SAS WP21 Secret Stockpiles

21
Secret Stockpiles
Arms Caches and Disarmament Efforts
in Mozambique
By Gary Littlejohn
A Working Paper of the Small Arms Survey

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Published in Switzerland by the Small Arms Survey
Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development

Studies, Geneva, 2015
First published in September 2015
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Contents
List of maps and tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

List of abbreviations and acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
About the author . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
The peace process, 198894 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
RENAMOs development as a political party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Disarmament and arms-recovery programmes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
The ONUMOZ period, 199294 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Operation Rachel: reducing the arms caches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Transformation of Arms into Ploughshares (TAE) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
The Mozambican Force for Crime Investigation and Social
Reintegration (FOMICRES) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Summary of disarmament . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Further details on locations of arms caches . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Prevailing concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
RENAMO split . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Violence of 201314 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
FRELIMOs difficulty in governing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Police and armed forces: difficulties in upholding the law . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
ONUMOZs missed opportunity on disarmament . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Operation Rachel and post-conflict arms recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
DDR and integration of the two armies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

List of maps and tables
Maps
1 Mozambique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2 Largest RENAMO arms caches in Sofala Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Tables
1 Presidential elections in Mozambique, 19942014

(% of vote secured) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2 Parliamentary elections in Mozambique, 19942014

(% of vote secured) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3 Number of parliamentary seats secured

in Mozambique, 19942014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
4 Arms collected by ONUMOZ, 199294 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5 Arms and ammunition collected under Operation Rachel,

19952008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
6 Operation Rachel missions: timing, arms collected,

and location, 19952008 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
7 TAE arms collection totals, October 1995 to October 2003 . . . . . . . . . . . 30
8 FIC/TAE arms collection totals, October 2003

to December 2004 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
9 Small arms distribution to RENAMO and subsequent

collection in Mozambique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

List of abbreviations and acronyms
AAs reas de assembleia (Assembly Areas)

AIM Agncia de Informao de Moambique
(Mozambique News Agency)
CCF Comisso de Cessar Fogo (Cease-fire Commission)
CCM Conselho Cristo de Moambique (Christian Council
of Mozambique)
CTNAs Centros de Tropas No Acantonadas (Centres for Troops
Not in Cantonment)
DDR Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
FADM Foras Armadas de Defesa de Moambique (Armed Forces
for the Defence of Mozambique)
FIC Fora de Inteligncia Comunitria (Community
Intelligence Force)
FIR Fora de Interveno Rpida (Rapid Intervention Force)
FOMICRES Fora Moambicana para a Investigao de Crimes e
Reinsero Social (Mozambican Force for Crime
Investigation and Social Reintegration)
FPLM Foras Populares de Libertao de Moambique
(Peoples Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique)
FRELIMO Frente de Libertao de Moambique (Mozambique
Liberation Front)
GoM Government of Mozambique
GPA General Peace Accord for Mozambique (1992)
MDM Movimento Democrtico de Moambique (Democratic
Movement of Mozambique)
MNR Mozambique National Resistance

ONUMOZ United Nations Operation in Mozambique (199294)
OR Operation Rachel
PDD Partido para a Paz, Democracia e Desenvolvimento
(Party for Peace, Democracy and Development)
PRM Polcia da Repblica de Moambique (Police of the
Republic of Mozambique)
RENAMO Resistncia Nacional Moambicana (Mozambican
National Resistance)
SADF South African Defence Force
SAPS South African Police Service
TAE Transformao das Armas em Enxadas (Transformation
of Arms into Ploughshares)
UD Unio Democrtica (Democratic Union)
UNSC United Nations Security Council
UNSG United Nations Secretary-General

About the author
Gary Littlejohn is a former member of the editorial boards of the journals

Economy and Society, Review of African Political Economy, Journal of Southern
African Studies, and No Vamos Esquecer. He has worked on various short-term
consultancies for the Government of Mozambique, the Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) of the UN, the Joint Economic Commission for Africa-
FAO Agricultural Division (JEFAD) of the UN, the European Commission,
the International Finance Corporation, the UN Environment Programme
(UNEP), the International Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), the Africa
Institute of Strategic Studies (US Department of Defense), and the Small
Arms Survey. From 1982 to 1983 the author taught and was engaged in field
work at the Centre of African Studies, Eduardo Mondlane University,
Mozambique. He has since returned to Mozambique more than a dozen times.
Gary Littlejohn travels and lectures worldwide; he is fluent in Portuguese
and French and has a working knowledge of Russian.

Acknowledgements
The author is indebted to Mozambican friends and colleagues who have

helped with field work and documentation over the years. They include: Joo
Paulo Borges Coelho, Teresa Cruz e Silva, Paul Fauvet, and David Hedges for
their key informant interviews; and in particular, Albino Forquilha, Execu-
tive Director/CEO of FOMICRES for his invaluable information, analysis,
and support. In addition, he thanks Alex Vines and Paul Fauvet for their
review comments and Eric Berman for his patience and support.

Map 1 Mozambique
TANZANIA
L. Malawi
ZAMBIA CABO
NIASSA DELGADO
Lichinga Pemba
MALAWI
o
L u ri
Lilongwe
Nampula
TETE
L. Cahora
Bassa Zambezi NAMPULA
Tete
ZAMBZIA
MOZAMBIQUE
A B W E
Quelimane
SOFALA
Chimoio
MANICA
M B
Beira
INDIAN
ZI
Save
OCEAN
Lim
INHAMBANE
po
po
GAZA
Inhambane
SOUTH
AFRICA
MAPUTO
Xai-Xai International
boundary
Province
Maputo boundary
Capital city
Mbabane Province capital
0 km 200 Selected roads
SWAZILAND

Introduction
More than 20 years have passed since the peace process in Mozambique con-
cluded in late 1994. The process was overseen by a United Nations Operation in
Mozambique (ONUMOZ), which was carried out during the peace agreement
between the Government of Mozambique and Resistncia Nacional Moam-
bicana (Mozambican National Resistance, RENAMO) 1 in October 1992 and
which lasted until 9 December 1994.2 The governing party, Frente de Liber-
tao de Moambique (Mozambique Liberation Front, FRELIMO), had been
conducting lengthy, complex negotiations with RENAMO rebel forces for
some timenegotiations which resulted in a ceasefire for the country on 4
October 1992 (Vines, 2013, p. 178). The General Peace Accord for Mozambique
(GPA) provided for the disarmament of both parties and for the integration
of reduced FRELIMO and RENAMO forces into a single national army.
The disarmament process that followed was fraught with difficulties,
mainly arising from mistrust between the two signatories of the GPA.
Despite various and repeated attempts, the process of arms collection was
limited and there was considerable concern about hidden stockpiles guarded
by RENAMO (Vines, 1998, pp. 19293). One reason for this concern was the
significant increase in armed crime in South Africa noted since 1989, which
in part was attributed to arms leaking from the Mozambican conflict across
the shared border (Vines, 1998, p. 203). Within Mozambique it was feared that
armed conflict would reignite if political differences persisted. In response
to certain disagreements with FRELIMO, many of which pertained to elec-
tion processes, RENAMO periodically threatened to return to armed conflict.
Such threats seemed credible because of RENAMOs hidden arms caches.
Although RENAMO initially fared well in national elections, its perfor-
mance deteriorated over time, and periodically its leadership resorted to the
threat of armed conflict as a means to secure high-level negotiations with the
government. There was little armed conflict, however, until almost 20 years
after the end of the peace process.

Eventually armed conflict broke out again in 2013 and continued into
2015, despite attempts by both parties and mediators to resolve the situation.
Negotiations striving to contain or terminate the conflict were so drawn out
that they fuelled the fear that the conflict would ultimately spiral out of con-
trol. Although a return to full-scale civil war seemed unlikely, the conflict
nevertheless bore serious economic consequences (Hanlon, 2014a, p. 4) and
threatened to disrupt presidential and parliamentary elections set for 2014.
The absence of conventional democratic processes was believed to discour-
age foreign investment in Mozambique, thereby hampering future economic
stability.
This Working Paper reviews disarmament efforts conducted during the
ONUMOZ period of 199294. It considers three subsequent arms-recovery
programmes carried out and describes the delicate nature of cooperation
that took place between state and non-state agencies. The paper also assesses
the implications of disarmament for Mozambique and the international
community.

Background
The peace process, 198894

From 1987 to 1988 President Joaquim Chissano instituted a review of
FRELIMOs economic, foreign and civil rights policies (Rupiya, 1998, p.
14). In 1989, FRELIMO consequently renounced its ideology of Marxism
Leninism, announcing this decision at its party congress in July, thereby also
facilitating an agreement that the West might be willing to support. Simul-
taneously, in 198889 a military stalemate was at play (Vines, 2013, p. 377).
Following communication between the Mozambican government and the
Catholic Church, in September 1988 Pope John Paul II embarked on a tour of
southern Africa, including a visit to Mozambique. Prior to the popes arrival
in Mozambique:
Chissano met President P.W. Botha of South Africa at Songo in Tete Province
and secured a pledge to abide by the earlier Nkomati Accord which this time was
thought to have been largely honoured (Rupiya, 1998, p. 14).
According to the Nkomati Accord of 1984, South Africa agreed to stop

supplying arms and other support to RENAMO, and Mozambique in turn
agreed to close down the military operations of the anti-apartheid African
National Congress situated in Mozambique (Rupiya, 1998, p. 13). Notwith-
standing promises, until 1992 South Africa continued to supply support to a
large RENAMO base on the MozambicanSouth African border at Nungwe.3
Nevertheless the above-mentioned diplomatic developments of 1988 had
paved the way for a breakthrough in February 1989 when church leaders
returned from talks in Kenya with a clear message (Rupiya, 1998, p. 14), a
message that negotiations with RENAMO could be successful. Talks held in
Nairobi among Church leaders and RENAMO led to further direct negotia-
tions between RENAMO and FRELIMO in Rome in July 1990, hosted by the

Sant Egidio Catholic lay community (Vines, 2013, p. 377). In addition, the
Constitution of Mozambique was changed in 1990 to accommodate a multi-
party system (Macaringue, 2003, p. 139).
Meanwhile, by late 1988, although the South African government had
largely ceased to supply RENAMO with weapons, freelance arms suppliers
continued to do so 4 and mediation efforts proved difficult. Five rounds of
talks in Rome had yielded only a partial ceasefire by December 1990, with
an agreement that in return for the confinement of Zimbabwean troops
along the Beira and Limpopo transport corridors, RENAMO would cease its
attacks on strategic trade routes (Rupiya, 1998, p. 15).
With the limitations of the 1990 ceasefire, fighting intensified in 1991 in
the far south of Mozambique.5 From 1991 to 1992, droughtprecipitated by
mild El Nio conditions and felt most acutely in the middle of the country
was taking a toll on RENAMO forces. Food supplies ran low and people were
effectively starved out; many adult men departed for Zimbabwe, leaving
child soldiers behind to lead their encampments. Large numbers of women
and children in turn moved to refugee camps along the Beira Corridor.6 In
the centre of the country, RENAMO had been partially contained both by
Zimbabwean forces who had been defending the BeiraMutare railway line
since 1982 and by Tanzanian forces who had been operating in Zambzia
Province from 1986 onwards.7 The difficult circumstances RENAMO was
facing, the sustained mediation efforts, and lengthy negotiations eventually
led to the signing of the GPA in Rome on 4 October 1992.
As part of the GPA, ONUMOZ was established, during which the exist-
ing government was recognized as sovereign. The roots of many prevailing
political problems in Mozambique can be traced to the end of the civil war and
to the time of the ONUMOZ mission. ONUMOZ oversaw the disarmament
process, which was fraught with difficulties. In addition to the disarmament
that was seen to be integral to the termination of armed conflict, the GPA
envisaged four phases: the ceasefire, the separation of forces, the concentra-
tion of forces into a new army, and demobilisation (Vines, 2013, p. 378).8

President Joaquim Chissano receives the protocol for demobilization conducted under the
UN Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) held from 1992 to 1994; in Maputo, July 1994.
Source: Srgio Santimano/UN Photo
Demobilization proceeded fairly smoothly, owing to a desire of many

troops to leave the armed forces. Disarmament was linked to the formation
of a new army, and to the physical separation of forces into different places,
referred to as reas de assembleia (Assembly Areas, AAs). A second desig-
nation was created for the locations of troops who did not comply with the
requirement to enter the AAs. Such troops were located in areas known as
Centros de Tropas No Acantonadas (Centres for Troops Not in Cantonment,
CTNAs), yet certain attempts were made to disarm them. The separation of
forces into AAs and CTNAs, the disarmament itself, and the formation of
the new army were all problematic processes as explained below (see The
ONUMOZ period, 199294). Elections held 2729 October 1994 for a presi-
dent and for deputies of the Assembly of the Republic were both won by
FRELIMO. When its mandate ended on 9 December 1994, ONUMOZ then
withdrew from Mozambique (UNSG, 1994, para. 1).
While the GPA was being signed in 1992, the Angolan peace process was
disintegrating, after slow and ineffective progress.9 Against this backdrop,

A Mozambican woman casts her ballot at a polling station in Catembe for elections held on
28 October 1994. Source: Pernaca Sudhakaran/UN Photo
FRELIMO was cautious about the outcome of the agreement and the uncer-
tain effectiveness of the involvement of ONUMOZ. Certain British citizens
living in Mozambique at the time reported that ONUMOZ was set up with
limited funding and was thus eager to declare itself a success, precisely
in contrast to the failure of the UN in Angola. ONUMOZ had held fairly
fractious relations with the Government of Mozambique and had acted
unilaterally at times.10
RENAMOs development as a political party

During the peace process, RENAMO faced the challenge of transforming
itself essentially from a rebel force into a political party. Some of its mem-
bers received basic skills training in political participation 11 and, accordingly,
RENAMO fared well in the 1994 elections. In October 1994, it was the main
opposition party in the national presidential and parliamentary elections.

From the elections of October 1999 to 2014, RENAMO electoral results
have undergone a gradual long-term decline (Vines, 2013, p. 383) and with
it, the prospects of it reaching political power peacefully have diminished.
It has responded in part by challenging the organization and rules of the
electoral process. To date RENAMO has not been the only political party to
express their objections; various reports have circulated of FRELIMO using
government resources to fund and otherwise logistically support election
campaigns (Hanlon, 2014j, 2014l; Vines, 2013, pp. 38390). Tables 1 to 3 sum-
marize the electoral results for RENAMO from 1994 to 2014.
Despite its considerable success in the first multiparty elections, RENAMO
did not build a strong organizational foundation for democratic political
activity. Nor did it develop a defined strategy for the economic and social
future of the country and any attempts to do so were reportedly stifled by
existing heads, such as Afonso Dhlakama who has been in leadership since
1980 (Vines, 2013, p. 390). The failure to develop into a fully-fledged demo-
cratic party, coupled with the periodic abandoning of peaceful politics, led
to a steady decline in votes for RENAMO.
Table 1 Presidential elections in Mozambique, 19942014 (% of vote secured)
Political candidate, party represented 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014
Joaquim Chissano, FRELIMO 53.4 52.4
Armando Guebuza, FRELIMO 63.6 75.0
Filipe Nyusi, FRELIMO 57.0
Afonso Dhlakama, RENAMO 33.7 47.7 31.7 16.4 36.6
Daviz Simango, MDM 9 6.4
Notes: indicates the party did not participate in election in the year indicated.
Percentages given may not total exactly 100 due to rounding of numbers.
Sources: Hanlon (2014j, p. 2; 2014l, p. 1); Vines (2013, p. 383)

Table 2 Parliamentary elections in Mozambique, 19942014 (% of vote secured)
Political party 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014
FRELIMO 44.3 48.5 62.0 74.7 55.7
RENAMO 37.8 38.8 29.7 17.7 32.9
MDM 8.5
Note: indicates the party did not participate in election in the year indicated.
Sources: Hanlon (2014l, p. 2); Vines (2013, p. 384)
Table 3 Number of parliamentary seats secured in Mozambique, 19942014
Political party 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014
FRELIMO 129 133 160 191 144
RENAMO 117 112 90 51 89
UD 9
MDM 8 17
Note: indicates the party did not participate in election in the year indicated.
Sources: Hanlon (2014j, p. 3); Vines (2013, p. 384)
Dhlakama effectively withdrew from national politics, firstly by leaving

the capital city of Maputo for Nampula, a provincial capital in the north of
Mozambique, and then by moving to Saturnjira, close to the former guerrilla
headquarters in Gorongosa District, Sofala Province (Vines, 2013, pp. 38687).
This retreat from participation in national, parliamentary politics, with the
resulting loss of feedback on the impact of Dhlakamas decisions, probably

paved the way for what would become an armed confrontation between
RENAMO and the Government of Mozambique in 2013 and 2014.
An electoral turning point for RENAMO occurred in 1999 (see Tables
13), when FRELIMO supporters, among others, expressed their suspicion
concerning the presidential vote.12 Accordingly FRELIMO adopted a more
aggressive approach to the elections, with some irregularities in the 1999
and 2004 elections (Vines, 2013, p. 383). In response RENAMO staged pro-
tests throughout Mozambique in 1999, on grounds of alleged electoral fraud.
Elections, however, were only one of the challenges RENAMO faced. The
partys difficulty integrating into the civil service at the local level had effec-
tively deprived it of its patronage, as it refused to allow qualified government
teachers and health personnel to come into its zones (Manning, 1998, p. 185;
cited in Vines, 2013, p. 384).
Although it received support from the Mozambican state, RENAMO did
not manage it correctly and between 1999 and 2004, about half of the funds
went unaccounted for (Vines, 2013, p. 384). The internal organization of the
party was poor and as it lost seats, state funding declined. The party reacted
by organizing various protests, generally regarding the elections. It also
tended to obstruct parliament or to withdraw decisions from it, usually seek-
ing high-level bilateral negotiations instead. Ineffectiveness in the party gen-
erated internal divisions, with members defecting to create new parties, the
most successful of which was the Movimento Democrtico de Moambique
(Democratic Movement of Mozambique, MDM) (see Table 3). According to
Vines, FRELIMO capitalised on these divisions (2013, p. 385).
Since the return to armed violence in 2013 and as of mid-2015, RENAMO
fared much better in elections and there was a higher voter turnout in 2014
than in the previous two elections (Hanlon, 2014j, p. 2). This may have raised
RENAMOs expectations of further concessions, posing further challenges to
resolving the current conflict. As of mid-2015, despite this apparent reversal
of fortunesincluding an improvement in parliament for MDM and a stable
vote for RENAMOFRELIMO remains dominant.

Disarmament and arms-recovery
programmes
The ONUMOZ period, 199294

When the GPA was signed in 1992, peace was tenuous and considerable
mistrust persisted between the signatories. Neither the government nor
the opposition wished to surrender all their firearms (Rupiya, 1998, p. 16)
and the ONUMOZ disarmament process proved problematic.13 Problems
included the disputes over the selection and location of the AAs, the reluc-
tance of both sides to send their troops to be quartered in the AAs as defined
by ONUMOZ, the handing in of old weapons, and the hiding of arms caches.
Poor conditions in the camps led to mutinies and riots in the first half of 1994
(Vines, 2013, p. 379).
The creation of a new integrated army posed certain difficulties, too. In
response, the Comisso de Cessar Fogo (Cease-fire Commission, CFF) intro-
duced a mechanism with which to verify the existence of undeclared small
arms and light weapons held in either caches or depots. This ultimately led
to the verification of 754 locations, belonging to RENAMO and the govern-
ment, both declared and undeclared (UNSG, 1994, paras. 1213). The verifi-
cation process enabled an assessment of the nature and scope of the arms
caches. However, because ONUMOZ found it impossible to enforce a com-
plete disarmament by the conclusion of its mandate (Rupiya, 1998, p. 16), not
all arms caches were uncovered.14
According to Vines (2013, p. 381), head of ONUMOZ Aldo Ajello, admit-
ted that disarmament was never his priority, as he believed this would
undermine the peace process. Similarly, disarmament appeared to be of
low importance to President Chissano who feared that disarmament-related
incentives would lure away too many of the soldiers in his forces and leave
him exposed (Vines, 1998, p. 200).15 Numerous arms caches had thus not

Head of ONUMOZ Aldo Ajello shakes hands with President of RENAMO Afonso Dhlakama
after his demobilization, Maringu, August 1994. Source: Grant Neuenburg/UN Photo
been destroyed by 1994. The return of war in Angola following its elections
in October 1992 may have affected prevailing attitudes in Mozambique, too.16
Arms caches are by nature contentious, but even more so when elections
are pending and political tensions are running high. Hunguana argues
that, as a political party, RENAMO should have had no armed forces and
that this mistake stems from the incomplete implementation of the GPA
(Hunguana, 2013).
By the end of the ONUMOZ mandate, many caches reported had not been
verified by the CCF and RENAMO had halted all verification of its declared
locations. Despite this, the Mozambican government declined a UN proposal
to maintain a small team in the country in the post-ONUMOZ period, with
which to complete the small arms and light weapons verification process
(Vines, 1998, p. 195). Collections were carried out at both AAs and CTNAs.
Troops were expected to arrive at AAs and hand over their weapons. Because

Table 4 Arms collected by ONUMOZ, 199294
Location, phase, or source of firearms Totals
AAs and CTNAs (government and RENAMO) 104,606
Verification phase 46,193
Other source (e.g. unilaterally demobilized government troops,

56,227
armed, paramilitary, private and irregular troops)
Total 207,026
Note: These figures are based on the Final Report of the Chairman of the CCF; they exclude
6,925 counted items (vehicles and heavy weapons) also collected.
Source: Berman (1996, p. 88)
both sides were reluctant to do this, ONUMOZ had to seek out troops who
were assembled and housed, but not in the official AAs. Troops who were
still expected to participate in disarmament were in the CTNAs. In total, the
UN handed in 180,000 small arms and light weapons to the new Mozam-
bican army, but destroyed only 24,000 (Vines, 1998, p. 194). Table 4 indicates a
higher reported figure of arms submitted, however.
When figures for collections at the AAs and CTNAs include the 6,925
heavier items (i.e. those excluded from total in Table 4), they yield totals of
94,063 for government weapons and 17,468 for RENAMO weapons.
In an attempt to keep the peace process on track, certain creative
responses were developed (Berman, 1996, p. 85). They included a Reintegra-
tion Support Scheme (RSS) of monthly support for two years in cash (Vines,
2013, p. 380) for each demobilized soldier and the verification phase of disar-
mament. While the verification phase recorded substantial additional mili-
tary equipment, the process was noteworthy for highlighting its potential
achievements, rather than its actual results (Berman, 1996, p. 85). The greatest
weakness of ONUMOZ was that it did not effectively prioritize disarmament.

This reluctance may be explained as a result of the hostility shown by
RENAMO towards the UN (Vines, 2013, p. 379).
During its term of activity, ONUMOZ hindered complete disarmament
by effectively allowing RENAMO to maintain its bases in various parts of
the country and by failing to collect all of their small arms. RENAMO in
turn further impeded the process by handing in older models of weapons
and withholding newer ones, this effectively serving as an insurance pol-
icy.17 Their newer weapons were stored in caches that were hidden, some-
times underground. Such a tactic is feasible in a large country with a widely
dispersed population.
Operation Rachel: reducing the arms caches

Within months of the October elections, the Government of Mozambique
embarked on a series of operations in collaboration with the South African
Firearms Investigation Unit of the South African Police Service (SAPS), in an
effort to collect and destroy arms originating in Mozambique (Vines, 1998,
p. 202). These missions were referred to collectively as Operation Rachel.18
To this end, President Nelson Mandela and President Chissano signed an
agreement in March 1995 (Hennop, 2006, p. 24).
South Africa was motivated by its rising armed crime and by intelligence
received by the SAPS who suggested that arms were leaking from Mozam-
bique into South Africa (Vines, 1998, p. 203). With the demise of apartheid,
cooperation between the two governments became smoother. Between 1995
and 2008 there were 28 such missions, including certain sub-operations.
Despite a hiatus between the 27th mission in October 2006 and the 28th in
November 2008, the latter was the second-largest mission conducted to date
(see Table 5).
Because such operations were intelligence-led, neither the intelligence
sources nor the locations of the arms caches were publicly disclosed. This
served to avoid jeopardizing any future arms-recovery operations. Some data
was released by a now defunct South African NGO, SaferAfrica (Hennop, 2006);

Table 5 Arms and ammunition collected under Operation Rachel, 19952008
Year Small arms collected Ammunition collected
1995 1,127 23,153
1996 488 136,639
1997 5,683 3,000,000
1998 4,693 155,314
1999 12,036 3,315,106
2000 2,415 83,276
2001 3,930 486,000
2002 4,930 11,004,018
2003 1,637 2,200,001
2004 2,453 2,100,038
2005 3,189 1,666,808
2006 3,170 300,000
2008 6,124 7,000,000
Total 51,875 31,470,353
Sources: Hennop (2006, p. 25); unpublished data supplied by FOMICRES (2008)
Tables 5 and 6 incorporate data provided confidentially in 2008 by FOMICRES,

otherwise unpublished. Consequently, although most of the data in Table 6
was published by SaferAfrica in 2006, the table also contains data through
to 2008.
Because the data in Table 6 is incomplete, it does not correspond pre-
cisely to Table 5. It does indicate, however, the timeframe of relatively small
missions and their geographical reach. These smaller missions illustrate the
ambitious nature of Operation Rachel, which covered several provinces at
once at times, and which lasted for more than 13 years. The figures provided
illustrate that, while some success was achieved over a long period in recov-
ering those arms not collected during the ONUMOZ mission, large numbers
of arms still went unaccounted for.19

Under Operation Rachel, members of both countries police forces (the SAPS and the PRM)
load the contents of a weapons cache discovered in Northern Mozambique onto a truck;
they include AK-47 automatic rifles and ammunition, RPG-7 rockets and launchers, mortars,
and landmines; August 2003. Source: Halden Krog/EPA

Table 6 Operation Rachel missions: timing, arms collected, and location,
19952008
Title of Number of
Operation Date small arms Provinces as provided
Rachel (OR) collected
OR I November 1995 1,127 Maputo, Gaza
September/October
OR II 488
1996
Maputo, Gaza, Inhambane,

OR III July/August 1997 5,683
Sofala, Manica

OR IV October 1998 4,388
Sofala, Manica, Zambzia
OR V (1) February 1999 446 Gaza
OR V (2) April 1999 4 Gaza
OR V (3) July 1999 998 Maputo
OR V (4) October 1999 866 Maputo, Gaza, Inhambane
OR VI (1) October 1999 151 Maputo, Sofala
OR VI (2) June 2000 362 Maputo, Gaza, Inhambane
OR Ad Hoc 1 July 2000 4 Gaza
OR VI (3) July 2000 180 Gaza
OR Ad Hoc 2 12
OR VI (4) 448
OR VI (5) 381
OR Ad Hoc 3 March 2001 11 Gaza

OR VII (1) May 2001 1,452
Sofala, Manica, Tete
OR Ad Hoc 4 July 2001 72 Maputo
Maputo, Manica, Sofala,

OR VII (2) September 2001 2,495
Tete, Niassa, Cabo Delgado

OR VIII (1) May 2002 2,247 Sofala, Zambzia, Tete,
Nampula, Cabo Delgado
OR VIII (2) 2,566

OR IX August 2003 1,598 Sofala, Zambzia, Tete,
Nampula, Cabo Delgado
Maputo City, Maputo

OR X (1) May 2004 256
Province
Nampula, Cabo Delgado,

Zambzia, Gaza, Tete,
OR X (2) October 2004 1,741
Niassa, Maputo City,
Maputo Province
Nampula, Zambzia, Gaza,

OR XI (1) October 2005 3,174 Tete, Niassa, Maputo,
Sofala, Inhambane
OR XI (2) November 2005 15 Gaza, Maputo
Nampula, Zambzia, Gaza,

OR XII (1) October 2006 3,070
Tete, Niassa, Maputo
OR XII (2) November 2008 6,798
Total 28 operations 41,033
Note: indicates no data is available.

The definition of small arms used in this table excludes items such as ammunition, RPG rockets,
hand grenades, and detonators. With the exception of OR XI (2), in all operations in which
only small quantities of small arms were collected, more than a million rounds of ammunition
and other ordnance were nonetheless collected.
Sources: Hennop (2006, p. 25); unpublished data supplied by FOMICRES (2008)
The delicate nature of arms recovery is evident in that the govern-

ment was willing to collaborate with the Mozambican NGO, Transfor-
mao das Armas em Enxadas (Transformation of Arms into Ploughshares,
TAE) (Faltas and Paes, 2004, p. 30).20 Such cooperation may have come
about because the national police, the Polcia da Repblica de Moam-
bique (Police of the Republic of Mozambique, PRM) was considered not
entirely reliable (Faltas and Paes, 2004, p. 9), and TAE had access to intel-
ligence that was not available to the police. It is noteworthy that in addition
to more than a million rounds of ammunition collected during Operation
Rachel (see note to Table 6 above), TAE collected a further substantial number
of rounds of ammunition.

Transformation of Arms into Ploughshares (TAE)
TAE, which was established by the Christian Council of Mozambique, shared
in (and thereby also became key to) the source of core information on arms
locations in the country. Because most of this intelligence information per-
tained to RENAMO-held arms caches, RENAMO felt singled out.21 Militias
formerly armed by the government had already voluntarily disarmed after
the ceasefire and during the ONUMOZ period, at least in urban areas. While
Table 7 TAE arms collection totals, October 1995 to October 2003
Type of arm collected Total
AKM 4,671
Pistols (various) 754
MG 41
PPX 561
Bazooka 150
Mortars (various) 116
Machine guns PK 77
Machine gun components 32
Mauser 283
G3 186
Semi-automatics 263
Grenade launchers 50
Rifles 520
FBP 109
M20 32
ZG1 5
Total 7,850
Source: Faltas and Paes (2004, p. 18)

small quantities of arms are possibly still to be found in rural areas, the
focus on RENAMO arms caches to the exclusion of other parties was under-
standable under the circumstances.22 This is because non-RENAMO arms
distributed to civilian militias in the countryside were probably scattered,
poorly maintained, and largely not very useful. The RENAMO arms caches
have probably been preserved in oil to prevent them from rusting and are
guarded by those who are loyal to RENAMO. Such arms might be sold into
South Africa or used for political armed conflict in Mozambique.
TAE and Operation Rachel were both established in 1995 and they soon
evolved to work in a complementary manner. However, within the TAE, per-
sonnel from Fora de Inteligncia Comunitria (Community Intelligence
Force, FIC) took the lead as partners of the TAE in the weapons collection
process.23 Although resources were limited, support of civil society for small
arms and light weapons interventions in Mozambique was still consider-
able; this was the first disarmament project ever to have been run by civil
society in the country. TAEs objective was to use a creative and peaceful
disarmament initiative to promote a culture of peace (Faltas and Paes, 2004,
p. 14). From 1995 to 2003, the efforts of TAE had resulted in the collection of
thousands of firearms (see Table 7). The project exchanged firearms collected
for tools or goods needed locally and then destroyed the weapons. In some
cases, local artists created metal sculptures from the remains of firearms.
From 2003 onwards, financial constraints rendered the TAE less active.
These constraints impinged on its ability to provide development incentives,
such as village wells in exchange for arms. Following a critical report (Faltas
and Paes, 2004), TAE was reorganized and its personnel changed, largely
in response to the critical evaluation carried out in 2004.24 TAE responded
positively to the evaluation by improving its record keeping and reducing
its staff by 2006. This staff reduction essentially consisted of the FIC staff
leaving their partnership with TAE and operating independently. Despite
the TAE initially showing resilience and sustaining its relationships with
international partners,25 it has since come to a near standstill.26

International donors who view Mozambique as an example of post-
conflict success (in terms of disarmament and demobilization and the tech-
nical processes therein) have since withdrawn their support. TAE had been a
successful civil society initiative, yet the problems resulting in part from its
response to the critical report led to its effectiveness waning as funding was
reduced. This regrettable outcome indicates that civil society participation in
arms reduction is not merely delicate, but that it is a political process with an
easily jeopardized outcome.
The Mozambican Force for Crime Investigation and Social

Reintegration (FOMICRES)
Prior to the 2006 reorganization of TAE, FIC started recording its collection
figures separately while still in partnership with TAE (see Table 8). As it sep-
arated more formally from TAE in 2006, it was renamed Fora Moambicana
para a Investigao de Crimes e Reinsero Social (Mozambican Force for
Crime Investigation and Social Reintegration, FOMICRES).27
Because of the favourable intelligence links that FOMICRES fostered with
RENAMO,28 it was able to continue with arms collection and remained suc-
cessful. The figures in Table 8 cover the arms collection over the transitional
period of 2003 to 2004.
Summary of disarmament
To calculate the possible scale of the RENAMO arms caches never disclosed,
one can deduct from the estimates of small arms distributed during the con-
flict period the numbers of such arms officially recovered later on. The three
programmes, ONUMOZ, Operation Rachel, and TAE, supplied the figures
informing Table 9, which summarizes the arms collection and destruction
conducted during and after the ONUMOZ mission.

Table 8 FIC/TAE arms collection totals, October 2003 to December 2004
Type of armament Total
AKM 465
Pistols (various) 77
MG 6
PPX 100
Bazooka/RPG 7 34
Mortars (various) 10
Machine guns PK 15
Machine gun parts 8
Mauser 92
G3 43
Semi-automatics 215
Grenade launchers 0
Rifles 48
FBP 49
M20 2
ZG1 0
Total arms collected 1,164
Note: After 2004, FOMICRES took on further peacebuilding activities and crime reduction
in the cities. Its peacebuilding work meant that it retained its sources of information within
RENAMO. (Author interview with Albino Forquilha, Executive Director/CEO, FOMICRES,
Maputo, April 2013.)
Source: unpublished data provided by FOMICRES (2008)

Table 9 Small arms distribution to RENAMO and subsequent collection
in Mozambique
Small arms distributed Number of items
Distributed to RENAMO combatants 48,000105,000
Small arms collected Number of items
Collected by ONUMOZ, 199294 207,026
Collected by Operation Rachel, 19952008 51,875
Collected by TAE, 19952003 7,850
Collected by FOMICRES, 200304 1,164
Total collected 267,915
Note: This table gives the highest published estimate of the total number of firearms
distributed to militias. This may be an overestimate, since the population of Mozambique
in 1980 was 12.1 million, and more than half were under 18. The table indicates the upper
limit of the range of estimates on this number, and therewith, the worst-case scenario.
Sources: Berman (1996, p. 88; see Table 4); Faltas and Paes (2004, p. 18; see Table 7); Leo
(2004, p. 98); unpublished data provided by FOMICRES (2008; see Tables 5 and 8)
Vines estimates that ONUMOZ collected arms totalling 204,000, of which

180,000 were handed over to the new army and 24,000 destroyed (Vines, 1998,
p. 194). Since only 40 per cent of RENAMO locations officially declared were
ultimately visited during the ONUMOZ mandate (Vines, 1998, p. 195), one
may assume that RENAMO handed over only a proportion of their arms, pre-
sumably the most obsolete ones. Assuming that the 24,000 arms destroyed
came predominantly from RENAMO, it is likely that of the 48,000105,000
RENAMO arms not collected during the ONUMOZ period, between 24,000
and 81,000 remained hidden in their original caches. This resulting estimate
is derived from subtracting 24,000 from the estimate of total arms originally
distributed (see Table 9).
The sum of the TAE, FOMICRES, and Operation Rachel collection fig-
ures indicates that 60,889 arms were collected after the ONUMOZ period.
This in turn suggests that as many as 20,111 arms (81,000 minus 60,889) may

still be in the possession of RENAMO. Even if the numbers of arms once
distributed to militias and RENAMO are overestimated, considerable hid-
den caches appear to linger on in the country. Neither the locations of arms
collection points nor the caches themselves have been made public. TAE and
Operation Rachel were politically sensitive programmes and therefore reli-
ant upon intelligence regarding specific caches, sometimes at short notice.
Operation Rachel provided its data regarding location figures by province
only, not by specific location (see Table 6).
Further details on locations of arms caches

Information obtained by the author during fieldwork in 2014 makes it pos-
sible to infer district locations of the largest arms caches under RENAMO
control.29 The five districts with the largest known caches all lie in Sofala
Province: Maringu, Gorongosa, Nhamatanda, Buzi, and Chibavava (see
Map 2). At times, the town of Maringu, in Maringu District, has functioned
as Dhlakamas headquarters.30
On his visits to RENAMO sites over the years, Albino Forquilha, director
of FOMICRES, reports having seen anti-aircraft weapons.31 This would imply
that RENAMO has a greater military capacity and owns more sophisticated
weaponry than is generally assumed. For example, recalling his meeting
with Dhlakama in Nampula in September 2010, Vines described Dhlakamas
guard of honour as being poorly dressed and brandishing old arms (Vines,
2013, p. 392). This seems to suggest limited resources. Similarly, Paul Fauvet,
a British journalist based in Mozambique, has expressed the view that
RENAMO may have hundreds of troops in the centre of the country, rather
than thousands.32 Despite such impressions, evidence nevertheless suggests
that large arms caches in Sofala Province have been and are still success-
fully hidden by RENAMO for at least 20 years. In addition, it seems likely
that some recent armed attacks in 2013 and 2014 in Mozambique have been
wrongly attributed to RENAMO,33 possibly as a cover for criminal activity.

Map 2 Largest RENAMO arms caches in Sofala Province
MALAWI
Chemba
ZAMBZIA
Ma
r ing
Caia
u
M O Z A M B I Q U E
ZIMBABWE
Ma
Ch e
Go
rim
rro
ron
go
m
m
u
go
e
MANICA
sa
Muanza
Nh
SOFALA l
ne
am
n
ha
at
da
an
Dondo C
bi
q ue
Beira
Buzi
am
Ch
oz
0 km 100
M
ib
av
ava
District with RENAMO

arms caches
(Sofala Province)
Machanga International
boundary
Province boundary
District boundary
INHAMBANE
Since neither Operation Rachel nor any subsequent mission has collected
arms from the substantial caches to be found in the five Sofala Districts, even
though Sofala Province was often listed when large numbers of arms were
collected (see Table 6), the scale of these caches cannot be gauged. Never-
theless, according to Fauvet, the presence of reportedly large caches shows
thatwhatever tensions persist between the neglected RENAMO military
in the countryside and the political leadership in the citiesthe military
has remained fundamentally loyal in protecting the locations of their arms
caches.34

The intelligence sources that fed Operation Rachel and TAE are unlikely
to have come from the SAPS. They were more likely to have been of Mozam-
bican origins, especially those associated with FOMICRES.35 Decades earlier,
in 1981, the intelligence functions of the SAPS had been transferred to the
South African Defence Force (SADF), at least initially (Sanders, 2006, p. 150),
and so consequently the SAPS intelligence contacts were probably to all
intents and purposes no longer reliable.
Arms recovery operations subsequently carried out in collaboration
between Mozambique and South Africa, such as Operation Rachel, focused
primarily on collecting weapons found in RENAMO caches. This is borne
out by the evidence that at times Operation Rachel staff also seized radio
and other telecommunications equipment, which could only have belonged
to RENAMO.36 It is known that unlike other parties, such as FRELIMO and
civilian militias, RENAMO owned sophisticated radio equipment.
The fact that such equipment was available to RENAMO implied that
RENAMO had the capability rapidly to mobilize and coordinate its forces
for any renewed armed conflict. Dhlakama mentioned on occasion that he
had the means available to mobilize soldiers, should he so wish. For exam-
ple, in February 2007 he claimed that in the Zambzia Province alone he
could mobilize 5,000 soldiers; the implication being that sufficient weapons
to equip them were hidden, but available (Canal de Moambique, 2007). In 2009,
researcher Nikkei Wiegink was informed by a RENAMO source that it had
3,000 former combatants in Maringu District, Sofala Province.37 This consti-
tutes a considerable number of potential combatants within a single district,
and indicates that the hidden arms in the same district would have been
readily usable by a substantial force, presumably at fairly short notice.

Prevailing concerns
RENAMO split
In May 2009, Dhlakama moved to the northern city of Nampula, effectively
demonstrating his disconnection from parliamentary politics, yet claiming
he would thus be closer to the electorate (Vines, 2013, p. 386). His move north
was prior to the national elections of October 2009 and may have stemmed
from the establishing of two breakaway parties, the Partido para a Paz,
Democracia e Desenvolvimento (Party for Peace, Democracy and Develop-
ment, PDD) in 2004 and the MDM in March 2009. The MDM held a strong
base in Beira, the second-largest city in Mozambique, which might otherwise
be suitable political territory for RENAMO.
Following alleged attempts in December 2011 and April 2012 to repair
the situation through meetings with the new President Armando Guebuza,
Dhlakama left Nampula in October 2012 for Saturnjira, Gorongosa, situ-
ated near the former guerrilla base of Casa Banana. He later mentioned that
he was training up his supporters for renewed conflict (Vines, 2013, p. 387).
Sofala was the RENAMO heartland and held a concentration of former
combatants, as supported by evidence on the main arms caches (see Map 2).
A core group of older former combatants was living at Saturnjira and
Dhlakama had maintained links with his mid-level commanders.
In late 2012, Dhlakama agreed to talks between the government and
RENAMO in Maputo, although there was little progress from December
2012 onwards. Talks were stalled as the government moved its armed forces
to near Saturnjira early in April 2013, doubtless causing tensions to rise
(Littlejohn, 2013). In early April 2013, open conflict broke out between gov-
ernment forces and RENAMO forces in this region (Vines, 2013, p. 287).38
Thereafter political developments were intertwined with the conflict to
some extent.

Despite politics being overshadowed by violence, for a time the violence
itself took place within a fairly contained and sparsely populated geographi-
cal area. This factor, combined with the determination of other political
parties (including FRELIMO) to carry on with local and national elections,
suggests that the effect of the violence on the elections was also limited. This
weakened RENAMO in its negotiations. Yet when violence became more
widespread in January 2014, the government embarked on more serious
negotiations.
In the presidential elections of October 2014, FRELIMO candidate Filipe
Nyusi won 57 per cent of the vote and Dhlakama came second with 37 per
cent. FRELIMO also secured a majority of parliamentary seats (Hanlon,
2014j, pp. 1, 3). The MDM, which had formerly split from RENAMO, won
6 per cent of the presidential votes. According to Hanlon (2014j, p. 1) the
election was again overshadowed by misconduct and unfairness, and there
were problems in at least 12% of polling stations. While such electoral
difficulties hindered national reconciliation, they point to a remarkable resil-
ience in the political support of RENAMOdespite it having boycotted the
election process in 2013 (Hanlon, 2014j, p. 4) and Dhlakama refusing to leave
his headquarters for a part of 2014. The electorate seemingly did not wholly
blame RENAMO for the recent violence. What else might have prompted
that violence?
Violence of 201314
In early April 2013, nine people were killed in a confrontation between
RENAMO supporters and the government in Muxngu, Sofala Province
(Vines, 2013, p. 387). The context for this confrontation was police suspicion
concerning Dhlakamas move to Saturnjira, no doubt exacerbated by his
claims of training military personnel. FRELIMO had sent a large number
of the Fora de Interveno Rpida (Rapid Intervention Force, FIR), a para-
military police force reporting to the Ministry of the Interior) in an attempt
to physically surround his base. Tensions had been mounting for several

Local civilians flee after gunmen attacked a local police station in Maringu, 22 October
2013. Source: Andre Catueira/EPA
months. Dhlakama had taken up residence on top of a mountain, reachable

only by a winding road, and around which several villages were scattered.
It was nigh impossible for a large military force to approach the location
undetected by villagers who would then alert others. Accordingly, although
an attempt by the FIR to arrest Dhlakama on the grounds of being in posses-
sion of illegal arms failed, not far away about 15 RENAMO members were
successfully arrested and held in a police station on 4 April 2013 (Vines, 2013,
p. 387). The next day the police station was subject to a retaliatory attack in
which the RENAMO members held captive were rescued, allegedly by fellow
RENAMO forces (Littlejohn, 2013).
In an interview Dhlakama claimed that RENAMO generals had threat-
ened to assassinate him if he did not order the rescue operation attack on the
police station. Vines believes this claim to be untrue. Rather he maintains it
is more likely that he realized that he [Dhlakama] had admitted to the press
that he had instigated a crime (Vines, 2013, p. 387).

A fortnight later, on 18 April, two members of parliament from RENAMO
paid a visit to Dhlakama. They were arrested, allegedly without a warrant,
and jailed overnight by the PRM. One of the pair was the Secretary-General
of RENAMO, Ossufo Momade. According to an official account broadcast on
the radio, the pair had refused to yield to a police road block and, when PRM
officers attempted to halt them, the former had brandished arms (Littlejohn,
2013). This confrontation, the media coverage it garnered, and its political
repercussions set in motion a series of events which were felt well into 2014.
By July 2013, mediators employed to broker the difficulties and to help clar-
ify RENAMOs demands suggested the government might make certain
concessions (Hanlon, 2013a, p. 1). Dhlakama responded:
[F]our issues needed to be resolved: electoral law, making the civil service
non-party, issues around the military, and finally a fairer share of the wealth
of Mozambique (Hanlon, 2013a, p. 2).
At the same time, road traffic on the N1, the main road running north to
south through Mozambique and which passes through Sofala Province in
the vicinity of significant RENAMO-held arms caches, was down by 30 per
cent. This implies that people were afraid to travel in the area. Rail traffic was
also said to be suffering enormous losses (Hanlon, 2013a, p. 2), presumably
because trains were not running for fear of assault. Reports of ongoing
intransigence on both sides in August 2013 prevailed, with a series of con-
flicts ensuing. RENAMO carried out a raid on a railway station in Sofala
Province on 12 October, a military confrontation took place on 21 October
(Hanlon, 2013b, p. 1), and government forces attacked RENAMO headquarters
in the same month.
By 27 October 2013, a RENAMO member of parliament had been killed
in Saturnjira and confrontations on the N1 had left one person dead and
ten injured (Hanlon, 2013c, pp. 12). On 30 October, RENAMO started to
reoccupy formerly abandoned bases in Nampula Province. These bases were
then subject to military action by government forces. The Maringu base

in Sofala was captured by government forces, while RENAMO again con-
ducted attacks on the N1 road.
When RENAMO refused to attend talks, the search for intermediaries
resumed (Hanlon, 2013d, pp. 12). By 7 November, RENAMO had launched a
counter-attack in Sofala Province, killing eight soldiers and raiding a health
post (Hanlon, 2013e). By 15 November, further raids by RENAMO had taken
place in Sofala and Nampula, and Dhlakama proposed his core terms for
peace talks.39 His terms were: government troops were to withdraw to their
former positions, national and international mediators would be agreed
upon, and local elections would be postponed (Hanlon, 2013f, p. 1).
In January 2014, RENAMO attended talks in Maputo, after agreeing with
the government on appointing two observers or mediators to facilitate nego-
tiations. Meanwhile, geographically widespread fighting continued, with
banks warning the media of the economic impact of the violence (Hanlon,
2014a, pp. 14). By March 2014, it was evident that both the conflict and the
talks were continuing simultaneously. A pivotal matter of the talks was how
RENAMO officers and soldiers might be integrated into the national army
(Hanlon, 2014b, p. 1). Related negotiations prevailed for several months and
different issues were tackled with international mediators against the back-
drop of periodic conflict.
In early April, there was a de facto government acceptance that RENAMO
could keep its soldiers as operational forces until after the election
(Hanlon, 2014c, p. 1). Despite this concession, by 8 May, after instigating
further raids on the N1 road, RENAMO unilaterally announced a ceasefire
(Hanlon, 2014d, p. 1). By 9 May, Dhlakama had registered his candidacy for
the presidential elections set for October 2014 (Hanlon, 2014e, p. 2). Toward
the end of May, further battles took place in the Gorongosa area (Hanlon,
2014f, p. 1). Each party blamed the other. By June, Dhlakama was threatening
to divide the country and verbally criticizing religious leaders, one of whom
was a former mediator (Hanlon, 2014g, p. 3). By July, assaults on the road had
ceased and the nomination papers for Dhlakamas presidential candidacy
had been signed and submitted (Hanlon, 2014h, p. 1). By early September,
Dhlakama and Guebueza convened, the presidential election campaign was

confirmed, and negotiations regarding the army and other demands put
forward by RENAMO continued (Hanlon, 2014i, p. 1).
In talks between RENAMO and FRELIMO, an outstanding matter was
the future recognition of political party representation within the national
armed forces (Hanlon, 2014k, p. 1).40 In late 2014, both sides were disputing
access to the RENAMO-held area of Gorongosa, but by July 2015 the scene
of conflict had moved to a RENAMO military base near Zobue, not far from
Moatize, in Tete Province (Hanlon, 2015). Claiming that he won the recent
presidential election, Dhlakama has been demanding a caretaker govern-
ment in which Filipe Nyusi does not function as president, and a restructur-
ing of the military, which is unlikely to occur. As Hanlon (2014k, p. 2) writes,
the only thing which can be predicted is months of negotiation and confron-
tation, probably including military action. In late 2014, RENAMO had still
refused to demobilize before all issues were settled (Hanlon, 2014k, p. 1). As
of mid-2015, the outcome of these lengthy negotiations, including on politi-
cal parity within the armed forces, is unknown: they were stalled in late July
2015 and fighting continued (Hanlon, 2015).
FRELIMOs difficulty in governing

As the ruling party, FRELIMO faces mounting problems of governance,
apparent in the strikes and riots occurring across the country regarding
wages, food, water, and electricity. Government capacity to solve problems
may be further undermined if revenues decline, as happens when oil and
gas prices drop. Revenues from mineral exports are linked to government
income, too. Coal exports have declined rapidly; in 2014, a large Brazilian
mining company suffered considerable losses in the Moatize coal mine in
Tete Province.41 These losses can be attributed to market conditions in the
global economy as much as they can to the disruption of transport triggered
by RENAMO-related conflict.
Mozambican election results themselves indicate that the legitimacy of
FRELIMO is weakening, an echo of which is felt in the trouble the PRM faces
in maintaining law and personal security. Longstanding public mistrust

toward the PRM can explain why TAE and FOMICRES acted as sources of
intelligence during Operation Rachel, instead of the police; this mistrust was
a matter of ongoing press reporting in 2007 and intermittently has been a
matter of media debate since then. In early 2015, the lack of confidence in the
PRM made front-page news. News coverage addressed the way police han-
dled demonstrations triggered by the assassination of a prominent lawyer
who favoured constitutional change (lvaro, 2015, pp. 14).
Police and armed forces: difficulties in upholding the law

The PRM, whether or not in collaboration with the FIR, has displayed organ-
izational weakness for some years. The Mozambican press has published
articles accusing certain members of the PRM of being involved with organ-
ized crime gangs, with considerable criticism from the press from September
2006 to September 2007 (Littlejohn, 2008). Although overall performance may
have improved since the subsequent removal of former Minister of the Inte-
rior, Jose Pacheco, public criticism remains (Hanlon, 2013e).
The FIR is effectively a paramilitary force, which adopted an active
role in the conflict of April 2013. Consequently, although Mozambique
has low levels of violent crime compared to certain neighbours, such as
South Africa, crime levels have little to do with the PRM. For example,
a series of criminal kidnappings occurred in the 20132014 conflict, and
several months passed before it came to an end. More importantly, when the
PRM plays a role in suppressing public strikes or demonstrations, it is no
longer seen as impartial.
Surveys conducted by FOMICRES reveal that rates of violence, including
armed violence, are increasing in Mozambique. Key contributing factors are
growing unemployment and, with it, the cost of living.42 Economic growth has
largely failed to create new jobs. One feature of public violence is the return
of lixamento (lynching), a practice in which an alleged criminal is caught by a
group of civilians and burnt to death; it comes into play as mob justice when
law enforcement, especially that of the PRM, is perceived to be ineffective.
Low tax revenues for government translate into limited expenditure
on its armed forces. Consequently the Government of Mozambique has

struggled to develop and implement a long-term strategy for its armed
forces. Numbers of armed forces personnel have been substantially reduced
and, although training facilities exist, little staff or doctrinal reorganization
has occurred (Macaringue, 2003, p. 144). Despite fairly dramatic changes
in the countrys economic structure and performance since the departure of
ONUMOZ, the military response has been passiveundertaking limited
training or re-equipment.43 With the future of the army as one of the key
contentious matters between RENAMO and FRELIMO, the stagnation of
government policy highlights the difficulties FRELIMO faces.
At the time of the incident at Saturnjira that set off open conflict on
3 April 2013, it was rumoured that the FIR members ostensibly involved in
this incident were in fact members of Foras Armadas de Defesa de Moam-
bique (Armed Forces for the Defence of Mozambique, FADM), an armed
force led by General Paulino Macaringue. General Macaringue denied this
in a public statement on 7 April 2013. The general argued that the involve-
ment of the FADM would have constituted the start of another civil war,
whereas the involvement of the FIR was a civil matter (relating to a sus-
pected crime, namely the possession of illegal arms).44 This claim aligned
with Macaringues earlier views, expressed before he took charge of FADM
(Macaringue, 2003, pp. 14850), which indicated that at this time he was
not avoiding involvement in a politically charged situation, but consciously
adhering to the Constitution for reasons he had previously elaborated. He
proposed that the role of armed forces be redefined, as they had been in
some other countries following the post-apartheid changes of the 1990s in
southern Africa (Macaringue, 2003). Soon after the armed incident in April
2013, however, he was effectively removed from his position, although tech-
nically his contract was not renewed.45
Aside from RENAMOs demand for what amounts to equal distribution
of personnel from each political party within the armed forces, a failure
to address the future of the forces has left them much reduced since 1992
(Macaringue, 2003, p. 142). Little has changed in their doctrine or organiza-
tion. New thinking on this topic is called for in the FRELIMORENAMO
negotiations.

Conclusions
ONUMOZs missed opportunity on disarmament

ONUMOZ missed a vital opportunity to disarm RENAMO completelya
stance supported by data in the Tables of this Working Paper, as well as the
statements of former head of ONUMOZ, Aldo Ajello, and former President
Chissano. This failure is much graver than perceived at the time of the mis-
sion, as RENAMO has ultimately retained much larger caches of arms than
was previously thought. Because of the events in Angola, which had resulted
in a return to war, ONUMOZ and FRELIMO both felt that insisting on full
disarmament would jeopardize the entire peace process. The matter since
resurfaced, bearing adverse effects on the economy and on political life, not
to mention potential loss of life. Because trust in government has declined
since the ONUMOZ period, pursuing disarmament in the future will be
extremely challenging. Dhlakamas guerrilla mentality, seeking to strike
bargains at a personal level with the leadership of FRELIMO outside insti-
tutional frameworks such as the Parliament or the National Electoral Coun-
cil, has perpetuated his reliance on armed forces. The government response
has been ineffective, of which the enduring conflict that started in 2013 is a
consequence.
Operation Rachel and post-conflict arms recovery

The efforts to recover and destroy arms carried out by Operation Rachel,
TAE, and FOMICRES have eliminated only a small percentage of the war-
time weapons (see Tables 5 to 8). Even with incomplete estimates, it is certain
that very large stockpiles existed and that disarmament had a limited effect
on them. This failure set the scene for the conflict of 201315, which may flare
up in future regarding elections and faltering negotiations. The possession

Demobilized soldiers, in Sofala, January 1994. Source: Srgio Santimano/UN Photo

of substantial hidden arms caches meant that recourse to violence could be
sustained as a realistic possibility within the RENAMO leadership. Weapons
hidden in arms caches are predominantly in Sofala Province and not in cir-
culation per se (see Map 2). Thus although some RENAMO bases have been
held by government forces, weapons remain undiscovered.
Post-war initiatives, such as Operation Rachel and TAE, have demon-
strated that when ongoing efforts are not made to detect and recover arms
held in secret caches, conflict may flare up again shortly. Such efforts, and
these poorly supported by the international community, contain impor-
tant lessons regarding community involvement and cooperative relations
between state and civil society.
DDR and integration of the two armies

The difficulties of integrating FRELIMO and RENAMO forces within a single
army, the FADM, have been highlighted by the resurgence of open conflict.
Not all armed force members were fully in favour of disarmament, demo-
bilization, and reintegration (DDR). Many members of the former FRELIMO
army, objecting to their living conditions at that time, did not wish to remain
there in the AAs. Those that did remain in the army almost certainly felt
that they were better trained than those from the RENAMO force, and thus
that they were more eligible for promotion. More importantly, although
RENAMO did contribute forces to the new army (FADM), they may have
been marginalized. Certain officers loyal to FRELIMO almost certainly
feared that the RENAMO intake would form the core of an armed coup
against the government.
The challenge of addressing DDR in other or future UN or African Union
peacekeeping missions is evident from the difficult experience described in
this Working Paper. The involvement of civil society in disarmament after
the ONUMOZ period shows that DDR is not a purely technical process; it
draws upon active participation from both parties to the conflict, and can
also include participation from civil society in a post-conflict period. Much

of RENAMOs arms were collected during the ONUMOZ period, and many
RENAMO personnel were integrated into the new army, the FADM. One of
the most senior figures in the FADM at the time of the outbreak of conflict in
2013 was formerly in RENAMO. Although the conflict was not yet resolved
in mid-2015, it is clear that it is limited mainly to Sofala Province, with an
overspill into a nearby part of Tete Province. The geographical limits on this
conflict correspond to the areas where the largest RENAMO arms caches
were hidden.
Although many people are still loyal to RENAMO in this part of Mozam-
bique, others have found new lives within the civilian economy. Primarily
for this reason, RENAMO is no longer influential enough to initiate conflict
on a national scale again, in contrast to the prevailing, geographically lim-
ited conflict (centred on Sofala Province), which has been running from 2013
to mid-2015. This inability to ignite nationwide conflict is ultimately an indi-
cator of the relative success of DDR conducted during the ONUMOZ period,
despite the weaknesses and obstacles mentioned in this Working Paper.
It indicates that DDR was not unsuccessful per se; it was merely incom-
plete. Completing it will require further political commitment within
Mozambique.

Endnotes
1 The Mozambique National Resistance (MNR), as it was originally referred to by the Rhode-
sian security services, was renamed Resistncia Nacional Moambicana (Mozambican
National Resistance, RENAMO) once taken over by the apartheid-era South African military
intelligence (Vines, 2013, p. 376).
2 More specifically, the United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ) was estab-
lished by UN Security Council Resolution 797, which was adopted in December 1992
(UNSC, 1992b).
3 Nungwe, like most locations of RENAMO bases, is generally not to be found on maps. It
is situated in the Lebombo mountains, north of Ressano Garcia, and about 1.5 km from
the South African border. When Mozambican forces tried to seize Nungwe in 1992, the
South African Defence Force (SADF) may have used chemical weapons to drive them off.
Paul Fauvet, journalist and editor of the English service of Agncia de Informao de
Moambique (Mozambique News Agency, AIM), interviewed soldiers who survived this
attack, and a cautious UN report (UNSC, 1992a, p. 11) confirmed that their symptoms were
consistent with exposure to a chemical agent. This was the only alleged use of chemical
weapons during the Mozambican war with RENAMO. (Author correspondence with Paul
Fauvet, journalist and editor, AIM, Maputo, 5 February 2015.)
4 The services of at least one independent South African arms supplierwho reported using
a Douglas DC3 aeroplane in Manica and Sofala Provinces to the south of the Beira Corridor
from late 1988 onwardswere confirmed by the supplier himself in an author interview. By
then, the interviewee had ceased to supply arms but had been employed by the UN to help
plan food aid to RENAMO, because he knew the locations of rebel camps. (Author inter-
view with an anonymous South African arms supplier, Manica Province, 30 March 1993.)
5 Even with intense fighting in the far south of Mozambique, not far from the capital city of
Maputo, the logistical problems of supplying the government troops continued. (Author
interview with a soldier of the Foras Populares de Libertao de Moambique (Peoples
Forces for the Liberation of Mozambique, FPLM), Maputo Province, September 1991.)
6 This displacement was observed by a joint World Food Programme (WFP)/Food and
Agriculture Organization (FAO) Food and Crop Assessment Mission to Angola and
Mozambique held in March 1993. The mission, in which the author participated, involved
participants visiting various RENAMO bases in Manica and Sofala Provinces, down to
the south of the Beira Corridor, in order to arrange food aid for RENAMO. From 1990 to
1992, there were very clear traces of a reduction in the cultivated areas of RENAMO farms,
which interviewees ascribed to the drought. The mission arranged a visit to refugee camps
along the Beira Corridor, too. (Author interviews with RENAMO personnel in bases in
Manica and Sofala, south of the Beira Corridor, March 1993.)

7 Author correspondence with Paul Fauvet, journalist and editor, AIM, Maputo, 5 February
2015.
8 The army was named the Foras Armadas de Defesa de Moambique (FADM). The prob-
lems of integrating troops into this army continued in some respects until the present day.
9 Author interviews with Angolans and foreign members of the National Electoral Council,
in Luanda, July 1992.
10 Author interviews in March 1993 with British citizens who were living in Mozambique at
the time of the interview.
11 Author interview with an anonymous South African, a former small arms supplier who
piloted a helicopter in Chimoio, Manica Province, during the WFP/FAO mission of 30
March 1993.
12 Confidential communication with author, 1999.
13 For further details, see Vines (2013, pp. 37882).
14 For a further critique on the weaknesses of the ONUMOZ mission, see Gamba (1996, pp.
xvxx).
15 Indeed, in the early 1990s the Southern African Conference of Bishops sought to persuade
both parties who subsequently signed the GPA to surrender arms via an initiative called
Food for Guns, envisaged as a confidence-building measure to take place prior to a full
peace agreement. The effort was reportedly vetoed by President Chissano, who allegedly
declined it fearing that if too many of his soldiers took part, his negotiating position would
be weakened. (Confidential communication with the author, 1992.)
16 For an assessment of the impact of the developments in Angola upon UN thinking regard-
ing Mozambique, see Berman (1996, pp. 3139).
17 Interview evidence of RENAMOs tactics and details of the difficulties experienced by
ONUMOZ appear in Vines (1998, pp. 19293).
18 For an account of the challenges inherent to arms collection and a description of coopera-
tion between the two countries pertaining to Operation Rachel, carried out from March
1995 to August 1997, see Vines (1998, pp. 197205).
19 Vines refers to an Interpol estimate that 1.5 million AK-47s were distributed to the civilian
population during the war (Vines, 1998, p. 192).
20 The name of the NGO, Transformao das Armas em Enxadas (meaning Transformation
of Arms into Ploughshares) stems from the biblical phrase swords into ploughshares
and implies the exchanging of arms for development tools (Faltas and Paes, 2004, p. 7).
21 Author interview with Albino Forquilha, Director of Fora Moambicana para a Investiga-
o de Crimes e Reinsero Social (Mozambican Force for Crime Investigation and Social
Reintegration, FOMICRES), Maputo, 17 October 2007.
22 Author interview with a senior staff member of TAE, Maputo, October 2007.
23 FIC was established in 1995. See FOMICRES (n.d.a).
26 In June 2014, its offices had apparently been closed when the author attempted to visit.

27 Author interviews with TAE and FOMICRES, and a separate focus group discussion with
TAE, the Conselho Cristo de Moambique (Christian Council of Mozambique, CCM),
and the Centre of Public Integrity, held in Maputo, 24 October 2007. FOMICRES was for-
mally established on 25 May 2006. See FOMICRES (n.d.b). In 2012 FOMICRES changed its
designation to Promoo da Paz, Preveno do Crime e Reinsero Social (unofficially
translated as: Promotion of Peace, Crime Prevention and Social Reintegration), but the
NGO still refers to itself by the acronym FOMICRES.
28 That most of the permanent staff members at FOMICRES were former members of
RENAMO was mentioned to the author at a group meeting with FOMICRES, held in
Maputo, 18 April 2013. Of the four other NGOs invited, only BRAVIM, a humanitarian
mine action NGO, attended this meeting.
29 Author interview with Albino Forquilha, Executive Director/CEO, FOMICRES, Maputo,
17 June 2014.
17 June 2014. The director has paid numerous visits to RENAMO areas over the years.
17 June 2014.
32 Author interview with Paul Fauvet, journalist and editor, AIM, Maputo, 18 June 2014.
35 This inference is based on author interviews with FOMICRES staff between 2007 and 2014,
including a group interview on 18 April 2013, in Maputo.
36 Author interview with senior staff member, TAE, Maputo, 17 October 2007.
37 RENAMO has no register of its former combatants and may exaggerate its numbers
(author communication with researcher Nikkei Wiegink, March 2015). For an anthropo-
logical account of combatant attitudes to returning home, see Wiegink (2013).
38 This attack on the police station was a response to the capture or arrest of RENAMO
personnel on 3 April 2013 (Littlejohn, 2013).
39 Although the precise timing is unknown, according to Forquilha, when Dhlakama con-
tacted his former foreign supporters, they indicated they were no longer willing to provide
support. (Author interview with Albino Forquilha, Executive Director/CEO, FOMICRES,
Maputo, 17 June 2014.)
40 RENAMOs goal has been an explicit recognition of one-for-one parity, such that, for
example, if a military commander came from FRELIMO, his deputy should come from
RENAMO. FRELIMOs goal has been merit-based promotion only, as opposed to the polit-
icization of career paths in the armed forces.
19 April 2013.
43 Author interview with member of the Mozambican navy, Abuja, Nigeria, March 2005.
19 April 2013.

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21

A Working Paper of the Small Arms Survey

Published in Switzerland by the Small Arms Survey

Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and Development

First published in September 2015

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored

Small Arms Survey

Copy-edited by Nina Behrman and Estelle Jobson

2 Small Arms Survey Working Paper 21

The Small Arms Survey is a global centre of excellence whose mandate is to

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Littlejohn Secret Stockpiles3

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4 Small Arms Survey Working Paper 21

List of maps and tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Littlejohn Secret Stockpiles5

6 Small Arms Survey Working Paper 21

2 Largest RENAMO arms caches in Sofala Province . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

1 Presidential elections in Mozambique, 19942014

2 Parliamentary elections in Mozambique, 19942014

3 Number of parliamentary seats secured

4 Arms collected by ONUMOZ, 199294 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

5 Arms and ammunition collected under Operation Rachel,

6 Operation Rachel missions: timing, arms collected,

7 TAE arms collection totals, October 1995 to October 2003 . . . . . . . . . . . 30

8 FIC/TAE arms collection totals, October 2003

9 Small arms distribution to RENAMO and subsequent

Littlejohn Secret Stockpiles7

AAs reas de assembleia (Assembly Areas)

8 Small Arms Survey Working Paper 21

Littlejohn Secret Stockpiles9

Gary Littlejohn is a former member of the editorial boards of the journals

10 Small Arms Survey Working Paper 21

The author is indebted to Mozambican friends and colleagues who have

Littlejohn Secret Stockpiles11

12 Small Arms Survey Working Paper 21

Littlejohn Secret Stockpiles13

14 Small Arms Survey Working Paper 21

The peace process, 198894

According to the Nkomati Accord of 1984, South Africa agreed to stop

Littlejohn Secret Stockpiles15

16 Small Arms Survey Working Paper 21

Demobilization proceeded fairly smoothly, owing to a desire of many

Littlejohn Secret Stockpiles17

RENAMOs development as a political party

18 Small Arms Survey Working Paper 21

Table 1 Presidential elections in Mozambique, 19942014 (% of vote secured)

Political candidate, party represented 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014

Joaquim Chissano, FRELIMO 53.4 52.4

Armando Guebuza, FRELIMO 63.6 75.0

Filipe Nyusi, FRELIMO 57.0

Afonso Dhlakama, RENAMO 33.7 47.7 31.7 16.4 36.6

Daviz Simango, MDM 9 6.4

Littlejohn Secret Stockpiles19

Political party 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014