CRIMPRO RULE 126

Title: GR No. 209387

Ponente: LEONEN, J

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

FACTS

Dela Cruz was an on-the-job trainee of an inter-island vessel. He frequently traveled, "coming back and
forth taking a vessel." At around 12:00 noon of May 11, 2007, Dela Cruz was at a pier of the Cebu
Domestic Port to go home to Iloilo. While buying a ticket, he allegedly left his bag on the floor with a
porter. It took him around 15 minutes to purchase a ticket. Dela Cruz then proceeded to the entrance of
the terminal and placed his bag on the x-ray scanning machine for inspection. The operator of the x-ray
machine saw firearms inside Dela Cruz's bag.

Flores, the x-ray machine operator-on-duty, saw the impression of what appeared to be three (3) firearms
inside Dela Cruz's bag. Upon seeing the suspected firearms, she called the attention of port personnel
Igot who was the baggage inspector then. Igot asked Dela Cruz whether he was the owner of the bag.
Dela Cruz answered Igot in the affirmative and consented to Igot's manual inspection of the bag.

Port Police Officer Abregana was called by Igot and was told that there were firearms in a bag owned by
Dela Cruz. Dela Cruz admitted that he was owner of the bag. The bag was then inspected and the
following items were found inside: three (3) revolvers; NBI clearance; seaman's book; other personal
items; and four (4) live ammunitions placed inside the cylinder. When asked whether he had the proper
documents for the firearms, Dela Cruz answered in the negative. Dela Cruz was then arrested and
informed of his violation of a crime punishable by law. He was also informed of his constitutional rights.

In the Information, Dela Cruz was charged with violation of Republic Act No. 8294 for illegal possession of
firearms. Subsequently, another Information was filed charging him with the violation of Commission on
Elections Resolution No. 7764, in relation to Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.

Dela Cruz entered a plea of not guilty to both charges during arraignment.

After trial, RTC Dela Cruz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating the Gun Ban under Commission on
Elections Resolution No. 7764, in relation to Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881. The trial court also
finds the search conducted by the port authorities reasonable and, therefore, not violative of the
accused's constitutional rights. Hence, when the search of the bag of the accused revealed the firearms
and ammunitions, accused is deemed to have been caught in flagrante delicto, justifying his arrest even
without a warrant under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The firearms and
ammunitions obtained in the course of such valid search are thus admissible as evidence against [the]
accused.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's Judgment.

Petitioners Contention:

1. Dela Cruz argues that there was no voluntary waiver against warrantless search. In petitioner's case,
it may well be said that, with the circumstances attending the search of his luggage, he had no actual
intention to relinquish his right against warrantless searches. He knew in all honest belief that when
 his luggage would pass through the routine x-ray examination, nothing incriminating would be
recovered. It was out of that innocent confidence that he allowed the examination of his luggage. He
believed that no incriminating evidence would be found. He knew he did not place those items. But
what is strikingly unique about his situation is that a considerable time interval lapsed, creating an
opportunity for someone else to place inside his luggage those incriminating items.

Respondents Argument:

1. Respondent argues that there was a valid waiver of Dela Cruz's right to unreasonable search and
seizure, thus warranting his conviction. Dela Cruz was caught in flagrante delicto. The firearms were
seized during a routine baggage x-ray at the port of Cebu, a common seaport security procedure.
According to respondent, this case is similar to valid warrantless searches and seizures conducted by
airport personnel pursuant to routine airport security procedures. Records are also clear that Dela
Cruz voluntarily waived his right to unreasonable searches and seizure.

ISSUE/S

I. Whether or not petitioner waived his right against unreasonable searches and seizures- YES
II. Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure in this case- YES

RATIO

For a full understanding of the nature of the constitutional rights involved, the court examined three (3)
points of alleged intrusion into the right to privacy of petitioner: first, when petitioner gave his bag for x-
ray scanning to port authorities; second, when the baggage inspector opened petitioner's bag and called
the Port Authority Police; and third, when the police officer opened the bag to search, retrieve, and seize
the firearms and ammunition.

The first point of intrusion occurred when petitioner presented his bag for inspection to port
personnelthe x-ray machine operator and baggage inspector manning the x-ray machine
station. The court held that the search WAS NOT rendered unreasonable at the first point of
intrusion.

With regard to searches and seizures, the standard imposed on private persons is different from that
imposed on state agents or authorized government authorities. In People v. Marti, This court held that
there was no unreasonable search or seizure. The evidence obtained against the accused was not
procured by the state acting through its police officers or authorized government agencies. The Bill of
Rights does not govern relationships between individuals; it cannot be invoked against the acts of private
individual. If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first
secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at the behest or
initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at
bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure
cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the
protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed by private
individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.

Hence, by virtue of Marti, items seized pursuant to a reasonable search conducted by private persons are
not covered by the exclusionary rule. To determine whether the intrusion by the port personnel in this
case was committed by private or public persons, we revisit the history and organizational structure of
the Philippine Ports Authority.
The Cebu Port Authority is clothed with authority by the state to oversee the security of persons and
vehicles within its ports. While there is a distinction between port personnel and port police officers in this
case, considering that port personnel are not necessarily law enforcers, both should be considered agents
of government under Article III of the Constitution. The actions of port personnel during routine security
checks at ports have the color of a state-related function.

Thus, with port security personnel's functions having the color of state-related functions and deemed
agents of government, Marti is inapplicable in the present case. Nevertheless, searches pursuant to port
security measures are not unreasonable per se. The security measures of x-ray scanning and inspection
in domestic ports are akin to routine security procedures in airports.

In People v. Suzuki, the accused "entered the pre-departure area of the Bacolod Airport Terminal." He was
"bound for Manila via flight No. 132 of the Philippine Airlines and was carrying a small traveling bag and a
box marked 'Bongbong's piaya." The accused "proceeded to the 'walk through metal detector,' a machine
which produces a red light and an alarm once it detects the presence of metallic substance or object."
"Thereupon, the red light switched on and the alarm sounded, signifying the presence of metallic
substance either in his person or in the box he was carrying." When the accused was asked to open the
content of the box, he answered "open, open." Several packs of dried marijuana fruiting tops were then
found inside the box. Suzuki argued that the box was only given to him as "pasalubong" by a certain
Pinky, whom he had sexual relations with the night before. He did not know the contents of the box. This
court in Suzuki found that the search conducted on the accused was a valid exception to the prohibition
against warrantless searches as it was pursuant to a routine airport security procedure .

It is axiomatic that a reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved
according to the facts of each case. Given the circumstances obtaining here, we find the search
conducted by the airport authorities reasonable and, therefore, not violative of his constitutional rights.
Hence, when the search of the box of piaya revealed several marijuana fruiting tops, appellant is deemed
to have been caught in flagrante delicto, justifying his arrest even without a warrant under Section 5(a),
Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. The packs of marijuana obtained in the course of such valid
search are thus admissible as evidence against appellant.

The reason behind it is that there is a reasonable reduced expectation of privacy when coming into
airports or ports of travel Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure
of their persons or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of
privacy, which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in
airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism has come
increased security at the nation's airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft routinely pass
through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-
ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are
conducted to determine what the objects are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable,
given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy
expectations associated with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public
address systems, signs and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any
prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements
place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless searches and
seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.

This rationale was reiterated more recently in Sales v. People where the court upheld the validity of the
search conducted as part of the routine security check at the old Manila Domestic Airport. Port authorities
were acting within their duties and functions when it used x-ray scanning machines for inspection of
passengers' bags. When the results of the x-ray scan revealed the existence of firearms in the bag, the
port authorities had probable cause to conduct a search of petitioner's bag. Notably, petitioner did not
contest the results of the x-ray scan.

The second point of intrusion was when the baggage inspector opened petitioner's bag and
called the attention of the port police officer. The court also held that the search WAS NOT
rendered unreasonable at the second point of intrusion,
The port personnel's actions proceed from the authority and policy to ensure the safety of travelers and
vehicles within the port. At this point, petitioner already submitted himself and his belongings to
inspection by placing his bag in the x-ray scanning machine. The presentation of petitioner's bag for x-ray
scanning was voluntary. Petitioner had the choice of whether to present the bag or not. He had the option
not to travel if he did not want his bag scanned or inspected. X-ray machine scanning and actual
inspection upon showing of probable cause that a crime is being or has been committed are part of
reasonable security regulations to safeguard the passengers passing through ports or terminals. Probable
cause is reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to
induce a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense charged. It refers to the
existence of such facts and circumstances that can lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed, and that the items, articles or objects sought in connection
with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law are in the place to be searched.

A third point of intrusion to petitioner's right to privacy occurred during petitioner's

The Constitution safeguards a person's right against unreasonable searches and seizures. A warrantless
search is presumed to be unreasonable. However, this court lays down the exceptions where warrantless
searches are deemed legitimate: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest; (2) seizure in "plain
view"; (3) search of a moving vehicle; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop and
frisk; and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances.

In case of consented searches or waiver of the constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches, it is
fundamental that to constitute a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the right exists; (2) that the person
involved had knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the existence of such right; and (3) the said
person had an actual intention to relinquish the right.

Petitioner anchors his case on the claim that he did not validly consent to the search conducted by the
port authorities. He argues that he did not have an actual intention to relinquish his right against a
warrantless search. In cases involving the waiver of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures,
events must be weighed in its entirety. The trial court's findings show that petitioner presented his bag
for scanning in the x-ray machine. When his bag went through the x-ray machine and the firearms were
detected, he voluntarily submitted his bag for inspection to the port authorities. It was after the port
personnel's inspection that Officer Abregana's attention was called and the bag was inspected anew with
petitioner's consent.

Similar to the accused in People v. Kagui Malasugui and People v. Omaweng who permitted authorities to
search their persons and premises without a warrant, petitioner is now precluded from claiming an
invalid warrantless search when he voluntarily submitted to the search on his person. In
addition, petitioner's consent to the search at the domestic port was not given under
intimidating or coercive circumstances.

We also cannot subscribe to petitioner's argument that there was no valid consent to the
search because his consent was premised on his belief that there were no prohibited items in
his bag. The defendant's belief that no incriminating evidence would be found does not
automatically negate valid consent to the search when incriminating items are found. His or
her belief must be measured against the totality of the circumstances. Again, petitioner
voluntarily submitted himself to port security measures and, as he claimed during trial, he
was familiar with the security measures since he had been traveling back and forth through
the sea port.

Consequently, we find respondent's argument that the present petition falls under a valid
consented search and during routine port security procedures meritorious. The search
conducted on petitioner's bag is valid.

Routine baggage inspections conducted by port authorities, although done without search
warrants, are not unreasonable searches per se. Constitutional provisions protecting privacy
should not be so literally understood so as to deny reasonable safeguards to ensure the
safety of the traveling public.

RULING

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated September 8, 2012 and the
Resolution dated August 23, 2013 in CA-GR CEB CR No. 01606 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS.

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