Chapter 7 VotingSystems
Chapter 7 VotingSystems
Chapter 7 VotingSystems
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Preference
Crunch
Miniatures
Snickers
_________
_________
_________
Each voter fills out the above ballot with their preferences, and what follows is
the results of the election.
Table 7.1.2: Ballots Cast for the Candy Election
Voter
Anne
Bob
Chloe
Dylan
1st choice
C
M
C
M
nd
2 choice
S
S
M
C
rd
3 choice
M
C
S
S
Voter
1st choice
2nd choice
3rd choice
George
S
M
C
Hiza
S
M
C
Voter
1st choice
2nd choice
3rd choice
Makya
S
M
C
Nadira
S
M
C
Isha
S
M
C
Ochen
C
M
S
Jacy
M
C
S
Paki
C
M
S
Eli
S
M
C
Fred
S
M
C
Kalb
C
M
S
Lan
M
C
S
Quinn
S
M
C
Riley
S
M
C
Now we must count the ballots. It isnt as simple as just counting how many voters like
each candidate. You have to look at how many liked the candidate in first-place, second
place, and third place. So there needs to be a better way to organize the results. This is
known as a preference schedule.
Preference Schedule: A table used to organize the results of all the preference ballots in
an election.
Example 7.1.2: Preference Schedule for the Candy Election
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The Borda Count Method (Point System): Each place on a preference ballot is
assigned points. Last place receives one point, next to last place receives two points, and
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Match-Up 2
M vs. S
8 to 10
Winner of Match-Up 2: S
Match-Up 3
S vs. C
10 to 8
Winner of Match-Up 3: S
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M: 1
S: 2
C: 0
Thus, S wins the election.
Note: If any one given match-up ends in a tie, then both candidates receive point each
for that match-up.
The problem with this method is that many overall elections (not just the one-on-one
match-ups) will end in a tie, so you need to have a tie-breaker method designated before
beginning the tabulation of the ballots. Another problem is that if there are more than
three candidates, the number of pairwise comparisons that need to be analyzed becomes
unwieldy. So, how many pairwise comparisons are there?
In Example 7.1.6, there were three one-on-one comparisons when there were three
candidates. You may think that means the number of pairwise comparisons is the same as
the number of candidates, but that is not correct. Lets see if we can come up with a
formula for the number of candidates. Suppose you have four candidates called A, B, C,
and D. A is to be matched up with B, C, and D (three comparisons). B is to be compared
with C and D, but has already been compared with A (two comparisons). C needs to be
compared with D, but has already been compared with A and B (one more comparison).
3 2 1 6
Therefore, the total number of one-on-one match-ups is
comparisons that
need to be made with four candidates. What about five or six or more candidates?
Looking at five candidates, the first candidate needs to be matched-up with four other
candidates, the second candidate needs to be matched-up with three other candidates, the
third candidate needs to be matched-up with two other candidates, and the fourth
candidate needs to only be matched-up with the last candidate for one more match-up.
4 3 2 1 10
Thus, the total is
pairwise comparisons when there are five candidates.
5 4 3 2 1 15
Now, for six candidates, you would have
pairwise comparisons to
do. Continuing this pattern, if you have N candidates then there are
N 1 N 2 L
3 2 1
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N 1 N 2 L
3 2 1
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
N N 1
2
10 10 1 10 9
45
2
2
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14
Tucson
Phoenix
Yuma
Flagstaff
If we use the Borda Count Method to determine the winner then the number of
Borda points that each candidate receives are shown in Table 7.1.13.
Table 7.1.13: Preference Schedule for Conference City with Borda Points
Number of voters 51
25
10
14
1st choice
Flagstaff
Phoenix
Yuma
Tucson
4 points
204
100
40
56
nd
2 choice
Phoenix
Yuma
Phoenix
Phoenix
3 points
153
75
30
42
3rd choice
Tucson
Tucson
Tucson
Yuma
2 points
102
50
20
28
th
4 choice
Yuma
Flagstaff
Flagstaff
Flagstaff
1 point
51
25
10
14
The totals of all the Borda points for each city are:
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w1 w2 w3 L wN
q w1 w2 w3 L wN
2
q : w1, w2 , w3 ,K , wN
a.
8 : 5, 4, 4,3, 2
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5 4 4 3 2 18
. Half of
9 q 18
18 is 9, so the quota must be
than 9, this system is not valid.
b.
16 : 6,5,3,1
6 5 3 1 15
. Half of 15 is
7.5 q 15
7.5, so the quota must be
. Since the quota is 16, and 16 is more than
15, this system is not valid.
c.
9 : 5,4, 4,3,1
5 4 4 3 1 17
. Half of 17
8.5 q 17
is 8.5, so the quota must be
. Since the quota is 9, and 9 is more than
8.5 and less than 17, this system is valid.
d.
16 : 5,4,3,3,1
5 4 3 3 1 16
. Half of
8 q 16
16 is 8, so the quota must be
. Since the quota is 16, and 16 is equal to
the maximum of the possible values of the quota, this system is valid. In this
system, all of the players must vote in favor of a motion in order for the motion to
pass.
e.
9 :10,3, 2
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10 3 2 15
. Half of 15 is
7.5 q 15
7.5, so the quota must be
and 15, this system is valid.
f.
8 : 5, 4, 2
5 4 2 11
. Half of 11 is 5.5,
5.5 q 11
so the quota must be
11, the system is valid.
In Example 7.2.2, some of the weighted voting systems are valid systems. Lets examine
9 :10,3, 2
16 : 5,4,3,3,1
the system
, every player has the same amount of power since all players
are needed to pass a motion. That also means that any player can stop a motion from
passing. A player that can stop a motion from passing is said to have veto power. In the
8 : 5, 4, 2
system
, player three has a weight of two. Players one and two can join
together and pass any motion without player three, and player three doesnt have enough
weight to join with either player one or player two to pass a motion. So player three has
no power. A player who has no power is called a dummy.
Example 7.2.3: Dictator, Veto Power, or Dummy?
57 : 23,21,16,12
In the weighted voting system
, are any of the players a dictator
or a dummy or do any have veto power.
Since no player has a weight higher than or the same as the quota, then there is no
dictator. If players one and two join together, they cant pass a motion without
player three, so player three has veto power. Under the same logic, players one
and two also have veto power. Player four cannot join with any players to pass a
motion, so player fours votes do not matter. Thus, player four is a dummy.
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Now that we have an understanding of some of the basic concepts, how do we quantify
how much power each player has? There are two different methods. One is called the
Banzhaf Power Index and the other is the Shapely-Shubik Power Index. We will look at
each of these indices separately.
Banzhaf Power Index:
A coalition is a set of players that join forces to vote together. If there are three players
P1 , P2
P3
and
P2
Lose
P3
Lose
P1 , P2
19
Win
P1, P3
15
Lose
P2 , P3
10
Lose
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P1, P2 , P3
22
Win
In each of the winning coalitions you will notice that there may be a player or
players that if they were to leave the coalition, the coalition would become a
losing coalition. If there is such a player or players, they are known as the critical
player(s) in that coalition.
Example 7.2.5: Critical Players
17 :12,7,3
P1, P2 , P3
22
Win
P1, P2
Notice, player one and player two are both critical players two times and player
three is never a critical player.
Banzhaf Power Index:
The Banzhaf power index is one measure of the power of the players in a weighted voting
system. In this index, a players power is determined by the ratio of the number of times
that player is critical to the total number of times any and all players are critical.
B
i
T
Banzhaf Power Index for Player Pi
Bi
where
= number of times player Pi is critical
and T = total number of times all players are critical
Example 7.2.6: Banzhaf Power Index
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17 :12,7,3
Using table 7.2.2, Player one is critical two times, Player two is critical two times,
and Player three is never critical. So T = 4, B1 = 2, B2 = 2, and B3 = 0. Thus:
2 1
4 2
Banzhaf power index of P1 is
= 0.5 = 50%
2 1
4 2
Banzhaf power index of P2 is
= 0.5 = 50%
0
0
4
Banzhaf power index of P3 is
= 0%
So players one and two each have 50% of the power. This means that they have
equal power, even though player one has five more votes than player two. Also,
player three has 0% of the power and so player three is a dummy.
How many coalitions are there? From the last few examples, we know that if there are
three players in a weighted voting system, then there are seven possible coalitions. How
about when there are four players?
Table 7.2.3: Coalitions with Four Players
1 Player
2 Players
P1 , P2 , P3 , P4 P1, P2 , P1 , P3 , P1 , P4
P2 , P3 , P2 , P4 , P3 , P4
3 Players
P1 , P2 , P3 , P1, P2 , P4
4 Players
P1, P2 , P3 , P4
P1 , P3 , P4 , P2 , P3, P4
So when there are four players, it turns out that there are 15 coalitions. When there are
five players, there are 31 coalitions (there are too many to list, so take my word for it). It
doesnt look like there is a pattern to the number of coalitions, until you realize that 7, 15,
and 31 are all one less than a power of two. In fact, seven is one less than
less than
players is
24
2N 1
25
23
, 15 is one
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. Find the
Since there are five players, there are 31 coalitions. This is too many to write out,
but if we are careful, we can just write out the winning coalitions. No player can
win alone, so we can ignore all of the coalitions with one player. Also, no twoplayer coalition can win either. So we can start with the three player coalitions.
Table 7.2.4: Winning Coalitions and Critical Players
Winning Coalition Critical Player
P1 , P2 , P3
P1, P2 , P3
P1 , P2 , P4
P1 , P2 , P4
P1, P2 , P5
P1 , P2 , P5
P1, P3 , P4
P1 , P3 , P4
P1, P3 , P5
P1 , P3 , P5
P2 , P3 , P4
P2 , P3 , P4
P1, P2 , P3 , P4
P1 , P2 , P3 , P5
P1
P1, P2 , P4 , P5
P1 , P2
P1 , P3 , P4 , P5
P1 , P3
P2 , P3 , P4 , P5
P2 , P3 , P4
P1, P2 , P3 , P4 , P5
So player one is critical eight times, player two is critical six times, player three is
critical six times, player four is critical four times, and player five is critical two
times. Thus, the total number of times any player is critical is T = 26.
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8
4
26 13
6
3
26 13
6
3
26 13
4
2
26 13
2
1
26 13
= 0.308 = 30.8%
= 0.231 = 23.1%
= 0.231 = 23.1%
= 0.154 = 15.4%
= 0.077 = 7.7%
Every player has some power. Player one has the most power with 30.8% of the
power. No one has veto power, since no player is in every winning coalition.
Shapely-Shubik Power Index:
Shapely-Shubik takes a different approach to calculating the power. Instead of just
looking at which players can form coalitions, Shapely-Shubik decided that all players
form a coalition together, but the order that players join a coalition is important. This is
called a sequential coalition. Instead of looking at a player leaving a coalition, this
method examines what happens when a player joins a coalition. If when a player joins the
coalition, the coalition changes from a losing to a winning coalition, then that player is
known as a pivotal player. Now we count up how many times each player is pivotal, and
then divide by the number of sequential coalitions. Note, that in reality when coalitions
are formed for passing a motion, not all players will join the coalition. The sequential
coalition is used only to figure out the power each player possess.
17 :12,7,3
. One of the
P1 , P2 , P3
sequential coalitions is
which means that P1 joins the coalition first, followed
by P2 joining the coalition, and finally, P3 joins the coalition. When player one joins the
coalition, the coalition is a losing coalition with only 12 votes. Then, when player two
joins, the coalition now has enough votes to win (12 + 7 = 19 votes). Player three joining
doesnt change the coalitions winning status so it is irrelevant. Thus, player two is the
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Note: The difference in notation: We use
for coalitions and
sequential coalitions.
So there are six sequential coalitions for three players. Can we come up with a
mathematical formula for the number of sequential coalitions? For the first player in the
sequential coalition, there are 3 players to choose from. Once you choose one for the first
spot, then there are only 2 players to choose from for the second spot. The third spot will
only have one player to put in that spot. Notice, 3*2*1 = 6. It looks like if you have N
players, then you can find the number of sequential coalitions by multiplying
N N 1 N 2 L 3 2 1
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Then press the MATH button. You will see the following:
Figure 7.2.6: MATH Menu
Now press the right arrow key to move over to the abbreviation PRB, which
stands for probability.
Figure 7.2.7: PRB Menu
Number 4:! is the factorial button. Either arrow down to the number four and
press ENTER, or just press the four button. This will put the ! next to your five on
the home screen.
Figure 7.2.8: 5! on the Home Screen
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Notice that 5! is a very large number. So if you have 5 players in the weighted voting
system, you will need to list 120 sequential coalitions. This is quite large, so most
calculations using the Shapely-Shubik power index are done with a computer.
Now we have the concepts for calculating the Shapely-Shubik power index.
Si
N!
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P2
P2 , P1 , P3
P1
P2 , P3 , P1
P1
P3 , P1 , P2
P2
P3 , P2 , P1
P1
S1 3 S2 3
S3 0
So,
,
, and
.
3 1
6 2
3 1
6 2
0
0
6
= 0.5 = 50%
= 0.5 = 50%
= 0%
This is the same answer as the Banzhaf power index. The two methods will not
usually produce the same exact answer, but their answers will be close to the same
value. Notice that player three is a dummy using both indices.
Example 7.2.10: Calculating the Power
7 : 6, 4, 2
For the voting system
, find:
a. The Banzhaf power index for each player
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P2
Lose
P3
Lose
P1, P2
10
Win
P1, P2
P1, P3
Win
P1, P3
P2 , P3
Lose
P1, P2 , P3
12
Win
P1
B1 3, B2 1, B3 1, T 3 1 1 5
So,
3
5
1
5
1
5
= 0.6 = 60%
= 0.2 = 20%
= 0.2 = 20%
P2
P1 , P3 , P2
P3
P2 , P1 , P3
P1
P2 , P3 , P1
P1
P3 , P1 , P2
P1
P3 , P2 , P1
P1
S1 4, S2 1, S3 1, 3! 6
So
4 2
6 3
1
6
1
6
= 0.667 = 66.7%
= 0.167 = 16.7%
= 0.167 = 16.7%
Notice the two indices give slightly different results for the power distribution,
but they are close to the same values.
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Chapter 7 Homework
1. An organization recently made a decision about which company to use to redesign
its website and host its members information. The Board of Directors will vote
using preference ballots ranking their first choice to last choice of the following
companies: Allied Web Design (A), Ingenuity Incorporated (I), and Yeehaw Web
Trends (Y). The individual ballots are shown below. Create a preference schedule
summarizing these results.
AIY, YIA, YAI, AIY, YIA, IAY, IYA, IAY, YAI, YIA, AYI, YIA, YAI
2. A group needs to decide where their next conference will be held. The choices are
Kansas City (K), Lafayette (L), and Minneapolis (M). The individual ballots are
shown below. Create a preference schedule summarizing these results.
KLM, LMK, MLK, LMK, MKL, KLM, KML, LMK, MKL, MKL, MLK, MLK
3. A book club holds a vote to figure out what book they should read next. They are
picking from three different books. The books are labeled A, B, and C, and the
preference schedule for the vote is below.
Number of voters
12
9
8
5
10
st
1 choice
A
B
B
C
C
2nd choice
C
A
C
A
B
rd
3 choice
B
C
A
B
A
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
4. An election is held for a new vice president at a college. There are three
candidates (A, B, C), and the faculty rank which candidate they like the most. The
preference ballot is below.
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5. A city election for a city council seat was held between 4 candidates, Martorana
(M), Jervey (J), Riddell (R), and Hanrahan (H). The preference schedule for this
election is below.
Number of voters
60
73
84
25
110
1st choice
M
M
H
J
J
nd
2 choice
R
H
R
R
M
rd
3 choice
H
R
M
M
R
4th choice
J
J
J
H
H
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
6. A local advocacy group asks members of the community to vote on which project
they want the group to put its efforts behind. The projects are green spaces (G),
city energy code (E), water conservation (W), and promoting local business (P).
The preference schedule for this vote is below.
Number of voters
12
57
23
34
13
18
22
39
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W
G
E
P
W
P
E
G
G
W
E
P
G
E
W
P
E
G
P
W
E
P
W
G
P
W
G
E
P
E
W
G
7. An election is held and candidate A wins. A mistake was found that showed that
candidate C was not qualified to run in the election. The candidate was removed,
and the election office determined the winner with candidate C removed. Now
candidate D wins. What fairness criterion was violated?
8. An election is held and candidate C wins. Before the election is certified the
ballots are misplaced. Another election is held, and the only change in the ballots
was that more people put C as their first choice. When the winner is determined,
candidate A now wins. What fairness criterion was violated?
15 : 7,6,3,1
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23 :10,3, 2,1
9 :10,3, 2,1
16 : 9,6,3,1
q : 7, 6, 4,1
15. Consider the weighted voting system
.
a. What is the minimum value of the quota q?
b. What is the maximum value of the quota q?
c. What is the quota q if a motion can only pass with 2/3s of the vote?
d. What is the quota q if a motion can only pass with more than 2/3s of the
vote?
q : 25, 20,15,15,6
16. Consider the weighted voting system
a. What is the minimum value of the quota q?
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12 :13,5, 4,1
16 :12,2, 2,1
24 :19,16,12
54 : 42,13,12
13: 7,6,2
15 :16,12,1
16 : 9,6,3,1
25. The United Nations (UN) Security Council consists of five permanent members
(United States, Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, France, and China) and
10 non-permanent members elected for two-year terms by the General Assembly.
The five permanent members have veto power, and a resolution cannot pass
without nine members voting for it. Set up the weighted voting system for the
UN.
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