Fagerberg - Innovation A Guide For Literature
Fagerberg - Innovation A Guide For Literature
Fagerberg - Innovation A Guide For Literature
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I N N O VAT I O N
A G U I D E TO T H E
L I T E R AT U R E
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1.1 Introduction1
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20
Share (%)
15
10
0
1955
1960
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
Year
Fig. 1.1 Scholarly Articles with Innovation in the title, 19552004
(per 10,000 social science articles)
Note: The source is the ISI Web of Knowledge. Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI) from 1956 to present were included.
A search has been done, for the number of articles and in English, and the total number of publications in each database,
from the year 1975 to present. The results are presented as shares of total articles/documents were included in the
calculations, so the numbers from that period are not strictly comparable to those for later years.
As a result, our knowledge about innovation processes, their determinants and social
and economic impact has been greatly enhanced.
When innovation studies started to emerge as a separate Weld of research in the
1960s, it did so mostly outside the existing disciplines and the most prestigious
universities. An important event in this process was the formation in 1965 of the
Science Policy Research Unit (SPRU) at the University of Sussex (see Box 1.1). The
name of the center illustrates the tendency for innovation studies to develop under
other (at the time more acceptable?) terms, such as, for instance, science studies or
science policy studies. But as we shall see in the following, one of the main lessons
from the research that came to be carried out is that science is only one among several
ingredients in successful innovation. As a consequence of these Wndings, not only the
focus of research in this area but also the notions used to characterize it changed.
During the late twentieth/early twenty-Wrst century, a number of new research
centers and departments have been founded, focusing on the role of innovation in
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and networks), the working of which is studied within disciplines such as sociology,
organizational science, management, and business studies. Moreover, as economic
geographers point out, learning processes tend to be linked to speciWc contexts or
locations. The way innovation is organized and its localization also undergo important changes through time, as underscored by the work within the Weld of economic
history. There is also, as historians of technology have pointed out, a speciWc technological dimension to this; the way innovation is organized, as well as its economic and
social eVects, depends critically on the speciWc nature of the technology in question.
Two decades ago, it was still possible for a hard-working student to get a fairly
good overview of the scholarly work on innovation by devoting a few years of
intensive study to the subject. Not any more. Today, the literature on innovation is
so large and diverse that even keeping up-to-date with one speciWc Weld of research is
very challenging. The purpose of this volume is to provide the reader with a guide to
this rapidly expanding literature. We do this under the following broad headings:
I
II
III
IV
Part One focuses on the process through which innovations occur and the actors
that take part: individuals, Wrms, organizations, and networks. As we will discuss in
more detail below, innovation is by its very nature a systemic phenomenon, since it
results from continuing interaction between diVerent actors and organizations. Part
Two outlines the systems perspective on innovation studies and discusses the roles of
institutions, organizations, and actors in this process at the national and regional
level. Part Three explores the diversity in the manner in which such systems work
over time and across diVerent sectors or industries. Finally, Part Four examines the
broader social and economic consequences of innovation and the associated policy
issues. The remainder of this chapter sets the stage for the discussion that follows by
giving a broad overview of some of the central topics in innovation studies (including conceptual issues).
another (biotechnology for instance). In many cases, however, there is a considerable time lag between the two. In fact, a lag of several decades or more is not
uncommon (Rogers 1995). Such lags reXect the diVerent requirements for working
out ideas and implementing them. While inventions may be carried out anywhere,
for example in universities, innovations occur mostly in Wrms, though they may also
occur in other types of organizations, such as public hospitals. To be able to turn an
invention into an innovation, a Wrm normally needs to combine several diVerent
types of knowledge, capabilities, skills, and resources. For instance, the Wrm may
require production knowledge, skills and facilities, market knowledge, a wellfunctioning distribution system, suVicient Wnancial resources, and so on. It follows
that the role of the innovator,3 i.e. the person or organizational unit responsible for
combining the factors necessary (what the innovation theorist Joseph Schumpeter
(see Box 1.2) called the entrepreneur), may be quite diVerent from that of the
inventor. Indeed, history is replete with cases in which the inventor of major
technological advances fails to reap the proWts from his breakthroughs.
Long lags between invention and innovation may have to do with the fact that, in
many cases, some or all of the conditions for commercialization may be lacking.
There may not be a suVicient need (yet!) or it may be impossible to produce and/or
market because some vital inputs or complementary factors are not (yet!) available.
Thus, although Leonardo da Vinci is reported to have had some quite advanced
ideas for a Xying machine, these were impossible to carry out in practice due to a lack
of adequate materials, production skills, andabove alla power source. In fact,
the realization of these ideas had to wait for the invention and subsequent commercialization (and improvement) of the internal combustion engine.4 Hence, as this
example shows, many inventions require complementary inventions and innovations to succeed at the innovation stage.
Another complicating factor is that invention and innovation is a continuous
process. For instance, the car, as we know it today, is radically improved compared to
the Wrst commercial models, due to the incorporation of a very large number of
diVerent inventions/innovations. In fact, the Wrst versions of virtually all signiWcant
innovations, from the steam engine to the airplane, were crude, unreliable versions
of the devices that eventually diVused widely. Kline and Rosenberg (1986), in an
inXuential paper, point out:
it is a serious mistake to treat an innovation as if it were a well-deWned, homogenous thing
that could be identiWed as entering the economy at a precise dateor becoming available at a
precise point in time. . . . The fact is that most important innovations go through drastic
changes in their lifetimeschanges that may, and often do, totally transform their economic
signiWcance. The subsequent improvements in an invention after its Wrst introduction may be
vastly more important, economically, than the initial availability of the invention in its
original form. (Kline and Rosenberg 1986: 283)
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Box 1.2 The innovation theorist Joseph Schumpeter
Joseph Schumpeter (18831950) was one of the most original social scientists of the
twentieth century. He grew up in Vienna around the turn of the century, where he
studied law and economics. For most of his life he worked as an academic, but he also
tried his luck as politician, serving brieXy as Wnance minister in the Wrst post-World
War I (socialist) government, and as a banker (without much success). He became
professor at the University of Bonn in 1925 and later at Harvard University in the USA
(1932), where he stayed until his death. He published several books and papers in
German early on, among these the Theory of Economic Development, published in 1911
and in a revised edition in English in 1934. Among his most well-known later works are
Business Cycles in two volumes (from 1939), Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy
(1943), and the posthumously published History of Economic Analysis (1954).
Very early he developed an original approach, focusing on the role of innovation in
economic and social change. It was not suVicient, Schumpeter argued, to study the
economy through static lenses, focusing on the distribution of given resources across
diVerent ends. Economic development, in his view, had to be seen as a process of
qualitative change, driven by innovation, taking place in historical time. As examples
of innovation he mentioned new products, new methods of production, new sources
of supply, the exploitation of new markets, and new ways to organize business. He
deWned innovation as new combinations of existing resources. This combinatory
activity he labeled the entrepreneurial function (to be fulWlled by entrepreneurs),
to which he attached much importance. One main reason for the important role played
by entrepreneurs for successful innovation was the prevalence of inertia, or resistance
to new ways as he phrased it, at all levels of society that entrepreneurs had to Wght in
order to succeed in their aims. In his early work, which is sometimes called Schumpeter Mark I, Schumpeter focused mostly on individual entrepreneurs. But in later
works he also emphasized the importance of innovation in large Wrms (so-called
Schumpeter Mark II), and pointed to historically oriented, qualitative research
(case studies) as the way forward for research in this area.
In his analysis of innovation diVusion, Schumpeter emphasized the tendency for
innovations to cluster in certain industries and time periods (and the derived eVects
on growth) and the possible contribution of such clustering to the formation of
business cycles and long waves in the world economy (Schumpeter 1939). The latter
suggestion has been a constant source of controversy ever since. No less controversial,
and perhaps even better known, is his inspired discussion of the institutional changes
under capitalism (and its possible endogenous transformation into socialism) in the
book Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1943).
Sources: Swedberg 1991; Shionoya 1997; Fagerberg 2003.
organize business. However, in economics, most of the focus has been on the two
Wrst of these. Schmookler (1966), for instance, in his classic work on Invention and
Economic Growth, argued that the distinction between product technology and
production technology was critical for our understanding of this phenomenon
(ibid. 166). He deWned the former type as knowledge about how to create or improve
products, and the latter as knowledge about how to produce them. Similarly, the
terms product innovation and process innovation have been used to characterize the occurrence of new or improved goods and services, and improvements in the
ways to produce these good and services, respectively.5 The argument for focusing
particularly on the distinction between product and process innovation often rests
on the assumption that their economic and social impact may diVer. For instance,
while the introduction of new products is commonly assumed to have a clear,
positive eVect on growth of income and employment, it has been argued that process
innovation, due to its cost-cutting nature, may have a more ambiguous eVect
(Edquist et al. 2001; Pianta in this volume). However, while clearly distinguishable
at the level of the individual Wrm or industry, such diVerences tend to become
blurred at the level of the overall economy, because the product of one Wrm (or
industry) may end up as being used to produce goods or services in another.6
The focus on product and process innovations, while useful for the analysis of
some issues, should not lead us ignore other important aspects of innovation. For
instance, during the Wrst half of the twentieth century, many of the innovations that
made it possible for the United States to forge ahead of other capitalist economies
were of the organizational kind, involving entirely new ways to organize production
and distribution (see Bruland and Mowery in this volume, while Lam provides an
overview of organizational innovation). Edquist et al. (2001) have suggested dividing the category of process innovation into technological process innovations and
organizational process innovations, the former related to new types of machinery,
and the latter to new ways to organize work. However, organizational innovations
are not limited to new ways to organize the process of production within a given
Wrm. Organizational innovation, in the sense used by Schumpeter,7 also includes
arrangements across Wrms such as the reorganization of entire industries. Moreover,
as exempliWed by the case of the USA in the Wrst half of the previous century, many of
the most important organizational innovations have occurred in distribution, with
great consequences for a whole range of industries (Chandler 1990).
Another approach, also based on Schumpeters work, has been to classify innovations according to how radical they are compared to current technology (Freeman
and Soete 1997). From this perspective, continuous improvements of the type
referred to above are often characterized as incremental or marginal innovations,8 as opposed to radical innovations (such as the introduction of a totally
new type of machinery) or technological revolutions (consisting of a cluster of
innovations that together may have a very far-reaching impact). Schumpeter
focused in particular on the latter two categories, which he believed to be of greater
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The problems with this model, Kline and Rosenberg point out, are twofold. First,
it generalizes a chain of causation that only holds for a minority of innovations.
Although some important innovations stem from scientiWc breakthroughs, this is
not true most of the time. Firms normally innovate because they believe there is a
commercial need for it, and they commonly start by reviewing and combining existing
knowledge. It is only if this does not work, they argue, that Wrms consider investing in
research (science). In fact, in many settings, the experience of users, not science, is
deemed to be the most important source of innovation (von Hippel 1988; Lundvall
1988). Second, the linear model ignores the many feedbacks and loops that occur
between the diVerent stages of the process. Shortcomings and failures that occur at
various stages may lead to a reconsideration of earlier steps, and this may eventually
lead to totally new innovations.
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inertia, with the latter seen as (partly) endogenous. This may, to some extent, have
been an adequate interpretation of events in Europe around the turn of the nineteenth century. But during the Wrst decades of the twentieth century, it became clear
to observers that innovations increasingly involve teamwork and take place within
larger organizations (see Bruland and Mowery (Ch. 13), Lam (Ch. 5), and Lazonick
(Ch. 2) in this volume). In later work, Schumpeter acknowledged this and emphasized the need for systematic study of cooperative entrepreneurship in big Wrms
(so-called Schumpeter Mark II). However, he did not analyze the phenomenon in
much detail (although he strongly advised others to).11
Systematic theoretical and empirical work on innovation-projects in Wrms (and
the management of such projects) was slow to evolve, but during the last decades a
quite substantial literature has emerged (see chapters by Pavitt and Lam in this
volume). In general, research in this area coincides with Schumpeters emphasis on
uncertainty (Nelson and Winter 1982; Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995; Van de Ven et al.
1999). In particular, for potentially rewarding innovations, it is argued, one may
simply not know what are the most relevant sources or the best options to pursue
(still less how great the chance is of success).12 It has also been emphasized that
innovative Wrms need to consider the potential problems that path dependency
may create (Arthur 1994). For instance, if a Wrm selects a speciWc innovation path
very early, it may (if it is lucky) enjoy Wrst mover advantages. But it also risks being
locked in to this speciWc path through various self-reinforcing eVects. If in the end
it turns out that there actually existed a superior path, which some other Wrm
equipped with more patience (or luck) happened to Wnd, the early mover may be
in big trouble because then, it is argued, it may simply be too costly or too late to
switch paths. It has been suggested, therefore, that in the early phase of an innovation
project, before suVicient knowledge of the alternatives is generated, the best strategy
may simply be to avoid being stuck to a particular path, and remain open to
diVerent (and competing) ideas/solutions. At the level of the Wrm, this requires a
pluralistic leadership that allows for a variety of competing perspectives (Van de
Ven et al. 1999), in contrast to the homogenous, unitary leader style that, in the
management literature, is sometimes considered as the most advantageous.13
Openness to new ideas and solutions? is considered essential for innovation
projects, especially in the early phases. The principal reason for this has to do with a
fundamental characteristic of innovation: that every new innovation consists of a
new combination of existing ideas, capabilities, skills, resources, etc. It follows
logically from this that the greater the variety of these factors within a given system,
the greater the scope for them to be combined in diVerent ways, producing new
innovations which will be both more complex and more sophisticated. This evolutionary logic has been used to explain why, in ancient times, the inhabitants of the
large Eurasian landmass came to be more innovative, and technologically sophisticated, than small, isolated populations elsewhere around the globe (Diamond 1998).
Applied mechanically on a population of Wrms, this logic might perhaps be taken to
11
imply that large Wrms should be expected to be more innovative than small Wrms.14
However, modern Wrms are not closed systems comparable to isolated populations
of ancient times. Firms have learnt, by necessity, to monitor closely each others
steps, and search widely for new ideas, inputs, and sources of inspiration. The more
Wrms on average are able to learn from interacting with external sources, the greater
the pressure on others to follow suit. This greatly enhances the innovativeness of
both individual Wrms and the economic systems to which they belong (regions or
countries, for instance). Arguably, this is of particular importance for smaller Wrms,
which have to compensate for small internal resources by being good at interacting
with the outside world. However, the growing complexity of the knowledge bases
necessary for innovation means that even large Wrms increasingly depend on external sources in their innovative activity (Granstrand, Patel, and Pavitt, 1997; and in
this volume: Pavitt; Powell and Grodal; Narula and Zanfei).
Hence, cultivating the capacity for absorbing (outside) knowledge, so-called
absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal 1990), is a must for innovative Wrms,
large or small. It is, however, something that Wrms often Wnd very challenging; the
not invented here syndrome is a well-known feature in Wrms of all sizes. This
arguably reXects the cumulative and embedded character of Wrm-speciWc knowledge. In most cases, Wrms develop their knowledge of how to do things incrementally. Such knowledge, then, consists of routines that are reproduced through
practice (organizational memory: Nelson and Winter 1982). Over time, the organizational structure of the Wrm and its knowledge base typically co-evolve into a
set-up that is beneWcial for the day-to-day operations of the Wrm. It has been argued,
however, that such a set-up, while facilitating the daily internal communication/
interaction of the Wrm, may in fact constrain the Wrms capacity for absorbing new
knowledge created elsewhere, especially if the new external knowledge signiWcantly
challenges the existing set-up/knowledge of the Wrm (so-called competence destroying technical change: Tushman and Anderson 1986). In fact, such problems
may occur even for innovations that are created internally. Xerox, for instance,
developed both the PC and the mouse, but failed to exploit commercially these
innovations, primarily because they did not seem to be of much value to the Wrms
existing photo-copier business (Rogers 1995).
Thus organizing for innovation is a delicate task. Research in this area has, among
other things, pointed to the need for innovative Wrms to allow groups of people
within the organization suVicient freedom in experimenting with new solutions
(Van de Ven 1999), and establishing patterns of interaction within the Wrm that allow
it to mobilize its entire knowledge base when confronting new challenges (Nonaka
and Takeuchi 1995; Lam, Ch. 5 in this volume). Such organizing does not stop at the
gate of the Wrm, but extends to relations with external partners. Ties to partners with
whom communication is frequent are often called strong ties, while those that are
more occasional are denoted as weak ties (Granovetter 1973; see Powell and
Grodal, Ch. 3 in this volume). Partners linked together with strong ties, either
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As is evident from the preceding discussion, a central Wnding in the literature is that,
in most cases, innovation activities in Wrms depend heavily on external sources. One
recent study sums it up well: Popular folklore notwithstanding, the innovation
journey is a collective achievement that requires key roles from numerous entrepreneurs in both the public and private sectors (Van de Ven et al. 1999: 149). In that
particular study, the term social system for innovation development was used to
characterize this collective achievement. However, this is just one among several
examples from the last decades of how system concepts are applied to the analysis of
the relationship between innovation activities in Wrms and the wider framework in
which these activities are embedded (see Edquist, Ch. 7 in this volume).
One main approach has been to delineate systems on the basis of technological,
industrial, or sectoral characteristics (Freeman et al. 1982; Hughes 1983; Carlsson and
Stankiewicz 1991; Malerba, Ch. 14 in this volume) but, to a varying degree, to include
other relevant factors such as, for instance, institutions (laws, regulations, rules,
habits, etc.), the political process, the public research infrastructure (universities,
research institutes, support from public sources, etc.), Wnancial institutions, skills
(labor force), and so on. To explore the technological dynamics of innovation, its
various phases, and how this inXuences and is inXuenced by the wider social,
institutional, and economic frameworks has been the main focus of this type of
analysis. Another important approach in the innovation-systems literature has
focused on the spatial level, and used national or regional borders to distinguish
between diVerent systems. For example, Lundvall (1992) and Nelson et al. (1993)
have used the term national system of innovation to characterize the systemic
interdependencies within a given country (see Edquist in this volume), while
Braczyk et al. (1997) similarly have oVered the notion of regional innovation
systems (see Asheim and Gertler, Ch. 11 in this volume). Since the spatial systems
are delineated on the basis of political and administrative borders, such factors
13
naturally tend to play an important role in analyses based on this approach, which
has proven to be inXuential among policy makers in this area, especially in Europe
(see Lundvall and Borras, Ch. 22 in this volume). (Part II of this volume analyzes
some of the constituent elements of such systems in more detail.15)
What are the implications of applying a system perspective to the study of
innovation? Systems areas networksa set of activities (or actors) that are
interlinked, and this leads naturally to a focus on the working of the linkages of
the system.16 Is the potential for communication and interaction through existing
linkages suViciently exploited? Are there potential linkages within the system that
might proWtably be established? Such questions apply of course to networks as well
as systems. However, in the normal usage of the term, a system will typically have
more structure than a network, and be of a more enduring character. The structure
of a system will facilitate certain patterns of interaction and outcomes (and constrain
others), and in this sense there is a parallel to the role of inertia in Wrms. A dynamic
system also has feedbacks, which may serve to reinforceor weakenthe existing
structure/functioning of the system, leading to lock in (a stable conWguration), or
a change in orientation, oreventuallythe dissolution of the system. Hence,
systems mayjust as Wrmsbe locked into a speciWc path of development that
supports certain types of activities and constrains others. This may be seen as an
advantage, as it pushes the participating Wrms and other actors in the system in a
direction that is deemed to be beneWcial. But it may also be a disadvantage, if the
conWguration of the system leads Wrms to ignore potentially fruitful avenues of
exploration. The character of such processes will be aVected by the extent to which
the system exchanges impulses with its environment. The more open a system is for
impulses from outside, the less the chance of being locked out from promising
new paths of development that emerge outside the system. It is, therefore, important
for system managerssuch as policy makersto keep an eye on the openness of
the system, to avoid the possibility of innovation activities becoming unduly constrained by self-reinforcing path-dependency.
Another important feature of systems that has come into focus is the strong
complementarities that commonly exist between the components of a system. If, in a
dynamic system, one critical, complementary component is lacking, or fails to
progress or develop, this may block or slow down the growth of the entire system.
This is, as pointed out earlier, one of the main reasons why there is often a very
considerable time lag between invention and innovation. Economic historians have
commonly used concepts such as reverse salients and bottlenecks to characterize such phenomena (Hughes 1983; Rosenberg 1982). However, such constraints
need not be of a purely technical character (such as, for instance, the failure to invent
a decent battery, which has severely constrained the diVusion of electric cars for
more than century), but may have to do with lack of proper infrastructure, Wnance,
skills, etc. Some of the most important innovations of this century, such as electricity
and automobiles (Mowery and Rosenberg 1998), were dependent on very extensive
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infrastructural investments (wiring and roads/distribution-systems for fuel, respectively). Moreover, to fulWl the potential of the new innovation, such investments
often need to be accompanied by radical changes in the organization of production
and distribution (and, more generally, attitudes: see Perez 1983, 1985; Freeman and
Louca 2001). There are important lessons here for Wrms and policy makers. Firms
may need to take into account the wider social and economic implications of an
innovation project. The more radical an innovation is, the greater the possibility that
it may require extensive infrastructural investments and/or organizational and
social change to succeed. If so, the Wrm needs to think through the way in which it
may join up with other agents of change in the private or public sector. Policy
makers, for their part, need to consider what diVerent levels of government can do to
prevent bottlenecks to occur at the system level in areas such as skills, the research
infrastructure, and the broader economic infrastructure.
One of the striking facts about innovation is its variability over time and space. It
seems, as Schumpeter (see Box 1.2) pointed out, to cluster, not only in certain
sectors but also in certain areas and time periods. Over time the centers of innovation have shifted from one sector, region, and country to another. For instance, for a
long period the worldwide center of innovation was in the UK, and the productivity
and income of its population increased relative to its neighboring countries, so that
by the mid-nineteenth century its productivity (and income) level was 50 per cent
higher than elsewhere; at about the beginning of the twentieth century the center of
innovation, at least for the modern chemical and electrical technologies of the day,
shifted to Germany; and now, for a long time, the worldwide center of innovation
has been in the USA, which during most of the twentieth century enjoyed the highest
productivity and living standards in the world. As explained by Bruland and
Mowery in this volume, the rise of the US to world technological leadership was
associated with the growth of new industries, based on the exploitation of
economies of scale and scope (Chandler 1962, 1990) and mass production and
distribution.
How is this dynamic to be explained? Schumpeter, extending an earlier line of
argument dating back to Karl Marx,17 held technological competition (competition
through innovation) to be the driving force of economic development. If one Wrm in
a given industry or sector successfully introduces an important innovation, the
argument goes, it will be amply rewarded by a higher rate of proWt. This functions
15
as a signal to other Wrms (the imitators), which, if entry conditions allow, will
swarm the industry or sector with the hope of sharing the beneWts (with the result
that the initial innovators Wrst mover advantages may be quickly eroded). This
swarming of imitators implies that the growth of the sector or industry in which
the innovation occurs will be quite high for a while. Sooner or later, however, the
eVects on growth (created by an innovation) will be depleted and growth will slow
down.
To this essentially Marxian story Schumpeter added an important modiWcation.
Imitators, he argued, are much more likely to succeed in their aims if they improve
on the original innovation, i.e., become innovators themselves. This is all the more
natural, he continued, because one (important) innovation tends to facilitate
(induce) other innovations in the same or related Welds. In this way, innovation
diVusion becomes a creative processin which one important innovation sets the
stage for a whole series of subsequent innovationsand not the passive, adaptive
process often assumed in much diVusion research (see Hall in this volume). The
systemic interdependencies between the initial and induced innovations also imply
that innovations (and growth) tend to concentrate in certain sectors and their
surroundings or clusters (Schumpeter 1939: 1001). Schumpeter, as is well
known, looked at this dynamic as a possible explanatory factor behind business
cycles of various lengths (Freeman and Louca 2001).
This simple scheme has been remarkably successful in inspiring applications in
diVerent areas. For instance, there is a large amount of research that has adapted the
MarxSchumpeter model of technological competition to the study of industrial
growth, international trade, and competitiveness,18 although sometimes, it must be
said, without acknowledging the source for these ideas. An early and very inXuential
contribution was the so-called product-life-cycle theory suggested by Vernon
(1966), in which industrial growth following an important product innovation was
seen as composed of stages, characterized by changing conditions of and location of
production.19 Basically what was assumed was that the ability to do product innovation mattered most at the early stage, in which there were many diVerent and
competing versions of the product on the market. However, with time, the product
was assumed to standardize, and this was assumed to be accompanied by a greater
emphasis on process innovation, scale economics, and cost-competition. It was
argued that these changes in competitive conditions might initiate transfer of the
technology from the innovator country (high income) to countries with large
markets and/or low costs. Such transfers might also be associated with international
capital Xows in the form of so-called foreign direct investments (FDIs), and the
theory has therefore also become known as a framework for explaining such Xows
(see Narula and Zanfei in this volume).
The product-life-cycle theory, attractive as it was in its simplicity, was not
always corroborated by subsequent research. While it got some of the general
conjectures (borrowed from Schumpeter) right, the rigorous scheme it added,
16
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17
18
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The MarxSchumpeter model was not intended as a model of industrial dynamics; its
primary purpose was to explain long run economic change, what Schumpeter called
development. The core of the argument was (1) that technological competition is the
major form of competition under capitalism (and Wrms not responding to these
demands fail), and (2) that innovations, e.g. new combinations of existing knowledge and resources, open up possibilities for new business opportunities and future
innovations, and in this way set the stage for continuing change. This perspective, while
convincing, had little inXuence on the economics discipline at the time of its publication, perhaps because it did not lend itself easily to formal, mathematical modeling of
the type that had become popular in that Weld. More recently, however, economists
(Romer 1990), drawing on new tools for mathematical modeling of economic phenomena, have attempted to introduce some of the above ideas into formal growth
models (so-called new growth theory or endogenous growth theory).21
In developing this perspective, Schumpeter (1939) was, as noted, particularly
concerned with the tendency of innovations to cluster in certain contexts, and
the resulting structural changes in production, organization, demand, etc. Although
these ideas were not well received by the economic community at the time, the big
slump in economic activity worldwide during the 1970s led to renewed attention,
and several contributions emerged viewing long run economic and social change
from this perspective. Both Mensch (1979) and Perez (1983, 1985), to take just two
examples, argued that major technological changes, such as, for instance, the ICT
revolution today, or electricity a century ago, require extensive organizational and
institutional change to run their course. Such change, however, is diVicult because of
the continuing inXuence of existing organizational and institutional patterns. They
saw this inertia as a major growth-impeding factor in periods of rapid technological
change, possibly explaining some of the variation of growth over time (e.g. booms
and slumps) in capitalist economies. While the latter proposition remains controversial, the relationship between technological, organizational, and institutional
change continues to be an important research issue (Freeman and Louca 2001),
with important implications both for the analysis of the diVusion of new technologies (see Hall in this volume) and the policy discourse (see Lundvall and Borras in
this volume).
Although neither Marx nor Schumpeter applied their dynamic perspective to the
analysis of cross-national diVerences in growth performance, from the early 1960s
onwards several contributions emerged that explore the potential of this perspective
for explaining diVerences in cross-country growth. In what came to be a very
inXuential contribution, Posner (1961) explained the diVerence in economic growth
19
between two countries, at diVerent levels of economic and technological development, as resulting from two sources: innovation, which enhanced the diVerence, and
imitation, which tended to reduce it. This set the stage for a long series of contributions, often labeled technology gap or northsouth models (or approaches),
focusing on explaining such diVerences in economic growth across countries at
diVerent levels of development (see Fagerberg 1994, 1996 for details). As for the
lessons, one of the theoretical contributors in this area summed it up well when he
concluded that: Like Alice and the Red Queen, the developed region has to keep
running to stay in the same place (Krugman 1979: 262).
A weakness of much of this work was that it was based on a very stylized
representation of the global distribution of innovation, in which innovation was
assumed to be concentrated in the developed world, mainly in the USA. In fact, as
argued by Fagerberg and Godinho in this volume, the successful catch-up in
technology and income is normally not based only on imitation, but also involves
innovation to a signiWcant extent. Arguably, this is also what one should expect from
the Schumpeterian perspective, in which innovation is assumed to be a pervasive
phenomenon. Fagerberg (1987, 1988) identiWed three factors aVecting diVerential
growth rates across countries: innovation, imitation, and other eVorts related to
the commercial exploitation of technology. The analysis suggested that superior
innovative activity was the prime factor behind the huge diVerence in performance
between Asian and Latin American NIC countries in the 1970s and early 1980s.
Fagerberg and Verspagen (2002) likewise found that the continuing rapid growth
of the Asian NICs relative to other country groupings in the decade that followed
was primarily caused by the rapid growth in the innovative performance of
this region. Moreover, it has been shown (Fagerberg 1987; Fagerberg and Verspagen
2002) that, while imitation has become more demanding over time (and hence
more diVicult and/or costly to undertake), innovation has gradually become a
more powerful factor in explaining diVerences across countries in economic
growth.
Arguably, we have a good understanding of the role played by innovation in long run
economic and social change, and many of its consequences:
20
.
jan fagerberg
21
One obstacle to improving our understanding is that innovation has been studied
by diVerent communities of researchers with diVerent backgrounds, and the failure
of these communities to communicate more eVectively with one another has
impeded progress in this Weld. One consequence of these communication diViculties
has been a certain degree of fuzziness with respect to basic concepts, which can
only be improved by bringing these diVerent communities together in a constructive
dialogue, and the present volume should be seen as a contribution towards this aim.
DiVerent, and to some extent competing, perspectives should not always be seen as a
problem: many social phenomena are too complex to be analyzed properly from a
single disciplinary perspective. Arguably, innovation is a prime example of this.
Notes
1. I wish to thank my fellow editors and contributors for helpful comments and suggestions.
Thanks also to Ovar Andreas Johansson for assistance in the research, Sandro Mendonca
for his many creative inputs (which I unfortunately have not have been able to follow to
the extent that he deserves), and Louise Earl for good advice. The responsibility for
remaining errors and omissions is mine.
2. A consistent use of the terms invention and innovation might be to reserve these for the
Wrst time occurrence of the idea/concept and commercialization, respectively. In practice
it may not always be so simple. For instance, people may very well conceive the same idea
independently of one another. Historically, there are many examples of this; writing,
for instance, was clearly invented several times (and in diVerent cultural settings)
throughout history (Diamond 1998). Arguably, this phenomenon may have been
reduced in importance over time, as communication around the globe has progressed.
3. In the sociological literature on diVusion (i.e. spread of innovations), it is common to
characterize any adopter of a new technology, product, or service an innovator. This then
leads to a distinction between diVerent types of innovators, depending on how quick they
are in adopting the innovation, and a discussion of which factors might possibly explain
such diVerences (Rogers 1995). While this use of the terminology may be a useful one in
the chosen context, it clearly diVers from the one adopted elsewhere. It might be preferable
to use terms such as imitator or adopter for such cases.
4. Similarly for automobiles: while the idea of a power-driven vehicle had been around for a
long time, and several early attempts to commercialize cars driven by steam, electricity,
and other sources had been made, it was the incorporation of an internal combustion
engine driven by low-cost, easily available petrol that made the product a real hit in the
market (Mowery and Rosenberg 1998).
5. A somewhat similar distinction has been suggested by Henderson and Clark (1990). They
distinguish between the components (or modules) of a product or service and the way these
components are combined, e.g. the product design or architecture. A change only in
the former is dubbed modular innovation, change only in the latter architectural
innovation. They argue that these two types of innovation rely on diVerent types of
knowledge (and, hence, create different challenges for the Wrm).
22
jan fagerberg
6. In fact, many economists go so far as to argue that the savings in costs, following a process
innovation in a single Wrm or industry, by necessity will generate additional income and
demand in the economy at large, which will compensate for any initial negative eVects
of a process innovation on overall employment. For a rebuttal, see Edquist 2001 and
Pianta, Ch. 21 in this volume.
7. Schumpeter 1934: 66.
8. In the sociological literature on innovation, the term reinvention is often used to
characterize improvements that occur to a product or service, while it is spreading in a
population of adopters (Rogers 1995).
9. In the Community Innovation Survey (CIS) Wrms are asked to qualify novelty with
respect to the context (new to the Wrm, industry or the world at large). See Smith in this
volume for more information about these surveys.
10. Kim and Nelson (2000a) suggest the term active imitation for producers who, by
imitating already existing products, modify and improve them.
11. For instance, in one of his last papers, he pointed out: To let the murder out and start my
Wnal thesis, what is really required is a large collection of industrial and locational
monographs all drawn up according to the same plan and giving proper attention on
the one hand to the incessant historical change in production and consumption functions and on the other hand to the quality and behaviour of leading personnel
(Schumpeter 1949/1989: 328).
12. Even in cases where the project ultimately is successful in aims, entrepreneurs face the
challenge of convincing the leadership of the Wrm to launch it commercially (which may
be much more costly than developing it). This may fail if the leadership of the Wrm has
doubts about its commercial viability. It may be very diVicult for management to foresee
the economic potential of a project, even if it is technically successful. Remember, for
instance, IBM director Thomas Watsons dictum in 1948 that there is a world market for
about Wve computers (Tidd et al. 1997: 60)!
13. A uniWed homogenous leadership structure is eVective for routine trial-and-error
learning by making convergent, incremental improvements in relatively stable and
unambiguous situations. However, this kind of learning is a conservative process that
maintains and converges organizational routines and relationships towards the existing
strategic vision . . . although such learning is viewed as wisdom in stable environments, it
produces inXexibility and competence traps in changing worlds (Van de Ven et al.
1999: 117).
14. It would also imply that large countries should be expected to be more innovative than
smaller ones, consistent with, for instance, the prediction of so-called new growth
theory (Romer 1990). See Verspagen in this volume.
15. See, in particular, Ch. 10 by Granstrand (intellectual property rights), Ch. 8 by Mowery
and Sampat (universities and public research infrastructure), and Ch. 9 by OSullivan
(Wnance).
16. This is essentially what was suggested by Porter (1990).
17. See Fagerberg 2002, 2003 for a discussion of this MarxSchumpeter model.
18. See Fagerberg (1996), Wakelin (1997), and Cantwell, Ch. 20 in this volume for overviews
of some of this literature.
19. For a more recent analysis in this spirit, with a lot of empirical case-studies, see Utterback
(1994).
23
20. Available econometric evidence suggests that innovation, measured in various ways (see
Smith in this volume), matters in many industries, not only those which could be
classiWed as being in the early stage of the product-cycle (Soete 1987; Fagerberg 1995).
21. For an overview, see Aghion and Howitt (1998). See also the discussion in Fagerberg
(2002, 2003), and Ch. 18 by Verspagen in this volume.
22. For a discussion of the role of diVerent types of knowledge in economics, including the
organizational dimension, see Cowan et al. (2000) and Ancori et al. (2000).
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