[G.R. No. 108926.

July 12, 1996]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and

HEIRS OF DEMOCRITO O. PLAZA, respondents.
DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:

Petitioner implores this Court to review and set aside the decision of February 8,
1993 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 34950 which affirmed the decision of
June 14, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati in LRC Case No. M-99 confirming
respondent Democrito O. Plazas title over Rel. Plan 1059, which is the relocation plan of
Psu-97886.
[1]

After the filing of private respondents Comment, this Court, in its resolution of May
24, 1993, gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective Memoranda. The petitioner filed its Memorandum on June 29, 1993 while
private respondent filed his Memorandum on July 6, 1993.
The factual background is summarized in the Decision of the Court of Appeals as
follows:
[2]

According to petitioner-appellee, the subject property situated at Liwanag, Talon (formerly

Pamplona), Las Pinas, Rizal, now Metro Manila, having an area of 45,295 sq. m., was first owned
by Santos de la Cruz who declared the same in his name under Tax Declaration Nos. 3932, for the
year 1913; 3933 for 1917; and 6905, for 1921 (Exhs. 2-B, 2-C and 2-D, Exh. K for petitionerappellee, pp. 514-516, Record). Subsequently, the subject property was successively bought or
acquired by Pedro Cristobal, Regino Gervacio, Diego Calugdan and Gil Alhambra. To evidence
their respective acquisition of the property in question, Tax Declaration Nos. 7937, for the year
1923; 8463, for 1927; 9467, for 1934; and 2708 (year not available) were presented. After Gil
Alhambra died, his heirs extrajudicially partitioned the subject property and declared it in their
names under Tax Declaration Nos. 5595 and 5596 for the year 1960. On 5 July 1966, they
executed a Deed of Sale With Mortgage deeding the subject property to petitioner-appellee for
P231,340.00 payable in three (3) installments, the payment of which was secured by a mortgage
on the property. Upon receipt of the full payment, they executed a Release of Mortgage on 1
August 1968. After the sale, petitioner-appellee took possession of the subject property and paid
the taxes due thereon for the years 1966 up to 1986, and in 1985 declared it in his name under Tax
Declaration Nos. B-013-01392 and B-013-01391. He appointed Mauricio Plaza and Jesus
Magcanlas as the administrator and caretaker thereof, respectively. Due to losses, the property in
question was cultivated only for a while. Five (5) years according to Mauricio Plaza, and from
1966 up to 1978 according to Jesus Magcanlas.
[3]

[4]

[5]

[6]

[7]

On 14 November 1986, petitioner-appellee filed a petition, which was amended on 17 July 1987,
for the registration and confirmation of his title over the subject property alleging, among others,
that:
1. by virtue of the deed of sale, he is the owner thereof;
2. he and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the property prior to, and since 12 June 1945;

3. other than himself, there is no other person occupying, or having any interest over the property;
and,
4. there are no tenants or agricultural lessees thereon.[8]

On 24 February 1988, oppositor-appellant, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic, for brevity),
filed its opposition maintaining, among others, that: (1) petitioner-appellee and his predecessorsin-interest have not been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of the land in question since 12 June 1945 or prior thereto; (2) the muniment of title and tax
declarations as well as tax payments relied upon do not constitute sufficient evidence of a bona
fide acquisition of the land by petitioner-appellee and of his open, continuous possession and
occupation thereof in the concept of owner since 12 June 1945, or prior thereto, and (3) the subject
property pertains to the public domain and is not subject to private appropriation.
[9]

On 9 March 1988, after the compliance of the jurisdiction requirements was proved and, on
motion, the lower court issued its order of general default.
[10]

Aside from the Republic, there were others who opposed the petition and filed their opposition
thereto prior to, or were allowed to submit their opposition despite, and after, the issuance of the
order of general default. They are:
(a) Arsenio Medina who withdrew his opposition on 29 May 1989; [11]
(b) Emilio, Leopoldo and Abraham, all surnamed Borbon; Heirs of Andres Reyes; Maximo Lopez; and,
Marilou Castanares who prayed that the lower court direct petitioner-appellee to see to it that their
respective property, which adjoins the land in question, are not included in the petition; [12]
(c) the Heirs of Santos de la Cruz and the Kadakilaan Estate. Upon their respective motion, the order
of default was set aside as to them and they were allowed to file their opposition.

The Heirs of Santos de la Cruz argue that: (1) their predecessor-in-interest, Santos de la Cruz, is
the primitive owner of the subject lot; and, (2) he, his heirs, and upon their tolerance, some other
persons have been in open, peaceful, notorious and continuous possession of the land in question
since time immemorial until the present.
The Kadakilaan Estate contends that: (1) by reason of its Titulo de Propiedad de Terrenos of 1891
Royal Decree 01-4, with approved plans registered under the Torrens System in compliance with,
and as a consequence of, P.D. 872, it is the owner of the subject property; and, (2) petitionerappellee or his predecessors-in-interest have not been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land in question since 12 June 1945 or earlier.
[13]

(d) the Heirs of Hermogenes Rodriguez. They allege, among others, that by reason of a Titulo de
Propiedad de Terrenos of 1891; Royal Decree No. 01-4, Protocol of 1891; Decree No. 659,
approved Plan of the Bureau of Lands No. 12298 dated 10 September 1963, their predecessor-ininterest is the owner of the subject property. Despite (sic) that their motion to lift order of default as
to them and admit their opposition, which motion was opposed by petitioner-appellee, does not
appear to have been acted upon by the lower court, they were able to present one (1) witness;
[14]

and,

(e) Phase II Laong Plaza Settlers Association, Inc. It filed a motion to intervene in the case but the
motion does not appear to have been acted upon by the lower court. [15]

On 13 March 1990, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office, West Sector
(CENRO-WEST) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources requested the lower
court to furnish it photocopies of the records of the petition as the property in question was the

subject of a request for a Presidential Proclamation reserving the land in question for Slum
Improvement and Resettlement Site (SIR) of the National Housing Authority.
[16]

On 22 June 1990, upon order of the lower court, an ocular inspection was conducted on the subject
property by the court-appointed commissioner who submitted his report on 2 July 1990.
[17]

On 3 January 1991 Proclamation No. 679 was issued by the President of the Republic of the
Philippines withdrawing the subject property from sale or settlement and reserve (the same) for
slum improvement and sites and services program under the administration and disposition of the
National Housing Authority in coordination with the National Capital Region, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources subject to actual survey and private rights if any there be, ...
The National Housing Authority was authorized to develop, administer and dispose of the area in
accordance with LOI 555, as amended (by LOI Nos. 686 and 1283), and LOI 557.
[18]

On 31 May 1991 petitioner-appellee filed his memorandum. The oppositors did

not. Nevertheless, among them, only the Republic and the Heirs of Santos de la Cruz formally
offered their evidence.
[19]

[20]

On 14 June 1991 the lower court rendered the judgment referred to earlier.
On 8 July 1991, from among the oppositors, only the Republic filed a notice of appeal
which was approved on 10 July 1991. By reason of the approval thereof, the motion
filed on 23 July 1991 by the Heirs of Hermogenes Rodriguez for the reconsideration of
the judgment was denied on 1 August 1991.
[21]

[22]

On February 8, 1993, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the trial
courts judgment.
Hence, this petition filed by the Republic of the Philippines alleging that:
THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS AFFIRMING THE DECISION OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT GRANTING PRIVATE RESPONDENTS APPLICATION FOR
REGISTRATION, IS NOT SUPPORTED BY AND IS CONTRARY TO LAW, THE EVIDENCE
AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE.
Petitioner argues that the burden rests on the applicant to show by convincing
evidence that he has a registrable title over the property sought to be titled, which the
latter failed to do.
According to petitioner, aside from mere tax declarations all of which are of recent
vintage, private respondent has not established actual possession of the property in
question in the manner required by law (Section 14, P.D. 1529) and settled jurisprudence
on the matter. Thus, no evidence was adduced that private respondent cultivated much
less, fenced the subject property if only to prove actual possession. The actual fencing of
the property was done only starting 1988 when the actual occupants were forcibly ejected
and driven out from their respective abodes and that its witnesses namely: Elascio
Domitita, Manuel Dolom, Bernadette Aguinaldo and Virginia Franco, who were all actual
residents of the questioned area, categorically testified on this score, summarized as
follows:
1. In their long stay in the area, the longest staying occupant being Domitita who had been in the
premises for more than thirty (30) years nobody ever claimed ownership over the subject property;

2. It was only in 1988 that they learned that private respondent had filed a petition to have the
property titled in his name;
3. Private respondent had not introduced any improvement nor was there a caretaker assigned by him
to look after the property; and,
4. Aside from them, there were about 200 more families residing in the area but through force,
intimidation and illegal demolitions, were driven out by private respondent from the premises.

We are not persuaded. On this point, the respondent Court correctly found that:
Proof that petitioner-appellee and his predecessors-in-interest have acquired and have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject property for a period of 30
years under a bona fide claim of ownership are the tax declarations of petitioner-appellees
predecessors-in-interest, the deed of sale, tax payment receipts and petitioner-appellees tax
declarations. The evidence on record reveals that: (1) the predecessors-in-interest of petitionerappellee have been declaring the property in question in their names in the years 1923, 1927, 1934
and 1960; and, (2) in 1966, petitioner-appellee purchased the same from the Heirs of Gil Alhambra
and since then paid the taxes due thereon and declared the property in his name in 1985.
xxxxxxxxx
x x x Considering the dates of the tax declarations and the realty tax payments, they can hardly be
said to be of recent vintage indicating petitioner-appellees pretended possession of the
property. On the contrary, they are strong evidence of possession in the concept of owner by
petitioner-appellee and his predecessors-in-interest. Moreover, the realty tax payment receipts
show that petitioner-appellee has been very religious in paying the taxes due on the property. This
is indicative of his honest belief that he is the owner of the subject property. We are, therefore, of
the opinion that petitioner-appellee has proved that he and his predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject property in the concept of
owner for a period of 30 years since 12 June 1945 and earlier. By operation of law, the property in
question has become private property.
[23]

Contrary to the representations of the Republic, petitioner-appellee had introduced some

improvements on the subject property from the time he purchased it. His witnesses testified that
petitioner-appellee developed the subject property into a ricefield and planted it with rice, but only
for about five years because the return on investment was not enough to sustain the continued
operation of the riceland. Though not in the category of permanent structures, the preparation of
the land into a ricefield and planting it with rice are considered improvements thereon.
[24]

Although tax declarations or realty tax payments of property are not conclusive
evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of possession in the concept
of owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his
actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder
has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for
taxation purposes manifests not only ones sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the
property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested
parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an
act strengthens ones bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.
[25]

[26]

Neither do we find merit in the assertions of petitioners witnesses Elascio Domitita,

Manuel Dolom, Bernadette Aguinaldo and Virginia Franco. As properly stated by the
public respondent,
xxx Their alleged possession is not based on any right. Neither do they claim to have any title or
interest over the subject property. As a matter of fact, they did not bother to oppose the
petition. The most that can be said of their alleged possession is that it was only with the tolerance
of rightful owners of the property - plaintiff-appellee and his predecessors-in-interest, hence, is no
bar to the granting of the petition. We do not see why we should accept the bare assertions of the
alleged occupants at their face value as against the claim of ownership of plaintiff-appellee backed
up by legal documents, tax declarations, and tax receipts.
[27]

Well-settled and oft-repeated is the rule that findings of facts of the Court of Appeals
are final and conclusive on the Supreme Court except: 1.) when the conclusion is a
finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures; 2.) when the
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; 3.) when there is a grave
abuse of discretion; 4.) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; 5.)
when the findings of facts are conflicting; 6.) when the Court of Appeals, in making its
findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions
of both appellant and appellee; 7.) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary
to those of the trial court; and 8.) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation
of specific evidence on which they are based. Concededly, none of the above
exceptions obtains in the case at bar.
[28]

Petitioner also alleges that the land in question had been withdrawn from the
alienable portion of the public domain pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 679
entitled Reserving for Slum Improvement and Resettlement (SIR) Sites and Services of
the National Housing Authority, A Certain Parcel of Land of the Public Domain Situated in
the Municipality of Las Pinas, Metro Manila, which was issued on January 7, 1991 or
almost 6 months prior to the issuance of the trial courts decision.
The Court of Appeals opined that the issuance of the proclamation did not have any
effect on the subject property as the proclamation only withdrew it from sale or settlement
and reserved the same for slum improvement and sites and services program, but
subject to actual survey and existing private rights. The proclamation did not prohibit the
registration of title of one who claims, and proves, to be the owner thereof. We agree. At
any rate, registration does not vest title. It is merely evidence of such title. Our land
registration laws do not give the holder any better title than what he actually has. When
the conditions set by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of
law, acquires a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate
of title being issued. The Torrens system was not established as a means for the
acquisition of title to private land, as it merely confirms, but does not confer ownership.
[29]

[30]

Of particular relevance is the finding of the respondent Court of Appeals to the effect
that We have found that petitioner-appellee has proven his claim of ownership over the subject
property. As provided in the proclamation itself, his ownership of the subject property must be
respected and he cannot be barred from having the land titled in his name. This does not
contravene or negate the intention of the proclamation. Besides, its implementing Letters of
Instruction recognize that there may be lands declared included in the Slum Improvement

Resettlement (SIR) program that are privately owned. Paragraph 10 of LOI No. 555 provides that
if the land declared to be included in the SIR program is privately owned, the concerned local
government, upon the approval by the National Housing Authority of its project plan, shall acquire
the property through expropriation. In LOI No. 686 paragraph 3, it is mandated that the NHA,
upon request of the local government, expropriate or otherwise acquire land for the SIR
program. Proclamation No. 679 is, therefore, not a valid justification to deny the petition.
x x x At the time the Proclamation was issued, the controversy over the subject property was subjudice. The conflicting rights over it had been presented to the court for resolution. That
jurisdiction could not be removed from it by subsequent legislation. The President must have been
aware of this. Hence, the inclusion of the cautionary clause subject to existing private rights.
[31]

Over time, Courts have recognized with almost pedantic adherence that what is
inconvenient or contrary to reason is not allowed in law - Quod est inconveniens, aut
contra rationem non permissum est in lege. Undoubtedly, reason and law find respondent
entitled to rights of ownership over the disputed property.
ACCORDINGLY, the assailed decision dated February 8, 1993 is hereby AFFIRMED
and the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 122451. October 12, 2000]

CAGAYAN ROBINA SUGAR MILLING CO., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,

CENTRAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS, BOARD OF
ASSESSMENT APPEALS, and THE PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR OF
CAGAYAN, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition assails the decision[1] dated September 26, 1995, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 37934, denying petitioner's petition for review of the decision[2] dated April 30, 1994, of the
Central Board of Assessment Appeals (CBAA). Earlier, the CBAA had dismissed petitioner's appeal
from the Resolution[3] of the Local Board of Assessment Appeals (LBAA) dated April 1, 1992, which
fixed at P260,327,060.00 the market value of petitioner's properties located in Piat, Cagayan.
The factual antecedents which gave rise to the instant case, are as follows:
In 1990, the Assets Privatization Trust (APT) offered for sale all the assets and properties of the
Cagayan Sugar Corporation (CASUCO), which had been foreclosed and transferred to APT by the
Development Bank of the Philippines. The APT set the floor bid price for the said properties at three
hundred fifty five million pesos (P355,000,000.00). Petitioner, as the highest bidder, acquired the
aforesaid properties for a total price of P464,000,000.00.
Among the properties bought by petitioner were sugar mill machineries located at the CASUCO
millsite in Sto. Domingo, Piat, Cagayan. The market value of these machineries was pegged at
P391,623,520.00 and the assessed value was set at P313,298,820.00 under Tax Declaration No.
5355.

On October 18, 1990, the Provincial Assessor of Cagayan issued a "Notice of Assessment of
Real Property" to petitioner covering the machineries installed at the CASUCO millsite (Lots 89-F-1
and 89-F-2 of Psd-2-01-005548) based on the market value of P391,623,520.00 and the assessed
value thereof at P313,298,820.00.
On February 8, 1991, petitioner appealed the assessment to the LBAA, on the ground that it was
excessive, erroneous, and unjust.
On September 10, 1991, petitioner asked the Provincial Assessor to reconsider his assessment,
contending that it should not be based on the APT-set selling price alone, but should likewise
consider the operating conditions of the properties and pricing factors such as goodwill and future
business potential.
On April 1, 1992, the LBAA resolved that the basis of the market value for assessment purposes
of the properties acquired by petitioner should be the APT floor bid price of P355,000,000.00. The
LBAA then deducted from this amount the value of the land (P4,721,130.00), the total market value of
the buildings (P17,605,340.00), to derive the market value of the machineries, amounting to
P332,673,530.00. By further deducting the value of machineries not subject to real property tax, the
LBAA fixed the market value of the petitioner's machineries at P260,327,060.00 for assessment
purposes. The LBAA ordered the Provincial Assessor of Cagayan to make the necessary
amendments, as a result of which Declaration No. 5514 was issued, putting the assessed value of
petitioner's machineries at P208,261,650.00.
On April 18, 1992, petitioner prepared an "Appeal of Assessment" addressed to the LBAA but did
not file the same with the CBAA. It was only on November 25, 1992, that petitioner filed with the
CBAA an "Appeal of Assessment" identical with its earlier appeal dated April 18, 1992.
On January 2, 1994, the LBAA and the Provincial Assessor of Cagayan moved to dismiss
petitioner's appeal dated November 25, 1992, on the ground that it had been filed beyond the thirtyday reglementary period therefor.
On May 17, 1994, the CBAA dismissed petitioner's appeal on the ground that it was timebarred. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the decision, but its motion was denied by the CBAA
in its resolution of June 30, 1994.
On October 3, 1994, petitioner filed with this Court a special civil action for certiorari, docketed as
G.R. No. 116795, assailing the May 17, 1994 decision and June 30, 1994 resolution of the CBAA for
having been issued with grave abuse discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
On July 3, 1995, we resolved to refer G.R. No. 116795 to the Court of Appeals for appropriate
action, pursuant to Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95.[4]
On September 26, 1995, the appellate court disposed of the case as follows:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Petition is hereby DENIED due course and is
DISMISSED. With costs against the Petitioner.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Hence, the instant case anchored on the following assignment of errors:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT:

(1) THE RESPONDENT PROVINCIAL ASSESSOR'S AND THE LOCAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT
APPEALS' ASSESSMENT OF PETITIONER'S MACHINERIES WAS PREPARED IN
ACCORDANCE WITH SECTIONS 5 AND 28 OF THE REAL PROPERTY TAX CODE (P.D. NO.
464); AND

(2) THE RESPONDENT CENTRAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS ACTED IN ACCORD

WITH LAW IN FIXING THE MARKET VALUE OF THE MACHINERIES INSTALLED IN THE
MILLSITE OF PETITIONER AT P260,237,060.00 AND THE ASSESSED VALUE THEREOF AT
P208,261,650.00.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENT

CENTRAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS ACTED IN ACCORD WITH LAW WHEN
IT DISMISSED PETITIONER'S APPEAL FOR HAVING BEEN FILED OUTSIDE THE
REGLEMENTARY PERIOD.
We find that the issues for our resolution are:
(1) Did the Court of Appeals err in finding the assessment of petitioner's machineries proper and
correct under the Real Property Tax Code?
(2) Did the appellate court err in upholding the dismissal of petitioner's appeal to the CBAA for being
time-barred?

We note that the real property tax being assessed and collected against petitioner's machineries
is for 1990. Hence, in this case, the applicable law is the Real Property Tax Code (P.D. No. 464), and
not the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160).
Petitioner contends that in fixing the market value of the machineries in question at
P260,327,060.00, the LBAA deviated from the rules provided for in the Real Property Tax Code for
the appraisal of machineries. Petitioner argues that in simply deducting from the APT floor bid price of
P355,000,000.00, the value of the land, buildings, and machineries not subject to real property tax in
order to arrive at the market value, the LBAA used a method not sanctioned by P.D. No. 464 and it
was error for both the CBAA and the court a quo to have affirmed it.
Petitioner points out that the APT erred in relying on Sales Analysis or Market Data Approach to
determine the floor bid price. The Sales Analysis or Market Data Approach involves a comparison of
the property appraised to similar properties sold in similar markets in order to derive a market value
for the property to be appraised. Petitioner submits that in the instant case, no comparison with any
similar property was ever made. Instead, the comparison was made to a bid price. Moreover, in using
as basis the valuation of the APT, the LBAA failed to take into account other circumstances of value
such as goodwill and future business potential.
Petitioner insists that the Court of Appeals erred when it failed to rule that both the Provincial
Assessor and the LBAA should have applied the following formula provided for in Section 28 [6]of P.D.
No. 464:

Remaining Economic Life x Replacement Cost = Current Market Value[7]

Economic Life.
We agree with petitioner that Section 28 of the Real Property Tax Code provides for a formula for
computing the current market value of machineries. However, Section 28 must be read in
consonance with Section 3 (n)[8] of the said law, which defines "market value." Under the latter
provision, the LBAA and CBAA were not precluded from adopting various approaches to value
determination, including adopting the APT "floor bid price" for petitioner's properties. As correctly
pointed out by the CBAA and affirmed by the court a quo:

Valuation on the basis of a floor bid price is not bereft of any basis in law. One of the approaches
to value is the Sales Analysis Approach or the Market Data Approach where the source of market
data for valuation is from offer of sales or bids of real property. Valuation based on the floor bid
price belongs to this approach, pursuant to Section 3(n) [9]

Tax assessments by tax examiners are presumed correct and made in good faith, with the
taxpayer having the burden of proving otherwise. [10] In the instant case, petitioner failed to show that
the use by the LBAA and CBAA of the APT floor bid price, pursuant to Section 3 (n) of the Real
Property Tax Code was incorrect and done in bad faith. The method used by the LBAA and CBAA
cannot be deemed erroneous since there is no rigid rule for the valuation of property, which is
affected by a multitude of circumstances and which rules could not foresee nor provide for. [11] Worthy
of note, petitioner has not shown that the current market value of its properties would be significantly
lower if its proposed formula is adopted. A party challenging an appraiser's finding of value is required
not only to prove that the appraised value is erroneous but also what the proper value is. [12] Factual
findings of administrative agencies, which have acquired expertise in their field, are generally binding
and conclusive upon the Court.[13] The Court will not presume to interfere with the intelligent exercise
of the judgment of men specially trained in appraising property.[14] Where the judicial mind is left in
doubt, it is a sound rule to leave the assessment undisturbed. [15] In this case, we see no reason to
depart from this rule.
Petitioner insists that its protest has merit, in view of a 1st Indorsement Letter of the Deputy
Executive Director of the Bureau of Local Government Finance dated May 17, 1996, [16] directing the
Provincial Assessor of Cagayan to recompute the market value of petitioner's machineries. However,
said letter referred to the protested assessment done by the Provincial Assessor. There was no
reference at all to the assessment of petitioner's machineries, which was done by the LBAA, which
revised and corrected the protested appraisal by the Provincial Assessor. Said letter did not find
erroneous the re-assessment done by the LBAA, which was subsequently upheld by both the CBAA
and the Court of Appeals. Findings of fact of administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which
have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally
accorded not only respect, but finality when affirmed by the Court of Appeals.[17]
On the issue of whether the period for petitioner's appeal to the CBAA had already elapsed,
petitioner posits that since the appraisal and assessment of the Provincial Assessor is void ab
initio for not having been made in accordance with Section 28 of P.D. No. 464, the prescriptive period
provided for in Section 30[18] of the decree should not apply to petitioner. Petitioner cites Basey Wood
Industries, Inc. v. Board of Assessment Appeals (CBAA Case No. 100), where the CBAA held that
when an assessment is not in accordance with law, the prescriptive period for appeal to the Provincial
Board of Assessment Appeals is suspended.
Petitioner's arguments, however, are off tangent. The appeal found to be time-barred is not
petitioner's appeal of the Provincial Assessor's assessment to the LBAA, but the resolution of the
LBAA sought to be appealed to the CBAA. As found by the Court of Appeals:

Records show that the Petitioner had already received, as of April 18, 1992, the Resolution of the
Respondent LBAA dated April 1, 1992, denying Petitioner's appeal. The Petitioner, thus, had only
until May 18, 1992, to appeal the questioned Resolution of Respondent LBAA. However, it was
only on November 25, 1992 when the Petitioner lodged its appeal with the Respondent CBAABy
then, the thirty (30) day reglementary period to perfect Petitioner's appeal had long elapsed. [19]
Based on the records, we hold that the respondent court did not err in finding petitioner's appeal
to the CBAA time-barred. The applicable provision is Section 34[20] of P.D. No. 464, and not Section
30. Where the owner or administrator of a property or an assessor is not satisfied with the decision of
the Local Board of Assessment Appeals, he may, within thirty days from the receipt of the decision,
appeal to the Central Board of Assessment Appeals.[21] Petitioner does not dispute respondent court's
findings that petitioner received on April 18, 1992, the LBAA resolution denying its appeal and that it
had only until May 18, 1992, to appeal the local board's resolution to the CBAA. Petitioner, however,
only filed its appeal with the CBAA on November 25, 1992 or way beyond the period to perfect an
appeal. No error was thus committed by the CBAA when it dismissed petitioner's appeal for having
been filed out of time and the appellate court was correct in affirming the dismissal. Well-entrenched
is the rule that the perfection of an appeal within the period therefor is both mandatory and
jurisdictional, and that failing in this regard renders the decision final and executory.[22]

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 37934 AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.