Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs
Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs
Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs
Published by
GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies, Institute of Asian Studies and
Hamburg University Press.
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Introduction
Myanmar has seen an unprecedented political opening in recent years,
which has clearly transformed the long-term repressive military regime.
Since President U Thein Sein took office in March 2011, he has initiated
a political liberalisation that has reduced repression and created avenues
for participation in the institutions designed by the military the decade
before. These reforms have opened new political space for both civil
society and the political opposition. As a consequence, the international
community has praised U Thein Sein widely for his reformist policies.
Foreign Policy named him Thinker of the Year in 2012, and UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon praised his vision, leadership and courage to
put Myanmar on the path to change. Despite these glorifications, however, Myanmars political opening is highly contested. Some see Myanmars reforms as a survival strategy of the quasi-military government
to overcome the danger of factionalism and to increase regime durability
by creating power-sharing institutions (McDonald 2013; Croissant and
Kamerling 2013). Others see the current opening as the beginning of a
protracted transition to unfold in the years to come (Bnte forthcoming). Some authors have also posited that it was the militarys desire to
establish domestic and international legitimacy that triggered Myanmars
elites to change (Pederson 2012).
Robert Taylor contends that it was the countrys dire economic situation that stimulated change (Taylor 2012). In this article, it is argued
that the countrys liberalisation is a deliberate strategy of the military,
whose aim is to achieve economic renewal and a recalibration of foreign
relations. This special issue is specifically devoted to examining the
changing foreign policy of the liberalizing regime, the external aspects of
Myanmars reform process, and the relevant reception and implications
of this foreign policy shift. The idea for this issue emerged from a conference on Myanmars international relations at the Department of Political and Administrative Sciences at the University of Rostock in November 2014, where earlier versions of most of the following articles were
presented. The conference was funded by the universitys Faculty of
Economic and Social Sciences, whose support is gratefully acknowledged.
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manoeuvre has grown remarkably in the last two years. New political
freedoms enrich this picture. In all areas, however, reforms are fragile
and contested, and there is still resistance on the part of some authorities
to giving room to activists and civil society groups.
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army. The ethnic groups have not found a common voice, with most,
but not all, of them demanding a rewriting or serious revision of the
Constitution along with the establishment of a truly federal state with a
federally structured army. Lasting peace is a protracted issue, since on
both sides economic interests are involved and major grievances need to
be recognised.
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2012, only a week after the NLD won a number of seats in a series of
parliamentary by-elections.
The domestic reform process has also provided the backdrop
against which Myanmar has started to realign its relations with China.
During the period of international sanctions, Myanmar depended largely
on Beijings support, both politically and economically, for its security
and development. However, as Maung Aung Myoe argues in the first of
the following articles, for some years the SLORC/SPDC regime had
been increasingly uncomfortable with its great reliance on China. Beijing,
in turn, sees Myanmar as a geopolitical pivot, or more precisely, a pillar
of its string of pearls strategy in the Indo-Pacific region. Myanmar is
the only country bordering China with access to the Eastern Indian
Ocean, specifically the Bay of Bengal and the Andaman Sea. For many
observers within Myanmar, Chinas past support for the military regime
had been a main factor in preventing any meaningful political change or
democratisation and in strengthening the repressive nature of the regime.
While the Burmese government realising that the strategic asymmetry
between Myanmar and China is unlikely to disappear has refrained
from presenting or constructing China as a threat, there can be little
doubt that reducing Myanmars strategic and economic dependence on
Beijing ranks high on Thein Seins foreign policy agenda. The most visible and, for Beijing, shocking indication in this regard was the decision in September 2011 to suspend the construction of the controversial
Myitsone Dam, a hydroelectric project financed and led by a state-owned
Chinese company.
Myanmars government does not perceive its relations with China
and the US as a zero-sum game in which changes in one case inevitably
impact the other. In other words, Naypyidaws more sober perspective
on Beijing is not primarily the result of markedly improved political and
economic ties with Washington. At the same time, it is hard to ignore
that normalizing relations with the United States seems to be the highest
priority for Myanmar. Jrgen Haacke shows that the comprehensive
reforms ushered in from mid-2011 by President U Thein Sein formed an
important stepping stone, but Washingtons 2009 adoption of pragmatic
engagement as the outcome of the Burma policy review conducted by
the Obama administration played an equally important part in the process of bilateral rapprochement. On her groundbreaking visit to Myanmar in late 2011, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that the
United States would reciprocate under the formula of action-foraction. Ultimately, however, the substantive US policy shifts towards
Myanmar in 2012 proved possible only because Daw Aung San Suu Kyi
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agreed with the Thein Sein government and the Obama administration
that the time for a new approach had come. Haacke also elaborates on
the dynamic patterns of decision-making regarding US Myanmar policy
and finds that particularly during the first term of the Obama administration, the State Department became the key incubator of and vehicle for
change in relations with Myanmar, whereas congressional voices remained largely subdued. However, as Myanmars political reforms failed
to advance beyond the key concessions offered in 2012, Myanmar has
again become a point of controversy between the administration and
Congress. The question of military engagement has attracted particular
attention. Haacke concludes that existing congressional resistance to
more substantial military-to-military relations is likely to place a ceiling
on any further deepening of bilateral ties for the time being.
Such explicit or implicit limits to the depth and breadth of cooperation are not visible in the case of relations between the European Union
and Myanmar. The EU has evinced a comprehensive foreign policy
change, from a rigorous sanctions-driven approach to a sudden, almost
hyper-optimistic embrace of and support for the still fragile and ultimately risk-prone reform process. At the same time, Jrn Dosch and Jatswan
S. Sidhu demonstrate that, while guided by normative convictions and
concerns for human rights and democracy, the EUs approach and posture vis--vis Myanmar since 1988 has been more reactive than carefully
planned and strategised. Whereas in the period from 1988 until early
2011 the EUs Myanmar policy frequently fluctuated between a carrot
and a stick approach, depending on the circumstances, since 2011 the
emphasis has been exclusively on carrots. This signifies an important
shift in the application of normative power. The EU has generously
provided large amounts of aid intended mainly to assist Myanmar in its
transition. The European Commission alone has allocated 688 million
EUR to support the countrys reform process over the period 2014
2020, an amount supplemented by equally substantial contributions from
several member states, including but not limited to Germany, the UK,
France and Sweden. The EUs official documents reflect a strong optimism about the reform process that does not factor in the possibility of
an autocratic recession. While this optimism is shared by the European
Commission and most EU member states, the similar perceptions and
compatible normative foundations on which their policies are based have
so far not translated into well-coordinated and coherent foreign policy
strategies and development cooperation programmes.
However, no external actor has responded more enthusiastically to
Myanmars political transition than Japan, which has forgiven an unprec-
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edentedly high percentage of Myanmars debt and allocated new largescale official development assistance (ODA), including the first yen loans
to Myanmar in a quarter of a century. As Donald M. Seekins explains, in
collaboration with the new post-junta regime, Tokyo has sketched out
ambitious development projects for Myanmar that, if carried out, would
be a major factor in transforming not only the economy but also society
and inter-ethnic relations within Southeast Asias second-largest country.
Both the large size of Japans post-2011 ODA intervention in Myanmar
and its emphasis on ambitious infrastructure projects, especially special
economic zones (SEZs), draw attention to an important yet often ignored problem in the usual debates on development: Can modernizing
and transforming an undeveloped economy and society solve deep and
long-standing political conflicts, or is it likely that technology-driven economic development, by concentrating power more thoroughly in the
hands of recipient-country elites, will succeed only in making the political
system more authoritarian? Seekins takes a pessimistic view, arguing the
inflow of large amounts of ODA is likely to be destabilizing. Indeed, it is
likely to make deep-rooted social and ethnic conflicts inside Myanmar
even worse than they are now unless, prior to large-scale economic intervention, there is a political resolution to the most serious of these conflicts.
Whereas China, the US, the EU and Japan are trying to establish a
new basis for their respective bilateral relations with Myanmar, India and
Russia are encountering the challenges and opportunities implicit in
building tangible relations in the absence of strong historical foundations.
Pierre Gottschlich describes Indias approach towards Myanmar as a
new beginning in international diplomacy. From an Indian perspective,
as Gottschlich argues, a change in the relations between New Delhi and
Naypyidaw is not simply conceivable but absolutely necessary. For India,
the current situation presents a unique opportunity to rectify some foreign policy failures of the past and overhaul its attitude of obliviousness
and neglect towards Myanmar that has marred the relationship for decades in spite of a 1951 bilateral Treaty of Friendship, which, according
to Nehru, was supposed to last forever thereafter. After more than 65
years, New Delhi has still not made a palpable foreign policy announcement about Myanmar, let alone drafted a grand strategy regarding the
country a rather surprising fact given that the two states share a land
border stretching 1,643 kilometres. Drawing on interviews with different
stakeholder groups, Gottschlich shows that there is agreement neither on
the most decisive issues in the bilateral relationship nor on the order of
Indias foreign policy priorities towards Myanmar. However, five themat-
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References
BBC (2012), Suu Kyi: Democracy in My Lifetime, 5 January, online:
<www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16421610> (5 January 2012).
Bnte, Marco (2014), Burmas Transition to Quasi Military Rule: From
Rulers to Guardians?, in: Armed Forces and Society, 42, 2, 742764.
Bnte, Marco (forthcoming), Myanmars Protracted Transition: Arenas,
Actors, Outcomes, in: Asian Survey (Berkeley).
Bnte, Marco, and Clara Portela (2013), The Beginning of Reforms and the
End of Sanctions, GIGA Focus International, 3, Hamburg: GIGA,
online: <www.giga-hamburg.de/giga-focus/international> (26 August 2015).
Croissant, Aurel, and Jil Kamerling (2013), Why Do Military Regimes
Institutionalize? Constitution-Making and Elections as Political Sur-
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