Bozarth, Jerold D. - The Specificity Myth - The Fallacious Premise of Mental Health Treatment
Bozarth, Jerold D. - The Specificity Myth - The Fallacious Premise of Mental Health Treatment
Bozarth, Jerold D. - The Specificity Myth - The Fallacious Premise of Mental Health Treatment
Health Treatment
Jerold D. Bozarth, Ph.D.
Bozarth, J. (August, 2000). Paper presentation at the American
Psychological Association, Washington, D. C.
Posted by Jerold Bozarth and Sam Evans Person-Centered
International
This paper contends that mental health treatment in the United
States is founded upon a fallacious premise; that is, the premise
that there are specific treatments for specific dysfunction. I label
this premise, "The Specificity Myth". This myth has been
perpetuated from the medical model and from behavioral treatment
models for mental dysfunction. It is found in extreme form in the
attempts to identify Empirically Validated Treatments (EVT)
(Recently termed Empirically Supported Treatments (EST)).
The argument is not new from the standpoint of fundamental views
of the nature of human beings. OHara (1993) summarizes the two
most prominent views of human nature as the deterministic view
and the view of humans as beings in the process of actualization.
She identifies the determinsitic view as suggesting that " . . . the
only valid knowledge is scientific knowledge, hence, human life is
predictable, explainable and controllable" (p. 9). The view of the
actualizing human being suggests " . . . a process by which the
natural inner being is set free from the stunting effect of civilization
to realize itself and to actualize its highest potentials" (p. 8). The
deterministic view currently dominates mental health treatment
with the illusion of scientific verification. This view blends with the
medical model for physical illness that has dominated mental health
treatment propelling the assumption that appropriate diagnosis is
related to viable treatment.
This paper reviews the credibility of diagnosis, the pattern of
psychotherapy outcome research, the conclusion of five decades of
psychotherapy outcome research, and several intrinsic flaws in the
reported evidence for Empirically Supported Treatment.
Diagnosis
Psychiatric diagnosis and empirically validated treatment are
predicated upon the same assumption. Both are based upon
classification with the claim that classification is central to science.
Hence, both are implicitly linked to science with the implication that
the foundation and process of this conclusion does not need to be
examined. That is, the logic is that the assumptions are integrally
related to science and not open to critique.
Diagnosis involves two assumptions. First, it is assumed that there is
a relationship among certain phenomena (discovered by
researchers) from which the concept of a diagnostic label can be
determined. Second, it is assumed that there is a binding of the
clusters identified by researchers. The validity of both of these
assumptions is sorely lacking in relation to psychiatric diagnoses.
For example, it was clear from my (Bozarth, 1999) personal
observations in the 1950s and my personal studies in the 1960s
that a particular diagnosis or even psychological description was
more related to the diagnostician or author of the descriptive
reports than to the characteristics of the "patients". It became
common knowledge among hospital personnel that the diagnosis of
"schizophrenia" in the 1950s was a catch all for those who did not
fit other diagnostic categories. Boyle (1990) presents a compendium
of arguments that schizophrenia is a "scientific delusion". Boyle
(1999) states that " . . . there is no evidence whatsoever that the
original introduction of the concept of schizophrenia was
accompanied by the observation of a meaningful relationship
amongst the many behaviors and experiences from which the
concept was inferred" (p. 80). Statistical studies of groups diagnosed
as schizophrenia show no evidence of the symptoms clustering
together in a meaningful way (Bentall, 1990; Slade & Cooper, 1979).
Similar lack of evidence of other diagnostic concepts has been found
in studies of depression (Hallett, 1990; Wiener, 1989; panic disorder
(Hallam, 1989); agoraphobia (Hallam, 1983); borderline personality
disorder (Kutchins & Kirk, 1997); self-defeating or masochistic
personality disorder (Caplan & Gans, 1991). Boyle (1999) presents
an extensive discussion of these critical points; i.e., the previous
"discovery" of patterns by researchers and the existence of
underlying processes, which she contends has been seriously
questioned in relation to psychiatric diagnoses. Boyle concludes
that:
The assumptions behind psychiatric classification are extremely
problematic, which is hardly surprising as they were developed by
medicine to suit bodily processes not peoples behaviour and
experience. Non-diagnostic approaches demand a very different set
of assumptions, which in turn demand a different set of social and
therapeutic responses (p. 88).
These problematic assumptions are the basis of the current mental
health treatment system. The problems with these assumptions are
virtually ignored in the development of the diagnostic manuals.
Rather, the attention is directed to the benefits of the manual for
the purpose of providing " . . . clear descriptions of diagnostic
categories . . ." (American Psychiatric Association, p. xxvii). Further,
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no
noted that, like the arguments for diagnosis, six of the assertions
are based upon the assumption that their first argument is true. The
assertion that "much is already known" is followed by the six
assertions that have to do with influence, strategies and factors
other than the validity of the EST stance. The only substantial
argument is whether or not there are effective treatments for
particular dysfunction. The bold assertion is affirmative (Barlow,
1996; Chambless, 1996). The Institute for the Study of Therapeutic
Change (Web Page, talkingcure.com , 2000) succinctly responds to
this assertion:
Unfortunately, they (the members of the Task Force) are dead wrong
when they link therapeutic effectiveness to so-called empirically
validated treatments (EVT"S). In drawing their conclusions,
members of the Task Force of Division 12 have ignored the
conclusion of nearly 40 years of sophisticated outcome research
(See Psychotherapy (1997, 33(2)); and American Psychologist
(1996,51(10)).
With such a difference in views, it behooves us to look a bit further
at assumptions and process of the development of ESTs.
The words "efficacy" and "effectiveness" were interchangeable until
recent years. The dictionary definitions are synonymous Recently,
the term "efficacious" has come to identify the results of "gold
standard" studies (Seligman, 1995). These are studies which have
been traditionally identified as true design studies; that is, studies
which are randomized, double-blind and have an adequate number
of subjects and have adequate controls for therapists as well as
having appropriate replications of the study. The rationale is that
causation can be more accurately determined with this type of
study. Efficacious studies are actually rare in the bulk of research in
psychotherapy outcome. The following conclusions attend to major
flaws of the assumptions and process of confirming ESTs:
Conclusion 1: There is considerable variation of the design
criteria from the assumption that these are "Gold Standard"
studies as implied by the advocates. The quality of the
designs is no more rigorous than many of those
representing the previous five decades of research.
It turns out that the "efficacious" and "gold standard" studies
identified by the task force are not quite as efficacious as implied.
The Task Force, in one publication, identified 36 studies of
"Empirically Validated Treatments and another 32 studies of
"Probably Efficacious Treatments" (Chambless et. al., 1996). The
general criteria for acceptance as efficacious studies includes case
study design experiments with Ns greater than 9. These
experiments are part of the 36 recommended studies. The task
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force guidelines for the criteria of EST now defines their "Well
Established Treatments" in less than rigorous terminology. (Task
Force on promotion and dissemination of psychological procedures,
1995). Rather than referring to true design studies, they refer to the
need for "At least two GOOD (authors emphasis) group design
studies . . .". Such loose terminology is indicative of the deviation
from their original intention to utilize "efficacious" studies as the
criterion.
A thorough critique of the empirically validated treatment studies is
presented in the journal of Psychotherapy Research (Bohart, OHara,
& Leitner, 1998).
Conclusion 2: Five decades of research have been
disregarded because those studies are not viewed as
appropriately measuring the specific behaviors of the
therapist or either because the do not fit the clusters of
client dysfunction which have been reliably agreed upon,
but not validly determined, by those who recommended the
categories for the DSM-IV.
It is somewhat baffling how the task force conclusions could be
reached after examining psychotherapy outcome research over the
past five decades. It turns out that the five decades of research
have been summarily disregarded for somewhat obscure reasons.
The dismissal is, according to Garfield (1996) related to the idea
that there are now instruments (i.e. training manuals) that identify
more specific behaviors and standardize the therapy; and to the
idea that there are reliable diagnoses (via the DSM-IV) to which
treatment can be directed. As noted previously, it is interesting that
neither the DSM-lll-R or DSM-IV actually recommend treatments for
their "reliable" diagnoses. Treatments are now being determined
through the EST phenomenon.
A specific example of dismissal is the renowned Smith et. al (1980)
analysis of 475 studies which concludes that psychotherapy of all
kinds is generally more effective than no treatment. The study is
disregarded primarily on the basis that it pre-dates the Beck et. al.
Manual and DSM-III (Garfield, 1996). The faux pas of dismissing the
1980 analysis has been raised anew by a meta-analysis in the
November, 1997 issue of the Psychological Bulletin (Wampold, et.
al.) which re-confirms the Smith et. al. study. Elliott (1997) also reconfirms these findings in his summary of meta-analysis.
Conclusion 3: The findings of five decades of psychotherapy
outcome research have discovered that the clientdriven/person-centered paradigm accounts for the major
success variance for clients.
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the reason for the referral. Or listen to her more pressing concerns
as she talks about the rest of it? Do I stop her from talking about
what she expresses as her more basic difficulty?
How can it be so simple? . . .what is the definition of efficacious?
What is withholding treatment? How do you know what the problem
is, anyway even if youre intent on fixing it; if you close off the
avenue of talking about it before you begin? The doctor hadnt even
heard about the sister . . . that is how efficacious he is . . .
This is just one of maybe five panic attack cases I have right
now . . . all with tails that wag the dog.
The efficacy of treatment becomes a bit confounded in the real
world.
The myth of EST is further compromised in the violation of the
fundamental premise. The primary premise is that there are certain
procedures that will ameliorate or diminish particular dysfunction. It
is so certain that this is the case that the procedures are identified
via treatment manuals. This is pretty good because what it means is
that anyone who is reasonably intelligent can follow the procedures
and the result will be positive. In the 1960s,we did this with
behavior modification procedures that were integrated into hospitals
and schools for the mentally retarded and mentally ill. Ward
attendants, many with less than high school education, could follow
these procedures with reported successful results as long as the
procedures were followed. Many of these procedures are still in the
institutions in spite of serious questions about the validity of the
results. But, if it works as asserted, lets do it. However, somehow
we find that it requires a doctoral level psychologist to apply the
technical manual. Why is this? If the procedure is, in fact, the point
of the whole thing, then why do we need the clinical psychologist as
a treatment phenomenon? We dont! If the premise of specificity
(that there are particular treatments for particular dysfunction) is
correct, the specific treatment is the thing. But now we have an
intervening variable present. That is, we need a competent clinician
in case there are clinical judgments to be made when the procedure
is not working. This means that we must be ready to change the
procedure at any given moment and that it is deemed by someone
to not be working. The procedure, which is the thing, must be open
to be tailor made to the particular client. Among other things, the
common factors have entered into the realm of the ESTs.
The fact that five decades of psychotherapy outcome research has
been ignored in the search for specificity as highlighted by the EST
proposals is further compounded by the murkiness of "good"
research designs which support procedures that can not be trusted
without the murkiness of clinical judgment.
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Summary
Our examination of the credibility of diagnosis, the pattern of
psychotherapy outcome research, the conclusion of five decades of
psychotherapy outcome research, and the intrinsic flaws in the
reported evidence for Empirically Supported Treatment suggest a
radical conclusion.
This conclusion is that the foundation of the mental health system in
the United States is founded upon a myth; that is, the myth that
there are specific treatments for particular dysfunction. This
conclusion calls for a radical re-structuring of the mental health
system to accentuate the variables related to success. These are
the common factor variables of therapist/client relationship and
emphasis of client resources and client frame of reference.
References
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Washington D. C.:American Psychiatric Association.
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scientific
delusion?
14
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Guttingen
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18
Wampold,
B.E.
(1997).
Methodological
identifying
efficacious psychotherapies.
Research, 7, 21-43.
problems
in
Psychotherapy
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