religions

Article
Religious Pluralism and Civic Rights in a Muslim
Nation: An Analysis of Prophet Muhammads
Covenants with Christians
Craig Considine
Department of Sociology, Rice University, Houston, TX 77005, USA; [email protected]

Academic Editor: Todd Green

Received: 30 November 2015; Accepted: 28 January 2016; Published: 4 February 2016

Abstract: This article examines the roles that religious pluralism and civic rights played in Prophet
Muhammads vision of a Muslim nation. I demonstrate how Muhammad desired a pluralistic
society in which citizenship and equal rights were granted to all people regardless of religious
beliefs and practices. The Covenants of the Prophet Muhammad with the Christians of his time are
used as a framework for analysis. These documents have received little attention in our time, but
their messages are crucial in light of current debates about Muslim-Christian relations. The article
campaigns for reviving the egalitarian spirit of the Covenants by refocusing our understanding of
the ummah as a site for religious freedom and civil rights. Ultimately, I argue that the Covenants of
Prophet Muhammad with the Christians of his time can be used to develop a stronger narrative of
democratic partnership between Muslims and Christians in the Islamic world and beyond.

Keywords: Prophet Muhammad; religious pluralism; civic nation; Covenants of Prophet Muhammad;
Muslim-Christian Relations

When assessing current trends in Muslim-Christian relations, there is a tendency to view

this complex relationship through the prism of contemporary events alone. Any account of
Muslim-Christian relations, however, must consider historical processes and events in order to
position current developments in their appropriate context. Before embarking on contemporary
issues affecting Muslim and Christian communities, a few historical issues are in order. In the modern
era (15001945 CE), the major part of the Muslim world was ruled by Christian civilization. During
this period, the Islamic world, as noted by Armstrong, was convulsed by the modernization process.
Instead of being one of the leaders of world civilization, Islamdom was quickly and permanently
reduced to a dependent bloc by the European powers [1]. Europeans assumed that European culture
had always been progressive and that Muslim societies were backward, inefficient, and corrupt [1].
European colonialists in the Middle East, Africa, and South Asia also wreaked havoc by plundering
Islamic economies and supplanting Islamic educational systems with secular or Christianity-based
systems [2]. These kind of colonial interactions had a decisive influence on the religious and political
relations between Muslims and Christians, and shaped not least the mutual theological images and
assessments of the other [3]. Towards the end of European colonial rule, the Ottoman Empire crumbled,
which created a vacuum in the Middle East that contributed to tensions between local inhabitants
and external powers of interests. As World War I ended, Westernersprimarily the Britishsaw
an opportunity to bring modern coherence to [Arabia] by imposing new kingdoms of their own
devising, as long as the kings would be compliant with the strategic interests of the British Empire [4].
When the British and other European powers (such as the French) drew up state borders in the Middle
East, they paid little attention to the ethnic and religious division within Arabian societies. Muslims
today see these historic events as influencing the development of Islamic societies as well as shaping
perceptions of Christians living within their own borders and around the Western world.

Religions 2016, 7, 15; doi:10.3390/rel7020015 www.mdpi.com/journal/religions

Religions 2016, 7, 15 2 of 21

In recent years, relations between Muslims and Christians have been described in light of a clash
of civilizations ([5], p. 22) in which the Muslim world (Islamic civilization) and the West
(Christian civilization) are situated in binaries such as us versus them, good versus evil, civilized
versus uncivilized, and secular versus non-secular. The clash of civilizations gained particular
prominence after the events of 11 September 2001 and the Wests subsequent military operations
in Muslim-majority countries, including Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, Yemen, Libya, and Syria. The
widespread violence caused by these invasions helped fan the flames of radical Islam and fostered
opposition to the Western world and Christianity alike. To further complicate relations between
Muslims and Christians, Muslims today might perceive Christian nations like the Philippines and
the United States as severely oppressing Muslims, whereas Christians may perceive Muslim nations,
like Pakistan, Iraq, and Sudan, as severely oppressing Christians. Furthermore, Muslim-Christian
relations today are negatively shaped by centuries-old fears of Islamic jihad and the Christian
crusade. Daeshor otherwise known as the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS or IS)has taken
over a large swath of territory across Mesopotamia. Daesh has declared a Caliphate and professed
a plan to establish political and religious hegemony over Muslims and non-Muslims across the Middle
East and beyond [6]. Concern over Daesh activities in the United States [7] and the so-called tide
of Muslim migrants coming into Europe [8] have served to further the suspicion between Muslims
and Christians.
All of these political, religious, and cultural developments throughout history have shaped how
Muslims and Christians perceive each other today; for example, there is currently a high level of
anti-Muslim world sentiment in the United States and anti-Western world sentiment in Muslim
nations across the globe. The United States, a predominantly Christian nation that frequently depicts
itself as advocating for religious pluralism and civil society, has a high to very high level of social
hostilities involving religion. A poll taken at the end of 2013 by the Pew Research Centers Forum on
Religion and Public Life [9] showed that 60 percent of all Republicans exhibited prejudice towards
Muslims. American citizens are particularly hostile towards Arab-Americans, many of whom are
Muslim. A survey carried out in 2014 by Zogby Analytics [10], an Egyptian research group, found
that only 36 percent of American citizens have a favorable view of Arab-Americans, a number that
fell down from 43 percent in 2010 [11]. Comparatively, states that have a high percentage of Muslims
almost uniformly persecute minority religious communities, especially Christians in Middle Eastern
states [12]. In Syria and Iraq, Christians have borne the worst of the religious persecution that has
inflicted the Middle East in recent years. Daeshand its extreme practice of Takfirism [13]has
enslaved, killed, and uprooted hundreds of thousands of Christians [14]. Iraqi Christians, who trace
their origins back to the period of the first century, have witnessed 125,000 people leave their homes
over the course of 2014 and 2015 [15]. Griswold [16] goes so far as to say the rise of Daesh signals the
end of Christianity in the Middle East altogether. Considering the persecution of Christians in Middle
Eastern states, it becomes imperative to distinguish injurious treatment of Christians to that of Prophet
Muhammad and his defense of Christian communities. This article discusses and sheds light on how
Islamic groups such as Daesh disregard the Prophets commandments on how Muslims should treat,
incorporate, and interact with Christians in their midst.
Religious persecution in the United States and throughout the Middle East has made theologians,
sociologists, and political theorists acutely aware of the need to foster pluralism and civility in
religiously diverse nations. One potential source for creating this type of society is to treat the
Covenants of Prophet Muhammad as a third foundational source of Islamic scripture that is entirely in
line with the Quran and hadiths [17]. While the Covenants have been known to scholars for many
centuries and accepted as law by Muslim leaders, traditional Muslims and modern Western
scholars have largely neglected these documents ([18], pp. 12). Issues of the authenticity of the
Covenants are one potential reason as to why these texts have been largely ignored. The Covenants
of Prophet Muhammad with Christians have been the subject of much discussion among scholars.
An examination of their authenticity is necessary in order to address the legitimacy of these documents
Religions 2016, 7, 15 3 of 21

and the integrity of their messages. As a framework of analysis, four of the Covenants will be used to
explore the concepts of religious pluralism and civic rights in a Muslim nation. These Covenants
include: The Covenant of the Prophet with the Monks of Mount Sinai; The Covenant of the Prophet
with the Christians of Najran; The Covenant of the Prophet with the Christians of Persia; and
The Covenant of the Prophet with the Christians of the World. The authenticity of each of these
documents will be discussed on an individual basis below. It is worth noting that a complete and
detailed account of the authenticity of these documents is outside the boundary of this paper. Morrow,
however, provides a more in-depth break down on issues pertaining to authenticity ([17], pp. 65, 99, 109, 139).
Christians have reportedly guarded the Covenant of the Prophet with the Monks of Mount Sinai
for nearly nine centuries ([17], p. 65). The French knight Greffin Affagart, who performed a pilgrimage
to Saint Catherines monastery between 1533 and 1534 CE, provided one of the earliest accounts of
this Covenant; he noted the existence and presence of the original copy in his journal ([17], p. 68; [19]).
Approximately two centuries later, the French General Marie-Joseph de Gramb (17721848 CE)
confirmed Affagarts observation and claimed that the document had been kept in the Covenant of
the Holy Transfiguration of God at the Monastery of Saint Catherine ([20], p. 294). Hobbs, who also
investigated the authenticity of the Covenant with the Monks of Mount Sinai, stated that the original
document was transported in 1517 by military personnel of the Ottoman Empire from the Sinai region
to the palace of Sultan Selim I in Istanbul ([21], p. 160; [22], p. 148). Indeed, as Ratfliff argues, every
authority has accepted 1517 as the year in which this Covenant was taken to the capital of the Ottoman
Empire ([22], pp. 1415). Perhaps the most convincing argument for the authenticity of the Covenant
with the Monks of Mount Sinai came from Burckhardt, who visited the monastery in 1816 and had the
opportunity to examine the copy ([17], p. 68). He observed, in a note it is expressly stated that the
original, written by Ali, was lost, and that the present was copied from a fourth copy taken from the
original ([17], p. 68). Despite the observations made by the aforementioned travellers, [t]he dating of
many [of the Covenant with the Monks of Mount Sinai] bristles with difficulties [23]. As previous
copies became old and brittle and started to distinegrate, new copies of [this Covenant] were created
for the sake of posterity ([17], p. 66). The claim, therefore, is that the existing copy of the Covenant
with the Monks of Mount Sinai is a replica of the original. The monks from Saint Catherines Monastery
have consistently upheld its authenticity since the early days of Islam, so have the Jabaliyya Arabs of
the Sinai. It is also worth noting that scholars of the five schools of Islamic jurisprudence during the
Fatimid, the Ayyubi, and the Mamluk dynasties recognized and respected the Covenants by following
its orders in relation to the treatment of Christians [24].
Scholars have also deliberated over the authenticity of The Covenant of the Prophet with the
Christians of Najran. This Covenant first came to light in Patrologia Orientalis, a body of work
that attempts to create a comprehensive collection of the writings by scholars of Eastern Churches
including those of the Syriac, Armenian, Arabic, Coptic, Georgian, and Slavonic traditions [25]. Scher,
an Assyrian Chaldean Catholic archbishop of Sirrt in Southeastern Turkey, claimed that a copy of
the Covenant with the Christians of Persia was based on a document found in the year 878/879
CE [25]. Schers claim stemmed from the testimony of Habib, a monk in the city of Brimantha who
made a copy from a document originally found in the Library of Philosophy, where he was the
curator ([26], p. 281). Scher, however, dimissed the authenticity of the document, claiming that it was
forged by the Christians so that the Muslims would spare them ([26], p. 282). However, as Morrow
duly notes, Scher did not advance a single argument to support his allegations and did not present
a shred of proof to demonstrate that the covenenant in question was counterfeit ([17], p. 109). While
Scher also argued that the Covenant with the Christians of Najran is written in flawed Arabic, Morrow
again points out that the Archbishop does not avail himself of his linguistic expertise to support the
supposition ([17], p. 110). Moreover, as Ibn Ishaq (704761 CE) reports, the Prophet seems to have
been in contact with the Christians of Najran around the second year before the hijrah (the migration
or journey of Prophet Muhammad and his followers from Mecca to Medina):
Ishaq discusses Muhammads tolerance and hospitality towards the visitors of Najran:
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[W]hen they came to Medina they came into the Messengers mosque as he prayed the
afternoon prayer clad in Yamani garments, cloaks, and mantles, with the elegance of men
of B. al-Harith b. Kab. The Prophets Companions who saw them that day said that they
never saw their like in any deputation that came afterwards. The time of their prayers
having come they stood and prayed in the Messengers mosques; and he said that they
were to be left to do so. They prayed towards the east ([27], p. 271.)

After several rounds of negotiation over whether the Najrans should pay the jizya, or poll tax for
non-Muslims, the Christians Najrans eventually sent a delegation to meet with Prophet Muhammad in
Medina. Resulting from this meeting was the Treaty of Najran, which, according to Abu Bakr, conferred
on the non-Muslims, living in the Islamic State, autonomy, both religious and administrative [28].
Evidently, the Christians of Najran had been accorded special terms and privileges by the Prophet,
which were maintained by Abu Bakr and Umar ([17], p. 113). Based on the various meetings and
treaties between Prophet Muhammad and the Christians of Najran, the messages in the Covenant with
the Christian Najrans appear at the least feasible, if not authentic.
Far fewer scholars are familiar with The Covenant of the Prophet with the Christians of Persia
than they are with the previous two Covenants ([17], p. 99). The Covenant with the Christians of Persia
was first discussed in detail by the historian Arpee, who wrote that the document was preserved in
the archives of the Armenian Biship of New Julfa and presented to the Armenian Bishop of New Julfa
in the 17th century by Shah Abbas I of Persia ([29], p. 355; [17], p. 99). According to Arpee, Jafar, sixth
Shiite Imam (8th century), testifies to its authenticity after compaing the text with the original in his
own hand ([29], p. 355). In the opinion of Dadoyan, however, Arpees argument is highly dubious yet
intriguing ([30], p. 60). Dadoyan argues that [n]o such document exists . . . and no record exists of any
such document in the archives of the Prelacy of New Julfa ([30], p. 64). Arguing alongside Arpee and
opposing Dadyoyan, Morrow posits that Arpee had insufficient linguistic proficiency as to replicate a
17th-century Persian edict, nor did he have enough knowledge of Shiism to produce a convincing product.
Furthermore, Arpee had nothing to gain by perpertraing a historical fraud . . . ([17], p. 103).
According to Morrow, Shah Abbas obtained the document through several potential avenues
including: (1) from another Christian community, likely the Armenian Christians of Julfa; (2) the
Safavid Persians obtained a copy from Christian monks, likely from Egypt; and (3) the Safavids
obtained a copy of the covenant from Arab Shiite scholars from the Levant who moved to Persian
in masse during the rule of Shah Abbas ([17], p. 100). The most likely scenario, as argued by
Morrow, is that Abbas obtained the Covenant from Safavid state archives ([17], p. 101). Nevertheless,
the message of the Covenant itself reflects the treatment of Christians under the rule of Shah Abbas.
The Safavid Empire during his reign was noted for its tolerance of Christians. Abbas was regarded as
a liberator by Christians, who joined in Shiite-Christian solidarity under Persian rule [31].
The fourth and final Covenant examined in this paper is The Covenant of the Prophet with
the Christians of the World. According to Fortescue, this document originates from Yeshuyab II,
who was said to have visited Muhammad and to have obtained from him a legal document granting
certain rights to Nestorians ([32], p. 92). Father Pacifique Scaliger (15881648 CE), a Capuchin monk, is
said to have been the first Christian to bring the document to Europe sometime in the 16th or 17th
century ([33], p. 291; [34], p. 255). According to Sir Paul Ricaut (16291700 CE), the document was
allegedly found in the Monastery at Mount Carmel:

The Treaty . . . was found in a convent belonging to the monks of Mount Carmel, close to
Mount Lebanon and at one days journey from Mecca, where Muslim pilgrims perform
their Qurban, or sacrifice, prior to entering the City. It is said that the original was brought
to the Library of the King of France ([35], p. 320).

However, as Morrow points out, Ricaut likely made a mistake. The discovery of the Covenant with
the Christians of the World was probably discovered in Arabia as opposed to Palestine ([17], p. 140).
After all, it takes approximately forty days to go from the Hijaz to Syria or Iraq by caravan ([17], p. 140).
Religions 2016, 7, 15 5 of 21

It is also worth pointing out that Ricaut himself used the phrase On dit, which is Latin for It is
alleged. Nevertheless, Bayle ([36], p. 38; [37]) is convinced that Father Scaliger discovered the
Covenant in a monastery somewhere in the Middle East. Morrow, in support of Bayle, is persuaded
that Scaliger brought it to France, where it was eventually deposited in the library of the French
King ([17], p. 142; [38], p. 100). Father Scaliger, like Arpee (who studied the Covenants with the
Christians of Persia), was not proficient in classical languages or well-versed in Islamic studies,
meaning it is highly unlikely that he forged the document. Ultimately, many scholars over the
centuries have argued for the authenticity of all of these Covenants. According to Morrow, individuals
and groups who oppose the Covenantsand Islam in generaluse the hermeneutics of suspicion
to widen the gap between Muslims and Christians and to fulfill their own self-fulfilling prophecies
about Prophet Muhammad [39].
Nevertheless, Muhammads Covenants offer leaders of Muslim nations a blueprint for advancing
pluralism, a concept that is frequently overlooked in discussions about Islamic values. The
notion of nation itself remains a topic of perennial debate; adding the Muslim before nation
complicates the matter even further. According to Saunders, the word ummah, or Muslim nation,
is most closely linked to the term people, and is thought to be a cognate of the Hebrew am and
ummetha ([40], p. 306). Reflecting such usage, ummah has been historically translated as nation,
and is often used in Arabic to denote the Western concept of nation, e.g., al-Umam al-Muttahida
(the United Nations) ([40], p. 306). When Prophet Muhammad rose to prominence in the seventh
century, the ummah was marked by a pervasive new moral tone, but eventually morphed into
a state of mind, a form of social consciousness, or an imagined community which united the faithful
in order to lead a virtuous life ([41], p. 50). Furthering the discussion of the ummah, Tibi suggests that
it is wrong to conceptualize the ummah as coterminous with Islams righteous believers because
Islam has always been characterized by complexity and diversity ([42], pp. 12829). The ummah
can also be used as a political term that signifies a united and diverse nation based on a universalist
creed ([43], pp. 23638). This creed is rooted in egalitarianism and equality; it allows non-Muslim
religious and cultural groups into the community of believers.

1. Exploring Religious Pluralism in Islam

Scholars of pluralism, such as Eck, suggest that four elements must be in-place if a communityor
in this context, a nationaims to consider itself pluralistic. First, pluralism is not diversity alone,
but the energetic engagement with diversity [44]. Eck implies that pluralism is not a given in socially
diverse societies, and that reaching a state of pluralism requires genuine social interactions and the
building of authentic relationships. Second, Eck states pluralism is not just tolerance, but the active
seeking of understanding across lines of differences [44]. While religious tolerance, broadly speaking,
encourages a level of respect for religious traditions, it does little to counter ignorance and stereotypes
of religious communities. Tolerance, Eck argues, reproduces old patterns of division and violence; as a
result, it is too thin a foundation for a world of religious difference and proximity [44]. Tolerance also
does not require Muslims and Christians to know anything about each other. In essence, Eck calls on
individuals and groups to move beyond the indifference of tolerance and towards the celebration of
difference as found in in the pluralist tradition. Pluralism can be further distinguished from tolerance
in another other way. While pluralism treats religious diversity as something to be celebrated in order
to produce positive social changes, tolerance can be said to encourage social isolation and impenetrable
social group boundaries. The third feature of pluralism, as put forth by Eck, is that pluralism is not
relativism, but the encounter of commitments [44]. In this regard, pluralism can be seen as open
and supportive of various religious values and institutions. Finally, Ecks last feature of pluralism
stresses the importance of inter-religious dialogue, which she summarizes as encounter, give and
take, criticism and self-criticism [44]. She adds: Dialogue means both speaking and listening, and
that process reveals both common understandings and real differences [44]. Ecks fourth feature
of pluralism follows Kamali in that pluralism does not simply aim at tolerance of the other but
Religions 2016, 7, 15 6 of 21

entails active effort to gain an understanding of the other ([45], p. 28). People of different religious
backgrounds can live side-by-side with one another in a relative state of tolerance, yet these people can
remain ignorant of the lifestyles and beliefs practiced and expressed in other religious communities.
Unless individuals actively engage with people outside of their immediate religious circles, there is
no pluralism.
In light of this overview of pluralism, it is important to recognize that there are different types
of pluralism, among them being cultural, political, and religious. For the purpose of this article, it is
necessary to focus on religious pluralism. In the Covenants, Prophet Muhammad can be seen as an
advocate for a religiously pluralistic society ([45], pp. 3435); he not only considered the interests of
Christians, but he safeguarded them; he also demonstrates a preference for pluralism in the sense
that he viewed Christianity as containing some true values that were in-line with Islamic values
and principles [46]. The Covenants of the Prophetin addition to the Quran and hadithsattest to
Islams affirmative stance on pluralism ([45], p. 35). A special place is reserved in Islamic scripture
for Christians as well as Jews. In the Quran, beliefs in the truth of Christian and Jewish doctrine
are encapsulated in the term ahl al kitab (People of the Book), or people who have received and
believed in earlier revelations from the prophets of the Abrahamic tradition. The pluralistic nature
of the term ahl al kitab is evident in the use of the noun book in the singular and not the plural,
meant to emphasize that Jews, Christians, and Muslims follow one and the same book, not various
conflicting scriptures [47]. Islamic holy texts like the Quran also accept all Abrahamic prophets before
Muhammad and recognize Jewish scripturethe Talmudand Christian scripturethe Gospelas
sacred books. Furthermore, under Prophet Muhammads leadership, Christians and Jews received
the special status of dhimmi, or protected peoples, and al-muminin, or the faithful ([18], p. 2).
These two statuses indicate that the Prophet considered both Christians and Jews to be monotheistic
believers alongside Muslims. Far from denying the validity of Christianity and Judaism, Muhammad
regarded them as standing in de jure with Islam as religions from the same God ([48], p. 2).
Emon, however, argues that the discursive intersection of Islamic law and the rights of minorities
creates the dhimmi rules, which often lie at the center of debates about whether Islam as a political
system is tolerant or intolerant of non-Muslims [49]. The dhimmi rules, he argues, means
that non-Muslims
are subjected to various rules regulating the scope of what modern layers would call their
freedom and liberty, whether to manifest their religious beliefs or to act in ways contrary to
Islamic legal doctrines but in conformity with their own normative traditions ([49], p. 323).
While Emon claims that dhimmi rules are important indices of the inherent intolerance in the
Islamic tradition, they appear to contradict several hadiths. Prophet Muhammad, for example, stated
Whoever oppresses a dhimmi or burdens a weight over him more than he can carry, I will be his
enemy [50]. Similarly, Prophet Muhammad stated I am claimant of anyone who depresses a dhimmi.
The one who I claimant of (in this world), I am also claimant of on the Day of Judgment [50].
Yet, despite these favorable hadiths towards People of the Book, there are also passages of the
Quran which appear to support the dhimmi rules as described by Emon. One particular verse of the
Quran verse (9:29) states the following:
Fight against those who do not believe in God or in the Last Day, who do not forbid
what God and his Prophet have forbidden or practice the true religion, among those
who have been given the Book, until they pay the jizya [poll tax] from their hand, they
being humbled ([51], p. 236).
This verse has been traditionally interpreted to mean that the jizya was intended as a symbolic
expression of subordination of Jews and Christians [52]. However, this verse stresses that certain
conditions have to be met to fight against People of the Book. Abualrub elaborates:
This verse stresses the necessity of fighting against the People of the Scripture, but under
what conditions?...The Islamic State is not permitted to attack non-Muslims who are not
Religions 2016, 7, 15 7 of 21

hostile to Islam, who do not oppress Muslims, or try to convert Muslims by force from their
religion, or expel them from their lands, or wage war against them, or prepare for attacks
against them. If any of these offenses occur, however, Muslims are permitted to defend
themselves and protect their religion. Muslims are not permitted to attack non-Muslims
who signed peace pacts with them, or non-Muslims who lived under the protection of the
Islamic State ([53]).

Abualrubs analysis suggests that verses of the Quran must be examined in a scriptural and
historical context. Another controversial verse of the Quran (8:5556) is frequently taken out of context;
according to some critics of Islamic scripture, this verse refers to non-believers of Islam as The worst
of beasts:

Verily, the worst of beasts in the sight of God are those who conceal (the truth), and do not
acknowledge it. These are those whom you have made a peace treaty with, but they break
their treaty at every opportunity and have no fear of the law ([51], p. 227).

This passage, however, goes on to clarify the cause of the condemnation of the non-believers.
Prophet Muhammad condemned them not simply because they were non-Muslims, but because
they violated a treaty they had agreed to, which resulted in the deaths of many Muslims [54]. Treating
this verse as supposedly violent quickly dissolves with a brief consideration of the textual and
historical context. As discussed below, the Covenants of the Prophet Muhammad with the Christians
of his time are further substantiated when one looks at verses of the Quran and hadiths in their
historical context.
In his Covenant with the Christians of Persia, the Prophet is nothing less than emphatic on the
issue of complete religious freedom:

And even as they honor and respect me, so shall Moslems care for that people as being
under our protection and whensoever any distress or discomfort shall overtake [Christians],
Moslems shall hold themselves in duty bound to aid and care for them, for they are a people
subject to my Nation, obedient to their word, whose helpers also they are.
It therefore is proper for my sake to attend to their comfort, protection and aid, in
face of all opposition and distress, suppressing everything that becomes a means to
their spoliation ([55], p. 18).

A similarif not identical passageis found in the three other Covenants addressed in this paper.
Muhammad makes it clear that freedom of religion is an inherent right for Christians living in a Muslim
nation. Christian Persians are allowed to practice Christianity and they are under no compulsion
whatsoever to accept or reject Islam. In viewing Christian Persians as muminin or believers, the Prophet
is consistent with the Constitution of Medina, one of the earliest known documents in Islam ([17], p. 104).
Although this particular document addressed the ummahs relations with Jewish tribes, it nevertheless
highlights how Prophet Muhammad wanted Muslims to interact with People of the Book. Article 20
of the Constitution notes how non-Muslim minorities have the same rights as Muslims: A Jew, who
obeys us (the state) shall enjoy the same right of life protection (as the [Muslims] do, so long as they
[the Muslims] are not wrong by him [56]. Jews and Christians were not only given the same rights as
Muslims within the realm of the Muslim nation, but also throughout Christendom, as clearly noted
in the Covenant with the Christians of Persia.
The specific community referred to in the Covenant with the Christians of Persia is, of course,
composed of people who are friends of Islam, the brothers and sisters of the believers, and not
Crusaders, colonizers, or imperialists ([17], p. 104). The Covenant of Prophet Muhammad with
the Christians of Persia, the Constitution of Medina, and the Quran all provide religious freedom to
non-Muslims, but they, by no means, forbid Muslims from fighting them if there were violations of
an agreement or treaty. The Quran (22:39, after all, permits self-defense regardless of the religious
background of enemies: Permission (to fight) is given to those on whom war is made, because they
Religions 2016, 7, 15 8 of 21

are oppressed ([51], p. 417). Nevertheless, the expression of religious pluralism in the Covenant with
the Christians of Persia is a corollary of the freedom of religion in the Quran (11:118): And if your
Lord pleased, He would have made people a single nation ([51], p. 284). An informative hadith,
summarized by Musa, offers a compelling story in support of this verse of the Quran:

Christian merchants from Syria came to Medina to trade. While they were there, they
converted the two sons of one of Muhammads followers. The sons then returned to Syria
with the merchants. When their faith sought permission from the Prophet to go after his
sons and demand their return, the Prophet responded by reciting the verse: There is no
compulsion in religion. The story goes on to say that the man held this against the Prophet,
which led to the revelation of a verse of the Quran (4:65): But no, by your Lord! they do
not believe until they make you a judge of what is in dispute between them, then find no
reluctance in their hearts as to what you decide and submit with full submission. So no
matter how much the Muslim father wished to demand that his sons return to Medina and
Islam, the Quranic command that there is no compulsion in religion prevailed ([57]).

By guaranteeing the Persian Christiansand the two sons of Muhammads followerthe right
to freely practice Christianity, Prophet Muhammad emulated real pluralism, which implies equal
treatment of citizens before the law without any distinction being made based on religion ([45], p. 28).
Securing the rights of these people meant that the Prophet wanted Christians to feel like they can
bring their full identities to the table, which for Patel and Meyer is a crucial element in creating
a religiously pluralistic society ([58], p. 2). Muhammad allowed Persian Christians the right to believe
that they are right and others are wrong, and they are allowed to think their beliefs are true and others
are not ([55], p. 2).
The religious freedom that Muhammad granted the Persian Christians directly contrasts with how
states such as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia treat their minority religious communities. Saudi Arabia
is a sovereign Islamic state that bases its law on the Quran and sunnah of Prophet Muhammad [59].
While Article 8 of the Saudi Constitution states the government is based on the premise of justice,
consultation, and equalityin accordance with the Islamic Shariahthe United States State
Department claims that religious freedom is heavily restricted in Saudi Arabia. Freedom of religion,
in fact, is neither recognized nor protected under the law and is severely restricted in practice [60].
In Saudi Arabia, the public practice of Christianityand indeed every other religion other than
Islamis prohibited, nor does the Saudi Constitution separate state and religion [60]. Saudi
Arabias Commission for the Promotion of Virtue and Prevention of Vice (CPVPV) continues to
conduct raids on private non-Muslim religious gatherings [60]. Despite these restrictions on Christians,
the United States State Department did note incremental improvements in terms of safeguarding
religious freedom in Saudi society [60]. However, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia does not appear to
care for Christians to the same extent of the Prophet himself. Prophet Muhammad set a legal precedent
for Muslim rulers; non-Muslims were given the right to live in a nation that neither promotes nor
disparages any particular religion. Under the leadership of the Prophet, religionwhether it be
Islam, Christianity, or any other traditionwas not meant to be a matter of duress, intimidation,
or persuasion, but rather of conscience and free will. According to the Covenant with the Christians of
Persia, Muslims who coerce Christians into converting to Islam commit an act of fitnah, or sedition
and, therefore, must be resolutely avoided. The Covenant explicitly points out: There shall be no
compulsion or restraint against them in any of these matters ([61], p. 14). This commandment, which
mirrors a verse of the Quran (2:256) on religious freedom, indicates that coercion and faith are not to
mix in a Muslim nation.
Lapidus explicitly claims that Prophet Muhammad separated religious matters from political
matters; he also argues that secular governments have existed in the Muslim world throughout history.
He notes:
Religions 2016, 7, 15 9 of 21

In fact, religious and political life developed distinct spheres of experience, with
independent values, leaders, and organizations. From the middle of the tenth
century effective control of the Arab-Muslim empires had passed into the hands of
generals, administrators, governors, and local provincial lords; the Caliphs had lost
all effective political power. Governments in Islamic lands were henceforth secular
regimesSultanatesin theory authorized by the Caliphs, but actually legitimized by the
need for public order. Henceforth, Muslim states were fully differentiated political bodies
without any intrinsic religious character, though they were officially loyal to Islam and
committed to its defense ([62], p. 364).

In modern times, there are many Muslim nations that can be considered secular states. Turkey,
for example, has negated its Islamic Ottoman system and adopted a secular-oriented system of
government [63]. Turkey adopted a secular civil code to replace sharia; the secular code provided
equal rights to men and women in matters of marriage and divorce and dropped the Islamic court
system as well as institutions of Islamic education [64]. Other Muslim-majority nations said to
have secular governments include Albania [65], Gambia [66], Kazakhstan [67], Senegal [68], and
Uzbekistan [69]. These secular countries maintain their loyalty to Islam as the dominant religion in
a similar manner to how many Americans consider the United States to be secular but still loyal
to Christianity. Islam might be the religion of the majority, but the state or nation itself has no overt
religious identity.
The emphasis the Quran places on respecting the People of the Book indicates that Muslims
are tolerant of religious groups so long as they are monotheists, or believers in one God. While
the Quran frequently calls on and encourages non-Muslims to worship God according to Islamic
principles, the Islamic holy text can be interpreted as extending freedom of religion to disbelievers
or those outside the Abrahamic tradition. Verse 9:6 of the Quran, for example, provides protection
for idolators: And if anyone of the idolaters seek your protection, protect him till he hears the
word of Allah, then convey him to his place of safety. This is because they are a people who dont
know ([51], p. 232). While this verse calls on disbelievers to embrace Islam as the truth, it does
not call on Muslims to convertwhether by persuasion or forcenon-Muslims to Islam. According to
Ali, this verse leaves no doubt that the Holy Prophet was never ordered by God to oppress anyone
on account of his or her religion ([51], p. 233). While the Covenants of Prophet Muhammad with
the Christians of his time deal specifically with Christian communities in his midst, there is reason
to believe that the Prophet would extend freedom and protection to polytheists as highlighted in
the Quran.
According to Prophet Muhammad, a Muslim nation must also extend rights to Christian
religious leaders, as discussed in the Covenant with the Christian Monks of Mount Sinai. This
particular community had complete freedom in anointing leaders and control over their places of
worship. Consider the following passage from the Covenant:

A bishop shall not be removed from his bishopric, nor a monk from his monastery, nor
a hermit from his tower, nor shall a pilgrim be hindered from his pilgrimage. Moreover,
no building from among their churches shall be destroyed, nor shall the money from their
churches be used for the building of mosques or houses for the Muslims ([61], p. 14).

This passage suggests that an Islamic state must not harm Christian churches in any way, nor can
any Muslim leader intrude on how Christian groups anoint leaders. So long as Christians submit to
Muslim authorities and seek the protection of Muslims, all help would be given to them by Muslims
in every way legitimate ([17], p. 106). In this agreement with the Monks, Muhammad showed himself
to be a religious pluralist rather than a religious absolutist, or denier of religious diversity ([70], p. 23).
Muslim absolutists assert that democratic principles, such as the right to private property and freedom
of religion, are fundamentally incompatible with Islamic values and that Muslims, by necessity
of their religion, must oppose all forms of democratic culture and governance. Recent Pew Global
Religions 2016, 7, 15 10 of 21

Attitudes surveys, in fact, show that majorities in the Arab world favor democracy as a form of
government [71]. As noted above, most experts cite Turkey, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Malik, and Senegal
as democracies [72]. Indonesia, the worlds largest Muslim nation, is an interesting case study in
observing how the pluralist spirit of the Covenants has been applied to modern societies. Article 28E
of the Constitution reflects much of what was written in the Covenant with the Monks of Mount Sinai:

(1) Every person shall be free to choose and to practice the religion of his/her choice, to choose
ones education, to choose ones employment, to choose ones citizenship, and to choose ones
place of residence within the state territory, to leave it and to subsequently return to it.
(2) Every person shall have the right to the freedom to believe his/her faith, and to express his/her
views and thoughts, in accordance with his/her conscience.
(3) Every person shall have the right to the freedom to associate, to assemble, and to express
opinions [73].

Moreover, Article 28D states that every Indonesian citizenregardless of ethnic or religious
backgroundshall have the right of recognition, guarantees, protection and certainty before a just
law, and of equal treatment before the law [73]. The Constitution of Indonesia clearly protects
religious freedom and, in practice, the government generally respects the religious freedom of the six
officially recognized religions [74]. However, in some instances, the government fails to protect citizens
from discrimination and abuse based on religion [74]. For example, the central Indonesia government
holds authority over religious matters, but in previous years has made no effort in some regions of the
country to overturn local laws restricting rights otherwise provided by the Constitution [75]. Despite
these shortcomings, the Constitution of Indonesia can be seen as closely mirroring the Covenants
of Prophet Muhammad, who did not subscribe to Islamic absolutism; he respected Christians as
equal members of the Muslim nation, and showed appreciation for cultural and religious diversity as
something to be protected. The relations that he forged with the Monks at Mount Sinai were based on
plurality and not sectarianism.
Prophet Muhammad, nonetheless, did enforce the jizya, or poll tax, on Christian communities.
In fact, the jizya is enforced in all of the Covenants discussed in this paper. The jizya is one area in
which Christians criticize Islam for its oppression and creation of second-class citizens in Muslim
societies. However, the Prophet made it clear in the Covenants with the Christians of Mount Sinai,
Persia, Najran, and the World that in the levying of taxes, it is necessary not to exact from Christians
more than they are able to pay. Rather, Muhammad asks Muslims to adjust matters with their
consent, without force or violence ([55], p. 18). The Prophet added Whosoever shall not do as is here
prescribed, but shall do contrary to my behests; the same shall be held a despiser of the Compact, and
a gainsayer of the word of God and of his Prophet ([55], p. 19). Similarly, in the Covenant with the
Christians of the World, Prophet Muhammad suggested thatin extraordinary casesthe jizya can
be dismissed altogether: I remove from them the harm from taxes and loan in the supplies borne to
the People of the Pact except what they themselves consent to give. They should not be compelled or
unfairly treated in this matter ([75], p. 50). Nonetheless, the money that Muslims collected through
the jizya was to be placed in the Treasury for public use ([17], p. 105). This is an important point
because corrupt individuals or groups were not meant to acquire money collected through the jizya.
The jizya was collected for the betterment of the public good, of which Christians were a part. It is
also worth noting that during the reign of Umar, the third Caliph of the ummah and Companion of
Prophet Muhammad, the jizya was abolished in light of all non-Muslims that were unable to earn
their livelihood [76]. Such conditions were clearly stated in contracts and other documents signed by
Muslims and non-Muslims during the reign of Umar [77].
Prophet Muhammad was a religious pluralist because he engaged in a form of proactive
cooperation that affirms the identity of the constituent communities while emphasizing the well-being
of each and all ([78], p. xv). Consider how he embodied religious pluralism in his Covenant with the
Christians of Najran:
Religions 2016, 7, 15 11 of 21

The Muslims must not abandon the Christians, neglect them, and leave them without help
and assistance since I have made this pact with them on behalf of Allah to ensure that
whatever good befell Muslims it would befall them as well and that whatever harm befell
Muslims would befall them as well ([79], p. 36).

The passage encapsulates the spirit of religious pluralism in that it fosters mutually inspiring
relationships and common action among members of different religious groups for the common
good ([58], p. 2). As Patel and Meyer remind us, religious pluralism is not simply relativism, but
makes room for real and different religious commitments ([58], p. 2). In the Covenant with the
Najrans, Muhammad encourages Muslims and Christians to become mutually dependent upon one
another for safety and prosperity. Benevolence, encouraging goodwill, commanding charity, and
deterring evil are the most sincere mechanisms to reaching these aims ([79], p. 32). This particular
passage from the Covenant with the Christians of Najran aligns closely to verse 16:91 of the Quran:
And fulfill the covenant of Allah, when you have made a covenant, and do not break (your) oaths
after making them firm, and you have indeed made Allah your surety. Surely Allah knows what you
do ([51], pp. 33334). On the other side of the spectrum, however, there are verses of the Quran
that can be viewed as contradicting the messages of the Covenants. For example, the Quran (9:29)
commands Muslims to Fight those who do not believe in Allah, nor in the Last Day, nor forbid what
Allah and His Messenger have forbidden, nor follow the Religion of Truth ([51], p. 236), which can be
interpreted to mean fight infidels, or non-believers, such as Christians. In the Quran, however, the
term infidel is not just a noun or an adjective; infidel is the word that the Quran uses to describe
exclusively the Meccan aristocracy with which the Muslim community was at war with. Scholars of
the Quran tell us that verses dealing with infidels are not meant to encourage the use of violence
among Muslims. In fact, such an interpretation is completely false and contradicts authentic Islamic
teachings [80]. Consider the following commentary for further evidence of the defensive nature of
verse 16:91:

If the non-Muslim country did not attack the Muslim one nor mobilize itself to prevent
the practice and spread of Islam, nor transgress against mosques, nor work to oppress the
Muslim people in their right to profess their faith and decry unbelief, then it is not for the
Muslim country to attack that country. Jihad of a military nature was only permitted to
help Muslims defend their religion and remove oppression from the people ([53]).

The context of Quran (9:29) must also be placed in its proper historical context. The Byzantine
Empire, the great Christian power of the time, had mobilized its forces to fight against the rise of
Islam. As Ali notes, the use of force against Christians was not in any way the object of the Quran
to bring the Christians into subjection. On the other hand, the Christians first moved themselves to
bring Muslim Arabia under subjection ([51], p. 236). Prophet Muhammad did not initiate aggression;
rather he and his followers were under attack from those groups who wanted to destroy the Islamic
state [80]. As for fighting the Jews, they had conducted a peace pact with the Prophet after he migrated
to Medina. Soon afterwards, as Musaji notes, they betrayed the peace pact and joined forces with the
pagans and the hypocrites against Muslims [80]. Therefore, the command to fight in verse 9:29 was
not directed towards all Christians, only those who were aggressive and threatening violence against
the ummah.
The equitable ethos of the Covenantsin tandem with the Quranchallenge those who declare
Islam as fundamentally intolerant of Christians. In line with the message of the Covenants, the Quran
(5:82) establishes Prophet Muhammad as an admirer of Christians: . . . you will find the nearest in
friendship to the believers to be those who say, We are Christians. That is because there are priests and
monks among them and because they are not proud [51], p. 155). In the Covenant with the Monks of
Mount Sinai, Muslims and Christians are asked to work with one another in order for members of
each group to recognize valuable gains in interfaith interaction:
Religions 2016, 7, 15 12 of 21

If in the interest of the benevolent Moslem public, and of their faith, Moslems shall ask of
the Christians for assistance, the latter shall not deny them what help, as an expression of
friendship and goodwill, they are to render . . . we deem all help and succor rendered to
them every way legitimate ([55], p. 21).

This passage follows Patel in that pluralism occurs when people of different religious traditions
make their unique contribution for the common good of society by actively assisting each other in
ways that are mutually beneficial to both parties ([78], p. 2). The nearest Arabic word that captures the
essence of this passage is al-tasamuh, often translated as meaning tolerance ([45], p. 29). Tasamuh
denotes generosity and ease from both sides on a reciprocal basis ([81], p. 74). Building on Abdel
Haleem, Kamali argues that the more precise Arabic equivalent of pluralism is al-taaddudiyyah, which
he translates literally to mean pluralism ([45], p. 29). Prophet Muhammads commitment and
recognition of diversity is not an attempt to assimilate Christians into Muslim society; on the contrary,
this kind of deep pluralism recognizes religious and cultural differences and engages in them in
order to gain a sound understanding of the values and commitments of the different other ([45], p. 28).
At this stage of the paper, it is important to distinguish Prophet Muhammads religious pluralism
from toleration, which allows only for coexistence [44]. In addition to encouraging Muslims and
Christians to form bonds of solidarity, he advises individuals in each group to vigorously defend each
other. The Covenant with the Christians of Persia reads:

All pious believers shall deem it their bounded duty to defend believers and to aid them
whosesoever they may be, whether far or near, and throughout Christendom shall protect
the places where they conduct worship, and those where their monks and priests dwell.
Everywhere, in mountains, on the plains, in towns and in waste places, in deserts, and
wheresoever they may be, that people shall be protected, both in their faith and in their
property, both in the West and in the East, both on sea and land ([55], p. 18).

The text declares that defending Christian communities is the responsibility of the ummah. The
text, furthermore, states that membership of a particular religious grouping does not set the standard
of citizenship in Muslim nations. With regard to Christian citizens, the Prophet valued them and
validated their beliefs by protecting them by means of his army. In the Covenants with the Christians
of the World, he echoed the treatment of the Christian of the World by stating:

The covenant of Allah is that I should protect their land, their monasteries, with my power,
my horses, my men, my weapons, my strength, and my Muslim followers . . . I place them
under my protection, my security, and my trust at every moment ([75], pp. 4950).

Muhammads protection of Christian communities is diametrically opposed to Muslim absolutists

who view Christians as morally inferior to Muslims and thus incapable of becoming equal members
of an Islamic state. Consider several recent events during which Daesh destroyed the property
of Christians. In July 2014, Daesh set fire to a 1800-year-old church in Iraqs second largest city,
Mosul [82]. A statement released by Daesh a week before this incident stated that Mosuls Christians
should convert, pay a special tax, leave, or face death [82]. Months later, in February 2015, Daesh
members rounded up 220 Christian civilians in the village of Tal Tamir and burned two Christian
churches. According to reports, they were peaceful villages that had nothing to do with the war [83].
The Covenants show that Muslim leaders are not advised by Muhammad to prohibit citizens from
expressing non-Muslim identities or ruin churches, but are instead commanded to treat them as equal
members of the ummah.
Considering that the People of the Book have a special status in the Islamic tradition, critics
have wondered about the rights of non-Abrahamic communities living inside the territories of the
ummah. Muslims during the time of Prophet Muhammad used the term polytheists to refer to people
who do not have a tradition of a revealed book in their religion. A hadith reports a particular story that
highlights the Prophets position on dealing with religious groups outside of the Abrahamic tradition.
Religions 2016, 7, 15 13 of 21

In calling his Muslim army to defend themselves against polytheist aggression towards the ummah,
the Prophet stated:

dont exaggerate, dont cheat, dont mutilate, dont kill a new-born child. If you meet your
enemies of polytheists call them for one of three options. Whatever they take, you must
accept, and stop fighting them. Call them to Islam . . . they will have the same rights and
duties of the immigrants ([84]).

Although he encouraged Muslims to engage in defensive warfare against the polytheists, it is

clear that Muhammad was willing to grant them the same rights that he would later grant Christians
(immigrants) in the Covenants. History shows us that Muslim rulers and empires followed in the
footsteps of Prophet Muhammad by granting non-Abrahamic communities privileges and political
rights under Islamic rule. For example, governments of the Indian subcontinent readily extended
the dhimmi status to Hindus and Buddhists of India ([85], p. 278). On several occasions throughout
history, Muslim rulers and jurists eradicated the jizya ([86], pp. 7980). Akbar the Great of the Mughal
Empire abolished the jizya in relation to Hindus, Buddhists, Jains, and Sikhs under his rule ([87],
pp. 2839; [88], pp. 28289; [89], pp. 4016). To reiterate, it is worth remembering that each of the
Covenants discussed in this paper include a passage on how to levy the jizya. Muslims are not to
enforce the tax on Christians without their consent, nor are Muslims able to enforce the jizya with
force or violence ([55], p. 18). Furthermore, as Prophet Muhammad noted in the Covenant with the
Christians of Najran, the charges of the jizya shall not exceed the measure of their means, meaning
that taxes should not be excessive and be judged based on individual cases depending on the status of
the citizen.

2. The Muslim Nation as Civic Nation

Having considered the concept of religious pluralism in the Covenants, the paper now takes up
the discussion of civic rights among members of the Muslim nation. Scholars have dedicated much
time and effort to unpack the various kinds of nation-building projects, but the distinction between
civic nation versus ethnic nation is perhaps the most widely-employed conceptual building block
in the study of nationhood and national identity ([90], p. 554). While these types of nations share
common elements like historical territory and common culture, they have distinct features. An ethnic
nation bases national group membership upon qualities such as ancestry, marriage, and blood. In this
sense, an ethnic nation is an exclusive nation because it places emphasis on historical experiences and
the resulting phenotypes that outline the boundary of the natives. Some contemporary scholars
argue that Eastern European and Asian countries are historical examples of ethnic nations while
Western European countries and the United States are historical examples of civic nations. In the
Eastern model, nationalism arises in polities that coincide with cultural or ethnic boundaries (e.g.,
Russian, Austro-Hungarian, and Ottoman empires) ([90], p. 555). In these regions, Kohn argues,
imagining the ethnic nation led to redrawing political boundaries in conformity with ethnographic
demands ([91], p. 329). Kohn, on the other hand, argues that in the West, particularly in the United
Kingdom, France, and the United States, nationalism was primarily political. Commenting on Kohns
theory, Shulman adds: ideas of the nation and nationalism arose within preexisting state structures
that encompassed populations with a relatively high degree of cultural homogeneity ([90], p. 555).
He continues: Members of the [civic] nation were unified by their equal political status and their will
as individuals to be part of the nation ([90], p. 555).
In light of Kohn and Shulman, a civic nation can be viewed as the opposite of an ethnic nation.
A civic nation determines national group membership upon citizenship rights, rather than that of
ancestry, marriage, or blood, as commonly found in an ethnic nation. A civic nation can be defined as
a community of equal, rights-bearing citizens, united in patriotic attachment to a shared set of political
practices and values ([92], p. 6). Civic nation building envisions one people with a common sense
of we, but not in the sense that we derive from a particular ethnicity or religion. Civic nationalism
Religions 2016, 7, 15 14 of 21

separates culture and state whereas ethnic nationalism joins them ([93], p. 204). In summary, a civic
nation allows individuals to define the national community rather than having the national community
define the individual, which is not necessarily the case in an ethnic nation. As such, an ethnic nation
abandons the idea that national belonging is a choice and not an inheritance.
The Eastern (ethnic) versus Western (civic) model for nation building is not just a historical
argument; many scholars see the continuation of historical patterns in current national identities in the
East versus West framework ([90], p. 556). According to Brubaker, the twenty or so post-communist
states of Eastern Europe were conceived and justified, in the nationalist movements . . . as the
state of and for a particular ethno-national group ([94], p. 65). As such, in Eastern Europe,
understandings of nationality have become institutionalized and fundamentally ethno-cultural
rather than political. However, some scholars have attacked the narrow logic that ethnic nations
are simply ethnic in the sense of being emotionally-charged and exclusive entities based only on
dominant ethno-cultural groups. Quebec and Flanders, for example, have been labeled ethnic nations
but in actuality can be treated as cultural nations ([93], p. 126, 133). Quebec and Flanders do not
restrict immigration or necessarily give preference to ethnically similar individuals. However, they
do encourage assimilation into the prominent culture and give preference for culturally similar
immigrants in terms of immigration policies ([93], p. 561). In this sense, a government that pursues
the cultural assimilation of minorities is a cultural nation; cultural unity is seen as the foundation
for a strong nation-state ([90], p. 561). The differences between the cultural and ethnic nation model
is that cultural nations encourage assimilation whereas ethnic nations do not, because the latter
concept demarcates culture by ancestry and race, which cannot be gained or learned by human
effort. Another topic of interest in discussions about the nature of cultural nations is the role religion
plays in relation to national belonging. A cultural nation can be seen as having key components such
as religion, language, and tradition ([90], p. 559). As discussed below, Prophet Muhammad did not
require Christians to convert to Islam, nor did he encourage them to assimilate into Muslim culture.
In effect, he distanced himself from the cultural and ethnic nations and moved the ummah closer to the
civic approach in terms of nation-building.
Prophet Muhammad insisted that the Muslim national group boundary is not the property of any
particular religious or ethnic group. In this regard, he can be seen as being a political pluralist in
that he desired a political culture of non-centralised action, which endows civic centres of activity
with initiative rather than imagining that the state has to license and delegate everything from the
top ([45], p. 40). For the state to give preference to one or more groups means devaluating citizens
based upon their ethnic or cultural backgrounds. The Prophet did not want to inflict harm on Christians,
nor interfere or encroach on their privacy or private property. In the Covenant with the Christians of
the World, he laid down the injunction:
The covenant of Allah is that I should protect their land, their monasteries, with my power,
my horses, my men, my strength, and my Muslim followers in any region, far away or
close by, and that I should protect their businesses. I grant security to them, their churches,
their businesses, their houses of worship, the places of their monks, the places of their
pilgrims, wherever they may be found . . . ([75], p. 48)
This is the sanctity of privacy and property rights that Muhammad granted Christian citizens in
an Islamic state. The rights he granted them are not simply a claim of individuals against the state but
a claim of individuals that the state itself underwrites for the good of all ([95], p. 600). These rights
include property rights of individuals as a basic condition for democratic citizenship ([95], p. 600).
Prophet Muhammad instructed his followers to follow these commands, and stated that any Muslim
that disobeys them acts against the will of God. Muslims who disrespect his ordinances are [enemies]
on the Day of Judgment among all the Muslims ([75], p. 54). In the Covenant with the Christians of
the World, a civic conception of the nation was developed by Muhammad in the sense that ethnic or
cultural unity was not a requisite for belonging to the ummah. People in a civic nation are united by
such traits as common citizenship, respect for law and state institutions, and belief in a set of political
Religions 2016, 7, 15 15 of 21

principles ([90], p. 560). Nevertheless, it is important to discuss another characteristic of civic nations,
that is cultural preservation and access to political power among minority communities. As Kymlicka
argues, the idea that the government of a civic nation could be neutral with respect to ethnic and
nationals groups is patently false [96]. He claims that the government of a civic nation cannot avoid
deciding which societal cultures will be supported ([96], p. 110). However, Kymlicka may be overly
hasty in arguing that a civic nation acts unfairly towards minorities. While Prophet Muhammad did
use the Quran as the basis for his political philosophy, he did not take sides in terms of offering
citizenship in a diverse and pluralistic society like Arabia in the 7th century.
Stilz offers several views on this issue of neutrality in a civic nation. One, neutrality of impact,
sees neutrality as a thesis about the consequences of government action. It holds that the state should
pursue no policies that have the end result that one way of life is advantaged, favored, or assisted in
ways others are not ([97], p. 265). The other, neutrality of justification, sees neutrality as a thesis
about the kind of reasons for which governments should act. In terms of neutrality of justification,
specific laws are not created to impinge upon the beliefs or practices of minorities. One potential way to
argue against the validity of neutrality in Prophet Muhammads ummah is by turning to the dhimmi
rules, as discussed in the previous section. While dhimmi literally means protected person, dhimmis
in Muhammads ummah were asked to pay the jizya and faced certain political restrictions. However,
as Glenn points out, dhimmis were treated equally in practically the whole of the law of property and of
contracts and obligations ([98], p. 219). Throughout Islamic history, there are plenty of instances where
Muslim nations treated Christians equally in the court of law. For example, in the early Caliphate,
Al-Andalus, Indian subcontinent, and the Ottoman Millet system, qadis (Islamic judges) typically did
not interfere in the legislative or legal matters of Christians [99]. Christians living in these Muslim
nations were granted the right to create and maintain their own laws independent of sharia. Moreover,
throughout history, Christians and Jews living as dhimmis were allowed to engage in practices such as
the consumption of alcohol and pork, both of which are forbidden under sharia. While an argument
can be made that Christians were excluded from specifically Muslim privileges, one can also make
the argument that they were excluded from specifically Muslim duties like serving as soldiers during
times of war ([98], p. 219). The Muslim nation as designed by Prophet Muhammad can be regarded
as anti-hierarchical and non-centralist in terms of governance; it was meant to be a confederation of
religious groupings rather than a space for Muslims alone. Citizenship in Muhammads nation did not
derive from the solidarity of people who feel responsible forand committed tomembers of a single
racial or ethnic community, but rested on the ability of citizens to get a fair hearing for their views
and fair protection of their interests ([100], p. 2). The Prophets nation entailed no need for religious
unity or conversion to Islam.
Perhaps the most obvious of the civic rights that Muhammad gave to Christians was freedom of
conscience. As the ruler of the first Islamic state, he did not require Christians to adopt the religion
or culture of the majority nation, hence why he told the Christians of Persia: No Christian shall be
brought by force to confess Islam, and no disputes except over the better things shall be envisaged in
with them ([55], p. 20). This type of governance follows the concept of civic nation because a civic
nation takes account of their fellow citizens interests; citizens are also not forced to adopt the cultural
practices of the majority within ([98], p. 278). In the Covenants, Prophet Muhammad established civic
national principles by creating a fair set of rules within which Christians had equal opportunity to
make free choices (perhaps based on their cultural preference) [97]. If Muhammad had favored an
ethnic framework for his nation, he would have tried to forcibly incorporate and assimilate Christian
minorities into the dominant Muslim culture.
Although modern conceptions of citizenship are largely considered products of the
Enlightenment, the Covenants demonstrate that Islamic civilization conceived of citizenship rights
long before the aforementioned period in history. To reiterate, Prophet Muhammad defended the
rights of Christians in an Islamic state by offering them security and protection in moments of danger
or strife. He elaborates in the Covenant with the Christians of the World:
Religions 2016, 7, 15 16 of 21

defend them from any damage, harm or retribution. I am behind them, protecting
them from every enemy or anyone who wishes them harm . . . In virtue of this pact,
[Christians] have obtained inviolable rights to enjoy our protection, to be protected from
any infringement of their rights, and they are not to be disputed, rejected or ignored so that
they will be bound to the Muslims both in good and bad fortune ([75], p. 50).

The language that Muhammad used in his Covenants is remarkably similar to that of the
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, a political document passed by Frances National
Constituent Assembly in 1789. Article VI of this document states that citizens of the French Republic
are to be treated equally under the law. French citizens should be eligible to all honours, places, and
employments, according to their different abilities without any other distinction than that created by
their virtues and talents [101]. Like the Covenants with the Christians of the World and the Christians
of Persia, Article XII of the Declaration declares that state officials are permitted to use public force
if necessary to give security to the rights of men and of citizens [101]. The Covenants, therefore,
exhibit civic principles in that national belonging is not predicated on race, ethnicity, or religion, but
rather rational attachment to a political body ([92], p. 4). Membership into the Muslim nation is
open equally and without any qualification or restriction. In this sense it embodies the universalism of
Islam: the nation becomes a consciousness of belonging to a religious and political community that is
independent of the Muslim state ([41], p. 49). While the Covenants may be interpreted as requiring
only Muslims themselvesand not the actually Islamic stateto protect Christians, one can also argue
that Muhammads role as Caliph of the ummah and his commandments outlined in the Covenants
were in fact a type of law alongside the Quran and hadiths. As the Quran (4:59) notes, O you who
believe, obey Allah and obey the Messenger and those in authority from among you . . . ([51], p. 118).
This verse gives us the basis of Islamic political authority and tells us that Muslims are to obey the
commandments of the Prophet. As the leader of the ummah, Muhammad used his authority to dictate
official state policies in relation to Christian minorities. One can, therefore, surmise that it was not
simply individual Muslims who were called upon to protect Christians, but rather than entire state
itself as led by the Prophet.

3. Conclusions: The Muslim Nation as Pluralistic and Civic-Oriented

In an attempt to provide direction for improving relations between Muslim and Christians, this
article drew upon Prophet Muhammads Covenants as establishing freedom of religion and civic
rights for Christians living within the ummah. The Covenants of the Prophet with the Christians of his
time bring to the foreground the question of how Muslim leaders govern in relation to non-Muslim
communities. The Covenants, as this article highlighted, were designed to protect and defend peaceful
Christian communities, not attack them ([18], p. 3; emphasis original). For this reason alone,
the Covenants can be used in policy-making circles concerning current tensions between Muslims
and Christians. Ultimately, this article shows that contemporary Islamic states that mistreat and
discriminate against Christians cannot be justified in light of Prophet Muhammads Covenants. The
re-discovery of these documents provides an opportunity to give new birth to Islam and regenerate
the essence of Islamic teachings ([17], p. 120).
The Prophets cordial relations with Christians were not due merely to political expediency or
personal aspirations, but rather they resulted from his belief that Christians should be able to freely
practice their own faith in accordance with their own will. The Quran (2:256) clearly supports this
statement when it declares in no uncertain terms: There shall be no compulsion in religion ([51], p. 62).
In tandem with the Quran, hadiths, and the Constitution of Medina, the Covenants assure Christians
that they will have the freedom to choose their spiritual destiny as citizens of the ummah. His inclusive
position on incorporating Christians reflects this verse of the Quran (3:64): Say: O People of the Book,
come to an equitable word between us and you ([51], p. 83). Far from being a tyrant, as depicted
in modern representations [102]. Muhammad developed a democratic aptitude towards Christian
Religions 2016, 7, 15 17 of 21

communities. The Prophets relationships with Christians can be characterized by more than mere
tolerance, but rather by compassion and the fostering of peace.
The Covenants and their common message of dignity and equality help to minimize the scope
and scale of current polarization between Muslims and Christians in the Middle East and beyond.
By striking harmony with Prophet Muhammads Covenants and vision for the ummah, Muslims will
draw upon the best principles of their Islamic tradition. The value of the Covenants lies in its moral
authenticity and its virtue. The Covenants do not simply provide theoretical possibilities of Muslim
and Christian coexistence; they are, on the other hand, historical realities that provide a framework on
which future prospects can be envisaged for Muslim and Christian understanding. The Covenants,
therefore, should be referred to and used in current inter-religious and political conflicts, especially
those involving the persecution of Christians in so-called Islamic states.
According to Prophet Muhammad, a nation consisting predominantly of Muslims does not
necessarily mean that the nation is Islamic: it can become truly Islamic only by virtue of consciously
turning to religious pluralism and civic rights as the pillars of the ummah. This is part of the vision
imparted to Muslims and Christians by his example.

Conflicts of Interest: The author declares no conflict of interest.

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