An Asian Poverty Line? Issues and Options
An Asian Poverty Line? Issues and Options
An Asian Poverty Line? Issues and Options
Stephan Klasen
No. 609
November 2016
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S. Klasen
Abstract
Given Asias record of rapid economic growth and the conceptual and empirical problems
of the current international income poverty line (dollar-a-day), this paper discusses whether
there is merit to develop an Asia-specific poverty line that addresses some of the
shortcomings of the dollar-a-day line and additionally considers Asias particular economic
situation. We consider various ways of creating an Asia-specific poverty line, including
an Asia-specific international income poverty line (using purchasing-power parity [PPP]
adjusted dollars) that is derived from Asian national poverty lines. We argue that there
can be some merit in developing an Asian poverty line and that, in the case of income
poverty, it would be best to ground such an Asia-specific poverty line in a consistent method
of generating national poverty lines using national currencies rather than generating a
PPP-adjusted poverty line in international dollars that is specific for Asia. It is important that
such a poverty line also considers relative poverty in its assessment to reflect the rising
aspirations of Asian societies, in line with suggestions made by Chen and Ravallion (2013)
on weakly relative poverty lines. In terms of multidimensional poverty lines, there is also
some merit in developing an Asia-specific multidimensional poverty index that takes into
account the specific living conditions of Asian societies.
S. Klasen
Contents
1.
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................... 1
2.
3.
4.
An Absolute Income Poverty Line using the World Banks Methods .............. 4
A Weakly Relative Poverty Line using the World Banks Approach.............. 8
Using National Poverty Lines to Measure Poverty in Asia .............................. 9
An Asia-specific Multidimensional Poverty Index?........................................ 10
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................... 12
APPENDIX.......................................................................................................................... 14
S. Klasen
1. INTRODUCTION
Using the widely-used international income poverty line ($1.25 per person per day),
poverty in Asia has fallen dramatically in recent decades. In fact, the very rapid
progress on absolute income poverty reduction in Asia is largely responsible that
the first Millennium Development Goal (MDG) aiming to halve the incidence of
absolute poverty between 1990 and 2015 has been reached four years ahead of
schedule. This was achieved by particularly rapid progress in many populous Asian
economies (particularly, the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), Indonesia, Viet Nam),
overcompensating for much slower progress in poverty reduction in Sub-Saharan
Africa (Chen and Ravallion 2013).
Despite this progress, it is too early to declare victory on the poverty front in Asia for
various reasons. First, progress in poverty reduction remains fragile in many Asian
countries and the vulnerability to poverty remains high (Klasen and Waibel 2013,
2014). Second, there is the recognition that poverty captures more than a lack of
incomes, an issue covered by the literature on multidimensional poverty (e.g. Alkire
and Santos 2014; Rippin 2013). Progress in reducing multidimensional poverty in Asia
has generally been more uneven (although there are substantial uncertainties about
the data, particularly comparable data over time). Lastly, in many Asian countries
national poverty lines are substantially higher than the international $1.25-a-day
poverty line; in some, including PRC and India, they have been revised upwards to also
reflect the rising aspirations of the populations in these societies. At these higher (and
increasing) poverty lines, poverty is far from defeated.
Partly as a result of these factors, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) is considering
whether there is merit in developing an Asia-specific poverty line. In addition, it is
considering ways to derive such an Asian poverty line, closely related to the methods
developed and applied by the World Bank (Ravallion, Chen and Sangraula 2009) in
deriving the international $1.25-a-day poverty line but specific for the Asian situation.
This paper first discusses whether there indeed is merit in developing an Asia-specific
poverty line. We then discuss various options of developing such a poverty line,
considering income and multidimensional versions of such a poverty line. We argue
that there can be some merit in developing an Asian poverty line and that, in the case
of income poverty, it would be best to ground such an Asian-specific poverty line in a
consistent method of generating national poverty lines using national currencies rather
than generating a PPP-adjusted poverty line in international dollars (see also Klasen
2013a and Klasen et al. 2015). It is important that such a poverty line also considers
relative poverty in its assessment to reflect the rising aspirations of Asian societies
(see Ravallion and Chen 2011; Chen and Ravallion 2013). In terms of multidimensional
poverty lines, there is merit in developing an Asia-specific multidimensional poverty
index (MPI) that takes into account the specific living conditions of Asian societies.
S. Klasen
example, households tend to be smaller than in Africa, family ties are quite strong, and
the provision of public services by the state is substantial. To the extent that this is
the case, it might justify a lower poverty line, measured in terms of private per capita
incomes because fewer private incomes are required to achieve a certain level of
well-being. But it is not obvious that these apparent differences justify a peculiar
Asian poverty line because the heterogeneity within Asia in these economic and social
arrangements is very large. Also, one would first need to investigate the empirical
importance of these claims and their relevance to particular Asian countries before
one could draw any firm conclusions on this. It should also logically lead to different
poverty lines within Asia, depending on the particular circumstances. It would thus be
particularly difficult to use this argument as a motivation for a uniform income poverty
line appropriate for all of Asia.
A second argument relates to differences in levels and trends of economic
performance that ought to be reflected in the setting of a poverty line. Average incomes
in Asia are higher than in Africa (but lower than in Latin America and the Middle East)
and most economies in Asia have experienced rather rapid growth in the last three
decades. This might justify the use of an Asian poverty line that reflects the average
income level and, more importantly, reflects its rapid economic performance. We argue
below that such a poverty line should contain a relative element, i.e., increase with
rising prosperity in Asia. Of course the high heterogeneity in Asias income levels and
economic growth experience might be seen as a counterargument to a single and
uniquely Asian income poverty line. But to the extent that neighboring countries
benchmark their performance against each other, an argument for a unique line
reflecting these special features can be made.
A third argument is that an Asian poverty line would be more closely aligned with
national poverty lines in Asia and, thus, the disconnect between national and
international poverty measurement would be correspondingly smaller (see Dotter and
Klasen 2014a; Klasen 2013). This is essentially an empirical question. Clearly, the
current $1.25 international poverty line is only very loosely linked to Asian realities. The
only country included in the sample of the 15 poorest countries that were used to
derive the $1.25 the poverty line is Tajikistan (Ravallion, Chen and Sangraula 2009). In
fact, one can argue that the $1.25 poverty line is much more a reflection of national
poverty realities in Africa than in Asia (which includes only South, East, and Southeast
Asia; Central Asia is included with Europe here). This can also be seen in Figure 1
below. This figure shows the difference in the poverty headcount using the national
poverty line minus the headcount using the international poverty line. A negative
number means that the international poverty line is higher than the national poverty
line. This is the case in a number of Asian countries, including large ones (the size
of the bubble indicates the number of poor people there). For these countries, the
international poverty line appears rather high. In Europe and Central Asia, the
international poverty line is far too low. An extreme case is Tajikistan where the poverty
headcount using the national poverty line is 40 percentage points higher than using
the international poverty line (even though this country is included in the sample used
to calculate the international poverty line). Thus, the mismatch between Asian national
poverty lines and the international poverty line appears substantial, which would
argue for an Asia-specific poverty line. Of course, if an Asian poverty line was
directly grounded in country-specific poverty lines (in contrast to the international
poverty line that is an average of poverty lines across the world), the linkage between
national and pan-Asian poverty measurement could be even closer. This is an issue we
discuss below.
S. Klasen
Notes: NPL refers to national poverty lines; IPL to the international poverty line ($1.25 a day); the y-axis measures mean
consumption per capita per month, taken from the national accounts (NA). Europe includes Eastern European and
Central Asian countries; LAC refers to Latin American and Caribbean countries; and MENA refers to countries in the
Middle East and North Africa; where these regions refer to World Bank regional classifications.
Source: Dotter and Klasen (2014a).
S. Klasen
S. Klasen
(i.e., a linear model, in effect modeling the relationship in Figure 2b), ADB (2014)
estimates the relationship between national poverty lines and the log of per-capita
consumption (i.e. a log-linear model). As shown by Greb et al. (2012), using a loglinear model also leads to a larger reference group in the global model and a global
poverty line of $1.45 per day. Thus, using a sample of Asian countries does not lead to
a different poverty line from using the global sample if the same estimation method is
used. Nevertheless, the question arises which estimation method is to be preferred.
But both the estimations by Ravallion, Chen and Sangraula (2009) and by ADB (2014)
are problematic from a statistical point of view. In particular, in the linear model used by
Ravallion, Chen and Sangraula (2009), there actually is no statistical evidence of a kink
in the curve so that the kink is imposed on the data rather than observed (which is
visible from Figure 2b, see Greb et al. 2012 and Klasen et al. 2015). In the log-linear
model, the residuals are not normally distributed so that the inference, especially
regarding location and significance of the kink which separates the flat from the rising
portion, is problematic. As shown by Klasen et al. (2015), the preferred statistical
specification is actually a log-log model where there is statistical evidence for a kink as
well as normally distributed residuals. Using the latter model, a global poverty line of
about $1.21 is obtained, with a slightly larger reference group (of 19 countries).
Applying this to the estimation of the Asian poverty line, one could then take the
average of the Asian countries included in the reference group for the global line. That
would result in a poverty line of about $1.28 but only three Asian countries are included
in the reference group (Tajikistan, Nepal, and Bangladesh) which makes this approach
unreliable. If we instead estimated the linear or the log-log model using the 21 Asian
observations, this would yield an 'Asian' poverty line of $1.41$1.43; 1 this is driven
largely by the relative high national poverty lines in Tajikistan, Yemen, and Mongolia.
Also here, the reliability is an issue because a nonlinear threshold model is estimated
on just 21 observations where outliers and small data problems could have a large
impact; it is also likely that the switch to the 2011 PPP round would lead to a
substantial change in this estimate. Overall, we suggest that this method would not
generate a very reliable and robust estimate for an Asia-specific income poverty line.
Besides these estimation issues, there are more serious concerns and criticisms of this
entire approach which have been discussed extensively in the literature (e.g., Reddy
and Pogge 2009; Klasen 2013, 2013b; Klasen et al. 20015; Deaton 2010; Dotter and
Klasen 2014a). We highlight four of the most important issues that have been
discussed in the literature. First, this method is rather unstable and highly dependent
on the sample of countries included in the estimation and the PPP exchange rates
used. When, in 2008, the World Bank switched from using the 1993 PPPs and the
sample of countries used for estimating the poverty line. It led to the switch of the
international poverty line from $1.08 in 1993 dollars to $1.25 in 2005 dollars. Currently,
similar issues are arising with the new 2011 PPPs which could lead to serious
reassessments of poverty levels in the world and in different regions (Klasen et al.
2015). More seriously, the 2008 revision led to a massive upward shift in global poverty
for all years, e.g., from about 29% in 1990 to about 41% in the same year; thus, the
base year of the first MDG was changed substantially with a large impact on what
halving global poverty would mean. The pace of poverty reduction was, however, less
affected (Chen and Ravallion 2010). As shown by Deaton (2010) and Greb et al.
(2012), the main reason for the massive increase in levels of observed global poverty
was not the switch of the PPPs, but the switch in the sample of countries used to
estimate global poverty. Deaton (2010) additionally noted that the change in the
1
I thank Tatyana Krivobokova for providing these estimates, based on the methods described in
Klasen et al. (2015).
S. Klasen
sample led to some perverse effects. In particular, he noted the case of India. Whereas
India was part of the reference group of countries that made up the global poverty line
using 1993 dollars, high subsequent growth ensured that India was no longer in the
reference group in the assessment using 2005 dollars. Because Indias poverty line
is rather low, the exclusion of India from the reference group led to an increase in
the global poverty line, which, in turn, led to an increase in measured poverty in India
using that new line. In a sense, rapidly rising incomes in India have led to higher
observed poverty in India using the international poverty line, clearly a problematic
effect. In short, there appear to be substantial problems and uncertainties associated
with switches in PPPs and national poverty lines used to estimate the global poverty
line. The 2011 PPPs suggest that prior assessments of PPP-adjusted incomes
underestimated per capita incomes in PRC and India, and some other Asian
economies. If these are used to generate a new international poverty line, this could
have substantial implications for poverty in those countries, compared with other
regions, as well as on global poverty.
A second line of criticism relates to the use of PPPs more generally for this type of
assessment (Deaton 2010; Klasen 2013b; Reddy and Pogge 2009). One criticism is
that PPPs are generated to compare overall price levels, not price levels for the poor;
worse, they can be sensitive to changes in the price level for goods unrelated to the
poor (Reddy and Pogge 2009). Another criticism is that PPPs are only valid for a
particular benchmark year, but not over time. Thus, the question arises whether one
should use only one PPP benchmark year (as currently being done in the World Banks
approach to poverty measurement), or several benchmark years (as done for the Penn
World Tables that also use PPP-adjusted income data).
A third line of criticism is that the international income poverty line has limited relevance
for country-level poverty assessments because the difference between country-level
income poverty lines and the international income poverty line is substantial (Dotter
and Klasen 2014a). This point, which was already alluded to above, is nicely visible in
the estimation of the Asian poverty line below. As can be seen, the difference between
country-level poverty lines and the estimated Asian poverty line is substantial. In
Tajikistan and Yemen, poverty using the Asian poverty line is much lower than using
national poverty estimates whereas, in Nepal and India, it is much higher. In fact, there
is a clear regional pattern to the difference between national poverty lines and an Asian
poverty line. All South Asian countries are below the estimated line, i.e., poverty is
lower using national poverty lines than the international poverty line. The converse is
the case for all Western and Central Asian countries that were part of the former Soviet
Union. There national poverty lines are all above the line; thus, poverty is much lower
using the common Asian poverty line. This clear regional pattern appears problematic
and suggests substantial problems with one common Asian poverty line.
A fourth criticism of such an approach, closely related to the one just discussed, is the
increasing irrelevance of the $1.25 poverty line for an increasing number of Asian
countries. In many Asian economies, this poverty line is simply too low to be relevant
for policymakers there. In fact, several Asian countries, including PRC and India, have
recently increased their national poverty line to make it more relevant for national
policymaking. In this context, the question arises whether one should adjust the poverty
line because of increasing prosperity. This is precisely the suggestion by Ravallion and
Chen (2011) of a weakly relative international poverty line to which we turn below.
S. Klasen
To summarize, the case for an Asian poverty line using the World Banks method of
deriving the $1.25 poverty line is weak. It would not lead to a substantially different
poverty line, it is poorly linked to national poverty lines, it is unstable due to the link
to the PPPs and the estimation method, and it would be increasingly irrelevant for
fast-growing Asian economies.
Figure 2a: Threshold Model for log(Consumption)
Note: Analysis based on Klasen et al. (2015). The data are from Chen, Ravallion, and Sangraula (2009).
S. Klasen
Figure 2c: National Poverty Lines from Asian Countries plotted against Mean
Consumption in International 2005 PPP
Note: PCE refers to per capita expenditures; all figures refer to dollars/capita/month.
Source: Elaboration of ADB (2014:8), based on data from Chen, Ravallion and Sangraula (2009).
S. Klasen
S. Klasen
10
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11
S. Klasen
REFERENCES
Alkire, S., and F. James. 2011a. Counting and Multidimensional Poverty Measurement.
Journal of Public Economies 95(7): 476487.
Alkire, S., and M. E. Santos. 2014. Measuring Acute Poverty in the Developing World:
Robustness and Scope of the Multidimensional Poverty Index. World
Development 59: 251274.
ADB. 2014. Poverty in Asia: A Deeper Look. Manila: Asia Development Bank.
Chen, S., and M. Ravallion. 2001. How Did the Worlds Poor Fare in the 1990s?
Review of Income and Wealth 47(3): 283300.
. 2010. The Developing World is Poorer than We Thought, but No Less
Successful in the Fight against Poverty. Quarterly Journal of Economics
125(4): 15771625.
. 2013. More Relatively Poor in a Less Absolutely-poor World. The Review of
Income and Wealth 59(1): 128.
Deaton, A. 2010. Price Indexes, Inequality, and the Measurement of World Poverty.
American Economic Review 100(1): 534.
Dotter, C., and S. Klasen. 2014a. The (Ir-)Relevance of the International Poverty Line
for National Poverty Assessment. Mimeograph, University of Gttingen.
. 2014b. The Multidimensional Poverty Index: Achievements, Conceptual and
Empirical Issues. UNDP HDRO Occasional Paper, New York: UNDP.
Greb, F., S. Klasen, S. Pasaribu, and M. Wiesenfarth. 2011. Dollar a Day Re-Revisited.
Courant Research Center Discussion Paper No. 91. University of Gttingen.
Klasen, S. 2013a. Is it Time for a New International Poverty Measure? In Development
Cooperation Report 2013: Ending Poverty, edited by E. Solheim. Paris: OECD.
. 2013b. Measuring Levels and Trends in Absolute Poverty in the World:
Open Questions and Possible Alternatives. In Poverty and Social Exclusion:
New Methods of Analysis, edited by G. Betti and A. Lemmi. London: Taylor
and Francis.
Klasen, S., T. Krivobokova, F. Greb, R. Lahot, S. Pasaribu, and M, Wiesenfarth. 2015.
International Poverty Measurement: Which Way Now? Mimeograph, University
of Gttingen.
Klasen, S., and H. Waibel. 2013. Vulnerability to Poverty. London: Palgrave.
. 2014. Vulnerability to Poverty in South-East Asia: Drivers, Measurement,
Responses, and Policy Issues. World Development, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/j.worlddev.2014.01.007
Pasha, A. 2014. Regional Perspectives to the Multidimensional Poverty Index.
Mimeograph, University of Gttingen.
Ravallion, M. 1994. Poverty Comparisons, Fundamentals of Pure and Applied
Economics Volume 56, Chur, Switzerland: Harwood Academic Publishers.
Ravallion, M., S. Chen, and P. Sangraula. 2009 Dollar a Day Revisited. World Bank
Economic Review 23(2): 163184
Ravallion, M., and S. Chen. 2011. Weakly Relative Poverty. Review of Economics and
Statistics 93(4): 12511261.
12
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Ravallion, M., G. Datt, and D. van de Walle. 1991. Quantifying Absolute Poverty in the
Developing World. Review of Income and Wealth 37(4):34561.
Reddy, S., and T. Pogge. 2009. How Not to Count the Poor. In Debates on the
Measurement of Global Poverty, edited by S. Anand, P. Segal and J. Stiglitz.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
UNDP. 2010. Human Development Report. New York: UNDP.
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Vol. II, edited by K. Basu and R. Kanbur. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rippin, N. 2013. Considerations of Efficiency and Distributive Justice in
Multidimensional Poverty Measurement. Ph.D. dissertation, University
of Gttingen.
World Bank. 1990. World Development Report 1990: Poverty. New York: Oxford
University Press.
. 2000. World Development Report 2000/01: Attacking Poverty. Washington DC:
The World Bank.
13
S. Klasen
APPENDIX
Table A.1: Average Relative Poverty Line by Region and Year
Region
Method 1
East Asia and Pacific
PRC
Eastern Europe and Central Asia
Latin America and the Caribbean
Middle East and North Africa
South Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa
Total
Total excl. PRC
Method 2
East Asia and Pacific
PRC
Eastern Europe and Central Asia
Latin America and the Caribbean
Middle East and North Africa
South Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa
Total
Total excl. PRC
Region
Method 1
East Asia and Pacific
PRC
Eastern Europe and Central Asia
Latin America and the Caribbean
Middle East and North Africa
South Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa
Total
Total excl. PRC
Method 2
East Asia and Pacific
PRC
Eastern Europe and Central Asia
Latin America and the Caribbean
Middle East and North Africa
South Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa
Total
Total excl. PRC
1981
1.33
1.25
4.05
4.32
2.42
1.27
1.55
2.00
2.29
1.34
1.25
4.21
4.25
2.56
1.27
1.55
2.01
2.30
1.35
1.25
4.35
4.07
2.40
1.30
1.53
2.00
2.28
1.39
1.25
4.21
4.00
2.41
1.35
1.51
2.00
2.28
1.43
1.25
3.78
4.28
2.47
1.38
1.49
1.99
2.26
1.36
1.26
4.19
4.51
2.84
1.30
1.71
2.09
2.41
1996
1.38
1.29
4.36
4.17
3.04
1.32
1.66
2.09
2.39
1999
1.41
1.33
4.49
4.36
2.84
1.35
1.65
2.12
2.41
2002
1.45
1.34
4.27
4.42
2.85
1.30
1.60
2.11
2.38
2005
1.54
1.42
4.76
4.47
2.98
1.38
1.54
2.18
2.46
2008
1.57
1.35
3.79
4.41
2.50
1.47
1.51
2.08
2.34
1.66
1.48
3.98
4.68
2.59
1.54
1.51
2.17
2.41
1.82
1.64
4.54
4.76
2.80
1.58
1.53
2.30
2.52
2.03
1.85
5.61
5.09
3.05
1.74
1.55
2.54
2.77
2.34
2.20
6.99
5.79
3.37
1.94
1.60
2.90
3.13
1.73
1.61
4.37
4.68
2.98
1.41
1.56
2.24
2.46
1.80
1.71
3.96
4.70
3.06
1.46
1.58
2.23
2.41
2.06
2.01
4.39
4.66
3.35
1.48
1.61
2.37
2.50
2.39
2.40
5.22
5.17
3.02
1.54
1.63
2.60
2.66
2.72
2.81
6.71
5.93
3.24
1.58
1.78
2.94
2.98
14
S. Klasen
Table A.2: Weakly Poverty Measures for the Developing World, 19812008
Region
1981
1984
1987
1990
70.0
72.6
21.4
50.3
41.2
61.6
64.3
58.5
53.4
60.4
59.0
21.5
46.9
40.7
60.9
64.2
54.4
52.8
63.6
65.2
25.4
46.8
39.3
60.3
65.1
56.0
52.9
60.1
61.1
32.2
50.0
38.6
58.9
66.9
55.7
53.8
1,044.1
753.1
94.7
195.4
77.8
615.7
278.6
2,306.1
1,553.0
1999
946.2
639.8
97.5
193.6
83.9
653.4
302.8
2,277.3
1,637.5
2002
1,047.0
739.9
118.0
204.3
88.5
691.6
333.6
2,483.0
1,743.1
2005
1,031.8
720.0
150.8
230.0
93.3
720.3
371.4
2,597.6
1,877.6
2008
52.1
51.3
32.2
51.1
38.8
56.9
66.5
52.6
53.0
48.8
48.4
30.4
51.2
37.9
56.8
65.3
51.2
52.0
43.4
41.9
29.3
47.9
36.6
55.1
63.6
48.2
50.2
42.4
41.0
28.2
45.9
35.0
53.5
61.1
46.9
48.6
959.2
642.7
151.3
259.1
105.6
781.6
431.9
2,688.7
2,046.1
924.4
620.0
143.1
270.9
109.0
821.4
457.9
2,726.6
2,106.6
841.7
546.5
138.0
263.4
111.1
836.6
479.9
2,671.0
2,124.5
840.4
542.6
133.6
261.5
111.9
849.4
496.4
2,692.9
2,150.3
15
1993