Civil Law Mock Bar

2010 BAR EXAMINATION
Note:
Although the questions, as framed, do not require reasons for the True or False
Answers, proper explanations are herein provided to aid in the evaluation of the answers of the
examinees.
I
True or False.
A.
Under Article 26 of the Family Code, when a foreign spouse divorces his/her
Filipino spouse, the latter may re-marry by proving only that the foreign spouse has obtained a
divorce against her or him abroad. (1%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
False.
In Garcia v. Recio, 366 SCRA 437 (2001), the SC held that for a Filipino spouse to have
capacity to contract a subsequent marriage, it must also be proven that the foreign divorce
obtained by the foreigner spouse gives such foreigner spouse capacity to remarry.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
True.
Art. 26 (2) (FC), clearly provides that the decree of divorce obtained abroad by the
foreigner spouse is sufficient to capacitate the Filipino spouse to remarry.
B.
X, a widower, died leaving a will stating that the house and lot wher he lived
cannot be partitioned for as long as the youngest of his four children desires to stay there. As
coheirs and co-owners, the other three may demand partition anytime. (1%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
FALSE.
The other three co-heirs may not at any time demand the partition of the house and lot since
it was expressly provided by the decedent in his will that the same cannot be partitioned while his
youngest child desires to stay there. Article 1083of the New Civil Code allows a decedent to
prohibit, by will, the partition of a property in his estate for a period not longer than 20 years no
matter what his reason may be. Hence, the three co-heirs cannot' demand its partition at anytime
but only after 20 years from the death of their father. Even if the deceased parent did not leave a
will, if the house andlotponstituted their family home, Article 159 of the Family Code prohibits its
partition for a period often (10) yeans, or for long as there is a minor beneficiary living in the
family home.
II
Multiple choice.
A. A had a 4-storey building which was constructed by Engineer B. After five years,
the building developed cracks and its stairway eventually gave way and collapsed,
resulting to injuries to some lessees. Who should the lessees sue for damages? (1%)
1.
2.
3.
A, the owner
B, the engineer
both A & B
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
3.
BothA&B.
The lessee may proceed against A for breach of contract, and against Bfor tort or
statutory liability.
Under Article 1654 (2, of the) New Civil Code, the lessor is obliged to make all the necessary
repairs in order to keep the leased property suitable for the use to which it has been devoted.
Consequently, under Article 1659 NCC, the proprietor of a building or structure is resppnsiblefor
the damages resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it is due to the lack of necessary repairs.
Under Article 1723 NCC, the engineer or architect who drew up the plans and specifications
for a building is liable for damages if within 15 years from the completion of the structure, the
same should collapse by reason of a defect in those plans and specifications, or due to the defects
in the ground. This liability may be enforced against the architect or engineer even by a t^ird
party who has no privity of contract with the architect or engineer under Article 2192 NCC.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
No. 1. A, the owner.

The lessee can sue only the lessor for breach of contract under Article 1659 in relation to
Article 1654 NCC. The lessee cannot sue the architect or the engineer because there was no
privity of contract between them. When sued, however, the lessor may file a third party claim
against the architect or the engineer.
ANOTHER ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
No. 2. B, the Engineer.

Under Article 1723 (NCC), the engineer or architect who drew up the pl&ns and
specifications for a building is liable for damages if within 15 years from the completion of the
structure, the same should collapse by reason of a defect in those plans and specifications, or due
to the defects in the ground. Under Article 2192 (NCC), however, if the damages should be the
result of any ofthe defect in the construction mentioned in Article 1723 (NCC), the third person
suffering damages may proceed only against the engineer or architect or contractor within the
period fixed therein. The damages suffered by the lessee in the problem are clearly those
resulting from defects in the construction plans or spedfications.
B.
O, owner of Lot A, learning that Japanese soldiers may have buried gold and other
treasures at the adjoining vacant Lot B belonging to spouses X & Y, excavated in Lot B where she
succeeded in unearthing gold and precious stones. How will the treasures found by 0 be divided?
(1%)
1.
2.
3.
4.
100% to 0 as finder
50% to O and 50% to the spouses X and Y
50% to O and 50% to the state
None of the above
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. 4. None of the above.
The general rule is that the treasure shall belong to the spouses X and Y, the owners of Lot B.
Under Article 438 (NCC), the exception is that when the discovery of a hidden treasure is made
on the property of another and by chance, one-half thereof shall belong to the owner of the land
and the other one-half is allowed to the finder. In the problem, the finding of the treasure was
not by chance because O knew that the treasure was in Lot B. While a trespasser is also not
entitled to any share, and there is no indication in the problem whether or not O was a trespasser,
O is not entitled to a share because the finding was not by chance.
A executed a Deed of Donation in favor of B, a bachelor, covering a parcel of land
valued at PI million. B was, however, out of the country at the time. For the donation to be valid,
(1%)
C.
1. B may e-mail A accepting the donation.

2. The donation may be accepted by Bs father with whom he lives.
3. B can accept the donation anytime convenient to him.
4.
Bs mother who has a general power of attorney may accept the donation for him.
5.
None of the above is sufficient to make Bs acceptance valid.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. 5. None of the above is sufficient to make Bs acceptance valid.
Since the donation covered an inmmovable property, the donation and the acceptance
must be in a public document. An e-mail is not a public document. Hence, No. 1 is false.
No. 2 and No. 4 are both false. The acceptance by the donees father alone or mother
alone, even though in a public document, is not sufficient because the father and the mother did
not have a special power of attorney for the purpose. Under Article 745 (NCC), the done must
accept the4 donation personally, or through an authorized person with a special power of
attorney for the purpose; otherwise, thye donation shall be void.
No. 3 is also false. B cannot accept the donation anytime at his convenience. Under Article
749 NCC, the done may accept the donation only during the lifetime of the donor.
B.
A executed a 5-page notarial will before a notary public and three witnesses. All of
them signed each and every page of the will.

One of the witnesses was B, the father of one of the legatees to the will. What is the effect of
B being a witness to the will? (1%)
1.
2.
3.
The will is invalidated

The will is valid and effective
The legacy given to Bs child is not valid
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No. 3. The legacy given to Bs child is not valid.
The validity of the will is not affected by the legacy in favor of the son of an attesting witness
to the will. However, the said legacy is void under Article 823 NCC.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
No. 2. The will is valid and effective.
Under Article 823 (NCC), the legacy given in favor of the son of an instrumental witness to a
will has no effect on the validity of the will. Hence, the will is valid and effective.
Ill
Define, Enumerate or Explain. (2% each)
A.
What is the difference between guaranty and suretyship?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Guaranty and Suretyship distinguished:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
The obligation in guaranty is secondary; whereas, in suretyship, it is primary.

In guaranty, the undertaking is to pay if the principal debtor cannot pay; whereas, in
suretyship, the undertaking is to pay if the principal debtor does not pay.
In guaranty, the guarantor is entitled to the benefit of excussion; whereas, in suretyship
the surety is not so entitled.
Liability in guaranty depends upon an independent agreement to pay the obligations
of the principal if he fails to do so; whereas, in suretyship, the surety assumes liability as
a regular party.
The Guarantor insures the solvency of the principal debtor; whereas, the surety insures
the debt.
In a guaranty, the guarantor is subsidiarily liable; whereas, in a Suretyship, the surety
binds himself solidarily with the principal debtor. (Art. 2047, Civil Code)
B.
Define quasi tort. Who are the persons liable under quasi torts and what are the
defenses available to them?
NOTE: It is recommended that the examiner exercise leniency and liberality in grading the
answers given to this question. The term quasi-tort is not a part of legal developments in
civil law. In Philippine legal tradition, quasi-delict has been treated as the closest civil law
equivalent of the common law tort. In fact, in a number of Supreme Court decisions, the two
terms have been considered synonymous. In reality, however, the common law tort is much
broader in scope than the civil law quasi-delict.
In recent developments in common law, the concept of quasi-torts can be considered as
the closest common law equivalent of the civil law concept of quasi-delict. This is because it
is argued that the growing recognition of quasi-torts as a source of obligation is hinged on
the acceptance at common law of the civil law principles of quasi-delict. 1
FIRST SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Quasi-tort is a legal concept upholding the doctrine that some legal duty exists that can not
be classified strictly as a personal duty (that is, resulting in a tort), nor as a contractual duty (thus
resulting in a breach of contract) but rather some other kind of duty recognizable by the law.
Tort or Quasi-Tort is an Anglo American or Common Law concept, while Delict or QuasiDelict is a Civil Law concept. (Wikipedia Encyclopedia)
SECOND SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Quasi-tort is considered as the equivalent of quasidelict. Hence the rules of the latter
pertaining to persons who can be held liable and their defenses would also apply.
Those liable for quasi-delict include:
1.
2.
The tortfeasor or the person causing damage to another through fault or negligence
(Article 2176 NCC); and
Persons vicariously liable under Article 2180 (NCC).
The defenses available include:

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
That the defendant was not negligent or that he exercised due diligence (Article
2176 NCC).
That although the defendant is negligent, his negligence is not the proximate cause
of the injury. (Article 2179 NCC).
That the plaintiffs own negligence was the immediate and proximate cause of his
injury (Article 2179 NCC).
That the person vicariously liable has observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage (2180 NCC).
That the cause of action has prescribed after the lapse of 4 years (Article 1146 NCC).
The fact that the plaintiff had committed contributory negligence is a partial defense
(Article 2179 NCC).
C.
case.
Give at least two reasons why a court may assume jurisdiction over a conflict of laws
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1)
Statute theory. There is a domestic law authorizing the local court to
assume jurisdiction.
2)
Comity theory. The local court assumes jurisdiction based on the principle
of comity or courtesy.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
1. Public
Order. To maintain peace and order, disputes that disturb the peace of the forum
should be settled by the courts of the forum even though the application of a foreign law is
necessary for the purpose.
2. Humanitarian Principle. An aggrieved party should not be left without remedy in a forum
even though the application of a foreign law by the courts of the forum is unavoidable in order to
extend relief.
IV
Spouses B and G begot two offsprings. Albeit they had serious personality differences, the
spouses continued to live under one roof. B begot a son by another woman. G also begot a
daughter by another man.
If G gives the surname of B to her daughter by another man, what can B do to protect
their legitimate childrens interests? Explain. (5%)
A.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
B can impugn the status of Gs daughter by another man as his legitimate daughter on the
ground that for biological reason he could not have been the father of the child, a fact that may
be proven by the DNA test. Having been born during the marriage between B and G, Gs
daughter by another man is presumed as the child of B under Article 164 of the Family Code. In
the same action to impugn, B can pray for the correction of the status of the said daughter in her
record of birth.
B. If B acquiesces to the use of his surname by Gs daughter by another man, what is/are
the consequence/s? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If B acquiesces and does not file the action to impugn the legitimacy of the child within the
prescriptive period for doing so in Article 170 of the Family Code, Gs daughter by another man
shall be conclusively presumed as the legitimate daughter of B by G.
V
G filed on July 8, 2000 a petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage to B. During the
pendency of the case, the couple entered into a compromise agreement to dissolve their absolute
community of property. B ceded his right to their house and lot and all his shares in two business
firms to G and their two children, aged 18 and 19.
B also opened a bank account in the amount of P3 million in the name of the two children to
answer for their educational expenses until they finish their college degrees.
For her part, G undertook to shoulder the day-to-day living expenses and upkeep of the
children. The Court approved the spouses agreement on September 8, 2000.
Suppose the business firms suffered reverses, rendering G unable to support herself and
the children. Can G still ask for support pendente lite from B? Explain. (3%)
A.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, G can still ask for support from B because during the pendency of the action, the
marriage between them is considered still subsisting (Article 68, Family Code). Being considered
still married to each other, B and G still have the obligation to support each other. The
compromise agreement cannot operate to waive future support when needed (Article 2035, Civil
Code).
After the compromise agreement was approved by the court and the properties of the
marriage were distributed, there remained no more common properties of B and G. While Article
198 of the Family Code appears ' to limit the source of support to the common properties of the
said marriage in case of the pendency of an action to declare the nullity of marriage, Article 94
and Article 121 indicate otherwise. Under the said Articles, the spouses remain personally and
solidarily liable with their separate properties for support even though, for whatever reason, there
are no more community or partnership properties left.
The judgment based on the compromise dissolving the property relations of B and G does
not bar G from asking support pendente lite. The dissolution of the property relations of the
spouses did not terminate the obligation between them to support each other. The declaration
of the nullity of their marriage is what terminates the right of G to be supported by B as his
spouse.
Suppose in late 2004 the two children had squandered the P3 million fund for their
education before they could obtain their college degrees, can they ask for more support from B?
Explain. (3%)
B.
Yes, the two children can still ask for support for schooling or training for some profession,
trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority until they shall have finished or completed
their education (Article 194, Paragraph 2, Family Code; Javier v. Lucero, 94 Phil. 634 [1954]).
Their having squandered the money given to them for their education will not deprive them of
their right to complete an education, or to extinguish the obligation of the parents to ensure the
future of their children.
Gigolo entered into an agreement with Majorette for her to carry in her womb his baby via
in vitro fertilization. Gigolo undertook to underwrite Majorettes pre-natal expenses as well as
those attendant to her delivery. Gigolo would thereafter pay Majorette P2 million and, in return,
she would give custody of the baby to him.
After Majorette gives birth and delivers the baby to Gigolo following her receipt of P2
million, she engages your services as her lawyer to regain custody of the baby.
A.
What legal action can you file on behalf of Majorette? Explain. (2.5%)

As her lawyer, I can file a petition for habeas corpus on behalf of Majorette to recover
custody of her child. Since she is the mother of the child that was born out of wedlock, she has
exclusive parental authority and custody over the child. Gigolo, therefore, has no right to have
custody of the child and his refusal to give up custody will constitute illegal detention for which
habeas corpus is the proper remedy.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The action to regain custody will not prosper. In the first place Majorette can not regain
custody of the baby. As surrogate mother she merely carries the child in her womb for its
development. The child is the child of the natural parents - Gigolo and his partner. The
agreement between Gigolo and Majorette is a valid agreement.
B. Can
Gigolo demand from Majorette the return of the P2 million if he returns the baby?
Explain. (2.5%)
No, he cannot. Both he and Majorette are guilty of violating the provision of the Anti-Child
Abuse Law (RA7610) on child trafficking. Being in pari delicto, the parties shall be left where they
are and Gigolo cannot demand the return of what he paid.
Yes. The agreement between Gigolo and Majorette is a valid agreement.
C. Who of the two can exercise parental authority over the child? Explain. (2.5%)
Majorette, the mother, can exercise parental authority. Since the child was born out of
wedlock, the child is illegitimate and the mother has the exclusive parental authority and custody
over the child.
Gigolo can exercise parental authority over the child. Majorette has no blood relation to the
child. She is just a carrier of the child.
D.
Is the child entitled to support and inheritance from Gigolo? Explain. (2.5%)

If Gigolo voluntarily recognized the child as his illegitimate child in accordance with Article
175 in relation to Article 172 of the Family Code, the child is entitled to support and inheritance
from Gigolo.
Yes, because Gigolo is the natural and biological parent of the baby.
VII
G and B were married on July 3, 1989. On March 4, 2001, the marriage, which bore no
offspring, was declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code. At the time of the
dissolution of the marriage, the couple possessed the following properties:
A.
a house and lot acquired by B on August 3, 1988, one third (1/3) of the purchase
price (representing down payment) of which he paid; one third (1/3) was paid
by G on February 14, 1990 out of a cash gift given to her by her parents on her
graduation on April 6, 1989; and the balance was paid out of the spousesjoint
income; and
an apartment unit donated to B by an uncle on June 19, 1987.
Who owns the foregoing properties? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Since the marriage was declared void ab initio in 2001, no Absolute Community or Conjugal
Partnership was ever established between B and G. Their property relation is governed by a
special co-ownership under Article 147 of the Family Code because they were capacitated to
marry each other. Under that Article 147, wages and salaries of the former spouses earned
during their cohabitation shall be owned by them in equal shares while properties acquired thru
their work or industry shall be owned by them in proportion to their respective contributions.
Care and maintenance of the family is recognized as a valuable contribution. In the absence of
proof as to the value of their respective contributions, they shall share equally.
If ownership over the house and lot was acquired by B on August 3,1988 at the time he
bought it on installment before he got married, he shall remain owner of the house and lot but he
must reimburse G for all the amounts she advanced to pay the purchase price and for her onehalf share in the last payment from their joint income. In such case, the house and lot were not
acquired during their cohabitation, hence, are not co-owned by B and G.
But if the ownership of the house and lot was acquired during the cohabitation, the house
and lot will be owned as follows:
1)
1/3 of the house and lot is owned by B. He is an undivided co-owner to that extent for
his contribution in its acquisition in the form of the down payment he made before the
celebration of the marriage. The money he used to pay the down payment was not
earned during the cohabitation, hence, it is his exclusive property.
2)
1 / 3 of the house and lot is owned by G. She is an undivided co-owner to the extent for
her contribution in its acquisition when she paid 1/ 3 of the purchase price using the
gift from her parents. Although the gift was acquired by G during her cohabitation with
B, it is her exclusive property. It did not consist of wage or salary or fruit of her work or
industry
3)
1/3ofthe house is co-owned by B and G because

the payment came from their co-owned funds,
i.
e., their joint income during their cohabitation which is shared by them equally in
the absence of any proof to the contrary.
After summing up their respective shares, B and G are undivided co-owners of the house
and lot in equal shares.
As to the apartment, it is owned exclusively by B because he acquired it before their
cohabitation. Even if he acquired it during their cohabitation it will still be his exclusive property
because it did not come from his wage or salary, or from his work or industry. It was acquired
gratuitously from his uncle.
B.
If G and B had married on July 3, 1987 and their marriage was dissolved in 2007, who
owns the properties? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The answer is the same as in letter A. Since the parties to the marriage which was
later declared void ab initio were capacitated to marry each other, the applicable law under
the New Civil Code was Article 144. This Article is substantially the same as Article 147 of the
Family Code. Hence, the determination of ownership will remain the same as in question A.
And even assuming that the two provisions are not the same, Article 147 of the Family Code is
still the law that will govern the property relations of B and G because under Article 256, the
Family Code has retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights under the New Civil Code or other laws. Applying Article 147 retroactively to the case of
G and B will not impair any vested right. Until the declaration of nullity of the marriage under
the Family Code, B and G have not as yet acquired any vested right over the properties
acquired during their cohabitation.
VIII.
Spouses Rex and Lea bore two children now aged 14 and 8. During the subsistence of their
marriage, Rex begot a child by another woman. He is now 10 years of age.
On Leas discovery of Rexs fathering a child by another woman, she filed a petition for
legal separation which was granted.
Rex now wants to adopt his illegitimate child.

A.
Whose consent is needed for Rexs adoption of his illegitimate child? (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The consent of the 14-year-old legitimate child, of the 10-year-old illegitimate child, and
of the biological mother of the illegitimate child are needed for the adoption. (Section 7 and 9,
RA 8552). The consent of Lea is no longer required because there was already a final decree of
legal separation.
B.
If there was no legal separation, can Rex still adopt
his illegitimate child? Explain. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, he can still adopt his illegitimate child but with the consent of his spouse, of his
14-year-old legitimate child, of the illegitimate child, and of the biological mother of the
illegitimate child (Section 7 and 9, RA 8552).
IX
Eighteen-year old Filipina Patrice had a daughter out of wedlock whom she named Laurie.
At 26, Patrice married American citizen John who brought her to live with him in the United
States of America. John at once signified his willingness to adopt Laurie.
Can John file the petition for adoption? If yes, what are the requirements? If no, why? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, John cannot file the petition to adopt alone. Philippine law requires husband and wife
to adopt jointly except in certain situations enumerated in the law. The case of John does not fall
in any of the exceptions. (.R.A. 8552).
X
In 1997, B and G started living together without the benefit of marriage. The relationship
produced one offspring, Venus. The couple acquired a residential lot in Paranaque. After four (4)
years or in 2001, G having completed her 4- year college degree as a fulltime student, she and B
contracted marriage without a license.
The marriage of B and G was, two years later, declared null and void due to the absence of
a marriage license.
If you were the judge who declared the nullity of the marriage, to whom would you
award the lot? Explain briefly. (3%)
A.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Since the marriage was null and void, no Absolute Community or Conjugal Partnership was
established between B and G. Their properties are governed by the special co-ownership
provision of Article 147 of the Family Code because both B and G were capacitated to marry
each other. The said Article provides that when a man and a woman who are capacitated to
marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage, or under a void marriage: (1) their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal
shares; and (2) property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership. In co-ownership, the parties are co-owners if they
contributed something of value in the acquisition of the property. Their share is in proportion to
their respective contributions. In an ordinary co- ownership the care and maintenance of the
family is not recognized as a valuable contribution for the acquisition of a property. In the Article
147 special co-ownerships, however, care and maintenance is recognized as a valuable
contribution which will entitle the contributor to half.of the property acquired.
Having been acquired during their cohabitation, the residential lot is presumed acquired
through their joint work and industry under Article 147, hence, B and G are co-owners of the said
property in equal shares.
Article 147 also provides that when a party to the void marriage was in bad faith, he forfeits
his share in the co-ownership in favor of the common children or descendants. In default of
children or descendants, the forfeited share shall belong to the innocent party. In the foregoing
problem, there is no showing that one party was in bad faith. Hence, both shall be presumed in
good faith and no forfeiture shall take place.
B.
Is Venus legitimate, illegitimate, or legitimated? Explain briefly. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Venus is illegitimate. She was conceived and born outside a valid marriage. Thus, she is
considered illegitimate (.Article 165, Family Code). While Venus was legitimated by the
subsequent marriage of her parents, such legitimation was rendered ineffective when the said
marriage was later on declared null and void due to absence of a marriage license.
Under Article 178 of the Family Code, legitimation shall take place by a subsequent valid
marriage between parents. The annulment of a voidable marriage shall not affect the
legitimation. The inclusion of the underscored portion in the Article necessarily implies
that the Articles application is limited to voidable marriages. It follows that when the subsequent
marriage is null and void, the legitimation must also be null and void. In the present problem, the
marriage between B and G was not voidable but void. Hence, Venus has remained an illegitimate
child.
XI
The spouses Peter and Paula had three (3) children. Paula later obtained a judgment of
nullity of marriage. Their absolute community of property having been dissolved, they delivered
PI million to each of their 3 children as their presumptive legitimes.
Peter later re-married and had two (2) children by his second wife Marie. Peter and Marie,
.having successfully engaged in business, acquired real properties. Peter later died intestate.
A.
Who are Peters legal heirs and how will his estate be divided among them?. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The legal heirs of Peter are his children by the first and second marriages and his surviving
second wife.
Their shares in the estate of Peter will depend, however, on the cause of the nullity of the first
marriage. If the nullity of the first marriage was psychological incapacity of one or both spouses,
the three children of that void marriage are legitimate and all of the legal heirs shall share the
estate of Peter in equal shares. If the judgment of nullity was for other causes, the three children
are illegitimate and the estate shall be distributed such that an illegitimate child of the first
marriage shall receive half the share of a legitimate child of the second marriage, and the second
wife will inherit a share equal to that of a legitimate child. In no case may the two legitimate
children of the second marriage receive a share less than one-half of the estate which is their
legitime.
When
the
estate
is
not
sufficient
to
pay
all
the
legitimes of the compulsory heirs, the legitime of the spouse is preferred and the illegitimate
children will suffer the reduction.
Computation:
A.
If the ground of nullity is psychological incapacity:
3 children by first marriage ------------------ 1/6th of the estate for each
2 children by second marriage -------------- 1/6th of the estate for each
Surviving second spouse --------------------- 1/6th of the estate
B.
If the ground of nullity is not psychological incapacity
2 legitimate children --------------------------- 1/4 of the estate for each of second marriage
Surviving second spouse ---------------------1/4 of the estate
3 illegitimate children -------------------------- 1/12 of estate for each of first marriage
Note: The legitime of an illegitimate child is
supposed to be Yu the legitime of a legitimate child or 1/ 8th of the estate. But the estate will not
be sufficient to pay the said legitimes of the 3 illegitimate children, because only Y* of the estate
is left after paying the legitime of the surviving spouse which is preferred. Hence, the remaining
Y* of the estate shall be divided among the 3 illegitimate children.
B.
What is the effect of the receipt by Peters 3 children by his first marriage of their
presumptive legitimes on their right to inherit following Peters death? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
In the distribution of Peters estate, one-half of the presumptive legitime received by the
three children of the first marriage shall be collated to Peters estate and shall be imputed as an
advance on their respective inheritance from Peter. Only half of the presumptive legitime is
collated to the estate of Peter because the other half shall be collated to the estate of his first
wife.
XII
On May 5, 1989, 16-year old Rozanno, who was issued a student permit, drove to school a
car, a gift from his parents. On even date, as his class was scheduled to go on a field trip, his
teacher requested him to accommodate in his car, as he did, four (4) of his classmates because
the van rented by the school was too crowded. On the way to a museum which the students were
scheduled to visit, Rozanno made a wrong maneuver, causing a collision with a jeepney. One of
his classmates died. He and the three (3) others were badly injured.
A.
Who is liable for the death of Rozannos classmate and the injuries suffered by
Rozanno and his 3 other classmates? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
At the time the incident occurred in May 1989, Rozanno was still a minor. Being a minor,
Article 218 of the Family Code applies. Pursuant to Article 218, the school, its administrators and
teachers shall be liable for the acts of the minor Rozanno because of the special parental
authority and responsibility that they exercise over him. This authority applies to all authorized
activities, whether inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution. The field trip,
on which occasion Rozanno drove the car, was an authorized activity, and, thus, covered by the
provision. Furthermore, the parents of Rozanno are subsidiarily liable pursuant to Article 219
(FC), and principally liable under Article 221 (FC), if they were negligent.
B.
How about the damage to the jeepney? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
With respect to the damages caused to the jeepney, only Rozanno should be held liable
because his negligence or tortious act was the sole, proximate, and immediate cause thereof.
Under the same facts, except the date of occurrence of the incident, this time in mid1994, what would be your answer? Explain. (2%)
C.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Since Rozanno was 16 years old in 1989, if the incident happened sometime in the middle of
1994, Rozanno would have been 21 years old at that time. Hence, he was already of legal age.
The law reducing the age of majority to 18 years took effect in December 1989.
Being of legal age, Articles 218, 219, and 221 of the Family Code are no longer applicable.
In such case, only Rozanno will be personally responsible for all the consequences of his act unless
the school or his parents were themselves also negligent and such negligence contributed to the
happening of the incident. In that event, the school or his parents are not liable under Article 218,
219 or 221 of the Family Code, but will be liable under the general provisions of the Civil Code on
quasi-delict.
Franz was the owner of Lot E which was surrounded by four (4) lots one of which - Lot C - he
also owned. He promised Ava that if she bought Lot E, he would give her a right of way in Lot C.
Convinced, Ava bought Lot E and, as promised, Franz gave her a right of way in Lot C.
Ava cultivated Lot E and used the right of way granted by Franz.
Ava later found gainful employment abroad. On her return after more than 10 years, the
right of way was no longer available to her because Franz had in the meantime sold Lot C to
Julia who had it fenced.
A.
Does Ava have a right to demand from Julia the activation of her right of way?
Explain. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. Ava has the right to demand from Julia the activation of the right of way, for the
following reasons:
1)
An easement of right of way is a real right which attaches to, and is inseparable from,
the estate to which it belongs.
2)
The sale of the property includes the easement or servitude, even if the deed of sale is
silent on the matter.
3)
The vendee of the property in which a servitude or easement exists cannot close or
put up obstructions thereon to prevent the dominant estate from using it.
4)
Avas working abroad for more than ten (10) years should not be construed as nonuser, because it cannot be implied from the facts that she or those whom she left
behind to cultivate the lot no longer use the right of way.
Note: Since a right of way is a discontinuous

easement, the period of 10 years of non-user shall be computed from the day it ceased to be
used under Art. 6341(2) CC.
Renunciation or waiver of an easement must be specific, clear, express and made in a
public instrument in accordance with Article 1358 of the New Civil Code.
5)
ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Yes. Ava has the right to demand from Julia the activation of her right of way. A voluntary
easement of right of way, like any other contract, could be extinguished only by mutual
agreement or by renunciation of the owner of the dominant estate. Also, like in any other
contract, an easement is generally effective between parties, their heirs and assigns, except in
case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their
nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law (Unisource Commercial v. Chung, 593 SCRA 530
[2009]).
B.
Assuming Ava opts to demand a right of way from any of the owners of Lots A, B, and D, can
she do that? Explain. (2.5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. Ava has the option to demand a right of way on any of the remaining lots of Franz more
so after Franz sold Lot C to Julia. The essential elements of a legal right of way under Article 649
and 650 of the New Civil Code are complied with.
Yes. Ava has the option to demand a right of way from the other lots. The law provides that
whenever a piece of land acquired by sale, exchange or partition is surrounded by other estates
of the vendor, exchanger, or co-owner, he shall be obliged to grant a right of way without
indemnity (Art. 652, NCC).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
No. There was merely a promise to Ava that a right of way shall be granted to her in Lot C if
Ava purchased Lot
The promise was not reduced into writing (Obra v. Baldria, 529 SCRA 621 [2007]). Hence, it
was not or could not have been registered as to warn buyers of Lot C about the existence of the
easement on the property. Not having been annotated on the TCT to Lot C, the buyer acquired
Lot C free from such right of way granted to Ava.
E.
XIV
Primo owns a pet iguana which he keeps in a manmade pond enclosed by a fence situated
in his residential lot. A typhoon knocked down the fence of the pond and the iguana crawled out
of the gate of Primos residence. N, a neighbor who was passing by, started throwing stones at the
iguana, drawing the iguana to move toward him. N panicked and ran but tripped on something
and suffered a broken leg.
Is anyone liable for Ns injuries? Explain. (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No one is liable. The possessor of an animal or whoever may make use of the same is
responsible for the damage which it may cause, although it may escape or be lost. This
responsibility shall cease only in case the damage should come from force majeure or from the
fault of the person who has suffered damage (Art. 2183,New Ciml Code).
XV
A, B, and C entered into a partnership to operate a restaurant business. When the restaurant
had gone past break-even stage and started to gamer considerable profits, C died. A and B
continued the business without dissolving the partnership. They in fact opened a branch of the
restaurant, incurring obligations in the process. Creditors started demanding for the payment of
their obligations.
A. Who are liable for the settlement of the partnerships obligations? Explain? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The two remaining partners, A and B, are liable. When any partner dies and the business is
continued without any settlement of accounts as between him or his estate, the surviving
partners are held liable for continuing the business despite the death of C (Articles 1841, 1785,
par. 2, and 1833 of theNew Civil Code).

B.
What are the creditors recourse/s? Explain. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Creditors can file the appropriate actions, for instance, an action for the collection of sum of
money against the partnership at will and if there are no sufficient funds, the creditors may go
after the private properties of Aand B (Article 816,New Civil Code). Creditors may also sue the
estate of C. The estate is not excused from the liabilities of the partnership even if C is dead
already but only up to the time that he remained a partner (Article 1829, 1835, par. 2; NCC,
Testate Estate of Mota v. Serra, 47 Phil. 464 [1925]). However, the liability of Cs individual
property shall be subject first to the payment of his separate debts (Article 1835,New Civil
Code).
XVI
X was the owner of an unregistered parcel of land in Cabanatuan City. As she was abroad,
she advised her sister Y via overseas call to sell the land and sign a contract of sale on her
behalf.
Y thus sold the land to B1 on March 31, 2001 and executed a deed of absolute sale on
behalf of
X. B1 fully paid the purchase price.
B2, unaware of the sale of the land to Bl, signified to Y his interest to buy it but asked Y for
her authority from X. Without informing X that she had sold the land to Bl, Y sought X for a
written authority to sell.
X e-mailed Y an authority to sell the land. Y thereafter sold the land on May 1, 2001 to B2 on
monthly installment basis for two years, the first installment to be paid at the end of May 2001.
Who between B1 and B2 has a better right over the land? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
B-2 has a better title. This is not a case of double sale since the first sale was void. The law
provides that when a sale of a piece of land or any interest therein is through an agent, the
authority of the latter shall be in writing; otherwise, the sale shall be void (Article 1874,New Civil
Code). The property was sold by Y to Bl without any written authority from the owner X. Hence,
the sale to Bl was void.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Under the facts, B-l has a better right to the land. Given the fact that the Deed of Sale in
favor of B-1 and B- 2 are not inscribed in the Registry of Deeds, the case is governed by Article
1544 of the New Civil Code which provides that in case of double sales of an immovable property,
the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith was first in possession and in the
absence thereof to the person who presents the oldest title, provided there is good faith.
In a case, the Supreme Court has held that in a sale of real estate the execution of a notarial
document of sale is tantamount to delivery of the possession of the property sold. Ownership of
the land therefore pertains to the lmt buyer. It may also be mentioned that under Act 3344 no
instruments or deed establishing, transmitting, acknowledging, modifying, or extinguishing right
to real property not registered under Act 496 shall be valid between the parties. Thus, the Deed
of Sale of B-2 has no binding effect on B-1.
- ooOoo 2009 BAR EXAMINATION
PART I
I
TRUE or FALSE. Answer TRUE if the statement is true, or FALSE if the statement is false.
Explain your answer in not more than two (2) sentences. (5%)
[a]
The doctrine of processual presumption allows the court of the forum to presume
that the foreign law applicable to the case is the same as the local or domestic law.

TRUE. If the foreign law necessary to resolve an issue is not proven as a fact, the court of the
forum may presume that the foreign law is the same as the law of the forum.
[b] In reserva troncal, all reservatarios (reservees) inherit as a class and in equal shares
regardless pf their proximity in degree to the prepositus
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
FALSE. Not all of the relatives within the third degree will inherit as reservatario, and not all
of those who are entitled to inherit will inherit in equal shares. The applicable laws of intestate
succession will determine who among the relatives will inherit as reservatarios and what shares
they will take, i.e., the direct line excludes the collateral, the descending direct line excludes the
ascending, the nearer excludes the more remote, the nephews and nieces exclude the uncles and
the aunts, and half blood relatives inherit half the share of full- blood relatives.
[c]
An oral partnership is valid.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
TRUE. Partnership is a consensual contract,hence, it is valid even though not in writing.

TRUE. An oral contract of partnership is valid even though not in writing. However, if it
involves contribution of an immovable property or a real right, an oral contract of partnership is
void. In such a case, the contract of partnership to be valid, must be in a public instrument (Art.
1771, NCC), and the inventory of said property signed by the parties must be attached to said
public instrument (Art. 1773, NCC.).
TRUE. Partnership is a consensual contract, hence, it is valid even though not in writing.
The oral contract of partnership is also valid even if an immovable property or real right is
contributed thereto. While the law^ in such a case, requires the partnership to be in a public
document, the law does not expressly declare the contract void if not executed in the required
form (Article 1409[7], NCC). And there being nothing in the law from which it can be inferred
that the said requirement is prohibitory or mandatory (Article 5, NCC), the said oral contract of
partnership must also be valid. The interested party may simply require the contract to be made
into a public document in order to comply with the required form (Article 1357, NCC). The
purpose of the law in requiring a public document is simply to notify the public about the
contribution.
[d]
An oral promise of guaranty is valid and binding.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
FALSE. An oral contract of guaranty, being a special promise to answer for the debt of
another, is unenforceable unless in writing (Article 1403 [2] b, NCC).
TRUE. An oral promise of guaranty is valid and binding. While the contract is valid,
however, it is unenforceable because it is not in writing. Being a special promise to answer for
the debt, default, or miscarriage of another, the Statute of Frauds requires it to be in writing to
be enforceable (Article 1403 [2] b, NCC). The validity of a contract should be distinguished
from its enforceability.
[d]
A dead child can be legitimated.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
TRUE. To be legitimated, the law does not require a child to be alive at the time of the
marriage of his/her parents (Article 177, FC). Furthermore, Art. 181 of the Family Code which
states that [Th]e legitimation of children who died before the celebration of marriage will
benefit their descendants, does not preclude instances where such legitimation will benefit no
one but the childs ascendants, or other relatives.
with his three children one of whom is Roberto as beneficiaries.
Marilyn is now claiming for herself and her children her husbands share in the estate left
by Dr. Lopez, and her husbands share in the proceeds of Dr. Lopezs life insurance policy. Rule
on the validity of Marilyns claims with reasons. (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
As to the Estate of Dr. Lopez:
Marilyn is not entitled to a share in the estate of Dr. Lopez. For purposes of succession,
Dr. Lopez and his son Roberto are presumed to have died at the same time, there being no
evidence to prove otherwise, and there shall be no transmission of rights from one to the
other (Article 43, NCC). Hence, Roberto inherited nothing from his father that Marilyn would
in turn inherit from Roberto. The children of Roberto, however, will succeed their
grandfather, Dr. Lopez, in representation of their father Roberto and together will receive 1/3
of the estate of Dr. Lopez since their father Roberto was one of the three children of Dr.
Lopez. Marilyn cannot represent her husband Roberto because the right is not given by law to
a surviving spouse.
As to the proceeds of the insurance on the life of Dr. Lopez:
Since succession is not involved as regards the insurance is not involved as regular the
insurance contract, the provisions of the Rules of Court (Rule 131, Sec. 3, [jj] [5]) on
survivorship shall apply. Under Rules, Dr. Lopez, who was 70 years old, is presumed to have
died ahead of Roberto, who is presumably between the ages of 15 and 60. Having survived
the insured, Robertos right as a beneficiary became vested upon the death of Dr. Lopez.
When Roberto died after Dr. upon the death of Dr. Lopez. When Roberto died after Dr.
Lopez, his right to receive the insurance proceeds became part of his hereditary estate, which
in turn was inherited in equal shares by his legal heirs, namely, his spouse and children.
Therefore, Robertos children and his spouse are entitled to Robertos one-third share in the
insurance proceeds.
III
In December 2000, Michael and Anna, after obtaining a valid marriage license, went to the
Office of the Mayor of Urbano, Bulacan, to get married. The Mayor was not there, but the
Mayors secretary asked Michael and Anna and their witnesses to fill up and sign the required
marriage contract forms. The secretary then told them to wait, and went out to look for the
Mayor who was attending a wedding in a neighboring municipality.
When the secretary caught up with the Mayor at the wedding reception, she showed him
the marriage contract forms and told him that the couple and their witnesses were waiting in his
office. The Mayor forthwith signed all the copies of the marriage contract, gave them to the
secretary who returned to the Mayors office.' She then gave copies of the marriage contract to
the parties, and told Michael and Anna that they were already married. Thereafter, the couple
lived together as husband and wife, and had three sons.
[a]
Is the marriage of Michael and Anna valid, voidable, or void? Explain your answer. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The marriage is void because the formal requisite of marriage ceremony was absent (Art. 3,
F.C. 209, Family Code).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The marriage is void because an essential requisite was absent: consent of the parties freely
given in the presence of the solemnizing officer (Art. 2, FC).
[b]
What is the status of the three children of Michael and Anna? Explain your
answer. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The children are illegitimate, having been born outside a valid marriage.
[c] What property regime governs the properties acquired by the couple? Explain.
(2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The marriage being void, the property relationship that governed their union is special coownership under Article 147 of the Family Code. This is on the assumption that there was no
impediment for them to validly marry each other.
IV
Harry married Wilma, a very wealthy woman. Barely five (5) years into the marriage,
Wilma fell in love with Joseph. Thus, Wilma went to a small country in Europe, became a
naturalized citizen of that country, divorced j Harry, and married Joseph. A year thereafter, Wilma
and Joseph returned and established permanent residence in the Philippines.
[a] Is the divorce obtained by Wilma from Harry-recognized in the Philippines? Explain
your answer. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
As to Wilma, the divorce obtained by her is recognized as valid in the Philippines
because she is now a foreigner. Philippine personal laws do not apply to a foreigner. However,
recognition of the divorce as regards Harry will depend on the applicability to his case of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. If it is applicable, divorce is recognized as to
him and, therefore, he can remarry. However, if it is not applicable, divorce is not recognized as
to him and, consequently, he cannot remarry.
Yes, the divorce obtained by Wilma is recognized as valid in the Philippines. At the time she
got the divorce, she was already a foreign national having been naturalized as a citizen of that
small country in Europe. Based on precedents established by the Supreme Court (Bayot v. CA,
570SCRA 472 [2008]), divorce obtained by a foreigner is recognized in the Philippines if validly
obtained in' accordance with his or her national law.
[b]
If Harry hires you as his lawyer, what legal recourse would you advise him to take?
Why? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
I will advice Harry to:
(1)
dissolve and liquidate his property relations with Wilma; and
(2)
if he will remarry, file a petition for the recognition and enforcement of the foreign
judgment of divorce (Rule 39, Rules of Court).
(3)
Harry tells you that he has fallen in love with another woman, Elizabeth, and wants to
marry her because, after all, Wilma is already married to Joseph. Can Harry legally
marry Elizabeth? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, he can validly marry Elizabeth, applying the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court in
Republic v. Obrecido (427 SCRA 114 [2005]).
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, for the Filipino spouse to have
capacity to remarry, the law expressly requires the spouse who obtained the divorce to be a
foreigner at the time of the marriage. Applying this requirement to the case of Harry, it would
seem that he is not given the capacity to remarry. This is because Wilma was a Filipino at the time
of her marriage to Harry.
In Republic v. Obrecido, however, the Supreme Court ruled that a Filipino spouse is given
the capacity to remarry even though the spouse who obtained the divorce was a Filipino at the
time of the marriage, if the latter was already a foreigner when the divorce was obtained abroad.
According to the Court, to rule otherwise will violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
V
Four children, namely: Alberto, Baldomero, Caridad, and Dioscoro, were born to the spouses
Conrado and Clarita de la Costa. The childrens birth certificates were duly signed by Conrado,
showing them to be the couples legitimate children.
Later, one Edilberto de la Cruz executed a notarial document acknowledging Alberto and
Baldomero as his illegitimate children with Clarita. Edilberto died leaving substantial properties.
In the settlement of his estate, Alberto and Baldomero intervened claiming shares as the
deceaseds illegitimate children. The legitimate family of Edilberto opposed the claim.
Are Alberto and Baldomero entitled to share in the estate of Edilberto? Explain. (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Alberto and Baldomero are not entitled to share in Edilbertos estate. They are not
related at all to Edilberto. They were born during the marriage of Conrado and Clarita, hence, are
considered legitimate children of the said spouses. This status is conferred on them at birth by
law.
Under Philippine law, a person cannot have more than one natural filiation. The legitimate
filiation of a person can be changed only if the legitimate father will successfully impugn such
status.
In the problem, therefore, the filiation of Alberto and Baldomero as the legitimate
children of Conrado cannot be changed by their recognition by Edilberto as his illegitimate
children. Before they can be conferred the status of Edilbertos illegitimate children, Conrado
must first impugn their legitimacy. Since Conrado has not initiated any action to impugn their
legitimacy, they continue to be the legitimate children of Conrado. They cannot be the
illegitimate children of Edilberto at the same time. Not being the illegitimate children of
Edilberto, they have no right to inherit from him.
VI
On December 1, 2000, Dr. Juanito Fuentes executed a holographic will, wherein he gave
nothing to his recognized illegitimate son, Jay. Dr. Fuentes left for the United States, passed
the New York medical licensure examinations, resided therein, and became a naturalized
American citizen. He died in New York in 2007. The laws of New York do not recognize
holographic wills or compulsory heirs.
[a] Can the holographic will of Dr. Fuentes be admitted to probate in the Philippines?
Why or why not? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the holographic will of Dr. Fuentes may be admitted to probate in the Philippines because
there is no public policy violated by such probate. The only issue at probate is the due execution
of the will which includes the formal validity of the will. As regards formal validity, the only issue
the court will resolve at probate is whether or not the will was executed in accordance with the
form prescribed by the law observed by the testator in the execution of his will. For purposes of
probate in the Philippines, an alien testator may observe the law of the place where the will was
executed (Article 17, NCC), or the formalities of the law of the place where he resides, or
according to the formalities of the law of his own country, or in accordance with the Philippine
Civil Code (Art. 816, NCC).Since Dr. Fuentes executed his will in accordance with Philippine
law, the Philippine court shall apply the New Civil Code in determining the formal validity of
the holographic will. The subsequent change in the citizenship of Dr. Fuentes did not affect the
law governing the validity of his will. Under the New Civil Code, which was the law used by Dr.
Fuentes, the law in force at the time of execution of the will shall govern the formal validity of
the will (Article 795, NCC).
[b] Assuming that the will is probated in the Philippines, can Jay validly insist that he
be given his legitime? Why or why not? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Jay cannot insist because under New York law he is not a compulsory heir entitled to a
legitime.
The national law of the testator determines who his heirs are, the order that they succeed,
how much their successional rights are, and whether or not a testamentary disposition in his will is
valid (Article 16, NCC). Since, Dr. Fuentes was a US citizen, the laws of New York determines who
his heirs are. And since New York law does not recognize the concept of compulsory heirs, Jay is
not a compulsory heir of Dr. Fuentes entitled to a legitime.
VII
Ramon Mayaman died intestate, leaving a net estate of .P10,000,000.00. Determine how
much each heir will receive : from the estate:
[a] If Ramon is survived by his wife, three full-blood brothers, two half-brothers, and one
nephew (the son of a deceased full-blood brother)? Explain. (3%).
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Having died intestate, the estate of Ramon shall be inherited by his wife and his full and
half blood siblings or their respective representatives. In intestacy, if the wife concurs with no
one but the siblings of the husband, all of them are the intestate heirs of the deceased
husband. The wife will receive half of the intestate estate, while the siblings or their respective
representatives, will inherit the other half to be divided among them equally. If some siblings
are of the full-blood and the others of the half blood, a half blood sibling will receive half the
share of a full-blood sibling.
1.
2.
3.
4.
The wife of Ramon will, therefore, receive one half of the estate or the amount of
P5,000.000.00,
The three (3) full-blood brothers, will, therefore, receive PI,000,000.00 each.
The nephewwill receive PI,000,000.00 by right of representation.
The two (2) half-brothers will receive P500,000.00 each.
[b] If Ramon is survived by his wife, a half-sister, and three nephews (sons of a deceased
full-blood brother)? Explain. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The wife will receive one half of the estate or P5,000,000.00. The other half shall be
inherited by (1) the full-blood brother, represented by his 3 children, and
(2) the half- sister. They will divide that other half between them such that the share of the
half-sister is just half the share of the full-blood brother. The share of the full-blood brother
shall in turn be inherited by the three (3) nephews in equal shares by right of representation.
Therefore, the three (3) nephews will receive PI,111,111.10 each and the half-sister will
receive the sum of PI,666,666.60.
VIII
Jude owned a buiiding which he had leased to several tenants. Without informing his
tenants, Jude sold the building to Ildefonso. Thereafter, the latter notified all the tenants that
he is the new owner of the building. Ildefonso ordered the tenants to vacate the premises within
thirty (30) days from notice because he had other plans for the building. The tenants refused to
vacate, insisting that they will only do so when the term of their lease shall have expired. Is
Ildefonso bound to respect the lease contracts between Jude and his tenants? Explain your
answer. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Ildefonso must respect the lease contracts between Jude and his tenants. While it is
true that the said lease contracts were not registered and annotated on the title to the
property, Ildefonso is still not an innocent purchaser for value. He ought to know the existence
of the lease because the building was already occupied by the tenants at the time he bought it.
Applying the principle of caveat emptor, he should have checked and known the status of the
occupants or their right to occupy the building before buying it.
IX
Before migrating to Canada in 1992, the spouses Teodoro and Anita entrusted all their
legal papers and documents to their nephew, Atty. Tan. Taking advantage of the situation, Atty.
Tan forged a deed of sale, making it appear that he had bought the couples property in Quezon
City. In 2000, he succeeded in obtaining a TCT over the property in his name. Subsequently, Atty.
Tan sold the same property to Luis, who built an auto repair shop on the )ropertv. In 2004, Luis
registered the deed of conveyance, and title over the property was transferred in his name.
In 2006, the spouses Teodoro and Anita came to the Philippines for a visit and discovered what
had happened to their property. They immediately hire you as lawyer. What action or actions
will you institute in order to vindicate their rights? Explain fully. (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
I will institute the following actions against Atty.Tan:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
A civil action for damages for the fraudulent transfer of the title in his name and to
recover the value of the property;
An action against the National Treasurer for compensation from the State Assurance
Fund which is set aside by law to pay those who lose their land or suffer damages as a
consequence of the operation of the Torrens system;
A criminal action for forgery or falsification of public document;
A complaint with the Supreme Court/Integrated Bar of the Philippines to disbar or
suspend him or other disciplinary action for violation or the Code of Professional
Ethics.
Any action against Luis will not prosper because he is an innocent purchaser for value. The
Title to the land he bought was already in the name of the person who sold the property to him
and there is nothing on the title which will make him suspect about the fraud committed by Atty.
Tan.
X
Rommels private car, while being driven by the regular family driver, Amado, hits a
pedestrian causing the latters death. Rommel is not in the car when the incident happened.
[a]
Is Rommel liable for damages to the heirs of the deceased? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Rommel may be held liable for damages if he fails to prove that he exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family (Art. 2180, par. 5, NCC) in selecting and supervising his
family driver. The owner is presumed liable unless he proves the defense of diligence. If the
driver was performing his assigned task when the incident happened, Rommel shall be solidarily
liable with the driver.
In case the driver is convicted of reckless imprudence and cannot pay the civil liability,
Rommel is subsidiarily liable for the damages awarded against the driver and the defense of
diligence is not available.
[b] Would your answer be the same if Rommel was in the car at the time of the
accident? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, my answer would be the same. Rommel, who was in the car, shall be liable for damages
if he could have prevented the misfortune by the use of due diligence in supervising his driver
but failed to exercise it (Art. 2184, NCC). In such a case, his liability is solidary with his driver.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, my answer will be the same except that in such a case the liability of the owner is not
presumed. When the owner is inside the vehicle, he becomes liable only when it is shown that he
could have prevented the misfortune by the use of due diligence (Article 2184, NCC). For the
owner to be held liable, the burden of proving that he could have prevented the misfortune rests
on the shoulder of the victim.
PART II
XI
TRUE or FALSE. Answer TRUE if the statement is true, or FALSE if the statement is false.
Explain your answer in not more than two (2) sentences. (5%)
[a]
A clause in an arbitration contract granting one of the parties the power to choose
more arbitrators than the other renders the arbitration contract void.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
True. The Civil Code provides that Any clause giving one of the parties power to choose
more arbitrators than the other is void and of no effect (Art. 2045, NCC).
[b]
If there is no marriage settlement, the salary of a spouse in an adulterous marriage
belongs to the conjugal partnership of gains.

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
False. In an adulterous relationship, the salary of a married partner belongs to the absolute
community, or conjugal partnership, of such married partner with his or her lawful spouse. Under
Article 148 of the Family Code, the property relations between married partner and his/ her
paramour is governed by ordinary co-ownership where the partners become co-owners only
when they contributed to the acquisition of the property. The paramour is deemed to have not
contributed in the earning of the salary of the married partner.
[c]
Acquisitive prescription of a negative easement runs from the time the owner of the
dominant estate forbids, in a notarized document, the owner of the servient estate
from executing an act which would be lawful without the easement.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
True. In negative easements, acquisitive prescription runs from the moment the owner of
the dominant estate forbade, by an instrument acknowledged before a notary public, the owner
of the servient estate from executing an act which would be lawful without the easement (Art.
621, NCC).
[d]
The renunciation by a co-owner of his undivided share in the co-owned property in

lieu of the performance of his obligation to contribute to taxes and expenses for
the preservation of the property constitutes dacion en pago.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
True. Under the Civil Code, a co-owner may renounce his share in the co-owned property in
lieu of paying for his share in the taxes and expenses for the preservation of the co-owned
property. In effect, there is dacion en pago because the co-owner is discharging his monetary
obligation by paying it with his non-monetary interest in the co-owned property. The fact the he
is giving up his entire interest simply means that he is accepting the value of his interest as
equivalent to his share in the taxes and expenses of preservation.
[e]
A person can dispose of his corpse through an act inter vivos.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
False. A person cannot dispose of his corpse through an act inter vivos, i.e., an act to take
effect during his lifetime. Before his death there is no corpse to dispose. But he is allowed to do so
through an act mortis causa, i.e., an act to take effect upon his death.
XII
Emmanuel and Margarita, American citizens and employees of the U.S. State Department,
got married in the African state of Kenya where sterility is a ground for annulment of marriage.
Thereafter, the spouses were assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Manila. On the first year of the
spouses tour of duty in the Philippines, Margarita filed an annulment case against Emmanuel
before a Philippine court on the ground of her husbands sterility at the time of the celebration
of the marriage.
[a]
Will the suit prosper? Explain your answer. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the suit will not prosper. As applied to foreign nationals with respect to family
relations and status of persons, the nationality principle set forth in Article 15 of the Civil Code
will govern the relations of Emmanuel and Margarita. Since they are American citizens, the
governing law as to the ground for annulment is not Kenyan law which Margarita invokes in
support of sterility as such ground; but should be U.S. law, which is the national law of both
Emmanuel and Margarita as recognized under Philippine law. Hence, the Philippine court will
not give due course to the case based on Kenyan law. The nationality principle as expressed in
the application of national law of foreign nationals by Philippine courts is established by
precedents (Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653 [1989], Garcia v. Recio, 366 SCRA 437 [2001],
Llorente v. Court of Appeals 345 SCRA 92 [2000], and Bayot v. Court of Appeals 570 SCRA 472
[2008]).
The forum has jurisdiction over an action for the annulment of marriage solemnized
elsewhere but only when the party bringing the action is domiciled in the forum. In this case,
none of the parties to the marriage is domiciled in the Philippines. They are here as officials of
the US Embassy whose stay in the country is merely temporary, lasting only during their fixed
tour of duty. Fence, the Philippine courts have no jurisdiction over
the action.
[a]
Assume Emmanuel and Margarita are both Filipinos. After their wedding in Kenya,
they come back and take up residence in the Philippines. Can their marriage be
annulled on the ground of Emmanuels sterility? Explain. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the marriage cannot be annulled under Philippine law. Sterility is not a ground for
annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the Family Code.
No, the marriage cannot be annulled in the Philippines.
The Philippine court shall have jurisdiction over the action to annul the marriage not only
because the parties are residents of the Philippines but because they are Filipino citizens. The
Philippine court, however, shall apply the law of the place where the marriage was celebrated in
determining its formal validity (Article 26,FC; Article 17, NCC).
Since the marriage was celebrated in Kenya in accordance with Kenyan law, the formal
validity of such marriage is governed by Kenyan law and any issue as to the formal validity of that
marriage shall be determined by applying Kenyan law and not Philippine law.
However, while Kenyan law governs the formal validity of the marriage, the legal capacity of the
Filipino parties to the marriage is governed not by Kenyan law but by Philippine law (Article 15,
NCC). Sterility of a party as a ground for the annulment of marriage is not a matter of form but a
matter of legal capacity. Hence, the Philippine court must apply Philippine law in determining
the status of the marriage on the ground of absence or defect in the legal capacity of the Filipino
parties. Since sterility does not constitute absence or defect in the legal capacity of the parties
under Philippine law, there is no ground to avoid or annul the marriage. Hence, the Philippine
court has to deny the petition.
XIII
Rafael, a wealthy bachelor, filed a petition for the adoption of Dolly, a one-year old
foundling who had a severe heart ailment. During the pendency of the adoption proceedings,
Rafael died of natural causes. The Office of the Solicitor General files a motion to dismiss the
petition on the ground that the case can no longer proceed because of the petitioners death.
[a]
Should the case be dismissed? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
It depends on the stage of the proceedings when Rafael died. If he died after all the
requirements under the law have been complied with and the case is already submitted for
resolution, the court may grant the petition and issue a decree of adoption despite the death of
the adopter (Section 13, RA 8552). Otherwise, the death of the petitioner shall have the effect of
terminating the proceedings.
[b]
Will your answer be the same if it was Dolly who died during the pendency of the
adoption proceedings? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, if it was Dolly who died, the case should be dismissed. Her death terminates the
proceedings (Art. 13, Domestic Adoption Law).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
It depends. If all the requirements under the law have already been complied with and the
case is already submitted for resolution, the death of the adoptee should Ljot abate the
proceedings. The court should issue the decree of adoption if it will be for the best interest of
the adoptee. While RA 8552 provides only for the case where it is the petitioner who dies
before the decree is issued, it is with more compelling reason that the decree should ! allowed
in case it is the adoptee who dies because adoption is primarily for his benefit.
XIV
Rodolfo, married to Sharon, had an illicit affair with his secretary, Nanette, a 19-year old
girl, and begot a baby girl, Rona. Nanette sued Rodolfo for damages: actual, for hospital ! and
other medical expenses in delivering the child by I caesarean section; moral, claiming that
Rodolfo promised to j marry her, representing that he was single when, in fact, he was not; and
exemplary, to teach a lesson to like-minded Lotharios.
[a]
If you were the judge, would you award all the claims of Nanette? Explain. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If Rodolfos marriage could not have been possibly known to Nanette or ther is no gross
negligence on the part of Nanette, Rodolfo could be held liable for moral dmages.
If there is gross negligence in a suit for quasi-delict, exemplary damages could be
awarded.
[b]
Suppose Rodolfo later on acknowledges Rona and gives her regular support, can
he compel her to use his surname? Why or why not? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, he has no right to compel Rona to use his surname. The law does not give him that right
simply because he gave her support (RA 9255).
Under the Family Code, an illegitimate child was required to use only the surname of the
mother. Under RA 9255, otherwise known as the Revilla law, however, the illegitimate child is
given the option to use the surname of the illegitimate father when the latter has recognized the
former in accordance with law. Since the choice belongs to the illegitimate child, Rodolfo cannot
compel Rona, if already of age, to use his surname against her will. If Rona is still a minor, to use
the surname of Rodolfo will require the consent of Ronas mother who has sole parental authority
over her.
[c]
When Rona reaches seven (7) years old, she tells Rodolfo that she prefers to live
with him, because he is better off financially than Nanette. If Rodolfo files an action for the
custody of Rona, alleging that he is Ronas choice as custodial parent, will the court grant
Rodolfos petition? Why or why not? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, because Rodolfo has no parental authority over Rona. He who has the parental authority
has the right to custody. Under the Family Code, the mother alone has parental authority over the
illegitimate child. This is true even if the illegitimate father has recognized the child and even
though he is giving support for the child. To acquire custody over Rona, Rodolfo should first
deprive Nanette of parental authority if there is a ground under the law, and in a proper court
proceeding. In the same action, the court may award custody of Rona to Rodolfo if it is for her
best interest.
Sarah had a deposit in a savings account with Filipino Universal Bank in the amount of five
million pesos (P5,000,000.00). To buy a new she obtained a loan from the same bank in the
amount of P 1,200,000.00, payable in twelve monthly installments. Sarah
[b]
Suppose Rodolfo later on acknowledges Rona and gives her regular support, can
he compel her to use his surname? Why or why not? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No he has no right to compel Rona to use his surname. The law does not give him that right
simply because he gave her support (RA 9255).
Under the family code, an illegitimate child was required to use only the surname to the
mother. Under RA 9255, otherwise known as the Revilla law, however, the illegitimate child is
given the option to use the surname of the illegitimate father when the latter has recognized the
former in accordance with law. Since the choice belongs to the illegitimate child, Rodolfo cannot
compel Rona, if already of age, to use his surname against her will. If Rona is still a minor, to use
the surname of Rodolfo will require the consent of Rona's mother who has sole parental authority
over her.
[c]
when Rona reaches seven (7) years old, she tells Rodolfo that she prefers to live
with him, because he is better off financially than Nanette. If Rodolfo files an action for the
custody of Rona, alleging that he is Rona's choice as custodial parent, will the court grant
Rodolfo's petition? Why or why not? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No because Rodolfo has no parental authority over Rona. He who has the parental
authority has the right to custody. Under the Family Code, the mother alone has parental
authority over the illegitimate child. This is true even if the illegitimate father has recognize the
child and even though he is giving support for the child. To acquire custody over Rona, Rodolfo
should first deprive Nanette of parental authority if there is a ground under the law, and in a
proper court proceeding. In the same action the court may award custody of Rona to Rodolfo if it
is for her best interest.
Sarah had a deposit in a savings account with Filipino Universal Bank in the amount of five
Million pesos (P5,000,000.00). To buy a new car, she obtained a loan from the same bank in the
amount of P1,200,000.00, payable in twelve monthly installments. Sarah issued in favor of the
bank in post-dated checks, each in the amount of P100,000.00 to cover the twelve monthly
installment payments. On the third, fourth and fifth months, the corresponding checks bounced.
The bank then declared the whole obligation due, and proceed to deduct the amount of
one million pesos(P1,000,000.00) from Sarah's deposit after notice ot her that this is a form of
compensation allowed by law. Is the bank correct? Explaint (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No the bank is not correct, while the Bank is correct about the applicability of
compensation, it was not correct as to the amount compensated.
A bank deposit is a contract lof loan, where the depositor is the creditor and the bank the
debtor. Since Sarah is also the debtor of the bank with respect to the loan, both are mutually
principal debtors and creditors of each other. Both obligations are due, demandable and
liquidated but only up to the extent of P300,000(covering the unpaid third, fourth and fifth
monthly installments). The entire one million was not yet due because the loan has no
accelaration clause in case of default. And since there is no retention or controversy commenced
by third persons and communicated in due time to the debtor, then all the requisites of legal
compensation are present but only up to the amount of P300,000. The bank, therefore, may
deduct P300,000 pesos from Sarah's bank deposit by way of compensation.
XVI
Marciano is the owner of a parcel of land through which a river runs out into the sea. The
land had been brought unber the Torrens System, and is cultivated by Ulpiano and his family as
farmworkers therein. Over the years, the river brought silt and sediment from its source up in the
mountains and forests so that gradually the land owned by Marciano increased in area by three
hectares. Ulpiano built three huts on this additional area, where he and his two married children
live. On this same area. Ulpiano and his family planted peanuts, monggo, beans and vegetables.
Ulpiano also regular paid taxes on the land, as shown by tax declarations, for over thirty years.
When Marciano learned of the increase in the size of the land he ordered Ulpiano to demolish the
huts, and demanded that he be paid his share in the proceeds of the harvest. Marciano claims that
under the civil code, the alluvium belongs to him as a registered riparian owner to whose land the
accretion attaches, and that his right is enforceable against the whole world.
[a]
is Marciano correct? Expalain. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Marciano's contention is correct. Since the accretion was deposited on his land by the
action of the waters of the river and he did not construct any structure to increase the deposition
of soil ad silt, Marciano automatically owns the accretion. His real right of ownership is
enforceable against the whole word including Ulpiano and his two married children. Although
Marciano's land is registered the 3 hectares land deposited through accretion was not
autonatically registered. As unregistered land, it is subject to acquisitive prescription by third
persons.
Although Ulpiano and his children live in the 3 hectare unregistered land owned by
Marciano, they are farmworkers; therefore they are possessors not in the concept of owners but in
the concept of more holders. Even if they possessed the land for more than 30 years, they cannot
become the owners thereof through extraordinary acquisitve prescription, because the law
requires possession in the concept of owner. Payment of taxes and tax declaration are not enough
to make their possession one in the concept of owner. They must repudiate the possession in the
concept of holder by executing unequivocal acts of repudiatin amounting to custer of Marciano,
known to Marciano and must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Only then would his
possession become adverse.
[b]
what rights, if any, does Ulpiano have against Marciano? Explain (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
although Ulpiano is a possessor in bad faith, because he knew he does not own the land,
he will lose the three huts he built in bad faith and make an accounting of the fruits he has
gathered, he has the right to deduct from the value of the fruits the expenses for production,
gathering and preservation of the fruits (Article 443, NCC).
He may also ask for reimbursement of the taxes he has paid, as these are charges on the
land owned by Marciano. This obligation is based on a quasi-contract (
Article 2175, NCC).
XVII
Rosario obtained a loan of P100,000.00 from Jennifer, and pledge her diamond ring. The
contract signed by the parties stipulated and if Rosarion is unable to redeem the ring on due date,
she will execute a document in favor of Jennifer providing that the ring shall automatically be
considered full payment of the loan.
[a]
Is the contract valid? Explain. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The contract is valid because Rosario has to execute a document in favor of Jennifer to
transfer the ownership of the pledged ring to the latter. The contract does not amount to a
pactum commissorium because it does not provide for the automatic appropriation by the pledge
of the thing pledged in case of default by the pledgor.
[b]
Will your answer to [a] be the same if the contract stipulates that upon failure of
Rosario to redeem the ring on due date, Jennifer may immediately sell the ring and appropriate
the entire proceeds thereof for herself as full payment of the? Reasons. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, my answer will be different . While the contract of pledge is valid, the stipulation
authorizing the pledge to immediately sell the thing pledgedis void under Article 2088 of the new
Civil Code which provides that: the creditor cannot appropriate the thimgs given by way of
pledge or mortgage, or dispose of them x x. Jennifer cannot immediately sell by herself the thing
pledge. It must be foreclosed by selling it at a public auction in accordance with the procedure
under Article 2112 of the New Civil Code.
XVIII
The ifugao Arms is a condominium project in Baguio City. A strong earthquake occurred
which left huge cracks in the outer walls of the building. As a result, a number of condominium
units were rendered unfit for use. May Edwin, owner of one of the condominium units affected,
legally sue for partition by sale of the whole proect? Explain. (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes edwin may legally sue for partition by sale of the whole condominium project under
the following conditions: (a) the damage or destruction caused by the earthquake has rendered
one-half () or more of the units therein untenantable, and (b) that the condominium owners
holding an aggregate of more than thirty (30%) percent interest of the common areas are
opposed to the restoration of the condominium project (Section 8[b], Republic act No. 472
Condominium Act).
XIX
In 1972, Luciano de la Cruz sold to Chua Chung Chun, a Chinese citizen, a parcel of land in
Binondo, Chua died in1990 leaving behind his wife and three children, one of whom, Julian is a
naturalized Filipino citizen. Six years after Chua's death, the heirs executed an extrajudicial
settlement of estate, and the parcel of land was allocated to Julian. In 2007, Luciano filed suit to
recover the land he sold to Chua, alleging that the sale was void because it contravened the
Constitution which prohibits the sale of private lands to aliens, Julian moved to dismiss the suit on
grounds of pari delicto, laches and aquisitive prescription. Decide the case with reasons. (4%).
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The case must be dismissed. Julian, who is a naturalized Filipino citizen and to whom the
property was allocated in an extra-judicial partition of the estate, is now the new owner of the
property. The defect in ownership of the property of Julian's alien father has already been cured
by its transfer to Julian. It has been validated by the transfer of the property to a Filipino citizen.
Hence, there is no more violation of the constitution because the subject real property is now
owned by a Filipino citizen (Halili v. CA 287 SCRA 465 [1998]). Futher, after the lapse of 35 years,
laches has set in and the motion to dismiss may be granted, for the failure of Luciano to question
the ownership of Chua before its transfer to Julian.
XX
[a] If Ligaya, a Filipino citizen residing in the United States, file a petition for change of
name before the District Court of New York, what law shall apply? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
New York law shall apply. The petition for change of name filed in New York does not
concern the legal capacity or status of the petitioner. Moreover, it does not affect the Registry of
any other country including the country of birth of the petitioner. Whatever judgment is rendered
in that petition will have effect only in New York. The New York court cannot, for instance, order
the Civil Registrar in the Philippines to change its records. The judgment of the New York Court
allowing a change in the name of the Petitioner will be limited to the records of the petitioner in
New York and the use of the new name in all her transactions in New York. Since the records and
processes in New York are the only ones affeted the New York Court will apply New York law in
resolving the petition.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Philippine law shall apply (Art. 15, NCC). Status, conditions, family rights and duties are
governed by Philippine laws as to Filipinos even though sojourning abroad.
If Ligaya, a Filipino, files a petition for change of name with the District Court of New York,
the laws of New York will govern since change of name is not one of those covered by the
principles of nationality.
[b]
If Henry, an American citizen residing in the Philippines, files a petition for change
of name before a Philippine court, what law shall apply? Explain (2%)
SUGGESTE ANSWER:
Philippine law will apply. The petition for change of name in the Philippines will affect only
the records of the petitioner and his transactions in the Philippines. The Philippine court can never
acquire jurisdiction over the custodian in the US of the records of the petitioner. Moreover,
change of name has nothing to do with the legal capacity or status of the alien. Since Philippine
records and transations are the only ones affected, the Philippine court may effect the change
only in accordance with the laws governing those records and transactions. That the law cannot be
but Philippine law.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
U.S. Law shall apply as it is his national law. This is pursuant to the application of lex
patriae or the nationality principle, by which his legal status is governed by national law, the
matter f change of name being included in legal status. The Supreme Court has reiterated in
several cases, that the lex partiae as provided in Article 15 of the Civil Code is applicable to
foreign nationals in determining their legal status (supra).
I
Ana Rivera had a husband, a Filipino citizen like her, who was among the passengers on
board a commercial jet plane which crashed in the Atlantic Ocean ten(10) years earlier and had
never been heard of ever since. Believing that her husband had died, Ana married Adolf Cruz
Staedtler, a divorced German national born of a German father and a Filipino mother residing in
Stuttgart. To avoid being required to submit the required certificate of capacity to marry from
the German Embassy in Manila, Adolf stated in the application for marriage license that he was a
Filipino citizen. With the marriage license stating that Adolf was a Filipino, the couple got
married in a ceremony officiated by the Parish Priest of Calamba, Laguna in a beach in Nasugbu,
Batangas, as the local parish priest refused to solemnize marriages except in his church. Is the
marriage valid? Explain fully. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The issue hinges on whether or not the missing husband was dead or alive at the time of the
second marriage.
If the missing husband was in fact dead at the time the second marriage was celebrated, the
second marriage was valid. Actual death of a spouse dissolves the marriage ipso facto whether or
not the surviving spouse had knowledge of such fact. A declaration of presumptive death even if
obtained will not make the marriage voidable because presumptive death will not prevail over
the fact of death.
If the missing husband was in fact alive when the second marriage was celebrated, the
second marriage was void ab initio because of a prior subsisting marriage. Had Ana obtained a
declaration of presumptive death, the second marriage would have been voidable.
In both cases, the fact that the German misrepresented his citizenship to avoid having to
present his Certificate of Legal Capacity, or the holding of the ceremony outside the church or
beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the solemnizing officer, are all irregularities which do not
affect the validity of the marriage.
II
At age 18, Marian found out that she was pregnant. She insured her own life and named
her unborn child as her sole beneficiary. When she was already due to give birth, she and her
boyfriend Pierto, the father of her unborn child, were kidnapped in a resort in Bataan where they
were vacationing. The military gave chase and after one week, they were found in an abandoned
hut in Cavite. Marian and Pietro were hacked with bolos. Marian and the baby she delivered were
both found dead, with the babys umbilical cord already cut. Pietro survived.
a)
Can Marians baby be the beneficiary of the insurance taken on the life of the
mother? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a)
An unborn child may be designated as the beneficiary in the insurance policy of
the mother. An unborn child shall be considered a person for purposes favorable to it provided it
is born later in accordance with the Civil Code. There is no doubt that the designation of the
unborn child as a beneficiary is favorable to the child.
b)
Between Marian and the baby, who is presumed to have died ahead? (1%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b)
if the baby was not alive when completely delivered from the mother;s womb, it
was not born as a person, then the question of who between two persons survived will not be an
issue. Since the baby had a intrauterine life of more than 7 months, it would be considered born if
it was alive, at the time of its complete delivery from the mothers womb. We can gather from the
facts that the baby was completely delivered. But whether or not it was alive has to be proven by
evidence.
If the baby was alive when completely delivered from the mothers womb, then it was born
as a person and the question of who survived as between the baby and the mother shall be
resolved by the provisions of the Rules of Court on survivorship. This is because the question has
nothing to do with succession. Obviously, the resolution of the question is needed just for the
implementation of an insurance contract. Under Rule 13, Sec. 3, (jj), (5) as between the baby who
was under 15 years old and Marian who was 18 years old, Marian is presumed to have survived.
In both cases, therefore, the baby never acquired any right under the insurance policy. The
proceeds of the insurance will then go to the estate of Marian.

Will Pietro, as surviving biological father of the baby, be entitled to claim the proceeds
of the life insurance on the life of Marian? (2%)
b)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
c) Since the baby did not acquire any right under the insurance contract, there is nothing
for Pietro to inherit.
Ill
Roderick and Faye were high school sweethearts. When Roderick was 18 and Faye, 16 years
old, they started to live together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. When
Faye reached 18 years of age, her parents forcibly took her back and arranged for her
marriage to Brad. Although Faye lived with Brad after the marriage, Roderick continued to
regularly visit Faye while Brad was away at work. During their marriage, Faye gave birth to a
baby girl, laica. When Faye was 25 years old, Brad discovered her continued liaison with
Roderick and in one of their heated arguments, Faye shot Brad to death. She lost no time in
marrying her true love Roderick, without a marriage license, claiming that they have been
continuously cohabiting formore than 5 years.
a)
Was the marriage of Roderick and Faye valid? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a)
The marriage was void because there was no marriage license. Their marriage was not
exempt from the requisite of a marriage license because Roderick and Faye L have not been cohabiting
for at least 5 continuous years j before the celebration of their marriage. Their lovers tryata and brief
visitations did not amount to cohabitation. Moreover, the Supreme Court held that for the marriage to
be exempt from a license, there should be no impediment for them to marry each other during the entire
5 years of cohabitation. Roderick and Faye could not have cohabited for 5 continuous years without
impediment because Faye was then legally married to Brad.
b)
What is the filiation status of Laica? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b)What is the filiation status of Laica? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b) Having been born during the marriage of Faye and Brad, she is presumed to be the
legitimate child of Faye and Brad. This presumption had become conclusive because the period of time to
impugn her filiation had

already prescribed.
c) Can Laica bring an action to impugn her own status on the ground that based on
DNA results, Roderick is her biological father? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) No, she cannot impugn her own filiation. The law does not allow a child to impugn his
or her own filiation. In the problem, Laicas legitimate filiation was accorded to her by operation
of law which may be impugned only by Brad, or his heirs in the cases provided by law within the
prescriptive period.
Can Laica be legitimated by the marriage of her biological parents? (1%)
b)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) No she cannot be legitimated by the marriage of her biological parents. In the first
place she is not, under the law, the child of Roderick. In the second place, her biological
parents could not have validly married each other at the time she was conceived and born
simply because Faye was still married to Roderick at that time. Under Article 177 of the Family
Code, only children conceived or born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the
conception of the child were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, may be
legitimated.
IV
Gianna was bom to Andy and Aimee, who at the time of Giannas birth were not married to
each other. While - Andy was single at that time, Aimee was still in the process ; of securing a
judicial declaration of nullity on her marriage to her ex-husband. Giannas birth certificate, which
was signed by both Andy and Aimee, registered the status of Gianna as legitimate, her surname
carrying that of Andys, and that her parents were married to each other.
Can a judicial action for correction of entries in Giannas birth certificate be
successfully maintained to:
a)
i)
Change her status from legitimate to illegitimate (1%); and
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) (i) A judicial action cannot be maintained to change the status of Gianna from
legitimate to illegitimate child of Andy and Aimee. While it is true that Gianna is the
biological daughter of Andy and Aimee conceived and born without marriage between them.
Gianna is presumed, under the law as the legitimate child of Aimee and her husband. This filliation
may be impugned only by the husband. To correct the status of Gianna in her birth certificate
form legitimate child of Andy and Aimee to illegitimate child of Andy and Aimee will amount
to indirectly impugning her filiation as the child of Aimees husband. This is not allowed unless
brought by Aimees husband in a proper action. What cannot be done directly cannot be done
indirectly.
ii) Change her surname from that of Andys to Aimees maiden surname? (1%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) ii) A judicial action to change the surname of Gianna from the surname of Andy to the
maiden surname j of Aimee is also not allowed. Gianna, being presumed to be I the legitimate
child of Aimees husband is required by law to be registered under the surname of Aimees
husband.
1
While it is true that Giannas registered surname is I erroneous, a judicial action for correction
of entry to change the surname of Gianna to that of Aimees maiden surname will also be
erroneous. A judicial action to correct an entry in the birth certificate is allowed to i correct an
error and not to commit another error.
SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE ANSWER TO IV,(i) and (ii):
It may be noted that the problems does not show whether Gianna was born while Aimee
was living with her ex husband. Neither does it show who filed the judicial action to correct the
entries.
If the problem is intended only for the purpose of determining whether factual changes
are in order, then the answers are:
(i)
A change from legitimate to illegitimate is proper upon proof of lack of marriage
between Andy and Aimee.
(ii)
If the child is considered illegitimate, then she should follow the surname of her mother.
b)
Instead of a judicial action, can administrative proceedings be brought for the
purpose of making the above corrections? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWERS:
b)
Under R.A. 9048, only typographical errors are allowed to be corrected
administratively. The change of status from legitimate to illegitimate is not a typographical error
and even assuming that it is, its administrative correction is not allowed under R.A. 9048.
Typographical errors involving status, age, citizenship, and gender are expressly excluded from
what may be corrected administratively.
The change of the surname is also not allowed administratively. R.A. 9048 provides for an
administrative procedure for change of first name only and not for change of surname.
c)
Assuming that Aimee is successful in declaring her former marriage void, and Andy
and Aimee subsequently married each other, would Gianna be legitimated? (1%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
c)
No, Gianna will not be legitimated. While the court may have declared the
marriage void ab initio and, therefore, no marriage took place in the eyes of the law, Gianna will
still not be legitimated. This is because at the time she was conceived and born her biological
parents could not have validly married each other. For their marriage to be valid, the court must
first declare the first marriage null and void. In the problem, Gianna was conceived and born
before the court has decreed the nullity of her mothers previous marriage.
V
Despite several relationships with different women, j Andrew remained unmarried. His
first relationship with Brenda produced a daughter, Amy,now 30 years old. His second, with Carla,
produced two sons: Jon and Ryan. His 1 third, with Donna, bore him two daughters: Vina and
Wilma.
His fourth, with Elena, bore him no children although Elena : has a daughter Jane, from a previous
relationship. His last, with Fe, produced no biological children but they informally adopted
without court proceedings, Sandy, now 13 years old, whom they consider as their own. Sandy was
orphaned as a baby and was entrusted to them by the midwife who attended to Sandys birth. All
the children, including Amy, now live with Andrew in his house.
a)
Is there any legal obstacle to the legal adoption of Amy by Andrew? To the legal
adoption of Sandy by Andrew and Elena? (2%).
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a)
No, there is no legal obstacle to the legal adoption of Amy by Andrew. While a
person of age may not be adopted, Amy falls within two exceptions: (1) she is an illegitimate
child and she is being adopted by her : illegitimate father to improve her status; and (2) even on
the assumption that she is not an illegitimate child of Andrew, she may still be adopted,
although of legal age, because she has been consistently considered and treated by the adopter
as his own child since minority. In fact, she has been living with him until now.
There is a legal obstacle to the adoption of Sandy by Andrew and Elena. Andrew and Elena
cannot adopt | jointly because they are not married.
b)
In his old age, can Andrew be legally entitled to l] claim support from Amy, Jon,
Ryan, Vina , Wilma 1 and Sandy assuming that all of them have the 1 means to support him? (1%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b)
Andrew can claim support from them all, except from Sandy, who is not his child,
legitimate, illegitimate or adopted.
c)
Can Amy, Jon, Ryan, Vina and Wilma can ask support from each other because they
are half-blood brothers and sisters, and Vina and Wilma are full-blood sisters (Art.195 [5], Family
Code), but not Sandy who is not related to any of them.
d)
Can Jon and Jane legally marry? (1%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
d)
Jon and Jane can legally marry because they are not related to each other. Jane is
not a daughter of Andrew.

Alex died without a will, leaving only an undeveloped and untitled lot in Taguig City. He is
survived by his wife and 4 children. His wife told the children that she is waiving her hare in the
property, and allowed Bobby, the eldest son who was about to get married, to construct his house
on 1/4 of the lot without however obtaining the consent of his siblings. l&After settlement of
Alexs estate and partition among the | heirs, it was discovered that Bobbys house was
constructed on the portion allocated to his sister, Cathy. Cathy asked Bobby to demolish his house
and vacate the portion allotted to her. In lieu of demolition, Bobby offered to purchase from
Cathy the lot portion on which his house was constructed. At that time, the house was valued at
P300,000 while the portion of the lot on which the house was constructed was valued at P350,000.
a)
Can Cathy lawfully ask for demolition of Bobbys H&- house? (3%)
MAIN SUGGESTED ANSWER:

a) Yes, Cathy can ask for the demolition of Bobbys I house on the portion allotted to
Cathy in the partition. The lot is presumed to be community property as it was acquired during
the marriage. Upon Alexs death there I was created a co-ownership by operation of law among
the ! widow and four children. (Art. 1078, CC) Bobbys share is only an undivided interest of 1/10
of the entire lot. The widows share in the co-ownership is 6 /10 of the entire lot, 1/2 of the lot
being her share in the community property and 1/5 of Alexs share in the other half, because she
has the same share as one of the four children. She has the financial majority or majority interest
of the co-ownership.
Bobbys act of building on of the lot is an act requiring the unanimous consent of all the
co-owners since it is an act of alteration. Bobby only had the ideal share of 1/10 of the entire lot,
and when he built his house on of the lot, he was arrogating unto himself the right to partition
the poverty and taking more than what he legally owns. The consent given by the widow to
Bobbys act of building his house was legally insufficient. As a matter of right, Cathy can ask for the
demolition of the house and the payment of damages.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
a)
Art. 448 of the New Civil Code is applicable by i analogy (Concepcion Fernandez
del Campo v. Abeisa, 160 , SCRA 379 [1988]). Pursuant thereto, Cathy is given two ^ options: (1)
to appropriate the house that Bobby built, I upon payment of indemnity; or (2) to compel
Bobby to buy the land, considering that its value is not considerably higher than the value of
the house. At this stage she is not given the option to demand demolition of the house.
However, if she has chosen to sell the land to Bobby and the latter does not or cannot buy the
land, she can demand the demolition of the house.
b)
Can Bobby legally insist on purchasing the land? ' (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b) No, Bobby cannot legally insist on purchasing the land. The rules on building, planting
and sowing are 1 not applicable to co-ownership. The rules applicable to co- ! ownership are
acts of alteration or acts of ownership on I one hand and acts of mere administration on the
other. Even if it were applicable, Bobby acted in bad faith and hence, demolition is one of the
three options open to an J owner. It is the owner of the land, not the builder, planter or sower
who has the options, even if both acted in bad faith or good faith.
VII
Anthony bought a piece of untitled agricultural land from Bert, Bert, in turn, acquired the
property by forging Carlos signature in a deed of sale over the property. Carlo had been in
possession of the property for 8 years, declared it for tax purposes, and religiously paid all taxes
due on the property. Anthony is not aware of the defect in Berts title, but has been in actual
physical possession of the property from the time he bought it from Bert, who had never been in
possession. Anthony has since then been in possession of the property for one year.
a)
Can Anthony acquire ownership of the property by acquisitive prescription? How
many more years does he have to possess it to acquire ownership? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a)
Yes, Anthony can acquire ownership of the property by ordinary acquisitive
prescription which requires just title and good faith (Art. 1117, cc). There was just title because a
deed of sale was issued in his favor even though it was forged, which fact he was not aware of. He
needs to possess the land in good faith and in the concept of owner for a total of ten years in
order to acquire ownership.
Since Anthony possessed the land for only one year, he has not completed the ten-year period.
Even if Anthony tacks the 8-year period of possession by Carlo who in the deed of sale is supposed
to be his grantor or predecessor in interest (Article 1138 [I], CC), the period is still short of ten
years.
b)
if Carlo is able to legally recover his property, can he require Anthony to account
for all the fruits he has harvested from the property while in possession? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b)
Since Anthony is a possessor in good faith, Anthony cannot be made to account for
the fruits he gathered before he was served with summons. A possessor in good faith is entitled
to the fruits received before the possession was legally interrupted by the service of summons
(Art. 544, CC). After Anthony was served with summons, he became a possessor in bad faith and
a builder, planter, sower in bad faith. He can also be made to account for the fruits but he may
deduct expenses for production gathering and preservation of the fruits (Art. 1 443, CC).
c)
If there are standing crops on the property when Carlo recovers possession, can
Carlo appropriate them? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
c)
The value of the standing crops must be prorated depending upon the period of
possession and the period of growing and producing the fruits. Anthony is entitled to a part of the
net harvest and a part of the expenses of cultivation in proportion to his period of possession.
Carlo may appropriate the respective parts subject to prorating the respective periods of
possession. However, Carlo may allow Anthony to gather these growing fruits as an indemnity for
the expenses of cultivation. If Anthony refuses to accept this concession, he shall lose the right to
indemnity under Art. 443 (Art. 545, par. 3, CC).
VII
Adam, a building contractor, was engaged by Bias to construct a house on a lot which he
(Bias) owns. While digging on the lot in order to lay down the foundation of the house, Adam hit
a very hard object. It turned out to be the vault of the old Banco de las Islas Filipinas. U sing a
detonation device, Adam was able to open the vault containing old notes and coins which were
in circulation during the Spanish era. While the notes and coins are no longer legal tender, they
I were valued at P 100 million because of their historical value and the coins silver and nickel
content. The following filed legal claims over the notes and coins:
i)
Adam, as finder;
ii)
Blas, as owner of the property where they were found;
iii)
Bank of the Philippine Islands, as successor-in-interest of the owner of the vault;

and
iv)
The Philippine Government because of their historical value.
a)
who owns the notes and coins? (4%)

a)
Hidden treasure is money jewelry or other precious objects the ownership of which
does not appear (Art. 439, CC). The vault of the Banco de las Islas Filipinas has been buried for
about a century and the Bank of the Philippine Islands cannot succeed by inheritance to the
property of Banco de las Islas Filipinas. The ownership of ;the vault, together with the notes and
coins can now " legally be considered as hidden treasure because its ownership is no longer
apparent. The contractor, Adams i is not a trespasser and therefore entitled to one-half of the
hidden treasure and Bias as owner of the property, is entitled the other half (Art. 438, CC). Since
the notes and , coins have historical value, the government may acquire them at their just price
which in turn will be divided equally between Adam and Bias (Art. 438, par. 3, CC).
SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

a) The Banco de las Islas Filipinas is the owner of the vault. The finder and owner of the
land cannot share ; in the notes and coins, because they are not buried treasure under the law, as
the ownership is known. Although under Art. 720 of the Civil Code the finder shall be given a
reward of one-tenth of the price of the thing found, as a lost movable, on the principle of quasicontract
However, the notes and coins may have become res nullius considering that Banco de las
Islas Filipinas is longer a juridical person and has apparently given up looking for them and
Adam, the first one to take possession with intent to possess shall become the sole owner.
b)
Assuming that either or both Adam and Bias are adjudged as owners, will the notes
and coins be deemed part of their absolute community or conjugal partnership of
gains with their respective spouses? (2%)
b)
Yes. The hidden treasure will be part of the absolute community or conjugal
property, of the respective marriages (Arts. 91, 93 and 106, Family Code).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
b)
It is not hidden treasure and therefore, not part, if the absolute or conjugal
partnership of the spouses. But the finder of the lost movable, then his reward equivalent to
one-tenth of the value of the vaults contents, will form part of the conjugal partnership. If the
government wants to acquire the notes and coins, it must expropriate them for public use as
museum pieces and pay just compensation.
IX
The properties of Jessica and Jenny, who are neighbors, lie along the banks of the
Marikina River. At certain times of the year, the river would swell and as the water recedes,
soil, rocks and other materials are deposited on Jessicas and Jennys properties. This pattern of
the river swelling, receding and depositing soil and other materials being deposited on the
neighbors properties have gone on for many years. Knowing this pattern, Jessica constructed a
concrete barrier about 2 meters from her property line and extending towards the river, so
that when the water recedes, soil and other materials are trapped within this barrier. After
several years, the area between Jessicas property line to the concrete barrier was completely
filled with soil, effectively increasing Jessicas property by 2 meters. Jennys property, where no
barrier was constructed, also increased by one meter along the side of the river.
Can Jessica and Jenny legally claim ownership over the additional 2 meters and one
meter, respectively, of land deposited along their properties? (2%)
a)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a)
Jenny can legally claim ownership of the lands by right of accession (accretion)
under Article 457 of the Civil Code. The lands came into being over the years through the
gradual deposition of soil and silt by the natural action of the waters of the river.
Jessica cannot claim the two meter-wide strip of land added to her land. Jessica
constructed the cement j barrier two meters in front of her property towards the river not to
protect her land from the destructive forces of the water but to trap the alluvium. In order that
the riparian owner may be entitled to the alluvium the deposition must occur naturally without
the intervention of the riparian owner (Republic v. CA, 132 SCRA 514 [1984]).
b)
If Jessicas and Jennys properties are registered, will the benefit of such registration
extend to the increased area of their properties? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the registration of Jessicas and Jennys adjoining property does not automatically extend to
the accretions. They have to bring their lands under the operation of the Torrens system of land
registration following the procedure prescribed in P.D. No. 1529.
c)
Assume the two properties are on a cliff adjoining the shore of Laguna
Lake. Jessica and Jenny h a hotel built on the properties. They had the earth and rocks excavated
from the properties dumped on the adjoining shore, giving rise to a new patch of dry land. Can
they validly lay claim to the patch of land? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a)
Jessica and Jenny cannot validly lay claim to the price of dry land that resulted from
the dumping of rocks and earth materials excavated from their properties because it is a
reclamation without authority. The land is part of the lakeshore, if not the lakebed, which is
inalienable land of the public domain.
X
Arthur executed a will which contained only: (i) a provision disinheriting his daughter
Bernice for running off with a married man, and (ii) a provision disposing of his share in the
family house and lot in favor of his other children Connie and Dora. He did not make any
provisions in favor of his wife Erica, because as the will stated, she would anyway get V* of the
house and lot as her conjugal share. The will was very brief and straightforward and both the
above provisions were contained in page 1, which Arthur and his instrumental witness, signed
at the bottom. Page 2 contained the attestation clause and the signatures, at the bottom
thereof, of the 3 instrumental witnesses which included Lambert, the driver of Arthur; Yoly, the
family cook, and Attorney Zorba, the lawyer who prepared the will. There was a 3rd page, but
this only contained the notarial acknowledgement. The attestation clause stated the will was
signed on the same occasion by Arthur and his instrumental witnesses who all signed in the
presence of each other, and the notary public who notarized the will. There are no marginal
signatures or pagination appearing on any of the 3 pages. Upon his death, it was discovered
that apart from the house and lot, he had a P 1 million account deposited with ABC Bank.
a)
Was Erica preterited? (1%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Erica was not preterited under Art. 854 of the New Civil Code because she was not
related in the direct line. Moreover, since there is an intestate portion in [Arthur's estate from
which Erica will inherit as an intestate heir, she was not totally excluded or omitted from the heritance of Arthur. To be preterited, the heir who must be a compulsory heir in the direct line
should be totally excluded from the inheritance, i.e., the heir will not receive anything by will, or
by intestacy, and has not received any advance by way of donation inter vivos.
Even assuming that Erica was preterited, her preterition will not have any effect on the
provisions of the will. The effect of preterition is simply to annul the institution of an heir made in
the will. Legacies and devises are respected unless they are inofficious. In the I problem, since the
will contains nothing but a devise,there is no institution that will be annulled even on the
assumption that there was preterition.
b)
What other defects of the will, if any, can cause denial of probate? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
There are no other defects of the will that can cause denial of probate. Art. 805 of the Civil
Code provides that the will must be subscribed at the end thereof by the testator, and subscribed
by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another. The driver,
the cook and the lawyer who prepared the will are credible witnesses. The testator and the
instrumental] witnesses of the will, shall also sign, each and every page, of the will proper, except
the last, on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on
the upper part of each page.
It has been held, however, that the testator's signature is not necessary in the attestation
clause, and that if a will consists of two sheets, the first of which contains the testamentary
dispositions, and is signed at the bottom by the testator and the three witnesses, and the second
sheet contains the attestation clause, as in this case, signed by 3 witnesses, marginal signatures
and paging are not necessary. After all, the object of the law is to avoid substitution of any of the
sheets of the will. (Abangan v. Abangan, 40 Phil. 476 [1919]; In Re: Will of Tan Diuco, 45 Phil 807
[1924]).
c)
Was the disinheritance valid? (1%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
c)
The fact that the daughter disinherited ran off with a married man is a valid
ground for disinheritance under the Civil Code. One ground for disinheritance of a descendant is
when the descendant leads a dishonorable or disgraceful life (Art. 919 [7], CC]. Running away
with a married man leads to a dishonorable or disgraceful life.
d)
How should the house and lot, and the cash be distributed? (1%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
d)
On the assumption that the House and Lot and the Cash were all conjugal
property, the distribution will be as follows:
House and Lot

One half of the house shall be the conjugal share of Erica. The other half is the conjugal
share of Arthur which was inherited by Erica, Connie and Dora in equal shares. Hence, Erica,
Connie and Dora will be undivided co-owners of the house and lot with Erica getting 2/3 share
thereof and Connie and Dora with 1/6 share each.
Cash
The one million cash shall be divided in the same manner. thereof or 500,000 shall be
the conjugal share of Erica while 500,000 shall be the share of Arthur. This amount shall be divided
in 3 equal shares, or 166,666.66 per share. Erica will get 166,666.66 as her share, while Dora and
Connie will get 166,666.66 each as their inheritance. The one million cash will be distributed as
follows:
Erica --------------666,666.66
Dora ---------------166,666.66
Connie ------------ 166,666.66
XI
John and Paula, British citizens at birth, acquired Philippine citizenship by naturalization
after their marriage. During their marriage the couple acquired substantial landholdings in
London and in Makati. Paula bore John three children, Peter, Paul and Mary. In one of their trips
to London, the couple executed a joint will appointing each other as their heirs and providing
that upon the death of the survivor between them the entire estate would go to Peter 'and Paul
only but the two could not dispose of nor divide the London estate as long as they live. John and
Paula died tragically in the London Subway terrorist attack in 2005. Peter and Paul filed a
petition for probate of their parents will before a Makati Regional Trial Court.
a)
Should the will be admitted to probate? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the will cannot be admitted to probate. Joint wills are void under the New Civil
Code. And even if the joint will executed by Filipinos abroad where valid where it was
executed, the joint will is still not valid in the Philippines.
a)
b)
Are the testamentary dispositions valid? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b)
If a will is void, all testamentary dispositions contained in that will are also void.
Hence, all testamentary provisions contained in the void joint will are also void.
(2%)
c)
is the testamentary prohibition against the division of the London estate valid?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
c)
The testamentary prohibition against the division by Peter and Paul of the London
estate for as long as they live, is not valid. Article 494 of the New Civil Code provides that a donor
or testator may prohibit partition for a period which may not exceed twenty (20) years.
XII
Ernesto, an overseas Filipino worker, was coming home to the Philippines after working
for so many years in the Middle East. He had save P100,000 in his savings account in Manila which
he intended to use to start a business in his home country. On his flight home, Ernesto had a fatal
heart attack. He left behind his widowed mother, his common-law wife and their twin sons. He
left no will, no debts, no other relatives and no other properties except the money in his savings
account. Who are the heirs entitled to inherit form him and how much should each receive? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If the 100,000 peso savings came form wages and salaries that Ernesto earned during the
time that he was cohabiting with his common law wife, and there was no impediment for them to
marry each other. The P100,000 shall be owned by them in equal shares under Article 147 of the
Family Code. Therefore, one half thereof, of P50,000, shall belong to the common law wife as her
share in the co-ownership, while the other half of P50,000 shall be the share of Ernesto that will
be inherited by his mother, and two illegitimate children. The mother will get P25,000 while the
two illegitimate children will get P12,500 each. The common law wife is not a legal heir of
Ernesto because they were not legally married.
If there was an impediment for Ernesto and his common law wife to marry each other, the
P100,000 will be owned by Ernesto alone, the common law wife not having contributed to its
acquisition (Art. 148, Family Code) it shall be inherited by his mother who will get P50,000, and
his two illegitimate sons who will get 25,000 each.
XIII
Raymond, single, named his sister Ruffa in his will as I a devisee of a parcel of land which he
owned. The will I imposed upon Ruffa the obligation of preserving the land and transferring it,
upon her death, to her illegitimate daughter Scarlet who was then only one year old. Raymond
later died, leaving behind his widowed mother, Ruffa and Scarlet.
a)
Is the condition imposed upon Ruffa to preserve the property and to transmit it
upon her death to Scarlet, valid? (1%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) When an obligation to preserve and transmit the property to Scarlet was imposed on
Ruffa, the testato Raymond intended to create a fideicommissary substitution where Ruffa is
the fiduciary and Scarlet is the fideicommissary. Having complied with the requirements of
Articles 863 and 869 (N.C.C.) the fideicommissary substitution is valid.
b)
if Scarlet predeceases Ruffa, who inherits the property? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If Scarlet predeceases Ruffa, the fideicommissary substitution is rendered null or
ineffective under Article 863 (N.C.C.) And applying Article 868 (N.C.C.), the fideicommissary
clause is disregarded without prejudice to the validity of the institution of the fiduciary. In such
case Ruffa shall inherit the devise free from the condition.
c)
If Ruffa predeceases Raymond, can Scarlet inherit the property directly from
Raymond? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
c)
In fideicommissary substitution, the intention of the testator is to make the second
heir his ultimate heir. The right of the second heir is simply postpone by the delivery of the
inheritance to the first heir for him to enjoy the usufruct over the inheritance. Hence, when the
first heir predeceased the testator, the first heir did not qualify to inherit and the right of the
second heir to receive the inheritance will no longer be delayed provided the second heir is
qualified to inherit at the time of the testators death. In fideicommissary substitution, the first and
the second heirs inherit from the testator, hence, both should be qualified to inherit from the
testator at the time of his death.
In the problem, when Ruffa predeceased Raymond, she did not qualify to receive the
inheritance to enjoy its usufruct, hence, the right of Scarlet to receive the inheritance upon the
death of the testator will no longer be delayed. However, Scarlet is not qualified to inherit from
Raymond because she is barred by Article 992 of the New Civil Code being an illegitimate child of
Raymonds legitimate father. The devise will therefore be ineffective and the property will be
disposed of by intestacy.
XIV
Stevie was born blind. He went to school for the blind, and learned to read in Braille
language. He speaks English fluently. Can he:
a)
Make a will? (1%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a)
Stevie may make a notarial will. A blind man is not expressly prohibited from
executing a will. In fact, Article 808 of the NCC provides for additional formality when the testator
is blind. Stevie, however, may not make a holographic will in Braille because the writing in Braille
is not a handwriting. A holographic will to be valid must be written entirely, signed, and dated by
the testator in his own handwriting.
b)
Act as a witness to a will? (1%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b)
A blind man is disqualified by law to be a witness to a notarial will.
c)
In either of the above instances, must the will be read to him? (1%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
c) In case Stevie executes a notarial will, it has to be read to him twice. First by one of the
instrumental witnesses, and second by the notary public before whom the will was
acknowledged.
XV
Eduardo was granted a loan by XYZ Bank for the purpose of improving a building which XYZ
leased from him. Eduardo, executed the promissory note (PN) in favor of the bank, with his
friend Recardo as cosignatory. In the PN, they both acknowledged that they are individually and
collectively liable and waived the need for prior demand. To secure the PN, Recardo executed a
real estate mortgage on his own property. When Eduardo defaulted on the PN, XYZ stopped
payment of rentals on the building on the ground that legal compensation had set in. Since there
was still a balance due on the PN after applying the rentals, XYZ foreclosed the real estate
mortgage over Recardos property. Recardo opposed the foreclosure on the ground that he is only
a co-signatory; that no demand was made upon him for payment, and assuming he is liable, his
liability should not go beyond half the balance of the loan. Further, Recardo said that when the
bank invoked compensation between the rentals and the amount of the loan, it amounted to a
new contract or novation, and had the effect of extinguishing the security since he did not give his
consent (as owner of the property under the real estate mortgage) thereto.
a)
Can XYZ Bank validly assert legal compensation? (2%)
MAINSUGGESTED ANSWER:
a)
XYZ Bank may validly assert the partial compensation of both debts, but it should be
facultative compensation because not all of the five requisites of legal compensation are present
(Article 1279,N.C.C). The payment of the rentals by XYZ bank is not yet due, but the principal
obligation of loan where both Eduardo and Recardo are bound to pay the entire loan, is due and
demandable without need of demand. XYZ Bank may declare its obligation to pay rentals as
already due and demand payment from any of the two debtors.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
a)
Legal compensation can be validly asserted between the bank, Eduardo and Recardo.
This is a case of facultative obligation, thus, the bank can assert partial compensation. Banks have
an inherent right to set off where both obligations are due and demandable (Art. 1279, CC)
b)
Can Recardos property be foreclosed to pay the full balance of the loan? (2%)
MAINSUGGESTED ANSWER:
b) No, because there was no prior demand on Ricardo, depriving him of the right to
reasonably block the foreclosure by payment. The waiver of prior demand in the PN is against
public policy and violates the right to due process. Without demand, there is no default and the
foreclosure is null and void. Since the mortgage, insofar as Ricardo is concerned is not violated, a
requirement under Act 3135 for a valid foreclosure of real estate mortgage is absent.
In the case of DBP vs. Licuanan (516 SCRA 644 [2007]), it was held that: the issue of
whether demand was made before the foreclosure was effected is essential. If demand was made
and duly received by the respondents and the latter still did not pay, then they were already in
default and foreclosure was proper. However, if demand was not made, then the loans had not
yet become due and demandable. This meant that respondents had not defaulted in their
payment and the foreclosure was premature.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
b)
No. Although the principal obligation of loan is due and demandable
without need of further demand the foreclosure of the accessory contract of real estate
mortgage, there is a need of notice and demand.
ANOTHER ANSWER:
b)
Yes. Recardos property can be foreclosed to pay the full balance of the loan. He is
admittedly individually and collectively liable. His liability is solidary. He and Eduardo have
waived notice for a prior demand as provided in the promissory note.
a)
Does Recardo have basis under the Civil Code for claiming that the original contract
was novated? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
c)
one of the three kinds of novation is applicable. There is no objective novation,
whether express or implied, because there is no change in the object or principal conditions
of the obligation. There is no substitution of debtors, either. Compensation is considered as
abbreviated or simplified payment and since Recardo bound himself solidarily with Eduardo,
any facultative compensation which occurs does not result in partial legal subrogation.
Neither Eduardo nor Recardo is a third person interested in the obligation under Art 1302,
CC.
XVI
Dux leased his house to Iris for a period of 2 years, at the rate of P25,000.00 monthly, payable
annually in advance. The contract stipulated that it may be renewed for another2-year period
upon mutual agreement of the parties. The contract also granted Iris the right of first refusal to
purchase the property at any time during the lease, if Dux decides to sell the property at the same
price that the property is offered for sale to a third party. Twenty-three months after execution of
the lease contract, Dux sold the house to his mother for P2 million. Iris claimed that the sale was a
breach of her right of first refusal. Dux said there was no breach because the property was sold to
his mother who is not a third party. Iris filed an action to rescind the sale and to compel Dux to
sell the property to her at the same price. Alternatively, she asked the court to extend the lease
for another 2 years on the same terms.
a)
Can Iris seek rescission of the sale of the property to Duxs mother? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) Iris can seek rescission because pursuant to Equatorial Realty Co. v. Mayfair Theater
(264 SCRA 483 [1996]) recission is a relief allowed for the protection of one of the contracting
parties and even third persons from all injury and damage the contract of sale may causes or the
protection of some incompatible and preferred right.
b)
Will the alternative prayer for extension of the lease prosper? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b)
XVII
No, the extension of the lease should be upon the mutual agreement of the parties.
Felipe borrowed $100 from Gustavo in 1998, when the Phil P - US$ exchange rate was P56 US$1. On March 1, 2008, Felipe tendered to Gustavo a cashiers check in the amount of P4,135
in payment of his US$100 debt, based on the Phil P - US$ exchange rate at that time. Gustavo
accepted the check, but forgot to deposit it until Sept. 12, 2008. His bank refused to accept the
check because it had become stale. Gustavo now wants Felipe to pay him in cash the amount of
P5,600. Claiming that the previous payment was not in legal tender, and that there has been
extraordinary deflation since 1998, and therefore, Felipe should pay him the value of the debt at
the time it was incurred. Felipe refused to pay him again, claiming that Gustavo is estopped from
raising the issue of legal tender, having accepted the check in March, and that it was Gustavos
negligence in not depositing the check immediately that caused the check to become stale.
a)
Can Gustavo now raise the issu e that the cashiers check is not legal tender? (2%)
a)
No, because Gustavo is guilty of estoppel by laches. He led Felipe to believe he could
pay by cashiers check, and Felipe relied that such cashiers check would be encashed thus
extinguishing his obligation. Because of Gustavos inaction of more than six months the check
became stale and Felipe will prejudiced if he will be required to pay $ 100 at the exchange rate
of P56 to $ 1.00. The exchange should be the rate at the time of payment.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
a)
Yes. The cashiers check is not legal tender until it is encashed. (Art. 1249,CC). the
cashiers check by itself is not legal tender. (Cuaycong v. Ruiz, 86 Phil. 170 [1950]; Belisario v.
Natividad, 60 Phil. 156 [1934]).
b)
Can Felipe validly refuse to pay Gustavo again? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b)
Yes, if the payment is valid. Since the bank considered the cashiers check as being
stale for not having been encashed on time, then the cashiers check may be issued again. At any
rate, non-payment of the amount to Gustavo would constitute unjust enrichment.
c)
Can Felipe compel Gustavo to receive US$100 instead? (1%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) Yes. Felipe can compel Gustavo to pay US $ 100 instead. Under the prior law, RA 529, as
amended by R.A. 4100, payment can only be in Philippine currency as it would be against public
policy, null and void and of no effect. However, under RA 8183, payment maybe made in the
currency agreed upon by the parties, and the rate of exchange to be followed is at the time of
payment. [C.F. Sharp & Co. Inc vs. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 381 SCRA 314 [2002]).
XVIII
AB Corp. entered into a contract with XY Corp. whereby the former agreed to construct the
research and laboratory facilities of the latter. Under the terms of the contract, AB Corp. agreed
to complete the facility in 18 months, at the total contract price ofPIO million. XY Corp. paid
50% of the total contract price, the balance to be paid upon completion of the work. The work
started immediately, but AB Corp. later experienced work slippage because of labor unrest in his
company. AB Corp.s employees claimed that they are not being paid on time; hence, the work
slowdown. As of the 17th month, work was only 45% completed. AB Corp. asked for extension of
time, claiming that its labor problems is a case of fortuitous event, but this was denied by XY
Corp. When it became certain that the construction could not be finished on time, XY Corp. sent
written notice canceling the contract, and requiring AB Corp. to immediately vacate the
premises.
a)
Can the labor unrest be considered a fortuitous event? (1%)

a) Labor unrest is not a fortuitous event that will excuse AB Corp. from complying with its
obligation of constructing the research and laboratory facilities of XY Corp. The labor unrest,
which may even be attributed in large part to AB Corp. itself, is not the direct cause of noncompliance by AB Corp. It is independent of its obligation. It is similar to the failure of a DBP
borrower to pay her loan just because her plantation suffered losses due to the cadang-cadang
disease. It does not excuse compliance with the obligation (DBP vs. Vda. de Moll, 43 SCRA 82
[1972])
ADDITIONAL ANSWER:
a) The labor unrest in this case is not a fortuitous event. The requisites of fortuitous event
are: (1) the event must be independent of human will or at least of the debtors will; (2) the event
could not be foreseen, or if foreseen, is inevitable; (3) the event must have rendered impossible
debtors compliance of the obligation in a proper manner; and (4) the debtor must not be guilty
of concurrent negligence (Lasam v Smith, 45 Phils. 657 [1924]). All the requisites are absent in this
case. AB Corp. could have anticipated the labor unrest which was caused by delays in paying the
laborers wages. The company could have hired additional laborers to make up for the work
slowdown.
b)
Can XY Corp. unilaterally and immediately cancel the contract? (2%)

b) No. XY Corp cannot unilaterally and immediately cancel the contract because there is
need for a judicial action of rescission. The provisions of Art. 1191 of the Civil Code providing for
rescission in reciprocal obligations can only be invoked judicially (Escueta v. Pando, 76 Phil. 256
[1946]; Republic v. Hospital de San Juan de Dios, 84 Phil. 820 [1949]).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
b) Yes, XY Corp. may unilaterally cancel the obligation but this is subject to the risk that
the cancellation of the reciprocal obligation being challenged in court and if AB Corp. succeeds,
then XY Corp. will be declared in default and be liable for damages (U.P. v. de los Angeles, 35
SCRA 102 [1970]).
c)
Must AB Corp. return the 50% downpayment? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
c)
No, under the principle of quantum meruit, AC Corp. has the right to retain payment
corresponding to his percentage of accomplishment less the amount of damages suffered by XY
Corp. because of the delay or default.
XIX
Juliet offered to sell her house and lot, together with all the furniture and appliances therein, to
Dehlma. Before agreeing to purchase the property, Dehlma went to the Register of Deeds to
verify Juliets title. She discovered that while the property was registered in Juliets name under
the Land Registration Act, as amended by the Property Registration Decree, it was mortgaged to
Elaine to secure a debt of P80,000. Wanting to buy the property, Dehlma told Juliet to redeem
the property from Elaine, and gave her an advance payment to be used for purposes of releasing
the mortgage on the property. When the mortgage was released, Juliet executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale over the property which was duly registered with the Registry of Deeds, and a new
TCT was issued in Dehlmas name. Dehlma immediately took possession over the house and lot
and the movables therein Thereafter, Dehlma went to the Assessors Office to get a new tax
declaration under her name. She was surprised to find out that the property was already declared
for tax purposes in the name of XYZ Bank which had foreclosed the mortgage on the property
before it was sold to her. XYZ Bank was also the purchaser in the foreclosure sale of the property.
At that time the property was still unregistered but XYZ Bank registered the Sheriffs Deed of
Conveyance in the day book of the Register of Deeds under Act. 3344 and obtained a tax
declaration in its name.
a)
Was Dehlma a purchaser in good faith? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a)
Yes, Dehlma is a purchaser in good faith. She learned about the XYZ tax declaration
and foreclosure sale only after the sale to her was registered. She relied on the certificate of title
of her predecessor-in-interest. Under the Torrens system, a buyer of registered lands is not
required by law to inquire further than what the Torrens certificate indicates on its face. If a
person proceeds to buy it relying on the title, that person is considered a buyer in good faith.
The priority in time rule could not be invoked by XYZ Bank because the foreclosure sale of
the land in favor of the bank was recorded under Act No. 3344, the law governing transactions
affecting unregistered land, and thus, does not bind the land.
b)
Who as between Dehlma and XYZ Bank has a better right to the house and lot? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
b)
Between Dehlma and the bank, the former has a better right to the house and lot.
c)
Who owns the movables inside the house? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
c)
Unless there is a contrary stipulation in the absolute deed of sale, Dehlma owns the
movables covered by the Deed of Sale and her ownership is perfected by the execution and
delivery of public document of sale. The delivery of the absolute deed of sale is a symbolical
delivery of the house and lot, including the contents of the house. This is an obligation to deliver a
specific thing, which includes the delivery of the specific thing itself and all of its accessions and
accessories even though they may not have been mentioned (Art. 1166, CC).
I
Distinguish the following concepts:
(a)
Occupation v. possession. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a)
Occupation can take place only with respect to property without an owner while
possession can refer to all kinds of property, whether with owner or without an owner.
Occupation itself, when proper, confers ownership but possession does not by itself give rise to
ownership (Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines
[1999 ed.], vol. II, p. 489).
FIRST ALTERNA TIVE ANS WER:

Occupation is an original mode of acquiring ownership (Art. 712, NCC). Things appropriable
by nature which are without an owner, such as animals that are the object of hunting and fishing,
hidden treasure and abandoned movables, are acquired by occupation (Art. 713, NCC). However,
ownership of a piece of land cannot be acquired by occupation (Art. 714, NCC).
On the other hand, possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right, as
provided in Article 523 of the New Civil Code. Possession can be in the concept of an owner or in
the concept of a holder (Art. 525, NCC).
SECOND ALTERNA TIVE ANS WER:

Occupation is a mode of acquiring dominion by the seizure of corporeal things which have
no owner, with the intention of acquiring the ownership thereof. It is an original mode of
acquiring ownership upon seizure of a res nullius by the occupant who has the intention to
become the owner thereof.
Possession, on the other hand, is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right.
Possession may be the real right of possession or jus possessionis or it can be merely the
right to possess or jus possidendi, which are among the basic rights of ownership. If the
real right of possession is possession in the concept of owner, but subject to certain
limitations, it may ripen into full ownership of the thing or property right through
acquisitive prescription depending on whether it is a case of ordinary or extraordinary

prescription and whether the property is movable or immovable.
(b)
Illegal and impossible conditions in a simple donation v. illegal and impossible

conditions in an onerous donation. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(b) Illegal and impossible conditions in a simple donation are considered as not
written. Such conditions shall, therefore, be disregarded but the donation remains valid
(Article 727, NCC).
On the other hand, illegal and impossible conditions imposed in an onerous donation
shall annul the donation (Article 1183, NCC). This is so, because onerous donations are
governed by the law on contracts (Article 733, NCC).
II
(10%)
Manila Petroleum Co. owned and operated a petroleum operation facility off the
coast of Manila. The facility was located on a floating platform made of wood and metal,
upon which was permanently attached the heavy equipment for the petroleum
operations and living quarters of the crew. The floating platform likewise contained a
garden area, where trees, plants ans flowers were planted. The platform was tethered to a
ship, the MV 101, which was anchored to the seabed.
(a) Is the platform movable or immovable property?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The platform is an immovable property under Article 415 (9) NCC., which provides that
docks and structures which, though floating, are intended by their nature and object to remain at
a fixed place on a river, lake or coast. Since the floating platform is a petroleum operation
facility, it is intended to remain permanently where it is situated, even if it is tethered to a ship
which is anchored to the seabed.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The platform is a movable property because it is attached to a movable property, i.e. the
vessel which was merely anchored to the seabed. The fact that the vessel is merely anchored to
the seabed only shows that it is not intended to remain at a fixed place; hence, it remains a
movable property. If the intention was to make the platform stay permanently where it was
moored, it would not have, been simply tethered to a vessel but itself anchored to the seabed.
(b) Are the equipment and living quarters movable or immovable property?
SUGGES TED A NSWER:

(b) The equipment and living quarters of the crew are immovable property under
Article 415 (3) NCC, classifies as an immovable everything attached to an immovable in a fixed
manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated therefrom without breaking the material or
deterioration of the object. Both the equipment and the living quarters are permanently
attached to the platform which is also an immovable.
The equipment can also be classified as an immovable property under Article 415
(5)
NCC because such equipment are machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements
intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a
building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or
works. It is logically, assumed that the petroleum industry may be carried on' in a building or on
a piece of land and the platform is analogous to a building.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The equipment and living quarters of the crew are movable properties since they are
attached to a platform which is also movable property, because it is simply attached to a vessel
is likewise a movable property since it was merely anchored to the seabed. The fact that the
vessel is merely anchored on the seabed only shows that it is not intended to remain at a fixed
place; hence, it remains a movable property.
(c) Are the trees, plants and flowers immovable or movable property?
Please briefly give the reason for your answers.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The trees, plants and flowers planted in the garden area of the platform are immovable
property under Article 415 (2) NCC which classifies as an immovable property trees, plants and
growing fruits, while they are attached to the land or form an integral part of an immovable.
The garden forms an integral part of an immovable, the petroleum operation facility.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The trees, plants and flowers planted in the garden area of the platform are movable property
because they are not permanently attached to the land and do not form an integral part of an
immovable. The platform is not an immovable property for the same reason already given in the
Alternative Answer to Item (a) above.
III
Explain the following concepts and doctrines and give an example of each:
(a)
concept of trust de son tort (Constructive trust)

(5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) A constructive trust is a trust not created by any word or phrase, either expressly or
impliedly, evincing a direct intention to create a trust, but is one that arises in order to satisfy the
demands of justice. It does not come about by agreement or intention but mainly operation of
law and construed as a trust against one who, by fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or
holds the legal right to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, to hold
(Heirs of Lorenzo Yap v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 523 [1999]).

(b) The following are examples of constructive trust:
1. Article 1456 NCC which provides:
If property is acquired through mistakes or fraud, the person obtaining it is,

by force of law considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the
person from whom the property comes.
2. Article 1451 NCC which provides:
When land passes by succession to any person and he causes the legal title
to be put in the name of another, a trust is established by implication of law for
the benefit of the true owner.
Article 1454 NCC which provides:
3.
If an absolute conveyance of property is made in order to secure the performance

of an obligation of the grantor toward the grantee, a trust by virtue of law is established.
If the fulfillment of the obligation is offered by the grantor when it becomes due, he may
demand the reconveyance of the property to him.
Article 1455 (NCC which provides:
4.
When any trustee, guardian or other person holding a fiduciary relationship

uses trust funds for the purchase of property and causes the conveyance to be
made to him or to a third person, a trust is established by operation of law in favor
of the person to whom the funds belong.
(b)
doctrine of discovered peril (last clear chance) (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(b)
The doctrine of last clear chance states that where the plaintiff was guilty of prior or
antecedent negligence but the defendant, who had the ultimate opportunity to avoid the
impending harm failed to do so, it is the defendant who is liable for all the consequences of the
accident notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff.
An example is where a person was riding a pony on a bridge and improperly pulled the pony to
the wrong side when he saw a car coming. The driver of the car did not stop or change direction,
and nearly hit the horse, and, the frightened animal jumped to its death. The driver of the car is
guilty of negligence because he had a fair opportunity to avoid the accident and failed to avail
himself of that opportunity. He is liable under the doctrine of last clear chance (Picartv. Smith, 37
Phil. 809 [1918]).
IV
(10%)
Bedrock Land & Property Development Corp. is a development company engaged in
developing and selling subdivisions, condominium units and industrial estates. In order to
replenish its inventories, it embarked on an aggressive land banking program. It employed
scouts who roam all over the Philippines to look for and conduct investigations on prospective
sites for acquisition and development, whether developed, semi-developed or raw land. The
management of Bedrock asks you as the company counsel to prepare a manual containing a
summary of the pertinent laws and regulations relating to land registration and acquisition of
title to land. The manual should include the following items:
(a)
What is the governing law?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a)
The governing law is the Land Registration Act as amended by the Property
Registration Decree (Act No. 496 as amended by P.D. No. 1529).
[Note: It is respectfully recommended that full credit be given to examinees who did not
give the exact title or number of the law but merely stated a description of the law.]
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
In general, the governing law relating to registration and acquisition of title to land is Act
496 of 1902 as amended by P.D. No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree
of June 11, 1978.
1.
Chapter III-I governs original registration of land title under the Torrens System by
voluntary or ordinary judicial proceedings.
2.
Chapter II-II governs compulsory registration of lands through cadastral proceedings.
3.
Section 103 governs registration of homestead, sales or free patent under C.A. No. 141, as
amended, otherwise known as the Public Land Act.
4.
Section 104 governs registration of certificates of land transfer, emancipation patents and
Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) under the Comprehensive Land Reform Law.
5.
Chapter V governs the registration of voluntary dealings on registered land like

conveyances, transfers, mortgages, leases, powers of attorney, trusts and similar contracts
inter vivos.
6.
7.
8.
Chapter V-II governs the registration of involuntary dealings on registered land like
attachments, adverse claims, enforcement of liens on registered land, notices of lispendens.
Chapter VI governs the registration of judgments, orders and partitions, condemnation in
eminent domain proceedings, judicial and extra-judicial settlement of estates.
Sections 107, 108 and 109, governs petitions and actions after original registration like:
a)
Compulsory surrender of withheld owners duplicate certificate of title;
b)
Amendment and alteration of certificate of title;
c)
Replacement of lost or destroyed owners duplicate certificate of title.
9.
R.A. No. 26 governs judicial reconstitution of lost or destroyed originals of the certificate of
title.
10.
R.A. No. 6732 governs administrative reconstitution of lost or destroyed original certificates
of title.
11.
Section 113 governs the registration of instruments affecting unregistered private lands.
12.
Section 117 governs consultas, where the Register of Deeds refuses to register a
deed or when he is in doubt as to what action to take on an instrument presented for
registration.
(b) What properties are not registrable?
Supply this information.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(b)
The following properties are not registrable:

1. Properties of the public dominion;
2. Properties for public use or public service;
3. Inalienable lands of the public domain;
4. Military installations, civil and quasi-public lands; and
5. All lands not classified as alienable and disposable.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
1.
Properties of public dominium intended for public use, like roads, canals, rivers,
torrents, ports and bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and the like, are
incapable of private appropriation, much less registration (Article 420, New\ Civil Code). This
includes public markets, public plazas, municipal streets and public buildings (Municipality of
Antipolo v. Zapanta, 133 SCRA 820 [1986]); Martinez vs. CA, 56 SCRA 647 [1974]; Navera v.
Quicho, 5 SCRA 454 [1962]).
2. Lands proclaimed or classified as forest or timberland, mineral lands and national parks.
Under Section 2, Article XII, Constitution of the Philippines, these lands are inalienable.
3. Lands that have been reserved by law or Presidential proclamation for military, civil or for
public or quasi-public purpose. Under Section 88, Chapter XII of the Public Land Act, such lands
shall be inalienable and shall not be subject to occupation, entry, sale, lease or other disposition.
4. In general, all lands of the public domain that have not been classified as alienable and
disposable under the Public Land Act.
5. Lands that form part of the seabed, riverbed or lakebed. These lands are not susceptible to
private appropriation.
6. Foreshore lands or that strip of land that lies between the high and low water marks and
alternately wet and dry according to the flow of the tide belong to the public domain, and can
only be acquired by lease if not needed by the government for public or quasi-public purposes.
7. Lands reclaimed by the government from the sea, lakes or other bodies of water are
disposable or acquisible only by lease and not otherwise, under the Public Land Act.
V.
(10%)
What are obligations without an agreement? Give five examples of situations giving rise to
this type of obligation.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Obligations without an agreement are obligations that do not arise from contract such as
those arising from:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
delicts;
quasi-delicts;
solution indebiti;
negotiorum gestio; and
all other obligations arising from law.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Obligations without an agreement refer to the juridical relation of quasi-contract which
arise from certain lawful, voluntary and unilateral acts to the end that no one shall be unjustly
enriched or benefited at the expense of another. (Art. 2142, NCC)
First example of an obligation without an agreement is a case of negotiorum gestio,
whereby one who voluntarily takes charge of the agency or management of the business or
property of another, without any power from the latter, is obliged to continue the same until the
termination of the affair and its incidents, or to require the person concerned to substitute him, if
the owner is in a position to do so (Art. 2144, NCC).
Second example, a case of solution indebiti may also give rise to an obligation without an
agreement. This refers to the obligation to return which arises when something is received when
there is no right to demand it, and it was unduly delivered through mistake (Art. 2154, NCC).
Third example, is when without the knowledge of the person obliged to give support, it is
given by a stranger, the latter shall have a right to claim the same from the former, unless it
appears that he gave it out of piety and without intention of being repaid (Art. 2164, NCC).
Fourth example, is when through an accident or other cause a person is injured or becomes
seriously ill, and he is treated or helped while he is not in a condition to give consent to a
contract, he shall be liable to pay for the services of the physician or other person aiding him,
unless the service has been rendered out or pure generosity (Art. 2167, NCC).
Fifth instance of an obligation without an agreement is when the person obliged to
support an orphan or an insane or other indigent person unjustly refuses to give support to the
latter, any third person may furnish support to the needy individual, with right of reimbursement
from the person obliged to give support. The provisions of this article apply when the father or
mother of a child under eighteen years of age unjustly refuses to support him (Art. 2166, NCC).
VI
(10%)
Clara, thinking of her mortality, drafted a will and asked Roberta, Hannah, Luisa and
Benjamin to be witnesses. During the day of the signing of her will, Clara fell down the stairs and
broke both her arms. Coming from the hospital, Clara insisted on signing her will by thumb mark
and said that she can sign her full name later. While the will was being signed, Roberta
experienced a stomach ache and kept going to the restroom for long periods of time. Hannah,
while waiting for her turn to sign the will, was reading the 7 lh Harry Potter book on the couch,
beside the table on which everyone was signing. Benjamin, aside from witnessing the will, also
offered to notarize it. A week after, Clara was run over by a drunk driver while crossing the street
in Greenbelt. May the will of Clara be admitted to probate? Give your reasons briefly.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Probate should be denied. The requirement that the testator and at least three (3)
witnesses must all sign in the presence of one another was not complied with. Benjamin who
notarized the will is disqualified as a witness, hence, he cannot be counted as one of the three
witnesses (Cruz v. Villasor, 54 SCRA 31 [1973]). The testatrix and the other witnesses signed the
will not in the presence of Roberta because she was in the restroom for extended periods of time.
Inside the restroom, Roberta could not have possibly seen the testatrix and the other witnesses
sign the will by merely casting her eyes in the proper direction (Jaboneta v. Gustilo, 5 Phil. 541
[1906]; Nera v. Rimando, 18 Phil. 451 [1914]). Therefore, the testatrix signed her will in the
presence of only two witnesses, and only two witnesses signed the will in the presence of the
testatrix and of one another.
It is to be noted, however, that a thumbmark intended by the testator to be his signature
in executing his last will and testament is valid (Payad v. Tolentino, 62 Phil. 848 [1936]; Matias v.
Salud, L-104 Phils. 1046, 23 June [1958]). The problem, however, states that Clara said that she
can sign her full name later; Hence, she did not consider her thumb-mark as her complete
signature, and intended further action on her part. The testatrix and the other witness signed the
will in the presence of Hannah, because she was aware of her function and role as witness and
was in a position to see the testatrix and the other witness sign by merely casting her eyes in the
proper direction.
VII
Write "TRUE'1 if the statement is true or FALSE if the statement is false. If the statement
is FALSE, state the reason. (2%)
1. Roberta, a Filipino, 17 years'of age. without the knowledge of his parents, can
acquire a house in Australia because Australian Laws allow aliens to acquire property from the
age of 16.
SUGGESTE ANSWER:
TRUE. Since Australian Law allows aliens to acquire property from the age of 16, Roberta
may validly own a house in Australia, following the principle of lex rei sitae enshrined in Article
16, NCC which states: Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated. Moreover, even assuming that legal capacity of Roberta in entering
the contract in Australia is governed by Philippine law under Article 15, NCC, the contract of sale
is not void but merely voidable under the NCC. Hence, even under Philippine law, she will
acquire ownership over the property she bought until the contract is annulled.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
FALSE. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad
(Art. 15, NCC). The age of majority under Philippine law is 18 years (Rep. Act No. 6809); hence,
Roberta, being only 17 years old, has no legal capacity to acquire and own land.
If a man commits several acts of sexual infidelity, particularly in 2002, 2003, 2004,
2005, the prescriptive period to file for legal separation runs from 2002.
2.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
FALSE. The five-year prescriptive period for filing legal separation runs from the occurrence
of each act of sexual infidelity. Hence, the prescriptive period for the sexual infidelity committed
in 2002 runs from 2002; for the sexual infidelity committed in 2003, the prescriptive period runs
from 2003 and so on. The action for legal separation for the last act of sexual infidelity in 2005
will prescribe in 2010.
3. An individual, while single, purchases a house and lot in 1990, and borrows money
in 1992 to repair it. In 1995, such individual gets married while the debt is still being
paid. After the marriage, the debt is still the responsibility of such individual.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
FALSE. The absolute community of property is liable for the ante-nuptial debts of either
spouse in so far as the same redounded to the benefit of the family (Art. 94[7], Family Code).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
FALSE. The debt is already the responsibility of the community property, because the
property already constitutes absolute community of property under Art. 91 of the Family Code
which took effect in 1988 while the house and lot here involved was purchased in 1990. There is
no indication that the spouse who bought the property had legitimate descendants by a former
marriage, which would exclude the house and lot from the community property, (Art. 92[3],
Family Code). If the spouses established a conjugal partnership, the property belongs to the
individual spouse if full ownership was vested before the marriage. (Art. 118, Family Code).
4. The day after John and Marsha got married, John told her that he was impotent.
Marsha continued to live with John for 2 years. Marsha is now estopped from filing an
annulment case against John.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
FALSE. Marsha is not estopped from filing an annulment case against John on the ground of his
impotence, because she learned of his impotence after the celebration of the marriage and not
before. Physical incapability to consummate the marriage is a valid ground for the annulment of
marriage if such incapacity was existing at the time of the marriage, continues and appears to be
incurable. The marriage may be annulled on this ground within five years from its celebration
(Art. 45 [5], Family Code).
5. Amor gave birth to Thelma when she was 15 years old. Thereafter, Amor met David
and they got married when she was 20 years old. David had a son, Julian, with his ex-girlfriend
Sandra. Julian and Thelma can get married.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
True. Julian and Thelma can get married. Marriages between stepbrothers and stepsisters
are not among the marriages prohibited under the Family Code.
VIII
(10%)
In 1986, Jennifer and Brad were madly in love. In 1989, because a certain Picasso painting
reminded Brad of her, Jennifer acquired it and placed it in his bedroom. In 1990, Brad and
Jennifer broke up. While Brad was mending his broken heart, he met Angie and fell in love.
Because the Picasso painting reminded Angie of him, Brad in his will bequeathed the painting to
Angie. Brad died in 1995. Saddened by Brads death, Jennifer asked for the Picasso painting as a
remembrance of him. Angie refused and claimed that Brad, in his will, bequeathed the painting to
her. Is Angie correct? Why or why not?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
NO. Angie is not correct. The Picasso painting was not given or donated by Jennifer to Brad. She
merely placed it in his bedroom. Hence, she is still the owner of the painting. Not being the
owner of the Picasso painting, Brad cannot validly bequeathed the same to Angie (Art. 930, NCC).
Even assuming that the painting was impliedly given or donated by Jennifer to Brad, the donation
is nevertheless void for not being in writing. The Picasso painting must be worth more than 5,000
pesos. Under Article 748, NCC the donation and acceptance of a movable worth more than 5,000
pesos must be in writing, otherwise the donation is void. The donation being void, Jennifer
remained the owner of the Picasso painting and Brad could not have validly disposed of said
painting in favor of Angie in his will.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, Angie is correct. Even assuming that there was a void donation because the donation
was not in writing, Brad, who was in uninterrupted possession of the Picasso painting from 1989
to 1995, lasting for six (6) years prior to his death, Brad has already acquired ownership of the
painting through acquisitive prescription. Under Article 1132 of the New Civil Code, Ownership
of movables prescribes through continous possession for four (4) years in good faith and for eight
(8) years without need of any other conditions. A void donation may be the basis of possession in
the concept of owner and of just title for purposes of acquisitive prescription.
IX
Multiple choice: Choose the right answer? (2% each)
1.
The parties to a bailment are the:

a)
bailor;
b)
c)
d)
e)
bailee;
comodatario;
all of the above;
letters a and b
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1.
e (letters a & b)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
1.
d (all of the above)

Adeposit made in compliance with a legal obligation is:
2.
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
an extrajudicial deposit;
a voluntary deposit;
a necessary deposit;
a deposit with a warehouseman;
letters a and b
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
2.
3.
c ( necessary deposit)
A contract of antichresis is always:
a)
a written contract;
b)
a contract with a stipulation that the debt will be paid through receipt of
the
c)
d)
e)
fruits of an immovable;
involves the payment of interests, if owing;
all of the above;
letters a and b.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
3.
4.
d (all of the above)

An assignee in a proceeding under the insolvency Law does not have the duty of:
a)
suing to recover the properties of the estate of the insolvent debtor;

b)
c)
selling property of the insolvent debtor;

ensuring that a debtor corporation operate the business efficiency and effectively
d)
the proceedings are pending.

collecting and discharging debts owned to the insolvent debtors.
while
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
4.
(c )
5.
In order to obtain approval of the proposed settlement of the debtor in an insolvency
proceeding:
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
the court must initiate the proposal;

2/3 of the number of creditors should agree to the settlement;
3/5 of the number of creditors should agree to the settlement;
1/3 of the total debts must be represented by the approving creditors;
letters a and b.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
5.
None of the choices is the correct answer. In order to obtain approval of the proposed
settlement, 2/3 of the number of creditors representing 3/5 of the total liabilities must
approved the same.
[Note: Items 4 fit 5 on Insolvency Law are not included within the coverage of Civil Law but
in Commercial Law. It is therefore suggested that the examinees be given full credit for
the two items regardless of their answers.]
X
(10%)
For purposes of this question, assume all formalities and procedural requirements have been
complied with.
In 1970, Ramon and Dessa got married. Prior to their marriage, Ramon had a child, Anna. In
1971 and 1972, Ramon and Dessa legally adopted Cherry and Michelle, respectively. In 1973,
Dessa died while giving birth to Larry. Anna had a child, Lia. Anna never married. Cherry, on the
other hand, legally adopted Shelly. Larry had twins, Hans and Gretel, with his girlfriend, Fiona. In
2005, Anna, Larry, and Cherry died in a car accident. In 2007, Ramon died. Who may inherit from
Ramon and who may not? Give your reasons briefly.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The following may inherit from Ramon:
1.
Michelle, as an adopted child Ramon, will inherit as a legitimate child of Ramon. As an

adopted child, Michelle has all the rights of a legitimate child (Section 18, Domestic
Adoption Law).
2.
Lia will inherit in representation of Anna. Although Lia is an illegitimate child, she is not
barred by Article 992, because her mother Anna is herself illegitimate. She will
represent Anna as regards Annas legitime under Art. 902, NCC and as regards Annas
intestate share under Article 990, NNC.
The following may not inherit from Ramon:
1.
a
Shelly, being an adopted child, cannot represent Cherry. This is because adoption creates
personal legal relation only between the adopter and the adopted. The law on
representation
requires the representative to be a legal heir of the person he is representing and also of
the person from whom the person being represented was supposed to inherit. While
Shelly is a legal heir of Cherry, Shelly is not a legal heir of Ramon. Adoption created a
purely personal legal relation only between Cherry and Shelly.
2.
Hans and Gretel are barred from inheriting from Ramon under Article 992 of the New
Civil Code. Being illegitimate children, they cannot inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate relatives of their father or mother. Since Ramon is a legitimate relative of Larry,
the illegitimate twin children of Larry are barred from inheriting ab intestato from Ramon.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The problem expressly mentioned the dates of the adoption of Cherry and Michelle as 1971
and 1972. During that time, adoption was governed by the New Civil Code. Under the New Civil
Code, husband and wife were allowed to adopt separately or not jointly with the other spouse.
And since the problem does not specifically and categorically state, it is possible to construe the
use of the word respectively in the problem as indicative of the situation that Cherry was
adopted by Ramon alone and Michelle was adopted by Dessa alone. In such a case of separate
adoption the alternative answer to the problem will be as follows:
Only Lia will inherit from Ramon in representation of Ramons illegitimate daughter Anna.
Although Lia is an illegitimate child, she is not barred from inheriting from Ramon because her
mother Anna is herself illegitimate.
Shelly cannot inherit in representation of Cherry because Shelly is just an adopted child of
Cherry. In representation, the representative must not only be a legal heir of the person he is
representing but also of the decedent from from whom the represented person is supposed to
inherit. In the case of Shelly, while she is a legal heir of Cherry by virtue of her adoption, she is
not a legal heir of Ramon. Adoption creates a personal legal relation only between the adopting
parent and the adopted child (Teotico v. Del Val, 13 SCRA 406 [1965]).
Michelle cannot inherit from Ramon, because she was adopted not by Ramon but by Dessa.
In the eyes of the law she is not related to Ramon at all. Hence, she is not a legal heir of Ramon.
Hans and Gretel are not entitled to inherit from Ramon, because they are barred by Article
992 NCC. Being illegitimate children of Larry, they cannot inherit from the legitimate relatives of
their father Larry. Ramon is a legitimate relative, of Larry the legitimate father.
Under Article 213 of the Family Code, no child under 7 years of age shall be separated from
the mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
(1)
Explain the rationale of this provision. 2.5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The rationale of the provision is that a child below 7 years old needs the love and care which
only its mother can give. The welfare of the child is given the highest priority and the interest of
the child prevails over procedural rules.
(2)
Give at least 3 examples of compelling reasons which justify the taking away
from the mothers custody of her child under 7 years of age. 2.5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The following have been considered as compelling reasons to deprive a mother of
custody: (1) neglect, (2) abandonment, (3) unemployment, (4) immorality (Espiritu v. CA, 242
SCRA 362 [1995D, (5) alcoholism, (6) drug addiction, (7) maltreatment, (8) insanity, (9) highly
communicable serious disease, (10) grave physical handicap, (11) serious and credible threat by
the child to harm himself if separated from his mother (Luna v. CA, 137 SCRA 7 [19851).
II
Saul, a married man, had an adulterous relation with Tessie. In one of the trysts, Sauls wife,
Cecile, caught them in flagrante. Armed with a gun, Cecile shot Saul in a fit of extreme jealousy,
nearly killing him. Four (4) years after the incident, Saul filed an action for legal separation
against Cecille on the ground that she attempted to kill him.
(1)
If you were Sauls counsel, how will you argue his case? 2.5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If I were the counsel for Saul, I would argue that attempt by one spouse against the life of
the other is a valid ground for legal separation and that there is no need for conviction in a
criminal case.
(2)
If you were the lawyer of Cecile. What will be your defense? 2.5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If I were the lawyer of Cecile, I will interpose the defense that the attempt on his life was
without criminal intent but was impelled solely by passion and obfuscation. This is the reason why
under the Revised Penal Code, even killing him when caught in the act would be justified. To be a
ground for legal separation, the attempt must be intentional and wrongful.
(3)
(4)
If you were the judge, how will you decide the case?
5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
As judge, I will deny the petition. A petition for legal separation may be filed only by the
aggrieved spouse. Since Saul was unfaithful and was in fact caught in flagrante by his wife, he is
not an aggrieved spouse entitled to the relief. He who comes to court must come with clean
hands. And even assuming that the attempt on his life by the wife is a ground for legal separation,
he is still not entitled to the relief because of his infidelity. The law does not allow legal
separation if both parties have given ground for legal separation.
III
Ed and Beth have been married for 20 years without children. Desirous to have a baby, they
consulted Dr. Jun Canlas, a prominent medical specialist on human fertility. He advised Beth to
undergo artificial insemination. It was found that Eds sperm count was inadequate to induce
pregnancy. Hence, the couple looked for a willing donor. Andy, the brother of Ed, readily
consented to donate his sperm. After a series of tests, Andys sperm was medically introduced
into Beths ovary. She became pregnant and 9 months later, gave birth to a baby boy named
Alvin.
(1)
Who is the father of Alvin? Explain. 2.5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Ed is the father of Alvin because Alvin was conceived and bom during the marriage of his
mother to Ed. Under the law, the child born during the marriage of the mother to her husband is
presumed to be the legitimate child of the husband (Concepcion v. Almonte, 468 SCRA 438
[2005D- While it is true that there was no written consent by the husband to the artificial
insemination, absence of such consent may only give the husband a ground to impugn the
legitimacy of the child but will not prevent the child from acquiring the status of legitimate child
of the husband at the time of its birth.
Ed is the father of Alvin if he gave his written consent to the artificial insemination of his
wife. Otherwise, the child is the illegitimate child of Andy. Under the Family Code, children
conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm of the husband or that
of a donor or both are legitimate children of the husband and the wife, provided that both of
them authorized or ratified such insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by
both of them before the birth of the child.
(2)
2.5%
What are the requirements, if any, in order for Ed to establish his paternity over Alvin?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
To establish Eds paternity over Alvin, only two requirements must concur: (1) the fact that
Ed and the mother of Alvin are validly married, and (2) the fact that Alvin was conceived or born
during the subsistence of such marriage.
To establish Eds paternity over Alvin, two requirements must obtain: (1) both spouses
authorized or ratified the insemination in a written document executed and signed by them
before the birth of the child; and (2) the instrument is recorded in the civil registry together with
the birth certificate of the child.
IV
Gigi and Ric, Catholics, got married when they were 18 years old. Their marriage was
solemnized on August 2, 1989 by Rics uncle, a Baptist Minister, in Calamba, Laguna. He
overlooked the fact that his license to solemnize marriage expired the month before and that the
parties do not belong to his congregation. After 5 years of married life and blessed with 2
children, the spouses developed irreconcilable differences, so they parted ways.
While separated, Ric fell in love with Juliet, a 16 year-old sophomore in a local college and a
Seventh-Day Adventist. They decided to get married with the consent of Juliets parents. She
presented to him a birth certificate showing she is 18 years old. Ric never doubted her age much
less the authenticity of her birth certificate. They got married in a Catholic church in Manila a
year after, Juliet gave birth to twins, Aissa and Aretha.
(1)
2.5%
What is the status of marriage between Gigi and Ric - valid, voidable or void? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER
The marriage between Gigi and Ric is void because a minister has no authority to solemnize
a marriage between contracting parties who were both not members of the ministers religious
sect. Under the Family Code, a minister or a priest has authority to solemnize a marriage but only
if one or both contracting parties are members of the religious sect of the priest or minister. Since
neither Ric or Gigi was a member of the Baptist Church because both of them were Catholic, the
Baptist Minister did not have authority to solemnize their marriage.
Ric and Gigi cannot claim that they believed in good faith and that the Baptist Minister had
the authority to solemnize the marriage and invoke Article 35 (2) of the Family Code to make the
marriage valid. The provision of the Family Code applies only to a mistake of fact, and not to a
mistake of law. Hence, the fact that the Ministers license was expired will not affect the validity
of the marriage if Ric or Gigi believed in good faith that the Minister had a valid license. That
would be a mistake of fact. However, believing that the Minister had authority to solemnize the
marriage even if none of the contracting parties was a member of the Ministers religious sect is a
mistake of law. This is because the law expressly provides that the Minister has authority only if
one or both contracting parties are members of the Ministers religious sect. A mistake of law
does not excuse from noncompliance therewith.

The marriage between Ric and Gigi is valid. Assuming that the parents of Ric and Gigi did
not give their consent to the marriage, the marriage would have been voidable. However, it was
ratified when Ric and Gigi continued cohabiting for 2 years after they attained the age of 21. It
must be noted that they had 5 years of married life or until they were 23 years old.
The fact that neither Ric nor Gigi was a Baptist would be just a mere irregularity in the
authority of the Baptist Minister to solemnize the marriage. Hence, it would have no adverse
effect on the validity thereof. Also, the fact that the license of the Baptist Minister was expired
will not have any effect on the validity of the marriage because Ric and Gigi can be presumed to
have believed in good faith that the Minister had a valid license.
(2)
Explain. 2.5%
What is the status of the marriage between Ric and Juliet - valid, voidable or void?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The marriage between Ric and Juliet is void because Juliet was below 18 years of age. Under
the Family Code, the requisite age for legal capacity to contract marriage is 18 years old and a
marriage by a party who is below 18 years old is void under all circumstances. Hence, even
though Juliets parents have given their consent to the marriage and even though Ric believed in
good faith that she was 18 years old, the marriage is void.
(3)
Suppose Ric himself procured the falsified birth certificate to persuade Juliet to
marry him despite her minority and assured her that everything is in order. He did not divulge to
her his prior marriage with Gigi. What action, if any, can Juliet take against him? Explain. 2.5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) Juliet may file an action to declare her marriage to Ric null and void on the ground that
she was not of marrying age. (b) She may also file a criminal case against Ric for bigamy because
he contracted the marriage with her without a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage
to Gigi. (c) She may also file a criminal case for falsification, perjury, or illegal marriage as the
case may be. (d) In case the facts and the evidence will warrant, she may also file a criminal case
for seduction. In all these cases, Juliet may recover damages.
(4)
If you were the counsel for Gigi, what action/s will y-ou take to enforce and
protect her interests? Explain. 2.5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
As counsel for Gigi, I will file an action for the declaration of nullity of Gigis marriage to Ric
on the ground of absence of authority of the Baptist Minister to solemnize the marriage between
Ric and Gigi who were both non-members of the Baptist Church.
As counsel for Gigi, and on the basis of the legal presumption that her marriage to Ric is
valid, I will file the following actions: (1) Legal separation on the grounds of subsequent
bigamous marriage and sexual infidelity,
(2)
Receivership of the conjugal or community property,
(3)
Judicial separation of property, (4) Petition for sole administration of the conjugal or
community property, (5) Action for damages for abuse of right, and (6) Action to declare the
marriage of Ric and Juliet as null and void and to recover her share in her community of property
with Ric, consisting of the portion shared by Ric in whatever property was commonly or jointly
acquired by Ric and Juliet.
V
Spouses Biong and Linda wanted to sell their house. They found a prospective buyer, Ray.
Linda negotiated with Ray for the sale of the property. They agreed on a fair price of P2 Million.
Ray sent Linda a letter confirming his intention to buy the property. Later, another couple, Bemie
and Elena, offered a similar house at a lower price of PI.5 Million. But Ray insisted on buying the
house of Biong and Linda for sentimental reason. Ray prepared a deed of sale to be signed by the
couple and a managers check of P2 Million. After receiving the P2 Million, Biong signed the
deed of sale. However, Linda was not able to sign it because she was abroad. On her return she
refused to sign the document saying she changed her mind. Linda filed suit for nullification of the
deed of sale and for moral and exemplary damages against Ray.
(1) Will the suit prosper? Explain. 2.5%

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The suit will prosper. The sale was void because Linda did not give her written consent to the
sale. In Jad.er-Ma.nalo v. Camaisa, 374 SCRA 498 (2002), the Supreme Court has ruled that the
sale of conjugal property is void if both spouses have not given their written consent to it and
even if the spouse who did not sign the Deed of Sale participated in the negotiation of the
contract. In Abalos v. Macatangay, 439 SCRA 649(2004), the Supreme Court even held that for
the sale to be valid, the signatures of the spouses to signify their written consent must be on the
same document. In this case, Linda, although she was the one who negotiated the sale, did not
give her written consent to the sale. Hence, the sale is void. However, Linda will not be entitled
to damages because Ray is not in anyway in bad faith.
The suit will not prosper because the contract of sale has already been perfected and partly
consummated. The contract of sale is perfected upon the meeting of the minds of the buyer and
seller on to the thing to be sold and on the price thereof. In this case, Linda had a meeting of
minds with Ray when they agreed that the property will be sold for 2 million pesos at the
conclusion of her negotiations with him, while Biong had a meeting of minds with Ray when he
signed the Deed of Sale and accepted the 2 million-peso payment by Ray. Linda is estopped from
questioning the validity of the contract she herself negotiated with Ray.
(2) Does Ray have any cause of action against Biong and Linda? Can he also recover
damages from the spouses? Explain. 2.5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Ray has a cause of action against Linda and Biong for the return of the 2 million pesos he
paid for the property. He may recover damages from the spouses, if it can be proven that they
were in bad faith in backing out from the contract, as this is an act contrary to morals and good
customs under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code.
Assuming that the contract of sale has been perfected, Ray may file a counterclaim against
Linda and Biong for specific performance or rescission, with damages in either case. Linda has
breached the obligation created by the contract when she filed an action for nullification of sale.
On account of Lindas bad faith or fraud, Ray may ask for damages under Article 1170 of the Civil
Code.
VI
Gemma filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with Arnell on the
ground of psychological incapacity. She alleged that after 2 months of their marriage, Amell
showed signs of disinterest in her, neglected her and went abroad. He returned to the
Philippines after 3 years but did not even get in touch with her. Worse, they met several times in
social functions but he snubbed her. When she got sick, he did not visit her even if he knew of
her confinement in the hospital. Meanwhile, Amell met an accident which disabled him from
reporting for work and earning a living to support himself.
Will Gemmas suit prosper? Explain. 5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Gemmas suit will not prosper. The acts of Amell complained about do not by themselves
constitute psychological incapacity. It is not enough to prove the commission of those acts or
the existence of his abnormal behavior. It must be shown that those acts or that behavior was
manifestatioil of a serious mental disorder and that it is the root cause why he was not able to
perform the essential duties of married life. It must also be shown that such psychological
incapacity, as manifested in those acts or that behavior, was existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage. In this case, there was no showing that Arnell was suffering from a
serious mental disorder, that his behavior was a manifestation of that disorder, and that such
disorder prevented him from complying with his duties as a married person.
VII
Marvin, a Filipino, and Shelley, an American, both residents of California, decided to get
married in their local parish. Two years after their marriage, Shelley obtained a divorce in
California. While in Boracay, Marvin met Manel, a Filipina, who was vacationing there. Marvin
fell in love with her. After a brief courtship and complying with all the requirements, they got
married in Hongkong to avoid publicity, it being Marvins second marriage. Is his marriage to
Manel valid? Explain. 5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the marriage of Marvin and Manel is valid. While Marvin was previously married to
Shelley, the divorce from Marvin obtained by Shelley in California capacitated Marvin to
contract the subsequent marriage to Manel under the 2nd paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code which provides that where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law.
VIII
Alberto and Janine migrated to the United States of America, leaving behind their 4 children,
one of whom is Manny. They own a duplex apartment and allowed Manny to live in one of the
units. While in the United States, Alberto died. His widow and all his children executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement of Albertos estate wherein the 2-door apartment was assigned by all
the children to their mother, Janine. Subsequently, she sold the property to George. The latter
required Manny to sign a prepared Lease Contract so that he and his family could continue
occupying the unit. Manny refused to sign the contract alleging that his parents allowed him and
his family to continue occupying the premises.
If you were Georges counsel, what legal steps will you take? Explain. 5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
As Georges counsel, I will give Manny a written demand to vacate within a definite period,
say 15 days. After the lapse of 15-day period, I will file an action for unlawful detainer to recover
the possession of the apartment from Manny. Mannys occupation of the premises was by mere
tolerance of his parents. When all the co-heirs/co-owners assigned the 2-door apartment to
Janine in the extrajudicial partition, Janine became the sole owner of the same. He continued to
occupy it under the same familial arrangement. Upon the sale of the property to George,
Mannys lawful occupation of the property was terminated and Mannys refusal to sign the lease
contract and to vacate the premises after the period to vacate lapsed made his occupation
unlawful, hence, entitling George to the remedy of unlawful detainer.
IX
A drug lord and his family reside in a small bungalow where they sell shabu and other
prohibited drugs. When the police found the illegal trade, they immediately demolished the
house because according to them, it was a nuisance per se that should be abated. Can this
demolition be sustained? Explain. 5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the demolition cannot be sustained. The house cannot be considered as nuisance perse.
To be considered per se, the act, occupation, or structure must be a nuisance at all times and
under any circumstances, regardless of location or surrounding. Since the demolished house was
not a nuisance during the times that it was not being used for selling drugs, it cannot be
considered as nuisance perse. Moreover, in the abatement of a nuisance, whether judicially or

extra-judicially, the abatement should not inflict unnecessary damage or injury. In this case, what
may be considered as nuisance per se is not the structure of the house but the use of the house
for the selling of shabu. However, the demolition of the house is not necessary to abate the sale
of shabu in that community. To demolish the house is an unnecessary damage and injury
The selling of shabu is not only a public nuisance but a grave threat to the welfare of the
community. As such it can be enjoined and all instruments thereof destroyed by the law enforcers.
The sale of the shabu in that community is facilitated by the house which hides the pernicious
activity from the law enforcers. This being the case, the house may be considered as an instrument
of the crime and the law enforcers are justified in demolishing the house in the exercise of the
police powers of the State.
X
Don died after executing a Last Will and Testament leaving his estate valued at P12 Million
to his common-law wife Roshelle. He is survived by his brother Ronie and his half-sister Michelle.
(1) Was Dons testamentary disposition of his estate in accordance with the law on
succession? Whether you agree or not, explain your answer. 2.5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the testamentary disposition is in accordance with the law on succession. Don was not
survived by any compulsory heir. Hence, he could will his entire estate to
anybody of his choice including a total stranger. His institution of his common-law wife to his
entire estate is valid. The disposition is not in consideration of an adulterous relationship
because both of them were not married to anyone at the time of his making of the will and at
the time of his death. Relationship between two unmarried persons is not adulterous. The law
does not prohibit testamentary dispositions in favor of a common law spouse. What the law
prohibits are donations in favor of common law spouses under the Family Code. Such provision
does not include a disposition mortis causa such as a testamentary institution.
Article 1028 of the New Civil Code provides that prohibitions concerning donations inter
vivos shall apply to testamentary dispositions. Article 87 of he Family Code provides that the
prohibition against donations between spouses during the marriage shall also apply to persons
living together as husband and wife without a valid marriage."
Accordingly, Dons testamentary disposition in favor of his common law wife Roshelle is
void because it is prohibited by law.
(2)
If Don failed to execute a will during his lifetime, as his lawyer, how will you
distribute his estate? Explain. 2.5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If Don failed to execute a will, he died intestate and his estate was inherited by his
intestate heirs. His intestate heirs are Ronie and Michelle. However, Ronie will receive double
the share of Michelle because Michelle was a half-blood sister while Ronnie was a full-blood
brother. Ronie will receive 8 million pesos, while Michelle will receive 4 million pesos.
(3)
Assuming he died intestate survived by his brother Ronie, his half-sister Michelle,
and his legitimate son Jayson.
how will you distribute his estate? Explain. 2.5%

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Only Jayson will inherit from Don as his compulsory heir in the direct descending line.
Jayson will exclude the collateral relatives Ronie and Michelle. In intestate succession, the direct
line excludes the collateral line.
(4) Assuming further he died intestate, survived by his father Juan, his brother Ronie, his
half-sister Michelle, and his legitimate son Jayson, how will you distribute his estate? Explain.
1.5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Only Jayson will inherit from his father Don. In intestate succession, the direct line excludes
the collateral line. But among those in the direct line, the descending excludes the ascending.
Hence, the father Juan and Jayson, who are in the direct line, exclude the brother Ronie and the
sister Michelle who are both in the collateral line. However the son Jayson, who is in the
descending line, excludes the father Juan who is in the ascending line.
XI
Spouses Alfredo and Racquel were active members of a religious congregation. They
donated a parcel of land in favor to that congregation in a duly notarized Deed of Donation,
subject to the condition that the Minister shall construct thereon a place of worship within 1 year
from the acceptance of the donation, in an affidavit he executed in behalf of the congregation,
the Minister accepted the donation. The Deed of Donation was not registered with the Registry
of Deeds.
However, instead of constructing a place of worship, the Minister constructed a bungalow on the
property he used as his residence. Disappointed with the Minister, the spouses revoked the
donation and demanded that he vacate the premises immediately. But the Minister refused to
leave, claiming that aside from using the bungalow as his residence, he is also using it as a place
of worship on special occasions. Under the circumstances, can Alfredo and Racquel evict the
Minister and recover possession of the property?
If you were the couples counsel, what action will you take to protect the interests of your
clients? 5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
As counsel for the couple, I may file an action for reconveyance of the property on the
ground that the donation was not perfected. It was not perfected because although it was made
in a public document and was accepted by the donee in a separate public document, the donee
failed to notify the donor of such acceptance in an authentic form before the donation was
revoked under Article 749 of the Civil Code. Such notification was necessary for the donation to
become valid and binding.
Assuming that the donation is valid on the ground that it was an onerous donation, and
therefore, the law on contracts applied even as to its form, I may file an action for the revocation
of the donation under Article 764 of the Civil Code for noncompliance with the condition
imposed on the donation. In donating the land, the intension of the couple was for the land to
become the site of a church, or place of worship, for their congregation. This is why the couple
have imposed, as a condition of the donation, the construction thereon of a church, or a place of
worship, within 1 year from the acceptance of the donation. The construction of a residential
bungalow which is used as a place of worship but only on special occasions is not a substantial
compliance with such condition. Hence, the donation may be revoked for failure to comply with
the condition.
Upon the filing of the case, I will file a notice of lis pendens with the Register of Deeds for
annotation on the TCT to ensure against the transfer of the land to an innocent purchaser for
value.
XII
Tony bought a Ford Expedition from a car dealer in Muntinlupa City. As payment, Tony
issued a check drawn against his current account with Premium Bank. Since he has a good
reputation, the car dealer allowed him to immediately drive home the vehicle merely on his
assurance that his check is sufficiently funded. When the car dealer deposited the check, it was
dishonored on the ground of Account Closed. After an investigation, it was found that an
employee of the bank misplaced Tony's account ledger. Thus, the bank erroneously assumed
that his account no longer exists. Later, it turned out thatTonys account has more than sufficient
funds to cover the check. The dealer however, immediately filed an action for recovery of
possession of the vehicle against Tony for which he was terribly humiliated and embarrassed.
Does Tony have a cause of action against Premium Bank? Explain. 5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Tony has a cause of action against Premium Bank. According to Art. 2176, whoever by
act or omission causes damages to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. The proximate cause of the injury which is the dishonor of Tonys check, was
the banks negligence in misplacing his account ledger. The fiduciary nature of banking requires
high standards of integrity and performance necessitating banks to treat the accounts of its
depositors with meticulous care.
XIII
Arturo sold his Pajero to Benjamin for PI Million. Benjamin took the vehicle but did not
register the sale with the Land Transportation Office. He allowed his son Carlos, a minor who
did not have a drivers license, to drive the car to buy pan de sal in a bakery. On the way, Carlos,
driving in a reckless manner, sideswiped Dennis, then riding a bicycle. As a result, he suffered
serious physical injuries. Dennis filed a criminal complaint against Carlos for reckless
imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries.
1. Can Dennis file an independent civil action against Carlos and his father Benjamin for
damages based on quasidelict? Explain. 2.5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Dennis can file an independent civil action against Carlos and his father, Benjamin.
The independent civil action against Carlos can be based on Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
which states that, "whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there, being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done." The proximate cause of the injury suffered
by Dennis, was the negligent driving of Carlo. He can thus be held personally liable by the
former for said injuries.
2. Assuming Dennis' action is tenable, can Benjamin raise the defense that he is not
liable because the vehicle is not registered in his name? Explain. 2.5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Benjamin cannot raise the defense that he is not liable because the vehicle is not
registered in his name. Had Dennis sued Benjamin based on the latters liability as the owner of
the vehicle, the non-registration of the vehicle in his name would have been a valid defense. As
held in the case of BA Finance Corporation v. CA (215 SCRA 715 [19921), it is the registered
owner of any vehicle, who should be primarily responsible to the public or third persons for
injuries caused the latter while the vehicle is being driven. In this case, Arturo was not sued. If
sued, Arturo should be held liable for the injury incurred by Dennis.
However, Benjamin is not being sued based on his ownership of the registered vehicle, but
rather for his responsibility as the parent of a minor child whose negligent act resulted to
damage or injury to another. As provided in Article 2180 of the Civil Code, as amended by
Article 221 of the Family Code, the father and mother are responsible for the damages caused
by the fault and negligence of the minor children who live in their company. This liability is
imposed upon the parents on the presumption that they have failed in their duty of supervision
over their children. Regardless of the ownership of the vehicle, Dennis, therefore, has a cause of
action against Benjamin.
XIV
Zirxthoussous delos Santos filed a petition for change of name with the Office of the Civil
Registrar of Mandaluyong City under the administrative proceeding provided in Republic Act
No. 9048. He alleged that his first name sounds ridiculous and is extremely difficult to spell and
pronounce. After complying with the requirements of the law, the Civil Registrar granted his
petition and changed his first name Zirxthoussous to Jesus." His full name now reads Jesus
delos Santos.
Jesus delos Santos moved to General Santos City to work in a multi-national company.
There, he fell in love and married Mary Grace delos Santos. She requested him to have his first
name changed because his new name Jesus delos Santos" is the same as that of her father who
abandoned her family and became a notorious drug lord. She wanted to forget him. Hence, Jesus
filed another petition with the Office' of the Local Civil Registrar to change his first name to
Roberto. He claimed that the change is warranted because it will eradicate all vestiges of the
infamy of Mary Grace's father.
Will the petition for change of name of Jesus delos Santos to Roberto delos Santos under
Republic Act No. 9048 prosper? Explain. 10%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the petition will not prosper. Under RA 9048, the extrajudicial correction of entry or
change of first name may be availed of only once.
XV
2.5%
1. What entries in the Civil Registry may be changed or corrected without a judicial order?
SUGGESTED ANSWER
Only clerical or typographical errors may be corrected, and only the first name or nickname
may be changed, without judicial order under RA 9048.
2. May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural father, use the surname of her
natural mother as her middle name? 2.5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, an illegitimate child who is adopted by his natural father may carry the surname of his
biological mother as his middle name. The Supreme Court has ruled that there is no law allowing
or prohibiting such child from doing so. What is not prohibited is allowed. Likewise, the use of the
surname of the mother, even of legitimate children is in accord with Filipino customs and
traditions and will serve the best interest of the child who will not be confused by wondering why
he has no middle name. (In Re: Adoption of Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia, 454 SCRA 541
120051).
XVI
1. Under Article 2219 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be recovered in the cases
specified therein, several of which are enumerated below.
Choose the case wherein you cannot recover moral damages. Explain. 1.5%
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries

Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries
Immorality or dishonesty
Illegal search
Malicious prosecution
SUGGESTED ANSWER
Moral damages may not be recovered in (c) immorality or dishonesty because it is not
included in the enumeration in Article 2219 of the Civil Code.
Moral damages may be recovered in all of the five instances enumerated above. While
immorality and dishonesty" are not included in the ten instances enumerated in Article 2219 of
the Civil Code, the same article provides that moral damages may be recovered in the following
and analogous cases". Article 2219(10) provides and includes: Acts and actions referred to in
Article 21...". Article 21 in turn provides: Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another
in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
for damages. Immorality or dishonesty is analogous to acts contrary to morals, and therefore
covered by Article 2219.
2.
Article 36 of the Family Code provides that a marriage contracted by any party who, at
the time of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations of marriage, shall be void.
Choose the spouse listed below who is psychologically incapacitated. Explain. 2.5%
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
nagger
Gay or lesbian
Congenital sexual pervert
Gambler
Alcoholic
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The gay or lesbian is psychologically incapacitated. Being gay or lesbian is a mental disorder
which prevents the afflicted person from performing the essential duties of married life. He or she
will not be able to perform his or her duty of sexual consortium with his or her spouse due to his or
her sexual preference for a person of the same sex. However, the law requires that the disorder or
state of being gay or lesbian incapacitating such person must be existing at the time of the
celebration of the marriage.
A. Gabby and Mila got married at Lourdes Church in Quezon City on July 10. 1990. Prior
thereto, they executed a marriage settlement whereby they agreed on the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains. The marriage settlement was registered in the Register of Deeds of Manila,
where Mila is a resident. In 1992, they jointly acquired a residential house and lot, as well as a
condominium unit in Makati. In 1995, they decided to change their property relations to the
regime of complete separation of property. Mila consented, as she was then engaged in a
lucrative business. The spouses then signed a private document dissolving their conjugal
partnership and agreeing on a complete separation of property.
Thereafter, Gabby acquired a mansion in Baguio City, and a 5-hectare agricultural land in
Oriental Mindoro, which he registered exclusively in his name.

In the year 2000, Milas business venture failed, and her creditors sued her for
PI0,000,000.00. After obtaining a favorable judgment, the creditors sought to execute on the
spouses' house and lot and condominium unit, as well as Gabby's mansion and agricultural land.
a)
Discuss the status of the first and the amended marriage settlements. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. 1) The first marriage settlement was valid because it was in writing, signed by the parties
and executed before the celebration of the marriage.
2) The subsequent agreement of the parties was void as a modification of their
marriage settlement. To be valid, the modification must be executed before the celebration of
the marriage. The subsequent agreement of the parties did not effect a dissolution of their
conjugal partnership and a separation of their properties because
it was not approved by the court. To be valid, an agreement by the parties to dissolve their
conjugal partnership and to separate their properties during the marriage has to be approved by
the court.
b) Discuss the effect/s of the said settlements on the properties acquired by the spouses.
(2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b)
Since the marriage settlement was binding between the parties, conjugal
partnership of gains was the regime of their property relations. Under the regime of conjugal
partnership of gains, all properties acquired by the spouses during the marriage, jointly or by
either one of them, through their work or industry are conjugal. Therefore, the residential house
and lot, and the condominium unit are conjugal having been jointly acquired by the couple
during the marriage. Inasmuch as the subsequent agreement on dissolution of the conjugal
partnership and separation of property was invalid, conjugal partnership subsisted between the
parties. Therefore, the mansion and the agricultural land are also conjugal having been acquired
by one of the spouses during the marriage.
c)
What properties may be held answerable for Milas obligations? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
c)The marriage settlement cannot prejudice third parties, such as the creditors, because it
was not registered with the local civil registrar where the marriage was recorded. To bind third
parties, the Family Code requires registration of the marriage settlement not only with the
proper registers of deeds but also with the local civil registrar where the marriage was recorded.
Hence, if the rules on conjugal partnership will prejudice the creditors, the rules on absolute
community will be applied instead. However, insofar as debts contracted by one spouse without
the consent of the other are concerned, the rule is the same for both conjugal partnership and
absolute community. The partnership or community is liable for debts contracted by one spouse
but only to the extent that it benefited the family. Therefore, if the debts contracted by Mila
redounded to the benefit of the family, all the conjugal partnership properties are liable to pay
them but only to the extent the family was benefited. The separate properties of Mila may be
held answerable for Milas debts and obligations that did not redound to the benefit of the
family.
II
In 1985, Sonny and Lulu, both Filipino citizens, were married in the Philippines. In 1987,
they separated, and Sonny went to Canada, where he obtained a divorce in the same year. He
then married another Filipina, Auring, in Canada on January 1, 1988. They had two sons, James
and John. In 1990, after failing to hear from Sonny, Lulu married Tirso, by whom she had a
daughter, Verna. In 1991, Sonny visited the Philippines where he succumbed to heart attack.
a) Discuss the effect of the divorce obtained by Sonny
and Lulu in Canada. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a)
The divorce obtained by Sonny in Canada was not valid because he and his wife
were both Filipino citizens. Divorce between a Filipino couple is not valid under Philippine law
even though they are living abroad. (Art. 15, Civil Code)
b)
Explain the status of the marriage between Sonny and Auring. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b) Since the divorce obtained by Sonny was void, his marriage to Auring is necessarily
void ab initio because of his subsisting marriage to Lulu. (Art. 41, Family Code)
c) Explain the status of the mairiage between Lulu and Tirso. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
c) The marriage between Lulu and Tirso is also void ab initio because Lulu is still validly
married to Sonny.
d)
Explain the respective filiation of James, John and Verna. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
James and John are the illegitimate children of Sonny and Auring because thej r were
conceived and born outside a valid marriage. Verna is an illegitimate child of Lulu and Tirso
having been conceived and bom to the invalid marriage of Lulu and Tirso. Verna cannot be
presumed as the legitimate child of Sonny because of the supervening marriage that was
celebrated between Lulu and Tirso even though such marriage is void ab initio.
c)
The case of Liyao v. Liyao ______________________ is not applicable

because in that case the wife begot a. child by another man during her marriage to her
estranged husband but no marriage was celebrated between the wife and the father of the child.
The child in that case was presumed to be the legitimate child of the estranged husband.
Who are the heirs of Sonny? Explain. (2%) SUGGESTED ANSWER:
e) The heirs of Sonny are his wife Lulu, and his 2 illegitimate children James and John. The
void remarriage of Lulu to Tirso did not incapacitate her to succeed Sonny.
d)
Ill
Emil, the testator, has three legitimate children. Tom, Henry and Warlito; a wife named
Adette; parents named Pepe and Pilar; an illegitimate child, Ramon; brother, Mark: and a
sister, Nanette. Since his wife Adette is well-off, he wants to leave to his illegitimate child as
much of his estate as he can legally do. His estate has an aggregate net amount of PI,200,000.00,
and all the above-named relatives are still living. Emil now comes to you for advice in making a
will.
How will you distribute his estate according to his wishes without violating the law on
testamentary succession? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
In his will, Emil should give his compulsory heirs just their respective legitimes and give all of
the free portion to his illegitimate child in addition to the said child's legitime. He should divide
his estate in his will as follows:
TOM ..
P200,000.00 (legitime)
Henry
200,000.00 (legitime)
Warlito .
200,000.00 (legitime)
Adette ..
200,000.00 (legitime)
Ramon 400,000.00 (P100,000 as legitime,
And P 300,000.00 as free
Portion
_______________
.. P 1,200,000.00
IV
Steve was married to Linda, with whom he had a daughter, Tintin. Steve fathered a son with
Dina, his secretary of 20 years, whom Dina named Joey, bom on September 20, 1981. Joeys birth
certificate did not indicate the father's name. Steve died on August 13, 1993, while Linda died on
December 3, 1993, leaving their legitimate daughter, Tintin, as sole heir. On May 16, 1994, Dina
filed a case on behalf of Joey, praying that the latter be declared an acknowledged illegitimate
son of Steve and that Joey be given his share in Steve's estate, which is now being solely held by
Tintin. Tintin put up the defense that an action for recognition shall only be filed during the
lifetime of the presumed parents and that the exceptions under Article 285 of the Civil Code do
not apply to him since the said article has been repealed by the Family Code. In any case,
according to Tintin. Joeys birth certificate does not show that Steve is his father.
(2%)
a)
Does Joey have a cause of action against Tintin for recognition and partition? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a)
Yes, Joey has such a cause of action against Tintin. While the Family Code has repealed
the provisions of the New Civil Code on proof of filiation, said repeal did not impair vested rights.
Joey was born an illegitimate child in 1981. As an illegitimate child, he had acquired, at birth, the
right to prove his filiation in accordance with the provisions of the New Civil Code in force at that
time. Under the New Civil Code, an illegitimate child may file an action to compel his
recognition even after the death of the putative father when the father died during the minority
of the child. While the Family Code has repealed this provision, it will not operate to prejudice
Joey who has already acquired a vested right thereto.
ALTERNATIVE SUGGESTED ANSWER:

a) The Family Code governs the capacity of his heirs to inherit, since Steve died in 1993. The
Family Code requires that because the illegitimate child has no documentary proof of his
filiation, the action to establish his filiation must be brought during the lifetime of his alleged
father, whose death occurred in 1993.
Hence, the illegitimate child Joey has no cause of action.

b)
Are the defenses set up by Tintin tenable? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b) The defenses of Tintin are not tenable. The fact that Joey's birth certificate does not show
that Steve was his father is of no moment. The law does not require such mention. Besides, the
New Civil Code provides that when the father did not sign the birth certificate, his name should
not be disclosed therein. While it is true that capacity to inherit is determined at the time of the
death of the decedent and that filiation is an element of capacity to inherit, filiation is
determined not at the time of the death of the decedent but at the time of the birth of the child
who is born with a status. Such status may subsequently change such as in legitimation, but
legitimation is deemed to retroact to the time of birth. In the same manner, recognition when
given voluntarily by the father, or decreed by the court, retroacts to the time of the childs birth.
c) Supposing that Joey died during the pendency of the action, should the action be
dismissed? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
c) If Joey filed the action and died when the New Civil Code was still in force, his action
would be dismissed because the action was not transmissible to the heirs of the illegitimate child
(Conde v. Abaya, 13 Phil. 249 [1909])). But if the action was filed after effectivity of the Family
Code, and Joey died during the pendency of the action for recognition, it should not be
dismissed. Under the present Family Code, an action commenced by a legitimate child to claim
his legitimate filiation is not extinguished by his death. The Family Code makes this provision
applicable to the action for recognition filed by an illegitimate child. Joey has the right to invoke
this provision because it does not impair any vested rights. (Art. 175, Family Code)
V
In 1984, Eva, a Filipina, went to work as a nurse in the USA. There she met and fell in love
with Paul, an American citizen, and they got married in 1985. Eva acquired American citizenship
in 1987. During their sojourn in the Philippines in 1990, they filed a joint petition for the
adoption of Vicky, a 7-year-old daughter of Evas sister. The government, through the Office of
the Solicitor General, opposed the petition on the ground that the petitioners, being both
foreigners, are disqualified to adopt Vicky.
a)
Is the government's opposition tenable? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a)
Yes, the position of the government is tenable. Foreigners are disqualified to adopt
unless they fall in any of the exceptions provided for in the law. Eva and Paul are both foreigners.
Eva., falls in one of the exceptions. She is qualified to adopt because she is a former Filipino
citizen who wishes to adopt a relative by consanguinity. Unfortunately, Paul is not qualified to
adopt because he does not fall in any of the exceptions. Hence, they cannot adopt jointly. When
husband and wife are adopting jointly, both of them must be qualified to adopt in their own
right. Eva cannot, alone by herself, adopt her niece because husband ana wife must adopt jointly
unless they fall in any of the exceptions provided for in the law. They cannot adopt separately
because they do not fall in any of the exceptions. Hence, whether separately or jointly, Eva and
Paul cannot adept Vicky in the Philippines. (Domestic Adoption Law [RA 8552]
b]
Would your answer be the same if they sought to adopt Eva's illegitimate daughter?
Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, my answer would be different. Eva is qualified to adopt her illegitimate daughter,
because she falls in one of the exceptions that allow foreigners to adopt. She is a former Filipino
citizen adopting her relative by consanguinity. Eva can adopt separately her illegitimate child
because her case is also an exception to the rule that husband and wife should adopt jointly.
Supposing that they filed the petition to adopt Vicky in the year 2000, will your answer
be the same? Explain. (2%)
b)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
c) Yes, my answer will be the same. The new Law on Domestic Adoption allows a
foreigner to adopt in the Philippines if he has been residing in the Philippines for at least 3 years
prior to the filing of the petition unless the law waives that residency requirement. Paul and Eva
have not resided in the Philippines for the last 3 years. However, Eva will qualify for waiver
because she was a former Filipino citizen who wishes to adopt a relative by consanguinity within
the 4th degree. Unfortunately Paul will not qualify to adopt because he does not fall in any of the
instances for waiver to apply. They cannot adopt jointly because one of them is not qualified.
Neither may Eva adopt alone because she does not fall in any of the exceptions that allow
husband and wife to adopt separately.
VI
Hans Herber, a German national, and his Filipino wife, Rhoda. are permanent residents of
Canada. They desire so much to adopt Magno. an 8-year old orphaned boy and a baptismal
godson of Rhoda. Since the accidental death of Magno's parents in 2004, he has been staying
with his aunt who, however, could hardly afford to feed her own family. Unfortunately. Hans and
Rhoda cannot come to the Philippines to adopt Magno although they possess all the
qualifications as adoptive parents.
Is there a possibility for them to adopt Magno? How should they go about it? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Under R.A. 8043 establishing the rules for inter-country adoption of Filipino children, the
spouses may file an application to adopt a Filipino child with the Inter-country Adoption Board
(ICAB) after they have been determined eligible and fit to adopt by the State Welfare Agency or
a licensed adoption agency in Canada. The Canadian agency will forward the required supporting
documents to the ICAB for matching with a Filipino child. The spouses, after filing a petition with
the ICAB, shall be issued the Placement Authority and when all the travel documents of the child
who is declared legally eligible for adoption as determined by the ICAB, are ready the adoptive
parents or any one of them shall personally fetch the child in the Philippines for adoption in the
court of the foreigners country.
Don was the owner of an agricultural land with no access to a public road. He had been
passing through the land of Ernie with the latter's acquiescence for over 20 years. Subsequently,
Don subdivided his property into 20 residential lots and sold them to different persons. Ernie
blocked the pathway and refused to let the buyers pass through his land.
a)
Did Don acquire an easement of right of way? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Don did not acquire an easement of right of way. His passage through Ernies land was
by mere acquiescence or tolerance. He cannot claim to have acquired the easement of right of
way by prescription, because this easement is discontinuous although apparent. Only continuous
and apparent easements can be acquired by prescription of 10 years of uninterrupted use and
enjoyment.
a)
VTII
State with reason whether each of the following is a nuisance, and if so, give its
classification, whether public or private.
a)
A squatters hut (1 %)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
According to Article 694 of the Civil Code, a nuisance is any act, omission, establishment,
business condition of property, or anything else which:
Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or
Annoys or offends the senses; or
Shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality; or
(4)
Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or
any body of water; or
(5)
Hinders or impairs the use of property.
(1)
(2)
(3)
A nuisance may be either public or private. Under Article 685, a public nuisance affects a
community or neighborhood or any considerable number or persons, although the extent of the
annoyance, danger of damage upon individuals may be unequal. A private nuisance, on the other
hand, is one that violates only private rights and produces damage to but one or a few persons.
a)
A squatter's hut, being an illegal construction, constitutes a public nuisance per se, if it
poses problems of health and sanitation. (City of Manila v. Garcia. 19 SCRA 41[1967J). If the
squatters hut is built on a private land and hinders or impairs the owner's use of his or her own
property, then it would constitute a private nuisance.
b)
Could Ernie close the pathway and refuse to let the buyers pass? Give reasons. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b)
As there is no right of way existing in favor of Don's land, Ernie could close the pathway.
The lot buyers may request Don to establish a right of way as voluntary easement by entering into
a contract with Ernie, or file action to constitute a legal easement by proving compliance with the
four requisites for creating a legal easement of right of way under Articles 649 and 650 of the
new Civil code.
c)
What are the rights of the lot buyers, if any? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The lot buyers have the right to:
c)
1)
ask for a constitution of legal easement of right of way;
(2) require Don to provide for a right of way. Under Sec. 29 of PD 957, the owner
or developer of a subdivision without access to any existing road must secure a right of
way;
(3) Formally complain to the Housing and land Use of Regulatory Board regarding
Dons failure to comply with PD 957 specifically.
(a)
(b)
(c)
failure to provide for a right of way

failure to convert the land from agricultural to residential under
agrarian law
failure to secure a license to sell
(4) commence criminal prosecution for violation of the penal provisions of PD

957, Sec. 39
A swimming pool (1 %)
b)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b)
A swimming pool is not a nuisance and is an exception to the attractive nuisance
doctrine (Hidalgo v. Guillermo, 91 Phil. 488 [1952]). It generally does not cause an injury, harm
or prejudice to an individual or the public (Article 694, par. 1).
c)
A house of prostitution (1 %)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
c) A house of prostitution is a public nuisance because it shocks or disregards the decency
or morality of the community. (Article 694 par. 3, Civil Code)
d) A noisy or dangerous factory in a private land (1%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
d)
A noisy or dangerous factory even if built in a private land may be considered a
nuisance if it offends the senses of the owners of the adjacent property or poses a danger to
their safety (Article 694, par. 1, Civil Code). This kind of nuisance may be classified as a public
nuisance if it affects and annoys those who come within its sphere.
e)
Uncollected garbage (1 %)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
e)
Uncollected garbage can be injurious to health and even the environment. It is thus,
considered a public nuisance.

IX
Marvin offered to construct the house of Carlos for a very reasonable price of P900.000.00,
giving the latter 10 days
within which to accept or reject the offer. On the fifth day, before Carlos could make up his
mind, Marvin withdrew his offer.
a)
What is the effect of the withdrawal of Marvin's offer? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) The withdrawal of Marvins offer is valid because there was no consideration paid for the
option. An option is a separate contract from the contract which is the subject of the offer, and if
not supported by ajpty consideration, the option contract is not deemed perfected. Thus, Marvin
may withdraw the offer at any time before acceptance of the offer.
b) Will your answer be tire same if Carlos paid Marvin PIO.OOO.OO as consideration for
that option? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b) If Carlos paid PIO.OOO.OO as consideration for that option, Marvin cannot withdraw the
offer prior to expiration of the option period. The option is a separate contract and if founded on
consideration is a perfected option contract and must be respected by Marvin.
c) Supposing that Carlos accepted the offer before Marvin could communicate his
withdrawal thereof? Discuss the legal consequences. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
c) If Carlos has already accepted the offer and such acceptance has been
communicated to Marvin before Marvin communicates the withdrawal, the acceptance creates a
perfected construction contract, even if no consideration was as yet paid for the option. If Marvin
does not perform his obligations under the perfected contract of construction, he shall be liable
for all consequences arising from the breach thereof based on any of the available remedies
which may be instituted by Carlos, such as specific performance, or rescission with damages in
both cases.
X
Bemie bought on installment a residential subdivision lot from DEVLAND. After having
faithfully paid the installments for 48 months. Bemie discovered that
DEVLAND had failed to develop the subdivision in accordance with the approved plans and
specifications within the time frame in the plan. He thus wrote a letter to DEVLAND informing it
that he was stopping payment. Consequently, DEVLAND cancelled the sale and wrote Bemie,
informing him that his payments are forfeited in its favor.
a)
Was the action of DEVLAND proper? Explain (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a)
Assuming that the land is a residential subdivision project under P.D. No. 957 (The
Subdivision and Condominium Buyers Protective Decree), DEVLANDs action is not proper
because under Section 23 of said Decree, no installment payment shall be forfeited to the owner
or developer when the buyer, after due notice, desists from further payment due to the failure of
the owner-developer to develop the subdivision according to the approved plans and within the
time limit for complying with the same.
b)
Discuss the rights of Bernie under the circumstances. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a)
Under the same Section of the Decree, Bemie may, at his option, be reimbursed the
total amount paid including amortization interests but excluding delinquency interests at the
legal rate. He may also ask the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board to apply penal sanctions against DEVLAND consisting of payment of

administrative fine of not more than P20.000.00 and/or imprisonment for not more than 20 years.
b) Supposing DEVLAND had fully developed the subdivision but Bemie failed to pay
further installments after 4 years due to business reverses. Discuss the rights and obligations of
the parties. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
Under R.A. No. 6552 (Maceda Law). DEVLAND has the right to cancel the contract but
it has to refund Bernie the cash surrender value of the payments on the property equivalent to
50% of the total payments made.
c)
ADDITIONAL SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Bemie has the right to pay, without additional interest, the unpaid installments within
the grace period granted him by R.A 6552 equivalent to one-month for every year of installment
payments, or four months in this case. After the lapse of four months DEVLAND may cancel the
contract after thirty days from and after Bemie receives a notice of cancellation or demand for
rescission of the contract by notarial act. (Sec. 4, R.A. 6552) Bemie also has the right to sell or
assign his rights before the cancellation of the contract (Sec. 5)
c)
XI
Before he left for Riyadh to work as a mechanic, Pedro left his Adventure van with Tito, with the
understanding that the latter could use it for one year for his personal or family use while Pedro
works in Riyadh. He did not tell Tito that the brakes of the van were faulty. Tito had the van
tuned up and the brakes repaired. He spent a total amount of PI 5.000.00. After using the
vehicle for two weeks. Tito discovered that it consumed too much fuel. To make up for the
expenses, he leased it to Annabelle. Two months later. Pedro returned to the Philippines and
asked Tito to return the van. Unfortunately, while being driven by Tito, the van was accidentally
damaged by a cargo truck without his fault.
a)
Who shall bear the P15,000.00 spent for the repair of the van? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a)
The contract between Pedro and Tito is one of commodatum. Of the P15.000.00
spent, Pedro, the bailor, shall bear the expenses for the repair of the faulty brakes, they being
extraordinary expenses incurred due to the non-disclosure by the bailor of the defect or fault;
Tito, on the other hand, shall shoulder that part of the P15,000.00 spent for the tune-up, said
expense being ordinary for the use and preservation of the van.
b)
Who shall bear the costs for the vans fuel, oil and other materials while it was with
Tito? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a)
The costs for the fuel and other materials are considered ordinary expenses, and
consequently Tito, the bailee, shall shoulder them. (Art. 1941, Civil Code)
b)
Explain. (2%)
Does Pedro have the right to retrieve the van even before the lapse of one year?
SUGGESTED ANSWER
c)
No, Pedro cannot demand the return of the van until after the expiration of the
one-year period stipulated. However, if in the meantime he should have urgent need of the van,
he may demand its return or temporary use.
d)
Who shall bear the expenses for the accidental damage caused by the cargo truck,
granting that the truck driver and truck owner are insolvent? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
d)
Both Tito and Pedro shall bear equally the costs of the extraordinary expenses,
having been incurred on the occasion of actual use of the van by Tito, the bailee, even though he
acted without fault. (Art. 1949(2), Civil Code)
XII
On July 14, 2004, Pedro executed in favor of Juan a Deed of Absolute Sale over a parcel of
land covered by TCTNo. 6245. It appears in the Deed of Sale that Pedro received from Juan
P120,000.00 as purchase price. However, Pedro retained the owners duplicate of said title.
Thereafter, J uan, as lessor, and Pedro, as lessee, executed a contract of lease over the property
for a period of one (1) year with a monthly rental of PI,000.00. Pedro, as lessee, was also
obligated to pay the realty taxes on the property during the period of lease. Subsequently, Pedro
filed a complaint aqainst Juan for the reformation of the Deed of Absolute Sale, alleging that the
transaction covered by the deed was an equitable mortgage. In his verified answer to the
complaint, Juan alleged that the property was sold to him under the Deed of Absolute Sale, and
interposed counterclaims to recover possession of the property and to compel Pedro to turn over
to him the owner's duplicate of title.
Resolve the case with reasons. (6%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
An equitable mortgage arises from a transaction, regardless of its form, which results into a
security, or an offer or attempt to pledge land as security for a debt or liability. Its essence is the
intent of the parties to create a mortgage, lien or charge on the property sufficiently described or
identified to secure an obligation, which intent must be clearly established in order that such a
mortgage may exist.
Defendant's defense that he acquired the land through an Absolute Deed of Sale and not
through pacto de retro is untenable. The presumption of equitable mortgage under Article 1602
of the Civil Code, equally applies to a contract purporting to be an absolute sale (Article 1604,
NCC). The facts and circumstances that Pedro retained possession of the Owner's Duplicate
Copy of the Certificate ofTitle; that he remained in possession of the land as lessee; that he
bound himself to pay the realty taxes during the period of lease, are matters collectively and
strongly indicating that the Deed of Absolute Sale is an equitable mortgage. In case of doubt,
the Deed of Sale should be considered as a loan with mortgage, because this juridical relation
involves a lesser transmission of rights and interests.
If the transaction is proven to be an equitable mortgage, Pedro's prayer for reformation of
the instrument should be granted in accordance with Article 1605 of the Civil Code. Thus, in case
of non-payment, he may foreclose the mortgage and consolidate his ownership of the land. In
that event, Juan's counterclaim to recover possession of the land and to compel Pedro to
surrender the Owners Duplicate Copy of the title becomes a consequential right.
XIII
Rod, the owner of an FX taxi, found in his vehicle an envelope containing TCT No. 65432
over a lot registered in Cesars name. Posing as Cesar. Rod forged Cesars signature on a Deed of
Sale in Rods favor. Rod registered the said document with the Register of Deeds, and obtained a
new title in his name. After a year, he sold the lot to Don, a buyer in good faith and for value,
who also registered the lot in his name.
a)
Did Rod acquire title to the land? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a)
Rod did not acquire title to the land covered by T .C. T. No. 65432of Cesar. A forged
deed is an absolute nullity and conveys no title.
b)
Discuss the rights of Don, if any, over the property. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b)
Don acquired a good title to the land. Under the Torrens System, a forged deed
can be the root of a good title. Since the certificate of title was already transferred to Rod, upon
the subsequent transfer thereof to Don, an innocent purchaser in good faith, Don acquired a
good title to the land. The registration of the land in the name of Rod was conclusive notice to the
whole world. Persons dealing with registered land have the legal right to rely on the face of the
Torrens title and to dispense with the need to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title
of the vendor appearing in the certificate in the absence of facts and circumstances what would
impel a reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry. This is the Mirror Principle of the Torrens
system.
c)
In an ejectment case filed by Don against Cesar, can the latter ask for the
cancellation of Dons title considering that he (Cesar) is the rightful owner of the lot? Explain.
(2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
c)
Cesar cannot ask for cancellation of Don's title in the ejectment case filed by Don
against him. Under Section 48 of PD 1529, the Property Registration Decree, a Torrens title shall
not be subject to collateral attack, ft cannot be altered, modified or cancelled except in a direct
proceeding in accordance with law. The ejectment proceeding does not provide the proper forum
for the cancellation of Dons title. While Cesars counterclaim for cancellation of Dons title may
be considered a direct attack, the same should nevertheless be denied on procedural grounds
because a Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Court is without jurisdiction to cancel a Torrens title.
XIV
Under a written contract dated December 1, 1989, Victor leased his land to Joel for a
period of five (5) years at a monthly rental of PI,000.00, to be increased to Pl.200.00 and
PI,500.00 on the third and fifth year, respectively. On January 1, 1991, Joel subleased the land to
Conrad for a period of two (2) years at a monthly rental of PI,500.00.
On December 31. 1992, Joel assigned the lease to his compadre, Ernie, who acted on the
belief that Joel was the rightful owner and possessor of the said lot Joel has been faithfully
paying the stipulated rentals to Victor. When Victor learned on May 15,1992 about the sublease
and assignment, he sued Joel, Conrad and Ernie for rescission of the contract of lease and for
damages.
a)
Will the action prosper? If so, against whom? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a)
Yes, the action for rescission of the lease will prosper because Joel cannot assign
the lease to Ernie without the consent of Victor. (Art. 1649, Civil Code). But Joel may sublet to
Conrad because there is no express prohibition (Art. 1650, Civil Code; Alipio v. Court of Appeals,
341 SCRA 441 (20001).
Victor can rescind the contract of lease with JoeJ, and the assignment of the lease to Ernie,
on the ground of violation of law and of contract. The sub-lease to Conrad remained valid for
two (2) years from January 1, 1991, dnd had not yet lapsed when the action was filed on May 15,
1992.
b)
In case of rescission, discuss the rights and obligations of the parties. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b) In case of rescission, the rights and obligations of the parties should be as follows: At
the time that Victor filed suit on May 15, 1992, the assignment had not yet lapsed. It would lapse
on December 1, 1994, the very same date that the 5-year basic lease would expire. Since the
assignment is void, Victor can get the property back because of the violation of the lease. Both
Joel and Ernie have to surrender possession and are liable for damages. But Conrad has not yet
incurred any liability on the sublease which still subsisted at the time of the filing of the action on
May 15, 1992.
Ernie can file a cross-claim against Joel for damages on account of the rescission of the
contract of assignment. Conrad can file a counter-claim against Victor for damages for lack of
causes of action at the time of the filing of the suit.
XV
Under the law on quasi-delict, aside from the persons who caused injury to persons, who
else are liable under the following circumstances:
(2%)
a)
When a 7-year-old injures his playmate while playing with his father's rifle. Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) Under Article 221 of the Family Code, parents and other persons exercising parental
authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of
their unemancipated children or wards living in their company and under their parental authority
subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.
b) When a domestic helper, while haggling for a lower price with a fish vendor in the
course of buying foodstuffs for her employers family, slaps the fish vendor, causing her to fall
and sustain injuries. Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
a)
Under Article 2180, employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though
the former are not engaged in any business or industry. As the domestic helper was then in the
exercise of her duties and acting within the scope of her assigned tasks, her employer is also
liable for the damage she has caused to the fish vendor.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
a)
The act of slapping the fish vendor" is not "within the scope of the assigned tasks"
of the domestic helper. Hence, under Article 2180, the employer is not liable for the damages
caused by the domestic helper to the fish vendor.
A carpenter in a construction company accidentally hits the right foot of his coworker with a hammer. Explain. (2%)
b)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
c)
His employer, the construction company, is also liable for the damages that the
carpenter caused to the latters co-worker. Under Article, 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code,
liability is based on culpa aquiliana which holds the employer primarily liable for tortious acts of
its employees subject, however, to the defense that the former exercised all the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his employees. (Franco v. IAC, 178
SCRA 331 [1989]).
d)
A 15-year-old high school student stabs his classmates who is his rival for a girl
while they were going out of the classroom after their last class. Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
c)
Under Section 218 of the Family Code, the school, its administrators and teachers,
or the individual, entity or institution engaged in child care shall have special parental authority
and responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether inside or outside the
premises of the school, entity or institution.
b)
What defense, if any, is available to them? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
b) These persons identified by law to be liable may raise the defense that they exercised
proper diligence required under the circumstances. Their responsibility will cease when they
prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. As
regards the employer, if he shows to the satisfaction of the court that in the selection and in the
supervision of his employees he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family,
the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability. (Layugan v. 1AC, 167 SCRA 363
11988]).
XVI
Dr. and Mrs. Almeda are prominent citizens of the country and are frequent travelers
abroad. In 1996, they booked round-trip business class tickets for the Manila- Hongkong-Manila
route of the Pinoy Airlines, where they are holders of Gold Mabalos Class Frequent Flier cards. On
their return flight, Pinoy Airlines upgraded their tickets to first class without their consent and,
inspite of their protestations to be allowed to remain in the business class so that they could be
with their friends, they were told that the business class was already fully booked, and that they
were given priority in upgrading because they are elite members/holders of Gold Mabalos Class
cards. Since they were embarrassed at the discussions with the flight attendants, they were forced
to take the flight at the first class section apart from their friends who were in the business class.
Upon their return to Manila, they demanded a written apology from Pinoy Airlines. When it went
unheeded, the couple sued Pinoy Airlines for breach of contract claiming moral and exemplary
damages, as well as attorneys fees.
Will the action prosper? Give reasons. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, Pinoy Airlines breached its contract of carriage by upgrading the seat accommodation
of the Almedas without their consent. The object of their contract was the transportation of the
Almedas from Manila to Hongkong and back to Manila, with seats in the business class section
of the aircraft. They should have been consulted first whether they wanted to avail themselves
of the privilege and would consent to a change of seat accommodation. It should not have been
imposed on them over their vehement objection. By insisting on the upgrade, Pinoy Airlines
breached its contract of carriage with the Almedas.
However, the upgrading or the breach of contract was not attended by fraud or bad faith.
They were not induced to agree to the upgrading through insidious words or deceitful
machination or through willful concealment of material facts. Bad faith does not simply connote
bad judgment or negligence; it imports a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and
conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty through some motive or interest or ill will
that partakes of the nature of fraud.
Neither is Pinoy Airlines in bad faith since Section 3 of the Economic Regulation No.7 of
the Civil Aeronautics Board provides that an overbooking that does not exceed ten percent is
not considered deliberate and therefore does not amount to bad faith.
As a result, the Almedas are not entitled to recover moral damages. Moral damages
predicated upon a breach of contract of carriage may only be recoverable in instances where
the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith or when the mishap resulted in the death of a
passenger. Where in breaching the contract of carriage the airline is not shown to have acted
fraudulently or in bad faith, liability for damages is limited to the natural and probable
consequences of the breach of the obligation which the parties had foreseen or could have
reasonably foreseen. In such a case the liability does not include moral and exemplary damages.
It is a requisite in the grant of exemplary damages that the act of the offender be
accompanied by bad faith or done in wanton, fraudulent or malevolent manner. Such requisite is
absent in this case. Moreover, to be entitled thereto the claimant must first establish his right to
moral, temperate, or compensatory damages. Since the Almedas are not entitled to any of these
damages, the award for exemplary damages has no legal basis. And where the awards for moral
and exemplary damages are eliminated, so must the award for attorneys fees.
The most that can be awarded for the breach of contract is an award for nominal damages.
Pinoy Airlines may be said to have disturbed the spouses' wish to be with their companions at the
Business Class on their flight to Manila.
(Cathay Pacific v. Spouses Vazquez, 399 SCRA 207 [2003]).
QUESTION No. I
A. Mr. ZY lost P100,000 in a card game called Russian poker, but he had no more cash to
pay in full the winner at the time session ended. He promised to pay PX, the winner, two weeks
thereafter. But he failed to do so despite the lapse of two months, so PX filed in court a suit to
collect the amount of P50.000 that he won but remained unpaid. Will the collection suit against
ZY prosper? Could Mrs. ZY file in turn a suit against PX to recover the P 100,000 that her
husband lost? Reason. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
B.
A1. The suit by PX to collect the balance of what he won from ZY will not prosper.
Under Article 2014 of the Civil Code, no action can be maintained by the winner for the
collection of what he has won in a game of chance. Although poker may depend in part on
ability, it is fundamentally a game of chance.
2) If the money paid by ZY to PX was conjugal or community property, the wife of

ZY could sue to recover it because Article 117(7) of the Family Code provides that losses in
gambling or betting are borne exclusively by the loser-spc-use. Hence, conjugal or community
funds may not be used to pay for such losses. If the money were exclusive property of ZY, his
wife may also sue to recover it under Article 2016 of the Civil Code if she and the family needed
the money for support.
C.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER TO IA (2):

A. (2). Mrs. ZY cannot file a suit to recover what her husband lost. Art 2014 of the Civil
Code provides that any loser in a game of chance may recover his loss from the winner, with
legal interest from the time he paid the amount lost. This means that only he can file the suit.
Mrs. ZY cannot recover as a spouse who has interest in the absolute community property or
conjugal partnership of gains, because under Art. 117(7) of the Family Code, losses are borne
exclusively by the loser-spouse. Therefore, these cannot be charged against absolute community
property or conjugal partnership of gains. This being so, Mrs. ZY has no interest in law to
prosecute and recover as she has no legal standing in court to do so.
B. TX filed a suit for ejectment against BD for nonpayment of condominium rentals amount
to PI50,000. During the pendency of the case, BD offered and TX accepted the full amount due
as rentals from BD, who then filed a motion to dismiss the ejectment suit on the ground that the
action is already extinguished.
Is BDs contention correct? Why or why not? Reason. (5%)

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. BDs contention is not correct. TX can still maintain the suit for ejectment. The
acceptance by the lessor of the payment by the lessee of the rentals in arrears even during the
pendency of the ejectment case does not constitute a waiver or abandonment of the ejectment
case. (Spouses Clutario v. CA, 216 SCRA 341 [1992]).
QUESTION No. II
A.
Distinguish briefly but clearly between:

1.
Mutuum and commodatum.
2.
Substitute parental authority and special parental authority.
3.
Civil obligation and natural obligation.
4.
Inexistent contracts and annullable contracts.
5.
Domiciliaiy theory and nationality theory of personal law. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The distinctions are as follows:
In mutuum, the object borrowed must be a consumable thing the ownership of which is
transferred to the borrower who incurs the obligation to return the same consumable to the
lender in an equal amount, and of the same kind and quality. In commodatum. the object
borrowed is usually a non-consumable thing the ownership of which is not transferred to the
borrower who incurs the obligation to return the very thing to the lender.
A.
1.
2. In substitute parental authority, the parents lose their parental authority in favor of the
substitute who acquires it to the exclusion of the parents.
In special parental authority, the parents or anyone exercising parental authority does not
lose parental authority. Those who are charged with special parental authority exercise such
authority only during the time that the child is in their custody or supervision.
Substitute parental authority displaces parental authority while special parental authority
concurs with parental authority.
3. Civil obligation is a juridical necessity to give, to do and not to do. It gives the creditor the
legal right to compel by an action in court the performance of such obligation.
A natural obligation is based on equity and natural law. There is no legal right to compel
performance thereof but if the debtor voluntarily pays it, he cannot recover what was paid.
Inexistent contracts are considered as not having been entered into and, therefore, void ab
initio. They do not create any obligation and cannot be ratified or validated, as there is no
agreement to ratify or validate. On the other hand, annullable or voidable contracts are valid
until invalidated by the court but may be ratified.
4. In inexistent contracts, one or more requisites of a valid contract are absent. In anullable
contracts, all the elements of a contract are present except that the consent of one of the
contracting parties was vitiated or one of them has no capacity to give consent.
5.Domiciliary Theory posits that the personal status and rights of a person are governed by
the law of his domicile or the place of his habitual residence. The Nationality Theory, on the other
hand, postulates that it is the law of the persons nationality that governs such status and rights.
B.
DT and MT were prominent members of the frequent travelers club of FX Airlines.
In Hong Kong, the couple were assigned seats in Business Class for which they had bought tickets.
On checking in, however, they were told they were upgraded by computer to First Class for the
flight to Manila because the Business Section was overbooked.
Both refused to transfer despite better seats, food, beverage and other services in First Class.
They said they had guests in Business Class they should attend to. They felt humiliated,
embarrassed and vexed, however, when the stewardess allegedly threatened to offload them if
they did not avail of the upgrade. Thus they gave in, but during the transfer of luggage DT
suffered pain in his arm and wrist. After arrival in Manila, they demanded an apology from FX's
management as well as indemnity payment. When none was forthcoming, they sued the airline
for a million pesos in damages.
Is the airline liable for actual and moral damages? Why or why not? Explain briefly. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
FX Airlines committed breach of contract when it upgraded DT and MT, over their
objections, to First Class because they had contracted for Business Class passage. However,
although there is a breach of contract, DT and MT are entitled to actual damages only for such
pecuniary losses suffered by them as a result of such breach. There seems to be no showing that
they incurred such pecuniary loss. There is no showing that the pain in DT's arm and wrist resulted
directly from the carrier's acts complained of. Hence, they are not entitled to actual damages.
Moreover, DT could have avoided the alleged injury by requesting the airline staff to do the
luggage transfer as a matter of duty on their part. There is also no basis to award moral damages
for such breach of contract because the facts of the problem do not show bad faith or fraud on
the part of the airline. (Cathay Pacific v. Vazquez, 399 SCRA 207 [20031). However, they may
recover moral damages if the cause of action is based on Article 21 of the Civil
Code for the humiliation and embarrassment they felt when the stewardess threatened to
offload them if they did not avail of the upgrade.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
If it can be proved that DTs pain in his arm and wrist occasioned by the transfer of luggage
was caused by fault or negligence on the part of the airlines stewardess, actual damages may be
recovered.
The airline may be liable for moral damages pursuant to Art. 2219 (10) if the cause of
action is based on Article 21 or an act contrary to morals in view of the humiliation suffered by
DT and MT when they were separated from their guests and were threatened to be offloaded.
QUESTION NO. III
A.
RN and DM, without any impediment to marry each other had been living
together without benefit of church blessings. Their common-law union resulted in the birth of
ZMN. Two years later, they got married in a civil ceremony. Could ZMN be legitimated? Reason.
(5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A.
ZMN v/as legitimated by the subsequent marriage of RN and DM because at the
time he was conceived, RN and DM could have validly married each other. Under the Family
Code children conceived and bom outside ofwedlock of parents who, at thetime of the formers
conception, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other are legitimated by the
subsequent marriage of the parents.
B.
Dr. ALX is a scientist honored for work related to the human genome project.
Among his pioneering efforts concern stem cell research for the cure of Alzheimer's disease.
Under corporate sponsorship, he helped develop a microbe that ate and digested oil spills in the
QUEST
sea.
Now he leads a college team for cancer research in MSS State. The team has
experimented on a mouse whose body cells replicate and bear cancerous tumor. Called
oncomouse, it is a life-form useful for medical research and it is a novel creation. Its body cells
do not naturally occur in nature but are the product of man's intellect, industry' and ingenuity.
However, there is a doubt whether local property laws and ethics would allow rights of exclusive
ownership on any life-form. Dr. ALX needs your advice: (1) whether the reciprocity principle in
private international law could be applied in our jurisdiction; and (2) whether there are legal and
ethical reasons that could frustrate his claim of exclusive ownership over the life-form called
"oncomouse in Manila? What will be your advice to him? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
B. (1) The reciprocity principle in private international law may be applied in our
jurisdiction. Section 3 of R.A. 8293, the Intellectual Property Code, provides for reciprocity, as
follows: "Any person who is a national, or who is domiciled, or has a real and effective industrial
establishment in a country which is a party to any convention, treaty or agreement relating to

intellectual property rights or the repression of unfair competition, to which the Philippines is
also a party, or extends reciprocal rights to nationals of the Philippines by law, shall be entitled to
benefits to the extent necessary to give effect to any provision of such convention, treaty or
reciprocal law, in addition to the rights to which any owner of an intellectual property right is
otherwise entitled by this Act. (n) To illustrate: the Philippines may refrain from imposing a
requirement of local incorporation or establishment of a local domicile for the protection of

industrial property rights of foreign nationals (citizens of Canada, Switzerland, U.S.) if the
countries of said foreign nationals refrain from imposing said requirement on Filipino citizens.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Reciprocity principle cannot be applied in our jurisdiction because the Philippines is a party
to the TRIPS agreement and the WTO. The principle involved is the most-favored nation clause
which is the principle of non-discrimination. The protection afforded to intellectual property
protection in the Philippines also applies to other members of the WTO. Thus, it is not really
reciprocity principle in private international law that applies, but the most-favored nation clause
under public international law.
There is no legal reason why oncomouse" cannot be protected under the law.
Among those excluded from patent protection are plant varieties or animal breeds, or
essentially biological process for the production of plants and animals" (Section 22.4 Intellectual
Property Code, R.A. No. 8293). The oncomouse" in the problem is not an essentially biological
process for the production of animals. It is a real invention because its body cells do not naturally
occur in nature but are the product of mans ingenuity, intellect and industry.
(2)
The breeding of oncomouse has novelty, inventive step and industrial application. These
are the three requisites of patentability. (Sec. 29, IPC)
There are no ethical reasons why Dr. ADX and his college team cannot be given exclusive
ownership over their invention. The use of such genetically modified mouse, useful for cancer
research, outweighs considerations for animal rights.

There are no legal and ethical reasons that would frustrate Dr. ALXs claim of exclusive
ownership over "oncomouse". Animals are property capable of being appropriated and owned. In
fact, one can own pet dogs or cats, or any other animal. If wild animals are capable of being
owned, with more reason animals technologically enhanced or corrupted by mans invention or
industry are susceptible to exclusive ownership by the inventor.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The oncomouse is a higher life form which does not fall within the definition of the term
invention". Neither may it fall within the ambit of the term manufacture which usually implies a
non-living mechanistic product.
The oncomouse is better regarded as a discovery" which is the common patrimony of man.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The oncomouse is a non-patentable invention. Hence, cannot be owned exclusively by its
inventor. It is a method for the treatment of the human or animal body by surgery or therapy and
diagnostic methods practiced on said bodies are not patentable under Sec. 22 of the IPC.
QUESTION No. IV
A. JV, owner of a parcel of land, sold it to PP. But the deed of sale was not registered. One
year later, JV sold the parcel again to RR, who succeeded to register the deed and to obtain a
transfer certificate of title over the property in his own name.
Who has a better right over the parcel of land, RR or PP? Why? Explain the legal basis for
your answer. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A.
It depends on whether or not RR is an innocent purchaser for value.
Under the Torrens System, a deed or instrument operated only as a contract between the
parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds to make the registration. It is the
registration of the deed or the instxmment that is the operative act that conveys or affects the
land. (Sec. 51, P.D. No. 1529).
In cases of double sale of titled land, it is a well- settled rule that the buyer who first
registers the sale in good faith acquires a better right to the land. (Art. 1544, Civil Code).
Persons dealing with property covered by Torrens title are not required to go beyond what
appears on its face. (Orquiola v. CA386, SCRA301, [2002]; Domingo v. Roces 401 SCRA 197,
[2003]). Thus, absent any showing that RR knew about, or ought to have known the prior sale of
the land to PP or that he acted in bad faith, and being first to register the sale, RR acquired a
good and a clean title to the property as against PP.
B.
CX executed a special power of attorney authorizing DY to secure a loan from any
bank and to mortgage his property covered by the owners certificate of title. In securing a
loan from Mbank, DY did not specify that he was acting for CX in the transaction with said
bank.
Is CX liable for the bank loan? Why or why not? Justify your answer. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
B.
CX is liable for the bank loan, because he authorized the mortgage on his property to
secure the loan contracted by DY. If DY later defaults and fails to pay the loan, CX is liable to
pay. However, his liability is limited to the extent of the value of the said property.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
CX is not personally liable to the bank loan because it was contracted by DY in his personal
capacity. Only the property of CX is liable. Hence, while CX has authorized the mortgage on his
property to secure the loan of DY, the bank cannot sue CX to collect the loan in case DY defaults
thereon. The bank can only foreclose the property of CX. And if the proceeds of the foreclosure
are not sufficient to pay the loan in full, the bank cannot run after CX for the deficiency.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
While as a general rule the principal is not liable for the contract entered into by his agent
in case the agent acted in his own name without disclosing his principal, such rule does not apply
if the contract involves a thing belonging to the principal. In such case, the principal is liable
under Article 1SS3 of the Civil Code. The contract is deemed made on his behalf (Sy-juco v. Syjuco 40 Phil. 634 [1920]).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
CX would not be liable for the bank loan. CXs property would also not be liable on the
mortgage. Since DY did not specify that he was acting for CX in the transaction with the bank,
DY in effect acted in his own name. In the case of Rural Bank ofBombon v. CA, 212 SCRA,
(1992), the Supreme Court, under the same facts, ruled that in order to bind the principal by a
mortgage on real property executed by an agent, it must upon its face purport to be made,
signed and sealed in the name of the principal, otherwise, it will bind the agent only. It is not
enough merely that the agent was in fact authorized to make the fnortgage, if he, hsis not
acted in the name of the principal. Neither is it ordinarily sufficient that in the mortgage the
agent describes himself as acting by virtue of a power of attorney, if in fact the agent has acted
in his own name and has set his own hand and seal to the mortgage. There is no principle of
law by which a person can become liable on a real estate mortgage which she never executed
in person or by attorney in fact".
QUESTION No. V
A. DPO went to a store to buy a pack of cigarettes worth P225.00 only. He gave the
vendor, RRA, a P500-peso bill. The vendor gave him the pack plus P375.00 change. Was there
a discount, an oversight, or an error in the amount given? What would be DPOs duty, if any, in
case of an excess in the amount of change given by the vendor? How is this situational
relationship between DPO and RRA denominated? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A.
There was error in the amount of change given by RRA. This is a case of solutio
indebiti in that DPO received something that is not due him. He has the obligation to return the
P100.00; otherwise, he will unjustly enrich himself at the expense of RRA. (Art. 2154, Civil Code)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
DPO has the duty to return to RRA the excess P100 as trustee under Article 1456 of the
Civil Code which provides: If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person
obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the
person from whom the property comes. There is, in this case, an implied or constructive trust in
favor of RRA.
B.
OJ was employed as professional driver of MM Transit bus owned by Mr. BT. In the
course of his work, OJ hit a pedestrian who was seriously injured and later died in the hospital
as a result of the accident. The victims heirs sued the driver and the owner of the bus for
damages
Is there a presumption in this case that Mr. BT, the owner, had been negligent? If so, is the
presumption absolute or not? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
B.
Yes, there is a presumption of negligence on the part of the employer. However, such
presumption is rebuttable. The liability of the employer shall cease when they prove that they
observed the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage (Article 2180, Civil Code).
When the employee causes damage due to his own negligence while performing his own duties,
there arises the juris tantum presumption that the employer is negligent, rebuttable only by
proof of observance of the diligence of a good father of a family {Metro Manila Transit v. CA,
223 SCRA 521 [1993}; Delsan Transport Lines v. CSLA Construction, 412 SCRA 524 [2Q03D.
Likewise, if the driver is charged and convicted in a criminal case for criminal negligence, BT is
subsidiarily liable for the damages arising from the criminal act.
QUESTION No. VI
A. ABC loaned to MNO P40.000 for which the latter pledged 400 shares of stock in XYZ
Inc. It was agreed that if the pledgor failed to pay the loan with 10% yearly interest within four
years, the pledgee is authorized to foreclose on the shares of stock. As required, MNO delivered
possession of the shares to ABC with the understanding that the shares would be returned to
MNO upon the payment of the loan. However, the loan was not paid on time.
A month after 4 years, may the shares of stock pledged be deemed owned by ABC or not?
Reason. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A.
The shares of stock cannot be deemed owned by ABC upon default of MNO. They
have to be foreclosed. Under Article 2088 of the Civil Code, the creditor cannot appropriate the
things given by way of pledge. And even if the parties have stipulated that ABC becomes the
owner of the shares in case MNO defaults on the loan, such stipulation is void for being a
pactum commissorium.
B.
As an agent, AL was given a guarantee commission, in addition to his regular
commission, after he sold 20 units of refrigerators to a customer, HT Hotel. The customer,
however, failed to pay for the units sold. ALs principal, DRB1, demanded from AL payment for
the customers accountability. AL objected, on the ground that his job was only to sell and not to
collect payment for units bought by the customer.
Is ALs objection valid? Can DRBI collect from him or not? Reason. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, ALs objection is not valid and DRBI can collect from AL. Since AL accepted a
guarantee commission, in addition to his regular commission, he agreed to bear the risk of
collection and to pay the principal the proceeds of the sale on the same terms agreed upon with
the purchaser (Article 1907, Civil Code)
A.
QUESTION No. VH
A. PH and LV are HK Chinese. Their parents are now Filipino citizens who live in Manila.
While still students in MNS State, they got married although they are first cousins. It appears that
both in HK and in MNS State first cousins could marry legally.
They plan to reside and set up business in the Philippines. But they have been informed,
however, that the marriage of first cousins here is considered void from the beginning by reason
of Public policy. They are in a dilemma. They dont want to break Philippine law, much less their
marriage vow. They seek your advice on whether their civil status will be adversely
affected by Philippine domestic law? What is your advice? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A.
My advise is as follows:
The civil status of PH and LV will not be adversely affected by Philippine law because they
are nationals of Hong Kong and not Filipino citizens.
Being foreigners, their status, conditions and legal capacity in the Philippines are governed
by the law of Hong Kong, the country of which they are citizens. Since their marriage is valid
under Hong Kong law, it shall be valid and respected in the Philippines.
B.
In a class suit for damages, plaintiffs claimed they suffered Injuries from torture
during martial law. The suit was filed upon President EM's arrival on exile in HI, a U.S. state. The
court in HI awarded plaintiffs the equivalent of PI00 billion under the U.S. law on alien tort
claims. On appeal, EMs Estate raised the issue of prescription. It argued that since said U.S. law
is silent on the matter, the court should apply: (1) His law setting a two-year limitation on tort
claims: or (2) the Philippine law which appears to require that claims for personal injury arising
from martial law be brought within one year.
Plaintiffs countered that provisions of the most analogous federal statute, the Torture
Victims Protection Act, should be applied. It sets ten years as the period of prescription.
Moreover, they argued that equity could toll the statute of limitations. For it appeared that EM
had procured Constitutional amendments granting himself and those acting under his direction
immunity from suit during his tenure.
In this case, has prescription set in or not? Considering the differences in the cited laws,
which prescriptive period should be applied: one year under Philippine law, two years under His
law, ten years under U.S. federal law, or none of the above? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. The US Court will apply US law, the law of the forum. In determining the applicable
prescriptive period. While US law is silent on this matter, the US Court will not apply Philippine
law in determining the prescriptive period. It is generally affirmed as a principle in private
international law that procedural law is one of the exceptions to the application of foreign law
by the forum. Since prescription is a matter of procedural law even in Philippine jurisprudence,
(Cadalin v. POEA/ NLRC/Brown and Root International, 238 SCRA 721 [1994]), the US Court will
apply either HI or Federal law in determining the applicable prescriptive period and not
Philippine law. The Restatement of American law affirms this principle.
QUESTION No. VIII

A.
A Filipino couple, Mr. And Mrs. BM, Jr., decided to adopt YV, an orphan from St.
Claire's orphanage In New York City. They loved and treated her like a legitimate child for they
have none of their very own. However, BM, Jr., died In an accident at sea, followed to the grave
a year later by his sick father, BM, Sr. Each left a sizable estate consisting of bank deposits, lands
and buildings in Manila. May the adopted child, YV, inherit from BM, Jr.? May
she also Inherit from BM. Sr.? Is there a difference? Why? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
YV can inherit from BM, Jr. the succession to the estate of BM, Jr. is governed by
Philippine law because he was a Filipino when he died (Article 16, Civil Code). Under Article
1039 of the Civil Code, the capacity of the heir to succeed is governed by the national law of the
decedent and not by the national law of the heir. Hence, whether or not YV can inherit from BM,
Jr. is determined by Philippine law. Under Philippine law, the adopted inherits from the adopter
as a legitimate child of the adopter.
A.
YV, however, cannot inherit, in his own right, from the father of the adopter, BM, Sr.,
because he is not a legal heir of BM, Sr. The legal fiction of adoption exists only between the
adopted and the adopter. (Teotico v. Del Val 13 SCRA 406 [1965]). Neither may he inherit from
BM, Sr. by representing BM, Jr. because in representation, the representative must be a legal heir
not only of the person he is representing but also of the decedent from whom the represented
was supposed to inherit (Article 973, Civil Code).
Mr. XT and Mrs. YT have been married for 20 years. Suppose the wife, YT, died
childless, survived only by her husband, XT. What would be the share of XT from her estate as
inheritance? Why? Explain. (5%)
B.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
B.
Under the Civil Code, the widow or widower is a legal and compulsory heir of the
deceased spouse. If the widow is the only surviving heir, there being no legitimate ascendants,
descendants, brothers and sisters, nephews and nieces, she gets the entire estate.
QUESTION No. IX
A.
The parties in a contract of loan of money agreed that the yearly interest rate is 12%
and it can be increased if there is a law that would authorize the increase of interest rates.
Suppose OB, the lender, would increase by 5% the rate of interest to be paid by TY, the borrower,
without a law authorizing such increase, would OBs action be just and valid? Why? Has TY a
remedy against the imposition of the rate increase? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER
OBs action is not just and valid. The debtor cannot be required to pay the increase in
interest there being no law authorizing it, as stipulated in the contract. Increasing the rate in the
absence of such law violates the principle of mutuality of contracts.
A.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Even if there was a law authorizing the increase in interest rate, the stipulation is still void
because there is no corresponding stipulation to decrease the interest due when the law reduces
the rate of interest.
B.
DON, an American businessman, secured parental consent for the employment of five
minors to play certain roles in two movies he was producing at home in Makati. They worked at
odd hours of the day and night, but always accompanied by parents or other adults. The
producer paid the children talent fees at rates better than adult wages.
But the social worker, DEB, reported to OSWD that these children often missed going to
school. They sometimes drank wine, aside from being exposed to drugs. In some scenes, they
were filmed naked or in revealing costumes. In his defense. DON contended all these were part
of artistic freedom and cultural creativity. None of the parents complained, said DON. He also
said they signed a contract containing a waiver of their right to file any complaint in any office or
tribunal concerning the working conditions of their children acting in the movies.
Is the waiver valid and binding? Why or why not? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
B. The waiver Is not valid. Although the contracting parties may establish such
stipulations, clauses, terms
and conditions as they may deem convenient, they may not do so if such are
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy (Article 1306, Civil Code).
The parents waiver to file a conlplaint concerning the working conditions detrimental to the
moral well-being of their children acting in the movies is in violation of the Family Code and
Labor laws. Thus, the waiver is invalid and not binding.
C.
D. The Child Labor Law is a mandatory and prohibitory law and the rights of the child cannot
be waived as it is contrary to law and public policy.

QUESTION No. X
A. BONI and ANNE met while working overseas. They became sweethearts and got
engaged to be married on New Years Eve aboard a cruise ship in the Caribbean. They took the
proper license to many in New York City, where there is a Filipino consulate. But as planned the
wedding ceremony was officiated by the captain of the Norwegian-registered vessel in a private
suite among selected friends.
Back in Manila, Anne discovered that Boni had been married in Bacolod City 5 years earlier
but divorced in Oslo only last year. His first wife was also a Filipina but now based in Sweden. Boni
himself is a resident of Norway where he and Anne plan to live permanently.
Anne retains your sendees to advise her on whether her marriage to Boni is valid under
Philippine law? Is there anything else she should do under the circumstances? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
If Boni is still a Filipino citizen, his legal capacity is governed by Philippine Law (Art. 15
Civil Code). Under Philippine-Law, his marriage to Anne is void because of a prior existing
marriage which was not dissolved by the divorce decreed in Oslo. Divorce obtained abroad by a
Filipino is not recognized.
A.
If Boni was no longer a Filipino citizen, the divorce is valid. Hence, his marriage to Anne is
valid if celebrated in accordance with the law of the place where it was celebrated. Since the
marriage was celebrated aboard a vessel of Norwegian registry, Norwegian law applies. If the
Ship Captain has authority to solemnize the marriage aboard his ship, the marriage is valid and
shall be recognized in the Philippines.
As to the second question, if Boni is still a Filipino, Anne can file an action for declaration of
nullity of her marriage to him.
In his lifetime, a Pakistani citizen, ADIL, married three times under Pakistani law. When
he died an old widower, he left behind six children, two sisters, three homes, and an estate worth
at least 30 million pesos in the Philippines. He was bom in Lahore but last resided in Cebu City,
where he had a mansion and where two of his youngest children now live and work. Two of his
B.
oldest children are farmers in Sulu, while the two middle-aged children are employees in
Zamboanga City. Finding that the deceased left no will, the youngest son wanted to file intestate
proceedings before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. Two other siblings objected, arguing
that it should be in Jolo before a Sharia court since his lands are in Sulu. But Adils sisters in
Pakistan want the proceedings held in Lahore before a Pakistani court.
Which court has jurisdiction and is the proper venue for the intestate proceedings? The law
of which country shall govern succession to his estate? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
In so far as the properties of the decedent located in the Philippines are concerned,
they are governed by Philippine law (Article 16, Civil Code). Under Philippine law, the proper
venue for the settlement of the estate is the domicile of the decedent at the time of his death.
Since the decedent last resided in Cebu City, that is the proper venue for the intestate
settlement of his estate.
B.
However, the suecessional rights to the estate of ADEL are governed by Pakistani law, his
national law, under Article 16 of the Civil Code.
5%
It is said that equity follows the law What do you understand by this phrase, and what are its
basic implications?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Equity follows the law means that courts exercising equity jurisdiction are bound by rules of
law and have no arbitrary discretion to disregard them. (Arsenal v. IAC, 143 SCRA 40[1986].
Equity is applied only in the absence of but never against statutory law. (Toyota Motor Phil. v. CA
216 SCRA 236 [1992]).

5%
Gene and Jane, Filipinos, met and got married in England while both were taking up postgraduate courses there. A few years after their graduation, they decided to annul their marriage.
Jane filed an action to annul her marriage to Gene in England on the ground of the latters
sterility, a ground for annulment of marriage in England. The English court decreed the marriage
annulled. Returning to the Philippines, Gene asked you whether or not he would now be free to
marry his former girlfriend. What would your legal advice be?
No, Gene is not free to marry his former girlfriend. His marriage to Jane if valid according to
the forms and solemnities of British law, is valid here (Article 17, 1st par., NCC). However, since
Gene and Jane are still Filipinos,although living in England, the dissolution of their marriage is still
governed by Philippine law (Article 15, NCC). Since, sterility is not one of the grounds for the
annulment of a marriage under Article 45 of the Family Code, the annulment of Gene's marriage
to Jane on that ground is not valid in the Philippines (Article 17, par., NCC).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, Gene is free to marry his girlfriend because his marriage was validly annulled in England.
The issue of whether or not a marriage is voidable, including the grounds therefor, is governed by
the law of the place where the marriage was solemnized (lex loci celebrationis). Hence, even if
sterility is not a ground to annul the marriage under Philippine law, the marriage is nevertheless
voidable because sterility makes the marriage voidable under English law. Therefore, annulment
of the marriage in England is valid in the Philippines.
Republic of the Philippines, 159 SCRA 593 [1988]). Since Miss Universe is still a foreigner,
despite her marriage to a Filipino doctor, she can be deported upon expiry of her allowable stay
in the Philippines.
No, the Bureau of Immigration cannot order her deportation. An alien woman marrying a
Filipino, native-born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipino if she is not disqualified to be a
citizen of the Philippines. (Mo Ya Lim v. Commissioner of Immigration, 41 SCRA 292 [1971]),
(Sec. 4, Naturalization Law). All that she has to do is prove in the deportation proceeding the fact
of her marriage and that she is not disqualified to become a Filipino citizen.
It depends. If she is disqualified to be a Filipino citizen, she may be deported. If she is not
disqualified to be a Filipino citizen, she may not be deported. An alien woman who marries a
Filipino citizen becomes a Filipino citizen only when she proves that she is not disqualified to
become one. The marriage of Miss Universe to the Filipino doctor did not automatically make
her a Filipino citizen. She still has to prove that she is not disqualified to become a citizen.
IV
5%
If a pregnant woman passenger of a bus were to suffer an abortion following a vehicular
accident due to the gross negligence of the bus driver, may she and her husband claim damages
from the bus company for the death of their unborn child? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the spouses cannot recover actual damages in the form of indemnity for the loss of life of the
unborn child. This is because the unborn child is not yet considered a person and the law allows
indemnity only for loss of life of persons. The mother, however, may recover damages for the
bodily injury she suffered from the loss of the fetus which is considered part of her internal
organs. The parents may also recover damages for injuries that are inflicted directly upon them,
e.g., moral damages for mental anguish that attended the loss of the unborn child. Since there is
gross negligence, exemplary damages can also be recovered. (Geluz v. CA, 2 SCRA 801[ 1961])
v
5%
Jo-Ann asked her close friend, Aissa, to'buy some groceries for her in the supermarket. Was
there a nominate contract entered into between Jo-Ann and Aissa? In. the affirmative, what was
it? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, there was a nominate contract. On the assumption that Aissa accepted the request of her
close friend Jo-Ann to buy some groceries for her in the supermarket, what they entered into was
the nominate contract of Agency. Article 1868 of the New Civil code provides that by the
contract of agency a person binds himself to render some service or to do something in
representation or on behalf of another, with the consent or authority of the latter.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, they entered into a nominate contract of lease of service in the absence of a relation of
principal and agent between them (Article 1644, New Civil Code).
VI
5%
Which of the following remedies, i.e., (a) declaration of nullity of marriage, (b) annulment of
marriage, (c) legal separation, and or (d) separation of property, can an aggrieved spouse avail
himself/herself of(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
If the wife discovers after the marriage that her husband has AIDS"
If the wife goes (to) abroad to work as a nurse and refuses to come home after the
expiration of her three-year contract there.
If the husband discovers after the marriage that his wife has been a prostitute before
they got married.
If the husband has a serious affair with his secretary and refuses to stop notwithstanding
advice from relatives and friends.
If the husband beats up his wife every time he comes home drunk.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(i) Since AIDS is a serious and incurable sexually- transmissible disease, the wife may file an
action for annulment of the marriage on this ground whether such fact was concealed or not
from the wife, provided that the disease was present at the time of the marriage. The marriage is
voidable even though the husband was not aware that he had the disease at the time of
marriage.
(ii) If the wife refuses to come home for three (3) months from the expiration of her contract,
she is presumed to have abandoned the husband and he may file an action for judicial separation
of property. If the refusal continues for more than one year from the expiration of her contract,
the husband may file the action for legal separation under Art. 55 (10) of the Family Code on the
ground of abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause formore than one
year. The wife is deemed to have abandoned the husband when she leaves the conjugal dwelling
without any intention of returning (Article 101, FC). The intention not to return cannot be
presumed during the 3-year period of her contract.
(iii) If the husband discovers after the marriage that his wife was a prostitute before they got
married, he has no remedy. No misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank, fortune
or chastity shall constitute fraud as legal ground for an action for the annulment of marriage
(Article 46 FC).
(iv) The wife may file an action for legal separation. The husbands sexual infidelity is a
ground for legal separation (Article 55, FC). She may also file an action for judicial separation of
property for failure of her husband to comply with his marital duty of fidelity (Article 135(4), 101,
FC).
(v)
The wife may file an action for legal separation on the ground of repeated physical
violence on her person (Article 55(1), FC). She may also file an action for judicial separation of
property for failure of the husband to comply with his marital duty of mutual respect (Article
135(4), Article 101, FC). She may also file an action for declaration of nullity of the marriage if the
husbands behavior constitutes psychological incapacity existing at the time of the celebration of
marriage.
VII
5%
Lina, a former Filipina who became an American citizen shortly after her marriage to an
American husband, would like to adopt in the Philippines, jointly with her husband, one of her
minor brothers. Assuming that all the required consents have been obtained, could the
contemplated joint adoption in the Philippines prosper? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. Lina and her American husband can jointly adopt a minor brother of Lina because she
and her husband are both qualified to adopt. Lina, as a former Filipino citizen, can adopt her
minor brother under Sec. 7(b)(i) of RA 8552 (Domestic Adoption Act of 1998), or under Art.
184(3}(a) of the Family Code. The alien husband can now adopt under Sec. 7[b] of RA 8552. The
Supreme Court has held in several cases that when husband and wife are required to adopt
jointly, each one of them must be qualified to adopt in his or her own right (.Republic v.
Toledano, 233 SCRA 9 [1994I]). However, the American husband must comply with the
requirements of the law including the residency requirement of three (3) years. Otherwise, the
adoption will not be allowed.
VIII
5%
If during class hours, while the teacher was chatting with other teachers in the school
corridor, a 7-year old male pupil stabs the eye of another boy with a ballpen during a fight,
causing permanent blindness to the victim, who could be liable for damages for the boy's injury:
the teacher, the school authorities, or the guilty boy's parents? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The school, its administrators, and teachers have special parental authority and
responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction or custody (Article
218, FC). They are principally and solidarity liable forthe damages caused by the acts or omissions
of the unemancipated minor unless they exercised the proper diligence required under the
circumstances (Article 219, FC). In the problem, the teacher and the school authorities are liable
forthe blindness of the victim, because the student who caused it was under their special
parental authority and they were negligent. They were negligent because they were chatting in
the corridor during the class period when the stabbing incident occurred. The incident could
have been prevented had the teacher been inside the classroom at that time. The guilty boys
parents are subsidiarily liable under Article 219 of the Family Code.
IX
5%
Andres is a riparian owner of a parcel of registered land. His land, however, has gradually
diminished in area due to the current of the river, while the registered land of Mario on the
opposite bank has gradually increased in area by 200-square meters.
Who has the better right over the 200-square meter area that has been added to Mario's
registered land, Mario or Andres?
(a)
(b)
May a third person acquire said 200-square meter land by prescription?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a.
Mario has a better right over the 200 square meters increase in area by reason of
accretion, applying Article 457 of the New Civil Code, which provides that to the owners of
lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the
effects of the current of the waters.
Andres cannot claim that the increase in Marios land is his own, because such is an accretion
and not a result of the sudden detachment of a known portion of his land and its attachment to
Mario's land, a process called avulsion. He can no longer claim ownership of the portion of his
registered land which was gradually and naturally eroded due to the current of the river, because
he had lost it by operation of law. That portion of the land has become part of the public domain.
b.
Yes, a third party may acquire, by prescription the 200 square maters, increase in area,
because it is not included in the Torrens Title of the riparian owner. Hence, this does not involve
the imprescriptibility conferred by Section 47, P.D. No. 1529. The fact that the riparian land is
registered does not automatically make the accretion thereto a registered land. {Grande v. CA,
115 Phil. 521 [1962]; Jagualing v. CA, 194 SCRA 607 [1991]).
5%
In 1950, Dr. Alba donated a parcel cf land to Central University on condition that the latter must
establish a medical college on the land to be named after him. In the year 2000, the heirs of Dr.
Alba filed an action to annul the donation and forthe reconveyance of the property donated to
them for the failure, after 50 years, of the University to establish on the property a medical school
named after their father. The University opposed the action on the ground of prescription and
also because it had not used the property for some purpose other than that stated in the
donation. Should the opposition of the University to the action of Dr. Albas heirs be sustained?
Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The donation may be revoked. The non-establishment of the medical college on the donated
property was a resolutory condition imposed on the donation by the donor. Although the Deed
of Donation did not fix the time forthe establishment of the medical college, the failure of the
donee to establish the medical college after fifty (50) years from the making of the donation
should be considered as occurrence of the resolutory condition, and the donation may now be
revoked. While the general rule is that in case the period is not fixed in the agreement of the
parties, the period must be fixed first by the court before the obligation may be demanded, the
period of fifty (50) years was more than enough time for the donee to comply with the condition.
Hence, in this case, there is no more need for the court to fix the period because such procedure
would serve no other purpose but to delay compliance with the condition. (Central Philippine
University V.CA, 246 SCRA 511).
The donation may not as yet be revoked. The establishment of a medical college is not a
resolutory or suspensive condition but a charge, obligation, ora mode". The noncompliance
with the charge or mode will give the donor the right to revoke the donation within four (4) years
from the time the charge was supposed to have been complied with, or to enforce the charge by
specific performance within ten (10) years from the time the cause of action accrued. Inasmuch
as the time to establish the medical college has not been fixed in the Deed of Donation, the
donee is not yet in default in his obligation until the period is fixed by order of the court under
Article 1197 of the New Civil Code. Since the period has not been fixed as yet, the donee is not
yet in default, and therefore the donor has no cause of action to revoke the donation. (Dissenting
opinion of Davide, CJ, Central Philippine University v. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 511 [1995])
XI
5%
Mr. Reyes executed a will completely valid as to form. A week later, however, he executed
another will which expressly revoked his first will, following which he tore his first will to pieces.
Upon the death of Mr. Reyes, his second will was presented for probate by his heirs, but it was
denied probate due to formal defects. Assuming that a copy of the first will is available, may it
now be admitted to probate and given effect? Why?

SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the first will may be admitted to probate and given effect. When the testator tore the
first will, he was under the mistaken belief that the second will was perfectly valid and he would
not have destroyed the first will had he known that the second will is not valid. The revocation by
destruction therefore is dependent on the validity of the second will. Since it turned out that the
second will was invalid, the tearing of the first will did not produce the effect of revocation. This
is known as the doctrine of dependent relative revocation (Molo v. Molo, 90 Phil 37).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
No, the first will cannot be admitted to probate. While it is true that the first will was not
successfully revoked by the second will because the second will was later denied probate, the first
will was, nevertheless, revoked when the testator destroyed it after executing the second invalid
will. (Diaz v. De Leon, 43 Phil. 413 [1922]).
XII
5%
(a) Luis was survived by two legitimate children, two illegitimate children, his parents, and
two brothers. He left an estate of P1 million. Who are the compulsory heirs of Luis, how much is
the legitime of each, and how much is the free portion of his estate, if any?
(b) Suppose Luis, in the preceding question (a), died intestate. Who are his intestate heirs,
and how much is the share of each in his estate?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) The compulsory heirs are the two legitimate children and the two illegitimate children.
The parents are excluded by the legitimate children, while the brothers are not compulsory heirs
at all.
Their respective legitimes are:

The legitime of the two (2) legitimate children is one- half (1/2) of the estate (P500,000.00)
to be divided between them equally, or P250,000.00 each.
(1)
(2) The legitime of each illegitimate child is one-half (1/2 the legitime of each legitimate
child or P125,000.00.
Since the total legitimes of the compulsory heirs is P750.000.00, the balance of
P250,000.00 is the free portion.
(b) The intestate heirs are the two (2) legitimate children and the two (2) illegitimate
children. In intestacy the estate of the decedent is divided among the legitimate and illegitimate
children such that the share of each illegitimate child is one- half the share of each legitimate
child.
Their shares are:
For each legitimate child - P333.333.33
For each illegitimate child - P166.666.66
(Article 983, New Civil Code; Article 176, Family Code)
XIII
5%
Are the following obligations valid, why, and if they are valid, when is the obligation
demandable in each case?
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
If the debtor promises to pay as soon as he has the means to pay;

If the debtor promises to pay when he likes;
If the debtor promises to pay when he becomes a lawyer;
If the debtor promises to pay if his son, who is sick with cancer, does not die within one
year.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The obligation is valid. It is an obligation subject to an indefinite period because the
debtor binds himself to pay when his means permit him to do so (Article 1180, NCC). When the
creditor knows that the debtor already has the means to pay, he must file an action in court to fix
the period, and when the definite period as set by the court arrives, the obligation to pay
becomes demandable (Article 1197, NCC).
(a)
(b) The obligation to pay when he likes is a suspensive condition the fulfillment of which is
subjectto the sole will of the debtorand, therefore, the conditional obligation is void. (Article
1182, NCC).
(c) The obligation is valid. It is subject to a suspensive condition, *.e. the future and uncertain
event of his becoming a lawyer. The performance of this obligation does not depend solely on the
will of the debtor but also on other factors outside the debtor's control.
The obligation is valid. The death of the son of cancer within one year is made a negative
suspensive condition to his making the payment. The obligation is demandable if the son does
not die within one year (Article 1185, NCC).
(d)
XIV
5%
A, B, C, D, and E made themselves solidarily indebted to X for the amount of P50,000.00.
When X demanded payment from A, the latter refused to pay on the following grounds:
B is only 16 years old

C has already been condoned by X.
D is insolvent.
E was given by X an extension of 6 months without the consent of the other four codebtors.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
State the effect of each of the above defenses put up by A on his obligation to pay X, if
such defenses are found to be true.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) A may avail the minority of B as a defense, but only for Bs share of P10,000.00. A solidary
debtor may avail himself of any defense which personally belongs to a solidary codebtor, but
only as to the share of that co-debtor.
A may avail of the condonation by X of C's share of P10.000.00. A solidary debtor may, in
actions filed by the creditor, avail himself of all defenses which are derived from the nature of
the obligation and of those which are personal to him or pertain to his own share. With respect
to those which personally belong to others, he may avail himself thereof only as regards that part
of the debt for which the latter are responsible. (Article 1222, NCC).
(b)
A may not interpose the defense of insolvency of D as a defense. Applying the principle
of mutual guaranty among solidary debtors, A guaranteed the payment of Ds share and of all
the other co-debtors. Hence, A cannot avail of the defense of Ds insolvency.
(c)
(d) The extension of six (6) months given by X to E may be availed of by A as a partial defense
but only for the share of E. There is no novation of the obligation but only an act of liberality
granted to E alone.
XV
5%
(a)
(b)
May a person sell something that does not belong to him? Explain.
May a person donate something that does not belong to him? Explain.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a)
Yes, a person may sell something which does not belong to him. Forthe sale to be valid,
the law does not require the seller to be the owner of the property at the time of the sale. (Article
1434, NCC). If the seller cannot transfer ownership over the thing sold at the time of delivery
because he was not the owner thereof, he shall be liable for breach of contract.
As a general rule, a person cannot donate something which he cannot dispose of at the
time of the donation (Article 751, New Civil Code).
(b)
XVI
5%
X sold a parcel of land to Y on 01 January 2002, payment and delivery to be made on 01
February 2002. It was stipulated that if payment were not to be made by Y on 01 February 2002,
the sale between the parties would automatically be rescinded. Y failed to pay on 01 February
2002, but offered to pay three days later, which payment X refused to accept, claiming that their
contract of sale had already been rescinded. Is X's contention correct? Why?
SUGGESTED ANSWER
No, X is not correct. In the sale of immovable property, even though it may have been
stipulated, as in this case, that upon failure to pay the price at the time agreed upon the
rescission of the contract shall of right take place, the vendee may pay, even after the expiration
of the period, as long as no demand for rescission of the contract has been made upon him either
judicially or by a notarial act (Article 1592, New Civil Code). Since no demand for rescission was
made on Y, either judicially or by a notarial act, X cannot refuse to accept the payment offered by
Y three (3) days after the expiration of the period.
This is a contract to sell and not a contract of absolute sale, since as there has been no delivery
of the land. Article 1592 of the New Civil Code is not applicable. Instead, Article 1595 of the
New Civil Code applies. The seller has two alternative remedies: (1) specific performance, or (2)
rescission or resolution under Article 1191 of the New Civil Code. In both remedies, damages are
due because of default.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, the contract was automatically rescinded upon Ys failure to pay on 01 February 2002. By
the express terms of the contract, there is no need for X to make a demand in order for rescission
to take place. (Article 1191, New Civil Code. Suria v. IAC 151 SCRA 661 [1987]; U.P. v. de los
Angeles 35 SCRA 102 [1970]).
XVII
5%
As a result of a collision between a taxicab owned by A and another taxicab owned by B, X,
a passenger of the first taxicab, was seriously injured. X later filed a criminal action against both
drivers.
(a) Is it necessary for X to reserve his right to institute a civil action for damages against both
taxicab owners before he can file a civil action for damages against them? Why?
(b)
May both taxicab owners raise the defense of due diligence in the selection and
supervision of their drivers to be absolved from liability for damages to X? Reason.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a) It depends. If the separate civil action is to recover damages arising from the criminal act,
reservation is necessary. If the civil action against the taxicab owners is based on culpa
contractual, or on quasi-delict, there is no need for reservation.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
(a)
No, such reservation is not necessary. Under Section 1 of Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, what is deemed instituted with the criminal action is only the action to
recover civil liability arising from the crime or ex delicto. All the other civil actions under Articles
32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the New Civil Code are no longer deemed instituted, and may be filed
separately and prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the criminal action
(Section 3, Rule 111, Ibid.), The failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver
of the right to file a separate and independent civil action based on these articles of the New Civil
Code (Casupanan v. Laroya GR No. 145391, August 26, 2002).
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(b)
It depends. If the civil action is based on a quasi-delict the taxicab owners may raise the
defense of diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of the driver; if
the action against them is based on culpa contractual or civil liability arising from a crime, they
cannot raise the defense.
XVIII
5%
In 1970, the spouses Juan and Juana de la Cruz, then Filipinos, bought a parcel of
unregistered land in the Philippines on which they built a house which became their residence. In
1986, they migrated to Canada and became Canadian citizens.
Thereafter, in 1990, they applied, opposed by the Republic, for the registration of the
aforesaid land in their names. Should the application of the spouses de la Cruz be granted over
the Republics opposition? Why?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the application should be granted. As a rule, the Constitution prohibits aliens from
owning private lands in the Philippines. This rule, however, does not apply to the spouses Juan
and Juana de la Cruz because at the time they acquired ownership over the land, albeit
imperfect, they were still Filipino citizens. The application for registration is a mere confirmation
of the imperfect title which the spouses have already acquired before they became Canadian
citizens. (Republic v. CA, 235 SCRA 567 [1994]).
XIX
5%
X constructed a house on a lot which he was leasing from Y. Later, X executed a chattel
mortgage over said house in favor of Z as security for a loan obtained from the latter. Still later, X
acquired ownership of the land where his house was constructed, after which he mortgaged both
house and land in favor of a bank, which mortgage was annotated on the Torrens Certificate of
Title. When X failed to pay his loan to the bank, the latter, being the highest bidder at the
foreclosure sale, foreclosed the mortgage and acquired Xs house and lot. Learning of the
proceedings conducted by the bank, Z is now demanding that the bank reconvey to him Xs
house or pay Xs loan to him plus interests. Is Zs demand against the bank valid and sustainable?
Why?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Zs demand is not valid. A building is immovable or real property whether it is erected by the
owner of the land, by a usufructuary, or by a lessee. It may be treated as a movable by the parties
to a chattel mortgage but such is binding only between them and not on third parties
(Evangelista v. Alto Surety Co., Inc. 103 Phil. 401 [1958]). In this case, since the bank is not a party
to the chattel mortgage, it is not bound by it. As far as the Bank is concerned, the chattel
mortgage does not exist. Moreover, the chattel mortgage is void because it was not registered.
Assuming that it is valid, it does not bind the Bank because it was not annotated on the title of the
land mortgaged to the bank. Z cannot demand that the Bank pay him the loan Z extended to X,
because the Bank was not privy to such loan transaction.
No, Zs demand against the bank is not valid. His demand that the bank reconvey to him Xs
house presupposes that he has a real right over the house. All that Z has is a personal right against
X for damages for breach of the contract of loan.
The treatment of a house, even if built on rented land, as movable property is void insofar
as third persons, such as the bank, are concerned. On the other hand, the Bank already had a real
right over the house and lot when the mortgage was annotated at the back of the Torrens title.
The bank later became the owner in the foreclosure sale.
Z cannot ask the bank to pay for Xs loan plus interest. There is no privity of contract
between Z and the bank.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The answer hinges on whether or not the bank is an innocent mortgagee in good faith or a
mortgagee in bad faith. In the former case, Zs demand is not valid. In the latter case, Zs demand
against the bank is valid and sustainable.
Underthe Torrens system of land registration, every person dealing with registered land
may rely on the correctness of the certificate of title and the law will not in any way oblige him
to look behind or beyond the certificate in order to determine the condition of the title. He is
not bound by anything not annotated or reflected in the certificate. If he proceeds to buy the
land or accept it as a collateral relying on the certificate, he is considered a buyer ora
mortgagee in good faith. On this ground, the Bank acquires a clean title to the land and the
house.
However, a bank is not an ordinary mortgagee. Unlike private individuals, a bank is
expected to exercise greater care and prudence in its dealings. The ascertainment of the
condition of a property offered as collateral for a loan must be a standard and indispensable
part of its operation. The bank should have conducted further inquiry regarding the house
standing on the land considering that it was already standing there before X acquired title to
the land. The bank cannot be considered as a mortgagee in good faith. On this ground, Z's
demand against the Bank is valid and sustainable.

XX
5%
Louie, before leaving the country to train as a chef in a five-star hotel in New York, U.S.A.,
entrusted to his firsi-degree cousin Dewey an application for registration, underthe Land
Registration Act, of a parcel of land located in Bacolod City. A year later, Louie returned to the
Philippines and discovered that Dewey registered the land and obtained an Original
Certificate of Title over the property in his Deweys name. Compounding the matter, Dewey
sold the land to Huey, an innocent purchaser for value. Louie promptly filed an action for
reconveyance of the parcel of land against Huey.
(a)
Is the action pursued by Louie the proper remedy?
(b) Assuming that reconveyance is the proper remedy, will the action prosper if the case was
filed beyond one year, but within ten years, from the entry of the decree of registration?
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
(a)
An action for reconveyance against Huey is not the proper remedy, because Huey
is an innocent purchaser for value. The proper recourse is for Louie to go after Dewey for
damages by reason of the fraudulent registration and subsequent sale of the land. If Dewey is
insolvent, Louie may file a claim against the Assurance Fund (Heirs of Pedro Lopez v. De Castro
324 SCRA 591 [2000] citing Sps. Eduarte v. CA, 323 Phil. 462, 467 [1996]).
(b)
Yes, the remedy will prosper because the action prescribes in ten (10) years, not
within one (1) year when a petition for the reopening of the registration decree may be filed. The
action for reconveyance is distinct from the petition to reopen the decree of registration (Grey
Alba v. De la Cruz, 17 Phil. 49 [1910]). There is no need to reopen the registration proceedings,
but the property should just be reconveyed to the real owner.
The action for reconveyance is based on implied or constructive trust, which prescribes in
ten (10) years from the date of issuance of the original certificate of title. This rule assumes that
the defendant is in possession of the land. Where it is the plaintiff who is in possession of the land,
the action for reconveyance would be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title which action is
imprescriptible (David v. Malay, 318 SCRA 711 [1999]).
On May 1,1375, Facundo married Petra, by whom he had a son Sotero. Petra died on July
1,1996, while Facundo died on January 1, 2002. Before his demise, Facundo had married, on July
1, 2000, Queries. Having lived together as husband and wife since July 1,1990, Facundo and
Querica did not secure a marriage license but executed the requisite affidavit for the purpose.
To ensure that his inheritance rights are not adversely affected by his fathers second
marriage, Sotero now brings a suit to seek a declaration of the nullity of the marriage of Facundo
and Querica, grounded on the absence of a valid marriage license. Querica contends that there
was no need for a marriage license in view of her having lived continuously with Facundo for five
years before their marriage and that Sotero has no legal personality to seek a declaration of
nullity of the marriage since Facundo is now deceased.
A. Is the marriage of Facundo and Querica valid, despite the absence of a marriage license?
Explain. (2%)
B.
Does Sotero have the personality to seek a declaration of nullity of the marriage,
especially now that Facundo is already deceased?
Explain. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The marriage with Querica is void. The exemption from the requirement of a marriage
license under Art. 34, Family Code, requires that the man and woman must have lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other
during those five years. The cohabitation of Facundo and Querica for six years from 1990 to July
1,1996 when Petra died was one with a legal impediment hence, not in compliance with the
requirement of law. On the other hand, the cohabitation thereafter until the marriage on July 1,
2000, although free from legal impediment, did not meet the 5-year cohabitation requirement.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
A.
The marriage of Facundo and Querica is VALID. The second marriage was
solemnized on July 1, 2000 when the Family Code was already effective. The Family Code took
effect on August 3,1988. Under the Family Code, no marriage license is required if the parties
have been cohabiting for the period of five years and there is no legal impediment. There must be
no legal impediment ONLY AT THE TIME OF THE SOLEMNIZATION OF THE MARRIAGE, and not
the whole five- year period. This is clearly the intent of the code framers (see Minutes of the 150th
joint Civil Code and Family Law Committees held on August 9, 1986). Also, in Manzano v.
Sanchez, AM No. MT-00-129, March 8,2001, the Supreme Court said that, as one of the
requisites for the exception to apply, there must be no legal impediment at at the time of the
marriage. TheSupreme Court did notsay that the legal impediment must exist all throughout the
five-year period.
This is different from the case of Nihat v. Bayadog, (328 SCRA 122 [2000]). In the said
case, the situation occurred during the regime of the New Civil Code where Article 76 thereof
clearly provides that during the five-year cohabitation, the parties must be unmarried. This is not
so anymore in the Family Code. The change in Family Code is significant. If the second marriage
occurred before the effectivity of the Family Code, the answer would bo that the marriage is void.
B.
A void marriage may be questioned by any interested Party in any proceeding
where the resolution of the issue is material. Being a compulsory heir, Sotero has the personality
to question the validity of the marriage of Facundo and Quen'ca. Otherwise, his participation in
the estate of Facundo would be affected. (Niria! v. Bayadog, 328 SCRA 122 [2000]).
II
A- Give a brief definition or explanation of the term psychological incapacity as a
ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage. (2%)
B.
If existing at the inception of marriage, would the state of being of unsound mind or the
concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or lesbianism be considered
indicia of psychological incapacity? Explain. (2%)
if drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality should occur only

during the marriage, would these constitute grounds for a declaration of nullity or for legal
separation, or would they render the marriage voidable? (1%)
C.
SUGGESTE ANSWER:
A.
Psychological incapacity is a mental disorder of the most serious type showing the
incapability of one or both spouses to comply with the essential marital obligations of love,
respect, cohabitation, mutual help and support, trust and commitment. It must be characterized
by juridlcal antecedence, gravity and incurability and its root causes must be clinically Identified
or examined. (Santos v. CA, 240 SCRA 20[1995])
B.
In the case of Santos v. Court of Appeals, 240 SCRA 20 (1995), the Supreme Court held
that being of unsound mind, drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality
may be indicia of psychological Incapacity, depending on the degree of severity of the disorder.
However, the concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or homosexuality is
a ground for annulment of marriage.
C.
In accordance with law, if drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, lesbianism or
homosexuality should occur only during the marriage, they:
(1)
will not constitute as grounds for declaration of nullity (Art. 36, Family Code);
(2)
will constitute as grounds for legal separation (Art 55, FC); and
(3)
will not constitute as grounds to render the marriage voidable (Art. 45 and 46, FC).
III
Felipe and Felisa, Doth Filipino citizens, were married in Malolos, Bulacan on June 1, 1950. In
1960, Felipe went to the United States, becoming a U.S. citizen in 1975. In 1980, he obtained a
divorce from Felisa, who was duly notified of the proceedings. The divorce decree became final
under California law. Coming back to the Philippines in 1982, Felipe married Segundina, a
Filipino citizen. In 2001, Felipe, then domiciled in Los Angeles, California, died, leaving one child
by Felisa, and another one by Segundina. He left a will which was executed in Manila, under
which he left his estate to Segundina and his two children and nothing to Felisa.
Segundina files a petition for the probate of Felipes will. Felisa questions the intrinsic validity
of the will, arguing that her mam'age to Felipe subsisted despite the divorce obtained by Felipe
because said divorce is not recognized in the Philippines. For this reason, she claims that the
properties left by Felipe are their conjugal properties and that Segundina has no successional
rights.
A.
Is the divorce secured by Felipe in California recognizable and valid in the Philippines?
How does it affect Felipes marriage to Felisa? Explain. (2%)
B.
What law governs the formalities of the will? Explain. (1%)
C.
Will Philippine law govern the intrinsic validity of the will? Explain. (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. (1) The divorce secured by Felipe in California is recognizable and valid in the Philippines
because he was no longer a Filipino at the time he secured it. Aliens may obtain divorces abroad
which may be recognized in the Philippines provided that they are valid according to their
national law (Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., 139 SCRA 139 [1985]); Qurta v. Court of Appeals, 300
SCRA 406 [1998]; Llorente v. Court of Appeals, 345 SCRA 592 [2000]).
(2) With respect to Felipe the divorce is valid, but with respect to Felisa it is not. The
divorce
will not capacitate Felisa to remarry because she and Felipe were both Filipinos at the time of
their marriage. However, in DOJ Opinion No. 134 series of 1993, Felisa is allowed to remarry
because the injustice sought to be corrected by Article 26 also obtains in her case.
B.
The foreigner who executes his will in the Philippines may observe the formalities
prescribed in:
1)
the law ot the country of which he is a citizen under Article 817 of the New Civil
code, or
2)
the law of the Philippines being the law of the place of execution under Article 17 of
the New Civil Code.
C.
Philippine law will not govern the instrinsic validity of the will. Article 16 of the New Civil
Code provides that intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions shall be governed by the national
law of the person whose succession is under consideration. California law will govern the intrinsic
validity of the will.
IV
Antonio, Bart, and Carlos are brothers. They purchased from their parents specific portions of
a parcel of land as evidenced by three separate deeds of sale, each deed referring to a particular
lot in metes and bounds. When the deeds were presented for registration, the Register of Deeds
could not issue separate certificates of title due to the absence of a subdivision plan. The new title
had to be issued, therefore, in the names of the brothers as co-owners of the entire property. The
situation has not changed up to now, but each of the brothers has been receiving rentals
exclusively from the lot actually purchased by him. Antonio sells his lot to a third person, with
notice to his brothers. To enable the buyer to secure a new title in his name, the deed of sale was
made to refer to an undivided interest in the property of the seller (Antonio), with the metes and
bounds of the lot sold being stated. Bart and Carlos reacted by signifying their exercise of their
right of redemption as co-owners. Antonio, in his behalf and in behalf of his buyer, contends that
they are no ionger co-owners, although the title covering the property has remained in their
names as such.
May Bart and Carlos still redeem the lot sold by Antonio? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, they may not redeem because there was no co- ownership among Antonio, Bart and
Carlos to start with. Their parents already partitioned the land in selling separate portions to
them. The situation is the same as in the case Si v. Court of Appeals, (342 SCRA 653 [2000]).
V
Senen and Peter are brothers. Senen migrated to Canada early while still a teenager. Peter
stayed on in Bulacan to take care of their widowed mother and continued to work on the family
farm even after her death. Returning to the country some thirty years after he had left, Senen
seeks a partition of the farm to get his share as the only co-heir of Peter. Refer interposes his
opposition, contending that acquisitive prescription has already set in and that estoppel lies to
bar the action for partition, citing his continuous possession of the property for at least 10 years,
for almost 30 years in fact. It is undisputed that Refer has never openly claimed sole ownership of
the property. If he ever had the intention to do so, Senen was completely ignorant of it. Will
Senens action proper? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Senen's action wiil prosper. Article 494 of the New Civil Code provides that no
prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long
as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership. Peter has never renounced the coownership nor notified Senen of his having repudiated the same.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Senens action will prosper. This is a case of implied trust. (Art 1441, NCC). For purposes of
prescription, one has to have possession under the concept of an owner (Art 540, NCC). There is
no such concept here. Peferwas a co-owner, he never claimed sole ownership of the property. He
is therefore estopped under Art. 1431, NCC.
VI.
Lauro owns an agricultural land planted mostly with fruit trees. Hernando owns an
adjacent land devoted to his piggery business, which is two (2) meters higher in elevation.
Although Hernando has constructed a waste disposal lagoon for his piggery , it is inadequate to
contain the waste water containing pig manure, and it often overflows and inundates Lauros
plantation. This has increased the acidity of the soil in the plantation, causing the trees to wither
and die. Lauro sues for damages caused to his plantation. Hernando invokes his right to the
benefit of a natural easement in favor of his higher estate, which imposes upon the lower estate
of Lauro the obligation to receive the waters descending from the higher estate. Is Hernando
correct? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Hernando is wrong. It is true that Lauros land is burdened with the natural easement to accept
or receive the water which naturally and without interruption of man descends from a higher
estate to a lower estate. However, Hernando has constructed a waste disposal lagoon for his
piggery and it is this waste water that flows downward to Lauro's land. Hernando has, thus,
interrupted the flow of water and has created and is maintaining a nuisance. Under Art. 697 NCC,
abatement of a nuisance does not preclude recovery of damages by Lauro even for the past
existence of a nuisance. The claim for damages may also be premised on Art. 2191(4] NCC.
ANOTHER ANSWER:
Hernando is not correct Article 637 of the New Civil Code provides that the owner of the
higher estate cannot make works which will increase the burden on the servient estate . (Remman
Enterprises, Inc. v. CA, 330 SCRA 145 [2000]). The owner of the higher estate may be compelled
to pay damages to the owner of the lower estate.
VII.
Way back in 1948, Windas husband sold in favor of Verde Sports Center Corp. (Verde) a
10-hectare property belonging to their conjugal partnership. The sale was made without Winds's
knowledge, much less consent. In 1950, Winda learned of the sale, when she discovered the deed
of sale among the documents in her husbands vault after his demise. Soon after, she noticed that
the construction of the sports complex had started. Upon completion of the construction in 1952,
she tried but failed to gel free membership privileges in Verde.
Winda now files a suit against Verde for the annulment of the sale on the ground that she did
not consent to the sale, in answer, Verde contends that, in accordance with the Spanish Civil
Code which was then in force, the sale In 1948 of the property did not need her concurrence.
Verde contends that in any case the action has prescribed or is barred by laches. Winda rejoins
that her Torrens title covering the property is indefeasible, and imprescriptible.
A
B.
Define or explain the term laches/(2%)

Decide the case, stating your reasons for your decision.
(3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A.
Laches means failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do what, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. It is
negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time. (De Vera v. CA, 305 SCRA 624
[1999])
B.
While Article 1413 of the Spanish Civil Code did not require the consent of the
wife for the validity of the sale, an alienation by the husband in fraud of the wife is void as held in
Uy Coque v. Navas, 45 Phil. 430 (1923). Assuming that the alienation in 1948 was in fraud of
Winda and, therefore, makes the sale to Verde void, the action to set aside the sale, nonetheless,
is already barred by prescription and laches. More than 52 years have already elapsed from her
discovery of the sale in 1950.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
B.
Windas claim that her Torrens Title covering the property is indefeasible and
imprescriptible [does not hold water] is not tenable. The rule of indefeasibllity of a Torrens Title
means that after one year from the date of Issue of the decree of registration or if the land has
fallen into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, the title becomes incontestible and
incontrovertible. Imprescriptibility, on the other hand, means that no title to the land in
derogation of that of the registered owner may be acquired by adverse possession or acquisitive
prescription or that the registered owner does not lose by extinctive prescription his right to
recover ownership and possession of the land.
The action in this case is for annulment of the sale executed by the husband over a
conjugal partnership property covered by a Torrens Title. Actions on contracts are subject to
prescription.
III.
By virtue of a Codicil appended to his will, Theodore devised to Divino a tract of sugar land,
with the obligation on the part of Divino or his heirs to deliver to Botina a specified volume of
sugar per harvest during Betinas lifetime. It is also stated in the Codicil that in the event the
obligation is not fulfilled, Botina should immediately seize the property from Divino or the latters
heirs and turn it over to Theodoro's compulsory heirs. Divino failed to fulfill the obligation under
the Codicil. Botina brings kilt against Divino for the reversion of the tract of land.
A.
Distinguish between modal institution and substitution of heirs. (3%)
B.
Distinguish between simple and fideicommissary substitution of heirs. (2%)
C.
Does Botina have a cause of action against Divino? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. A modal institution is the institution of an heir made for a certain purpose or cause (Arts.
871 and 882, NCC). Substitution is the appointment of another heir so that he may enter into the
inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted. (Art 857, NCC).
B. In a simple substitution of heirs, the testator designates one or more persons to substitute
the heirs instituted in case such heir or heirs should die before him, or should not wish or should
be incapacitated to accept the inheritance. In a fideicommissary substitution, the testator
institutes a first heir and charges him to preserve and transmit the whole or part of the
Inheritance to a second heir. In a simple substitution, only one heir inherits. In a fideicommissary
substitution, both the first and second heirs inherit. (Art 859 and 863, NCC)
C.
Botina has a cause of action against Divino. This is a case of a testamentary disposition
subject to a mode and the will itself provides for the consequence if the mode is not complied
with. To enforce the mode, the will itself gives Botina the right to compel the return of the
property to the heirs of Theodore. (Rabadilla v. Coscolueila, 334 SCRA 522 [2000]
GR113725,29 June 2000).
IX.
Stockton is a stockholder of Core Corp. He desires to sell his shares in Core Corp. in view of a
court suit that Core Corp. has filed against him for damages in the amount of P10 million, plus
attorneys fees of PI million, as a result of statements published by Stockton which are allegedly
defamatory because it was calculated to injure and damage the corporations reputation and
goodwill.
The articles of incorporation of Core Corp. provide for a right of first refusal in favor of the
corporation. Accordingly, Stockton gave written notice to the corporation of his offer to sell his
shares of P10 million. The response of Core Corp. was an acceptance of the offer in the exercise
of its rights of first refusal, offering for the purpose payment in form of compensation or set-off
against the amount of damages it is claiming against him, exclusive of the claim for attorney's
fees. Stockton rejected the offer of the corporation, arguing that compensation between the
value of the shares and the amount of damages demanded by the corporation cannot legally
take effect Is Stockton correct? Give reasons for your answer. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Stockton is correct. There is no right of compensation between his price of P10 million and
Core Corp.s unliquidated claim for damages, in order that compensation may be proper, the two
debts must be liquidated and demandable. The case for the P10 million damages being still
pending in court, the corporation has as yet no claim which is due and demandable against
Stockton.
ANOTHER MAIN ANSWER:

The right of first refusal was not perfected as a right for the reason that there was a
conditional acceptance equivalent to a counter-offer consisting in the amount of damages as
being credited on the purchase price. Therefore, compensation did not result since there was no
valid right of first refusal (Art 1475 & 1319, NCC)
ANOTHER MAIN ANSWER:
Even [if] assuming that there was a perfected right of first refusal, compensation did not
take place because the claim is unliquidated.
X.
Printado is engaged in the printing business. Suplico supplies printing paper to Printado
pursuant to an order agreement under which Suplico binds himself to deliver the same volume of
paper every month for a period of 18 months, with Printado in turn agreeing to pay within 60 days
after each delivery. Suplico has been faithfully delivering under the order agreement for 10
months but thereafter stopped doing so, because Printado has not made any payment at all.
Printado has also a standing contract with publisher Publico for the printing of 10,000 volumes of
school textbooks. Suplico was aware of said printing contract. After printing 1,000 volumes,
Printado also fails to perform under its printing contract with Publico. Suplico sues Printado for
the value of the unpaid deliveries under their order agreement. At the same time Publico sues
Printado for damages for breach of contract with respect to their own printing agreement. In the
suit filed by Suplico, Printado counters that: (a) Suplico cannot demand payment for deliveries
made under their order agreement until Suplico has completed performance under said contract;
(b) Suplico should pay damages for breach of contract; and ( c ) Suplico should be liable for
Printados breach of his contract with Publico because the order agreement between Suplico and
Printado was for the benefit of Publico. Are the contentions of Printado tenable? Explain your
answer as to each contention. (5%)
No, the contentions of Printado are untenable.
Printado having failed to pay for the printing paper covered by the delivery invoices on
time, Suplico has the right to cease making further delivery. And the latter did not violate the
order agreement {Integrated Packaging Corporation v. Court of Appeals, (333 SCRA 170,
G.R.No. 115117. June 8. [2000]).
Suplico cannot be held liable for damages, for breach of contract, as it was not he who
violated the order agreement, but Printado.
Suplico cannot be held liable for Printado's breach of contract with Publico. He is not a
party to the agreement entered into by and between Printado and Publico. Theirs is not a
stipulation pourautrul. [Aforesaid] Such contracts do could not affect third persons like Suplico
because of the basic civil law principle of relativity of contracts which provides that contracts can
only bind the parties who entered into it, and it cannot favor or prejudice a third person, even if
he is aware of such contract and has acted with knowledge thereof. {Integrated Packaging
Corporation v. CA, supra.)
XI.
Sancho and Pacifico are co-owners of a parcel of land. Sancho sold the property to Bart.
Pacifico sued Sancho and Bari for annulment of the sale and reconveyance of the property based
on the fact that the sale included his one -half pro-indiviso share. Pacifico had a notice of lis
pendens annotated on the title covering the property. After trial, the court declared Bart the
owner of the property and ordered the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens. The notice of lis
pendens could not be cancelled immediately because the title over the property was with a bank
to which the property had been mortgaged by Bart Pacifico appealed the case. While the appeal
was pending and with the notice of lis pendens still uncancelled, Bart sold the property to Carlos,
who immediately caused the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens, as well as the issuance of a
new title in his name.
Is Carlos (a) a purchaser in good faith, or (b) a transferee pendente lite? If your answer is
(a), how can the right of Pacifico as co-owner be protected? Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A.
Carlos is a buyer in bad faith. The notice of lis pendens was still annotated at the back of
the title at the time he bought the land from Bart. The uncanceiled notice of lis pendens operates
as constructive notice of its contents as well as interests, legal or equitable, included therein. All
persons are charged with the knowledge of what it contains.
In an earlier case, it was held that a notice of an adverse claim remains effective and
binding notwithstanding the lapse of the 30 days from its inscription in the registry. This ruling is
even more applicable in a lis pendens.
Carlos is a transferee pendente lite insofar as Sanchos share in the co-ownership in the
land is concerned because the land was transferred to him during the pendency of the appeal.
A.
Pacifico can protect his right as a co-owner by pursuing his appeal; asking the Court of
Appeals to order the re-annotation of the lis pendens on the title of Carlos', and by invoking his
right of redemption of Barts share under Article 1620 of the New Civil Code.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER
A.
Carlos is a purchaser in good faith.
A possessor in good faith has been defined as one who is unaware that there exists a flaw
which invalidates his acquisition of the thing (Art 526, NCC). Good faith consists in the
possessors belief that the person from whom he received the thing was the owner of the same
and could convey his title. In the case [at bar], in question, while Carlos bought the subject
property from Bart while a notice of lis pendens was still annotated thereon, there was also an
existing court order cancelling the same. Hence, Carlos cannot be considered as being "aware of
a flaw which invalidates [their] the acquisition of the thing since the alleged flaw, the notice of lis
pendens, was already being ordered cancelled at the time of the purchase. On this ground alone,
Carlos can already be considered a buyer in good faith. (Po Lam v. Court of appeals, 347 SCRA 86,
[2000]).
B.
To protect his right over the subject property, Pacrfico should have timely filed an action
for reconveyance and reinstated the notice of lis pendens.
XII.
Adela and Beth are co-owners of a parcel of land. Beth sold her undivided share of the
property to Xandro, who promptly notified Adela of the sale and furnished the latter a copy of
the deed of absolute sale. When Xandro presented the deed for registration, the register of
deeds also notified Adela of the sale, enclosing a copy of the deed with the notice. However,
Adela ignored the notices. A year later, Xandro filed a petition for the partition of the property.
Upon receipt of summons, Adela immediately tendered the requisite amount for the redemption.
Xandro contends that Adela lost her right of redemption after the expiration of 30 days from her
receipt of the notice of the sale given by him. May Adela still exercise her right of redemption?
Explain. (5%)
SUGGESTED MAIN ANSWER:
Yes, Adela may stili exercise her right of redemption notwithstanding the lapse of more
than 30 days from notice of the sale given to her because Article 1623 of the New Civil Code
requires that the notice in writing of the sale must come from the prospective vendor or vendor
as the case may be. In this case, the notice of the sale was given by the vendee and the Register of
Deeds. The period of 30 days never tolled. She can still avail of that right.
FIRST ALTERNATIVE MAIN ANSWER:
Adela can no longer exercise her right of redemption. As co-owner, she had only 30 days
from the time she received written notice of the sale which in this case took the form of a copy of
the deed of sale being given to her (Conejero v. CA, 16 SCRA 775 [196SJ). The law does not
prescribe any particular form of written notice, nor any distinctive method for notifying the
redemptioner (Etcuban v. CA, 148 SCRA 507 [1987]). So long as the redemptioner was informed
in writing, he has no cause to complain (Distrito v. CA, 197 SCRA 606, 609 [1991]). In fact in
Distrito, a written notice was heid unnecessary where the co-owner had actual knowledge of the
sale, having acted as middleman and being present when the vendor signed the deed of sale.
XIII.
Felipe is a Filipino citizen. When he went to Sydney for vacation, he met a former
business associate, who proposed to him a transaction which took him to Moscow. Felipe
brokered a contract between Sydney Coals Corp. (Coals), an Australian firm, and Moscow
Energy Corp. (Energy), a Russian firm, tor Coals to supply coal to Energy on a monthly basis for
three years. Both these Firms were not doing, and still do not do, business in the Philippines.
Felipe shuttled between Sydney and Moscow to close the contract. He also executed in Sydney a
commission contract with Coals and in Moscow with Energy, under which contracts he was
guaranteed commissions by both Firms based on a percentage of deliveries for the three-year
period, payable in Sydney and in Moscow, respectively, through deposits in accounts that he
opened in the two cities. Both firms paid Felipe his commission for four months, after which they
stopped paying him. Felipe learned from his contacts, who are residents of Sydney and Moscow,
that the two Firms talked to each other and decided to cut him off. He now files suit in Manila
against both Coals and Energy for specific performance.
A. Define or explain the principle of u/ex loci contractus.' (2%)
B.
Define or explain the rule of uforum non conveniens." (3%)
C.
Should the Philippine court assume jurisdiction over the case? Explain. (5%) *
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. Lex loci contractus may be understood in two sense, as follows:
(1)
It is the law of the piace wnere contracts, wills, and otherpublic instruments are
executed and governs their forms and solemnities, pursuant to the First paragraph, Article 17
of the New Civil Code; or
It is the proper law of the contract; i.e., the system of Saw intended to govern the entire
contract, including its esseoitiaS requisites, indicating the Saw of the place with which the
contract has Its closest connection or where the main elements of the contract con verge. As
illustrated by Zaiamea v. Court of Appeals (228 SCRA 23 [1893]), it is the Saw of the place where
the airline ticket was issued, where the passengers are nationals and residents of, and where the
defendant airline company maintained its office.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
A.
Under the doctrine of lex loci contractus, as a general rule, the law of the place
where a contract is made or entered into governs with respect to its nature and validity,
obligation and interpretation. This has been said to be the rule even though the place where the
contract was made is different from the place where it is to be performed, and particularly so, if
the place of the making and the place of performance are the same (United Airline v. CA, G.R. No.
124110, April 20, 2001).
SUGGESTE ANSWER:
A.
Forum non conveniens means that a court has discretionary authority to decline
jurisdiction over a cause of action when it is of the view that the action may be justly and
effectively adjudicated elsewhere.
B.
No, the Philippine courts cannot acquire jurisdiction over the case of Felipe. Firstly, under
the rule of forum non conveniens, the Philippine court is not a convenient forum as all the
incidents of the case occurred Gutside the Philippines. Neither are both Coals and Energy doing
business inside the Philippines. Secondly, the contracts were not perfected in the Philippines.
Under the principle of lex foci contractus, the law of the place where the contract is made shaii
apply. Lastly, the Philippine court has no power to determine the facts surrounding the execution
of said contracts. And even if a proper decision could be reached, such would have no binding
effect on Coals and Energy as the court was not able to acquire jurisdiction over the said
corporations. (Manila Hotel Corp. v. NLRC, 343 SCRA 1,13- 14[2000])
XVI.
Bert offers to buy Simeons property underthe following terms and conditions: P1 million
purchase price, 10% option money, the balance payable in cash upon the clearance of the
property of all illegal occupants. The option money is promptly paid and Simeon clears the
property of all illegal occupants in no time at all. However, when Berf tenders payment of the
balance and asks Simeon for the deed of absolute sale, Simeon suddenly has a change of heart,
claiming that the deal is disadvantageous to him as he has found out that the property can fetch
three times the agreed purchase price. Bert seeks specific performance but Simeon contends
that he has merely given Bert an option to buy and nothing more, and offers to return the option
money which Bert refuses to accept.
A.
Explain the nature of an option contract. (2%)
B.
Will Berts action for specific performance prosper? Explain. (4%)
C.
May Simeon justify his refusal to proceed with the sale by the fact that the deal is
financially disadvantageous to him? Explain. (4%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. An option contract is one granting a privilege to buy or sell within an agreed time and at a
determined price. It must be supported by a consideration distinct from the price. (Art. 1479 and
1482, NCC)
B. Berts action for specific performance wiil prosper because there was a binding
agreement of sale, not just an option contract. The sale was perfected upon acceptance by
Simeon of 10% of the agreed price. This 3mount is in reality earnest money which, under Art.
1482, shall be considered a3 part of the price arid as proof of the perfection of the contract.
(Topacio v. CA, 211 SCRA 291[1992j; Villongco Realty v. Bormaheco, 65 SCRA 352 [1975]).
C.
Simeon cannot justify his refusal to proceed with the sale by the fact that the deal is
financially disadvantageous to him. Having made a bad bargain is not a legal ground for pulling
out of a binding contract of sale, in the absence of some actionable wrong by the other party
(Vales v. Villa, 35 Phil. 769 [1916]), and no such wrong has been committed by Bert.
XV.
Carlos sues Dino for (a) collection on a promissory note for a loan, with no agreement on
interest, on which Dino defaulted, and (b) damages caused by Dino on his (Carlos) priceless
Michaelangelo painting on which Dino accidentally spilled acid while transporting it. The court
finds Dino liable on the promissory note and awards damages to Carlos for the damaged painting,
with interests for both awards. What rates of interest may the court impose with respect to both
awards? Explain. (5%
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
With respect to the collection of money or promissory note, it being a forbearance of
money, the legal rate of interest for having defaulted on the payment of 12% will apply. With
respect to the damages to the painting, it is 6% from the time of the final demand up to the time
of finality of the decision and 12% of the total amount from finality of judgment until judgment
credit is fully paid. The court considers the latter as a forbearance of money. (Eastern Shipping
Lines, Inc. v. CA, 234 SCRA 78 [1994]; Art 2210 and 2211, CC)
XVI.
Ortillo contracts Fabricate, Inc. to supply and install tile materials in a building he is
donating to his province. Ortillo pays 50% of the contract price as per agreement. It is also
agreed that the balance would be payable periodically after every 10% performance until
completed. After performing about 93% of the contract, for which it has been paid an additional
40% as per agreement, Fabricate, Inc. did not complete the project due to its sudden cessation of
operations. Instead, Fabricate, Inc. demands payment of the last 10% of the contract despite its
non-completion of the project. Ortillo refuses to pay, invoking the stipulation that payment of
the last amount of 10% shall be upon completion. Fabricato, Inc. brings suit for the entire 10%,
plus damages, Ortillo counters with claims for (a) moral damages for Fabricato, Inc.s unfounded
suit which has damaged his reputation as a philanthropist and respected businessman in his
community, and (b) attorneys fees.
A.
Does Ortillo have a legal basis for his claim for moral damages? (2%)
B.
How about his claim for attorneys fees, having hired a lawyer to defend him? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A. There Is no legal basis to Ortillo's claim for moral damages. It does not fall under the
coverage of Article 2219 of the New Civil Code.
B.
Ortillo is entitled to attorneys fees because Fabricatos complaint is a case of malicious
prosecution or a clearly unfounded civil action. (Art 2208 [4] and [11], NCC).
XVII.
A van owned by Orlando and driven by Diego, while negotiating a downhill slope of a city
road, suddenly gained speed, obviously beyond the authorized limit in the area, and bumped a
car in front of it, causing severed damage to the car and serious injuries to its passengers.
Orlando was not in the car at the time of the incident. The car owner and the injured passengers
sued Orlando and Diego for damages caused by Diego's negligence, in their defense, Diego
claims that the downhill slope caused the van to gain speed and that, as he stepped on the
brakes to check the acceleration, the brakes locked, causing the van to go even faster and
eventually to hit the car in front of it. Orlando and Diego contend that the sudden malfunction of
the vans brake system is a fortuitous event and that, therefore, they are exempt from any
liability.
A.
Is this contention tenable? Explain. (2%)
B.
Explain the concept of vicarious liability in quasi-delicts. (1%)
Does the presence of the owner inside the vehicle causing damage to a third party affect
his liability for his drivers negligence? Explain. (2%)
C.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
A.
No. Mechanical defects of a motor vehicle do not constitute fortuitous event, since the
presence of such defects would have been readily detected by diligent maintenance check. The
failure to maintain the vehicle in safe running condition constitutes negligence.
B. The doctrine of vicarious liability is that which renders a person liable for the negligence of
others for whose acts or omission the law makes him responsible on the theory that they are
under his control and supervision.
C.
In motor vehicle mishaps, the owner is made solidarily liable with his driver if he (the
owner) was in the vehicle and could have, by the use of due diligence, prevented the mishap.
(Caedo v. Yu Khe Thai, 26 SCRA 410 [1968]). However, this question has no factual basis in the
problem given, in view of the express given fact that Orlando was not in the car at the time of
the incident
-EndI
Alex was bom a Filipino but was a naturalized Canadian citizen at the time of his death on
December 25, 1998. He left behind a last will and testament in which he bequeathed all his
properties, real and personal, in the Philippines to his acknowledged illegitimate Filipina
daughter and nothing to his two legitimate Filipino sons. The sons sought the annulment of the
last will and testament on the ground that it deprived them of their legitimes but the daughter
was able to prove that there were no compulsory heirs or legitimes under Canadian law. Who
should prevail? Why? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The daughter should prevail because Article 16 of the New Civil Code provides that intestate
and testamentary succession shallbe governedby the national law of the person whose succession
is under consideration.
II.
A German couple filed a petition for adoption of a minor Filipino child with the Regional
Trial Court of Makati under the provisions of the Child and Youth Welfare Code which allowed
aliens to adopt. Before the petition could be heard, the Family Code, which repealed the Child
and Youth Welfare Code, came into effect. Consequently, the Solicitor General filed a motion to
dismiss the petition, on the ground that the Family Code prohibits aliens from adopting. If you
were the judge, how will you rule on the motion? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The motion to dismiss the petition for adoption should be denied. The law that should
govern the action is the law in force at the time of filing of the petition. At that time, it was the
Child and Youth Welfare Code that wa3 in effect, not the Family Code. Petitioners have already
acquired a vested right on their qualification to adopt which cannot be taken away by the Family
Code. CRepublic v. Miller G.R. No. 125932, April 21, 1999, citing Republic v. Court of Appeals,
205 SCRA 356)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The motion has to be granted. The new law shall govern their qualification to adopt and
under the new law, the German couple is disqualified from adopting. They cannot claim that they
have already acquired a vested right because adoption is not a right but a mere privilege. No one
acquires a vested right on a privilege.
[Note: If the examinee based his answer on the current law, RA 8552, his answer should be
considered correct. This question is based on the repealed provision of the Family Code on
Adoption.]
III.
Mike built a house on his lot in Pasay City. Two years later, a survey disclosed that a portion
of the building actually stood on the neighboring land of Jose, to the extent of 40 square meters.
Jose claims that Mike is a builder in bad faith because he should know the boundaries of his lot,
and demands that tire portion of the house which encroached on his land should be destroyed or
removed. Mike replies that he is a builder in good faith and offers to buy the land occupied by
the building instead.
1)
Is Mike a builder in good faith or bad faith? Why?
2)
Whose preference should be followed? Why? (2%)
(3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1)
Yes, Mike is a builder in good faith. There is no showing that when he built his
house, he knew that a portion thereof encroached on Jose's lot. Unless one is versed in the
science of surveying, he cannot determine the precise boundaries or location, of his property by
merely examining his title. In the absence of contrary proof, the law presumes that the
encroachment was done in good faith [Technogas Phils, v. CA, 268 SCRA 5, 15 (1997)].
None of the preferences shall be followed. The preference of Mike cannot prevail
because under Article 448 of the Civil Code, it is the owner of the land who has the option or
choice, not the builder. On the other hand, the option belongs to Jose, he cannot demand that
the portion of the house encroaching on his land be destroyed or removed because this is not
one of the options given by law to the owner of the land. The owner may choose between the
appropriation of what was built after payment of indemnity, or to compel the builder to pay for
the land if the value of the land is not considerably more than that of the building. Otherwise, the
builder shall pay rent for the portion of the land encroached.
2)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Mike cannot be considered a builder in good faith because he built his house
without first determining the comers and boundaries of his lot to make sure that his construction
was within the perimeter of his property. He could have done this with the help of a geodetic
engineer as an ordinary prudent and reasonable man would do under the circumstances.
1)
2)
Joses preference should be followed. He may have the building removed at the
expense of Mike, appropriate the building as his own, oblige Mike to buy the land and ask for
damages in addition to any of the three options. (Articles 449, 450, 451, CC)
IV.
For many years, the Rio Grande river deposited soil along its bank, beside the titled larid
of Jose. In time, such deposit reaehed an area of one thousand square meters. With the
permission of Jose, Vicente cultivated the said area. Ten years later, a big flood occurred in the
river and transferred the 1000 square meters to the opposite bank, beside the land of Agustin.
The land transferred is now contested by Jose and Agustin as riparian owners and by Vicente who
claims ownership by prescription. Who should prevail,? Why? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Jose should prevail. The disputed area, which is an alluvion, belongs by right of accretion
to Jose, the reparian owner (Art. 457 CC). When, as given in the problem, the very same area was
transferred" by flood waters to the opposite bank, it became an avulsion and ownership thereof
is retained by Jose who has two years to remove it (Ant. 459, CC). Vicente's claim based on
prescription is baseless since his possession was by mere tolerance of Jose and, therefore, did not
adversely affect Joses possession and ownership (Art. 537, CC). Inasmuch as his possession is
merely that of a holder, he cannot acquire the disputed area by prescription.
V.
Emma bought a parcel of land from Equitable-PCI Bank, which acquired the same from
Felisa, the original owner. Thereafter, Emma discovered that Felisa had granted a right of way
over the land in favor of the land of Georgina, which had no outlet to a public highway, but the
easement was not annotated when the servient estate was registered under the Torrens system.
Emma then filed a complaint for cancellation of the right of way, on the ground that it had been
extinguished by such failure to annotate. How would you decide the controversy? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The complaint for cancellation of easement of right of way must fall. The failure to
annotate the easement upon the title of the servient estate is not among the grounds for
extinguishing an easement under Art. 631 of the Civil Code. Under Article 617, easements are
inseparable from the estate to which they actively or passively belong. Once it attaches, it can
only be extinguished under Art. 631, and they exist even if they are not stated or annotated as an
encumbrance on the Torrens title of the servient estate, (n Tolentino 326, 1987 ed.)
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Under Section 44, FD No. 1529, every registered owner receiving a certificate of title
pursuant to a decree of registration, and every subsequent innocent purchaser for value, shall
hold the same free from all encumbrances except those noted on said certificate. This rule,
however, admits of exceptions.
Under Act 496, as amended by Act No. 2011, and Section 4, Act 3621, an easement if not
registered shall remain and shall be held to pass with the land until cutoff or extinguished by the
registration of the servient estate. However, this provision has been suppressed in Section 44, PD
No. 1529. In other words, the registration of the servient estate did not operate to cut-off or
extinguish the right of way. Therefore, the complaint for the cancellation of the right of way
should be dismissed.
VI.
Because her eldest son Juan had been pestering her for capital to start a business, Josefa gave him
PI00,000.00. Five years later, Josefa died, leaving a last will and testament In which she instituted
only her four younger children as her sole heirs. At the time of her death, her only property left
was P900.000.00 in a bank. Juan opposed the will on the ground of preterition. How should
Josefa's estate be divided among her heirs? State briefly the reason(s) for your answer. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
There was ao preterition of the oldest son because the testatrix donated 100,000 pesos to
him. This donation is considered an advance on the sonis inheritance. There being no preterition,
the institutions in the will shall be respected but the legitime of the oldest son has to be
completed if he received less.
After collating the donation of P100.000 to the remaining property of P900.000, the estate
of the testatrix is P100.000. Of this amount, one-half or P P500.000, is the legitime of the
legitimate children and it follows that the legitime of one legitimate child is P100.000. The
legitime, therefore, of the oldest son is PI OO, OOO. However, since the donation given him was
P100.000, he has already received in full his legitime and he will not receive anything anymore
from the decedent. The remaining P900.000, therefore, shall go to the four younger children by
institution in the will, to be divided equally among them. Each will receive P 225,000.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Assuming that the donation is valid as to form and substance, Juan cannot invoke preterition
because he actually had received a donation inter vivos from the testatrix (IHTolentino 188,1992
ed.). He would only have a right to a completion of his legitime under Art. 906 of the Civil Code.
The estate should be divided equally among the five children who will each receive P225,000.00
because the total hereditary estate, after collating the donation to Juan (Art. 1061, CC), would be
PI million. In the actual distribution of the net estate, Juan gets nothing while his siblings will get
P225.000.00 each.
VII.
Four foreign medical students rented the apartment of Thelma for a period of one year.
After one semester, three of them returned to their home country and the fourth transferred to a
boarding house. Thelma discovered that they left unpaid telephone bills in the total amount of
P80.000.00. The lease contract provided that the lessees shall pay for the telephone services in
the leased premises. Thelma demanded that the fourth student pay the entire amount of the
unpaid telephone bills, but the latter is willing to pay only one fourth of it. Who is correct? Why?
(5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The fourth student is correct. His liability is only joint, hence, pro rata. There is solidary
liability only when the obligation expressly so states or when the law or nature of the obligation
requires solidarity (Art. 1207, CC). The contract of lease in the problem does not, in any way,
stipulate solidarity.
VIII.
To secure a loan obtained from a rural bank, Purita assigned her leasehold rights over a stall
in the public market in favor of the bank. The deed of assignment provides that in case of default
in the payment of the loan, the bank shall have the right to sell Purita's rights over the market
stall as her attorney-in-fact, and to apply the proceeds to the payment of the loan.
1)
Was the assignment of leasehold rights a mortgage or a cession? Why? (3%)
2)
Assuming the assignment to be a mortgage, does the provision giving the bank
the power to sell Puritas rights constitute pactum commissorium or not? Why? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
1)
The assignment was a mortgage, not a cession, of the leasehold rights. A cession
would have transferred ownership to the bank. However, the grant of authority to the bank to sell
the leasehold rights in case of default is proof that no such ownership was transferred and that a
mere encumbrance was constituted. There would have been no need for such authority had there
been a cession.
2)
No, the clause in question is not a pactum commissorium. It is pactum
commissorium when default in the payment of the loan automatically vests ownership of the
encumbered property in the bank. In the problem given, the bank does not automatically
become owner of the property upon default of the mortgagor. The bank has to sell the property
and apply the proceeds to the indebtedness.
IX.
Samuel borrowed P300.000.00 housing loan from the bank at 18% per annum interest.
However, the promissory note contained a proviso that the bank reserves the right to increase
interest within the limits allowed by law." By virtue of such proviso, over the objections of
Samuel, the bank increased the interest rate periodically until it reached 48% per annum. Finally.
Samuel filed an action questioning the right of the bank to increase the interest rate up to 48%.
The bank raised the defense that the Central Bank of the Philippines had already suspended the
Usury Law. Will the action prosper or not? Why? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The action will prosper. While it is true that the interest ceilings set by the Usury Law are
ho longer in force, it has been held that PD No. 1684 and CB Circular No. 905 merely allow
contracting parties to stipulate freely on any adjustment in the interest rate on a loan or
forbearance of money but do not authorize a unilateral increase of the interest rate by one party
without the others consent (PNB v. CA, 238 SCRA 20 [1994]]). To say otherwise will violate the
principle of mutuality of contracts under Article 1308 of she Civil Code. To be valid, therefore,
any change of interest must be mutually agreed upon by the parties (Dizon v. Magsaysay, 57
SCRA 250 [1974]). In the present problem, the debtor not having given his consent to the
increase in interest, the increase is void.
X.
On July 1, 1998. Brian leased an office space in a building for a period of five years at a rental
rate of PI.000.00 a month. The contract of lease contained the proviso that in case of inflation or
devaluation of the Philippine peso, the monthly rental will automatically be increased or
decreased depending on the devaluation or inflation of the peso to the dollar." Starting March 1,
2001, the lessor increased the rental to P2.000.00 a month, on the ground of inflation proven by
the fact that the exchange rate of the Philippine peso to the dollar had increased from
P25.00=$1.00 to P50.00=$1.00. Brian refused to pay the increased rate and an action for unlawful
detainer was filed against him. Will the action prosper? Why? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The unlawful detainer action will not prosper. Extraordinary inflation or deflation is defined
as the sharp decrease in the purchasing power of the peso. It does not necessarily refer to the
exchange rate of the peso to the dollar. Whether or not there exists an extraordinary Inflation or
deflation is for the courts to decide. There being no showing that the purchasing power of the
peso had been reduced tremendously, there could be no inflation that would justify the increase
in the amount of rental to be paid. Hence, Brian could refuse to pay the increased rate.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The action will not prosper. The existence of inflation or deflation requires an official
declaration by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The unlawful detainer action will prosper. It is a given fact in the problem, that there was
inflation, which caused the exchange rate to double. Since the contract itself authorizes the
increase in rental in the event of an inflation or devaluation of the Philippine peso, the doubling
of the monthly rent is reasonable and is therefore a valid act under the very terms of the
contract. Brian's refusal to pay is thus a ground for ejectment.
XI.
The sugar cane planters of Batangas entered into a longterm milling contract with the Central Azucarera de Don
Pedro Inc. Ten years later, the Central assigned its rights to the said milling contract to a Taiwanese group which would take
over the operations of the sugar mill. The planters filed ap action to annul the sgid assignment on the ground that the
Taiwanese group was not registered withthe Board of Investments. Will the action prosper or not?Explain briefly. (5%)
(Note: The question presupposes knowledge and requires the application of the provisions
of the Omnibus investment Code, which properly belongs to Commercial law)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The action will prosper not on the ground invoked but on the ground that the farmers have
not given their consent to the assignment. The milling contract imposes reciprocal obligations
on the parties. The sugar central has the obligation to mill the sugar cane of the farmers while
the latter have the obligation to deliver their sugar cane to the sugar central. As to the obligation
to mill the sugar cane, the sugar central is a debtor of the farmers. In assigning its rights under
the contract, the sugar central will also transfer to the Taiwanese its obligation to the sugar cane
of the farmers. This will amount to a novation of the contract by substituting the debtor with a
third party. Under Article 1293 of the Civil Code, such substitution cannot take effect without
the consent of the creditor. The farmers, who are creditors as far as the obligation to mill their
sugar cane is concerned, may annul such assignment for not having given their consent thereto.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The assignment is valid because there is absolute freedom to transfer the credit and the
creditor need not get the consent of the debtor. He only needs to notify him.
XII.
OnJune 15,1995, Jesus sold a parcel of registered land to Jaime. On June 30. 1995, he sold the same land to Jose.
Who has a better right If:
a)
the first sale is registered ahead of the second sale, withknowledge of the latter. Why? (3%)
b)
the second sale is registered ahead of thefirst sale, with knowledge of the latter? Why? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The first buyer has the better right if his sale was first to be registered, even though
the first buyer knew of the second sale. The fact that he knew of the second sale at the time of his
registration does not make him as acting in bad faith because the sale to him was ahead in time,
hence, has a priority in right. What creates bad faith in the case of double sale of land is
knowledge of a previous sale.
b) The first buyer is still to be preferred, where the second sale is registered ahead of the
first sale but with knowledge of the latter. This is because the second buyer, who at the time he
registered his sale knew that the property had already been sold to someone else, acted in bad
faith. (Article 1544, C.C.)
XIII.
Joe and Rudy formed a partnership to operate a car repair shop in Quezon City. Joe provided the capital while Rudy
contributed his labor and industry. On one side of their shop, Joe opened and operated a coffee shop, while on the other
side, Rudy put up a car accessories store. May they engage in such separate businesses? Why? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Joe, the capitalist partner, may engage in the restaurant business because it is not the same
kind of business the partnership is engaged in. On the other hand, Rudy may not engage in any
other business unless their partnership expressly permits him to do so because as an industrial
partner he has to devote his full time to the business of the partnership (Art. 1789, CC).
XIV.
On January 1, 1980, Nestor leased the fishpond of Mario for a period of three years at a monthly rental of PI,000.00,
withan optionto purchase the same duringthe period of the lease for the price of P500.000.00. After the
expiration of the three-year period, Mario allowed Nestor to remain in the leased premises at the same rental rate. On June
15, 1983, Nestor tendered the amount of P500,000.00 to Mario and demanded that the latter execute a deed of absolute
sale of the fishpond in his favor. Mario refused, on the ground that Nestor no longer had an option to buy the fishpond.
Nestor filed an action for specific performance. Will theaction prosper or not? Why? (5%)
XV.
Richard sold a large parcel of land in Cebu to Leo for P100 million payable in annual installments over a period of ten
years, but title will remain with Richard until the purchase price is fully paid. To enable Leo to pay the price, Richard gave
him a power-of-attomey authorizing him to subdivide the land, sell the individual lots, and deliver the proceeds to Richard,
to be applied to the purchase price. Five years later, Richard revoked the power of attorney and took over the sale of the
subdivision lots himself. Is the revocation valid or not? Why? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The revocation is not valid. The power of attorney given to the buyer is irrevocable because
it is coupled with an interest: the agency is the means of fulfilling the obligation of the buyer to
pay the price of the land (Article 1927, CC). In other words, a bilateral contract (contract to buy
and sell the land) is dependent on the agency.
XVI.
Arturo gave Richard a receipt which states:
Receipt
Received from Richard as down payment

For my 1995 Toyota Corolla with
plate No. XYZ-1 23................................. P50.000.00
Balance payable: 12/30/01 ................... P50 000.00
September 15, 2001.
(Sgd.) Arturo
Does this receipt evidence a contract to sell? Why? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
It is a contract of sale because the seller did not reserve ownership until he was fully paid.
XVII.
Cesar bought a residential condominium unit from High Rise Co. and paid the price in full. He
moved into the unit, but somehow he was not given the Condominium Certificate ofTitle covering
the property. Unknown to him. High Rise Co. subsequently mortgaged the entire condominium
building to Metrobank as security for a loan of P500 million. High Rise Co. failed to pay the loan
and the bank foreclosed the mortgage. At the foreclosure sale, the bank acquired the building,
being the highest bidder. When Cesar learned about this, he filed an action to annul the
foreclosure sale insofar as his unit was concerned. The bank put up the defense that it relied on
the condominium certificates of title presented by High Rise Co., which were clean. Hence, it was
a mortgagee and buyer in good faith. Is this defense tenable or not? Why? (5%.)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Metrobanks defense is untenable. As a rule, an innocent purchaser for value acquires a
good and a clean title to the property. However, It is settled that one who closes his eyes to facts
that should put a reasonable man on guard is not an innocent purchaser for value. In the present
problem the bank is expected, as a matter of standard operating procedure, to have conducted
an ocular inspection, of the promises before granting any loan. Apparently, Metrobank did not
follow this procedure, otherwise, it should have discovered that the condominium unit in
question was occupied by Cesar and that fact should have led it to make further inquiry. Under
the circumstances, Metrobank cannot be considered a mortgagee and buyer in good faith.
XVIII.
After working overtime up to midnight, Alberto an executive of an insurance company drove
a company vehicle to a favorite Videoke bar where he had some drinks and sang some songs with
friends to "unwind". At 2:00 a.m.. he drove home, but in doing so, he bumped a tricycle, resulting
in the death of its driver. May the insurance company be held liable for the negligent act of
Alberto? Why.? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The insurance company is not liable because when the accident occurred, Alberto was not
acting within the assigned tasks of his employment.
It is true that under Art. 2180 (par. 5), employers are liable for damages caused by their
employees who were acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. However, the mere fact that
Alberto was using a service vehicle of the employer at the time of the injurious accident does not
necessarily mean that he was operating the vehicle within the scope of his employment. In
Castilex Industrial Corp. v. Vasquez, Jr. (321 SCRA393 [1999]), the Supreme Court held that
notwithstanding the fact that the employee did some overtime work for the company, the former
was, nevertheless, engaged in his own affairs or carrying out a personal purpose when he went to
a restaurant at 2:00 a.m. after coming out from work. The time of the accident (also 2:00 a. m.)
was outside normal working hours.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWERS:
The insurance company is liable if Alberto was negligent in the operation of the car and the
car was assigned to him for the benefit of the insurance company, and even though he was not
within the scope of his assigned tasks when the accident happened. In one case decided by the
Supreme Court, where an executive of a pharmaceutical company was given the use of a
company car, and after office hours, the executive made personal use of the car and met an
accident, the employer was also made liable under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code for the injury
caused by the negligent operation of the car by the executive, on the ground that the car which
caused the injury was assigned to the executive by the employer for the prestige of the company.
The insurance company was held liable even though the employee was not performing within the
scope of his assigned tasks when the accident happened [Valenzuela v. CA, 253 SCRA 303
(1996)].
XIX
Betty and Lydia were co-owners of a parcel of land. Last January 31, 2001, when she paid her real
estate tax, Betty discovered that Lydia had sold her share to Emma on November 10, 2000. The
following day, Betty offered to redeem her share from Emma, but the latter replied that Betty's
right to redeem has already prescribed. Is Emma correct or not? Why? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Emma, the buyer, is not correct. Betty can still enforce her right of legal redemption as a coowner. Article 1623 of the Civil Code gives a co-owner 30 days from written notice of the sale by
the vendor to exercise his right of legal redemption. In the present problem, the 30-day period
for the exercise by Betty of her right of redemption had not even begun to run because no notice
in writing of the sale appears to have been given to her by Lydia.
XX
Mario sold his house and lot to Carmen for PI million payable in five (5) equal annual
installments. The sale was registered and title was issued in Carmen's name. Carmen failed to pay
the last three installments and Mario filed an. action for collection, damages and attorneys fees
against her. Upon filing of the complaint, he caused a notice of lis pendens to be annotated on
Carmen's title. Is the notice of lis pendens proper or not? Why? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The notice of lis pendens is not proper for the reason that the case filed by Mario against
Carmen is only for collection, damages, and attoraeyis fees.
Annotation of a lis pendens can only be done in cases involving recovery of possession of
real property, or to quiet title or to remove cloud thereon, or for partition or any other
proceeding affecting title to the land or the use or occupation thereof. The action filed by Mario
does not fall on anyone of these.
2000 BAR EXAMINATION I
a) As finance officer of K and Co., Victorino arranged a loan of P5 Million from PNB for the
corporation. However, he was required by the bank to sign a Continuing Surety Agreement to
secure the repayment of the loan. The corporation failed to pay the loan, and the bank obtained
a Judgment against it and Victorino. jointly and severally. To enforce the judgment, the sheriff
levied on a farm owned by the conjugal partnership ofVictorino and his wife Elsa. Is the levy
proper or not? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The levy is not proper there being no showing that the surety agreement executed by the
husband redounded to the benefit of the family. An obligation contracted by the husband alone
is chargeable against the conjugal partnership only when it was contracted for the benefit of the
family. When the obligation was contracted on behalf of the family business the law presumes
that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the family. However, when the obligation was
to guarantee the debt of a third party, as in the problem, the obligation is presumed for the
benefit of the third party, not the family. Hence, for the obligation under the surety agreement
to be chargeable against the partnership it must be proven that the family was benefited and
that the benefit was a direct result oi such agreement. [Ayola Investment v. Ching. 286 SCRA
272)
b)
OnAprill5, 1980, Rene and Angelina were married to each other without a marriage
settlement. In 1985, they acquired a parcel of land in Quezon City. On June 1, 1990, when
Angelina was away in Baguio, Rene sold the said lot to Marcelo. Is the sale void or voidable? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The sale is void. Since the sale was executed in 1990, the Family Code is the law applicable.
Under Article 124 of the FC, the sale of a conjugal property by a spouse without the consent of
the other is void.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The sale is voidable. The provisions of the Family Code may apply retroactively but only if
such application will not impair vested rights. When Rene and Angelina got married in 1980, the
law that governed their property relations was the New Civil Code. Under the NCC, as
interpreted by the Supreme Court in Heirs of Felipe v.Aldon, 100 SCRA 628 and reiterated in
Heirs of Ayuste v. Malobonga, G.R. No. 118784, 2 September 1999, the sale executed by the
husband without the consent of the wife is voidable. The husband has already acquired a vested
right on the voidable nature of dispositions made without the consent of the wife. Hence. Article
124 of the Family Code which makes the sale void does not apply.
For five years since 1989, Tony, a bank Vice-President, and Susan, an entertainer, lived
together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage although they were capacitated to
many each other. Since Tonys salary was more than enough for their needs, Susan stopped
working and merely kept house". During that period, Tony was able to buy a lot and house in a
plush subdivision. However, after five years. Tony and Susan decided to separate.
a)
Who will be entitled to the house and lot ? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Tony and Susan are entitled to the house and lot as coowners in equal shares. Under Article
147 of the Family Code, when a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other lived
exclusively with each other as husband and wife, the property acquired during their cohabitation
are presumed to have been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry and shall be owned
by them in equal shares. This is true even though the efforts of one of them consisted merely in
his or her care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
b) Would it make any difference if Tony could not marry Susan because he was
previously married to Alice from whom he is legally separated ? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, it would make a difference. Under Article 148 of the Family Code, when the parties to
the cohabitation could not marry each other because of an impediment, only those properties
acquired by both of them through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry
shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. The efforts of
one of the parties in maintaining the family and household are not considered adequate
contribution in the acquisition of the properties.
Since Susan did not contribute to the acquisition of the house and lot, she has no share
therein. If Tony cohabited with Susan after his legal separation from Alice, the house and lot is his
exclusive property. If he cohabited with Susan before his legal separation from Alice, the house
said lot belongs to his community or partnership with Alice.
III.
Manuel, a Filipino, and his American wife Eleanor, executed a Joint Will in Boston,
Massachusetts when they were residing in said city. The law of Massachusetts allows the
execution of joint wills. Shortly thereafter, Eleanor died. Can the said Will be probated in the
Philippines for the settlement of her estate ? (3%)
a)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes, the will may be probated in the Philippines insofar as the estate of Eleanor is concerned.
While the Civil Code prohibits the execution of joint wills here and abroad, such prohibition
applies only to Filipinos. Hence, the joint will which is valid where executed is valid in the
Philippines but enly with respect to Eleanor. Under Article 819, it is void with respect to Manuel
whose joint will remains void in the Philippines despite being valid where executed.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The will cannot be probated in the Philippines, even though valid where executed, because
it is prohibited under Article 818 of the Civil Code and declared void under Article 819. The
prohibition should apply even to the American wife because the joint will is offensive to public
policy. Moreover, it is a single Juridical act which cannot be valid as to one testator and void as to
the other.
b) Cristy and her late husband Luis had two children. Rose and Patrick. One summer, her
mother-in-law, aged 70, took the two children, then aged lOand 12, with her on a boat trip to
Cebu. Unfortunately, the vessel sank en route, and the bodies of the three were never found.
None of the survivors ever saw them on the water. On the settlement of her mother- in-laws
estate, Cristy files a claim for a share of her estate on the ground that the same was inherited by
her children from their grandmother in representation of their father, and she inherited the same
from them. Will her action prosper? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, her action will not prosper. Since there was no proof as to who died first, all the three
are deemed to have died at the same time and there was no transmission of rights from one to
another, applying Article 43 of the New Civil Code.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
No, her action will not prosper. Under Article 43 of the New Civil Code, inasmuch as there is
no proof as to who died first, all the three are presumed to have died at the same time and there
could be no transmission of rights among them. Her children not having inherited from their
grandmother, Cristy has no right to share in her mother-in-laws estate. She cannot share in her
own right as she is not a legal heir of her mother-in-law. The survivorship provision of Rule 131 of
the Rules of Court does not apply to the problem. It applies only to those cases where the issue
involved is not succession.

IV
In his last will and testament, Lamberto 1) disinherits his daughter Wilma because she is
disrespectful towards me and raises her voice talking to me", 2) omits entirely his spouse Elvira,
3) leaves a legacy of P100.000.00 to his mistress Rosa and P50,000.00 to his driver Ernie and 4)
institutes his son Baldo as his sole heir. How will you distribute his estate of PI .000,000.00? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The disinheritance of Wilma was ineffective because the ground relied upon by the testator
does not constitute maltreatment under Article 919(6) of the New Civil Code. Hence, the
testamentary provisions in the will shall be annulled but only to the extent that her legitime was
impaired. The total omission of Elvira does not constitute preterition because she is not a
compulsory heir in the direct line. Only- compulsory heirs in the direct line may be the subject of
preterition. Not having been preterited, she will be entitled only to her legitime. The legacy in
favor of Rosa is void under Article 1028 for being in consideration of her adulterous relation with
the testator. She is, therefore, disqualified to receive the legacy of 100,000 pesos. The legacy of
50,000 pesos in favor of Ernie is not inofficious not having exceeded the free portion. Hence, he
shall be entitled to receive it. The institution of Baldo, which applies only to the free portion,
shall be respected. In sum, the estate of Lamberto will be distributed as follows:
Baldo ------------------- 450,000
Wilma ------------------ 250.000
Elvira ------------------- 250,000
Ernie ------------------- 50,000
_____________
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The disinheritance of Wilma was effective because disrespect of, and raising of voice to, her
father constitute maltreatment under Article 919(6) of the New Civil Code. She is, therefore, not
entitled to inherit anything. Her inheritance will go to the other legal heirs. The total omission of
Elvira is not preterition because she is not a compulsory heir in the direct line. She will receive
only her legitime. The legacy in favor of Rosa is void under Article 1028 for being in consideration
of her adulterous, relation with the testator. She is, therefore, disqualified to receive the legacy.
Ernie will receive the legacy in his favor because it is not inofficious. The institution of Baldo,
which applies only to the free portion, will be respected. In sum, the estate of Lamberto shall be
distributed as follows:
Heir
LegitimeLegacy Institution
Baldo 500,000
Elvira 250,000
Ernie
50.000 50,000
TOTAL 750,000
50,000 200,000
TOTAL
200,000
250.000
1.000.000
700.000
Same answer as the first Alternative Answer except as to distribution. Justice Jurado solved
this problem differently. In his opinion, the legitime of the heir who was disinherited Is
distributed among the other compulsory heirs in proportion to their respective legitimes, while
his share in the intestate portion, if any. is distributed among the other legal heirs by accretion
under Article 1018 of the NCC in proportion to their respective intestate shares. In sum the
distribution shall be as follows:
Heir
Legitime Distribution
of Wilmas Legacy Institution TOTAL
Baldo 250.0000 125,000
200,000
575,000
Wilma (250,000)
TOTAL 500,000
250,000 50,000
200,000 1,000,000
V.
Sometime In 1990, Sarah, bom a Filipino but by then a naturalized American citizen, and her American husband
Tom. filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, for the adoption of the minor child of her sister, a Filipina. Can the
petition be granted? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
It depends. If Tom and Sarah have been residing In the Philippines for at least 3 years prior to the effectlvity of RA
8552, the petition may be granted. Otherwise, the petition cannot be granted because the American husband is not
qualified to adopt.
While the petition for adoption was filed in 1990, it was considered refiled upon the effectlvity of RA8552, the
Domestic Adoption Act of 1998. This is the law applicable, the petition being still pending with the lower court.
Under the Act, Sarah and Tom must adopt jointly because they do not fall in any of the exceptions where one of
them may adopt alone. When husband and wife must adopt jointly, the Supreme Court has held in a line of cases that both
of them must be qualified to adopt. While Sarah, an alien. Is qualified to adopt under Section 7(b)(1) of the Act for being a
former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative within the 4th degree of consanguinity or affinity, Tom, an alien, is not
qualified because he is neither a former Filipino citizen nor married to a Filipino. One of them not being qualified to adopt,
their petition has to be denied. However, if they have been residents of the Philippines three years prior to the effectivity of
the Act and continues to reside here until the decree of adoption is entered, they are qualified to adopt the nephew of
Sarah under Section 7(b)thereof, and the petition may be granted.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Since the petition was filed before the effectlvity of the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, the Family Code is the law
applicable.
Under the FC, Sarah and Tom must adopt Jointly because they do not fall in any of the exceptions where one of
them may adopt alone. Under a long line of cases decided by the Supreme Court, when husband and wife must adopt
jointly, both of them must be qualified to adopt. While Sarah is qualified to adopt under Article 184(3)(a) for being a former
Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity, Tom is not. He Is not a former Filipino citizen and neither is
he married to a Filipino. One of them not being qualified to adopt, the petitionmust be denied.
VI.
The coconut farm of Federico is surrounded by the lands of Romulo. Federico seeks a right of way through a portion
of the land of Romulo to bring his coconut products to the market. He has chosen a point where he will pass through a
housing project of Romulo. The latter wants him to pass another way which Is one kilometer longer. Who should prevail?
(5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Romulo will prevail. Under Article 650 of the New Civil Code, the easement of right of way shall be established at the
point least prejudicial to the servient estate and where the distance from the dominant estate to a public highway is the
shortest. In case of conflict, the criterion of least prejudice prevails over the criterion of shortest distance. Since the route
chosen by Federico will prejudice the housing project of Romulo, Romulo has the right to demand that Federico pass
another way even though it will be longer.
VII.
a)
Arturo borrowed P500.000.00 from his father. After he had paid P300.000.00, his
father died. When the administrator of his fathers estate requested payment of the balance of
P200.000.00, Arturo replied that the same had been condoned by his father as evidenced by a
notation at the back of his check payment for the P300.000.00 reading: In full payment of the
loan". Will this be a valid defense in an action for collection? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
It depends. If the notation in full payment of the loan" was written by Arturo's father, there
was an implied condonation of the balance that discharges the obligation. In such case, the
notation is an act of the father from which condonation may be inferred. The condonation being
implied, it need not comply with the formalities of a donation to be effective. The defense of full
payment will, therefore, be valid.
When, however, the notation was written by Arturo himself, it merely proves his intention in
making that payment but in no way does it bind his father (Yam u. CA, G.R. No. 104726, 11
February 1999). In such case, the notation was not the act of his father from which condonation
may be inferred. There being no condonation at all, the defense of full payment will not be valid.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
If the notation was written by Arturo's father, it amounted to an cocpress condonation of
the balance which must comply with the formalities of a donation to be valid under the 2nd
paragraph of Article 1270 of the New Civil Code. Since the amount of the balance is more than
5,000 pesos, the acceptance by Arturo of the condonation must also be in writing under Article
748. There being no acceptance in writing by Arturo, the condonation is void and the obligation
to pay the balance subsists. The defense of full payment is, therefore, not valid. In case the
notation was not written by Arturo's father, the answer is the same as the answers above.
b)
Anastacia purchased a house and lot on Installments at a housing project in Quezon City.
Subsequently, she was employed in California and a year later, she executed a deed of donation,
duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate in Los Angeles. California, donating the house
and lot to her friend Amanda. The latter brought the deed of donation to the owner of the
project and discovered that Anastacia left unpaid installments and real estate taxes. Amanda
paid these so that the donation in her favor can be registered in the project owner's office. Two
months later, Anastacia died, leaving her mother Rosa as her sole heir. Rosa filed an action to
annul the donation on the ground that Amanda did not give her consent in the deed of donation
or in a separate public instrument. Amanda replied that the donation was an onerous one
because she had to pay unpaid installments and taxes; hence her acceptance may be implied.
Who is correct? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Rosa is correct because the donation is void. The property donated was an immovable. For such
donation to be valid, Article 749 of the New Civil Code requires both the donation and the
acceptance to be in a public instrument. There being no showing that Amandas acceptance was
made in a public instrument, the donation is void. The contention that the donation is onerous
and. therefore, need not comply with Article 749 for validity is without merit. The donation is not
onerous because it did not impose on Amanda the obligation to pay the balance on the purchase
price or the arrears in real estate taxes. Amanda took it upon herself to pay those amounts
voluntarily. For a donation tc be onerous, the burden must be imposed by the donor on the
donee. In the problem, there is no such burden imposed by the donor on the donee. The donation
not being onerous, it must comply with the formalities of Article 749
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Neither Rosa nor Amanda is correct. The donation is onerous only as to the portion of the
property corresponding to the value of the installments and taxes paid by Amanda.
The portion in excess thereof is not onerous. The cnerous portion is governed by the rules on
contracts which do not require the acceptance by the donee to be in any form. The onerous part,
therefore, is valid. The portion which is not onerous must comply with Article 749 of the New
Civil Code which requires the donation and the acceptance thereof to be in a public instrument
in order to be valid. The acceptance not being in a public instrument, the part which is not
onerous is void and Rosa may recover it from Amanda.
VIII.
a)
Republic Act 1899 authorizes municipalities and chartered cities to reclaim foreshore
lands bordering them and to construct thereon adequate docking and harbor facilities. Pursuant
thereto, the City of Cavite entered into an agreement with the Fil-Estate Realty Company,
authorizing the latter to reclaim 300 hectares of land from the sea bordering the city, with 30%
of the land to be reclaimed to be owned by Fil-Estate as compensation for its services. The
Solicitor General questioned the validity of the agreement on the ground that it will mean
reclaiming land under the sea which is beyond the commerce of man. The City replies that this is
authorized by R.A. 1899 because it authorizes the construction of docks and harbors. Who is
correct? (3%)
b)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The Solicitor General is correct. The authority of the City of Cavite under RA 1899 to reclaim
land is limited to foreshore lands. The Act did not authorize it to reclaim land from the sea. The
reclamation being unauthorized, the City of Cavite did not acquire ownership over the reclaimed
land. Not being the owner, it could not have conveyed any portion thereof to the contractor.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
It depends. If the reclamation of the land from the sea is necessaiy in the construction of the
docks and the harbors, the City of Cavite is correct. Otherwise, it is not. Since RA 1899 authorized
the city to construct docks and harbors, all works that are necessary for such construction are
deemed authorized, including the reclamation of land from the sea. The reclamation being
authorized, the city is the owner of the reclaimed land and it may convey a portion thereof as
payment for the services of the contractor.
On the assumption that the reclamation contract was entered into before RA 1899 was
repealed by PD 3-A, the City of Cavite is correct. Lands under the sea are beyond the commerce
of man in the sense that they are not susceptible of private appropriation, ownership or
alienation. The contract in question merely calls for the reclamation of 300 hectares of land
within the coastal waters of the city. Perse, it does not vest, alienate or transfer ownership of land
under the sea. The city merely engaged the services of Fil-Estate to reclaim the land for the city.
b)
Regina has been leasing foreshore land from the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic
Resources for the past 15 years. Recently, she learned that Jorge was able to obtain a free patent
from the Bureau of Agriculture, covering the same land, on the basis of a certification by the
District Forester that the same is already alienable and disposable. Moreover, Jorge had already
registered the patent with the Register of Deeds of the province, and he was issued an Original
Certificate of Title for the same. Regina fded an action for annulment of Jorges title on the
ground that it was obtained fraudulently. Will the action prosper? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
An action for the annulment of Jorge's Original Certificate of Title will prosper on the
following grounds:
(1) Under Chapter IX of C.A. No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act. foreshore
lands are disposable for residential, commercial, Industrial, or similar productive purposes, and
only by lease when not needed by the government for public service.
(2)
If the land is suited or actually used for fishpond or aquaculture purposes, it comes
under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources (BFAR) and can only be
acquired by lease. (P.D. 705)
(3)
Free Patent is a mode of concession under Se ction 41, Chapter VII of the Public
Land Act, which is applicable only for agricultural lands.
(4)
The certificate of the district forester that the land is already alienable and
disposable" simply means that the land is no longer needed for forest purposes, but the Bureau of
Lands could no longer dispose of it by free patent because it is already covered by a lease
contract between BFAR and Regina. That contract must be respected.
(5)
The free patent of Jorge is highly irregular and void ab Initio, not only because the
Bureau has no statutory authority to issue a free patent over a foreshore area, but also because of
the false statements made in his sworn application that he has occupied and cultivated the land
since July 4, 1945, as required by the free patent law. Under Section 91 of the Public Land Act,
any patent, concession or title obtained thru false representation is void ab initio. In cases of this
nature, it is the government that shall institute annulment proceedings considering that the suit
carries with it a prayer for the reversion of the land to the state. However, Regina is a party in
interest and the case will prosper because she has a lease contract for the same land with the
government.
IX
a)
Demetrio knew that a piece of land bordering the beach belonged to Ernesto.
However, since the latter wa3 studying in Europe and no one was taking care of the land,
Demetrio occupied the same and constructed thereon nipa sheds with tables and benches which
he rented out to people who want to have a picnic by the beach. When Ernesto returned, he
demanded the return of the land. Demetrio agreed to do so after he has removed the nipa sheds.
Ernesto refused to let Demetrio remove the nipa sheds on the ground that these already
belonged to him by right of accession. Who is correct? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Ernesto is correct. Demetrio is a builder in bad faith because he knew beforehand that the
land belonged to Emesto. Under Article 449 of the New Civil Code, one who builds on the land of
another loses what is built without right to indemnity. Emesto becomes the owner of the nipa
sheds by right of accession. Hence. Emesto is well within his right in refusing to allow the removal
of the nipa sheds.
b)
In good faith, Pedro constructed a flve-door commercial building on the land of Pablo
who was also in good faith. When Pablo discovered the construction, he opted to appropriate the
building by paying Pedro the cost thereof. However, Pedro insists that he should be paid the
current market value of the building, which was much higher because of inflation.
1)
2)
Who is correct, Pedro or Pablo ? (1%)

In the meantime that Pedro is not yet paid, who is entitled to the rentals of the
building. Pedro or Pablo? (1%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Pablo is correct. Under Article 448 of the New Civil Code in relation to Article 546, the
builder in good faith is entitled to a refund of the necessary and useful expenses incurred by him,
or the increase in value which the land may have acquired by reason of the improvement, at the
option of the landowner. The builder is entitled to a refund of the expenses he incurred, and not
to the market value of the improvement.
The case of Pecson v. CA, 244 SCRA 407, is not applicable to the problem. In the Pecson case, the
builder was the owner of the land who later lost the property at a public sale due to non-payment
of taxes. The Court mled that Article 448 does not apply to the case where the owner of the land
is the builder but who later lost the land; not being applicable, the Indemnity that should be paid
to the buyer must be the fair market value of the building and not Just the cost of construction
thereof. The Court opined in that case that to do otherwise would unjustly enrich the new owner
of the land.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Pedro is correct. In Pecson u. CA, it was held that Article 546 of the New Civil Code does
not specifically state how the value of useful improvements should be determined in fixing the
amount of Indemnity that the owner of the land should pay to the builder in good faith. Since the
objective of the law is to adjust the rights of the parties in such manner as "to administer
completejustice tobothofthem in sucha way as neither one nor the other may enrich himself of
that which does not belong to him", the Court ruled that the basis of reimbursement should be
the fair market value of the building.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
2)
Pablo is entitled to the rentals of the building. As the owner of the land, Pablo is
also the owner of the building being an accession thereto. However. Pedro who is entitled to
retain the building is also entitled to retain the rentals. He, however, shall apply the rentals to the
indemnity payable to him after deducting reasonable cost of repair and maintenance.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Pablo is entitled to the rentals. Pedro became a possessor in bad faith from the time he
learned that the land belongs to Pablo. As such, he loses his right to the building, including the
fruits thereof, except the right of retention.
X
Ambrosio died, leaving his three daughters, Belen, Rosario and Sylvia a hacienda which
was mortgaged to the Philippine National Bank. Due to the failure of the daughters to pay the
bank, the latter foreclosed the mortgage and the hacienda was sold to it as the highest bidder.
Six months later, Sylvia won the grand prize at the lotto and used part of it to redeem the
hacienda from the bank. Thereafter, she took possession of the hacienda and refused to share its
fruits with her sisters, contending that it was owned exclusively by her, having bought it from the
bank with her own money. Is she correct or not? (3%)
a)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Sylvia is not correct. The 3 daughters are the co-owners of the hacienda being the only heirs
of Ambrosio. When the property was foreclosed, the right of redemption belongs also to the 3
daughters. When Sylvia redeemed the entire property before the lapse of the redemption period,
she also exercised the right of redemption of her co-owners on their behalf. As such she is holding
the shares of her two sisters in the property, and all the fruits corresponding thereto, in trust for
them. Redemption by one co-owner Inures to the benefit of all (Adille v. CA, 157SCRA 455).
Sylvia, however, is entitled to be reimbursed the shares of her two sisters in the redemption price.
b) Felix cultivated a parcel of land and planted it to sugar cane, believing it to be his own.
When the crop was eight months old, and harvestable after two more months, a resurvey of the
land showed that it really belonged to Fred. What are the options available to Fred? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
As to the pending crops planted by Felix in good faith, Ffed has the option of allowing Felix
to continue the cultivation and to harvest the crops, or to continue the cultivation and harvest the
crops himself. In the latter option, however, Felix shall have the right to a part of the expenses of
cultivation and to a part of the net harvest, both in proportion to the time of possession. (Art. 545
NCC).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Since sugarcane is not a perennial crop, Felix is considered a sower in good faith. Being so. Art
448 applies. The options available to Fred are: (a) to appropriate the crop after paying Felix the
indemnity under Art. 546, or (b) to require Felix to pay rent.
XI
Eugenio died without issue, leaving several parcels of land in Bataan. He was survived by
Antonio, his legitimate brother; Martina, the only daughter of his predeceased sister Mercedes;
and five legitimate children of Joaquin, another predeceased brother. Shortly after Eugenios
death, Antonio also died, leaving three legitimate children. Subsequently. Martina, the children
of Joaquin and the children of Antonio executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of
Eugenio, dividing it among themselves. The succeeding year, a petition to annul the extrajudicial
settlement was filed by Antero, an illegitimate son of Antonio, who claims he is entitled to share
in the estate of Eugenio. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Antero is
barred by Article 992 of the Civil Code from inheriting from the legitimate brother of his father.
How will you resolve the motion? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The motion to dismiss should be granted. Article 992 does not apply. Antero is not claiming
any inheritance from Eugenio. He is claiming his share in the inheritance of his father consisting
of his fathers share in the inheritance of Eugenio (Dela Merced v. Dela Merced, G.R. No. 126707,
25 February 1999).
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
It depends. If Antero was not acknowledged by Antonio, the motion to dismiss should be
granted because Antero is not a legal heir of Antonio. If Antero was acknowledged , the motion
should be denied because Article992 is not applicable. This is because Antero is claiming his
inheritance from his illegitimate father, not from Eugenio.
XII.
In 1979, Nestor applied for and was granted a Free Patent.over a parcel of agricultural land
with an area of 30 hectares, located in General Santos City. He presented the Free Patent to the
Register of Deeds, and he was issued a corresponding Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 375.
Subsequently, Nestor sold the land to Eddie. The deed of sale was submitted to the Register of
Deeds and on the basis thereof, OCT No. 375 was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 4576 was issued in the name of Eddie. In 1986, the Director of Lands filed a complaint for
annulment of OCT No. 375 and TCT No. 4576 on the ground that Nestor obtained the Free
Patent through fraud. Eddie filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that he was an innocent
purchaser for value and in good faith and as such, he has acquired a title to the property which is
valid, unassailable and indefeasible. Decide the motion. (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The motion of Nestor to dismiss the complaint for annulment of O.C.T. No. 375 and T.C.T.
No. 4576 should be denied for the following reasons:
1) Eddie cannot claim protection as an innocent purchaser for value nor can he interpose
the defense of indefeasibility of his title, because his TCT is rooted on a void title. Under Section
91 of CA No. 141, as amended, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, statements of material
facts in the applications for public land must be under oath. Section 91 of the same act provides
that such statements shall be considered as essential conditions and parts of the concession, title,
or permit issued, any false statement therein, or omission of facts shall ipso facto produce the
cancellation of the concession. The patent issued to Nestor in this case is void ab initio not only
because it was obtained by fraud but also because it covers 30 hectares which is far beyond the
maximum of 24 hectares provided by the free patent law.
2) The government can seek annulment or the original and transfer certificates of title and
the reversion of the land to the state. Eddies defense is untenable. The protection afforded by
the Torrens System to an innocent purchaser for value can be availed of only if the land has been
titled thru Judicial proceedings where the issue of fraud becomes academic after the lapse of one
(1) year from the issuance of the decree of registration. In public land grants, the action of the
government to annul a title fraudulently obtained does not prescribe such action and will not be
barred by the transfer of the title to an innocent purchaser for value.
XIII
Priscilla purchased a condominium unit in Makati City from the Citiland Corporation for a
price of P10 Million, payable P3 Million down and the balance with interest thereon at 14% per
annum payable in sixty (60) equal monthly installments of P 198,333.33. They executed a Deed of
Conditional Sale in which it is stipulated that should the vendee fail to pay three (3) successive
installments, the sale shall be deemed automatically rescinded without the necessity of judicial
action and all payments made by the vendee shall be forfeited in favor of the vendor by way of
rental for the use and occupancy of the unit and as liquidated damages. For 46 months, Priscilla
paid the monthly installments religiously, but on the 47th and 48th months, she failed to pay. On
the 49th month, she tried to pay the installments due but the vendor refused to receive the
payments tendered by her. The following month, the vendor sent her a notice that it was
rescinding the Deed of Conditional Sale pursuant to the stipulation for automatic rescission, and
demanded that she vacate the premises. She replied that the contract cannot be rescinded
without judicial demand or notarial act pursuant to Article 1592 of the Civil Code.
a)
b)
Is Article 1592 applicable? (3%)

Can the vendor rescind the contract? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) Article 1592 of the Civil Code does not apply to a conditional sale. In Valarao v. CA, 304
SCRA 155, the Supreme Court held that Article 1592 applies only to a contract of sale and not to
a Deed of Conditional Sale where the seller has reserved title to the property until full payment of
the purchase price. The law applicable is the Maceda Law.
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, the vendor cannot rescind the contract under the circumstances. Under the Maceda Law,
which is the law applicable, the seller on Installment may not rescind the contract till after the
lapse of the mandatory grace period of 30 days for every one year of Installment payments, and
only after 30 days from notice of cancellation or demand , for rescission by a notarial act. In this
case, the refusal of the seller to accept payment from the buyer on the 49th month was not
Justified because the buyer was entitled to 60 days grace period and the payment was tendered
within that period. Moreover, the notice of rescission served by the seller on the buyer was not
effective because the notice was not by a notarial act. Besides, the seller may still pay within 30
days from such notarial notice before rescission may be effected. All these requirements for a
valid rescission were not complied with by the seller. Hence, the rescission is invalid.
XIV
Kristina brought her diamond ring to a jewelry shop for cleaning. The jewelry shop undertook
to return the ring by February 1, 1999. When the said date arrived, the Jewelry shop informed
Kristina that the job was not yet finished. They asked her to return five days alter. On February 6.
1999, Kristina went to the shop to claim the ring, but she was Informed that the same was stolen
by a thief who entered the shop the night before. Kristina filed an action for damages against the
jewelry shop which put up the defense of force majeure. Will the action prosper or not? (5%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The action will prosper. Since the defendant was already in default not having delivered the
ring when delivery was demanded by plaintiff at due date, the defendant is liable for the loss of
the thing and even when the loss was due to force majeure.
XV
a) Lolita was employed in a finance company. Because she could not account for the funds
entrusted to her, she was charged with estafa and ordered arrested. In order to secure her release
from jail, her parents executed a promissory note to pay the finance company the amount
allegedly misappropriated by their daughter. The finance company then executed an affidavit of
desistance which led to the withdrawal of the information against Lolita and her release from jail.
The parents failed to comply with their promissory note and the finance company sued them for
specific performance. Will the action prosper or not? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The action will prosper. The promissory note executed by Lolitas parents is valid and
binding, the consideration being the extinguishment of Lolitas civil liability and not the stifling of
the criminal prosecution.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The action will not prosper because the consideration for the promissory note was the nonprosecution of the criminal case for estafa. This cannot be done anymore because the information
has already been filed in court and to do it is illegal. That the consideration for the promissory'
note is the stifling of the criminal prosecution is evident from the execution by the finance
company of the. affidavit of desistance immediately after the execution by Lolitas parents of the
promissory note. The consideration being illegal, the promissory' note is invalid and may not be
enforced by court action.
b)
Pedro promised to give his grandson a car if the latter will pass the bar
examinations. When his grandson passed the said examinations, Pedro refused to give the car on
the ground that the condition was a purely potestative one. Is he correct or not? (2%)
SUGGESTEDANSWER:
No, he is not correct. First of all, the condition is not purely potestative, because it does not
depend on the sole will of one of the parties. Secondly, even if it were, it would be valid because
it depends on the sole will of the creditor (the donee) and not of the debtor (the donor).
XVI
In an action brought to collect a sum of money based on a surety agreement, the defense of
laches was raised as the claim was filed more than seven years from the maturity of the
obligation. However, the action was brought within the ten-year prescriptive period provided by
law wherein actions based on written contracts can be instituted.
a)
b)
Will the defense prosper? Reason. (3%)

What are the essential elements of laches? (2%)
SUGGESTEDANSWER:
No, the defense will not prosper. The problem did not give facts from which laches may be
inferred. Mere delay in filing an action, standing alone, does not constitute laches [Agra v. PNB,
309 SCRA 509).
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
a) The four basic elements of laches are: (1) conduct on the part of the defendant or of one
under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complainant seeks a remedy; (2) delay
in asserting the complainants rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the
defendants conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute suit; (3) lack of
knowledge on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he
bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the
complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred.
XVII.
In 1955, Ramon and his sister Rosario inherited a parcel of land in Albay from their parents.
Since. Rosario was gainfully employed in Manila, she left Ramon alone to possess and cultivate
the land. However. Ramon never shared the harvest with Rosario and was even able to sell onehalf of the land in 1985 by claiming to be the sole heir of his parents. Having reached retirement
age in 1990 Rosario returned to the province and upon learning what had transpired, demanded
that the remaining half of the land be given to her as her share. Ramon opposed, asserting that he
has already acquired ownership of the land by prescription, and that Rosario is barred by laches
from demanding partition and reconveyance. Decide the conflicting claims. [5%)
SUGGESTEDANSWER:
Ramon is wrong on both counts: prescription and laches. His possession as co-owner did not
give rise to acquisitive prescription. Possession by a co-owner is deemed not adverse to the other
co-owners but is, on the contrary, deemed beneficial to them (Pangan u. CA, 166 SCRA 375).
Ramons possession will become adverse only when he has repudiated the co-ownership and such
repudiation was made known to Rosario. Assuming that the sale in 1985 where Ramon claimed he
was the sole heir of his parents amounted to a repudiation of the co-ownership, the prescriptive
period began to run only from that time. Not more than 30 years having lapsed since then, the
claim of Rosario has not as yet prescribed. The claim of laches is not also meritorious. Until the
repudiation of the co-ownership was made known to the other co-owners, no right has been
violated for the said co-owners to vindicate. Mere delay in vindicating the right, standing alone,
does not constitute laches.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Ramon has acquired the land by acquisitive prescription, and because of laches on the part
of Rosario. Ramons possession of the land was adverse because he asserted sole ownership
thereof and never shared the harvest therefrom. His adverse possession having been continuous
and uninterrupted for more than 30 years, Ramon has acquired the land by prescription. Rosario
is also guilty of laches not having asserted her right to the harvest for more than 40 years.
A foreign munufacturer of computers and a Philippine distributor entered into a contract
whereby the distributor agreed to order 1,000 units of the manufacturers computers every
month and to resell them In the Philippines at the manufacturers suggested prices plus 10%. All
unsold units at the end of the year shall be bought back by the manufacturer at the same price
they were ordered. The manufacturer shall hold the distributor free and harmless from any claim
for defects in the units. Is the agreement one for sale or agency? (5%)
SUGGESTEDANSWER:
The contract is one of agency not sale. The notion of sale is negated by the following
indicia; (1) the price is fixed by the manufacturer with the 10% mark-up constituting the
commission; (2) the manufacturer reacquires the unsold units at exactly the same price; and (3)
warranty for the units was borne by the manufacturer. The foregoing Indicia negate sale because
they indicate that ownership over the units was never intended to transfer to the distributor.
XIX
A leased his house to B with a condition that the leased premises shall be used for residential
purposes only. B subleased the house to C who used it as a warehouse for fabrics. Upon learning
this. A demanded that C stop using the house as a warehouse, but C ignored the demand. A then
filed an action for ejectment against C. who raised the defense that there is no privity of contract
between him and A, and that he has not been remiss in the payment of rent. Will the action
prosper? (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
Yes. the action will prosper. Under Article 1651 of the Civil Code, the sublessee is bound
to the lessor for all acts which refer to the use and preservation of the thing leased in the manner
stipulated between the lessor and the lessee.
b)
In 1995, Mark leased the rice land of Narding in Nueva Ecija for an annual rental of
PI ,000.00 per hectare. In 1998, due to the El Nino phenomenon, the rice harvest fell to only 40%
of the average harvest for the previous years. Mark asked Narding for a reduction of the rental to
P500.00 per hectare for that year but the latter refused. Is Mark legally entitled to such
reduction? (2%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
No, Mark is not entitled to a reduction. Under Article 1680 of the Civil Code, the lessee of a
rural land is entitled to a reduction of the rent only in case of loss of more than 1/2 of the fruits
through extraordinary and unforeseen fortuitous events. While the drought brought about by the
El Nino" phenomenon may be classified as extraordinary, it is not considered as unforeseen.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Yes, Mark is entitled to a reduction of the rent. His loss was more than 1 /2 of the fruits and the
loss was due to an extraordinary and unforeseen fortuitous event. The El Nino" phenomenon is
extraordinary because it is uncommon; it does not occur with regularity. And neither could the
parties have foreseen its occurrence. The event should be foreseeable by the parties so that the
lessee can change the time for his planting, or refrain from planting, or take steps to avoid the
loss. To be foreseeable, the time and the place of the occurrence, as well as the magnitude of the
adverse effects of the fortuitous event must be capable of being predicted. Since the exact place,
the exact time, and the exact magnitude of the adverse effects of the El Nino" phenomenon are
still unpredictable despite the advances in science, the phenomenon is considered unforeseen.
XX
a) Silvestre leased a car from Avis-Rent-A-Car Co. at the Mactan International Airport. No
sooner had he driven the car outside the airport when, due to his negligence, he bumped an FX
taxi owned and driven by Victor, causing damage to the latter in the amount of P 100,000.00.
Victor filed an action for damages against both Silvestre and Avis, based on quasi-delict. Avis
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint against it on the ground of failure to state a cause of
action. Resolve the motion. (3%)
SUGGESTED ANSWER:
The motion to dismiss should be granted. AVIS is not the employer of Silvestre; hence, there
is no right of action against AVIS under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Not being the employer,
AVIS has no duty to supervise Silvestre. Neither has AVIS the duty to observe due diligence in the
selection of its customers. Besides, it was given in the problem that the cause of the accident was
the negligence of Silvestre.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The motion should be denied. Under the Public Service Law, the registered owner of a
public utility Is liable for the damages suffered by third persons through the use of such public
utility. Hence, the cause of action is based in law, the Public Service Law.
b) Despite a warning from the police that an attempt to hijack a PAL plane will be made in
the following week, the airline did not take extra precautions, such as frisking of passengers, for
fear of being accused of violating human rights. Two days later, an armed hijacker did attempt to
hijack a PAL flight to Cebu. Although he was subdued by the other passengers, he managed to
fire a shot which hit and killed a female passenger. The victims parents sued the airline for
breach of contract, and the airline raised the defense of force mqjeure. Is the airline liable or not?
(2%)
SUGGESTEDANSWER:
The airline Is liable. In case of death of a passenger, common carriers are presumed to have
been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence (Article 1756, Civil Code). The failure of the airline to take extra precautions despite a
police warning that an attempt to hijack the plane would be made, was negligence on the part of
the airline. Being negligent, it is liable for the death of the passenger. The defense of force
mqjeure is not tenable since the shooting incident would not have happened had the airline
taken steps that could have prevented the hijacker from boarding the plane.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Under Article 1763 of the Civil Code, the common carrier is not required to observe
extraordinaiy diligence in preventing injury to its passengers on account of the willful acts or
negligence of other passengers or of strangers. The common carrier, in that case, is required to
exercise only the diligence of a good father of a family; hence, the failure of the airline to take
EXTRA precautions in filsking the passengers and by leaving that matter to the security personnel
of the airport, does not constitute a breach of that duty so as to make the airline liable. Besides,
the use of irresistible force by the hijackers was force mqjeure that could not have been
prevented even by the observance of extraordinary diligence.
Elated that her sister who had been married for five years was pregnant for the first time,
Alma donated P100,000.00 to the unborn child. Unfortunately, the baby died one hour after
delivery. May Alma recover the P100,000.00 that she had donated to said baby before it was bom
considering that the baby died? Stated otherwise, is the donation valid and binding? Explain.
(5%)
ANSWER:
The donation is valid and binding, being an act favorable to the unborn child, but only if the
baby had an intra-uterine life of not less than seven months and provided there was due
acceptance of the donation by the proper person representing said child. If the child had less
than seven months of intra-uterine life, it is not deemed born since it died less than 24 hours
following its delivery, in which case the donation never became effective since the donee never
became a person, birth being determinative of personality.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Even if the baby had an intra-uterine life of more than seven months and the donation was
properly accepted, it would be void for not having conformed with the proper form. In order to
be valid, the donation and acceptance of personal property exceeding five thousand pesos
should be in writing. (Article 748, par. 3)
II.
Mr. and Mrs. Cruz, who are childless, met with a serious motor vehicle accident with Mr.
Cruz at the wheel and Mrs. Cruz seated beside him, resulting in the instant death of Mr. Cruz.
Mrs. Cruz was still alive when help came but she also died on the way to the hospital. The couple
acquired properties-worth One Million (PI,000,000.00) Pesos during their marriage, which are
being claimed by the parents'of both spouses in equal shares. Is the claim of both sets of parents
valid and why? (3%)
(b) Suppose in the preceding question, both Mr. and Mrs. Cruz were already dead when
help came, so that nobody could say who died ahead of the other, would you answer be the same
to the question as to who are entitled to the properties of the deceased couple? (2%)
ANSWER:
(a)
No, the claim of both parents is not valid. When Mr. Cruz died, he was succeeded
by his wife and his parents as his intestate heirs who will share his estate equally. His estate was
0.5 Million pesos which is his half share in the absolute community amounting to 1 Million Pesos.
His wife, will, therefore, inherit 0.25 Million Pesos and his parents will inherit 0.25 Million Pesos.
When Mrs. Cruz died, she was succeeded by her parents as her intestate heirs. They will
inherit all of her estate consisting of her 0.5 Million half share in the absolute community and her
0.25 Million inheritance from her husband, or a total of 0.750 Million Pesos.
In sum, the parents of Mr. Cruz will inherit 250,000 Pesos while the parents of Mrs. Cruz will
inherit 750,000 Pesos.
(b)
This being a case of succession, in the absence of proof as to the time of death of
each of the spouses, it is presumed they died at the same time and no transmission of rights from
one to the other is deemed to have taken place. Therefore, each of them is deemed to have an
estate valued at P500,000.00, or one-half of their conjugal property of PI million. Their respective
parents will thus inherit the entire P1 Million in equal shares, or P500,000.00 per set of parents.
III
What is the status of the following marriages and why?

(a)
A marriage between two 19-year olds without parental consent. (2%)
(b) A marriage between two 21-year olds without parental advice. (2%)
(c)
A marriage between two Filipino first cousins in Spain where such marriage is valid. (2%)
(d) A marriage between two Filipinos in Hong kong before a notaiy public. (2%)
(e)
A marriage solemnized by a town mayor three towns away from his jurisdiction. (2%)
ANSWER:
The marriage is voidable. The consent of the parties to the marriage was defective.
Being below 21 years old, the consent of the parties is not full without the consent of their
parents. The consent of the parents of the parties to the marriage is indispensable for its validity.
(a)
(b)
Between 21-year olds, the marriage is valid despite the absence of parental advice,
because such absence is merely an irregularity affecting a formal requisitei.e., the marriage
license-and does not affect the validity of the marriage itself. This is without prejudice to the civil,
criminal, or administrative liability of the party responsible therefor.
c)
By reason of public policy, the marriage between Filipino first cousins is void [Art.
38, par. (1), Family Code], and the fact that it is considered a valid marriage in a foreign country in
this case, Spaindoes not validate it, being an exception to the general rule in Art. 26 of said
Code which accords validity to all marriages solemnized outside the Philippines x x x and valid
there as such.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The marriage is void. Under Article 26 of the Family Code, a marriage valid where
celebrated is valid in the Philippines except those marriages enumerated in said Article which
marriages will remain void even though valid where solemnized. The marriage between first cousins is one of those marriages enumerated therein, hence, it is void even though valid in Spain
where it was celebrated.

By reason of Art. 15 in relation to Article 38 of the Civil Code, which applies to Filipinos
wherever they are, the marriage is void.
(d)
It depends. If the marriage before the notary public is valid under Hong kong Law,
the marriage is valid in the Philippines. Otherwise, the marriage that is invalid in Hong kong will
be invalid in the Philippines.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
If the two Filipinos believed in good faith that the Notary Public is authorized to solemnize
marriage, then the marriage is valid.
(e) Under the Local Government Code, a town mayor may validly solemnize a marriage but
said law is silent as to the territorial limits for the exercise by a town mayor of such authority.
However, by analogy, with the authority of members of the judiciary to solemnize a mar riage, it
would seem that the mayor did not have the requisite authority to solemnize a marriage outside
of Eva now wants to know what action or actions she can file against Ben. She also wants to know
if she can likewise marry again. What advice can you give her? (5%)
ANSWER:
Considering that Art. 26(2nd par.) contemplates a divorce between a foreigner and a
Filipino, who had such respective nationalities at the time of their marriage, the divorce in
Europe will not capacitate the Filipino wife to remarry. The advice we can give her is either to
file a petition for legal separation, on the ground of sexual infidelity and of contracting a
bigamous marriage abroad, or to file a petition to dissolve the conjugal partnership or absolute
community of property as the case maybe.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
Eva may file an action for legal separation on the grounds of sexual infidelity of her husband
and the contracting by her husband of a bigamous marriage abroad.
She may remarry. While a strict interpretation of Article 26 of the Family Code would
capacitate a Filipino spouse to remarry only when the other spouse was a foreigner at the time
of the marriage, the DOJ has issued an opinion (Opinion 134 s. of 1993) that the same injustice
sought to be cured by Article 26 is present in the case of spouses who were both Filipino at the
time of the marriage but one became an alien subsequently. Said injustice is the anomaly of Eva
remaining married to her husband who is no longer married to her. Hence, said Opinion makes
Article 26 applicable to her case and the divorce obtained abroad by her former Filipino
husband would capacitate her to remarry. To contract a subsequent marriage, all she needs to
do is present to the civil registrar the decree of divorce when she applies for a marriage license
under Article 13 of the Family Code.
his territorial jurisdiction. Hence, the marriage is void, unless it was contracted with either or both
parties believing in good faith that the mayor had the legal authority to solemnize this particular
marriage [Art. 35, par. (2), Family Code].
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
The marriage is valid. Under the Local Government Code, the authority of a mayor to
solemnize marriages is not restricted within his municipality implying that he has the authority
even outside the territory thereof. Hence, the marriage he solemnized outside his municipality is
valid. And even assuming that his authority is restricted within his municipality, such marriage
will, nevertheless, be valid because solemnizing the marriage outside said municipality is a mere
irregularity applying by analogy the case of Navarro v. Domagtoy, 259 SCRA 129. In this case, the
Supreme Court held that the celebration by a judge of a marriage outside the jurisdiction of his
court is a mere irregularity that did not affect the validity of the marriage notwithstanding Article
7 of the Family Code which provides that an incumbent member of the judiciary is authorized to
solemnize marriages only within the courts jurisdiction.

The marriage is void because the mayor has no authority to solemnize marriage outside his
jurisdiction.
IV.
Ben and Eva were both Filipino citizens at the time of their marriage in 1987. When their
marriage turned sour, Ben went to a small country in Europe, got himself naturalized there, and
then divorced Eva in accordance with the law of that country. Later, he returned to the
Philippines with his new wife.
V
What do you understand by presumptive legitime, in what case or cases must the parent
deliver such legitime to the children, and what are the legal effects in each case if the parent fails
to do so? (5%)
ANSWER
Presumptive legitime is not defined in the law. Its definition must have been taken from Act
2710, the Old Divorce Law, which required the delivery to the legitimate children of the
equivalent of what would have been due to them as their legal portion if said spouse had died
intestate immediately after the dissolution of the community of property. As used in the Family
Code, presumptive legitime is understood as the equivalent of the legitimate childrens legitimes
assuming that the spouses had died immediately after the dissolution of the community of
property.
Presumptive legitime is required to be delivered to the common children of the spouses
when the marriage is annulled or declared void ab initio and possibly, when the conjugal
partnership or absolute community is dissolved as in the case of legal separation. Failure of the
parents to deliver the presumptive legitime will make their subsequent marriage null and void
under Article 53 of the Family Code.
VI
(a)
Two (2) months aiter the death of her husband who was shot by unknown criminal
elements on his way home from office, Rose married her childhood boyfriend, and seven (7)
months aiter said marriage, she delivered a baby. In the absence of any evidence from Rose as to
who is her childs father, what status does the law give to said child? Explain. (2%)
(b) Nestor is the illegitimate son of Dr. Perez. When Dr. Perez died, Nestor intervened in
the settlement of his fathers estate, claiming that he is the illegitimate son of said deceased, but
the legitimate family of Dr. Perez is denying Nestors claim. What evidence or evidences should
Nestor present so that he may receive his rightful share in his fathers estate? (3%)
ANSWER:
1(a) The child is legitimate of the second marriage under Article 168(2) of the Family Code
which provides that a child bora after one hundred eighty days following the celebration of the
subsequent marriage is considered to have been conceived during such marriage, even though it
be bora within three hundred days after the termination of the former marriage.
(b) To be able to inherit, the illegitimate filiation of Nestor must have been admitted by
his father in any of the following: (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register, (2) a final
judgment, (3) a public document signed by the father, or (4) a private handwritten document
signed by the father (Article 175 in relation to Article 172 of the Family Code).
VII
Mr. Cruz, widower, has three legitimate children, A, B and C. He executed a Will
instituting as his heirs to his estate of One Million (PI,000,000.00) Pesos his two children A and B,
and his friend F. Upon his death, how should Mr. Cruzs estate be divided? Explain. (3%)
(a)
(b)
In the preceding question, suppose Mr. Cruz in stituted his two children A and B as
his heirs in his Will, but gave a legacy of P 100,000.00 to his friend F. How should the estate of
Mr. Cruz be divided upon his death? Explain. (2%)
ANSWER:
(a)
Assuming that the institution of A, B and F were to the entire estate, there was
preterition of C since C is a compulsory heir in the direct line. The preterition will result in the
total annulment of the institution of heirs. Therefore, the institution of A, B and F will be set aside
and Mr. Cruzs estate will be divided, as in intestacy, equally among A, B and C as follows: A P333,333.33; B - P333,333.33; and C - P333,333.33.
(b)
On the same assumption as letter (a), there was preterition of C. Therefore, the
institution of A and B is annulled but the legacy of P 100,000.00 to F shall be respected for not
being inofficious. Therefore, the remainder of P900,000.00 will be divided equally among A, B
and C.
VIII.
Mr. Palma, widower, has three daughters D, D-l and D-2. He executes a Will disinheriting D
because she married a man he did not like, and instituting daughters D- 1 and D-2 as his heirs to
his entire estate of P 1,000,000.00. Upon Mr. Palma's death, how should his estate be divided?
Explain. (5%)
(b.) Mr. Luna died, leaving an estate of Ten Million (P10,000,000.00) Pesos. His widow gave
birth to a child four months after Mr. Lunas death, but the child died five hours after birth. Two
days after the childs death, the widow of Mr. Luna also died because she had suffered from difficult childbirth. The estate of Mr. Luna is now being claimed by his parents, and the parents of his
widow. Who is entitled to Mr. Lunas estate and why? (5%)
ANSWER:
This is a case of ineffective disinheritance because marrying a man that the father did not
approve of is not a ground for disinheriting D. Therefore, the institution of D-l and D-2 shall be
annulled insofar as it preju dices the legitime of D, and the institution of D-1 and D- 2 shall only
apply on the free portion in the amount of P500.000.00. Therefore, D, D-l and D-2 will get their
legitimes of P500,000.00 divided into three equal parts and D-l and D-2 will get a reduced
testamentary disposition. of P250,000.00 each. Kence, the shares will be:
D
D-l
D-2
P166,666.66
P166.666.66 + P250,000.00
P166,666.66 + P250.000.00
(b.) Half of the estate of Mr. Luna will go to the parents of Mrs. Luna as their inheritance
from Mrs. Luna, while the other half will be inherited by the parents of Mr. Luna as the
reservatarios of the reserved property inherited by Mrs. Luna from her child.
When Mr. Luna died, his heirs were his wife and the unborn child. The unborn child inherited
because the inheritance was favorable to it and it was born alive later though it lived only for five
hours. Mrs. Luna inherited half of the 10 Million estate while the unborn child inherited the other
half. When the child died, it was survived by its mother, Mrs. Luna. As the only heir, Mrs. Luna
inherited, by operation of law, the estate of the child consisting of its 5 Million inheritance from
Mr. Luna. In the hands of Mrs. Luna, what she inherited from her child was subject to reserva
troncal for the benefit of the relatives of the child within the third degree of consanguinity and
who belong to the family of Mr. Luna, the line where the property came from.
When Mrs. Luna died, she was survived by her parents as her only heirs. Her parents will
inherit her estate consisting of the 5 Million she inherited from Mr. Luna. The other 5 Million she
inherited from her child will be delivered to the parents of Mr. Luna as beneficiaries of the
reserved property. In sum, 5 Million Pesos of Mr. Lunas estate will go to the parents of Mrs. Luna,
while the other 5 Million Pesos will go to the parents of Mr. Luna as reservatarios.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
If the child had an intra-uterine life of not less than 7 months, it inherited from the father. In
which case, the estate of 10M will be divided equally between the child and the widow as legal
heirs. Upon the death of the child, its share of 5M shall go by operation of law to the mother,
which shall be subject to reserva troncal. Under Art. 891, the reserva is in favor of relatives
belonging to the paternal line and who are within 3 degrees from the child. The parents of Mr.
Luna are entitled to the reserved portion which i3 5M as they are 2 degrees related from child.
The 5M inherited by Mrs. Luna from Mr. Luna will be inherited from her by her parents.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
If the child had an intra-uterine life of not less than 7 months, it inherited from the father. In
which case, the estate of 10M will be divided equally between the child and the widow as legal
heirs. Upon the death of the child, its share of 5M shall go by operation of law to the mother,
which shall be subject to reserva troncal. Under Art. 891, the reserva is in favor of relatives
belonging to the paternal line and who are within 3 degrees from the child. The parents of Mr.
Luna are entitled to the reserved portion which i3 5M as they are 2 degrees related from child.
The 5M inherited by Mrs. Luna from Mr. Luna will be inherited from her by her parents.
However, if the child had intra-uterine life of less than 7 months, half of the estate of Mr.
Luna, or 5M, will be inherited by the widow (Mrs. Luna), while the other half, or 5M, will be
inherited by the parents of Mr. Luna. Upon the death of Mrs. Luna, her estate of 5M will be
inherited by her own parents.
IX.
(a)
Because of confusion as to the boundaries of the adjoining lots that they bought
from the same subdivision company, X constructed a house on the adjoining lot of Y in the honest
belief that it is the land that he bought from the subdivision company. What are the respective
rights of X and Y with respect to Xs house? (3%).
(b)
Suppose X was in good faith but Y knew that X was constructing on his (Ys) land
but simply kept quiet about it, thinking perhaps that he could get Xs house later. What are the
respective rights of the parties over Xs house in this case? 12%)
ANSWER:
(a)The rights of Y, as owner of the lot, and of X, as builder of a house thereon, are governed
by Art. 448 of the Civil Code which grants to Y the right to choose between two remedies: (a)
appropriate the house by indemnifying X for its value plus whatever necessary expenses the latter
may have incurred for the preservation of the land, or (b) compel X to buy the land if the price of
the land is not considerably more than the value of the house. If it is, then X cannot be obliged to
buy the land but he shall pay reasonable rent, and in case of disagreement, the court shall fix the
terms of the lease.
(b)
Since the lot owner Y is deemed to be in bad faith (Art. 453), X as the party in
good faith may (a) remove the house and demand indemnification for damages suffered by him,
or (b) demand payment of the value of the house plus reparation for damages (Art. 447, in
relation to Art. 454). Y continues as owner of the lot and becomes, under the second option,
owner of the house as well, after he pays the sums demanded.
X
The spouses X and Y mortgaged a piece of registered land to A, delivering as well the OCT to
the latter, but they continued to possess and cultivate the land, giving 1/2 of each harvest to A in
partial payment of their loan to the latter. A, however, without the knowledge of X and Y, forged
a deed of sale of the aforesaid land in favor of himself, got a TCT in his name, and then sold the
land to B, who bought the land relying on As title, and who thereafter also got a TCT in his name.
It was only then that the spouses X and Y learned that their land had been titled in Bs name. May
said spouses file an action for reconveyance of the land in question against b? Reason. (5%)
ANSWER:
The action of X and Y against B for reconveyance of the land will not prosper because B has
acquired a clean title to the property being an innocent purchaser for value.
A forged deed is an absolute nullity and conveys no title. The fact that the forged deed
was registered and a certificate of title was issued in his name, did not operate to vest upon A
ownership over the property of X and Y. The registration of the forged deed will not cure the
infirmity. However, once the title to the land is registered in the name of the forger and title to
the land thereafter falls into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, the latter acquires a
clean title thereto. A buyer of a registered land is not required to explore beyond what the
record in the registry indicates on its face in quest for any hidden defect or inchoate right which
may subsequently defeat his right thereto. This is the mirror principle of the Torrens system
which makes it possible for a forged deed to be the root of a good title.
Besides, it appears that spouses X and Y are guilty of contributory negligence when they
delivered this OCT to the mortgagee without annotating the mortgage thereon. Between them
and the innocent purchaser for value, they should bear the loss.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
If the buyer B, who relied on the seller As title, was not aware of the adverse possession of
the land by the spouses X and Y, then the latter cannot recover the property from B. B has in his
favor the presumption of good faith which can only be overthrown by adequate proof of bad
faith. However, nobody buys land without seeing the property, hence, B could not have been
unaware of such adverse possession. If after learning of such possession, B simply closed his eyes
and did nothing about it, then the suit for reconveyance will prosper as the buyers bad faith will
have become evident.
XI
In 1997, Manuel bound himself to sell Eva a house and lot which is being rented by another
person, if Eva passes the 1998 bar examinations. Luckily for Eva, she passed said examinations.
(a) Suppose Manuel had sold the same house and lot to another before Eva passed the 1998
bar examinations, is such sale valid? Why? (2%)
(b) Assuming that it is Eva who is entitled to buy said house and lot, is she entitled to the
rentals collected by Manuel before she passed the 1998 bar examinations? Why? (3%)
ANSWER:
(a) Yes, the sale to the other person is valid as a sale with a resolutory condition because
what operates as a suspensive condition for Eva operates a resolutory condition for the buyer.
FIRST ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

Yes, the sale to the other person is valid. However, the buyer acquired the property subject
to a resolutory condition of Eva passing the 1998 Bar Examinations. Hence, upon Evas passing the
Bar, the rights of the other buyer terminated and Eva acquired ownership of the property.
SECOND ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

The sale to another person before Eva could buy it from Manuel is valid, as the contract
between Manuel and Eva is a mere promise to sell and Eva has not acquired a real right over the
land assuming that there is a price stipulated in the contract for the contract to be considered a
sale and there was delivery or tradition of the thing sold.
(a)
No, she is not entitled to the rentals collected by Manuel because at the time they
accrued and were collected, Eva was not yet the owner of the property.

Assuming that Eva is the one entitled to buy the house and lot, she is not entitled to the
rentals collected by Manuel before she passed the bar examinations. Whether it is a contract of
sale or a contract to sell, reciprocal prestations are deemed imposed A for the seller to deliver
the object sold and for the buyer to pay the price. Before the happening of the condition, the
fruits of the thing and the interests on the money are deemed to have been mutually
compensated under Article 1187.

Under Art. 1164, there is no obligation on the part of Manuel to deliver the fruits (rentals) of
the thing until the obligation to deliver the thing arises. As the suspensive condition has not been
fulfilled, the obligation to sell does not arise.
XII
In 1950, the Bureau of Lands issued a Homestead patent to A. Three years later, A sold the
homestead to B. A died in 1990, and his heirs filed an action to recover the homestead from B cn
the ground that its sale by their father to the latter is void under Section 118 of the Public Land
Law. B contends, however, that the heirs of A cannot recover the homestead from him anymore
because their action has prescribed and that furthermore, A was in pan delicto. Decide. (5%)
ANSWER;
The sale of the land by A to B 3 years after issuance of the homestead patent, being in
violation of Section 118 of the Public Land Act, is void from its inception.
The action filed by the heirs of B to declare the nullity or inexistence of the contract and to
recover the land should be given due course.
Bs defense of prescription is untenable because an action which seeks to declare the nullity
or inexistence of a contract does not prescribe. (Article 1410; Banaga vs. Soler, 2 SCRA 755)
On the other hand, Bs defense of pari delicto is equally untenable. While as a rule, parties
who are in pari delicto have no recourse against each other on the principle that a transgressor
cannot profit from his own wrongdoing, such rule does not apply to violations of Section 118 of
the Public Land Act because of the underlying public policy in the said Act to conserve the land
which a homesteader has acquired by gratuitous grant from the government for himself and his
family. In keeping with this policy, it has been held that one who purchases a homestead within
the five-year prohibitory period can only recover the price which he has paid by filing a claim
against the estate of the deceased seller (Labrador vs. Delos Santos 66 Phil. 579) under the
principle that no one shall enrich himself at the expense of another. Applying the pari delicto rule
to violation of Section 118 of the Public Land Act, the Court of Appeals has ruled that the
homesteader suffers the loss of the fruits realized by the vendee who in turn forfeits the improvement that he has introduced into the land. (Obot vs. Sandadillas, 62 OG, April 25, 1966)
The action to declare the nullity of the sale did not prescribe (Art. 1410), such sale being one
expressly prohibited and declared void by the Public Lands Act [Art. 1409, par. (7)]. The
prohibition of the law is clearly for the protection of the heirs of A such that their recovering the
property would enhance the public policy regarding ownership of lands acquired by homestead
patent (Art. 1416). The defense of pari delicto is not applicable either, since the law itself allows
the homesteader to reacquire the land even if it has been sold.
Prescription does not arise with respect to actions to declare a void contract a nullity
(Article 1410). Neither is the doctrine of pari delicto applicable because of public policy. The law
is designed for the protection of the plaintiff so as to enhance the public policy of the Public Land
Act to give land to the landless.
If the heirs are not allowed to recover, it could be on the ground of laches inasmuch as 40
years had elapsed and the owner had not brought any action against B especially if the latter had
improved the land. It would be detrimental to B if the plaintiff is allowed to recover.
XIII.
What are the so-called Maceda and Recto laws in connection with sales on installments?
Give the most important features of each law. (5%)
ANSWER:
The Maceda Law (R.A. 655) is applicable to sales of immovable property on installments. The
most important features are(Rillo v. CA, 247 SCRA 461):
(1) After having paid installments for at least two years, the buyer is entitled to a
mandatory grace period of one month for every year of installment payments ntade, to pay the
unpaid installments without interest.
If the contract is cancelled, the seller shall refund to the buyer the cash surrender value
equivalent to fifty percent (50%) of the total payments made, and after five years of installments,
an additional five percent (5%) every year but not to exceed ninety percent (90%) of the total
payments made.
(2) In case the installments paid were less than 2 years, the seller shall give the buyer a grace
period of not less than 60 days. If the buyer fails to pay the installments due at the expiration of
the grace period, the seller may cancel the contract after 30 days from receipt by the buyer of the
notice of cancellation or demand for rescission by notarial act.
The Recto Law (Art. 1484) refers to sale of movables payable in installments and limiting the
right of seller, in case of default by the buyer, to one of three remedies:
(a)
exact fulfillment;
(b)
cancel the sale if two or more installments have not been paid;
(c) foreclose the chattel mortgage on the things sold, also in case of default
of two or more
installments, with no further action against the purchaser.

XIV.
(a) May a lessee sublease the property leased without the consent of the lessor, and what are
the respective liabilities of the lessee and sub-lessee to the lessor in case of such sublease? (3%)
(b)
arise? (2%)
Under what circumstances would an implied new lease oi a tacita reconduccion
ANSWER:
(a) Yes, provided that there is no express prohibition against subleasing. Under the law,
when in the contract of'Iease of things there is no express prohibition, the lessee may sublet the
thing leased without prejudice to his responsibility for the performance of the contract toward
the lessor. (Art. 1650)
In case there is a sublease of the premises being leased, the sublessee is bound to the lessor
for all the acts which refer to the use and preservation of the thing leased in the manner
stipulated between the lessor and the lessee. (Art. 1651)
The sublessee is subsidiarily liable to the lessor for any rent due from the lessee. However,
the sublessee shall not be responsible beyond the amount of the rent due from him. (Art. 1652)
As to the lessee, the latter shall still be responsible to the lessor for the rents; bring to the
knowledge of jthe lessor every usurpation or untoward act which any third person may have
committed or may be openly preparing to carry out upon the thing leased; advise the owner the
need for all repairs; to return the thing leased upon the termination of the lease just as he
received it, save what has been lost or impaired by the lapse of time or by ordinary wear and tear
or from an inevitable cause; responsible for the deterioration or loss of the thing leased, unless
he proves that it took place without his fault.
(b)
An implied new lease or tacita reconduccion arises if at the end of the contract the
lessee should continue enjoying the thing leased for 15 days with the acquiescence of the lessor,
and unless a notice to the contrary by either parties has previously been given (Art. 1670). In
short, in order that there may be tacita reconduccion there must be expiration of the contract;
there must be continuation of possession for 15 days or more; and there must be no prior
demand to vacate.
XV.
X appoints Y as his agent to sell his products in Cebu City. Can Y appoint a subagent and if he does, what are the effects of such appointment? (5%)
(a)
A granted B the exclusive right to sell his brand of Maong pants in Isabela, the
price for his merchandise payable within 60 days from delivery, and promising B a commission of
20% on all sales. After the delivery of the merchandise to B but before he could sell any of them,
BOs store in Isabela was completely burned without his fault, together with all of As pants. Must
B pay A for his lost pants? Why? (5%)
(b)
ANSWER:
a. Yes, the agent may appoint a substitute or subagent if the principal has not prohibited him
from doing so, but he shall be responsible for the acts of the substitute:
when he was not given the power to appoint one;
(1)
(2)
when he was given such power, but without designating the person, and the
person appointed was notoriously incompetent or insolvent.
(a) The contract between A and B is a sale not an agency to sell because the price is
payable by B upon 60 days from delivery even if B is unable to resell it. If B were an agent, he is
not bound to pay the price if he is unable to resell it.
As a buyer, ownership passed to B upon delivery and, under Art. 1504 of the Civil Code, the
thing perishes for the owner. Hence, B must still pay the price.
XVI.
(a)
Distinguish a contract of chattel mortgage from a contract of pledge. (2%)
(b) Are
the right of redemption and the equity of redemption given by law to a mortgagor
the same? Explain. (2%)
(c) X borrowed money from Y and gave a piece of land as security by way of mortgage. It was
expressly agreed between the parties in the mortgage contract that upon nonpayment of the
debt on time by X, the mortgaged land would already belong to Y. If X defaulted in paying, would
Y now become the owner of the mortgaged land? Why?. (3%)
Suppose in the preceding question, the agreement between X and Y was that if X
failed to pay the mortgage debt on time, the debt shall be paid with the land mortgaged by X to
Y. Would your answer be the same as in the preceding question? Explain. (3%)
(d)
ANSWER:
In a contract of chattel mortgage possession belongs to the creditor, while in a
contract of pledge possession belongs to the debtor.
(a)
A chattel mortgage is a formal contract while a pledge is a real contract.

A contract of chattel mortgage must be recorded in a public instrument to bind third
persons while a contract of pledge must be in a public instrument containing description of the
thing pledged and the date thereof to bind third persons.
(b)
The equity of redemption is different from the right of redemption. Equity of
redemption is the right of the mortgagor after judgment in a judicial foreclosure to redeem the
property by paying to the court the amount of the judgment debt before the sale or confirmation
of the sale. On the other hand, right of redemption is the right of the mortgagor to redeem the
property sold at an extra-judicial foreclosure by paying to the buyer in the foreclosure sale the
amount paid by the buyer within one year from such sale.
(c)
No, Y would not become the owner of the land. The stipulation is in the nature of
pactum commissorium which is is prohibited by law. The property should be sold at public
auction and the proceeds thereof applied to the indebtedness. Any excess shall be given to the
mortgagor.
(d)
No, the answer would not be the same. This is a valid stipulation and does not
constitute pactum commissorium. In pactum commissorium, the acquisition is automatic without
need of any further action. In the instant problem another act is required to be performed,
namely, the conveyance of the property as payment (dacion en pago).
Juan is a Filipino citizen residing in Tokyo. Japan. State what laws govern:
1. His capacity to contract marriage in Japan. [ 1%)
2.
His successional rights as regards his deceased Filipino father's property in Texas, U.SA
[1%]
3. The extrinsic validity of the last will and testament which Juan executed while sojourning
in Switzerland. [2%]
4.
Answer
The intrinsic validity of said will. [1%]
1.
Juan's capacity to contract marriage la governed by Philippine law - i.e., the
Family Code - pursuant to Art. 15, Civil Code, which provides that our laws relating to, among
others, legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines even though living
abroad.
Answer
By way of exception to the general rule of lex rel sitae prescribed by the first
paragraph of Art. 16, Civil Code, a person's successional rights are governed by the national law
of the decedent (2nd par.. Art. 16). Since Juan's deceased father was a Filipino citizen, Philippine
law governs Juan's successional rights.
2.
Another Answer:
2.
Juan's successional rights are governed by Philippine law, pursuant to Article 1039 and
the second paragraph of Article 16, both of the Civil Code. Article 1039, Civil Code, provides that
capacity to succeed shall be governed by the law of the nation" of the decedent,
i.
e.. his national law. Article 16 provides in paragraph
two that the amount of successional rights, order of succession, and intrinsic validity of
testamentary succession shall be governed by the national law" of the decedent who Is
identified as a Filipino in the present problem.
Answer:
3. The extrinsic validity of Juan's will Is governed by (a) Swiss law, it being the law where the
will was made (Art. 17, 1st par. Civil Code), or (b) Philippine law, by implication from the
provisions of Art. 816, Civil Code, which allows even an alien who is abroad to make a will in
conformity with our Civil Code.
Answer
The intrinsic validity of his will is governed by Philippine law, it being his national law.
(Art. 16, Civil Code)
4.
II.
Francis Albert, a citizen and resident of New Jersey. U.S.A., under whose law he was still a
minor, being only 20 years of age, was hired by ABC Corporation of Manila to serve for two years
as its chief computer programmer. But after serving for only four months, he resigned to join XYZ
Corporation, which enticed him by offering more advantageous terms. His first employer sues
him in Manila for damages arising from the breach of his contract of employment. He sets up his
minority as a defense and asks for annulment of the contract on that ground. The plaintiff
disputes this by alleging that since the contract was executed in the Philippines under whose law
the age of majority is 18 years, he was no longer a minor at the time of perfection of the contract.
1.
Will the suit prosper? (3%)
2. Suppose XYZ Corporation is impleaded as a codefendant. what would be the basis of its
liability, if any? [2%]
Answers
1.
The suit will not prosper under Article 15, Civil Code. New Jersey law governs
Francis Albert's capacity to act, being his personal law from the standpoint of both his nationality
and his domicile. He was, therefore, a minor at the time he entered Into the contract.
Alternative answer:
1.
The suit will not prosper. Being a U.S. national, Albert's capacity to enter into a contract
is determined by the law of the State of which he Is a national, under which he is still a minor. This
is in connection with Article 15 of the Civil Code which embodies the said nationality principle of
lex patriae. While this principle intended to apply to Filipino citizens under that provision, the
Supreme Court in Recto v. Harden is of the view that the status or capacity of foreigners is to be
determined on the basis of the same provision or principle, i.e., by U.S. law in the present
problem.
Plaintiffs argument does not hold true, because status or capacity is not determined by lex
loci contractus but by lex patriae.
Another Answer;
1.
Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the forms and solemnities of contracts,
wills and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are
executed.
Since the contract of employment was executed in Manila, Philippine law should govern.
Being over 18 years old and no longer a minor according to Philippine Law, Francis Albert can be
sued. Thus, the suit oi ABC Corporation against him for damages will prosper.
Answer:
2.
XYZ Corporation, having enticed Francis Albert to break his contract with the
plaintiff, may be held liable for damages under Art. 1314, Civil Code.
Alternative Answer;
2.
The basis of liability of XYZ Corporation would be Article 28 of the Civil Code which
states that:
Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial, or industrial enterprises or in labor through

the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or
highhanded method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers
damage."
Another Answer:
1.
No liability arises. The statement of the problem does not in any way suggest intent,
malice, or even knowledge, on the part of XYZ Corporation as to the contractual relations
between Albert and ABC Corporation.
III
Jaime, who is 65, and his son, Willy, who is 25, died in a plane crash. There is no proof as to
who died first. Jaimes only surviving heir is his wife, Julia, who is also Willys mother. Willy's
surviving heirs are his mother, Julia and his wife, Wilma.
1. In the settlement of Jaimes estate, can Wilma successfully claim that her late husband,
Willy had a hereditary share since he was much younger than his father and, therefore, should be
presumed to have survived longer? [3%]
2. Suppose Jaime had a life insurance policy with his wife, Julia, and his son, Willy, as the
beneficiaries. Can Wilma successfully claim that one-half of the proceeds should belong to
Willys estate? [2%]
Answer;
1.
No, Wilma cannot successfully claim that Willy had a hereditary share in his father's
estate. Under Art. 43, Civil Code, two persons who are celled to succeed each other" are
presumed to have died at the same time, in the absence of proof as to which of them died first.
This presumption of simultaneous death applies in cases involving the question of succession as
between the two who died, who in this case are mutual heirs, being father and son.
Answer:
1. Yes, Wilma can invoke the presumption of survivorship and claim that one-half of the
proceeds should belong to Willys estate, under Sec. 3 (jj) par. 5 Rule 131, Rules of Court, as the
dispute does not involve succession. Under this presumption, the person between the ages of 15
and 60 years is deemed to have survived one whose age was over 60 at the time of their deaths.
The estate of Willy endowed with juridical personality stands in place and stead of Willy, as
beneficiary.
IV
Using a falsified managers check. Justine, as the buyer, was able to take delivery of a
second hand car which she had Just bought from United Car Sales, Inc. The sale was registered
with the Land Transportation Office. A week later, the seller learned that the check had been
dishonored, but by that time, Justine was nowhere to be seen. It turned out that Justine had sold
the car to Jerico, the present possessor who knew nothing about the falsified check. In a suit by
United Car Sales, Inc. against Jerico for recovery of the car. plaintiff alleges it had been
unlawfully deprived of its property through fraud and should, consequently, be allowed to
recover it without having to reimburse the defendant for the price the latter had paid. Should
the suit prosper? (5%)
Answer
The suit should prosper as to the recovery of the car. However, since Jerico was not guilty of
any fraud and appears to be an Innocent purchaser for value, he should be reimbursed for the
price he paid. This Is without prejudice to United Car Sales, Inc. right of action against Justine. As
between two innocent parties, the party causing the Injury should suffer the loss. Therefore,
United Car Sales, Inc. should suffer the loss.
Alternati v e Answer:
Yes, the suit will prosper because the criminal act of estafa should be deemed to come
within the meaning of unlawful deprivation under Art. 559, Civil Code, as without it plaintiff
would not have parted with the possession of its car.
Another Answer:
No, the suit will not prosper. The sale is valid and Jerico is a buyer in good faith.
Another Answer:
Under the law on Sales, when the thing sold is delivered by the seller to the buyer without
reservation of ownership, the ownership is transferred to the buyer. Therefore in the suit of
United Car Sales, Inc. against Jerico for the recovery of the car, the plaintiff should not be allowed
to recover the car without reimbursing the defendant for the price that the latter paid. (EDCA
Publishing and Distributing Corp. vs. Santos. 184 SCRA 614, April 26, 1990)
V
In 1973, Mauricio, a Filipino pensioner of the U.S. Government, contracted a bigamous
marriage with Erlinda, despite the fact that his first wife, Carol, was still living. In 1975, Mauricio
and Erlinda jointly bought a parcel of riceland, with the title being placed jointly in their names.
Shortly thereafter, they purchased another property (a house and lot) which was placed in her
name alone as the buyer. In 1981. Mauricio died, and Carol promptly filed an action against
Erlinda to recover both the riceland and the house and lot. claiming them to be conjugal property
of the first marriage. Erlinda contends that she and the late Mauricio were co- owners of the
riceland; and with respect to the house and lot. she claims she is the exclusive owner. Assuming
she fails to prove that she had actually used her own money in either purchase, how do you
decide the case? [5%)
Answer:
Carol's action to recover both the riceland and the house and lot is well-founded. Both are
conjugal property, in view of the failure of Erlinda, the wife in a bigamous marriage, to prove that
her own money was used in the purchases made. The Supreme Court in a case applied Art. 148,
Family Code, despite the fact that the husband's death took place prior to the effectivity of said
law. However, even under Art. 144, Civil Code, the same conclusion would have been reached in
view of the bigamous nature of the second marriage.
Another Answer:
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which applies to bigamous marriages, only the
properties acquired by both parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or
industry shall be owned by them in common In proportion to their respective contributions.
Moreover, if one of the parties is validly married to another, his share in the co-ownership shall
accrue to the absolute community/conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage.
Thus, in this case, since Erlinda failed to prove that she used her own money to buy the
riceland and house and lot, she cannot claim to be the co-owner of the riceland nor the
exclusive owner of the house and lot. Such properties are Mauriclo's. And since his share accrues
to the conjugal partnership with Carol, Carol can validly claim such properties to the exclusion
of Erlinda. (Art. 144, Civil Code).
VI.
In 1970. Bob and Issa got married without executing a marriage settlement. In 1975, Bob
Inherited from his father a residential lot upon which, in 1981, he constructed a two- room
bungalow with savings from his own earnings. At that time, the lot was worth P800.000.00 while
the house, when finished cost P600.000.00. In 1989, Bob died, survived only by his wife, Issa and
his mother, Sofia. Assuming that the relative values of both assets remained at the same proportion:
State whether Sofia can rightfully claim that the house and lot are not conjugal
but exclusive property of her deceased son. {3%}
1.
2.
Will your answer be the same if Bob died before August 3, 1988? [2%]
The original name printed in the question appears as "Issa". however, it was corrected to read
as Sofia, which correction was announced in all the examination rooms.
Another Answer:
1. Since Bob and Sofia got married in 1970, then the law that governs is the New Civil Code
(Persons), in which case, the property relations that should be applied at regards the property of
the spouses is the system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains (Article 1.19,
Civil Code). By conjugal partnership of gains, the husband and the wife place in a common fund
the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or industry (Article 142, Civil
Code). In this instance, the lot inherited by Bob in 1975 is his own separate property, he having
acquired the same by lucrative title (par. 2, Art. 148, Civ1! Code). However, the house
constructed fro... his own savings in 1981 during the subsistence of his marriage with Issa is
conjugal property and not exclusive property in accordance with the principle of reverse
accession provided for in Art. 158, Civil Code.
Another Answer:
1. Sofia, being her deceased son's legal heir concurring with his surviving spouse (Arts. 985,
986 and 997, Civil Code), may rightfully claim that the house and lot are not conjugal but belong
to the hereditary estate of Bob. the value of the land being more than the cost of the
improvement (Art. 120, Family Code).
Answer:
Yes, the answer would still be the same. Since Bob and Issa contracted their marriage way
back in 1970, then the property relations that will govern is still the relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains (Article 119, Civil Code). It will not matter if Bob died before or
after August 3, 1988 (effectivity date of the Family Code), what matters is the date when the
marriage was contracted. As Bob and Issa contracted their marriage way back in 1970, the
property relation that governs them is still the conjugal partnership of gains. (Art. 158, Civil
Code)
2.
Another Answer:
2. If Bob died before August 3. 1988, which is the date the Family Code took effect, the
answer will not be the same. Art. 158, Civil Code, would then apply. The land would then be
deemed conjugal, along with the house, since conjugal funds were used In constructing it. The
husband's estate would be entitled to a reimbursement of the value of the land from conjugal
partnership funds.
VII
Juan and his sister Juana inherited from their mother two parcels of farmland with exactly
the same areas. For convenience, the Torrens certificates of title covering both lots were placed
in Juans name alone. In 1996, Juan sold to an innocent purchaser one parcel in its entirety
without the knowledge and consent of Juana, and wrongfully kept for himself the entire price
paid.
1.
What rights of action, if any, does Juana have against and/or the buyer? (3%]
2. Since the two lots have the same area, suppose Juana files a complaint to have herself
declared sole'-owner of the entire remaining second lot. contending that her brother had
forfeited his share thereof by wrongfully disposing of her undivided share in the first lot, will the
suit prosper? (2%)
1. When, for convenience, the Toxrens title to the two parcels of land were placed in
Juan's name alone, there was created an implied trust (a resulting trust) for the benefit of Juana
with Juan as trustee of one-half undivided or ideal portion of each of the two lots. Therefore,
Juana can file an action for damages against Juan for having fraudulently sold one of'the two
parcels which he partly held in trust for Juana's benefit. Juana may claim actual or compensatory
damage for the loss of her share in the land; moral damages for the mental anguish, anxiety,
moral shock and wounded feelings she had suffered; exemplary damage fey way of example for
the common good, and attorneys fees.
Juana has no cause of action against the buyer who acquired the land for value and in good faith,
relying on the transfer certificate of title showing that Juan is the registered owner of the land.
Another Answer:
1.
Under Article 476 of the Civil Code, Juana can file an action for quieting of title as
there is a cloud in the title to the subject real property. Second, Juana can also file an action for
damages against Juan, because the settled rule is that the proper recourse of the true owner of
the property who was prejudiced and fraudulently dispossessed of the same is to bring an action
for damages against those who caused or employed the same. Third, since Juana had the right to
her share in the property by way of Inheritance, she can demand the partition of the thing owned
in common, under Article 494 of the Civil Code, and ask that the title to the remaining property
be declared as ezclusively hers.
However, since the farmland was sold to an innocent purchaser for value, then Juana has no
cause of action against the buyer consistent with the established rule that the rights of an
innocent purchaser for value must be respected and protected notwithstanding the fraud
employed by the seller in securing his title. (Eduorte vs. CA, 253 SCRA 391)
Additional Answer:
1.
Juana has the right of action to recover (a) her one-half share in the proceeds of the
sale with legal interest thereof, and (b) such damages as she maybe able to prove as having been
suffered by her, which may include actual or compensatory damages as well as moral and
exemplary damages due to the breach of trust and bad faith (Imperial vs. CA, 259 SCRA65). Of
course, if the buyer knew of the co-ownership over the lot he was buying, Juana can seek (c)
reconvenyance of her one-half share instead but she must implead the buyer as codefendant and
allege his bad faith in purchasing the entire lot. Finally, consistent with the ruling in Imperial vs.
CA, Juana may seek instead (d) a declaration that she is now the sole owner of the entire
remaining lot on the theory that Juan has forfeited his one-half share therein.
Additional Answer:
1. Juana can file an action for damages against Juan for having fraudulently sold one of the
two parcels which he partly held in trust for Juana's benefit. Juana may claim actual or
compensatory damage for the loss of her share in the land; moral damages for the mental anguish,
anxiety, moral shock and wounded feelings she had suffered; exemplary damage by way of
example for the common good, and attorney's fees.
Juana has no cause of action against the buyer who acquired the land for value and in good
faith, relying on the transfer certificate showing that Juan is the registered owner of the land.
Answer:
Juana's suit to have herself declared as sole owner of the entire remaining area will not
prosper because while Juan's act in selling the other lot was wrongful, it did not have the legal
effect of forfeiting his share In the remaining lot. However, Juana can file an action against Juan
for partition or termination of the co-ownership with a prayer that the lot sold be adjudicated to
Juan, and the remaining lot be adjudicated and reconveyed to her.
1.
Another Answen
2.
The suit will prosper, applying the ruling in Imperial vs. CA cited above. Both law and
equity authorize such a result, said the Supreme Court.
Strictly speaking, Juana's contention that her brother had forfeited his share in the second
lot is incorrect. Even if the two lots have the same area, it does not follow that they have the same
value. Since the sale of the first lot on the Torrens title in the name of Juan was valid, all that
Juana may recover is the value of her undivided interest therein, plus damages. In addition, she
can ask for partition or reconveyance of her undivided interest in the second lot, without
prejudice to any agreement between them that in lieu of the payment of the value of Juana's
share in the first lot and damages, the second lot be reconveyed to her.
Alternative Answer:
2.
The suit will not prosper, since Juan's wrongful act of pocketing the entire proceeds of
the sale of the first lot is not a ground for divesting him of his rights as a co- owner of the second
lot. Indeed, such wrongdoing by Juan does not constitute, for the benefit of Juana, any of the
modes of acquiring ownership under Art. 712, Civil Code.
VIII
On July 27, 1997, Pedro mailed in Manila a letter to his brother, Jose, a resident of Iloilo
City, offering to donate a vintage sports car which the latter had long been wanting to buy from
the former. On August 5, 1997, Jose called Pedro by cellular phone to thank him for his
generosity and to inform him that he was sending by mail his letter of acceptance. Pedro never
received that letter because it was never mailed. OnAugust 14. 1997, Pedro received a telegram
from Iloilo informing him that Jose had been killed in a road accident the day before (August 13,
1997)
1.
Is there a perfected donation? (2%]
Will your answer be the same if Jose did mail his acceptance letter but it was received by
Pedro in Manila days after Joses death? [3%)
2.
Answer
1.
None. There is no perfected donation. Under Article 748 of the Civil Code, the
donation of a movable may be made orally or in writing. If the value of the personal property
donated exceeds five thousand pesos, the donation and the acceptance shall be made in writing.
Assuming that the value of the thing donated, a vintage sports car, exceeds P5.000.00, then the
donation and the acceptance must be in writing. In this instance, the acceptance of Jose was not
in writing, therefore, the donation is void. Upon the other hand, assuming that the sports car
costs less than P5.000.00, then the donation may be oral, but still, the simultaneous delivery of
the car is needed and there being none, the donation was never perfected.
Answer
1.
Yes, the answer is the same. If Jose's mail containing his acceptance of the donation
was received by Pedro after the former's death, then the donation Is still void because under
Article 734 of the Civil Code, the donation is perfected the moment the donor knows of the
acceptance by the donee. The death of Jose before Pedro could receive the acceptance
indicates that the donation was never perfected. Under Article 746 acceptance must be made
during the lifetime of both the donor and the donee.
IX.
Ernesto donated in a public instrument a parcel of land to Demetrio. who accepted it in the
same document. It Is there declared that the donation shall take effect immediately, with the
donee having the right to take possession of the land and receive its fruits but not to dispose of
the land while Emesto is alive as well as for ten years following his death. Moreover. Emesto also
reserved In the same deed his right to sell the property should he decide to dispose of it at any
time - a right which he did not exercise at all. After his death, Ernestos heirs seasonably brought
an action to recover the property, alleging that the donation was void as it did not comply with
the formalities of a will. Will the suit prosper? [5%]
Answer:
Yes, the suit will prosper as the donation did not comply with the formalities of a will. In this
instance, the fact that the donor did not intend to transfer ownership or possession of the
donated property to the donee until the donor's death, would result in a donation mortis causa
and in this kind of disposition, the formalities of a will should be complied with, otherwise, the
donation is void. In this instance, donation mortis causa embodied only in a public instrument
without the formalities of a will could not have transferred ownership of disputed property to
another.
Alternative Answer:
One of the essential distinctions between a donation inter tdvos and a donation mortis causa is
that while the former is irrevocable, the latter is revocable. In the problem given, all the clauses
or conditions mentioned in the deed of donation, except one, are consistent with the rule of
Irrevocability and would have sustained the view that the donation is inter vivos and therefore
valid. The lone exception is the clause which reserves the donor's right to sell the property at any
time before his death. Such a reservation has been held tp render the donation revocable and,
therefore, becomes a donation mortis causa (Puig vs. Penaflorida, 15 SCRA 276, at p. 286). That
the right was not exercised is immaterial; its reservation was an implied recognition of the
donor's power to nullify the donation anytime he wished to do so. Consequently, it should have
been embodied in a last will and testament. The suit for nullity will thus prosper.
X.
In a 20-year lease contract over a building, the lessee is expressly granted a right of first
refusal should the lessor decide to sell both the land and building. However, the lessor sold the
property to a third person who knew about the lease and in fact agreed fo respect it.
Consequently, the lessee brings an action against both the lessor-seller and the buyer
(a) to rescind the sale and (b) to compel specific performance of his right of first refusal in the
sense that the lessor should be ordered to execute a deed of absolute sale in.favor of the lessee at
the same price. The defendants contend that the plaintiff can neither seek rescission of the sale
nor compel specific performance of a mere" right of first refusal. Decide the case. [5%1
Answer:
The action filed by the lessee, for both rescission of the offending sale and specific
performance of the right of first refusal which was violated, should prosper. The ruling fn
Equatorial Realty Development, Inc. vs. Mayfair Theater, Inc. (264 SCRA 483). a case with similar
facts, sustains both rights of action because the buyer in the subsequent sale knew the existence
of right of first refusal, hence in bad faith.
Another Answer:
The action to rescind the sale and to compel the right to first refusal will not prosper. (Any
Yu Asuncion vs. CA, 238 SCRA 602). The Court ruled in a unanimous en banc decision that the
right of first refusal is not founded upon contract but on a quasi-delictual relationship covered by
the principles of human relations and unjust enrichment (Art. 19, et seq. Civil Code). Hence the
only action that will prosper according to the Supreme Court is an "action for damages in a
proper forum for the purpose."
XI.
Tessie died survived by her husband Mario, and two nieces. Michelle and Jorelle, who are
the legitimate children of an elder sister who had predeceased her. The only property she left
behind was a house and lot worth two million pesos, which Tessie and her husband had acquired
with the use of Marios savings from his income as a doctor. How much of the property or its
value, if any, may Michelle and Jorelle claim as their hereditary shares? [5%]
Answer:
Article 1001 of the Civil Code provides, Should brothers and sisters or their children
survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half f the inheritance
and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half."
Tessie's gross estate consists of a house and lot acquired during her marriage, making it
part of the community property. Thus, one-half of the said property would have to be set aside
as Mario's conjugal share from the community property. The other half, amounting to one
million pesos, is her conjugal share (net estate), and should be distributed to her intestate heirs.
Applying the above provision of law, Michelle and Jorelle, Tessie's nieces, are entitled to onehalf of her conjugal share worth one million pesos, or 500,000 pesos, while the other one-half
amounting to P500.000 will go to Mario, Tessie's surviving spouse. Michelle and Jorelle are then
entitled to P250.000 pesos each as their hereditary share.
XII
Enrique died, leaving a net hereditary estate of PI.2 million. He is survived by his widow,
three legitimate children, two legitimate grandchildren sired by a legitimate child who
predeceased him, and two recognized illegitimate children. Distribute the estate in intestacy.
[5%]
ANSWER:
Under the theory of Concurrence, the shares are as follows:
A (legitimate child) = P200.000
B (legitimate child) = P200.000
C (legitimate child) = P200.000
D (legitimate child) = 0 (predeceased]
E (legitimate child of D) = P100.000 - by right of representation
F (legitimate child of D) P100.000 - by right of representation
G (illegitimate child) * PI00,000 - 1/2 share of a legitimate child
H (illegitimate child) = PI00,000 - 1/2 share of a legitimate child
W (Widow) = P200,000 - same share as legitimate child
ANOTHER ANSWER:
Under the theory of Exclusion the free portion (P300,000), is distributed only among the
legitimate children and is given to them in addition to their legitime. All other intestate heirs are
entitled only to their respective legitimes. The distribution is as follows:
Legitime
A (Legitimate child)
B (Legitimate child)
C (Legitimate child)
D (Legitimate child)
E (Legitimate child of D)
F (Legitimate Child of D)
G (Illegitimate Child)
H (Illegitimate Child)
W (Widow)
Free Portion
Total
P150,000 + P 75,000
= P225,000
P150,000 + P150,000
= P225,000
P150,000 + P 75,000
= P225,000
0 +
0
=
0
P 75,000 + P 35,500
= P 112,000
P 75,000 + P 37,500 = P 112,500
P 75,000 + 0
= P 75,000
P 75,000 + 0
= P 75,000
P 150,000 + 0
= P 150,000
XIII.
A Galant driven by John and owned by Art, and a Corolla driven by its owner, Gina, collided
somewhere along Adrlatlco Street. As a result of the accident, Gina had a concussion.
Subsequently, Gina brought an action for damages against John and Art. There is no doubt that
the collision is due to Johns negligence. Can Art, who was in the vehicle at the time of the
accident, be held solidarlly liable with his driver. John? [5%]
ANSWER:
Yes. Art may be held solidary liable with John, if it was proven that the former could have
prevented the misfortune with the use of due diligence. Article 2184 of the Civil Code states: In
motor mishaps, the owner is solidary liable with his driver, if the former, who was in the vehicle,
could have, by the use of due diligence, prevented the misfortune, x x x"
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
1.
It depends. The Supreme Court In Chapman us. Underwood (27 Phil 374), held: An
owner who sits in his automobile, or other vehicle, and permits his driver to continue in a
violation of law by the performance of negligent acts, after he has had a reasonable opportunity
to observe them and to direct that the driver cease therefrom, becomes himself responsible for
such acts, x x x On the other hand, if the driver, by a sudden act of negligence, and without the
owner having a reasonable opportunity to prevent the act or its continuance, injures a person or
violates the criminal law, the owner of the automobile, although present therein at the time the
act was committed is not responsible, either civilly or criminally, therefor. The act complained of
must be continued in the presence of the owner for such a length of time that the owner, by his
acquiescence, makes his drivers act hie own."
XIV.
1. Define compensation as a mode of extinguishing an obligation, and distinguish it from
payment. [2%]
2.
X, who has a savings deposit with Y Bank In the sum of P1.000.000.00. incurs a loan
obligation with the said Bank in the sum of P800.000.00 which has become due. When X tries to
withdraw his deposit. Y Bank allows only P200.000.00 to be withdrawn, less service charges,
claiming that compensation has extinguished its obligation under the savings account to the
concurrent amount of Xs debt. X contends that compensation is improper when one of the debts,
as here, arises from a contract of deposit. Assuming that the promissory note signed by X to
evidence the loan does not provide for compensation between said loan and his savings deposit,
who is correct? 13%}
ANSWER:
1. Compensation is a mode of extinguishing to the concurrent amount, the obligations of
those persons who In their own right are reciprocally debtors and creditors of each other
(Tolentino, 1991 ed.,p. 365, citing 2 Castan 560 and Francia vs. LAC, 162 SCRA 753). It involves
the simultaneous balancing of two obligations in order to extinguish them to the extent in which
the amount of one is covered by that of the other. (De Leon, 1992 ed., p. 221, citing 6 Manresa
401).
Payment means not only delivery of money but also performance of an obligation (Article
1232, Civil Code). In payment, capacity to dispose of the thing paid and capacity to receive
payment are required for debtor and creditor, respectively: in compensation, such capacity is not
necessary, because the compensation operates by law and not by the act of the parties. In
payment, the performance must be complete; while in compensation there may be partial
extinguishment of an obligation (Tolentino. supra)
ANSWER:
Y bank is correct. Art. 1287, Civil Code, does not apply. All the requisites of Art. 1279, Civil Code
are present. In the case of Gullas vs. PNB (62 Phil. 519), the Supreme Court held: The Civil Code
contains provisions regarding compensation (set off) and deposit. These portions of Philippine
law provide that compensation shall take place when two persons are reciprocally creditor and
debtor of each other. In this connection, it has been held that the relation existing between a
depositor and a bank is that of creditor.and debtor, x x x As a general rule, a bank has a right of
set off of the deposits in its hands for the payment of any indebtedness to it on the part of a
depositor." Hence, compensation took place between the mutual obligations of X and Y bank.
XV
Joey. Jovy and Jojo are solidary debtors under a loan obligation of P300.000.00 which has
fallen due. The creditor has. however, condoned Jojos entire share in the debt. Since Jovy has
become insolvent, the creditor makes a demand on Joey to pay the debt.
How much, if any. may Joey be compelled to pay? [2%]
1.
2.
payment? (3%)
To what extent, if at all. can Jojo be compelled by Joey to contribute to such
ANSWER
1.
Joey can be compelled to pay only the remaining balance of P200.000, in view of
the remission of Jojo's share by the creditor. (Art. 1219, Civil Code)
ANSWER:
Jojo can be compelled by Joey to contribute P50,000. Art. 1217, par. 3, Civil Code
provides, "When one of the solidary debtors cannot, because of his insolvency, reimburse his
share to the debtor paying the obligation, such share shall be borne by all his co-debtors, in
proportion to the debt of each."
2.
Since the Insolvent debtor's share which Joey paid was P100,000, and there are only two
remaining debtors - namely Joey and Jojo - these two shall share equally the burden of
reimbursement. Jojo may thus be compelled by Joey to contribute P50,000.00.
XVI.
Distinguish between:
1.
Continuous and discontinuous easements; [2%J
2.
Apparent and non-apparent easements; and [2%]
3.
Positive and negative easements. (1%)
Answer:
1. Continuous easements are those the use of which is or maybe Incessant, without the
Intervention of any act of man, while discontinuous easements are those which are used at
Intervals and depend upon the acts of man. (Art. 615, Civil Code)
Answers
2. Apparent easements are those which are made known and are continually kept in view by
external signs that reveal the use and enjoyment of the same, while nonapparent easements are
those which show no external indication of their existence. (Art. 615, Civil Code)
Answer;
3. Positive easements are those which impose upon the owner of the servient estate the
obligation of allowing something to be done or of doing it himself, while negative easements are
those which prohibit the owner of the servient estate from doing something which he could
lawfully do if the easement did not exist. (Art. 615, Civil Code)
XVII
Dielle, Karlo and Una are general partners in a merchandising firm. Having contributed
equal amounts to the capital, they also agree on equal distribution of whatever net profit is
realized per fiscal period. After two years of operation. however, Una conveys her whole interest
in the partnership to Justine, without the knowledge and consent of Dielle and Kaflo.
1. Is the partnership dissolved? [2%j
2. What are the rights of Justine, if any, should she desire to participate in the management
of the partnership and in the distribution of a net profit of P360.000.00 which was realized after
her purchase of Unas interest? [3%]
ANSWER:
1. No, a conveyance* by a partner of his whole interest in a partnership does not of itself
dissolve the partnership In the absence of an agreement. (Art. 1813, Civil Code)
Answer:
2. Justine cannot interfere or participate in the management or administration of the
partnership business or affairs. She may. however, receive the net profits to which Una would
have otherwise been entitled. In this case, P120,000 (Art. 1813, Civil Code)
XVIII.
1. Distinguish usufruct from commodatum and state whether these may be constituted over
consumable goods. [2%]
2. Distinguish consensual from real contracts and name at least four (4) kinds of real
contracts under the present law. (3%)
Answer:
1. Usufruct is a right given to a person (usufructuary) to enjoy the property of another with
the obligation of preserving its form and substance. (Art. 562, Civil Code)
On the other hand, commodatum is a contract by which one of the parties (bailor) delivers to
another (bailee) something not consumable so that the latter may use it for a certain time and
return it.
in usufruct the usufructuary gets the right to the use and to the fruits of the same, while in
commodatum, the bailee only acquires the use of the thing loaned but not its fruits.
Usufruct may be constituted on the whole or a part of the fruits of the thing. (Art. 564, Civil
Code). It may even be constituted over consumables like money (Altman v. Veloso, 52 Phil. 545).
On the other hand, in commodatum, consumable goods maybe subject thereof only when the
purpose of the contract is not the consumption of the object, as when it is merely for exhibition.
(Art. 1936, Civil Code)
Another Answer:
1. There are several points of distinction between usufruct and commodatum. Usufruct is
constituted by law, by contract, by testamentary succession, or by prescription (Art. 1933, Civil
Code). Usufruct creates a real right to the fruits of another's property, while commodatum
creates only a purely personal right to use another's property, and requires a stipulation to enable
the bailee to make use of the fruits (Arts. 1939 & 1940, Civil Code). Usufruct may be onerous
while commodatum is always or essentially gratuitous (Arts. 1933 &: 1935, Civil Code). The
contract constituting usufruct is consensual, while commodatum is a real contract (perfected only
by delivery of the subject matter thereof). However, both involve the enjoyment by a person of
the property of another, differing only as to the extent and scope of such enjoyment [jus jruendi
in one and jus utendi in the other); both may have as subject matter either an immovable or a
movable; and, both may be constituted over consumable goods (Arts. 574 & 1936, Civil Code).
A consumable thing may be the subject-matter of an abnormal usufruct but in a normal
usufruct, the subject- matter maybe used only for exhibition. A commodatum of a consumable
thing may be only for the purpose of exhibiting, not consuming it.
ANSWER:
2. Consensual contracts are those which are perfected by mere consent (Art. 1315, Civil
Code). Real contracts are those which are perfected by the delivery of the object of the
obligation. (Art. 1316, Civil Code)
Examples of real contracts are deposit, pledge, commodatum and simple loan (mutuum).
XIX.
Section 70 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. concerning adverse claims on registered land,
provides a 30-day period of effectivity of an adverse claim, counted from the date of its
registration. Suppose a notice of adverse claim based upon a contract to sell was registered on
March 1, 1997 at the instance of the BUYER but on June 1, 1997, or after the lapse of the 30-day
period, a notice of levy on execution in favor of a JUDGMENT CREDITOR was also registered to
enforce a final Judgment for money against the registered owner. Then, on June 15. 1997 there
having been no formal cancellation of his notice of adverse claim, the BUYER pays to the sellerowner the agreed purchase price in full and registers the corresponding deed of sale. Because
the annotation of the notice of levy is carried over to the new title in his name, the BUYER brings
an action against the JUDGMENT CREDITOR to cancel such annotation, but the latter claims
that his lien is superior because it was annotated after the adverse claim of the BUYER had ipso
facto ceased to be effective. Will the suit prosper? [5%1
Answer:
The suit will prosper. While an adverse claim duly annotated at the back of a title under
Section 70 of P.D. 1529 is good only for 30 days, cancellation thereof is still necessary to render
it ineffective, otherwise, the inscription thereof will remain annotated as a lien on the property.
While the life of adverse claim is 30 days under P.D. 1529, it continuous to be effective until it is
canceled by formal petition filed with the Register of Deeds.
The cancellation of the notice of levy is justified under Section 108 of P.D. 1529 considering
that the levy on execution can not be enforced against the buyer whose adverse claim against
the registered owner was recorded ahead of the notice of levy on execution.
XX
In 1965, Renren bought from Robyn a parcel of registered land evidenced by a duly
executed deed of sale. The owner presented the deed of sale and the owners certificate of title
to the Register of Deeds. The entry was made in the day book and corresponding fees were paid
as evidenced by official receipt. However, no transfer of certificate of title was issued to Renren
because the original certificate of title in Robyns name was temporarily misplaced after fire
partly gutted the Office of the Register of Deeds. Meanwhile, the land had been possessed by
Robyns distant cousin. Mikaelo, openly, adversely and continuously in the concept of owner since
1960. It was only in April 1998 that Renren sued Mikaelo to recover possession. Mikaelo invoked
a) acquisitive prescription and b) laches, asking that he be declared owner of the land. Decide the
case by evaluating these defenses. 15%)
Answer:
a) Renren's action to recover possession of the land will prosper. In 1965, after buying the
land from Robyn, he submitted the Deed of Sale to the Registry of Deeds for registration
together with the owners duplicate copy of the title, and paid the corresponding registration
fees. Under Section 56 of P.D. No. 1529, the Deed of Sale to Renren is considered registered
from the time the sale was entered in the Day Book (now called the Primary Entry Booh).
For all legal Intents and purposes, Renren is considered the registered owner of the
land. After all, it was not his fault that the Registry of Deeds could not issue the corresponding
transfer certificate of title.
Mikaelo's defense of prescription can not be sustained. A Torrens title is
Imprescriptible. No title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall
be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. (Section 47. P.D. No. 1529)
The right to recover possession of registered land likewise does not prescribe because
possession is Just a necessary incident of ownership.
b) Mikaelo's defense of laches, however, appears to be more sustainable. Renren bought the
land and had the sale registered way back in 1965. From the facts, it appears that it was only in
1998 or after an inexplicable delay of 33 years that he took the first step asserting his right to the
land. It was not even an action to recover ownership but only possession of the land. By ordinary
standards, 33 years of neglect or inaction is too long and maybe considered unreasonable. As
often held by the Supreme Court, the principle of Imprescriptibility sometimes has to yield to the
equitable principle of laches which can convert even a registered land owner's Maim into a stale
demand.
Mikaelo's claim of laches, however, is weak insofar as the element of equity is concerned,
there being no showing in the facts how he entered into the ownership and possession of the
land.
-end1997 BAR EXAMINATION
Question No. 1:
How would you compare the Civil Law system In Its governance and trend with that of the
Common Law system?
Answer:
As regards "governance":
Governance in Civil Law is codal. statutory and written law. It is additionally derived from
case law. Common law is basically derived from case law.
As regards "trend":
Civil law is now tending to rely more and more on decisions of the courts explaining the laws.
Common law is now codifying laws more and more. So they are now merging towards similar
systems.
Additional Answers:
1. Common law refers to the traditional part of the law as distinct from legislation: it refers
to the universal part of law as distinct from particular local customs (Encyclopedia Americana,
Vol. 7).
On the other hand, civil law is understood to be that branch of law governing the
relationship of persons in respect of their personal and private interests as distinguished from
both public and international laws.
In common law countries, the traditional responsibility has for the most part been with the
Judges; in civil law countries, the task is primarily reposed on the lawmakers. Contemporary
practices, however, so indicate a trend towards centralizing that function to professional groups
that may. indeed, see the gradual assimilation in time of both systems. (Vltug, Civil Law and
Jurisprudence. p. XX]
In Civil Law. the statutes theoretically take precedence over court decisions interpreting them;
while in Common Law. the court decisions resolving specific cases are regarded as law rather
than the statutes themselves which are, at the start, merely embodiments of case law. Civil Law is
code law or written law. while Common Law is case law. Civil Law adopts the deductive method from the general to the particular, while the Common Law uses the inductive approach - from the
particular to the general. Common Law relies on equity. Civil Law anchors itself on the letter of
the law. The civilists are for the judge-proof law even as the Common Law is judge-made law.
Civil Law judges are merely supposed to apply laws and not interpret them.
Question No. 2:
In 1977. Mario and Clara, both Filipino citizens, were married in the Philippines. Three years
later, they went to the United States of America and established their residence in San Francisco,
California. In 1987, the couple applied for, and were granted. U.S. citizenship. In 1989, Mario,
claiming to have been abandoned by Clara, was able to secure a decree of divorce in Reno,
Nevada. U.S.A.
life.
In 1990, Mario returned to the Philippines and married Juana who knew well Mario's past
(a)
(b)
Is the marriage between Mario and Juana valid?

Would the renvoi doctrine have any relevance to the case?
Answer:
(a)
Yes. In relation to Art. 15 of the Civil Code, Conflict of Laws provides that the
recognition of an absolute divorce granted in another State rests on the citizenship of the parties
at the time the divorce was granted (Paras, PhiL Conflict of Laws. p. 259). Applied in this case, the
divorce decree issued to Clara and Mario will be recognized as valid here considering that at the
time the foreign decree was granted, both Clara and Mario are citizens of the U.S_A., a country
which grants/allows absolute divorce. Since the marriage between Mario and Clara has been
validly terminated, Mario and Juana can freely marry each other.
(b)
No. The renvoi doctrine is relevant in cases where one country applies the
domiciliary theory and the other the nationality theory, and the issue involved is which of the laws
of the two countries should apply to determine the order of succession, the amount of
successional rights, or, the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions. Such issue is not involved
in this case.
Alternative Answer:
Yes. "Renvoi" - which means "referring back" is relevant because here, we are applying U.S.
law to Mario, being already its citizen, although the formalities of the second marriage will be
governed by Philippine law under the principle of lex loci celebrationis.
Question No. 3:
In the context that the term is used in Civil Law, state the (a) concept, fb) requisites and (c)
consequences of a prejudicial question.
Answer:
Concept
(a)
A prejudicial question is one which must be decided first before a criminal action may be
instituted or may proceed because a decision therein is vital to the Judgement in the criminal
case. In thecase of People vs. AdeloAragonl L-5930, Feb. 17, 1954), the Supreme Court defined it
as one which arises in a case, the resolution of which question is a logical antecedent of the issues
involved in said case and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal (Paras. Vol. 1, Civil
Code Annotation, 1989 ed. p. 194).
Requisites
(b)
1.
The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court.
2.
Jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal.
Additional Answer:
The civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the criminal action, and
the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may
proceed.
1.
2.
(c)
Consequences
The criminal case must be suspended. Thus, in a criminal case for damages to one's
property, a civil action that involves the ownership of said property should first be resolved [Dc
Leon vs. Mabanag, 38 Phil. 202)
Question No. 4.
Luis and Rizza, both 26 years of age and single, live exclusively with each other as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage. Luis is gainfully employed. Rizza is not employed, stays
at home, and takes charge of the household chores.
After living together for a little over twenty years, Luis was able to save from his salary
earnings during that period the amount of P200.000.00 presently deposited in a bank. A house
and lot worth P500,000.00 was recently purchased for the same amount by the couple. Of the
P500.000.00 used by the common-law spouses to purchase the property, P200.000.00 had come
from the sale of palay harvested from the hacienda owned by Luis and P300.000.00 from the
rentals of a building belonging to Rizza. In fine, the sum of P500.000.00 had been part of the
fruits received during the period of cohabitation from their separate property. A car worth P
100,000.00, being used by the common-law spouses, was donated just months ago to Rizza by
her parents.
Luis and Rizza now decide to terminate their cohabitation, and they ask you to give them
your legal advice on the following:
(a)
How. under the law, should the bank deposit of P200.000.00, the house and lot
valued at P500.000.00 and the car worth P 100.000.00 be allocated to them?
(b)
What would your answer be (to the above question) had Luis and Rizza been
living together all the time, Le.. since twenty years ago, under a valid marriage?
ANSWER:
Art. 147 of the Family Code1 provides In part that when a man and a woman who are
capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband and wife without
the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by
them In equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry
shall be governed by the rules of co- ownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall
be presumed to have been obtained by their Joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned
by them In equal shares. A party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of
any property shall be deemed to have contributed Jointly in the acquisition thereof if the
formeris efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the household.
Thus:
1)
2)
3)
the wages and salaries of Luis in the amount of P200,000.00 shall be divided
equally between Luis and Rizza.
the house and lot valued at P500.000.00 having been acquired by both of them
through work or industiy shall be divided between them in proportion to their
respective contribution, in consonance with the rules on co-ownership. Hence, Luis
gets 2\5 while Rizza gels 3\5 oi P500.000.00.
the car worth P100,000.00 shall be exclusively owned by Rizza. the same having
been donated to her by her parents.
The property relations between Luis and Rizza, their marriage having been celebrated 20 years
ago (under the Civil Code) shall be governed by the conjugal partnership of gains, underwhich
the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds, products, fruits and Income from
their separate properties and those acquired by either or both spouses through their efforts or by
chance, and upon dissolution of I he marriage or of the partnership, the net gains or benefits
obtained by either or both spouse shall be divided equally between them (Art. 142, Civil Code).
Thus:
1)
The salary of Luis deposited in the bank in the amount of P200.000.00 and the
house and lot valued at P500.000.00 shall be divided equally between Luis and
Rizza.
2)
However, the car worth P 100.000.00 donated to Rizza by her parents shall be
considered
to
her
own
paraphernal
property,
having
been
acquiredbylucrativetitle(par.2,Art. 148, Civil Code).
Question No. 15:

Under what conditions, respectively, may drug addiction be a ground, if at all. (a) for a
declaration of nullity of marriage, (b) for an annulment of the marriage contract, and
(b) for legal separation between the spouses?
Answer:
1.
Declaration of nullity of marriage:

The drug addiction must amount to psychological incapacity to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage;
2.
It must be antecedent (existing at the time of marriage), grave and incurable;
3.
The case must be filed before August 1, 1998. Because if they got married before
August 3, 1998. it must be filed before August 1, 1998.
(a)
(b)
1.
2.
3.
4.
(c)
Annulment of the Marriage Contract:

The drug addiction must be concealed;
It must exist at the time of marriage:
There should be no cohabitation with full knowledge of the drug addiction;
The case is filed within five (5) years from discovery.
Legal Separation:
1.
2.
3.
There should be no condonation or consent to the drug addiction:

The action must be filed within five (5) years from the occurrence of the cause.
Drug addiction arises during the marriage and not at the time of marriage.
Question No. 16:

Pedro is the registered owner of a parcel of land situated in Malolos, Bulacan. In 1973, he
mortgaged the land to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) to secure a loan of P 100,000.00. For
Pedro's failure to pay the loan, the PNB foreclosed on the mortgage in 1980, and the land was
sold at public auction to PNB for being the highest bidder. PNB secured title thereto in 1987.
In the meanwhile, Pedro, who was still in possession of the land, constructed a warehouse on
the property. In 1988, the PNB sold the land to Pablo. The Deed of Sale was amended in 1989 to
include the warehouse.
Pedro, claiming ownership of the warehouse, files a complaint to annul the amended Deed
of Sale before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, where he resides, against both the PNB
and Pablo. The PNB filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for improper venue contending that
the warehouse is real property under Article 415(1} of the Civil Code and therefore the action
should have instead been filed in Malolos, Bulacan. Pedro claims otherwise. The question arose as
to whether the warehouse should be considered as real or as personal property.
If consulted, what would your legal advice be?
Answer:
The warehouse which is a construction adhered to the soil is an immovable by nature under
Art. 415 (1), and the proper venue of any case to recover ownership of the same, which is what the
purpose of the complaint to annul the amended Deed of Sale amounts to, should be the place
where the property is located, or the KTC of Bulacan.
Additional Answer:
Buildings are always immovable property, and even in the Instances where the
parties to a contract seem to have dealt with it separate and apart from the land on which it
stood in no wise does it change its character as immovable property. A building is an immovable
even if not erected by the owner of the land. The only criterion is union or incorporation with the
soil. [Ladera vs. Hodges (CA) 48 O.G. 4374) (Reyes andPuno, Outline of Philippine Civil Law. Vol.
2. p.7)
1.
2.
The warehouse built by Pedro on the mortgaged property is real property within
the context of Article 415 of the New Civil Code. Although it was built by Pedro after the
foreclosure sale without the knowledge and consent of the new owner which makes him a
builder in bad faith, this does not alter the character of the warehouse as a real property by
incorporation. It is a structure which cannot be removed without causing injury to the land. So,
my advice to Pedro is to file the case with the RTC of Bulacan, the situs of the property.
(Note: If the examinee does not mention that the
structure was built by a builder in bad faith, it should be given full credit).
Question No. 7:
Marcelino, a treasure hunter as Just a hobby, has found a map which appears to indicate the
location of hidden treasure. He has an idea of the land where the treasure might possibly be
found. Upon inquiry, Marcelino learns that the owner of the land, Leopoldo, is a permanent
resident of Canada. Nobody, however, could give him Leopoldo's exact address. Ultimately,
anyway, he enters the land and conducts a search. He succeeds.
Leopoldo. learning of Marcellno's "find", seeks to recover the treasure from Marcelino but the
latter is not willing to part with it. Falling to reach an agreement, Leopoldo sues Marcelino for
the recovery of the property. Marcelino contests the action.
How would you decide the case?
Answer:
I would decide in favor of Marcelino since he is considered a finder by chance of the hidden
treasure, hence, he is entitled to one-half (1/2) of the hidden treasure. While Marcelino may have
had the intention to look for the hidden treasure, still he is a finder by chance since it is enough
that he tried to look for it. By chance in the law does not mean sheer luck such that the finder
should have no intention at all to look for the treasure. By chance means good luck, implying that
one who intentionally looks for the treasure is embraced in the provision. The reason is that it is
extremely difficult to find hidden treasure without looking for it deliberately.
Marcelino is not a trespasser since there is no prohibition for him to enter the premises,
hence, he is entitled to half of the treasure.
Alternative Answers:
1. Marcelino did not find the treasure by chance because he had a map. he knew the
location of the hidden treasure and he intentionally looked for the treasure, hence, he is not
entitled to any part of the treasure.
2. Marcelino appears to be a trespasser and although there may be a question of whether he
found it by chance or not. as he has found the hidden treasure by means of a treasure map, he will
not be entitled to a finder's share. The hidden treasure shall belong to the owner.
The main rule is that hidden treasure belongs to the owner of the land, building or other
property on which it is found. If it is found by chance by a third person and he is not a trespasser,
he is entitled to one-half (1/2). If he is a trespasser, he loses everything.
3.
Question No. 8:
On 1 January 1980, Minerva, the owner of a building granted Petronila a usufruct over the
property until 01 June 1998 when Manuel, a son of Petronila, would have reached his 30th
birthday. Manuel, however, died on 1 June 1990 when he was only 26 years old.
Minerva notified Petronila that the usufruct had been extinguished by the death of Manuel
and demanded that the latter vacate the premises and deliver the same to the former.
Petronila refused to vacate the place on the ground that the usufruct in her favor would
expire only on 1 June 1998 when Manuel would have reached his 30th birthday and that the
death of Manuel before his 30th birthday did not extinguish the usufruct.
Whose contention should be accepted?
Answer:
Petronila's contention is correct. Under Article 606 of the Civil Code, a usufruct granted for
the time that may elapse before a third person reaches a certain age shall subsist for the number
of years specified even if the third person should die unless there is an express stipulation in the
contract that states otherwise. In the case at bar, there is no express stipulation that the
consideration for the usufruct is the existence of Petronila's son. Thus, the general rule and not
the exception should apply in this case.
Alternative Answer:
This is a usufruct which is clearly intended for the benefit of Manuel until he reaches 30 yrs.
of age, with Petronila serving only as a conduit, holding the property in trust for his benefit. The
death of Manuel at the age of 26, therefore, terminated the usufruct.
Question No. 9:
Distinguish between "possession" and "occupation" as these terms are commonly used
in Book II and Book III of the Civil Code.
(a)
(b) Are the effects of illegal and immoral conditions on simple donations the same as those
effects that would follow when such conditions are imposed on donations con causa onerosa?
Answer:
Possession is a real right, while occupation is one oi the original modes of acquiring
ownership and other real rights. Possession, the holding of a thing or the exercise of a right, does
not in itself constitute ownership. Whereas, occupation is a mode of acquiring ownership. There
can be possession without ownership.
(a)
Additional Answer:
Possession is the holding of a thing or the enjoyment of a right (Art. 532, CC). It can refer to
all kinds of property whether with or without an owner while occupation can take place only.with
respect to property without an owner (Articles 531 & 713). Occupation in itself, when proper,
confers ownership but possession does not by itself give rise to ownership.
Answer:
(b) No, they don't have the same effect. Illegal or impossible conditions in simple and
remuneratoiy donations shall be considered as not imposed. Hence the donation is valid. The
donation will be considered as simple or pure. The condition or mode is merely an accessory
disposition, and its nullity does not affect the donation, unless it clearly appears that the donor
would not have made the donation without the mode or condition.
Donations con causa onerosa is governed by law on obligations and contracts, under which
an impossible or illicit condition annuls the obligation dependent upon the condition where the
condition is positive and suspensive. If the impossible or illicit condition is negative, it is simply
considered as not written, and the obligation is converted into a pure and simple one. However,
in order that an illegal condition may annul a contract, the impossibility must exist at the time of
the creation of the obligation; a supervening impossibility does not affect the existence of the
obligation.
Additional Answer:
No. In simple or pure donation, only the illegal or impossible condition is considered not
written but the donation remains valid and becomes free from conditions. The condition or mode
being a mere accessory disposition, its nullity does not affect the donation unless it clearly
appears that the donor would not have made the donation without the mode or condition. On
the other hand, onerous donation is governed by the rules on contracts. Under Article 1183,
impossible or illegal conditions shall annul the obligation which depends upon them. In these
cases, both the obligation and the condition are void.
Question No. 10:
Johnny, with no known living relatives, executed a notarial will giving all his estate to his
sweetheart. One day. he had a serious altercation with his sweetheart. A few days later, he was
introduced to a charming lady who later became a dear friend. Soon after, he executed a
holographic will expressly revoking the notarial will and so designating his new friend as sole
heir. One day when he was clearing up his desk. Johnny mistakenly burned, along with other
papers, the only copy of his holographic will. His business associate, Eduardo, knew well the
contents of the will which was shown to him by Johnny the day it was executed. A few days after
the burning incident, Johnny died. Both wills were sought to be probated in two separate
petitions.
Will either or both petitions prosper?
Answer:
The probate of the notarial will will prosper. The holographic will cannot be admitted to
probate because a holographic will can only be probated upon evidence of the will itself unless
there is a photographic copy. But since the holographic will was lost and there was no other copy,
it cannot be probated and therefore the notarial will will be admitted to probate because there is
no revoking will.
Additional Answers:
1. In the case of Gan vs. Yap (104 Phil 509), the execution and the contents of a lost or destroyed
holographic will may not be proved by the bare testimony of witnesses who have seen or read
such will. The will itself must be p resented otherwise it shall produce no effect. The law regards
the document itself as material proof of authenticity. Moreover, in order that a will may be
revoked by a subsequent will, it Is necessary that the latter will be valid and executed with the
formalities required for the making of a will. The latter should possess all the requisites of a valid
will whether it be ordinary or a holographic will, and should be probated in order that the
revocatory clause thereof may produce effect. In the case at bar, since the holographic will itself
cannot be presented, it cannot therefore be probated. Since it cannot be probated, it cannot

revoke the notarial will previously written by the decedent.
1. On the basis of the Rules of Court, Rule 76, Sec. 6. provides that no will shall be proved as
a lost or destroyed will unless its provisions are clearly and distinctly proved by at least two (2)
credible witnesses. Hence, if we abide strictly by the two-witness rule to prove a lost or destroyed
will, the holographic will which Johnny allegedly mistakenly burned, cannot be probated, since
there is only one witness. Eduardo, who can be called to testify as to the existence of the will. If
the holographic will, which purportedly, revoked the earlier notarial will cannot be proved
because of the absence of the required witness, then the petition for the probate of the notarial
will should prosper.
Question No. 11:

"T" died intestate on 1 September 1997. He was survived by M (his mother), W (his widow),
A and B (his legitimate children), C (his grandson, being the legitimate son of B), D (his other
grandson, being the son of E who was a legitimate son of, and who predeceased, T), and F
(hisgrandson, being the son of G. a legitimate son who repudiated the inheritance from 'T'). His
distributable net estate Is PI20.000.00.
How should this amount be shared in intestacy among the surviving heirs?
Answer:
The legal heirs are A, B, D, and W. C is excluded by B who is still alive. D inherits in representation
of E who predeceased. F is excluded because of the repudiation of G. the predecessor. M is
excluded by the legitimate children of T. The answer may be premised on two theories: the
Theoiy of Exclusion and the Theoiy of Concurrence.
Under the Theory of Exclusion the legitimes of the heirs are accorded them and the free
portion will be given exclusively to the legitimate descendants. Hence under the Exclusion
Theory:
A will get P20.000.00, and P 13,333.33 (1/3 of the free portion)
B will get P 20,000.00, and P13,333.33 (1/3 of the free portion)
D will get P20.000.00. and P13,333.33 (1/3 of the free portion)
W, the widow is limited to the legitime of P20,000.00
Under the Theory of Concurrence, in addition to their legitimes, the heirs of A, B. D and W
will be given equal shares in the free portions:
A: P20.000.00 plus PI0.000.00 (1 /4of the free portion) B: P20.000.00plus PI0.000.00 (1/4 of
the free portion) C: P20,000.00 plus P10,000.00 (1 /4 of the free portion) W: P20,000.00
plus P10,000.00(1/4 of the free portion)
Alternative Answer:
Shares in intestacy
T - decedent
Estate: PI20,000.00
Survived by:
M - Mother ............................ .............. None
W - Widow........................................... P 30,000.00
A - Son................................................... P 30.000.00
B - Son ................................................... P 30.000.00
C - Grandson (son of B) ...................... None
D - Grandson (son of E who
predeceased T)....................... P 30,000.00
F - Grandson (son of G who
repudiated the inheritance
fromT*) ................................... None
1) The mother (M) cannot inherit from T because under Art. 985 the ascendants shall inherit
in default of legitimate children and descendants of the deceased.
2) The widow's share is P30.000.00 because under Art. 996 it states that if the widow or
widower and legitimate children or descendants are left, the surviving spouse has in the
succession the same share as that of each of the children.
3) C has no share because his father is still alive hence succession by representation shall not
apply (Art. 975).
4) D inherits P30.000 which is the share of his father E who predeceased T by virtue of Art.
981 on the right of representation.
F has no share because his father G repudiated the inheritance. Under Article 977 heirs
who repudiate their share may not be represented.
5)
Question No. 12;

"X". the decedent, was survived by W (his widow). A (his son). B (a granddaughter, being the
daughter of A) and C and D (the two acknowledged illegitimate children of the decedent). "X'
died this year (1997) leaving a net estate of P180,000.00. All were willing to succeed, except A
who repudiated the inheritance from his father, and they seek your legal advice on how much
each can expect to receive as their respective shares in the distribution of the estate.
Give your answer.
Answer:
The heirs are B, W. C and D. A inherits nothing because of his renunciation. B inherits a
legitime of P90.000.00 as the nearest and only legitimate descendant, inheriting in his own right
not by representation because of As renunciation. W gets a legitime equivalent to one-half (1
/2) that of B amounting to P45.000. C and D each gets a legitime equivalent to one- half (1/2)
that of B amounting to P45.000.00 each. But since the total exceeds the entire estate, their
legitimes would have to be reduced correspondingly to P22.500.00 each (Art. 895. CO). The total
of all of these amounts to P180.000.00.
ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:
INTESTATE SUCCESSION
ESTATE : P180,000.00
W- (widow gets 1/2 share)
A- (son who repudiated his
inheritance)
B - (Granddaughter)
C - (Acknowledged
illegitimate child)
D - (Acknowledged
Illegitimate child)
P90.000.00
(Art. 998,'
None
None
(Art. 977)
P45.000.00
(An.998)
P45.000.00
(Art. 998)
The acknowledged illegitimate child gets 1/2 of the share of each legitimate child.
Question No, 13:
On 01 January 1980. Redentor and Remedios entered into an agreement by virtue of which
the former was to register a parcel of land in the name of Remedios under the explicit covenant
to reconvey the land to Remigio. son of Redentor. upon the son's graduation from college. In
1981. the land, was registered in the name of Remedios.
Redentor died a year later or in 1982. In March 1983, RemJgio graduated from college. In
February 1992, Remigio accidentally found a copy of the document so constituting Remedios as
the trustee of the land. In May 1994. Remigio filed a case against Remedios for the
reconveyance of the land to him. Remedios. in her answer, averred that the action already
prescribed.
How should the matter be decided?
Answer:
The matter should be decided in favor of Remigio (trustee) because the action has not
prescribed. The case at bar involves an express trust which does not prescribe as long as they
have not been repudiated by the trustee {Diaz us. Gorricho. 103 Phil. 261).
Question No. 14:
In two separate documents signed by him, Juan Valentino "obligated" himself each to Marla
and to Perla, thus
'To Marla, my true love, I obligate myself to give you my one and only horse
when I feel like it."
- and
To Perla, my true sweetheart, I obligate myself to pay you the P500.00 I owe
you when I feel like it."
Months passed but Juan never bothered to make good his promises. Maria and Perla came to
consult you on whether or not they could recover on the basis of the foregoing settings.
What would your legal advice be?
Answer:
I would advise Maria not to bother running after Juan for the latter to make good his
promise. [This is because a promise is not an actionable wrong that allows a party to recover
especially when she has not suffered damages resulting from such promise. A promise does not
create an obligation on the part of Juan because it is not something which arises from a contract,
law, quasl-contracts or quasi-delicts (Art. 1157)]. Under Art. 1182, Juan's promise to Maria is void
because a conditional obligation depends upon the sole will of the obligor.
As regards Perla. the document is an express acknowledgment of a debt, and the promise to
pay what he owes her when he feels like it is equivalent to a promise to pay when his means
permits him to do so. and is deemed to be one with an indefinite period under Art. 1180. Hence
the amount is recoverable after Perla asks the court to set the period as provided by Art. 1197,
par. 2.
Question No. 15:
State the basic difference (only in their legal effects)
(a)
Between a contract to sell, on the one hand, and a contract of sale, on the other;
(b)
Between a conditional sale, on the one hand, and an absolute sale, on the other
hand.
Answer:
In a contract of sale, ownership is transferred to the buyer upon delivery of the
object to him while in a contract to sell, ownership is retained by the seller until the purchase
price is fully paid. In a contract to sell, delivery of the object does not confer ownership upon the
buyer. In a contract of sale, there is only one contract executed between the seller and the buyer,
while in a contract to sell, there are two contracts, first the contract to sell (which is a conditional
or preparatory sale) and a second, the final deed of sale or the principal contract which is
executed after full payment of the purchase price.
(a)
(b)
A conditional sale is one where the vendor is granted the right to unilaterally
rescind the contract predicated on the fulfillment or non-fulfillment, as the case may be, of the
prescribed condition. An absolute sale is one where the title to the property is not reserved to the
vendor or if the vendor is not granted the right to rescind the contract based on the fulfillment or
non-fulfillment, as the case may be, of the prescribed condition.
Question No. 16:
AB sold to CD a motor vehicle for and in consideration of P120,000.00, to be paid in twelve
monthly equal installments of P 10,000.00, each installment being due and payable on the 15th
day of eaclrmonth starting January 1997.
To secure the promissory note, CD (a) executed a chattel mortgage on the subject motor
vehicle, and (b) furnished a surety bond Issued by Philamlife. CD failed to pay more than two (2)
Installments
AB went after the surety but he was only able to obtain three-fourths (3/4) of the total
amount still due and owing from CD. AB seeks your advice on how he might. If at all, recover the
deficiency.
How would you counsel AB?
Answer:
Yes, he can recover the deficiency. The action of AB to go after the surety bond cannot be
taken to mean a waiver of his right to demand payment for the whole debt. The amount received
from the surety is only payment pro tanto, and an action may be maintained for a deficiency debt.
Question No. 17:
Stating briefly the thesis to support your answer to each of the following cases, will the
death (a) of the lessee extinguish the lease agreement?
(b)
of a partner terminate the partnership?
(c) of an agent end an agency?
Answer:
a) No. The death of the lessee will not extinguish the lease agreement, since lease is not
personal in character and the right is transmissible to the heirs. (Heirs o/Dimaculangan VS.
LAC. 170 SCRA 393).
Yes. The death of a partner will terminate the partnership, by express provision of
par. 5, Art. 1830 of the Civil Code.
(b)
(c) Yes. The death of an agent extinguishes the agency, by express provision of par.
3. Art 1919 of the Civil Code '

Question No. 18:
In order to secure a bank loan, XYZ Corporation surrendered its deposit certificate, with a
maturity date of 01 September 1997 to the bank. The corporation defaulted on the due
repayment of the loan, prompting the bank to encash the deposit certificate. XYZ Corporation
questioned the above action taken by the bank as being a case of pactum commtssorium. The
bank disagrees.
What is your opinion?
Answer:
We submit that there is no pactum commtssorium here. Deposits of money in banks and
similar institutions are governed by the provisions on simple loans (Art. 1980, Civil Code). The
relationship between the depositor and a bank is one of creditor and debtor. Basically this is a
matter of compensation as all the elements of compensation are present in this case [BPI vs. CA,
232 SCRA 302).
Additional Answer:
Where the security for the debt is also money deposited in a bank, it is not illegal for the
creditor to encash the time deposit certificates to pay the debtor's overdue obligation. (Chu vs.
CA, et aL, G.R. 78519. September 26, 1989).
Question No. 19:
When would an employer's liability for damage, caused by an employee in the
performance of his assigned tasks, be primary and when would it be subsidiary .in nature?
(a)
Would the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of the
employee be available to the employer in both instances?
(b)
Answer:
(a) The employer's liability for damage based on culpa aqutliana under Art. 2176 and 2180
of the Civil Code is primary, while that under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code is subsidiary.
(b) The defense of diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee under Article
2180 of the Civil Code is available only to those primarily liable thereunder, but not to those
subsidiarily liable under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code (Yumul vs. Juliano, 72 Phil. 94).
there can be no easement over another easement for The same reason as in (a). An easement,
although it is a real right over an immovable* is not a corporeal right. There is a Roman maxim
which says that: There can be no servitude over another servitude.

Question No. 2:
While in Afghanistan, a Japanese by the name of Sato sold to Ramoncito, a Filipino, a parcel
of land situated in the Philippines which Sato inherited from his Filipino mother.
What law governs the formality in the execution of the contract of sale? Explain your
answer and give its legal basis.
1.
Answer:
Under Art. .16 par. 1, NCC, real property is subject to the law of the country where it is
situated.. Since the property is situated in the Philippines, Philippine law applies. The rule of lex
rei sitae in Article 16 prevails over lex loci contractus in Article 17 of the NCC.
Alternative Answer:
Afghanistan law governs the formal requirements of the contract since the execution is in
Afghanistan. Art. 17 of the Civil Code provides that the forms and solemnities of contracts, wills,
and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are
executed. However, if the contract was executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the
Republic of the Philippines in Afghanistan, Philippine law shall apply.
What law governs the capacity of the Japanese to sell the land? Explain your answer and
give its legal basis.
2.
Answer:
Japanese law governs the capacity of the Japanese to sell the land being his personal law on
the basis of an interpretation of Art. 15. NCC.
Alternative Answer:
Since capacity to contract is governed by the personal law of an individual, the
Japanese seller's capacity should be governed either by his national law (Japanese law) or by the
law of his domicile, depending upon whether Japan follows the nationality or domiciliary theory
of personal law for its citizens.
a)
Philippine law governs the capacity of the Japanese owner in selling the land.
While as a general rule capacity of persons is governed by the law of his nationality, capacity
concerning transactions involving property is an exception. Under Article 16 of the NCC, the
capacity of persons in transactions involving title to property is governed by the law of the
country where the property is situated. Since the property is in the Philippines, Philippine law
b)
governs the capacity of the seller.

What law governs the capacity of the Filipino to buy the land? Explain your answer and
3.
Answer:
Philippine law governs the capacity of the Filipino to buy the land. In addition to the
principle of lex rei sitae given above. Article 15 of the NCC specifically provides that Philippine
laws relating to legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines no matter
where they are.
Question No. 3:
In 1980 spouses Felisa and George, both Filipino citizens. migrated to the United States. Six
years later they became American citizens. In 1989 they jointly filed a petition before the
Regional Trial Court of Malabon seeking to adopt Gilda, the 10-year old daughter of Helen,
Felisa's younger sister. The government opposed the petition on the ground that Felisa and
George Were disqualified since they were already American citizens.
1.
How will you resolve the petition? Explain
2.
Will your answer be the same if George were a natural-born American citizen?
Explain.
3.
Will your answer be the same if Felisa were the illegitimate parent of Gilda?
Explain.
Going back to the basic facts, suppose Felisa acquired her American citizenship
during the pendency of the petition for adoption, will your answer be the same as in Question
No. 1?
Explain.
4.
Answer:
The petition should be denied because George is not qualified to adopt. As
husband and wife, they have to adopt jointly under Article 185 of the Family Code. Their case
does not fall in any of the exceptions where a spouse may adopt alone. In Republic v. Toledano,
(233 SCRA 9), the Court ruled that both spouses must be qualified to adopt when required by law
to adopt jointly. Being aliens, Felisa and George are, as a rule, disqualified to adopt under Art.
184 of the FC. While Felisa falls in one of the exceptions to this rule, being a former Filipino who
seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity, George does not. He does not seek to adopt his
relative by consanguinity, or a legitimate child of his spouse and neither is his spouse a Filipino.
One of the spouses being disqualified to adopt, the petition has to be denied.
1.
Alternative Answer:
Since the adopters are former Filipino citizens and the child sought to be adopted is a
relative by consanguinity of one of them, and since the rule of joint adoption by spouses is duly
complied with, the petition should be granted.
The answer will be the same if George were a natural-born American. He will still
not fall in any of the exceptions to the disqualification of aliens.
2.
Alternative Answer:
No, my answer will be different because in that case, while Felisa is qualified to adopt, the
petition for joint adoption cannot be granted. It should be converted into a petition only by
Felisa. It cannot be granted as a joint petition but can be granted as an individual petition.
3. No, the answer will be different. In such a case. Felisa may adopt alone. Her case falls under the
exception to the rule in Art. 185 requiring husband and wife to adopt jointly, because she seeks to
adopt her own illegitimate child. She is .qiialified to adopt alone under Art. 184 because she is a
former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a relative by consanguinity. Hence, the court may
decree the adoption of Gilda by Felisa.
4. Yes, the answer will be the same as in No. 1. The adopter must be qualified to adopt not only
on the date of filing of the case, but also on the date of judgment.
Question No.. 4:
Rommel was issued a certificate of title over a parcel of land in Quezon City. One year later
Rachelle, the legitimate owner of the land, discovered the fraudulent registration obtained by
Rommel. She filed a complaint against Rommel for reconveyance and caused the annotation of a
notice of lis pendens on the certificate of title issued to Rommel. Rommel now invokes the
indefeasibility of his title considering that one year has already elapsed from its issuance. He also
seeks the cancellation of the notice of lis pendens.
Will Rachelles suit for reconveyance prosper? Explain.
1.
May the court cancel the notice of lis pendens even before final judgment is
rendered? Explain.
2.
Answer:
Yes, Rachelles suit will prosper because all elements for kn action for reconveyance are
present, namely:
1.
a.
Rachelle is claiming dominical rights over the same land.

b.
Rommel procured his title to the land by fraud.
c.
d.
The action was brought within the statutory period of four (4) years from
discovery of the fraud and not later than ten (10) years from the date of
registration of Rommels title.
Title to the land has not passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.
Rommel can invoke the indefeasibillty of his title if Rachelle had filed a petition to reopen or
review the decree of registration. But Rachelle instead filed an ordinary action in personam for
reconveyance. In the latter action, indefeasibility is not a valid defense because, in filing such
action, Rachelle is not seeking to nullify nor to impugn the indefeasibility of Rommels title. She is
only asking the court to compel Rommel to reconvey the title to her as the legitimate owner of
the land.
Alternative Answer:
Yes. The property registered is deemed to be held in trust for the real owner by the person
in whose name it is registered. The Torrens system was not designed to shield one who had
committed fraud or misrepresentation and thus holds the title in bad faith. [WaLstromv.Mapa, Jr.,
(G.R. 38387. 29 Jan. 1990) as cited in Martinez, D., Summary of SC Decisions, January to June,
1990. p. 3591.
A notice of lis pendens may be canceled even before final judgment upon proper
showing that the notice is for the purpose of molesting or harassing the adverse party or that the
notice of lis pendens is not necessary to protect the right of the party who caused it to be
registered. (Section 77, P.D. No. 1529)
2.
In this case, it is given that Rachelle is the legitimate owner of the land in question. It can be
said, therefore, that when she filed her notice of lis pendensher purpose was to protect her
interest in the land and not just to molest Rommel. It is necessary to record the lis pendens to
protect her interest because if she did not do it, there is a possibility that the land will fall into the
hands of an innocent purchaser for value and in that event, the court loses control over the land
making any favorable judgment thereon moot and academic. For these reasons, the notice of lis
pendens may not be canceled.
Question No. 5:
Olivia owns a vast mango plantation which she can no longer properly manage due lo a
lingering illness. Since she is indebted to Peter in the amount of P500.000.00 she asks . Peter to
manage the plantation and apply the harvest to the payment of her obligation to him, principal
and interest, until her Indebtedness shall have been fully paid. Peter agrees.
1.
What kind of contract is entered into between Olivia and Peter? Explain.
2.
What specific obligations are imposed by law on Peter as a consequence of their
contract?
3.
Does the law require any specific form for the validity of their contract? Explain
May Olivia re-Require the plantation before her entire indebtedness shall have
been fully paid? Explain.
4.
Answer:
A contract of antichresis was entered into between Olivia and Peter. Under
Article 2132 of the New Civil Code, by a contract of antichresis the creditor acquires the right to
receive the fruits of an immovable of his debtor, with the obligation to apply them to the
payment of the interest, and thereafter to the principal of his credit.
1.
2.
Peter must pay taxes and charges upon the land and bear the necessaiy expenses
for preservation and repair which he may deduct from the fruits. (Art. 2135, NCC)
The amount of the principal and interest must be specified in writing, otherwise
the antichresis will be void. (Art. 2134, NCC)
3.
4.
No. Art. 2136 specifically provides that the debtor cannot re-acquire the
enjoyment of the immovable without first having totally paid what he owes the creditor.
However, it is potestative on the part of the creditor to do so in order to exempt him from his
obligation under Art. 2135, NCC. The debtor cannot re-acquire the enjoyment unless Peter
compels Olivia to enter again the enjoyment of the property^
Question No. 6;
On 10 September 1988 Kevin, a 26-ycar old businessman, married Karla, a winsome lass of
18. Without the knowledge of their parents or legal guardians, Kevin and Karla entered into an
antenuptial contract the day before their marriage stipulating that conjugal partnership of gains
shall govern their marriage. At the time of their marriage Kevins estate was worth 50 Million
while Karlas was valued at 2 Million.
A month after their marriage Kevin died in a freak helicopter accident. He left no will, no
debts, no obligations. Surviving Kevin, aside from Karla, are his only relatives: his brother Luis and
first cousin Lilia.
1.
What property regime governed the marriage of Kevin and Karla? Explain.
2.
Determine the value of the estate of Kevin.
3.
Who are Kevins heirs?
4.
How much is each of Kevins heirs entitled to inherit?
Answer:
Since the marriage settlement was entered into without the consent and without
the participation of the parents (they did not sign the document), the marriage settlement is
invalid applying Art. 78, F.C. which provides .that a minor who according to law may contract
marriage may also enter into marriage settlements but they shall be valid only if the person who
may give consent to the marriage are made parties to the agreement. (Karla was still a minor at
the time the marriage settlement was executed in Septem- , ber 1988 because the law, R.A.
6809, reducing the age of majority to 18 years took effect on 18 December 1989). The marriage
settlement being void, the property regime governing the marriage is, therefore, absolute
community of property, under Art. 75 of the FC.
1.
All the properties which Kevin and Karla owned at the time of marriage became
community property which shall be divided equally between them at dissolution. Since Kevin
owned 50 Million and Karla, 2 Million, at the time of the marriage, 52 Million constituted their
community properly. Upon the death of Kevin, the community was dissolved and half of the 52
Million oi 26 Million is his share in the community. This 26 Million therefore is his estate.
3.
Karla and Luis are the intestate heirs of Kevin.
2.
They are entitled to share the estate equally under Article 1001 of the NCC.
Therefore, Karla gets 13 Million and Luis gets 13 Million.
4.
Question No, 7:
Abraham died intestate on 7 January 1994 survived by his son Braulip. Abrahams older son
Carlos died on 14 February 1990.
*
Darrilo who claims to be an adulterous child of Carlos , intervenes in the proceedings for the
settlement Of the estate of Abraham in representation of Carlos. Danilo was legally adopted on
17 March 1970 by Carlos with the consent of the latters wife.
1.
Under the Family Code, how may an illegitimate filiation be proved? Explain.
2.
As lawyer for Danilo. do you have to prove Danilos illegitimate filiation? Explain.
3.
Can Daiiilo inherit from Abraham in representation of his father Carlos? Explain.
Answer;
1. Under Art. 172 in relation to Art. 173 and Art, 175 of the FC, the filiation of illegitimate
children may be established in the same way and by the same evidence as legitimate children.
Art. 172 provides that the filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following: (1)
the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final Judgment; or (2) an admission of
legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned. In the absence Tof the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by: (1) the open and Continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child: or (2) any
other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
No. Since Danilo has already been adopted by Carlos, he ceased to be an
illegitimate child. An adopted child acquires all the rights of a legitimate child under Art. 189 of
the FC.
2.
3.
No. he cannot. Danilo cannot represent Carlos as the latters adopted child in the
inheritance of Abraham because adoption did not make Danilo a legitimate grandchild of
Abraham. Adoption is personal between Carlos and Danilo. He cannot also represent Carlos as
the latters illegitimate child because in such case he is barred by Art. 992 of the NCC from
inheriting from his illegitimate grandfather Abraham.
Alternative Answer:
An adopted childs successional rights do not include the right to represent his deceased
adopter in the inheritance of the latters legitimate parent, in view of Art. 973 which provides that
in order that representation may take place, the representative must himself be capable of
succeeding the decedent. Adoption by itself did not render Danilo an heir of 'the adopters
legitimate parent. Neither does his being a grandchild of Abraham render him an heir of the
latter because as an illegitimate child of Carlos, who was a legitimate child of Abraham, Danilo is
incapable of succeeding Abraham under Art. 992 of the Code.
Question No. 8:
Pauline, Patricia and Priscilla formed a business partnership for the purpose of engaging in
neon advertising for a term of five (5) years. Pauline subsequently assigned to Philip her interest
in the partnership. When Patricia and Priscilla learned of the assignment, they decided to
dissolve the partnership before the expiration of its term as they had an unproductive business
relationship with Philip in the past. On the other hand, unaware of the move of Patricia and
Priscilla but sensing their negative.reaction to his acquisition of Paulines interest, Philip
simultaneously petitioned for the dissolution of the partnership.
1. Is the dissolution done by Patricia and Priscilla without the consent of Pauline or Philip
valid? Explain.
2. Does Philip have any right to petition for the dissolution of the partnership before the
expiration of its specified term? Explain.
Answer:
1.
Under Art. 1830 (1) (c) of the NCC. the dissolution by Patricia and Priscilla is valid
and did not violate the contract of partnership even though Pauline and Philip did not consent
thereto. The consent of Pauline is not necessary because she had already assigned her interest to
Philip, The consent of Philip is not also necessary because the assignment to him of Paulines
interest did not make him a partner, under Art. 1813 of the NCC.
Alternative Answer:
*
Interpreting Art. 1830 (1) (c) to mean that if one of the partners had assigned his interest on
the partnership to another the remaining partners may not dissolve the partnership, the
dissolution by Patricia and Priscilla without the consent of Pauline or Philip is not valid.
No, Philip has no right to petition for dissolution because he does not have the
standing of a partner (Art. 1813 NCC).
2.
Question No. 9:
Tim came into possession of an old map showing where a purported cache of gold bullion
was hidden. Without any authority from the government Tim conducted a relentless search and
finally found the treasure buried in a new river bed formerly part of a parcel of land owned by
spouses Tirso andTessie. TTie did river which used to cut through the land of spouses Ursula and
Urbito changed its course through natural causes.
Suppose Tirso and Tessie were married on 2 August 1988 without executing any antenuptial
agreement. One year after their marriage, Tirso while supervising the clearing of Tessies inherited
land upon the latters request, accidentally found the treasure not in
properly of Tessie. To whom shall the treasure belong? Explain.
Answer:
The treasure was found In a property of public dominion, the new river bed. Since Tim did
not have authority from the government and, therefore, was a trespasser, he is not entitled to the
one-half share allotted to a finder of hidden treasure. All of it will go to the State. In addition,
under Art. 438 of the NCC, in order that the finder be entitled to the 1/2 share, the treasure must
be found by chance, that is by sheer luck. In this case, since Tim found the treasure not by chance
but because he relentlessly searched for it, he is not entitled to any share in the hidden treasure.
1.
Alternative Answer:
The law grants a one-half share to a finder of hidden treasure provided he is not a trespasser
and the finding is by chance. It is submitted that Tim is not a trespasser despite his not getting
authority from the government, because the new river bed where he found the treasure is
property for public use (Art. 420 NCC), to which the public has legitimate access. The question,
therefore, boils down to whether or not the finding was by chance in view of the fact that Tim
conducted a relentless search" before finding the treasure. The strict or literal view holds that
deliberate or intentional search precludes entitlement to the one-half share allotted by law to
the finder since the phrase by chance" means by accident", meaning an unexpected discovery.
The liberal view, however, would sustain Tim's right to the allocated share interpreting the phrase
in question as meaning by a stroke of good fortune", which does not rule out deliberate or
intentional search. It is submitted that the liberal view should prevail since in practical reality,
hidden treasure is hardly ever found without conscious effort to find it, and the strict view would
tend to render the codal provision in question illusory.
Since Tirso and Tessie were married before the efiectivity of the Family Code, their
property relation is governed by conjugal partnership of gains. Under Art. 54 of the Civil Code,
the share of the hidden treasure which the law
2.
awards to the finder or the proprietor belongs to the conj ugal partnership of gains. The one-half
share pertaining to Tessie as owner of the land, and the one-half share pertaining to Tirso as
finder of the treasure, belong to the conjugal partnership of gains.
Question No. 10:
On 8 December 1991 Vanessa purchased from the Manila office of Euro-Aire an airline
ticket for its Flight No. 710 from Dallas to Chicago on 16 January 1992. Her flight reservation was
confirmed. On her scheduled departure Vanessa checked in on time at the Dallas airport.
However, at the check-in counter she discovered that she was waitlisted with some other
passengers because of intentional overbooking, a Euro-Aire policy and practice. Euro-Aire
admitted that Vanessa was not advised of such policy when she purchased her plane ticket.
Vanessa was only able to fly two days later by taking another airline.
Vanessa sued Euro-Aire in Manila for breach of contract and damages. Euro-Aire claimed
that it cannot be held liable for damages because its practice of overbooking passengers was
allowed by the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations. Vanessa on the other hand contended that
assuming that the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations allowed intentional overbooking, the airline
company cannot invoke the U.S. Code on the ground that the ticket was purchased in Manila,
hence, Philippine law should apply, under which Vanessa can recover damages for breach of
contract of carriage.
Decide. Discuss fully.
Answer:
Vanessa can recover damages under Philippine law for breach of contract of carriage.
Philippine law should govern as the law of the place where the plane tickets were bought and the
contract of carriage was executed. In Zalamea v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 104235. Nov. 10.
1993) the Supreme Court applied Philippine law in recovery of damages for breach of contract of
carriage for the reason that it is the law of the place where the contract was executed.
If the violation of the contract was attended with bad faith, there is a ground to recover
moral damages. But since there was a federal regulation which was the basis of the act
complained of, the airline cannot be in bad faith. Hence, only actual damages can be recovered.
The same is true with regards to exemplary damages.
Question No. 11:
Armando owns, a row of residential apartments in San Juan, Metro Manila, which he rents
out to tenants. On 1 April 1991 he left for the United States without appointing any administrator
to manage his apartments such that uncollected rentals accumulated for three (3) years. Amparo,
a niece of Armando, concerned with the Interest of her uncle, took it upon herself to administer
the property. As a consequence, she incurred expenses in collecting the rents and in some
instances even spent for necessary repairs to preserve the property.
. 1. What juridical relation between Amparo and Armando, if any, has resulted from Amparos
unilateral act of assuming the administration of Armandos apartments? Explain.
What rights and obligations, if any, does Amparo have under the circumstances? Explain.
2.
Answer:
1.
Negotiorum gestio existed between Amparo and Armando. She voluntarily took charge
of the agency or management of the business or property of her uncle without any power from
her uncle whose property was neglected. She is called the gestor negotiorum or officious
manager. (Art. 2144, NCC)
It is recommended by the Committee that an enumeration of any two (2) obligations and
two (2) rights as enumerated in Arts. 2145 to 2152, NCC, would entitle the examinee to full
credit.
2.
Art. 2145. The officious manager shall perform his duties with all the diligence of a good
father of a family, and pay the damages which through his fault or negligence may be suffered by
the owner of the property or business under management.
The courts may, however, increase or moderate the indemnity according to the
circumstances of each case.
Art. 2146. If the officious manager delegates to another person all or some of his duties, he
shall be liable for the acts of the delegate, without prejudice to the direct obligation of the latter
toward the owner of the business.
The responsibility of two or more officious managers shall be solidary, unless management
was assumed to save the thing or business from imminent danger.
Art. 2147. The officious manager shall be liable for any fortuitous event:
(1)
If he undertakes risky operations which the owner was not accustomed to embark
upon:
(2)
If he has preferred his own interest to that of the owner;
(3)
If he fails to return the property or business after demand by the owner;
(4)
If he assumed the management in bad faith.
Art. 2148. Except when the management was assumed to save the property or business from
imminent danger, the officious manager shall be liable for fortuitous events
(1)
If he is manifestly unfit to cany on the management;
(2)
If by his intervention he prevented a more competent person from taking up the
management.
Art. 2149. The ratification of the management by the owner of the business produces the
effects of an express agency, even if the business may not have been successful.
Art. 2150. Although the officious management may not have been expressly ratified, the owner of
the property business who enjoys the advantages of the same shall be liable for obligations
Incurred In his interest, and shall reimburse the officious manager for the necessary and useful
expenses and for the damages which the latter may have suffered in the performance of his duties.
The same obligation shall be incumbent upon him when, the management had for its
purpose the prevention of an imminent and manifest loss, although no benefit may have been
derived.
Art. 2151. Even though the owner did not derive any benefit and there has been no
imminent and manifest danger to the property or business, the owner is liable as under the first
paragraph of the preceding article, provided:
(1)
The officious manager has acted in good faith, and
(2)
The property or business is intact, ready to be returned to the owner.
Art. 2152. The officious manager is personally liable for contracts which he has entered into
with third persons, even though he acted in the name of the owner, and there shall be no right of
action between the owner and third persons.. These provisions shall not apply:
(1)
If the owner has expressly or tacitly ratified the management, or
(2)
When the contract refers to things pertaining to the owner of the business.
(NOTE: It is recommended by the Committee that an enumeration of any two (2) obligations
and any two (2) rights as enumerated in Arts. 2145 to 2152. NCC would entitle thfe examinee to
full credit.)
Question No, 12:

In 1983 PHILCREDIT extended loans to Rivett-Strom Machineries. Inc. (RIVETT-STROM),
consisting of US$10 Million for the cost of machineries imported and directly paid by
PHILCREDIT. and 5 Million in cash payable in installments over a period of ten (10) years on the
basis of
computed at the rate of exchange of the U.S. dollar vis-a-vis the Philippine peso at the time of
payment.
RIVETT-STROM made payments on both loans which if based on the rate of exchange in
1983 would have fully settled the loans.
PHILCREDIT contends that the payments on both loans should be based on the rate of
exchange existing at the time of payment, which rate of exchange has been consistently
increasing, and for which reason there would still be a considerable balance on each loan.
Is the contention of PHILCREDIT correct? Discuss fully.
.*
Answer;
As regards the loan consisting of dollars, the contention of PHILCREDIT is correct. It has to
be paid in Philippine currency computed on the basis of the exchange rate at the time of
payment.of each installment, as held in Kalalo v. Luz, 34 SCRA 337. As regards the P5 Million
loan in Philippine pesos, PHILCREDIT is wrong. The payment thereof cannot be measured by the
peso-dollar exchange rate. That will be violative of the Uniform Currency Act (R.A. 529) which
prohibits the payment of an obligation which, although to be paid in Philippine currency, is
measured by a foreign.currency. (Palanca v. CA, 238 SCRA 593).
Question No. 13:
Salvador, a timber concessionaire, built on his lot a warehouse where he processes and
stores his timber for shipment. Adjoining the warehouse is a furniture factory qwned by
NARRAMIX of which Salvador is a majority stockholder. NARRAMIX leased space in the
warehouse where it placed its furniture-making machinery.
1.
How would you classify the furniture-making machinery as property under the
Civil Code? Explain.
2. Suppose the lease contract between Salvador and NARRAMIX stipulates that at the end of the
lease the machinery shall become the property of the
Answer:
The furniture-making machinery is movable property because it was not installed by the
owner of the tenement. To become immovable under Art. 415 (5) of the NCC, the machinery must
be installed by the owner of the tenement.
1.
Alternative Answer:
It depends on the circumstances of the case. If the machinery was attached in a fixed
manner, in such a way that it cannot be separated from the tenement without breaking the
material or causing deterioration thereof, it is Immovable property [Art. 415 (3), NCC]. However,
if the machinery can be transported from place to place without impairment of the tenement to
which they were fixed, then it is movable property. [Art. 416 (4), NCC}
It Is immovable property. When there is a provision in the lease contract making the
lessor, at the end of the lease, owner of the machinery installed by the lessee, the said machinery
is considered to have been installed by the lessor through the lessee who acted merely as his
agent. Having been Installed by the owner of the tenement; the machinery became immovable
under Art. 415 of the NCC. (Davao Sawmill v. Castillo, 61 Phil. 709)
2.
Question No. 14:

Yvette was found to be positive for HIV virus, considered sexually transmissible, serious and
incurable. Her boyfriend Joseph was aware of her condition and yet married her. After two (2)
years of cohabiting with Yvette, and in his belief that she would probably never be able to bear
him a healthy child, Joseph now wants to have his marriage with Yvette annulled. Yvette opposes
the suit contending that Joseph is estopped from seeking annulment of their marriage since he
knew even before their marriage that she was afflicted with HIV virus.
Can the action of Joseph for annulment of his marriage with Yvette prosper? Discuss fully.
Answer:
No. Joseph knew that Yvette was HIV positive at the time of the marriage. He is. therefore,
not an injured party. The FC gives the right to annul the marriage only to an injured party. [Art. 47
(5). FC)
Alternative Answer:
The action for annulment can prosper because the prescriptive period of five (5) years has
riot yet lapsed. [Art. 45 (6), FC):
Question No. 15:
Michelle, the French daughter of Penreich, a German national, died In Spain leaving real
properties in the Philippines as well as valuable personal properties in Germany.
1.
What law determines who shall succeed the deceased? Explain your answer and
What law regulates the distribution of the real properties in the Philippines?
Explain your answer and give its legal basis.
2.
What law governs the distribution of the personal properties in Germany? Explain
your answer and give its legal basis.
3.
Answer:
Assuming that the estate of the decedent is being settled in the Philippines)
The national law of the decedent (French law) shall govern in determining who will
succeed to his estate. The legal basis is Art. 16 par. 2, NCC.
1.
Alternative Answer:
French law shall govern the distribution of his real properties in the Philippines except when
the real property is land which may be transmitted to a foreigner only by hereditary succession
2. The
distribution of the real properties in the Philippines shall be governed by French law.
The legal basis is Art. 16. NCC).
The distribution of the personal properties in Germany shall be governed by French law.
The legal basis is Art. 16. NCC).
3.
Question No. 16:

Lawrence, a retired air force captain, decided to go into the air transport business. He
purchased an aircraft in cash except for an outstanding balance of P500,000.00. He incurred an
indebtedness of P300.000.00 for repairs with an aircraft repair company. He also borrowed PI
Million from a bank for additional capital and constituted a chattel mortgage on the aircraft to
secure the loan.
While on a test flight the aircraft crashed causing physical injuries to a third party who was
awarded damages of P200.000.00.
Lawrences insurance claim for damage to the aircraft was denied thus leaving him nothing
else but the aircraft which was then valued only at PI Million. Lawrence was declared insolvent.
Assuming that the aircraft was sold for PI Million, give the order of preference of the
creditors of Lawrence and distribute the amount of PI Million.
Answer:
Assuming that the aircraft was sold for P1 Million, there is no order of preference. The P1
Million will all go to the bank as a chattel mortgagee because a chattel mortgage under Art. 2241
(4) NCC, defeats Art. 2244 (12) and (14). Art. 2241 (3) and (5) are not applicable because the
aircraft is no longer in the possession of the creditor.
Question No. 17:

In 1980. Maureen purchased two lots in a plush subdivision registering Lot 1 in her name and
Lot 2 in the name of her brother Walter with the latters consent. The idea was to circumvent a
subdivision policy against the acquisition of more than one lot by one buyer. Maureen
constructed a house on Lot 1 with an extension on Lot 2 to serve as a guest house. In 1987, Walter
who had suffered serious business losses demanded that Maureen remove the extension house
since the lot on which the extension was built was his property. In 1992, Maureen sued for the
reconveyance to her of lit 2 asserting that a resulting trust was created when she had the lot
registered in Walters name even if she paid the purchase price. Walter opposed the suit arguing.
that assuming the existence of a resulting trust the action of Maureen has already prescribed
since ten years have already elapsed from the registration of the title in his name.
Decide. Discuss fully
Answer:
This is a case of an implied resulting trust. If Walter claims to have acquired ownership of
the land by prescription or if he anchors his defense on extinctive prescription, the ten year
period must be reckoned from 1987 when he demanded that Maureen remove the extension
house on Lot No. 2 because such demand amounts to an express repudiation of the trust and it
was made known to Maureen. The action for reconveyance filed in 1992 is not yet barred by
prescription. (Spouses Huang u. Court of Appeals. Sept. 13, 1994).
Question No. 18:
Isidro and Irma. Filipinos, both 18 years of age, were passengers of Flight No. 317 of Oriental
Airlines. The plane they boarded was of Philippine registry. While en route from Manila to Greece
some passengers hijacked the plane, held the chief pilot hostage at the cockpit and ordered him
to fly instead to Libya. During the hijacking Isidro suffered a heart attack and was on the verge of
death . Since Irma was already eight months pregnant by Isidro, she pleaded to the hijackers to
allow the assistant pilot to solemnize her marriage with Isidro. Soon after the marriage, Isidro
expired. As the plane landed in Libya Irma gave birth. However, the baby died a few minutes after
complete delivery. Back in the Philippines Irma immediately filed a claim for inheritance. The
parents of Isidro opposed her claim contending that the marriage between her and Isidro void ab
initio on the following grounds: (a) they had not given their consent to the marriage of their son;
(b) there was no marriage license: (c) the solemnizing officer had no authority to perform the
marriage: and, (d) the solemnizing officer did not file an affidavit of marriage with the proper civil
registrar.
1.
Resolve each of the contentions ([a] to (d)) raised by the parents of Isidro. Discuss fully.
\
2.
Does. Irma have any successional rights at all? Discuss fully.
Answer;
1.
(a) The fact that the parents of Isidro and of Irma did
not give their consent to the marriage did not make the marriage void ab initio. The
marriage is merely voidable under Art 45 of the FG.
(b)
Absence of marriage license did not make the marriage void ab initio. Since the
marriage was solemnized in articulomortis, it was exempt from the license
requirement under Art. 31 of the FC.
(c)
On the assumption that the assistant pilot was acting for and in behalf of the
airplane chief who was under disability, and by reason of the extraordinary and
exceptional circumstances of the case (le. hostage situation), the marriage was
solemnized by an authorized officer under Art. 7
(3) and Art. 31, of the FC.
(d)
Failure of the solemnizing officer to file the affidavit of marriage did not affect the
validity of the marriage. It is merely an irregularity which may subject the
solemnizing officer to sanctions.

Alternative Answer:
Considering that the solemnizing officer has no authority to perform the marriage because
under Art. 7 the law authorizes only the airplane chief, the marriage is void, hence, a, c, and d are
immaterial.
2. Irma succeeded to the estate of Isidro as his surviving spouse to the estate of her
legitimate child. When
Isidro died, he was succeeded by his surviving wife lima, and his legitimate unborn child. They
divided the estate equally between them, the child excluding the parents of Isidro. An unbom
child is considered bom for all purposes favorable to it provided it is bom later. The child was
considered bom because, having an intra-ulerine life of more than seven months, it lived for a
few minutes after its complete delivery. It was legitimate because it was bom within the valid
marriage of the parents. Succession is favorable to it. When the child died, Irma inherited the
share of the child. However, the share of the child in the hands of Irma is subject to reserva
troncal for the benefit of the relatives of the child within the third degree of consanguinity and
who belong to the line of Isidro.
Alternative Answer:
If the marriage is void. Irma has no successional rights with respect to Isidro but she would
have successional rights with respect to the child.
1994 Bar Examination
Question No. 1:
In Private International Law (Conflict of Laws) what is:
1) Cognovit?
2) A borrowing statute?
3) Characterization?
1) a) Cognovit is a confession of judgment whereby a portion of the complaint is confessed
by the defendant who denies the rest thereof (.Philippine law Dictionary, 3rd Ed.) (Ocampo v.
Florenciano, L-M 13553, 2/23/50).

Cognovit is a statement of confession". Oftentimes, it is referred to as a power of
attorney" or simply as a power", it is the written authority of the debtor and his direction to the
clerk of the district court, or justice of the peace to enter Judgment against the debtor as stated
therein. (Words and Phrases, vol. 7, pp. 115-166).
b)
c)
Cognovit is a plea in an action which acknowledges that the defendant did
undertake and promise as the plaintiff in its declaration has alleged, and that it cannot deny that
it owes and unjustly detains from the plaintiff the sum claimed by him in his declaration, and
consents that judgment be entered against the defendant for a certain sum. (Words and Phrases,
vol. 7, pp. 115-166).
d)
Cognovit is a note authorizing a lawyer for confession of judgment by defendant.
Borrowing Statute" - Laws of the state or jurisdiction used by another slate in deciding
conflicts questioned
2)
involved in the choice of law (Blacks Law Dictionary, 5th ed. 1979).
3) a) Characterization" is otherwise called classification or qualification." It is the
process of assigning a disputed question to its correct legal category (Private International Law,
Salonga).
b) Characterization" is a process in determining under what category a certain set of

facts or rules fall. (Paras, Conflict of Laws, p. 94, 1984 ed.)
Question No. 2:
What is the doctrtne of forum non conveniens?
2) What is a long arm statute"?
1)
a) Forum non conveniens is a principle in Private International Law that where the ends
of justice strongly indicate that the controversy may be more suitably tried elsewhere, then
jurisdiction should be declined and the parties relegated to relief to be sought in another forum.
(Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, p. 254; 1982 ed.).
1)
Where in a broad sense the ends of justice strongly indicate that the controversy
may be more suitably tried elsewhere, thenjurisdiction should be declined and the parties
relegated to relief to be sought in another forum. (Handbook on Private International Law,
Aruego).
b)
Forum non conveniens means simply that a court may resist imposition upon its
jurisdiction even whenjuris- diction is authorized by the letter of a general venue statute.
(Salonga. Private International Law, p. 51, 1967 ed.)
c)
Forum non conveniens is a doctrine whereby a court of law having full jurisdiction
over a case brought in a proper venue or district declines to determine the case on its merits
because justice would be better served by the trial over the case in another jurisdiction.
(Webster's Dictionary)
d)
a) Long arm statute is a legislative act which provides for personal Jurisdiction, via
substituted service or process, over persons or corporations which are non-residents of the state
and which voluntarily go into the state,1 directly or by agent or communicate with persons in the
state for limited purposes, in actions which concern claims relating to performance of execution
of those purposes [Blacks Law Dictionary, 5th Ed. 1979).
(2)
b)
Long arm statute refers simply to authorized substituted service.
Question No, 3:
1)
What is the procedure of consulta when an instrument is denied registration?
Distinguish the Torrens system of land registration from the system of recording of
evidence of title.
2)
How do you register now a deed of mortgage of a parcel of land originally registered
under the Spanish Mortgage Law?
3)
a ) (1) The Register of Deeds shall notify the interested party in writing, setting forth the
defects of the instrument or the legal ground relied upon for denying the registration, and
advising that if he is not agreeable to such ruling, he may, without withdrawing the documents
from the Registry , elevate the matter by Consulta to the Administrator of the Land Registration
Authority (LRA).
1)
Within five (5) days from receipt of notice of denial, the party in interest
shall file his Consulta with the Register of Deeds concerned and pay the consulta fee.
(2)
3) After receipt of the Consulta and of the corresponding fee, the Register of
Deeds makes an annotation of the pending consulta at the back of the certificate of title.
(4)The Register of Deeds then elevates the case to the LRA Administrator with
certified records thereof and a summary of the facts and issues involved.
(5) The LRA Administrator then conducts hearings after due notice or may just
require parties to submit their memoranda.

(6) After hearing, the LRA Administrator issues an order prescribing the step to be
taken or the memorandum 16 be made. H is resolution in consulta shall be conclusive and
binding upon all Registers of Deeds unless reversed on appeal by the Court of Appeals or
by the Supreme Court. (Section 117. P.D. 1529).
b)
The procedure of consulta is a mode of appeal from denial by the Register of
Deeds of the registration of the instrument to the Commissioner of Land Registration.
Within five days from receipt of the notice of denial, the interested party may
elevate the matter by consulta to the Commissioner of Land Registration who shall enter an order
prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be made. Resolution in consulta shall be
binding upon all Registers of Deeds provided that the party in interest may appeal to the Court of
Appeals within the period prescribed (Sec. 117. P.D. 1529).
c)
a) The Torrens system of land registration is a system for the registration of title to the
land. Thus, under this system what is entered in the Registry of Deeds, is a record of the owners
estate or interest in the land, unlike the system under the Spanish Mortgage Law or the system
under Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Act 3344 where only the
evidence of such title is recorded. In the latter system, what is recorded is the deed of conveyance
from hence the owner's title emanatedand not the title itself.
2)
b) Torrens system of land registration is that which is prescribed in Act 496 (now PD
1529), which is either judicial or quasi-judicial. System or recording of evidence of title is merely
the registration of evidence of acquisitions of land with the Register of Deeds, who annotates the
same on the existing title, cancels the old one and issues a new title based on the document
presented for registration.
a) After the Spanish Mortgage Law was abrogated by P.D. 892 on February 16,1976, all
lands covered by Spanish titles that were not brought under the torrens system within six (6)
months from the date thereof have been considered as unregistered private lands."
3)
Thus, a deed of mortgage affecting land originally registered under the Spanish Mortgage
Law is now governed by the system of registration of transactions or instruments affecting
unregistered land under Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended by Act No.
3344. Under this law, the instrument pr transaction affecting unregistered land is entered in a
book provided for the purpose but the registration thereof , is purely voluntary and does not adversely affect third persons who have a better right.
b) By recording and registering with the Register of Deeds of the place where the land is
located, in accordance with Act 3344. However, P.D. 892 required holders of Spanish title to
bring the same under the Torrens System within 6 months from its effectivity on February
16,1976.
Question No. 4:
1)
Are decisions of the Court Of Appeals considered laws?
2)
What are the binding effects of an obiter dictum and a dissenting opinion?
How can a decision of the Supreme Court be set aside?
3)
Alternative Answers;
a) No. but decisions of the Court of Appeals may serve as precedents for inferior
courts .on points of law not covered by any Supreme Court decision, and a ruling of the Court of
Appeals may become a doctrine. (Miranda v. Imperial 77 Phil. 1066).
1)
b) No. Decisions of the Court of Appeals merely have persuasive, and therefore no
mandatory effect. However, a conclusion or pronouncement which covers a point of law still
undecided may still serve as judicial guide and it is possible that the same maybe raised to the
status of doctrine, if after it has been subjected to test in the crucible of analysis, the Supreme
Court should find that it has merits and qualities sufficient for its consideration as a rule of
jurisprudence [Civil Code. Paras).
2)
None. Obiter dictum and opinions are not necessary to the determination of a
case. TTiey are not binding and cannot have the force of official precedents. It is as if the Court
were turning aside from the main topic of the case to collateral subjects: a dissenting opinion
affirms or overrules a claim, right or obligation. It neither disposes nor awards anything it merely
expresses the view of the dissenter. (Civil Code, Paras)
3)
A decision of a division of the Supreme Court may be set aside by the Supreme
Court sitting en banc, a Supreme Court decision may be set aside by a contrary ruling of the
Supreme Court itself or by a corrective legislative act of Congress, although said laws cannot
adversely affect those favored prior to the Supreme Court decision. (Civil Code, Paras).
*
Question No. 5:
Can a husband and wife form a limited partnership to engage in real estate business,
with the wife being a limited partner?
2) Can two corporations organize a general partnership under the Civil Code of the
Philippines?
1)
3)
Can a corporation and an individual form a general partnership?
a) Yes. The Civil Code prohibits a husband and wife from constituting a universal
partnership. Since a limited partnership is not a universal partnership, a husband and wife may
1)
validly form one.

Yes. While spouses cannot enter into a universal partnership, they can enter into a
limited partnership or be members thereof (CIR v. Suter, et at., 27 SCRA 152).
b)
2) a) No. A corporation is managed by its board of directors. If the corporation were to

become a partner, co-partners would have the power to make the corporation party to
transactions in an irregular manner since the partners are not agents subject to the control of the
Board of Directors. But a corporation may enter into a Joint venture with another corporation as
long as the nature of the venture is in line with the business authorized by its charter. (Thdson &
Co., Inc. v. Bolano, 95 Phil. 106).
As a general rule a corporation may not form a general partnership with another
corporation or an Individual because a corporation may not be bound by persons who are. neither
directors nor officers of the corporation.
b)
However, a corporation may form a general partnership with another corporation or an

individual provided the following conditions are met:
1)
The Articles of Incorporation of the corporation expressly allows the corporation to

enter into
partnerships;
2)
The Articles of Partnership must provide that all partners will manage the
partnership, and they shall be jointly and severally liable; and
3)
In case of a foreign corporation, it must be licensed to do business in the

Philippines.
No. A corporation may not be a general partner because the principle of mutual
agency in general partnership allowing the other general partner to bind the corporation will
violate the corporation law principle that only the board of directors may bind the corporation.
c)
#
3) No, for the same reasons given in the Answer to Number 2 above.
Question No. 6:
Paulita left the conjugal home because of the excessive drinking of her husband, Alberto.
Paulita, out of her own endeavor, was able to buy a parcel of land which she was able to register
under her name with the addendum widow." She also acquired stocks in a listed corporation
registered in her name. Paulita sold the parcel of land to Rafael, who first examined the original
of the transfer certificate of title.
Has Alberto the right to share in the shares of stock acquired by Paulita?
Can Alberto recover the land from Rafael?
1)
2)
1. a) Yes. The Family Code provides.that all property acquired during the marriage,
whether the acquisition appears to have been made, contracted or registered in the name of one
or both spouses, is presumed to be absolute community property unless the contrary is proved.
marriage despite the fact that those shares were registered only in her name. Alberto's right to
claim his share will only arise, however, at dissolution.
The presumption is still that the shares of stock are owned Ln common. Hence,
they will form part of the absolute community or the conjugal partnership depending on what the
property regime is.
b)
c)
Since Paulita acquired the shares of stock by onerous title during the marriage,
these are part of the conjugal or absolute community property as the case may be (depending on
whether the marriage was celebrated prior to, or after, the effectivity of the Family Code). Her
physical separation from her husband did not dissolve the community of property. Hence, the
husband has a right to share iri the shares of stock.
a) Under a community of property, whether absolute or relative, the disposition of

property belonging to such community is void if done by Just one spouse without the consent of
the other or authority of the proper court. However, the land was registered in the name of
Paulita as widow". Hence, the buyer has the right to rely upon what appears in the record of the
Register of Deeds and should, consequently, bie protected. Alberto cannot recover the land from
Rafael but would have the right of recourse against his wife.
2)
The parcel of land is absolute community property having been acquired during
the marriage and through Paulitas industry despite the registration being only in the name of
Paulita. The land being community property, its sale to Rafael without the consent of Alberto is
void. However, since the land is registered in the name of Paulita as widow, there is nothing in the
title which would raise a suspicion for Rafael to make inquiry. He, therefore, is an innocent
purchaser for value from whom the land may no longer be recovered.
b)
No. Rafael is an innocent purchaser in good faith who, upon relying on the correctness of
the certificate of title, acquires rights which are to be protected by the courts.
c)
Under the estalished principles of land registration law, the presumption is that the
transferee of registered land is not aware of any defect in the title of the property he purchased.
(See Tajonera v. Court of Appeals, 103 SCRA 467). Moreover, the person dealing with registered
land may safely rely on the correctness of its certificate of title and the law will in no way oblige
him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the property. {Director of Lands v.
Abache, et al., 73 Phil. 606). No strong considerations of public policy have been presented which
would lead the Court to reverse the established and sound doctrine that the buyer in good faith
of p registered parcel of land does not have to look beyond the Torrens Title and search for any
hidden defect or inchoate right which may later invalidate or diminish his right to what he
purchased. (Lopez v. Court of Appeals, 189 SCRA 271)
The parcel of land is absolute community property having been acquired during the
marriage and through Paulitas Industry despite registration only in the name of Paulita. The land
being community property, its sale to Rafael without the consent of Alberto is void.
b)
Question No, 7:
In 1975, Carol begot a daughter Bing, out of wedlock. When Bing was ten years old. Carol
gave her consent for Bings legal adoption by Norma and Manuel, which was granted by the court
in 1990. In 1991, Carol learned that Norma and Manuel were engaged in a call-girl-ring that
catered to tourists. Some of the girls lived with Norma and Manuel. Carol got Bing back, who in
the first place wanted to return to her natural mother.
1)
Who has a better right to the custody of Bing. Carol or Norma?
2)
Aside from taking physical custody of Bing, what legal actions can Carol lake to
prolecl Bing?
a) It depends on whether or not Bing was at least 18 years old at the time Carol
asserts the prerogative to take custody of Bing. If she was at least 18 years old. then she is no
longer under parental authority and neither Carol nor Norma can assert the prerogative to take
custody. However, if she was less than 18 years old, then Norma has a better right since the
adoption by Norma of Bing terminates the parental authority of Carol over Bing. ,
1)
bj The natural mother, Carol, should have the better right in light of the principle that
the childs welfare is the paramount consideration in custody rights. Obviously, Bings continued
stay in her adopting parents house; where interaction with the call1 girls is inevitable, would be
detrimental to her moral and spiritual development. This could be the reason for Bings
expressed desire to return to her natural mother. It should be noted, however, that Bing is no
longeF a minor, being 19 years of age now. It is doubtful that a court can still resolve the question
of custody over one who is suiJuris and not otherwise incapacitated.
2)
a) On the assumption that Bing is still a minor or otherwise incapacitated, Carol
may petition the proper court for resolution or rescission of the decree of adoption on the
ground that the adopting parents have exposed, or are exposing, the child to corrupt influence,
tantamount to giving her corrupting orders or examples. She can also ask for the revesting in her
of parental authority over Bing. If, however, Bing is already 19 years of age and therefore no
longer a minor, it is not Carol but Bing herself who can petition the court for Judicial rescission of
the adoption, provided she can show a ground for disinheritance of an ascendant.
Carol may file an action to deprive Norma of parental authority under Article 231 of the Family
Code or file an action for the rescission of the adoption under in relation to Article 231 (2) of the
Family Code
Question No. 8:
In January 1993, Four-Gives Corporation leased the entire twelve floors of the GQS Towers
Complex, for a period of ten years at a monthly rental of P3.000,000.00. There Is a provision in
the contract that the monthly rentals should be paid within the first five days of the month. For
the month of March, May, June, October and December 1993. the rentals were not paid on time
with some rentals being delayed up to ten days. The delay was due to the heavy paper work
involved in processing the checks.
Four-Gives Corporation also subleased five of the twelve floors to wholly-owned
subsidiaries. The lease contract expressly prohibits the assignment of the lease contract or any
portion thereof. The rental value of the building has' increased by 50% since its lease to FourGives Corporation.
1)
Can the building owner eject Four-Gives Corporation on grounds of the repeated
delays in the payment of the rent?
Can the building owner ask for the cancellation of the contract for violation of the
provision against assignment?
2)
a) The repeated delays" in the payment of rentals would, at best, be a slight or casual breach
which does not furnish a ground for ejectment especially because the delays were only due to
heavy paper work. Note that there was not even a demand for payment obviously because the
delay lasted for only-a few days (10 days being the longest), at the end of which time payments
were presumably made and were accepted. There was, therefore, no default. Note also that there
was no demand made upon the lessee to vacate the premises for non-payment of the monthly
rent. -There is. Therefore no cause of action for ejectment arising from the repeated
b) The buildipg owner cannot eject Four-Gives Corporation on the ground of repeated delays in
the payment of rentals. The delay In the payment of the rentals is minimal and cannot be made
the basis of an ejectment suit. The delay was due to the heavy paper work involved in processing
the checks. It would be otherwise if the lease contract stated that in the payment of rentals within
the first five days of the month, time is of the essence or that the lessee will be indelay if he fails to
pay within the agreed period without need of demand. In this case he can judicially eject the
tenant on the ground of lack of payment of the price stipulated after a demand to vacate. (Article
1673(2), New Civil Code).
c) No. Resolution of a contract will not be permitted for a slight or casual breach, but only for
such substantial and fundamental breach as would defeat the very object of the parties in making
the agreement. (Zepeda v. CA, 216 SCRA 293). The delay of ten (10) days is not such a substantial
and fundamental breach to warrant the resolution of the contract of lease specially so when the
delay was due to the heavy paperwork In processing the checks.
2)
a) No. Sublease is different from assignment of lease. Sublease, not being prohibited by
the contract of lease is therefore allowed and cannot be invoked as a ground to cancel the lease.
b) No, the lessor cannot have the lease cancelled for alleged violation of the provision
against assignment. The lessee did not assign the lease, or any portion thereof, to the subsidiaries.
It merely subleased some floors to its subsidiaries. Since the problem does not state that the
contract of lease contains a prohibition against sublease, the sublease is lawful, the rule being that
in the absence of an express prohibition a lessee may sublet the thing leased, in whole or in part,
without prejudice to his/its responsibility to the lessor for the performance of the contract.
Question No. 9:
The complete publication of the Family Code was made on August 4. 1987. On
September 4. 1987, Junior Cruz and Gemma Reyes were married before a municipal mayor. Was
the marriage valid?
1)
2)
Suppose the couple got married on September 1, 1994 at the Manila Hotel before
the Philippine Consul General to Hongkong* who was on vacation in Manila. The couple
executed an affidavit consenting to the celebration, of the marriage at the Manila Hotel. Is the
marriage valid?
Answer:
P
1)
a) Yes, the marriage is valid. The Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. At
the time of the marriage on September 4, 1987, municipal mayors were empowered to solemnize
marriage under the Civil Code of 1950.
2)
a) The marriage is not valid. Consuls and vice- consuls are empowered to
solemnize marriages between Philippine citizens abroad in the consular office of the foreign
country to which they were assigned and have no power to solemnize marriage on Philippine soil.
b) A Philippine consul is authorized by law to solemnize marriages abroad between

Filipino citizens. He has no authority to solemnize a marriage in the Philippines. Consequently, the marriage in question is void, unless either or both of the contracting parties
believed in good faith that the consul general had authority to solemnize their marriage in
which case the marriage is valid.
Question No. 10:
On his deathbed. Vicente was executing a will. In the room were Carissa, Carmela, Comelio
and Atty. Cimpo, a notary public. Suddenly, there was a street brawl which caught Comelios
attention, prompting him to look out the window. Comelio did not see Vicente sign a will. Is the
will valid?
Yes. The will is valid. The law does not require a witness to actually see the testator
sign the will. It is sufficient if the witness could have seen the act of signing had he chosen to do
so by casting his eyes to the proper direction.
a)
Yes, the will is valid. Applying the test of position", although Comelio did not
actually see Vicente sign the will, Comelio was in the proper position to see Vicente sign if
Comelio so wished.
b)
Question No. 11:

In 1978, Bobby borrowed P 1,000,000.00 from Chito payable in two years. The loan, which
was evidenced by a promissory note, was secured by a mortgage on real property. No action was
filed by Chito to collect the loan or to foreclose the mortgage. But in 1991, Bobby, without
receiving any amount from Chito, executed another promissory note which was worded exactly
as the 1978 promissory note, except for the date thereof, which was the date of its execution.
1)
Can Chito demand payment on the 1991 promissory note in 1994?
Can Chito foreclose the real estate mortgage if Bobby fails to make good his obligation
under the 1991 promissory note?
2)
Answer:
Yes, Chito can demand payment on the 1991 promissory note in 1994. Although the
1978 promissory note for PI million payable two years later or in 1980 became a natural
obligation after the lapse of ten (10) years, such natural obligation can be a valid consideration of
a novated promissory note dated in 1991 and payable two years later, or in 1993.
1)
All the elements of an implied real novation are present:

a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
an old valid obligation;

a new valid obligation;
capacity of the parties;
animus novandi or intention to novate; and
The old and the new obligation should be incompatible with each other on all
material points (Article 1292). The two promissory notes cannot stand together,
hence, the period of prescription of ten (10) years has not yet lapsed.
No. The mortgage being an accessory contract prescribed with the loan. The novation of
the loan, however, did not expressly include the mortgage, hence, the mortgage is extinguished
under Article 1296 of the NCC. The contract has been extinguished by the novation or extinction
of the principal obligation insofar as third parties are concerned.
2)
Question No. 12:

Rosa and Ariel were married in the Catholic Church of Tarlac, Tarlac on January 5, 1988. In
1990, Ariel went to Saudi Arabia to work. There, after being converted Into Islam, Ariel married
Mystica. Rosa learned of the second marriage of Ariel on January 1. 1992 when Ariel returned to
the Philippines with Mystica. Rosa filed an action for legal separation on February 5. 1994.
1)
Does Rosa have legal grounds to ask for legal separation?
2)
Has the action prescribed?
Alternative Answer:
a) Yes, the abandonment of Rosa by Ariel for more than one (1) year is a ground for legal
separation unless upon returning to the Philippines, Rosa agrees to cohabit with Arief which
is allowed under the Muslim Code. In this case, there is condonation.
Yes. The contracting of a subsequent bigamous marriage whether in the Philippines
or abroad is a ground for legal separation under Article 55(7) of the Family Code. .Whether the
second marriage is valid or not, Ariel having converted into Islam, is immaterial.
b)
No. Under Article 57 of the Family Code, the aggrieved spouse must file the
action within five (5) years from the occurrence or the cause. The subsequent marriage of Ariel
could not have occurred earlier than 1990, the time he went to Saudi Araibia. Hence, Rosa has
until 1995 to bring the action under the Family Code.
1)
Question No. 13;

In 1991, Victor established judicially out of conjugal property, a family home in Manila
worth P200,000.00 and extrajudicially a second family home in Tagaytay worth P50,000.00.
Victor leased the family home in Manila to a foreigner. Victor and his family transferred to
another house Of his in Pasig.
Can the two family homes be the subject of execution on a judgment against Victors wife
for non-payment of the purchase in 1992 of household appliances?
Answer:
The two (2) so-called family homes can be the subject of execution. Neither of the abodes
are considered family homes because for purposes of availing the benefits under the Family
Code, there can only be one (1) family home which is defined as the dwelling house where the
husband and the wife and their family actually reside" and the land on which it is situated. (Arts.
152 and 161, Family Code)
Question No. 14:

On January 5, 1992, Nonoy obtained a loan of PI,000,000.00 from his friend Rally. The
promissory note did not stipulate any payment for interest. The note was due on January 5, 1993
but before this date the two became political enemies. Nonoy, out of spite, deliberately
defaulted in paying the note, thus forcing Raffy to sue him.
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
What actual damages can Rafly recover?

Can Raffy ask for moral damages from Nonoy?
Can Raffy ask for nominal damages?
Can Raffy ask for temperate damages?
Can Raffy ask for attorneys fees?
Answer:
Raffy may recover the amount of the promissory note of PI million, together with
interest at the legal rate from the date of judicial or extrajudicial demand. In addition, however,
inasmuch as the debtor is in bad faith, he is liable for all damages which may be reasonably
attributed to the non-performance of the obligation. (Art. 2201(2), NCC).
1)
Yes. under Article 2220, NCC moral damages are recoverable in case of breach of
contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.
2)
Nominal damages may not be recoverable in this case because Raffy may already
be indemnified of his losses with the award of actual and compensatory damages. Nominal
damages are adjudicated only in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or
invaded by the defendant may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.
3)
Raffy may ask for. but would most likely not be awarded temperate damages, for
the reason that his actual damages may already be compensated upon proof thereof with the
promissory note. Temperate damages may be awarded only when the court finds that some
pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved
with certainty. (Article 2224, Civil Code)
4)
5)
Yes, under paragraph 2, Article 2208 of the Civil Code, considering that Nonoy's
act or omission has compelled Raffy to litigate to protect his interests. Furthermore, attorneys
fees may be awarded by tne court when it is Just and equitable. (Article 2208(110) Civil Code).
Question No. 15:
Vini constructed a building on a parcel of land he leased from Andrea. He chattel
mortgaged the land to Felicia. When he could not pay Felicia, Felicia initiated foreclosure
proceedings. Vini claimed that the building he had constructed on the leased land cannot be
validly foreclosed because the building was, by law, an immovable.
Is Vini correct?
The Chattel Mortgage is void and cannot be foreclosed because the building is an
immovable and cannot be an object of a chattel mortgage.
a)
It depends. If the building was intended and is built of light materials, the chattel
mortgage may be considered as valid as between the parties and it may be considered in respect
to them as movable property, since it can be removed from one place to another. But if the
building is of strong material and is not capable of being removed or transferred without being
destroyed, the chattel mortgage is void and cannot be foreclosed.
b)
If it was the land which Vini chattel mortgaged, such mortgage would be void, or
at least unenforceable, since he was not the owner of the land.
c)
If what was mortgaged as a chattel is the building, the chattel mortgage is valid as between
the parties only, on grounds of estoppel which would preclude the mortgagor from assailing the
contract on the ground that its subject-matter is an immovable. Therefore Vini's defense is
untenable, and Felicia can foreclose the mortgage over the building, observing, however, the
procedure prescribed for the execution of sale of ajudgment debtor's immovable under Rule 39,
Rules of Court, specifically, that the notice of auction sale should be published in a newspaper of
general circulation.
The problem that Vini mortgaged the land by way of a chattel mortgage is
untenable. Land can only be the subject matter of a real estate mortgage and only an absolute
owner of real property may mortgage a parcel of land. (Article 2085 (2) Civil Code). Hence, there
can be no foreclosure.
d)
But on the assumption that what was mortgaged by way of chatlel mortgage was the
building on leased land, then the parties are treating the building as chattel. A building that is
not merely superimposed on the ground is an immovable property and a chattel mortgage on
said building is legally void but the parties cannot be allowed to disavow their contract on
account of estoppel by deed. However, if third parties are involved such chattel mortgage is void
and has no efTect.

Question No. 16:
Johnny Matons conviction for homicide was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and. in
addition, although the prosecution had not appealed at all. the appellate court increased the
indemnity for death from P30.000.00 to P50.000.00. On his appeal to the Supreme Court, among
the other things Johnny Maton brought to the high courts attention, was the increase of
indemnity imposed by the Court of Appeals despite the clear fact that the People had not
appealed from the appellate courts judgment.
Is Johnny Maton correct?

In Abejam v. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court said that even if the issue of
damages were not raised by the appellant in the Court of Appeals but the Court of Appeals in its
findings increased the damages, the Supreme Court will not disturb the findings of the Court of
Appeals.
a)
No, the contention of the accused is not correct because upon appeal to the Appellate
Court, the court acquired jurisdiction over the entire case, criminal as well as civil. Since the
conviction of homicide had been appealed, there is no finality in the amount of indemnity
because the civil liability arising from the crime and the judgment on the crime has not yet
become final.
b)
Yes. Since the civil indemnity is an award in the civil action arising from the criminal
offense, the rule that a party cannot be granted affirmative relief unless he himself has appealed
should apply. Therefore, it was error for the Court of Appeals to have expanded the indemnity
since the judgment on the civil liability had become final.
c)
d)
No. Courts can review matters not assigned as errors. (Hydro Resource vs. CA , 204 SCRA
309).
Question No. 17:
Dino sued Ben for damages because the latter had failed to deliver the antique Marcedes
Benz car Dino had purchased from Ben, which wasby agreementdue for delivery on
December 31. 1993. Ben, in his answer to Dino's complaint, said Dino's claim has no basis for the
suit, because as the car was being driven to be delivered to Dino on January 1. 1994, a reckless
truck driver had rammed into the Mercedes Benz. The trial court dismissed Dino's complaint,
saying Ben's obligation had, indeed, been extinguished by force majeure.
Is the trial court correct?

a)
No. Article 1262, New Civil Code provides, An obligation which consists in the
delivery of a determinate thing shall be extinguished if it should be lost or destroyed without the
fault of the debtor, and before he has incurred in delay.
The judgment o'f the trial court is incorrect. Loss of the thing due by fortuitous
events or force majeure is a valid defense for a debtor only when the debtor has not incurred
delay. Extinguishment of liability for fortuitous event requires that the debtor has not yet
incurred any delay. In the present case, the debtor was in delay when the car was destroyed on
January 1, 1993 since it was due for delivery on December 31, 1993. (Art. 1262 Civil Code)
b)
It depends whether or not Ben, the seller, was already in default at the time of the
accident because a demand for him to deliver on due date was not complied with by him. That
fact not having been given in the problem, the trial court erred in dismissing Dino's complaint.
Reason: There is default making him responsible for fortultuous events including the assumption
of risk or loss.
c)
If on the other nand Ben was not in default as no demand has been sent to him prior to the
accident, then we must distinguish whether the price has been paid or not. If it has been paid,
the suit for damages should prosper but only to enable the buyer to recover the price paid. It
should be noted that Ben. the seller, must bear the loss on the principle of res peril domino. He
cannot be held answerable for damages as the loss of the car was not imputable to his fault or
fraud. In any case, he can recover the value of the car from the party whose negligence caused
the accident. If no price has been paid at all, the trial court acted correctly in dismissing the
complaint.
Question No. 18:

Prime Realty Corporation appointed Nestor the exclusive agent in the sale of lots of its
newly developed subdivision. Prime Realty told Nestor that he could not collect or receive
payments from the buyers. Nestor was able to sell ten lots to Jesus and to collect the
downpayments for said lots. He did not turn over the collections to Prime Realty. Who shall bear
the loss for Nestor's defalcation, Prime Realty or Jesus?
Alternative Answer:
The general rule is that a person dealing with an agent must inquire into the authority of
that agent. In the present case, if Jesus did not inquire into that authority, he is liable for the loss
a)
due to Nestors defalcation unless Article 1900, Civil Code governs, in which case the developer
corporation bears the loss.
Art. 1900 Civil Code provides: So far as third persons are concerned, an act is deemed to
have been performed within the scope of the agents authority, if such act is within the terms of
the power of attorney, as written, even if the agent has in fact exceeded the limits of his authority
according to an understanding between the principal and the agent.
However, if Jesus made due inquiiy and he was not Informed by the principal Prime Realty of
the limits of Nestors authority. Prime Realty shall bear the loss.
Considering that Prime Realty Corporation only told" Nestor that he could not receive or
collect payments, it appears that the limitation does not appear in his written authority or power
of attorney. In this case, insofar as Jesus, who is a third person, is concerned, Nestors acts of
collecting payments is deemed to have been performed within the scope of his authority (Article
1900, Civil Code). Hence, the principal is liable.
b)
However, if Jesus was aware of the limitation of Nestor's power as an agent, and Prime
Realty Corporation does not ratify the sale contract, then Jesus shall be liable (Article 1898, Civil
Code).
Question No. 19:
In 1982, Steve borrowed P400.000.00 from Danny, collateralized by a pledge of shares of
stock of Concepcion Corporation worth P800.000.00. In 1983, because of the economic crisis,
the value of the shares pledged fell to only P 100,000.00. Can Danny demand that Steve
surrender the other shares worth P700.000.00?
No. Bilateral contracts cannot be changed unilaterally. A pledge is only a subsidiary
contract, and Steve is still indebted to Danny for the amount of P400.000.00 despite the fall in
the value of the stocks pledged.
a)
No. Dannys right as pledgee is to sell the pledged shares at a public sale and keep the
proceeds as collateral for the loan. There is no showing that the fall in the value of the pledged
property was attributable to the pledgers fault or fraud. On the contrary, the economic crisis was
the culprit. Had the pledgee been deceived as to the substance or quality of the pledged shares
of stock, he would have had the right to claim another thing in their place or to the immediate
payment of the obligation. This is not the case here.
b)
Question No. 20:

Able, a corporation domiciled in State A, but, doing business in the Philippines, hired Eric, a
Filipino engineer, for its project in State B. In the contract of employment executed by the
parties in State B, it was stipulated that the contract could be terminated at the company's will,
which stipulation is allowed in State B. When Eric was summarily dismissed by Able, he sued Able
for damages in the Philippines.
Will the Philippine court apply the contractual stipulation?

Using the significant relationships theory", there are contacts significant to the
Philippines. Among these are that the place of business is the Philippines, the employee
concerned is a Filipino and the suit was filed in the Philippines. thereby Justifying the application
of Philippine law. In the American Airlines case the Court held that when what is involved is
paramount state interest such as the protection of the rights of Filipino laborers, the court can
disregard choice of forum and choice of law. Therefore the Philippine Court should not apply the
stipulation in question.
a)
b) No. Lex/orishould be applied because the suit is filed in Philippine courts and Eric was
hired in the Philippines. The Philippine Constitution affords full protection to labor and the
stipulation as to summary dismissal runs counter to our fundamental and statutory laws.
Question No. 1:
A and B. both 18 years old, were sweethearts studying in Manila. On August 3. 1988, while in
first year college. they eloped. They stayed in the house of a mutual friend in town X. where they
were able to obtain a marriage license. On August 30, 1988, their marriage was solemnized by
the town mayor of X in his office. Thereafter, they returned to Manila and continued to live separately in their respective boarding houses, concealing from their parents, who wero living in the
province what they had done. In 1992. after graduation from college. A and B decided to break
their relation and parted ways. Both went home to their respective towns to live and work.
Was the marriage of A and B solemnized on August 30, 1988 by the town mayor of X in
his office a valid marriage? Explain your answer.
1)
Answer:
The marriage of A and B is void because the solemnizing officer had no legal authoiity to
solemnize the marriage. But if either or both parties believed in good faith that the solemnizing
officer had the legal authority to do so. the marriage is voidable because the marriage between
the parties, both below 21 years of age, was solemnized without the consent of the parents. (Art.
35. par. (2) and Art. 45 par. (1). Family Code)
Can either or both of them contract marriage with another person without committing
bigamy? Explain your answer.
2)
Answer:
Either or both of the parties cannot contract marriage in the Philippines with another
person without committing bigamy, unless there is compliance with the requirements of Article
52 Family Code, namely: there must be a judgment of annulment or absolute nullity of the marriage, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the delivery of their
childrens presumptive legitimate which shall be recorded in the appropriate Civil Registry and
Registry of Property, otherwise the same shall not aiTect third persons and the subsequent
marriage shall be null and void. (Arts. 52 and 53. Family Code)
Alternative Answer:
Yes, they can. The subsequent marriage contracted by one of the parties will not give rise to
bigamy even in the absence of a court declaration of nullity of the first marriage. The subsistence
of a prior valid marriage is an indispensable element of the crime of bigamy. The prior court
declaration of nullity of the first marriage is required by the Family Code only for the purpose of
the validity of the subsequent marriage, not as an element of the crime of bigamy.
Question No. 2:
A is the acknowledged natural child of B who died when A was already 22 years old. When
Bs full blood brother, C, died he (C) was survived by his widow and four children of his other
brother, D. Claiming that he is entitled to inherit from his fathers brother, C. A brought suit to
obtain his share in the estate of C.
Will his action prosper?
Answer:
No, the action of A will not prosper. On the premise that B, C and D are legitimate brothers,
as an illegitimate child of B, A cannot inherit in intestacy from C who is a legitimate brother of B.
Only the wife of C in her own right and the legitimate relatives of C (i.e. the children of D as Cs
legitimate nephews inheriting as collateral relatives) can inherit in intestacy. fArts. 992, 1001.
1005 and 975, Civil Code)
Alternative Answer:
The action of A will not prosper. Being an illegitimate. he is barred by Article 992 of the Civil
Code from inheriting ab intestato from the legitimate relatives of his father.
Question No. 3:
A. a Filipino, executed a will in Kuwait while there as a contract worker. Assume that under
the laws of Kuwait, It is enough that the testator aiTix his signature in the presence of two
witnesses and that the will need not be acknowledged before a notary public.
May the will be probated in the Philippines?
Answer:
Yes. Under Articles^SlS and 17 of the Civil Code, the formality of the execution of a will is
governed by the law of the place of execution. If the will was executed with the formalities
prescribed by the laws of Kuwait and valid there as such, the will is valid and may be probated in
the Philippines.
Question No. 4:
In 1937, A obtained a loan of P20.000.00 from the National City Bank of New York, an
American-owned bank doing business in the Philippines. To guarantee payment of his
obligation, A constituted a real estate mortgage on his 30-hectare parcel of agricultural land. In
1939, before he could pay his obligation, A died intestate leaving three children. B, a son by a
first marriage, and C and D, daughters by a second marriage. In 1940, the bank foreclosed the
mortgage for non-payment of the principal obligation. As the only bidder at the extrajudicial
foreclosure sale, the bank bought the properly and was later issued a certificate of sale. The war
supervened in 1941 without the bank having been able to obtain actual possession of the
property which remained with As three children who appropriated for themselves the income
from it. In 1948, B bought the properly from the bank using the money he received as backpay
lrom the U. S. Government, and utilized the same in agri-business. In 1960, as B's business
flourished. C and D sued B for partition and accounting of the income of the properly, claiming
that as heirs of their father they were co-owners thereof and offering to reimburse B for
whatever he had paid in purchasing (he properly from ihe bank.
In brief, bow will you answer the complaint of C and D, if you were engaged by B as bis
counsel?
Answer:
As counsel of B. 1 shall answer the complaint as follows: When B bought the property, it was
not by a right of redemption since the period therefore had already expired. Hence, B bought the
property in an independent unconditional sale-. C and D are not co-owners with B of the
property. Therefore, the suit of C and D cannot prosper.
Alternative Answer:
As counsel of B, I shall answer the complaint as follows: From the facts described, it would
appear that the Certificate of sale has not been registered. The one-year period of redemption
begins to run from registration. In this case, it has not yet even commenced. Under the Rules of
Court, the properly may be released by the Judgment debtor or his successor in interest. (Sec-.
29. Rule 27). It has been held that this includes a joint owner. (Ref. Magno vs.Ciola. 61 Phil. 80).
Question No. 5:
A, about to leave the country on a foreign assignment, entrusted to B his brand new car and
its certificate of registration. Falsifying A's signature. B sold A's car to C for P200.000.00. C then
registered the car in his name. To complete the needed amount, C borrowed P 100,000.00 from
the savings and loan association in his office, constituting a chattel mortgage on the car. For
failure of C to pay the amount owed, the savings and loan association filed in the RTC a complaint
for collection with application for issuance of a writ of replevin to obtain possession of the
vehicle so that the chattel mortgage could be foreclosed. The RTC issued the writ of replevin. The
car was then seized from C and sold by the sheriff at public auction at which the savings and loan
association was the lone bidder. Accordingly, the car was sold to it. A few days later. A arrived
from his foreign assignment. Learning of what happened to his car, A sought to recover possession and ownership of it from the savings and loan association.
Can A recover his car from the savings and loan association? Explain your answer.
Answer:
Under the prevailing rulings of the Supreme Court, A can recover the car from the Savings
and Loan Association provided he pays the price at which the Association bought the car at a
public auction. Under that doctrine, there has been an unlawful deprivation by B of A of his car
and. therefore, A can recover It from any person in possession thereof.. But since it was bought at
a public auction in good faith by the Savings and Loan Association, he must reimburse the
Association at the price for which the car was bought.
Alternative Answer:
Yes. A can recover his car from the Savings and Loan Association. In a Chattel Mortgage, the
mortgagor must be the absolute owner of the thing morgaged. Furthermore. the person
constituting the mortgage must have the free disposal of the property, and in the absence
thereof, must be legally authorized for the purpose. In the case at bar, these essential requisites
did not apply to the mortgagor B. hence the Chattel Mortgage was not valid.
Question No. 6:
On January 2, 1986, A executed a deed of donation Inter vivos of a parcel of land to Dr. B
who had earlier constructed thereon a building in which researches on the dreaded disease
AIDS were being conducted. The deed, acknowledged before a notary public, was handed over
by A to Dr. B who received it. A few days after, A flew to Davao City. Unfortunately, the airplane
he was riding crashed on landing killing him. Two days after the unfortunate accident. Dr. B,
upon advice of a lawyer, executed a deed acknowledged before a notary public accepting the
donation.
Is the donation effective? Explain your answer.
Answer:
No, the donation is not effective. The law requires that the separate acceptance of the
donee of an immovable must be done in a public document during the lifetime of the donor (Art.
746 & 749, Civil Code) In this case, B executed the deed of acceptance before a notary public
after the donor had already died.
Question No. 7:
Maria, to spite her husband Jorge, whom she suspected was having an affair with another
woman, executed a will, unknown to him, bequeathing all the properties she inherited from her
parents, to her sister Miguela. Upon her death, the will was presented for probate. Jorge opposed
probate of the will on the ground that the will was executed by his wife without his knowledge,
much less consent, and that it deprived him of his legitime. After all, he had given her no cause
for disinheritance, added Jorge in his opposition.
How will you rule on Jorges opposition to the probate of Marias will, if you were the Judge?
Answer:
As Judge, I shall rule as follows: Jorges opposition should be sustained in part and denied in
part. Jorges omiss'ion as spouse of Maria is not preterition of a compulsory heir in the direct line.
Hence, Art. 854 of the Civil Code does not apply, and the institution of Miguela as heir is valid,
but only to the extent of the free portion of one- hay. Jorge is still entitled to one-half of the
estate as his legitime. (Art. 1001, Civil Code)
As Judge, I shall rule as follows: Jorges opposition should be sustained in part and
denied in part. This is a case of ineffective disinheritance under Art. 918 of the Civil Code,
a)
because the omission of the compulsory heir Jorge by Maria was intentional. Consequently, the
institution of Miguela as heir is void only insofar as the legitime of Jorge is prejudiced.
Accordingly. Jorge is entitled to his legitime of one-half of the estate, and Miguela gets the other
half.
As Judge. I shall rule as follows: Jorges opposition should be sustained. This is a
case of preterition under Article 854 Civil Code. The result of the omission of Jorge as compulsory
heir having the same right equivalent to a legitimate child in the direct line" is that total intestacy will arise, and Jorge will inherit the entire estate.
b)
As Judge, I shall rule as follows: the opposition should be denied since it is predicated
upon causes not recognized by law as grounds for disallowance of a will, to wit:
c)
1)
that the will was made without his knowledge.
2)
that the will was made without his consent; and
3)
that it has the effect of depriving him of his legitime, which is a ground that goes
into the intrinsic validity of the will and need not be resolved during the probate
proceedings. However, the opposition may be entertained for the purpose of
securing to the husband his right to the legitime on the theoiy that the will
constitutes an ineffective disinheritance under Art. 918 of the Civil Code.
As Judge, I shall rule as follows: Jorge is entitled to receive his legitime from the
estate of his wife. He was not disinherited in the will even assuming that he gave ground for
disinheritance, hence', he is still entitled to his legitime. Jorge, however, cannot receive
anything from the free portion. He cannot claim preterition as he is not a compulsory heir in the
direct line. There being no preterition, the institution of the sister was valid and the only right of
Jorge is to claim his legitime.
d)
Question No. 8:
LT applied with.BPI to purchase a house and lot in Quezon City, one of its acquired assets.
The amount offered was PI,000.000.00 payable, as follows: P200.000.00 down payment, the
balance of P800.000.00 payable within 90 days from June 1, 1985. BPI accepted the offer,
whereupon LT drew a check for P200.000.00 in favor of BPI which the latter thereafter
deposited in its account. On September 5, 1985, LT wrote BPI requesting extension until
October 10, 1985, within which to pay the balance, to which BPI agreed. On October 5, 1985,
due to the expected delay in the remittance of the needed amount by his financier from the
United States, LT wrote BPI requesting a last extension until October 30. 1985. within which to
pay the balance. BPI denied LTs request because another had offered to buy the same property
for PI,500,000.00, cancelled its agreement with LT and offered to return to him the amount of
P200,200.00 that LT had paid to it. On October 20. 1985, upon receipt of the amount of
P800.000.00 from his US financier, LT offered to pay the amount by tendering a cashiers check
therefor but which BPI refused to accept. LT then filed a complaint against BPI in the RTC for
specific performance and deposited in court the amount of P800.000.00.
Is BPI legally correct in cancelling its contract with LT?

Answer:
BPI is not correct in cancelling the contract with LT. In Lina Topacio v. Court of Appeals and
BPI Investment (G. R. No. 102606, July 3. 1993, 211 SCRA 291). the Supreme Court held that the
earnest money is part of the purchase price and is proof of the perfection of the contract.
Secondly, notarial or judicial rescission under Art. 1592 and 1991 of the Civil Code is necessary
(Taguba v. de Leon, 132 SCRA 722.)
Alternative Answer:
BPI is correct in cancelling its contract with LT but BPI must do so by way of judicial
rescission under Article 1191 Civil Code. The law requires a judicial action, and mere notice of
rescission is insufficient if it is resisted. The law also provides that slight breach is not a ground for
rescission (Song Fo & Co. vs. Hawaiian Ph.iL Co., 47 Phils. 821). Delay in the fulfillment of the
obligation (Art. 1169, Civil Code) is a ground to rescind, only if time is of the essence. Otherwise,
the court may refuse the rescission if there is a just cause for the fixing of a period.
Question No. 9:
A is the owner of a lot on which he constructed a building in the total cost of P
10.000,000.00. Of that amount B contributed P5.000,000.00 provided that the building as a

whole would be leased to him (B) for a period of ten years from January 1, 1985 to December 31,
1995 at a rental of PI00.000.00 a year. To such condition, A agreed. On December 20. 1990, the
building was totally burned. Soon thereafter, As workers cleared the debris and started
construction of a new building. B then served notice upon A that he would occupy the building
being constructed upon completion, for the unexpired portion of the lease term, explaining that
he had spent partly for the construction of the building that was burned. A rejected Bs demand.
*
Did A do right in rejecting Bs demand?

Answer:
Yes, A was correct in rejecting the demand of B. As a result of the total destruction of the
building by fortuitu- ous event, the lease was extinguished. (Art. 1655, Civil Code.)
Question No. 10:
A, B and C formed a partnership for the purpose of contracting with the Government in the
construction of one of its bridges. On June 30, 1992, after completion of the project, the bridge
was turned over by the partners to the Government. On August 30, 1992, D. a supplier of
materials used in the project sued A for collection of the indebtedness to him. A moved to dismiss
the complaint against him on the ground that it was the ABC partnership that is liable for the
debt. D replied that ABC partnership was dissolved upon completion of the project for which
purpose the partnership was formed.
Will you dismiss the complaint against B if you were the judge?
Answer:
As Judge. I would not dismiss the complaint against
A. because A is still liable as a general partner for his pro
rata share of 1/3 (Art. 1816, C. C.). Dissolution of a partnership caused by the termination of the
particular undertaking specified in the agreement does not extinguish obligations, which must be
liquidated during the winding up" of the partnership affairs (Articles 1829 and 1830, par. 1-a,
Civil Code).
Question No. 11:
In 1971, Able Construction, Inc. entered into a contract with Tropical Home Developers, Inc.
whereby the former would build for the latter the houses within its subdivision. The cost of each
house, labor and materials included, was P 100,000.00. Four hundred units were to be
constructed within five years. In 1973, Able found that it could no longer continue with the job
due to the Increase in the price of oil and its derivatives and the concomitant worldwide spiralling
of prices of all commodities, including basic raw materials required for the construction of the
houses. The cost of development had risen to unanticipated levels and to such a degree that the
conditions and factors which formed the original basis of the contract had been totally changed.
Able brought suit against Tropical Homes praying that the Court relieve it of its obligation.
Is Able Construction entitled to the relief sought? Answer:
Yes, the Able Construction, Inc. is entitled to the relief sought under Article 1267, Civil
Code. The law provides: When the service has become so difficult as to be manifestly beyond the
contemplation of the parties, the obligor may also be released therefrom, in whole or in part."
Question No. 12:
On January 2, 1980, A and B entered into a contract whereby A sold to B a parcel of land for
and in consideration of P 10,000.00, A reserving to himself the right to repurchase the same.
Because they were friends, no period was agreed upon for the repurchase of the property.
1)
Until when must A exercise his right of repurchase?
If A fails to redeem the property within the allowable period, what would you advise B
to do for his better protection?
2)
Answer:
A can exercise his right of repurchase within four (4) years from the date of the contract
(Art. 1606, Civil Code).
1)
I would advise B to file an action for consolidation of title and obtain a judicial order of
consolidation which must be recorded in the Registry of Property (Art. 1607, Civil Code).
2)
Question No. 13:
In September, 1972, upon declaration of martial rule in the Philippines, A, together with his
wife and children, disappeared from his residence along A. Mabini Street. Ermita, Manila. B. his
immediate neighbor, noticing that mysterious disappearance of A and his family, closed the
doors and windows of his house to prevent it from being burglarized. Years passed without B
hearing from A and his family. B continued taking care of A's house, even causing minor repairs
to be done at his house to preserve it. In 1976, when business began to perk up in the area, an
enterprising man, C, approached B and proposed that they build stores at the ground floor of the
house and convert its second floor into a pension house. B agreed to Cs proposal and together
they spent for the construction of stores at the ground floor and the conversion of the second
floor into a pension house. While construction was going on. fire occurred at a nearby house.
The houses at Hie entire block, including A's. were burned. After the EDSA revolution in February
1986. A and his family returned from the United Stales where they took refuge in 1972. Upon
learning of what happened to his house. A sued B for damages. B pleaded as a defense that he
merely look charge of his house under the principle of neqoliorwn yeslio. He was not liable as
the burning of the house is a fortuitous event.
Is B liable to A for damages under the foregoing circumstances?
Answer
No, B is not liable for damages, because he is a gestor in negotiorum gestio (Art. 2144, Civil
Code)
Furthermore, B is not liable to A because Article 2147 of the Civil Code is not applicable.
B did not undertake risky operations which the owner was not accustomed to embark upon:
a)
he has not preferred his own interest to that of the owner:
he has not failed to return the property or business after demand by the owner; and
c) he has not assumed the management in bad faith.
b)
Alternative Answer:
He would be liable under Art.2147 (1) of the Civil Code, because he used the property for an
operation which the operator is not accustomed to, and in so doing, he exposed the house to
increased risk, namely the operation of a pension house on the second floor and stores on the first
floor.
Question No. 14:
Peter Co, a trader from Manila, has dealt business with Allied Commodities in Hongkong for
five years. All through the years. Peter Go accumulated an indebtedness of P500,000.00 with
Allied Commodities. Upon demand by its agent in Manila, Peter Co paid Allied Commodities by
check the amount owed. Upon deposit in the payees account in Manila, the check was
dishonored for insufficiency of funds. For and in consideration of PI.00, Allied Commodities
assigned the credit to Hadji Butu who brought suit against Peter Co in the RTC of Manila for
recoveiy of the amount owed. Peter Co moved to dismiss the complaint against him on the
ground that Hadji Butu was not a real party in interest and. therefore, without legal capacity to
sue and that he had not agreed to a subrogation of creditor.
Will Peter Cos defense of absence of agreement to a subrogation of creditor prosper?

Answer:
No, Cos defense will not prosper. This is not a case of subrogation, but an assignment of
credit. Assignment of credit is the process of transferring the right of the assignor to the
assignee. The assignment may be done either gratuitously or onerously, in which case, the
assignment has an effect similar to that of a sale {Nyco Sales Corp.v.BA Finance Corp. G.R.
No.71694, Aug. 16, 1991 200 SCRA 637). As a result of the assignment, the. plaintiff acquired all
the rights of the assignor including the right to sue in his own. name as the legal assignee. In
assignment, the debtor^ consent is not essential for the validity of the assignment (Art. 1624;
1475, CC; Rodriguez v. CA, et al, G. R No. 84220. March 25, 1992 207 SCRA 553).
Alternative Answer:
No, the defense of Peter Co will not prosper. Hadji Butu validly acquired his right by
anassignment of credit under Article 1624 of the Civil Code. However, the provisions on the
contract of sale (Article 1475 Civil Code) will apply, and the transaction is covered by the Statute
of Frauds. (Art. 1403 par. (2) Civil Code)
Question No. 15:
Julio and Lea, both 18 years old, were sweethearts. At a party at the house of a mutual
friend. Lea met Jake, also 18 years old, who showed interest in her. Lea seemed to entertain Jake
because she danced with him many times. !n a fit of jealousy, Julio shot Jake with his fathers 38
caliber revolver which, before going to the party he was able to get from the unlocked drawer
inside his fathers bedroom. Jake died as a result of the lone gunshot wound he sustained. His
parents sued Julios parents for damages arising from quasi-delict. At the time of the incident,
Julio was 18 years old living with his parents. Julios parents moved to dismiss the complaint
against them claiming that since Julio was already of majority age, they were no longer liable for
his acts.
1)
Should the motion to dismiss be granted? Why*?
2)
What is the liability of Julios parents to Jakes parents? Explain your answer.
Answer:
No, the Motion to Dismiss should not be granted. Article 236 of the Family Code
as amended by Republic Act 6809, provides in the third paragraph that nothing in this Code
shall be construed to derogate from the duty or responsibility of parents and guardians for
children and wards below twenty-one years or age mentioned in the second and third paragraphs
of Article 2180 of the Civil Code.
1)
The liability of Julios parents to Jakes parents arises from quasi-delict (Arts. 2176 and
2180 Civil Code) and shall cover specifically the following:
a)
P50.000.00 for the death of the son;
b)
such amount as would correspond to lost earning capacity; and
c)
moral damages.
Question No. 16:

Tomas Encamacions 3,000 square meter parcel of land, where he has a plant nursery, is
located just behind Aniceta Magsinos two hectare parcel land. To enable Tomas to have access
to the highway, Aniceta agreed to grant him a road right of way a meter wide through which he
could pass. Through the years Tomas business flourished which enabled him to buy another
portion which enlarged the area of his plant nursery. But he was still landlocked. He could not
bring in and out of his plant nursery a jeep or delivery panel much less a truck that he needed to
transport his seedlings. , He now asked Aniceta to grant him a wider portion of her property, the
price of which he was willing to pay, to enable him to construct a road to have access to his plant
nursery. Aniceta refused claiming that she had already allowed him a previous road right of way.
Is Tomas entitled to the easement he now demands from Aniceta?
Answer:
Art. 651 of the Civil Code provides that the width of the easement must be sufficient to
meet the needs of the dominant estate, and may accordingly change from time to time. It is the
need of the dominant estate which determines the width of the passage. These needs may vary
from time to time. As Tomas' business grows, the need for use of modem conveyances requires
widening of the easement.
Alternative Answer:
The facts show that the need for a wider right of way arose from the increased production
owing to the acquisition by Tomas of an additional area. Under Art. 626 of the Civil Code, the
easement can be used only for the immovable originally contemplated. Hence, the increase in
width is justified and should have been granted.
Question No. 17:
Joaquin Reyes bought from Julio Cruz a residential lot of 300 square meters in Quezon City
for which Joaquin paid Julio the amount of P300,000.00. When the deed was about to be
prepared Joaquin told Julio that it be drawn in the name of Joaquina Roxas, his acknowledged
natural child. Thus, the deed was so prepared and executed by Julio. Joaquina then built a house
on the lot where she, her husband and children resided. Upon Joaquins death, his legitimate
children sought to recover possession and ownership of the lot, claiming that Joaquina Roxas was
but a trustee of their father.
Will the action against Joaquina Roxas prosper? Answer:
Yes, because there is a presumed donation in favor of Joaquina under Art. 1448 of the Civil
Code (De los Santos v. Reyes. 27 January 1992. 206 SCRA 437). However, the donation should be
collated to the hereditary estate and the legitime of the other heirs should be preserved.
Alternative Answer:
Yes, the action against Joaquina Roxas will prosper, but only to the extent of the aliquot
hereditaiy rights of the legitimate children as heirs. Joaquina will be entitled to retain her own
share as an illegitimate child. (Arts. 1440 and 1453. Civil Code; Art. 176, F. C.)
Question No, 18:
A, upon request, loaned his passenger Jeepney to B to enable B to bring his sick wife from
Paniqui. Tarlac to the Philippine General Hospital in Manila for treatment. On the way back to
Paniqui, after leaving his wife at the hospital. people stopped the passenger jeepney. B stopped
for them and allowed them to ride on board, accepting payment from them just as in the case of
ordinary passenger jeepneys plying their route. As B was crossing Bamban, there was an onrush of
lahar from Mt. Pinatubo. The jeep that was loaned to him was wrecked.
What do you call the contract that was entered into by A and B with respect to the
passenger jeepney that was loaned by A to B to transport the latters sick wife to Manila?
1)
2)
3)
1)
Is B obliged to pay A for the use of the passenger jeepney?

Is B liable to A for the loss of the jeepney? Answer;
The contract is called commodatum. (Art. 1933, Civil Code)
No, B is not obliged to pay A for the use of the passenger jeepney because
commodatum is essentially gratuitous. (Art. 1933, Civil Code)
2)
Yes, because B devoted the thing to a purpose different from that for which it has
been loaned (Art. 1942, par. 2, Civil Code)
3)
Alternative Answer:
No, because an obligation which consists in the delivery of a determinate thing shall be
extinguished if it should be lost or destroyed without the fault of the debtor, and before he has
incurred in delay. (Art. 1262, Civil Code)
Question No, 19:
Maria and Luis, both Filipinos, were married by a Catholic priest in Lourdes Church, Quezon
City in 1976. Luis was drunk on the day of his wedding. In fact, he slumped at the altar soon after
the ceremony. After marriage, Luis never had a steady Job because he was drunk most of the
time. Finally, he could not get employed at all because of drunkenness. Hence, it was Maria who
had to earn a living to support herself and her child begotten with Luis. In 1986, Maria filed a
petition in the church matrimonial court in Quezon City to annul her marriage with Luis on the
ground of psychological incapacity to comply with his marital obligation. Her petition was
granted by the church matrimonial court.
Can Maria now get married legally to another man under Philippine laws after her
marriage to Luis was annulled by the church matrimonial court? Explain.
1)
2)
What must Maria do to enable her to get married lawfully to another man under
Philippine laws?
Answers:
No, Maria cannot validly contract a subsequent marriage without a court
declaration of nullity of the first marriage. The law does not recognize the church declaration of
1)
nullity of a marriage.
To enable Maria to get married lawfully to another man, she must obtain a
Judicial declaration of nullity of the prior marriage under Article 36 Family Code.
2)
Question No. 20:

On June 30. 1986, A filed in the RTC of Abra an application for registration of title to a
parcel of land under P. D. No. 1529, claiming that since June 12. 1945, he has
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of said parcel of
land of the public domain which was alienable and disposable, under a bona fide claim of
ownership. After issuance of the notice of initial hearing and publication, as required by law, the
petition was heard on July 29, 1987. On the day of the hearing nobody but the applicant
appeared. Neither was there anyone who opposed the application. Thereupon, on motion of the
applicant, the RTC issued an order of general default and allowed the applicant to present his
evidence. That he did; On September 30, 1989, the RTC dismissed As application for lack of
sufficient evidence. A appealed to the Court of Appeals.
The appellant urged that the RTC erred in dismissing his application for registration and in
not ordering registration of his title to the parcel of land in question despite the fact that there
was no opposition filed by anybody to his application.
Did the RTC commit the error attributed to it?
/
Answer:
No, the RTC did not commit the error attributed to it. In an application for Judicial
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title to public agricultural land under Section 48 of the
Public Land Act, the lack of opposition and the consequent order of default against those who
did not answer or show up on the date of Initial hearing, does not guarantee the success of the
application. It is still incumbent upon the applicant to prove with well nigh incontrovertible
evidence that he has acquired a title to the land that is fit for registration. Absent such
registrable title, it is the clear duty of the Land Registration Court to dismiss the application and
declare the land as public land.
An application for land registration is a proceeding in rem. Its main objective is to establish
the status of the res whether It is still part of our public domain as presumed under the Regalian
doctrine or has acquired the character of a private property. It is the duty of the applicant to
overcome that presumption with sufficient evidence.

Question No. 1:
In 1989, Maris, a Filipino citizen, married her boss Johnson, an American citizen, in Tokyo in
a wedding ceremony celebrated according to Japanese laws. One year later, Johnson returned to
his native Nevada, and he validly obtained in that state an absolute divorce from his wife Maris.
After Maris received the final judgment of divorce, she married her childhood sweetheart
Pedro, also a Filipino citizen, in a religious ceremony in Cebu City celebrated according to the
formalities of Philippine law. Pedro later left for the United States and became naturalized as an
American citizen. Maris followed I*edro to the United States, and after a serious quarrel, Maris
filed a suit and obtained a divorce decree issued by the court in the state of Maryland.
Maris then returned to the Philippines and in a civil ceremony celebrated in Cebu City
according to the formalities of Philippine law, she married her former classmate Vincent likewise
a Filipino citizen.
Was the marriage of Maris and Johnson valid when celebrated? Is their marriage
still validly existing now? Reasons.
a)
Was the marriage of Maris and Pedro valid when celebrated? Is their marriage still
valid existing now? Reasons.
b)
Was the marriage of Maris and Vincent valid when celebrated? Is their marriage
still validly existing now? Reasons.
c)
d)
At this point in time, who is the lawful husband of Maris? Reasons.
Answer:
(a) The marriage of Marts and Johnson was valid when celebrated because all marriages
solemnized outside the Philippines (Tokyo) in accordance with the laws in force in the country
where they are solemnized (Japan), and valid there as such, are also valid in the Philippines.
Their marriage no longer validly subsists, because it has been dissolved by the absolute
divorce validly obtained by Johnson which capacitated Maris to remarry (Art. 26. Family Code).
The marriage of Maris and Pedro was valid when celebrated because the divorce
validly obtained by Johnson in Manila capacitated Maris to marry Pedro.
(b)
The marriage of Maris and Pedro is still validly existing, because the marriage has not been
validly dissolved by the Maryland divorce (Art. 26, Family Code).
The marriage of Maris and Vincent is void ab initio because it is a bigamous
marriage contracted by Maris during the subsistence of her marriage with Pedro (Art. 25 and 41,
(c)
Family Code).
The marriage of Maris and Vincent does not validly exist because Article 26 does not apply.
Pedro was not a foreigner at the time of his marriage with marts and the divorce abroad (in
Maryland) was initiated and obtained not by the alien spouse, but by the Filipino spouse. Hence,
the Maryland divorce did not capacitate Maris to marry Vincent.
At this point in time, Pedro is still the lawful husband of Maris because their valid
marriage has not been dissolved by any valid cause (Art. 26, Family Code).
(d)
Question No. 2:
In 1989, Rico, then a widower forty (40) years of age, cohabited with Cora, a widow thirty
(30) years of age. While living together, they acquired from their combined earnings a parcel of
riceland.
After Rico and Cora separated, Rico lived together with Mabel, a maiden sixteen (16) years
of age. While living together, Rico was a salaried employee and Mabel kept house for Rico and
did full-time household chores for him. During their cohabitation, a parcel of coconut land was
acquired by Rico from his savings.
After living together for one (1) year, Rico and Mabel separated. Rico then met and married
Letty, a single woman twenty-six (26) years of age. During the marriage of Rico and Letty. Letty
bought a manago orchard out of her own personal earnings.
a)
Who would own the riceland, and what property regime governs the ownership?
Explain.
Who would own the coconut land, and what property regime governs the
ownership? Explain.
b)
Who would own the mango orchard, and what property regime governs the
ownership? Explain.
c)
Answer:
Rico and Cora are the co-owners of the riceland. The regime is that of coownership (Art. 147, Family Code, first paragraph).
(a)
(Optional Addendum: However, alter Ricos marriage to Letty. the half interest of Rico in
the riceland will then become absolute community property of Rico and Letty.)
Rico is the exclusive owner of the coconut land. The regime is a sole/single
proprietorship (Art. 148, Family Code, first paragraph is applicable, ahd not Art. 147 Family
Codek
(b)
(Optional Addendum: However, alter Rico's marriage to Letty, the coconut land of Rico will
then become absolute community property of Rico and Letty.)
Rico and Letty are the co-owners. The regime is the Absolute Community of
Property (Arts. 75,90 and 91, Family Code).
(c)
Question No. 3:
In June 1988, X obtained a loan from A and executed with Y as solidary co-maker a promissory
note in favor of A for the sum of P200.000.00. The loan was payable at P20,000.00 with interest
monthly within the first week of each month beginning July 1988 until maturity in April 1989 To
secure the payment of the loan, X put up as security a chattel mortgage on his car, a Toyota
Corolla sedan. Because of failure of X and Y to pay the principal amount of the loan, the car was
extrajudlcially foreclosed. A acquired the car at As highest bid of PI20.000.00 during the auction
sale.
After several fruitless letters of demand against X and Y, A sued Y alone for the discovery of
P80.000.00 constituting the deficiency.
Y resisted the suit raising the following defenses:
a)
That Y should not be liable at all because X was not sued together with Y.
That the obligation has been paid completely by A?s acquisition of the car through
dacion en pago" or payment by cession.
b)
That Y should not be held liable for the deficiency of P80.000.00 because he was not a comortgagor in the chattel mortgage of the car. which contract was executed by X alone as owner
and mortgagor.
c)
d)
That assuming that Y is liable, he should only pay the proportionate sum of P40.000.00.
Decide each defense with reasons.
Answer:
This first defense of Y is untenable. Y is still liable as solidary debtor. The creditor
may proceed against any one of the solidary debtors. The demand against one does not preclude
further demand against the others so long as the debt is not fully paid.
(a)
The second defense of Y is untenable. Y is still liable. The chattel mortgage is only
given as a security and not as payment for the debt in case of failure to pay. Y as a solidary comaker is not relieved of further liability on the promissory note as a result of the foreclosure of
(b)
the chattel mortgage.

The third defense of Y is untenable. Y is a surety of X and the extrajudicial demand
against the principal debtor is not inconsistent with a judicial demand against the surety. A
suretyship may co-exist with a mortgage.
(c)
The fourth defense of Y iis untenable. Y is liable for the entire prestation since Y
incurred a solidary obligation with X.
(a)
(Arts. 1207. 1216, 1252 and 2047 Civil Code; Bicol Savings and Loan Associates vs.
Guinhawa 188 SCRA 642)
Question Number 4:
A owns a parcel of residential land worth P500.000.00 Unknown to A, a residential house

costing P 100.000.00 is built on the entire parcel by B who claims ownership of the land. Answer
all the following questions based on the premise that B is a builder in good faith and A is a
landowner in good faith.
a)
May A acquire the house built by B? If so, how?
If the land increased in value to P500.000.00 by reason of the building of the

house thereon, what amount should be paid by A in order to acquire the house from B?
b)
Assuming that the cost ofthe house wasP900.000.00 and not P 100,000.00, may A
require B to buy the land?
c)
If B voluntarily buys the land as desired by A, under what circumstances may A

nevertheless be entitled to have the house removed?
d)
In what situation may a forced lease" arise between A and B, and what terms and
conditions would govern the lease?
e)
Give reasons for your answers.
Answer:
Yes, A may acquire the house build by B by paying indemnity to B. Article 448 of the Civil
Code provides that the owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in
good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after
payment of the indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 545 of the Civil Code.
(a)
1. A undertook the repair of the foundation of the house, then tilting to one side, to prevent
the house from collapsing.

2.
B and C mortgaged the house and lot to secure a
3.
B engaged a contractor to build a concrete fence all around the lot.
4.
C built a beautiful grotto in the garden.
5.
A and C sold the land to X for a very good price.
loan.
Is A's sole decision to repair the fou ndation ofthe house binding on B and C? May
A require B and C to contribute their 2/3 share of the expense? Reasons.
a)
b)
What is the legal effect of the mortgage contract executed by B and C? Reasons.
Is Bs sole decicion to build the fence binding upon A and C? May B require A and
C to contribute their 2/ 3 share of the expense? Reasons.
c)
Is Cs sole decision to build the grotto binding upon A and B? May C require A and
B to contribute their 2/ 3 share of the expense? Reasons.
d)
e)
What are the legal effects of the contract of sale executed by A. C and X? Reasons.
Answer:
(a) Yes. As sole decision to repair the foundation is binding upon B and C must contribute 2/3 of
the expense. Each co-owner has the right to compel the other co-owners to contribute to the
expense of preservation of the thing (the house) owned in common in proportion to their
respective interests (Arts. 485 and 488, Civil Code).
(b)The mortgage shall not bind the 1/3 right and interest of A and shall be deemed to cover only
the rights and interests of B and C in the house and lot. The mortgage shall be limited to the
portion (2/3) which may be allocated to B and C in the partition (Art. 493, Civil Code).
Bs sole decision to build the concrete fence is not binding upon A and C.
Expenses to improve the thing owned in common must be decided upon by a majority of the coowners who represent the controlling interest (Arts. 489 and 492, Civil Code).
(a)
Cs sole decision to build the grotto is not binding upon A and B who cannot be
required to contribute to the expenses for the embellishment of the thing owned in common if
not decided upon by the majority of the co-owners who represent the controlling interest (Arts.
489 and 492, Civil Code).
(b)
(c)
The sale to X stfall not bind the 1/3 share of B and shall be deemed to cover only
the 2/3 share of A arid C in the land (Art. 493, Civil Code). B shall have the right to redeem the
2/3 share sold to X by A and C since X is a third person (Art. 1620, Civil Code).
Question Number 7:
A owned a parcel of unregistered land located on the Tarlac side of the boundary between
Tarlac and Pangasinan. His brother B owned the adjoining parcel of unregistered land on the
Pangasinan side. *
A sold the Tarlac parcel to X in a deed of sale executed as a public instrument by A and X.
After X paid in full the price of the sale, X took possession of the Pangasinan parcel in the belief
that it was the Tarlac parcel covered by the deed of sale executed by A and X.
After twelve (12) years, a controversy arose between B andX on the issue of the ownership
of the Pangasinan parcel.
B claims a vested right of ownership over the Pangasinan parcel because B never sold that
parcel to X or to anyone else.
On the other hand, X claims a vested right of ownership over the Pangasinan parcel by
acquisitive prescription, because X possessed this parcel for over ten (10) years under claim of
ownership.
Decide on this claims, giving your reason
Question Number 8:
A as principal appointed B is his agent granting him general and unlimited management
over A's propeities, stating that A withholds no power from B and that the agent may execute
such acts as he may consider appropriate.
Accordingly, B leased A's parcel of land in Manila to C for four (4) years at P60.000.00 per
year, payable annually in advance.
B leased another parcel of land of A in Caloocan City to D without a fixed term at P3,000.00
per month payable monthly.
B sold to E a third parcel of land belonging to A located in Quezon City for three (3) times
the price that was listed in the inventory by A to B.
All those contracts were executed by B while A was confined due to illness in the Makati
Medical Center.
Rule on the validity and binding ellect of each of the above contracts upon A the principal.
Explain your answers
Answer:
The agency couched in general terms comprised only acts of administration (Art. 1877, Civil
Code). The lease contract on the Manila parcel is not valid, not enforceable and not binding
upon A. For B to lease the property to C, for more than one (1) year, Amust provide B with a
special power of attorney (Art. 1878, Civil Code).
The lease of the Caloocan City property to D is valid and binding upon A. Since the lease is
without a fixed term, it is understood to be from fnonth to month, since the rental is payable
monthly (Art. 1687, Civil Code).
The sale of the Quezon City parcel to E is not valid and not binding upon A. B needed a
special power of attorney to validly sell the land (Arts. 1877 and 1878. Civil Code). The sale of the
land at a very good price does not cure the defect of the contract arising from lack of authority.
Question Number 9:
A.
XandY staged a daring bank robbery in Manila at 10:30

M. in the morning of a regular business day, and escaped with their loot of two (2) bags, each bag
containing P50.000.00.
During their flight to elude the police. X and Y entered the nearby locked house of A, then
working in his Quezon City office. From A's house. X and Y stole a box containing cash totalling
P50.000.00 which box A had been keeping in deposit for his friend B.
In their hurry, X and Y left in A's bedroom one (1) of the bags which they had taken from the
bank.
With X and Y now at large and nowhere to be found, the bag containing P50.000.00 is now
claimed by B, by the Mayor of Manila, and by the bank.
B claims that the depository. A, bv force maieure had obtained the bag of money in place of
the box of money deposited by B.
The Mayor of Manila, on the other hand, claims that the bag of money should be deposited
with the Office of the Mayor as required of the finder by the provisions of the Civil Code.
The bank resists the claims of B and the Mayor of Manila.
To whom should A deliver the bag of money? Decide with reasons.
Answer:
B would have no rignt to claim the money. Article 1990 of the Civil Code is not applicable.
The law refers to another thing received in substitution of the object deposited and is predicated
upon something exchanged.
The Mayor of Manila cannot invoke. Article 719 of the Civil Code which requires the finder
to deposit the thing with the Mayor only when the previous possessor is unknown.
In this case, a must return the bag of money to the bank as the previous possessor and known
owner (Arts. 719 and 1990 Civil Code).
Question Number 10:
As the result of a collision between a public service passenger bus and a cargo truck owned
by D. X sustained physical injuries and Ydied. Both X and Y were passengers of the bus. Both
drivers were at fault, and so X and Z, the only heir and legitimate child of the deceased Y, sued
the owners of both vehicles.
May the owner ofthe bus raise the defense of having exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family?
a)
b)
May D raise the same defense?
May X claim moral damages from both defendants?

d) May Z claim moral damages from both defendants? Give reasons for all your answers.
c)
Answer:
(a) No. The owner of the bus cannot raise the defense because the carrier's liability is based
on breach of contract.
(a)
Yes. D can raise the defense because his liability is based on a quasi-delict.
(b)
Because X suffered physical injuries, X can claim moral damages against D. But as
against the owner of the bus, X can claim moraUdamages only if X proves reckless negligence of
the carrier amounting to fraud.
Z can claim moral damages against both defendants because the rules on
damages arising from death due to a quasi-delict are also applicable to death of a passenger
caused by breach of contract by a common carrier (Arts. 1755. 1756, 1764, 2206 and 2219. Civil
Code).
(c)
Question Number 11:

What are the essential requisites or elements for the allowance of the reopening or review
of a decree of registration?
Answer:
The essential elements are: (1) that the petitioner has a real or dominical right; (2) that he
has been deprived thereof through fraud; (3) that the petition is filed within one (1) year from
th'e issuance of the decree; and (4) that the property has not yet been transferred to an innocent
purchaser (Rublico vs. Orellana 30 SCRA 511; Libudan vs. Gil 45 SCRA 17).
Optional extended answer;

Petition for review of the Decree of Registration. A remedy expressly provided in Section 32 of P.
D. No. 1529
(formerly Section 38, Act 496), this remedy has the following elements:
a~ The petition must be filed by a person claiming dominical or other real rights to the land
registered in the name of respondent.
The registration of the land in the name of respondent was procured by means of actual,
(not just constructive) fraud, which must be extrinsic, Fraud is actual if the registration was made
through, deceit or any other intentional act of downright dishonesty to enrich oneself at the
expense of another. It is extrinsic when it is something that was not raised, litigated and passed
upon in the main proceedings.
b.
c.
The petition must be filed within one (1) year from the date of the issuance of the decree.
Title to the land has not passed to an innocent purchaser for value (Libudan vs. Gil, 45
SCRA 27, 1972), Rublico vs. Orrelana, 30 SCRA 511, 1969); RP vs. CA, 57 G. R. No. 40402, March
d.
16, 1987).
The buyer in good faith of a registered parcel of land does not have to. look beyond
the torrens title in search for any hidden defect or inchaote right which may later invalidate or
diminish his right to what he purchased (Lopez vs. CA, G. R. 49739, January 20, 1989).
1.
Question Number 12:

W, X, Y and Z organized a general partnership with W and X as industrial partners and Y and
Z as capitalist partners. Y contributed P50.000.00 and Z contributed P20.000.00 to the common
fund. By a unanimous vote of the partners, W and X were appointed managing partners, without
any specification of their respective powers and duties.
A applied for the position of Secretary and B applied for the position of Accountant of the
partnership.
The hiring of A was decided upon by W and X, but was opposed by Y and Z.
The hiring of B was decided upon by W and Z, but was opposed by X and Y.
Who of the applicants should be hired by the partnership? Explain and give your reasons.
Answer:
A should be hired as Secretary. The decision for the hiring of A prevails because it is an act
of administration which can be performed by the duly appointed managing partners, W and X.
B cannot be h ired, because in case of a tie in the decision of the managing partner^, the
deadlock must be decided by the partners owning the controlling interest. In this case, the
opposition of X and Y prevails because Y owns the controlling interest (Art. 1801, Civil Code).
Question Number 13:

In fear of repraisals from lawless elements besieging his barangay, X abandoned his
fishpond, fled to Manila and left for Europe. Seeking that the fish in the fishpond were ready for
harvest, Y, who is in the business of managing fishponds on a commission basis, took possession
of the property, harvested the fish and sold the entire harvest to Z.
Thereafter, Y borrowed money from W and used the money to buy new supplies of fish fry
and to prepare the fishpond for the next crop.
a) What is the Juridical relation between X and Y during Xs absence?
Upon the return of X to the barangay, what are the obligations of Y to X as

regards the contract with Z?
b)
c)
Upon Xs return, what are the obligations of X as regards Ys contract with W?
What legal effects will result If X expressly ratifies Ys management and what
would be the obligations ofX in favor of Y?
d)
Answer:
The juridical relation is that of the quasi-contract of negotiorum gestio". Y Is the
gestor" or officious manager" and X is the owner" (Art. 2144, Civil Code).
(a)
Y ihust render an account of his operations and deliver to X the price he received
for the sale of the harvested fish (Art. 2145, Civil Code).
(b)
X must pay the loan obtained by Y from W because X must answer for obligations
contracted with third persons in the interest of the owner (Art. 2150, Civil Code).
(c)
Express ratification by X provides the effects of an express agency and X is liable

to pay the commissions habitually received by the gestor as manager (Art. 2149, Civil Code).
(d)
Question Number 14:

X and Y entered into a contract in Australia, whereby it was agreed that X would build a
commercial building for Y in the Philippines, and in payment for the construction, Y will transfer
and convey his cattle ranch located in the United States in favor of X.
What law would govern:
a) The validity of the contract?
b) The performance of the contract?
c) The consideration of the contract?
Answer:
The validity of the contract will be governed by Australian law, because the validity
refers to the element of the making of the contract in this case:
(a)
(Optional Addendum: . . . unless the parties agreed to be bound by another law".)

(b) The
performance will be governed by the law of the Philippines where the contract is to
be performed.
The consideration will be governed by the law of the United States where the ranch is
located.
(c)
(Optional Addendum: In the foregoing cases, when the foreign law would apply, the absence
of proof of that foreign law would render Philippine law applicable under the eclectic theory".)

Question Number 1:
A. How does the 1987 Consitution strengthen the family as an institution?
B. Do the Constitutional policy on the family and the provision that marriage is the
foundation ofthe family and shall be protected by the State bar Congress from enacting a law
allowing divorce in the Philippines?
Answer:
A.
Sec. 2, Article II of the Constitution provides that:
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall wqually protect the life of the mother and
the life of the unbom from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the
rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the
support of the Government.
Section I, Article XV, further provides that:
The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation.
Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total
development.
(Note: The Committee recommends that a citation of either one of the provisions be credited as a
Complete answer).
Answer:
No, the Constitutional policy, as well as the support - ing provision, does not amount to a
prohibition to Congress to enact a law on divorce. The Constitution only meant to help the
marriage endure, to strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development."
B.
Alternative Answer:
B. Yes, Congress is barred from enacting a law allowing divorce, since Section 2 of Article
XV provides:
Sec. 2 Marriage, as an inviolable social institution is the foundation of the family and shall
be protected by the State
Since marriage is inviolable, it cannot be dissolved by an absolute divorce.
Question Number 3:
Bar Candidates Patricio Mahigugmaon and Rowena Amor decided to marry each other
before the last day of the 1991 Bar Examinations. They agreed to execute a Marriage
Settlement. Rowena herself prepared the document in her own handwriting. They agreed on
the following:
(1) a
conjugal partnership of gains; (2) each donates to the other fifty percent (50%) of his/her present
property; (3) Rowena shall administer the conjugal partnership property; and (4) neither may
bring an action for the annulment or declaration of nullity of their marriage. Both signed the
agreement in the presence of two (2) witnesses. They did not. however, acknowledge it before
a notary public.
As to form, is the Marriage Settlement valid? May it be registered in the
registry of property? If not. what steps must be taken to make it registerable?
(a)
(b)
Are the stipulations valid?
If the Marriage Settlement is valid as to form and the above stipulations are
likewise valid, does it now follow that said Marriage Settlement is valid and
enforceable?
(c)
Answer:
A.
Yes. it is valid as to form, because it is in writing.
No. it cannot be registered in the registry of property because it is not a public

document. To make it registerable. it must be reformed and has to be notarized.
Stipulations (1) ana (3) are valid because they are not contrary to law. Stipulation
(4) is void because it is contrary to law. Stipulation (2) is valid up to 1/5 of their respective
present properties but void as to the excess (Art. 84, Family Code).
B.
No, on September 15, 1991, the marriage settlement

is not yet valid and enforceable until the celebration of the
marriage, to take place before the last day of the' 1991 bar Examinations.
C.
A.
Yes, it is valid as between the parties but not as against third persons. No,
because it is not a public document. To make it registerable, it must be reformed and has to be
notarized.
It depends. As between the parties, stipulations (1) and (3) are valid because they
are not contrary to law. Stipulation (2) is void because it is contrary to law. Stipulation (2) is valid
up to 1/5 of their respective present properties but void as to the excess (Art. 84, Family Code).
B.
Question Number 4:
One of the grounds for annulment of marriage is that either party, at the time of
their marriage was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible disease, found to be serious and
appears incurable. Two (2) years after their marriage .which took place on 10 October 1988.
Bethel discovered that her husband James has a sexually-transmissible disease which he
contracted even prior to their marriage although James did not know it himself until he was
examined two (2)years later when a child was already bom to them. Bethel
sues James for annulment of their marriage. James opposes the annulment on the ground that he did
not even know that he had such a disease so that there was no fraud or bad faith on his part.
A.
Decide.
Suppose that both parties at the time of their marriage were similarly afflicted with
sexually-transmissible diseases, serious and incurable, and both knew of their respective
infirmities, can Bethel or James sue for annulment of their marriage?
B.
Answer
The marriage can be annulled, because good faith is not a defense when the
ground is based upon sexually- transmissible disease on the part of either party.
A.
Yes, the marriage can still be annulled because the fact that both of them are
afflicted with sexually-transmissible diseases does not efface or nullity the ground.
B.
C.
Alternative Answer:
No, the marriage can no longer be annulled, because the fact that both were afflicted
and that both knew of their respective infirmities constitutes a waiver of that ground.
A.
Question Number 5:
In June 1985, James married Mary. In September 1988, he also married Ophelia with
whom he begot two (2) children, A and B. In July 1989, Mary died. In July 1990. he married
Shirley and abndoned Ophelia. During their union, James and Ophelia acquired a residential lot
worth P300.000.00.
Ophelia sues James for bigamy and prays that his marriage with Shirley be declared null
and void. James, on the other hand, claims that since his marriage to Ophelia was contracted
during the existence of his marriage with Mary, the former is not binding upon him. the same
being void ab initio; he further claims that his marriage to Shirley is valid and binding as he was
already legally capacitated at the time
he married her.
Is the contention of James correct?
(b)
What property regime governed the union of James and Ophelia?
(c)
Is the estate of Maiy entitled to a share in the residential lot acquired by James
and Ophelia?
(a)
Answer
A Yes. His marriage to Ophelia is void ab initio because of his subsisting prior marriage to
Mary. His marriage to Shirley, after Marys death, is valid and
Alternative Answer:
A.
No. The contention of James is not correct.
Art. 40, Family Code, provides that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be
invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void." It can be said, therefore, that the marriage of James to Shirley is void
since his previous marriage to Ophelia, although itself void, had not yet been judicially declared
void.
Alternative Answer:
No. The contention of James is not correct. He cannot set up as a defense his own
criminal act or wrongdoing.
A.
Answer:
A.
The provisions of Art 148 of the Family Code, shall govern:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the
properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding
shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of
money and evidences of credit.
B.
It should be distinguished when the property was acquired.
If it was acquired before Marys death, the estate of Mary is entitled to 1/2 of the share
of James.
If it was acquired after Mary's death, there will be no share at all for the estate of Mary.
Question Number 6:
(a)
For purposes of succession, when is death deemed to occur or take place?
(b)
May succession be conferred by contracts or acts inter uiuos? Illustrate.
Is there any law which allows the delivery to compulsory heirs of their
presumptive legitimes during the lifetime of their parents? If so, in what instances?
(c)
Answer:
Death as a fact is deemed to occur when it actually takes place. Death is
presumed to take place in the circumstances under Arts. 390-391 of the Civil Code. The time of
death is presumed to be at the expiration of the 10-year period as prescribed by Article 390 and
at the moment of disappearance under Article 391.
A.
B.
Under Art. 84 ofthe Family Code amending Art, 130 of the Civil Code, contractual
succession is no longer possible since the law now requires that donations of future property be
governed by the provisions on the testamentary succession and formalities of wills.
Alternative Answer:
In the case of Coronado vs. CA(191 SCRA81), it was ruled that no property passes under
a will without its being probated, but may under Article 1058 of the Civil Code of 1898, be
sustained as a partition by an act inter vivos (Many- Oy vs. CA 144 SCRA 33).
A.
And in the case of Chavez vs. LAC (191 SCJRA 211), it was ruled that while the law
prohibits contracts upon future inheritance, the partition by the parent, as provided in Art. 1080,
is a case expressly authorized by law. A person has two options in making a partition of his estate:
either by an act inter vivos or by will. If the partition is by will, it is imperative that such partition
must be executed in accordance with the provisions of the law on wills; if by an act inter vivos,
such partition may even be oral or written, and need not be in the form of a will, provided the
legitime is not prejudiced.
Where several sisters execute deeds of sale over their 1/6 undivided share of the
paraphernal property of their mother, in favor of another sister, with their mother not
only giving her authority . thereto but even signing said deeds, there is a valid partition
inter vivos between the mother and her children which cannot be revoked by the mother.
Said deeds of sale are not contracts entered into with respect to future inheritance.
It would be unjust for the mother to revoke the sales to a son and to execute a
simulated sale in favor of a daughter who already benefited by the partition."
Answer:
Yes, under Arts. 51 and 52 ofthe New Family Code, in case of legal separation,
annulment of marriage, declaration of nullity of marriage and the automatic termination of a
subsequent marriage by the reapperance of the absent spouse, the common or community
property of the spouses shall be dissolved and liquidated.
A.
Art. 51. In said partition, the value of the presumptive legitimes of all common children,
computed as of the date of the final judgment of the trial court, shall be delivered in cash,
property or sound securities, unless the parties, by mutual agreement, judicially approved, had'
already provided for such matters.
The children of their guardian, or the tru stee of their property, may ask for the
enforcement of the judgment.
The delivery of the presumptive legitimes herein prescribed shall in no way prejudice the
ultimate successional rights of the children accruing upon the death of either or both of the
parents; but the value of the properties already
Art. 52. The judgmennt of annulment or of absolute nullity ofthe marriage, the partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the childrens presumptive
legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property; otherwise,
the same shall not affect third
Question Number 7:
A. The Japan Air Lines (JAL). a foreigner corporation licensed to do business in the
Philippines, executed in Manila a contract of employment with Maritess Guapa under which the
latter was hired as a stewardess on the aircraft plying the Manila-Japan-Manila route. The
contrast specifically provides that (1) the duration of the contract shall be two (2) years, (2)
notwithstanding the above duration, JAL may terminate the agreement at any time by giving her
notice in writing ten (10) days iri advance, and (3) the contract shall be construed as governed
under and by the laws of Japan and only the court in Tokyo, Japan shall have the jurisdication to
consider any matter arising from or relating to the contract.
JAL dismissed Maritess on the fourth month of her employment without giving her due
notice. Maritess then filed a complaint with the Labor Arbiter for reinstatement, backwages and
damages. The lawyer of JAL contends that neither the Labor Arbiter nor any other agency or
court in the Philippines has jurisdiction over the case in view ofthe above provision (3) of the
contract which Maritess voluntarily signed. The contract is the law between her and JAL.
Decide the issue.
B. Where under a States own conflicts rule that domestic law of another State should
apply, may the courts of the former nevertheless refuse to apply the latter? If so, under what
circumstance?
Answer:
Labor Legislations are generally intended as expressions of public policy on
employer*employee relations. The contract therefore, between Japan Air Lines (JAL) and Maritess may apply only to the extent that its provisions are not inconsistent with Philippine labor
laws intended particularly to protect employees.
A.
recei
shall
Under the circumstances, the dismissal of Maritess without complying with Philippine Labor
law would be invalid and any stipulation in the contract to the contrary is considered void . Since
the law of the forum in this case is the Philippine law, the issues should be resolved in accordance
with Philippine law.
B.
The third paragraph of Art. 17 of the Civil Code provides that:
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have
for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.
Accordingly, a states own conflict of laws rule may, exceptionally be inapplicable, given
public policy considerations by the law of the forum.
Going into the specific provisions of the contract in question, I would rule as follows:
The duration of the contract is not opposed to Philippine law and it can therefore
be valid as stipulated;
1.
The second provision to the effect that notwithstanding duration, Japan Air Lines
(JAL) may terminate her employment is invalid, being inconsistent with our Labor laws;
2.
- That the contract shall be construed as governed under and by the laws of Japan
and only the courts of Tokyo, Japan shall have jurisdiction, is invalid as clearly opposed to the
aforecited third paragraph of Arts. 17 and 1700 of the Civil Code, which provides:
3.
Art. 1700. The relations between capital and labor are not merely contractuals.
They are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts must yield to the
common good. Therefore, such contracts are subject to the special laws on labor
unions, collective bargaining, strikes and lockouts, closed shop, wages, working
conditions, hours of labor and similar subjects."
Alternative Answer:
A. When a contract has a foreign element such as in the factual setting stated in the problem
where one of the parties is a foreign corporation, the contract can be sustained as valid
particularly the stipulation expressing that the contract is governed by the laws of the foriegn
country. Given this generally accepted principle of international law, the contract between
Maritess and JAL is valid and it should therefore be enforced.
Question Number 8:
Jacob, a Swiss national, married Lourdes, a Filipina, in Berne, Switzerland. Three years later,
the couple decided to reside in the Philippines. Jacob subsequently acquired several properties
in the Philippines with the money he inherited from his parents. Forty years later, Jacob died
intestate, and is survived by several legitimate children and duly recognized illegitimate
daughter Jane, all residing in the Philippines.
Suppose that Swiss law does not allow illegitimate children to inherit, can Jane,
who is a recognized illegitimate child, inherit part of the properties of Jacob under Philippine
law?
(a)
Assuming that Jacob executed a will leaving certain properties to Jane as her
legitime in accordance with the law of succession in the Philippines, will such testamentary
disposition be valid?
(b)
Answer:
A. Yes. As stated in the problem, Swiss law does not allow illegitimate children to inherit.
Hence, Jane cannot inherit the property of Jacob under Philippine law.
B. The testamentary disposition will not be valid if it would contravene Swill law; otherwise,
the disposition would be valid. Unless the Swiss law is proved, it would be presumed to be the
same as that of Philippine law under the doctrine of processual presumption.
Question Number 9:
Roland, a basketball star, was under contract for one year to play-for-play exclusively for
Lady Love. Inc. However, even before the basketball season could open, he was offered a more
attractive pay plus fringes benefits by Sweet Taste, Inc. Roland accepted the offer and transferred
to Sweet Taste. Lady Love sues Roland and Sweet Taste for breach of contract. Defendants claim
that the restriction to play for Lady Love alone is void, hence, unenforceable, as it constitutes an
undue interference with the right of Roland to enter into contracts and the impairment of his
freedom to play and enjoy basketball.
Can Roland be bound by the contract he entered into with Lady Love or can he disregard the
same? Is he liable at all? How about Sweet Taste? Is it liable to Lady Love?
Answer:
Roland is bound by the contract he entered into with Lady Love and he cannot disregard the
same, under the principles of obligatoriness of contracts. Obligations arising from contractis have
the force of law between the parties.
Yes. Roland is liable under the contract as far as Lady Love is concerned.
He is liable for damages under Article 1170 of the Civil Code since he contravened the tenor
of his obligation. Not being a contracting party. Sweet Taste is not bound by the contract but it
can be held liable under Art. 1314. The basis of its liability is not prescribed by contract but is
founded on quasi-delict, assuming that Sweet Taste knew of the contract. Article 1314 of the Civil
Code provides that any third person who induces Another to violate his contract shall be liable for
damages to fhe other contracting party.
Alternative Answer
It is assumed that Lady Love knew of the contract.
Neither Roland nor SweetTaste would be liable, because the restriction in the contract is
violative of ARticle .1306 as being contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy.
Question Number 10:

On 20 December 1970, Juliet, a widow, borrowed'from Romeo P4.000.00 and, as security
therefore, she executed a deed of mortgage over one of her two (2) registered lots which has a
market value of P4 5,000.00. The document and the certificate of title of the property were
delivered to Romeo.
On 2 June 1971, Juliet obtained an additional sum of P3,000.00 from Romeo. On this date,
however, Romeo caused the preparation of a deed of absolute sale of the above property, to
which Juliet affixed her signature without first reading the document. The consideration
indicated is P7.000.00. She thought that this document was similar to the first she signed. When
she reached home, her son X, after reading the duplicate copy of the deed, informed her that
what she signed was not a mortgage but a deed of absolute sale. On the following day, 3 June
1971, Juliet, accompanied by X, went back to Romeo and demanded the reformation it, Romeo
prepared and signed a document wherein, as vendee in the deed of sale above mentioned, he
obligated and bound himself to resell the land to Juliet or her heirs and successors for the same
consideration as reflected in the deed of sale (P7.000.00) within a period of two (2) years, or
until 3 June 1973. It is further stated therein that should the Vendor (Juliet) fail to exercise her
right to redeem within the said period, the conveyance shall be deemed absolute and irrevocable. Romeo did not take possession of the property. He did not pay the taxes thereon.
Juliet died in January 1973 without having repurchased the property. Her only surviving
heir, her sonX, failed to repurchase the property on or before 3 June 1973. in 1975, Romeo sold
the property to Y for P50.000.00. Upon learning of the sale, X filed an action for the
nullification of the sale and for the recovery of the property on the ground
that the so-called deed of absolute sale executed by his mother was merely an equitable
mortgage, taking into account the inadequacy of the price and the failure of Romeo to take
possession of the property and to pay the taxes thereon. Romeo and Y maintain that there was a
valid absolute sale and that the document signed by the former-on 3 June 1973 was merely a
promise to sell.
(a)
If you were the Judge, would you uphold the theory of X?

(b)
If you decide in favor of Romeo and Y, would you uphold the validity of the
promise to sell?
Answer:
I will not uphold the theory of X for the nullification of the sale and for the
recovery of the property on the ground that the so-called sale was only an equitable mortgage.
An equitable mortgage may arise only if, in truth, the sale was one with the right of repurchase.
The facts of the case state that the right to repurchase was granted after the absolute deed of
sale was executed. Following the rule in Cruzo vs. Carriaga (174 SCRA 330), a deed of repurchase
executed independently of the deed of sale where the two stipulations are found in two
instruments instead of one document, the right of repurchase would amount only to one option
granted by the buyer to the seller. Since the contract cannot be upheld as a contract of sale with
the right to repurchase, Art. 1602 of the Civil Code on equitable mortgage will not apply. The rule
could have been different if both deeds were executed on the same occasion or date, in which
case, Cinder the ruling in spouses Claravall v. CA (190 SCRA 439), the contract may still be
sustained as an equitable mortgage, given the circumstances expressed in Art. 1602. The reserved
right to repurchase is then deemed an original intention.
A.
If I were to decide in favor oi Romeo and Y. I would not uphold the validity of the
promise to sell, so as to enforce it by an action for specific performance. The promise to sell
would only amount to a mere offer and, therefore, it is not enforceable unless it was sought to be
exercised before a withdrawal or denial thereof.
B.
Even assuming the facts given at the end of the case, there would have been no separate
consideration for such promise to sell. The contract would at most amount to an option which
again may not be the basis for an action for specific performance.
Question Number 11:

A is the lessee of an apartment owned by Y. A allowed his married but employed daughter B,
whose husband works in Kuwait, to occupy it. The relationship between Y and A soured. Since he
has no reason at all to eject A, Y, in connivance with the City Engineer, secured from the latter an
order for the demolition of the building. A immediately filed an action in the Regionaf Trial Court
to annul the order and to enjoin its enforcement. Y and A were able to forge a compromise
agreement under which A agreed to a twenty percent (20%) increase in the monthly rentals.
They further agreed that the lease will expire two (2) years later and that in the event that Y
would sell the property, either A or his daugther B shall have the right of first refusal. * The
Compromise Agreement was approved by the court. Six (6) months before the expiration of the
lease, A died. Y sold the property to the Visorro Realty Corp. without notifying B. B then filed an
action to rescind the sale in favor of the corporation and to compel Y to sell the property to her
since under the Compromise Agreement, she was given the right of first refusal which, she
maintains, is a stipulation pour atrui under Article 1311 of the Civil Code.
Is she correct?
Answer:
B is not correct. Her action cannot prosper. Article 1311 requires that the third person
intended to be benefited must communicate his acceptance to the obligor before the revocation. There is no showing that B manifested her acceptance to Y at any time before the death
of A and before the sale. Hence, B cannot enforce any right under the alleged stipulation pour
atrui.
Question Number 12:

Maria Enriquez failed to pay the realty taxes on her unregistered agricultural land located in
Magdugo, Toledo City. In 1989, to satisfy the taxes due, the City sold it at public auction to Juan
Miranda, an employee at the Treasurers Office of said City, whose bid at PI0,000.00 was the
highest. In due time, a final bill of sale was executed in his favor.
Maria refused to turn-over the possession of the property to Juan alleging that (1) she had
been, in the meantime, granted a free patent and on the basis thereof an Original Certificate of
Title was issued to her, and (2) the sale in favor of Juan is void from the beginning in view of the
provision in the Administrative Code of 1987 which prohibits officers and employees of the
government from purchasing directly or indirectly any property sold by the government for nonpayment of any tax, fee or other public charge.
Is the sale to Juan valid? If so. what is the effect of the issuance of the Certificate
of Title to Maria?
(a)
(b)
If the sale is void, may Juan recover the P 10,000.00? If not, why not?
(c)
If the sale is void, did it not nevertheless, operate to divent Maria of her
ownership? If it did, who then is the owner of the property?
Answer:
A. The sale of the land to Juan is not valid, being contrary to law. Therefore, no transfer of
ownership of the land was effected from the deliquent taxpayer to him. The original certificates
pf title obtained by Maria thru a free patent grant from the Bureau of Lands (under Chapter VII,
CA 141) is valid but in view of her delinquency, the said title is subject to the right of the City
Government to sell the land at public auction. The issuance of the OCT did not exempt the land
from the tax sales. Section 44 of P.D. No. 1529 provides that every registered owner receiving a
Certificate of Title shall hold the same free from all encumbrances, subject to certain exemptions.
A.
Juan may recover because he was not a party to the violation of the law.
No. the sale did not divest Maria of her title precisely because the sale is void. It is
as good as if no sale ever took place.
B.
In tax sales, the owner is divested of his land initially upon award and issuance of a
Certificate of Sale, and finally after the lapse of the 1 year period from date of registration, to
redeem, upon execution by the treasurer of an instrument sufficient in form and effects to convey
the property. Maria remained owner of the land until another tax sale is to be performed in favor
of a qualified buyer.
Question Number 13:

In a deed of sale of a realty, it was stipulated that the buyer would construct a commercial
building on the lot while the seller would construct a private passageway bordering the lot. The
building was eventually finished but the seller failed to complete the passageway as some of the
squatters, who were already known to be there at the time they entered into the contract,
refused to vacate the premises. In fact, prior to its execution, the seller filed ejectment cases
against the squatters.
The buyer now sues the seller for specific performance with damages. The defense is that
the obligation to construct the passageway should be with a period which, incidentally, had not
been fixed by them, hence, the need for fixing a judicial period.
Will the action for specific performance of the buyer against the seller prosper?
Answer:
No, the action for specific performance filed by the buyer is premature under Art. 1197 of
the Civil Code. If a period has not been fixed although contemplated by the parties, the parties
themselves should fix that period, failing in which, the Court maybe asked to fix it taking into
consideration the probable contemplation of the parties. Before the period is fixed, an action for
specific performance is premature.
Alternative answer
It has been held in Borromeo vs. CA (47 SCRA 69). that the Supreme Court allowed the
simultaneous filing of action to fix the probable contemplated period of the parties where none is
fixed in the agreement, if this would avoid multiplicity of suits. In addition, technicalities must be
subordinated to substantial justice.
Alternative answer
The action for specific performance will not prosper. The filing of the ejectment suit by the seller
was precisely in compliance with his obligations and should not. therefore, be faulted if no
decision has yet been reached by the Court on the matter.
Question Number 14:
Spouses Michael and Linda donated a 3-hectare residential land to the City of Baguio on the
condition that the city government would build thereon a public park with a boxing arena, the
construction of which shall commence within six (6) months from the date the parties ratify the
donation. The donee accepted the donation and the title to the property was transferred in Its
name. Five years elapsed but the public park with the boxing arena was never started.
Considering the failure of the donee to comply with the condition of the donation, the donorspouses sold the property to Ferdinand who then sued to recover the land from the city
government.
Will the suit prosper?

Answer:
Ferdinand has no right to recover the land. It is true that the donation was revocable because
of breach of the conditions. But until and unless the donation was revoked, it remained valid.
Hence, Spouses Michael and Linda had no right to sell the land to Ferdinand. One cannot give
what he does not have. What the donors should have done first was to have the donation
annulled or revoked. And after that was
done, they could validly have disposed of the land in favor of Ferdinand.
Alternative Answer:
Until the contract of donation has been resolved or rescinded under Article 1191
of the Civil Code or revoked under Art. 764 of the Civil Code, the donation stands effective and
valid. Accordingly, the sale made by the donor to Ferdinand cannot be said to have conveyed
title to Ferdinand, who, thereby, has no cause of action for recovery of the land acting for and in
his behalf.
A.
The donation is onerous. And being onerous, what applies is the law on contracts,
and not the law on donation (De Luna us. Abrigo, 81 SCRA 150). Accordingly, the prescriptive
period for the filing of such an action would be the ordinary prescriptive period for contacts
which may either be six or ten depending upon whether it is verbal or written. The filing of the
case five years later is within the prescriptive period and, therefore, the action can prosper.
B.
Alternative Answer:
The law on donation lays down a special prescriptive period in the case of breach of
condition, which is four years from non-compliance thereof (Article 764 Civil Code). Since the
action has prescribed, the suit will not prosper.
Question Number 15:
Bruce as the registered owner, of a parcel of land with a building thereon and is in peaceful
possession thereof. He pays the real estate taxes and collects the rentals therefrom. Later,
Catalino, the only brother of Bruce, filed a petition where he, misrepresenting to be the
attorney-in-fact of Bruce and falsely alleging that the certificate of title was lost, succeeded in
obtaining a second owners duplicate copy of the title and then had the same transferred in. his
name through a simulated deed of sale in his favor. Catalino then mortgaged the property to
Desiderio who had the mortgage annotated on the title. Upon learning of the fraudulent
transaction, Bruce filed a complaint against Catalino and
Desiderio to have the title of Catalino and the mortgage in favor of Desiderio declared null and
void.
Will the complaint prosper, or will the title of Catalino and the mortgage to Desiderio be
sustained?
Answer:
The complaint for the annulment of Catalinos Title will prosper. In the first place, the second
owners copy of the title secured by him from the Land Registration Court is void ab initio, the
owner's copy thereof having never been lost let alone the fact that said second owners copy of
the title was fraudulently procured and improvidently issued by the Court. In the second place,
the Transfer Certificate of Title procured by Catalino is equally null and void, it having been
issued on the basis of a simulated or forged Deed of Sale. A forged deed is an absolute nullity and
conveys no title.
The mortgage in favor of Desiderio is likewise null and void because the mortgagor is not
the owner of the mortgaged property. While it may be true that under the Mirro Principle" of
the Torrens System of Land Registration, a buyer or mortgagee has the right to rely on what
appears on the Certificate of Title, and in the absence of anything to excite suspicion, is under no
obligation to look beyond the certificate and investigate the mortgagors title, this rule does not
find application in the case at hand because here, Catalinos title suffers from two fatal infirmities,
namely:
1.
The fact that it emanated from a forged deed of a simulated sale;
The fact that it was derived from a fraudulently procured or improvidently issued second
owner's copy, the real owners copy being still intact and in the possession of the true owner,
Bruce.
2.
The mortgage to Desiderio should be cancelled without prejudice to his right to go after
Catalino and/or the government for compensation from the assurance fund.
Question no. 16
Romano was bumped by a minivan owned by the Solomon School of Practical Arts (SSPA).
The mlnivan was driven by Peter, a student assistant whose assignmerit was to clean the school
passageways daily one hour before and one hour after regular classes, in exchange for free
tuition. Peter was able to drive the school vehicle after persuading the regular driver, Paul, to
turn over the wheel to him (Peter). Romano suffered serious physical injuries. The accident
happened at night when only one headlight of the vehicle was functioning and Peter only had a
student drivers permit.
As a consequence, Peter was convicted in the criminal case. Thereafter. Romarjo sued for
damages against Peter and SSPA.
(a)
Will the action for damages against Peter and SSPA prosper?
Will your answer be the same if, Paul, the regular driver, was impleaded as party
defendant for allowing Peter to drive the minivan without a regular driver's license.
(b)
Is the exercise of due diligence in the selection and supervision of Peter and Paul
a material issue to be resolved in this case?
(c)
Answer:
A,
Yes. It will prosper (Art. 2180) because at the time he drove the vehicle, he was
not performing his assigned tasks as provided for by Art. 2180. With respect to SSPA, it is not
liable for the acts of Peter because the latter was not an employee as held by Supreme Court in
Filamer Christian Institute vs. CA, (190 SCRA 485).
Peter belongs to a special category of students who render service to the school in
exchange for free tuition fees.
B.
I would maintain the same answer because the incident did not occur while the
employee was in the performance of his duty as such employee. The incident occured at night
time, and, in any case, there was no indication in the problem that he was performing his duties
as a driver.
In the case of Peter, if he were to be considered as employee, the exercise of due
diligence in the selection and supervision of peter would not be a material issue since the
conviction of Peter would result in a subsidiary liability where the defense would not be available
by the employer.
C.
In the case of Paul, since the basis of subsidiary liability is the paterfamilias rule under
Art. 2180, the defense of selection and supervision of the employee would be a valid defense.
Alternative Answer:
In the case of Peter, if he were to be considered an employee, the exercise of due

diligence in the selection and supervision of Peter would not be a material issue since the
conviction of Peter would result in a subsidiary liability where the defense would not be available
by the employer.
A.
In the case of Paul, since he was in the performance of his work at the time the incident
occured, the school may be held subsidiarily liable not because of the conviction of Peter, but
because of the negligence of Paul under Art. 2180.
Question Number 17:
Pablo sold his car to Alfonso who isssued a postdated check in full payment therefor. Before
the maturity of the check. Alfonso sold the car to Gregorio who later sold it to Gabriel. When
presented for payment, the check issued by Alfonso was dishonored by the drawee bank for the
reason that he, Alfonso, had already closed his account even before he issued his check.
Pablo sued to recover the car from Gabriel alleging that he (Pablo) had been unlawfully
deprived of it by reason of Alfonsos deception.
Will the suit prosper?
Answer:
No. The suit will not prosper because Pablo was not unlawfully deprived of the car although
he was unlawfully
deprived of the price. The perfection of the sale and the delivery of the car was enough to allow
Alfonso to have a right of ownership over the car, which can be lawfully transferred to Gregorio.
Art. 559 applies only to a person who is in possession in good faith of the property, and not to the
owner thereof. Alfonso, in the problem, was the owner, and, hence, Gabriel acquired the title to
the car.
Non-payament of the price in a contract of sale does not render ineffective the obligation
to deliver.
The obligation to deliver a thing is different from the obligation to pay its price.
EDCA Publishing Co. v. Santos (1990)

1990 Bar Examination
Question Number I:
A vacant lot several blocks from the center of the town was leased by its owner to a young
businessman B. for a term of fifteen (15) years renewal upon agreement of the parties. After
taking possession of the lot, the lessee built thereon a building of mixed materials and a store. As
the years passed, he expanded his business, earning more profits. By the tenth (10th) year of his
possession, he was.able to build a three (3)- storey building worth at least P300,000.00. Before
the end of the term of the lease, B negotiated with the landowner for its renewal, but despite
their attempts to do so, they could not agree on the new conditions for the renewal. Upon the
expiration of the term of the lease, the landowner asked B to vacate the premises and remove his
building and other improvements. B refused unless he was reimbursed for necessary and useful
expenses. B claimed that he was a possessor and builder in good faith, with right of retention.
This issue is now before the court for resolution in a pending litigation.
a) What are the rights of B?
b) What are the rights of the landowner?
Answer:
B has the right to remove the building and other improvements unless the landowner
decides to retain the building at the time of the termination of the lease and pay the lessee onehalf of the value of the improvements at that time. The lessee may remove the building even
though the principal thing may suffer damage but B should not cause any more impairment upon
the property leased than is necessaiy. The claim of B that he was a possessor and builder in good
faith with the right of retention is not tenable. B is not a builder in good faith, because as lessee
he does not claim ownership Over the property leased.
a)
The landowner/lessor may refuse to reimburse 1 /2 of the value of the improvements and
require the lessee tc remove the improvements. (Article 1678. Civil Code).
b)
Question number 2
In 1950s, the Government acquired a big landed estate in Central Luzon from the
registered owner for subdivision into small farms and redistribution of bona fide occupants. F
was a former lessee of a parcel of land, five hectares in. area. After completion of the resurvey
and subdivision. F applied to buy the said land in accordance with the guidelines of the
implementing agency. Upon full payment of the price in 1957, the corresponding deed of
absolute sale was executed in his favor and was registered, and in 1961, a new title was issued in
his name. In 1963, F sold the said land to X; and in 1965 X sold it to Y. New titles were
successively issued in the names of the* said purchasers.
In 1977, C filed an action to annul the deeds of sale to F, X and Y and their titles, on the
ground that he (C) had been in actual physical possession of the land, and that the sale to F and
the subsequent sales should be set aside on the ground of fraud. Upon motion of defendants, the
trial court dismissed the complaint, upholding their defenses of their being innocent purchasers
for value, prescription and laches. Plaintiff appealed.
Is the said appeal meritorious? Explain your answer.
(a)
Suppose the government agency concerned joined C in filing the said action
against the defendants, would that change the result of the litigation? Explain.
(b)
Answer:
(a) The appeal is not meritorious. The trial court ruled correctly in granting defendant's
motion to dismiss for the following reasons:
1. While there is the possibility that F, a former lessee of the land was aware of the fact
that C was the bona fide occupant thereof and for this reason his transfer certificate of title may
be vulnerable, the transfer of the same land and the issuance of new TCTs to X and Y who are
innocent purchasers for value, render the latters titles indefeasible. A person dealing with
registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title and the law will not in
any
way oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the property in search
for any hidden defect or inchaote right which may later invalidate or diminish his right to the
land. This is the mirror principle of the Torrens System of land registration.
2. The action to annul the sale was instituted in 1977 or more than ten (10) years from the
date of execution thereof in 1957. hence, it has long prescribed.
Under Section 45 of Act 496, the entry of a certificate of title shall be regarded as an
agreement running with the land, and binding upon the applicant and all his successors in title
that the land shall be and always remain registered land. A title under Act 496 is indefeasible and
to preserve that character, the title is cleansed anew with every transfer for value. (De Jesus u.
City of Manila: 29 Phil. 73; Laperal v. Citu of Manila, 62 Phil. 313, Penullar v. PNB 120 SCRA 111).
3.
Even if the government joins C, this will not alter the outcome of the case so much
because of estoppel as an express provision in Section 45 of Act 496 and Section 31 of P.D. No.
1529 that a decree of registration and the certificate of title issued in pursuance thereof shall be
conclusive upon and against all persons, including the national government and all branches
thereof, whether mentioned by name in the application or notice, or not.
(b)
Question Number 3:
B donated to M a parcel of land in 1980. B made the deed of donation, entitled Donation
Inter Vivos," in a public instrument and M accepted the donation in the same document. It was
provided in the deed that the land donated shall be immediately delivered to M and that M shall
have the right to enjoy the fruits fully. The deed also provided that B was reserving the right to
dispose of said land during his (Bs) lifetime, and that M shall not register the deed oi donation
until after Bs death. Upon Bs death, W, Bs widow and sole heir, filed an action for the recovery
of the donated land, contending that the donation made by B is a donation mortis causa and not
a donation inter vivos. Will said action prosper? Explain your answer.
Answer
Yes, the action will proper. The donation is a donation mortis causa because the reservation
is to dispose of all the property donated and, therefore, the donation is revocable at will.
Accordingly, the donation requires the execution of a valid will, either notarial or holgraphic.
(Arts 755, 728 Civil Code)
Question Number 3:
Mr. and Mrs. R own a bumed-out building, the firewall of which collapsed and destroyed
the shop occupied by the family of Mr. and Mrs. S, which resulted in injuries to said couple and
the death of their daughter. Mr. and Mrs. S had been warned by Mr. Mrs. R to vacate the shop in
view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed to do so.
Mr. and Mrs. S filed against Mr. and Mrs. R an action for recovery of damages the former
suffered as a result of the collapse of the firewall. In defense, Mr. and Mrs. Rrely on the doctrine
of last clear chance" alleging that Mr. and Mrs. S had the last clear chance to avoid the accident
if only they heeded the formers warning to vacate the shop, and therefore Mr. and Mrs. Rs prior
negligence should be disregarded.
If you were the Judge, how would you decide the case? State your reasons.
Answer:
I would decide in favor of Mr. and Mrs. S. The proprietor of a building or structure is
responsible for the damages resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the
lack of necessary repairs. (Article 2190, Civil Code).
As regards the defense of Mr. and Mrs. R relying on the doctrine of last clear chance. the
same is not tenable because according to the Supreme Court in one case (DeRoy v. Court of
Appeals. G. R. L-80718. January 29, 1988, 157 SCRA 757) the doctrine of last clear chance is not
applicable to instances covered by Art. 2190, Civil Code
Further, in Phoenix Construction, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court {G.R. L-65295, March
10, 1987. 148 SCRA 353). the Supreme Court held that the role of the common law "last clear
chance doctrine in relation to Article 2179 of the Civil Code is merely to mitigate damages
within the context of contributory negligence.
Question Number 5:
D sold a second-hand car to E for PI50,000.00 The agreement between D and E was that half
of the purchase price, or P75.000.00, shall be paid upon delivery of the car to E and the balance
of P75,000.00 shall be paid in five equal monthly installments of PI5,000.00 each. The car was
delivered to E, and E paid the amount of P75.000.00 to D. Less than one month thereafter, the car
was stolen from Es garage with no fault on Es part and was never recovered. Is E legally bound to
pay the said unpaid balance of P75.000.00? Explain your answer.
Answer:
Yes, E is legally bound to pay the balance of P75,000.00. The ownership of the car sold was
acquired by E from the moment it was delivered to him. Having acquired ownership, E bears the
risk of the loss of the thing under the doctrine of res perit domino. (Articles 1496, 1497, Civil
Code).
Question Number 6:
A leased a parcel of land to B for a period of two years. The lease contract did not contain
any express prohibition against the assignment of the leasehold or the subleasing of the leased
premises. During the third year of the lease, B subleased the land to C. In turn, C, without As
consent, assigned the sublease to D. A then filed an action for the rescission of the contract of
lease on the ground that B has violated the terms and conditions oLthe lease agreement. If you
were the judge, how would you decide the case, particularly with respect to the validity of:
(a)
Bs sublease to C? and
(a)
C's assignment of the sublease to D?
Explain you answer

Answer:
Bs sublease to C is valid. Although the original period of two years for the lease
contract has expired, the lease continued with the acquiescence of the lessor during the third
year. Hence, there has been an implied renewal of the contract of lease. Under Art. 1650 of the
Civil Code, the lessee may sublet the thing leased, in whole or in part, when the contract of lease
does not contain any express prohibition. (Articles 1650, 1670 Civil Code). As action for
rescission should riot prosper on this ground.
(a)
Cs assignment of the sublease to D is not valid. Under Art. 1649, of the Civil
Code, the lessee cannot assign the lease without the consent of the lessor, unless there is a
stipulation to the contrary. There is no such stipulation in the contract. If the law prohibits
assignment of the lease without the consent of the lessor, all the more would the assignment of a
sublease be prohibited without such consent. This is a violation of the contract and is a valid
ground for rescission by A.
(b)
Question Number 7:
X was the owner of a 10,000 square meter property. X married Y and out of their union, A,
B and C were bom. After the death of Y, X married Z and they begot as children, D, E and F. After
the death of X, the children of the first and second marriages executed an extrajudicial partition
of the aforestated property on May 1, 1970. D, E and F were given a one thousand square meter
portion of the property. They were minors at the time of the execution of the document. D was
17 years old, E was 14 and F was 12; and they were made to believe by A, B and C that unless they
sign the document they will not get any share. Z was not presesnt tl\en. In January 1974, D,E and
F filed an action in court to nullify the suit alleging they discovered the fraud only in 1973.
(a)
Can the minority of D, E and F be a basis to nullify the partition? Explain your answer.
(b) How about fraud? Explain your answer.

Answer:
Yes, minority can be a basis to nullify the partition because D, E and F were not
properly represented by their parents or guardians at the time they contracted the extrajudicial
partition. (Articles 1327, 1391, Civil Code).
(a)
In the case of fraud, when through insidious words or machinations of one party
the other is induced to enter into the contract without which he would not have agreed to, the
action still prosper because under Art. 1391 of the Civil Code, in case of fraud, the action for
annulment may be brought within four years from the discovery of the fraud.
(b)
Question Number 8:
B and G (college students, both single and not disqualified to marry each other) had a
romantic affair. G was seven months in the family way as of the graduation of B. Right after
graduation B went home to Cebu City. Unknown to G, B had a commitment to C (his childhood
sweetheart) to marry her after getting his college degree. Two weeks after B marriage in Cebu
City. G gave birth to a son E in Metro Manila.
After ten years of married life in Cebu, B became a widower by the sudden death of C in a
plane crash. Out of the union of B and C, two children, X and Y, were bom. Unknown to C, while
on weekend trips to Manila during the last 5 years of their marriage, B invariably visited G and
lived at her residence and as a result of which, they renewed their relationship. A baby girl F was
bom to B and G two years before the death of C. Bringing his family later to Manila, B finally
married G. Recently, G died.
What are the rights of Bs four children: X and Y of his first marriage: and E and F. his
children with G? Explain your answer.
Answer
Under the facts stated, X and Y are legitimate children of B and G. E is the legitimate
children of B and G. E is the legitimated child of B & G. F is the illegitimate child of B and
C. As legitimate children of B and C, X and Y have the following rights:
To bear the surnames of the father and the mother, in conformity with the
provisions of the Civil Code on Surnames;
(1)
To receive support from their parents, their ascendants. and in proper

cases, their brothers and sisters, in conformity with the provisions of the Family Code on Support;
and
*
(2)
To be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights granted to them by

the Civil Code. (Article 174, Family Code). E is the legitimated child of B and G. Under Art. 177 of
the Family Code, only children conceived and bom outside of wedlock of parents who, at the
time of the concepcion of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each
other may be legitimated. E will have the same rights as X and Y. F is the illegitimate child of B
and G. F has the right to use the surname of G, her mother, and is entitled to support as well as
the legitime consisting of 1/2 of that of each of X, Y and E. (Article 176, Family Code)
(3)
Question Number 9:
H died leaving a last will and testament wherein it is stated that he was legally married to
W by whom he had two legitimate children A and B. H devised to his said forced heirs the entire
estate except the free portion which he gave to X who was living with him at the time of his
death.
In said will he explained that he had been estranged from his wife W for more than 20 years
and he has been living with X as man and wife since his separation from his legitimate family.
In the probate proceedings, X asked for the issuance of letters testamentary in accordance
with the wll wherein she is named sole executor. This was opposed by and her children.
(a) Should the will be admitted in said probate proceedings?
(b) Is the said devise to X valid?

(c) Was it proper for the trial court to consider the intrinsic validity of the provisions of said
will? Explain your answers.
Answer:
(a) Yes, the will may be probated if executed according to the formalities prescribed by law.
The institution giving X the free portion is not valid, because the prohibitions
under Art. 739 of the Civil Code on donations also apply to testamentary dispositions (Article
1028, Civil Code). Among donations which are considered void are those made between persons
who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation.
(b)
As a general rule, the will should be admitted in probate proceedings if all the necessary
requirements for its extrinsic validity have been met, and the court should not consider the
intrinsic validity of the provisions of said will. However, the exception arises when the will in
effect contains only one testamentary disposition. In effect, the only testamentary disposition
under the will is the giving of the free portion to X, since legitimes are provided by law. Hence,
the trial court may consider the intrinsic validity of the provisions of said will. (Nuguid u. Nuguid,
etai. No. L-23445, June 23. 196$, 17 SCRA; Nepomucenov. CA. L-62952, 9 October 1985, 139
SCRA 206).
(c)
Question Number 10:

The marriage of H and W was annu lied by the competent court. Upon finality of the
judgment of nullity, H began looking for his prospective second mate. He fell In love with a sexy
woman S who wanted to be married as soon as possible, i.e.,. after a few months of courtship. As a
young lawyer, you were consulted by H.
(a)
How soon can H be joined in lawful wedlock to his girlfriend S? Under existing
laws, are there certain requisites that must be complied with before he can remarry? What
advice would you give H?
Suppose that children were bom from the union of H and W, what would be the
status of said children? Explain your answer.
(b)
If the subsequent marriage of H to S was contracted before compliance with the

statutory condition for its validity, what are the rights of the children of the first marriage (i.e., of
H and W) and of the children of the subsequent marriage (of H and S)?
(c)
Answer:
H, or either spouse for that matter, can marry again after complying with the provisions
of Article 52 of the Family Code, namely, there must be a partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the childrens presumptive legitimes, which should
be recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registries of property. H should be so advised.
(a)
Alternative Answer: for (a)

The following are the requisites prescribed by law and the advice to H is to comply with
them, namely:
If either spouse contracted the marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net
profits of the community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of
the common children or, if there are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous
marriage or, in default of children, the innocent spouse;
(1)
(2)
Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except that if the donee
contracted the marriage in b^d faith, such donations made to said donee are revoked by
operation of law;
(3)
The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit
from the innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession;
(4)
If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith all donations by
reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the other are revoked
by opeiation of law.
The judgment of annulment of the marriage, the partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the childrens presumptive legitimes shall he
recorded in the appropriate civil registry and registers of property. (Articles 53, 52. 43, 44. Family
Code)!
(5)
The children bom from the union of H and W would be legitimate children if
conceived or bom before the decree of annulment of the marriage (under Art. 45 of the Family
(b)
Code) has become final and executory (Art. 54, Family Code).
(c) The children of the first marriage shall be considered legitimate children if conceived
or bom before the judgment of annulment of the marriage of H and W has become final and
executory. Children conceived or bom of the subsequent marriage shall likewise be legitimate
even if the marriage of H and S be null and void for failure to comply with the requisites oCArticle
52 of the Family Code (Article 53, Family Code).
As legitimate children, they have the following rights:
To bear the surnames of the father ana the mother in conformity with the
provisions of the Civil Code on Surnames:
(1)
To receive support from their parents, their ascendants, and in proper cases, their
brothers and sisters, in conformity with the provisions of this Code on Support: and
(2)
To be entitled to the legitime and other successional rights granted to them by

the Civil Code (Article 174, Family Code).
(3)
Question Number 11:

(1)
If a will is executed by a testator who is a Filipino
citizen, what law will govern if the will is executed in the Philippines? ,What law will govern if the
will is executed in another country? Explain your answers.
If a will is executed by a foreigner, for instance, a Japanese, residing in the Philippines,
what law will govern if the will is executed in the Philippines? And what law will govern if the will
is executed in Japan, or some other country, for instance, the U.S. A.? Explain your answers.
(2)
Answer:
1) a. If the testator who is a Filipino citizen executes his will in the Philippines, Philippine law will
govern the formalities, 0
b. If said Filipino testator executes his will in another country, the law of the country where
he may be or Philippine law will govern the formalities. (Article 815, Civil Code)
2) a. If the testator is a foreigner residing in the Philippines and he executes his will in the
Philippines, the law of the country of which he is a citizen or Philippine law will govern the
formalities.
b. If the testator is a foreigner and executes his will in a foreign country, the law of his
place of residence or the law of the country of which he is a citizen or the law of the place of
execution, or Philippine law will govern the formalities (Articles 17, 816, 817, Civil Code
Possible Additional Answers:
a. In the case of a Filipino citizen, Philippine law shall govern substantive validity whether he
executes his will in the Philippines or in a foreign country.

b. In the case of a foreigner, his national law shall govern substantive validity whether he
executes his will in the Philippines or in a foreign country.
In I960, an unregistered parcel ofland was mortgaged by owner O to M, a family friend, as

collateral for a loan. O acted through his attorney-in-fact, son S. who was duly authorized by way
of a special power of attorney, wherein O declared that he was the absolute owner of the land,
that the tax declarations/receipts were all issued in his name, and that he has been in open,
continuous and adverse possession in the concept of owner.
As O was unable to pay back the loan plus interest for the past five (5) years, M had to
foreclose the mortgage. At the foreclosure sale, M was the highest bidder. Upon issuance of the
sheriffs final deed of sale and registration in January, 1966, the mortgage property was turned
over to Ms possession and control. M has since then developed the said property. In 1967, O
died, survived by sons S and P.
In 1977, after the tenth (10th) death anniversary of his father O, son P filed a suit to annul
the mortgage deed and subsequent sale of the property, etc.. on the ground of fraud. He asserted
that the property in question was conjugal in nature actually belonging, at the time of the
mortgage, to O and his wife, W, whose conjugal share went to their sons (S and P) and to O.
(a)
Is the suit filed by P barred by prescription? Explain your answer.
After the issuance of the sheriffs final deed of sale in 1966 in this case, assuming
that M applied for registration under the Torrens System and was issued a Torrens Title to the
said property in question, would that added fact have any significant effect on your conclusion?
State your reason.
(b)
Answer:
(a) Under Art. 173 of the Civil Code, the action is barred by prescription because the wife
had only ten (10) years from the transaction and during the marriage to file a suit for the
annulment of the mortgage deed.

Alternative Answers to (a)
First Alternative Answer:
The mortgage contract executed by O, if at all, is only a voidable contract since it
involves a conjugal partnership property. The action to annul the same instituted in 1977, or
eleven years after the execution of the sheriffs final sale, has obviously prescribed because:
(a)
An action to annul a contract on the ground of fraud must be brought within four
(4) years from the date of discovery of the fraud. Since this is in essence an action to recover
ownership, it must be reckoned from the date of execution of the contract or from the
registration of the alleged fraudulent document with the assessors office for the purpose of
transferring tlfe tax declaration, this being unregistered land, (Bael v. Intermediate Appellate
Court G. R. L- 74423 Jan.30. 1989 169 SCRA 617).
1.
If the action is to be treated as an action to recover ownership of land, it would

have prescribed just the same because more than 10 years have already elapsed since the date of
the execution of the sale.
2.
Second Alternative Answer:

The action to recover has been barred by acquisitive prescription lii favor of M
considering that M has possessed the land under a claim of ownership for ten (10) years with a
just title.
(a)
If M had secured a Torrens Title to the land, all the more S and P could not recover
because if at all their remedies would be:
(b)
A Petition to Review the Decree of Registration. This can be availed of within one
(1) year from the entry thereof, but only upon the basis of actual fraud." There is no showing that
M committed actual fraud in securing.his title to the land; or
1.
An action in personam against M for the reconveyance of the title in their favor.
Again, this remedy is available within four years from the date of the discovery of the fraud but
not later than ten (10) years from the date of registration of the title in the name of M.
2.
Question number 13
B and G. age 20 and 19. respectively, and both single, eloped and got married to each other
without parental consent in the case of G. a teenaged student of an exclusive college for girls.
Three years later, her parents wanted to seek judicial annulment on that ground. You were
consulted and asked to prepare the proper complaint. What advice would you give G's parents?
Explain your answer.

Answer:
G himself should file the complaint under Article 45 of the Family Code, and no longer the
parents because G is already 22 years of age.
Question Number 14:
After a devastating storm causing widespread destruction in four Central Luzon provinces,
the executive and legislative branches of the government agreed to enact a special law
appropriating PI billion for purposes of relief and rehabilitation for the provinces. In view of the
urgent nature of the legislative enactment, it is provided in its effeclivity clause that it shall take
effect upon approval and after completion of publication in the Official Gazette and a newspaper
of general circulation in the Philippines. The law was passed by the Congress on July 1. 1990,
signed into law by the President on July 3. 1990, and published in such newspaper of general
circulation on July 7. 1990 and in the Official Gazette on July 10, 1990.
As to the publication of said legislative enactment, is there sufficient observance
or compliance with the requirements for a valid publication? Explain your answer.
(a)
(b)
When did the law take effect? Explain your answer.
Can the executive branch start releasing and disbursing funds appropriated by the
said law the day following its approval? Explain your answer.
(c)
Answer
(a) Yes.
there is sufficient compliance. The law itself prescribes the requisites of publication
for its effectivity, and all requisites have been complied with. (Article 2. Civil Code)
The law takes effect upon compliance with all the conditions for effectivity, and
the last condition was complied with on July 10. 1990. Hence, the law became effective on that
date.
(b)
No. It was not yet effective when it was approved by Congress on July 1. 1990 and
approved by the President on July 3. 1990. The other requisites for its effectivity were not yet
complete at the time.
(c)
Question No. 1:
Robert and Evelyn, both Filipinos, met in Los Angles, California. They agreed to get
married on June 10, 1989. On June 7, 1989, Robert flew to New York due to an urgent business
matter but intended to return to Los Angeles on June 9, 1989, in time for the wedding. The
business emergency of Robert, however, lasted longer than he expected so that he failed to
Teturn to Los Angeles as planned. In order not to postpone the wedding, Robert immediately
called his brother Val who was also residing at Los Angeles to stand as his proxy at the wedding,
which the latter did. Is the marriage of Robert and Evelyn valid in the Philippines? Give your
reasons.
(1)
Answer:
If the marriage was performed in accordance with the laws of California and valid there, then
the marriage is likewise valid in the Philippines.
Alternative Answer:
Since the problem does not state the California law on marriage by proxy, the presumption
in Private International Law is that the California law is the same as the Philippine law. Therefore,
the marriage would be void.
While X, an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, was vacationing in Cebu City, he
was requested to solemnize the marriage of Serge and Joan in the residence of Serges parents.
X could not refuse the request of both the parents of the couple because they were his relatives.
On the
(2)
day set for the wedding, there were so many visitors at the residence of Serges parents so
that X decided to solemnize the marriage at the kiosk of the public plaza located nearby. Is the
marriage of Serge and Joan valid? Give your reasons.
Answer:
Yes because the requirement that the marriage be solemnized in a public place is not an
essential requisite of the law.
Question No. 2:
Paul, a 17-year old Filipino and a permanent resident in the United States, married
Jean, a 16-year old American in Las Vegas, Nevada. The parents of both gave their consent to
the marriage. The marriage is valid in Nevada. Is its also valid in the Philippines? Give your
reasons.
(1)
Answer:
No, the marriage is not valid. Under the Family Code, the law requires that the contracting
parties are at least eighteen (18) years of age.

Alternative Answer:
If the marriage took place before the effectivity of the Family Code, the marriage will be
valid since under the provisions of the Civil Code a marriage valid in the place of celebration is
valid in the Philippines except bigamous, polygamous, and incestuous marriages as determined
by Philippine law. The minimum age under the old law was sixteen (16) for the male and
fourteen (14) for the female.
Cesar and Baby contracted marriage on June 15, 1983. A year later, Baby bore a child,
X The following year, the couple acquired a car and a residential lot in Metro
(2)
Manila. On September 1, 1988, the marriage was declared void from the beginning by a
competent court because Cesar was below 16 years of age at the time of the marriage. Sometime
in December, 1988, Cesar met Rosa with whom he fell in love. Gesar married Rosa on January 15,
1989. On September 1, 1989, Rosa gave birth prematurely to a child, Y. Is the marriage of Cesar
and Rosa valid? What is the status of the child Y? Give your reasons.
Answer:
If there was a liquidation of the properties of the first marriage and the presumptive legitime
of X was duly delivered, the second marriage is valid. If there was no such compliance, then the
marriage is void. The child is legitimate since Y was born a full year after the termination of the
first marriage and during the second marriage.
Alternative Answers:.
A. The Family Code requires the registration of the judgment of nullity, the partition of the
properties and the delivery of the legitimes to be made with the appropriate civil registry and
registries of property. It further provides that failure to comply with the said requirement shall
render the marriage null and void. If there was such a recording, the marriage is valid. Otherwise,
the marriage is void. Nevertheless, child Y is a legitimate child because it was born during the
marriage of Cesar and Rosa.
Since the problem does not state that there was compliance with the requirements as to
recording of judgment of nullity and the liquidation and delivery of the presumptive legitime of
the child X, the marriage of Cesar and Rosa is void. However, the child Y" is legitimate because
it was born during the marriage of Cesar and Rosa.
B.
QUESTION NO. 3
What properties are excluded from the regime of absolute community of property
between spouses?
(1)
Answer:
The following shall be excluded from the community property:
(1)
Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title by either spouse, and
the fruits as well as the income thereof, if any, unless it is expressly provided by the donor,
testator or grantor that they shall form part of the community property;
(2)
Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse; however, jewelry shall
form part of the community property;
(3)
Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who has legitimate
descendants by a former marriage, and the fruits as well as the income, if any, of such property.
(2) When should the property relations of the spouses be mandatorily governed by the
regime of complete separation of property?
Answer:
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage without complying with the
requirement that the community or conjugal property be liquidated judicially or extra-judicially
within one year from the death of the deceased spouse, a mandatory regime of complete
separation of property shall govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage.
Question No. 4:
(1)
Cadio and Corona contracted marriage on June 1,
1982. A few days after the marriage, Corona discovered that Cadio was a homosexual. As
homosexuality was not a ground for legal separation under the Civil Code, there was nothing that
Corona could do but bear with her problem. The couple, however, stated to live separately. With
the enactment of the Family Code, Corona decided to be legally separated from Cadio based on
the new ground of homosexuality. Corona brought her action for legal separation on September
15, 1988. Will the action prosper? Give your reasons.
Answer:
Yes, the action will prosper because the cause arose only on August 3, 1988, the
effectivity of the Family Code, and the action had not yet prescribed.
Alternative Answer:
The action will prosper. The offense of homosexuality as a continuing offense can be a
ground for legal separation. The prescriptive period of five years will apply only when the offense
has a fixed period of time and, therefore, the date of its occurrence can be computed.
(2) What is Family Home and when is it deemed constituted? Who are the beneficiaries
thereof?
Answer:
The Family Home is the dwelling house where the husband, the wife, and their family
including the unmarried head of the family reside and the land on which it is situated.
The Family Home is deemed constituted on a house .and lot from the time it is occupied
as a family residence.
The beneficiaries of a family home are:
(1)
The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head of a family; and
(2)
Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the
relationship be legitimate or
illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who depend upon, the head of the
family for legal support.
Question No. 5:
(1) What are the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of a child?
Answer:
Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on the following grounds:
(1)
That it was physically impossible for the husband to have sexual intercourse with
his wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the
child because of:
(a)
the physical incapacity of the. husband to have sexual intercourse with his
wife;
(b)
the fact that the husband and wife were living separately in such a way that
sexual intercourse was not possible; or
(c)
serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevented sexual intercourse:
That it is proved that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not
have been that of the husband, except in the instance provided in the second paragraph of Art.
164; or
(3)
That in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written
authorization or ratification of either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence,
intimidation, or undue influence.
(2) Felix, a Filipino doctor of medicine, married Monique, an Italian nurse, in 1985. It was
later discovered that Monique cannot bear a child so that the couple decided
(2)
to adopt one. Can they jointly adopt Marie, the 19-year old niece of Monique? Explain.
Answer:
Since the child to be adopted is an Italian citizen, the joint adoption cannot be effected.
Had the child been a relative by consanguinity of the Filipino spouse, the adoption would have
been valid under the Philippine law.

Question No. 6:
(1)
What is USUFRUCT? How is usufruct extinguished?
Answer:
Usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving its
form and substance, unless the title constituting it or the law otherwise provides. Usufruct is
extinguished:
(1) By the death of the usufructuary, unless a contrary intention clearly appears;
(2) By the expiration of the period for which it was constituted, or by the fulfillment of any
resolutory condition provided in the title creating the usufruct;
(3) By merger of the usufruct and ownership in the same person;
(4) By renunciation of the usufructuary;
(5) By the total loss of the thing in usufruct;
(6) By the termination of the right of the person constituting the usufruct;
(7) By prescription.
RECOMMENDATION OF THE COMMITTEE:
An enumeration of four (4) should be given full credit

Spouses A and B are registered owners of lot 1 consisting of 20,000 square meters
while spouses C and D are owners of lot 2. These lots are separated by a river. For a period
of more than 40 years, the river overflowed its banks yearly and the property of the spouses C
and D gradually received deposits of soil from the effects of the current of the river so that an
alluvial deposit of 29,000 square meters was added to their lot, 11,000 square meters of which
used to be part of lot 1. Spouses "A and B contend that accretion should not extend to
registered land because to allow the spouses C and D to acquire title over the accretion will
be in derogation of the indefeasibility of the Torrens Title of spouses A and B. Is this
contention correct? Explain.
(2)
Answer:
No, the contention of A and B is not correct because the registration under the Torrens Law
does not protect the owner against the diminution of his land through gradual changes due to
the effects of the current of the river. The accretion will benefit C and D.
Question No. 7:
(1) X mortgaged his land to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) to secure a promissory
note. He defaulted in the payment of the loan so that the land was sold at public auction on
January 20, 1960, for P3,500 with the PNB as the highest bidder. On January 20, 1970, X
offered to redeem the property in the amount of P3,500. He enclosed a postal money order for
PI,000 as partial payment and stated that the balance is to be paid in 12 monthly installments.
The PNB then discovered that the sheriffs certificate of sale prepared after the public auction of
the land was not registered so that it cause the same to be registered on January 30, 1970. The
PNB refused the offer of X"
contending that the offer to redeem was beyond the one-year period provided under Act
No. 3135 and that it was not accompanied by an actual and simultaneous tender of the entire
repurchase price. In view of the refusal of the PNB, X filed an action to repurchase on February
20, 1970. Will the action prosper? Give your reasons.Answer:
Yes, the action should prosper. The one (1) year period of redemption is Counted from the
registration of the sheriffs certificate of sale hence the action has not yet prescribed. However,
there need not be a tender of the redemption price because the filing of the judicial action to
enforce the right of redemption within the redemption period suffices.
Subsequent to the original registration of a parcel of land bordering a river, its area was
increased by accession. This additional area was not included in the technical description
appearing on the Torrens Certificate of Title having been acquired subsequent to the registration
proceedings. May such additional area be acquired by third persons thru prescription? Give your
reasons.
(2)
Answer:
The Land Registration Law provides that no title in derogation of the registered owner may
be acquired by adverse possession or acquisitive possession. Since the law refers to registered
lands, the accession mentioned in this question may be acquired by a third person through
adverse possession or acquisitive possession.
Alternative Answer:
If the accession is manmade, then it cannot be considered as private property. It belongs to
the public domain, and, therefore, cannot be acquired by adverse possession or acquisitive
possession.
QUESTION NO. 8
(1)
Distinguish an implied contract from a quasi- contract.
Answer:
Any of the following answers should be given full credit:
A.
An implied contract requires consent of the parties. A quasi-contract is not
predicated on consent, being a unilateral act.

B.
The basis of an implied contract is the will of the parties. The basis of a qdasicontract is law to the end that there be no unjust situation.
(2) What is dation in payment and how is it distinguished from assignment of property?
Answer:
Dation in payment is a special form of payment whereby property is alienated to the
creditor in satisfaction of a debt in money.
Assignment of property, or payment by cession, is a special form of payment whereby the
debtor cedes or assigns his property to his creditors so that the proceeds thereof will be applied
in payment of his debts.
Alternative Answer:
In dation in payment whereby property is given by the debtor to the creditor in payment of
a debt in money, there is only one creditor. In assignment of property, there are several
creditors.
In the former, the debtor may be solvent. In the latter, there may be partial insolvency.
In the former, particular property is ceded.'In the latter, all the property of the debtor is
ceded.
In the former, the particular obligation is extinguished in whole or in part as agreed upon. In
the latter, it releases the debtor from the net proceeds only, unless otherwise agreed or intended.
Question No. 9:
If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, to whom shall the
ownership be transferred?
(1)
Answer:
If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership shall be
transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good faith, if it should
be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who
in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be an inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith
was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the oldest
title, provided there is good faith.
(2) X used his savings from his salaries amounting to a little more than P2,000 as capital in
establishing a restaurant. Y gave the amount of P4,000 to X as financial assistance with the
understanding that Y would be entitled to 22% of the annual profits derived from the operation
of the restaurant. After the lapse of 22 years, Y filed a case demanding his share in the said
profits. X denied that there was a partnership and raised the issue of prescription as Y did not
assert his rights anytime within ten (10) years from the start of the operation of the restaurant. Is
Y a partner of X in the business? Why? What is the nature of the right to demand ones share
in the profits of a partnership? Does this right prescribe?
Answer:
Yes, because there is an agreement to contribute to a common fund and an intent to
divide profits. It is founded upon an express trust. It is imprescriptible unless repudiated.
Alternative Answer:
No, Y is not a partner because the amount is extended in the form of a financial
assistance arid therefore it is a loan, and the mere sharing of profits does not establish a
partnership. The right is founded upon a contract of loan whereby the borrower is bound to
pay principal and interest like all ordinary obligations. Yes, his right prescribes in six or ten
years depending upon ^whether the contract is oral or written.
Question No. 10:
(1) What are the characteristics of a will?
Answer:
A will is
1.
Personal
2.
Unilateral
3.
Formal or Solemn
4.
Ambulatory or revocable
5.
Individual, not joint
6.
Free and voluntary
7.
Mortis causa

Since this is not a codal provision, it is recommended that an answer of three (3) be given
full credit.
X, a Spanish citizen and a resident of Los Angeles, California, executed a will in
Tokyo. Japan. May such will be probated in the Philippines? May his estate located in the
Philippines be distributed in conformity with the provisions of the said will? Give your reasons.
(2)
Answer:
A Yes, it may be made according to the formalities of Spanish law, California law, Japanese
law, or Philippine law.
B. Yes, provided that the provisions conform to the order of succession and the amount of
successional rights as regulated by Spanish law.
Question No. IX:
The probate of the will of Nicandro is contested on the ground that the notary public
before whom the will, was acknowledged was also one of the three instrumental witnesses. If you
were the probate judge, how would you decide the contest? Give your reasons.
(1)
Answer:
The will is void. The acknowledging officer cannot serve as attesting witness at the same
time. In effect there are only two witnesses since the notary cannot swear before himself.
Jose and Ana are husband and wife. On January 10, 1980, Jose learned that Ana was
having illicit relations with Juan. In fact, Jose personally saw his wife and Juan leaving a motel on
one occasion. Despite all the evidence he had at hand, Jose did not bring any action for legal
separation against Ana. Instead, Jose simply prepared a will wherein he disinherited Ana for her
acts of infidelity. The validity of the disinheritance was questioned by Ana upon Joses death. If
you were the judge, how would you resolve this question? Give your reasons.
(2)
Answer:
The disinheritance is valid. Under the Civil Code, the legal ground for disinheriting a
spouse is that the spouse has given cause for legal separation. Therefore, a final judgment is
not needed.
Alternative Answer:
The disinheritance is not valid. The facts indicate that there was condonation by Jose of
Anas illicit relationship with Juan since they appear to have continued to live together.
Question No. 12:
Distinguish between a.contract of real estate mortgage and a contract of sale with
right of repurchase.
(1)
Answer:
Real estate mortgage is an accessory contract. A contract of sale with right of
repurchase is a principal contract.
2.
Real estate mortgage involves no transfer of title. A contract of sale involves a
conditional transfer of title.
1.
Real estate mortgage involves no transfer of possession. A contract of sale

involves a conditional transfer of possession.
3.
In a real estate mortgage the creditor has no rights to the fruits. In a contract of
sale, the vendee is entitled to the fruits.
4.
In a real estate mortgage, upon default the creditor is not the owner. In a contract of
sale, upon consolidation, the vendee is the owner.
5.

Any three (3) of the foregoing distinctions should be given full credit.
Does an action to foreclose a real estate mortgage affecting registered land under the
Torrens System prescribe? Give your reasons.
(2)
Answer:
Even if the property given as collateral is covered by a Torrens Title, the right to foreclose a
real estate mortgage thereon prescribes. This is really an action to enforce collection of the loan.
Question No. 13:
X offered to buy the house and lot of Y for P300,000. Since X had only P200,000 in
cash at the time, he proposed to pay the balance of P1(J)0,000 in four (4) equal monthly
installments. As the title to the property was to be immediately transferred to the buyer, X, to
secure the payment of the balance of purchase price, proposed to constitute a first mortgage on
the property in favor of Y. Y agreed to the proposal so that on April 15, 1987, the contract of
sale in favor of X was executed and on the same date (April 15, 1987), X constituted the said
first mortgage. When the first installment became due. X defaulted in the payment thereof. Y
now brings an action to rescind the contract of sale, which X opposed. How would you decide
the conflict? Give your reasons.
(1)
Answer:
Either of the following answers should be given full credit:
Y cannot rescind. The relationship is no longer that of buyer and seller because the sale
was already perfected and consummated. The relationship is already that of mortgagor and
mortgagee. Rescission is not a principal action retaliatory in character but a subsidiary one
available only in the absence of any other legal remedy. Foreclosure is not only a legal but a
contractual remedy. The debtor must pay and, in case of breach, the mortgagee may foreclose.
B.
Y can rescind. Specific performance and rescission are alternative remedies in
A.
breach of reciprocal obligations. The contract is only partly consummated. The price is not fully
paid. The mortgage is an accessory contract of guarantee arid can be waived by the creditor who
can avail of his remedies in the principal contract.
Considering that the default covers only P25,000.00 and the sum of
P2OO,OOO.0O has already been paid, there is only, a slight or casual breach negating the right
of the seller to rescind the contract of sale.
D.
Rescission is available provided that the vendor give the vendee the 60-day
period as required by the Maceda Law or the Realty Installment Buyers Law.
C.
X came across an advertisement in the Manila Daily Bulletin about the rush sale of
three slightly used TOYOTA cars, Model 1989 for only P200,000 each. Finding the price to be
very cheap and in order to be sure that he gets one unit ahead of the others, X immediately
phoned the advertiser Y and place an order for one car. Y accepted the order and promised
to deliver the ordered unit on July 15, 1989. On the said date, however, Y did not deliver the
unit. X brings an action to compel Y to deliver the unit. Will such action prosper? Give your
reasons.
(2)
Answer:
The contract in this case has been perfected. However, the contract is unenforceable under
the statute of frauds. The action will prosper if there is no objection to the oral evidence, which
amounts to a waiver of the statute of frauds.
Question No. 14:
(1)
What do you understand by ANTICHRESIS? How is it distinguished from pledge
and mortgage?
Answer:
Antichresis is a contract whereby the creditor acquires the right to receive the fruits of an
immovable of his debtor with the obligation to apply them to the payment of interest if owing
and thereafter to the principal.
Pledge is an accessory and real contract whereby the debtor delivers to the creditor
movable property as security for the performance of a principal obligation upon the fulfilment
of which the thing pledged shall be returned to the debtor.
A real estate mortgage is an accessory contract whereby the debtor guarantees the
performance of the principal obligation by subjecting real property or real right as security for
the performance of such obligation.
Alternative Extended Answer:

By the contract of antichresis the creditor acquires the right to receive the fruits .of an
immovable of his debtor, with the obligation to apply them to the payment of the interest, if
owing* and thereafter to the principal of his credit.
Antichresis distinguished from pledge:
1. Antichresis is consensual, pledge is a real contract.
2. Antichresis involves real property, pledge involves personal property.
3. In antichresis, the principal and the interest must be provided in writing for validity. In
pledge, the date and description of the pledge must be in a public instrument to affect third
persons.
Antichresis distinguished from mortgage:
1. In antichresis the fruits that are applied to .the interest and thereafter to the principal. In
mortgage the fruits are not applied to the principal obligation.
2. In antichresis, the creditor is in possession. In mortgage, the debtor is in possession.
3. The principal and interest must be in writing tor validity. In mortgage, registration is
required to bind third persons.
4. In antichresis, the creditor pays the taxes. In mortgage, taxes are not imposed on the
creditor.
If the above alternative answer is given, two (2) distinctions for each should be given full
credit.
(2) A diamond ring and a female cow were pledged to secure a loan in the amount of
P100,000. The pledge appeared in a public instrument. A month later, the cow gave birth. When
the amount of the loan was not paid upon its maturity date, the pledged caused to be sold at a
public auction the ring, the cow and the cows offspring and the amount of P150,000. as realized.
The pledgor, upon learning of the sale, demanded from the pledgee the excess in the price over
and above the amount of the principal obligation, claiming that he is entitled to the excess and
that the offspring was not included in the pledge. The pledgee refused to comply with the
demand. How would you decide this conflict? Give your reasons.
Answer:
Debtor/pledgor is not entitled to the excess unless the contrary is agreed upon. The
offspring shall pertain to the pledgor but is subject to the pledge if there is no stipulation to the
contrary.
Question No. 15:

(1)
What do you understand by ESTOPPEL? What are the different kinds of estoppel?
Explain.
Answer:
The Civil Code enumerates only two (2) kinds of estoppel: estoppel .in pais or, by conduct
and estoppel by deed. Estoppel in pais or by conduct arises when one by his act, representation,
oral admission or by his silence induces another to believe certain facts to exist and the other
realize an act on such belief.
Estoppel by deed is that by virtue of which a party to a deed and his privies are precluded
from asserting as against the other party any right or title in derogation of the deed or any fact
asserted therein.
Alternative Extended Answer:
The Civil Code gives two (2) kinds of estoppel, namely: estoppel in pais and estoppel by
deed; and jurisprudence gives a third, namely: estoppel by laches.
Estoppel in pais or by conduct arises when one by his act, representation, oral admission or
by his silence induces another to believe certain facts to exist and the other realize an act on such
belief.
Estoppel by deed is that by virtue of which a party to a deed and his privies are precluded
from asserting as against the other party by which any right or title in derogation of the deed or
any fact asserted therein.
Laches is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time giving rise to the
presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.
(2)
How is a civil obligation distinguished from a natural obligation? Give an example
of a natural obligation.
Answer:
Civil obligations give a right of action to compel their performance. Natural obligations,
not being based on positive law but on equity and natural law, do not grant a right of action to
enforce their performance, but after voluntary fulfillment by the obligor, they authorize the
retention of what has been delivered on rendered by reason thereof.
Example ot a natural obligation (one example out of any of the following):
When a right to sue upon a civil obligation has lapsed by extinctive prescription, the
obligor who voluntarily performs the contract cannot recover what he has delivered or the value
of the service he has rendered.
2. When without the knowledge or against the will of the debtor a third person pays a debt
which the obligor is not legally bound to pay because the action thereon has prescribed, but the
debtor later voluntarily reimburses the third person, the obligor cannot recover what he has
paid.
3. When a minor between eighteen and twenty-one years of age who has entered into a
contract without the consent of the parent or guardian, after the annulment of the contract
voluntarily returns the whole thing or price received, notwithstanding the fact that he has not
been benefited thereby, there is no right to demand the thing or price thus returned.
4. When a minor between eighteen and twenty-one* years of age, who has entered into a
contract without the consent of the parent or guardian, voluntarily pays a sum of money or
delivers a fungible thing in fulfillment of the obligation, there shall be no right to recover the
same from the obligee who has spent or consumed it in good faith.
5. When, after an action to enforce a civil obligation has failed, the defendant voluntarily
performs the obligation, he cannot demand the return of what he has delivered or the payment
of the value of the service he has rendered.
6.
When a testate or intestate heir voluntarily pays a debt of the decedent exceeding the
value of the property which he received by will or by the law of intestacy from the estate of the
deceased, the payment is valid and cannot be rescinded by the payer.
7. When a will is declared void because it has not been executed in accordance with the
formalities required by law, but one of the intestate heirs, after the settlement of the debts of the
deceased, pays a legacy in compliance with, a clause in the defective will, the payment is
effective and irrevocable.
1.
Question No. 16:

May the owner of a building constructed on an unregistered land belonging to
another apply for the registration of such building under the Land Registration Act and P.D.
1529? What should he do to protect his rights in case the owner of the land applied for
registration thereof? Give your reasons.
(1)
Answer:
The Land Registration Act and PD 1529 apply to registration of land only. It may include the
building as an accessory but the building cannot be registered independently of the land because
registration contemplated under this Act refers only to ownership of land.

The owner of the building should file an opposition or answer to the application for
registration and ask the court that his right to the building be annotated in the decree and later
in the certificate of title.
(2)
A is the owner of a registered land. The Torrens Title is entrusted to B, his clerk
secretary, who forges AY signature on a deed of sale of said land in his (Bs) favor. A new title is
issued in the name of B,r upon registration. Does B have a valid title over the land? If B sells
the property to C, does the latter acquire a valid title over it?
Answer:
A forged deed is an absolute nullity and conveys no title but it can be the root of a title. If
title to the land has been transferred to a party based upon a forged deed, and later on after the
issuance of such title the property is transferred to another who is an innocent purchaser for
value, then the latter acquires a valid title.
1988 BAR QUESTIONS
Question No. 1:
What is a prejudicial question? What are its elements? What is its effect upon a
criminal action?
(b)
Mojar, a passenger in a bus operated by Times Transit Co., suffered serious
physical injuries as a result of a vehicular accident. An information was filed against Ailes, driver
of the bus, for serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence. Ailes was, however,
acquitted on the merits of the case because, according to the judgment of acquittal, he was not
negligent. Subsequently, Mojar instituted an action against Times Transit Co., to recover
damages. Will the action prosper? Give your reasons.
(c)
As a rule, once the criminal action has been commenced, the civil action for
damages arising from the offense charged shall be suspended until the final termination of the
criminal action. What are the exceptions to said rule as provided by the Civil Code?
(a)
Answer:
A prejudicial question is a question which arises in a case, the resolution of which is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to
another tribunal (People vs. Aragon 94 Phil. 357; Jimenez vs. Aceria 22SCRA 1380).
(a)
It has two elements. They are: First, that it must be determinative of the guilt or innocense of
the accused in the criminal case; and second, jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in
another tribunal (Ibid.)

Its effect upon a criminal case i$ to suspend it if one has already been commenced (Article
36, CC). This is of course,
the reverse of the ordinary rule of procedure. The reason for this is that the resolution of the
question is determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case.
(b)
If Mojar can prove the negligence of Ailes by preponderance of evidence, the
action will prosper. He can still recover damages from the operator of the bus even if the driver
had been acquitted in the criminal action, because it is clear that the action to recover is based
on culpa contractual and not on the act or omission complained of as a felony (Bernaldez vs.
Bohol Trans. Co. 7 SCRA 276). According to article 31 of the Civil Code, when the civil action is
based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such civil
action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of
the latter.
(c)
The exceptions are as follows:
(1)
Where the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or
omission complained of as a felony, such as when the basis of the civil action is culpa contractual,
culpa aquiliana, etc. (Arts. 31, 2177, CC).
(2)
Where the law grants to the injured party the right to institute a civil action which
is entirely separate and independent from the criminal action, such as when the action is based
on (a) interferences by public officers or employees or by private individuals with civil rights and
liberties; (b) defamation; (c) fraud; (d) physical injuries; or (e) refusal or neglect of a city or
municipal police officer to render aid or protection in case of danger to life or property (Arts. 32,
33, 34, CC).
(3)
Where the question to be resolved in the civil action is prejudicial to the criminal
action (Art. 36, CC).
Alternative Answers to: No. 1 (a) and (b)
A prejudicial question is a question which arises in a civil suit, the resolution of which
is determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
(a)
Its essential elements, as prescribed by Section 5 of Rule 111 are: (a) the civil action
involves an issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines
whether or not the criminal action may proceed.
Its effect upon a criminal case is to suspend the criminal case if one has already been
commenced.
(b) Considering that the acquittal is not based on reasonable doubt but on a positive
finding of innocence (he was not negligent) the civil action can no longer prosper.
The civil liability arising from the act complained of as a felony is barred by the finding of
innocence. However, the civil action for damages based on an obligation ex-contractu is not
deemed barred because of article 31 of the Civil Code.
Question No, 2:
Distinguish co-ownership from partnership.
(b)
Is the lease of the entire community property in co- ownership an act of
administration or an act of ownership or alteration? Explain, in relation to the need of consent of
the co-owners.
(c)
Since 1935* Janice possessed alone a parcel of land which she co-owned with
Lenny. In 1970, with the knowledge of Lenny, Janice obtained a torrens title over the land in her
own name alone. On August 1, 1988, Lenny brought an action against Janice for reconveyance of
her share. Janice set up the defense of laches. Will the defense prosper? Reasons.
(a)
Answer:
(a)
Co-ownership is distinguished from an ordinary partnership in the following ways:
(1) As to creation: Whereas co-ownership may be created by law, contract, succession,

fortuitous event, or occupancy, partnership is always created by contract.
(1)
As to purpose: Whereas the purpose of co-ownership is the common enjoyment
of the thing or right owned in common, the purpose of a partnership is to obtain profits.
(2)
As to personality: Whereas a co-ownership has no juridical personality which is
separate and distinct from that of the owners, a partnership has.
(3)
As to duration: Whereas an agreement not to divide the community property for
more than ten years is not allowed by law* such an agreement would be perfectly valid in the
case of partnerships. This is so, because under the lw, there is no limitation upon the
duration of partnerships.
(4)
As to power of members: Whereas a co-owner has no power to represent the coownership* unless there is an agreement to that effect, a partner has the power to represent
the partnership, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary.
(5)
As to effect of disposition of shares: If a co-owner transfers his share to a third
person, the latter becomes automatically a co-owner, but if a partner transfers his share to a
third person, the latter does not become a partner, unless agreed upon by all of the partners.
(6)
As to division of profits: Whereas in co-ownership the division of the benefits and
charges is fixed by law, in a partnership the division of profits arid losses may be subject to the
agreement of the partners.
(7)
As to effect of death: Whereas the death of a coowner has no effect upon the
existence of the co-ownership, the death of a partner shall result in. the dissolution of the
partnership.
(b) Lease of personal property is a mere act of administration, and, therefore, requires the
resolution of the majority of the co-owners. However, lease of real property may be an act of
administration or an act of alteration de-pending upon the circumstances of each particular case.
(1) If the lease is recorded in the Registry of Property, whatever may be the duration thereof, it is
an act of ownership, and therefore, requires the unanimous consent of all the co- owners, since
under the law, a special power of attorney is required (See Art. 1647, CC). (2) If the lease is not
recorded in the Registry of Property, but the duration thereof is more than one year, it is also an
act of ownership, and therefore, requires the unanimous consent of all the co-owners, since,
again, under the law, a special power of attorney is required (See Art. 1878 No. 8, CC). (3) If the
lease, however, is not recorded in the Registry of Property and the duration thereof is only one
year or less, it is an act of administration, and therefore, merely requires the resolution of the
majority of the co-owners.
(a)
It is submitted that the defense of laches will prosper. As held by the Supreme Court in
several notable decisions, in order that the doctrine of laches or stale demands can be applied,
the following elements must concur: (1) Conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under
whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made arid for which the
complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainants rights, the complainant
having had knowledge or notice, of the defendants conduct and having been afforded an
opportunity to institute a suit (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that
the complainant would assert the right on which he bases the suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to
the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be
barred (Miguel vs. Catalino, 26 SCRA 234). All ot these elements are present in the instant case.
As a matter of fact, the doctrine was applied to a case wherein co-heir and another were able,
through fraud, to register a tract of land in their names. According to the Supreme Court, the
action for reconveyance brought by the other co-heirs more than twenty years later is now
barred not only by extinctive prescription but also by laches. (Fabian vs. Fabian, 22 SCRA 231).
Committees Recommendation Re: No. 2 (a):
It is recommended that a mention of three distinctions should merit a full credit for
this question.
(a)
Question No. 3:
How are easements acquired?
(b)
In acquiring easement by prescription, how shall the period of possession be computed?
(c)
About fifteen years ago, Adelaida constructed a house on her lot at Quezon City
adjoining a lot owned by Bernie. She provided it'with several windows overlooking Bernies lot
half a meter away from the boundary line. A month ago, Bernie brought an action against
Adelaida for the closure of the windows alleging that they violate the law on distances.
1.
Has Adelaida acquired an easement of light and
(a)
view by prescription?
2.
Will the action of Bernie prosper?
3.
If the action will not prosper, will that not be tantamount to saying that Adelaida
has already acquired an easement of light and view?
Answer:
Continuous and apparent easements are acquired either by virtue of a title or by
prescription of ten years (Art. 620, CC), while continuous nonapparent easements and
discontinuous easements whether apparent or nonapparent, can only be acquired by virtue of
a title (Art. 622, CC).
In order that an easement may be acquired by prescription, the time of possession shall be
computed thus: In positive easements, from the day on which the owner of the dominant estate,
or the person who may have made use of the easement, commenced to exercise it upon the
servient estate; and in negative easements, from the day on which the owner of the dominant
estate forbade, by an instrument acknowledged before a notary public, the owner of the servient
estate, from executing an act which would be lawful without the easement. (Art. 621, CC.)
(c) (1) Adelaida has not acquired an easement of light and view by prescription after ten
years. There are two reasons for this. In the first place, there w'as no formal prohibition as
required by law'. This should have been done by means of an instrument acknowledged before a
notary public w'herein she should have prohibited Bernie from obstructing his light and view. She
did not. In the second place, she did not observe the legal requirement that there should be a
distance of at least two meters betw'een the window's and Bernies lot, since the view is direct.
According to the Civil Code, non-observance of this distance does not give rise to prascription.
(2)
The action will not prosper because more than ten years has already elapsed from
the time of the opening of the windows. Bernies right of action has already prescribed.
(3)
This is not tantamount to saying that Adelaida has already acquired an easement
of light and view. Under the Civil Code, nobody can prevent Bernie from obstructing Adelaidas
light and view' by constructing a building on his lot or by raising a wall thereon contiguous to the
windows of Adelaida.
(a)
(b)
Question No. 4:
What is meant by "law as a mode of acquiring ownership? What are the different
instances under the Civil Code whereby there is an acquisition of ownership by operation of law'?
State at least three.
(b)
A donated to X a parcel of land in 1975. The donation w'as made in a public
instrument, w'hile the acceptance made by X w-as embodied in the same public instrument. The
Deed of Donation was entitled "Donation Inter Vivos. There is however a provision in the deed
to the effect that, although the land donated shall be delivered immediately to X upon the
perfection of the donation with full right to enjoy all of the fruits thereof, "title shall pass to the
donee only upon the donors death. Upon the death of A, his widow and only heir, B. brought an
action for the recovery of the property on the ground that the donation is a donation mortis
(a)
causa and not a donation inter vivos. Will the action prosper? Give your reasons.
Answer:
(A) When the Civil Code speaks of law as a distinct mode of acquiring ownership, it refers
to those instances where the law, independently of the other modes of acquiring ownership,
automatically and directly vests the ownership of the thing in a certain individual once the
prescribed requisites or conditions are present or complied with. Examples of this are:
Land which belongs exclusively to either of the spouses where a building is
constructed with conjugal funds. Here, the ownership of the land is vested automatically
in the conj ugal partnership once the condition that its value has been reimbursed to the
owner has been
(1)
complied with (Art. 158, par. 2, CC.)

Hidden treasure which a stranger discovers by chance on anothers property.
Here, one-half of the treasure belongs by right of occupation to the stranger, while the
other half belongs by operation of law to the
(2)
proprietor. (Art. 438, par. 2, CC.)

Abandoned beds, when a river or stream suddenly changes its course to traverse private
lands. The former owners of the new bed shall be the owners of the abandoned bed in proportion
to the area lost by each. (Art. 58, P.D. No. 1067.)
(4)
Fruits naturally falling from a tree upon adjacent land. Here, the ownership of the fruits is
vested automatically in the owner of the adjacent land. (Art. 681, CC.)
(b) Yes, the action will prosper. In Bonsato vs. Court of Appeals, and Howard vs. Court of
Appeals, the Supreme Court declared that in order that a donation will be considered a
disposition post mortem, it should reveal any or all of the following characteristics:
(1)
Convey no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor;
or, what amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership, full or
naked, and control the property while alive;
(2)
That before his death the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad
nutum; but revo- cability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the
donor to dispose of the property conveyed;
(3)
That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.
(3)
It is clear from the facts stated in the problem that the donation reveals the first
characteristic. Hence, it is a disposition, post mortem. Therefore, in order that the donation can
take effect it is essential that it must be made in a will executed in accordance with all of the
formalities prescribed by law (Art. 728, CC) Since this requisite has not been complied with, the
donation in the instant case is void or inexislent.
Committees Recommendations Re: No. 4 (a) and (b)

(a) It is recommended that the following be likewise considered as instances whereby there
is acquisition of ownership by operation of law:
The acquisition of property in co-ownership under a marriage governed by tfie

absolute community regime.
(1)
(2)
Estoppel under article 1434 of the Civil Code which provides that:
When a person who is not the owner of a thing^ells or alienates and delivers it, and later
the seller or grantor acquires title thereto, such title passes by operation of law to the buyer
or grantee.; and
(3)
Registration of land under Act 496 where the applicant is not the real owner.
It is recommended that the mention of the first characteristic of the three mentioned
above, should merit a full credit for this question.
(b)
Question No. 5:
In probate proceedings, what are the only questions which a probate court can
(a)
determine?
A presented for probate a will purporting to be the last will and testament of his
deceased wife. The will was admitted to probate without any opposition. Sixteen months later,
the brothers and sisters of the deceased discovered that the will was a forgery. Can A now be
prosecuted for the criminal offense of forgery? Give your reasons.
(b)
Answer:
Under our law, there are only three possible ques tions which can be determined by the
probate court. They are:
(a)
Whether or not the instrument which is offered for probate is the last will and
testament of the decedent; in other words, the question is one of identity.
(2)
Whether or not the will has been executed in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by law; in other words, the question is one of due execution.
(3)
Whether or not the testator had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time
of the execution of the will; in other words, the question is one of capacity.
(1)
Consequently, the probate court cannot inquire into the intrinsic validity of testamentary
dispositions.
A can no longer be prosecuted for the criminal offense of forgery. This is so because,
according to the last paragraph of Art. 838 of the.Civil Code, subject to the right of appeal the
allowance of the will, either during the lifetime of the testator or after his death, shall be
conclusive as to its due execution. Since sixteen months have already elapsed from the allowance
of the will to the time when the forgery was discovered, there is now no possible remedy of
impugning the validity of the will. Even a petition to set aside a judgment or order of a Court of
First Instance on the ground of fraud in accordance with Secs. 2 and 3 of Rule 38 of the Rules of
(b)
Court is no longer possible because more than six months from the time of the promulgation of
the judgment or order have already elapsed. (Mercado vs. Santos, 66 Phil. 215.)
Committees Recommendation Re: No. 5 (a)
(a) It is recommended that a mention of numbers (2) or (3) should merit a full credit for
this question.
Suggested Alternative Answer To: No. 5 (b):

The criminal action can still prosper because the question of probate is a civil law matter
while the question of forgery is a penal matter. That does not preclude the determination of
guilt of the forger because the two are founded on different legal bases. Besides, in a crimi 7
nal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is required while in civil cases, only
preponderance of evidence is required.
Question No. 6:
(a)
(b)
(c)
What is preterition? What are its requisites? What is its effect?

What are the different limitations imposed by law upon fideicommissary
substitutions?
Who are compulsory heirs?
Answer:
Preterition or pretermission, as it is sometimes called may be defined as the omission in the
testators will of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the
time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator (Art. 854, CC). Stated in
another way, it consists in the omission in the testators will of the compulsory heirs in the diret
line, or of anyone of them, either because they are not mentioned therein, or, though mentioned,
they are neither instituted as heir nor expressly disinherited (Neri vs. Akutin, 74 Phil. 185; Nugu.id
vs. Nuguid, 17 SCRA 449). Its requisites are:
(1)
(2)
(3)
The heir omitted must be a compulsory heir in the direct line;

The ommission must be total and complete; and
The omitted heir must survive the testator.
The effect is to annul entirely the institution of heirs but legacies and devises shall be valid
insofar as they are not inofficious. (Art. 854, CC.)
(b)
There are four limitations. They are:
(1)
The substitution must not go beyond one degree from the heir originally
instituted (Art. 863, CC).
(2)
' The fiduciary and the fideicommissary must be living at the time of the death of
the testator (Ibid).
(3)
(4)
The substitution must not burden the legitime of compulsory heirs (Art. 864, CC).
The substitution must be made expressly (Art. 865, par. 1, CC.)
(c)
In general, compulsory heirs are those for whom the law has reserved a portion of
the testators estate which is known as the legitime.
(1)
In particular, the following are compulsory heirs:

Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;'
(2)
In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respects to
their legitimate children and descendants;
(3)
The widow or widower;
(4)
Acknowledged natural children and natural children by legal fiction;
(5)
Other illegitimate childen referred to in article 287.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in numbers 3,4, and 5 are not excluded by those in numbers
1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another.
Compulsory heirs mentioned in numbers 3, 4, and 5 are not excluded by those in numbers
1 and 2; neither do they exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the classes mentioned shall inherit from
them in the manner and to the extent established by the Civil Code. (Art. 887, CC.)
Committees Recommendation Re; No. 6 (c);
(c) It is recommended that an enumeration of numbers one to five without the mention
of the additional last three paragraphs should merit full credit for this question.
Question No. 7;
When does the right of representation take place?
(b)
Suppose that the beneficiary in a will is the wife of the minister of the gospel who
rendered aid to the testator during the latters last illness, would she be disqualified from
inheriting from the testator? Explain.
(a)
(c)
Answer;
The right of representation shall take place in the following cases:
(1) In testamentary succession:
(a)
In case a compulsory heir in the direct descending line dies before the testator
survived by his children or descendants (Art. 85.6, CC).

(b)
In case a compulsory heir in the direct descending line is incapacitated to succeed
from the testator and he has children or descendants. (Arts. 856,1035, CC).
(c)
In case a compulsory heir in the direct descending line is disinherited and he has
children or descendants. (Art. 923, CC).
(2) In intestate succession:
(a)
In case a legal heir in the direct descending line dies before the decedent survived
by his children or descendant (Arts. 98lj 982, CC), or in the absence of other heirs who can
exclude them from the succession, a brother or sister dies before the decedent survived by
his or her own children. (Ars. 972, 975, CC).
(b)
In case a legal heir in the direct descending line is incapacitated to succeed from
the decedent and he has children or descendants (Art. 1035, CC)* or in the absence of other
heirs who can exclude them from the succession, a brother or sister is incapacitated to
succeed from the decedent and he or she has children. (Arts. 972,975,1035, CC).
(b)
We believe that the wife of the minister would not be disqualified from inheriting from the
testator. Under No. 2 of Art. 1027 of the Civil Code, the law extends the disqualification of priests
and ministers of the gospel tp their relatives within the fourth degree as well as to the church,
order, chapter, community, organization or iastitlition to which they may belong. The spouse is
not included. Consequently, Such spouse is not disqualified. Otherwise, we would be reading into
the law what is not found there. Besides, capacity to succeed is the general rule, while incapacity
to succeed is the exception. Hence, the rules on incapacity must always be strictly construed.
Suggested Alternative Answer To: No. 7(b):
If the testamentary disposition was actually intended to favor the Minister as a
disqualified person and was ostensibly made thru an intermediary, namely, the wife, then the
Minister is considered disqualified as the real and intended heir.
(b)
Question No. 8:
(a) Mario
received from Edgar a pendant with diamonds valued at P5,000.00 to be sold on

commission basis or to be returned on demand. In the evening of August 31, 1987, while he was
walking home, two men snatched his clutch bag containing the pendant and ran away. Subsequently, the snatchers were apprehended and charged. During the pendency of the criminal case,
Edgar brought an action against Mario for the recovery of the pendant or its value and damages.
Mario interposed the defense of fortuitous event but Edgar contends
(1)
That the defense of fortuitous event is untenable because there was negligence
on the part of the defendant; and
(2)
That if the defense is untenable, there must be a prior conviction of robbery
before it can be availed of. Decide the case.
(b)
Distinguish between the effects of suspensive and resolutory conditions upon ail
obligation.
Answer:
The factual setting of the above problem is identical to that of Austria vs. Court of
Appeals (39 SCRA 527). In that case the Supreme Court held that defendant is not liable.
(a)
To constitute a caso fortuito that would exempt a person from responsibility, it is necessary
(1) that the event must be independent of the will of the debtor; (2) that it must be either
unforeseeable or unavoidable; (3) that the occurrence must render it impossible for the debtor to
fulfill the obligation in a normal manner; and (b) that the debtor must be free of participation in,
or aggravation of, the injury to the creditor.
All of the above requisites or conditions are present in this case. It is undeniable that in
order to completely exonerate the debtor by reason of a fortuitous event, such debtor must, in
addition into the causes itself, be free of any concurrent or contributory fault or hegligence. We
believe, however, that her act in travelling alone in the evening, carrying jewelry of considerable
value, cannot be considered as either concurrent or -contributory negligence, While it may be so
considered now, we are not persuaded that the same rule should obtain ten years previously
when the robbery in question took place, for at that time criminality had not by far reached the
levels attained in the present day.
There is likewise no merit in the contention that to allow the fact of robbery to be
recognized in this case before conviction is secured in the criminal action, would prejudice the
latter case, or would result in' inconsistency should the accused obtain an acquittal or should the
criminal case be dismissed. It must be realized that a court finding that a robbery has happened
would not necessarily mean that those accused in the criminal action would be found guilty of
the crime; nor would a ruling that those actually accused did not commit the robbery be
inconsistent with a finding that a robbery did take place. The evidence to establish these facts
would not necessarily be the same.
It is evident that a resolutory condition affects the obligation to which it is attached in a
manner which is diametrically opposed to that of a suspensive condition. If the suspensive
condition is fulfilled, the obligation arises or becomes effective if the resolutory condition is
fulfilled, the obligation is extinguished. If the first is not fulfilled, the juridical relation is created;
if the second is not fulfilled, the juridical relation is consolidated. In other words, in the first,
rights are not yet acquired, but there is a hope or expectancy that they will soon be acquired; in
the second, rights are already acquired, but subject to the threat of extinction (8 Manresa, 5th
Ed., Bk. 1, p. 311.)
(a)
Suggested Alternative Answers to No. 8(a):

(1) We would like to call attention to the fact that the question says "contends. So
perhaps we should make a distinction if negligence is proven and if negligence is not proven.
If the negligence of the defendant is not proven as Edgar contends, then the defense of
fortuitous event is tenable. However, if negligence is proven to be present then the defense
(a)
of fortuitous event is not tenable here and the defendant will be liable.
(2) 'There is no need of prior conviction in either case.
Question No. 9:
(a) Define alternative and facultative obligations.
Define joint and solidary obligations.

A, B, and C borrowed PI2,000 from X. This debt is evidenced by a promissory note wherein
the three bound themselves to pay the debt jointly and severally. However, according to the
note, A can be compelled to pay only on June 15, 1962, B can be compelled to pay only on June
15, 1964, while C can be compelled to pay only on June 15 1966. On June 15, 1962, X made a
demand upon A to pay the entire indebtedness but the latter aid only P4,000.00. Subsequently,
because of As refusal to pay the balance, X brought an action against him for collection of the
amount. Will such an action prosper? Reasons.
(b)
(c)
Answer:
Alternative obligations rgfer to those juridical relations which comprehend several
objects or prestations which are due, but the payment or performance of one of them would be
sufficient. On the other hand, facultative obligations refer to those juridical relations where only
one object or prestation has been agreed upon by the parties to the obligation, but the obligor
may deliver or render another in substitution.
(a) When there is a concurrence of two or more creditors or of two or more debtors in one
and the same Obligation, such obligation may be either joint (obligacion man- comunada) or
solidary (obligacion solidaria). A joint obligation may be defined as an obligation where there is a
concurrence of several creditors or .several* debtors, or of several creditors and debtors* by
virtue which each of the creditors has a right t6 demand, while each of debtors is bound to render
compliance with his proportionate part of the prestation which constitutes the object of the
obligation. In other words, each of the creditors is entitled to demand the payment of only a
proportionate part of the credit, while each of the debtors is liable for the payment of only a
proportionate part of the debt. A solidary obligation, on the other hand, may be defined as an
obligation where there is a concurrence of several creditors, or several debtors, or of several
creditors and debtors, by virtue which each of the creditors has a right to demand, while each of
the debtors is bound to render entire compliance with the prestation which constitutes the
object of the obligation. In other words, each of the creditors is entitled to demand the payment
of the entire credit, while each of the debtors is liable for the payment of the entire debt. (See
Art. 1207, CC; 3 Castan, 7th Ed., pp. 65-66.)
(b)
For the present, the action will not prosper. It is of course true that the obligation here is
solidary and that its solidary character is not destroyed by the fact that the debtors are bound by
different periods for payment is expressly provided for in Art. 1211 of the Civil Code. However, in
solidary obligations of this type, the right of the creditor is limited to the recovery of the amount
owed by the debtor whose obligation has already matured, leaving in suspense his right to
recover the shares corresponding to the other debtors whose obligations have not yet matured.
(a)
This restriction upon the creditors right does not destroy the solidary character of the obligation,
because ultimately, he can still compel one and the same debtor, if that is his wish, to pay the
entire obligation; Therefore, in the instant case, X shall have to wait for June 15, 1964, when Bs
obligation shall have matured, and for June 15, 1966, when Cs obligation shall have also matured.
On June 15, 1966, he can collect P4,000 from either A or B. On June 15, 1966, he can again
collect another P4,000 from either A or B or C. (See Ynchaustivs. Yulo, 34 Phil. 978.)
Suggested Alternative Answer To: No. 9 (c):
It now being 1988, the action can no longer prosper because it has already prescribed.
Actions upon written contracts prescribe in 10 years. '
(b)
Question No. 10:

(a) Under the Civil Code, what are the different special forms of payments?
What are the special requisites of consignation in order that it shall produce the
effect of payment?
(c) A treasury warrant payable to Rosenne and indorsed by Boni was cashed at the Philippine
National Bank. The warrant was subsequently dishonored by the Philippine Treasury. The Bank
then applied the deposit of Boni to the payment of the amount paid for the warrant. Is the action
of the Bank in accordance with law? Reasons.
(b)
Answer:
Under the Civil Code, there are actually four special forms of payment. They are (1)
application of payment (Arts. 1252-1254); (2) dation in payment (Art.
(a)
1245);
(3)
payment
by
cession
(Art.
1255);
and
(4)
tender
of
payment
and
consignation
(Arts.
1256-1261).
Strictly
speaking,
however,
application
of
payment,
by
its
very
nature, is not a special form of payment.
(a) In
order
that
consignation
shall
produce
the
effect
of payment, it is not only essential that it must conform with
all
of
the
requisites
of
payment,
but
it
is
also
essential
that
certain
special
requirements
prescribed
by
law
must
be
complied with. The debtor must show:
That there is a debt due;
That
the
consignation
has
been
made
either
because
the
creditor
to
whom
tender
of
payment
was
made
refused
to
accept
the
payment
without
just
cause,
or
because
any
of
the
cause
stated
by
law
for
effective
(1)
(2)
consignation
without
previous
tender
of
payment
exists (Art. 1256, CC);
(3)
The
previous
notice
of
the
consignation
had
been
given
to
the
persons
interested
in
the
fulfillment
of
the
obligation (Art. 1256, CC);
(4)
That
the
thing
or
amount
due
had
been
placed
at
the
disposal
of
judicial
authority
(Art.
1258,
par.
1,
CC); and
(5) That
after
the
consignation
had
been
made,
the
persons
interested
in
the
fulfillment
of
the
obligation
had
been notified thereof (Art. 1258, par. 2, CC).
Yes,
the
action
of
the
Bank
is
in
accordance
with
law.
The
facts
stated
in
the
above
problem
are
exactly
the
same
as
those
in
the
case
of
Gullas
vs.
National
Bank,
62
Phil.
519,
where
the
Supreme
Court
held
that
a
bank
has
a
right of set-off of the deposit in its hands for the payment of
any
indebtedness
to
it
on
the
part
of
the
depositor.
When-a
person deposits his money at a bank, whether such deposit is fixed, savings or current, a
relationship of creditor and debtor is established between the depositor and bank. ^ It
(b)
therefore, evident that all of the requisites for compensation are present in this case.
Committees Recommendation Re; No. 10(a):
The committee recommends that if application for payment is not mentioned by the
examinee, full credit must likewise be given.
(a)
Question No. 11:

(a)
Suppose that under an obligation imposed by a final judgment, the liability of the
judgment debtor is to pay the amount of P6,000.00 but both the judgment debtor and the
judgment creditor subsequently entered into a contract reducing the liability of the former to
only P4,000.00, is there an implied novation which will have the effect of extinguishing the
judgment obligation and creating a modified obligatory relation? Reasons.
(b)
Merle offered to sell her automobile to Violy for P60,000.00. After inspecting the
automobile, Violy offered to buy it for P50,000.00. This offer was accepted by Merle. The next
day, Merle offered to deliver the automobile, but Violy being short of funds, secured
postponement of the delivery, promising to pay the price upon arrival of the steamer, Helena.
The steamer however never arrived because it was wrecked by a typhoon and sank somewhere
off the Coast of Samar,
(1)
(2)
Is there a perfected contract in this case? Why?

Is the promise to pay made by Violy conditional or with a term? Why?
(3)
Can Merle compel Violy to pay the purchase price and to accept the automobile?
Why?
Answer;
There is no implied novation in this case. We see no valid objection to the judgment debtor
and the judgment creditor in entering into an agreement regarding the monetary obligation of.
the former under the judgment referred to. The payment by the judgment debtor of the lesser
amount of P4,000, accepted by the creditor without any protest or objection and acknowledged
by the latter as in full satisfaction of the money judgment, completely extinguished the judgment
debt and released the debtor from
his pecuniary liability. Novation results in two stipulationsone to extinguish an existing
obligation, the other to substitute a new one in its place. Fundamental it is that novation effects a
substitution or modification of an obligation by another or an extinguishment of one obligation
by the creation of another. In the case at hand, we fail to see what new or modified obligation
arose out of the payment by judgment debtor of the reduced amount of P4,000 to the creditor.
Additionally, to sustain novation necessitates thjit the same be so declared in unequivocal terms
clearly and unmistakably shown by the ex-, press agreement of the parties or by acts of
equivalent importor that there is complete and substantial incompatibility between the two
obligations. (Sandico vs. Piguing, 42SCRA 322.)
(b) (1) Yes, there is a perfected contract because there is already a concurrence between
the offer and the acceptance with respect to the object and the cause which shall
constitute the contract. Such concurrence is manifested by the acceptance made by Merle
of the offer
made by Violy.
(2)
I submit that the promise to pay made by Violy is not conditional, but with a term.
The promise is to pay the P50,000 upon arrival in this port of the steamer, Helena* not if
the steamer Helena shall arrive in this port. Hence, the promise is with regard to the date
of arrival and not with regard to the fact of arrival.
(3)
Yes, Merle can compel Violy to pay the purchase * price and to accept the
automobile. She will, however,
have to wait for the date when the steamer, Helena, would have arrived were it not for the
shipwreck. After all, there is already a perfected contract. lesser amount of P4,000,
accepted by the creditor without any protest or objection and acknowledged by the latter
as in full satisfaction of the money judgment, completely extinguished the judgment debt
and released the debtor from his pecuniary liability.
Novation results in two stipulationsone to extinguish an existing obligation, the other to
substitute a new one in its place. Fundamental it is that novation effects a substitution or
modification of an obligation by another or an extinguishment of one obligation by the

creation of another. In the case at hand, we fail to see what new or modified obligation arose
out of the payment by judgment debtor of the reduced amount of P4,000 to the creditor.
Additionally, to sustain novation necessitates thjit the same be so declared in unequivocal terms
clearly and unmistakably shown by the ex-, press agreement of the parties or by acts of
equivalent importor that there is complete and substantial incompatibility between the two
obligations. (Sandico vs. Piguing, 42SCRA 322.)
(1) Yes, there is a perfected contract because there is already a concurrence between
the offer and the acceptance with respect to the object and the cause which shall
constitute the contract. Such concurrence is manifested by the acceptance made by Merle
of the offer
(c)
made by Violy.
(4)
I submit that the promise to pay made by Violy is not conditional, but with a term.
The promise is to pay the P50,000 upon arrival in this port of the steamer, Helena* not if
the steamer Helena shall arrive in this port. Hence, the promise is with regard to the date
of arrival and not with regard to the fact of arrival.
(5)
Yes, Merle can compel Violy to pay the purchase * price and to accept the
automobile. She will, however,
have to wait for the date when the steamer, Helena, would have arrived were it not for the
shipwreck. After all, there is already a perfected contract.
Suggested Alternative Answers To: No. 11(a) and (b):

(1) There remains an obligation on the basis of the facts given. There is no showing in the
facts that the P4,000 has been paid so it created a modified obligatory obligation no longer
based on the judgment but based on the novatory agreement.
(2)
There is no implied novation. Instead there has been a partial remission in the
amount of P2,000 leaving P4,000 still enforceable under the judgment.
(3)
It can amount to a compromise. A final judgment which has not yet been fully
satisfied may be the subject of a compromise. The compromise partakes the nature of a
novation. Article 204; provides that:
(a)
If one of the parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, the other party
may either enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his
original demand.
(Gatchalian vs. Arlegui 75 SCRA 234; Dormitorio vs. Fernandez 72 SCRA 388). '
(b)
(2) The promise to pay is subject to a term. When there is a pre-existing obligation and
the condition affects only the time of payment such condition can be considered as a
period. In other words, the parties must be deemed to have contemplated a period.
(3) Yes Merle can compel Violy to pay the purchase price and to accept the automobile
but only after the t parties would have fixed the period. Failing in that, the courts may be asked
to fix the period. Article 1180 provides that:
When the debtor binds himself to pay when his means permit him to do so, the
obligation shall be deemed to be one with a period, subject to the provisions of
article 1197.
Question No. 12:

s
(a)
Pursuant to private international law or conflict of laws, to what law is real
property as well as personal property subject? Are there any exceptions to the rule? If there are,
name them,
(b)
What are the four aspects of succession which are governed by the national law
of the decedent if he is a foreigner?
(c)
A, a citizen of California, U.S.A. but domiciled in the Philippines, died testate in
Manila, survived by two acknowledged natural children, B and G. In his will, he left more than
P500,000.00 to B and only P3,000.00 to C. It is admitted that under tlje Civil Code of California,
the domiciliary law of the decedent shall govern questions involving the validity of testamentary
provisions. C, who is contesting the validity of the. disposition in favor of B now contends that
the Philippine laws with respect to succession are applicable. Is this Correct? Give your reasons.
Answer:
(a)
Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated (Art. 16, par. 1, CC). There are, however, two exceptions to this rule. They are:
(1) under the second paragraph of Art. 16, which declares that, testamentary and intestate
succession, both with respect to the order of succession, the amount of successional rights and
the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions shall be regulated by the national law of the
decedent; and (2) under No. 2 Art. 124, which declares that if the husband is a foreigner and the
wife is a Filipino, their property relationsshall be governed by the husbands national law, without
prejudice to the provisions of the Civil Code with regard to immovable property.
(b)
The four aspects of succession which are governed by the national law of the decedent if
he is a foreigner are: first, the order of succession; second, the amount of successional rights;
third, the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions; and fourth, the capacity to succeed. (Arts.
16, par. 2, 1039, CC; see Beilis vs. Beilis, 20 SCRA 358.)
(c) Yes, this is correct. The doctrine of renvoi is applicable in the instant case. Although the
Civil Code in Art. 16 states that the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions shall be regulated
by the decedents national law, nevertheless, the Civil Code of California declares that the
decedents domiciliary law shall govern. Hence, the question shall be referred back to the
decedents domicile. In other words, the laws of the Philippines with respect to succession shall
govern. Consequently, in the partition of the estate, C shall be given a share which must not be
less than his legitime. (Aznarvs; Garcia, 7 SCRA 95).
Question No. 13:
(a) A sold to B a house and lot for P50,000.00 payable 30 days after the execution of the
deed of sale. It was expressly agreed in the deed that the sale would ipso facto be of no effect
upon the buyers failure to pay as' agreed. B failed to pay on maturity, and A sued to declare the
contract of no force and effect. If B tendered payment before the action was filed, but
subsequent to the stipulated date of payment, would the action prosper? Why?
(b)
In 1950, A executed a power of attorney authorizing B to sell a parcel of lancl
consisting of more than 14 hectares. A died in 1954. In 1956, his four childen sold more than 12
hectares of the land to C. In 1957, B sold. 8 hectares of the same land to D. It appears that C did
not register the sale executed by the children. D, who was not aware of the previous sale,
registered the sale executed by B, whose authority to sell was annotated at the back of the
Original Certificate of Title.
What was the effect of the death of A upon Bs authority to sell the land?
(2) Assuming that B still had the authority to sell the landwho has a better right over the
said land, C or D?
What are the requisites in order that the defendant can be held liable for damages in a quasidelict case?
(1)
(1)
Answer:
The action would not prosper in such a case. According to the law, in the sale of
immovable property, even though it may have been stipulated that upon failure to pay the price
at the time agreed upon the rescission of the contract shall of right take place, the vendee may
pay, even after the expiration of the period, so long as no demand for the rescission of the
contract has been made upon him either judicially or by notarial act. After the demand, the court
may not grant him a new term. (Art. 1592, CC.) Here, at the time B tendered payment of the
purchase price, there was still no demand made upon him by A for the payment of said purchase
price either judicially or by notarial act.
(b) {1) While the death of the principal in 1954 ended the authority of the agent to sell
the land, it has not been shown that he was aware of his principal s demise. Hence, the act
of such agent is valid and shall be fully effective with respect to third persons which may
have contracted with him in good faith in conformity with Art. 1931 of the Civil Code.
(Buason vs. Panuyas, 105 Phil. 795, Herrera vs. Luy, 110 Phil. 1020.)
(2) As the case at bar is a case of double sale of registered land he who recorded the
sale in good faith has a better right in conformity with Art. 1544 of the Civil Code. Since D
was not aware of the previous sale, he had to rely on the face of the certificate of title of
the registered owner. Hence, he now has a better right to the land. (Buason vs. Panuyas,
supra.)
(a)
In actions based on quasi-deliets, before the person injured can recover damages from
the defendant, it is
(c)
necessary that he must be able to prove the following facts:

The fault or negligence of the defendant;
(2)
The damages suffered or incurred by the plaintiff; and
(3)
The relation of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the
defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff. (Taylor vs. Manila Electric Co., 16 Phil.
8.)
'
(1)
Alternative Answer to: No. 13 (b):

(1) The agency is terminated upon the death of either the principal or agent.
Exceptionally, a transaction entered into by the agent with a third person where both had
acted in good faith is valid. Article 1930 of the Civil Code provides that:
(b)
The agency shall remain in full force and effect even after the death of the
principal, if it has been constituted in the common interest of the latter and of the
agent, or in the interest of a third person who has accepted the stipulation in his
favor.
and Article 1931 provides that:
Anything done by the agent, without knowledge of the death of the principal or
of any other cause which extinguishes the agency, is valid and shall be fully effective
with respect to third persons who may have contracted with him in good faith.
Question No. 14:
(a)
1) Is title to registered land subject to prescription?
Explain your answer.

How about the right of the registered owner to recover possession, is it equally
imprescriptible? Why? on the imprescriptibility of Torrens Title? Explain.
(b) In passing upon the registrability of a document sought to be registered, what formal
requisites is the Register of Deeds charged to determine, under his responsibility, whether or not
they have been complied with?
2)
Answer:
1) No because under Section 47, P.D. 1529, no title to registered land in
derogation of that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession. A similar provision is found in the Civil Code. The reason is that once a piece of land
is registered under the Torrens System, it operates as a notice to the whole world. All
persons are bound by it. No one can plead ignorance of the registration.
(2)
The right to recover the land from another person holding it is equally
imprescriptible, the reason being that possession is a mere consequence of ownership.
(a)
While a Torrens Title is imprescriptible, under certain exceptional circumstances, it may

yield to the equitable principle of laches. In other words, certain circumstances such as inaction
or utter neglect on the part of the owner and the intervention of rights by third parties may, for
reasons of equity, convert the claim of imprescriptibility into a stale demand. (Mejia vs. Gamponia,. 100 Phil. 277; Miguel vs. Catalino, G.R. L-23072, Nov. 29, 1968; Heirs of Batiog Lacarnen
vs. Heirs of Laruan, G.R. L-27058, July 31, 1985).
(3)
To be registerable, a voluntary document affecting registered land must be sufficient in

law. (Section 51, P.D. 1529) Sufficiency refers to both substance and form. As to form, it is the
RODs responsibility to check such items as the full name and signature of vendor or grantor, the
marital consent of the wife if the land sold is conjugal, the full name, nationality, the civil status,
the name of spouse, if married, the resident and postal address of the grantee. If the grantee is a
corporation, the deed must be accompanied with the Articles of Incorporation, a board
resolution authorizing the corporation to buy and another resolution of the Board naming the
corporate officer authorized to execute and sign the contract. This is not to mention the proper
observance of the requirements in the acknowledgment portion of the deed.
(b)
Question No. 15:

Suppose that in an oral contract, which by its terms is not to be performed within
one year from the execution thereof, one of the contracting parties has aleady complied within
the year with the obligations imposed upon him by said contract, can the other party avoid
fulfillment of those incumbent upon him by invoking the Statute of Frauds?
(b)
One-half of a parcel of land belonging to A and B was sold by X to Y for the
amount of PI ,500.00. The sale was executed verbally. One year later, A and B sold the entire land
to X. Is the sale executed verbally by X to Y valid and binding? Reasons.
(c)
Distinguish between a contract of sale and a contract to sell.
(a)
Answer:
No, he cannot. This is so, because the Statute of Frauds aims to prevent and not to
protect fraud. It is well- settled that when the law declares that an agreement which by its terms
is not to be performed within a year from the making thereof is unenforceable by action, unless
the same* or some note or memorandum thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party
charged, or by his agent, it refers only to an agreement which by its terms is not to be performed
on either side within a year fom the execution thereof. Hence.
(a)
one which has already been fully performed on one side within a year is taken out of the
operation of the statute. (Phil. Nat. Bank vs. Phil. Vegetable Oil Co., 49 Phil. 857; Shoemaker vs.
La Tondena, 68 Phil. 24.)
(b)
The sale, although not contained in a public instrument or formal writing, is
nevertheless valid and binding.for the time-honored rule is that even a verbal contract of sale qf
real estate produces legal effects between the parties. In the premises, Art. 1434 or the Civil
Code, which declares that when a person who is not the owner of a thing sells or alienates and
delivers it, and later the seller or grantor acquires title thereto, such title passes by operation of
law to the buyer or grantee, is applicable. (Bucton vs. Gabar, 55 SCRA 499.)
(c)
The two may be distinguished from each other in the following ways:
(1)
In the first, title passes to the vendee upon delivery of the thing sold, whereas in
the second, by agreement, ownership is reserved in the vendor and is not to pass until full
payment of the price.
(2)
In the first, nonpayment is a negative resolutory condition, whereas in the second,
full payment is a positive suspensive condition.
(3)
In the first, the vendor has lost and cannot recover ownership until and unless the
Contract is resolved or rescinded, whereas in the second, title remains in the vendor, and
when he seeks to eject the vendee because of noncompliance by such vendee with the suspensive condition stipulated, he is enforcing the contract and not resolving the same.
(Santos vs. Santos, CA, 47 Off. Gaz; 6372.)
Suggested Alternative Answers To: No. 15 (b):
1) The contract of sale is valid and enforceable in view of the payment of the price of
PI,500 But there is no showing the problem that there was delivery of the
(b)
land. Accordingly, Article 1434 does not apply. However, Y can compel under Article 1357
to observe the proper form of a deed of sale involving real property and simultaneously compel
specific performance to deliver.
(c)
2) The verbal sale of land is unenforceable since there is no statement in the problem that
the agreed price of PI,500 was paid, nor was the land delivered. Being, Article 1434 will not apply
since it is predicated on a valid or enforceable contract of sale.
(d)
Question No. 1:
Alma, a Filipino citizen went to the United States on a tourist visa. Wanting to legalize her
stay and obtain permanent employment, she married John, an American citizen, for a fee, with
the understanding that after a year, John would divorce her. As agreed upon the two obtained a
divorce in Reno, Nevada.
(a) Suppose that after the divorce Alma consults you on the question of how she can now
marry her childhood sweetheart Rene, in tfe Philippines preferably, or if that cannot be done,
in some other country where Alma and Rene are prepared to go so that they can be joined in
wedlock and live the life they had dreamed about. What advice will you give Alma. Explain.
(bi Suppose on the other hand that Alma and John decided to give their marriage a try.
They had seven years of marriage. Alma eventually became an American citizen, but the
marriage soured, and ended up in a divorce, just the same.
This time Alma wants a marriage for keeps, so she comes back to the Philippines to Rene
who, ever faithful, has waited for seven long years. Can she and Rene contract a valid marriage?
Explain.
Answer:
(First Assumption)
a.
Assuming that the marriage of Alma and John is valid, then the divorce obtained by
them is void because of Article 15 of the Civil Code, Hence a marriage between Alma
and Rene in the Philippines
or elsewhere will be bigamous. The advice to Alma, therefore, is for her not to marry
Rene.
b. Since Alma became an American citizen and presumably she had that citizenship at the
time of the divorce, if the divorce is valid under the American law or the law of her
nationality at that time, then she would be released from her marriage with John. Alma
and Rene can contract a valid marriage when she comes back to the Philippines.
(Second Assumption)
a.
Assuming that the marriage of Alma and John is fictitious, there having been no real
intent to enter into the marriage, and there having been no consent at all since Almas
intention was merely to legalize her stay and obtain permanent employment, the
marriage between Alma and John is Yoid. On this premise, my advice to Alma would be
that she can now marry her childhood sweetheart Rene in the Philippines or in any other
country for that matter.
b.
Assuming, upon the other hand, that Alma and John did intend to marry and give their
marriage a try, and Alma eventually became an American citizen, the divorce would be
valid. Hence, she and Rene can contract a valid marriage upon her return to the Philippines
Question No. 2:
Ato was the registered owner of a passenger jeepney, which was involved in a collision
accident with a vegetable truck, resulting in the death of four passengers and injuries to three. At
the time of the accident, Ato was legally married to Maria but was cohabiting with Tonia in a
relationship akin to that of husband and wife.
Could the heirs of the dead passengers and tire injured
Person recover damages from?
(a) Ato?
(b)
(c)
Maria?
Tonia?
Explain each case.
Answer:
a.
Ato Yes. Insofar as the dead passengers are concerned, the heirs can recover damages
on the basis of culpa contractual. If the injured persons are also passengers, Ato is
Jikewise liable on the same basis of culpa contractual. However, if the injured persons
are not passengers, then the liability for damages of Ato will be on the basis of a quasi-
delict.
b.
c.
Maria In view of the ruling in Juaniza v. Jose (89 SCRA 306) that the passenger
jeepney acquired by the husband during an illicit cohabitation with the paramour is
conjugal property, Maria is liable to the same extent as Ato insofar as the conjugal
property in the marriage between Ato and Maria could be answerable. But as regards her
paraphernal property, Maria cannot be held answerable.
Tonia No. In Juaniza v. Jose the paramour of the owner of the passenger jeepney that
figured in an accident was held to be not a coowner, and therefore not liable for
damages. Article 144 is inapplicable.
Question No. 3:
Celso Lim would like to correct an allegedly wrong entry in the birth certificate of one of
his sons, Celso Jr., describing the latter as a Chinese national and not as a Filipino. Among the
evidence Celso Lim had are his own birth certificate describing him as a Filipino, the birth
certificate of his other children, all describing them as Filipinos and a court decision describing
his father (Celso, Jr.s grandfather) as a Filipino.
What action must Celso Lim take to ensure the effective correction of the
allegedly wrong entry in his sons birth certificate?
(a)
(b)
Who should be made parties to such action or proceeding?
Answer:
Celso must file a petition in an adversary proceeding to correct the erroneous entry. In
the case of Republic v. Valencia, (L-32181, March 5, 1986), it was ruled that not only clencal
errors can be the subject-matter of the petition, but even the controversial entries can be
corrected.
a.
Under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, he should notify the Civil Registrar and all the
persons affected or who have an interest in the subject matter of the petition, including the
Solicitor General.
b.
Question No. 4:
Angel died intestate leaving considerable properties accumulated during 25 years of
marriage. He is survived by his widow, a legally adopted son, the child of a deceased legitimate
daughter, two illegitimate children duly recognized by Angel before his death and his ailing 93year old mother who has wholly dependent on him.
How would you distribute the estate indicating by fractions the portions of the following
who claim to be entitled to inherit:
the widow?
the adopted son?
the child of the deceased legitimate daughter?
the two recognized illegitimate children?
The mother
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
Answer:
a.
b.
c.
d.
the widow 1/4

the adopted son - 1/4
the child of the deceased legitimate daughter 1/4
the two recognized illegitimate children - v/e must distinguish:
Assuming that the two recognized illegitimate children are natural children, then each of
them will get 1/8.
Upon the other hand, if they are recognized spurious children then each of them will get
2/5 of 1/4 of the estate. The remaining 1/5 of 1/4 will be distributed as follows:
Under the theory of concurrence, that 1/5 of 1/4 will be divided equally among the widow,
the adopted son and the child of the deceased legitimate daughter.
Under the theory of exclusion that 1/5 of 1/4 will be divided equally between the adopted
son and the child of the deceased legitimate daughter.
e.
the mother - will get nothing.
Question No. 5:
Tomas, Rene and Jose entered into a partnership under the firm name Manila Lumber.
Subsequently, upon mutual agreement, Tomas withdrew from the partnership and the
partnership was dissolved. However, the remaining partners, Rene and Jose, did not terminate
the business of Manila Lumber. Instead of winding up the business of the partnership and
liquidating its assets, Rene and Jose continued the business in the name of Manila Lumber
apparently without objection from Tomas. The withdrawal of Tomas from the partnership was
not published in the newspapers.

Could Tomas be held liable for any obligation or indebtedness Rene and Jose might incur
while doing business in the name of Manila Lumber after his withdrawal from the partnership?
Explain.
Answer:
Yes. Tomas can be held liable under the doctrine of estoppel. But as regards the parties
among themselves, only Rene and Jose are liable. Tomas cannot be held liable since there was no
proper notification or publication.
In the event that Tomas is made to pay the liability to third person, he has the right to seek
reimbursement from Rene and Jose (Articles 1837 to 1840; Goquiolay vs. Sycip, 9 SCRA 663).
Question No. 6:
M/S Philippines, operated by United Shipping Lines, loaded in Japan for shipment to Manila
50 crates of pipes consigned to Standard Blooming Mills. The shipment was insured againts
marine risks with Marine Insurance Company. Enroute, the ship caught fire resulting in the total
loss of ship and cargo. The insurance company paid the consignee and thereafter sought recovery
and reimbursement from the United Shipping Lines as subrogee unto the rights of the insured.
Evidence was presented establishing the fact that from the time the goods were stored in the
ships hatch, no regular inspection was made during the voyage such that the fire must have
started 24 hours before it was noticed.
Could the insurance company claim reimbursement of the amount it had paid its insured
from the United Shipping Lines? Explain.
Answer:
Yes. Under Article 2207, the insurer is subrogated to the rights of the insured against the
wrongdoer or the person
who violated the contract when the insurer pays or indemnifies the insured for the injury or loss
arising out of the wrong or breach of contract complained of. There being a breach of contract of
carriage in view of total loss of the cargo insured, Marine Insurance Company may claim reimbursement of the amount paid the insured from the United Shipping Lines.
Question No. 7;
Fred sold to Juan a parcel of land, belonging to his minor son, Lino, then under his
guardianship, without judicial approval. After the sale, Juan immediately took possession of the
land, built a house and religiously paid the taxes thereon. Nine years thereafter, Lino, no longer
a minor, rented the ground floor of the house built by Juan. Lino paid the rent for the first month,
then stopped paying. Two years thereafter, when pressed for payment of the accrued rent. Lino
refused, claiming ownership over the property, alleging that the sale of the property to Juan
while he was a minor without the approval of the guardianship court rendered the sale null and
void.
Is the claim of Lino valid and meritorious? Explain. Answer:
No, Linos claim is not valid and not meritorious because Lino is in estoppel. A lessee cannot
assail the right and title of the lessor and cannot claim ownership as against the lessor. The fact
that the sale was made while Lino was a minor is of no moment because he recognized and
ratified the contract after he was already of majority age.
Answer:
No, Linos claim is not valid and not meritorious because Juan had already become the
owner of the land by ordinary acquisitive prescription through adverse possession of the land
for over ten (10) years.
Answer
No, Lino's claim is not valid and not meritorious. Lino can no longer recover the land
because of laches.
Question No. 8:
Miguel, Carlos and Lino are neighbors. Miguel owned a piece of registered land which both
Carlos and Lino wanted to buy. Miguel sold the land to Carlos. The sale was not registered upon
the request of Miguel. Later on, the same property was sold by Miguel to Lino. Miguel told
Carlos about the second sale. Carlos immediately tried to see Lino to discuss the matter and
inform him of the previous sale to him (Carlos) of the same property but Lino refused to see
Carlos. Thereupon Carlos annotated in the Registry of Property his adverse claim on the
property. A week later, Lino registered the sale on his favor and had a new transfer certificate of
title issued in his name. However, the adverse claim of Carlos was duly annotated in the title.
Notwithstanding, Lino took possession of the property and built a small bungalow thereon.
(a)
(b)
Who is the rightful owner of the property? Explain.

To whom would the bungalow built by Lino on the property belong? Explain.
Answer:
a. In double sales, under Article 1544 the land sold belongs to the first registrant in good
faith. If none, it belongs to the first possessor in good faith. If none it belongs to the person with
the oldest title, provided there is good
faith. Carlos, who has the oldest title, is therefore the rightful owner of the property, because
there was no registration in good faith by Lino.

b.
The bungalow built by Lino belongs to Carlos. Lino is a builder in bad faith. Article
449 provides that he who builds in bad faith on the land of another loses what it built without
right to indemnity
Question No. 9:
Rita owned a valuable painting which was stolen from her house. The theft was duly
reported to the authorities. A year after, Rita saw the painting hanging in the office of Mario.
When queried, Mario said that he bought the painting in a gallery auction. The painting was
positively identified as the one stolen from the house of Rita.
Could Rita recover the painting? If so, would Mario be entitled to reimbursement
of the amount he paid for the painting? Explain.
(a)
(b)
Supposing Mario bought the painting from a friend, would your answer be the
same? Explain.
Answer:
Yes, Rita could recover the paintings but Mario is not entitled to reimbursement because
a gallery auction is a public sale (Article 559).
a.
Yes, insofar as recovery of the painting is concerned. Rita can recover it. No, as regards
reimbursement, because the painting was not bought at a public sale as provided under Article
559 of the Civil Code. Mario is entitled to reimbursement.
b.
Question No. 10.

Lino entered into a written agreement for the repair of his priv-ate plane with Airo Repair
Works, Inc. for P500,000. Additional work was done upon the verbal request and authority of a
duly recognized representative of Lino. Lino refused to pay for the additional work, interposing
as a defense the absence of a written contract for the additional work done.
Is the defense put up by Lino valid? Explain?
Answer:
The defense put up by Lino is valid under Article 1724 of the Civil Code. The change must
have been authorized by the proprietor in writing, and the additional price to be paid the
contractor must have been determined in writing by both parties.
Answer:
It appearing that the additional work was done upon verbal request and authority of a duly
authorized representative of Lino, and the benefits have been received by Lino in consequence
of the actual repair and the additional work, the defense put up by Lino is not valid on the
ground that no person may unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another.
Question No. 11:

Ana rented a safety deposit box at the Alto Bank, paid the rental fee and was given the key.
Ana put her jewelry and gold coins in the box. Days after, three armed men gained entry into the
Alto Bank, opening its vault and several safety deposit boxes, including Anas and emptied them of their contents.
Could Ana hold the Alto Bank liable for the loss of the contents of her deposit box? Explain
Answer:
No, because under Article 1990 of the Civil Code, if the depository by force majeure loses
the thing and receives money or another thing in its place, he shall deliver the sum or other thing
to be depositor. There being no showing that there was anything received in place of the things
deposited the Alto Bank is not liable foi the contents of the safety box.
Answer
The Alto Bank is not liable because the contract is not a deposit but a rental of the safety
deposit box. Hence, the Alto Bank is not liable for the loss of the contents of the box.
Question No. 12:

Spouses Martin and Tecla bought a parcel of land on installment. At the time the total sale
price was paid, Martin had left the conjugal abode and was cohabiting with Tina.
Notwithstanding such separation, Tecla religiously paid the installments as they fell due out of
her earnings from a small saivsari store. After the "total purchase price had been paid, Martin
had the property titled in the name of Martin married to Tina. Tecla died and her two children
by Martin demanded partition of the property and their mothers share. Martin and Tina
refused, claiming that the property belonged to their conjugal partnership. No proof was
presented that Martin married Tina during or after the death of Tecla,
To whom does the property titled in the name of Martin married to Tina belong? How
would the property be divided among Martin, the two children of Martin and Tecla and Tina?
Explain.
Answer:
The property is conjugal property.- 1/2 belongs to Martin and the other half of Tecla.
However, 1/2 belonging to Tecla will be divided among Martin and the two children, each of
them getting 1/3 of that 1/2.
Question No. 13:

Lilia and Nelia arc relatives, Lilia being the grandniece of Nelia. They had a common
ancestor, Bonong, father of Nelia and great-grandfather of Lilia. Bonong had a sister, Rosa, who
donated gratuitously a parcel of land to her niece.
Mely, sister of Nelia and grandmother of Lilia. Mely died intestate, leaving aforementioned
parcel of land, survived by her husband Jose and their two children, Rico and Nina. Bonong died
intestate survived by his legitimate grand^ children, Rico and Nina. In the adjudication of his
estate, the portion pertaining to Mely, who had predeceased her father, went to her two
legitimate children, Rico and Nina. Rico died instestate, single , and without any issue, leaving his
share in the inheritance to his father, Jose, subject to a reserva troncal duly annotated on the
title. Thereafter Nina died intestate and her rights and interests were inherited by her only
legitimate child, Lilia. Thereafter, Jose died intestate survived by his only descendant, Lilia. Nelia,
aunt of Rico, would like to lay claim as reservatario to a portion of the one-half pro indiviso share
of the property inherited by Jose from his son Rico.
How should the estate of Jose, including the property subject to reserva troncal be
adjudicated? Explain.
Answer:
This is a proper case of reserva troncal. The prepositus is Rico, the reservista is Jose and the
reservatarios are Lilia (a niece) and Nelia (an aunt), both of them being relatives within the 3rd
degree of Rico (the prepositus) and belonging to the maternal line represented by Mely.
Accordingly, Nelia as reservatario cannot claim any portion of the pro-indiviso share of the
property inherited by Jose from Rico. Lilia alone should inherit because in reserva troncal, the
successional rights of relatives who are reservatarios are determined by the rules of intestate
succession. In intestacy, nephews and nieces exclude uncles and aunts. Hence, Lilia the niece,
excludes Nelia, the aunt, from the reservable property (De Papa vs. Camacho 144 SCRA 281).
The rest of Joses estate, not subject to reserva, will be inherited by his granddaughter Lilia
as sole intestate heir.
This is a proper case of reserva troncal. The prepositus is Rico, the reservista and the
reservatarios are Lilia and Nelia, both of them being relatives within the 3rd degree computed
from Rico and belonging to the maternal line* represented by Mely. Under the doctrine of
reserva integral all the reservatarios in the nearest degree will inherit in equal shares the
reservable portion of the pro-indiviso share of the property inherited by Jose from Rico. The
properties transmitted to Jose by Rico are the following:
Firstly, the property which Rico obtained from Mely consisted of his share in Melys interest
as donee of Rosas land. The interest acquired by Rico was 1/3, because 1/3 thereof was inherited
by Jose and 1/3 by Nina. So the property that was obtained by Jose from Rico is the latters 1/3
interest of the land.
In the case of Bonongs estate, the share of Mely was 1/2 and Nelias was the other half. Out
of Melys share, 1/2 belonged to Rico and the other half belonged to Nina, both inheriting by
right of representation.
Summarizing the reservable estate is the 1/3 share of Rico in Rosas land which was donated
to Mely, and the 1/2 interest of Rico in Melys share of the estate of Bonong. These reservable
properties should be divided equally between Nelia and Lilia (Article 891).
Question No. 14:
Lina married Hugo in a church ceremony. Hugo discovered that five years before, Lina
married Six to in a ciyil ceremony. Lina however, did not know at the time she married Sixto that
the latter was already married. Upon learning that Sixto was already married Lina immediately
left Sixto and since then had not seen nor heard from him. Lina, however, did not take any step to
have her marriage with Sixto annuled before she married Hugo.
Could Hugo successfully sue for a declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lina7 Explain.
Answer:
No, Hugo cannot sue for a declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lina. The marriage of
Lina with Sixto was void, so the marriage of Hugo with Lina is valid. There was no need for a prior
court action to declare the marriage with Sixto as void (Yap vs. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 229).
Answer:
Yes, because the marriage of Hugo with Lina is not valid, for the reason that there was no
prior judicial declaration that the marriage with Sixto is void. Such judicial declaration is required
by law (Wiegel vs. Sempio Dy 143 SCRA 49 9 L
Question No. 15:

The X Electric Cooperative, services a small town where the roads are lined with lush acacia
trees. Normally these trees are pruned before the onset of the rainy season by the cooperative
itself since the power lines of the cooperative are not infrequently affected by falling branches.
This year, for financial reasons, the electric cooperative omitted the pruning in spite of reminders
from the townspeople. In August this year a strong typhoon hit the town and live wires fell to the
ground. While the cooperative made a preliminary survey of the damages, it did not immediately
take precautionary measures against possible harm. Thus, the attention of one of its employees
was. called to the fallen wire in the center of the town. Before the cooperative could make the
necessary repairs, a four-year old boy crossed the street and was electrocuted by the live wire.
His parents sued the electric cooperative for damages.
If you were counsel for the parents, what argu
(a)
ments would you advance to support your claim for damages and how much damages would you
demand?
(b)
If you were counsel for the electric cooperative, what defenses would you offer?
If you were judge, how would you decide the case?
(c)
Answer:
The damages that can be claimed by the parents are the following:
a.
1.
civil indemnity for death - P30,000.00,
The People of the Philippines v. Leopoldo Tray a, L-48065, Jan. 29, 1987-;
actual and compensatory damages;
3. moral damages for mental anguish;
4. exemplary or corrective damages.
2.
As counsel for the electric cooperative, I would offer the defense of fortuitous event,
because the strong typhoon could not be foreseen and even if foreseen, could not be avoided.
b.
As judge, I would rule for the parents. The attention of the cooperative through its
employee was called to the fallen live wire. If there had been care and diligence, the death could
have been avoided. The cooperative could have made the necessary repairs before the 4 year old
boy crossed the street and was electrocuted by the live wire. It failed to do so, hence it is liable.
c.
Question No. 16:

Manny and Nita, husband and wife, decided to separate by mutual agreement. They had a
contract prepared, signed it and had it notarized, providing for their separation and for the
extra-judicial liquidation of their conjugal assets. They likewise agreed to live separately and that
if either spouse should find a more compatible partner, the other would raise no objection and
would refrain from taking any judicial action against the other.
Determine the validity of each of the provisions of the agreement. Explain briefly.
Answer:
The provision for their separation is void.
2. The provision for the extra-judicial liquidation of their conjugal assets is void.
3. The agreement to live separately is void.
4. The agreement that should either spouse find a more compatible partner, the other
would raise no objection and would refrain from taking any judicial action against the
other is void.
1.
The aforementioned stipulations are all void because they are contrary to law, morals, good
custom, public order and public policy. The specific provision of law is Article 221 of the Civil
Code.

Civil Law Mock Bar

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Civil Law Mock Bar

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Civil Law Mock Bar

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

2010 BAR EXAMINATION

No. 1. A, the owner.

No. 2. B, the Engineer.

1. B may e-mail A accepting the donation.

them signed each and every page of the will.

The will is invalidated

What is the difference between guaranty and suretyship?

The obligation in guaranty is secondary; whereas, in suretyship, it is primary.

The defenses available include:

Statute theory. There is a domestic law authorizing the local court to

FIRST SUGGESTED ANSWER:

FIRST SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Who owns the foregoing properties? Explain. (5%)

1/3ofthe house is co-owned by B and G because

Rex now wants to adopt his illegitimate child.

Is Venus legitimate, illegitimate, or legitimated? Explain briefly. (3%)

If the ground of nullity is not psychological incapacity

How about the damage to the jeepney? Explain. (2%)

Note: Since a right of way is a discontinuous

ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER:

par. 2, and 1833 of theNew Civil Code).

What are the creditors recourse/s? Explain. (3%)

ANOTHER SUGGESTED ANSWER:

An oral partnership is valid.

TRUE. Partnership is a consensual contract,hence, it is valid even though not in writing.

An oral promise of guaranty is valid and binding.

A dead child can be legitimated.

Republic v. Obrecido (427 SCRA 114 [2005]).

If there is no marriage settlement, the salary of a spouse in an adulterous marriage

belongs to the conjugal partnership of gains.

The renunciation by a co-owner of his undivided share in the co-owned property in

A person can dispose of his corpse through an act inter vivos.

Will the suit prosper? Explain your answer. (3%)

Should the case be dismissed? Explain. (2%)

is Marciano correct? Expalain. (3%)

Is the contract valid? Explain. (3%)

proceeds of the insurance will then go to the estate of Marian.

Was the marriage of Roderick and Faye valid? (2%)

What is the filiation status of Laica? (2%)

impugn her filiation had

Can Laica be legitimated by the marriage of her biological parents? (1%)

Change her status from legitimate to illegitimate (1%); and

not a daughter of Andrew.

MAIN SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Can Bobby legally insist on purchasing the land? ' (2%)

Blas, as owner of the property where they were found;

Bank of the Philippine Islands, as successor-in-interest of the owner of the vault;

The Philippine Government because of their historical value.

who owns the notes and coins? (4%)

MAIN SUGGESTED ANSWER:

SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVE ANSWER:

MAIN SUGGESTED ANSWER:

Was Erica preterited? (1%)

Was the disinheritance valid? (1%)

House and Lot

Should the will be admitted to probate? (2%)

Are the testamentary dispositions valid? (2%)

if Scarlet predeceases Ruffa, who inherits the property? (2%)

Make a will? (1%)