ROMMEL C.

ARNADO, Petitioner,
v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND FLORANTE CAPITAN, Respondents.
18 August 2015

TOPIC: Use of a Foreign Passport

DOCTRINE AND PROVISIONS

RA No. 9225

DEL CASTILLO, J:

FACTS
Petitioner Arnado is a natural-born Filipino citizen who was naturalized as citizen of the US.
Subsequently, Arnado applied for repatriation under Republic Act No. 92255 before the Consul
General of the Philippines in San Franciso, USA.
July 10, 2008: He took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and an Order of
Approval of Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition was issued in his favor.
April 3, 2009: Arnado executed an Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship.
November 30, 2009: Arnado filed his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the mayoralty post of
Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte for the May 10, 2010 national and local elections.
Linog C. Balua, another mayoralty candidate, filed a petition to disqualify Arnado on the ground,
among others, that Arnado remained a US citizen because he continued to use his US passport for
entry to and exit from the Philippines after executing aforesaid Affidavit of Renunciation.
While Balua's petition remained pending, the May 10, 2010 elections proceeded. Arnado was
proclaimed the winning candidate.
October 5, 2010: The Comelec First Division issued a Resolution holding that Arnado's continued
use of his US passport effectively negated his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation. The Comelec
First Division accordingly nullified his proclamation and held that the rule on succession 1 should be
followed. Arnado moved for reconsideration, while Casan Macode Maquiling, the candidate with the
second highest number of votes, argued that the Comelec First Division erred in applying the rule
on succession.
February 2, 2011: The Comelec En Banc rendered a Resolution reversing the ruling of the Comelec
First Division. The Comelec En Banc found merit in Arnado's explanation that he continued to use
his US passport because he did not yet know that he had been issued a Philippine passport at the
time of the relevant foreign trips. After receiving his Philippine passport, Arnado used the same for
his subsequent trips.
Maquiling sought recourse by filing a petition to this court. While this was pending, the period for
the filing of CoCs for local elective officials for the May 13, 2013 elections officially began.
October 1, 2012: Arnado and Respondent Capitan filed their CoCs for mayor of Kauswagan
April 16, 2013: Court rendered its Decision in Maquiling. It annulled and set aside the Comelec En
Banc's February 2, 2011 Resolution, disqualified Arnado from running for elective position, and
declared Maquiling as the duly elected mayor of Kauswagan in the May 10, 2010 elections. The
majority of the Members of the Court opined that in his subsequent use of his US passport, Arnado
effectively disavowed or recalled his April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation. [LGC of 1991 Sec.
40(d)]
May 9, 2013: Arnado executed an Affidavit Affirming Rommel C. Arnado's "Affidavit of Renunciation
dated April 3, 2009.
May 10, 2013: Capitan, Arnado's lone rival, filed a Petition [SPA No. 13-309 (DC)] seeking to
disqualify him from running based on the ruling of this Court in Maquiling; The resolution of said
petition was, however, overtaken by the May 13, 2013 elections where Arnado garnered 84% of the
total votes cast.
May 14, 2013: Arnado was proclaimed as the winning candidate.
Capitan filed another Petition this time seeking to nullify Arnado's proclamation.
Ruling of the Comelec Second Division

1 LGC of 1991 Sec. 44(a): If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the
governor or Mayor, the vice-governor or vice-mayor concerned shall become the
governor or Mayor. x x x
 September 6, 2013: The Comelec Second Division promulgated a Resolution granting the petition
disqualifying Arnado from running in the May 13, 2013 elections. At the time he filed his CoC on
October 1, 2012, Arnado still failed to comply with the requirement of RA 9225 of making a personal
and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship. Arnado also failed to execute another
Affidavit of Renunciation for purposes of the May 13, 2013 elections. The May 9, 2013 Affidavit
Affirming Rommel C. Arnado's "Affidavit of Renunciation dated April 3, 2009" does not suffice
because it should have been executed on or before the filing of the CoC on October 1, 2012.
Ruling of the Comelec En Banc
Arnado filed a Verified Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that the Comelec Second Division erred
in applying Maquiling; that Capitan's Petition was filed beyond the 25-day reglementary period
reckoned from the filing of the CoC sought to be cancelled; and, that the Comelec must uphold the
sovereign will of the people of Kauswagan who expressed, thru the ballots, their overwhelming
support for him as their mayor.
December 9, 2013: The Comelec En Banc affirmed the ruling of the Comelec Second Division. It
accordingly annulled the proclamation of Arnado and declared Capitan as the duly elected mayor of
Kauswagan.

December 16, 2013 Arnado filed the instant Petition with ancillary prayer for injunctive relief to
maintain the status quo ante.2
December 26, 2013, Arnado filed an Urgent Motion for Issuance of Status Quo Ante Order or
Temporary Restraining Order in view of the issuance by the Comelec En Banc of a Writ of Execution
to implement its December 9, 2013 Resolution.
January 14, 2014: this Court issued a Resolution requiring the respondents to file their respective
comments on the petition, and granting Arnado's ancillary relief for TRO.
Capitan filed an Urgent Motion to Lift and/or Dissolve the TRO contending that the acts sought to be
restrained by Arnado are already fait accompli.3 He alleged that the Comelec En Banc had already
issued a Writ of Execution and pursuant thereto a Special Municipal Board of Canvassers was
convened. It proclaimed him to be the duly elected mayor of Kauswagan and on January 2, 2014
he took his oath of office. Since then, he has assumed and performed the duties and functions of his
office.
February 25, 2014: This Court ordered the issuance of a Status Quo Ante Order directing the
parties to allow Arnado to continue performing his functions as mayor of Kauswagan pending
resolution of this case.

ISSUES/HOLDING
In a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the primordial issue to
be resolved is whether the respondent tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion 4 amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolution. And as a matter of policy, this Court will not interfere
with the resolutions of the Comelec unless it is shown that it had committed grave abuse of discretion.

I. WHETHER x x x THE COMELEC EN BANC AND 2ND DIVISION VIOLATED PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FAILING TO DISMISS THE PETITIONS
OF RESPONDENT CAPITAN ON THE GROUND OF FORUM-SHOPPING 5 AND/OR LATE FILING, ETC.
Arnedo avers that Capitan is guilty of forum-shopping because the latter subsequently filed a similar
case docketed as SPC No. 13-019, and that SPA No. 13-309 (DC) was filed beyond the 25-day
prescriptive period reckoned from the time of the filing of his CoC on October 1, 2012.

2 Latin for the way things were before

3 A thing that has already happened or been decided before those affected hear
about it, leaving them with no option but to accept

4 The "capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of

jurisdiction"; "Mere abuse of discretion is not enough; it must be grave"; Grave
abuse of discretion has likewise been defined as an act done contrary to the
Constitution, the law or jurisprudence
 The allegation is unsubstantiated as petitioner made only a general averment and provided no proof
to his allegations. Forum shopping exists when the element of litis pendentia are present:
(1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as would represent the same interests in both
actions;
(2) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and
(3) the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other
action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration.
The allegation is also erroneous. The parties are not the same. In the first case, they are only
Capitan and Arnado. In the second, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Kauswagan is impleaded
as respondent. Also, the reliefs sought are not the same. The former case sought to disqualify
Arnado and/or to cancel his CoC whereas the latter prayed for the annulment of Arnado's
proclamation as mayor of Kauswagan.
With regard to the alleged tardiness in filing, under Section 3, Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of
Procedure, a petition for disqualification should be filed "any day after the last day for filing of
certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation." Here, Arnado was proclaimed
as the winning candidate on May 14, 2013. Thus, the petition in SPA No. 13-309 (DC) was
seasonably filed on May 10, 2013.

II. WHETHER x x x THE COMELEC EN BANC VIOLATED DUE PROCESS AND COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION BY ALLOWING COMMISSIONER ELIAS YUSOPH TO REVIEW THE DECISION HE
WROTE FOR THE 2ND DIVISION
Arnado's claim that Commissioner Yusoph penned both the September 6, 2013 Resolution of the
Comelec Second Division and the December 9, 2013 Resolution of the Comelec En Banc is not
correct. While Commissioner Yusoph, together with Commissioners Maria Gracia Cielo M. Padaca
and Luie Tito F. Guia, signed said Resolution, there is nothing therein which would indicate that
Commissioner Yusoph was the writer or the ponente of said Resolution. The resolutions did not state
who the ponente is.

III. WHETHER x x x THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISENFRANCHISING

84% OF THE VOTERS OF KAUSWAGAN IN THE MAY 2013 ELECTIONS.
In Velasco v. Comelec, this Court pronounced that election victory cannot be used as a magic
formula to bypass election eligibility requirements; otherwise, certain provisions of laws pertaining
to elections will become toothless. One of which is Section 39 of the Local Government Code of
1991, which specifies the basic positive qualifications of local government officials. If in Velasco the
Court ruled that popular vote cannot override the required qualifications under Section 39,63a
fortiori, there is no reason why the Court should not follow the same policy
This case is strikingly similar to the case of Lopez v. Comelec. In that case, petitioner Lopez was
also a natural-born Filipino who lost his Philippine citizenship after he became a naturalized US
citizen. He later reacquired his Philippine citizenship by virtue of RA 9225. Thereafter, Lopez filed his
candidacy for Chairman of Barangay Bagacay, San Dionisio, Iloilo in the synchronized Barangay and
Sangguniang Kabataan Elections held on October 29, 2007 without first making a personal and
sworn renunciation of his foreign citizenship. In spite of the fact that Lopez won in the elections, this
Court still affmned the Resolution of the Comelec disqualifying Lopez as a candidate for a local
elective position for his failure to comply with the requirements of Section 5(2) of RA 9225.

IV. WHETHER x x x THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN DISQUALIFYING

PETITIONER WHO HAS FULLY COMPLIED WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF RA 9225 BEFORE THE
FILING OF HIS COC ON OCTOBER 1, 2012.
Arnado avers that further inquiry and examination of the notarial register of his former counsel,
Atty. Thomas Dean M. Quijano, revealed that he executed an Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of
Allegiance on November 30, 2009. Hence, at the time he filed his CoC on October 1, 2012, he is a
citizen of the Philippines who does not owe allegiance to any other country and, therefore, is
qualified to run for mayor of Kauswagan in the May 13, 2013 elections.
As to the alleged recently discovered November 30, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of
Allegiance, the same is highly suspect. The original or certified true copy thereof was not presented.

5 There is forum-shopping when two or more actions or proceedings, founded on

the same cause, are instituted by a party on the supposition that one or the other
court would make a favorable disposition
 In addition, such crucial evidence sufficient to alter the outcome of the case was never presented
before the Comelec much less in the Maquiling case. Curiously, it only surfaced for the first time in
this petition. In Jacot v. Dal, this Court disallowed the belated presentation of similar evidence on
due process considerations.
Hence, the alleged November 30, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance cannot be
given any probative weight.

This Court finds no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Comelec En Banc in sustaining the Resolution
of the Comelec Second Division disqualifying Arnado from running in the May 13, 2013 elections and in
accordingly setting aside his proclamation as elected mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao del Norte and proclaiming
Capitan as the duly elected mayor of said municipality.

RULING
The instant Petition is hereby DISMISSED and the assailed Comelec Resolutions are AFFIRMED. The Status
Quo Ante Order issued by this Court is LIFTED.

OPINIONS
7 concurred, 4 dissented, 3 were on leave or had no part

DISSENTING

Leonen, J.:

I
The effect of reacquisition is the restoration of Philippine citizenship to natural-born Filipino citizens who
have been naturalized as citizens in a foreign country. All that is required to retain their citizenship is to take
the oath of allegiance under the law. Petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
on July 10, 2008. On April 3, 2009, he executed his Affidavit of Renunciation of his foreign citizenship.
Petitioner alleges that he executed his Affidavit of Renunciation with Oath of Allegiance on November 30,
2009. On May 9, 2013, he again executed the Affidavit Affirming Rommel C. Arnado 's "Affidavit of
Renunciation Dated April 3, 2009."

Petitioner renounced his American citizenship no less than three times before he filed his Certificate of
Candidacy on October 1, 2012. He had performed all the acts required by Republic Act No. 9225 in order to
reacquire his Filipino citizenship before he ran for public office.

II
Petitioner's use of his American passport was an isolated act required by the circumstances. At that time, he
had not yet been issued his Philippine passport.

In the dissent in Maquiling led by Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion, it was pointed out that when Amado
traveled back to the United States, "he had no Philippine passport that he could have used to travel to the
United States to attend to the winding up of his business and other affairs in America."17cralawrednad

The use of a foreign passport should not by itself cause the immediate nullity of one's affidavit of
renunciation. Its circumstances must also be taken into account. Petitioner could use only his American
passport when he traveled on April 14, 2009 since the Consulate of the Philippines had not yet issued him a
Philippine passport.

III

It can be reasonably concluded that, per Maquiling, petitioner's use of his Philippine passport signifies his
Philippine citizenship. According to Republic Act No. 8239, a passport is "a document issued by the Philippine
government to its citizens and requesting other governments to allow its citizens to pass safely and freely,
and in case of need to give him/her all lawful aid and protection."

By definition, a Philippine passport is a document issued by the government to its citizens. Clearly, a
Philippine passport cannot be issued to an American citizen.

IV
The ponencia erroneously cites Lopez v. Commission on Elections as basis for stating that petitioner's
landslide victory could not override eligibility requirements. The candidate in that case failed to execute a
personal and sworn renunciation of his American citizenship. In this case, petitioner made a personal and
sworn renunciation of his American citizenship no less than three times.

Election laws must be interpreted to give effect to the will of the people. Well-entrenched in our
jurisprudence is the doctrine that in case of doubt, political laws must be so construed as to give life and
spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot. Public interest and the sovereign will
should, at all times, be the paramount considerations in election controversies. For it would be better to err
in favor of the people's choice than to be right in complex but little understood legalisms.

Brion, J.:

Despite some commonalities, the present disqualification case, however, is separate and substantively
distinct from the Maquiling disqualification case.

I specifically find the ponencia 's conclusions grossly erroneous and tainted with grave abuse of discretion
based on the following considerations:

(1) Arnado became a "pure" Philippine citizen on April 3, 2009, after he took his oath of allegiance and
executed his affidavit of renunciation. That he was subsequently deemed to have recanted his renunciation
is unfortunate, but even the Maquiling ruling recognizes that for some eleven (11) days (i.e., from April 3 to
14, 2009), he was qualified to run for public office because he was a "pure" Filipino.
Arnado more than reconfirmed and regained this status and was qualified to run for public office in the May
2013 Elections based on his persistent assertions of sole allegiance to the Republic and his repeated
renunciation of his US citizenship.
a. Separately from the April 3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation that Maquiling said Arnado recanted,
Arnado executed on May 9, 2013, another Affidavit of Renunciation affirming the terms of his April
3, 2009 Affidavit and thus cured any defect in his qualification to run in the May 2013 Elections.
(2) The legal consequences of the Maquiling ruling is limited to Arnado's qualification for public office in the
May 2010 elections.
a. The intervening 2010 Maquiling disqualification ruling did not and could not have invalidated
Arnado's status as a "pure" Philippine citizen who was qualified to run for public office after having
complied with the RA No. 9225 requirements in the May 2013 Elections.
(3) The Comelec gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the May 9, 2013 Confirmation of the Oath of
Affirmation was filed out of time.
a. The Comelec grossly failed to consider (i) the circumstances of the filing of the October 1, 2012
Certificate of Candidacy (CoC), and (ii) the circumstances and the dynamics between the
2010 Maquiling case and ruling, and the present 2013 disqualification case, in terms of the
retroactive application of the Maquilingruling.
b. When Arnado filed his CoC on October 1, 2012 (for the 2013 Elections), the prevailing Comelec en
banc ruling [in its February 2, 2011 resolution in SPA No. 10-109 (DC)] was that he was not
disqualified to run for elective public office; hence, Arnado did not need to execute another
affidavit of renunciation.
c. Based solely on the Maquiling Decision (that pertained to Arnado'sdisqualification for the 2010
elections), the Comelec disqualified Arnado for the May 2013 elections because his October 1,
2012 CoC was not supported by any Affidavit of Renunciation (since Maquiling considered his April
3, 2009 Affidavit of Renunciation for the 2010 elections effectively recanted). This Comelec ruling
disregards the unusual consequences of the April 3, 2009 Affidavit and the unique circumstances
under which the October 1, 2012 CoC was filed.
d. Since the Comelec did not accept the Affidavit of Renunciation that Arnado filed on May 9, 2013 (for
the 2013 Elections) in the light of the 2010 Maquiling ruling, he was placed in an impossible
situation of being disqualified in 2013 for a ruling applicable to the 2010 elections, without being
given the opportunity to submit his compliance for the May 2013 elections.
e. Notably, his May 9, 2013 Affidavit of Renunciation, submitted to comply with his May 2013
candidacy, was rejected because it should have been filed on October 1, 2012 (i.e., when he filed his
CoC for the May 2013 elections). If the Maquilingruling, made on April 16, 2013, was made to
retroactively apply to October 1, 2012, so should the opportunity to comply be similarly made
retroactive. To the extent he was denied this opportunity is grave abuse of discretion.
(4) At any rate, all doubts should be resolved in favour of Arnado's qualification:
a. Arnado's unequivocal acts and show of allegiance to the Republic and renunciation of other
citizenships, taken together, should have resolved all doubts in favor of his qualification;
b. the mandate of the people of Kauswagan that twice elected Arnado as their Mayor should be
respected and upheld