VI.

INTERPRETATION OF DOCUMENTS

G.R. No. L-7991 January 29, 1914

LEON J. LAMBERT, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
T. J. FOX, defendant-appellee.

This is an action brought to recover a penalty prescribed on a contract as

punishment for the breach thereof.
Early in 1911 the firm known as John R. Edgar & Co., engaged in the retail book
and stationery business, found itself in such condition financially that its
creditors, including the plaintiff and the defendant, together with many others,
agreed to take over the business, incorporate it and accept stock therein in
payment of their respective credits. This was done, the plaintiff and the
defendant becoming the two largest stockholders in the new corporation called
John R. Edgar & Co., Incorporated. A few days after the incorporation was
completed plaintiff and defendant entered into the following agreement:
Whereas the undersigned are, respectively, owners of large amounts of stock in
John R. Edgar and Co, Inc; and,
Whereas it is recognized that the success of said corporation depends, now and
for at least one year next following, in the larger stockholders retaining their
respective interests in the business of said corporation:
Therefore, the undersigned mutually and reciprocally agree not to sell, transfer,
or otherwise dispose of any part of their present holdings of stock in said John R.
Edgar & Co. Inc., till after one year from the date hereof.
Either party violating this agreement shall pay to the other the sum of one
thousand (P1,000) pesos as liquidated damages, unless previous consent in
writing to such sale, transfer, or other disposition be obtained.
Notwithstanding this contract the defendant Fox on October 19, 1911, sold his
stock in the said corporation to E. C. McCullough of the firm of E. C. McCullough
& Co. of Manila, a strong competitor of the said John R. Edgar & Co., Inc.
This sale was made by the defendant against the protest of the plaintiff and with
the warning that he would be held liable under the contract hereinabove set forth
and in accordance with its terms. In fact, the defendant Foz offered to sell his
shares of stock to the plaintiff for the same sum that McCullough was paying
them less P1,000, the penalty specified in the contract.
The learned trial court decided the case in favor of the defendant upon the
ground that the intention of the parties as it appeared from the contract in
question was to the effect that the agreement should be good and continue only
until the corporation reached a sound financial basis, and that that event having
occurred some time before the expiration of the year mentioned in the contract,
the purpose for which the contract was made and had been fulfilled and the
defendant accordingly discharged of his obligation thereunder. The complaint
was dismissed upon the merits.
It is argued here that the court erred in its construction of the contract. We are of
the opinion that the contention is sound. The intention of parties to a contract
must be determined, in the first instance, from the words of the contract itself. It
is to be presumed that persons mean what they say when they speak plain
English. Interpretation and construction should by the instruments last resorted
to by a court in determining what the parties agreed to. Where the language used
by the parties is plain, then construction and interpretation are unnecessary and,
if used, result in making a contract for the parties. (Lizarraga Hermanos vs. Yap
Tico, 24 Phil. Rep., 504.)
In the case cited the court said with reference to the construction and
interpretation of statutes: "As for us, we do not construe or interpret this law. It
does not need it. We apply it. By applying the law, we conserve both provisions
for the benefit of litigants. The first and fundamental duty of courts, in our
judgment, is to apply the law. Construction and interpretation come only after it
has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate without
them. They are the very last functions which a court should exercise. The majority
of the law need no interpretation or construction. They require only application,
and if there were more application and less construction, there would be more
stability in the law, and more people would know what the law is."
What we said in that case is equally applicable to contracts between persons. In
the case at bar the parties expressly stipulated that the contract should last one
year. No reason is shown for saying that it shall last only nine months. Whatever
the object was in specifying the year, it was their agreement that the contract
should last a year and it was their judgment and conviction that their purposes
would not be subversed in any less time. What reason can give for refusing to
follow the plain words of the men who made the contract? We see none.
The appellee urges that the plaintiff cannot recover for the reason that he did not
prove damages, and cites numerous American authorities to the effect that
because stipulations for liquidated damages are generally in excess of actual
damages and so work a hardship upon the party in default, courts are strongly
inclined to treat all such agreements as imposing a penalty and to allow a
recovery for actual damages only. He also cites authorities holding that a penalty,
as such, will not be enforced and that the party suing, in spite of the penalty
assigned, will be put to his proof to demonstrate the damages actually suffered by
reason of defendants wrongful act or omission.
In this jurisdiction penalties provided in contracts of this character are enforced .
It is the rule that parties who are competent to contract may make such
agreements within the limitations of the law and public policy as they desire, and
that the courts will enforce them according to their terms. (Civil Code, articles
1152, 1153, 1154, and 1155; Fornow vs. Hoffmeister, 6 Phil. Rep., 33; Palacios vs.
Municipality of Cavite, 12 Phil. Rep., 140; Gsell vs. Koch, 16 Phil. Rep., 1.) The
only case recognized by the Civil Code in which the court is authorized to
intervene for the purpose of reducing a penalty stipulated in the contract is when
the principal obligation has been partly or irregularly fulfilled and the court can
see that the person demanding the penalty has received the benefit of such or
irregular performance. In such case the court is authorized to reduce the penalty
to the extent of the benefits received by the party enforcing the penalty.
In this jurisdiction, there is no difference between a penalty and liquidated
damages, so far as legal results are concerned. Whatever differences exists
between them as a matter of language, they are treated the same legally. In either
case the party to whom payment is to be made is entitled to recover the sum
stipulated without the necessity of proving damages. Indeed one of the primary
purposes in fixing a penalty or in liquidating damages, is to avoid such necessity.
It is also urged by the appelle in this case that the stipulation in the contract
suspending the power to sell the stock referred to therein is an illegal stipulation,
is in restraint of trade and, therefore, offends public policy. We do not so regard
it. The suspension of the power to sell has a beneficial purpose, results in the
protection of the corporation as well as of the individual parties to the contract,
and is reasonable as to the length of time of the suspension. We do not here
undertake to discuss the limitations to the power to suspend the right of
alienation of stock, limiting ourselves to the statement that the suspension in this
particular case is legal and valid.
The judgment is reversed,

Norton Resources and Development Corp. vs All Asia Bank

Corp.
Facts: Norton is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of construction and
development of housing subdivisions based in Davao City. All Asia Bank Corp. is a
domestic bank Corporation operating in Davao City.

One day, Norton entered in a Loan Agreement with All Asia Bank for the amount of
P3.8M for the construction of 160 housing units, the Home Financing Corp, as
guarantor. To speed up the processing of all documents necessary for the release of
the funds, petitioner allegedly offered respondent a service/commitment fee of 320k
for the construction of the housing units or at 2k per unit. The offer having been
accepted, both parties executed a MOA on the same date.

Petitioner was not able to complete the construction and failed to pay its loan
obligation. HFC paid only 2.9M but withhold the 250k.
Petitioner filed a Complaint for Sum of Money, Damages and Attorneys Fees against
respondent with the RTC. Petitioner alleged that the P320,000.00
commitment/service fee mentioned in the MOA was to be paid on a per-unit basis
at P2,000.00 per unit. Inasmuch as only 35 housing units were constructed, petitioner
posited that it was only liable to pay P70,000.00 and not the whole amount
of P320,000.00, which was deducted in advance from the proceeds of the loan.

As such, petitioner demanded the return of P250,000.00, representing the

commitment fee for the 125 housing units left unconstructed and unduly collected by
respondent. Respondent denied that the P320,000.00 commitment/service fee
provided in the MOA was broken down into P2,000.00 per housing unit for 160 units.
RTC rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner. The CA reversed the ruling of the RTC.
Hence , this instant petition.

Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT (MOA) REFLECTS THE

TRUE INTENTION OF THE PARTIES.

Ruling: Yes. Section 9, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court clearly provides:

SEC. 9. Evidence of written agreements. When the terms of an agreement have

been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and
there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of
such terms other than the contents of the written agreement.

However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of the
written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:

(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake, or imperfection in the written agreement;

(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and
agreement of the parties thereto;

(c) The validity of the written agreement; or

(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in
interest after the execution of the written agreement.

The "parol evidence rule" forbids any addition to or contradiction of the terms of a
written instrument by testimony or other evidence purporting to show that, at or
before the execution of the parties' written agreement, other or different terms were
agreed upon by the parties, varying the purport of the written contract. When an
agreement has been reduced to writing, the parties cannot be permitted to adduce
evidence to prove alleged practices which, to all purposes, would alter the terms of
the written agreement. Whatever is not found in the writing is understood to have
been waived and abandoned. None of the above-cited exceptions finds application in
this case, more particularly the alleged failure of the MOA to express the true intent
and agreement of the parties concerning the commitment/service fee
of P320,000.00.

VII. QUALIFICATION OF WITNESSES

G.R. No. 198240; July 3, 2013; LUISA NAVARRO MARCOS*, vs.THE HEIRS OFTHE LATE
DR. ANDRES NAVARRO, JR., namely NONITA NAVARRO, FRANCISCA NAVARRO
MALAPITAN, SOLEDAD NAVARRO BROCHLER, NONITA BARRUN NAVARRO, JR., IMELDA
NAVARRO, ANDRES NAVARRO III, MILAGROS NAVARRO YAP, PILAR NAVARRO, TERESA
NAVARRO-TABITA, and LOURDES BARRUN-REJUSO, ;VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

FACTS:

Sps Andres Navarro, Sr. and Concepcion Medina-Navarro died in 1958 and 1993, respectively.
They left behind several parcels of land including a 108.3997-hectare lot (subject lot/ SL)
located in Cayabon, Milagros, Masbate.

Their daughters are petitioners Luisa Navarro Marcosand Lydia Navarro Grageda while the
respondents are the heirs of their only son Andres.

Respondents: claimed exclusive ownership of the SL based on the Affidavit of Transfer of Real
Property dated May 19, 1954 where Andres, Sr allegedly donated the subject lot to Andres, Jr.

Petitioners: Affidavit is a forgery. So they obtained a handwriting examination through Assistant

Fiscal Andres Marcos, requested a handwriting examination of the affidavit. The PNP handwriting
expert PO2 Mary Grace Alvarez found that Andres, Sr.s signature on the affidavit and the
submitted standard signatures of Andres, Sr. were not written by one and the same person. -> So,
the Petitioners sued the respondents for annulment of the deed of donation before (RTC) of
Masbate, where the case was docketed as Civil Case No. 5215.

After the pre-trial: respondents moved to disqualify PO2 Alvarez as a witness. They argued that
the RTC did not authorize the handwriting examination of the affidavit. They added that
presenting PO2 Alvarez as a witness will violate their constitutional right to due process since no
notice was given to them before the examination was conducted. Thus, PO2 Alvarezs report is a
worthless piece of paper and her testimony would be useless and irrelevant.

RTC granted respondents motion. The RTC ruled that PO2 Alvarezs supposed testimony would
be hearsay as she has no personal knowledge of the alleged handwriting of Andres, Sr. Also,
there is no need for PO2 Alvarez to be presented, if she is to be presented as an expert witness,
because her testimony is not yet needed. MR denied.

CA (pet for certiorari): Dismissed their petition in the assailed Decision dated February 28, 2011
on the ground that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 5215 has mooted the issue of PO2 Alvarezs
disqualification as a witness.

The appellate court also denied their MR. It refused to take judicial notice of the decision of
another CA Division which reinstated Civil Case No. 5215. The CA held that a CA Justice cannot
take judicial notice of decisions or matters pending before another Division of the appellate court
where he or she is not a member. The CA also held that the sisters were negligent for belatedly
informing it that Civil Case No. 5215 was reinstated. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: WON CA erred in refusing to reconsider the assailed decision in light of the reinstatement
of Civil Case No. 5215. (WON CA erred in not ruling that the RTC committed GAD in
disqualifying PO2 Alvarez as a witness.)

HELD: YES.

Petitioner: They stress that PO2 Alvarez will be presented as an expert witness to render an
opinion on whether the disputed handwriting was indeed made by Andres, Sr. or whether it is a
forgery.
Respondents comment: CA properly disqualified PO2 Alvarez. Her disqualification was mooted
by the dismissal of Civil Case No. 5215.

SC: Petitioner is correct.

The CA ruling that the dismissal of Civil Case No. 5215 has mooted the issue of PO2
Alvarezs disqualification as a witness can no longer be justified. Hence, we reverse the
CA ruling. While we agree with the CA in considering the RTCs Orders which dismissed
Civil Case No. 5215, we are unable to agree with its refusal to take judicial notice of the
Decision of another CA Division which reinstated Civil Case No. 5215. Subsequent
proceedings were even held in the reinstated Civil Case No. 5215 per Orders issued by the RTC
which were already submitted to the CA. That Civil Case No. 5215 was reinstated is a fact that
cannot be ignored.

RTC committed GAD disqualifying PO2 Alvarez as a witness. Grave abuse of discretion defies
exact definition, but it generally refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at
all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion and hostility. Grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal
violates the Constitution or grossly disregards the law or existing jurisprudence.

In Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and Separation Benefits System v.

Republic of the Philippines: a witness must only possess all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications provided in the Rules of Court. Section 20, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence
provides:

SEC. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications.Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who can
perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses.

Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law,
shall not be a ground for disqualification.

Specific rules of witness disqualification are provided under Sections 21 to 24, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence.
Section 21 disqualifies a witness by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. Section 22 disqualifies a witness by reason
of marriage. Section 23 disqualifies a witness by reason of death or insanity of the adverse party. Section 24 disqualifies a
witness by reason of privileged communication.

In Cavili v. Judge Florendo: the specific enumeration of disqualified witnesses excludes

the operation of causes of disability other than those mentioned in the Rules. The Rules
should not be interpreted to include an exception not embodied therein. We said:

The generosity with which the Rule allows people to testify is apparent. Interest in the outcome of
a case, conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, and religious belief are not
grounds for disqualification.

Sections 19 and 20 of Rule 130 provide for specific disqualifications. Section 19 disqualifies
those who are mentally incapacitated and children whose tender age or immaturity renders them
incapable of being witnesses. Section 20 provides for disqualification based on conflicts of
interest or on relationship. Section 21 provides for disqualification based on privileged
communications. Section 15 of Rule 132 may not be a rule on disqualification of witnesses but it
states the grounds when a witness may be impeached by the party against whom he was called.

There is no provision of the Rules disqualifying parties declared in default from taking the
witness stand for non-disqualified parties. The law does not provide default as an
exception. The specific enumeration of disqualified witnesses excludes the operation of causes
of disability other than those mentioned in the Rules. As a general rule, where there are express
exceptions these comprise the only limitations on the operation of a statute and no other
exception will be implied. x x x The Rules should not be interpreted to include an exception not
embodied therein.

As a handwriting expert of the PNP, PO2 Alvarez can surely perceive and make known her
perception to others. We have no doubt that she is qualified as a witness. She cannot be
disqualified as a witness since she possesses none of the disqualifications specified under the
Rules. Respondents motion to disqualify her should have been denied by the RTC for it was not
based on any of these grounds for disqualification. The RTC rather confused the qualification of
the witness with the credibility and weight of her testimony.

Moreover, Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence is clear that the opinion of an expert
witness may be received in evidence, to wit:

SEC. 49. Opinion of expert witness.The opinion of a witness on a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or
training which he is shown to possess, may be received in evidence.

For instance, in Tamani v. Salvador, we were inclined to believe that Tamanis signature was
forged after considering the testimony of the PNP document examiner that the case involved
simulated or copied forgery, such that the similarities will be superficial. We said that the value of
the opinion of a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere statements of whether a writing is
genuine or false, but upon the assistance he may afford in pointing out distinguishing marks,
characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of writing which
would ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed observer.

Thus, we disagree with the RTC that PO2 Alvarezs testimony would be hearsay. Under Section
49, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence, PO2 Alvarez is allowed to render an expert opinion, as
the PNP document examiner was allowed in Tamani. But the RTC already ruled at the outset that
PO2 Alvarezs testimony is hearsay even before her testimony is offered and she is called to the
witness stand. Under the circumstances, the CA should have issued a corrective writ of certiorari
and annulled the RTC ruling.

True, the use of the word "may" in Section 49, Rule 130 of the Rules on Evidence signifies
that the use of opinion of an expert witness is permissive and not mandatory on the part of
the courts. Handwriting experts are often offered as expert witnesses considering the technical
nature of the procedure in examining forged documents. Also, , analysis of the questioned
signature in the deed of donation executed by the late Andres Navarro, Sr. in crucial to the
resolution of the case.

In sum, the RTC should not have disqualified P02 Alvarez as a witness. She has the
qualifications of witness and possess none of the disqualifications under the Rules. The
Rules allow the opinion of an expert witness to be received as evidence. In Tamani, we used the
opinion of an expert witness. The value of P02 Alvarez's expert opinion cannot be determined if
P02 Alvarez is not even allowed to testify on the handwriting examination she conducted.

G.R. No. 181539, July 24, 2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EDWIN ALEMAN Y
LONGHAS, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Accused-appellant Edwin Aleman appeals from the Decision 1 dated
September 28, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02100
affirming the Decision2 dated November 16, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 76 in Criminal Case No. Q-03-118348 which
found him guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide.

Accused-appellant was charged under the following Information: cralavvonlinelawlibrary

That on or about the 10 th day of February 2003, in Quezon City, Philippines,

the said accused, conspiring and confederating with another person whose
true name, identity and other personal circumstances have not as yet been
ascertained and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously rob one RAMON JAIME BIROSEL y VILLA in the
following manner, to wit: on the date and place aforementioned while said
victim was inside his car having a conversation over his cellphone, the said
accused suddenly appeared and with intent to gain and by means of violence
approached the said vehicle and ordered said victim to open it and once
opened thereafter stabbed the said victim with a bladed weapon hitting him
on the thorax thereby inflicting upon him serious and mortal wounds which
were the direct and immediate cause of his untimely death, and thereupon
took, stole and carried away the following, to wit:
cralavvonlinelawlibrary

a) Two (2) Nokia cellular phones

b) One (1) brown leather wallet
c) Undetermined amount of cash money
d) One (1) necklace
e) One (1) mens ring
all with undetermined value, belonging to said Ramon Jaime Birosel y Villa, to
the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Ramon Jaime Birosel y Villa. 3

Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge when arraigned. 4 After

pre-trial was conducted, trial ensued.

The prosecution established that, as shown in the medico-legal report

prepared by Police Senior Inspector (P/S Insp.) Elizardo Daileg of the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory who autopsied the victims
cadaver, the cause of death was hemorrhagic shock secondary to multiple
stab wounds [in] the thorax. In particular, three penetrating stab wounds
were inflicted on the upper left portion of the victims chest, piercing the
upper lobe of the left lung and perforating the heart. He also suffered stab
wounds in the right eye, stomach and left forearm and incised wounds in the
left upper eyelid and left palm.5

The victim, Ramon Jaime Birosel, was a 55-year old real estate broker at the
time of his death. He was survived by his widow, Maria Filomena Birosel,
with whom he had no child. Filomena spent a total of P477,054.30 in funeral
expenses in connection with the burial of her deceased husband. Filomena
stated that the Nokia 3315 and Siemens S-45 cellular phones taken away
from Ramon were valued at P3,500.00 each, while the necklace snatched
from him was worth P20,000.00.6

The prosecutions case against accused-appellant hinges on the following

eyewitness account of Mark Almodovar: cralavvonline lawlibrary

[O]n February 10, 2003[,] at about 7:00 oclock in the evening, [Mark] went
out of his house to play ball in the basketball court. He walked to the
basketball court[, played there,] and at about 9:00 oclock, he stopped
playing as he then felt like urinating. He went to a place near the basketball
court where there were five cars parked. While urinating, he saw a fat man
walking towards a car. The fat man was talking on his cellular phone. He then
noticed two men following the fat man, who entered a parked car. The two
male persons who were then following the fat man then separated: one went
to the left side of the fat mans car and stood by the door at the drivers side
of the vehicle. While the other positioned himself by the door at the opposite
side of the car. [Mark] made a diagram, rectangular shape and two circles on
both sides, (Exhibit L) depicting the car and the positions of the two men.
The man who stood by the door at the drivers side had a knife while his
companion was armed with a gun. He then witnessed the man with the knife
in his hand stabbing the fat man repeatedly on different parts of his body,
while the man with the gun fired once. After taking the fat mans personal
belongings, including his ring, watch, wallet and cellular phone, the two men
left. He followed them to a place which he described as far and there, he saw
them buried the knife and covered it with soil. He made a drawing
representing the place where he followed them (Exh. M). After burying the
knife in the ground, the men left and he followed them again to a place which
he described as near. While thereat, he saw one of the culprits uncovered his
face. He recognized him as the person who went to the left side of the car
and stabbed the victim who was later on identified as the accused Edwin
Aleman. After which, the two men left. He decided not to follow them and
went home instead. It was about 11:00 oclock in the evening when he
arrived home. After waking up at 8:00 oclock the following morning, he
returned to the scene of the incident. There were many people gathered in
the area, including policemen. He saw a chubby girl and requested her to call
the policemen. He rode in a car with the police officers and the chubby girl.
They went to a house in a far place, but no one was there. He recognized and
identified the face of the fat man depicted in the picture (Exhibit N) shown
to him.

On cross-examination, he stated that he did not receive any death t[h]reat.

In the year 2003, his grandfather died in Nueva Ecija and he attended the
wake. He stayed there until his father, grandmother and another person,
whom he does not know but of the same age as that of his father, fetched
him on September 12, 2003. He was taken to Antipolo where he stayed at
the house of the relatives of the victim until December 10, 2003, the day he
initially testified in court. There was no sign language interpreter in the said
house. The relatives of the victim gave him some money which he used to
buy for two shirts, two pants and a pair of shoes.

Before going to the basketball court which is a little farther from their house
at 7:00 oclock in the evening, he already ate his evening meal at 6:00
oclock. There were six of them, boys and girls playing basketball. The
basketball court was a full court but they were not playing a real game, just
running and shooting. At about 8:00 oclock, they stopped playing, they sat
down and had soft drinks. After finishing his soft drink, he urinated in the
shrubbery near the five parked cars.

He added that he is familiar with Sikatuna Bliss but he does not know what
building in Sikatuna Bliss was fronting the five cars that were parked near
the basketball court. It was the first time that he saw the fat man and the
two male persons who wore black bonnets which covered their whole face.
The fat man was already inside his car when he was repeatedly stabbed. The
fat man was not using his cell phone when the one with the knife knocked
twice on the window of the car. The window of the car was half-opened when
the fat man was immediately stabbed. The man with a gun was on the other
side of the car when he fired his gun once. He did not notice any argument
between the fat man and his attacker. He kept a distance of about eight to
ten meters between him and the two men as he followed them. There were
no persons around when the two men attacked the fat man. After witnessing
the stabbing, his initial reaction was to follow the culprits. He did not call his
playmates because they were still playing. In fleeing, the two male persons
did not run. They just walk[ed] fast. He had been [on] their trail for about
nine minutes before they removed their bonnets. He followed them for about
thirty minutes.

When he gave his statements to the police, he did not tell them that the
knife was buried under the ground. It was 9:56 oclock when the men took
off their bonnets. The man with the knife removed the bloodstained white t-
shirt that he was wearing and, along with his bonnet, threw it away in a
place he described as flowing or running water. At about 10:00 oclock, the
two men boarded a motorcycle and left. It was the man with the gun who
drove the motorcycle. He took the same route when he walked back home. It
was about 10:00 oclock when he passed by the car of the fat man again.
There were no persons when he went back to the basketball court. Thus, he
just went home to sleep and the following morning, he gave his statement to
the police.

On re-direct examination, he was asked and he made a drawing (Exhibit O)

showing the basketball court (Exhibit O-1), the five parked cars near the
place where he urinated (Exhibit O-2), the exact spot where he urinated
(Exhibit O-3) and the car of the fat man (Exhibit O-4). When asked how
he was able to see the face of the accused, he answered that there was light
in the area which he described as near the flowing water where the accused
removed his bonnet. He stated that the light near the flowing water came
from a light bulb and the distance from the witness stand up to second door
outside the courtroom represents how far he was from the man with the
knife when [the latter] took off his bonnet.7

Mark was 14 years old when he testified. He is a deaf-mute. He was

assisted in his testimony by Daniel Catinguil, a licensed sign language
interpreter from the Philippine Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf who has
been teaching in the Philippine School for the Deaf since 1990. Catinguil had
also completed a five-year course at the Philippine Normal University with a
degree in teaching special education children.8

Accused-appellant was 26 years old and a resident of Area 6, Barangay

Botocan, Project 2, Quezon City when he testified. He interposed denial and
alibi as his defenses. He claimed that, at the time the incident happened on
February 10, 2003, he was at the billiards hall which was a 15-minute walk
from his residence. A road separates the billiards hall from Sikatuna Bliss.9

On that particular night, accused-appellant went to the billiards hall at

around 7:00 in the evening and played billiards against a certain Ruben.
They played until around 10:00 in the evening. Just as they were finished
playing, accused-appellants sister, Hilda Aleman, arrived to fetch him for
dinner. He went home with her. The following morning, after having
breakfast, he watched a basketball game and talked to his friends. At around
noon, while on his way back to his house, a neighbor, Vangie Barsaga, called
him and informed him that police officers came to his house looking for him.
At around 3:00 in the afternoon of that day, he went to the nearest police
station, Camp Karingal, where he presented himself to Senior Police Officer
(SPO) 1, at that time Police Officer 3, Leonardo Pasco of that stations District
Police Intelligence Unit. He asked SPO1 Pasco if they were looking for a
certain Edwin Aleman and, upon receiving a positive answer, he introduced
himself. He was informed that he was a suspect in a killing incident. He was
told to stay put while they were waiting for the alleged eyewitness to arrive.
On February 13, 2003, he was twice made to join a police line-up together
with five others. In both instances, they were ordered to turn around several
times and they complied. Thereafter, he was given a spot report: re:
Voluntary Surrender of Alleged Suspect in a Robbery w/ Homicide Case by a
police officer and was informed that he would be turned over to the custody
of the Criminal Investigation Division of Camp Karingal.10

Accused-appellants testimony that he was at the billiards hall on February

10, 2003 playing against Ruben until around 10:00 in the evening was
corroborated by Filomena Fungo, grandmother of Ruben, who saw accused-
appellant and Ruben playing when she went to the billiards hall twice that
night to fetch Ruben.11 Hilda, accused-appellants sister, also corroborated
accused-appellants testimony that she fetched him from the billiards hall at
around 10:00 in the evening of February 10, 2003. She further stated that,
upon getting home, she and accused-appellant ate dinner together and,
thereafter, watched some television shows until accused-appellant went to
sleep some 30 minutes later.12
Accused-appellant also attempted to show that the eyewitness, Mark, failed
to identify him during the police line-up. Defense witness SPO1 Leonardo
Pasco stated that he was the one who prepared the spot report although it
was his superior who signed it. He further stated that Mark failed to identify
accused-appellant during the police line-up. Another defense witness,
barangay kagawad Ricofredo Barrientos, stated that he was with Mark on
February 13, 2003 when Mark was asked to identify the robber-killer of the
victim from a line-up. According to Barrientos, a police officer made a
gesture to Mark by slashing his throat with the use of his hand and, after
viewing the persons in the line-up, Mark shook his head. The line-up was
presented to Mark twice and he shook his head in both instances. 13

After studying the parties respective evidence, the trial court rejected the
defenses of accused-appellant for their inherent weakness and implausibility.
On the other hand, it viewed the prosecutions evidence favorably,
particularly the eyewitness testimony of Mark and his positive identification of
accused-appellant as the one who stabbed the victim. In particular, the trial
court found Marks testimony simple and credible. He had no ill motive that
would make him testify falsely against accused-appellant. While there were
minor inconsistencies in his testimony, the discrepancies were
inconsequential and did not affect the truthfulness of Marks narration. Thus,
in its Decision dated November 16, 2005, the trial court found accused-
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with
homicide. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads: cralavvonlinelawlibrary

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Edwin Aleman guilty beyond reasonable

doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, described and penalized under
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659, in
relation to Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code, the court hereby sentences
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of
Ramon Jaime Birosel as follows: cralavvonlinelawlibrary

1. The amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as civil indemnity for

the death of the victim;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

2. The amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) as moral damages; and

3. The amount of Four Hundred Seventy-Seven Thousand Fifty-Four Pesos

and Thirty Centavos (P477,054.30) as actual damages.

He is also ordered to reimburse the heirs of the victim the amount of Three
Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P3,500.00) representing the value of the
Nokia 3315 cellular phone, the amount of Three Thousand Five Hundred
Pesos (P3,500.00) representing the value of the S-45 Siemens cellular
phone, and the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) representing
the value of the necklace, which were all taken from the victim.
With costs against the accused.14

Accused-appellant appealed his case to the Court of Appeals. He anchored

his appeal on the claim that the trial court erred in convicting him for robbery
with homicide. His claim was four-pronged, all aimed at discrediting the
eyewitness, Mark.15

First, accused-appellant questioned the qualification of Mark to be a witness.

Accused-appellant argued that, being a deaf-mute who cannot make known
his perception to others as he has no formal education on sign language,
Mark is unqualified to be a witness. In fact, he was unable to give a
responsive answer to some questions propounded to him through the
interpreter such as when he could not answer why he preferred to play in a
basketball far from his house than in a nearer one.16

Second, accused-appellant asserted that Marks testimony was not

corroborated by his alleged playmates or by the chubby girl he mentioned
in his testimony. Such lack of corroboration weakened Marks testimony.17

Third, accused-appellant contended that Mark admitted receiving money, new

clothes and shoes from the private complainant before he took the witness
stand. This made his testimony highly suspicious.18

Fourth, accused-appellant highlighted Marks failure to identify him as the

perpetrator of the crime in the two instances that he was presented to Mark
in a line-up. This made Marks alleged positive identification of accused-
appellant doubtful.19

In its Decision dated September 28, 2007, the Court of Appeals held that the
contentions of accused-appellant lacked merit. 20

The Court of Appeals declared that the capacity of a deaf-mute to testify has
long been recognized. The witness may communicate his perceptions to the
court through an interpreter. In this case, Marks testimony was facilitated
by Catinguil, a licensed sign language interpreter who has been teaching in
the Philippine School for the Deaf since 1990. With the help of Catinguil, the
trial court determined that Mark is not mentally deficient and that he was
able to tell time, space and distance. He was able to draw and make
sketches in open court to show the relative position of things and persons as
he perceived like a normal person. By using signs and signals, he was able
to recount clearly what he witnessed in the evening of February 10, 2003.
According to the appellate court, the above established Marks competence as
a witness.21

The Court of Appeals also found that Marks testimony was corroborated by
the findings of the medico-legal officer who autopsied the victims corpse that
the cause of death was hemorrhagic shock secondary to multiple stab
wounds in the thorax. This physical evidence is an eloquent manifestation of
truth and its evidentiary weight is far more than that of corroborative
testimonies.22

The Court of Appeals rejected as groundless accused-appellants imputation

to Mark of improper motive or bias. It also pointed out the irrelevance of
non-identification of an accused in a police line-up. What is important is the
positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime by the
witness in open court.23

Thus, the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that the prosecution
was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of robbery
with homicide. It upheld the conviction of accused-appellant for the said
felony. The decretal portion of the Decision dated September 28, 2007
reads:cralavvonline lawlibrary

WHEREFORE, premises considered[,] the decision dated November 16,

2005 of the Regional Trial Court [(RTC)], National Capital Judicial Region,
Branch 76, Quezon City, in Criminal Case No. Q-03-118348 is
AFFIRMED.24 nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary

Accused-appellant is now before this Court insisting on the failure of the

prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt on the very same
grounds he raised in the Court of Appeals.

This Court is not persuaded.

Both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that accused-appellant stabbed
the victim several times, causing the latters death, for the purpose of
depriving the victim of his personal properties, which personalties accused-
appellant took away with him before leaving the scene of the crime. The
killing of the victim was by reason of the robbery. It therefore constitutes
the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. This finding of the trial
court as affirmed by the appellate court is conclusive to this Court. Also, a
review of the records show that both the trial and the appellate courts did
not miss, misapply or misinterpret any relevant fact that would warrant an
alteration of their identical conclusions as to the criminal responsibility of
accused-appellant.25

The Court of Appeals has sufficiently addressed the concerns of accused-

appellant. Accused-appellant has presented no compelling reason that would
justify the reversal of his conviction.

The mere fact that Mark is a deaf-mute does not render him unqualified to be
a witness. The rule is that all persons who can perceive, and perceiving,
can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses.26 A deaf-
mute may not be able to hear and speak but his/her other senses, such as
his/her sense of sight, remain functional and allow him/her to make
observations about his/her environment and experiences. The inability to
hear and speak may prevent a deaf-mute from communicating orally with
others but he/she may still communicate with others in writing or through
signs and symbols and, as in this case, sketches. Thus, a deaf-mute is
competent to be a witness so long as he/she has the faculty to make
observations and he/she can make those observations known to others. As
this Court held in People v. Tuangco27: cralavvonlinelawlibrary

A deaf-mute is not incompetent as a witness. All persons who can perceive,

and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be
witnesses. Deaf-mutes are competent witnesses where they (1) can
understand and appreciate the sanctity of an oath; (2) can comprehend facts
they are going to testify on; and (3) can communicate their ideas through a
qualified interpreter. Thus, in People vs. De Leon and People vs. Sasota, the
accused was convicted on the basis of the testimony of a deaf-mute. x x x.
(Citations omitted.)

When a deaf-mute testifies in court, the manner in which the examination of

a deaf-mute should be conducted is a matter to be regulated and controlled
by the trial court in its discretion, and the method adopted will not be
reviewed by the appellate court in the absence of a showing that the
complaining party was in some way injured by reason of the particular
method adopted.28

In this case, both the trial and the appellate courts found that Mark
understood and appreciated the sanctity of an oath and that he
comprehended the facts he testified on. This Court sees no reason in ruling
otherwise.

Mark communicated his ideas with the help of Catinguil, a licensed sign
language interpreter from the Philippine Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf
who has been teaching in the Philippine School for the Deaf since 1990 and
possessed special education and training for interpreting sign language. The
trial and the appellate courts found Catinguil qualified to act as interpreter for
Mark. No ground to disturb that finding exists.

Mark communicated a credible account of the things he perceived on that

fateful February 10, 2003 the situation of the victim who had just boarded
his car; the respective positions of accused-appellant and his still unidentified
cohort vis--vis the victim; accused-appellants knock on the window of the
victims car and the sudden series of stabs accused-appellant inflicted upon
the victim; the taking of the victims various personal properties; accused-
appellants walk away from the crime scene; and, the revelation of accused-
appellants identity when he finally removed the bonnet that covered his face,
unaware that someone was secretly and silently watching. In this
connection, the Court of Appeals correctly observed that [d]espite intense
and grueling cross-examinations, the eyewitness responded with consistency
upon material details that could only come from a firsthand knowledge of the
shocking events which unfolded before his eyes.29 The imperfections or
inconsistencies cited by accused-appellant were due to the fact that there is
some difficulty in eliciting testimony where the witness is a deaf-mute. 30
Besides they concerned material details which are neither material nor
relevant to the case. As such, those discrepancies do not detract from the
credibility of Marks testimony, much less justify the total rejection of the
same. What is material is that he positively identified accused-appellant and
personally saw what accused-appellant did to the victim on the fateful night
when the incident happened. The trial courts assessment of the credibility of
Mark, which was affirmed by the appellate court, deserves the highest
respect of this Court.

Moreover, the Court of Appeals correctly observed that Marks testimony was
corroborated by the findings of the medico-legal officer who autopsied the
victims corpse that the cause of death was hemorrhagic shock secondary to
multiple stab wounds [in] the thorax.31 The multiple mortal wounds inflicted
on the victim constitute physical evidence which further establish the truth of
Marks testimony. Its evidentiary value far outweighs any corroborative
testimony which accused-appellant requires of the prosecution. Moreover,
the settled rule is that the positive and credible testimony of a single witness
is sufficient to secure the conviction of an accused.32

The RTC and the Court of Appeals saw no improper motive which would impel
Mark to testify falsely against accused-appellant. As the determination of
bad faith, malice or ill motive is a question of fact, this Court respects the
unanimous finding of the trial and the appellate courts on the matter.

Accused-appellants attempt to render doubtful Marks identification of him

fails. Indeed, the law requires not simply an eyewitness account of the act of
committing the crime but the positive identification of the accused as the
perpetrator of the crime.33 Here, Mark has positively pointed to accused-
appellant as the perpetrator of the crime. The Court of Appeals correctly
ruled that Marks failure to identify accused-appellant in a police line-up on
February 13, 2003 was of no moment. There is no law stating that a police
line-up is essential to proper identification. What matters is that the positive
identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime be made by the
witness in open court.34 Nevertheless, the records show that Mark identified
accused-appellant as the robber-killer of the victim in a police line-up on
February 18, 200335 and, more importantly, in open court in the course of
Marks testimony.

In sum, the trial and the appellate courts correctly convicted accused-
appellant for the special complex crime of robbery with homicide. Accused-
appellants crime is punishable under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, by reclusion perpetua to death.
Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code states that when the law prescribes a
penalty consisting of two indivisible penalties, and the crime is not attended
by any aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be imposed. 36
Considering that no modifying circumstance attended the commission of the
crime, the penalty imposed by the trial and the appellate courts, reclusion
perpetua, is proper.

The civil indemnity is increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00, the current

amount of civil indemnity awarded in cases of murder.37 Robbery with
homicide belongs to that class of felony denominated as Robbery with
violence against or intimidation of persons 38 under Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code and the killing or death of a person is committed by reason or on
occasion of the robbery. The increase in the amount of civil indemnity is
called for as the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, like murder,
involves a greater degree of criminal propensity than homicide alone where
the civil indemnity awarded is P50,000.00.

The P50,000.00 imposed as moral damages is proper and conforms to recent

jurisprudence.39

The reimbursement of actual damages in the total amount of P477,054.30

for various funeral-related expenses is proper as it is fully supported by
evidence on record. The same holds true for the payment of the value of the
items taken from the victim, namely, two cellphones at P3,500.00 each and
the necklace at P20,000.00.

In addition, and in conformity with current policy, we also impose on all the
monetary awards for damages (namely, the civil indemnity, moral damages
and actual damages) interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from date of
finality of this Decision until fully paid.40

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated September 28, 2007 of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 02100 affirming the Decision dated
November 16, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 76 in
Criminal Case No. Q-03-118348 which found accused-appellant Edwin
Aleman guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in so far as legal
interest at the rate of 6% per annum is imposed on the civil indemnity, moral
damages and actual damages awarded to the heirs of the victim, which shall
commence from the date of finality of this decision until fully paid.

Gonzales v. Court of Appeals (CA)

Digest
Gonzales v. CA
G.R. No. L-37453 May 25, 1979
Guerrero, J. (Ponente)
Facts:
1. Petitioner Rizalina Gonzales and Lutgarda Santiago
(Private respondent) are the nieces of the deceased
Isabel Gabriel who died a widow. A will was thereafter
submitted to probate. The said will was typewritten, in
Tagalog and appeared to have been executed in April
1961 or two months prior to the death of Isabel. It
consisted of 5 pages including the attestation and
acknowledgment, with the signature of testatrix on
page 4 and the left margin of all the pages.

2. Lutgarda was named as the universal heir and

executor. The petitioner opposed the probate.

3. The lower court denied the probate on the ground

that the will was not executed and attested in
accordance with law on the issue of the competency
and credibility of the witnesses.

Issue: Whether or not the credibility of the

subscribing witnesses is material to the validity of a
will

RULING: No. The law requires only that witnesses

posses the qualifications under Art. 820 (NCC) and
none of the disqualifications of Art. 802. There is no
requirement that they are of good standing or
reputation in the community, for trustworthiness,
honesty and uprightness in order that his testimony is
believed and accepted in court. For the testimony to
be credible, it is not mandatory that evidence be
established on record that the witnesses have good
standing in the the community. Competency is
distinguished from credibility, the former being
determined by Art. 820 while the latter does not
require evidence of such good standing. Credibility
depends on the convincing weight of his testimony in
court.

Qualification of Witnesses

G.R. No. L-38468-69 June 29, 1984

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LORENZO TUVERA y BAUTISTA alias "ENSO", CORNELIO DE LA CRUZ alias "NELY", and MATIAS
GULENG, accused, CORNELIO DE LA CRUZ y DUMALAY alias "NELY", defendant-appellant.

FACTS

Cornelio dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and Robbery. The co-accused
Matias Goleng is acquitted.

A search party composed of policemen of Bacnotan, La Union, proceeded to the mountains of Bo. Ubbog to
look for Amadeo Orejudos, barrio captain of said barrio, who has been reported missing. In the course of
their search, they found the lifeless body of Orejudos lying near a shallow creek. The body was covered with
branches, leaves and some earth. an autopsy is conducted recognizing the injuries sustained by the victim
through Dr. Julita Draculan.

Upon receiving information that the persons last seen in the company of the victim were Lorenzo Tuvera and
Cornelio dela Cruz, Pat. Espejo summoned them to the police station. In the ensuing investigation, Tuvera
pointed to dela Cruz as the killer of Orejudos. At first, dela Cruz denied the accusation and, instead,
countered by charging that Tuvera was the author of the crime. However, after Tuvera narrated the details of
how dela Cruz perpetrated the crime, the latter readily admitted responsibility for the killing of Orejudos. He
also informed the police that he took the gun of the victim. Asked as to the place where he had kept the gun,
dela Cruz directed the police to a small hut in the mountains of Bo. Ubbog, where they recovered a 'Hi-
standard' Cal. 22 revolver with ammunitions, licensed in the name of the deceased Amadeo Orejudos. Dela
Cruz executed two written statements which he signed in the presence of the Chief of Police, the Fiscal, and
Judge Nemesio Molina of the Municipal Court of Bacnotan.

During the investigation, Tuvera also informed the police investigators that one Matias GULENG had offered
dela Cruz an amount to kill Orejudos. Cornelio dela Cruz, Lorenzo Tuvera and Matias Guleng were
subsequently indicted for murder qualified by treachery, and in a separate information, dela Cruz and Tuvera
were accused of the crime of robbery for having taken and carried away a 'Hi-standard' revolver, Cal. 22 with
ammunitions, belonging to the deceased Orejudos,
At the trial, accused Tuvera, on motion of the prosecution, was discharged from the information and utilized
as state witness. His testimony was given in open court.

ISSUE

WON the trial court erred in accepting and giving weight to the testimony of co-accused Lorenzo Tuvera who
turned state witness.

HELD

NO. An accused is always a competent witness for or against his co-accused, and the fact that he had been
discharged from the information does not affect the quality of his testimony, for the admissibility, the
relevancy, as well as the weight that should be accorded his declarations are to be determined by the Rules
on Evidence. And in this connection, it has been held that the uncorroborated testimony of an accused,
when satisfactory and convincing, may be the basis for a judgment of conviction of his co-accused.

The trial court had the opportunity to observe the demeanor and manner of testifying of the witnesses of
both the prosecution and the defense, and it assessed the testimony of Tuvera to be convincing and
credible. What is more, the declarations of this witness find solid corroboration in the statements contained
in the appellant's affidavits. The latter not only admitted having killed the deceased Orejudos, he also
informed the police authorities of the place where he hid the gun which he took from the victim. In fact, the
police officers did recover the said gun at the same hut pointed to by him.

Equally untenable is appellant's attempt to repudiate his confession on ground of force and intimidation. He
claimed that he was mauled and tortured by his investigators, but he failed to Identify his alleged torturers.
Neither did he file charges against them. He admittedly affixed his signature in the two affidavits and
voluntarily swore to the truth of the recitals therein before Judge Nemesio Molina of the Bacnotan Municipal
Court, but never for a moment did he complain of any alleged maltreatment. At the preliminary investigation,
Judge Molina propounded questions to appellant, and it appears that his answers thereto were confirmatory
of the facts set forth in his affidavits. ALL these circumstances strongly belie appellant's allegation of
coercion and duress.