Madhyamaka (Sanskrit: Madhyamaka, Chinese: ; pinyin: Zhnggun Pi; also known

as nyavda) refers primarily to a Mahayana Buddhist school of philosophy[1] founded

by Nagarjuna. According to Madhyamaka all phenomena (dharmas) are empty (nya) of
"nature,"[2] a "substance" or "essence" (svabhva) which gives them "solid and independent
existence,"[3] because they are dependently co-arisen. But this "emptiness" itself is also "empty": it
does not have an existence on its own, nor does it refer to a transcendental reality beyond or above
phenomenal reality.[4][5][6]
Contents
[hide]

1Etymology
2Emptiness
o 2.1Dependent origination
o 2.2Svabhava - essence
o 2.3Two truths
o 2.4The emptiness of emptiness
o 2.5Essentialism and nihilism
o 2.6The limits of language
o 2.7Liberation
3Origins and development
o 3.1Origins
3.1.1Sutta Nipata
3.1.2Abhidharma
3.1.3Prajpramit
o 3.2Indian Madhyamaka
3.2.1Ngrjuna
3.2.2ryadeva
3.2.3Buddhaplita and Bhvaviveka
3.2.4Candrakrti
3.2.5ntideva
3.2.6Shantarakshita
o 3.3Tibetan Buddhism
3.3.1Jonangpa
3.3.2Tsongkhapa
3.3.3Tibetan classification of schools
3.3.3.1Svtantrika
3.3.3.2Prsagika
o 3.4Chn/Zen
o 3.5Western Buddhism
3.5.1Thich Nhat Hanh
3.5.2Modern Madhyamaka
4Influence on Advaita Vedanta
5Understanding in modern scholarship
o 5.1Kalupahana
o 5.2Hayes
o 5.3Magee
6See also
7Notes
8References

o 8.1Published references
o 8.2Web references
9Sources
10Further reading
11External links

Etymology[edit]
The school of thought and its subsidiaries are called "Madhyamaka"; those who follow it are called
"Mdhyamikas". "Madya" means "middle", as the Teaching of the Buddha is called "The Middle
Way". "Madhyamaka" means "middlemost". A "Madyamika" is a "middlemoster", because he takes
the middlemost way in philosophy.

Emptiness[edit]
Central to Madhyamaka philosophy is sunyata, "emptiness." The term refers to the "emptiness" of
inherent existence: all phenomena are empty of "substance" or "essence" (Sanskrit: svabhva) or
inherent existence, because they are dependently co-arisen. At a conventional level, "things" do
exist, but ultimately they are "empty" of inherent existence. But this "emptiness" itself is also "empty":
it does not have an existence on its own, nor does it refer to a transcendental reality beyond or
above phenomenal reality.[4][5][6]

Dependent origination[edit]
Nagarjuna further develops the notion of dependent arising, arguing that every dharma, or every
"thing", does not exist on its own, but depending on other "things" and causes:
Whatever is dependent arising
We declared that to be emptiness.
That is dependent designation,
And is itself the middle way.
Ngrjuna, Mlamadhyamakakrik 24:18

Svabhava - essence[edit]
Nagarjuna follows his own logic to its end, wondering what the subsequent consequences are of his
propositions. Since all "things" are dependently arisen, how then can a non-existing "thing" cause
another "thing" to come into being? In Chapter 15 of the Mlamadhyamakakrik Nagarjuna centers
on the words svabhava [note 1] parabhava[note 2] bhava[note 3] and abhava:[note 4]
Nagarjuna's critique of the notion of own-nature[note 5] (Mk. ch. 15) argues that anything which arises
according to conditions, as all phenomena do, can have no inherent nature, for what is depends on
what conditions it. Moreover, if there is nothing with own-nature, there can be nothing with 'othernature' (para-bhava), i.e. something which is dependent for its existence and nature on
something else which has own-nature. Furthermore, if there is neither own-nature nor other-nature,
there cannot be anything with a true, substantial existent nature (bhava). If there is no true existent,
then there can be no non-existent (abhava).[13]
In chapter 15 of the Mulamadhyamakakarika, "Nagarjuna is playing on the word 'thing'".[web 1][note
6]
Nagarjuna uses the ambivalence inherent in the term svabhava:
[T]he word "svabhava" can be interpreted in two different ways. It can be rendered either
as identity [...] or as causal independence.[14]

This ambiguity is easily lost in translation:

When one reads Nagarjuna's argument in Sanskrit, it is not immediately obvious that the argument
has taken advantage of an ambiguity in the key term. But when one tries to translate his argument
into some other language, such as English or Tibetan, one finds that it is almost impossible to
translate his argument in a way that makes sense in translation. This is because the terms in the
language of translation do not have precisely the same range of ambiguities as the words in the
original Sanskrit. In English, we are forced to disambiguate, and in disambiguating, we end up
spoiling the apparent integrity of the argument.[14]
The doctrine of dependent arising cannot be reconciled with "a conception of self-nature or
substance".[11] Nagarjuna refutes "the commentarial doctrine of the 'own-being' of principles as
contrary to the Tripitaka":[7]
Nagarjuna had no objection to the Abhidhamma formulation of causal relations so long as the relata
are not regarded as having a unique nature or substance (svabhava).[8]
The rejection of inherent existence does not imply that there is no existence at all.[10] What it does
mean is that there is no "unique nature or substance (svabhava)"[8] in the "things" we perceive. This
may not necessarily be in contrast to the Abhidhamma point of view, given the ambivalence in the
terms used by Nagarjuna:
What Nagarjuna is saying is that no being has a fixed and permanent nature. What the abhidarmikas
maintained was that every thing has features that distinguish it from other things.[15][note 7]

Two truths[edit]
Madhyamaka discerns two levels of truth, conventional truth and ultimate truth,[4] to make clear that it
does make sense to speak of existence. Ultimately, we realize that all phenomena are sunyata,
empty of concrete existence. Conventionally, we do perceive concrete objects which we are aware
of.[17] Yet, this perceived reality is an experiential reality, not an ontological reality with substantial or
independent existence.[17]
The ultimate truth of sunyata does not refer to "nothingness" or "non-existence"; it refers to the
absence of inherent existence.[18]
According to Hayes, the two truths may also refer to two different goals in life: the highest goal of
nirvana, and the lower goal of "commercial good". The highest goal is the liberation from attachment,
both material and intellectual.[19]
Insight into the emptiness of "things' is part of developing wisdom, seeing things as they are.
Conceiving of concrete and unchanging objects leads to clinging and suffering. Buddhapalita says:
What is the reality of things just as it is? It is the absence of essence. Unskilled persons whose eye
of intelligence is obscured by the darkness of delusion conceive of an essence of things and then
generate attachment and hostility with regard to them.
Buddhaplita-mula-madhyamaka-vrtti P5242,73.5.6-74.1.2[20]

The emptiness of emptiness[edit]

Ultimate truth also does not refer to "absolute truth," some absolute reality above or beyond the
"relative reality."[4] On the contrary, emptiness itself is "empty" of inherent existence:[5]
Ultimate truth does not point to a transcendent reality, but to the transcendence of deception. It is
critical to emphasize that the ultimate truth of emptiness is a negational truth. In looking for
inherently existent phenomena it is revealed that it cannot be found. This absence is not findable
because it is not an entity, just as a room without an elephant in it does not contain an elephantless

substance. Even conventionally, elephantlessness does not exist. Ultimate truth or emptiness does
not point to an essence or nature, however subtle, that everything is made of.[web 2][note 8]

Essentialism and nihilism[edit]

What remains is the middle way between eternalism and annihilationism:[11]
The object of the critique is to show that the eternalist view is untenable and further to show that the
'own-being' theory adopted by some Buddhists did not really differ, when its implications were strictly
worked out, from the eternalist theory of Brahmanism (the theory of an eternal 'soul' and other
eternal 'substances').[10]
These two views are considered to be the two extreme views:
1. Essentialism[21] or eternalism (sastavadava)[10] - a belief that things inherently exist and are
therefore efficacious objects of craving and clinging;[21]
2. Nihilism[21] or annihilationism (ucchedavada)[10] - views that lead one to believe that there is no
need to be responsible for one's actions. Nagarjuna argues that we naively and innately
perceive things as substantial, and it is this predisposition which is the root delusion that lies
at the basis of all suffering.[21]
Madhyamaka represents the Middle way between them.

The limits of language[edit]

Madhyamaka uses language to make clear the limits of our concepts. Ultimately, reality cannot be
depicted by concepts.[4][22] This creates a tension, since it does have to use concepts to convey its
teachings:
This dynamic philosophical tensiona tension between the Madhyamika accounts of the limits of
what can be coherently said and its analytical ostension of what cannot be said without paradox but
must be understoodmust constantly be borne in mind in reading the text. It is not an incoherent
mysticism, but it is a logical tightrope act at the very limits of language and metaphysics.[22]

Liberation[edit]
The ultimate aim of understanding emptiness is not philosophical insight as such, but to gain
a liberated mind which does not dwell upon concepts. To realize this, meditation on emptiness may
proceed in stages, starting with the emptiness of both self, objects and mental states,[23] culminating
in a "natural state of nonreferential freedom."[24][note 9]

Origins and development[edit]

Nagarjuna

The Madhyamaka school is usually considered to have been founded by Ngrjuna, though it may
have existed earlier. [25] The name of the school is perhaps related to its close adherence to
Ngrjunas main work, the Mlamadhyamakakrik. The term Madhyamaka is related to 'madhya'
('the middle').
Madhyamaka-thought had a major influence on the subsequent development of the Mahayana
Buddhist tradition, although often in interaction with, and also in opposition to, the other two major
streams of Mahayana Buddhist thought, namely Yogacara and Buddha-nature. It had a major impact
on Tibetan Buddhism, where it became the orthodox standard in the Gelugpa tradition, in opposition
to Jonangpa's "Mah-Mdhyamaka". It also influenced the Zen tradition,[4] although this influence is
less often discerned in comparison to the Buddha-nature thought. The present day schools
of Tiantai, Tendai, Sanron,[26] are also influenced by the Mdhyamaka tradition, forming an East
Asian Mdhyamaka tradition. Contemporary western Buddhism is less acquainted with
Madhyamaka thought, although some implications have been recognized by western teachers.

Origins[edit]
Sutta Nipata[edit]
The Ahakavagga (Pali, "Octet Chapter") and the Pryanavagga (Pali, "Way to the Far Shore
Chapter") are two small collections of suttas within the Pli Canon of TheravadaBuddhism.[note 10] They
are among the earliest existing Buddhist literature, and place considerable emphasis on the rejection
of, or non-attachment to, all views.
Gomez compared them to later Madhyamaka philosophy, which in its Prasagika form especially
makes a method of rejecting others' views rather than proposing its own.[27]
Tillman Vetter, although agreeing overall with Gomez's observations, suggests some refinements on
historical and doctrinal grounds.[28] First, he notes that neither of these short collections of suttas are
homogeneous and hence are not all amenable to Gomez' proposals. According to Vetter, those
suttas which do lend support to Gomez probably originated with a heterodox ascetic group that predated the Buddha, and were integrated into the Buddhist Sangha at an early date, bringing with
them some suttas that were already in existence and also composing further suttas in which they
tried to combine their own teachings with those of the Buddha.[28]
Paul Fuller has rejected the arguments of Gomez and Vetter.[29] He finds that
... the Nikayas and the Atthakavagga present the same cognitive attitude toward views, wrong or
right.[30]

Alexander Wynne also rejects both of Vetter's claims that the Parayanavagga shows a chronological
stratification, and a different attitude toward mindfulness and liberating insight than do other
works.[31][note 11]
Abhidharma[edit]
The Madhyamaka school has been perhaps simplistically regarded as a reaction against the
development of the Abhidharma, especially the Sarvstivdin. In the Abhidharma, dharmas are
characterized by defining traits (lakaa) or own-existence (svabhva), whose ontological status is
not dependent upon concepts. The problem with the Abhidharma is not that things are
'independently existent' (a position that most Abhidharma schools would not accept), but rather (from
a Madhyamaka perspective) that they are independent from notions. For the Madhyamaka, dharmas
are notionally dependent, and further more, their notional dependence entails existential
dependence and hence lack of ultimate, true existence.
The relationship between Madhyamaka and Abhidharma is complex; Abhidharmic analysis figures
prominently in most Madhyamaka treatises, and authoritative commentators like Candrakrti
emphasize that Abhidharmic categories function as a viable (and favored) system of conventional
truths - they are more refined than ordinary categories, and they are not dependent on either the
extreme of eternalism or on the extreme view of the discontinuity of karma, as the non-Buddhist
categories of the time did. It may be therefore important to understand that Madhyamaka constitutes
a continuation of the Abhidharma type of analysis, extending the range of dependent arising to entail
(and focus upon) notional dependence. The dependent arising of concepts based on other concepts,
rather than the true arising of really existent causes and effects, becomes here the matrix of any
possible convention.
Prajpramit[edit]
Madhyamaka thought is also closely related to a number of Mahyna sources; traditionally, the
Prajpramitstras are the literature most closely associated with Madhyamaka understood, at
least in part, as an exegetical complement to those Stras. Traditional accounts also depict
Ngrjuna as retrieving some of the larger Prajpramitstras from the world of the Ngas
(explaining in part the etymology of his name). Praj or higher cognition is a recurrent term in
Buddhist texts, explained as a synonym of Abhidharma, insight (vipayan) and analysis of the
dharmas (dharmapravicaya). Within a specifically Mahyna context, Praj figures as the most
prominent in a list of Six Pramits (perfections or perfect masteries) that a Bodhisatva needs to
cultivate in order to eventually achieve Buddhahood. Madhyamaka offers conceptual tools to
analyze all possible elements of existence, allowing the practitioner to elicit through reasoning and
contemplation the type of view that the Stras express more authoritatively (being considered word
of the Buddha) but less explicitly (not offering corroborative arguments). The vast Prajpramit
literature emphasizes the development of higher cognition in the context of the Bodhisattva path;
thematically, its focus on the emptiness of all dharmas is closely related to the Madhyamaka
approach.

Indian Madhyamaka[edit]
Ngrjuna[edit]
Kalupahana has argued that Ngrjuna's intention was not to establish an ontology or epistemology,
but to free the Buddhist soteriology from essentialist notions which obscured the Buddhist Middle
Way:[32]
ryadeva[edit]
Ngrjuna's pupil ryadeva (3rd century CE) emphasized the Bodhisattva-ideal. His works are
regarded as a supplement to Ngrjuna's,[33] on which he commented.[34]ryadeva also refuted the
theories of non-Buddhist Indian philosophical schools.[34]

Buddhaplita and Bhvaviveka[edit]

Buddhaplita (470550) has been understood as the origin of the prsagika approach.[35] He was
criticized by Bhvaviveka (ca.500ca.578), who argued for the use of syllogisms "to set one's own
doctrinal stance".[36] Bhvya/Bhvaviveka was influenced by the Yogcra school.
The opposing approaches of Buddhaplita and Bhvya are explained by later Tibetan doxographers
as the origin of a subdivision of Madhyamaka into two schools, the Prsagika and the Svtantrika.
Candrakrti[edit]
Candrakrti (600c. 650) wrote the Prasannapad (Clear Words), a highly influential commentary on
the Mlamadhyamakakrik. This commentary is central in the understanding of Madhyamaka in
Tibetan Buddhism.
ntideva[edit]
ntideva (end 7th century first half 8th century) is well known for his Bodhisattvacaryvatra, A
Guide to the Bodhisattva's Way of Life. He united "a deep religiousness and joy of exposure together
with the unquestioned Madhyamaka orthodoxy".[37]
Shantarakshita[edit]
A Yogcra and Mdhyamaka synthesis was posited by Shantarakshita in the 8th century[note 12] and
may have been common at Nalanda University at that time. Like the Prsagika, this view
approaches ultimate truth through the prasaga method, yet when speaking of conventional reality
they may make autonomous statements like the earlier Svtantrika and Yogcra approaches.
This was different from the earlier Svatantrika in that the conventional truth was described in terms
of the theory of consciousness-only instead of the tenets of Svatantrika, though neither was used to
analyze for ultimate truth.
For example, they may assert that all phenomena are nothing but the "play of mind" and hence
empty of concrete existenceand that mind is in turn empty of defining characteristics. But in doing
so, they're careful to point out that any such example would be an approximate ultimate and not the
true ultimate. By making such autonomous statements, Yogcra-Svatantrika-Madhyamaka is often
mistaken as a Svtantrika or Yogcra view, even though a Prsagika approach was used in
analysis.[38] This view is thus a synthesis of Madhyamaka and Yogcra.

Tibetan Buddhism[edit]
Jonangpa[edit]
Dolpopa, the founder of the Jonangpa school, called his synthesis the Mah-Mdhyamaka, the
"Great Middle Way".[39] He regarded the tathagatagarbha to be the true emptiness. This view was
opposed by Tsonghkhapa. [40]
Tsongkhapa[edit]
The Gelug school was founded by Je Tsongkhapa's reforms to Atisha's Kadam tradition in the 14th
century.[note 13] Tsongkhapa emphasized compassion and insight into emptiness.
In his Ocean of Reasoning, Tsongkhapa comments on the Mulamadhyamakakarika.[41] According to
Tsongkhapa, Nagarjuna uses the term svabhava to refer to sunyata as the nature of reality:[42]
Their nature of emptiness is their reality nature.[43]
This is in line with the Eight Thousand Stanza Perfection of Wisdom Sutra:
Subhuti, since the five aggregates are without nature, they have a nature of emptiness.[43]

Although Tsonkhapa argued in favour of Yogacara views early in his career[44] his later understanding
is derived from Candrakirti,[45] who states that conventionally there are entities with distinguishing
characteristics, but ultimately those qualities are not independent essences. But since this emptiness
is true for everything that exists, this emptiness may also be regarded as an essence, though not in
the sense of an independent essence. Candrakirti formulates a final negation by stating that even
the denial of svabhava implies ...
...that either oneself or one's audience is not entirely free from the belief in svabhava. Therefore,
ultimate truth, truth as it is for those who are free from misknowledge, cannot be expressed by
asserting either the existence or nonexistence of svahbava.[46]
Tibetan classification of schools[edit]
Madhyamaka thought has been categorized variously in India and Tibet.[note 14] In Tibetan Buddhism a
major difference is being made between "Svtantrika" and "Prasagika." Tibetan doxography,
perhaps mostly derivative of the views of the 11th-century Tibetan translator Patsap Nyima Drak
divides Madhyamaka into three main branches:

Svtantrika;
Prasagika;
The later Yogcra-Mdhyamaka synthesis, sometimes rendered Yogcra-SvtantrikaMdhyamaka.

Although presented as a divide in doctrines, the major difference may be between two style of
reasoning and arguing, while the division itself is exclusively Tibetan. Tibetan scholars were aware
of alternative Madhyamaka sub-classifications, but later Tibetan doxography emphasizes the
nomenclature of prsagika versus svtantrika. No conclusive evidence can show the existence of
an Indian antecedent, and it is not certain to what degree individual writers in Indian and Tibetan
discussion held each of these views and if they held a view generally or only in particular instances.
Both Prsagikas and Svtantrikas cited material in the gamas in support of their arguments.[47]
Svtantrika[edit]
Main article: Svatantrika
Bhavaviveka (c. 500 c. 578) is the first person to whom this view is attributed, as they are laid out
in his commentaries on Ngrjuna and his critiques of Buddhapalita. Svtantrika in Sanskrit refers to
autonomy and was translated back into Sanskrit from the equivalent Tibetan term.[48]
The Svtantrika states that conventional phenomena are understood to have a conventional
essential existence, but without an ultimately existing essence. In this way they believe they are able
to make positive or "autonomous" assertions using syllogistic logic because they are able to share a
subject that is established as appearing in common - the proponent and opponent use the same kind
of valid cognition to establish it. The name comes from this quality of being able to use autonomous
arguments in debate.[48]
Ju Mipham explained that using positive assertions in logical debate may serve a useful purpose,
either while debating with non-Buddhist schools or to move a student from a coarser to a more
subtle view. Similarly, discussing an approximate ultimate helps students who have difficulty using
only prasaga methods move closer to the understanding of the true ultimate. Ju Mipham felt that
the ultimate non-enumerated truth of the Svatantrika was no different from the ultimate truth of the
Prsagika. He felt the only difference between them was with respect to how they discussed
conventional truth and their approach to presenting a path.[48]
Prsagika[edit]
Main article: Prasagika

The central technique avowed by Prasagika Mdhyamaka is to show by prasaga (or reductio ad
absurdum) that any positive assertion (such as "asti" or "nsti", "it is", or "it is not") or view regarding
phenomena must be regarded as merely conventional (savti or lokavyavahra).
The Prsagika hold that it is not necessary for the proponent and opponent to use the same kind of
valid cognition to establish a common subject; indeed it is possible to change the view of an
opponent through a reductio argument.
Buddhapalita and Candrakirti are noted as the main proponents of this approach. Tibetan
teacher Longchen Rabjam noted in the 14th century that Candrakirti favored the prasaga approach
when specifically discussing the analysis for ultimacy, but otherwise he made positive assertions.
His central text, Madhyamakavatra, is structured as a description of the paths and results of
practice, which is made up of positive assertions. Therefore, even those most attributed to
the Prsagika view make positive assertions when discussing a path of practice but
use prasaga specifically when analyzing for ultimate truth.[48]

Chn/Zen[edit]
See also: Sengzhao
The Chn/Zen-tradition emulated Madhyamaka-thought via the San-lun Buddhists, influencing its
supposedly "illogical" way of communicating "absolute truth."[4]

Western Buddhism[edit]
Thich Nhat Hanh[edit]
Thich Nhat Hanh explains the Madhyamaka concept of emptiness through the related concept of
interdependence. In this analogy, there is no first or ultimate cause for anything that occurs. Instead,
all things are dependent on innumerable causes and conditions that are themselves dependent on
innumerable causes and conditions. The interdependence of all phenomena, including the self, is a
helpful way to undermine mistaken views about inherence, or that one's self is inherently existent. It
is also a helpful way to discuss Mahayana teachings on motivation, compassion, and ethics. The
comparison to interdependence has produced recent discussion comparing Mahayana ethics to
environmental ethics.[49]
Modern Madhyamaka[edit]
Madhyamaka forms an alternative to the Perennialist and essentialist (neo-)Advaita understanding
of nondualism or modern spirituality.[web 3][web 4][web 5] The classical Madhyamaka-teachings are
complemented with western (post-modern) philosophy,[web 6] critical sociology,[web 7] and social
constructionism.[web 8] These approaches stress that there is no transcendental reality beyond this
phenomenal world,[web 9] and in some cases even explicitly distinguish themselves from (neo-)Advaita
approaches.[web 10]

Influence on Advaita Vedanta[edit]

Main articles: Advaita Vedanta and Ajativada
Gaudapada, who was strongly influenced by Buddhism, borrowed the concept of "ajta" from
Nagajurna's Madhyamaka philosophy,[50][51] which uses the term "anutpda":[52]

"An" means "not", or "non"

"Utpda" means "genesis", "coming forth", "birth"[web 11]

Taken together "anutpda" means "having no origin", "not coming into existence", "not taking effect",
"non-production".[web 12]

The Buddhist tradition usually uses the term "anutpda" for the absence of an
origin[50][52] or sunyata.[53][note 15]
"Ajtivda" is the fundamental philosophical doctrine of Gaudapada.[57] According to Gaudapada, the
Absolute is not subject to birth, change and death. The Absolute is aja, the unborn eternal.[57] The
empirical world of appearances is considered unreal, and not absolutely existent.[57]
Gaudapada's perspective is quite different from Nagarjuna.[58] Gaudapada's perspective is based on
the Mandukya Upanishad.[58] In the Mandukya Karika, Gaudapada's commentary on the Mandukya
Upanishad, Gaudapada sets forth his perspective. According to Gaudapada, Brahman cannot
undergo alteration, so the phenomenal world cannot arise from Brahman. If the world cannot arise,
yet is an empirical fact, then the world has to be an unreal[note 16] appearance of Brahman. And if the
phenomenal world is an unreal appearance, then there is no real origination or destruction, only
apparent origination or destruction. From the level of ultimate truth (paramrthat) the phenomenal
world is Maya.[58]
As stated in Gaudapadas Karika Chapter II Verse 48:[web 13]
No jiva ever comes into existence. There exists no cause that can produce it. The supreme truth is
that nothing ever is born.[web 14]

Understanding in modern scholarship[edit]

Western scholarship has given a broad variety of interpretations of Madhyamaka:
Over the past half-century the doctrine of the Madhyamaka school, and in particular that of
Ngrjuna has been variously described as nihilism, monism, irrationalism, misology, agnosticism,
scepticism, criticism, dialectic, mysticism, acosmism, absolutism, relativism, nominalism, and
linguistic analysis with therapeutic value.[59]
Jay L. Garfield likewise rephrases Ruegg:
"Modern interpreters differ among themselves about the correct way to read it as least as much as
canonical interpreters. Nagarjuna has been read as an idealist (Murti 1960), a nihilist (Wood 1994), a
skeptic (Garfield 1995), a pragmatist (Kalupahana 1986), and as a mystic (Streng 1967). He has
been regarded as a critic of logic (Inada 1970), as a defender of classical logic (Hayes 1994), and as
a pioneer of paraconsistent logic (Garfield and Priest 2003)".[60]
These interpretations "reflect almost as much about the viewpoints of the scholars involved as do
they reflect the content of Ngrjuna's concepts".[61]
Most recent western scholarship (Garfield,[62] Napper,[63] Hopkins,[64] Huntington, and others) have,
after investigation, tended to adopt one or another of the Gelugpa collegiate interpretations of
Madhyamaka.

Kalupahana[edit]
Kalupahana's interpretation sees Madhyamaka, along with Yogacara, as an antidote against
essentialist biases in Mahayana Buddhist thought.[65][66]

Hayes[edit]
Richard P. Hayes is critical of the works of Nagarjuna:
Nagarjunas writings had relatively little effect on the course of subsequent Indian Buddhist
philosophy. Despite his apparent attempts to discredit some of the most fundamental concepts of
abhidharma, abhidharma continued to flourish for centuries,

without any appreciable attempt on the part of abhidharmikas to defend their methods of analysis
against Nagarjunas criticisms.[67]
According to Hayes, Nagarjuna makes use of two different possible meanings of the word svabhava,
and uses those two meanings to make statements which are not logical.[68]In doing so, Hayes
regards Nagarjuna...
[A] relatively primitive thinker whose mistakes in reasoning were eventually uncovered as the
knowledge of logic in India became more sophisticated in subsequent centuries.[69]