The Rise, Fall and Future of Dtente

Author(s): John Lewis Gaddis

Source: Foreign Affairs, Vol. 62, No. 2 (Winter, 1983), pp. 354-377
Published by: Council on Foreign Relations
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John Lewis Gaddis

THE RISE, FALL AND
FUTURE OF DETENTE
ne of the occupational

^^_^^
one

that

tends

plaintive

on

with

age,

certain

air

of

is

resigned

and miscalculations
defalcations,
are
as
a result,
to such
We
given,
or
I
knew
work
it
wouldn't
out,"
yes,

disasters,

all along,"

or, most

often,

"Too

bad

have

taken in looking

they didn't

to me."

listen

I am afraid,

Such,
now

the

up human
history.
as: "Ah,
statements

"I saw it coming

at

on,

a historian

of being

comes, I think, from our professional

posture of
not
to
to focus
is
backwards:
it
have
cheering
facing

attention
make

that

take

hazards

This

pessimism.
constantly
one's

to

tell

each

is the tone we historians

or

last decade

the

other,

we
relations.
D?tente,
war
tensions
but rather

so of
was

Soviet-American
not an end
to cold

a temporary relaxation
intersec
that depended
upon the unlikely
we
had to be,
There
tion of unconnected
argue,
phenomena.
a
arms
in
of
the
race,
strategic
downplaying
approximate
parity
a
to
from
refrain
chal
mutual
willingness
ideological differences,
an ability to reward restraint when it
of
the
interests
rivals,
lenging
to its further development,
inducements
occurred and to provide
of strong, decisive and intelligent
and the existence
leadership at
of
all
and Moscow,
the top in both Washington
overriding
capable
of the obstacles likely to be thrown in the path of d?tente by garbled
sullen

communications,

To

have

maintain,

found
was

bureaucracies,

all of these

about

as

likely

things
as some

or

outraged

in place
rare

constituencies.

at the same

astronomical

time, we

conjunction

of the stars and planets, or perhaps a balanced budget.

As a result, we have tended to see the revival of the cold war as
an entirely predictable
rooted in deep and immutable
development
our bets about the
of us who hedged
forces. Those
historical
now
can
pat each other on the
comfortably
durability of d?tente
statements
like: "We were right all along," or
back, exchanging
or "Isn't pessimism fun?"
"Too bad they don't listen to historians,"
in the way of
But if historians are ever going to provide much
we are not
to
to
if
is
usable guidance
say,
policymakers?which
at Ohio University.
is Distinguished
Professor
of History
John Lewis Gaddis
from his recent book, Strategies of Containment: A Critical
This article is adapted
Security Policy, and from a paper prepared
of Postwar American National
Appraisal
on East-West Relations.
Institute Preparatory
for the Aspen
Group

THE RISE, FALL, AND FUTURE OF D?TENTE

355

going to leave the field wide open to the political scientists?then

we are going to have to address not only questions of what went
there
wrong, but of what might have been done differently. Were
to
of
that
could
have
been
done
avoid
the
d?tente?
things
collapse
a
for
in a more
basis
these
Might
reconstituting
provide
it?perhaps
some point in the future?
durable form?at
What follows is an attempt to account for the decline of d?tente
not in terms of historical inevitability?because,
beyond death, and
in his
is
inevitable
unbalanced
nothing
budgets,
perhaps
really
there are
rather as a failure of strategy from which
tory?but
is on deficiencies
in
certain things we might
learn. The emphasis
was
or
not
States
American
because
the United
strategy,
solely,
even primarily, responsible
for the collapse of d?tente, but because
to do anything about.
it is the only strategy we are in a position
own
The Russians will have to learn from their
mistakes, which, as
recent

events

once

again

have

confirm,

not

been

inconsiderable.

a word

about strategy itself. I see it quite simply as

First, though,
the calculated relationship of ends and means, whether
in the realm
or
com
of military,
political, economic,
ideological
psychological
a
It is multi-dimensional
process that cannot be reduced
petition.
to,

or

entirely

divorced

from,

any

one

of

those

components.

Our

own contributions
to the failure of d?tente arose, I will suggest, to
a considerable
degree from just that failure to view strategy in all
our
of its dimensions?from
instead, to place its various
tendency,
in separate and discrete compartments.
elements
If this analysis is
there is to be one?may
correct, then the future of d?tente?if
in large part upon our ability to recapture some sense
well depend
of just what strategy is all about in the first place.
II
As the concept
it has

become

of d?tente

fashionable

has fallen

into disrepute

to

a return

call

for

to,

in recent years,
or

a revival

of,

containment. The implied message of such groups as the Committee

on the Present
and of such members
of that organization
Danger,
as have been, since 1981, in
has
positions of official responsibility,
a strategy that recog
been that we should never have abandoned
nized so clearly the nature of the Soviet threat, that provided
such
decisive programs for action, and that thus served to
the
peace
keep
of these
throughout most of the cold war. From the perspective
to seek d?tente
the decision
in the early 1970s was an
observers,
unwise exercise in wishful thinking, the effect of which was only to

356

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

shift the signals, in the eyes of Moscow's

watchful
and ambitious
to
to
from
red
ideologues,
yellow
green.1
But this assessment
reflects a misunderstanding
both of contain
ment and of the d?tente
never
that followed
for
containment
it,
was a
or
understood
applied
strategy. Like
consistently
universally
most

over

it evolved

strategies,
circumstance,

to

an

such

time

extent

and

that

under

its original

the pressure
of
founder,
George

came ultimately
to deny
F. Kennan,
paternity when confronted
with some of itsmore exotic manifestations.2
If one is to understand
came from and what functions
where
the idea of d?tente
it was
to serve, one must first be aware of how the idea of
intended
has

containment

to begin

A good place
tion

that

is, or

over

evolved
should

the

years.

in tracing

be,

is with a proposi

this evolution
that

unexceptionable:

can

strategy

never

be divorced
from the costs of implementing
is an unas
it. There
the objectives one seeks and the resources one
sailable link between
has

with

to seek?between

which

successful

strategy

can

ignore

one's
this

ends

relationship;

and

one's

means.

No
strate

unsuccessful

to it.
gies often fail precisely for want of attention
For the policymaker,
this linkage normally boils down to one of
two options: shall interests be restricted
to keep them in line with
to bring them
available resources; or shall resources be expanded
into line with proclaimed
interests? Does one allow the perception
of limited means to force differentiations
between vital and periph
eral

interests,

point

against

on

that

one

that

cannot

afford

every adversary? Or does one allow

interests

undifferentiated
ground

the ground

one

cannot

to force
afford,

the

anywhere,

to defend

every

the perception

of

on

the

of means,
expansion
to leave flanks

exposed?

can be written
The history of containment
largely in terms of
oscillations between
the belief that limited
these concepts: between
means
interests, on the one hand, and the
require differentiated
belief that undifferentiated
interests require unlimited means, on
the

other.3

as articulated
The original
strategy of containment,
largely by
Kennan
Truman
and as implemented
the
Administration
be
by
tween 1947 and 1949, operated
from the presumption
that the
American
capacity to shape events in the world at large was severely
both
limited,
by the fragility of the domestic economy, which could
1
Norman
The Present Danger, New York: Simon & Schuster,
1980.
Podhoretz,
See, for example,
2
F. Kennan, Memoirs:
See George
Boston:
1925-1950,
1967, p. 367.
Little, Brown,
3
can be found
An
of this argument
version
in John
Lewis
Gaddis,
expanded
Strategies
of
A Critical Appraisal
Containment:
Security Policy, New York: Oxford
Press,
of Postwar National
University
1982.

THE RISE, FALL, AND

FUTURE OF D?TENTE

357

an inflationary spiral if spending was not kept under

easily slip into
and
for demobilization,
which
tight control,
by postwar pressures
in the abrupt dismantling
of the wartime military
had resulted
was

Western

As

establishment.

ment

selective

the Pacific

with military
use

of

and

air

Near

of

and

East,

of de

war-devastated

to the

restricted

effectively

power?and

contain

the means

rehabilitation

capabilities
naval

and

chain?regarding

economic

of

concept

to be defended?primarily

Mediterranean

island

the

economies,
cautious

Eastern

offshore

fense?primarily

interests

regarding
the

Europe,

the Kennan

consequence,

the

regarding

nature

of

the threat itself, which was seen quite precisely as the expansion of
in the world a danger
Soviet influence, with communism
elsewhere
was
where
it
and
under
Moscow's
control.
directly
irrefutably
only
was
our
to
arenas
The
idea
confront
in
of
principal
adversary
means
most
chosen
consistent
with
us,
by
employing
competition
the kinds of power we could most feasibly bring to bear.4
By early 1950, though, a succession of events?the
victory of
in China, the Soviet development
communism
of an atomic bomb,
in
increasing concern about the dangers of piecemeal
aggression
to
areas?all
had
contributed
the
vulner
of
peripheral
perception
able flanks having been left exposed. The result, in the form of
to fit more broadly defined
of means
NSC-68, was an expansion
the principal author of that
interests: in the view of Paul Nitze,
there

was

no

document,
was
what

not.

adoption

of Keynesian

spending
the means
would

be

adversaries
Korea,

to

Nor

was

stimulate

to sustain

real
there

distinction
any

economic

between

reason

to think

that,

economy?the
a
of
strategy
global
to
wherever
respond

prepared
or
escalation
without
acted,
a
of course,
provided
quick

nation

vital

and
the

through

use of deficit

techniques?the

the

was

what

not

could

containment,
in whatever
and
capitulation.
test of
that

afford

in which

we

way

our

strategy,

and

although that conflict did not result in a military defeat, its duration
and costs?and
the fact that the strategy that governed
particularly
it seemed to involve relinquishing
the initiative, allowing adversaries
to determine
arenas and instruments of
yet
competition?forced
another
reconsideration
of containment
in Washington.
For the
the global threat appeared
Administration,
incoming Eisenhower
no less
to
it
than
had
the
authors
of NSC-68; the great
dangerous
difference was that the new President and his
colleagues emphati
economics. Worried
about the prospects
cally rejected Keynesian
4
The

"X" article
famous
in the July
1947
issue of Foreign Affairs was, at best, a
misleading
of what Kennan
had in mind.
and John
See, on this point, Kennan,
explication
op. cit., pp. 364-367;
Lewis Gaddis,
A Reassessment,"
"Containment:
Foreign Affairs, July 1977, pp. 873-887.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

358

of both perpetual deficits and confiscatory

taxation, the Eisenhower
on
concentrated
Administration
finding ways to make containment
more

work

at

effectively

cost.

less

result was a contraction

of conventional
forces,

The
down

on

reliance

greater

in the form of a scaling

with a proportionately

of means
together

the deterrent

of nuclear

effect

which,

weapons,

of
else one might
say about them, had the advantage
as
Once
Kennan
with
the
strategy,
again,
being relatively cheap.
concern about costs had produced
in
in
means,
although
selectivity

whatever

this

case

provide
pense?a
time

and

seemed

to

a way to defend
at reasonable
global commitments
liked to put it, to choose
way, as John Foster Dulles

no

ex
the

of

contraction

the nature

of our

the luxury of determining

interests.

Nuclear

own

response,

how

and where

weapons

thus

denying

we would

adversaries

our

expend

resources.

was credibility:
could one really
problem here, of course,
use
to
in
States
of
nuclear
initiate the
weapons
expect the United
as Quemoy
order to defend such unpromising
pieces of real estate
so
and Matsu? Did one not run the risk, by limiting one's means
The

narrowly,

of

once

encouraging

again

attacks

piecemeal

on

periph

eral flanks, of having one's position gradually eroded by low-level

to merit
none of them of sufficient
size or gravity
challenges,
was
the argument John F. Kennedy
and
nuclear retaliation? Such
his

made

advisers

ing into office,

had

to be

against

the Eisenhower

they reverted

expanded

to meet

strategy,

to the concept
interests.

and,

upon

com

of NSC-68: that means

Keynesian

economics

again

came into fashion; budgetary deficits became

less of a concern; and
re
States embarked
the United
upon the strategy of "flexible
us
to
to
at
the
aimed
aggression
respond
capacity
giving
sponse,"
wherever

it occurred,

at whatever

level

it occurred.

the liabilities of NSC-68, so too

But just as Korea had exposed
more
the
revealed
in
far
Vietnam,
ways
painful and traumatic,
if one resolved to restrict one's
limitations of "flexible response":
response

to

nothing

more

or

less

than

the other

side's

provocation,

the initiative to the other side,

did one not then again relinquish
as to the
the real decisions
leaving it with the ability to make
of one's forces? How could one indef
and disposition
commitment
not only the do
a strategy without wrecking
initely sustain such
consensus
but also the domestic
mestic
any
economy,
political
to
must
in
function
have
order
successfully?
government
in mind that the architects of d?tente
It was with this dilemma
of
to frame their strategy. Confronted
by the necessity
began

THE RISE, FALL, AND

the Nixon
containment,
cutting costs without abandoning
istration could have done several things:
to the early postwar concept
(1) It could have returned
economic

as a bulwark

development

359

FUTURE OF D?TENTE

Admin
of using
at

communism?but

against

tempts to transfer Marshall Plan solutions to the Third World areas

that now seemed at risk had already proved to be unfeasible;
to the Eisenhower-Dulles
concept of
(2) It could have returned
the Soviet Union had now attained ap
nuclear deterrence?but
the United States, in part as a result
with
strategic parity
proximate
and such an approach could hardly
of the distractions
of Vietnam,
have carried much credibility;
(3) It could have done nothing at all, in the belief that the Russians
sooner or later overextend
and their allies would
and exhaust
the new

themselves?but

of existing

the fragility
optimistic

course

of

was

Administration

power

balances

too

much

to

sensitive

such a passively

to embrace

action.

As it happened,
Nixon and Kissinger did none of these things;
embraced
instead they
"d?tente" as a means of updating and reinvi
gorating containment. The term had been in use since the early 1960s
a relaxation
to connote
of tensions with the Soviet Union,
and
a
was
one
new
the
such
relaxation
of
Administration's
part
although
a considerable
to say that
it
would
be
approach,
oversimplification
this was its chief priority. Rather, d?tente was a means of maintain
ing the balance of power in a way that would be consistent with
It was

resources.

available

a redefinition

of

interests

to accommo

date capabilities.
It was, like the Eisenhower
strategy, a way to make
at
but through a method
function more efficiently,
containment
once
tion"

more

ingenious

and

less

risky

than

the

old

"massive

retalia

concept.

on the face of it, was

This method,
breathtakingly
simple: con
tainment would be made to work better at less cost by reducing the
number of threats to be contained. The Nixon Administration
tried
to do this in three ways:
First, it sought to contract American
interests, thereby lowering
the danger of overcommitment.
Because
limited resources would
not permit the defense of all vulnerable
points, distinctions would
have

to be made,

once

again,

between

what

was

vital

and

what

was

not. Both Nixon and Kissinger

conceived of American
interests in
terms (much as Kennan had): for them,
classical balance-of-power
the preferred
situation would have been a pentagonal world order,
with independent
in the United
States, the Soviet
power centers
and
all
China
Union, Western
Europe, Japan,
balancing one an
other. Admittedly,
the kind of the power these nations could bring

360
to

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

bear

was

not

same:
only
like Western

the

others,

superpowers;

two

of

the

five

and

Europe

were

Japan,

nuclear
were

eco

nomic giants; China's strength

the military nor the
lay in neither
economic
sphere, but in its sheer size and unique ideological posi
tion. The point though, Kissinger
argued, was that the balance of
on
an
not
did
power
depend solely
equilibrium of military strengths:
what was required instead was an overall balance among all of the
various components
of power?a
balance that would maintain
itself
without disproportionately
large, and therefore disproportionately
American

exhausting,

efforts.5

revised its criteria for identifying

Second, the new Administration
and Kissinger
adversaries.
insisted, would
Ideology alone, Nixon
no longer ensure
even
because
antagonistic
hostility,
ideologically
states could share common objectives
in certain situations. By this
logic, it might actually be possible to work with some communists
to

contain

It was

others.

the dramatic

reversal

an almost overnight
to be

of

this

that produced,
of course,
reasoning
as
a
toward
China,
and,
consequence,

policy

contraction

in the number

of potential

enemies

contained.

the Nixon Administration

the Soviet
Third,
sought to engage
on
a
in
basis
the
time
for
first
sustained
the
Union,
postwar period,
These
in a direct effort to reduce
tensions
through diplomacy.
on
not
the basis that all differences
with
negotiations
proceeded,
the Russians

be

could

countries,

there

areas

remained

Discussions

rather

that despite

identified, could provide

containment
by lowering
contained.

but

resolved,

they could be managed:

of

on

the

competition

interest

congruent

that

expectation

between

the two
if

which,

to
the basis for a more efficient approach
still further the number of threats to be

were

to be

carried

on

with

a keen

sense

of

it could not be expected

the relation between power and diplomacy:
for nothing.
concessions
would
make
Russians
that the
Instead,
deterrents

both

and

inducements?sticks

and

carrots?would

have

came into
to be used, and it was here that the idea of "linkage"
was
it
transfers,
thought, could
play. Trade, credits, and technology
on
a
to
lid
the strategic
be exchanged
for Moscow's
put
agreement
arms race, to cooperate
inmanaging
crises in the Third World,
and
to help the United
itself grace
most
States extricate
immediately,
about this
idealistic
from
There
Vietnam.
was,
thus,
nothing
fully
to
the
reflected
what
it
with
Russians; rather,
negotiation
approach
5

See

printed
129.

Kissinger's
speech
in Henry
A. Kissinger,

to the Pacem
in Terris
III Conference,
October
Washington,
American
1977,
Foreign Policy, 3d ed., New York: Norton,

8,
pp.

1973,
128

FUTURE OF D?TENTE

THE RISE, FALL, AND

one would

then,

D?tente,
have
critics

was

an abandonment

hardly
It was,

charged.

rather,

that strategy to existing

relationship of ends and means

modate

to succeed.

cynical and manipulative

nature.

of human

view

to say was a remarkably

have

361

"We

not

did

an

of

imaginative

as its
containment,
to accom
effort

that calculated
realities, to maintain
must
have in order
that any strategy
a relaxation

consider

a conces

tensions

of

has recalled.
"We had our own
sion to the Soviets," Kissinger
reasons for it. We were not abandoning
the ideological
struggle,
order as it was?to
it
but simply trying?tall
discipline
by precepts
of the national interest." And, again: "D?tente defined not friend
ship

but

for

strategy

adversaries."6

among

relationship

In a curious way, in fact, the Nixon-Kissinger

strategy resembled
as articulated by Kennan during
idea of containment
the original
the first years of the cold war. For that strategy too had sought, by

means

short

to maintain

of war,

the global

It had involved
Soviet expansionism.
American
interests with a pentagonal
working

with

some

to contain

communists

of power

balance

against

as well the association

of
world order,
the idea of
others,

and

the

use

of

to seek to modify Soviet behavior.7

In this sense, then,
negotiations
were
not
architects
the
of d?tente
only functioning within the spirit
in shaping their strategy: they actually brought that
of containment
or not, to much
the same
strategy back, whether
they realized it
a quarter century before.
which
from
had
it
begun
point
in

In some respects, this strategy of seeking containment

by way of
salt
i
well.
The
d?tente
succeeded
did
agreements
remarkably
limit significant aspects of the strategic arms race. Chronic
issues
cold
perpetuating
defused.
D?tente

war

tensions

reversed,

in

with

Europe,

notably
ease,

deceptive

Berlin,

were

long-standing

now
pat

a
terns of hostility by building
with the
cooperative
relationship
Chinese at the expense of the Russians. Soviet power in the Middle
at a time when
East declined
the dependence
of
dramatically
on
Western
economies
that part of the world was growing. D?tente
the Russians
themselves
into a position of economic
de
brought
on the West
not
that
had
been
before.
And,
present
pendence
above all, d?tente ended Washington's
fixation
with
what
myopic
Kissinger

called

"a

small

peninsula

on

major

continent"8?Viet

6
Years of Upheaval,
Boston:
Little, Brown,
1982, pp. 236-237,
Henry
Kissinger,
recent
and Richard
Nixon's
discussion
of "hard-headed
d?tente"
594, 980-983;
Times, October
2, 1983.
7
See, on this point, Gaddis,
pp. 25-88.
Strategies of Containment,
8
The White House Years, Boston:
Little, Brown,
1979, p. 1049.
Henry
Kissinger,

600. See also pp.

in The New York

362

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

its attention
back on more
nam?and
focused
important global
concerns.
It is no small tribute to the architects of d?tente?though
one should not deny credit as well to the clumsiness of the Rus
sians?that
the influence
by any index of power other than military,
to that of the Soviet
and prestige of the United
States compared
of the 1980s than
Union was significantly greater at the beginning
it had been a decade earlier.9
these achievements,
Despite
though, d?tente by 1980 was almost
as
had surged
regarded
having failed. The Russians
universally
States
in both strategic and conventional
ahead of the United
had tightened
it was argued. They
rather than
power,
military
loosened controls on their own people. They had continued efforts
to destabilize Third World
areas; they had violated solemn agree
ments and, of course, most conspicuously,
in 1979, they had brutally
If this was containment,
invaded Afghanistan.
critics asked, could
far
behind?
be
appeasement
To

some

these

extent,

charges

reflect

of what

misunderstanding

d?tente was all about in the first place. As we have seen, it was
never
to end the arms race, or to eliminate
intended
entirely
or to serve as an
in the Third World,
for influence
competitions
of reform within
the Soviet Union,
official
instrument
although
at
in
1970s.
times
that
the
Rather,
gave
impression
early
hyperbole
for managing
it sought to provide mechanisms
conflicts among
adversaries,
commitment

the dangers
of escalation
and over
lowering
at the same
time
vital
interests.
compromising

thereby
without

criticism
Still, the fact that d?tente had come under such widespread
1980
its
than
that
suggests
problems
simple misun
lay deeper
by
over

derstandings

objectives.

I would argue that the failure of d?tente grew in large part out
that significant com
of its never having been fully implemented:
of

ponents

that

strategy?components

critical

to

its success?were

never really put into effect. Let me illustrate this point by discussing
three areas: linkage, the military balance, and human rights.
here was to try to change Soviet
(1) Linkage. The
objective
a
behavior
process of positive and negative reinforcement:
through
Russian actions consistent with our interests would be rewarded;
in some way be punished.
would
those of which we disapproved
a
clear and consistent
view of what American
But this implied
either
interests were, and of the extent to which Soviet behavior
or undercut
them. That
clear vision, in turn, implied
enhanced
9

For

Newsweek,

one
Ju\y

recent
11,

measurement
1983,

pp.

44-53.

of

the phenomenon,

see "What

the World

Thinks

of America,"

THE RISE, FALL, AND FUTURE OF D?TENTE

363

control over the linkage process: one could not divide

strategy.
authority and still expect coherent
is precisely what occurred. The
But division of authority
late
Senator Henry Jackson and his congressional
colleagues
torpedoed
trade agreement
increased
the 1972 Soviet-American
by requiring
rates of Jewish emigration
before credits and most-favored
nation
treatment would be provided?this
the
that
fact
the
agree
despite
ment
itself had been intended as a reward for Soviet cooperation
central

on

salt,

Berlin,

the Middle

East

and

Vietnam.

Later

on,

others

took it upon themselves to decide where

outside the Administration
in the Third World
should have shown restraint
in
the Russians
we
or
return for the favors
to what extent they
had provided
them,
or what internal
should have cut back on military
expenditures,
to
in
would
make
order
have
for
the negotiating
changes
they
process

to continue.

Now
it is probable
that the Administration
overestimated
from
the beginning what linkage could accomplish. The Russians made
it quite clear that they would feel free to continue competition
in
as
Third World
at
later acknowledged
areas; moreover,
Kissinger
the Administration
least with respect to Vietnam,10
may have ex
areas
in
its
of
control
such
in
the
first
aggerated
degree
place. Still,
a final assessment
on the principle
of linkage cannot be made
was never allowed to define
because
the Administration
precisely
what was to be linked to what, or to deliver
the rewards it had
in return for cooperative
behavior.
promised
The
balance.
D?tente was, as we have seen, an approach
(2)
military
on
to containment
based
the perception
of diminishing
military
these having declined as a result of the Vietnam War. The
means,
idea had been to attempt to constrain the Russians without further
In the field of strategic weapons, Nixon and
constraining ourselves.
success:
their objectives with remarkable
Kissinger
accomplished
to convince
the Russians
that they needed a salt
they managed
we
more
than
the
fact that the agreement
did,
agreement
despite
was
limited
weapons
programs
actually negotiated
only Moscow
to
not
salt
i
What
is
often recognized
about
is that
pursue.
likely
to couple
Nixon
and Kissinger
had intended
it with a military
buildup of their own in areas not restricted by the agreement?
the Trident
submarine, and the MX and
notably, the B-l bomber,
cruise

missiles.11

But again, this could not be done without

congressional
and once more
came
the problem of divided authority
10
11Kissinger,
Ibid., pp.

op.cit., pp.
1245-1246;

1135,

1145-1146,
Years

Kissinger,

1151,
of Upheaval,

1153.
pp. 998-1010.

approval,
into play.

364

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Senator

Jackson

imposed

with

a demand

time

this

process,

on

his priorities

again

for

the negotiating
numerical

across-the-board

in strategic weapons
systems, despite the fact that the
equivalence
never
had
and
sought,
Congress would never have author
military
to
reach those equivalencies.
Vietnam had
ized, building programs
an
on
to
Hill
sentiment
Capitol
brought anti-military
unprecedented
skepticism toward all
intensity; there grew out of this a corrosive
government
now

warnings,

pronouncements
to have
known

on

defense

its

needs?including
on the
conservative,

been

extent

of

the post-SALT Soviet military buildup. As a result, strategic modern

and Secretary of Defense
ization programs
that Nixon, Kissinger,
i agreement
to accompany
the salt
Melvin Laird had intended
more
to
were seriously delayed;
in order
get even these
seriously,
the Administration
scaled-back appropriations
through Congress,
forces as well.
had to make significant cutbacks in conventional
still not fully appreciated
of this is something
The consequence
to this day: that the Nixon and Ford Administrations
presided over
the most

dramatic

reallocation

resources

of

from

defense

to do

in modern American
mestic purposes
history. Defense
spending as
a percentage
44 percent
from
had
national
of total
budget
dropped
at the time Richard Nixon
took office in 1969 to 24 percent by the
time Gerald Ford left it in 1977. Defense
spending as a percentage
in 1969 to 5.2
of gross national product went from 8.7 percent
percent
would

in 1977.12

To

be

sure,

some

in any event
on
But
reductions
this scale
end.
or
Administrations
wanted,
what,
have

occurred

in

reduction
as

the Vietnam

military
War

exceeded
clearly
can
in retrospect,

spending
came
to an

what
be

the

two

considered

to have been wise, in view of what we now know of Soviet military

the same period.
If, in the case of linkage, the
spending during
carrots Washington
had intended to use to make d?tente work had
been held back, now, in the military
field, so too had been the
sticks.

(3)Human rights. One of the grounds upon which the strategy of

d?tente was most criticized was that it ignored the moral dimension
States could not expect to have its
of foreign policy. The United
views prevail in the world, the argument ran, if those views were at
for
and most
fundamental
variance with the deepest
principles
to stand. Only by abandoning
the nation was supposed
which
on considerations
of power could the United
strategies based solely
States achieve the respect it needed both at home and abroad if its
policies
12
Based
Washington:

were
on

to succeed.

in U.S.
figures
G.P.O.,
1979, pp.

Bureau
of
364, 435.

the Budget,

Statistical

Abstract

of the United

States,

1979,

THE RISE, FALL, AND

Once
reference

again,

though,

to moral

FUTURE OF D?TENTE

this charge

that d?tente
a

reflected

questions

poor

proceeded

365

without
of

understanding

what that strategy actually involved. For despite the seemingly cold
of the Nixon-Kissinger
blooded
orientation
geopolitical
foreign
on
some
obvious
moral
the
of that
and
part
policy,
lapses
despite
the strategy of d?tente did not ignore
doctrine's
chief practitioner,
insist upon the priority of order over
moral issues. It did, however,
some
framework
of order, Kissinger
Without
justice.
repeatedly
the
Reinhold
there
could
Niebuhr,
maintained,
echoing
theologian
be no justice: that quality tends not to flourish in conditions of war,
the priority for d?tente was to
anarchy or revolution. Accordingly,
build a stable international order within which the security interests
of great states could be satisfied; that having been achieved,
then
for once, have some chance of being
the claims of justice might,
honored.

as Kissinger
was that
The only problem,
recognized,
"stability"
was not the kind of concept to which passions would
rally.13 When
it became
clear that, from the viewpoint
of the Administration,
the American
in Viet
involvement
"stability" required prolonging
nam,

or

attempting

to overthrow

elected

constitutionally

govern

in Chile, or consorting with repressive dictators on both the

right and the left, then cries of outrage began to be heard, from
both right and left at home. It is an indication of the potency of
this appeal that both Ronald Reagan and Jimmy Carter could invoke
the human rights issue during
the 1976 campaign?albeit
from
and with different
different perspectives
in
mind?and
that
targets
this could become, once Carter took office in 1977, the major area
in which he sought to distinguish
his Administration
from the one
to approach justice by way
that had gone before. The opportunity
to approach
of order,
like the attempts
containment
by way of
and
of
American
linkage
increasing
by way
military power, never
off
the
really got
ground.
Clearly, Nixon and Kissinger must bear some of the responsibility
for all of this. Despite earnest and, on the whole, candid efforts to
and far-sighted
explain what was in fact a sophisticated
strategy,
never
in
succeeded
it
to their
across, whether
they
really
putting

ment

own

bureaucracies,

the

Congress,

or

the

public

as

a whole.

To

considerable
their method
undercut
itself: they relied on
extent,
to
on China,
and
control
achieve
secrecy
tight
major breakthroughs
and arms control, yet that same shielding of the policy
Vietnam
process from public scrutiny was seen by many as having got the
13
Henry A. Kissinger,
Policy, p. 94.

"Central

Issues

of American

Foreign

Policy,"

in Kissinger,

American

Foreign

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

366

in the first place and, for that matter,

into Vietnam
into
as
a
not
in
is
well.
bad
itself,
Watergate
Secrecy,
necessarily
thing.
But unwise things done in secret can later come back to haunt those
who would seek to do wise things in the same way.
led the public to expect too
Similarly, Nixon, Ford and Kissinger
much
from their initiatives. Although
that
they never claimed
d?tente would end all difficulties with the Russians,
they did partic
two sweeping but meaningless
in
of
the
conclusion
agreements
ipate
that seemed to imply something very much like that. I have inmind
to govern Soviet-American
here the statement on "Basic Principles"
Summit in 1972, and the Helsinki
relations, signed at the Moscow
of 1975. No one who knew anything
about the Soviet
Accords
to refrain from
should have expected
that these agreements
Union
or
to
observe human rights would
advantages
seeking unilateral
House
be
But
the
White
kept.
incautiously agreed to them,
actually
the
for
that one could
foundation
future
arguments
thereby laying
nation

not

the Russians

expect
stances.

to

keep

any

agreements

under

any

circum

also ran into an

It must be said as well, though,
that d?tente
unusual amount of plain bad luck. It was unfortunate
that the
across
to
in
the
and
of
mistrust
be
had
put
strategy
atmosphere
own
lack of
the Vietnam War, that Nixon's
cynicism that followed
down
the
crisis
should
have
upon his
Watergate
scruple
brought
was
as
under
Administration
d?tente
way, that the
just
getting
to
test the limits
Russians should have chosen the succeeding
years
of

in

d?tente

series

of

provocative

maneuvers

ranging

from

to Afghanistan,
and that it should have fallen to the Carter
Angola
at no point
it favored d?tente,
which, although
Administration,
to
behind
the
that
deal
with them.
understood
it,
strategy
lay
clearly
Life is unfair.
on the basis of diminishing
resources,
Any strategy conducted
or below, will involve making
at the level of geopolitics
whether
between vital and peripheral
distinctions
interests, between mortal
cannot defend
all points
threats. One
and simply bothersome
one's
But
of
this principle
concentrating
against all challenges.
resources and using them economically
does have the disadvantage
If one misjudges
the interests at stake or
of leaving flanks exposed.
the

threats

undermined
placed,

that

confront

in sudden
therefore,

upon

one's
then one risks having
them,
position
A
is
and dangerous
ways.
great
premium
re
assessment
accurate
of
defensive
the

and of the risks posed to them. Discriminating

judg
quirements,
and that,
ments have to substitute for indiscriminate
deployments,
constitutional
system, is a lot to expect of any
given the American

THE RISE, FALL, AND

or

moral

servative,

or Republican,

Democratic

whether

Administration,

FUTURE OF D?TENTE

367

liberal or con

amoral.
IV

Since 1981 we have reverted to the idea of making containment

The Reagan
rather than discrimination.
work through deployment
Administration
has rejected d?tente, with its emphasis on distinc
between

tions

on

interests,

dimensional

Instead

responses.

gradations
we have

on multi
of
and
threat,
to an earlier
returned
form

resources for
one that assumes virtually unlimited
of containment:
of settling differences
defense
and little real prospect
through
used to like to call "situations
until what Dean Acheson
negotiation
of

have

strength"

created.

been

scene would have

serious observers
of the international
in defense
in
for
substantial
increases
the
need,
1981,
questioned
is
worth
it
that
the
Pentagon
recalling
appropriations?indeed,
out
Carter
the
of
the
bottomed
last
years
budget actually
during
Few

and

Administration,

was

on

already

its way

at

up

the

time

Reagan

Still, the current leadership has stressed defense over

to a greater extent
in
its dealings with the Soviet Union
diplomacy
won
case
one
had Carter
than would have been the
reelection;
in fact, have to go back to the late Truman Administration
would,
to find a comparable
of military
emphasis upon the accumulation
hardware
and a corresponding
of
degree
regarding
skepticism
took office.

negotiations.

To

leaders have done

be sure, Kremlin

little to allay this skepti

own
cism. Their
until very recently,
has proceeded
military
buildup,
even
at an
for
the
characteristic
Russian
rate,
alarming
allowing
to
in such matters.
have main
tendency
"overcompensate"
They

tained

an opportunistic

weaknesses

wherever

possible,

to exploit Western

of attempting

policy

often

without

regard

con

to what

crete gains this might

recent Korean
airliner
bring them. The
once again their chronic
to
incident demonstrates
antici
inability
own
actions have on the rest of the world: to
pate the effects their
the

extent

ies,

it is due,

that
one

cohesion
suspects,

same time querulous

skill.
Still, the ineptitude
term

protection

against

exists
more

the Soviet
Union's
among
to Moscow's
belligerent

behavior

than

of one's adversary
the defects

to Washington's
provides

in one's

own

adversar
and

the

diplomatic

little greater
strategy

at

than

long
does

a related phenomenon
that has benefited
the Reagan Administra
to its immediate
tion until quite recently: the fact that, compared
it has been unusually fortunate
in not having to face
predecessors,

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

368
hard

or abroad.

at home

either

choices,

It is worth

these

examining

if that good
because
shortcomings,
significant
they could become
habit
luck?or
of
the Kremlin
leadership's
periodically
shooting
at some point run out.
itself in the foot?should
the Reagan Administration
has
(1) First, and most
important,
on
resources
based
unlimited
embraced a defense
without
strategy
Fi
for generating
those resources.
reliable mechanisms
providing
a
stimulus of deficit
defense buildup through the economic
nancing
one

Keynesianism,"

spending?"military

call

might

it?was

plau

and Kennedy Adminis

sible enough approach during the Truman
was
inflation
and there was still some
trations, when
negligible
of balancing
foreseeable
But the current
the budget.
prospect
For even though the Reagan
economic
climate is very different.
a consid
Administration
has brought
inflation under control?with
Paul Volcker
of the Federal Reserve
erable assist from Chairman
one
so
the highest
has
done
add?it
Board,
might
by tolerating
a
we have had since the Great Depression,
levels of unemployment
to sustain over time. And even if
policy that may prove difficult
as
does
it slowly seems to be doing, there
decline,
unemployment
remains the problem of massive budget deficits which seem likely
to keep interest rates high, and thus to endanger recovery, for years
to come.

To

be

its own

problem

of

version

backhanded

to apply

has attempted

the Administration

sure,

to this

Keynesianism?supply-side

had
economics.
But where previous
flirtations with Keynesianism
for
involved expanding
the budgetary
everyone,
pie
supply-side
economics

to

seemed

imply

vast

in

increases

share

the military's

in everything
and vast cutbacks
else, including curiously enough
taxes, with the balance not to be made right until some distant day
when the presumed benefits of this procedure would, as Mr. David
its effect on
Stockman
inaptly put it, "trickle down."14 Whatever
the

domestic

build
defense

this was

economy,

the public
spending

support
are

an

not

that will

to continue

for

very

calculated

well

approach

if high

be necessary

to

levels of

long.

circles of this
in the higher
And yet, there seems to prevail
Administration
the belief
that if only we "stay the course" on
defense spending, we can ultimately force the Russians to bankrupt
in the effort to keep up. If the historical record is
their economy
any

guide,

we

should

tions of a Soviet
and

it has
14
William

not

happened

Greidner,

be wary

economic
"The

of

this

collapse
yet,

Education

any

more

of David

vulture-like

have been

argument:

circulating

than Moscow's

Stockman,"

Atlantic,

own

December,

predic

since 1917
persistent
1981,

p. 47.

THE RISE, FALL, AND FUTURE OF D?TENTE

our

of

predictions

demise

economic

impending

come

have

369
true.15

A government's
in the name of defense
ability to tolerate discomfort
extent
in
of
the
its
depends,
large part, upon
authority over its own
and

citizens,

is no

there

reason

to expect,

soon,

a concentration

of

that would rival Moscow's

in that respect.
power inWashington
We are stuck, then, with the fact that there is a direct relationship
between
the national
If one
security and the national economy.
in the
appears aimed at the moon while the other seems headed
a
not
certain
that
is
imbalance
results
opposite direction,
likely to
a
consensus.
stable
domestic
Of
all
the
postwar Presidents,
produce
the one who would have been most appalled by the Reagan Admin
istration's emphasis on military spending would have been the most
Eisenhower.
For it was Eisenhow
military of all of them?Dwight
er's fundamental
held with rock-like tenacity, that one
conviction,
could not have a healthy defense without a healthy economy:
the
two went hand in hand, and if seeking one meant
sacrificing the
then
the whole
other,
said more
than once,

the Reagan

(2) Second,
new

game
"what

has

weapons,

been

ment

work through
place in a vacuum:
account

not

only

was

must

"We

lost.

it is we

are

seeking

to seek

he

in its zeal to accumulate

Administration,
slow

not
destroy,"
to defend."
to make

opportunities

contain

Defense
negotiation.
spending does not take
in calculating
its costs, one should take into
the

immediate

in

involved

expenses

research,

and deployment,
but also the probable
development,
production
of
the
other
make
which
further expenditures
side,
response
may
at a

necessary
decade

ago,

to

later
place

date.

One

multiple

our

of

thinks

on

warheads

more
than
decision,
our
land-based
missiles:

to follow our lead, and the fears we

the Russians' determination
then developed
about the vulnerability
of those very missiles,
led
first to plans for deploying
the cumbersome
and costly MX, and
more

recently

man"
vantage

conceptual
breakthrough?the
it not have
missile.17
been
single-warhead
Might
a
to have
on
ban
sought
negotiated
multiple-warhead

based missiles
can

with
But

to a new

also

be

in the first place? Diplomacy,

a means

of

fewer unfortunate
what

Russians

is there

achieving
negotiate

to abide by agreements

at

reached,

How

given

can

forgotten,
cost

less

than a crash defense

about?

land

it is too often

security?often

side effects
to

"Midget
to our ad

we

and

buildup.
trust

their dismal

the

record

15
Bialer
and Joan Afferica,
and Russia,"
See, on this point,
Seweryn
"Reagan
Foreign Affairs,
Winter
1982/83,
p. 263.
16
Eisenhower
November
Public
the
Presidents:
11, 1953,
press conference,
Papers
of
Lhuight D.
Eisenhower,
1953, Washington:
G.P.O.,
1960, p. 760.
17
"A New Approach
to Arms Control,"
Time, March
21, 1983, pp. 24-26.
Henry
Kissinger,

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

370

which were in the

in the past? In fact, if one looks at agreements
as
own
to
Russians'
best interests
the Limited Test Ban
keep, such
or salt
much
their
record
is
better
than it has been on
i,
Treaty
such things as the 1972 "Basic Principles"
statement, or the Hel
sinki

Accords.

states
sovereign
such
agreements

constrain

is to base

are

nations

great

them. No one

that lie behind

to

permanently
trick,
rather,

among

Agreements

as the interests

as

only

should expect
their

against
upon

good

treaties
the

will;
areas

specific

of

interest.
overlapping
areas
do exist, most obviously
in the field of arms control.
Such
to observe the provisions
Both sides have found it to their advantage
ii treaty: one wonders what
salt
of the unratified
possible disad
now
to
be
it?Why
vantage there could
going ahead and ratifying
not proceed with the negotiation
of a comprehensive
Test Ban
to reduce both theater
Treaty? Why not investigate opportunities
in connection
and tactical nuclear forces in Europe, perhaps
with
the

that

strategy

"no-early-use"

in conventional

progress

weaponry

has now made "thinkable"?18 And yet, the Reagan Administration

and so far
its efforts to a series of separately pursued
confines
unproductive

recent

Despite
not

appear

does

one

reconcile

in existing

to have

and

strategic

of greater

indications

does
MX

on

negotiations

the "build-down"
for

silos,

consistent

example,

position?how

with

concept
since

forces.

in these talks, it still

flexibility

out

worked

nuclear

theater

the

deploying

"build-down"

the

would

two older warheads

for each new but
appear to require destroying
seem to have
highly vulnerable one? Nor does the Administration
and
the
that
conceived
reliably verifiable
grasped
possibility
broadly
arms
sions

control
on the

even
agreements,
of
ourselves
part
at

greater
security
and
then hope
first,

Where

for

the

it reflects

verifiable,
even
involve
tween

less

the

18
Whether

arms

control

arms
superpowers

those
requiring
our allies,
than
the current

cost

and

of both

interests

reduction.
can

It
But

slow

conces

well

purchase
to
deploy

might

tendency

afterwards.

negotiations
works.

substantial

is not

a framework
down

and where

sides,

and

even

it is

It may

not

agreement
the
stabilize

arms

disarmament.
of

be

or not one agrees with the "no-first-use"

in 1982 by McGeorge
put forward
proposal
in "Nuclear
and the
and Gerard
Smith
F. Kennan,
S. McNamara
Robert
Weapons
George
Bundy,
that it has caused
there is no question
Atlantic
1982, pp. 753-768,
Alliance,"
Foreign Affairs, Spring
Bernard
for the first time. See, for example,
the strategy of "no early use" to be discussed
seriously
Summer
for a Difficult
W. Rogers,
Alliance:
"The Atlantic
Decade,"
Foreign Affairs,
Prescriptions
"Nuclear
and Franz-Josef
Alois Mertes
Karl Kaiser, Georg
Schulze,
Leber,
1982, pp. 1145-1157;
Summer
and the Preservation
of Peace: A German
1982, pp.
Response,"
Foreign Affairs,
Weapons
in the Summer
1982 and Fall
sections
and Correspondence"
1157-1171.
See also the "Comment
"The Military
Role
of the subject,
further discussion
1982 issues of Foreign Affairs, and McNamara's
of Nuclear
and Misperceptions,"
Foreign Affairs, Fall 1983, pp. 59-80.
Weapons:
Perceptions

THE RISE, FALL, AND

FUTURE OF D?TENTE

371

race; if nothing else, it can enhance each side's ability to monitor

in itself is sufficient reason to pursue the
what the other has. That
with

opportunities,
been
done

up

attitude

toward

own

one's

the

of

dangers

and

citizens

true:

than

has

to
one's

of

the

argu

discourage
own
population

one's

if the past

But

at all, it is that the reverse

anything
in the

overzealousness

to reassure:

One

overseas.

allies

pursuit

fears, not so much of the enemy himself,

which one is trying to deter him. The
Michael Howard
has wisely commented,
reassure

war.

nuclear

among

three years have demonstrated

is also

scale

cited against arms control?and

against the whole
for that matter?is
that it induces complacency

ments frequently
d?tente
strategy,
among

a broader

on

and

vigor

has allowed support for

the Reagan Administration
to erode both at home and abroad by taking too casual

(3) Third,
containment
an

greater
to now.

of

from

adversary
and allies

can

defense

induce

but of the very means by

purpose of a deterrent,
is both to discourage
and
about

to

and

aggression,
their
safety.19

limited interest in arms control,

Reagan Administration's
on
with
its
limited nuclear
together
early pronouncements
fighting
The

wars,

nuclear

firing

in

and

shots,

warning

"three feet of earth"

defense?the

reassurance

undermining

to

do-it-yourself

theory?all
a

dangerous

civil

backyard

of this has succeeded

It has

degree.

also

validated, once again, what historians will recognize as the Law of

to bring
Unintended
the tendency of governments
Consequence:
own
lack
of
their
about, through
foresight, precisely what it is they
most

to avoid.
now
exists,
movement
of

seek

For

there

nuclear
this

goes
campaign
chain
themselves

who

far

both

in this

unprecedented
than
deeper
to

the

gates

country

and

an

abroad,
The

proportions.
the few
conspicuous
of nuclear
weapons

anti
of

strength
protesters
plants;

nor

does it depend upon the immediate fortunes of the freeze move

ment. A revulsion against the very idea of nuclear deterrence
is
well underway,
and if the Administration
does not make progress
soon on arms control,
it is likely to see the initiative taken away
from it both here and in Europe
in ways it may regret, and which
not
in
be
the
national
For it is the very weapons
interest.
may
always
that are now the object of so much concern
that have played a
it would
major role in keeping the peace for almost four decades;
be tragic to see their deterrent
role curtailed in the name of peace
because a national administration
did not know how to make use
of them in that capacity without appearing
to relish war.
19
Michael
Winter

Howard,

1982/83,

pp.

"Reassurance
309-24.

and Deterrence:

Western

Defense

in the

1980s,"

Foreign

Affairs,

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

372

lapses on the part of the Reagan

These
seems

to me,

a mono-dimensional

Administration

approach

it

reflect,

to national

security

a tendency
to define
interests and threats in
policy: they reveal
no
or
awareness
with
little
of the political,
terms,
chiefly military
or

economic,

components

psychological

of

As

strategy.

a result,

this

runs the risk of generating

something of the same
made
of our affairs so diffi
that
the
conduct
backlash
antimilitary
if
it
is to be accomplished
in
1970s.
the
cult
Containment,
early
over
the long term, is going to have to
successfully and sustained

Administration

involve
strategy

awareness

keener

than

the

current

of

these

Administration,

nonmilitary
to this date,

dimensions
has

of

shown.

will no doubt
remain
the central focus of our
Containment
come. The Soviet Union
some
to
in
affairs
for
world
years
strategy
of
itself with the existing distribution
shows no signs of contenting
us
have
in
should
the
world;
power
by
experience
certainly
taught
now

that

our

capacity

to moderate

Moscow's

ambitions

by

any

means
of sticks and
other
than some fairly crude combination
carrots is severely
limited. Still, there are a few things we might
to this point; things
with containment
learn from our experience
to
do
well
administration
future
any
keep inmind as it seeks
might
to devise strategies for dealing with the Russians.
(1) One is precisely how little we have learned from the past. We
the polarities of limited means
have shifted back and forth between
and
the risks of discrimination
interests?between
and unlimited
the

excesses

that

flow

from

its absence?having

to

learn

each

time

for the most part, to

the problems with each approach, oblivious,
that we might do better with less dramatic swings of
the possibility
to
Has the time not come to attempt
the geopolitical
pendulum.
sense
some
our
of
what
has
into
build
process
policy-formulation
at
conclusions might be
of
least
what
and
before,
gone
elementary
are various ways in which
this might be
from it? There
derived
one might establish a permanent
staff
nonpartisan
accomplished:
the only key policy making body
for the National
Security Council,
in this field that does not now have one; one might draw in a more
formal and systematic capacity than is now done upon the expertise
of
and

retired
other

presidents,
experienced

national
"elder"

advisors,
security
one
statesmen;

secretaries
might

even

of
take

state
the

drastic step of encouraging

high officials actually to read history
themselves from time to time. The point would be to get away from
our amnesiac habit of periodically
the wheel; after all,
re-inventing

FUTURE OF D?TENTE

THE RISE, FALL, AND

373

the general shape of that device is reasonably well understood

may not need to be re-thought with each revolution.
(2) A second and related priority should be to insulate our
term

concerns

external

our

from

short-term

internal

and
long

preoccupa

in our approach to strategy and diplomacy

tions: no single deficiency
causes us more grief than its subordination
to the volatile and
irresponsible whims of domestic politics. As a historian, and there
fore something of a skeptic about the possibilities of human perfec
this. Indeed, the
tion, I cannot be very optimistic about achieving
recent
in
in
has
been
toward
trend,
years,
just the other direction,
more
and
intrusion
the more
of
into
flagrant
politics
frequent
national security issues, and toward longer and longer periods of
time required to repair the damage. No other great nation in the
history of the world has fallen into the curious habit of re-thinking
intervals to meet
its foreign policy at quadrennial
the anticipated
desires

of

particular

small

and

northern

snowy

or

province,

one

of corn and pigs. A compression

chiefly noted for the production
our
and rationalization
of
selection procedures
would
presidential
help

remove

these

so

temptations;

too

would

return

to

the

on controversial
of bipartisan consultation
foreign policy
a
in
direction
which
the
questions,
Reagan Administration
quite
is really needed,
wisely ismoving. What
though, is a change in our
if we could get to the stage at which
standards of political decorum:
to play politics with critical issues of
it would be as unacceptable
to joke
foreign and national security policy as it has now become
about women and minorities
from public platforms,
then we would
be well along the way toward solving this problem. But not until
tradition

then.

(3) At
deliberate
national
that means

the same time, there should be a greater

and more
to relate national
to the
effort made
security policy
We
economy.
are
infinite,

never

should
and

again
therefore

that

to

succumb
the

ends

of

the

illusion

strategy

can

be formulated
of them. Means
in fact will
quite independently
some
art
be
in
limited
of
way; the
always
strategy consists largely of
to
means.
desirable
ends
fit
available
The Vietnam
adjusting
expe
rience

ought

to have

taught

us

that

no

nation

can

sustain

a defense

its economy or deranges

its polity; we need to
policy that wrecks
recapture Eisenhower's
insight that there is no more critical foun
dation for national
that un
strength than the national consensus
derlies it.
(4) We could also learn to be more precise about just what it is
we are out to contain. Is the
the Soviet Union?
Is it the
adversary
world

communist

movement?

Is

it the

great

variety

of

non-com

374

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

munist Marxist movements

that exist throughout
the world? Surely
com
in an era in which we rely upon the world's most populous
state to help contain the world's most powerful
munist
communist
state,

era

in an

some

when

our

of

best

are

friends

there

socialists,

can be little doubt about the answer to this question. And yet, as
our current policy in Central America
and the Caribbean
shows,
we
in
the
Soviet
international
Union,
together
lumping
persist
and

communism,

one

that

strategy

never

take

on

of

principle

more

any

and

careless

It is a fundamental

end?

what
should

in the most

Marxism

non-communist

imprecise manner?to

enemies

than

necessary at any given point. But we seem to do it all the time.

(5) It follows from this that we could also make greater use than
we do of our friends. Most other nations
our goal
heartily endorse
of a world
safe for diversity;
the
would
few, given
choice,
align
of
the
themselves with the quite different
Russians.
Nation
goals
alism,
seem

in short,
to go out

for

works
of

our

us

way,

rather
at

times,

against
to alienate

in the task of containment.

cooperate

to the

extended
ing occasional

Israelis

over

the

concessions

grudging

us.

than

The

And

those

we
yet,
would

check we have

blank

useful

years?however
on their

who

part?has

in
produc
nonetheless

common cause with the other nations

our
impaired
ability to make
East
whose
interests we largely share: that the
of the Middle
Russians have been able to take so little advantage of this situation
a

is more

testimony

to

their

ineptitude

to our

than

wisdom.

Our

of the
for years prevented
any exploitation
support for Taiwan
to
for
the
this day retains
Sino-Soviet
weakening
potential
split, and
our very important relationship with mainland China. Our attitude
in southern Africa has not always
toward white minority
regimes
been best calculated to win us influence in the rest ofthat continent,
most of whose
share our desire to keep the
leaders emphatically
out.

Russians

Recently

we

even

went

out

of

our

way

to alienate

some of our closest European

allies by imposing a set of sanctions
on the Soviet Union
that no one thought would work, while at the
same time, and for the sake of a domestic constituency,
withholding
another more potent set of sanctions (on grain) that might have.
if others shared some
would function more efficiently
Containment
seem to make
of the burden of containing. And yet, we sometimes
that difficult.
work better
containment
trick that would make
(6) Another
would

be

to

the Russians'

This

is one

opportunities

take

advantage,
chronic
tendency

to a greater
to generate

extent
resistance

than

we have,
to themselves.

of

reason why Moscow

has not been able to exploit the
we have handed them in the Middle East and Africa;

THE RISE, FALL, AND FUTURE OF D?TENTE

375

it is why they have such difficulty consolidating

opportunities
they
It is a clich?,
have taken advantage of themselves, as inAfghanistan.
as the last great imperial
the Soviet Union
by now, to describe
a
one of the more reliable
not
what
is
but
rather
clich?,
power;
"lessons" to be drawn from the admittedly
imprecise discipline of
wind up containing
is
that
history,
imperial powers
ultimately
themselves
the
resistance
themselves
through
they
provoke. Noth
to the Russians
ing could be clearer than that this is happening
we
seem
not
to
account
in framing
take
it
much
into
and
yet
today,
our

We

policies.

should.

(7) It would also help if we would cool the rhetoric. The current
is hardly the first to engage in verbal overkill, but
Administration
the frequency and vividness of its excesses in this regard surely set
some kind of record. The President has informed us that Jesus?
not Kennan?was
the original architect of containment.20 The Vice
President has recently criticized not only Soviet but Tsarist Russia
for arrested cultural development,
pointing out (with some historic
took no part in the Renaissance,
the
license) that that country
or the
to
Reformation
this
would
be
the
appear
Enlightenment;2
of
and
so's
"Yeah,
your old man!"
diplomatic
saying:
equivalent
These are childish, but not innocent, pleasures. They demean those
who engage
in them, and therefore dignify
the intended target.
They obscure the message: how many people will recall Ambassador
Charles Lichenstein's
condemnation
eloquent and amply deserved
of the Korean airliner atrocity once he had coupled itwith his offer
to stand on the docks, waving goodbye
to the United Nations? That
the

Russians

invective
in which

themselves
is no

we

reason

can

safely

have
to

try
allow

long
to emulate
their

been

masters
this

them;

of
is one

the

art

of

competition

preeminence.

we should keep in mind the

(8) Finally, and in this connection,
of containment.
ultimate objectives
That
strategy was and still
should be the means to a larger end, not an end in itself. It should
lead to something; otherwise,
like any strategy formulated without
to policy, it is meaningless.
reference
There
in this
is a tendency
means
to
so
to
let
become
become
with
ends,
country
preoccupied
one
were
that
loses
of
the
those
processes
processes
sight
goal
supposed to produce. We have been guilty of that to some extent
we have missed
with containment;
in the past and are probably
20
to the National
Association
Reagan
speech
Vol.
Weekly Compilation
Documents,
of Presidential
367-369.
21
to the Austrian
Bush speech
Foreign
Policy
in The Washington
22, 1983.
Post, September

of Evangelicals,
19, March
14,
Association,

Orlando,
Florida, March
1983, Washington:
G.P.O.,

Vienna,

September

21,

1983,

8,

1983,

1983, pp.
as

quoted

376

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

to manage,
control, and possibly
today still missing opportunities
resolve many of our disagreements
with the Russians,
apparently
out of fear that such contacts might weaken
the public's resolve to
But that is getting
support containment.
things backward. The
was
to
of
idea
containment
facilitate, not impede,
original
ultimately
of a less dangerous
the attainment
international
order.
It would
not be a bad idea?from
the point of view of everybody's
inter
ests?to

to that

back

get

concept.
VI

in thinking about these problems,

It would not be inappropriate,
to recall the story of Dr. Samuel Johnson and the dog that walked
on its hind legs. What was remarkable,
the great man pointed out,
was not that the dog walked
that
way, but that it was able to
badly
do it at all.
Given all the impediments
that exist in our society to the rational
formulation
of strategy, what is remarkable
is not that we have
less well than we might
have these past three and a half
done
decades, but that we have done it at all. Containment
has, on the
inef
whole, been a successful strategy, despite all its impr?cisions,
reason
we
One
is
have
and
for
this
inconsistencies.
that
ficiencies,
been

more

in our

fortunate

than we

inept

Russians

antagonists?the

in seeking

to promote

have

their

been

interests

even

in the

world.

Still, that is no excuse not to do better. We really ought not

go on framing
long-term national
security policy in response
domestic

short-term

time
external
We

political

that the result will

in the hope

ought
national
between

relate,

our

fingers

in some way,

each

to the

we

realities
not

crossing

expedients,

to
to

to

to our own
and
interests.
confront,
long-term
to the extent
that we do,
the relationship
neglect,
not
We
and
the national
economy.
ought
security

to make unnecessary
for ourselves
difficulties
through imprecision
we
about what it is we are containing,
through the impediments
us
in
in
with
that
who
would
the
of
those
way
join
enterprise,
place
about the ultimate objective
and through our absent-mindedness
that strategy is supposed to produce.
a
All of these things fall under the category of what Clausewitz,
century

and

a half

ago,

called

"friction"?the

problems

an

army,

or a nation,
creates for itself by implementing
what
inadvertently
or
a
a
in
be
may
short-sighted,
haphazard,
perfectly good strategy
make
difference
between
the
doing
poorly thought-out way. They
Dr.
like
and
well
it,
Johnson's
dog.
just doing
something
as conceived by Nixon and Kissinger
in the early 1970s,
D?tente,

THE RISE, FALL, AND

FUTURE OF D?TENTE

377

was a well-intentioned
effort to minimize
this kind of friction: to
work more efficiently by taking a more precise
make containment
view of what it was we were trying to contain, and by enlisting the
aid of others in doing the containing. The fact that it failed says
less about the flaws in that strategy than about the imperfect way
in which

it was

executed?and

that,

in turn,

raises

an

interesting

dilemma. For if the evidence of Korea and Vietnam

tells us anything
at all, it is that this country will not support a foreign policy based
on

containment

that

disregards.

But

if we

are

to minimize

costs,

we

will need to have a strategy, and that implies the need for discrim
and central direction:
ination, consistency,
qualities not easily in
into
the
American
political system.
corporated
The task, then, will be to reconcile
the division of authority our
constitutional

structure

demands

with

the

concentration

of

author

ity our position in world affairs requires. It will not be an easy task,
to be sure, but it is not an entirely unfamiliar one either. We have
it in the past, though at about the level of competency
of
managed
we
Dr. Johnson's dog. One would hope, with experience,
could
that
learn to do itmore gracefully, with less upsetting of furniture and
shattering of crockery along the way. But better to do it awkwardly
than not to do it at all.