.
Translate a ZMK from ZMK to LMK encryption.
4.1 Generate and Print a ZMK Component

Command: Generate a random ZMK component, print it at the HSM attached printer and
return the encrypted value to the host.
If using a 32-character ZMK, the HSM must be configured for double-length
ZMKs (by the CS (Configure Security) command).
High-Speed HSMs.
The delimeter to separate optional fields is changed from ; to |

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value OC.
Delimiter 1A Value;
. . .
Delimiter 1A Optional. If present the following three fields must be

present. Value |.
If an option is not required by the command fill with a valid
value or 0.
Key scheme ZMK 1A Optional. Key scheme for encrypting key under ZMK.
Key scheme LMK 1A Optional. Key scheme for encrypting key under LMK.
Key check value type 1A Optional. Key check value calculation method
0 - KCV backwards compatible.
1 - KCV 6H.
Value X19.
2-22 1270A514 Issue 3


Response code 2A Value OD.

ZMK component 16H or 32H ZMK component encrypted under a variant of LMK pair 04-
1A+32H or 1A+48H 05.
X19.

Response code 2A Value OZ
1270A514 Issue 3 2-23

4.2 Form a ZMK from Three ZMK Components

Command: Form a ZMK from three encrypted components and return the ZMK encrypted
under LMK pair 04-05, and the check value.
If using a 32-character ZMK, the HSM must be configured for double-
lengthZMKs (by the CS (Configure Security) command).

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value GG.
First ZMK component 16H or 32H or The first ZMK component encrypted under a variant of LMK
1A+32H or 1A+48H 04-05.
Second ZMK component 16H or 32H or The second ZMK component encrypted under a variant of
1A+32H or 1A+48H LMK 04-05.
Third ZMK component 16H or 32H or The third ZMK component encrypted under a variant of LMK
1A+32H or 1A+48H 04-05.

present. Value ;.
value or 0.
1 - KCV 6H.
Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value GH.

10 : Parity error in first component.
11 : Parity error in second / third component.
ZMK 16H or 32H or The ZMK encrypted under LMK pair 04-05.
1A+32H or 1A+48H
Key check value 16 H or 6 H Result of encrypting 64 binary zeroes with the ZMK.
16H or 6H depends upon KVC type option.
X19.

2-24 1270A514 Issue 3

4.3 Form a ZMK from 2 to 9 ZMK Components

Command: Form a ZMK from 2 to 9 encrypted components and return the ZMK encrypted
under a variant of LMK pair 04-05, and the check value.
Use this command to provide inter-operation with non-Zaxus security
equipment.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value GY.
Number of components 1N Number of components between 2 and 9 (inclusive).

First ZMK component 16H or 32H or The first ZMK component encrypted under a variant of LMK
1A+32H or 1A+48H 04-05.
Second ZMK component 16H or 32H or The second ZMK component encrypted under a variant of
1A+32H or 1A+48H LMK 04-05.
. . .
. . .
Last ZMK component 16H or 32H or The last ZMK component encrypted under a variant of LMK
1A+32H or 1A+48H 04-05.

present. Value ;
If an option is not required fill with Value 0
Key scheme ZMK 1A Optional. Key scheme for encrypting key under ZMK

present. Value ;
value or 0.
1 - KCV 6H.
Value X19.
1270A514 Issue 3 2-25


RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value GZ.

10 : Parity error in first component.
11 : Parity error second to ninth components.
1A+32H or 1A+48H
Key check value 16 H or 6 H Result of encrypting 64 binary zeroes with the ZMK.
16H or 6H depends upon KVC type option.
X19.

2-26 1270A514 Issue 3

4.4 Translate ZMK from ZMK to LMK encryption

Command: To translate a ZMK from encryption under a ZMK to encryption under the LMK
Notes: This command is enabled via the Configure Security command and disabled by
running the Configure Security command.
The command does not require the imported ZMK to have odd parity, but odd
parity is forced on the encrypted output. Error 01 is returned and subsequent
fields are not inhibited.
ZMKs (by the CS(Configure Security) command)
The HSM must be in Authorised State
See key scheme table for schemes available to encrypt keys

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value BY.

ZMKi 16H or 32H or The ZMKi encrypted under LMK pair 04-05.
1A+32H or 1A+48H
ZMK 16H or 32H or The ZMK encrypted under ZMKi.

1A+32H or 1A+48H
equipment.

present. Value ;.
value or 0.
1 - KCV 6H.
Value X19.
1270A514 Issue 3 2-27


RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value BZ.

01 : ZMK parity error, advice only.
10 : ZMKi Parity error.
ZMK 16H or 32H or ZMK encrypted under LMK pair 04-05.
1A+32H or 1A+48H
X19.

2-28 1270A514 Issue 3

5 ZONE PIN KEY MANAGEMENT

The HSM provides Host commands to generate and translate a ZPK.
The generate facility encrypts the ZPK under the ZMK for transmission to another party and
under the LMK for storage on the Host database.
The two translate commands allow a ZPK to be translated from encryption under a ZMK to
encryption under the LMK and vice versa.
1270A514 Issue 3 2-29

5.1 Generate a ZPK

Command: Generate a random PIN key and return it to the Host encrypted under a ZMK
for transmission to another party and under the LMK for storage on the Host
database.
Notes: If using a 32-character ZMK, the HSM must be configured for double-length

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value IA.

1A+32H or 1A+48H
Atalla variant 1 N or 2 N Optional. Atalla variant; for use in systems with Atalla
equipment.

present. Value ;.
value or 0.
1 - KCV 6H.
Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value IB.
10 : ZMK does not have odd parity.
ZPK under ZMK 16H or The ZPK encrypted under the ZMK.
1A+32H or 1A+48H
ZPK under LMK 16H or The ZPK encrypted under LMK pair 06-07.
1A+32H or 1A+48H
Check value 16 H or 6 H Result of encrypting 64 binary zeroes with the ZPK.

16H or 6H depends upon KCV type option.
X19.

2-30 1270A514 Issue 3

5.2 Translate a ZPK from ZMK to LMK Encryption

Command: Translate a ZPK from encryption under a ZMK to encryption under the LMK.
Used to receive a ZPK from another party.
Notes: The command does not require the ZPK to have odd parity, but odd parity is
forced on the encrypted output. Unlike other commands, if error 01 is returned,
it does not inhibit the return of subsequent fields.
The command tests the ZPK, after decrypting it from under the ZMK, to ensure
the key (including the parity bits) is not zero (i.e., X0000 0000 0000 0000). If
the key is zero, the HSM returns error code 11 (all zero ZPK with even parity)
and terminates processing.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value FA.

1A+32H or 1A+48H
ZPK 16H or ZPK encrypted under the ZMK.

1A+32H or 1A+48H
equipment.

present. Value ;.
value or 0.
1 - KCV 6H.
Value X19.
1270A514 Issue 3 2-31


Response code 2A Value FB.

01 : ZPK parity error; advice only.
10 : ZMK parity error.
11 : All zero ZPK with even parity. (Processing is
terminated).
ZPK 16H or Translated ZPK; encrypted under LMK pair 06-07.
1A+32H or 1A+48H
Check value 16 H or 6 H Result of encrypting 64 binary zeroes with the ZPK.

X19.

2-32 1270A514 Issue 3

5.3 Translate a ZPK from LMK to ZMK Encryption

Command: Translate a ZPK from encryption under the LMK to encryption under a ZMK.
Used to transmit a ZPK to another party.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value GC.

1A+32H or 1A+48H
ZPK 16H or ZPK encrypted under LMK pair 06-07.

1A+32H or 1A+48H
equipment.

present. Value ;.
value or 0.
1 - KCV 6H.
Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value GD.
11 : ZPK parity error.
ZPK 16H or Translated ZPK; encrypted under the ZMK.
1A+32H or 1A+48H
Key check value 16 H or 6 H Result of encrypting 64 binary zeroes with the ZPK.
X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-33

6 ZONE ENCRYPTION, ZONE AUTHENTICATION KEY MANAGEMENT

The HSM provides facilities to generate and translate ZEKs and ZAKs.
For security reasons, encryption and decryption commands using ZEKs are not available in the
standard release; if required, refer to Zaxus for details.
2-34 1270A514 Issue 3

6.1 Generate ZEK/ZAK

Command: Generate a ZEK or ZAK.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value FI.
Flag 1N 0 for ZEK, 1 for ZAK.

1A+32H or 1A+48H
equipment.

present. Value ;.
value or 0.
1 - KCV 6H.
Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value FJ.
ZEK or ZAK for 16H or ZEK or ZAK encrypted under ZMK (ZEK when Flag is 0,
transmission 1A+32H or 1A+48H ZAK when Flag is 1).
ZEK for storage 16H or ZEK encrypted under LMK pair 30-31 (present only when
1A+32H or 1A+48H Flag is 0).
ZAK for storage 16H or ZAK encrypted under LMK pair 26-27 (present only when
Check value 16 H or 6 H Result of encrypting 64 binary zeroes with the ZEK/ZAK.

X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-35

6.2 Translate a ZEK/ZAK from ZMK to LMK Encryption

Command: Translate a ZEK or ZAK from ZMK to LMK.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value FK.

1A+32H or 1A+48H
ZEK/ZAK 16H or ZEK or ZAK encrypted under ZMK (ZEK when Flag is 0,
1A+32H or 1A+48H ZAK when Flag is 1).
equipment.

present. Value ;.
value or 0.
1 - KCV 6H.
Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value FL.

ZEK 16H or ZEK encrypted under LMK pair 30-31 (present only when
ZAK 16H or ZAK encrypted under LMK pair 26-27 (present only when
Check value 16 H or 6H Result of encrypting 64 binary zeroes with the ZEK/ZAK.

16H or 6 depends upon KCV type option.
X19.

2-36 1270A514 Issue 3

6.3 Translate a ZEK/ZAK from LMK to ZMK Encryption

Command: Translate a ZEK or ZAK.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value FM.

1A+32H or 1A+48H
ZEK 16H or ZEK encrypted under LMK pair 30-31 (present only when
ZAK 16H or ZAK encrypted under LMK pair 26-27. (present only when
equipment.

present. Value ;.
value or 0.
1 - KCV 6H.
Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value FN.

11 : ZEK/ZAK parity error.
ZEK/ZAK 16H or ZEK or ZAK encrypted under ZMK (ZEK when Flag is 0,
1A+32H or 1A+48H ZAK when Flag is 1).
Check value 16 H or 6 H Result of encrypting 64 binary zeroes with the ZEK/ZAK.

X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-37

7 TERMINAL MASTER, TERMINAL PIN AND PIN VERIFICATION KEY

MANAGEMENT
The TMK, TPK and PVKs are all encrypted under LMK pair 14-15. Therefore the following
commands can be used with any of those keys:
Generate a key and print it in plain text on a mailer.

Generate a key and encrypt it under a previous version of that key (or any combination of
the keys).
Translate a key from encryption under the LMK to encryption under a similar key.
Translate a key from ZMK to LMK encryption.
Translate a key from LMK to ZMK encryption.
Generate a pair of keys (for VISA PVV keys).
2-38 1270A514 Issue 3

7.1 Generate and Print a TMK, TPK or PVK

Command: Generate a random key, return it encrypted under LMK pair 14-15 and print it at
the device attached to the HSM Console port.
(This is because the channel protocol allows only one response per request).
High-Speed HSMs.
The delimeter to separate optional fields is changed from ; to |

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value OE.
Delimiter 1A Value ;
. . .
. . .
. . .
Last print field nA The last print field defined in the print format definition (must

present. Value |.
value or 0.
1 - KCV 6H.
Value X19.
1270A514 Issue 3 2-39


Response code 2A Value OF.

TMK, TPK or PVK 16H or TMK, TPK or PVK encrypted under LMK pair 14-15.
1A+32H or 1A+48H
X19.

Response code 2A Value OZ.
16 : Printer not ready/disconnected.
X19.

2-40 1270A514 Issue 3

7.2 Generate a TMK, TPK or PVK

Command: Generate a random key, and encrypt it under a TMK (TPK or PVK) and under
LMK pair 14-15.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value HC.
Current TMK, TPK or PVK 16H or The current TMK, TPK or PVK encrypted under LMK pair 14-
1A+32H or 1A+48H 15.

present. Value ;.
value or 0.
Key scheme TMK 1A Optional. Key scheme for encrypting key under TMK.
1 - KCV 6H.
Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value HD.

10 : TMK, TPK or PVK parity error.
New key under the current 16H or The new key encrypted under the current key.
key 1A+32H or 1A+48H
New key under LMK 16H or The new key under LMK pair 14-15.
1A+32H or 1A+48H
X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-41

7.3 Translate a TMK, TPK or PVK from LMK to Another TMK, TPK or PVK
Command: Translate a TMK, TPK or PVK from encryption under LMK pair 14-15 to
encryption under another TMK (TPK or PVK).
Notes: The command is used to replace an existing key with another key from the
database.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value AE.

Current TMK, TPK or PVK 16H or The current TMK, TPK or PVK encrypted under LMK pair 14-
1A+32H or 1A+48H 15.
Stored TMK, TPK or PVK 16H or The stored TMK, TPK or PVK under LMK pair 14-15.
1A+32H or 1A+48H

present. Value ;.
value or 0.
1 - KCV 6H.
Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value AF.
10 : Current TMK, TPK or PVK parity error.
11 : Stored TMK, TPK or PVK parity error.
Stored key under the 16H or The stored key encrypted under the current key.
current key 1A+32H or 1A+48H
X19.

2-42 1270A514 Issue 3

7.4 Translate a TMK, TPK or PVK from ZMK to LMK Encryption

Command: Translate a TMK, TPK or PVK from encryption under a ZMK to encryption
under the LMK.
Notes: The command is used to receive a key from another party.
The HSM must be in the Authorised State.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value FC.

1A+32H or 1A+48H
TMK, TPK or PVK 16H or TMK, TPK or PVK encrypted under the ZMK.
1A+32H or 1A+48H
equipment.

present. Value ;.
value or 0.
1 - KCV 6H.
Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value FD.

17: Not in the Authorized state.
TMK, TPK or PVK 16H or Translated TMK, TPK or PVK; encrypted under LMK pair 14-
1A+32H or 1A+48H 15.
Key check value 16 H or 6 H Result of encrypting 64 binary zeroes with the key.
X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-43

7.5 Translate a TMK, TPK or PVK from LMK to ZMK Encryption

Command: Translate a TMK, TPK or PVK from encryption under the LMK to encryption
under a ZMK.
Notes: The command is used to send a key to another party.
The HSM must be in the Authorised state.
ZMKs (by the CS (Configure Security) command)

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value FE.

1A+32H or 1A+48H
TMK, TPK or PVK 16H or TMK, TPK or PVK encrypted under LMK pair 14-15.
1A+32H or 1A+48H
equipment.

present. Value ;.
value or 0.
1 - KCV 6H.
Value X19.
2-44 1270A514 Issue 3


RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value FF.

TMK, TPK or PVK 16H or Translated TMK, TPK or PVK encrypted under the ZMK.
1A+32H or 1A+48H
X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-45

7.6 Generate a Pair of PVKs

Command: Generate two random keys and return them each encrypted under LMK pair
14-15 and under a ZMK.
Notes: The command is used to send the keys to another party.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value FG.

1A+32H or 1A+48H
equipment.

present. Value ;.
value or 0.
0 - KCV backwards compatible. Not available for keys
generated using new schemes
1 - KCV 6H. Only for available for keys generated under new
key schemes
2 KCV 6H for each key. Only available for keys generated
in backwards compatible mode.
Value X19.
2-46 1270A514 Issue 3


RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value FH.

First TMK, TPK or PVK 32H or 1A+32H New TMK, TPK or PVK; encrypted under LMK pair 14-15.
under LMK
First TMK, TPK or PVK 32H or 1A+32H New TMK, TPK or PVK; encrypted under the ZMK.
under ZMK
KCV Type = 0 or 2
First key check value 16 H or 6 H Result of encrypting 64 binary zeroes with the first half of
TMK, TPK or PVK. 6H if KCV Type = 2.
Second key check value 16 H or 6 H Result of encrypting 64 binary zeroes with the second half of
TMK, TPK or PVK. 6H if KCV Type = 2.
KCV Type = 1
Key check value 6H Result of encrypting 64 binary zeros with the key
X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-47

8 TERMINAL AUTHENTICATION KEY MANAGEMENT
A TAK is used in the generation and verification of MACs. Commands are provided to:
Generate a TAK for down line loading to an ATM or other terminal.
Translate a TAK from encryption under a ZMK to encryption under the LMK.
Translate a TAK from encryption under the LMK to encryption under a ZMK.
Translate a TAK from encryption under the LMK to encryption under a TMK.
The facilities allow for the use of a TAK in either an interchange or a local network.
2-48 1270A514 Issue 3

8.1 Generate a TAK

Command: Generate a random key, and encrypt it under a TMK (TPK or PVK) and under
LMK pair 16-17.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value HA.
TMK 16H or The TMK encrypted under LMK pair 14-15.

1A+32H or 1A+48H

present. Value ;.
value or 0.
1 - KCV 6H.
Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value HB.

10 : TMK parity error.
TAK under TMK 16H or The random TAK encrypted under the TMK.
1A+32H or 1A+48H
TAK under LMK 16H or The random TAK under LMK pair 16-17.
1A+32H or 1A+48H
X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-49

8.2 Translate a TAK from ZMK to LMK Encryption

Command: Translate a TAK from encryption under a ZMK to encryption under the LMK.
Used to receive a key from another party.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value MI.

1A+32H or 1A+48H
TAK 16H or TAK encrypted under ZMK.

1A+32H or 1A+48H
equipment.

present. Value ;.
value or 0.
1 - KCV 6H.
Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value MJ.

11 : TAK parity error.
TAK 16H or TAK encrypted under LMK pair 16-17.
1A+32H or 1A+48H
Key check value 16 H or 6 H Result of encrypting 64 binary zeroes with the TAK.
X19.

2-50 1270A514 Issue 3

8.3 Translate a TAK from LMK to ZMK Encryption

Command: Translate a TAK from encryption under the LMK to encryption under a ZMK.
Used to send a key to another party.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value MG.

1A+32H or 1A+48H

1A+32H or 1A+48H
equipment.

present. Value ;.
value or 0.
1 - KCV 6H.
Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value MH.

TAK 16H or TAK encrypted under the ZMK..
1A+32H or 1A+48H
Key check value 16 H or 6 H Result of encrypting 64 binary zeroes with the TAK.
X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-51

8.4 Translate a TAK from LMK to TMK Encryption

Command: Translate a TAK from encryption under the LMK to encryption under a TMK.
Used to send a key to a terminal.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value AG.
TMK 16H or TMK encrypted under the LMK pair 14-15.

1A+32H or 1A+48H

1A+32H or 1A+48H

present. Value ;.
value or 0.
1 - KCV 6H.
Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value AH.
10 : TMK parity error.
TAK 16H or Translated TAK; encrypted under the TMK.
1A+32H or 1A+48H
X19.

2-52 1270A514 Issue 3

9 PIN AND OFFSET GENERATION
The HSM provides support for many PIN verification techniques. The techniques often involve
the generation of a PIN using a given algorithm, or an algorithm that requires a value known as
an offset. The HSM provides support for PIN generation as follows:
Derive a PIN using the IBM 3624 method.
Derive a PIN using the Diebold Proprietary Algorithm.
Generate a random 4-digit PIN.
Offset generation support is provided as follows:
Generate an IBM PIN offset using the 3624 method.
Generate a Diebold PIN offset.
Generate a VISA PIN Verification Value (offset).
1270A514 Issue 3 2-53

9.1 Derive a PIN Using the IBM Method

Command: Generate a 4 to 12-digit PIN using the IBM method.
Notes: If an offset is included, the PIN is derived from the offset in addition to the other
data.
If no offset is included, it can be generated by the IBM PIN offset generation
command as detailed in Generate an IBM PIN offset.
The decimalization table can be stored in user storage and referenced in the
same way as keys.
The decimalization table of 16 digits must contain at least 8 different digits, with
no digit occurring more than 4 times. If this condition is not met, Error Code 25
is returned.
If a double or triple length PVK presented the warning 02 is returned but
processing continues deriving the PIN using TDES in place of DES

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value EE.
PVK 16H or PVK encrypted under LMK pair 14-15; used to generate the
1A+32H or 1A+48H derived PIN.
Offset 12 H Value OOOOFFFFFFFF. This field contains the offset (if

there is one), left-justified and padded with F.
Check length 2N The minimum PIN length.

Account number 12 N The 12 right-most digits of the account number, excluding
the check digit.
Decimalization table 16 N The table for converting hexadecimal characters to decimal.

PIN validation data 12 A User-defined data consisting of hexadecimal characters and
the character N, which indicates to the HSM where to insert
the last 5 digits of the account number.

Value X19.
2-54 1270A514 Issue 3


RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value EF.

02 : Warning PVK not single length
10 : PVK parity error.
25: Decimalisation table error.
PIN L N or LH The derived PIN encrypted under LMK pair 02-03.
X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-55

9.2 Derive a PIN Using the Diebold Method

Command: Generate a PIN using the Diebold method.
Notes: Requires the Diebold table to be in user storage.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value GA.
Index flag 1A Value K.

Table pointer 3H The value of the base location of the Diebold table.
Algorithm number 2H The number of the Diebold algorithm required.

Offset 4N For a derived PIN, this is 0000. Otherwise, an offset can be
used.
Account number 12 N The 12 right-most digits of the account number, excluding the
check digit.
Validation data 16 A User-defined data consisting of hexadecimal characters and the

character N, which indicates to the HSM where to insert the last
5 digits of the account number. The data must be right-justified
and padded with F.
End message delimiter 1C Optional. Must be present if a message trailer is present. Value
X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value GB.

12 : No table loaded in user storage.
End message delimiter 1C Present only if present in the command message. Value X19.

2-56 1270A514 Issue 3

9.3 Generate a Random PIN

Command: Generate a random PIN of 4 to 12 digits.
Notes: If the PIN length is not defined, a PIN of four digits is generated.
The PIN length selected must not exceed the value selected in the CS
(Configure Security) command.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value JA.

the check digit.
PIN length 2N Optional. In the range 04 to 12. If not present, a PIN of 4

digits is generated.

Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value JB.

24 : PIN length = or > encrypted PIN length.
X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-57

9.4 Generate an IBM PIN Offset

Command: Generate a PIN offset using the IBM method.
Notes: The decimalisation table can be stored in user storage and referenced in the
same way as keys.
The decimalisation table of 16 digits must contain at least 8 different digits,
with no digit occurring more than 4 times. If this condition is not met, Error
Code 25 is returned.
processing continues the generating the offset using TDES in place of DES

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value DE.
PVK 16H or PVK encrypted under LMK pair 14-15; used to generate the
1A+32H or 1A+48H offset.
PIN L N or LH The PIN for which an offset is required; encrypted under

LMK pair 02-03.

the check digit.
Decimalization table 16 N The table for converting hexadecimal values to decimal.


Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value DF.

14: Error in encrypted PIN.
25: Decimalization table error.
Offset 12 N The resulting offset value; left-justified and padded with F.
X19.

2-58 1270A514 Issue 3

9.5 Generate a Diebold PIN Offset

Command: Generate a PIN using the Diebold method.
Notes: Requires the Diebold table to be in user storage.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value CE.

Table pointer 3H The value of the base location of the Diebold table in user
storage.

the check digit.
Validation data 16 A User-defined data consisting of hexadecimal characters and

the last 5 digits of the account number. The data must be
right-justified and padded with F.

Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value CF.

14 : Encrypted PIN error.
Offset 4N The resulting Diebold offset.
X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-59

9.6 Generate a VISA PIN Verification Value

Command: Generate a 4-digit VISA PVV.
Notes: VISA defines the PIN Verification Key Indicator (PVKI) to be between 0 and 6.
The HSM does not enforce this restriction.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value DG.
PVK pair 32H or 1A+32H The two PVKs each encrypted under LMK pair 14-15.
PIN L N or LH The PIN for which a PVV is required; encrypted under LMK
pair 02-03.

the check digit.
PVKI 1N The PVKI (should be between 0 and 6).

Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value DH.

14 : Error in encrypted PIN.
27 : PVK not double length.
PVV 4N The resulting PVV.
X19.

2-60 1270A514 Issue 3

10 PIN VERIFICATION
The HSM supports four methods of PIN verification:
IBM 3624.
Diebold Proprietary Algorithm.
VISA PVV.
PIN comparison.
For each type, the PIN block is encrypted under a TPK or a ZPK depending on whether it has
come from a local ATM (or PIN pad etc.) or from an acquirer. Therefore support is provided for
verifying a PIN from a terminal or from interchange.
10.1 Verify a Terminal PIN Using the IBM Method

Command: Verify a PIN from a local ATM (or PIN pad etc.) using the IBM 3624 method.
same way as keys.
The decimalisation table of 16 digits must contain at least 8 different digits, with
is returned.
processing continues the verifying the PIN using TDES in place of DES

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value DA.
TPK 16H or The TPK under which the PIN block is encrypted; encrypted
1A+32H or 1A+48H under LMK pair 14-15.
PVK 16H or PVK encrypted under LMK pair 14-15

1A+32H or 1A+48H
Maximum PIN length 2N Value 12. Mandatory.
PIN block 16 H The PIN block encrypted under the TPK.

PIN block format code 2N One of the valid format codes.

the check digit.

Offset 12 H IBM offset value, left-justified and padded with F.

Value X19.
1270A514 Issue 3 2-61


RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value DB.

01 : Verification failure.
10 : TPK parity error.
12 : No keys or table loaded in user storage.
20 : PIN block error.
23 : Invalid PIN block format code.
24 : PIN is fewer than 4 or more than 12 digits.
25 : Decimalization table error.
X19.

2-62 1270A514 Issue 3

10.2 Verify an Interchange PIN Using the IBM Method

Command: Verify a PIN from interchange using the IBM 3624 method.
same way as keys.
The decimalisation table of 16 digits must contain at least 8 different digits, with
is returned.
processing continues the verifying the PIN using TDES in place of DES

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value EA.
ZPK 16H or The ZPK under which the PIN block is encrypted; encrypted
PVK 16H or The PVK encrypted under LMK pair 14-15.

1A+32H or 1A+48H
Maximum PIN length 2N Value 12.
PIN block 16 H The PIN block encrypted under the ZPK.


the check digit.

Offset 12 H IBM offset value, left-justified and padded with F.

Value X19.
1270A514 Issue 3 2-63


RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value EB.
02 : Warning PVK not single length.
12 : No keys or table loaded in user storage.
25 : Decimalization table error.
X19.
2-64 1270A514 Issue 3

10.3 Verify a Terminal PIN Using the Diebold Method

Command: Verify a PIN from a local ATM (or PIN pad etc.) using the Diebold method.
Notes: The Diebold table must be stored in user storage before using this command.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value CG.
1A+32H or 1A+48H under LMK pair 14-15
storage.


the check digit.

Offset 4N For a derived PIN this is 0000. Otherwise, an offset can be

used.

Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value CH.

12 : No keys loaded or no table in user storage.
X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-65

10.4 Verify an Interchange PIN Using the Diebold Method

Command: Verify a PIN from interchange using the Diebold method.
Notes: The Diebold table must be stored in user storage before using this command.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value EG.

storage.

the check digit.

Offset 4N For a derived PIN this is 0000. Otherwise, an offset can be

used.

Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value EH.

12 : No keys loaded or no table in user storage.
X19.

2-66 1270A514 Issue 3

10.5 Verify a Terminal PIN Using the VISA Method
Command: Verify a PIN from a local ATM (or PIN pad etc.) using the VISA PVV method.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value DC.

the check digit.

PVV 4N The PVV for the PIN.

Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value DD.

20 : PIN block does not contain valid values.
24 : PIN is fewer than 4 or more than 12 digits
X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-67

10.6 Verify an Interchange PIN Using the VISA Method

Command: Verify a PIN from interchange using the VISA PVV method.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value EC.

the check digit.

PVV 4N The PVV for the PIN.
Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value ED.
X19.

2-68 1270A514 Issue 3

10.7 Verify a Terminal PIN Using the Comparison Method
Command: Verify a PIN received from an ATM (or terminal etc.) by comparing it with a
value held on the Host database.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value BC.
PIN block 16 H The PIN block containing the PIN for verification; encrypted
under the TPK.

the check digit.
PIN L N or LH The PIN from the Host database encrypted under LMK pair
02-03.

Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value BD.

14 : Error in PIN from Host database.
X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-69

10.8 Verify an Interchange PIN Using the Comparison Method

Command: Verify a PIN received from interchange by comparing it with a value held on the
Host database.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value BE.
PIN block 16 H The PIN block containing the PIN for verification; encrypted
under the ZPK.
the check digit.
PIN L N or LH The PIN from the Host database encrypted under LMK pair
02-03.
Value X19.
RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value BF.
14 : Error in PIN from Host database.
X19.
2-70 1270A514 Issue 3

11 PIN TRANSLATION
Commands are provided to translate PIN blocks from encryption under one key to encryption
under another. The commands can also translate the format of a PIN block, with the exception
of the those that translate to the LMK (where the PIN is not held in a standard format). The key
translations available are as follows:
From one ZPK to another ZPK.

From TPK to ZPK.
From ZPK to LMK.
From TPK to LMK.
From LMK to ZPK.
1270A514 Issue 3 2-71

11.1 Translate a PIN from One ZPK to Another

Command: Translate a PIN block from encryption under one ZPK to encryption under
another ZPK and from one format to another. If the same ZPK is defined, only
the PIN block is translated, and if the same PIN block format is defined, only
the key is translated.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value CC.
Source ZPK 16H or Source ZPK under which the PIN block is currently
1A+32H or 1A+48H encrypted; encrypted under LMK pair 06-07.
Destination ZPK 16H or Destination ZPK under which the PIN block is to be
Source PIN block 16 H The source PIN block encrypted under the source ZPK.
Source PIN block format 2N The format code for the source PIN block.
Destination PIN block 2N The format code for the destination PIN block.
format

the check digit.

Value X19.
2-72 1270A514 Issue 3


RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value CD.

10 : Source ZPK parity error.
11 : Destination ZPK parity error.
20 : PIN block data error.
22 : Invalid account number.
PIN length 2N Length of the returned PIN.
Destination PIN block 16 H The destination PIN block encrypted under the destination
ZPK.
Destination PIN block 2N As received in the command message.

format
X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-73

11.2 Translate a PIN from TPK to ZPK Encryption

Command: Translate a PIN block from encryption under a TPK to encryption under a ZPK
and from one format to another. If the same PIN block format is defined, only
the key is translated.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value CA.
Source TPK 16H or Source TPK under which the PIN block is currently
Destination ZPK 16H or Destination ZPK under which the PIN block is to be
Source PIN block 16 H The source PIN block encrypted under the source TPK.
Source PIN block format 2N The format code for the source PIN block.
Destination PIN block 2N The format code for the destination PIN block.
format
the check digit.
Value X19.
RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value CB.

10 : Source TPK parity error.
11 : Destination ZPK parity error.
PIN length 2N Length of the returned PIN.
Destination PIN block 16 H The destination PIN block encrypted under the destination
ZPK.
Destination PIN block 2N As received in the command message.

format
X19.

2-74 1270A514 Issue 3

11.3 Translate a PIN from ZPK to LMK Encryption

Command: Translate a PIN from encryption under a ZPK to encryption under the LMK.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value JE.
Source ZPK 16H or The ZPK under which the PIN block is currently encrypted;
1A+32H or 1A+48H encrypted under LMK pair 06-07.
PIN block 16 H The source PIN block encrypted under the ZPK.
PIN block format 2N The format code for the PIN block.

the check digit.

Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value JF.

PIN L N or LH The PIN encrypted under LMK pair 02-03.
X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-75

11.4 Translate a PIN from TPK to LMK Encryption

Command: Translate a PIN from encryption under a TPK to encryption under the LMK.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value JC.
Source TPK 16H or Source TPK under which the PIN block is currently
PIN block 16 H The source PIN block encrypted under the TPK.

the check digit.

Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value JD.
X19.

2-76 1270A514 Issue 3

11.5 Translate a PIN from LMK to ZPK Encryption

Command: Translate a PIN from encryption under the LMK to encryption under a ZPK.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value JG.
Destination ZPK 16H or The ZPK under which the PIN block is to be encrypted;
1A+32H or 1A+48H encrypted under LMK pair 06-07.
the check digit.

Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value JH.

14 : Error in PIN from Host.
X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-77

11.6 Translate PIN Algorithm

Command: Translate a PIN from encryption using the VISA PIN algorithm to encryption
using the Racal algorithm.
Notes: The HSM must be configured for the Racal algorithm.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value BQ.

the check digit.
PIN LN The PIN encrypted under LMK pair 02-03 using the VISA
algorithm.

Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value BR.

PIN LH The PIN encrypted under new LMK pair 02-03 using the
Racal algorithm.
X19.

2-78 1270A514 Issue 3

12 PIN MAILER PRINTING

The HSM can print PIN mailers (multicopy forms, the contents of which can be read only after
the form has been opened) and other types of data that must be kept secret.
PIN mailers can be used to send PINs to cardholders. Also, if the cardholder is to be given the
opportunity of selecting his/her own PIN by mail (instead of at an entry device), solicitation data
can be sent; it is not necessary to send a PIN if only a solicitation request is to be sent.
The HSM provides the following print facilities:
Print a PIN/PIN and solicitation data.

Print solicitation data only.
Because the values that are printed on a mailer are not available to the Host, the HSM returns
check data to the Host to give confidence that the data printed on the mailer is correct (i.e., the
HSM has performed the correct cryptographic functions).
The data can be verified using the following commands:
Verify the cryptography for the PIN/PIN and solicitation data.

Verify the cryptography for the solicitation data.
(For RG7X10 series High-Speed HSMs, refer to Chapter 1).
1270A514 Issue 3 2-79

12.1 Print PIN/PIN and Solicitation Data

Command: Print the PIN/PIN and solicitation data at the HSM-attached terminal.
The Channel Attach option does not return the second response message is
delayed until after printing has been completed. (This is because the channel
protocol allows only one response per request.)
High-Speed HSMs.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value PE.

Document type 1A A : for 1st mailer on a 2-up form.
B : for 2nd mailer on a 2-up form.
C : for a 1-up form.
check digit.

. . .
. . .
. . .
Last print field nA The last print field defined in the print format definition (must not
contain a ; character).
X19.
2-80 1270A514 Issue 3


Response code 2A Value PF.

16 : Printer not ready.
18 : Document definition not loaded.
PIN and reference number L+ 12 N The cryptographic check on the PIN and solicitation reference
check value number.
X19.

Response code 2A Value PZ.
1270A514 Issue 3 2-81

12.2 Print a PIN Solicitation Mailer

Command: Print PIN solicitation data at the HSM-attached terminal.
(This is because the channel protocol allows only one response per request.)
High-Speed HSMs.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value OA.
Document type 1A A : for 1st mailer on a 2-up form.

B : for 2nd mailer on a 2-up form.
C : for a 1-up form.
the check digit.
. . .
. . .
. . .
Last print field nA The last print field defined in the print format definition (must

Value X19.
2-82 1270A514 Issue 3


Response code 2A Value OB.

16 : Printer not ready.

18 : Document definition not loaded.
Reference number check 12 N The cryptographic check on the solicitation reference

value number.

Value X19.

Response code 2A Value OZ.
X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-83

12.3 Verify PIN/PIN and Solicitation Mailer Cryptography

Command: Verify the PE command processing performed by the HSM.
Notes: It is suggested that a PE command performed by one HSM is verified by a PG
command performed by a different HSM.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value PG.

the check digit.

Reference number check L + 12 N The cryptographic check on the solicitation reference
value number.

Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value PH.
01 : Verification fail.
X19.

2-84 1270A514 Issue 3

12.4 Verify Solicitation Mailer Cryptography

Command: Verify the OA command processing performed by the HSM.
Notes: It is suggested that an OA command performed by one HSM is verified by an
RC command performed by a different HSM.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value RC.

the check digit.
Reference number check 12 N The cryptographic check on the solicitation reference

value number.

Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value RD.

01 : Verification fail.
X19.
Message trailer nA Present only if present in the command message.

Maximum length 32 characters.
1270A514 Issue 3 2-85

13 PIN SOLICITATION DATA PROCESSING

When a cardholder is given the option of selecting a PIN, he/she returns a form containing a
PIN selection and a reference number. For security reasons, the only connection between the
PIN and the cardholders account is this reference number which is a cryptographic
representation of the last 10 digits of the account number (excluding the account number check
digit).
The HSM processes these values and returns the encrypted PIN and the last 10 digits of the
account number (excluding check digit). The Host can match the account number digits and
store the encrypted PIN for subsequent processing (for verification purposes or the creation of
PIN offsets etc.).
Because the reference number is the only link to the cardholders PIN, there must be a means
of validating the data that is manually entered. There is no way to validate the PIN except
through dual entry procedures or through the visual comparison of the value entered and the
value recorded on the mailer form.
The 12-digit reference number, unlike the PIN, can be validated by a Host program. This
reference number is a 10-digit number, followed by two check digits. The check digits can be
validated during or after data entry.
The data is batch processed via Host commands. The number of records entered must be
greater than or equal to the minimum batch size set when the HSM is configured. Each batch
consists of at least one logical record. Each logical record contains a 12-digit reference number
(obtained from the returned solicitation mailer) and the cardholder-selected PIN.
When the batch has been loaded to internal memory, the HSM encrypts the PINs under LMK
pair 02-03, and decrypts the reference numbers, yielding a value which contains the 10 right-
most digits of the account number (excluding the check digit). The PIN and 10 digits of the
account number are returned to the Host.
2-86 1270A514 Issue 3

The algorithm for validating the two check digits of a reference number is as follows:
First Check Digit:
The first of the two check digits is calculated as:

MOD 10 [10 - MOD 10 (Y)]
where Y is the sum of the products obtained by multiplying the 3rd to the 10th digits of the
reference number by the following weights:
Digit Weight
3 9
4 7
5 8
6 6
7 7
8 9
9 6
10 8
Second Check Digit:
The second check digit is calculated as:

MOD 10 [10 - MOD 10 (Z)]
where Z is the sum of the following:
f(digit 1) + digit 2 + f(digit 3) + digit 4 +f(digit 5) + digit 6 + f(digit 7) + digit 8 +

f(digit 9) + digit 10 + f(first check digit)
The value of f(digit n) is determined as follows:
Digit f(digit n)
0 0
1 2
2 4
3 6
4 8
5 1
6 3
7 5
8 7
9 9
1270A514 Issue 3 2-87

The MOD 10 (n) operation yields a value that is the remainder after dividing n by 10. This
remainder is the same as the low-order digit on n.
The following example illustrates the validation of the reference number 936125183702, where
0 is the first check digit and 2 is the second check digit.
10-digit reference check digits
9 3 6 1 2 5 1 8 3 7 0 2
CHECK DIGIT VALIDATION EXAMPLE
FIRST CHECK DIGIT

6 1 2 5 1 8 3 7
x 9 x 7 x 8 x 6 x 7 x 9 x 6 x 8
5 1 3 7 1 5 = 260
+ 7 + + + 7 + + +
4 6 0 2 8 6
MOD 10 [10 MOD 10 (260)] = 0

MOD 10 [10-0] =0
MOD 10 [10] = 0
SECOND CHECK DIGIT
f(9) + 3 + f(6) + 1 + f(2) + 5 + f(1) + 8 + f(3) + 7 + f(0) =

9 + 3 + 3 + 1 + 4 + 5 + 2 + 8 + 6 + 7 + 0 = 48
mod 10 [10 mod 10 (48)] = 8
mod 10 [10 8] = 2
mod 10 [2] = 2
The HSM provides the following Host commands to support solicitation data entry:
Load solicitation data to user storage.
Final load of solicitation data and start processing.
Enable solicitation data entry at the Console.
Disable solicitation data entry at the Console.
Response to solicitation data entry at the Console.
2-88 1270A514 Issue 3

13.1 Load Solicitation Data to User Storage
Command: Load from 1 to 25 records of solicitation data to user storage.

Notes: The command can be used repeatedly to load the solicitation data. It overwrites
any tables or keys stored in the user storage. Therefore, it is necessary to
reload the tables and keys when solicitation processing has been completed.
This command will not operate in the RG7200 or RG7210 due to limitations of
the channel protocol. To use PIN solicitation functions in channel connected
HSMs the final load command must be used.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value QA.
Solicitation Data 1 nA The 12-digit reference number.

The selected PIN (4 to 12 digits).
A semicolon (;) as a delimiter.
The selected PIN.
. . .
. . .
. . .
Last solicitation data nA The 12-digit reference number.
The selected PIN.
Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value QB.
30 : Invalid reference number.
X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-89

13.2 Final Load of Solicitation Data to User Storage

Command: Load the last set of solicitation records to user storage and start processing
data.
Notes: The command overwrites any tables or keys stored in user storage.
Therefore, it is necessary to reload the tables and keys when solicitation
processing has been completed. The response message is repeated until all
the processed data has been returned to the Host.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value QC.
The selected PIN (4 to 12 digits).
The selected PIN.
. . .
. . .
. . .
Last solicitation data nA The 12-digit reference number.
The selected PIN.
Value X19.
2-90 1270A514 Issue 3


RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value QD.

30 : Invalid reference number.
31 : Insufficient entries for batch.
Processed Data 1 nN The 10 right-most digits of the account number and PIN
encrypted under LMK pair 02-03, truncated (if necessary).
The length is L or L+1 (to ensure that the length is even;
by padding with XF).
Processed Data 2 nN The 10 right-most digits of the account number and PIN
. . .
. . .
. . .
Last processed data nN The 10 right-most digits of the account number and PIN
X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-91

14 CLEAR PIN SUPPORT
CAUTION: THE USE OF CLEAR PIN FACILITIES PRESENTS A SIGNIFICANT SECURITY

RISK.
The HSM provides two commands to support the use of clear PINs:
Encrypt a clear PIN.
Decrypt an encrypted PIN and return a reference number for solicitation data processing.
14.1 Encrypt a Clear PIN

Command: Encrypt a clear text PIN.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value BA.
PIN LH The clear text PIN left-justified and padded with XF to the
encrypted PIN length L. Value set within configure security
command (range 5 13).
check digit.

Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value BB.
PIN LN The PIN encrypted under LMK pair 02-03.

2-92 1270A514 Issue 3

14.2 Decrypt an Encrypted PIN

Command: Decrypted an encrypted PIN and return a reference number.
Notes: The command is available only if selected during configuration (see Chapter 4
of the Installation and Operation manual).
The reference number can be used in solicitation data processing.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value NG.

the check digit.
PIN LN The PIN encrypted under LMK pair 02-03.

Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value NH.

Error code 00 : No errors.
14 : Error in encrypted PIN.
PIN LN The clear PIN left-justified and padded with XF.
Reference number 12 N The reference number derived by encrypting the account

number under LMK pair 18-19.
X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-93

15 HOST WATCHWORD SUPPORT

The HSM provides general Watchword support, with commands to:
Generate a Watchword Key.
Translate a Watchword Key from encryption under the LMK to encryption under a ZMK.
Translate a Watchword Key from encryption under a ZMK to encryption under the LMK.
Verify a Watchword response.
Generate a decimal MAC
Verify a decimal MAC
15.1 Generate a Watchword Key

Command: Generate a Watchword Key (WWK).

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value FO.
present. Value ;.
value or 0.
0 - KCV Backwards compatible
1 - Combined KCV 6H
Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value FP.

WWK 16H or Watchword Key encrypted under LMK pair 22-23.
1A+32H or 1A+48H
Check value 16 H or 6 H Result of encrypting 64 binary zeroes with the WWK.

X19.

2-94 1270A514 Issue 3

15.2 Translate a Watchword Key from LMK to ZMK Encryption

Command: Translate a Watchword Key from encryption under the LMK to encryption under
a ZMK.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value FQ.

1A+32H or 1A+48H
WWK 16H or Watchword encrypted under LMK pair 22-23.

1A+32H or 1A+48H
equipment.
Delimiter 1A Optional. If present the following three fields must be present.

Value ;.
value or 0.
1 - KCV 6H.
Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value FR.

WWK 16H or WWK encrypted under ZMK.
1A+32H or 1A+48H
Key check value 16 H or 6 H Result of encrypting 64 binary zeroes with the WWK.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-95

15.3 Translate a Watchword Key from ZMK to LMK Encryption

Command: Translate a Watchword Key from encryption under a ZMK to encryption under
the LMK.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value FS.

1A+32H or 1A+48H
WWK 16H or Watchword encrypted under ZMK.

1A+32H or 1A+48H
equipment.

present. Value ;.
value or 0.
1 - KCV 6H.
Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value FT.

11 : Imported key all zero
WWK 16H or WWK encrypted under LMK pair 22-23.
1A+32H or 1A+48H
Key check value 16 H or 6 H Result of encrypting 64 binary zeroes with the WWK.
X19.

2-96 1270A514 Issue 3

15.4 Verify a Watchword Response

Command: Verify a Watchword response.
Notes: The cipher scheme used depends upon the key length.
Single length WWK Cipher scheme code 0
Double length WWK Cipher scheme code 1
Triple length WWK Cipher scheme code 2

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value FU.
WWK 16H or Watchword Key encrypted under LMK pair 22-23.

1A+32H or 1A+48H
Flag 1N 1 = response for PIN 1,
2 = response for PIN 2.

Challenge 7N Watchword challenge.
Response 7N Watchword response.
Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value FV.
10 : WWK parity error.
X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-97

15.5 Generate a Decimal MAC

Command: Generate a Decimal MAC on character.
Notes: This command assumes that the data on which the MAC is to be generated
consists of characters only.
The cipher scheme used depends upon the key length.
Double length WWK Cipher scheme code 1 (X9.19 MAC)

COMMAND MESSAGE
Message Header mA Will be returned to the Host unchanged
Command Code 2A Value LK
TAK 16H or 1A+32H The TAK encrypted under LMK pair 16-17
MAC Length 1H Number of characters required in Decimal MAC
(range 1 to 12)
Data 0-n The data on which a MAC is to be generated, n=

1024 (512 for SNA-SDLC) systems
End Message Delimiter 1C Optional. Must be present if a message trailer is

present. Value X'19
Message Trailer nA Optional. Maximum length 32 characters

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response Code 2A Value LL

Error Code 2N 00 : No errors.
27 : Invalid key length.
MAC nN The calculated decimal MAC with a length as
specified in the command
End Message Delimiter 1C Will only be present if present in the command

message. Value X'19
Message Trailer nA Will only be present if in the command message.

Maximum length 32 characters
2-98 1270A514 Issue 3

15.6 Verify a Decimal MAC

Command: To verify a decimal MAC of user defined length
Notes: This command assumes that the data on which the MAC is to be generated
consists of characters only
The cipher scheme used deepends upon the key length.
Double length WWK Cipher scheme code 1 (X9.19 MAC)

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command Code 2A Value LM
TAK 16 H The TAK encrypted under LMK pair 16-17

MAC length 1H The number of characters in the Decimal MAC (range 1
- 12)
MAC nN The MAC to be verified

Data 0-n The data on which the mAC to be verified was
calculated, n= 1024 (512 for SNA-SDLC systems)
End Message Delimiter 1C Optional. Must be present if a message trailer is

present. Value X'19

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response Code 2A Value LN
Error Code 2N 00 : No errors
01 : MAC did not verify
27 : Invalid key length
10 : TAK parity error
12 : No keys loaded in user storage
13 : LMK error; report to supervisor
15 : Error in input data
21 : Invalid user storage index
End Message Delimiter 1C Will only be present if present in the command
message. Value X'19

1270A514 Issue 3 2-99

16 MESSAGE AUTHENTICATION CODE SUPPORT

The HSM provides commands to generate, verify and translate a MAC.
Because the HSM has no flow control, the application programmer is responsible for ensuring
that the input buffer is not exceeded. The HSM input buffer is 2047 bytes in length for all
models except the SNA-SDLC interface devices (RG7500 and RG7600), in which it is 1023
bytes. The length of the input buffer limits the amount of data over which a MAC can be
calculated in a single call to the HSM. To be sure that there is no overflow, limit the amount of
data to 1024 bytes, or 512 bytes if using SNA-SDLC.
The HSM normally calculates a MAC by converting the characters to ASCII (if they are received
as EBCDIC (shown in the table), and filling the last 64-bit block with binary zeroes (if
necessary). For this, the HSM must be configured for EBCDIC (and not ASCII) by the CH
(Configure Host) Console command. The HSM performs no other editing of the data.
The HSM provides commands to generate and verify MACs on short messages of up to 2047
bytes (1023 bytes for SNA-SDLC). For longer messages the MQ (Generate MAC (MAB) for
Large Message) command divides the message data into blocks. It creates a MAB or IV
(Initialisation Vector) for the first block, the last block and one or more blocks in between. The
response message for the last data block includes the MAC for the whole message. The MAC
is the first four bytes (eight characters) of the last MAB.
The MQ command handles the data in 8-bit binary form. It does not convert EBCDIC data to
ASCII; it calculates the MAC on the data as presented to the HSM. Therefore, any necessary
character conversion must be performed by the Host system.
The command used for large messages provides the Host with all the information needed for
MAC generation, MAC verification and continuation IVs when chaining MACs.
2-100 1270A514 Issue 3

EBCDIC to ASCII Translation Table
EBCDIC ASCII EBCDIC ASCII EBCDIC ASCII EBCDIC ASCII

Hex Cha Hex Hex Cha Hex Hex Cha Hex Hex Cha Hex
00 NUL 00 40 SP 20 80 C0 { 7B
01 SOH 01 41 81 a 61 C1 A 41
02 STX 02 42 82 b 62 C2 B 42
03 ETX 03 43 83 c 63 C3 C 43
04 44 84 d 64 C4 D 44
05 HT 09 45 85 e 65 C5 E 45
06 46 86 f 66 C6 F 46
07 DEL 7F 47 87 g 67 C7 G 47
08 48 88 h 68 C8 H 48
09 49 89 i 69 C9 I 49
0A 4A 8A CA
0B VT 0B 4B . 2E 8B { 7B CB
0C FF 0C 4C < 3C 8C CC
0D CR 0D 4D ( 28 8D CD
0E SO 0E 4E + 2B 8E CE
0F SI 0F 4F | 7C 8F CF
10 DLE 10 50 & 26 90 D0 } 7D
11 DC1 11 51 91 j 6A D1 J 4A
12 DC2 12 52 92 k 6B D2 K 4B
13 DC3 13 53 93 l 6C D3 L 4C
14 54 94 m 6D D4 M 4D
15 55 95 n 6E D5 N 4E
16 BS 08 56 96 o 6F D6 O 4F
17 57 97 p 70 D7 P 50
18 CAN 18 58 98 q 71 D8 Q 51
19 EM 19 59 99 r 72 D9 R 52
1A 5A ! 21 9A DA
1B 5B $ 24 9B } 7D DB
1C 1C 5C * 2A 9C DC
1D 1D 5D ) 29 9D DD
1E 1E 5E ; 3B 9E DE
1F 1F 5F 5F 9F DF
20 60 - 2D A0 E0 \ 5C
21 61 / A1 ~ 7E E1
22 FS 1C 62 A2 s 73 E2 S 53
23 63 A3 t 74 E3 T 54
24 64 A4 u 75 E4 U 55
25 LF 0A 65 A5 v 76 E5 V 56
26 ETB 17 66 A6 w 77 E6 W 57
27 ESC 1B 67 A7 x 78 E7 X 58
28 68 A8 y 79 E8 Y 59
29 69 A9 z 7A E9 Z 5A
2A 6A | 7C AA EA
2B 6B , 2C AB EB
2D ENQ 05 6D 5F AD [ 5B ED
2E ACK 06 6E > 3E AE EE
2F BEL 07 6F ? 3F AF EF
30 70 B0 F0 0 30
31 71 B1 F1 1 31
32 SYN 16 72 B2 F2 2 32
33 73 B3 F3 3 33
34 74 B4 F4 4 34
35 75 B5 F5 5 35
36 76 B6 F6 6 36
37 EOT 04 77 B7 F7 7 37
38 78 B8 F8 8 38
39 79 60 B9 F9 9 39
3A 7A : 3A BA FA
3B 7B # 23 BB FB
3C DC4 14 7C @ 40 BC FC
3D NAK 15 7D 27 BD ] 5D FD
3E 7E = 3D BE FE
3F SUB 1A 7F n 22 BF FF
Empty locations translate to ASCII null X00.
1270A514 Issue 3 2-101

16.1 Generate a MAC

Command: Generate a MAC on given data.
Notes: The value n given for Data is the recommended maximum value; it can be
increased towards 2047 (1023 for SNA-SDLC systems) with consideration for
the overall buffer size compared to the size of the complete HSM command
message.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value MA.
TAK 16 H TAK encrypted under LMK pair 16-17.

The data on which a MAC is to be generated, n = 1024 (512
Data 0-n
for SNA-SDLC systems).
Optional. Must be present if a message trailer is present.
End message delimiter 1C
Value X19.
RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value MB.
27 : TAK not single length.
MAC 8H The calculated MAC.
Present only if present in the command message. Value
X19.
Present only if present in the command message. Maximum
Message trailer nA
2-102 1270A514 Issue 3

16.2 Verify a MAC

Command: Verify a MAC.
Notes: The value n given for Data is the recommended maximum value; it can be
increased toward 2047 (1023 for SNA-SDLC systems) with consideration for
message.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value MC.
TAK 16 H TAK encrypted under LMK pair 16-17.

MAC 8H The MAC to be verified.
The data on which the MAC to be verified was calculated, n
Data 0-n
= 1024 (512 for SNA-SDLC systems).
Value X19.
RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value MD.
01 : MAC verification failure.
X19.
Message trailer nA
1270A514 Issue 3 2-103

16.3 Verify and Translate a MAC

Command: Verify a MAC and, if successful, generate a MAC on the same data with a
different key.
Notes: If the source MAC does not verify, the HSM does not return a destination MAC.
The value n given for Data is the recommended maximum value; it can be
message.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value ME.
Source TAK 16 H The source TAK encrypted under LMK pair 16-17.
Destination TAK 16 H The destination key encrypted under LMK pair 16-17.
MAC 8H The MAC generated with the source key.
The data on which to verify and generate a MAC, n = 1024
Data 0-n
(512 for SNA-SDLC systems).
Value X19.
RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value MF.
10 : Source TAK parity error.
11 : Destination TAK parity error.
27 : Source or Destination TAK not single length.
MAC 8H The MAC generated using the destination TAK.
X19.

2-104 1270A514 Issue 3

16.4 Generate MAC (MAB) for Large Message

Command: Generate a MAC (MAB) for a large message.
Notes: The command operates on binary data. If the HSM is set for Async/ASCII
operation, ensure that:
The Host port has been set for 8 data bit operation by the CH (Configure Host)
command.
The data for which the MAC is to be generated does not contain either EM
(X19) or ETX (X03).
The value n given for Data is the recommended maximum value; it can be
message.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value MQ.
Message block number 0 : The only block.
1 : The first block.
1N
2 : A middle block.
3 : The last block.
ZAK 16 H ZAK encrypted under LMK pair 26-27
IV Initialization value, present only when message block
16 H
number is 2 or 3.
Message length 3H Message length in bytes.
Message block nB The clear text message block.
Value X19.
1270A514 Issue 3 2-105


RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value MR.

02: ZAK not single length.
05 : Invalid message block number.
10 : ZAK parity error.
80 : Data length error.
MAB 16 H Used as IV for next block when message block number is 1
or 2. Used as message authenticator when message block
number is 0 or 3.
X19.

2-106 1270A514 Issue 3

16.5 Generate MAC (MAB) using ANSI X9.19 Method for a Large Message
Command: To generate a MAB for a large message using either a TAC or a ZAK. If the
key is single length use ANSI X9.9 MAC generation or if the key is double
length use ANSI X9.19 MAC generation.
Notes: The command can operate on binary data or expanded Hex. If the HSM is set
for Async/ASCII operation and binary data used ensure that:
The host port has been set for 8 data bit operation by the CH (Configure Host)
command.
The data for which the MAC is to be generated does not contain either EM
(X19) or ETX(X03).
Expanded Hex mode uses 2 hexadecimal characters for each binary byte.
If the message block is the first or a middle block it must be a multiple of 8
bytes.
Consideration to the buffer size of the HSM must be made before the value n
message length is selected.
1270A514 Issue 3 2-107


COMMAND MESSAGE
Message Header mA Will be returned to the Host unchanged.
Command Code 2A Value MS
Message Block Number 1N Message block processing number

0 - Only Block
1 - First Block
2 - A Middle Block
3 - Last Block
Key Type 1N Key type
0 TAK (Terminal Authentication Key)
1 ZAK (Zone Authentication Key)
Key Length 1N Key length
0 Single Length DES Key
1 Double Length DES Key
Message Type 1N Message Type
0 Message data is binary
1 Message data is expanded Hex
Key 16 or 32H or Key, encrypted under appropriate LMK pair
1A+32H TAK under LMK pair 16 17
ZAK under LMK pair 26 27
IV 16H Initialization value, present only when message block
number is 2 or 3
Message Length 4H Length of Message to be MACED (length of following field

if message type binary, Half the length of the following
field if expanded Hex)
Message Block nB or H The message block either in binary or as expanded Hex
End Message Delimiter 1C Optional. Must be present if a message trailer is present.

Value X19.
Message Trailer nA Optional. Maximum length is 32 bytes.
2-108 1270A514 Issue 3


RESPONSE MESSAGE
Message Header mA Will be returned to the Host unchanged.
Response Code 2A Value MT
Error Code 2N 00 : No errors
03 : Invalid Message Type Code
04 : Invalid Key Type Code
05 : Invalid Message Block Number
06 Invalid Key Length Code
10 : KEY parity error
12 : No keys loaded in user storage
13 : LMK error; report to supervisor
27 : Invalid key length
80 : Incorrect input data length
MAB 16H Used as IV for next block when message block number is
1 or 2
Used as message authenticator when message block is 0

or 3

Value X19.
Message Trailer nA Optional. Maximum length is 32 bytes.
1270A514 Issue 3 2-109

17 BASE24 BINARY MAC COMMANDS

Binary MAC commands, used by ACI's Base24 Release 5, allow the HSM to compute a MAC
on binary data. See also the MQ command which provides a binary MAC facility.
Some Host computers cannot handle binary data in a normal async environment. When the
HSM is set up for normal async the binary data is assumed to be supplied in expanded
hexadecimal notation (i.e., each binary byte is converted to two hexadecimal characters). This
has the effect of doubling the amount of data sent to the HSM.
Unlike the standard MAC commands, MA, MC and ME, the Binary MAC commands make no
assumptions about the format or representation of the supplied MAC data; they compute a
MAC on the exact binary values supplied regardless of character format. Note, however, that
the keys and other values are assumed to be in hexadecimal character format. Only the MAC
data field accepts binary data.
17.1 Generate a Binary MAC (Base24)

Command: Generate a MAC on binary data using a TAK.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value MK.

TAK 16 H The TAK used to generate the MAC, encrypted under LMK
16-17.
EITHER
For Binary
Communications Modes:
Data length 3H X001 to X320 indicating the length of the data field.
Data nB Data to be MACed. 1 to 800 bytes.

OR
For Normal Async
Modes:
Data nH Data to be MACed. 2 to 800 hexadecimal characters

representing 1 to 400 bytes.

Value X19.
2-110 1270A514 Issue 3


RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value ML.

12 : No keys in user storage.
13 : LMK parity error.
27 : TAK not single length
MAC 8H The computed MAC.
X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-111

17.2 Verify a Binary MAC (Base24)

Command: Verify a MAC on binary data using a TAK.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value MM.
TAK 16 H The TAK used to generate the MAC, encrypted under LMK
16-17.

EITHER
For Binary
OR
For Normal Async
Modes:
Value X19.
RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value MN.

01 : MAC did not verify.
X19.

2-112 1270A514 Issue 3

17.3 Verify and Translate a Binary MAC (Base24)

Command: Verify a MAC on binary data using a source TAK, then recompute the MAC
using a destination TAK.
Notes: If the verify fails no destination MAC is computed.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value MO.
Source TAK 16 H The source TAK used to verify the MAC, encrypted under
LMK 16-17.
Destination TAK 16 H The destination TAK used to verify the MAC, encrypted
under LMK 16-17.

EITHER
For Binary
OR
For Normal Async
Modes:

Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value MP.
01 : MAC did not verify.
10 : Source TAK parity error.
11 : Destination TAK parity error.
27 : Source or destination TAK not single length.
MAC 8H The computed MAC.
X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-113

18 USER STORAGE SUPPORT

The standard speed HSM contains 8192 bytes of memory allocated to the storage of keys and
tables. The high speed HSM contains 98304 bytes of memory allocated to the storage of keys
and tables. The configure security command sets the block size for user storage locations.
The data can be loaded and read from this storage by the Host. This facility can be used to
reload the contents after a power-down, a reset, or after batch solicitation data processing.
In addition, a facility is provided to verify a Diebold table held in user storage.
18.1 Load Data to User Storage

Command: Load data to user storage.
Notes: Each block of data is 16 or 32 or 48 characters long (enough for one single,
double or triple key) and this command can load a maximum of 32 blocks of
data. If the block size is set to a larger setting than the data to be loaded the
data should be padded with F to fill the block.
Ensure that the location within user storage does not conflict with any Diebold
table already loaded.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value LA.

Index address 3H The 3-digit address identifying the first location at which to
store the data.
Block count 2H The hexadecimal count of the number of blocks of data (0 to

X20).
Block 1 16H or 32H or 48H The first encrypted key or other data
. . .
. . .
. . .
Last block 16H or 32H or 48H The last encrypted key or other data.

Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value LB.

X19.

2-114 1270A514 Issue 3

18.2 Read Data from User Storage

Command: Read data from user storage.
Notes: Each block of data is 16 or 32 or 48 characters long (enough for one single,
double or triple key), and this command can return a maximum of 32 blocks of
data.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value LE.
Index address 3H The 3-digit address identifying the first location at which to
read the data.
Block count 2H The hexadecimal count of the number of blocks of data (0 to

X20).

Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value LF.
12 : No data loaded in user storage.
Block 1 16H or 32H or 48H The first encrypted key or other data.
. . .
. . .
. . .
Last block 16H or 32H or 48H The last encrypted key or other data.
X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-115

18.3 Verify the Diebold Table in User Storage

Command: Verify the Diebold table held in user storage.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value LC.
Index address 3H The address of the start of the Diebold table for validation.
Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value LD.

19: Diebold table invalid.
X19.

2-116 1270A514 Issue 3

19 PRINT OUTPUT FORMATTING

Forms for conveying and protecting PINs and keys can be produced on a printer attached to the
HSM Auxiliary port of an RG7X00 series HSM (or an RG7X10 High-Speed HSM supplied with a
print facility to special order). The documents are printed at the terminal in response to a
command from the Host, as defined elsewhere in this manual.
Before using the HSM printer commands it is necessary to define the format of the mailer or
document. The definition data is stored in the HSM until power is removed, or until a reset is
performed. The PA and PC commands are used to send formatting symbols to the HSM. The
formatting symbols for defining the print fields and any constant literals are given in the table
that follows the two-up and one-up examples.
Use the PA command to create the mailer format. The PC command is a continuation of the PA
command, used only if the format definition is too long to fit in a single message (i.e., the PA
command exceeds the Host's maximum output record size).
The format definition can contain up to 299 formatting symbols and constants.
Example.
Print Format for Two-up Mailers:
. + . 1 . + . 2 . + . 3 . + . 4 . + . 5 . + . 6
1
THOMAS M SMITH JOHN R JONES
2 APT 4B 1782
th
427 WEST 9 ST 3690
3 39 ELM DR WAYNE PA 19132
4 MEDIA PA 19063
5
6 THANK YOU THANK YOU
7
Formatting symbols in PA command:

>L>003^0>033^4>L>003^1>023^P>033^5>053^Q >L>003^2>033^6>L>003^3>03
3^7>L>L>003T HANK YO U>033T HANK YO U>L>F
First line: >L>003^0>033^4
Second line: >L>003^1>023^P>033^5>053^Q
Third line: >L>003^2>033^6
Fourth line: >L>003^3>033^7
Fifth line: >L
Sixth line: >L>003T HANK YO U>033T HANK YO U
Seventh line: >L
Form feed: >F
1270A514 Issue 3 2-117

Example.
Print Format for One-up Mailers:
. + . 1 . + . 2 . + . 3 . + . 4 . + . 5 . + . 6
1 THOMAS M SMITH
2 APT 4B 1782
3 39 ELM DR
4 MEDIA PA 19063
5 YOUR FULL SERVICE BANK
6
1 JOHN R JONES
2 th
427 WEST 9 ST 3690
3 WAYNE PA 19132
4
5
YOUR FULL SERVICE BANK
6
Formatting symbols in PA command:

>L>013^0>L>013^1>041^P>L>013^2>L>013^3>L>013 YO UR F ULL SERVICE
BANK>L>F>
First line: >L>013^0
Second line: >L>013^1>041^P
Third line: >L>013^2
Fourth line: >L>013^3
Fifth line: >L>013YO UR FULL SERVICE BANK
Sixth line: >L
Form feed: >F
2-118 1270A514 Issue 3

Symbol EBCDIC ASCII Meaning

>L 6E D3 3E 4C Line feed, carriage return.
>V 6E E5 3E 56 Vertical tab.
>H 6E C8 3E 48 Horizontal tab.
>F 6E C6 3E 46 Form feed.
>nnn 6E Fn Fn Fn 3E 3n 3n 3n Skip column nnn in relation to left margin, where nnn is a 3-

digit decimal number.
^M 5F D6 5E 49 For a key document, print third clear component.
^P 5F D7 5E 50 For a PIN mailer, print clear PIN for mailer 1. For a key
document, print clear component.
^Q 5F D8 5E 51 For a PIN mailer, print clear PIN for mailer 2. For a key
document, print clear component or encrypted TMK (only
one-up printing allowed for key documents).
^R 5F D9 5E 52 Print reference number for PIN mailer 1.
^S 5F E2 5E 53 Print reference number for PIN mailer 2.
^T 5F E3 5E 54 Print last 6 account number digits on PIN mailer 1.
^U 5F E4 5E 55 Print last 6 account number digits on PIN mailer 2.
|<L><hh 6A <L> <hh hh hh 7C <L> <hh hh hh Send binary data to printer for example printer control string.
hh hh ..> ..> ..> | character followed by the length of the string in bytes <L> 0
- F then the expanded hex string <hh hh hh ..>.
^0 5F F0 5E 30 Insert Print Field 0.

. . . .
. . . .
. . . .
^F 5F C6 5F 46 Insert Print Field 15.
Print Formatting Symbols
1270A514 Issue 3 2-119

19.1 Printing PINs in Word Format

Two print formatting symbols are provided for printing PINs in word format.
For example:
ONE TWO THREE FOUR.
English is used as the default setting. The symbols can be used in addition to the symbols for
printing PINs in numeric format (e.g., 1234).
^V 5F E3 5E 56 Print the clear PIN in word format for mailer 1.

Can be used for either a one-up or a two-up PIN
mailer.
e.g., ONE TWO THREE FOUR
^W 5F E6 5E 57 Print the clear PIN in word format for mailer 2.

Can be used only for a two-up PIN mailer.
e.g., ONE TWO THREE FOUR
Print Formatting Symbols for Printing PINs in Word Format
2-120 1270A514 Issue 3

19.2 Printing PINs in Columns
Four print formatting symbols are provided for printing PINs (both words and numerics) in
columns. For example:
1 ONE
2 TWO
3 THREE
4 FOUR
For the following definition of print symbols an n is used to indicate which digit of a PIN is to be
printed. The relationship between PIN digits and n is as follows:
PIN
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Digit
n 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A B C
^Pn 5F D7 5E 50 Print the clear PIN digit n in number format for mailer
F1-F9 31-39 1. Can be used for either a one-up or a two-up PIN
or C1-C3 or 41-43 mailer.
e.g., 1
^Qn 5F D8 5E 51 Print the clear PIN digit n in number format for mailer
F1-F9 31-39 2. Can be used only for two-up PIN mailer.
or C1-C3 or 41-43 e.g., 1
^Vn 5F E3 5E 56 Print the clear PIN digit n in word format for mailer 1.
F1-F9 31-39 Can be used for either a one-up or a two-up PIN
or C1-C3 or 41-43 mailer.
e.g., ONE
^Wn 5F E6 5E 57 Print the clear PIN digit n in word format for mailer 2.
F1-F9 31-39 Can be used only for two-up PIN mailer.
or C1-C3 or 41-43 e.g., ONE
Print Formatting Symbols for Printing PINs in Columns
1270A514 Issue 3 2-121

19.3 Load Formatting Data to HSM

Command: Load formatting data to the HSM.
Notes: The HSM can store a maximum of 299 symbols and constants.
High-Speed HSMs.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value PA.
Symbols and constants defined in Print Formatting Symbols
Data nA
Tables.
Value X19.
RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value PB.
X19.
Message trailer nA
2-122 1270A514 Issue 3

19.4 Load Additional Formatting Data to HSM

Command: Load additional formatting data to the HSM.
Notes: The PC command must be preceded by a PA command.
The HSM can store a maximum of 299 symbols and constants including the
data sent with the PA command.
High-Speed HSMs.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value PC.

Data nA Symbols and constants defined in Print Formatting Symbols
Tables.

Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value PD.

X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-123

19.5 Load a PIN Text String

Command: Load a PIN text string.
Notes: The default PIN text string, used by the HSM when printing PINs in words is
initialised at Cold-Start to English (ONE, TWO, THREE, ....). The Load PIN
Text String command can be used to re-define the text string which is then
stored in battery-backed not tamper-protected memory.
When re-defining the text strings, strings for all characters (0 to 9) must be
supplied.
The value for the length fields can be in the range 0,1,2,.... to F (Hex), with 0
representing length 1610.
High-Speed HSMs.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value LI.

Length 1H The length of the string for Character 0.
Character 0 nB The text string representing Character 0.

. . .
. . .
. . .

Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value LJ.

X19.

2-124 1270A514 Issue 3

20 TRANSLATE DATA AFTER CHANGE OF LOCAL MASTER KEYS

Much of the data held by the Host is encrypted under specific LMK pairs. If the value of a pair
changes, the associated data cannot be used until it has been translated. To do this a facility is
provided for the storage of the old LMK pair within the HSM. This storage location is known as
Key Change Storage.
When the old pair has been saved in key change storage, and the new pair loaded in the
standard LMK storage, all data held on the Host, encrypted under the old LMK pair must be
sent to the HSM for translation. Commands are provided for translating each type of key and
PINs encrypted for Host storage.
20.1 Translate a ZMK

Command: Translate a ZMK encrypted under the LMK pair held in key change storage
to encryption under LMK pair 04-05.
Notes: Notes: If using a 32-character ZMK, the HSM must be configured for double-
length ZMKs (by the CS (Configure Security) command).

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value GE.

ZMK 16H or 32H or The ZMK encrypted under the LMK pair held in key change
1A+32H or 1A+48H storage.

Value ;.
value or 0.
1 - KCV 6H.
Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value GF.

ZMK 16H or 32H or The ZMK translated to encryption under LMK pair 04-05.
1A+32H or 1A+48H

1270A514 Issue 3 2-125

20.2 Translate a ZPK

Command: Translate a ZPK encrypted under the LMK pair held in key change storage to
encryption under LMK pair 06-07.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value KC.
ZPK 16H or The ZPK encrypted under the LMK pair held in key change

present. Value ;.
value or 0.
1 - KCV 6H.
Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value KD.

ZPK 16H or The ZPK translated to encryption under LMK pair 06-07.
1A+32H or 1A+48H
X19.

2-126 1270A514 Issue 3

20.3 Translate a TMK, TPK or PVK

Command: Translate a TMK, TPK or PVK encrypted under the LMK pair held in key
change storage to encryption under LMK pair 14-15.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value AA.
TMK, TPK or PVK 16H or The TMK, TPK or PVK encrypted under the LMK pair held in
1A+32H or 1A+48H key change storage.

present. Value ;.
value or 0.
1 - KCV 6H.
Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value AB.

TMK, TPK or PVK 16H or The TMK, TPK or PVK translated to encryption under LMK
1A+32H or 1A+48H pair 14-15.
X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-127

20.4 Translate a TAK

Command: Translate a TAK encrypted under the LMK pair held in key change storage to
encryption under LMK pair 16-17.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value AC.
TAK 16H or The TAK encrypted under the LMK pair held in key change

present. Value ;.
value or 0.
1 - KCV 6H.
Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value AD.

TAK 16H or The TAK translated to encryption under LMK pair 16-17.
1A+32H or 1A+48H
X19.

2-128 1270A514 Issue 3

20.5 Translate a PIN and PIN Length

Command: Translate a PIN and/or PIN length from encryption under the LMK pair held in
key change storage to encryption under LMK pair 02-03. Also, translate the
PIN length if a new value has been selected.
Notes: The command can be used to translate the PIN length only. In this case, load
the same LMKs to key change storage that are loaded as the current LMK.
The PIN length is L2N for PIN encryption algorithm A, and L2H for PIN
encryption algorithm B, as selected by the CS (Configure Security) command.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value BG.

the check digit.
PIN L1 N or L1 H The PIN encrypted under the LMK pair in key change
storage, where L 1 is the old encrypted PIN length.

Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value BH.
14: Error in PIN from Host database.
PIN L2 N or L2 H The PIN encrypted under new LMK pair 02-03, where L2 is
the new encrypted PIN length.
X19.
1270A514 Issue 3 2-129

20.6 Translate Keys from Old LMK to New LMK

Command: Translate keys from encryption under the LMK held in key change storage to
encryption under a new LMK.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value BW.
Key type code 2N Indicates the LMK under which the key is encrypted.
00 : LMK pair 04-05
01 : LMK pair 06-07
02 : LMK pair 14-15
03 : LMK pair 16-17
04 : LMK pair 18-19
05 : LMK pair 20-21
06 : LMK pair 22-23
07 : LMK pair 24-25
08 : LMK pair 26-27
09 : LMK pair 28-29
0A : LMK pair 30-31
0B : LMK pair 32-33
10 : Variant 1 of LMK pair 04-05
FF : Use key type specified after delimiter
Key length flag 1N 0 for single-length key, 1 for double-length key, 3 for triple-
length key
Key 16H or 32H or Key encrypted under old LMK held in key change storage.
1A+32H or 1A+48H
Delimiter 1A Optional. Only present if following field present. Value ;

present. Value ;.
value or 0.
1 - KCV 6H.
Value X19.
2-130 1270A514 Issue 3


RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value BX.

04 : Invalid key type code.
05 : Invalid key length flag.
Key 16H or 32H or Key encrypted under the new LMK.
1A+32H or 1A+48H
X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-131

20.7 Erase the Key Change Storage

Command: Erase the key change storage area of memory.
Notes: It is recommended that this command is used after keys stored by the Host
have been translated from old to new LMKs.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value BS.

Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value BT.

X19.

2-132 1270A514 Issue 3

21 MISCELLANEOUS COMMANDS
The following miscellaneous commands are supported by the HSM:
Cancel the Authorized state.
Generate a check value for a given key.
Set HSM response delay.
Perform diagnostics and obtain LMK check value.
21.1 Cancel the Authorised State

Command: Cancel the Authorised state.
Notes: The command should be used whenever the application has completed the
current requirement for the Authorised state.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value RA.
Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value RB.

X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-133

21.2 Generate a Key Check Value (Not Double-Length ZMK)

Command: Generate a key check value for one of the following:
ZMK (single-length), ZPK, TMK, TPK, PVK, TAK
Notes: The command can be used to verify a key received from another party. The
HSM generates the value by encrypting 64 binary zeroes under the key.
This command does not support the use of double-length ZMKs.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value KA.
Encrypted key 16H or One of the following: ZMK, ZPK, TMK, TPK, PVK or TAK
1A+32H or 1A+48H encrypted under the relevant LMK pair.
Key type code 2N The key type identifier:

00 : ZMK.
01 : ZPK.
02 : TMK, TPK or PVK.
03 : TAK.
present. Value ;.
value or 0.
1 - KCV 6H.
Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value KB.
10 : Encrypted key parity error.
Key check value 16 H or 6 H The check value for the given key. Calculated by
encrypting 64 binary zeroes under the key.
X19.

2-134 1270A514 Issue 3

21.3 Generate a Key Check Value

Command: Generate a check value for a key encrypted under a specified LMK pair.
Note: See key table for key useage.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value BU.
Key type code 2N Indicates the LMK under which the key is encrypted. (see
key table)
00 : LMK pair 04-05
01 : LMK pair 06-07
02 : LMK pair 14-15
03 : LMK pair 16-17
04 : LMK pair 18-19
05 : LMK pair 20-21
06 : LMK pair 22-23
07 : LMK pair 24-25
08 : LMK pair 26-27
09 : LMK pair 28-29
0A : LMK pair 30-31
0B : LMK pair 32-33
FF : Use key type specified after delimiter
Key length flag 1N 0 for single-length key, 1 for double-length key, 3 for triple
length key.
Key 16H or Key encrypted under the specified LMK.

1A+32H or 1A+48H
Delimiter 1A Optional. Only present if following field present. Value ;


present. Value ;.
value or 0.
1 - KCV 6H.
Value X19.
1270A514 Issue 3 2-135


RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value BV.

04 : Invalid key type code.
05 : Invalid key length flag.
X19.

2-136 1270A514 Issue 3

21.4 Set HSM Response Delay

Command: Set the delay for which the HSM waits before it responds to a command
Notes: The command enables the Host to delay HSM output. This is for Host ports
that are half duplex and require time to reconfigure from output to input mode.
The delay duration is from 0 to 255ms. (The value is treated as MOD 256, so
a setting of 256 results in a delay of 0).
The delay is not implemented until after the response to this command.
If the HSM is configured to any host configuration other than async, this
command has no effect.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value LG.

Delay 3N Value 000 to 255.

Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value LH.

X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-137

21.5 Perform Diagnostics

Command: Test the processor, firmware PROMs and the LMK pairs. Return the LMK
check value.
Notes: The check value is the same as the value returned for the Console V
command.
The Host system should time the NC command and generate an appropriate
system message if a response is not received within 5 seconds. If an error is
detected in the processor, HSM functions are suspended, and no message is
returned to the Host.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value NC.

Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value ND.
40 : Firmware PROM error.
41 : Hardware/software error.
42 : DES crypto-processor failure.
LMK check 16 H The LMK check value.
Firmware number 9A The firmware reference number in the form: xxxx-xxxx

This is the value returned for the Console VR command.
X19.

2-138 1270A514 Issue 3

21.6 HSM Status

Command: To return HSM status information
Notes: Mode 00 available all others reserved for future use

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value N0.
Mode flag 2H Mode Flag 00 - Return status information

01 -
: Reserved for future use
FF -
Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value NP.
Mode 00
I/O buffer size 1N I/O buffer size 0 - 2k
1 - 8k
2 - 16k
3 - 32k
Ethernet type 1N Type of Ethernet connection 0 - UDP
1 - TCP
Number of TCP Sockets 1N Number of TCP sockets configured
Firmware number 9A The firmware reference number in the form: xxxx-xxxx
DSP fitted 1N DSP fitted 0 - No

1 - Yes
DSP firmware number 4A DSP firmware number
Mode 01 - FF Reserved for future use

X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-139

22 VISA CARD VERIFICATION VALUES

The CVV commands can also be used to generate and verify CVV2 and Mastercard CVC.
22.1 Generate a CVK Pair

Command: Generate a VISA CVK pair. Output the key pair encrypted under a variant of
LMK pair 14-15.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value AS.
Delimiter 1A Optional. Only present if following fields used. Value ;
CVK 1A Optional. Key scheme for encrypting CVK under LMK

present. Value ;.
value or 0.
1 - KCV 6H.
Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value AT.

CVK Key scheme = 0 or not specified
CVK A 16 H CVK A encrypted under a variant 4 of LMK pair 14-15.

CVK B 16 H CVK B encrypted under a variant 4 of LMK pair 14-15.
CVK Key scheme not 0
CVK A/B 1A + 32H CVK A/B encrypted under a variant 4 of LMK pair 14-15.
KCV Type = 0 or not specified
CVK A check value 6H The CVK A check value.
CVK B check value 6H The CVK B check value.
For KCV Type =1
CVK A/B check value 6H The CVK A/B check value

X19.

2-140 1270A514 Issue 3

22.2 Translate a CVK Pair from LMK to ZMK Encryption

Command: Translate a CVK pair from encryption under a variant of LMK pair 14-15 to
encryption under a ZMK.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value AU.

1A+32H or 1A+48H
CVK A / B 32H or 1A+32H CVK A / B encrypted under a variant 4 of LMK pair 14-15.
equipment.

present. Value ;.
value or 0.
1 - KCV 6H.
Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value AV.

11 : CVK A or B parity error.
CVK A / B 32H or 1A+32H CVK A/B encrypted under ZMK
KCV Type = 1
X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-141

22.3 Translate a CVK Pair from ZMK to LMK Encryption

Command: Translate a CVK pair from encryption under a ZMK to encryption under a
variant of LMK pair 14-15.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value AW.
ZMK 16 H or 32 H ZMK encrypted under LMK pair 04-05.
CVK A / B 32H or 1A+32H CVK A encrypted under the ZMK.

equipment.

present. Value ;.
value or 0.
1 - KCV 6H.
Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value AX.

CVK A / B 32H or 1A+32H CVK A / B encrypted under a variant 4 of LMK pair 14-15.
KCV Type = 1
X19.

2-142 1270A514 Issue 3

22.4 Translate a CVK Pair from Old LMK to New LMK Encryption
Command: Translate a CVK pair from encryption under a variant 4 of an old LMK pair 14-
15 to encryption under a variant 4 of a new LMK pair 14-15.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value AY.
CVK A / B 32H or 1A+32H CVK A / B encrypted under a variant 4 of the old LMK pair
14-15.

present. Value ;.
value or 0.
1 - KCV 6H.
Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value AZ.

CVK A / B 32H or 1A+32H CVK A / B encrypted under a variant of LMK pair 14-15.
X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-143

22.5 Generate a VISA CVV

Command: Generate a VISA CVV for encoding on a card.
Notes: Used to generate Track 1 or Track 2 CVVs.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value CW.
CVK A / B 32H or 1A+32H VISA CVK A / B encrypted under a variant 4 of LMK pair
14-15.
Primary account number nN The primary account number for the card.
Expiration date 4N The card expiration date.
Service code 3N The card service code.

Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value CX.
10 : CVK A or CVK B parity error.
27 : CVK not double length.
CVV 3N CVV to be encoded on card.
X19.

2-144 1270A514 Issue 3

22.6 Verify a VISA CVV

Command: Verify a VISA CVV.
Notes: The command issue to verify Track 1 or Track 2 CVVs.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value CY.
CVK A / B 32H or 1A+32H VISA CVK A / B encrypted under a variant 4 of LMK pair
14-15.
CVV 3N CVV for verification.

Primary account number nN The primary account number for the card.
Expiration date 4N The card expiration data.

Service code 3N The card service code.

Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value CZ.

01 : CVV failed verification.
27 : CVK not double length.
X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-145

23 VISA CASH SYSTEM

The HSM supports the functions to load and unload value from Visa Cash cards.
Notes:
The use of the ALGLIEP and VKLIEP fields in following commands deserves special mention as
these fields are optional. There are 3 scenarios controlled by these fields.
Scenario Applicable Visa Single or Double Additional Notes

Cash cards length KDL used
Neither VKLIEP or Version 1.5 and Single May be used with cards which
ALGLIEP supplied earlier DES cards do not report VKLIEP or ALGLIEP.
to HSM Backwards compatible with
earlier versions of HSM
firmware
Only VKLIEP Version 1.6 DES Double May be used with later cards.
supplied to HSM cards and Public Host must determine the value
Key cards of ALGLIEP and supply VKLIEP if
required. Backwards compatible
with earlier versions of HSM
firmware
Both VKLIEP and Any card. Single if ALGLIEP Allows host to send both
ALGLIEP supplied has value 01, ALGLIEP and VKLIEP without
to HSM double if ALGLIEP concern about their values.
has value 04 VKLIEP must always be supplied
as a placeholder even if its
value is not relevant (ie when
ALGLIEP is of value 01)
This set of scenarios accommodates all relevant combinations of Visa Cash cards and allows
the host application to operate in one of two modes.
Host makes the decision about what ALGLIEP is relevant for the current transaction and either
supplies VKLIEP if ALGLIEP is of value 04, or does not supply VKLIEP if ALGLIEP is of value 01.
ALGLIEP itself is not sent to the HSM. Thus the first and second scenarios in the above table
can be used to cater for all cards in use. This mode of operation is used by some (earlier) host
systems and therefore must be supported for backwards compatibility. Note that earlier Visa
Cash cards do not report a value of ALGLIEP and so the host may have to determine this in
other ways. Reference 4 discusses this point.
Host simply passes values of ALGLIEP and VKLIEP to HSM as supplied in the current
transaction. Thus if a card does not supply ALGLIEP or VKLIEP no values are passed to the HSM
and vice versa. Thus the first and third scenarios in the above table will be used. In this mode
of operation the host is not required to make any decisions about the transaction; these are left
to the HSM.
If Visa specifies alternative processing requirements in the future (and hence values of ALGLIEP
other than 1 or 4) the HSM will be upgraded to accommodate them.
The earlier Visa Cash cards which do not report ALGLIEP or VKLIEP will all eventually expire
making the first scenario in the above table redundant.
2-146 1270A514 Issue 3

23.1 Generate and Export a *KML

Command: Generate a double-length Master Load Key (*KML) and return it encrypted
under Variant 2 of LMK pair 04-05, and also under a double length Zone
Control Master Key (*ZCMK).
Notes: A check value for the *KML is also returned.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value DI.
*ZCMK 32H or 1A+32H or *ZCMK encrypted under LMK pair 04-05.

1A+48H
equipment.

Value ;.
If an option is not required by the command fill with a valid value
or 0.
1 - KCV 6H.
X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value DJ.

10 : *ZCMK parity error.
27 : *KML not double length.
*KML (*ZCMK) 32H or 1A+32H *KML, encrypted under *ZCMK.
*KML (LMK) 32H or 1A+32H *KML, encrypted under Variant 2 of LMK pair 04-05.
*KML check value 6H Check value formed by encrypting a block of 64 binary zeros
with the *KML and returning the 24 left-most bits of the result.
1270A514 Issue 3 2-147

23.2 Import a *KML

Command: Translate a double-length Master Load Key (*KML) from encryption under a
Zone Master Key (*ZCMK) to encryption under Variant 2 of LMK pair 04-05.
Notes: A check value for the *KML is also returned.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value DK.
*ZCMK 32H or 1A+32H or *ZCMK encrypted under LMK pair 04-05.

1A+48H
*KML 32H or 1A+32H *KML, encrypted under *ZCMK.

equipment.

present. Value ;.
value or 0.
1 - KCV 6H.
Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value DL.

10 ; *ZCMK parity error.
11 : *KML parity error.
27 : *KML not double length
*KML 32H or 1A+32H *KML, encrypted under Variant 2 of LMK pair 04-05.
*KML check value 6H Check value formed by encrypting a block of 64 binary

zeros with the *KML and returning the left-most 24 bits of
the result.
X19.

2-148 1270A514 Issue 3

23.3 Verify Load Signature S1 and Generate Load Signature S2

Command: Verify Load Signature S1 and generate Load Signature S2 .

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value DM.
BIN IEP 6H IEP Issuer Visa assigned BIN.

ID IEP 10 H IEP Serial number.
DEXP IEP 6H IEP Expiration date (YYMMDD format).
NT IEP 4H IEP Transaction counter.
M LDA 8H Amount to be loaded.

CURR LDA 4H Load device currency code.
CEXP LDA 2H Load device currency exponent.
BAL IEP 8H IEP Current balance.

ID ACQ 8H Acquirer BIN.
R 8H Random number.
S1 16 H Load request signature for validation.
VKLIEP 2H Optional. Load Key version. If present but ALGLIEP not

present, then a double length KDL will be used; see Notes in
Introduction. Must be present if ALGLIEP is present.
ALGLIEP 2H Optional. Load Algorithm. Can only take the values 01 and
04. If set to 01 a single length KDL is used and VKLIEP is
ignored. If 04, a double length KDL is used and VKLIEP is
used.

Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value DN.

01 : S 1 verification failure.
03 : Invalid ALGLIEP.
S2 16 H Returned load signature.
X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-149

23.4 Verify Load Completion Signature S3

Command: Verify Load Completion Signature S3 .

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value DO.


R 8H Random number.
CC IEP 4H Completion code.
S3 16 H Load completion signature for validation.

VKL IEP 2H Optional. Load Key version. If present but ALGLIEP not
used.

Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value DP.

01 : S 3 verification failure.
X19.

2-150 1270A514 Issue 3

23.5 Verify Unload Signature S1 and Generate Unload Signature S2

Command: Verify Unload Signature S1 and generate Unload Signature S2 .

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value DQ.

M LDA 8H Amount to be unloaded.

CURR LDA 4H Load device currency code.
CEXP LDA 2H Load device currency exponent.
BAL IEP 8H IEP Current balance.

R 8H Random number.
S1 16 H Unload request signature for validation.
VKLIEP 2H Optional. Load Key version. If present but ALGLIEP not

ALGLIEP 2H Optional. Load Algorithm. Can only take the values 01 and 04.
If set to 01 a single length KDL is used and VKLIEP is ignored.
If 04, a double length KDL is used and VKLIEP is used.

Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value DR.

01 : S1 verification failure.
S2 16 H Returned unload signature.
X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-151

23.6 Verify Unload Completion Signature S3

Command: Verify Unload Completion Signature S3 .

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value DS.


R 8H Random number.
CC IEP 4H Completion code.
S3 16 H Unload completion signature for validation.

VKL IEP 2H Optional. Load Key version. If present but ALGLIEP not
used.

Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Message header nA Return to the Host unchanged.
Response code 2A Value DT.

01 : S3 verification failure.
X19.

2-152 1270A514 Issue 3

24 CHIP CARD
This section specifies the Host Security Module functionality which is needed to support on-line
transaction processing for the various payment schemes under the EMV umbrella. Whilst EMV
specifies most of the details pertaining to cards and terminals, the individual schemes have
defined their own cryptographic processes for on-line authorisation functions.
There are three functions supported:
A function which will validate ARQC (or TC/AAC) or generate ARPC (or perform both in one
call)
A function to verify a Data Authentication Code or a Dynamic Number.
Generate Secure Message with Integrity and optional Confidentiality
These functions have been designed to be as general purpose as possible.
Key Naming Conventions
The various schemes have adopted different naming conventions for the keys used. For
consistency the following convention is used:
Key Description Name used in VSDC/UKIS Europay/Master

this specification name used Card name used
Master Key for Authentication MK-AC DMK Issuer MK
Cryptograms
Master Key for Secure Messaging MK-SMI DMK Issuer MK
Integrity
Master Key for Secure Messaging MK-SMC DMK Issuer MK
Confidentiality
Master Key for Data Authentication MK-DAC - Issuer MK
Codes
Master Key for Dynamic Numbers MK-DN - Issuer MK
Derived Key for Authentication DK-AC UDK ICC MK
Cryptograms
Derived Key for Secure Messaging DK-SMI UDK ICC MK
Integrity
Derived Key for Secure Messaging DK-SMC UDK ICC MK
Confidentiality
Derived Key for Dynamic Numbers DK-DN - ICC MK
1270A514 Issue 3 2-153

24.1 ARQC (or TC/AAC) Verification and/or ARPC Generation

Command: To validate an ARQC (or TC/AAC) and, optionally, to generate an ARPC.
Alternatively, the command can be used to generate an ARPC alone. This
function is a general purpose command which will validate an ARQC, TC or
AAC.
Notes: Diagnostic data is produced by this command only if the HSM is in Authorised
State.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value KQ.
Mode Flag 1H Mode of operation:

0 = Perform ARQC verification only
1 = Perform ARQC Verification and ARPC generation
2 = Perform ARPC Generation only
Scheme ID 1H Identifier of the EMV scheme;
0 = Visa VSDC or UKIS
1 = Europay or MasterCard M/Chip
*MK-AC(LMK) 32H or 1A+32H The Issuer Master Key for Application Cryptograms
encrypted under Variant 1 of LMK pair 28-29.
PAN/PAN Sequence No 8B Pre-formatted PAN/PAN Sequence No.

ATC 2B Application Transaction Counter. Only present for Mode 0.
Must be supplied, though not used, For Scheme ID = 0
UN 4B Unpredictable Number. Only present for Mode 0. Must be

supplied, though not used, For Scheme ID = 0
Transaction Data Length 2H Length of next field. Can be any length from 1 to 255 bytes.
Only present for Mode 0.
Transaction Data nB Variable length data. Only present for Mode 0
Delimiter 1A Delimiter, to indicate end of Transaction Data, value ;. Only

present for Mode 0.
ARQC/TC/AAC 8B ARQC/TC/AAC to be validated and/or used for ARPC

generation. Present for both Mode 0 and 1.
Delimiter 1A Value ;. Only present if the next field is present
ARC 2B Authorization Response Code to be used for ARPC

Generation. Not required for Mode 0. Must be present for
Mode 1 and Mode 2.

Value X19.
2-154 1270A514 Issue 3


RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value KR.
Error Code 2N 00 : No error.

01 : ARQC/TC/AAC verification failed.
04 : Mode Flag not 0, 1 or 2.
05 : Unrecognised Scheme ID.
10 : MK parity error.
81 : Zero length Transaction Data.
ARPC 8B The calculated ARPC. Only present if no error is
encountered and if requested by supplying ARC in command
message in Mode 0 or by selecting Mode 1.
Diagnostic data 8B Calculated ARQC/TC/AAC returned only if the error code is

01 and the HSM is in Authorised State.
X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-155

24.2 Data Authentication Code and Dynamic Number Verification

Command: To verify a Data Authentication Code (DAC) or Dynamic Number (DN).
Notes: Diagnostic data is produced by this command only if the HSM is in Authorised
State.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value KS.
Mode Flag 1H Mode of operation:

0 = Perform DAC Verification
1 = Perform DN Verification
Scheme ID 1H Identifier of the Scheme:
1 = Europay/MasterCard
*MK-DAC(LMK) 32 H or 1A+32H The Issuer Master Key for Data Authentication Codes
encrypted under Variant 4 of LMK pair 28-29. Present only
for Mode 0.
*MK-DN(LMK) 32 H or1A+32H The Issuer Master Key for Dynamic Numbers encrypted
under Variant 5 of LMK pair 28-29. Present only for Mode 1.
PAN/PAN Sequence No 8B Pre-formatted PAN/PAN Sequence No. Present for both

Mode 0 and 1.
DAC 2B Data Authentication Code for validation. Only present for

Mode 0.
DN 2B Dynamic Number for validation. Only present for Mode 1.
ATC 2B Application Transaction Counter. Only present for Mode 1.

UN 4B Unpredictable Number. Only present for Mode 1.
Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value KT.
Error Code 2N 00 : No error

01 : DAC or DN verification failed
04 : Mode Flag not 0 or 1
05 : Unrecognised Scheme ID
10 : MK parity error
12 : No keys in user storage
13 : LMK parity error
Diagnostic Data 2B The calculated DAC or DN (depending on the mode
selected). Only provided if error code 01 is returned and the
HSM is in Authorised State.
X19.

2-156 1270A514 Issue 3

24.3 Generate Secure Message with Integrity and optional Confidentiality

Command: To generate a Secure Message with Integrity over data to be sent from the
Issuer back to the Card. Optionally, Secure Messaging with Confidentiality is
provided in which case the message data must be supplied encrypted under a
Transport Key. In this latter case the command first decrypts the message data
using the Transport Key before re-encrypting it using a Session Key.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value KU.
Mode Flag 1N 0 = Provide only Integrity functionality

1 = Provide Integrity and Confidentiality using the same
Issuer Master Key
2 = Provide Integrity and Confidentiality using different
Master Keys
Scheme-ID 1N Identifier for the Scheme:
0 = Visa VSDC and UKIS
1 = Europay/MasterCard
*MK-SMI(LMK) 32 H or 1A+32H The Master Key for Secure Messaging with Integrity
encrypted under Variant 2 of LMK pair 28-29.
PAN/PAN Sequence No 8B Pre-formatted PAN/PAN Sequence number

Integrity Session Data 8B Data used for Integrity Session Key Generation. For
Scheme-ID = 1 (Europay/MasterCard) this will be an 8 byte
random number, RANDi. For Scheme-ID = 0 (Visa/UKIS)
this will be the ATC (2 bytes) right justified and padded on
the left with 6 zero bytes.
Plaintext Message Data 4H Length in bytes of data in next field. For the standard model
Length HSM (RG7x00) the maximum size is 512 bytes (hex 0200).
Plaintext Message Data nB Plaintext Message Data.
Delimiter 1A Delimiter of previous field, ;.

*MK-SMC(LMK) 32 H or 1A+32H The Master Key for Secure Messaging with Confidentially
encrypted under Variant 3 of LMK pair 28-29. Only present if
Mode = 2.
TK(LMK) 32 H or 1A+32H Transport Key encrypted under LMK pair 30-31. This key
was used to encrypt the supplied message. Only present if
Mode Flag = 1 or 2.
Confidentiality Session 8B Used for Confidentiality Session Key Generation. For

Data Scheme ID = 0, (Visa/UKIS) this will be the 2 byte ATC right
justified and padded on the left with 6 zero bytes. For
Scheme ID = 1 (Europay/MasterCard) this will be a random
number, RANDc. Only present if Mode Flag = 1 or 2.
Offset 4H Position within Plaintext data to insert Ciphertext data. Must

be between 0000 and Plaintext Message Data length. If
Offset = n, Ciphertext is inserted AFTER the nth bytes of the
Plaintext. (ie if length of Plaintext data is 0039, and Offset is
39, Ciphertext data is placed at the end of the plaintext
message. Only present if Mode Flag = 1 or 2.
1270A514 Issue 3 2-157


Cipher Text Message Data 4H Length in bytes of data in next field. For the standard model
Length HSM (RG7x00) the maximum size is 32 bytes (hex 0020).
Must be a multiple of 8 bytes (ie 8, 16, 24 or 32). Only
Present if Mode = 1 or 2.
Cipher Text Message Data nB Cipher Text Message supplied encrypted using a Transport
Key (TK). It must be a multiple of 8 bytes long. Note that no
additional padding is performed on the decrypted message
before the re-encryption process. Only Present if Mode = 1
or 2.

Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value KV.

04 : Mode flag not set to 0, 1 or 2.
05 : Unrecognized Scheme-ID.
06 : Invalid Offset.
09 : TK parity error.
10 : MK-SMI parity error.
11 : MK-SMC parity error.
81 : Data not a multiple of 8 bytes.
MAC 8B The calculated 64 bit MAC.
Secure Message Data 4H Length in bytes of data in next field.
Length
Secure Message Data nB Plaintext Data and (for Modes 1 and 2) re-encrypted
Ciphertext Data inserted as defined by the Offset value.

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25 AMERICAN EXPRESS CARD SECURITY CODE
25.1 Generate a *CSCK
Command: This command will generate a random dual-length *CSCK and encrypt it under
LMK 14-15 variant 4.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command Code 2A Value RY
Mode 1N Value 0

present. Value ;.
value or 0.
1 - KCV 6H.
Value X'19
RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response Code 2A Value RZ

Mode 1N Value 0
*CSCK 32H or 1A+32H The *CSCK encrypted under LMK 14-15 variant 4.
Key check value 16 H or 6 H Result of encrypting 64 binary zeros with the *CSCK.
End Message Delimiter 1C Will only be present if present in the command message.
Value X'19

1270A514 Issue 3 2-159

25.2 Export a *CSCK
Command: This command will decrypt a *CSCK from under LMK 14-15 variant 4 and re-
encrypt it under a supplied *ZMK.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Mode 1N Value 1
*ZMK 32H or 1A+32H or The Zone Master Key, encrypted under LMK 04-05.
1A+48H
Atalla variant 1 N or 2 N Optional.
present. Value ;.
value or 0.
1 - KCV 6H.
Value X'19

RESPONSE MESSAGE

10 : *ZMK parity error
11 : *CSCK parity error
27 : *CSCK not double length
Mode 1N Value 1
*CSCK encrypted for 32H or 1A+32H The *CSCK encrypted under the supplied *ZMK.
export
Key check value 16 H or 6 H Result of encrypting 64 binary zeros with the *CSCK.
Value X'19
Message Trailer nA Will only be present if in the command message. Maximum

2-160 1270A514 Issue 3

25.3 Import a *CSCK
Command: This command will decrypt a *CSCK from under a supplied *ZMK and re-
encrypt it under LMK 14-15 variant 4.
Notes: Parity on the incoming *CSCK will be ignored, but odd parity will be forced
before re-encryption. Error code 01 will be returned if the incoming key did
not have odd parity.
If the incoming key is found to be all zeros, error code 02 will be returned
and the key will not be translated.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Mode 1N Value 2
*ZMK 32H or 1A+32H or The Zone Master Key, encrypted under LMK 04-05.
1A+48H
*CSCK 32H or 1A+32H The *CSCK, encrypted under the *ZMK.

Atalla variant 1 N or 2 N Optional.
present. Value ;.
If an option is not required by the command fill with a
valid value or 0.
1 - KCV 6H.
Value X'19
1270A514 Issue 3 2-161


RESPONSE MESSAGE
01 : Incoming key did not have odd parity
02 : Incoming key was all zero
10 : *ZMK parity error
Mode 1N Value 2
*CSCK 32 H The *CSCK encrypted under LMK 14-15 variant 4.
Result of encrypting 64 binary zeros with the *CSCK.
Key check value 16 H or 6 H
Will only be present if present in the command message.
End Message Delimiter 1C
Value X'19
Will only be present if in the command message.
Message Trailer nA
2-162 1270A514 Issue 3

25.4 Calculate Card Security Codes
Command: This command will compute and return the 5-digit, 4-digit and 3-digit Card
Security Code Values from the supplied data.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Mode 1N Value 3
Flag 1N A flag to indicate special processing options; value 0.
Account number 19 N The full account number, left-justified and zero-filled if less
than 19 digits.
Expiration date 4N The expiration date in YYMM format.

Value X'19

RESPONSE MESSAGE

10 : *CSCK parity error
Mode 1N Value 3
5-digit CSC 5N The 5-digit Card Security Code Value.
Value X'19

1270A514 Issue 3 2-163

25.5 Verify Card Security Codes
Command: This command will verify the 5-digit, 4-digit and 3-digit Card Security Code.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Mode 1N Value 4
Flag 1N A flag to indicate special processing options; value 0.
Account number 19 N The full account number, left-justified and zero-filled if less
than 19 digits.
Expiration date 4N The expiration date in YYMM format.
5-digit CSC 5N 5-digit Card Security code. If not present value FFFFF
4-digit CSC 4N 4-digit Card Security code. If not present value FFFF
3-digit CSC 3N 3-digit Card Security code. If not present value FFF
Value X'19

RESPONSE MESSAGE

01 : Card security code verification failure.
10 : *CSCK parity error.
27 : *CSCK not double length.
Mode 1N Value 4
5-digit CSC verification 1N 0 if pass.
1 if not present.
2 if verification failed.
1 if not present.
1 if not present.
Value X'19

2-164 1270A514 Issue 3

26 RACAL TRANSACTION KEY SCHEME (RTKS)

The Racal Transaction Key Scheme (RTKS) is a key management technique that is closely
coupled with message authentication. The functions provided by the HSM include key
management in addition to MAC generation and verification.
The functions are all for use at an acquirer site:

Transaction request with PIN (T/AQ key). Used to receive a cardholder request message
from a terminal with a PIN encrypted under the T/AQ key.
Transaction request without PIN. Used to receive a cardholder request message from a
terminal with no PIN.
Transaction request with PIN (T/CI key). Used to receive the request from the terminal
when the PIN key cannot be determined by the acquirer.
KEYVAL translation. Used to pass KEYVAL to the card issuer (required to derive the PIN
key) when the PIN key cannot be determined by the acquirer.
Administration request. Used to receive an administration request message (such as a
reconciliation request).
Transaction response originating at the card issuer. Used when authorization is generated
at the card issuer.
Transaction response originating at the acquirer. Used when authorization is generated by
the acquirer.
Verify confirmation message from terminal. Used to verify the MAC on a confirmation
message from the terminal.
The existing Racal Transaction key commands have been modified to support longer
messages the new commands are backward compatible with existing systems the details of the
modifications are as follows.
Old style: Pointer (not all functions) 2H

Message Length 2H
Message Text nA
New style: Pointer (if required) 2H

Message Length 2H
Message Text nA
Delimiter 1C Optional, only if original length is 0
Extended Message Pointer(s) 4H Optional, only if original length is 0 and
the
function requires one or two pointers.
Extended Message Length 4H Optional, only if original length is 0
Extended Message nA Optional, only if above field is non zero
To use the extended message length option, the calling application has to set the Message
Length field to zero, whereupon the Message Text field will be of zero length, i.e. not present.
The zero Message Length enables the HSM to check for the optional Delimiter, any Extended
Message Pointer(s), the Extended Message Length field which defines the length of the
Extended Message.
Some of the functions do not include a pointer to items included in the message, whilst other
functions include either one or two pointers. If a function does include one or two pointers, one
or two Extended Message Pointers are included after the Delimiter as appropriate. The original
pointer(s) in the function are ignored when extended messages are used, however the 2 hex
digit placeholder(s) for the original pointer(s) must still be supplied.
Whilst the extended commands allow for message sizes up to 65537 characters long (hex
FFFF), in practice the limit is imposed by the maximum size of the HSM input buffer. For the
standard HSM (Models RG7x00), the input buffer size is limited to 2047 characters. Allowing for
1270A514 Issue 3 2-165

the other parts of a command message, the maximum message size will be in the region of
1900 characters. The high speed HSM (Models RG7x10) has a much larger input buffer (32K)
although the interface option in use may impose limits which are smaller than this. The HSM will
check that the message lengths (and the pointers) are within sensible limits for the HSM
platform executing the function.
Users may, if they wish, use the Extended Message Length scheme for small messages (i.e.
less than 160 bytes)
2-166 1270A514 Issue 3

26.1 Transaction Request With a PIN (T/AQ Key)

Command: Validate a MAC on request from a terminal and return the TPK under the LMK
and the MAC residue under the LMK.
Notes: The command does not accept an all zero account number element of the
message text field.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value RI.
Terminal key register 16 H The terminal key register encrypted under LMK pair 14-15.
Account number pointer 2H 00 if the account number starts at the first character in the
message text field, and one value greater for each
subsequent character into the field. The account number is
terminated by the first non-numeric character. This is
ignored if extended length messages are used but 2 hex
digits must still be supplied.
Fields C & D 16 H The C & D fields from the magnetic stripe of a card as
defined in the Racal Security Scheme.
PIN block pointer 2H 00 if the PIN block starts at the first character in the
subsequent character into the field. The PIN block is
assumed to be 16 (hexadecimal) characters and is assumed
to be formatted according to ANSI X9.8. . This is ignored if
extended length messages are used but 2 hex digits must
still be supplied.
Message length 2H Value X00 to XA0 (decimal 160) indicating the length of the
next field. This field should be set to X'00 and the next field
omitted if extended length messages required.
Message text nA The message to be authenticated as received from the

terminal, but excluding the STX, ETX and LRC. The last 8
characters are assumed to be the MAC. An all zero account
number cannot be used. Omitted if extended length
messages are required.
Delimiter 1C Optional. Value ";". Only present if extended length

messages to be used.
Extended account number 4H Optional. Only present if extended length messages are to
pointer be used. 0000 if the account number starts at the first
character in the message text field, and one value greater for
each subsequent character into the field. The account
number is terminated by the first non-numeric character.
Extended PIN block 4H Optional. Only present if extended length messages are to
pointer be used. 0000 if the PIN block starts at the first character in
the message text field, and one value greater for each
subsequent character into the field. The PIN block is
assumed to be 16 (hexadecimal) characters and is assumed
to be formatted according to ANSII X9.8.
1270A514 Issue 3 2-167


COMMAND MESSAGE
Extended Message Length 4H Optional. Only present if extended length messages are to
be used. Defines the length of the next field. Maximum
value is determined by the maximum size of the HSM input
buffer.
Extended Message Text nA Optional. Only present if extended length messages are to
be used. The message to be authenticated as received from
the terminal, but excluding the STX, ETX and LRC. The last
8 characters are assumed to be the MAC. An all zero
account number cannot be used.

Value X19.
RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value RJ.
01 : MAC verification fail.
10 : Key register parity error.
20 : PIN block does contain valid values.
22 : All zero account number used. (Processing is
terminated).
80 : Message length error.
MAC residue 8H The MAC residue encrypted under LMK 10.
TPK 16 H The TPK encrypted under LMK pair 14-15.

X19.

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26.2 Transaction Request Without a PIN

Verify the MAC and return the MAC residue. Similar to the previous command but does not
return the derived TPK.
Similar to the previous command, but does not return the derived TPK.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value RK.
terminated by the first non-numeric character. This is
ignored if extended length messages are used but 2 hex
digits must still be supplied.

characters are assumed to be the MAC. Omitted if extended
length messages are required.

buffer.

Value X19.
1270A514 Issue 3 2-169


RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value RL.

X19.

2-170 1270A514 Issue 3

26.3 Transaction Request With a PIN (T/CI Key)

Verify the MAC and return the MAC residue and KEYVAL encrypted under the LMK.
The command does not accept an all zero account number element of the message text field.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value RU.
Terminal key register 16 H The terminal key register encrypted under LMK pair 14- 15.
terminated by the first non-numeric character. This is ignored
if extended length messages are used but 2 hex digits must
still be supplied.

characters are assumed to be the MAC. An all zero account
number cannot be used. Omitted if extended length
messages are required.

buffer.

Value X19.
1270A514 Issue 3 2-171


RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value RV.

MAC residue 8H The MAC residue encryption under LMK 10.
X19.

2-172 1270A514 Issue 3

26.4 Translate KEYVAL

Translate KEYVAL from encryption under the LMK to encryption under a ZPK. Used to send
KEYVAL to another party.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value RW.
ZPK 16H or The ZPK encrypted under LMK pair 06-07.

1A+32H or 1A+48H
KEYVAL 16 H KEYVAL encrypted under LMK pair 14-15.

Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value RX.

KEYVAL 16 H KEYVAL encrypted under the ZPK.
X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-173

26.5 Administration Request Message

Command: Verify the MAC on an administration request message and return the MAC
residue encrypted under the LMK. Used to support terminal administration
request messages.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value RM.
Fields A & B 16 H The A & B fields as defined in the Racal Security Scheme.

characters are assumed to be the MAC. Omitted if extended
length messages are required.

buffer.

Value X19.
2-174 1270A514 Issue 3


RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value RN.

X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-175

26.6 Transaction Response with Auth Para from Card Issuer

Command: Generate a MAC on a response message to a terminal and the new Key
Register value encrypted under the LMK. Also, generate new MAC residue
under the LMK.
Notes: The command is used to respond to requests from terminals at the acquirer
Host.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value RO.
Fields A & B 16 H The A & B fields as defined in the Racal Security Scheme.
ZPK or flag 16H or The ZPK under which Auth Para is encrypted, or the
1A+32H or 1A+48H or character L if Auth Para is encrypted under the LMK.
A
Auth Para 16 H The authorization parameter either encrypted under ZPK or

under LMK pair 14-15 (as indicated in the previous field).
MAC residue 8H The MAC residue from the request message processing;
encrypted under LMK 10.
Message text nA The response message on which the response MAC should
be calculated. Omitted if extended length messages are
required.

buffer.

Value X19.
2-176 1270A514 Issue 3


RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value RP.

MAC 8H The generated MAC to be sent to the terminal.
X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-177

26.7 Generate Auth Para and Transaction Response

Command: Generate Auth Para, the response MAC on a response message to a terminal
and the new key register value encrypted under the LMK.
Notes: The command used to respond to requests from terminals at the acquirer Host.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value RQ.
Fields A & B 16 H The A & B fields from the card as defined in the Racal
Security Scheme.
Auth Para data block 16 H The data block used to generate Auth Para.
MAC residue 8H The MAC residue from the request message processing;
be calculated. Omitted if extended length messages are
required.

buffer.

Value X19.
2-178 1270A514 Issue 3


RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value RR.

MAC 8H The generated MAC to be sent to the terminal.
Terminal key register 16 H The new terminal key register to replace the current value;
encrypted under LMK pair 14-15.
X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-179

26.8 Confirmation
Command: Verify MAC on incoming confirmation message from the terminal.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value RS.
Fields A & B 16 H The A & B fields from the card as defined in the Racal
Security Scheme.
MAC residue 8H The MAC residue from the previous message processing;
be calculated, but excluding the STX, ETX and LRC. The last
8 characters are assumed to be the MAC. Omitted if
extended length messages are required.

Extended Message 4H Optional. Only present if extended length messages are to

Length be used. Defines the length of the next field. Maximum
buffer.

Value X19.
2-180 1270A514 Issue 3


RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value RT.

X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-181

27 DERIVED UNIQUE KEY PER TRANSACTION (DUKPT) SYSTEM

The Derived Unique Key per Transaction system accesses the following commands via the
Host port:
Generate a base derivation key (*BDK) and encrypt it under LMK pair 28-29 for Host storage.
Translate a PIN from *BDK to interchange key encryption.
Verify a PIN using the IBM method.
Verify a PIN using the Visa PVV method.
Verify a PIN using the Diebold method.
Verify a PIN using the encrypted PIN method.
Translate an encrypted *BDK from *ZMK to LMK.
Translate an encrypted *BDK from LMK to *ZMK.
2-182 1270A514 Issue 3

27.1 Generate an Base derivation key (*BDK)

Command: Generate a *BDK and encrypt it under LMK pair 28-29 for Host storage.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value BI.

present. Value ;.
value or 0.
1 - KCV 6H.
X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value BJ.
*BDK 32H or 1A+32H The *BDK encrypted under LMK pair 28-29.
End message delimiter 1C Present only if present in the command message.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-183

27.2 Translate a PIN from *BDK Encryption to Interchange Key Encryption

Command: Translate a PIN from encryption under the unique *BDK to encryption under an
interchange key (ZPK) for transmission to another node.
Notes: The command performs the same function as CA and CC, except the Host
supplies the HSM with the information necessary to compute the current key.
The *BDK, the KSN, and the KSN descriptor are supplied by the PIN pad.
The PIN block is assumed to be in the ANSI X9.8 format; no source PIN block
format codes are required.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value CI.
*BDK 32H or 1A+32H The *BDK pair encrypted under LMK pair 28-29.
ZPK 16H or The Zone Pin Key encrypted under LMK pair 06-07.
1A+32H or 1A+48H
KSN descriptor 3H The descriptor for the KSN (in the next field).
Key serial number 12 - 20 H The KSN supplied by the PIN pad.
Source encrypted block 16 H The encrypted PIN block received from the POS PIN
terminal.
Destination PIN block 2N One of the following codes:

format code 01 : ANSI format.
04 : Plus format.
Account number 12 N The 12 right-most digits of the PAN excluding the check
digit.
End message delimiter 1C Present only if a message trailer is present. Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value CJ.
Error code 2N 00: No errors.

10 : *BDK parity error.
11 : Interchange key parity error.
27 : *BDK not double length.
PIN length 2N Length of the translated PIN.
Encrypted PIN 16 H The PIN block encrypted under the interchange key and
formatted according to the destination PIN block format
code.
Destination PIN block 2N Returned to the Host unchanged.

format code

2-184 1270A514 Issue 3

27.3 Verify a PIN Using the IBM Method

Command: Verify a PIN using the IBM method.
Notes: The command performs the same function as DA and EA, plus it computes the
PIN pad key.

processing continues verifying the PIN using TDES in place of DES

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value CK.
PVK 16H or The PVK encrypted under LMK pair 14-15

1A+32H or 1A+48H
terminal.
Account number 12 N The 12 right-most digits of the primary account number

(PAN), excluding the check digit.
Decimalization table 16 N The table for converting encrypted characters to decimal

digits.
PIN validation 12 A User-defined data consisting of hexadecimal characters, and

the letter N, which indicates where the HSM is to insert the
last five digits of the account number specified in the Host
request message. (The digits must be left-justified).
Offset 12 H The IBM offset value, left-justified and padded with F.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value CL.
Error code 2N 00: No errors

03 : *BDK not double length
1270A514 Issue 3 2-185

27.4 Verify a PIN Using the VISA PVV Method

Command: Verify a PIN using the VISA PVV method.
Notes: The command performs the same function as DC and EC.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value CM.
PIN verification key 16 H The PIN verification key encrypted under LMK pair 14-15.
PVK 32H or 1A+32H The PIN verification key, encrypted under LMK pair 14-15.
terminal.
Account number 12 N The 12 right-most digits of the PAN, excluding the check
digit.
PVKI 1N The PIN verification key indicator.

PVV 4N The PIN verification value from the card or data base.
RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value CN.

27 : *BDK or PVK not double length.
2-186 1270A514 Issue 3

27.5 Verify a PIN Using the Diebold Method

Command: Verify a PIN using the Diebold method.
Notes: The command performs the same function as CG and EG. The PIN block is
assumed to be in the ANSI X9.8 format; no source PIN block format codes
are required.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value CO.
Index flag 1A Value K .

Base index 3H The index pointing to the start of the Diebold table in user
storage.
Diebold algorithm number 2H The algorithm number required by the Diebold method.
terminal.
digit.
PIN validation 16 H User-defined data consisting of hexadecimal characters, and

the letter N, which indicates where the HSM is to insert the
last five digits of the account number specified in the Host
request message. (The digits must be left-justified).
Offset 4N The Diebold offset value.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value CP.
19: Specified Diebold table is invalid.
1270A514 Issue 3 2-187

27.6 Verify a PIN Using the Encrypted PIN Method

Command: Verify a PIN using the Encrypted PIN method.
Notes: The command performs the same function as BC and BE. The PIN block is
assumed to be in the ANSI X9.8 format; no source PIN block format codes are
required.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value CQ.
terminal.
digit.
Encrypted data base PIN LN The PIN from the Host database encrypted under LMK pair
02-03.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value CR.

2-188 1270A514 Issue 3

27.7 Translate a Base Derivation Key from *ZMK to LMK Encryption

Command: Translate a *BDK from encryption under a *ZMK to encryption under LMK pair
28-29.
Notes: The command ignores the S/D (single/double length) parameter set by the CS
A key check value (KCV) is produced for the *BDK.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value DW.
*ZMK 32H or 1A+32H or The *ZMK encrypted under LMK pair 04-05.
1A+48H
*BDK 32H or 1A+32H The *BDK encrypted under the *ZMK.
Atalla variant 1 N or 2 N Optional. For use in networks that use a *ZMK variant.

present. Value ;.
value or 0.
1 - KCV 6H.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value DX.
10 : *ZMK parity error.
13: LMK error; report to supervisor.
Key check value 8H Result of encrypting 64 binary zeros with the *BDK.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-189

27.8 Translate a Base Derivation Key from LMK to *ZMK Encryption

Command: Translate a *BDK from encryption under a LMK pair 28-29 to encryption under
*ZMK.
Notes: The command ignores the S/D (single/double length) parameter set by the CS
A key check value (KCV) is produced for the *BDK.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value DY.
*ZMK 32H 1A+32H or The *ZMK encrypted under LMK pair 04-05.
1A+48H
*BDK 32H or 1A+32H The *BDK encrypted under LMK pair 28-29
Atalla variant 1 N or 2 N Optional. For use in networks that use a *ZMK variant.

present. Value ;.
value or 0.
1 - KCV 6H.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value DZ.

10 : *ZMK parity error.
*BDK 32H or 1A+32H The *BDK encrypted under the *ZMK.
2-190 1270A514 Issue 3

28 AUSTRALIAN TRANSACTION KEY SCHEME (ATKS)

The Australian Transaction Key Scheme accesses the following commands via the Host port:
Terminal-to-acquirer requests:
Transaction request without a PIN. Used to receive a cardholder request message from a
terminal with no PIN.
Transaction request with PIN (T/AQ key). Used to receive a cardholder request message
from a terminal with a PIN encrypted under the T/AQ key.
Transaction request with PIN (T/CI key). Used to receive a request from the terminal when
the PIN key cannot be determined by the acquirer.
Acquirer-to-terminal responses:
Transaction response originating at the acquirer. Used when authorization is generated by
the acquirer.
Transaction response originating at the card issuer. Used when authorization is generated
at the card issuer.
Acquirer PIN translation:
Translate a PIN from encryption under the PEK to encryption under a ZPK.
Acquirer completion:
Verify completion confirmation message from terminal. Used to verify the MAC on a
confirmation message from the terminal.
Generate completion response.
Card issuer support:

Verify a PIN from at the card issuer:
IBM.
Diebold.
Visa.
Comparison.
Generate authorization at the card issuer.
Binary message authentication:

Generate a MAC on a binary message.
Verify a MAC on a binary message.
1270A514 Issue 3 2-191

28.1 Transaction Request Without a PIN

Command: Validate the MAC on incoming data and return the MAC residue for subsequent
processing.
Notes: The command is used by the Acquirer for normal transaction message
processing, and for Administration Request messages.
If the Host is unable to support binary data transfers, the command can be used
in standard (ASCII character) asynchronous mode (in which the message
containing the MAC is transferred in expanded hexadecimal notation).

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value RE.
Terminal key 16 H The terminal key encrypted under LMK pair 14-15.
AB 16 H Formed in accordance with the terminal specification by the
Host.
EITHER
For Binary
Message length 3H X001 to X320 indicating the length of the next field.
Message text nB 1 to 800 bytes of message. The last 64 bits (8 bytes) are the
MAC field of which the left-most 32 bits contain the MAC.
OR
For Normal Async
Modes:
Message length 3H X002 to X320 indicating the number of characters in the
next field.
Message text nH 2 to 800 hexadecimal characters representing 1 to 400 bytes

of message. The last 16 characters contain the MAC field as
above.

Value X19.
2-192 1270A514 Issue 3


RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value RF.

01: MAC verification failure.
12: No keys loaded in user storage.
15: Error in input data.
21: Invalid user storage index.
80: Message length error (including odd number of
characters when using standard async mode).
90: Communications link parity error.
91: Communications link LRC error.
92: Transparent async data length error.
X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-193

28.2 Transaction Request With a PIN (T/AQ Key)

processing.
Notes: The command allows an Acquirer to process a message which is to be
authorised by the Acquirer on behalf of a Card Issuer. It is assumed that the
Acquirer has access to the CD fields from the users card. This command does
not perform any PIN verification (this is performed by one of the other
commands, DA, CG, DC).
The main outputs are the MAC residue from the incoming message, the PIN
block encrypted under a Terminal PIN Key (TPK), and the TPK. The TPK is
derived by the function.
If the Host is unable to support binary data transfers, the command can be
used in standard (ASCII character) asynchronous mode (in which the message
The PIN block pointer represents the count in bytes of the binary message.
Therefore the value supplied is the same irrespective of the communications
mode in use. In the case of standard async mode, the pointer can be used only
AFTER the compression of the message into its binary form has taken place.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value RG.

Host.
CD 16 H Formed in accordance with the terminal specification by the

Host.
PIN block pointer 3H X000 to X310. Count in bytes. X000 indicates that the PIN
block is the first 64 bits.
EITHER
For Binary
OR
For Standard Async
Communications Mode:
Message length 3H X002 to X320 indicating the number of characters in the next
field.

above.

Value X19.
2-194 1270A514 Issue 3


RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value RH.

20: PIN block error.
Terminal PIN key 16 H The derived TPK encrypted under LMK pair 14-15.
Derived PIN block 16 H The decrypted PIN block re-encrypted under the derived TPK
MAC residue 8H Encrypted under LMK 10.

X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-195

28.3 Transaction Request With a PIN (T/CI Key)

processing.
Notes: The command allows an Acquirer to process a message before passing on the
details to a Card Issuer. No knowledge of the CD fields from the card is
required by the Acquirer. This command is used with PIN transaction command
RO.
If the Host is unable to support binary data transfers, the command can be

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value RI.

Host.
EITHER
For Binary
OR
For Standard Async
next field.

above.

Value X19.
2-196 1270A514 Issue 3


RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value RJ.

20: PIN block error.
PIN encrypting key 16 H PEK encrypted under LMK pair 14-15.
MAC residue 8H Encrypted under LMK 10.
X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-197

28.4 Transaction Response With Auth Para Generated by the Acquirer

Command: Generate a transaction response with Auth Para generated by the Acquirer.
Notes: The command enables the Acquirer to generate the response message to a
terminal, when the Acquirer is delegated to authorise a transaction on behalf of
a Card Issuer. The Authorisation Parameter, Auth Para, is generated directly
and included in the output MAC if appropriate. Auth Para is included if the
transaction is approved, and not included if the transaction is declined.
The function can also be used to generate a MAC and update the Terminal Key for an
Administration message response. For this purpose, the AP Include flag is E.
If the Host is unable to support binary data transfers, the command can be used in standard
(ASCII character) asynchronous mode (in which the message to be MACed is transferred in
expanded hexadecimal notation).
The AT, STAN and CATID pointers are in integral bytes and refer to the locations of the various
values in the binary message. They are therefore the same irrespective of the communications
mode in use. In standard async mode, they can be used only AFTER re-compression to a
binary message.
AT is 6 bytes long (12 digits).

STAN is 3 bytes long (6 digits).
CATID is 8 bytes long (16 digits).

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value RK.


Host.
MAC residue (MR1 ) 8H Encrypted under LMK 10.

AP include flag 1A I = include, E = exclude.
CD 16 H Present only if flag is I.

AT pointer 3H Pointer to message text. Present only if flag is I.
STAN pointer 3H Pointer to message text. Present only if flag is I.
CATID pointer 3H Pointer to message text. Present only if flag is I.
2-198 1270A514 Issue 3


EITHER
For Binary
Communications
Modes:
Message text nB 1 to 800 bytes of message.
OR
For Standard Async
Communications
Mode:
next field.

of message.

Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value RL.

MAC residue (MR2) 8H Encrypted under LMK 10.
MAC 8H Newly-generated MAC.
Terminal key 16 H The new derived TK encrypted under LMK pair 14-15.
X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-199

28.5 Transaction Response With Auth Para Generated by the Card Issuer
Command: Generate a response message to be sent to the Terminal, with Auth Para
generated by the Card Issuer.
Notes: The command is used where a Card Issuer has generated Auth Para and sent
it to the Acquirer encrypted under a Zone PIN Key (ZPK). Its main functions are
to generate the MAC for the response message and to update the Terminal
Key.
in standard (ASCII character) asynchronous mode (in which mode the message
to be MACed is transferred in expanded hexadecimal notation).

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value RM.

Host.
MAC residue (MR1 ) 8H MR from the request message encrypted under LMK 10.
AP include flag 1A I = include, E = exclude.
Zone PIN key 16H or ZPK encrypted under LMK pair 06-07. Present only if AP
1A+32H or 1A+48H include flag is I.
Auth Para 16 H AP encrypted under a variant of ZPK. Present only if AP

include flag is I.
EITHER
For Binary
OR
For Standard Async
next field.

of message.

Value X19.
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RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value RN.

11: Zone PIN key parity error.
MAC residue (MR2) 8H The MR from the response message encrypted under LMK
10.
MAC 8H Newly-generated MAC.

Terminal key 16 H The new derived TK encrypted under LMK pair 14-15.
X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-201

28.6 Translate a PIN from PEK to ZPK Encryption

Command: Translate an encrypted PIN block from encryption under PEK to encryption
under a Zone PIN Key (ZPK).
Notes: Used with the RI command, transaction request with PIN (T/CI key).

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value RO.
PIN encrypting key 16 H PEK encrypted under LMK pair 14-15.
Zone PIN key 16H or ZPK encrypted under LMK pair 06-07.
1A+32H or 1A+48H
Encrypted PIN block 16 H From terminal, encrypted under card key and PEK.

Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value RP.

10: PEK parity error.
11: ZPK parity error.
Encrypted PIN block 16 H Now encrypted under card key and ZPK.
X19.

2-202 1270A514 Issue 3

28.7 Verify a Transaction Completion Confirmation Request

Command: Verify a transaction Completion Confirmation message and produce sufficient
information for the subsequent generation of a Completion Response message.
Notes: The command allows the Acquirer to use the original TK that was used when
the original request message and subsequent response message were
processed. It does not use the new TK generated as a result of the response.
in standard (ASCII character) asynchronous mode (in which the message

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value RQ.
Terminal key 16 H TK encrypted under LMK pair 14-15.

Host.
MAC residue 8H MR2 from transaction response encrypted under LMK 10.
EITHER
For Binary
OR
For Standard Async
next field.

above.

Value X19.
1270A514 Issue 3 2-203


RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value RR.

MAC residue 8H Resultant MR3)Encrypted under LMK 10 (only if there is no
error).
X19.

2-204 1270A514 Issue 3

28.8 Generate a Transaction Completion Response

Command: Generate a transaction Completion Response.
Notes: The command allows the Acquirer to use the TK that was used to process the
original request/response. It does not use the new TK generated as a result of
the response.
in standard (ASCII character) asynchronous mode (in which the message to be
MACed is transferred in expanded hexadecimal notation).

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value RS.

Terminal key 16 H TK encrypted under LMK pair 14-15.

Host.
MAC residue 8H MR3 encrypted under LMK 10 from previous transaction.

EITHER
For Binary
Communications
Modes:
OR
For Standard Async
Communications
Mode:
next field.

of message.

Value X19.
1270A514 Issue 3 2-205


RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value RT.

MAC 8H Resultant MAC.
X19.

Max.length 32 characters.
2-206 1270A514 Issue 3

28.9 Verify a PIN at the Card Issuer Using the IBM Method
Command: Verify a PIN using the IBM algorithm and generate Auth Para at the Card
Issuer.
Note: The command enables a Card Issuer to recover an encrypted PIN block sent by
the Acquirer.
processing continues verifying the PIN using TDES in place of DES

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value QQ.
Source zone PIN key 16H or ZPK s encrypted under LMK pair 06-07.
1A+32H or 1A+48H
Destination zone PIN key 16H or ZPK d encrypted under LMK pair 06-07.
1A+32H or 1A+48H
PIN verification key 16H or PVK encrypted under LMK pair 14-15.
1A+32H or 1A+48H
AB 16 H
CD 16 H
STAN 6N
CATID 16 H Representing the 64 bit field.

AT 12 H
PIN block 16 H As received from acquirer.

Check length 2N
Account number 12 N
Decimalization table 16 N
PIN validation data 16 H Note: This must be the full 16-hexadecimal character field,
exactly as it is to be used.
Offset 12 N
Value X19.
1270A514 Issue 3 2-207


RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value QR.

01: PIN verification.
10 : ZPKs parity error.
11 : ZPKd or PVK parity error.
24 : PIN is fewer than 4 or more than 12 digits in
length.
90 : Communications link parity error.
91 : Communications link LRC error.
92 : Transparent async data length error.
Auth Para 16 H Auth Para encrypted under a variant of ZPK d (only if there is
no error).
X19.

2-208 1270A514 Issue 3

28.10 Verify a PIN at the Card Issuer Using the Diebold Method
Command: Verify a PIN using the Diebold algorithm and generate Auth Para at the Card
Issuer.
Notes: The command enables a Card Issuer to recover an encrypted PIN block sent
by the Acquirer.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value QS.
1A+32H or 1A+48H
1A+32H or 1A+48H
PIN verification key 16 H PVK encrypted under LMK pair 14-15.
AB 16 H
CD 16 H
STAN 6N
AT 12 H
Index pointer 3H Points at Diebold table.
Algorithm number 2H Diebold algorithm required.
PIN block 16 H

Account number 12 N
Validation data 20 H Note: This must be the full 20-hexadecimal character field,
exactly as it is to be used.
Offset 4N

Value X19.
1270A514 Issue 3 2-209


RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value QT.
2N 00: No errors.
length.
no error).
X19.

2-210 1270A514 Issue 3

28.11 Verify a PIN at the Card Issuer Using the Visa Method
Command: Verify a PIN using the Visa PVV and generate Auth Para at the Card Issuer.
Note: The command enables a Card Issuer to recover an encrypted PIN block sent
by the Acquirer.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value QU.
1A+32H or 1A+48H
1A+32H or 1A+48H
PVK 32H or 1A+32H PVK encrypted under LMK pair 14-15.
AB 16 H
CD 16 H
STAN 6N

AT 12 H
PIN block 16 H As received from the acquirer.

Account number 12 N
PVKI 1N
PVV 4N
Value X19.
1270A514 Issue 3 2-211


RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value QV.

length.
no error).
X19.

2-212 1270A514 Issue 3

28.12 Verify a PIN at the Card Issuer by Comparison

Command: Verify a PIN by comparison and generate Auth Para at the Card Issuer.
Notes: The command enables a Card Issuer to recover an encrypted PIN block sent by
the Acquirer.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value QW.
1A+32H or 1A+48H
1A+32H or 1A+48H
AB 16 H
CD 16 H
STAN 6N
AT 12 H
PIN block 16 H As received from the acquirer.

Account number 12 N
PIN LN Encrypted under LMK pair 02-03 from Host database. L is

the encrypted PIN length.

Value X19.
1270A514 Issue 3 2-213


RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value QX.

14: Error in PIN from Host database
length.
no error).
X19.

2-214 1270A514 Issue 3

28.13 Generate Auth Para at the Card Issuer

Command: Generate Auth Para at the Card Issuer.
Note: The command enables the Card Issuer to generate Auth Para when no PIN is
to be verified, but the CD fields are not known at the Acquirer. Auth Para is
returned encrypted under a variant of a Zone PIN key (ZPK).

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value RU.
Source zone PIN key 16H or ZPK encrypted under LMK pair 06-07.
1A+32H or 1A+48H
AB 16 H
CD 16 H
STAN 6N
AT 12 H

Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value RV.

no error).
X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-215

28.14 Message Authentication Mode Numbers
The MAC commands specified in the following sections have associated "mode" numbers in
the range 0 to 3, as follows:
Mode 0: Normal mode. Used to generate the MAC for a message which completely fits in
the HSM buffer, which is 800 bytes or characters long.
Mode 1: Extended message (first block). Used to process the first 800 characters
(maximum) of a message greater than 800 characters. The output is an
intermediate value to be used as the Initialisation Vector for the next stage.
Mode 2: Extended message (middle block(s)). Used to process each complete 800
(maximum) character block after the first block for a message that exceeds 1600
characters. Requires an Initialisation Vector, and produces one for the next stage.
Mode 3: Extended message (last block). Used to process the last block of less than 800
characters of an extended message. Requires an Initialisation Vector, and
produces the final MAC.
For binary MAC functions, using modes 1 and 2, the number of message bytes supplied must
be a multiple of eight, otherwise a length error (error 80) is returned. For MAC functions where
binary data is input as two hexadecimal characters, the number of characters supplied must be
a multiple of sixteen (i.e. 8 bytes when compressed).
For modes 0 and 3 the HSM appends binary zeros up to an eight byte (64 bit) boundary if
insufficient data is supplied.
2-216 1270A514 Issue 3

28.15 Generate a MAC on a Binary Message

Command: Generate a MAC on a binary message.
Notes: If the Host is unable to support binary data transfers, the command can be
to be MACed is transferred in expanded hexadecimal notation).

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value MU.
Mode number 1N The MAC calculation mode number: 0 to 3.

0: The only block.
1: The first block.
2: A middle block.
3: The last block
Terminal authentication 16 H TAK encrypted under LMK pair 16-17.
key
Initialization vector 16 H Modes 2,3. IV returned from either mode 1 or 2 encrypted

under variant 1 of LMK pair 16-17..
EITHER
For Binary
Communications
Modes:

OR
For Standard Async
Communications
Mode:
next field.

of message.

Value X19.
1270A514 Issue 3 2-217


RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value MV.

10: TAK parity error.
IV 16 H Present only in modes 1 and 2. The IV encrypted under
variant 1 of LMK pair 16-17.
MAC 8H Present only in modes 0 and 3.

X19.

2-218 1270A514 Issue 3

28.16 Verify a MAC on a Binary Message

Command: Verify a MAC on a binary message.
Note: If the Host is unable to support binary data transfers, the command can be
used in standard 7-bit asynchronous mode, whereupon the message to be
MACed is transferred in expanded hexadecimal notation.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value MW.
Mode number 1N The MAC calculation mode number: 0 to 3.

0: The only block.
1: The first block.
2: A middle block.
3: The last block
Terminal authentication 16 H TAK encrypted under LMK pair 16-17.
key
Initialization vector (IV) 16 H Modes 2,3. IV returned from either mode 1 or 2 encrypted
under variant 1 of LMK pair 16-17.
MAC 8H Modes 0,3. The MAC received with the unsolicited message.
EITHER
For Binary
Communications
Modes:
OR
For Standard Async
Communications
Mode:
next field.

of message.

Value X19.
1270A514 Issue 3 2-219


RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value MX.

10: TAK parity error.
80 Message length error (including odd number of
IV 16 H Present only in modes 1 and 2. The IV encrypted under
variant 1 of LMK pair 16-17.
X19.

2-220 1270A514 Issue 3

29 USING THE OPTIONAL RSA CRYPTOSYSTEM

When installed the optional RSA cryptosystem provides the following
Generation of variable-length RSA keys.
Validation of public key certificates.
Generation and validation of digital signatures.
Secure DES key management using RSA public master keys.
Generation of hash values.
Within these functions certain options are defined these are detailed as follows:
DES Key Types

The DES Key Type field is 4 digits: the first two digits indicate the LMK pair used to encrypt the
key, the last two digits indicate the LMK variant, for example:
if the DES Key Type is 0600, LMK pair 06-07 is used (no variant),
if the DES Key Type is 3007, variant 7 of LMK pair 30-31 is used.
Algorithm Identifiers
Signature Algorithm:
01 RSA.
Hash Algorithm:
01 SHA-1, produces a 20 byte result.
02 MD5, produces a 16 byte result.
03 ISO 10118-2, produces a 16 byte result.
04 No hash.
If the no-hash option is chosen, the presented data is padded (according to the Pad Mode
Identifier). It is the responsibility of the Host application to ensure that the precise data to be
included in the signature block is supplied in the command.
Encryption Algorithm:
01 RSA.
Pad Mode:
01 PKCS#1.
Public Key Encoding:

01 DER encoding for ASN.1.
PKCS#1 Pad Mode

The PKCS#1 standard (see Reference 8 in the Associated Publications List) defines the
padding method to be used before operating with a public or secret RSA key. The data to be
encrypted or decrypted is padded as follows:
00 BT PS 00 D,
where:
BT is a single byte indicating the block type
PS is a padding string
D is the data.
The total length of the padded block is equal to the length (in bytes) of the RSA key modulus.
BT is 01 for a secret key operation; 02 for a public key operation.
PS consists of bytes FF....FF for block type 01; random non-zero bytes for block type 02. PS
must contain at least 8 bytes.
1270A514 Issue 3 2-221

The data block D is the ASN.1 encoded message digest, or DES key (depending on the
command used), as follows:
DigestInfo :: SEQUENCE {
digestAlgorithm DigestAlgorithmldentifier,
digest OCTET STRING
}
DigestAlgorithmldentifier :: SEQUENCE {
algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
parameters NULL
}
KeyBlock :: SEQUENCE {
deskey OCTET STRING,
iv OCTET STRING SIZE (8)
}
Examples:
Assume that the SHA-1 algorithm is used to produce the 20-byte digest:
0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF01234567.
The DigestAlgorithmldentifier for SHA-1 is:

30 09 06 05 2B0E03021A 05 00.
Thus, the ASN. 1 DER encoded DigestInfo is:

30 21 300906052B0E03021A0500 04140123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF01234567
If a single-length DES key 0123456789ABCDEF and IV = 9999999999999999 are used, the

ASN. 1 DER encoding of KeyBlock is:
30 14 04080123456789ABCDEF 04089999999999999999.
When the PKCS#1 pad mode is used, the following validity checks are carried out:
For a validation operation (Validate a Certificate, Validate a Signature):
The length of the data to be validated is equal to the length (in bytes) of the modulus of the key
to be used for the validation. If not, error code 76 is returned.
The first byte of the clear data block is 00. If not, error code 77 is returned.
The second byte of the clear data block is 01. If not, error code 77 is returned.
Subsequent bytes consist of at least 8 bytes of binary 1s, followed by a zero byte. If not, error
code 77 is returned.
The hash algorithm object identifier corresponds to that of the identifier of the hash algorithm
supplied in the command message. If not, error code 79 is returned.
The digest is compared with the hash of the supplied data. If the two values are not equal,
error code 02 is returned.
For a generation operation (Generate a Signature):
The length (in bytes) of the data block D is at most m-11 (where m is the length, in bytes, of the
modulus of the key to be used). If not, error code 76 is returned.
For an import key operation (Import a DES Key):
The length of the imported key block is equal to the length (in bytes) of the modulus of the
secret key to be used to decrypt the block. If not, error code 76 is returned.
The first byte of the clear data block is 00 and the second byte is 02. If not, error code 77 is
returned.
Subsequent bytes consist of at least 8 bytes of random non-zero bytes, followed by a zero byte.
If not, error code 77 is returned.
The data block D conforms to the ASN.1 encoding rules. If not, error code 77 is returned.
2-222 1270A514 Issue 3
For an export key operation (Export a DES Key):

The length (in bytes) of the data block D is at most m-11 (where m is the length, in bytes, of the
modulus of the key to be used). If not, error code 76 is returned.
Public Key Encoding

The HSM supports the following public key encoding types:
Type = 01 (DER encoding for an ASN.1 public key).
An ASN.1 RSAPublicKey has the following definition:

RSAPublicKey :: = SEQUENCE {
modulus INTEGER, - - n
publicExponent INTEGER - - e }
Sequence Byte Integer Modulus Modulus Integer Exponent Exponent

Identifier Length Identifier length Identifier length
Example:
For a 1024 bit modulus with an exponent of 03
X'30 X'81 X'86 X'02 X'81 X'80 128 byte X'02 X'01 X'03
Modulus
X'30 is the identifier specifying start of a sequence.
X'81 X'86 specifies the length of the following field in bytes.

If value between X'01 and X'7F then this directly specifies length of following field in bytes
(1byte to 127 bytes).
If value greater than X'80 it defines the number of bytes to define the length of the next field in
the above example X'81 therefore length i.e. 1 byte (X'86 - 134 bytes)
X'02 is the identifier specifying start of integer.
X'81 X'80 specifies the length of the following field in bytes using the same definition as above
(128 Bytes).
This is followed by the modulus in this example 128 bytes.
X'02 is the identifier specifying start of the second integer.
X'01 specifies the length of the following field in bytes using the same definition as above (1
Byte).
X'03 is the value of the exponent.
1270A514 Issue 3 2-223

The following ASN.1 DER encoded object identifiers for hashing functions are used by the
HSM:
1. Hash Algorithm 01 (SHA-1):

{iso(1) identified-organisation(3) oiw(14) secsig(3) 2 26}
which encodes as:
2B 0E 03 02 1A
2. Hash Algorithm 02 (MD5):
{iso(1) member-body(2) US(840) rsadsi(113549) digest Algorithm(2) 5 }
which encodes as:
2A 86 48 86 F7 0D 02 05
3. Hash Algorithm 03 (ISO 10118-2):

{2 10 67 4)
which encodes as:
5A 43 04
The No-Hash Option

One of the allowable hash function identifiers is 04, which corresponds to no-hash. This can be
used when the HSM provides signature generation or validation, or certificate validation, on
data that is hashed outside the HSM.
If the no-hash option is chosen, the data that is provided in the Validate a Certificate, Generate
a Signature and Validate a Signature commands is not modified in any way by the HSM, so it
must be precisely the data in the plain signature block (which depends on the pad mode used).
For example, if the SHA-1 algorithm is used to hash the data and the resultant hash value is:
0123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF01234567,
and if the PKCS#1 pad mode is used, the data to be provided must be the complete ASN.1
DER encoded DigestInfo, which is:
30 21 300906052B0E03021A0500 04140123456789ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF01234567
Note that when using the no-hash mode, the HSM checks that the DER encoded DigestInfo
syntax is correct. If there is a digest info syntax error, the HSM returns error code 74.
2-224 1270A514 Issue 3

29.1 Generate an RSA Key Set

Command: Generate an RSA key set.
Notes: Depending on key size, the function may take several minutes to execute.
If a Public Exponent is supplied in the command message, it must be an odd
value (i.e. the least-significant bit must be 1). If an even Public Exponent is
supplied, an error code is returned.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Message Header mA (Subsequently returned to the Host unchanged).
Command Code 2A Value EI.

Key type 1N Key type indicator:
0 : Signature only.
1 : Key management only.
2 : Both signature and key management.
Key length 4N Modulus length in bits:
Key type 0 : minimum 0320, maximum 2048.
Key type 1 or 2 : minimum 0320, maximum 1024.
Public key encoding 2N Encoding rules for public key (must allow public key length
to be inferred).
Public exponent length 4N Optional. Must be present if a public exponent is

supplied. Indicates the length (in bits) of the public
exponent.
Public exponent nB Optional. Must be an odd value. If not supplied, a default

exponent of 65537 is assumed.

Value X19.
1270A514 Issue 3 2-225


RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value EJ.

03 : Invalid public key encoding type.
04 : Length error.
05 : Invalid key type.
06 : Public exponent length error.
08 : Supplied public exponent is even.
17 : Not in Authorized state.
47 : DSP error; report to supervisor.
Public key nB Public key, encoded appropriately.
Secret key length 4N Length (in bytes) of the next field.

Secret key nB Secret key, encrypted under LMK pair 34-35.
X19.

2-226 1270A514 Issue 3

29.2 Load a Secret Key

Command: Load a secret key (encrypted using LMK pair 34-35) into the HSM's tamper-
protected memory.
Notes: It is the responsibility of the Host application to ensure that a previously-loaded
secret key is not accidentally overwritten by this command.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value EK. .
Key index 2N Index number for secret key to be stored (used if multiple
storage of keys is required).
Standard HSM : must be set to 00.
High-Speed HSM : can be 00 to 20.


Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value EL.
Error code 2N 00 : No error.
03 : Invalid key index.
04 : Insufficient memory for secret key storage.
49 : Secret key error; report to supervisor.
78 : Secret key length error.
X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-227

29.3 Translate a Secret Key from the Old LMK to a New LMK
Command: Translate a secret key from encryption under the old LMK pair 34-35 held in
key change storage, to encryption under a new LMK pair 34-35.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value EM.

Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value EN.

Secret key nB Secret key, encrypted under new LMK pair 34-35.
X19.

2-228 1270A514 Issue 3

29.4 Generate a MAC on a Public Key

Command: Generate a MAC on an uncertified public key, using LMK pair 36-37.
Notes: The function can be used, for example, to protect a certification authority public
key.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value EO.
Public key encoding 2N Encoding rules for the supplied public key (must allow the
public key length to be inferred).
Public key nB Public key.
Authentication data nA Optional. Additional data to be included in the MAC

calculation (must not include ;).

Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value EP.

04 : Public key does not conform to encoding rules.
17 : Not in Authorized state.
MAC 4B MAC on the public key and authentication data, calculated
using LMK pair 36-37.
Public key nB Public key, DER encoded in ASN. 1 format (sequence of

modulus, exponent).
X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-229

29.5 Verify a MAC on a Public Key

Command: Verify a MAC on a public key, using LMK pair 36-37.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value EQ.

Public key nB Public key, DER encoded in ASN.1 format (sequence of

modulus, exponent).


Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value ER.

X19.

2-230 1270A514 Issue 3

29.6 Validate a Certificate and Generate a MAC on its Public Key

Command: Validate a certificate and generate a MAC on the public key contained in the
certificate, using LMK pair 36-37.
Notes: The command can (optionally) check whether the public key in the certificate
corresponds to a secret key encrypted under the LMK.
1270A514 Issue 3 2-231


COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value ES.


modulus, exponent).

Delimiter 1A Delimiter, indicates the end of the authentication data

field. Value ;
Certificate length 4N Certificate length (in bytes).
Hash offset 4N Offset to the first byte in the certificate data to be included
in the hash calculation.
Hash length 4N Length (in bytes) of the data within the certificate which is
included in the hash calculation.
Signature offset 4N Offset to the first byte of the signature contained in the
certificate data.
Signature length 4N Length (in bytes) of the signature contained in the

certificate data.
Certificate nB Certificate data to be validated.

Delimiter 1A Delimiter, indicates the end of the certificate field. Value ;.
Hash identifier 2N Identifier of the hash algorithm used to hash the certificate
data.
Signature identifier 2N Identifier of the signature algorithm used to sign the

certificate data.
Pad mode identifier 2N Identifier of the pad mode used in certificate signature
generation.
Public key encoding 2N Encoding rules for the public key contained in the
certificate (must allow the public key length to be inferred).
Public key offset 4N Offset to the first byte of the public key field contained in
the certificate

Delimiter 1A Delimiter, indicates the end of the authentication data

field. Value ; .
Secret key length 4N Optional. Length (in bytes) of the next field. Must be
present if the secret key field is present.
Secret key nB Optional. Secret key, encrypted under LMK pair 34-35.
Value X19.
2-232 1270A514 Issue 3


RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value ET.

02 : Certificate validation failure.
05 : Invalid hash identifier.
06 : Invalid signature identifier.
07 : Invalid pad mode identifier.
74 : Invalid digest info syntax (no-hash mode only).
75 : Invalid public key / secret key pair.
76 : Public key length error.
77 : Clear data block error.
79 : Hash algorithm object identifier error.
80 : Certificate length error.
81 : Certificate offset and length error.
MAC 4B Public key, DER encoded in ASN.1 format (sequence of
modulus, exponent).
Public key nB Secret key, encrypted under new LMK pair 34-35.
X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-233

29.7 Translate a MAC on a Public Key

Command: Verify a MAC on a public key, using old LMK pair 36-37, held in key change
storage, and calculate a MAC using the new LMK.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value EU.

using old LMK pair 36-37.

modulus, exponent).


Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value EV.
using new LMK pair 36-37.
X19.

2-234 1270A514 Issue 3

29.8 Generate a Signature

Command: Generate a signature on a message using a secret key.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value EW.
Hash identifier 2N Identifier of the hash algorithm used to hash the message.
Signature Identifier 2N Identifier of the signature algorithm used to sign the

message.
Pad mode identifier 2N Identifier of the pad mode used in signature generation.
Data length 4N Length (in bytes) of the message data to be signed.
Message data nB Data to be signed.
Delimiter 1A Delimiter, indicates the end of the message data field.

Value ; .
Secret key flag 2N Flag, indicates the location of the secret key. The number
is the index of the stored secret key, except 99 which
means use the key supplied in the command.
Secret key length 4N Length (in bytes) of the next field (present only if the
secret key flag is 99).
Secret key nB Secret key, encrypted using LMK pair 34-35 (present only
if the secret key flag is 99).

Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value EX.

Error code 2N 00 :
No error.
03 :
Invalid secret key type.
04 :
Invalid secret key flag.
05 :
Invalid hash identifier.
06 :
Invalid signature identifier.
07 :
Invalid pad mode identifier.
13 :
LMK error; report to supervisor.
15 :
Error in input data.
47 :
DSP error; report to supervisor.
49 :
Secret key error; report to supervisor.
74 :
Invalid digest info syntax (no-hash mode
only).
76 : Hash length error.
Signature length 4N Length (in bytes) of the signature.
Signature nB Calculated signature.
X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-235

29.9 Validate a Signature

Command: Validate a signature on a message using a public key.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value EY.
Hash identifier 2N Identifier of the hash algorithm used to hash the message.
Signature Identifier 2N Identifier of the signature algorithm used to sign the
message.
Pad mode identifier 2N Identifier of the pad mode used in signature generation.
Signature length 4N Signature length (in bytes).

Signature nB Signature to be verified.
Delimiter 1A Delimiter, indicates the end of the signature field. Value ;.
Data length 4N Length (in bytes) of the message data to be signed.
Message data nB Data to be signed.

Delimiter 1A Delimiter, indicates the end of the message data field.
Value ; .


modulus, exponent).


Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value EZ.
00 : No error.
Error code 2N
02 : Signature verification failure.
04 : Public key does not conform to encoding
rules.
06 : Invalid signature identifier.
74 : Invalid digest info syntax (no-hash mode
only).
79 : Hash algorithm object identifier error.
81 : Signature length error.
X19.

2-236 1270A514 Issue 3

29.10 Import a DES Key
Command: To translate a DES key from encryption under a public key to encryption under
the LMK.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value GI.
Encryption identifier 2A Identifier of the algorithm used to encrypt the DES key.
Pad mode identifier 2N Identifier of the pad mode used in the encryption process.
DES key type 4N Indicates the required LMK pair, including the LMK
variant.
Encrypted key length 4N Length (in bytes) of the encrypted DES key.
DES key (PK) nB DES key, encrypted under the public key.
Delimiter 1A Delimiter, indicates the end of the encrypted DES key

field. Value ; .
Secret key flag 2N Flag, indicates the location of the secret key. The number
is the index of the stored secret key, except 99 which
means use the key supplied in the command.
Secret key length 4N Length (in bytes) of the next field (present only if the
secret key flag is 99).
Secret key nB Secret key, encrypted using LMK pair 34-35 (present only
if the secret key flag is 99).

present. Value ;.
value or 0.
1 - KCV 6H.
Value X19.
1270A514 Issue 3 2-237


RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value GJ.

03 : Invalid secret key type.
04 : Invalid secret key flag.
05 : Invalid DES key type.
06 : Invalid encryption identifier.
76 : Key block length error.
80 : Encrypted DES key length error.
Initialization value 16 H Initialization value for the DES key.
DES key (LMK) 16H or 32H or DES key, encrypted under the LMK pair indicated by the
1A+32H or 1A+48H DES key type.
Key check value 16 H or 6 H Check value on the DES key.

X19.

2-238 1270A514 Issue 3

29.11 Export a DES Key

Command: Translate a DES key from encryption under an LMK pair to encryption under a
public key.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value GK.
Encryption identifier 2A Identifier of the algorithm used to encrypt the DES key.
Pad mode identifier 2N Identifier of the pad mode used in the encryption process.
DES key type 4N Indicates the required LMK pair, including the LMK
variant.
DES key flag 1N Flag indicates the length of the DES key:
0 : single-length key.
1 : double-length key
2 : triple-length key
DES key (LMK) 16H or 32H or DES key, encrypted under the LMK pair indicated by DES
1A+32H or 1A+48H key type (length indicated by DES key flag).
Check value 16 H Check value on the DES key.


modulus, exponent).
Authentication Data nA Optional. Additional data to be included in the MAC


Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value GL.
00 : No error.
Error code 2N
02 : Check value verification failure.
04 : Public key does not conform to encoding
rules.
05 : Invalid DES key type.
06 : Invalid encryption identifier.
13 : LMK error ; report to supervisor
47 : DSP error ; report to supervisor.
Initialization value 16 H Initialization value for the DES key.
DES key length 4N Length (in bytes) of the next field.
DES key (PK) nB DES key, encrypted under the public key.
X19.

1270A514 Issue 3 2-239

29.12 Hash a Block of Data

Command: Hash a block of data.
Notes: It is the responsibility of the application program to ensure that the amount of
data supplied in this command does not cause a buffer overflow.

COMMAND MESSAGE
Command code 2A Value GM.
Hash identifier 2N Identifier of the hash algorithm used to hash the
data.
Data length 5N Length of the message data to be hashed.
Message data nB Data to be hashed.
Value X19.

RESPONSE MESSAGE
Response code 2A Value GN.

Hash value nB Hash result (length depends on the algorithm used)
X19.

2-240 1270A514 Issue 3

Host Security Module RG7000 PIN BLOCK FORMATS
CHAPTER 3
PIN BLOCK FORMATS
1 GENERAL 3-1
2 FORMAT 01 3-1
3 FORMAT 02 3-1
4 FORMAT 03 3-2
5 FORMAT 04 3-2
6 FORMAT 05 3-3

1 GENERAL
For PIN verification and PIN translation, the HSM requires the PIN to be input as a 16-digit PIN
block. The HSM supports four types of PIN block formats, each identified by a 2-digit PIN block
format code.
2 FORMAT 01
Format 01 is the format adopted by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI X9.8) and
is one of two formats supported by the International Standards Organisation (ISO 95641 -
format 0).
The format combines the customer PIN and account number as follows:
A 16-digit block is made from the digit 0, the length of the PIN, the PIN, and a pad
character (hexadecimal F). For example, for the 5-digit PIN 92389, the block is:
0592 389F FFFF FFFF
Another 16-digit block is made from four zeros and the 12 right-most digits of the account
number, excluding the check digit. For example, for the 13-digit account number 4000
0012 3456 2, where the check digit is 2, the block is:
0000 4000 0012 3456
The two blocks are exclusive-OR added:
05 92 38 9F FF FF FF FF
00 00 40 00 00 12 34 56
PIN block: 05 92 78 9F FF ED CB A9
3 FORMAT 02
Format 02 supports Docutel ATMs. A PIN block is created from the PIN length, a
6-digit PIN, and a user-defined numeric padding string.
If the PIN has fewer than 6 digits, it is left-justified and zero filled.
For example, for the 5-digit PIN 92389, the PIN digits are 923890.
With pad characters added, the PIN block could be, for example:
5923 8909 8765 4321
where 98765 4321 is the padding string.
1270A514 Issue 3 3-1

PIN BLOCK FORMATS Host Security Module RG7000
4 FORMAT 03
Format 03 supports Diebold and IBM ATMs. It also applies to the Docutel format that does not
include a PIN length. The PIN block is created from the customer PIN and the hexadecimal F
padding character. For example, for the 5-digit PIN 92389, the PIN block is:
9238 9FFF FFFF FFFF
5 FORMAT 04
Format 04 is the PIN block format adopted by the PLUS network. The format combines the
customer PIN and the related account number as follows:
A 16-digit block is made from the digit 0, the length of the PIN, the PIN, and a pad
character (hexadecimal F). For example, for the 5-digit PIN 92389, the block is
0592 389F FFFF FFFF
Another 16-digit block is made from four zeros and the left-most 12 digits of the account
number. For example, for the 16-digit account number 2283 4000 0012 3456, where the
check digit is 6, the block is:
0000 2283 4000 0012
The two blocks are exclusive-OR added:
0592 389F FFFF FFFF
0000 2283 4000 0012
PIN block: 0592 1A1C BFFF FFED
Note: Any transaction that requires a PIN block as a parameter accepts

Format 04. The major impact of this format is on the account
number field length: when a PIN block is formatted according to
Format 04, the account number field becomes 18 digits in length.
For the PIN translation CA and CC commands, there are two format
fields; if either is 04, the account number field must be 18 digits. If
the account number is less than 18 digits, it must be right-justified
and padded with XF on the left.
The following commands can use this format:
BC, BE, CA, CC, CG, DA, DC, EA, EC, EG, JC, JE. When reviewing the details for these
commands, consider the change to the account field that this format requires.
3-2 1270A514 Issue 3

6 FORMAT 05
Format 05 is the ISO 9564-1 Format 1 PIN Block represented by the following 16 hexadecimal
values:
1NP 1 . . P N R . . R
Where
N is the PIN length (4 - C),

P 1 . . P N is the N-digit PIN,
R . . R is random padding.
The following validity checks are carried out on incoming Format 05 PIN blocks:
The first character of the PIN block has value 1.

Error code 20 is returned if this check fails.
The PIN digits (in positions 3 - (N+2)) are in the range 0 to 9.

The second character (N) is in the hexadecimal range 4 - C.

1270A514 Issue 3 3-3

Host Security Module RG7000 ERROR CODES
CHAPTER 4
ERROR CODES
1 GENERAL 4-1

Host Security Module RG7000 ERROR CODES
1 GENERAL
The standard error codes returned by the HSM to the Host are listed in the table. Details of
which error codes are applicable to each command are documented in Chapter 2.
Code Description
00 No errors.
01 Verification failure. / Warning Imported key parity error
02 Key inappropriate length for algorithm
04 Invalid key type code.
05 Invalid key length flag.
10 Source key parity error.
11 Destination key parity error. / Key all 0
12 Contents of user storage not available. Reset, power-down or overwrite.
13 Master Key parity error.
14 PIN encrypted under LMK pair 02-03 is invalid.
15 Invalid input data (invalid format, invalid characters, or not enough data provided).
16 Console or printer not ready/not connected.
17 HSM not in the Authorized state, or not enabled for clear PIN output, or both.
18 Document format definition not loaded.
19 Specified Diebold Table is invalid.
20 PIN block does not contain valid values.
21 Invalid index value, or index/block count would cause an overflow condition.
22 Invalid account number.
23 Invalid PIN block format code.
24 PIN is fewer than 4 or more than 12 digits in length.
25 Decimalization table error.
26 Invalid key scheme
27 Incompatible key length
28 Invalid key type
29 Key function not permitted
30 Invalid reference number.
31 Insufficient solicitation entries for batch.
33 LMK Key change storage is corrupted.
40 Invalid firmware checksum.
41 Internal hardware/software error: bad RAM, invalid error codes, etc.
42 DES failure.
80 Data length error. The amount of MAC data (or other data) is greater than or less than
the expected amount.
90 Data parity error in the request message received by the HSM.
91 Longitudinal Redundancy Check (LRC) character does not match the value computed
1270A514 Issue 3 4-1

ERROR CODES Host Security Module RG7000
Code Description
over the input data (when the HSM has received a transparent async packet).
92 The Count value (for the Command/Data field) is not between limits, or is not correct
(when the HSM has received a transparent async packet).
4-2 1270A514 Issue 3

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Host Security Module RG7000

Host Security Module

HOST SECURITY MODULE RG7000

Revision Release Date HSM Functional

1270A513 Issue 2 May 2000 1.05 / 5.05 / Pre-release

1270A513 Issue 3 May 2000 1.05 / 5.05

This manual describes the functionality within the 1.05 and

Copyright 1987 - 2000 Zaxus Limited

HOST SECURITY MODULE RG7000

1270A514 Issue 3 Chapter 1

1270A514 Issue 3 1-1

1-2 1270A514 Issue 3

3.1 Key Usage

3.2 Key Encryption Schemes

ANSI X9.17 method

The tags for this scheme are:

The tags for this scheme are as follows:

Double length key variants Key 1 of 2 A6

Triple length key variants Key 1 of 2 6A

The variant A6 is applied to the first two hex characters of Y to encrypt A.

The variant 6A is applied to the first two hex characters of Y to encrypt A.

3.3 Key Generate, Import and Export

The option fields are:

Key scheme for encrypting the output key under ZMK.

The valid values for these options are:

Key under ZMK - Z, U, T Z Single Length, U Double Length, T Triple Length.

1-4 1270A514 Issue 3

4 COMMAND MESSAGE FORMAT

End of text character

4.1 Start of Text Character

4.2 Message Header

4.3 Command Code

1270A514 Issue 3 1-5

4.5 Message Trailer

4.6 End of Text Character

The ASCII and EBCDIC value is X'03.

1-6 1270A514 Issue 3

5 RESPONSE MESSAGE FORMAT

Each response from the HSM consists of the following:

Start of text character (if applicable).

End of text character

5.1 Start of Text Character

5.2 Message Header

1270A514 Issue 3 1-7

5.3 Response Code

5.4 Error Code

5.6 Message Trailer

5.7 End of Text Characters

1-8 1270A514 Issue 3

1270A514 Issue 3 1-9

6.1 ASCII Character Codes

ASCII HEX ASCII HEX ASCII HEX ASCII HEX

1-10 1270A514 Issue 3

6.2 EBCDIC Character Codes

EBCDIC HEX EBCDIC HEX EBCDIC HEX EBCDIC HEX

1270A514 Issue 3 1-11

EBCDIC HEX EBCDIC HEX EBCDIC HEX EBCDIC HEX

1-12 1270A514 Issue 3

7 TRANSPARENT ASYNCHRONOUS COMMUNICATIONS