THE COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE v. PROF.

FRANK AWUKU NORVOR [8TH JANUARY 2002] SUIT NO. FT(HR) 6/2001

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE, THE FAST TRACK

HIGH COURT SITTING AT ACCRA ON TUESDAY

THE 8TH JANUARY 2002

SUIT NO. FT(HR)6/2001

JANUARY 2002

CORAM: J. ANSAH, J.A. SITTING AS AN ADDITIONAL JUSTICE OF THE HIGH COURT

THE COMMISSIONER

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE

VERSUS:

PROF. FRANK AWUKU NORVOR

NO REPRESENTATIVE FOR BOTH CHRAJ AND PROF. FRANK NORVOR

YONNY KULENDI FOR CHRAJ

MR. W.O. BOAFO FOR RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT

The respondent in this case, Professor Frank Awuku Norvor, is the owner and Managing Director of Fan
Airways Limited that operates domestic flights in this country. In November 1996, the respondent employed
Ms Augustina Salome Tettey as a Ticketing and Reservations Officer. She also became a flight and cabin
attendant in March 1997. On January 2, 1998, the respondent dismissed Ms Tettey. On 20th January 1998,
she filed a complaint with the Commission for Human Rights and Administrative Justice (called CHRAJ in
short). I shall hereinafter call Ms Tettey, the complainant and Professor Norvor, the respondent and CHRAJ
as the applicant.

The complaint put before CHRAJ was that the respondent sexually harassed the complainant and when
she rebuffed his attempts, she dismissed her. The respondent on the other hand wrote on February 1998
to deny the allegations made against him asserting that the complainant was dismissed on grounds that
differed with what the complainant alleged. Her work performance was unsatisfactory. More particularly, it
was stated that she was engaged in the following unsatisfactory conduct, namely,

(a) making unwarranted use of the telephone in the company's Reservations office for long periods, thereby
disrupting the business of the company;

(b) refusing to tidy up the office and quarrelling with her co-workers who resented her lazy attitude; and

(c) refusing to carry her own service bags (containing snacks and related supplies) from the operations
office to the aircraft on which she was working"

The respondent also stated that when questioned about her refusal to carry her own bags the complainant
was alleged to have retorted in reply that she was not hired as a "kaya kaya" (porter). The respondent
furthermore stated that supervisors who flew with all other air hostesses to observe their performance on
flight came back with adverse reports on her. Besides all these allegations there was another to the effect
that the complainant was dismissed because of her flirtatious conduct towards several of the captains and
male customers of the company which had the potential of destroying the image of the company as well as
affecting the morale of the staff negatively. On receipt of the response CHRAJ decided to conduct a formal
hearing into the complaint, which actually began on 14th April 1998. The complainant stated her version
and called witnesses to testify on her behalf. Despite several adjournments granted the respondent or his
counsel to appear before CHRAJ to give evidence and call witnesses to testify for him, he refused to utilise
the opportunities given him fully. I must state that from the records of proceedings put before this court,
there were times when even though the respondent himself was not before CHRAJ in person he was fully
represented by his Counsel who duly cross- examined witnesses called by the complainant. In the course
of proceedings Counsel had to write to CHRAJ to withdraw his representation for the reason that he had
lost contact with his client. In those circumstances, CHRAJ felt it was left with no option than to proceed to
consider the available evidence before it and deliver a decision based on it and as they deemed fit under
the circumstances. Accordingly, on 15th January 1999, CHRAJ, having found the complaint to be justified,
in that the respondent discriminated against the complaint on the basis of her sex, ordered the respondent
to cease all acts of sexual harassment or similar violations towards the complainant. A further award of
56,000.00 was made for legal fees and hearing related expenses in favour of the complainant.
5,000,000.00 was awarded for injury to her dignity and self-respect, and the humiliation she suffered,
3,240,000.00 for nine months of lost wages occasioned by the dismissal with interest thereon. The
respondent's application to review this decision failed for reasons given.

It was when the respondent failed to comply with the decision by CHRAJ that it invoked its powers under
Section 18(2) of The Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice Act, 1993, Act 456 to seek
an order of this court to enforce its decision. The respondent rather vehemently opposed the application on
three main grounds, namely that, CHRAJ lacked the jurisdiction to hear the complaints because whatever
the respondent was alleged to have done to the complainant was at its highest a tort or the invasion of the
privacy of the complainant and did not amount to a violation of her human rights. It did not amount to
discrimination as defined in Article 17 of the Constitution. Secondly, even if it was human rights issue, the
enabling Act of CHRAJ dictated that the respondent was entitled to a fair hearing. The respondent did not
get any. The point was also made that it was Fan Airways that dismissed the complainant and therefore the
respondent could not in law be made responsible for those acts.

Before the various issues raised are resolved, it was vital that the facts are examined to find out whether or
not the complainant suffered any acts of sexual harassment meted out on her by the respondent. Before
CHRAJ, the complainant said that she had done just about a month at Fan Airways when the respondent
started making amorous proposals to her. He also made complimentary remarks about her bodily features
and appearance. He was said to have told the complainant "You are beautiful, you are the most beautiful
girl in the office..." and that this occurred on a weekly or fortnight intervals. The respondents was said to
have invited a kiss from the complainant as well. The respondent was also said to have translated this
verbal onslaught into action when on several occasions he attempted to force a kiss on the complainant,
hug her, hold her hand or go round and hold her from behind. There were times when the respondent
actually fondled her round. The complainant said that when she resisted all those attempts and advances
from the respondent, he reacted by telling her that if she would not yield to his requests then she should not
let it be anyone else. Thus it was that when one day he saw the complainant in the car of one Captain
Larkai, he became angry made some uncomplimentary remarks about her and threatened to carry out
reprisals against her. The respondent carried out his threats by first grounding her and finally on 2nd
January 1998, dismissed her. In view of the complainant, jealousy over her relationship with other men
caused her dismissal and not any other ground as was given by the respondent .

The respondent did not appear at the hearing. CHRAJ then felt that the complainant was a credible witness
for her evidence was devoid of any significant inconsistencies or contradictions, she was corroborated by
the testimonies of other witnesses, like Ms Manso and Captain Larkai. It was in those circumstances that
CHRAJ made the decision and those awards which they want to obtain an order of this court to enforce.

The respondent opposed the application on the grounds that CHRAJ did not have jurisdiction to hear the
complaint. The reason was that what the respondent was alleged to have done to the complainant was at
its highest a violation or an interference with her privacy and amounted in law to a tort. As a tort therefore, it
fell well outside the scope of cases that could properly be handled by CHRAJ. I must state that this
argument must fail in law. The reason is that it is clear that many of what are decidedly fundamental rights
as known or spelt out in our constitution (like those provided for under Chapter 5 of the 1992 Constitution of
Ghana) were also protected by the criminal laws of the land or by private law, such the law of torts. An
aggrieved person was entitled to proceed under either the constitutional provisions or under any other law.
The choice is for the aggrieved person to take. Once he or she exercises that option opened to him or her
under the law she could not be faulted for that. The two options are not mutually exclusive of each other,
though they may not be pursued simultaneously.

It was submitted before this court that even if what the respondent was alleged to have done were true it
amounted only to sexual harassment. That could not be heard by CHRAJ for that was a far cry from
amounting to discrimination or a human rights issue. The matter was not to be equated with "discriminated"
as defined under our constitution. Reference was made to Article 17 of the constitution and this I
respectfully wish to quote now.

17 (1) All persons shall be equal before the law.

(2) A person shall not be discriminated against on grounds of gender, race, colour, ethnic origin, religion,
creed or social or economic status.

(3) For the purpose of this article, "discriminate" means give different treatment to different persons
attributable only or mainly to their respective descriptions by race, place of origin, political opinions, colour,
gender, occupation, religion, or creed, whereby persons of one description are subjected to disabilities or
restrictions to which persons of another descriptions are not made subject or are granted privileges or
advantages which are not granted to persons of another description". (italics mine)

The issue raised by this submission is whether or not cases of sexual harassment are to be equated with
discrimination as defined under our constitution. I must confess that there is no reported (case let alone)
cases on sexual harassment on our local front. Notwithstanding that, cases from other countries, notably
commonwealth countries with the same common law tradition or system of jurisprudence, would offer
useful guidance. I must state that even though those authorities would not normally be of any binding effect
on our courts, they could not be denied the weight of force they carry. The first issue to consider is what
amounts to sexual harassment? Once again I must state that the term has not been given any judicial
definition locally as yet and I shall have to fall on how it has been defined in other jurisdictions. It was in the
Canadian case of Janzen V. Platy Enterprise Ltd. (1989) 1 S.C.R. 1252, 10 C.H.R.R., D/6205; 2,32,40
where Chief Justice Dickson defined sexual harassment as unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature that
detrimentally effect the work environment or leads to adverse consequences for the victims of the
harassment."

The widely acknowledged authority on the subject, Dr. Arjun P. Aggarwal also said that;

"Sexual harassment is any sexually-oriented practice that endangers an individual's continued employment,
negatively affects his or her work performance, or undermines his/her sense of personal dignity".

See his Sexual Harassment in the Workplace (1987), Butterworths Canada Ltd. at page 1 authored by Dr.
Aggarwal.

Similarly, the Alberta Human Rights Commission defined it as follows:

"Sexual harassment is an unwanted sexual solicitation or advance made by a person who knows or ought
to know that it is unwelcome.

A reprisal or threat by someone in a position of authority, after a sexual advance is rejected constitutes
sexual harassment."

Dr. Aggarwal listed several examples of unacceptable verbal behaviours that may constitute sexual
harassment at page 11 of this book referred to above. Among them are:

1. Comments of a sexual nature about weight, body shape, size or figure;

2. Comments about person's looks, dress, appearance or sexual habits;

3. Remarks about a woman's breasts buttocks.. and her overall figure;

The author went on to refer to unwanted physical contact with the victim and said some of them may be
explicitly sexual in nature while others may be only accidental. He cited the following among others as
examples:
Hugging, Attempted or actual kissing or fondling.

Among what he called "Psychological Sexual Harassment" were the following examples:

Relentless proposal of physical intimacy beginning with subtle hints which may lead to overt request for
dates and/or sexual intercourse;

Sexual favours;

Propositioning;

Generally then, to constitute sexual harassment a given conduct must be unwelcome and of sexual nature
detrimentally affecting the work environment. To meet the second requirement, it is not necessary that the
conduct be overtly sexual; as long as it is gender related such that it would not be directed at members of
the other sex, it may fall within this definition. Finally, the unwanted conduct must be shown to be
sufficiently severe and persistent to create a hostile environment.

I have referred to these various examples cited Dr. Aggarwal to show not only what amount to sexual
harassment but to show that in this case in particular there was evidence from the complainant, on whom
the burden lay to prove what the respondent did that made her level those allegations against him, that the
respondent from his verbal and physical behaviour did harass the complainant sexually. There was also
evidence of psychological sexual harassment meted on to the complainant by the respondent. I shall come
back to consider a view expressed by counsel for the respondent on how this matter was heard by CHRAJ
later.

For the meantime I wish to consider another ground of objection raised by counsel in opposition to this
application. The gravamen of the objection was that even if there was a case of sexual harassment made
against the respondent, it did not amount to discrimination as defined in Article 17 of the constitution
referred to above. In the said definition, the word "sex" or its derivatives was not used. Rather the word
used was "gender". I do not think this should present any difficult at all. This is because the two words are
synonymous with each other and may therefore be used interchangeably.

Dr. Aggarwal wrote in his invaluable book that prior to 1981 sexual harassment on the job was not
specifically prohibited by any human rights statute in Canada. In fact it was even doubted if sexual
harassment necessarily involved discrimination. That meant much as sexual harassment in the workplace
was recognised and acknowledged it could not be equated with discrimination in recent years however,
according to Dr. Aggarwal, Human Rights Commissions have taken an about turn in their thinking on the
issue with the result that now sexual harassment issues are firmly equated with discrimination and has
found a place in human rights legislation. That is the current thinking on this hitherto vexed question,
notably in countries like Canada and the United States of America. In both countries it is now accepted that
sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination. Admittedly, there are specific legislation to give backing
to this standing in those countries. This is not the situation in their country as yet. In other words that sex
discrimination is equal to sexual harassment or the vice versa has not been put in a legislative form as yet.
At this stage one car only express the hope that sooner than later, the necessary law would be passed so
as to bring the state of our human rights laws in step with what obtains in other jurisdictions.

The question that comes to mind is, does the definition of discrimination not cover sexual harassment?
Discrimination on grounds of gender is outlawed under Article 17(2). To subject a person of a particular
gender or sex to any practise or behaviour that would not be normally meted out to another for the reason
only that those persons are not of the same gender or sex, in my view smacks of discrimination on grounds
of sex or gender. In other words where one could reasonable say that a woman had been treated in a way
far different from how a man would be treated, this is a gender-related discrimination. Where the treatment
was sexual in nature, or sexual responses and favours are the desired objects of those practices and
behaviours then this is discrimination enough under Article 17 of the Constitution, the fundamental law of
the land. I think the article is wide enough to lead one to meaningfully say that it equates sexual
harassment with discrimination. Under the same Article 17 freedom for discrimination is a fundamental
freedom or right enshrined in Chapter 5 and which must be respected by the Executive, Legislature and
Judiciary, all other organs of government and their agencies, and then all natural and legal persons in
Ghana. Every person in Ghana, irrespective of his or her gender, to say the least is entitled to the
fundamental human rights and freedoms in chapter 5 of the Constitution. This entitlement knows no bounds
but is to be enjoyed by every person in Ghana wherever he or she finds himself or herself. The person's
workplace is not excluded. In British Telecommunications plc v. Williams 1997 Industrial Relations Reports
668 EAT, it was held that "sexual discrimination is a particular form of discrimination on the grounds of sex
which can best be defined as unwanted conduct of a sexual nature or other conduct based on sex affecting
the dignity of women and men at work". Besides Article 17 of the Constitution, there is the 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights which binds Ghana, a member of the United Nations. This Declaration
prohibits all forms of gender discrimination. That is not all Ghana is also signatory to the United Nations
International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women, as well as The
African Charter on Human And People's Rights. By its enabling Act, Act 456, CHRAJ is given the
jurisdiction to investigate complaints alleging sex discrimination and or violations of fundamental human
rights. I have endeavoured to say that sexual harassment constitutes a violation of fundamental human
rights. When carried out in the workplace it creates a hostile and offensive environment for members of one
sex. It makes the working place demeaning, disconcertingly harsh, for female employee has to contend
with sexual demands. Nothing is more worrisome than for a woman to always go to work with the fear of
having to contend with importunate sexual demands form a person she has no liking or love for hanging
around her neck. It creates unnecessary fear, tension, anxiety, embarrassment, humiliation and the
lowering of the person self-esteem. The combined effect of all this is that the person's fundamental right to
work in a conducive atmosphere is violated. It is a consideration of all these factors as well as Article 17 of
the constitution and the international treaties and declarations to which Ghana is a signatory that has
compelled me to hold that CHRAJ has jurisdiction to hear the complaint made to it. What the respondent
did to her could well be termed a tort, it may even be construed to be criminal but in all probability was a
violation of her human rights. In such a situation the complainant had the option to choose the best avenue
for redress available to her. I hold then that CHRAJ had jurisdiction to hear the complaint put before it.
Section 7(1) of The Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice Act, 1993, Act 456, provided
that one of the functions of CHRAJ is to investigate violations of fundamental human rights and freedoms. I
have said enough to show that sexual harassment is a violation of the human rights of the victim and as
such is a case in respect of which CHRAJ has jurisdiction to investigate. I therefore reject the submissions
by counsel for the respondent to the contrary.

Counsel for the respondent touched on another point that was of crucial importance in this application. Its
importance lay in the fact that if made out, it would have a telling effect on what was done at CHRAJ. It was
said that CHRAJ did not give a proper hearing in the case in that the respondent was not given an
opportunity to be present at the hearing. I must say that proceedings before CHRAJ must be done in a
judicial manner. Every party appearing before CHRAJ must be given a fair hearing (see Regulations 5 of
C.1.7). What go into a fair hearing are many but at least it means the rules of natural justice must be
observed most strictly throughout the entire proceedings. This is especially so in the case of the rule which
says that: "Audi alteram partem" or hear the other side. That no one is to be condemned unheard is one of
the firm cornerstones upon which our system of resolving disputes hinges.
It means in effect that not only must a party be heard, he must be made fully aware of the proceedings
against him and when his adversary testifies against him, he must be given an opportunity to cross-
examine him either by himself or through his counsel. At every stage he must be made aware of the
proceedings. If this is what goes into hearing the other side, then CHRAJ more than passed the litmus test.
I have had the benefit of reading the record as well as the various affidavit filed I this case, supported as
they were by documents. One striking feature about it is that the respondent was fully made aware of the
proceedings against him and the stage it had reached. In fact he was not denied the benefit of the services
of counsel of his choice, and when the hearing began he was fully represented. If anything at all, it was the
respondent himself who for reasons made known to this court by this counsel, chose to stay away from the
proceedings. Despite being served with one hearing notice after the other, he did not attend the hearings
before CHRAJ. Things got to their crescendo when counsel appearing for the respondent wrote to withdraw
his representation for the respondent on no ground other than that counsel had lost contact with the
respondent. It is remarkable to note that even then CHRAJ suffered the respondent one more adjournment,
repeating the cycle of having the respondent served with a hearing notice. And true to his track record, the
respondent did not obey the notice. It has now been made known that the respondent rather chose to go
round pursuing his business in arranging some necessary rights in the air transport business in
neighbouring areas. Much as the state stood to benefit in the long run in what the respondent was doing,
that per se did not entitle him to stay away from the proceedings which he did at any rate at the risk of the
proceedings going on without him which CHRAJ was perfectly entitled to do.

Where a party after having been served with a hearing notice and made aware of the proceedings for a
particular day nevertheless stays away from the hearing without obtaining from the adjudicating body an
excuse to be absent, he can hardly complain that he was not given a fair hearing. It is rather the opposite.
He was given an opportunity to defend himself but he chose not to avail himself of it. In such a situation he
is the architect of whatever fate that would befall him. I therefore come to the conclusion that in the light of
the facts of this case, the respondent was not denied the opportunity being fully heard in this matter. It must
also be stated that to grant an adjournment or refuse it is always within the sole discretion of the
adjudicating body which if exercised one way or the other cannot be interfered with except where there is
reasonable cause to do so, which I do not find any at this stage.

I also do not agree that in circumstances such as obtained in this case, the respondent should have been
allowed to give his evidence after CHRAJ had closed the hearing and come out with its decision. Once
again it lay within their discretion to give or refuse the respondent that benefit and I am not prepared to
interfere with the exercise of that discretion. I conclude then that CHRAJ granted a full and proper hearing
into the complaint. As the respondent did not give evidence at the hearing, it means that he did not
substantiate his claim that the complainant was dismissed on grounds other than that she refused the
proposition of love to her by the respondent. CHRAJ was therefore left with no choice than to find as it did
for the reasons why the complainant was dismissed and that the respondent did harass the complainant
with request for sexual favours which she refused.

I now come to a very important matter raised by counsel for the respondent. It relates to who is to answer
for what the respondent allegedly did. Was it the respondent himself or his employers? The argument put
up was that the dismissal of the complainant was effected by Fan Air itself and the respondent being only
the Managing Director, was legally distinct from the company so that the company should be held liable for
the acts of its employees. The case of Salomo vrs Salomo and then Catherine Lee vrs Lee's Air Family Ltd
1961 AC p. 12 were referred to.

The reply was that in certain circumstances the veil of incorporation would be pierced for the realities to be
seen in which case the employee would be held liable for his personal acts.

Once again I have had to take recourse to Dr. Aggarwal's invaluable book cited above where this issue was
fully discussed in Chapter 4 under the heading "Employer's Liability for Sexual Harassment of Employees."
At page 189 the point was made that:

"The courts and tribunals, thus, are not confined to one single legal theory in determining whether or not the
employer is responsible to its employees for the sexual harassment caused by it supervisory and non-
supervisor personnel. The courts and tribunals have found the employer responsible for the acts of its
employees, depending upon the circumstances in each case, on the basis of vicarious liability, law of
agency, organic theory (or controlling mind), and doctrine of strict liability". By the organic theory of
Corporate Responsibility is meant that:

"Where the employer is a corporate entity and an employee is in contravention of the Code and that
employee is part of the 'directing mind' of the corporation, then the employer corporation is itself personally
in contravention. The act of the employee becomes the act of the corporate entity itself, in accordance with
the organic theory of corporate responsibility" see page 188 in situation 4.
Here it would not be difficult to say that a Managing Director in the person of the respondent in this case
was a directing mind of Fan Airways in which case by the organic theory of corporate responsibility, Fan
Airways should be held responsible for the acts of its Managing Director. But then as seen already the
courts do not and are not obliged or limited and pinned to any particular yardstick or theory in fixing liability
in sexual harassment cases. Rather, the courts would look at the hard facts of each case in particular and
do justice in the case. Accordingly, in Olarte v. Commodore Business Machines (Ont. 1983) 4
C.H.R.R.D/1705 (Cumming) Professor Cumming stated the situations in which an employer may be
personally in breach of the Human Rights Code. He named three other instances as;

(i) where the employer himself, directly or indirectly, intentionally infringes a protected right;

(ii) where the employer is in a constructive discrimination; and

(iii) where the employer himself does not take part in the discrimination but authorises condones, adopts, or
ratifies an employee's discrimination .. or where the employer knew or should have known of the
discrimination, and did not take reasonable steps to put an end or at least minimise the discrimination,
abuse or practise. In each of the above instances the company would be responsible for the acts of the
employer, the respondent in this case. In determining liability in sexual harassment cases then one need
not limit oneself exclusively to only one theory. It could be seen from the situations so ably stated by
Professor Cummings that where situations (i) (ii) and (iii) do not obviously apply such as in this case, it
would be unfair to single out only the organic theory for application. I rather think that where the respondent
went out of his way to seek his pleasures by propositioning so profusely to an employee, he alone should
shoulder all responsibility.

At any rate if the respondent feels that someone else or together with him should suffer for his deeds
nothing stops him from roping that other person in to face the music. There are well-known procedures for
doing that and he should exploit them. Also non-joinder or mis-joinder of a party does not defeat an action
and an action would be determined on its merits. This action would not therefore fail because the company
has not been sued but the respondent has been.

Lastly, I come to another point raised for the respondent. It was that the issue as to whether or not what
was alleged to have been done to the complainant fell within the jurisdiction of CHRAJ should have been
referred to the Superior Court for interpretation. There can only be a short answer to this submission. It is to
be found in what Taylor J (as he then was) said in Republic v. Special Tribunal; Ex parte Forson (1980)
G.L.R. 529 namely that "it was not every question of an interpretation of an article of the constitution that
should be referred to the Supreme Court where no difficulty of interpretation existed, there was no need for
High Court to refer an article or any matter contained in the constitution to the Supreme Court for
interpretation".

His Lordship applied the dictum of Bannerman C.J. in Republic v. Maikankan (1971) 2 G.L.R. 473 at p. 478
(full bench); see also Republic v. Asiamah (1971)2 G.L.R. 479 Awoonor-Williams v. Gbedemah, Supreme
Court, 8 December 1969, unreported; digested in (1970) C.C. 18; Tait v. Ghana Airways Corporation 2 G&G
527. Supreme Court and Aduamoah II & ors v. Adum Twum II (2000) SC GLR 165

Accordingly, I hold that there was nothing difficult in understanding the meaning of discrimination as
internally defined in the constitution itself so as to call for any reference to the Supreme Court. There was
no need for CHRAJ or this Court to have referred any matter to the Supreme Court for interpretation or any
purpose.

When CHRAJ comes to court under sections 9 and 18(2) of Act 456 to seek a remedy as may be
appropriate for the enforcement of the recommendation of its recommendations, it is not open to the court
before which the application was made to reopen the matter as it were, by calling evidence afresh. The
court it must be stated is not sitting on appeal on the case either. It is when the court finds that in hearing
the complaint CHRAJ did not observe the rules of natural justice, or exceeded its jurisdiction or investigated
a case where it had no jurisdiction to do so, or for any other reason, the decision was legally unenforceable
that the application must fail. I have not been satisfied that CHRAJ is not entitled to the relief they seek
from this court.

In the main, CHRAJ ordered the respondent to pay some sums of money to the complainant. He was also
ordered to cease and desist from further harassing her sexually. The money aspect of the judgment should
be enforced by the usual methods in enforcing such judgments. It must be mentioned that it was only in
respect of the award for lost wages that interest was to run on the amount awarded. In other words no
interest was to run on any other award.

I think the application should succeed and an order is hereby made for CHRAJ to use the normal ways
known to the law to enforce their decision against the respondent.

KULENDI: My Lord, may we pray that costs be awarded in favour of the applicant in the sum of 7 million
subject to undue abuse and therefore it is important that litigants may be made to pay the full cost of their
efforts to exploit the process of the law, whiles these processes are there to enable parties ventilate
whatever grievances they have, they ought to be resorted to judiciously. My Lord I believe that it is improper
for parties to abandon proceedings and merely come and oppose the applications or appeal or seek review
in their bid to frustrate the person in whose favour a determination has been given. My Lord it is therefore
important in these circumstances that substantial costs be imposed to serve as a deterrent against future
attempt to unduly exploit the due process. My Lord I believe that costs of 7 million is minimal deterrent.

BOAFO: My Lord, costs are normally not to be used as a punitive instrument. My Lord will realise that so
far as the respondent is concerned the time of the court has not been wasted at all. The respondent has
fought a very good fight to enable the court to make very serious pronouncement of law. The court has
been able to put the records straight as to what constitute sexual harassment under our constitution. The
court has been able to define what constitute fair hearing under CHRAJ enabling Act. The court has been
able to define under what circumstances an inroads can be made into the concept of corporate liability. My
Lord these are very useful improvement and advance in our jurisprudence. The respondent has done a
very good job to the jurisprudence of this country and the fact that he resisted the immediate enforcement
of the judgment of the court should not be any ground for awarding excessive and punitive costs. My Lord
we leave it entirely in your discretion and we believe that the costs which will be awarded will reflect the
proceedings in this court. My Lord, the court normally is guided in the award of costs by the number of
attendances and My Lord will realise that these are not much. Costs are not intended to punish or to enrich
the victorious. My Lord, this is our submission.

BY COURT: Costs are in the discretion of the court and this discretion must be exercised judicially. I think
on the whole this case has served a useful purpose of delimiting what amount to sexual harassment in our
law. I shall not punish the respondent now for what he did by muting him with heavy cost. The 7 million
asked by counsel for CHRAJ is by all standards astronomically high. I award 2 million costs for CHRAJ.

J. ANSAH J.A.

AM @ CLADISCO --- RESPONDENT