note 部分3

This document discusses the key concepts in David Armstrong's 1997 work "A World of States of Affairs". It argues that states of affairs are ontologically basic and can account for possible worlds, universals, and classes. Physicalism is presented as a reductive hypothesis that draws authority from science. Supervenience is defined as an entity P entailing the existence of entity Q in all possible P-worlds. Internal relations are given as an example that supervene on their terms. Whatever supervenes in this way is not ontologically additional to the subvenient entities, like how mereological wholes are not additional to their parts.

Uploaded by

Cherry

We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.

Available Formats

Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd

0% found this document useful (0 votes)

20 views1 page

note 部分3

Uploaded by

Cherry

We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.

Available Formats

Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd

You are on page 1/ 1

Notes on A World of States of Affairs (1997)

It will be part of the task of this work to argue that either such entities
(possible worlds, universals and classes) can be dispensed with or, as is preferable
in general, that an account can be given of them within the spacetime system,
with that system taken to be a system of states of affairs.
Physicalism is a reductive hypothesis.
The thesis of Physicalism can, to a degree, draw on the authority of science
itself.
The theme of this work is that states of affairs are ontologically basic. It would
be absurd to think that a philosophy of states of affairs is epistemically basic.

2. Some preliminary doctrines

2.1 Supervenience
2.11 Definition of Supervenience
Entity Q supervenes upon entity P if and only if it is impossible that P should
exist and Q not exist, where P is possible.
Supervenience in my sense amounts to entity P entailing the existence of entity
Q, but the entailment restricted to the cases where P is possible.
We shall say that Q supervenes upon P if and only if there are P-worlds and all
P-worlds are Q-worlds. (A P-world is world that contains the entity P. If P is an
universal, then the world contains at least one instantiation of P)
An important case for us that falls under these definitions is that of internal
relations. In this work it will be said that a relation is internal to its terms if and
only if it is impossible that the terms should exist and the relation not exist,
where the joint existence of the terms is possible. Or again, the joint existence of
the terms being possible, they entail the existence of the relation. Or, finally,
there are worlds in which all the terms exist, and in all those worlds the relation
holds.
These definitions of supervenience leave it open that P also supervenes upon
Q. An example of symmetrical supervenience is furnished by mereology. The
mereological whole supervenes upon its parts, but equally the parts supervene
upon the whole.

2.12 The ontological free lunch

It will be used as a premiss in this work that whatever supervenes or, as we can
also say, is entailed or necessitated, in this way, is not something ontologically
additional to the subvenient, or necessitating, entity or entities. What
supervenes is no addition of being. Thus, internal relations are not ontologically
additional to their terms. Mereological wholes are not ontologically additional to
their parts, nor are the parts ontologically additional to the whole that they
compose.