Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-9987 April 29, 1957

GRACIANO INDIAS, petitioner,

Cipriano Cid and Associates for petitioner.

BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:

This is a petition for review of a decision of the Court of Industrial Relations dismissing the
complaint of petitioner against respondent for unfair labor practice and, indirectly, denying his
prayer that he be reinstated as an employee of respondent.

On June 23, 1954, a complaint was filed by petitioner alleging that respondent has engaged in
unfair labor practice within the meaning of section 4(a), paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Republic
Act No. 875. Respondent answered denying the material allegations of the complaint and, as a
special defense, alleged that petitioner was dismissed from the service for cause. It also set up a
counterclaim of P2,000. Hearings were conducted by the hearing examiner, Atty. Emiliano
Tabigne, at which both parties, represented by counsel, appeared. After the presentation of the
evidence, the hearing examiner rendered his report stating that the charge of unfair labor
practice has not been substantiated by the evidence and recommending its dismissal. He also
found that the dismissal of petitioner was for sufficient cause. And on May 20, 1955, the court
approved the hearing examiner's recommendation stating that, after a perusal of the record of
the case, it "finds no sufficient justification for modifying said recommendation, findings and
conclusions, and consequently, this case is hereby dismissed." Petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, which was denied by the court en banc. Hence this petition for review.

The first issue raised by petitioner is: "May the Court of Industrial Relations issue an order
dismissing a case without stating the facts and the law support thereof?"

The order now assailed by petitioner reads:

Hearing Examiner Mr. Tabigne recommends the dismissal of this case on the ground that
the evidence by the complainant did not support the charges of unfair labor practice. The
facts are stated in the Hearing Examiner's dated May 16, 1955.

After a perusal of the record of the case, the Court finds no sufficient justification for
modifying said recommendation, findings and conclusions, and consequently, this case is
hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

It is contended that the aforequoted order runs counter to the Constitution which provides that
"No decision shall be rendered by any court of record without expressing therein clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based" (Article VIII, section 12); and to Rule 35,
Section 1, of the Rules of Court, which provides that a court decision shall state "clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based." And the claim is made in view of the fact that
the order does not contain either a discussion of the evidence or any finding of fact based on
said evidence, which counsel claims does not meet the requirements of the law and the
Constitution.

We find no merit in this contention. The order, it is true, does not make its own discussion of the
evidence or its own findings of fact, but such is not necessary if the court is satisfied with the
report of its examiner or referee which already contains a full discussion of the evidence and the
findings of fact based thereon. The situation differs if the court disagrees with the report in which
case it should state the reasons for its disagreement. If it is in full accord with the report, it is
purposeless to repeat what the referee or examiner has already found in it. Such is the present
situation. The court approved the report of the hearing examiner "after a perusal of the record of
the case." This presupposes that it has examined the evidence and found no justification for
modifying his findings and conclusions. This is a substantial compliance with the law.

When the Court of Industrial Relations refers a case to a commissioner for investigation,
report, and recommendation, and at such investigation the parties were duly represented
by counsel, heard or at least given an opportunity to be heard, the requirement of due
process has been satisfied, even if the court failed to set the report for hearing, and a
decision on the basis of such report, with the other evidence of the case, is a decision
which meets the requirement of a fair and open hearing. (Manila Trading & Supply
Co. vs. Philippine Labor Union, 40 Off. Gaz., 23, 14th Suppl., p. 149)

Petitioner next disputes the finding of the hearing examiner which justifies his dismissal from the
service. He claims that the act imputed to him to the effect that he quarreled with a co-employee
outside of their place of work and after office hours furnishes no sufficient justification for his
dismissal. He intimates that his dismissal was rather prompted by his conduct in siding with the
faction headed by one Pedro Venida which went on strike because of the refusal of respondent
to recognize this faction. In short, he insinuates that if he was discharged, it was because of his
union activities. In answer to this contention, we need only to restate what the examiner found on
this matter:

As regards the dismissal of Indias on May 21, 1954, the evidence is clear that the
company effected his dismissal on the ground that he had committed a grave misconduct
due to his violent temper. Because of this behavior, he had a quarrel in the afternoon of
May 19, 1954 in the poblacion of Jose Panganiban with a co-laborer by the name of
Apolonio Umaga. The incident took place outside of the compound of the mines operated
by the respondent. The quarrel between Indias and Umaga resulted to a court action by
the said Umaga for less serious physical injuries, filed with the justice of the peace court
of Jose Panganiban (Exhibit "C"). Although this case is still pending decision by the said
court, it is shown that petitioner Indias possesses certain degree of violent character.
According to the rules and regulations of the company, laborers performing underground
work should possess good behavior as norm of conduct in order to avoid untoward
incident in the company's underground tunnels. The evidence is clear that this was the
only basis that the company dismissed petitioner Graciano Indias. There was no showing
that the management of respondent was motivated by other ulterior motives. The
dismissal effected by the department head Mr. Hincley of the respondent corporation was
due to result of his investigation that the said petitioner Indias inflicted physical injuries to
his co-worker Umaga. There was no showing for the evidence that management or the
department head whom herein petitioner worked had knowledge of the alleged unfair
labor practice acts imputed upon Orbe or any of the respondents representatives or
agents.

Considering that this is a question of fact which we cannot now consider because in appeals of
this nature we are limited considering question of law (Section 6 Republic Act No. 875), we have
no other alternative than to affirm the above findings of the examiner which were concurred in by
the Court of Industrial Relation.1

The whole controversy is centered around the right of the Court of Industrial Relations to
order the readmission of a laborer who, it is admitted, bad been found derelict in the
performance of his duties towards his employer. We concede that the right of an
employer to freely select or discharge his employees, is subject to regulation by the State
basically in the exercise of its paramount police power. (Commonwealth Acts Nos. 103
and 213). But much as we should expand beyond economic orthodoxy, we hold that an
employer cannot legally be compelled to continue with employment of a person who
admittedly was guilty of misfeasance or malfeasance towards his employer, and those
continuance in the service of the Latter is patently inimical to his interest. The law, in
protecting the rights of the laborer, authorizes neither oppression nor self-destruction of
the employer. There may, of course, be cases where the suspension or dismissal of an
employee is whimsical or unjustified or otherwise illegal in which case he will be
protected. Each case will be scrutinized carefully and the proper authorities will go to the
core of the controversy and not close their eyes to the real situation. This is not however
the case here. (Manila Trading & Supply Co. vs. The Honorable Francisco Zulueta, et al.
40 Off. Gaz., No. 10, p. 183)

The order appealed from is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and
Felix, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1
Dee C. Chuan & Sons, Inc. vs. Benito Nahag, et al., 95 Phil., 837.