Migrant Smuggling Report by OIM

MIGRANT SMUGGLING DATA AND RESEARCH: A global review of the emerging evidence base
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Migrant
Smuggling Data
and Research:
A global review of the

emerging evidence base
Acknowledgements
The editors would like to acknowledge the Government of Turkey for its support of the Comprehensive
Global Approach to Counter Migrant Smuggling and Enhanced Migrant Protection project under which
this report is prepared, the hard work and support of all of the authors, as well as the many thousands of
migrants who have participated in studies on migrant smuggling throughout the world.
This report was conceived and commissioned by Dr Frank Laczko, Head, IOM Global Migration Data Analysis
Centre, who managed the report project with assistance from Marie McAuliffe (as consultant), Tara Brian and
Julia de Bresser. The report was sub-edited by Melissa Borlaza and the layout done by Anna Lyn Constantino
under the leadership of the head of the IOM Publications Unit, Valerie Hagger, and support from Maria Paula
Subia.
The opinions expressed in the report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
International Organization for Migration (IOM) or the Republic of Turkey. The designations employed and the
presentation of material throughout the report do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on
the part of IOM or the Republic of Turkey concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or
of its authorities, or concerning its frontiers or boundaries.
Title:
ISBN:
Subjects:
Cover photo:
Migrant Smuggling Data and Research: A global review of the emerging evidence base /
edited by M.L. McAuliffe and F. Laczko
978-92-9068-730-6
International migration; migrant smuggling; irregular migration.
Valerie Hagger, 2013
Publisher:
International Organization for Migration

17 route des Morillons

1211 Geneva 19
Switzerland

Tel.: +41.22.717 91 11

Fax: +41.22.798 61 50

E-mail: [email protected]

Website: www.iom.int
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2016 International Organization for Migration (IOM)
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66_16
Migrant
Smuggling Data
and Research:
FOREWORD
The smuggling of migrants across international borders on routes
traversing land, air and sea continues to undermine migration governance and
impedes safe and orderly migration. In numerous parts of the world, migrant
smugglers have become an integral part of the irregular migration journey,
resulting in enormous profits for criminal smuggling networks while reducing
the ability of States to manage their borders and migration programmes. Given
that it is often covert in nature, migrant smuggling may only become visible
when tragedies occur or emergency humanitarian responses are required.
Events involving people drowning or perishing inside trucks regularly capture
the medias attention, but these tragedies are likely to be just the tip of the
iceberg. Reliance on smugglers makes migrants particularly vulnerable to abuse
and exploitation. Migrants who have experienced abuse by smugglers have
little effective recourse to justice. In this ever more pressing situation, States
are being severely tested in the fulfilment of their responsibilities to protect
migrants human rights and manage their borders.
Against this backdrop, it is timely that we review the current data and
research on migrant smuggling, which offers a unique ability to ascertain what is
being collected and what can be done to further build the evidence. The report
helps to deepen our understanding of the smuggling phenomenon, and provides
insights into how responses can be formulated that better protect migrants
while enhancing States abilities to manage orderly migration.
This report is the result of a collaboration between the International
Organization for Migration (IOM) and researchers from a range of backgrounds
and academic disciplines, and was supported by the Government of Turkey. As
a host country of around 2.7 million Syrian refugees and a transit country of
hundreds of thousands of migrants in 2015, Turkey along with many other
countries is experiencing first-hand the considerable challenges in combating
migrant smuggling while at the same time supporting refugees in need.
This report stemmed from an expert meeting on global migrant smuggling
data and research in December 2015 organized by IOM and the Government of
Turkey at Ko University in Istanbul. The meeting was attended by officials along
with researchers from civil society, academia and the private sector working
Migrant Smuggling Data and Research:
A global review of the emerging evidence base
iii
on migrant smuggling and irregular migration, whose work spans Europe, Asia,
the Americas, Australia and Africa. The discussion at the meeting underscored
the need to better understand migrant smuggling dynamics through data and
research, including the possibility of emerging trends in some regions pointing
to the expanding reach of migrants smugglers globally. The resultant report is
aimed at policymakers, researchers, analysts, students and practitioners working
on the complex topic of migrant smuggling. It provides a review that ideally we
would be keen to replicate in the years ahead in order to gauge progress on the
increasingly important collection, analysis and reporting of data and research on
migrant smuggling globally.
William Lacy Swing

Director General
iv
Foreword
CONTRIBUTORS
Danai Angeli is a lawyer based in Athens and a researcher at the European
University Institute (EUI) in Florence. She currently serves as a national trainer
on the European Convention on Human Rights and Asylum in Greece, certified
under the Human Rights Education for Legal Professionals (HELP) programme.
She has been involved in several research projects and has multiple publications
in the field of asylum and migration management. She worked, among others,
as a national expert on Greece and Cyprus in the DemandAt project (EUI), on
human trafficking in the domestic work sector and was the main researcher on
a project assessing the cost-effectiveness of irregular migration control policies
in Greece (Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy). In her capacity
as a qualified lawyer, she has provided legal representation in selected asylum
and migration cases before the European Court of Human Rights. She has a PhD
in law from the EUI.
Jorgen Carling is a research professor at the Peace Research Institute
Oslo (PRIO) and has a PhD in Human Geography. His research addresses several
aspects of international migration and transnationalism, including the formation
of migration aspirations, the impact of migration control measures, the
functioning of transnational families, and the dynamics of migrant remittances.
His empirical research has concentrated on migration from Africa to Europe.
Carling has extensive fieldwork experience and combines ethnographic data
with statistical analyses in his research. His work has been published in most of
the leading scientific journals in the field of international migration, and he is
an editorial board member of the International Migration Review and Journal
of Ethnic and Migration Studies. Carling has been a visiting researcher at the
Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute, the University of Oxford,
and the National University of Singapore.
Richard Danziger has been with IOM since 1994, and is currently the
International Organization for Migrations (IOM) Regional Director for West and
Central Africa. He has done three tours as IOMs Chief of Mission for Afghanistan
beginning in 1998 and most recently leaving in January 2016. From 2005 to 2010,
he headed IOMs Counter-Trafficking Division, overseeing human trafficking
projects and research throughout the world. Richard was a founding member of
the Steering Committee of the United Nations Global Initiative to Fight Human
Trafficking (UN.GIFT) and a member of the World Economic Forum Global Agenda
Council on Illicit Trade and Organized Crime, which he chaired in 2010/2011. He
has lectured extensively on human trafficking and migrant protection.
Anne T. Gallagher AO (BA. LLB, M.Int.L, PhD) is a lawyer, practitioner,
teacher and scholar with an established international reputation in human
rights and the administration of criminal justice. She served as a UN human
rights official from 1992 to 2003, the last four years as special adviser to the
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. In that capacity, she participated in
the development of international legal framework around human trafficking
and migrant smuggling, leading the UN Inter-Agency Group in the negotiation
process. Since resigning from the UN in 2003, Anne has held various leadership
and technical roles in an intergovernmental programme that aims to strengthen
legislative and criminal justice responses to human trafficking and related
exploitation in South-East Asia. Her other current positions include co-chair of
the International Bar Associations Presidential Task Force on Trafficking; member
of the IOM Director Generals Migration Advisory Board; and academic adviser
at Doughty St Chambers, the United Kingdoms largest civil rights practice. An
independent and award-winning scholar, she is widely recognized as a global
authority on the international law of human trafficking and migrant smuggling.
Ahmet duygu serves as the dean of College of Social Sciences and
Humanities at Ko University, Istanbul, Turkey. He currently holds a dual
appointment as full professor at Ko one in the Department of International
Relations and the other in the Department of Sociology. He is also the director
of the Migration Research Center at Ko University. He completed his PhD in
Demography at the Australian National University (ANU). He held visiting fellow
positions at Stockholm University, the University of Warwick, the University of
Manchester, and the European University Institute in Florence, Italy. He is an
elected member of the Science Academy in Turkey. He is involved in a couple of
European Union projects, such as TRANS-NET Transnationalisation, Migration
and Transformation: Multi-level Analysis of Migrant Transnationalism (FP7)
and EUMAGINE Imagining Europe from Outside (FP7), both of which are
completed. EURA-NET Transnational Migration in Transition: Transformative
Characteristics of Temporary Mobility of People (FP7) project is still ongoing
until 2017. In addition to these, Prof. Icduygu has conducted various research
projects for international organizations such as IOM, the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the International Labour
Organization (ILO). He teaches on migration studies, theories and practices of
citizenship, international organizations, civil society, nationalism and ethnicity,
and research methods.
vi
Contributors
Dinuk Jayasuriya is research director at Red Elephant Research and a

visiting fellow at the Development Policy Centre, Australian National University.
He has led mixed methods research and evaluation on irregular migration and
migrant smuggling in Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, Pakistan, Sri
Lanka and Viet Nam. He has previously consulted on evaluation, migration
and economic related studies for the World Bank, International Finance
Corporation, Asian Development Bank (ADB), Australian Aid, the Government
of Australia and multiple Red Cross Societies. He also leads evaluations for the
ADB and was formerly an employee of the World Bank Group, Australian Aid
and PricewaterhouseCoopers. Dinuk has a PhD in economics from the Australian
National University.
Sebnem Koser Akcapar is a social anthropologist. She is currently working
as associate professor at the Sociology Department, Ko University, Istanbul,
Turkey. After completing her PhD at the Katholieke Universitat Leuven in Belgium
on Iranian transit migrants and their social networks in facilitating their migration,
she moved to the United States where she worked as a postdoctoral visiting fellow
at the Institute for the Study of International Migration, Georgetown University.
Soon afterwards, she was affiliated with the Graduate Center for German and
European Studies, School of Foreign Service, at Georgetown University. She was
then appointed as the director of Center for Eastern Mediterranean Studies at
Georgetown University. Between 2013 and 2015, she worked as visiting professor
in different universities in New Delhi, India, where she conducted comparative
research on diaspora, labour migrants and refugees. Apart from her book and
edited volumes on international migration and Muslim communities in Europe
and North America, she has published many book chapters and articles in peerreviewed journals.
Frank Laczko (PhD) is the director of IOMs recently established Global
Migration Data Analysis Centre in Berlin. He is also the acting head of IOMs
mission in Germany. He has held positions with IOM in Budapest, Vienna and
Geneva. He has worked as a consultant for several international agencies
including OECD, ILO and UNHCR. He is the co-chair of the Global Migration
Working Group on Data and Research and co-editor of Migration Policy and
Practice. He co-edited a volume titled Data and Research on Human Trafficking:
A Global Survey, published in 2005. He and his team in Berlin are responsible for
preparing IOMs annual global report on migrant fatalities and the data collection
for the Missing Migrants project. He also manages a major global project funded
by the European Commission titled Migration, the Environment and Climate
Change: Evidence for Policymaking.

vii
Marie McAuliffe is the newly appointed head of the Migration Policy

Research Division in IOM Geneva. Marie has published in peer-reviewed migration
journals and for policy organizations on migrant smuggling, asylum seekers and
refugees, and protection in South-East Asia. She is currently editing a book on
irregular migration (with Khalid Koser) due to be published in 2017 by ANU Press.
Marie is also a doctoral candidate at the Australian National University, and is on
leave from the Australian Department of Immigration and Border Protection.*
She is a visiting fellow at the Global Migration Centre at the Graduate Institute of
International and Development Studies in Geneva, and a visiting scholar at the
Population Institute at Hacettepe University in Ankara. Marie has led migration
research and policy teams in government and has consulted to the IOM, the ILO,
as well as in the private sector, including while based in the Republic of Korea,
the Russian Federation and Turkey. For three years (20122014), Marie directed
the Australian irregular migration research programme.
Nassim Majidi is the founder and co-director of Samuel Hall, a think
tank specializing in field-based research, with offices in Kabul, Nairobi and
Mogadishu. Nassim is an associate researcher at Sciences Pos Centre for
International Studies and Research, and has published over 20 articles on
migration issues covering Afghanistan, the East and Horn of Africa. She teaches
a masters course on refugees and migration as part of Sciences Po Lilles Conflict
and Development programme. Her cross-cutting skills have led her to interview
refugees, migrants and returnees in the worlds border areas, origin, transit and
destination countries. Based on her knowledge of migration actors, she has
developed programmes, policies and monitoring reviews that have had a lasting
impact. Nassim was nominated in 2015 by the Norwegian Refugee Council for the
Nansen Refugee Award. Nassim has a PhD and a masters degree in International
Relations (Sciences Po Paris), and a BA in Government (Cornell University).
Arezo Malakooti is a social researcher with a developed expertise on
migration-related research. At the time of writing, Arezo was the director of
Migration Research at Altai Consulting. She is the primary author of a number
of studies on migration to and through North Africa, which has involved periods
of time spent in the region conducting interviews with migrants on the ground.
This includes Irregular Migration from West Africa to North Africa and Europe
(Altai for IOM Nigeria, 2015); Migration Trends in the Mediterranean: Connecting
the Dots (Altai for IOM MENA, 2015); Mixed Migration: Libya at the Crossroads.
The opinions, comments and analyses expressed in this publication are those of the author and do not
necessarily represent the views of the department or any of the organizations or institutions with which the
author is affiliated.
viii
Contributors
Mapping of Migration Routes from Africa to Europe and Drivers of Migration in

Post-revolution Libya (Altai for UNHCR Libya, 2013); and A Social and Economic
Assessment of Urban Refugees in Three Libyan Cities (Altai for UNHCR Libya,
2013). Arezo is currently working with IOMs Global Migration Data Analysis
Centre in Berlin as a senior research and data analyst.
Linda Oucho is a migration researcher working as a director for the African
Migration and Development Policy Centre in Nairobi, Kenya. She has conducted
research on migration, poverty, health, displacement, ruralurban, regional and
international migration. She has contributed to discussions on human trafficking,
gender and migration, media and perceptions of immigration, and human rights
and displacement among others. She worked as a project manager with Samuel
Hall in 2015, and prior to that, with international organizations, such as IOM,
the United Nations Development Programme, the European University Institute,
the International Centre for Policy Migration Development and the African,
Caribbean and Pacific Observatory on Migration. She has an interdisciplinary
background with a PhD in Ethnic Relations (University of Warwick), MA in Advice
and Paralegal Work (London Metropolitan University) and a BA in Humanities
(University of Botswana).
Gabriella E. Sanchez (PhD, Arizona State University) is assistant professor
at the National Security Studies Institute at the University of Texas at El Paso.
Her work primarily examines the facilitation of irregular border crossings and
the practices interactions with criminal organizations, its potential for market
diversification, and its facilitators decision-making processes. As sociocultural
anthropologist, Sanchez has completed extensive ethnographic research at
migrant smuggling and trafficking hubs in over 20 countries. Her book Human
Smuggling and Border Crossings (Routledge, 2015) was the result of her work
among coyotes on the United StatesMexico Border, and was a finalist to the
International Association for the Study of Organized Crimes 2015 Book of the
Year Award.
Jiyoung Song is the director of migration and border policy at the Lowy
Institute for International Policy in Sydney, Australia. She completed her PhD at
the University of Cambridge. Jiyoung specializes in migration and human rights
in East Asia with particular focus on the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea
China and ThailandMyanmar borders. Her latest publications include Irregular
Migration and Human Security in East Asia (Routledge, 2014).

ix
Ramesh Sunman is a research officer at Red Elephant Research and a

visiting fellow at the Department of Political and Social Change, Australian
National University. His research focuses on migration, poverty and social
transformation in the Global South, and South Asia in particular. He has published
papers in top-ranking international journals, such as the Journal of Ethnic and
Migration Studies and the Journal of Peasant Studies. Ramesh has a PhD from
the Australian National University.
Anna Triandafyllidou is a professor and director of the Cultural Pluralism
Research Area at the Global Governance Programme of the European University
Institute (Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies) in Florence, Italy. She is
also regular visiting professor at the College of Europe in Bruges since 2002. Her
latest authored books include Migrant Smuggling: Irregular Migration from Asia
and Africa to Europe (with T. Maroukis, Routledge, 2012) and What is Europe?
(with R. Gropas, Palgrave, 2015). She is the editor of the Routledge Handbook of
Immigration and Refugee Studies (2016).
Sheldon X. Zhang is a professor of sociology at San Diego State University.
He has been conducting funded research on transnational human trafficking
and smuggling activities for more than a decade. He has published two
books on human smuggling/trafficking activities: Chinese Human Smuggling
OrganizationsFamilies, Social Networks, and Cultural Imperatives (Stanford
University Press, 2008) and Smuggling and Trafficking in Human Beings: All
Roads Lead to America (Praeger, 2007). He is the editor of a special volume
on human trafficking in the journal of Crime, Law, and Social Change titled
Global Perspectives on Sex Trafficking (Vol. 56, 2011). He also co-edited (with
Ron Weitzer) another special issue on human trafficking in The ANNALS of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science (Vol. 653, 2014). His research
has also led to numerous publications in journals, such as Criminology, British
Journal of Criminology, Crime, Law and Social Change and Global Crime.
Contributors
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Foreword.............................................................................................iii
Contributors.........................................................................................v
Report Overview..................................................................................1
Marie McAuliffe and Frank Laczko
West and Central Africa......................................................................25

Jrgen Carling
East Africa..........................................................................................55
Nassim Majidi and Linda Oucho
North Africa........................................................................................85
Arezo Malakooti
Europe..............................................................................................105
Danai Angeli and Anna Triandafyllidou
Turkey..............................................................................................137
Ahmet duygu and Sebnem Koser Akcapar
Afghanistan...................................................................................... 161
Nassim Majidi and Richard Danziger
South Asia........................................................................................ 187

Dinuk Jayasuriya and Ramesh Sunam
South-East Asia and Australia...........................................................211

Anne Gallagher and Marie McAuliffe
North-East Asia.................................................................................243
Jiyoung Song
Latin America...................................................................................269
Gabriella E. Sanchez
The United States.............................................................................303

Sheldon X. Zhang

xi
1
REPORT OVERVIEW
Marie McAuliffe and Frank Laczko
Globally, migrant smuggling receives a considerable amount of media,
policy and public attention, but how much do we really know about it based on
sound evidence? To what extent are data and research on migrant smuggling
collected, reported and undertaken throughout the world? In the project from
which this report stems, we set out to answer these questions by working with
researchers and analysts to review the current data and research on migrant
smuggling globally. We did so for several reasons. First, migrant smuggling matters
increasingly to migrants, enormously to States and is clearly critical to a great
number of non-State actors, including unfortunately the smugglers and agents
who operate in this illicit sector. It also matters to a range of others including
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that support migrants, international
organizations working on migration, transnational crime, development and
human rights, as well as the media. Enhancing our understanding of migrant
smuggling improves our ability to combat inequity, exploitation and abuse
by helping craft effective responses aimed at supporting safe and orderly
migration policies and practices. The impacts of migrant smuggling can be many
and varied but none more tragic than the deaths of people during migration,
which tend to be heavily intertwined with unsafe, exploitative and unregulated
migration practices often involving smuggling. The International Organization
for Migrations (IOM) latest global report on migrant fatalities, for example,
reported over 60,000 dead or missing migrants worldwide since 1995 (Brian and
Laczko, 2016).
Second, we know that as with many other areas of international migration
and irregular migration especially (Clarke, 2000; Koser, 2010; Kraler and Reichel,
2011), there is currently no data available on the extent of migrant smuggling
globally. The lack of global data on migrant smuggling hinders comparative
analysis, as well as the ability to inform the development of effective responses.
We had a strong sense that data and research on migrant smuggling in some
regions was being collected, undertaken and reported to a much greater degree
than other regions, but it was unclear how much variation there was across the
world, including in and around migrant smuggling hotspots such as across
the south-west border between Mexico and the United States, the Aegean Sea
between Turkey and Greece or the Andaman Sea in South-East Asia. This review
is an attempt to better understand what is available and where.
Third, recent media coverage of irregular migration highlights that the
various conceptualizations of migrant smuggling, including in relation to its
related form of irregular migration human trafficking, sometimes leads to
confusion and misunderstandings of the nature and effects of the phenomenon.
Gaining a better understanding of how migrant smuggling is thought about
and defined in different regions is a priority. Transnational issues requiring
transnational and multifaceted responses can be better supported if we
understand differences in concepts underpinning data, research and analytical
efforts.
Fourth, we recognized that sustainable responses to migrant smuggling
require long-term thinking given its enduring nature and increasingly important
impact on safe and orderly migration. This review of current migrant smuggling
data and research sets out to highlight positive advances and productive
initiatives, as well as offer informed suggestions on how we can produce better
information on the phenomenon in years to come.
Fifth, the report provides a useful benchmark with which to gauge
progress in 5 to 10 years from now. Many policymakers, academics and analysts
have long recognized the importance of conducting research and analysis of
aspects of irregular migration, including migrant smuggling, but indications of
subtle shifts in smuggling practices in recent years renders this a timely volume.
Transformations in telecommunications technology and the exponential
growth of Big Data (Laczko and Rango, 2014) are changing the way in which
smuggling operates, placing further pressure on the international protection
system (McAuliffe, 2016; McAuliffe and Koser, 2015; Zijlstra and van Liempt,
forthcoming). For example, smugglers advertise their services on Facebook,
and many migrants travel with mobile phones, making it much easier for them
to obtain information about smuggling routes, conditions and where to seek
asylum. There is growing recognition that migrant smuggling is an increasingly
significant aspect of irregular migration for many regions and thousands of
migrants globally.
Sixth, this report aims to inform IOMs own response to migrant
smuggling, including the forthcoming Comprehensive Approach to Counter
Migrant Smuggling. The approach recognizes that combatting migrant smuggling
involves a multifaceted set of responses, which can be broadly grouped into
four key areas: (a) provide protection and assistance to smuggled migrants;
(b) address the causes of migrant smuggling; (c) enhance States capacity to
1. Report Overview
disrupt the activities of migrant smugglers; (d) promote research and data
collection on migrant smuggling.
Report Background
This project has brought together researchers and analysts working on
migrant smuggling throughout the world in order to review the current state
of data and research on the topic. Together, the authors who contributed to
this volume bring a rich and diverse set of experiences in migrant smuggling
expertise and academic disciplines, including anthropology, law, demography,
international relations, economics, political science and criminology. Authors
from academia, IOM, government, private sector organizations and policy think
tanks contributed.
Given the thematic nature of this report, a spatial approach to the review
was adopted with most chapters focusing on a single geographic region, such as
Europe, North Africa or South Asia. Three chapters have been devoted to specific
countries (Afghanistan, Turkey and the United States) including in recognition of
the particular issues they face. Within the confines of this publication, we cover
much of the globe. Part two of our review will cover remaining key regions, such
as Southern Africa, Central Asia and the Middle East.
The review was undertaken within a limited time period, and has been
designed as a benchmark review with particular emphasis on data and research
over the last five years until the end of 2015. By working with authors with
considerable existing expertise and knowledge of the subject (and of their
regions), a timely review could be undertaken. Each chapter covers three broad
areas: (a) overview of smuggling in the region/country; (b) review of data on
migrant smuggling; and (c) review of migrant smuggling research. Suggestions
and recommendations aimed at further building the emerging evidence base
are also provided in each chapter (and summarized at the end of this chapter).
Given the nature of irregular migration and smuggling, chapters place emphasis
on different aspects of the topics depending, for example, on data collection
capacities, regional and other multilateral processes focused on countering
smuggling, operations of international organizations and NGOs in regions,
the extent to which the grey literature has developed and/or the academic
community has conducted fieldwork to inform research findings. Rather than
a full evaluation or assessment of data and research of migrant smuggling,
which would take considerably more time and would be much more costly (and
perhaps of not much more value in the longer term give the high tempo of the
field), this review provides policymakers, researchers and analysts working on

migrant smuggling highly topical information on the data and research that has
been compiled in recent years. It also offers views on the gaps that remain and
how they may be usefully filled.
Concepts and definitions

While there is no single agreed definition of migrant smuggling globally,
the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (the Protocol)
sets out the international legal definition in the context of the overarching United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. With almost three
quarters of all States being party to the Protocol, it provides the most widely
recognized definition of migrant smuggling internationally. The Protocol defines
migrant smuggling as the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly,
a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State
Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident (Article
3). Other definitions are broader. The English Oxford Dictionary, for example,
defines smuggling as to convey (someone or something) somewhere secretly
and illicitly.1
Notwithstanding its clandestine nature and the related attempts by
smugglers and agents, as well as migrants to evade detection before, during
and often following arrival in a transit or destination country, the way in which
migrant smuggling is conceptualized also contributes to the difficulties in
understanding and defining smuggling. Naturally, there are differences within
the academic sphere, but likewise there are some differences within the policy
sphere, most notably between national (and regional) jurisdictions, which may
or may not be consistent with the concept of smuggling set out in the Protocol.
Salt and Steins seminal work on migrant smuggling in 1997 involved the
depiction of smuggling as one aspect of the illicit side of international migration
business. Smuggling is conceptualized as a profit-driven activity within a broader
business system, whereby the smugglers main motivation is profit, and the
common point of intersection with migrants is financial (Salt and Stein, 1997).
Salt and Steins model heavily favours the depiction of smugglers who are
involved in delivering a service through the exploit[ation of] legal as well as
illegal methods and channels of entry (Salt and Stein, 1997:484). Smugglers are
described as helping, servicing, facilitating, providing, although Salt and
Stein note that little information is available on whether it is more common for
migrants to seek out [smugglers] or vice versa (1997:479).
See www.oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/smuggle
1. Report Overview
Financial motives are central to the business model concept proposed

by Salt and Stein (1997), and are consistent with the final formulation of the
Protocol. This has the effect of excluding those who assist people to gain illegal
entry into a country without financially (or materially) benefitting. Indeed,
some argue that a broader definition of smuggling incorporating those who
operate without personal gain is required to adequately encompass refugee
smuggling (Doomernik, 2001; van Liempt and Doomernik, 2006). Rather than a
law enforcement framing or the business model concept, this broader definition
also incorporates the altruistic smuggler who helps people to safety (Salt and
Hogarth, 2000). The altruistic smuggler is a common theme in the literature,
especially in so far as it relates to the smuggling of asylum seekers and refugees.
Discussion of the nexus between smuggling and forced displacement features in
several chapters of this report. There also exists an uneasy tension conceptually
when the smuggler acts to profit from forced migrants. As Khalid Koser notes
(2011:258):
Helping people escape violence can be considered an invaluable service for
which it is justifiable to charge a fee. From another perspective, charging
a fee might be viewed as exploiting the situation of a desperate person.
Broadly then, migrant smuggling can be conceptualized in a variety of
ways, including:
Transnational criminal definition of smuggling for financial or other
material benefit this appears to be a commonly understood
definition, and one that applies in international law as per the
Protocol;
Altruistic smuggling that does not involve gaining financially or in
other ways, and may be construed or interpreted as a manifestation
of irregular migration social processes;
Smuggling for humanitarian reasons, including of refugees, which
may or may not involve financial or material gain; and
Self-smuggling, whereby migrants smuggle themselves in order
to enter a country without prior permission as a stowaway, for
example, on a vessel or aircraft.
These broad definitions, however, are not necessarily discrete and may
overlap making defining migrant smuggling challenging. Further, regional
or national legislation may differ, thereby rendering direct country-level
comparisons on aspects (such as arrests and prosecutions) difficult. The legal
definition in Australia, for example, requires the smuggling of another person(s)

and so excludes instances of self-smuggling. It also makes provision for
aggravated smuggling involving the smuggling of five or more people, with more
severe penalties. The European Union definition of migrant smuggling differs
from that of the Protocol in key ways, including that it allows for an optional
exemption of punishment for those providing humanitarian assistance (Article 1
of the European Union Directive 2002/90 of 28 November 2002). The intersection
of the European Union directive and national legislation and policy can also be
challenging. A recent report by the European Parliament found that variation
in the way in which laws are implemented in the national legislation of selected
Member States results in legal uncertainty and inconsistency, and impacts on
the effectiveness of the legislation (European Parliament, 2016:11). In addition,
legal definitions are subject to change. For example, recent Canadian Supreme
Court rulings of November 2015 under Canadas Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act found that smuggling offences apply only to those engaged in
organized crime. The court ruled that offences under the act do not apply to
those who provide humanitarian, mutual and family assistance to asylum
seekers, thereby narrowing the definition of smuggler under Canadian law.
There is also increasing recognition of shifts in smuggling processes
that further blur the line between human trafficking and migrant smuggling,
acknowledging that it has never been clear cut (Carling, Gallagher and
Horwood, 2015). While human trafficking involves coercion2 (whereas migrant
smuggling does not), there is increasing awareness of the potential for coercion
and exploitation of smuggled migrants who may find themselves in highly
exploitative conditions during or after the event. What starts out as a simple
transaction involving a person seeking the services of a smuggler may end up
with the migrant being deceived, coerced and/or exploited somewhere along
the line given the often unequal power relationships between smugglers and
migrants a smuggled migrant may quickly and unwillingly become a trafficked
person. Recent research has highlighted, for example, migrants being abducted
after arriving in Yemen with the assistance of smugglers. They are released only
once their families pay the smugglers/traffickers, which is typically between
USD 800 to 1,300 each (RMMS, 2015). Similar tactics have been used by
smugglers of migrants from Bangladesh and Myanmar to Thailand and Malaysia.
In light of such events, it is understandable that there have been calls for migrant
smuggling to be conceptualized as a human rights issue to a much greater degree.
2
The Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children defines
human trafficking as the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means
of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse
of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the
consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation (Article 3).
1. Report Overview
Complexities of smuggling
Part of the difficulty in fully understanding migrant smuggling processes
and practices, as well as how they are evolving is due to the number of actors
involved. In a 2011 report, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)
highlighted the dynamics and complexities involved in migrant smuggling and
the key actors involved:
Adaptability of smugglers and smuggling organizations is high, and
organizers shift routes in response to law enforcement countermeasures (2011:37);
Smuggling relies on corruption (in varying degrees) and a limited
amount of information is currently available about the role of
corrupt government officials in the smuggling process (2011:81);
Vulnerable migrants (such as women and children) likely make
up an ever-growing proportion of migrants smuggled worldwide
(2011:54);
There is a striking lack of information on smuggler-migrant
relationships; access to information is particularly difficult since
smugglers (and migrants) are often reluctant to be interviewed
(2011:66); and
Increasingly sophisticated networks have replaced small-scale
businesses in regions where anti-smuggling law enforcement
strategies are particularly robust (2011:81).
Despite the medias tendency to portray smugglers as evil characters, it
has become clearer over time both from research and intelligence gathering that
it is more accurate and useful to think of individual agents or smugglers as being
somewhere on a smuggling spectrum.

Figure 1: The smuggling spectrum
Source: McAuliffe and Mence, 2014.
At one end of the scale are the (irregular) migration agents, who may
be legitimate travel or migration agents providing lawful services to travellers/
migrants, with perhaps occasional assistance to those seeking to travel irregularly
(such as fraudulent documents, contacts, information/advice). At the other end
of the spectrum are the apex smugglers/traffickers, who oversee sophisticated
transnational criminal syndicates and networks that deal with large-scale
operations, often involving different types of smuggling and/or trafficking.
The diversity of smugglers has been examined in the academic and grey
literature. There have been various enquiries into the breadth of the concept of
smuggler, with empirical research and analysis largely concluding that there are
many types of people involved in smuggling networks ranging from organizers,
recruiters, transporters (such as crew), aides and suppliers (Andreas, 2011;
Schloenhardt, 2003; UNODC, 2011). Discussion of mom-and-pop smugglers
was also present in the literature, referring to the small-scale smuggler who may
not be connected to larger networked operations (Kyle and Liang, 2001).
Migrants are the primary non-State actors involved in the processes of
irregular migration and smuggling. In many situations, they are able to exercise
agency, although the extent to which this is possible is circumscribed by a range
of structural, security, economic and social factors (Castles, de Haas and Miller,
2014; de Haas, 2011; Koser, 2010). There is also recognition, including from
empirical studies, that the drivers underpinning migrant decision-making in
relation to irregular migration pathways and smuggling are complex, and include
protection, security, family, economic and other factors (Jayasuriya, McAuliffe
and Iqbal, 2016; McAuliffe, 2013). Migrants (along with their families), however,
bear much of the brunt of the negative consequences that irregular migration
journeys involving smuggling can bring: increased risks of exploitation, significant
1. Report Overview
physical and mental harm, and sometimes death. Increasingly, more vulnerable
groups of migrants are moving irregularly, including women and children, raising
a raft of complex issues for State and non-State actors alike.
One of the more challenging issues for State actors is that of corrupt officials
who can play critical roles in smuggling and trafficking networks (McAuliffe and
Koser, 2015; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD),
2015). The UNODC has highlighted the significant role corruption plays in migrant
smuggling, noting that (2011:3):
Migrant smuggling could not occur on the large scale that it so often does
without collusion between corrupt officials and criminals. Corruption
seriously undermines national and international efforts to prevent and
control the smuggling of migrants [it] may occur in countries of origin,
transit, or destination. It may be systemic, institutional or individual.
In some circumstances, the distinction between corrupt officials and
criminals may in fact mask more dire and entrenched behaviour in which
smugglers/traffickers can themselves be corrupt officials holding positions within
law enforcement, justice, immigration, customs, passport offices, border police
and other related government agencies. In environments of endemic corruption,
people movement is just one area of regulation that can be exploited for
personal gain. In some societies, extracting a bribe in exchange for a fraudulent
document, a stamp in a passport, entry to or exit from a country are likely to
be commonplace. Even in less corrupt societies, the opportunities perceived by
some officials may be considered greater than the risks of being caught.
The media are also an important non-State actor, including as a contributors
to the grey literature as a result of investigative reporting on smuggling (see
discussion in Chapters 2, 8 and 9). The media is also peripherally involved in
smuggling and irregular migration indirectly. First, the media plays a role in
the provision of information to migrants (and potential migrants) in a range of
situations: when they are considering their migration options, when they are
assessing where to migrate, in determining the safest and best way to travel,
and so on. Second, the media also plays a role as a vehicle in the polarization
of the public discourse on aspects of migration, and irregular migration and
smuggling in particular. This becomes problematic particularly when smuggling
and trafficking are used interchangeably, often further confusing complex issues
of movements and depicting an overly simplistic view of migrant smuggling.

Overview of data on migrant smuggling

It is often suggested in policy circles that in order to tackle migrant
smuggling effectively, it is necessary to have good data (European Commission,
2015). However, in practice, data available publicly on migrant smuggling are
scarce, and many countries do not necessarily have the capacity to systematically
collect such data. The illicit nature of migrant smuggling means that unlike areas
of regulated or licit behaviour, it is unreasonable to expect comprehensive data
on the extent and nature of its various manifestations. Most data appears to
be related to law enforcement aspects. However, the findings of this report
emphasize that we do not really have a clear picture of even the volume of
migrant smuggling globally. Only a minority of countries in the world produce
comparable national data on the scale of migrant smuggling each year, and
as mentioned earlier, there is no global estimate of the magnitude of migrant
smuggling.
This is not to say that migrant smuggling is not significant. There is evidence
in this volume indicating that migrant smuggling facilitates the movement of
huge numbers of people around the world. For example, in 2015, it is estimated
that there were 2.53 million irregular migrants from Cambodia, Lao Peoples
Democratic Republic and Myanmar living in Thailand, with an estimated
80 per cent having been smuggled (see chapter 9). Europol (2016) estimates
that 90 per cent of migrants that cross Europes borders unlawfully do so with
the help of smugglers. The Canadian Border Services Agency recently estimated
that 92 per cent of all Chinese irregular migrants arriving in Canada engaged a
smuggler at some stage of their journey (UNODC, 2015).
Many of the authors in this report highlight the huge sums being paid
by migrants to smugglers to facilitate their passage to their destinations. For
example, a migrant needs to pay as much as USD 13,000 to a smuggler to travel
from Bangladesh to France, and even more (USD 16,700) to travel from Sri Lanka
to Canada. Even a short journey can be very expensive. In 2015, migrants were
reportedly paying between EUR 500 and 2,500 to make the short trip from
Ayvalik in Turkey to Lesvos in Greece (see chapter 5 on Europe).
Nonetheless, in most regions of the world, it is hard to find reliable and
comparable data on recent trends in migrant smuggling. For example, in the
South-East Asia region, our review finds that very little data is publicly available
at the State level. Some countries still do not even collect official data on
migrant smuggling, or if they do so, do not make the information public. Zhang,
for example in his chapter on the United States in this volume, notes that there
are no publicly available data on migrant smuggling in the United States.
10
1. Report Overview
Probably the best data available relating to migrant smuggling are the data
concerning the number of countries that have ratified the Smuggling Protocol.
Information on the number of countries who have ratified the United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, and the two supplementary
Protocols (the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
Especially Women and Children, and the Protocol against the Smuggling of
Migrants by Land, Sea and Air) are easy to locate. However, it is much more
difficult to find reliable information on the extent to which countries have been
able to implement their obligations under these instruments or quantify migrant
smuggling.
Why is there such a paucity of reliable data on migrant smuggling? First,
official statistics tend to be fairly limited because they tend to only reflect the
number of persons apprehended or convicted for smuggling offences. As most
smugglers are usually not apprehended and/or prosecuted, this information
provides only a partial picture of smuggling operations. For example, only 18
people are currently serving a sentence in Australian prisons for a migrant
smuggling offence (Anderson, 2016), and yet migrant smuggling to Australia
has involved many thousands of asylum seekers and other migrants in recent
years. An example of the limitations of such data can be seen if we consider
the recent surge in arrivals to Europe through the Eastern Mediterranean route.
Despite indications that the majority of the approximated 850,000 migrants who
crossed the Eastern Mediterranean in 2015 used the services of smugglers, the
number of smugglers apprehended by authorities in Greece barely increased in
2015, including because unlike on other routes, smugglers did not necessarily
travel the short distances involved with migrants (see chapter 5 on Europe).
Law enforcement data also have to be interpreted with care; an increase in the
number of irregular migrants intercepted could reflect either more effective
border operations, or a real increase in smuggling, or both.
Second, as noted earlier, definitions of migrant smuggling can vary at
the national level, which makes it difficult to compare data between countries.
Another challenge mentioned by several authors is that authorities do not always
distinguish clearly between smuggling, trafficking and other forms of irregular
migration in the definitions that they use for data collection.
Third, there seems to be a reluctance among many States to share the
limited data that is collected. States often report that they are concerned about
making data on migrant smuggling public because of fears that such information
might be used by smugglers themselves (chapter 9). But there may be other
reasons why States are reluctant to release such data. Destination countries
wishing to reduce migrant smuggling may give greater priority to collecting
11
data on migrant smuggling compared with origin countries that may benefit
indirectly from irregular migration. Migrant smuggling may act to facilitate illegal
labour migration, which while highly risky for migrants and their communities,
may nevertheless result in some overall benefits, not least of which include the
remittances migrants send back home. Another factor as mentioned earlier is
corruption. In countries where officials may be involved in facilitating migrant
smuggling, the challenges of collecting robust and reliable data are likely to be
even greater.
This volume shows that in most regions of the world, States do not
appear to share data on migrant smuggling in a systematic way. An interesting
initiative in this respect is the Voluntary Reporting System on Migrant Smuggling
and Related Conduct in support of the Bali Process (VRS-MSRC), which aims to
collect and share information on irregular migration and migrant smuggling. It
was developed by UNODC in cooperation with law enforcement authorities from
Asia, Europe and North America as a means of sharing information on smuggling.
According to UNODC, VRS-MSRC has proven to be most useful for collecting data
on the number, citizenship and sex of smuggled migrants, but has been able to
collect much less information about smuggling routes and migrant smugglers
(UNODC, 2015).
It is apparent that some data on migrant smuggling is collected by law
enforcement agencies but is not shared publicly primarily because of the
nature of the data collected and its use in combatting smuggling operations.
For example, Europol recently reported that it holds intelligence on more
than 40,000 individuals suspected of being involved in migrant smuggling, but
provided few details about these operations (Europol, 2016). While there may
be valid and sensible reasons why States do not share and make public data on
migrant smuggling, one consequence of the lack of data is that the media can
make widely inaccurate estimates of the scale of migrant smuggling based on
limited evidence. This in turn can create misperceptions about the real dynamics
of migrant smuggling.
A fourth issue is that much of the data collected and published on migrant
smuggling tends to be in the form of law enforcement statistics. It has proven
much harder to find data on the risks and hardships that migrants face during
their journeys, which can ultimately result in deaths. To give but one example,
very few countries around the world collect official data on the number of deaths
that occur when migrants try to cross borders with the help of smugglers (Brian
and Laczko, 2014).
12
1. Report Overview
Finally, it could be argued that collecting data on migrant smuggling is

still not a high priority for many countries around the world. Unlike in the case
of human trafficking, there has been perhaps less political pressure on States
to collect data on migrant smuggling. For example, there is no global report
on migrant smuggling similar to the global report on trafficking in persons.
The annual United States Trafficking in Persons (TIP) Report represents an
updated, global look at the nature and scope of trafficking in persons. And is
the U.S. Governments principal diplomatic tool to engage foreign governments
on human trafficking (US Department of State, 2015). While data on human
trafficking remain patchy, the launching of annual global report on trafficking in
persons in 2001 has encouraged many countries to improve their data collection
efforts over the years (Laczko and Gozdziak, 2005). It has been perhaps easier to
encourage States to collect data on human trafficking given its coercive nature;
clearly countries do not wish to see their nationals trafficked against their will.
The same view may not be as clear cut with regard to migrant smuggling, given
that migrants are often viewed as making a voluntary decision to cross borders
with the help of a smuggler in search of a better life (however defined).
Overview of research on migrant smuggling

Research has a useful role to play in enhancing our understanding of
the phenomenon, particularly given the dearth of data on migrant smuggling,
providing insights and analyses that can be highly relevant to policy deliberations.
The research community is often better able to capture migrants perspectives,
including as they relate to understandings of risk, migration decision-making
as well as experiences en route. Researchers generally find it much easier to
gain access to smuggled migrants and smugglers than officials, and are much
better placed to seek their views on aspects of smuggling. As discussed earlier,
researchers can also offer different and broader analyses of smuggling. For
example, many researchers have documented the experiences of smuggled
migrants and the abuses and exploitation they face, providing valuable insights
for policymakers, which may not be gleaned from law enforcement data.
In recent years, a growing number of reports and publications on migrant
smuggling have been released. For example, a recent review in Asia counted
over 150 studies that had been produced in the region (UNODC, 2015). However,
the majority of these studies were small-scale qualitative studies, and only a
small number were based exclusively on quantitative research methods (a small
proportion used mixed methods). Our global review of research on migrant
smuggling confirms that this picture is also typical of research in other regions.
Many studies are conducted with small samples and limited budgets, focusing
on one country, or at best one region. There is a lack of larger-scale comparative
13
research based on surveys of migrants, which can supplement useful qualitative

studies able to get to the detail of smuggling processes that involve economic,
social and cultural aspects but that have more limited applicability to comparative
analysis of smuggling in multiple countries and regions. An interesting exception
has been some of the quantitative research recently conducted in South and
West Asia that surveyed households on international migration, security,
protection and smuggling. As part of a broader focus, this research has usefully
highlighted small but important differences in smuggling processes in different
origin locations in relation to populations at risk of forced migration and migrant
smuggling. For example, in one study involving large-scale surveys of around
12,000 potential migrants (discussed in chapter 9), some populations were
found to have been approached directly by migrant smugglers to a much greater
degree than others (McAuliffe and Jayasuriya, 2016). This would indicate that
some groups are being actively sought out by smugglers, placing them at even
higher risk of smuggling and exploitation.
Through this global review of studies on migrant smuggling, we have been
able to identify an emerging body of evidence, but much of this information
is scattered between countries and across different academic disciplines. It is
difficult to find all the information that policymakers might need in one place.
It is also evident that the volume and type of studies are constantly growing.
This makes it difficult for policymakers to keep up-to-date with the latest global
evidence on the subject of migrant smuggling. Another challenge is that while
many studies may have implications for policy, they are not written in a style that
makes it easy to identify their key policy messages. One of the major advantages
of research that focuses on migrant decision-making and experiences is that
it is migrant-centric rather than State-centric. In seeking to better understand
how migrants think about and decide upon irregular migration and smuggling,
research findings are able to support or refute some of the assumptions made
about migrants behaviour (and anticipated behaviour). While policymakers
have greater access to a wide range of information and data than perhaps ever
before, it is apparent that there still exists a level of presumption about potential
and actual migrant decision-making and experiences, including that there is
heterogeneity of the smuggled migrant and the smuggler. Migration research,
which examines dynamics beyond the transnational crime lens, continues to be
well placed to provide relevant, current and robust information on potential and
actual migrants and their interactions with smugglers and smuggling practices.
As this report highlights, there is considerable information on migrant
smuggling, although of varying quality and utility. Gathering the bulk of studies
on migrant smuggling is no easy task given that there is a considerable grey
literature on the subject. As discussed more fully in the chapter on West Africa
14
1. Report Overview
(chapter 2), grey literature refers to research output that is produced outside
of commercial and academic publishing and distribution channels, often by
government institutions, NGOs, and the private sector (Carling, this volume).
Drawing out the policy implications from such literature can sometimes be
especially challenging. While such studies can provide useful insights, they run
the risk of presenting a distorted picture of realities on the ground, particularly if
research methodologies are not adequate (or even documented).
Another major challenge in studying migrant smuggling is the uneven
nature of the research focus, which is primarily destination country focused.
While this is inevitably linked to research funding, there is a sound case for
conducting research on irregular migration and smuggling that is of particular
relevance to transit, host and origin countries. In chapter 9 on South-East
Asia and Australia, for example, the authors found that much of the research
had been funded by the Government of Australia, and often undertaken by
Australian researchers. In Europe, research funding may be limited to European
researchers, with implications for the development of research capacity within
neighbouring regions. By improving the overall management of migration in
regions, including through the support of safe migration pathways, as well as
support of populations who do not wish to migrate, all countries in a region are
able to benefit. Better accounting for origin, transit and host country research on
smuggling, however, has been hampered by a general lack of research capacity
in developing countries where smuggling occurs. For example, in sub-Saharan
Africa, there are less than 50 researchers for every million persons, compared
with 3,000 for every million people in OECD countries (DFID, 2007). It is perhaps
not surprising therefore that a great deal of research on migrant smuggling is
conducted by researchers based in destination countries in the north. In response
to this challenge, a limited number of regional research centres have been
established in developing countries to support data collection and studies with
local research staff. An interesting example of this type of initiative is the Regional
Mixed Migration Secretariat based in Nairobi (RMMS), which aims to collect
data and conduct research on mixed migratory flows. RMMS Horn of Africa
and Yemen is an inter-agency initiative established by the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees, IOM, Intersos, the Yemen Mixed Migration Taskforce
and the Danish Refugee Council. The establishment of a series of regional centres
for the collection and analysis of policy-relevant data and research on migrant
smuggling would help to build the evidence base in developing countries. Such
centres could be located in transit countries, such as Turkey or Niger where data
and research on migrant smuggling are especially scarce. For example, in Turkey
(chapter 6), research directly on migrant smuggling is very limited. In many
countries, studies of migrant smuggling typically form part of larger research
projects focusing on different aspects of irregular migration and trafficking.
15
Conclusions
Migrant smuggling is a dynamic and evolving phenomenon, and research
and data collection are critical to informing more effective responses aimed at
combating smuggling and protecting migrants. As many of the chapters in this
report show, important research has been undertaken on the transnational
crime aspects of migrant smuggling, including on routes, smuggling organization
(such as criminal networking, facilitation), smuggler profiles and fees/payment.
Likewise, there is an emerging academic literature on migrant smuggling,
particularly the economic and social processes involved in smuggling, which
has largely been based on small-scale qualitative research, mostly undertaken
by early career researchers. Contributions from private research companies, as
well as investigative journalists have provided useful insights in some regions,
helping to shed light on smuggling practices. There remains, however, a sizeable
gap in migration policy research and data, particularly in relation to migration
patterns and processes linked to migrant smuggling, including its impact on
migrants (particularly vulnerability, abuse and exploitation), as well as its impact
on irregular migration flows (increasing scale, diversity and geography).
To develop more effective and sustainable responses to migrant smuggling,
it is crucial that migrant-centric research continues and is expanded; the need to
supplement the critical transnational crime research and data collection focus
has perhaps never been more urgent given the increasing number of deaths of
migrants during smuggling (Brian and Laczko, 2016). Research on how migrants
think about irregular migration and smuggling, not just how they move, are
central to the development of global, regional and national level policies that
are better able to respond to the considerable increase in irregular migration
supported by smuggling. Such research and data would complement existing
information and intelligence on smuggling held by governments, as well as the
research focused on smuggling as a transnational crime and as an economicsociological process. The chapters in this report include a number of suggestions
on how to further build the evidence base on migrant smuggling. The suggestions
have been summarized under the broad headings of new partnerships,
capacity-building and emerging/priority topics.
1. Strengthening research and analysis partnerships
Greater attention to linking knowledge about the social and
economic processes of migrant smuggling with knowledge
of migrant smuggling policy and practice in order to better
understanding how one impacts the other. Ideally, this would
involve forging partnerships between policymakers and researchers
16
1. Report Overview
on aspects of migrant smuggling, including in specific (sub)regions

or in relation to particular groups of migrants or at-risk migrants
(such as unaccompanied minors), including those who have
experienced abuse and exploitation.
Employing partnerships and multi-disciplinary research methods
to further explore the complex dynamics between irregular
migration, migrant smuggling and human trafficking the sharp
distinction drawn in international and national laws risks masking
the blurring that occurs across all three overlapping forms of
migration.
Encouraging greater access to data to facilitate deeper analysis of
existing statistical data and other information that may be held
by States, either through trusted partnership arrangements or
through open access.
2. Supporting capacity-building
Much of the research undertaken and highlighted in the report was
conducted by people from outside the actual region, and there
is recognition that much more needs to be done to strengthen
research capacity and institutions within regions, such as West
Africa, Central Africa and South-East Asia. The establishment
of regional monitoring and analysis units or hubs focusing on
smuggling within the broader context of irregular migration could
play a useful part in regional capacity-building approach while
enhancing data collection efforts.
A greater focus on smuggling from transit and origin country
perspectives, including on the role of corruption in facilitating
movement and shaping the experiences of smuggled migrants.
Assisting transit countries better manage the entry and stay of
people, including through the development of effective migration
policies and practices underpins counter migrant smuggling efforts.
Broader and more consistent use of transnational data reporting
tools such as UNODCs VRS-MSRC and IOMs Displacement
Tracking Matrix (DTM). By gathering data through large-scale
rapid surveys of migrants on the move, the DTM has been able
to gather a considerable amount of information about migrant
smuggling in real time. However, this information sometimes has
to be interpreted with care, as it is often very difficult to draw a
representative sample of irregular migrants. Further enhancement
of DTM offers the potential for a unique data set to be built over
17
time on aspects of smuggling. Its potential as a powerful analytical

tool is considerable.
This report has identified a huge number of studies on migrant
smuggling. This evidence is currently scattered across several
countries and regions. Bringing this information together into a
global database of research and data on migrant smuggling, which
is regularly updated, could help policymakers to draw on the
emerging evidence in a more timely fashion in the future.
3. Focusing on emerging and priority topics for research and data collection
Striking a balance between timely data on irregular migration flows
involving smuggled migrants and methodological rigour needs to
be pursued as a priority. Capturing and reporting data that is not
sufficiently rigorous risks potentially adding to misinformation on
migrant smuggling. Non-traditional sources of migration data
especially Big Data offer new insights into the smuggling process
that have yet to be fully explored. While a growing number of
migration studies have used Big Data to measure population
movements and remittance flows, studies on irregular migration
using Big Data are in their infancy.
More recent efforts to combat migrant smuggling involving
military-led operations, and the deployment of tactical and
strategic elements is likely to open new lines of thought and add
an extra dimension to research and analysis. Of particular focus is
likely to be the effectiveness or otherwise of such efforts at curbing
or stopping smuggling, although the impact on operational staff as
well as migrants is also relevant.
The increase in recent years in humanitarian non-State actors who
may unintentionally be assisting organized criminal smuggling
networks, such as those involved in the development of apps to
help irregular migrants travel, needs to be further explored through
targeted research, as does the potential for assistance to refugees
in avoiding exploitation and abuse at the hands of smugglers.
Migrant-centric research offers different perspectives on
smuggling compared to research and analysis undertaken with
a transnational crime focus, which places greater emphasis
on smugglers operations and practices and less emphasis on
migrants experiences. Assuming an understanding of how
(potential) migrants think about smuggling and irregular migration,
as well as how they may behave is foolhardy but perhaps more
18
1. Report Overview
commonplace than is readily admitted. Robust research is able to

support or refute such assumptions, but there are many aspects
that remain under-researched, including on migration decisionmaking, migrant abuse and exploitation, smuggler marketing
and recruitment practices, the role of transnational connectivity
in smuggling, the risks of smuggled migrants becoming trafficked
victims, as well as the multifaceted reasons why people seek to
migrate irregularly.
References
Anderson, S.
2016 Asylum seeker boat bound for Australia intercepted, people
smuggler jailed in WA, Peter Dutton confirms. ABC News, 21 April.
Available from www.abc.net.au/news/2016-04-21/asylum-seekerboat-bound-for-australia-intercepted/7345274
Andreas, P.
2011 The transformation of migrant smuggling across the US-Mexican
border. In: Global Human Smuggling: Comparative Perspectives
(D. Kyle and R. Koslowksi, eds.). The John Hopkins University Press,
Baltimore.
Brian, T. and F. Laczko (eds.)
2014 Fatal Journeys: Tracking Lives Lost During Migration. International
Organization for Migration (IOM), Geneva. Available from
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countingtheuncounted.pdf
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2015 Beyond Definitions: Global migration and the smugglingtrafficking
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Clarke, J.
2000 The problems of evaluating numbers of illegal migrants in the
European Union. In: Regularisations of Illegal Immigrants in the
European Union (P. de Bruycker, ed.). Bruylant, Brussels.
Department for International Development (DFID)
2007 DFID Research Strategy 2008-2013. Working Paper on Capacity
Building. DFID, London.
Doomernik, J.
2001 Migrant Trafficking and Human Smuggling in Europe. A Review of
the Evidence with Case Studies from Hungary, Poland and Ukraine
(Book Reviews). International Migration Review 35.3, pp. 948950.
European Commission
2015 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament,
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee of the
Regions: EU Action Plan against migrant smuggling (20152020).
European Commission, Brussels.
European Parliament
2016 Fit for purpose? The Facilitation Directive and the criminalisation of
humanitarian assistance to irregular migrants. Study commissioned
by the European Parliaments Policy Department for Citizens Rights
and Constitutional Affairs. Available from www.europarl.europa.
eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/536490/IPOL_STU(2016)536490_
EN.pdf
Europol
2016 Migrant smuggling in the EU, February 2016. Europol, Hague.
Available
from
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Frontex
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Quarterly Risk Analysis Reports. Frontex, Warsaw.
de Haas, H.
2011 The determinants of international migration: Conceptualising policy,
origin and destination effects. International Migration Institute (IMI)
Working Paper 32. IMI, Oxford.
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International Organization for Migration (IOM)

2016 Missing Migrants project. Available from http://missingmigrants.
iom.int/
Jayasuriya, D.
2014 Drivers of irregular and regular migration from Sri Lanka: Evidence
from a large scale survey. Research Programme, Occasional Paper
Series no. 9. Department of Immigration and Border Protection,
Government of Australia.
Jayasuriya, D., M. McAuliffe and M. Iqbal
2016 The dynamic nature of migration aspirations: Findings from a
longitudinal study of households in Sri Lanka. Research Programme,
Occasional Paper Series no. 20. Department of Immigration and
Border Protection, Government of Australia.
Koser, K.
2010 Dimensions and dynamics of irregular migration. Population, Space
and Place 16, 181193.
2011 The smuggling of refugees. In: Global Human Smuggling:
Comparative Perspectives (D. Kyle and R. Koslowksi, eds.). The John
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, pp. 256272.
Kraler, A. and D. Reichel
2011 Measuring irregular migration and population flows What available
data can tell. International Migration, 49(5):97128.
Kyle, D. and Z. Liang
2001 Migration Merchants: Human Smuggling from Ecuador and China.
Working Paper No. 43. Center for Comparative Immigration Studies,
University of California at Davis.
Kyle, D. and R. Koslowksi (eds.)
2011 Global Human Smuggling: Comparative Perspectives. The John
Hopkins University Press, Baltimore.
Laczko, F. and E. Gozdziak (eds.)
2005 Data and research on human trafficking: A global survey. IOM,
Geneva. Available from http://publications.iom.int/system/files/
pdf/global_survey.pdf

21
Laczko, F. and M. Rango

2014 Can Big Data help us achieve a migration data revolution? Migration
Policy Practice, IV(2):2029. Available from http://publications.iom.
int/system/files/pdf/mpp16_24june2014.pdf
McAuliffe, M.
2013 Seeking the views of irregular migrants: Decision making, drivers
and migration journeys. Irregular Migration Research Programme.
2016 How transnational connectivity is shaping irregular migration:
Insights for migration policy and practice from the 2015 irregular
migration flows to Europe. Migration Policy Practice, VI(1):410.
Available
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Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. International Migration,
54(4):4459.
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2015 Unintended consequences: How migrant smugglers are exploiting
the international protection system. Advance, Winter 2015: 3033.
Australian National University (ANU), Canberra.
McAuliffe, M. and V. Mence
2014 Non-state Actors, Networks and Irregular Migration. Paper prepared
for the ANU-DIBP 2014 High-Level Strategic Discussions on Future
Migration Challenges (unpublished).
Monsutti, A.
2005 War and Migration: Social Networks and Economic Strategies of the
Hazaras of Afghanistan. Routledge, New York.
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2015 Corruption and the smuggling of refugees. OECD Directorate for
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2015 Migrant Smuggling in Asia: Current Trends and Related Challenges.
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2015 Trafficking in Persons Report, July 2015. Available from www.state.
gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2015/

23
van Liempt, I. and J. Doomernik

2006 Migrants agency in the smuggling process: The perspectives of
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Journal of Migration and Border Studies (forthcoming).
24
1. Report Overview
2
WEST AND CENTRAL AFRICA
Jrgen Carling
Introduction
West and Central Africa is a major source region of unauthorized
migration. Trucks overloaded with migrants, rushing north along the sandy roads
of the Sahara, have become iconic images of international migrant smuggling.
This particular flow is important, but only one aspect of a complex and poorly
documented landscape of migrant smuggling from West and Central Africa.
As in other parts of the world, migrant smuggling involves a range of
activities that are less conspicuous than the dramatic journeys across deserts
and seas. In particular, much unauthorized migration takes place on regular
international flights, but is facilitated by documents that are falsified, abused
or unlawfully obtained. But there is also a particular geographical circumstance
that makes migrant smuggling in this region elusive: the area of free movement
within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The majority
of West Africans who are smuggled overland start their journeys under the
provisions for free movement and violate immigration regulations only upon
leaving the ECOWAS area.3
The external borders of ECOWAS run primarily through areas that
are sparsely populated, politically unstable, and marked by general security
deficiencies (Map 2.1). One indication of this geography of insecurity is provided
by the travel advice issued by the Governments of France and the United
Kingdom. As shown on the map, this advice currently warns against all travel
to most of the Sahara and many other areas of West and Central Africa.4 In
other words, the highly populated areas from which most migrants originate are
almost completely encircled by a territory deemed too insecure for travelling.
3
4
There are limits to mobility within the ECOWAS area that may modify this general picture.
While the advice is issued specifically for citizens of the two countries, it reflects the general security
situation in the areas affected. The advice warns against all but essential travel to a larger area, including all
of Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Nigeria.

25
The fact that overland migrant smuggling out of the ECOWAS area
happens in remote and insecure areas has three important implications. First,
the limited government presence and control facilitates smuggling. Second,
the general insecurity, coupled with harsh environmental conditions, increases
migrant vulnerability. Third, the travel warnings limit possibilities for collecting
data and carrying out research. For instance, many universities in Europe and
North America would not allow students or faculty to carry out research in areas
covered by such warnings.
The countries of West and Central Africa differ in their capacity and
dedication to migration management, but the relevant international legal
frameworks are widely supported. The 2000 Protocol against the Smuggling
of Migrants has been signed by every country except Chad, Cte dIvoire and
Gabon.5 Without exception, countries in the region have signed the following:
(a) 2000 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons,
especially Women and Children; (b) 1951 Convention relating to the Status of
Refugees; and (c) 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.
This chapter broadly covers the countries of IOMs West and Central Africa
region, from Cabo Verde and Mauritania in the west to the Republic of the Congo
in the south. However, the western areas of Angola and the Democratic Republic
of the Congo can be said to be part of the same migration system and are also
included where relevant. Particular routes and practices of migrant smuggling
from West Africa are continuously shifting, but there is also a strong element
of continuity, especially in the period since the 1990s. Although the emphasis
here is on research from the past decade, older publications remain relevant to
understanding the dynamics of migrant smuggling in the region.
In the Francophone parts of the region, the key term for smuggler is the
French equivalent passeur. The term convoyeur is also used (Andersson, 2014b;
Daniel, 2008). In Anglophone West Africa, a smuggler is often referred to as a
connection man, a term that alludes to the smugglers role as a service provider
with particular networks and skills (Carling, 2006; Lucht, 2013). In the Gambia,
where unauthorized migration to Europe has reached extraordinary intensity,
this mode of migration is known as the back way to Europe (Chant, 2015; Jagne,
2014).
Among the signatories, the Republic of the Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Guinea-Bissau have not ratified the
convention.
26
2. West and Central Africa
Map 2.1: Map of West and Central Africa
Source: Carling, 2016.
Overview of migrant smuggling in the region

The primary overseas destination for migrant smuggling from West and
Central Africa is Europe. There are also important flows to the Americas, Asia and
other parts of Africa, as well as within the region. The number of West Africans
being smuggled to Europe is impossible to determine with certainty, but certain
indications are available. In 2014, almost 60,000 sub-Saharan Africans were
apprehended as undocumented entrants at Europes external borders (Frontex,
2015). Many originated from the Horn of Africa, but more than half were from
West and Central Africa. In the same year, 73,000 West and Central Africans
applied for asylum in Europe. These numbers indicate that many West and

27
Central African asylum seekers entered Europe either without being smuggled
or without being detected.
The West and Central African experience brings out the truly multifaceted
nature of migrant smuggling. Rather than thinking of routes as trajectories
on a map, it is appropriate to approach the diversity of smuggling as a series of
modes of migration with both geographical and organization aspects (cf. Carling,
2002). Migrants from West and Central Africa typically need to cross many
borders to reach their desired destination, and each border can be crossed in a
number of ways:
Visa-free entry under provisions for free movement of persons.
This is the form of mobility allowed under ECOWAS provisions,
and which generally takes place without the services of smugglers.
However, smugglers play a role in providing ECOWAS passports to
non-ECOWAS citizens to allow for mobility through West Africa en
route to Europe. Facilitators also organize parts of the journey for
ECOWAS nationals that do not involve smuggling (Daniel, 2008).
Visa-free entry under country-specific regulations. Migration
trajectories can make use of country-specific provisions for visafree entry to transit countries. For instance, citizens of Cameroon
which is not an ECOWAS member can travel without a visa
to Nigeria and Mali. And Malian citizens enjoy visa-free entry to
Algeria. Such provisions are used legally but also create a black
market for passports (ibid.).
Entry with short-term visa. Visas for business, family visits or other
short-term purposes can play a role in migration trajectories that
also involve smuggling. Legally obtained visas can provide access
to transit countries. For instance, visas to Portugal have been
important transit point for Angolans who later travelled onwards
to the Netherlands to seek asylum (Van Wijk, 2007). Visas from
West and Central Africa to countries of destination or transit are
also often obtained in unlawful ways, with or without the help
of professional smugglers (kesson, 2013; Alpes, 2014a; Altai
Consulting, 2013; Burrell, 2012a).
Unauthorized crossing of land borders between border crossing
points. This is the prototypical form of migrant smuggling,
exemplified by overloaded trucks crossing the Sahara. While such
unauthorized entry happens on foot in other parts of the world,
this is virtually unthinkable along most of the external borders of
ECOWAS. Unauthorized border crossings in the Sahara involve long
28
distances in sparsely populated areas with extreme environmental

conditions. Fatalities are frequent, but their number is unknown
(Altai Consulting, 2015a; Horwood and Malakooti, 2014).
Bribery-facilitated unauthorized entry. Corruption plays a key role
in migrant smuggling also in West and Central Africa. Even if the
actual crossing of a border takes place between border crossing
points, smugglers and their passengers will often have to pass
military or police checkpoints on the way. Possibilities for paying
ones way out of these situations even if the purpose of the
journey is obvious can be decisive for the smuggling enterprise
(Adepoju, 2011; Cherti, Pennington and Grant, 2013; Daniel, 2008;
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2013).
Unauthorized boat migration. Overland smuggling from West and
Central Africa to Europe usually proceeds with a crossing of the
Mediterranean by boat. In the recent past, boat migration directly
from West Africa to the Canary Islands has also been an important
mode of migration (Hernndez-Carretero and Carling, 2012).
Overland smuggling routes run north across the Sahara, in a network of
trajectories that stretches from Mauritania in the west to Chad in the east (Altai
Consulting, 2013; Carling, 2007b; de Haas, 2008; Frontex, 2014a; Pliez, 2011).
The relative prominence of different trajectories continuously shifts in response
to a host of factors, including crises in countries of origin, political unrest in
transit countries, anti-smuggling measures, and the migration and asylum
policies of Schengen countries along the external border. The overall structure
of northbound trajectories is nevertheless well-established.
Many journeys pass through West Africas northernmost capital cities,
Nouakchott, Bamako, Ouagadougou and Niamey. These are all large cities with
diverse economies, where smuggling plays a marginal role. One step further,
however, are hubs that have often served as trans-Saharan trading posts for
centuries, including Agadez, Arlit, Dirkou and Gao. In these towns, migrant
smuggling has become a significant part of the economy. Such specialized hubs
are a particular feature of geography of migrant smuggling in the Sahel and
Sahara. Foremost among them is Agadez in Central Niger, where trajectories from
across West Africa converge. This is also a city where migrants chose between
onward routes that fan out and lead towards either Spain or Italy (Bomono,
2011; Brachet, 2005a, 2005b; European Commission, 2015; Kuschminder et al.,
2015; Pliez, 2011). The cost of overland smuggling from West and Central Africa
to the North African coast ranges from USD 100 to USD 1,000 (Altai Consulting,
2013, 2015a).

29
In the 1990s and 2000s, West and Central Africans who were smuggled to
Europe often became illegal residents. Many were apprehended, but released
from detention with an expulsion order before the authorities were able to
arrange readmission to the country of origin (Carling, 2007a). Today, a much
larger proportion of West and Central Africans who are smuggled to Europe
apply for asylum. The majority have their applications rejected, but a substantial
minority are given protection in Europe. In 2015, that proportion was 29 per cent
for West and Central Africans in total (Eurostat, 2016). In other words, smuggling
has two very different outcomes. On the one hand, it leads many people down
a dead-end path to failed asylum applications, empty-handed return or illegal
residence in Europe. On the other hand, smuggling provides access to protection
for a large number of people who have a well-founded fear of persecution or
otherwise qualify for humanitarian protection.
The hardships and dangers of overland migration through the Sahara
are unquestionable, even if numbers on fatalities, assaults and other forms of
exploitation are unavailable. Indeed, some migrants fear the Sahara more than
the subsequent crossing of the Mediterranean. Anthropologist Hans Lucht (2011)
presents four cases of Ghanaians who travel north from Agadez, recounting
their experiences of robbery, deaths and the fight for water. The dangers of the
journey result not only from the smugglers disregard for migrants welfare, but
also from the presence of armed robbers and the risk of getting lost in the desert
(Altai Consulting, 2013; Carling et al., 2015; Lucht, 2011; Triulzi, 2013).
Review of data on migrant smuggling

Publicly available data on migrant smuggling in West and Central Africa is
extremely scarce. This is partly a consequence of the geographical circumstances
described in the introduction to this chapter: many journeys involve smuggling
only upon departure from the region. Systematic data collection on migrants who
are smuggled out of West and Central Africa is therefore primarily carried out
elsewhere, such as at the external borders of the Schengen area (e.g. Frontex,
2015). The data sources described in the chapters on Europe and North Africa
are particularly relevant for smuggling from West and Central Africa.
There are essentially three types of data that can be valuable as a public
resource. The first is aggregate statistics, such as time series or cross-national
comparisons. Tables that present interceptions of unauthorized migrants by
nationality, year or location are a case in point. For instance, Frontex publishes
data on the number of unauthorized entries detected at external borders,
separated by land borders, sea borders and border crossing points and broken
30
down by nationality.6 These entries do not all result from smuggling, but in the
case of West and Central Africans, it is safe to assume that the vast majority of
entrants have been assisted by smugglers. Table 2.1 exemplifies this type of data.
Data of this type is evidently valuable but almost always comes with
limitations. In particular, data is typically selected or aggregated in ways that
make sense in a particular publishing context, but may limit the potential for
analysis and secondary use. For instance, the border crossing data produced by
Frontex is published in the form of tables of top 10 nationalities with the result
that time series are interrupted. So although the type of data displayed in Table
2.1 is published as far back as 2008, the time series for these four nationalities
cannot be extended backwards because other nationalities happened to be
more numerous in previous years.
Similarly, the Frontex data exemplifies the problem that, in data by
nationality, smaller countries tend to be merged in large residual category of
other nationalities. The analytical value of the data is then reduced, especially
for West and Central Africa. Migration from this region is spread across a large
number of countries of origin, many of which have small populations. So even
if unauthorized migration is proportionally much more important in Mauritania
and Guinea than in Nigeria, for instance, the two former countries will be hidden
from view, buried in a residual category. This approach to data management and
publication reflects the destination-country bias with which most migration data
is collected and published.
Table 2.1: Detected unauthorized border crossings between border crossing points at the
external sea borders of the European Union, by nationality, 20102014
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014*
Nigeria
196
6,380
575
2,870
8,490
Gambia (the)
125
511
514
2,722
8,642
Mali
23
2,484
422
2,236
9,789
Senegal
10
453
145
1,391
4,769
Source: Frontex, 2014b, 2015. Only nationalities from West and Central Africa that are among the
top 10 nationalities are included.
Note:
*Data for 2014 includes 26,341 unspecified sub-Saharan nationals, which may include
nationals of the four countries listed here.
Summary statistics are sometimes on the borderline of what can be

considered data. Many of the published numbers relating to migrant smuggling
6
Frontex refers to entries as illegal, which can be disputed in the case of persons entering in order to seek
asylum. The term unauthorized is therefore used here.

31
in West and Central Africa are rather a handful of data points. For instance,
Massalaki (2015) reports that, according to UNODC, up to 4,000 migrants can
pass through Agadez, Niger, every week. The year before, the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees estimated that the weekly number of migrants
passing through Northern Niger on their way to Libya is 7501,000 (UNHCR,
2014). Although these are both estimates, it is hard to say how much of the
difference can be attributed to an actual increase in migration. The two estimates
are not exactly comparable in their geographical reference point, and there
may be methodological differences in how the estimates were produced. This
example illustrates the point that a call for more data on migrant smuggling is not
simply a call for more numbers, but rather, for numbers that are systematically
collected in a comparative way and made public together with the underlying
methodology, definitions and assumptions.
Data on asylum represents an important resource, but with limitations.
These data are collected, processed and distributed more systematically than
any other statistical information related to smuggling. However, the relationship
between smuggling and asylum is only partial; not all smuggled migrants apply
for asylum, and not all asylum seekers have been smuggled. Still, asylum statistics
are valuable for making cross-national comparisons in West and Central Africa.
Figure 2.1 displays the peak annual number of asylum applications
launched in Europe by African citizens from 2008 to 2014.7 The figure makes
cross-country comparisons with two perspectives: (a) how prominent was each
nationality from the Europe point of view; and (b) how important was asylum
migration to Europe from an origin-country point of view. The figure includes all
countries in Africa, but only the ones in West and Central Africa are labelled. The
vertical axis represents the absolute number of applications. Nigerians, Malians
and Gambians stand out with more than 10,000 applications from each in their
respective peak years. The horizontal axis expresses the number of applications
relative to the resident population in the country of origin. Among the countries
in West and Central Africa, the Gambia is in a league of its own in terms of
the intensity of asylum migration. Next in line are Mali, Guinea, Mauritania and
Guinea-Bissau. With the exception of Mali, these countries of origin receive
little attention in a media and policy landscape that is focused on the absolute
number of arrivals from a receiving-country perspective.
The number of applications fluctuates from year to year, and the peaks can have greater analytical value
than the averages.
32
Figure 2.1: Asylum applications launched in Europe by African citizens, maximum annual figure by
country of citizenship, 20082014
Source: UNHCR (asylum applications) and World Bank (population).
Moving on from summary statistics, the second form of data to consider

is primary survey data. Primary here implies that the data is available in its most
detailed form before any aggregation or analysis. For survey data, this implies
data sets containing all the individual responses, possibly with modifications to
ensure anonymity.

33
There are apparently no large-scale surveys that specifically address

migrant smuggling in West and Central Africa. However, several more general
surveys on migration include one or more questions related to smuggling. Primary
among these are the data sets from the project Migrations between Africa and
Europe (MAFE), led by the Institut national dtudes dmographiques (INED) in
France (Beauchemin et al., 2014). The project team conducted interviews with
representative samples of about 1,500 individuals (non-migrants and return
migrants) in selected regions of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ghana
and Senegal. In addition, 300 Congolese, 300 Ghanaians and 450 Senegalese were
interviewed in Europe. The detailed migration histories include specification of
whether or not the migrant travelled with a smuggler.
The MAFE project stands out not only by virtue of the scope and quality
of the data, but also by the commitment to data sharing. The various data sets
from the projects are available online, accompanied by a detailed guide that
facilitates their use (ibid.). Professional funders of academic research often have
requirements for making data publicly available after an embargo period. This
is the case with the European Commission, which funded the MAFE project.
But other agencies that commission or fund research typically have no such
requirements. Consequently, a large part of the data that is collected remains
inaccessible to other analysts.
This is unfortunate for several reasons. First, when there is no
secondary use of the data, there is a risk that the time and goodwill of survey
respondents do not produce new insights to the extent that would have been
possible. Second, the conclusions drawn by the people who conducted the
research are not supplemented by independent and critical scrutiny. This is
particularly problematic when the authors have limited technical expertise on
survey methodology or work for organizations with particular agendas. These
limitations often apply to the so-called grey literature, which accounts for much
of the available documentation of migrant smuggling in West and Central Africa.
Finally, the research contributions to policy are not fully realized when the data
cannot be re-analysed with additional perspectives or research questions. In the
case of the MAFE project, the question on smuggling has not been examined in
any of the project teams many publications, but this possibility is available to
others because of the data sharing.
In addition to summary statistics and primary survey data sets, data on
migrant smuggling could be made available in the form of in-depth interview
transcripts or other qualitative data. Requirements for data sharing are
increasingly also applied to such data, but this involves considerable ethical and
methodological challenges. Whereas survey data can easily be anonymized,
34
qualitative data often contain detailed descriptions that render individuals

identifiable, even if names of persons and places are removed. The confidentiality
of informants is therefore ensured in the writing process. Qualitative research
plays an essential role in understanding migrant smuggling in West and Central
Africa, but in the form of published work rather than as raw data.
Box 2.1: Facing the risks of being smuggled
Migrants who are smuggled face considerable danger: fatalities are a common theme across
news media, grey literature and academic publications about migrant smuggling (e.g. Brian
and Laczko, 2014; Spijkerboer, 2007; Carling, 2007a). When the risks are so great, why do
migrants resort to being smuggled? This question became prominent in West Africa in 2006,
when a new migration route directly to the Canary Islands emerged. Thousands of migrants
left Senegal and other countries on the West African coast in small wooden boats known
as pirogues and spent a week or more at sea before reaching the Spanish archipelago. The
media reported horror stories of death by starvation or drowning after engines failed or boats
capsized. One pirogue was washed ashore in Barbados, on the other side of the Atlantic, with
11 desiccated corpses on board.
Hernndez-Carretero and Carling (2012) examined how would-be migrants in Senegal related
to the risks of pirogue migration. While some factors were specific to this form of boat
migration, several psychological mechanisms could hold true for the risks of smuggling more
generally.8
Ignorance: Some migrants were apparently unaware of the dangers that awaited them, but
they appear to be a small minority. The rule here, as elsewhere, seemed to be that migrants
knew very well that they were doing something potentially dangerous (cf. Sheridan, 2009).
Avoidance: Prior to departure, some migrants expressly rejected thinking or asking about
potential negative outcomes, instead focusing on the possibilities of life in Europe. Such
behaviour is an understandable psychological defence mechanism.
Discrediting: Much of the information about the dangers of migration came from government
sources and campaigns. Some prospective migrants discredited the information by pointing to
the governments agenda of dissuading people from boarding the boats.
Distancing: Others acknowledged the risks as genuine, but distanced themselves from the
danger by pointing out that others were more at risk. In particular, many prospective migrants
held that the journey was dangerous for people from the inland who were not used to the sea,
but not for people who had grown up in fishing communities.
Minimization: Prospective migrants pointed to a number of strategies for reducing the risk,
ranging from bringing a backup GPS device to obtaining spiritual protection. All such measures
reduce the sense of powerlessness in the face of danger.
The headings that are used for the different mechanisms are developed for this report and not taken from
the original source.

35
Faith: Religious faith helped overcome fear among prospective migrants in Senegal. As one
of Hernndez-Carretero and Carlings informants expressed it, if you are fearful, then you
disbelieve God (2012:415). The particular belief that ones time of death is predetermined at
birth made fear of dying on the way to Spain irrelevant.
Bravery: Most prospective migrants sought to escape a feeling of social stagnation and
hopelessness. Risking a journey to Europe was seen as a sign of determination and taking
responsibility for oneself and ones family. The fact that this demanded courage did not make
it less admirable.
Realism: Prospective migrants were aware that many others had faced the dangers, succeeded,
and managed to improve the lives of their families. In light of the probability of different
outcomes, taking the risk was for many a rational choice.
The flow of pirogues from West Africa to the Canary Islands eventually ceased, partly as a
result of speedy returns. Migrants from coastal West Africa continue to leave for Europe, but
primarily travel overland to Libya and then cross the Mediterranean to Italy.
Review of migrant smuggling research

Much of the research on smuggling of West and Central Africans has been
conducted outside the region, especially in North Africa and Southern Europe.
Research in those regions is covered in other chapters of this report.
Research on migrant smuggling within West and Central Africa can be
divided into three main types, which will be discussed in turn: (a) investigative
journalism; (b) grey literature; and (c) academic research. Across the three types
of publication, the prominence of smuggling and smugglers varies. There are
few studies that explicitly address smuggling, but a large number that examine
irregular migration more broadly and include information about the nature
of smuggling. Most research focuses on the migrant journey in one way or
another, either by following one or more migrants en route (Andersson, 2014b;
Lucht, 2011; Schapendonk, 2011; Schapendonk and Steel, 2014), focusing on
particular transit towns and cities (Hinshaw and Parkinson, 2015; Pliez, 2011;
Smith, 2015), or taking more of a birds-eye view of migration routes (Bredeloup
and Pliez, 2005; Kuschminder, de Bresser and Siegel, 2015). There is a smaller
body of research that examines the various forms of brokerage and fraud related
to migration documents (kesson, 2013; Alpes, 2013b; Alpes and Spire, 2014;
Gaibazzi, 2014; Landinfo, 2012; Piot, 2010b). Some of the broader research
on contemporary society in the region also yields insights on the facilitation of
unauthorized migration. Examples include Emmanuel Grgoires (2010) study of
Tuaregs in Niger and Jenna Burrells (2012b) study of Internet use in Ghana.
36
Investigative journalism
A substantial part of research on migrant smuggling in West and Central
Africa has been conducted by investigative journalists. This is not surprising, since
the combination of human drama and political urgency has great journalistic
appeal. Several journalists have covered African migration issues for news media
for a number of years and subsequently written a book about the subject (e.g.
Daniel, 2008; Gatti, 2008; Liberti, 2011).
The French-Beninese journalist Serge Daniel wrote the book Les routes
clandestines: lAfrique des immigrs et des passeurs (2008) on the basis of four
years of research in 15 countries and a voyage of several months that took him
from Lagos to Ceuta, passing through Lom, Accra, Gao, Kidal and Tamanrasset.
His work stands out not just because of its thoroughness, but also because
he is born and raised in West Africa. Most other researchers and journalists
whose work on West and Central African migrant smuggling has reached an
international audience are European or North American.
The research that fits the label investigative journalism gains strength
from the emphasis on physical presence and first-hand accounts, even in harsh
and dangerous environments. For instance, journalists have recently files indepth reports on migrant smuggling in Gao (Smith, 2015) and Agadez (Hinshaw
and Parkinson, 2015), inside areas covered by the most severe travel warnings
(cf. Map 2.1). Published pieces often combine reporting on the ground with
contextual information gathered from experts of various kinds, such as local
officials, non-governmental organization (NGO) workers, community leaders
and academics, for instance.
A potential weakness of journalistic accounts of migrant smuggling is that
poorly grounded affirmations from these experts become reproduced as factual
truths after they are published in reputable news outlets. Many accounts also
suffer from inaccuracy and sensationalist leanings. For instance, many journalists
even in leading news organizations, such as the BBC, New York Times, Reuters
and Wall Street Journal confuse trafficking and smuggling. The pressure on
news media to cut costs and vie for attention in an overcrowded digital universe
could harm the quality of coverage on migrant smuggling. The most valuable
contributions to date have come from a combination of expensive on-site
reporting and accumulated in-depth expertise that is increasingly difficult to
sustain.

37
Grey literature
The term grey literature generally refers to research output that is
produced outside of commercial and academic publishing and distribution
channels, often by government institutions, NGOs or the private sector. On the
topic of migrant smuggling from West and Central Africa, this type of literature
includes a number of reports produced or commissioned by intergovernmental
organizations (Altai Consulting, 2013, 2015a, 2015b; Barrios, 2015; Cherti,
Pennington and Grant, 2013; Marie, 2004; European Commission, 2015; Finnish
Immigration Service Country Information Service, 2015; Frontex, 2014a; Global
Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2014; IOM, 2013, 2014; Reitano
and Tinti, 2015; Shelley, 2014; UNODC, 2013). The authors who include staff,
consultants and academics are in some cases identified and in other cases
obscured by institutional authorship. These studies are often written with policy
agendas in mind and valued for their policy relevance. They tend to focus on
empirical documentation and sometimes have a limited shelf life.
The quality of the grey literature on migrant smuggling varies enormously.
Many studies provide excellent and accessible overviews. However, a widespread
weakness is that research methodology is poorly documented. The missing
documentation makes it difficult to interpret the results, and leaves open the
possibility of methodological flaws. Whereas academic publications are subject
to critical scrutiny through anonymous peer review, there is no corresponding,
consistently applied mechanism for quality assurance of the grey literature.
The close ties between grey literature and policy processes create both
benefits and challenges. Grey literature can provide timely input to evidencebased policy. For instance, Horwood and Malakooti (2014) draw attention to
fatalities of African migrants in the Sahara, showing that measures to reduce
fatalities need to reach beyond Europes external borders. Challenges can occur
when grey literature is tied to specific policy agendas and selective perspectives
and interpretations produce biased conclusions.
The grey literature has an image of being technical and objective, with
report as the standard genre. However, such reports can also be tendentious.
For instance, one recent report on migrant smuggling from Africa to Europe
makes the assertion that a far more violent and ruthless smuggling industry
has emerged and illustrates it with a drawing of a masked man wielding a knife
above a person who is kneeling with hands tied behind the back (Reitano and
Tinti, 2015:12). The image is clearly inspired by the execution videos released by
the Islamic State in 2014 and 2015, and connections between migrant smuggling
38
and terrorism are mentioned in the text. But the insinuation that smugglers are
now beheading their clients remains unsubstantiated.
Grey literature is, by definition, flexible in format and content. This
flexibility can be used to great effect in documentation of migrant smuggling
experiences. Hagen-Zanker and Mallett (2016), for instance, combine illustrative
primary research, solid ties with the academic literature, and excellent research
communication in their report on migrant journeys to Europe. Migration from
Senegal, usually by means of smugglers, is one of the foci in the report.
Academic research
Boundaries between the literatures are blurred, since much of the grey
literature is written by academics, and some academic publications provide
summary overviews akin to grey literature reports. The focus in this section is
on original peer-reviewed research, which is a work that draws upon primary
data and has been subject to the quality assurance mechanisms of academic
publishing.
The bulk of academic research on migrant smuggling from West and
Central Africa uses ethnographic methods and analyses the experiences and
perspectives of migrants and their communities of origin. It is carried out
primarily by anthropologists, with a smaller number of geographers, sociologists
and interdisciplinary Africa specialists. The resulting literature falls into four
broad groups.
First, a number of recent studies have employed multisite fieldwork
along smuggling routes from West and Central Africa towards Europe. Ruben
Andersson (2014a, 2015b) and Joris Schapendonk (2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2007,
2014) have both followed migration routes from Senegal via Morocco to Europe.
Hans Lucht (2011, 2013) have traced routes from Ghana to Italy, and, in ongoing
research, Line Richter (2015) is following Malian migrants through the Maghreb.
A contrast to these trans-Saharan journeys is provided by Pilar Uriarte Blsamo
(2009), who examined clandestine journeys on cargo ships from West Africa to
South America, based on fieldwork in Argentina, Ghana, Nigeria, Uruguay and
Venezuela.
A second strand of ethnographic research examines the experiences
of West and Central African migrants at transit points on the way to Europe.
Examples include Kristin Kastners (2009, 2013, 2014) research among Nigerians
in the Gibraltar region, Brigitte Suters research among Africans in Istanbul
(2012a, 2012b, 2013) and Choplin and Lombards (2009, 2013) research on
39
stranded sub-Saharan Africans in Mauritania. The concentration of migrants in

these locations reflects the fragmentation of journeys that depend wholly or
partly on smuggling (cf. Collyer, 2007).
A third set of studies focus on societies of origin, where facilitators arrange
for migration on regular international flights, and where overland or maritime
journeys start. These studies shed light on the organization of smuggling, as well
as the motivations of smuggled migrants (e.g. Gaibazzi, 2012, 2013; HernndezCarretero and Carling, 2012; Vigh, 2009). The work of Maybritt Jill Alpes in
Anglophone Cameroon has been important to understanding how prospective
migrants and brokers navigate the regulatory dynamics of emigration (Alpes,
2012, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2014a, 2014b; Alpes and Spire, 2014). Her work
is part of a larger, global line of research that examines migration brokerage,
recognizing that the essence of such services is independent of the legal status
of particular practices (cf. Lindquist, Xiang and Yeoh, 2012). Charles Piot (2010a,
2010b) provides another in-depth view of the social dynamics of migration
documents in West and Central Africa. Based on long-term fieldwork in Togo,
he examines how people play the US Diversity Visa Lottery in semi-legal ways.
The quest for visas is also examined by Lisa kesson (2013) in Cabo Verde, Cati
Coe (2013) in Ghana, and Paolo Gaibazzi (2014) in the Gambia. Complementary
institutional perspectives on migration documents in West Africa are provided
by Francesca Zampagni (2011) in Senegal and Pieter Boeles (2003) in Ghana and
Nigeria.
A fourth body of research examines the transnational families and
networks of West and Central Africans. Facilitation of unauthorized migration
is a minor theme, but emerges, for instance, in the work of Beth Buggenhagen
(2012) on transnational Senegalese families and Valentina Mazzucato (2008) on
transnational ties between Ghana and the Netherlands.
Migration documents play different, but still important roles for migration
within Africa. Again, this is rarely a major theme in the literature, but is addressed,
for instance, in Bruce Whitehouses (2012) research on West Africans in Congo
and Jesper Bjarnesens (2013) examination of migration between Burkina
Faso and Cte dIvoire. Whitehouse shows how the prevalence of corruption
undermines the legality of migration within Africa. Immigrants who were
intercepted on the street in Brazzaville were often told by the police that we
dont eat paper and consequently concluded that the expense of a permit was
a poor investment. Similarly, legal circulation within ECOWAS is often impeded
by rent-seeking officials (Lucht, 2011).
40
Ethnographic research and policy relevance

Much of this reports insight into migrant smuggling in West and Central
Africa comes from ethnographic research. Such research typically involves a
triangular relationship between researchers, their research informants and
policymakers (Figure 2.2). The dynamics of this three-way relationship have
decisive implications for the nature of research on migrant smuggling in West
and Central Africa. Informants are the individuals who provide researchers
with information through interviews or otherwise and who are directly
implicated in the processes under study.9 In the case of research on migrant
smuggling, informants could be migrants, prospective migrants and smugglers.
Before any information can be obtained, however, the researcher needs access
to informants. Undocumented migration and migrant smuggling are sensitive
topics, and obtaining access is closely connected to building trust (Bilger and van
Liempt, 2009; Kastner, 2014).
Figure 2.2: The triangular relationship between researchers, informants and policymakers in
ethnographic research
Source: Carling, 2016.
Research on migrant smuggling can be valuable to policymakers,

either in the form of analysis of the dynamics at work, or as explicit policy
recommendations.10 But the policies that are developed and implemented
will often affect the informants, if not at the individual level, then by targeting
the same group. For instance, research that draws on smugglers as informants
Researchers differ with respect to their preferred terminology; informants are sometimes referred to as
research participants, or, if interviewees are the primary data collection methods, as interviewees.
10
Policymakers is a shorthand term for individuals and organizations that develop and implement policy.
9

41
could inform anti-smuggling policies and in turn harm the people who make the
research possible. The same applies to research with asylum seekers and other
migrants who have depended on smugglers to reach their destination; research
findings could inform counter-smuggling measures that hurt future migrants by
making journeys more dangerous or costly.
These connections between ethnographic research and policy create
ethical and methodological challenges. It is difficult to gain access if informants
perceive that the outcome of research is not in their interest. And concealing
such implications can contravene ethical guidelines and convictions. Much of
the ethnographic research on unauthorized migration from West and Central
Africa stems from months or years of building relationships with individuals
and communities, and researchers are understandably wary of betraying that
trust. Researchers manage obligations to their informants first and foremost
by ensuring the confidentiality of individuals (and sometimes locations). It
is difficult to tell whether findings are also presented selectively so that they
do not facilitate the containment of migration. Because ethnographers often
sympathize with their informants, there is a fine balance between research
ethics and politically motivated self-censorship.
Many ethnographers working in West and Central Africa would probably
be pleased to contribute to policies aimed at reducing migrant vulnerability.
However, it is a concern that anti-smuggling measures have sometimes been
justified with reference to migrant protection, even when the primary objective
is to contain asylum seekers and other migrants against their will (Carling and
Hernndez-Carretero, 2011; Crpeau, 2003; Horsti, 2012).
Besides the issues of distrust and contrasting agendas, exchanges
between ethnographic and policy communities are sometimes constrained
by communication gaps that neither side is able to bridge. Policymakers may
struggle to see the relevance of microlevel analyses, and ethnographers may lack
the familiarity with policy processes that could have helped make the relevance
explicit. But successful examples of bridging the gap exist in both the academic
and grey literature (e.g. Hagen-Zanker and Mallett, 2016; Schapendonk, 2015).
Much of the ethnographic research related to migrant smuggling from
West and Central Africa has been carried out by PhD candidates. Some convert
their dissertations into books, and others publish articles that draw upon specific
chapters or summarize the dissertation as a whole. From a policy perspective,
it is worth noting that the original dissertations often contain detailed empirical
descriptions that are lost in the competitive process towards scholarly publishing.
42
Conclusion and ways forward

Migration from West and Central Africa has been important for the regions
development, as well as the safety and prosperity of individuals and families.
When migrants resort to being smuggled, migration can become dangerous,
traumatizing and unreasonably costly. There is substantial potential for change
in the direction of IOMs vision of humane and orderly migration for the benefit
of all.
Migrant smuggling can be curtained by reducing either the supply or the
demand. A central finding from research in the region is that migrants are defiant
and determined in the face of dangerous journeys. This raises questions about
the impact of anti-smuggling measures. Such measures typically reduce supply
by increasing the risks and obstacles for smugglers. Consequently, the smugglers
who are still in business can only offer services that are more expensive and
dangerous for migrants. The question is whether this reduction in supply will
reduce the volume of smuggling or simply expose the same number of migrants
to greater risks and costs.
A second unanswered question is how demand for smuggling might be
reduced. Logically, there are two possibilities: (a) enabling a shift to legal forms
of migration; or (b) reducing demand for migration altogether. Both options
are politically controversial. The requirements to succeed with either strategy
are also unknown. New research can form a basis for simultaneously assessing
the feasibility and desirability of measures that seek to reduce the demand for
smuggling.
Closer ties between policy agendas and high-quality research could help
design and implement policies that reduce migrant fatalities and suffering. Such
connections are easier to forge when policies are genuinely oriented towards
migrant well-being. Cross-fertilization between academia and policy could also
be greatly enhanced by greater support for the open data agenda, exemplified
by the European Unions European Data Portal and the World Banks Open
Data Initiative. Policy organizations that commission or conduct research on
migrant smuggling could increase the value added by ensuring that primary data
becomes openly accessible for additional analyses.
Most of the research reviewed here is conducted by people from outside
West and Central Africa who are also based at institutions outside the region. In
order to ensure cross-fertilization between migration research and policy, it is
imperative to also strengthen research capacity and institutions within West and

43
Central Africa. In terms of methodology and research design, there is unfulfilled

potential for research that explicitly addresses smuggling and carried out in a
comparative fashion across several countries in West and Central Africa.
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53
3
EAST AFRICA
Nassim Majidi and Linda Oucho
Introduction
Migrant smuggling in East Africa originates mainly from the Horn of Africa,
inclusive of Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia. Outside of the Horn, the
East Africa region is governed by the East Africa Community (EAC) and its free
movement zone. The Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community
(1999) brought together the governments of Kenya, Uganda, United Republic of
Tanzania, and later Burundi and Rwanda, to establish the EAC. It is a regional
integration initiative reaffirming the free movement of goods, persons, workers,
services and capital. This agreement has led to significant internal migration
in the region; as of 2009, Kenyan emigrants major destinations in Africa, for
example, were to EAC neighbours Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania
(International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2015:55). These countries have
now, in turn, become major transit hubs for irregular migration and smuggling
networks from the Horn of Africa.
Migrant smuggling in the region occurs through land, sea and air routes
as migrants are driven out of their countries by conflict, poverty, climate and
developmental changes in the Horn of Africa. This subregion is pivotal for
migrant smuggling and human trafficking, which according to the Danish
Refugee Council, affects up to 80 per cent of migrants from the region (Martin
and Bonfanti, 2015). Although different sources capture smuggling data, there
is no standardized data collection system. This reiterates the need to take stock
of what smuggling and irregular migration represent in this region. The starting
point is the existing legal framework. Table 3.1 shows the countries that have
signed and ratified the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea
and Air. At a regional level, Rwanda, Burundi and the United Republic of Tanzania
have signed and ratified the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land,
Sea and Air. Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda have either ratified or signed
the protocol, whereas Somalia, Sudan and South Sudan have neither signed
nor ratified the protocol. Hence, the Horn remains a key subregion to the study
of smuggling: both home to most irregular migrants and to an overall lack of
adherence to legal frameworks on the smuggling of migrants.
55
Table 3.1: Signatories of the Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air and
the Convention against Transnational Organized Crime
Country
Protocol against the Smuggling

of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air
Convention against Transnational

Organized Crime
Signature
Year ratified
Signature
Ratification, Acceptance (A),

Approval (AA), Accession (a),
Succession (d)
Burundi
14 Dec 2000
24 May 2012
14 Dec 2000
24 May 2012
Djibouti
20 Apr 2005
20 Apr 2005 (a)
Ethiopia
22 Jun 2012
14 Dec 2000
23 Jul 2007
5 Jan 2005
16 Jun 2004 (a)
Rwanda
Kenya
14 Dec 2000
4 Oct 2006
14 Dec 2000
26 Sep 2003
United Republic
of Tanzania
13 Dec 2000
24 May 2006
13 Dec 2000
24 May 2006
Uganda
12 Dec 2000
12 Dec 2000
21 May 2004
Source: United Nations Treaties Collection.
The importance of smuggling in East Africa is recognized both within and

outside the region. Recent initiatives focus on training law enforcement on how
to handle migrant smuggling. These include the European Union-Horn of Africa
Migration Route Initiative under the Khartoum Process (2014), which targets
both trafficking and smuggling of migrants in the region with a dual view to
ending smuggling and addressing the root causes of the migration. In addition,
there is the Somalia-Kenya Forced Migrant Rights Initiative (20142017), which
targets migrant smuggling and human trafficking with the aim of creating safe
environment for forced migrants and smuggled migrants. The European Union
has been heavily involved in launching counter-smuggling initiatives in East Africa.
The European Unions Khartoum Process aims to improve migration governance
and help countries to fight smuggling of migrants and trafficking in human beings.
Most recently, the European Union has launched a new fund called the European
Union Emergency Trust Fund for Africa, and expanded its Regional Development
and Protection Programme to tackle the root causes of irregular migration in and
out of the region. One of the focus of these funds will be on the Horn of Africa.
Commentators including the Inter-agency Working Group (IAWG) on Disaster
Preparedness for East and Central Africa have highlighted the conflation of the
terms smuggling and trafficking in policy discussions led by the European Union
in the region (IAWG, 2015:3), and the insufficient recognition of the political and
security environments that drive forced displacement.
56
3. East Africa
Map 3.1: Eastern Africa
Source: African Development Bank. Available from www.afdb.org/fileadmin/_migrated/pics/

map_africa_eastern_uk.gif
This is a time of increased attention to and funding of initiatives on mixed

migration11 and irregular migration in the region. Smuggling is researched as a
secondary object of study, through the primary prism of irregular migration,
mixed migration, population movements in and out of a wider region that is
governed by different legal frameworks. This chapter highlights the low levels of
systematic and specific research on migrant smuggling. It maps out routes and
provides a description of the smuggler profiles and characteristics of smuggled
migrants identified by existing studies. Potential gaps and opportunities for
further research are shown to refocus the attention on the dynamic nature
of migrant smuggling. The chapter draws from recent reports on migrant
11
The principal characteristics of mixed migration flows include the irregular nature of and the multiplicity of
factors driving such movements, and the differentiated needs and profiles of the persons involved. Mixed
flows have been defined as complex population movements including refugees, asylum seekers, economic
migrants and other migrants. Unaccompanied minors, environmental migrants, smuggled persons, victims
of trafficking and stranded migrants, among others, may also form part of a mixed flow (IOMs Ninety-Sixth
Session, Discussion note: International Dialogue on Migration, 2008).

57
smuggling, most of which focus on Somali, Eritrean and Ethiopian migrants who
form a majority of the smuggled migrants. Other Eastern African countries have
limited data but are important as transit countries.

Smuggling routes
There are three main destinations for migrants from Eastern Africa, which
are Europe, the Middle East and Southern Africa. The routes taken depend on
the mode of transport used by the smuggled migrant.
EUROPE
Via the Sudan to Libya or Egypt where they access Europe

from West Balkans via the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia and the Central Mediterranean route to Italy.
Most of the migrants are Somalis, Eritreans, Sudanese and
Ethiopians.
MIDDLE EAST
To Yemen via the Somali regions cities of Hargeisa and

Bossaso.
SOUTHERN AFRICA Via Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique and the United Republic
of Tanzania, to South Africa where majority of the irregular
migrants are destined.
Smugglers use existing trade routes frequented by nomadic ethnic groups
from the Horn of Africa to North Africa and beyond. For instance, the Raishaida
from Eritrea continue their nomadic lifestyle moving across the border to Sudan
and the Tuareg in North Africa. In contrast, the routes to Southern Africa are
manned by a network of smugglers operating in the country of origin and the
transit countries, both on land and sea. The choice of the destination depends
on whether the migrant has networks residing in those locations (that is, family/
friends) or based on the options provided by the smuggler. It is noticeable that
migrants from Eastern Africa, especially Ethiopians and Somalis, prefer South
Africa as a destination; however, the numbers destined for that location are
unknown, unlike the figure reported to the Middle East via Yemen or Europe via
North Africa (see Map 3.2).
58
3. East Africa
Map 3.2: Migration routes from Eastern Africa
Source: IOM, 2012.

Note:
South Sudans independence as of July 2011.
Migrant smuggling from source to destination

Some countries in Eastern Africa operate primarily as transit countries,
whereas others are major source countries. Table 3.2 below outlines the source,
transit and destination countries of migrant smuggling.
Table 3.2: Source, transit and destination countries for migrant smuggling
Source country
Somalia
Transit countries/territories
Djibouti, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique,
United Republic of Tanzania
Djibouti
Destination countries
Europe, Kenya, South Africa,
Yemen
Yemen
Ethiopia
Djibouti, Kenya, Libya, Malawi,

Mozambique, Puntland, Somalia,
Somaliland, Sudan, United Republic of
Tanzania, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe
Europe, Lebanon, Saudi

Arabia, South Africa, United
Arab Emirates
Eritrea
Libya, Kenya, Sudan
Europe, Egypt, Israel, Kenya
Source: Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat (RMMS), 2013.

59
Somalia, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Djibouti have been identified as major

source countries of migrant smuggling. Somalia and Djibouti also operate as
transit countries for migrants travelling by sea, land or air to the Middle East
and South Africa (RMMS, 2014a). Uganda, Kenya and the United Republic of
Tanzania are the main transit countries given the more stable conditions than
other neighbouring States, such as Somalia, Ethiopia and Burundi. There has
been little evidence to show that they are source countries for migrant smuggling
(RMMS, 2013). Uganda is a transit country for nationals from the Democratic
Republic of the Congo, as South Sudanese accessing the country do so in order
to claim asylum. Sudan is not a major source country for irregular migration, as
most migrants claim asylum in the first safe country of arrival (IOM, 2011:59).
Similarly, there are limited studies on migrant smuggling from Burundi and
Rwanda, as these countries have produced more refugees and asylum seekers
as a result of conflict.
Smuggling by sea
Migrant smuggling through the sea tends to be for shorter journeys and
is favoured by migrants who lack the financial resources to fund their trip. There
are two major sea routes used to smuggle migrants to the Middle East and
Southern Africa. Migrants bound for the Middle East use the Gulf of Aden route
exiting from Hargeisa, Bossaso, in Somalia, Puntland, Somaliland and Djibouti
and transit through Yemen heading to Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern
countries.
Migrants using the South African route exit through Kismayo and
Mogadishu in Somalia by boat and travel to Mombasa, Kilifi, Lamu and other
unregulated ports in the north coast of Kenya. In Kenya, migrants can opt to
take another boat to Mozambique or proceed by land via the United Republic
of Tanzania, Malawi, Mozambique and finally South Africa. Ethiopians have used
South Africa as a transit route for the Americas, but the journey is costly as
counterfeited refugee documents or fake documentation have to be purchased
in transit countries. Ethiopian migrants often need resources to access their
desired destination and in a recent conference in Sudan, focusing on Migration
and Exile in the Horn of Africa in November 2015, Ethiopian migrants from a
poor background could only afford to migrate to Sudan instead of Yemen.
Smuggling by land
Land routes are for both short and longer journeys with migrants from
Ethiopia and Eritrea transiting Kenya through the porous borders of Isiolo and
Moyale in northern Kenya. Several arrests have been made at Moyale, Isiolo
60
3. East Africa
and Marsabit as prisons are said to be crowded with migrants (Barasa and
Fernandez, 2015:39). Refugee camps, Eastleigh in Nairobi and Mombasa, are
smuggling hubs that temporarily house transit migrants bound for different
locations (Gastrow, 2011). Ethiopians, Somalis and Eritreans destined for Europe
have been transported through Addis Ababa where they are met by brokers
that transport them to Sudan on the way to Libya. Hawala agents operating
in Khartoum manage the finances and transport of migrants through Ethiopia
into Sudan (Sahan Foundation and Intergovernmental Agency on Development
(IGAD) Security Sector Program, 2016:21). Uganda has been a transit country for
nationals from Central Africa, especially nationals from the Democratic Republic
of the Congo either migrating to Uganda or Kenya to seek asylum and/or settle.
Smuggling by air
Air routes have been linked to mostly Kenya as a major transit country
for smuggled migrants that can afford air travel where falsified documents
(that is, passports and visas) are obtained. By air, migrants can travel directly
and indirectly to Europe. Indirect travel is done through other African countries,
especially via West Africa or Middle East to Europe. Other destinations by
air include South Africa to Europe or the Americas (International Centre for
Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), 2008:6364). In the case of Eritrea,
smuggling by air is viewed as first class treatment, where smugglers organize
specific flight connections to remote international destinations, from where
European visas are obtained for their passengers (Sahan Foundation and IGAD
Security Sector Program, 2016:28).
Smuggling routes in source and transit countries are poorly regulated
by authorities due to the lack of resources at border points, making it difficult
for law enforcement to intercept irregular movements, especially along large
coastlines such as the 110-km coastline from Likoni to Vanga, which has opened
up 176 illegal entry points (Barasa and Fernandez, 2015:43). According to
the Tanzanian authorities, it is challenging for the officers stationed at these
border crossing points, as the volume of crossing per day is impossible to track
the lack of computerized data capture likewise limits the ability for offices
to check and verify travellers information (Ramkishun, 2015). The lack of
effective legislation or policies to manage and police irregular flows of migration
has allowed migrant smuggling to persist. This is also made worse by corrupt
practices of law enforcement operational at the border points and within the
country (RMMS, 2013). Furthermore, migrant smuggling is not high on the
agenda for countries in Eastern Africa as more pressing issues such as security
and the current refugee crisis takes precedence.

61
Smuggler services and networks

The services provided by smugglers in Eastern Africa are linked to wellestablished smuggling networks operating in the country of origin, transit and
destination countries. In Eastern Africa, engaging the services of a smuggler
requires the services of middlemen. These middlemen recruit potential migrants,
provide information about the destination country or cost of smuggling, as well
as necessary service to smugglers who lease out their services (such as renting
boats or accommodation for transit migrants). These middlemen can be viewed
as subsidiary smugglers as they are profiting from smuggling by supporting or
promoting the services of a smuggler.
Conflict, insecurity and the lack of rule of law within countries, such as
Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia has allowed migrant smuggling to thrive. In Somalia
in recent years, insecurity caused by Al-Shabaab attacks has pushed people to
seek alternative destinations beyond the region. In Eritrea, the Government
instituted a shoot on sight policy in early 2015 along its borders to reduce
the number of young people fleeing the country (Sahan Foundation and IGAD
Security Sector Program, 2016:29). The continuous droughts and famines in
Ethiopia becomes a recruitment ground for migrants for brokers or agents.
Middlemen and smugglers take advantage of these conditions by creating a
desire to migrate for a potential migrant by enticing them on job opportunities
in destination countries. They also increase the costs based on the smuggling/
trafficking route they take.
Characteristics of smugglers and smuggled migrants

The typical smuggler is an 1840 year old male of Ethiopian or Somali
origin (Barasa and Fernandez, 2015:40). Those participating in the migrant
smuggling process are all seen as smugglers, inclusive of taxi, bus, lorry drivers
and bush guides (Barasa and Fernandez, 2015). They are usually spread across
the migration route. Somali chief smugglers are spread across the country and
the Hawala system, an informal and international money transfer based on trust,
is used to pay the costs to smugglers by Somalis in the diaspora. Thirty-four
agents in Bossaso, Somalia, alone offering smuggling services work with several
hundred people who assist in the process (Inter-Agency Standing Committee,
2008:8). According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC),
there are indicators of strong links between individuals within the local
government and the migrant smuggling network (RMMS, 2013:54). Corruption
feeds into the smuggling process as officials gain a significant percentage of the
smuggling revenue.
62
3. East Africa
Middlemen working with or as smugglers in the smuggling network play

different roles, and they have been identified in Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya and
Somalia. They operate as:
Brokers and agents In Ethiopia, smugglers operate in Addis Ababa as brokers
and agents. The brokers usually have a well-known
reputation within the community, providing them with
a good profile in the presence of potential migrants
guaranteeing him/her clients (UNODC, 2010:74). In Sudan,
Hawala agents, usually of Somali origin, are managing the
finances and transport for smuggled migrants in Ethiopia
and into Sudan (Sahan Foundation and IGAD Security
Sector Program, 2016).
Facilitators
Recently in Eritrea, facilitators have been identified by

potential migrants through the Internet. The potential
migrants are connected with a local contact in Asmara,
and they provide transportation to Sudan or Ethiopia
avoiding any immigration procedures. These facilitators
in Eritrea have been alleged to be government officials
(Sahan Foundation and IGAD Security Sector Program,
2016:30).
Recruiters
Family members or close friends are used to establish

contact with the smugglers as they are trustworthy.
Travel agents
Smugglers operating in Somalia and Ethiopia view

themselves as travel agents and do not necessarily
view their activities as criminal. They view themselves as
provider of a humanitarian service, assisting persecuted
populations to escape to safety (Barasa and Fernandez,
2015:33).
Transporters
Smugglers operating along the route via Kenya, taxi, bus

and lorry drivers, as well as bush guides and those who
enter into contracts with and accompany migrants on
irregular crossings, are all considered smugglers, because
they derive benefit from the movement.
Smuggled migrants, on the other hand, tend to be individuals seeking

better livelihoods that their country or location at the time cannot provide for
them. Barasa and Fernandez (2015:33) argued that smuggled migrants do
63
not view themselves as victims of a crime, despite the abuse they experience
during, and as a result of, the smuggled process. Migrant smuggling has become
a survival strategy adopted by migrants who are seeking a better life. UNODC
described the different types of smuggled migrants using sea smuggling services
in general, but they do not describe the characteristics of the smuggled migrants
from Eastern Africa. Overall, the profile of those on the move is underreported.
Men, women and children
Families usually pull resources together for a male family member
to migrate in the hope that he will support the family left behind
once he reaches the country of destination. Data on irregular
migration can be used as a proxy. The data collected by the Mixed
Migration Monitoring Mechanism Initiative (4MI) project of RMMS
draws a mainly male profile with 67 per cent of irregular migrants
being men, and overall 61 per cent of migrants being single (Mixed
Migration Monitoring Mechanism Initiative (4Mi) website).
Women are roughly one third of the migrants, a sizeable minority.
They migrate by sea despite the fact that it is mostly dominated by
men. Anecdotes report that smugglers take advantage of pregnant
women or women with infants and children, as they become part
of the smugglers modus operandi enabling the women to stay at
the destination.
Children sometimes travel with their parents or one parent, while
others have been sent alone. Those travelling alone face a high
risk of being trafficked into labour or sex trade. However, the
assumption is that if the children are caught, the law would be
lenient enough to allow them to stay in the country.
Education and socioeconomic situation
Privileged people, that is, those with better resources, can afford
better inclusive services (such as falsified documents) to lessen
the risk to safety and have a higher chance of success. Transports
used by such migrants are usually direct and take a short space
of time (such as by air). These people are known to be skilled
professionals living in urban settings dwellers and highly educated.
Recent research (Samuel Hall, 2015) reveals that the elderly are
also taking irregular migration routes to Europe using land and
air routes, preferring the latter for the security it provides. RMMS
64
3. East Africa
found that some Somalis opt to fly to reduce the risks and dangers
of travelling by land (RMMS, 2013:58).
Poorer migrants rely on low-cost options with a high rate of failure
and have a higher risk to their lives and safety. In the case of
Eastern Africa, boats have been used to cross to the Middle East
and Mozambique, whereas those that opt to land routes, have
been confined in containers. Those smuggled by sea are young,
uneducated, male of working age, rural residents and unskilled.
Refugees and asylum seekers
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
reports the presence of 27,500 refugees and asylum seekers in
Djibouti (December 2014) the majority from Somalia, followed by
Ethiopia and Eritrea. It is reported that the numbers of refugees
and asylum seekers in Djibouti, looking to migrate to Yemen, has
remained constant (Horwood, 2015). With the changing context in
Yemen, the numbers in Djibouti are bound to rise.
Asylum seekers and refugees turn to smugglers to access a
safe country. The RMMS 4Mi project shows a sizeable group of
refugees, leaving a first safe country of exile and a second group of
asylum seekers pending asylum applications. Research undertaken
shows that Eritrean refugees are leaving Ethiopia, prepared to give
away their refugee status in the first country of exile to access a
better life further abroad, in Europe (Samuel Hall, 2014). In this
case, smuggled refugees turn into smuggled migrants seeking
protection elsewhere.
The relative economic status of a person being smuggled may have
implications on his or her capacity to access particular smuggling
services, but does not speak to his or her protection needs
(UNODC, 2011). Some smuggled migrants have claimed asylum in
transit country to access basic services, as well as prepare for their
next destination using smugglers operating within the camp.
Economic and human cost of migrant smuggling

Smuggling has both a financial and human cost. The financial cost of being
smuggled depends on the destination and mode of transport. Many migrants
opt for the cheaper route by road and/or sea because of the high cost attached
65
to air travel. Although travelling by air is the most favoured and quickest route,
it is also by far the most expensive as a flight from Somalia to the Netherlands in
the early 1990s cost USD 1,000 and after 9/11, the cost rose to USD 7,000. Those
travelling via Kenya have been assumed to have paid USD 20,000, inclusive of
fraudulent passports, tickets, visa and friendly immigration officers (RMMS,
2013:70). Smugglers operating in Uganda take advantage of potential migrants
by enticing them on the opportunities available in South Africa. Once the
migrants reach the South African borders, they abandon the migrant but also
increase the fee to cross the border (Endo, Namaaji and Kulathunga, 2011:18).
There have been different methods of payments, which include cash,
loans, credit schemes, arrangements through brokers, working to cover the
costs along the route, loans from private sources and personal savings (RMMS,
2014). Smuggling is a million-dollar business, as sources have provided different
fees to be smuggled to specific destination, which profits the smugglers. RMMS
reported that in 2009, a profit of USD 3440 million was made by smugglers for
smuggling Ethiopians and Somalis to South Africa. The cost of migrating to the
south depends on the route that is taken and to a certain extent, the nationality.
It has been noted that the costs to be smuggled to South Africa has been
increasing and the profits are significantly higher than those made by smugglers
operating in the eastern route to Yemen. In 2012, the smuggling business in
Somalia was estimated at USD 2.7 million (RMMS, 2013:69). Profits made by
smugglers operating in Djibouti have amounted to USD 1112.5 million for those
owning boats. Table 3.3 outlines the estimated fees to be smuggled by route/
destination.
Table 3.3: Smuggling fees by destination/route
Mode of
transport
Destination or route
Nationality
Fees (USD)
SOUTHERN AFRICA
Kakuma/Dadaab Camp (Kenya)
4South Africa
Road
Somalis
Ethiopia4via Zambia4South Africa
Road
All
Ethiopia/Somalia4via Malawi 4South

Africa
Road
Ethiopians and
Somalis
Ethiopia4Kenya/ United Republic of

Tanzania4Malawi
Road
Ethiopians
3,000
4,0005,000
4,218
850
SHORT DISTANCES
Eritrea4Sudan4short distance travel
Road
Eritreans
3,000
Asmara or Massawa4Khartoum
Road
Eritreans
100150
Eritrea4Sudan
Road
Eritreans
100150
66
3. East Africa
Ethiopia4Sudan/ Addis Ababa

Hargeisa4Addis Ababa
Road
Ethiopians and
Somalis
500800
Road
Somalis
250500
MIDDLE EAST
Eritrea4Israel
Road and sea
Eritreans
15,000
Obock (Djibouti)4Yemen
Sea
Eritreans
130150
Mogadishu (Somalia)4Djibouti4Yemen
Road and sea
Somalis
350400
Harar4Yemen
Road and sea
Ethiopians
290
Source: RMMS, 2013 and 2014; IOM, 2014.
The human cost of migrant smuggling is reflected by the migrant deaths

reported and the protection risks they face along the smuggling route. There
has been an increase in migrant deaths along migration routes revealing
protection risks of migrants crossing the Mediterranean and deserts (IOM, 2014).
Interventions by European countries receiving migrants such as naval blockages
and a surveillance system have not curbed the number of migrants heading to
Europe. Eritreans and Somalis remain the largest populations from Eastern Africa
bound for Europe. Currently, there are limited official statistics on the number of
migrant deaths along the migration routes as some a small number of migrants
die along the way in the desert and in the sea that are unaccounted for. Figure
3.1 shows the number of deaths that occurred between January and September
2014 across the globe, and it is noticeable that the Mediterranean leads the list.
Figure 3.1: Number of deaths between January to September 2014
Source: IOM, 2014.
Smuggled migrants also face protection risks as Human Rights Watch

(HRW, 2014) reports have highlighted physical and sexual abuse of both male
and female smuggled migrants. Smugglers are unconcerned about the needs of
the smuggled migrants (Barasa and Fernandez, 2015), as abuse cases have been

67
identified along the routes to the Middle East and North Africa. Migrants heading
to Europe via Libya have been abandoned in the desert when their transporters
to the next destination fail to show up on time (Sahan Foundation and IGAD
Security Sector Program, 2016). Others have been physically beaten and women
raped by militia whereas others, especially Eritreans, have been kidnapped and
experience further beatings. Their families left behind are then forced to pay a
ransom for their release.

Flows and trends
Existing data on migrant smuggling in East Africa is scarce. International
organizations and research centres, such as IOM, ICMPD, RMMS and UNODC have
been collecting data on or related to migrant smuggling, but the data samples
are too small to be generalized. Furthermore, data is not collected regularly,
making it difficult to identify changes in smuggling activities, trends, routes and
recruitment practices or determine whether the legal mechanisms put in place
in each country are effective. Smuggling data also gets lost in human trafficking
data/research as legally, there are clear distinctions between the two acts, but
conceptually, the distinction has been difficult to draw in practice. The lack of
clarity between the two concepts makes it difficult to develop a national law on
smuggling, as in the case of Kenya, and loopholes within the legal system allow
smugglers to escape prosecution. This is reflected by the low prosecution rates
of smugglers in Kenya, but also the negative impact of corruption by immigration
officers (Barasa and Fernandez, 2015). Furthermore, research studies have
identified smugglers separate from middlemen, yet middlemen are subsidiary
smuggling agents providing a service to the smuggling activity.
In 2004, the ICMPD estimated that the number of irregular migrants from
sub-Saharan African via North Africa to Europe stood at 35,000 (ICMPD, 2004).
By 2006, this number had increased to 300,000 (UNODC, 2010:6). In 2012,
over 100,000 irregular migrants from Ethiopia and Somalia were estimated to
be destined for Yemen alone, the majority of whom solicited the services of a
smuggler via Bossaso in Somalia and Obock in Djibouti (RMMS, 2013). RMMS
reported in 2012 that 85,000 Ethiopians crossed into Yemen with the aim of
seeking employment opportunities as casual labourers and domestic workers.
Yemen is experiencing difficulties providing the necessary protection to these
migrants. Table 3.4 outlines the estimated number of Ethiopians arriving in
Yemens coast between 2006 and 2013 with the number fluctuating through
time (RMMS, 2015:10).
68
3. East Africa
Table 3.4: Estimated arrivals to Yemen from Ethiopia and departures from Bossaso
Year
Estimated number of arrivals to

Yemen from Ethiopiaa
2008
17,072
34,314
2009
44,814
30,185
2010
34,527
18,488
2011
75,804
31,012
2012
84,446
27,067
2013
54,574
Departures from Bossasob
Source: RMMS, 2014a and 2013b.
The number of Somali migrants being smuggled increased between 2011

and 2014 from 1,513 to 8,490. Whereas, it has been estimated that 200,000
Eritreans crossed to the Middle East between 2011 and 2013 (Martin and
Bonfanti, 2015:5). IOMs migration profiling exercises already conducted in
Kenya, Sudan and Uganda listed removals of irregular migrants. Table 3.5 below
outlines the foreign nationals arrested and deported from Uganda between 2010
and 2012. This also includes the number of nationals apprehended in foreign
destinations. Sudans migration profile focused on its nationals found to be
illegally present in European Union States and those ordered to leave. Table 3.5
outlines the number apprehended between 2008 and 2009, where 345 and 465
were ordered to leave the country according to Eurostat data (IOM, 2011:60).
Table 3.5: Migrant arrests and deportations, Uganda and Sudan
Foreigners found to be illegally
present in country (arrests)
Foreigners ordered to leave the

country (deportations)
Citizens apprehended and

abroad
Ugandaa
2010
2011
2012
2010
2011
2012
2010
2011
2012
575
550
840
101
179
328
54
64
Sudan
2008
2009
2008
2009
2008
2009
2,305
2,660
Source: IOM, 2013a and 2011b.
Sources and types of data

Data sources include the media and agency research reports operating
in the region. There is no single agency or organization that is responsible for
collecting migrant smuggling data. While governments should play a role in

69
collecting data on irregular migration across national borders, as is done in other

regions, there is little public evidence to show that this is being carried out.
Existing agencies, mostly international non-governmental organizations (NGOs),
collect data on specific persons of concern including smuggled migrants, victims
of human trafficking and mixed migration flows of refugees, asylum seekers and
migrants. The media, in particular, captures data on smuggled migrants arrested
at border points, whereas international organizations and NGOs collect data on
particular areas of interest: the United Nations Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs will collect data that is related to transnational crimes to
outline observations, trends and dynamics unique to a region. UNHCR records
data of refugees who may use smugglers services to access safe countries.
Other international organizations, such as IOM, provide publicly accessible data
in online resources or publications platform. HRW captures data on protection
issues and human rights of irregular migrants in the region. The RMMS has most
recently adopted the Mixed Migration Monitoring Mechanism Initiative (4Mi),
which presents data using an interactive platform, and which is discussed below.
The organizations present in Eastern Africa with an interest in but may
not systematically collect data on migrant smuggling include the following:

UNODC;
RMMS;
UNHCR;
HRW;
Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime;
Global Alliance Against Traffic in Women;
IOM;
Mdecins Sans Frontires;
Amnesty International; and
International Rescue Committee.
Data collected from the region is therefore covered by organizations with

a global framework for action on smuggling (UNODC), regional strategies (IOM
and UNHCR), or a specific mandate to look at mixed migration in the region,
including migrant smuggling (RMMS). Most of the attention has been focusing
on mixed migration research, through which smuggling is partially covered.
While mixed migration is related to smuggling, it is not smuggling per se.
These organizations are supported by the following:
Independent research centres and organizations located in the
region (such as the Tanzanian Mixed Migration Task Force or
abroad (ICMPD));
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3. East Africa
Regional expert groups, such as the African, Caribbean and Pacific

Observatory on migration, funded by the European Union; and
Donor initiatives including the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa and
regional initiatives including the forthcoming Forced Displacement
and Mixed Migration Secretariat set-up by IGAD will be looking to
reinforce the state of research in the region in the coming years.
No single agency has taken up the responsibility of collecting migrant
smuggling data. The existing data is collected in the process of identifying human
trafficking victims, thereby not specifically focused on smuggling. This data is
used as proxy indicators of migrant smuggling to understand the phenomenon
in the region. Similarly, ongoing research on mixed migration has the twin focus
of researching irregular migration through the prism of forced and voluntary
migration, as well as methods of migration. Smuggling falls under such research
themes. Hence, most, if not all, the data on smuggling is collected indirectly,
with no focus on smuggling indicators but through proxy indicators.
Given the flurry of organizations encountering smuggling in the region,
but not focusing on smuggling as their core area of data collection and analysis,
Eastern Africa presents an opportunity for partnerships on smuggling data
collection and analysis. The partnerships could involve the development of
data collection tools to be adopted by partner agencies in capturing smuggling
data to ensure uniformity and reduce duplication. The RMMS 4Mi initiative is
a step in that direction as the data is captured by trained volunteers working
along the migratory routes where information on abuses on smuggled and/or
trafficked migrants or access routes are captured. RMMS latest project focuses
on migration originating from the Horn of Africa, targeting Eritrean, Ethiopian,
Djiboutian and Somali people on the move, highlighted in this chapter and
in the research as the main populations of smuggled migrants in the region.
Hence, although the project does not focus on smuggling, it looks at smugglerdominated movements (RMMS 4Mi).12 The websites infographics section
includes a section on smugglers that provides the option to filter the information
by current smuggler location, origin, gender, the state of the smuggling business
in their own view, and the benefits of smuggling as a source of employment
in the region. Questions used aim to assess whether smuggling is a profitable
business, a business on the rise or on the decline, and employment background
of smugglers. The approach taken is one that is market-driven, trying to assess
the cost-benefit and economic trade-offs inherent to the business of smuggling.
12
RMMS (2016) About us 4Mi of the RMMS 4Mi website. Available from http://4mi.regionalmms.org/4mi.
html

71
Remaining data available online include the following:

Regional migrant smuggling data provided by UNODC and IOM.
They also produce guide documents for agencies to understand
the dynamic nature of migrant smuggling in Eastern Africa. IOM
existing data is based on smaller samples, sometimes focusing
more on human trafficking and including migrant smuggling a
process by which traffickers transport their victims. Their insight
has been able to identify trafficking/smuggling routes frequented
by migrants. In addition, the migration profiling exercise by IOM is
an important way of taking stock on migration in countries, which
identifies gaps, as well as changes in trends and policy.
Ad hoc journalistic reports on arrests, deportation and the business
of migrant smuggling are made by the media (international and
local).
Think tank reports by HRW and Amnesty International highlight
protection issues faced by migrants smuggled.
Regional governmental authorities such as IGAD that recently
conducted an assessment of human trafficking and migrant
smuggling from Eastern Africa to Europe. Though the focus of the
study was on Somali and Eritrean migrants, the report provided a
snapshot of the smugglers, their networks, the smuggling routes
and protection risks faced by migrants travelling through the
desert and in Libya.
International law enforcement agency Frontex captures data on
smuggled people, arrests and deportations of irregular migrants.
INTERPOL provides guides, tools and training related to migrant
smuggling. Through the Smuggling Training Operations Programme,
INTERPOL provides support to countries on border management
issues. The programme trains law enforcement of Member States
to detect criminal activities, including those providing fraudulent
documentation to irregular migrants. In Eastern Africa, training has
been provided to Kenya and Uganda in 2011 and Rwanda in 2013
giving them access to INTERPOLs resources, such as the Stolen and
Lost Travel Documents Database.
Government-led research efforts have funded experts to take stock
of irregular migration, and through that, of smuggling in the region. The
Government of Australias funding of a research programme and occasional
paper series included a piece by Christopher Horwood in 2015 presenting an
overview of irregular migration flows in the Horn of Africa, and of the challenges
72
3. East Africa
and implications for source, transit and destination countries (Horwood, 2015).
Within the scope of the paper on irregular migration, Horwood reviews the
geographic nodes of smuggling in the region from Kenya as a regional hub
for the organization of smuggling, to Bossaso, Puntland as the epicentre of
smuggling in the region (Horwood, 2015:42) the role and the cost of smuggling
in facilitating irregular migration out of the region. Symptomatic of the rest of
the research in the region, smuggling is viewed through the lens of irregular
migration research.
Box 3.1: CASE STUDY
Smuggling migrants from Mogadishu, Somalia to Europe: The case of the elderly
A close relationship made of trust and personal connections ties Somali migrants with smugglers.
From the youth interviewed in Somalia to elderly returnees from Europe, all report choosing
their smuggler ahead of their migration. For the youth surveyed, they often prefer not to tell
their parents or relatives, and rely instead on their friends and on smugglers to inform their
migration decision. For the elderly, for whom irregular migration has additional risks, the choice
of the smuggler is paramount to travelling in safe conditions.
Yes, I used smugglers. We trust them because you deposit the money, and once you reach
your destination, as per the agreement, they will receive the money. The smuggler I chose has
a team in every country that I needed to travel through, so they treated me well. In the words
of Mohamed, 65, the smuggler enters a contract for a service in which he will only get paid
for every successful completion. It is therefore in the interest of the smuggler to deliver. This
includes safe travel conditions. This was Mohameds first trip abroad, from Somalia to Norway,
passing through Dubai, Istanbul and Athens. The smuggler facilitated the obtainment of a fake
passport from Greece in order to then pursue the journey onward through Austria, Sweden and
Norway.
Fatima, 61, left Mogadishu with her daughter and a smuggler, who was a family friend who
had successfully helped others to migrate to Europe. Her travels also included fake passports
and travels across the border to Kenya, and from Nairobis International Airport by plane to
Norway. Her situation as a woman travelling alone with her daughter caused additional strains
that she had not expected. She was under constant pressure to add money along the route, in
addition to the originally agreed-upon price. She felt threatened en route, and found the trip
very challenging. It was like gambling with your last saving and your life at the same time,
she recalls. Upon arrival in Norway, the smuggler was arrested at the airport. She eventually
returned to Mogadishu, with no other legal recourse in Norway.
Excerpts from research undertaken by Samuel Hall in Mogadishu, Somalia (2015)

The methods used to collect data on migrant smuggling in Eastern Africa
adopt quantitative, qualitative or mixed method approaches. Quantitative
methods, mainly through surveys, have been used to capture the trends of
migrants at exit and entry ports (RMMS, 2013). Qualitative methods, mostly key
73
informant interviews and in-depth interviews with potential migrants or those

who have returned, provide accounts that paint a picture of the state of migrant
smuggling in the region. But they also indicate the complexity of understanding
migrant smuggling and human trafficking. There is no standardized method that
has been agreed upon by agencies collecting data on migrant smuggling that
may increase chances of duplication and affect the quality of the data.
The research scope has focused on smuggled migrants with RMMS,
providing descriptive reports on the state of migrant smuggling for Ethiopians,
Eritreans and Somalis, taking focus away from other smaller migrant populations
(such as Djiboutians, Kenyans, Rwandese, South Sudanese, Tanzanians and
Ugandans). As there is no systematic procedure in place to capture migrant
smuggling data from the region, it makes it difficult to assess any changes in
terms of trends or whether protection issues have been addressed. The latest
initiative from RMMS includes an innovative strategy of collecting and reporting
data using the 4Mi. This online platform that collects and analyses data on
mixed migration flows initially out of the Horn of Africa, which includes migrant
smuggling. The primary data is collected from Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya,
Libya, Somalia, Somaliland, Sudan, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, as well
as secondary locations in Italy, Malta, Mozambique and South Sudan (RMMS).
4Mis use of infographics allows the user to narrow down searches by nationality
and destination. A specific tab is available on profiles of migrants, as well as on
the profiles of smugglers. RMMS has been able to record data on the following:
Nationals (currently limited to Djiboutians, Eritreans, Ethiopians
and Somalians);
Migrant destinations in Europe, Middle East and South Africa;
Number of irregular migrants;
Smuggling/trafficking routes;
Exit and entry ports;
Hotspots with protection issues, human rights violations and
corruptive process; and
Locations known for human rights abuses and corruptive practices.
Interdisciplinary perspectives have been used to understand migrant
smuggling in Eastern Africa, which include the economic and legal aspects of
the process. RMMS (2013; 2014a) reports have captured the non-economic and
economic costs and benefits of migrant smuggling for the smuggler and smuggled
migrant. RMMS has also captured protection risks faced along the smuggling
route, as well as some of the legal processes put in place to monitor migrant
smuggling from previous reports and through the 4Mi initiative. Academics and
think tanks have tried to put into perspectives the need for national policies to
74
3. East Africa
handle migrant smuggling or assess the impact of existing policies by analysing

how the policies operate in practice. Barasa and Fernandez (2015) argued
that there is a need for a coordinated response between Ethiopia, Kenya and
Somalia to stem migrant smuggling especially to Southern Africa. Furthermore,
they argued that because Kenya is a primary transit country for nationals from
Somalia and Ethiopia, it could operate as a central point where anti-migrant
smuggling initiatives can be managed.
Research on migrant smuggling shows that first, there is a persistent
conceptual confusion on terms, along with a continued lack of understanding on
the smuggling/trafficking nexus. Second, there are clear protection issues that
emerge for smuggled migrants that need to be understood. Finally, there is a
need to adapt research to the changing environment.
Conceptual confusion on terminology: Hamilton and Gebeyehus recent study
(2014) in Somaliland sought to analyse the challenges of building livelihoods
for youth amidst trends of human trafficking. The research Fight or Flight was
released in 2015 and retracted soon after its public launch by the Danish Refugee
Council. The organization reassessed that the research was not sufficiently
clear on whether the methods and findings revealed information collected on
smuggling or trafficking, inferring that the trends picked up on related to the
former. In Somalia, there is no specific term that translates human trafficking
or smuggling, as the term tahreeb is often used more generally to refer to both
regular and irregular movements.
Protection issues: Smuggled migrants face protection risks as UNHCR (2015)
reported some protection issues faced by smuggled migrants from Eastern and
the Horn of Africa, which include, but are not limited to the following:
Refoulement and deportation: 163,000 Ethiopian migrants
resident in Saudi Arabia were forcefully deported through the
Saudization initiative (2013).13 The initiative gave a grace period
for migrants to apply for the right documents, but after the amnesty
period ended, those undocumented migrants were deported (de
Regt and Tafesse, 2015). There were reports on abuse on deportees
while in Saudi Arabia and migrants faced an uncertain future upon
return to Ethiopia.
13
Saudi Arabia developed a policy between April and November 2013 that required all undocumented
migrants to regularize their residential and employment status within a period of seven months or face
deportation without penalty.

75
Risk of abduction and trafficking: Smuggled migrants face the

risk of being kidnapped, as not only are they involved in a criminal
activity, they rely on the protection of their smugglers who operate
as traffickers as well. HRW has reported cases of kidnappings of
Eritreans who were taken to Sinai and ransomed to their families
back in Eritrea (2014).
Denial of asylum: As these migrants have committed a criminal act
of illegally crossing borders, they will be unable to go through the
asylum process as their reasons for fleeing were economic.
Violation to the right to life: In 2014, IOM reported migrant
deaths in major smuggling/trafficking routes. Between January
and September 2014, 251 deaths were recorded from East Africa
in comparison to 123 from the Horn of Africa. European countries
have intervened using naval blockages and a surveillance system,
to curb the number of migrants bound for Europe, but migration
has not yet decreased.
Adapting research to a dynamic and evolving context: Research on smuggling
in East Africa will need to adapt to a dynamic situation and recent changes
that show how chronic events, policies and migration at large will continue to
impact both smugglers and migrants choices. There has been a change in the
environment as Yemen has become a less likely transit destination due to the
escalating violence in the country that has resulted in Yemeni refugees seeking
asylum in Ethiopia, Somalia and Uganda (RMMS, 2015). Xenophobic sentiments
are rising in Kenya due to the Al-Shabaab attacks that have taken place in Kenya
with political leaders associating Somali refugees with extremism (De Bode,
2015). The xenophobia violence that broke out in South Africa in March 2015
raised concerns on the safety of all immigrants residing in South Africa including
irregular migrants. Although the number of migrants destined for South Africa
have not reduced, the persistent xenophobic violence in South Africa is making
it an unattractive destination for irregular migrants (Horwood, 2014:141), but
there are limited figures to illustrate the decline in migrant numbers to the
region.
Migrant smuggling debates in Eastern Africa today

There are broad agreements on the existence of human rights violations in
the smuggled journey, but donor support on mixed migration has not necessarily
translated into the protection focus these trends highlight. IOM highlighted the
need to focus on mixed migration flows using the southern route and bring
about greater awareness on the route causes but also protection needs of
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3. East Africa
migrants bound for Southern Africa, in close collaboration with governments and
organizations in the source, transit and destination countries (IOM, 2014a:11).
UNHCR flagged the protection needs of migrants as they face high risks of abuse
(sexual and physical), abduction and trafficking among others. The focus remains
at the national level on border control capacity and smuggling routes. IOM aims
to support the EAC by developing standard operating procedures that help to
detect migrant smuggling, human trafficking and trafficking of illicit goods along
the border crossing points in Eastern and Southern Africa (IOM, 2014a:13).
In Ethiopia, IOM proposed awareness-raising activities on migration
smuggling and human trafficking, including the rights of migrants. In Kenya, IOM
provided support in enhancing the security and safety of Kenyas borders by
establishing an integrated border management system, building the capacities
of border officials to detect transnational crimes, such as migrant smuggling and
human trafficking (IOM, 2014:27).
To inform programming and policy debates, research gaps include the lack of
available data on the following:
Capacity of smugglers to create the aspirations to migrate,
generating demand among populations, especially young men in
rural areas;
Links with diaspora funding and chain migration from Eastern
Africa;
Urban organization of smuggling networks, their links to corruption,
and the role of major hubs such as Nairobi in facilitating smuggling
in the region; and
Abuses and the protection claims of smuggled migrants.
Acknowledging that smuggling can lead to trafficking and high
levels of violence will be needed to situate protection at the centre
of attention on smuggling in the region.
Research must continue to find innovative ways of collecting data on
migrant smuggling, identifying new routes or modes of transport to better
understanding the phenomenon. It should refocus its line of inquiry to look at
the political economy of smuggling, the emerging societal backlash through
xenophobic attacks on foreign nationals, as well as policy initiatives that address
the root causes of migrant smuggling from the source country. However, it
is important to outline the loose nature of migrant smuggling networks that
are harder to dismantle. This will help to distinguish migrant smuggling from
77
human trafficking, but also inform source, transit and destination countries how
to handle migrant smuggling.

Initiatives targeting migrant smuggling have provided training to law
enforcement officials on migrant smuggling, targeting counter-trafficking efforts
as well. These initiatives include the Strengthening Criminal Justice Response
to Trafficking in Persons and Smuggling of Migrants in Ethiopia and Djibouti
(20122014), which focused on legislative reform to combat human trafficking
and promoting safe labour migration through training of stakeholders and duty
bearers in the justice system in Ethiopia. Somalia-Kenya Forced Migrant Rights
Initiative (20142017) have been adopted with the aim of creating a protective
environment for refugees, victims of trafficking and smuggling, environmentally
induced migrants, refugees and asylum seekers.
The European Union and the African Union Khartoum Process (2014)
have an international protection pillar added through the signing of the Rome
Declaration between the European Union, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Tunisia, but the focus still remains on
root causes and ending irregular migration, rather than providing clear protection
responses. The States are expected to establish and manage reception centres,
collaborate with one another in the identification and prosecution of criminal
networks, supporting victims of trafficking and protecting the human rights of
smuggled migrants. The Rome Declaration also generally commits to promoting
sustainable development in countries of origin and transit in order to address
the root causes of irregular migration and mixed migration flows between Africa
and Europe. However, it is completely silent on legal migration channels, which
build one of the four key pillars of the other European Unions continental
cooperation framework with Africa, the Rabat Process. It does not tackle the
issue of the hazards and dangers to which forced migrants are exposed in many
of the countries of the region in which the reception centres are based, which
often are far from being safe.
To address the knowledge gap on migrant smuggling, there is a need to
boost research studies specifically on migrant smuggling. Most of the research
on smuggling has been extracted from research on irregular migration, trafficking
or mixed migration. Smuggling has not constituted a focus area of research in
the region. One suggestion could be therefore to research smuggling through a
comprehensive profiling exercise, similar to IOMs migration profiles. National/
local organizations in Eastern Africa should be involved in the research process,
especially civil society organizations that are on the ground and interact with
78
3. East Africa
members of society who are able to identify smuggling activities. In doing so,
researchers will begin to map out routes and predict potential new routes based
on existing evidence on smuggler behaviour. This will require a psychosocial
approach to understanding the process, relations, trade-offs of migrant
smuggling from smuggler and smuggled migrant viewpoints.
Organizations will benefit from partnerships between international and
national organizations with an interest in migrant smuggling that can collect,
analyse and report research in this area. By developing a data management
platform, it will create a focal reporting point but also allows its members to
design the appropriate tools to capture migrant smuggling data, as well as
discuss a range of innovative strategies of collecting data. Innovation is the key
to improving knowledge on migrant smuggling in the region, and the RMMS
4Mi is a step in the right direction but a partial one only, as smuggling remains
a subtopic of other research efforts. Dedicated research into smuggling is a
main research gap in the region, and needs to be assessed through concerted
partnerships at a time when political and security changes in Burundi, Somalia
and Yemen remind us once again of the rise of smuggling as a means to cope
with shocks.
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of Africa. Available from http://ronairobi.iom.int/about-iom/iomkenya-strategic-focus

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2013a Health Vulnerabilities Study of Mixed Migration Flows from the

East and Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes Region to Southern
Africa: Executive Summary Findings from the Formative Stage. IOM,
Geneva. Available from https://publications.iom.int/system/files/
pdf/migration_health_study_finalweb.pdf
2013b Migration in Uganda: A Rapid Country Profile. IOM, Kampala,
Uganda. Available from https://publications.iom.int/system/files/
pdf/mp_uganda_25feb2015_web.pdf
2014a Migration Initiatives 2015: Regional Strategies, Migrants and Cities.
IOM, Geneva. Available from http://publications.iom.int/system/
files/pdf/migration_initiatives2015.pdf
2014b Dimensions of Crisis on Migration in Somalia, Working Paper,
February 2014. IOM, Geneva. Available from www.iom.int/files/live/
sites/iom/files/Country/docs/Dimensions-of-Crisis-on-Migration-inSomalia.pdf
2015 Migration in Kenya: A Country Profile. IOM, Nairobi. Available from
https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/migration_profile_
kenya.pdf
Jubat, A.
2014
Red flag over Sh90 million human smuggling racket through KenyaEthiopia border. Standard Digital News, 2 December 2015. Available
from www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000140856/red-flag-oversh90m-human-smuggling-racket-through-kenya-ethiopia-border
Kuschminder, K., J. de Bresser and M. Siegel

2015 Irregular Migration Routes to Europe and Factors Influencing
Governance, Maastricht University, Maastricht.
Long, K. and J. Crisp
2011 In harms way: the irregular movement of migrants to Southern
Africa from the Horn and Great Lakes regions. New issues in refugee
research, Research paper no. 200. United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR), Geneva.
Mail and Guardian Africa
2015 EU will pay African countries to take their migrants back: new $2
billion trust fund for continent announced. 8 November 2015.
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Martin, I. and S. Bonfanti

2015 Migration and asylum challenges in Eastern Africa: mixed migration
flows require dual policy approaches. Migration Policy Centre.
DOI:10.2870/701596.
Ramkishun, M.
2015 Border resident communities New hiding places for migrant
smugglers. 23 February 2015. Available from https://weblog.iom.
int/border-resident-communities-new-hiding-places-migrantsmugglers
Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat (RMMS)
2013 Migrant Smuggling in the Horn of Africa and Yemen: The Political
Economy and Protection Risks. Mixed Migration Research Series No.
7. RMMS, Nairobi.
2014a Going West: Contemporary mixed migration trends from the Horn of
Africa to Libya and Europe. RMMS, Nairobi.
2014b Blinded by Hope: Knowledge, attitude and practices of Ethiopian
migrants. RMMS, Nairobi.
2015 A Certain Catalyst: an overview of the (mixed) migration and
development debate with special focus on the Horn of Africa region.
RMMS, Nairobi.
2016 4Mi website. Available from http://4mi.regionalmms.org/
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Security Sector Program
2016 Human Trafficking and Smuggling on the Horn of Africa-Central
Mediterranean Route.
Samuel Hall
2010 A long and winding road: Background paper for Regional Conference
on Refugee Protection and International Migration: Mixed
Movements and Irregular Migration from the East and Horn of Africa
and Great Lakes Region to Southern Africa. Dar es Salaam, Tanzania,
September 2010. Available from www.unhcr.org/4c7fa45b6.pdf
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Eritrean refugees in Ethiopia. Commissioned by the Norwegian
Refugee Council.
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to Mogadishu, commissioned by the Danish Refugee Council and
funded by the Norwegian Immigration Directorate (UDI). UNHCR
and IOM.
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2014 Smuggling and Trafficking from the East and Horn of Africa:
Executive Summary. UNHCR, Geneva. Available from www.refworld.
org/pdfid/51d175314.pdf
n.d. Smuggling and Trafficking from the East and Horn of Africa: Progress
Report UNHCR Strategy and Regional Plan of Action. UNHCR,
Geneva.
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2010 The Globalization of Crime: A Transnational Organized Crime Threat
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2011 Issue Paper: Smuggling of Migrants by Sea.
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13, January 2014. Available from www.humanitarianresponse.
info/system/files/documents/files/OCHA_ROSA_Humanitarian_
Bulletin_Jan_2014.pdf
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3. East Africa
4
NORTH AFRICA
Arezo Malakooti
Introduction
This chapter provides an overview of migrant smuggling in North Africa,
and presents a survey of existing literature and data on the topic. In assessing
the research conducted on the topic, and the extent to which data has been
collected or is currently being collected, this chapter will outline areas for further
research and make recommendations for ways in which research and data can
be used to inform policies and programmes. The literature review has focused
on a selection of studies considered relevant in terms of methodology and date
of publication but is in no way comprehensive. The writing of this chapter was
also supported by a number of key informant interviews with practitioners in the
countries of assessment.
Given that North Africa is a large and dynamic region, particularly from
the perspective of migration flows and migrant smuggling activity, in order to do
justice to the countries it encompasses, the geographic scope of the chapter has
been narrowed to the countries that feed into the Central Mediterranean route.
These are Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Tunisia.
Finally, the irregular migration flow to, through and from North Africa
is a mixed flow comprising labour migrants, asylum seekers and refugees.
This means that the people on the move are a complex group of people with
differing motivations who all make the same journeys, often relying on the
same smugglers. Thus, for the purposes of this chapter, the word migrant will
be used broadly to refer to all people on the move through the region, unless a
distinction is otherwise made.

Migratory flows in North Africa fall within broader international migration
patterns as North Africa is both a destination region for sub-Saharan African
migrants and also a transit region for migrants from the subcontinent who wish
to travel to Europe irregularly, with both the Central Mediterranean and Western
85
Mediterranean routes passing through North Africa. As sub-Saharan African

migrants are also joined by North African migrants on these Mediterranean
routes, it is also an origin region.
North Africa is a region characterized by mixed migratory flows and
high levels of irregular migration. The demand for irregular migration, and
consequently smuggling services, is fuelled by a number of factors. This includes
the lack of legal pathways for migration and strict immigration policies in
destination countries, the harsh terrain that needs to be traversed (particularly
the crossing of the Sahara for journeys into the region and the crossing of the
Mediterranean for onward journey from the region), and the lack of a legal
framework for asylum in Libya. Asylum seekers who travel by land to Libya
have been found to systematically travel in groups assisted by smugglers either
throughout the entire journey or in key locations (Malakooti, 2013b).14
Traditionally, migratory flows to and through the region have been
dominated by sub-Saharan Africans with the addition of some North Africans
who moved to Libya for work, and in more limited cases, to board boats to
Europe. From 2012 onwards, Syrian refugees began arriving in Libya in search
of safe haven. In 2014, the numbers of Syrians on boats to Europe that had
departed from the Libyan coast increased significantly. By 2015, they had mostly
rerouted to Greece via Turkey.
Main routes
Libya is the most attractive country in the region for irregular migrants
because it is a departure point for Europe, while also providing opportunities
for income generation. Moreover, there has been very little control of its
borders after the 2011 Libyan Revolution and particularly after the 2014 political
crisis. The other countries on the North African coast are no longer viable
departure points for Europe because of increased controls, and they also lack
the opportunities for income generation that Libya provides, thereby decreasing
their attractiveness as a destination. Even when migrants and asylum seekers
in Egypt tried to resume direct sea crossings to Italy in 2013 and 2014 (mainly
in response to increasing instability and risks in Libya post-2014 crisis), the
Government of Egypt stepped up its arrest of anyone attempting to depart
irregularly and curtailed the trend (Malakooti, 2015b).
14
Also, the encampment of refugees in Sudan has sometimes led to refugees leaving the camps and the country,
with the aid of a smuggler, in order to establish themselves elsewhere, outside of a camp (Malakooti, 2013a).
The deteriorating socioeconomic conditions for refugees in Egypt has also had the same effect, with refugees
leaving the country irregularly to find protection elsewhere, sometimes via direct boat crossings to Europe
and sometimes to Libya to look for work or to board boats from the Libyan coast (Malakooti, 2015b).
86
4. North Africa
Other countries in the region tend to be transit points for journeys to

Libya, for the most part. This is with the exception of Morocco, which serves as
the only North African departure point along the Western Mediterranean route,
and as such, still receives some irregular inflows. The increased controls along
the Spanish/Moroccan borders make it increasingly difficult to irregularly move
into Spain from Morocco, which means that the inflows into Morocco, as well as
the number of irregular migrants in the country, remain nowhere near as high
as Libya. There is also evidence that some irregular migrants in Morocco, when
they are unable to move into Spain after repeated attempts, end up moving
to Libya to try their luck along the Central Mediterranean route as so do some
Moroccans who wish to move to Europe irregularly (Malakooti, 2015a).
While the increased instability in Libya today and the consequent dangers
for migrants have presumably made the country less desirable than prior to the
2014 political crisis, the impression is that the inflows remain strong because
the migratory routes into the country and the transit routes through the country
are quite well established (ibid.). Map 4.1 charts all the main smuggling routes
through North Africa, with the exclusion of those moving through Morocco.
Map 4.1: Main smuggling routes through North Africa, with the exclusion of routes through
Morocco
Source: Malakooti, 20132015.

87
The dynamics of smuggling

As seen in Map 4.1, migrants typically make their journey in steps. This
leads to a variety of smugglers being used for the different stages of the journey,
and they can be found in a variety of locations (smuggling hubs are marked
in red on Map 4.1). While smuggling networks are sometimes hierarchical
structures organized across countries in a top-to-bottom fashion, they are also
often organized into loose horizontal networks (Bouteillet-Paquet, 2011). In
North Africa, both models can be found. Trafficking networks (as distinct from
smuggling networks) that move to or through North Africa tend to be more
transnational and hierarchical in character. The dramatic increase in the number
of migrants that moved through North Africa in 2014 also led to an increase in
more organized, hierarchical, transnational structures (Malakooti, 2015b).
Some general features of smuggling networks that were identified by
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) (Bouteillet-Paquet, 2011)
have also proven to be present in North Africa (Malakooti, 2015b; 2013a), more
specifically the following:
(a) There is usually someone at the top of the network that migrants rarely
see and who is native to the country within which the smuggling is
taking place;
(b) Migrants deal with intermediaries that come from the same country of
origin as them;
(c) Smuggling organizations can offer different packages from basic services
to more complex ones for a price;
(d) Structures are highly flexible and can adapt quickly to changes in policy
or law enforcement;
(e) Before the sea journey across the Mediterranean, migrants are typically
held in safe houses where they must wait for a period of hours, days,
weeks or even months for optimal weather and other conditions;
(f) Payment can be made through guarantors to decrease the vulnerability
of the migrant;
(g) As migrants typically conduct the journey in stages and as they
sometimes carry with them the money needed for future stages, they
become vulnerable to theft from a number of individuals including
smugglers, bandits and corrupt border officials; and
88
4. North Africa
(h) Corrupt public officials may positively facilitate smuggling or turn a blind
eye to it in exchange for a bribe payment.
Research conducted by the author in Libya in 2013 revealed that there
are generally two types of smugglers along the migratory routes in the region:
(a) smugglers who facilitate the journey itself (referred to as the muhareb in
Arabic); and (b) smugglers who act as intermediaries and create the market for
migrants (referred to as the samsar in Arabic). Usually, the samsar will take the
migrants to a holding location, and once there are enough of them, a muhareb
will be invited to come and offer his services to the migrants. The migrants
will pay the muhareb for the journey, and the muhareb will give a proportion
of the payment to the samsar (Malakooti, 2013a). These general features are
presented in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: Smuggling dynamics in Libya
Source/Note: Reproduction of a diagram initially designed by the author for inclusion in Altais
study on mixed migration to Libya (Malakooti, 2013a).

89
Key locations
There is much to suggest that the control of smugglers over migratory
routes in the region, as well as the need for migrants to resort to the services
of smugglers, remains high (European Commission, Directorate General for
Migration and Home Affairs, 2015; Sorensen, 2006). Traditionally, the crossing of
the Sahara, in order to move from sub-Saharan Africa to North Africa, has been
facilitated by a smuggler as the harsh terrain necessitates the help of someone
who is accustomed to it. This is particularly evident for journeys from Agadez to
Sabha, from Dongola (Sudan) to Kufra or Sabha, and across the Algerian desert
and into Libya (Tamanrasset to Djanet or Debdeb) (Malakooti, 2013a).
Moving through Libya, once one has entered through one of its southern
borders, is also very difficult and requires a smuggler. This is due to the ongoing
political instability, which has led to conflict in certain parts of the country and
the presence of checkpoints across the country, established by both State and
non-State actors (Malakooti, 2015a).
Key actors
Members of certain Saharan tribes are known to be active in the smuggling
business because of their strong knowledge of the desert and familiarity with
crossing it. The historic marginalization of such tribes under Gadhafis regime
also encouraged entry into the smuggling business for the sake of earning a
livelihood (Reitano, Adal, Shaw, 2014:4).
Members of the Tuareg tribe tend to dominate routes through North Niger
and Algeria and into Ghat and Ghadames in Libya. Members of the Tebu tribe
are thought to be active on routes through the Tibesti Mountains and on some
routes through the western part of Kufra (Police officers and border post officials
in this area are often Tebu, which likely helps facilitate passage for smugglers).
Members of the Zway tribe are believed to be controlling most of the smuggling
routes to the eastern part of Kufra from Sudan and Chad. There has also been
some competition between the Zway and the Tebu to control the smuggling
routes in and out of Kufra, particularly because the local economy has been so
dependent on this business (Malakooti, 2013a).
The effect of the conflict in Libya

There are suggestions that the conflict in Libya that began in 2014 has led
to more groups entering the smuggling trade as a way to fund their activities
90
4. North Africa
(Malakooti, 2015a). As such, migrant smuggling in Libya also reflects the

evolution and deepening of civil conflict in the country. For example, migrants
detained in Libya have reported that detention centre guards sometimes offer to
facilitate their release from detention if they purchase a boat journey to Europe
from a smuggler (Malakooti, 2013a; Frouws, 2014). Others also intimated that
some people were put on a boat straight from detention, without having paid a
smuggling fee (Malakooti, 2015a; Naik et al., 2015). Moreover, in April 2014, only
20 per cent of detention centres in Libya were reported to be official detention
centres by the Ministry of Interior (IOM, 2015a). Such insights suggest that there
may be State actors involved in smuggling in Libya and that non-State actors
have established migrant detention centres as a way to expand the market for
smuggling services.
Migrant smuggling in North Africa has traditionally been linked to
smuggling of other commodities, such as weapons, drugs and subsidized goods.
However, the United States Institute of Peace (Shaw and Mangan, 2014) has
identified an increase in the intermingling of migrant smuggling and drug
trafficking in recent years.
The economics of smuggling

Prior to 2014, journeys to North Africa and from North Africa to Europe
involved standard prices (Malakooti, 2013a). In 2014, however, the price of a
journey facilitated by a smuggler was dependent upon the nationality of the
migrant, the smuggling ring the migrant came into contact with in Libya, and
the level of service that the migrant was willing to pay for. Syrian refugees, for
example, paid higher prices than sub-Saharan Africans, and for higher price, a
migrant could secure a place on the top deck of the vessel and receive a life
jacket (Malakooti, 2015a).
While in 2013, the most expensive journeys were around USD 6,000
(Malakooti, 2013a), in 2014, they could be up to USD 20,000 (Malakooti, 2015a).
Prices increased when larger numbers of Syrians entered the market, as they
tend to have greater economic means when compared with sub-Saharan
Africans. The overall increase in traffic along North African routes in 2014 also
had an impact on prices. Migrant smuggling from the coast of Libya is estimated
to be worth between USD 255 to 323 million per year (GITNOC, 2015).
As most migrants do not have enough money for the entire journey
from the outset, many work in transit countries along the way. In some cases,
a smuggler might allow a migrant to continue the journey, even if they do not
have the requisite funds, on the promise that they will pay off their debt to the
91
smuggler once in the destination country. Such practices often lead to situations
of bonded labour, highlighting a fine line between smuggling and trafficking. It
is also common for smugglers to direct female migrants travelling from West to
North Africa, and who are out of money, to Arlit (Niger) to work in prostitution,
as a way to generate income for the next phase of their journey. This makes
them particularly vulnerable to being trafficked.

While no overall estimate has been made of the number of migrants
being smuggled into and through North Africa, data on migrant smuggling
at the country level is also limited and hampered by a number of challenges.
First and foremost, the phenomena of irregular migration in general, and
migrant smuggling specifically, are hard to quantify given the fact that they are
clandestine in nature. In North Africa, there is also the added complication of
unstable environments, particularly in the case of Libya, which makes it difficult
to conduct ongoing data collection. The current political crisis in Libya, and
the consequent lack of one universally recognized national government, also
prevents national government-led data collection exercises. Finally, the fact that
migration flows in the region are so dynamic also makes it difficult to produce a
snapshot of the scope and magnitude of the flows at any given moment. Most
data in this area is based on estimates at best.
Estimating the number of migrants smuggled into the region usually
occurs within the broader task of estimating the number of irregular migrants
travelling into the region irregular migration flows. There have also been some
attempts to quantify the number of irregular migrants in the region in the past
irregular migrant stocks. This has been particularly so for Libya.
In 2004, for example, Libyan authorities estimated the presence of
600,000 regular foreign workers and between 750,000 and 1.2 million irregular
foreign workers living in Libya (MPC, 2013c). In 2011, IOM estimated the
total number of migrants who had been residing in Libya prior to the 2011
revolution at 2.5 million, including 1 million Egyptians, 80,000 Pakistanis, 59,000
Sudanese, 63,000 Bangladeshis, 26,000 Filipinos, 10,500 Vietnamese and a large
population of sub-Saharan Africans mainly from Chad, Ghana, Mali, Niger and
Nigeria (IOM, 2011). Considering that regular economic migrants in Libya tend
to be Asian or Arab (Malakooti, 2013a), it is likely that 1 to 1.5 million of the 2.5
million were irregular migrants. The International Centre for Migration Policy
Development attempted to estimate the number of irregular migrants in Libya
for its 2010 study through interviews with Libyan authorities, and estimated
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4. North Africa
it at somewhere between 1 and 2 million. Altai Consulting also attempted to

estimate the total number of migrants in Libya (regular and irregular) for their
2013 study (Malakooti, 2013a) for the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) by extrapolating a figure from existing data sources
and estimates (combined with interviews with border officials) and fixed it at
somewhere between 1.8 million and 1.9 million individuals, with an increase of
50,000 to 100,000 migrants per year to be expected in that context. In its 2015
study, Altai Consulting (Malakooti, 2015a) estimated that the inflows into Libya
were likely to have decreased (but not ceased) as a result of the 2014 political
crisis. At the time of writing, there are few reliable estimates available on the
number of irregular migrants in Libya and the size of the inflows into the country.
Currently, the North Africa Mixed Migration Hub (MHub)15 is working on
an initiative for the ongoing monitoring of flows moving through North Africa.
The Migrant Footprints project involves an online data hub and platform in
which agencies, researchers, stakeholders, government, media and nominated
focal points16 can upload and download information and data on flows through
the region in real time. It aims to collect data on numbers of individuals moving
through the region (and thus create trend estimates of the magnitude of the
flows), as well as qualitative information on the migration dynamics in the region
(such as profiles, push-and-pull factors, risks and vulnerabilities).
MHub was created to improve data collection and research on the
irregular migration flows in North Africa. It works on behalf of the North Africa
Mixed Migration Task Force, which is supported by the Danish Refugee Council
(DRC), IOM, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR),
the Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat (RMMS), UNHCR and UNODC. One of
its regular activities is the dissemination of monthly trend bulletins providing
updates on trends. However, the monthly bulletins do not attempt to bring the
figures together to estimate overall numbers of inflows, outflows and body of
migrants in the region. They are intended to provide insights on a country basis.
Agencies and organizations who are working on the ground in Libya use
a number of indicators to gain an impression of how the size of the flows may
be changing. For example, the Directorate for Combatting Illegal Migration
(DCIM) regularly provides official numbers of migrants detained in centres in
Libya to organizations, such as IOM and UNHCR. Interviews with IOM staff in
Libya at the time of writing indicated that the number of migrants in detention
15
See www.mixedmigrationhub.org
Data focal points have been identified in Mali, Niger, Sudan and Tunisia and are individuals who have a
good sense of migration dynamics in their area and who also generate data for the database by conducting
interviews regularly in their respective locations.
16

93
increased between 2014 and 2015, which may suggest that the number of
irregular migrants in the country has increased. However, even DCIMs figures
are often not accurate, given the fact that there are a number of detention
centres active in Libya today, some of which are non-official and maintained by
non-State actors. Thus, such indicators only provide a sense of how the flows
have evolved, rather than accurate data or estimates. There has also been an
increase in the number of detention centres between 2014 and 2015, as well
as the creation of new centres that were opened by other directorates in Libya
and often called collection centres, which may also indicate an increase in the
number of migrants in the country, or an increase in smuggling activity. It should
also be noted that the number of migrants in detention fluctuates greatly,
presumably because of deportations and movements to Europe, thereby limiting
the reliability of such an indicator.
Other indicators that shed light on the number of irregular migrants in
the region (or the number of smuggled migrants in the region) include data
compiled by IOM on the beneficiaries of their assisted voluntary return (AVR)
and assisted voluntary return and reintegration (AVRR) programmes, asylumseekers and refugees registered with UNHCR,17 and rescue-at-sea operations
conducted by the Tunisian coast guard. In the pre-departure interviews that
IOM Libya conducts with the beneficiaries of its AVR and AVRR programmes,
data is often collected on smuggling dynamics and the victimization of migrants,
particularly in terms of abuse and labour exploitation.
In December 2015, IOM Libya launched a Displacement Tracking Matrix
(DTM) exercise in Libya. The DTM is a system developed by IOM that tracks
population displacement and the evolving needs of displaced populations during
crises.18 In Libya, the exercise will focus on generating data and knowledge on the
number of internally displaced persons (IDPs), resident migrants and irregular
migrants on the move and their locations, demographics and vulnerabilities.
The DTM in Libya will involve key informant interviews at the municipality level
and the district level. Community elders, authorities and other nominated
key informants will be asked about the number of migrants and IDPs in their
area, both in detention centres and the wider community. The exercise will
be repeated monthly for the first two months and then weekly. By creating
estimates of the number of irregular migrants in the country and the inflows
(which will be generated by monitoring changes each week), this exercise will
Given the lack of a national asylum framework in Libya, many asylum seekers and refugees registered with
UNHCR follow the same smuggling routes as irregular migrants in their search for protection (Malakooti,
2015b and 2013b).
18
The DTM model has been tried in 27 other countries and is based on a methodology that uses a variety of
tools and processes, and triangulates various layers of information in order to produce estimates.
17
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4. North Africa
also give an impression of the number of smuggled migrants in the country. The
results will be made publicly available through an online platform.
While the exercise is based on estimates and informant-based reporting,
by cross-referencing the estimates of a number of informants at a number of
layers, it allows for a strong estimate. Moreover, repeating the exercise on a
weekly basis not only allows figures to be regularly updated, but it also allows
for trends to be identified, which could allow for future forecasting too. In the
current context of Libya, that is, an environment that is changing rapidly, a good
estimate that is updated frequently is much more realistic and useful than an
actual counting exercise that would attempt to create an accurate figure. This is
because a counting exercise would need to be longitudinal in nature for it to yield
an accurate figure (it would need to be conducted over a year, at a minimum,
in order to account for seasonal variations), which means it would be time and
resource consuming. Moreover, given the ongoing insecurity in Libya and the
fact that communities are likely to keep moving in this context, the figure that it
yields may not be relevant by the time it is realized. The current context in Libya
also makes a counting exercise near impossible, given the security limitations.
As North Africa is also a transit region for migrants moving to Europe,
data on irregular migration in the region is sometimes extrapolated from official
data sources in receiving countries on the other side of the Mediterranean. For
example, data on irregular arrivals in Italy, Malta and Spain collected by national
governments, UNHCR, IOM and Frontex gives a sense of the number of irregular
migrants that moved to Europe through the various North African countries. For
example, Figure 4.2 charts arrivals in Italy between 2012 and 2014 according
to the country of departure and thus, provides official data on the number of
migrants that were smuggled from North Africa across the Mediterranean.

95
Figure 4.2: Irregular arrivals on the Italian coast by country of departure, 20122015
Source: Italian Ministry of Interior. Available from www.magistraturademocratica.it/mdem/upy/

farticolo/1.DATI%20IMMIGRAZIONE%20MIN.%20INTERNO%202014-2015.pdf
Note: The year 2013 also saw 7 arrivals from Morocco and 8 arrivals from Montenegro.
In terms of data collection on smuggling specifically, GITOC has developed

an initiative called the Smuggling Monitor, which monitors changes in smuggling
networks.19 More specifically, it keeps track of the cost of being smuggled,
incidences of violence against migrants (or associated with migration), and the
challenges of entry into the smuggling market. By focusing on these indicators, it
aims to develop a better understanding of how smuggling networks and markets
are functioning and ultimately, to measure the extent to which criminality is
involved. That is, it focuses on the criminal aspects of smuggling rather than the
migration aspects or drivers.
The Smuggling Monitor is not a traditional data collection exercise in
that it does not aim to quantify the smuggling market or collect figures or data
points. Rather, it brings together a number of qualitative information sources,
including primary qualitative interviews but also secondary literature and media
articles and pieces and continually adds to its number of sources. In this way, it
formalizes and systematizes qualitative information.
19
See www.globalinitiative.net
96
4. North Africa

Research that is focused specifically on smuggling is rare. Most research on
smuggling has been conducted within broader research on irregular migration.
One of the few organizations that has conducted research on smuggling
specifically is UNODC. While UNODC has looked at smuggling as a general global
issue (for example, McAdam and Nicot, 2011; Bouteillet-Paquet, 2011), it has also
conducted research on smuggling in, from and through North Africa specifically
(for example, UNODC, 2006; Monzini, 2010). However, the last UNODC study of
this nature was conducted in 2011, and the migration and smuggling dynamics
in the region have changed significantly in the last five years; first, after the
Libyan Revolution of 2011, and then after the ongoing political crisis of 2014 in
Libya (Malakooti, 2015a).
In fact, there is little research, specifically primary research, conducted
in the region post-2014 when Libya became increasingly unstable. Most of
the research post-2014 draws on secondary research and, where interviews
have been conducted with individuals in Libya, it is usually remotely and not
with migrants or smugglers themselves (for example, Abdel Aziz, Monzini and
Pastrone, 2015; Toaldo, 2015a and 2015b; Wolff, 2015; Reitano, Adal and Shaw,
2014 and 2015). While there are some post-2014 studies that include primary
research in Libya (see Malakooti, 2015a) most omit Libya altogether (see
European Union Directorate General for Migration and Home Affairs, 2015).
Even IOM has had challenges conducting research in Libya in recent years (see
IOM, 2015a).
Coinciding with the Libyan political crisis of 2014 was a large increase in
the number of migrants transiting through North Africa on their way to Europe,
or moving from North Africa to Europe in the same year.20 This led to a situation
that started being termed as the Mediterranean Crisis and thus, led to a
proliferation of research and analysis on the Mediterranean that looked at North
Africa as a transit region for journeys to Europe. The New-Med Research Network
was presumably established for this reason and produced quite a few papers in
2015 for this purpose (see also Malakooti, 2015a; Townsend and Oomen, 2015).
However, when analysing smuggling dynamics, such research tends to focus on
entry points into Libya and then boat journeys across the Mediterranean with
little regard for intraregional smuggling dynamics.
20
It is very likely that some of these migrants had been living in Libya for some time and were pushed out of
Libya and to Europe in 2014 because of the instability in Libya (see Malakooti, 2015a).

97
In terms of research focused on smuggling specifically in the post-2014

period, the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) and GITNOC have made sound
contributions. Unlike most of the research in this area, these two organizations
focus on the criminal drivers of smuggling in North Africa. That is, rather than
looking at smuggling as a facet of migration and smugglers as individuals who
fulfil a demand for irregular migration, they look at smuggling as a transnational
crime and part of the illicit economy. The USIP study, while not providing a great
deal of information on its methodology, was apparently based on more than
200 qualitative interviews across Libya. GITNOC does not necessarily base its
work on primary research; it tends to bring together a lot of secondary sources,
including the work of journalists and anecdotal evidence provided by the media,
with little critical assessment of its sources. In any case, both organizations have
attempted to size the criminal economy linked to smuggling in Libya and outline
the links between migrant smuggling and other forms of smuggling in the region.
Across the body of research, what is lacking is primary research. The
research can be categorized according to rapid updates and papers more akin to
policy briefs and research based on more sound methodologies. The policy brief
type research tends to be based on secondary research only with little critical
assessment of sources. The impression is that organizations active in this area
favour regular updates over rigorous research (GITNOC, New-Med). More sound
methodologies include primary research modules (see Altai, MHub and RMMS),
although most primary research that exists is in the form of primary qualitative
research. Most of it is conducted with migrants who are asked about their
experiences with smugglers (see Altai, RMMS and MHub). Some of it involves
interviews with smugglers, but this is not usually conducted systematically; if
conducted at all, it is usually a handful of smugglers that are interviewed among
a bigger sample of interviews with migrants (see Altai and RMMS).
There is dearth of research based on primary quantitative research or
samples larger than a few hundred interviews. While the qualitative research
that exists has been successful in identifying the trends and major dynamics, the
lack of quantitative research means that there has been no effort to quantify any
of these dynamics after 2006. It should be noted that Altais Libya study of 2013
(Malakooti, 2013a), and RMMS 2014 study did build upon quantitative research
that had been conducted for other studies but did not include quantitative
modules of their own.21
21
In the case of Altai, it was 600 interviews conducted with tribal groups in the south of Libya in 2013, and in
the case of RMMS, it was a survey conducted by DRC with over 1,000 migrants in 2013.
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4. North Africa
In terms of lines of enquiry, the research tends to be destination

focused, in terms of European destinations along Mediterranean routes, with
little research along the chain. This is presumably because of the challenge in
conducting research in Libya post-2014, as well as the tendency to focus on
the Mediterranean post-2014 (as previously mentioned). It is likely to also be
linked to the availability of data at destination (because of arrival statistics that
are kept by European arrival countries) and the ease with which interviews can
be conducted with migrants at destination. The effect of this is that smuggling
routes and dynamics from North Africa are better documented than smuggling
routes to and within North Africa, which means the issue is not comprehensively
addressed.
Moreover, when research is specifically focused on North Africa, it tends
to focus on Libya. There is little research that has been conducted in recent
years on other countries in the region. While Libya is the main country in North
Africa when it comes to migration and smuggling and thus, does warrant the
focus of the bulk of the research in the region, the lack of research on smuggling
dynamics in other countries in the region and smuggling dynamics at transit
points does make it challenging to develop interventions to address smuggling
in other locations in the region.
In terms of lines of enquiry more specifically, research areas that have
been well addressed include the mapping of irregular migration and smuggling
routes throughout the region (see Malakooti, 2015a, 2015b and 2013a; Collyer
et al., 2016) and the profiles of the smugglers and dynamics of smuggling in
the region (Reitano, Adal and Shaw, 2014; Toaldo, 2015b; Naik et al., 2015 and
2016; Frouws, 2014; Malakooti, 2015a, 2015b, 2013a and 2013b). There has also
been some attempt to map the economics of smuggling; that is, the pricing of
smuggling routes in terms of what migrants are paying for smuggling services
(Malakooti, 2015a, 2015b, 2013a and 2013b) and the sizing of the smuggling
economy in terms of the revenues it generates (USIP, UNODC, GITNOC).
While these areas have been well addressed, what is lacking is ongoing
research and analysis. The region is quite dynamic, and the instability in Libya
causes much change in the trends. Research that supports trend analysis would
be beneficial to policymakers and programme managers, and also provide some
forecasting ability over time.
There is also little research on the individuals that sit at the top of smuggling
networks in the region. Most studies agree that these networks are headed by
individuals who are rarely seen, but none of them reveal much about them.
More research dedicated to smuggling specifically, and particularly from the
99
perspective of the migration dynamics, rather than looking at it within broader

studies would also be useful. Finally, as it is well documented that certain transSaharan tribes are prominent in the smuggling routes into Libya and in the south
of Libya (Malakooti, 2013a; Reitano, Adal and Shaw, 2014), more research among
these communities and in terms of better understanding their motivations for
entering the smuggling trade, would be useful.

There is a lack of data on smuggling and irregular migration in the region.
As the region is dynamic, with numbers shifting regularly, more initiatives are
required that provide rapid, regularly updated, rigorous estimates.
Initiatives such as the Migrant Footprint Database and the Smuggling
Monitor show promise for the bringing together of information about smuggling
in the region, but for rigorous estimates to be generated on the number of
irregular and smuggled migrants in the region, a methodology is required that
interviews a number of key informants at a number of levels at regular and
frequent intervals.
For this reason, IOM Libyas DTM exercise shows promise for developing
rigorous estimates for Libya and, depending on how the pilot phase eventuates,
it might be beneficial to replicate the same exercise in other countries in the
region. Having said that, the majority of smuggling in the region is occurring
in, to and from Libya. Thus, generating more accurate data for Libya would
prove beneficial to the entire region. Once a better sense of the scope of the
phenomenon in Libya is attained, it will be easier to gauge whether more data is
required for the region.
In terms of research, most of the previous research in the area has focused
on Libya, or on European destinations on the Central Mediterranean route. More
research in other countries in the region, particularly Egypt which is probably
the most dynamic after Libya and more information about the dynamics at
transit points would be beneficial. Also, in terms of smuggling routes in the
region, most mapping exercises have focused on routes to Libya, routes from
North Africa to Europe, and routes from other countries in the region to Libya.
There is little research on the routes into the other countries in the region.
Finally, more ongoing analysis of the development of smuggling networks,
and the entry of new players in the smuggling market in Libya, particularly as
the conflict unfolds and becomes more intertwined with migrant smuggling,
100
4. North Africa
would allow better responses to migrant smuggling, better understanding of the

motivation of the smugglers and would allow for the better forecasting of future
trends. More research among Saharan tribal groups who have been prominent in
smuggling in the region for decades would also reveal a lot of useful information
about the root causes of migrant smuggling, whether it be economic-, criminalor migration-related.
References
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5
EUROPE
Danai Angeli and Anna Triandafyllidou
Introduction
Since the 1980s, irregular migration to Europe has rapidly expanded. The
perceived economic advantages, particularly in Western European countries,
large-scale conflicts in Asia and the Middle East, the effects of global poverty
especially in the south but also increasingly restrictive migration policies barring
access to the labour market are some of the many converging factors behind
the growth of this rather complex phenomenon. Over the past few years, the
political turmoil in the Arab world and in particular the ongoing crisis in the
Syrian Arab Republic have further exacerbated the number of undocumented
migrants reaching Europe (Triandafyllidou and Maroukis, 2012; Shelley,
2014; Kuschminder, de Bresser and Siegel, 2015; McAuliffe, 2013; Salt, 2000).
According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), in 2015, over
1 million irregular migrants and refugees arrived in Europe (IOM, 2015) from
developing countries in Africa and Asia the highest migration flow since the
Second World War. Frontex, the European Agency for the Management of the
European Unions External Borders reported an unprecedented number of over
1.5 million irregular border crossings, the overwhelming majority of which took
place at the GreekTurkish sea border (Frontex, 2016a). In response to these
developments, countries in Europe have kept their eyes fixed on their borders;
managing the growing numbers of migrants entering into the continent and
discouraging the influx of irregular flows has nowadays evolved into a primary
policy objective (Fargues and Fandrich, 2012; Fargues, 2014).
The connection between irregular migration and migrant smuggling as
a violent and ruthless business is relatively recent and was mainly established
in Europe during the first major refugee crisis in the mid-1990s. Up until then,
migrant smuggling was neither punished nor treated as an important act of
crime as it is today. It even had a positive connotation; a legacy of the heroic
acts of smuggling Jews to safety during the Second World War. There was also
no common policy to combat migrant smuggling (van Liempt, 2016; Doomernik,
2013). In 2000, the preparation of a proposal for a Council on the Framework
Decision on Strengthening the Penal Framework for Preventing the Facilitation
105
of Unauthorized Entry and Residence laid down the first ground for European
Union Member States to join forces against migrant smugglers (van Liempt,
2016; ONeill, 2011). The same year, the adoption of the United Nations Protocol
against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Air and Sea (hereafter Smuggling
Protocol) acknowledged the gravity of the phenomenon and officially included
migrant smuggling in the fight against organized crime (van Liempt, 2016).
Since then, European States have increasingly invested considerable
amounts of resources to counter migrant smuggling and punish the offenders.
Among the most notable developments was the 2015 adoption of a common
Action Plan against Migrant Smuggling, which laid down a comprehensive strategy
to this purpose (COM (2015) 285). In the course of 2016, Europes commitment
reached new levels with the deployment of North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) vessels in the Aegean Sea to help crack down criminal networks, in a way
literally militarizing the war on smugglers (Emmott and Stewart, 2016).
Even though migrant smuggling is not a recent phenomenon in Europe,
understanding its different forms and dynamics remains a complex task. Despite
a growing number of studies, knowledge about migrant smuggling is limited to
those cases that have actually been detected (Salt, 2000). Gaining an in-depth
understanding of migrant smuggling in Europe entails additional challenges given
the particularities of the geopolitical context. Notwithstanding the small size of
the continent and the established commitment to a common policy, European
countries are in their overwhelming majority still quite divergent in the way they
define, understand and counter the crime of migrant smuggling (Carrera, 2016).
The aim of the present chapter is essentially twofold: first, on the basis of
existing knowledge, the authors seek to unfold the scale of migrant smuggling in
Europe, provide an overview of its main characteristics and ultimately contribute
towards bringing together information that to this day lies in large fragmented.
Second, and most important, the authors seek to shed light, as well as probe
some of the main assumptions underpinning the current understanding about
migrant smuggling by inquiring into the methodological considerations that
underpin existing knowledge and scholarly analysis. The ultimate purpose is
to help advance discussions about migrant smuggling not only by identifying
potential gaps but also by delineating and raising better awareness about the
scale and limitations of the knowledge itself.
The chapter will have the following structure: the first part provides an
overview of the key features and characteristics of migrant smuggling in the
European region. The part presents the main routes and figures, describes
the modus operandi and profile of the smuggling networks and traces recent
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5. Europe
developments. A holistic approach addressing not only movement into Europe

but also within Europe is taken. In the second part of the discussion, the
focus is shifted to the analytical frames underpinning the current knowledge.
The main sources of information are identified, and the main methodological
considerations framing existing knowledge is reviewed. Particular focus on data
collection processes is given and the manner in which these are applied across the
different jurisdictions and delineate the scope and main contributions of existing
research is compared. In the final part, the main findings are summarized, and
recommendations for the way forward are given.

In the context of Europe, the discourse on migrant smuggling to and within
the continent goes hand in hand with the discussion about irregular migration. It
is estimated that roughly 90 per cent of all migrants that cross Europes external
or internal borders unlawfully rely at some point of their journey on the services
of a smuggler (Europol, 2016).22
During the last decade, irregular migration to and within Europe has
typically developed along two main axes: (a) from south to north; and (b) from
east to west (Triandafyllidou and Maroukis, 2012). Undocumented migrants
into Europe have mostly come from developing countries in Asia and Africa,
particularly the Syrian Arab Republic, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as
Senegal, Somalia, Nigeria and Morocco. According to Europol the European
Unions law enforcement agency in recent years, there has also been a
persistent flow of irregular migrants from India, Bangladesh, China and Viet Nam
(Europol, 2016).
The journey of an irregular migrant into Europe typically starts from the
European Unions external south and eastern land and sea borders, in particular
Greece, Italy, Malta, Spain, and continues therefrom towards western and
northern European countries. The preferred destinations are Germany, Sweden
and the United Kingdom. There is also evidence of transatlantic irregular
migration in particular towards North America; albeit its occurrence seems
less common (Europol, 2015a). According to Frontex, there are eight main
paths through which unauthorized migrants enter into Europe. Out of those,
Frontex reports, smugglers have in recent years made increasing use of three
main routes: (a) the so-called Western Mediterranean route, from Morocco
to Spain; (b) Central Mediterranean route from Libya to Italy and Malta; and
22
It should of course be noted that the majority of irregular migrants present in Europe have arrived legally
and then overstayed or abused their terms of entry/stay.

107
(c) Eastern Mediterranean route, from Turkey to Greece. A smaller percentage

has steadily entered through the Eastern land borders to the European Union,
via the Russian Federation, Ukraine and the Nordic countries (Frontex routes
map; Triandafyllidou and Maroukis, 2012).
The Eastern Mediterranean corridor, notably via Greeces land and sea
border with Turkey, remains one of the most travelled points of entry to the
European Union. According to Frontex, this route is mainly used by irregular
migrants from the Syrian Arab Republic, Afghanistan, Pakistan but also Iraq and
Somalia. In 2015, a record number of around 885,000 irregular migrants arrived
into the European Union via this path (Frontex, 2016b). One of the main features
of this route has been the alternating shifts in the flows between the land and
sea borders. While in 20082009, sea crossings from the Turkish coasts to the
Aegean islands (Samos, Lesvos and Chios) were the preferred routes, towards
the end of 2009, there was a sudden change: irregular migrants apprehended
at the GreekTurkish land border quintupled, while those apprehended at
the sea borders fell by 70 per cent. In 2012, the routes have shifted again;
apprehensions fell dramatically at the GreekTurkish land borders, but tripled
in 2013 and quadrupled in 2014. The same trend was maintained also in 2015;
the sea border and in particular the island of Lesvos accounted for almost all
irregular crossings into the country.
The Central Mediterranean route is reportedly mainly preferred by
sub-Saharan populations and in particular Eritreans, Ghanaians, Nigerians,
Senegalese and Somalis. Despite some recent fluctuations, this path has been
registering high numbers of irregular arrivals throughout the last 15 years. Italy
registered peaks in apprehensions at its sea borders in 20062007, then hit an
all-time low in 20092010 after the accords of the Government of Italy with the
Gheddafi regime in Libya to push back people who had set off the Libyan coast
to Italy. Numbers climbed dramatically in early 2011 and again in 20132014.
Arrivals remained high also in the course of 2015, although there was a relative
drop in the total number of irregular crossings compared to the year before
(Frontex, 2016c; Europol, 2016).
The Western Mediterranean route originates in sub-Saharan Africa and
mainly goes through Morocco to Spain, via the Spanish cities of Ceuta and Melilla
in North Africa or the Canary Islands or indeed directly across the Gibraltar straits
to mainland Spain. About a decade ago, this route was mainly used by Moroccan
and Algerian migrants seeking better job opportunities in Europe. In the mid2000s, it became a preferred route for irregular migrants from sub-Saharan
Africa driven northwards by regional conflicts. However, over the past five years,
it has lost in significance and has been to some extent abandoned. In 2015, the
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5. Europe
overall number of detected arrivals dropped further, while Syrians accounted for
most known cases of irregular border crossing (Frontex, 2016d).
A further path, the so-called Eastern European land route, crosses into
Europe via the Russian Federation and then Finland, Norway or Ukraine. This
path has typically accounted for a small albeit persistent flow of irregular
arrivals into Europe averaging over the past eight years 1,500 detections
on an annual basis (0.01% of all arrivals). Since 2015, it has however started
gaining significance. This path is mainly followed by Georgians, Russians, as well
as Afghans and Somalis who aim to reach Europe through the eastern borders.
Until 2015, Ukraine was the main transit country. Over the past year, however,
the flows have started shifting towards the artic route and in particular via the
Russian Federation to Norway and Finland. Although the flows have remained
relatively stable over the past eight years, in 2015, there was a relative increase
in the number of detected border crossings (Frontex, 2016e).
Irregular migrants arriving in the southern and eastern borders of the
European Union typically continue their journey towards Western European
countries, although for some nationalities, southern countries are the primary
destination. For many Pakistanis, for instance, Greece is the destination country
(Kuschminder, de Bresser and Siegel, 2015). Secondary movements within Europe
normally develop along a wide diversity and constantly change paths, without
there being any known key trajectories as within Europe. It is also common
for irregular migrants to cross into Europe with the aid of a smuggler, but then
continue their journey alone. Nonetheless, depending on the embarking point,
some common key trajectories are the following:
The journey for those arriving to Greece routinely continues
via the Western Balkans. Irregular migrants practically exit the
European Union through Greeces northern-western borders and
seek re-entry via the Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and the former
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia in different combinations and
to a lesser extent via Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania (Jandl, Fut
and Karsakova, 2005). From there, they reportedly continue their
journey to Austria and Germany via land. Prior to the refugee
crisis, the Balkan route was of lesser significance and mainly saw
numbers rise in 2013, when around 20,000 migrants made of
changes in border control policies to cross into the country and
apply for asylum. They then continued their journey onwards to
Northern Europe. The majority were Syrians, Somalis but also

109
nationals of UNSC resolution 1244-administered Kosovo.23 In the

course of 2015, this route became particularly popular among
Syrian, Iraqi and Afghan irregular migrants and asylum seekers
(Frontex, 2016f).
A second key trajectory crosses from Greece to south Italy,
through the ports of Patra, Igoumenitsa and Corfu. This
secondary movement typically constitutes the first leg of a longer
journey towards Western European countries starting from Italy
(Triandafyllidou and Maroukis, 2012).
Another important trajectory from Southern to Western Europe
departs from Italy, goes mostly through Milan and from there
continues to Northern Europe via Switzerland, Austria and Germany,
one of the top destination countries. Other migrants continue their
journey from Germany onwards to the French Channel ports and
the United Kingdom; or via France, Czech Republic and Germany
to the United Kingdom. A small number appears to continue their
journey from the United Kingdom to North America or Canada
(Europol, 2011, 2012 and 2013; Kuschminder, de Bresser and
Siegel, 2015). More specific paths, as is the case in the context of
smuggling into Europe where the trip between Ayvalik and the
south and north shore of Lesvos accounted, for instance, for most
irregular border crossings in 2015, are not discernible from the
available data.
Even though Frontex reports that irregular migrants rely heavily on
facilitators for their entry into the European continent, the same does not
apply for intra-European movements. Many migrants continue their journey
with their own means, via buses, railway lines or with the support of family
and friends, often taking advantage of migration regimes. Among those who
resort to smugglers, there is again further divergence as some rely on smugglers
throughout their journey and others for specific legs of their itinerary. The precise
extent in which smugglers are involved in irregular movement varies significantly,
making it difficult to draw accurate estimates. According to the national statistics
of Germany, for instance, between 2010 and 2014, a total of 154,282 migrants
entered the country unlawfully, but the total number of smuggled migrants was
31,816 (Federal Criminal Police Office of Germany (BKA), 2014).
23
Hereinafter referred to as Kosovo/UNSC 1244.
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5. Europe
While the ratio between the two total figures appears relatively stable
throughout the years, there are significant variations among the different routes.
For instance, in 2014, the route via Poland ranked sixth in the annual statistics on
irregular border crossings (1,693), but third in the context of detected smuggled
cases (343). In Austria, on the other hand, in the context of irregular migration,
the reliance on smugglers seems much higher. Between 2010 and 2014, the total
number of detected irregular migrants (60,069) was almost as high as those
who were smuggled into the country (62,108). Notably, even though irregular
entries were typically higher compared to detected smuggling cases, in 2014,
there was a remarkable shift. The total number of smuggled migrants (20,768)
significantly surpassed the number of those who had entered and were staying
in the country unlawfully (12,791) (BMI, 2014). In the absence of systematic
comparable research into these data, there is a significant knowledge gap on
cross-country migrant smuggling trends within the region.
Typically, a migrants journey consists of many intermediate stopovers, the so-called hotspots, where one can access specific services, such
as accommodation and transport. Europol has identified 230 such hotspots,
among which Istanbul, Athens, Berlin, Budapest, Calais, Copenhagen, Frankfurt,
Hamburg, London, Madrid, Milan and Vienna (Europol, 2016). Depending on
the available funds, a facilitated migrant may also stop on the way at urban or
semi-urban regions and work for a while, so as to pay off debt or collect money
to pay for the remainder of the trip. A journey within Europe can thus last from a
few days to a few months, depending on the funds of the migrant, as well as the
kind of obstacles encountered on the route. In cases where an irregular migrant
decides to travel one leg at the time, onward movement may take up to several
years, depending on the number of stop-overs and the possibility to work and
fund the rest of the trip (Europol, 2016). In a recent study, Europol mapped the
main smuggling paths into and within Europe as seen on Figure 5.1.

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Figure 5.1: Smuggling routes into and within the European Union
Source: Europol, 2016.
When it comes to the details of the actual transfer, the means and ways
vary greatly depending on the leg of the journey and many more converging
factors. In recent years, most smuggling to and within Europe has primarily
taken place by land and/or sea. Even though travel by air is currently of limited
use, Europol estimates that it will increase in significance the further security
controls on the land and sea routes are tightening (Europol, 2016). As regards
payment, this is normally made in cash in advance or in halfway instalments; if
migrants fail to pay, smugglers may extort the families in the country of origin.
Payment via labour may also be demanded (Europol, 2011, 2012a, 2013, 2015b).
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5. Europe
Smuggling into Europe through the Mediterranean sea routes typically

takes place on unseaworthy fishing boats or small overloaded rubber dinghies.
These vessels are generally poorly equipped, prone to capsizing and often lack
the necessary fuel to reach Europe (Frontex, 2016). The size of the vessel and the
number of passengers depends on the distance that has to be covered and the
funds available. A refugee dinghy crossing from the Turkish coast to the Aegean
Islands typically carries 50 to 65 people; a wooden boat from Libya to Italy can
carry up to a few hundreds (Kingsley, 2015). It is noteworthy that smugglers
themselves do not normally board the boats but reportedly assign pilot duties
to one of the passengers. The sums due vary depending on a variety of factors.
Each leg of the journey is normally associated with a specific fee range, the
precise height of which is influenced by additional factors, such as the weather
conditions, the risks involved, the facilities in the receiving country, as well as
social considerations (nationality, age, family status). In 2015, for instance,
crossing from Ayvalik to Lesvos reportedly cost between EUR 500 to EUR 2,500
with the lowest fees reported during windy winter days. Overall in the smuggling
industry, travel by sea under such conditions is generally considered among the
most dangerous and accounts for the highest number of deaths (University of
Amsterdam, 2016).
Subsidiary movement within the European continent typically takes place
by land, through private vehicles and concealed departments in trucks and train
freights. The precise mode depends (among other things) on the quality of the
road, the length of the journey, the financial possibilities of the client and also the
migration policies in place (e.g. Schengen). Compared to movement into Europe,
the available options here appear to be much broader, rendering the analysis
of the trends particularly complex. While data have not been systematically
collected, travelling in hidden spaces in trucks and buses has been frequently
reported in the context the ferry crossings from Greece to Italy (Triandafyllidou
and Maroukis, 2012). Travelling in concealed departments in vans, trucks and
minivans is also a commonly reported method in the context of the Western
Balkan route, in particular from Bulgaria via Romania, Slovakia and Hungary to
Vienna. According to the Austrian authorities, travelling from Greece to Austria
typically costs between EUR 3,000 to EUR 5,000; from Serbia to Austria between
EUR 700 to EUR 1,200 per person. Onward movement from Austria to Germany
entails a further EUR 1,000, while Scandinavia is a further EUR 2,500. Overall,
travel inside a truck has proven a rather perilous mode of transfer as there is a
real risk of suffocation. In one notorious case in 2015, 71 migrants were found
dead inside a lorry at the AustrianHungarian border (Harding, 2015).

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Travel by air through falsified documents or sham marriages, directly

from the country of origin or within Europe, covering part of the journey, has
also been documented, although to a lesser extent. In the period 20132014
in Germany, for instance, travel by air accounted for around 15 per cent of all
detected cases of irregular smuggling. In general, travel by air is considered a
safer but more expensive option.
Selected accounts from the Europol data illustrate the complexity of the
crime in the context of Europe. In one case, for instance, irregular migrants
from Viet Nam were offered two travel options to reach the United Kingdom
an economy and a VIP package ranging between EUR 18,000 and 35,000 per
person. The migrants were provided with valid Polish or Czech tourist visas and
once in Europe, they were housed in safe houses in Paris or Angers. From there,
they were smuggled to the United Kingdom via trucks or cars. In another known
case, Albanian migrants were smuggled from France across the channel to the
United Kingdom through the expensive and rather atypical mode of rented
private yachts. In another case, in 2013, a network that smuggled migrants from
India to Europe through forged documents issued in Portugal was dismantled.
The migrants received their forged documents and then dispersed to other
countries, such as Denmark, Germany, Italy and Spain, in private cars and vans.
The fee from Lisbon to Paris was reportedly EUR 250 (Europol, 2011, 2013 and
2014).
As regards to the profile of the smuggling networks, these may be largescale organizations involved in direct transcontinental smuggling, but most
commonly they are smaller loosely connected criminal groups, which control
movements in an organized and sophisticated manner. A smuggling network
typically comprises smaller regional criminal networks and local hubs, as well
as individual entrepreneurs active in a variety of countries (Europol, 2016; Fut,
Jandl and Karsakova, 2005; van Liempt, 2007). The organizers or leaders of the
network are usually located in key migration hubs and responsible for the overall
coordination. They operate remotely and maintain contact with a limited number
of members. Regional and smaller networks function autonomously. Their tasks
vary depending on the network they form part of. Regional leaders normally act
as local coordinators, such as making the necessary travel arrangements and
setting the prices; smaller local units are routinely responsible for ensuring that
travel and other services are provided within their territory before the migrants
are passed to the next associate along the route. They are often assisted by
freelancers and opportunistic individuals who act as local recruiters, drivers or
document falsifiers (Europol, 2016; Triandafyllidou and Maroukis, 2012).
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5. Europe
With the exception of criminal groups active in the Nordic countries,

smuggling networks typically comprise different nationalities both European
Union and non-European Union nationals. The latter are most often based in
countries of transit or destination acting as local coordinators or orchestrating
the smuggling activities (Europol, 2016). The age of the smuggler is normally
related to the position he/she holds in the organization. In 2015, the average age
of arrested smugglers was 36 years. Smugglers from Western Balkan countries
and European Union Member States were the oldest in age; Romanian nationals
were the youngest ones (Europol, 2016).
Links to other forms of crime are not uncommon. According to a 2016
study by Europol, in 2015, 22 per cent of all suspected smugglers were linked to
drug trafficking, 20 per cent to trafficking in human beings and 20 per cent to
property crime (Europol, 2016).

Data on migrant smuggling in Europe are only partially available and in
large highly fragmented. In addition, there is quite a divergence among the
different countries in the manner in which data are collected. This limits the
ability to fully comprehend the scale and dynamics behind the crime.
In principle, official data on migrant smuggling are collected by national
law enforcement agencies (police, coast guard, border authorities). They most
commonly consist of figures of annual apprehensions. Together with national
court records, these provide the primary source of information on migrant
smuggling. Statistical analyses may also be found in the data of international
organizations and European Union agencies, such as Europol and Frontex, but
also data collected through surveys. An important source of information within
this context has been the work of the International Centre for Migration Policy
Development that has consistently kept records of the main smuggling trends in
Central Europe. The basic advantage of the information provided through these
sources is that it is often of a broader scope, allowing a better overview of trends
and patterns in the region. However, the main limitation lies in the fact that
the findings are largely based on estimates derived from the official statistics. In
this sense, some of the main shortcomings applicable to the former extend also
here.
There are significant limitations to the kind of knowledge outlined above.
First, the scope of information is typically narrow as it is based on detected cases
and restricted to the national jurisdiction. Second, in the particular context of
Europe, not all countries are willing to publicize their data. France, Belgium and
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Czech Republic, for instance, do not disclose their national statistics (European
Migration Network, 2014). Third, there are significant discrepancies in the
manner in which data are collected, as well as in the years that the data are
shared. The diversity of the methods and indicators used renders the verification
and comparability of the available data particularly difficult.
Countries with particularly detailed statistics are Germany and Austria.
These two countries share not only the annual apprehension figures of
suspected smugglers, but also those of smuggled migrants, nationalities, gender
and conviction rate. By way of illustration, between 2010 and 2014, Germany
arrested a total of 11,130 persons suspected of facilitation of entry. During the
same period, Austria apprehended a total of 1,713 suspected smugglers (Table
5.1).
Table 5.1: Apprehensions of suspected smugglers in Germany and Austria, 20102014
Year
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Total
Germany
1,876
1,653
2,049
2,558
2,994
11,130
Austria
327
288
235
352
511
1,713
Source: Federal Criminal Police of Austria, 2014; Federal Criminal Police of Germany, 2014.
The majority of the suspects in Germany were non-nationals of the

European Union and mainly came from Hungary, Italy, Romania, Serbia and
the Syrian Arab Republic; 11 per cent were women. The main nationalities of
suspects in Austria were Hungarian, Serbian, Syrian, Romanian and those from
Kosovo/UNSC 1244; 4 per cent were women (BKA, 2014; BMI, 2014).
The Greek statistics, on the other hand, only report figures and occasionally
the nationalities of the suspected smugglers. Between 2010 and 2014, a total of
4,738 persons were apprehended (Table 5.2).
Table 5.2: Apprehensions of suspected smugglers in Greece, 20102014
Year
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
Total
Number
1,150
848
726
843
1,171
4,738
Source: Hellenic Police, 2016.
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5. Europe
On the basis of the available data, the majority came from Albania,
Greece, Syrian Arab Republic, Bulgaria, Afghanistan, Iraq and Turkey (Hellenic
Police, 2016).
A different approach is followed by the Swiss authorities, which publish
processed data, mainly in the form of percentages (Federal Police of Switzerland,
2015). In 2014, for instance, a total of 364 case files of migrant smuggling were
registered in the country. The majority of the smugglers came from Kosovo/
UNSC 1244 (29%), followed by Eritrea (15%) and Syrian Arab Republic (8%); most
victims were from Kosovo/UNSC 1244 (28%), Albania (10%) and Syrian Arab
Republic (8%). Switzerland also reports that false or stolen documents were
used in only 22 per cent of the cases.
Italy, on the other hand, only shares statistics on smuggled migrants, but
not smugglers themselves. The latter are included within a general category
of immigration-related offences without further segregation (Carrera, 2016;
European Migration Network, 2014). The United Kingdom only publishes data
about persons who have been prosecuted for assisting unlawful migration;
between 2010 and 2014, this was tantamount to 1,860 persons (Carrera, 2016;
European Migration Network, 2014).
Figure 5.2: Apprehensions of irregular migrants and suspected smugglers in Greece
Source: Hellenic Police, Ministry of Interior and Administrative Reconstruction, 2016.

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Next to the lack of comparable and comprehensive data, the accuracy

of the available information is hard to assess, as little is also known about the
data collection and registration processes themselves. National authorities in
Europe provide little if any at all information about the tools and procedures
employed mainly at the operational level to register the data. Standardized
procedures, for instance, and indicators are normally absent. Some insights on
the circumstances under which information is retrieved can be found within
the judicial files, once a suspected smuggler is brought before a court and a
public hearing takes place. The court records reveal that more often than not,
the identification process and collection of evidence is carried out within a
particularly difficult context, for instance, at a remote border location, in the
open sea at night, during a rescue operation or in the face of multiple arrivals.
Individual police testimonies on observed events are frequently the primary
or even only source of information. The extent to which information gets lost
or personal biases and presumptions may further obscure the assessment of a
situation is a gap in the authors knowledge (Shelley, 2014; Salt, 2000; Carrera et
al., 2016; European Commission, 2015).
A review of the Greek statistics helps illustrates the concern. Figure
5.2 illustrates the number of irregular migrants and the number of suspected
smugglers apprehended between 2006 and 2015. Interestingly, while the
flows of irregular arrivals have significantly fluctuated, the number of arrested
smugglers has remained relatively stable. What is probably most surprising is
that despite the dramatic increase of irregular arrivals in 2015 from 77,000 to
800,000 the number of detected smugglers hardly changed.
In addition, and independent of the dramatic shifts in the flows through
the land and sea borders over the past five years, each year more than half of all
suspected smugglers were arrested at the GreekTurkish land borders (Hellenic
Police, 2016). Although, as noted earlier, smugglers reportedly do not travel
with the refugee boats, this only partly answers the quest. In the absence of any
additional information, verifying what proportion of the overall phenomenon
the above data represents becomes almost impossible.
Collecting consistent data on migrant smuggling in the European context
presents the additional difficulty that there is little consensus across the national
jurisdictions on the definition of migrant smuggling itself. In practice, this means
that different situations may qualify as migrant smuggling across the region, as
each authority follows its own definition and rules (Salt, 2000). Nonetheless,
collecting national data would allow at least for checking trends within each
jurisdiction even if comparison would have to be done with caution.
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5. Europe
In particular, the understanding of the notion of migrant smuggling in

Europe derives in large from the international Smuggling Protocol, which defines
migrant smuggling as the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly,
a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State
Party of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident. The UN
Protocol has been ratified by all European countries but also the European Union
as a legal entity (Council of the European Union, 2006; United Nations, n.d.).
European countries that are also Member States to the European Union
find further guidelines on the definition of migrant smuggling in Directive
2002/90/EC and Framework Decision 2002/946/JHA, aptly referred to as the
Facilitators Package, which seek to harmonize the penalization of migrant
smuggling in the region. The above-described documents prohibit the following
types of behaviours in the context of migrant smuggling:
Assisting a non-European Union country national to enter or transit
through a European Union country, in breach of laws; and
Assisting intentionally, and for financial gain, a non-European
Union country national to reside in the territory of a European
Union country, in breach of laws.
Optionally, an exception can be made if the aim is to provide humanitarian
assistance to a person in distress.
At the scholarly level, the above-described framework has been rather
critically received both on account of legal ambiguity and its great divergence
from the UN Protocol standards. Among the most important differences is the
requirement of financial profit; while the UN Protocol necessitates the element
of financial gain for the conduct to be punishable, the Facilitators Package does
not (Alssopp and Manieri, 2016). Other controversial aspects include the nonbinding nature of the humanitarian assistance clause, but also the omission
of any reference to the role of family and personal relations (Carrera and Guild,
2016). Next to this, the Facilitators Package grants Member States a wide
discretion to frame their national laws. In practice, European countries have
followed diverse and at times inconsistent approaches towards criminalizing
migrant smuggling.
Austria, France, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland and
the United Kingdom follow a broad definition and penalize the facilitation of
entry irrespective of the financial gain involved; Germany and Belgium, however,
necessitate the element of financial gain as an additional requirement (Carrera
et al., 2016; Federal Aliens Law of Germany (AufenthG), 2004; Federal Aliens Act
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of Austria (FPG), n.d.; Federal Act on Foreign Nationals Act (FNA), n.d.; Greek
Code on Migration or Greek Law N.4251/2014); a similar approach is followed
by the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (European Migration Network,
2014). The so-called humanitarian clause, absolving from criminal liability
those who assist persons in distress, is only foreseen in the Greek and Spanish
legislation. The United Kingdom has transposed an analogous provision but
has restricted its scope to persons acting pro bono on behalf of a human rights
organization (Carrera, 2016).
Even wider disparities are present when it comes to criminalizing the
facilitation of unauthorized stay in the country. A 2016 survey of national laws
revealed that France, Greece and the United Kingdom do not require financial
gain to punish facilitation of stay; the opposite approach is followed by Germany,
Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands and Spain. Likewise, France, Germany, Italy and
the Netherlands exempt from criminal liability those who facilitate unauthorized
stay for humanitarian purpose; France only exempts those who assist family
members, while Germany entails exemptions only for those who conduct specific
professional duties (Carrera, 2016).
As regards the type and severity of punishment, also here a great
variety of sentences have been identified, ranging from a fine and 12 years
imprisonment (such as Austria, Germany and Spain) to 10 years in the case of
Greece and 14 years in the United Kingdom. Some national orders, such as Italy,
entail different sentences for facilitation of unauthorized stay and entry carry
different sentences, while others, such as Greece and the Netherlands, do not
make such a distinction (AufenthG, 2004; FPG, n.d.; FNA, n.d.; Greek Code on
Migration; European Migration Network, 2014).
Finally, the territorial scope of the definition also varies. Some European
countries sanction not only the facilitation of movement and stay in their own
country but also in other Member States. Even then, the approaches differ.
Hungary, for instance, sanctions only the facilitation of transit and stay in another
Member State. Italy only sanctions the facilitation of entry and transit. Spain
and the United Kingdom sanction all three categories (Carrera, 2016). Germany
punishes the facilitation of entry into, transit and stay in any other Schengen
country, while the Netherlands sanctions the facilitation of entry, transit and
stay in any country that is a party to the UN Protocol against Smuggling (Carrera,
2016).
Once theory is translated into practice and in the absence of standardized
procedures, there are significant divergence across national jurisdictions in the
way situations are interpreted and data registered, the precise extent of which is
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5. Europe
rather unknown (Carrera, 2016). In Greece, for instance, where the element of
financial benefit is not required, all drivers of all types of vehicles are potentially
criminally liable (L.4251/201430). In practice, arrests have been carried out
against tourist buses and taxi drivers for allowing undocumented drivers on
board (Hellenic Police, 2015a, 2015b, 2015c, 2015d, 2015e, 2015f and 2016;
Kathimerini, 2015). Migrant smuggling charges have commonly also been pressed
against unauthorized steering of a refugee dinghy that carried the captains family
members (Efimerida Syntakton, 2015). Volunteer lifeguards searching for a boat
that was presumed to be in distress were also arrested (Kathimerini, 2016). In
Spain, a photojournalist was arrested for carrying undocumented migrants in
her car towards Melilla. In Germany, on the other hand, a migrant who helped
his fiance enter the country irregularly was acquitted of the smuggling charges
(Carrera et al., 2016).
In 2016, in an effort to improve its overall legislative framework, the
European Commission launched a public consultation (European Commission,
2016). Its impact remains to be seen.

Migrant smuggling to and within Europe has been the subject of a growing
number of studies in recent years. To analyse the crime, scholars have employed
a broad spectrum of theoretical angles, analytical frames and orientations.
The variety of the approaches is reflective of the difficulty to comprehend the
complexity of the phenomenon (Baird, 2013a; Baird and van Liempt, 2016; Salt,
2000; van Liempt, 2007).
While literature of migrant smuggling in Europe is quite diverse and
vast, for the purposes of the present study, two broadly defined axes to review
contemporary contributions will be used: (a) the so-called criminological
approach, which focuses primarily on the modus operandi of the smuggling
process as an illicit business; and (b) the sociological perspective, which
investigates the social dynamics and relational dimension of migrant smuggling
(United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime) (UNODC), 2011; Baird, 2013a;
Baird and van Liempt, 2016). Given the different nuances attributed to each
term within literature, this chapter will broadly outline the key features of each
category as used here before presenting the scope and some key limitations and
strengths of each approach.
The criminological dimension, the origins of which are often accredited
to Salt and Steins seminal 1997 work Migration as Business, places migrant

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smuggling within the wider frame of irregular migration as a market and

conceptualizes migrant smuggling as an illicit, profit-making activity. Depending
on the specific theoretical model applied, two ancillary overlapping approaches
may be further discerned: (a) analysis of migrant smuggling from a primarily
economic perspective as a business; and (b) understanding of migrant smuggling
as a basic criminal structure and security threat (Salt, 2000; Baird, 2013a). To
analyse the phenomenon, scholarly contributions that fall within this category
mostly focus on the organizational aspect of migrant smuggling: the structure
of the networks, the routes, the prices, the flows and trends, estimation of the
stocks and even the likelihood of capture (Baird, 2013a). The overall scope
adopted may be however quite broad and place the discussion within the global
context of the migration industry and its politico-historical background (ibid.).
The literature that has developed along this strand is vast. A major
limitation in the analysis provided has been the little consideration paid to the
input of the migrant, who is frequently perceived as a victim trapped and moved
around within a network of associates rather than a decision maker (UNODC,
2011). Next to this, there is a certain degree of imbalance in the geographical
focus. While ample has been written on the flows, trends, estimates and modus
operandi of the smuggling networks in the European Unions southern external
borders and in particular the dramatic Mediterranean border crossings, less
attention has been paid to intra-European movements. Contributions mapping
and analysing the process of migrant smuggling from the south towards Western
European countries are relatively limited.
One of the earliest studies, carried out by Ulrich in 1995, focused on
migrant smuggling in the Nordic and Baltic countries by employing border
apprehensions and asylum data, among others. Among the most interesting
findings in terms of transport methods was the airlifting of 29 migrants via
helicopter from the Russian Federation into Poland (Ulrich, 1995). In a more
recent study focusing on Austria, Bilger, Hoffman and Jandl in 2006, followed a
market-oriented approach to analyse the structure and tactics of the smuggling
networks operative in the country. They concluded, among others, that Austria
was mainly acting as a transit country dominated by a multitude of providers
offering differentiated services (Bilger, Hoffman and Jandl, 2006). Research
conducted in Central and Eastern Europe revealed the continuously changing
patterns of migrant smuggling through Bulgaria, Hungary and Poland by means of
forged documentation, abuse of the asylum system and concealment in hidden
compartments in vehicles, as well as the organization of smuggling networks
into smaller, collaborating individual groups, which the analysts resembled to
an octopus rather than a pyramid structure (Fut, Jandl and Karsakova,
2005). In her study of the Netherlands, van Liempt traced the paths followed
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5. Europe
from three different geographical border areas into the country and established
different types of small-scale smugglers, not of all which were readily associated
with migrant smuggling (such as churches and travel agencies). Interestingly,
for many smuggled migrants, the Netherlands was a destination country of
coincidence rather than choice (van Liempt, 2007).
The 2016 opening and closure of the land border between Greece and the
former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has provided new incentives to advance
discussions about intra-European migrant smuggling; its long-term impact,
however, remains to be seen. Very interesting studies, such as Altai Consulting and
IOMs Migration Trends Across the Mediterranean: Connecting the Dots (2015),
speak of the Western and Central Mediterranean route analysing the smugglers
operations that take place mostly in North Africa. The same is true for the most
recent study of Monzini, Abdel Aziz and Pastore on The Changing Dynamics of
Cross-border Human Smuggling and Trafficking in the Mediterranean published
by IAI as part of the New-Med Research Network in late 2015. It is only the
Mdecins Sans Frontires report Obstacle course to Europe: A policy-made
humanitarian crisis at the EU borders, published in December 2015 that briefly
comments on the Balkan routes. Its focus is less on migrant smuggling but rather
on how State policies and particularly the gaps in the reception systems of Italy
and Greece and the closure of borders at intervals, in different places, create a
domino effect and sharply increase the vulnerability of the people on the move,
who face extremely harsh conditions without adequate assistance.
A second strand of literature, labelled here as sociological perspective,
focuses on the relational dynamics of migrant smuggling. The primary aim
here is not as much to map the routes and trends but rather decipher the
psychosynthesis of the humans involved within the smuggling process. In this
sense, it adopts a more subjective lens to analyse smuggling. While the primary
focus is on the interaction between the smuggler and the smuggled, the wider
social environment within which this relationship is embedded is commonly also
included in the analysis (such as family, friends, community and ethnic networks).
Migrant smuggling is thereby perceived as a complex interactive process and
less associated with its criminal dimension.
Qualitative analyses of the above are considered to offer particularly
valuable insights in understanding the modus operandi of migrant smuggling
that often escapes studies with a statistical focus. They also run a lesser risk of
building their analysis upon incorrect estimates and data. Their main limitation
lies in the rather narrow scope of the information they provide as their findings
are normally based on a small sample of respondents or interviewees (UNODC,
2011). Even studies that involve a wider range of participants are prone to this
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critique, as the overall number remains small when compared to the presumed
scale of phenomenon. Further criticism concerns the rather narrow focus
adopted, as most studies explore the social dynamics from the perspective of
the smuggled migrant, while less attention is paid to the reality of the smuggler
(Baird, 2013a; UNODC, 2011).
One representative study of this kind was for instance conducted by
van Liempt in 2007. Drawing from 56 interviews conducted with smuggled
migrants, van Liempt analyses the importance of trust in the choice to rely on
the smuggling services, as well as the influence of ones social network in the
decision-making process. While smuggled migrants may have limited choice in
certain respects, they still enjoy a certain degree of agency that is embedded
in a web of close social relations. Most of the interviewees in her case study
had found their smuggler through friends, family members and acquaintances.
At the same time, smugglers have developed their own strategies to cultivate
a favourable reputation and build upon this relationship of trust, for instance
by allowing payment in installments (van Liempt, 2007). In his analysis of
migrant smuggling in the Netherlands, Staring argues that migrant smugglers
bear less responsibility than is commonly assumed; the social networks in the
destination country and in particular the presence of family and friends ready
to help, offers the necessary support that render the use of smuggling business
less attractive (Staring, 2004). The importance of kinship to family and friends is
also underscored by Herman, who argues that the strength of the ties is more
important to the size of the network (Herman, 2006).
Of particular significance in advancing discussions about migrant
smuggling has been an interesting article that has just been published by Baird
and van Liempt (2016), titled Scrutinising the double disadvantage: knowledge
production in the messy field of migrant smuggling, which discusses some of
the conceptual and methodological problems in investigating migrant smuggling.
The authors point out that the criminological perspective has probably been
privileged in the past, but point to a number of different perspectives necessary
to capture the complex nature of smuggling, notably the business aspect, the role
of networks, the challenges for human rights and smuggling as part of a global
political economy. Indeed, their discussion of these issues shows that there is a
need for a combined approach to smuggling (even if there is agreement about a
common definition based on the Palermo Protocols) that takes into account its
different facets and brings together different types of data that can range from
interviews and non-participant observation and field notes to legal materials,
policy texts and statistical data of various types.
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5. Europe

When it comes to evaluating the understanding of migrant smuggling in
Europe, the present study confirms some important knowledge gaps and also
draws attention to new emerging ones.
There is wide agreement among scholars that there is a general lack
of data that contemporary research and data collection methods have thus
far been unable to overcome. The scale of the phenomenon, the specific
modalities of intra-European movement, its interconnection with other forms
of crime, the involvement of women, the scale of the smuggling industry and
its interconnection with other forms of crime and in particular trafficking in
human beings are some of the established factual knowledge gaps (UNODC,
2011; Europol, 2016; Baird, 2013a). The impact of the recent Syrian crisis and
the European response to an apparent incessantly growing threat has opened
however new strands of thought.
Irregular child migration has been known to take place in Europe for
several years now (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2011). Over
the past few years, a growing number of children have been travelling alone.
There is also strong speculation that many children are sent by their parents
or smugglers, on their own or with adults they are not related to, in order to
make it possible for the rest of the family to follow later by taking advantage of
reunification schemes. However, in 2016, Europol raised the alert on the fate of
around 10,000 children that had gone missing, 5,000 of whom were estimated
to have disappeared in Italy alone and 1,000 in Sweden (Townsend, 2016).
However, only few studies have explored the prevalence of minors also within
the smuggling process. Among the most informing contemporary contributions
in tracing the profile of smuggled children but also providing insights in their
decision-making process has been a 2005 study conducted by Derluyn and
Broekaert, on the basis of 1,093 data files of minors intercepted in Zeebruge,
one of the main Belgian ports. The children, primarily teenagers from Asian and
Eastern European countries, were transiting to reunite with family members,
find work or escape a dire situation at home (Derluyn and Broekart, 2005; Baird,
2013a). Nonetheless, pertinent questions both in terms of facts and doctrinal
implications remain unanswered. For instance, little is known about the extent
of their exploitation, the degree in which they act themselves as smugglers or
even guardians of other minors. Notions of agency, coercion and victimization in
the context of migrants smuggling become particularly complex when reviewed
in light of childhood (Baird, 2013a).

125
Inadequate attention is currently also paid to how cultural traits impact

on the smuggling process. Existing research indicates that the cultural and ethnic
factors play a major role in the strategies adopted and that the presence of ethnic
communities in the destination country can act as drivers for irregular migration.
Less however is known about their role in the context of the movement itself.
The smuggling routes from and via North Africa to Spain and Italy or to Turkey
and then Greece have catered for the same population mainly sub-Saharan
African young men from a wide array of countries of East, West and Central
Africa. These routes have only rarely been used by migrants from Asia (such as
Pakistanis or Indians). The routes to North Africa and then Italy, Spain or Malta
are occasionally used by families with children, but overall this is rarely the case
(Triandafyllidou and Maroukis, 2012). The route from South Asia (Pakistan,
Bangladesh and Afghanistan) via the Islamic Republic of Iran, Turkey and then
Greece is used by young men from these countries and to a large extent by
Afghan families; however, families among Pakistani and Bangladeshi are not
encountered (Triandafyllidou and Maroukis, 2012). The role of consent and trust
are likely to play a major role within this context. Existing data on smugglers
reveal also little about the interconnection between the different nationalities
within the smuggling business itself. In their review of Europols activities,
Carrera and Guild conclude that the nationalities of the smugglers is puzzling;
on the basis of the available data smuggling groups emerge as disparate groups,
with little connection to one another, often with little in common and without a
common language. They speculate that it might be that specific nationalities are
linked with specific services (Carrera and Guild, 2016).
The recent militarization of the fight against migrant smuggling in Europe,
primarily triggered by the deployment of NATO vessels in the Aegean Sea, is likely
to open new lines of thought and cut across a series of disciplines, although it
may not prove much more effective than current approaches (Triandafyllidou,
forthcoming). More than ever, the doctrine on migrant smuggling has come
closer to the discourse on the war on terror. At the same time, growing fears
about the use of the main smuggling paths by Islamic State fighters to enter
Western European countries and spread violence has further fuelled on the
debate between securitization and human rights. Within this wider context of
fear, insecurity and geopolitical turmoil, the recent decision by the European
countries to return to Turkey all irregular migrants and potential asylum seekers
crossing into the European Union through the GreekTurkish borders is likely
to have repercussions of a much wider breadth. In the context of asylum and
migration, it may generate new flows of people in search of basic human security;
and at the same time open up new business opportunities for both smuggling
and criminal networks (Triandafyllidou, forthcoming). It is also likely, however,
to start a new chapter on human rights (also Baird, 2013b). The danger that
126
5. Europe
inviolable human rights will be trampled in an effort to combat migrant smuggling

has become more than real. The axiomatic principle of non-refoulement is the
first to be put to the test. Reframing the discourse on migrant smuggling in terms
of human rights is a doctrinal challenge that lies imminently ahead.
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136
5. Europe
6
TURKEY
Ahmet duygu and Sebnem Koser Akcapar
Introduction
There is a long history of migrant smuggling in Turkey and its immediate
neighbourhood, which started with the irregular flows of migrants from
Afghanistan by the end of the 1970s following a series of events, namely the
following: (a) the Soviet invasion, civil wars, Taliban regime; (b) in the early
1980s from the Islamic Republic of Iran after the regime change and persecution
based on religion and political opinion; (c) end-1980s from Iraq due to Saddams
attacks on Kurds followed by American occupation in 2003 and the civil war;
and (d) more recently from the Syrian Arab Republic fleeing from civil war that
erupted in 2011. Apart from these flows, Turkey has transformed into a transit
migration hub for migrants hailing from Africa and South Asia thanks to the
dynamics of globalization and increasing mobility.
Undoubtedly, migrant smuggling in Turkey is closely associated with
irregular migration issues. As seen in other parts of the world, one reason for this
connotation is that mixed flows of migrants are involved in migrant smuggling
in the region. These migrants are as follows: (a) transit migrants who enter
the country usually from South Asia, Africa and Middle East with the intention
of using Turkey as a springboard to migrate to another country in the West,
mostly in Europe; (b) irregular economic migrants who come to Turkey with the
objective of living and working without valid documents; and (c) asylum seekers
who are stranded in the country longer than they expected and rejected cases
who are not accepted as refugees.

137
What makes migrant smuggling more complicated in the region is that

migrants in all three categories listed above may resort to the same human
smugglers either for entry or exit from Turkey. Besides, the boundaries between
these three categories are often very blurred.24 The geographical limitation on
the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees that Turkey withholds that is, not
allowing non-European asylum seekers who are accepted for refugee status
to settle in Turkey permanently has further direct implications in migrant
smuggling, forcing some asylum seekers who have access to more resources
opt for human smuggling.25 Ironically, however, all asylum applications made
in Turkey to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) are
from non-European countries, and those accepted as refugees instead wait for
resettlement in a third country.26
In line with the response of the international community in combating
migrant smuggling and trafficking, Turkey adopted two United Nations Palermo
Protocols on 18 March 2003, thereby accepting the broader definitions of
human smuggling and trafficking. For the first time, Turkish decision makers
then introduced heavy penalties for the crimes committed.27 Accordingly, in
the Turkish context, two different categories fall under the field of smuggling:
(a) migrant smuggling; and (b) human trafficking. These two notions are
considered different crimes, since migrant smuggling is considered a crime against
the nation-State, whereas human trafficking is a crime against an individual
(International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), 2015). When
compared with the organized criminal networks of trafficking in persons, migrant
smuggling networks in Turkey tend to be more randomly organized with different
people doing diverse jobs, very mobile and spontaneous, and yet exploitative.
For example, a transit migrant may apply for asylum after some time and stay in Turkey much longer while
at the same time, work in Turkey without proper documentation. When a rejection notification is received,
an asylum seeker in Turkey turns into an irregular migrant automatically either face deportation or resort
to human smuggling and becomes another transit migrant. The blurred boundaries between the asylum
system and transit migration is partly attributed to the asylum regime in Turkey and partly due to the
increasing securitization of migration in Europe (see Baldwin-Edwards, 2006 for a similar discussion in North
Africa).
25
Turkey is signatory to the 1951 Geneva Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its associated
1967 Protocol, but one of two countries in the world maintaining the geographical limitation clause that only
makes it possible to consider asylum applications of persons from European countries. Turkey also uses it as
a political tool to negotiate Turkeys stalled European Union membership process.
26
Asylum seekers in Turkey generally wait for a long time for their applications to be accepted with no
guarantee whatsoever to settle in Turkey. Once accepted as a refugee, resettlement options are also very
limited.
27
Smuggling of migrants shall mean the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or
other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a State Party of which the person is not a national
or a permanent resident whereas trafficking in persons shall mean the recruitment, transportation,
transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion,
of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability, or of the giving of
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose
of exploitation.
24
138
6.Turkey
Turkeys efforts in the European Union membership process and

harmonization with the European Union acquis in migration-related issues led
to a series of national, international and regional counter migrant smuggling
measures to be taken within the last decade. Within this framework, Turkish
authorities took some important legal and administrative steps in curbing and
controlling irregular migration, smuggling and trafficking. While some of these
measures are directly related with migrant smuggling, some are indirectly
correlated. For instance, a direct outcome of these efforts was the adoption of
Article 79 of the new Turkish Penal Code Law number 5237. The said article
that was put into force on 1 June 2005 provides detailed definition of migrant
smugglers and introduces a provision stipulating penalties of 3 to 8 years of
imprisonment and 10,000 days judicial fines to migrant smugglers. If proven
that human smuggling is carried out by perpetrators who are associated with a
criminal organization, the penalty to be imposed would increase. Article 79 also
provides for coercive measures, such as confiscation of assets on legal entities
involved in human smuggling. According to an amendment made in the article
in 2010, even if the human smuggling was at the stage of attempt, it would still
be considered as a crime fully committed, and consequently they would be
charged with the highest penalty possible. Other than criminalization of migrant
smuggling and imposing heavy penalties for those involved, the Law on Work
Permits for Aliens was put into force on 6 September 2003. The Ministry of
Labour and Social Security of the Republic of Turkey is authorized to issue all
types of work permits for foreigners to ensure better management and control
over the process.
In order to reduce irregular migration and halt human smuggling
and trafficking, a series of legal and administrative arrangements, which
were indirectly related with migrant smuggling, were also taken. The Road
Transportation Law came into force on 19 July 2003, and the Road Transportation
Regulation became effective in 2004. This regulation states that transportation
permit will not be renewed for three years, and the vehicles will be seized if the
person is sentenced for migrant smuggling. Another indirect development was
the Action Plan on Asylum and Migration adopted by Turkey in March 2005. The
Action Plan laid out all the necessary tasks and timetable for the harmonization
of Turkeys migration and asylum management system, as well as border and
visa regulations, asylum and migration issues and regulated migrant smuggling
and human trafficking issues. As sustainable management of migration became
a political priority, Turkey assumed the presidency of the Budapest Process a
consultative forum with over 50 governments and 10 international organizations
in 2006.

139
In recent years, Turkey has also made progress towards the better
management of migration and curbing irregularity of migrants. The enactment
of the Law on Foreigners and International Protection in April 2013 introduced a
new legal and institutional framework for a migration and asylum management
system with enhanced police and judicial cooperation in line with the European
Union standards, thus allowing non-Europeans applying for asylum to acquire
temporary protection status. A series of twinning projects within the last
decade were implemented on irregular migration issues, including integrated
border management and combating migrant smuggling. In addition to managing
irregular migration issues, Turkey is also cooperating with the International
Organization for Migration (IOM) in combating human trafficking.28 Additionally,
Turkey participated in the intergovernmental dialogue initiatives to manage
irregular migration and human smuggling, including the Hague Process on
Refugees and Migration and the Bali Process on People Smuggling on People
Smuggling, Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime.
On the international and regional front, readmission agreements are
effective instruments in managing irregular migration and encouraging States
to take serious measures against this phenomenon. To this end, Turkey signed
Readmission Agreements with some source (Syrian Arab Republic,29 Kyrgyzstan,
Ukraine, Pakistan, Russian Federation, Nigeria and Yemen) and some destination
countries (Greece, Romania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of Moldova,
Belarus and Montenegro) in the past to fight against irregular migration.
Furthermore, Turkey and the European Union signed a readmission agreement
in 2013, which necessitates the return of undocumented migrants who enter
the European Union through Turkey.30 The European UnionTurkey readmission
agreement is expected to come into force as of June 2016. Obviously, the
readmission agreement will bring more migrants back to Turkey. In return,
Turkey demands visa liberalization for Turkish citizens in the Schengen zone and
more burden-sharing with the European Union on irregular migration as most
apprehended cases in Eastern Europe transit through Turkey by using either
sea or land routes. Another significant regional initiative on migrant smuggling
was the Silk Route Partnership for Migration that was adopted in 2013 with
the participation of Turkey, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, China, Islamic Republic of
Iran, Iraq and Pakistan. Consequently, it was decided that these countries would
cooperate closely to prevent irregular migration, as well as combat migrant
smuggling and trafficking in human beings.
Turkey became a member of International Organization for Migration (IOM) on 30 November 2004.
Readmission agreement between Turkey and the Syrian Arab Republic is not active since 2011 due to
humanitarian reasons.
30
Turkey readmits its own nationals in accordance with its constitution and passport law. It also readmits aliens
with valid Turkish residence permits. If it is proven that third-country nationals have departed from Turkey
through unconventional methods, they will be readmitted if returned by the same or a subsequent flight in
accordance with the International Civil Aviation Organization rules and practices.
28
29
140
6.Turkey
Overview of migrant smuggling in the country

Turkey is certainly at the crossroads for irregular migrant flows originating
in the Middle East and beyond. It also acts as an active hub of migrant smuggling
where human smugglers operate across three old continents Africa, Asia and
Europe and throughout the Mediterranean basin. As classified in Frontex
reports, there are three main smuggling routes in the greater Mediterranean
basin: (a) Western Mediterranean route, from North Africa and Western African
coast to Iberian Peninsula; (b) Central Mediterranean route, from parts of Africa
to Italy and Malta; and (c) Eastern Mediterranean route, from Middle East and
Turkey targeting Greece, Cyprus and Bulgaria both by sea and by land near Evros
River (Frontex, 2013; 2014). Until 2014, the majority of the flows to Europe were
coming through the Central Mediterranean route, and specifically through Libya
(Frontex, 2013). In 2015, it shifted to the Eastern Mediterranean where Turkey is
located right at the centre as a transit zone with more than 1 million arrivals in
the European Union, including men, women and children. Some migrants and/
or migrant smugglers coming from the other two routes also preferred this third
route through Turkey to make entry to Europe.31 Therefore, due to its location,
irregular migrants transiting Turkey with human smugglers travel not only from
south to north but also along the east-west axis from Bangladesh, Pakistan,
Islamic Republic of Iran, Turkey and ultimately reaching Europe (ICMPD, 2015).
In order to take a clear snapshot on migrant smuggling flows and trends
in Turkey and the Middle East, this chapter refers to the apprehension figures in
Turkey since the actual number of flows on human smuggling is not available.
Between the mid-1990s and early 2000s, the number of apprehended cases of
irregular migrants increased from 11,000 in 1995 to 94,000 in 2000 (duygu,
2004). Between 2001 and 2013, with some fluctuations over the years, an
average of 56,232 irregular migrants was apprehended annually from different
nationalities (duygu and Aksel, 2015).32 There is clear evidence suggesting the
sudden rise of irregular migration in Turkey after 2011, apprehensions reaching
as high as nearly 150,000 by 2015.33 Recent research findings on irregular
migration in Turkey inform that not all these apprehension cases involved
migrant smuggling though. It is estimated that only half of those apprehended
are subjected to smuggling (duygu and Ykseker, 2012).
See ICMPDs Report (2015) funded by the European Commission for a detailed analysis of how Nigerian
nationals used air travel through Turkey to Bulgaria.
32
It should be noted, however, that it is very likely that the scale of irregular migration into and through Turkey
and the number of human smugglers operating in the region is much higher than the apprehensions.
33
Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM) of Turkey. Homepage (n.d.) (in Turkish). Available
from www.goc.gov.tr/icerik6/duzensiz-goc_363_378_4710_icerik
31

141
Although the apprehension statistics do not differentiate between

different types of irregular migrants, it is possible to create an informed estimate
on the volume of transit migration and the use of human smugglers by analysing
the breakdown of data on the countries of origin. Between 2000 and 2010, the
top five migrant originating countries were as follows: Iraq (94,000); Pakistan
(66,000); Afghanistan (59,000); Islamic Republic of Iran (22,000); and Bangladesh
(17,000) (duygu and Aksel, 2015).34 Some of these irregular migrants used
migrant smugglers either for entry into Turkey, exit from Turkey or both. In 2015
alone, a growing number of irregular transit migrants with diverse backgrounds
from different countries of origin were apprehended. Out of the 146,485 irregular
migrants, nationals from the Syrian Arab Republic topped the charts with 73,422
individuals, followed by those from Afghanistan (35,921); Iraq (7,247); Myanmar
(5,464); Pakistan (3,792); Georgia (2,857); Islamic Republic of Iran (1,978); Eritrea
(1,445), Uzbekistan (1,393); and Turkmenistan (1,241). According to the reports
by the Turkish National Police events, the Syrian Arab Republic, Afghanistan,
Myanmar, Pakistan, Eritrea and Iraq were the highest reported nationalities
of those apprehended during counter-smuggling operations in 2014 (ICMPD,
2015). The number of migrant smugglers apprehended between 2010 and 2015
were approximately 12,000. Those apprehended in 2015 comprised one third of
all apprehended migrant smugglers since 2010.35
Figures on irregular migration further indicate that over the last years
nearly four fifths of irregular migrants were caught near the borders of Greece
and Bulgaria, while the remaining one fifth at the long eastern borders between
Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran.36 It is possible to observe that similar
trends still continue with higher number of Syrian and Iraqi nationals getting
apprehended along the western land and sea borders (duygu and Aksel,
2015). Over the last two years, the land and sea borders between Greece and
Turkey gradually transformed into one of the most active irregular migration
and smuggling corridors in Europe. In the Aegean Sea alone, it is estimated that
1 million migrants left Turkey for Greek shores, and more than 3,771 migrants,
Some Pakistani nationals enter as irregular migrant workers whose aim is to transit through Turkey to reach
other European countries. Afghani nationals consist a group with mixed motivations entering Turkey either
directly from Afghanistan or from the Islamic Republic of Iran. Some of them apply for asylum, whereas
some with more resources choose to leave immediately. Both are mainly male-dominated flows, but some
travel with other immediate family members.
35
DGMM (n.d.).
36
One of the primary reasons for this situation is the stricter surveillance on Turkeys western borders, in
comparison to its eastern and south-eastern borders.
34
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6.Turkey
including small children, lost their lives or reported missing in such perilous
journeys.37
Main departure points used by migrant smugglers along the land borders
are Krklareli and Edirne provinces, whereas anakkale, Balkesir, Aydn, zmir
and Mula provinces located along the upper and lower Aegean Sea are the
main exit zones for crossing by boats (duygu and Karaay, 2011). There is
clear evidence from the incidents that boats used by migrants usually face the
danger of getting shipwrecked as they are of very poor quality to reduce the
costs of operation in case of confiscation, operated by inexperienced crew, and
overcrowded with many small children and women not able to swim.38 Moreover,
boats are reported to sail especially on days when visibility is poor and the sea
is rough to avoid coast guards at either side. Research on migrant smuggling
across the Aegean between Turkey and Greece points to human rights abuses,
as migrants are sometimes pushed back instead of being rescued at sea.39 The
city of Mersin in Southern Turkey by the Mediterranean emerged as a new route
of migrant smuggling over the last years through the use of large vessels (ICMPD,
2015). The joint operation of Turkish and German special police forces with the
codename Operation Wave in January 2016 against migrant smuggling networks
in the region indicates that both Syrian and Turkish smugglers cooperate to
recruit migrants.40
According to IOM figures, nearly 2,000 people arrive in Europe on a daily basis 10 times higher than 2015.
The total number of migrants reaching Europe between 1 January and 7 February 2016 increased more than
six-fold when compared with the same time period in 2015; the 92 per cent of them reached Greece (IOM,
IOM Counts Latest Mediterranean Arrivals in 2016, Press release, 8 January 2016. Available from www.
iom.int/news/iom-counts-latest-mediterranean-arrivals-2016).
38
T. Brian and F. Laczko (eds.) (2014) Fatal Journeys: Tracking Lives Lost during Migration. IOM, Geneva.
Available from https://publications.iom.int/system/files/pdf/fataljourneys_countingtheuncounted.pdf
39
See European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2013) and the report titled Greece: Frontier of
Hope and Fear, Migrants and Refugees Pushed Back at Europes Borders (Amnesty International, London,
2014. Available from www.amnesty.org/en/documents/EUR25/004/2014/en/) by Amnesty International
documenting Greek officials are pushing back migrants at sea back to Turkey.
40
The operation resulted in the arrest of 5 smugglers in Germany and 10 in Turkey. This network smuggled
more than 1,700 mostly Syrian refugees from Turkey to Germany. See Milliyet website for details (www.
milliyet.com.tr/operation-wave-against-refugee-en-2192601/en.htm).
37

143
Figure 6.1: Migrant routes in the Mediterranean region, 2016
Source: IOM Missing Migrants project (www.reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/

Migrant_Routes_Mediterranean_2016_16_Feb.pdf)
As seen in other parts of the world, there are two major organizational
structures of smuggling networks in Turkey and its immediate neighbourhood:
(a) the mafia-type, with higher charges and which is relatively less prevalent in
the region; (b) more informal smuggling networks, which is more widespread
and less costly than the first. Earlier research indicates that smuggling networks
operate in a complicated manner with different actors assuming different roles
(see duygu and Tokta, 2002:3645). The existence of migrants social networks
(kin and friends living in destination countries and wide web of human smuggling
networks operating in Turkey and beyond) is also effective in determining the
next phase of the migration journey heading Europe and even finance border
crossing with migrant smugglers.41 These social local and transnational networks
are very fluid and changing depending on the availability of limited resources and
other variables at the macro, meso and microlevels (see Akcapar, 2010; Wissink,
Dvell and van Eerdewijk, 2013). Apart from these two types of organizational
structures in migrant smuggling, there is anecdotal evidence that some migrants
initiate their own journey across the Aegean, especially after the recent mass
influx of refugees from the Middle East and South Asia into Turkey.
41
Turkish newspapers also report that some opportunistic people from the Turkish security forces may consent
or extend help to smugglers in exchange for monetary gain.
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6.Turkey
Another important point to be discussed within this context is the extent

of exploitation and abuse by smugglers leading to the death of migrants. The
Turkish Coast Guard saved more than 91,000 migrants/refugees in 2015 (quoted
in Akgl, Kapt and Demir, 2015:14), but 3,605 people drowned while trying to
reach European shores in the same year (IOM, 2015). Earlier reports pointed out
the strong interpersonal trust between migrant smugglers and those smuggled
in Turkey (Ylmaz, 2003; European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA),
2013). However, the heavy human toll at sea demonstrates that the human
security is endangered by migrant smugglers. According to an ethnographic
study on migrant smuggling in Turkey, irregular migrants were reportedly under
heavy pressure, and they described migrant smugglers as aggressive, rude and
sometimes physically violent (li, Sever and Sever, 2015:34). It is obvious that
due to the Syrian crisis and large numbers of migrants entering Turkey within the
last years, the unprecedented levels of migrant smuggling has surely surpassed
the capacities of the Government of Republic of Turkey to address this problem
alone (Akgl, Kapt and Demir, 2015:14).
The financial and other costs to migrants in human smuggling vary in
accordance with the smuggling operation, namely the starting and destination
point, the routes taken, and the mode of transportation. Therefore, the prices
paid to the migrant smugglers depend significantly in the ease of access and risks
involved during border crossings. For example, smugglers charge only USD 100
for single border crossing from one side to another, from neighbouring countries
along the eastern borders to the nearest Turkish towns. Border crossing at the
western provinces of Turkey to the European Union countries is more costly
though it starts from USD 500 or USD 1,000 and can be even as high as
EUR 20,000 per person if air travel and fake passports are involved. There are
also reports suggesting that crossing the Aegean Sea from Turkey to Greece in a
luxury yacht costs a migrant EUR 3,000 whereas travel in a simple inflatable raft
is much cheaper (ICMPD, 2015). If the smuggling is a package deal, that is, if the
migrant is taken from his/her hometown to a destination point in the west, it
may reach up to EUR 5,000 or higher depending on the final arrival.42
42
Those migrants taking the long route are known as uzuncu in Turkish.

145

Obtaining reliable and comprehensive migration data in general,
especially on irregular migration and migrant smuggling, is very challenging due
to its clandestine nature. The data on migrant smuggling in the region is often
regarded as a part of the phenomenon of irregular migration. As mentioned
earlier briefly, it is widely known that the three main groups of migrants who
are subject to smuggling are the following: (a) irregular transit migrants;
(b) those who opt to live and work in the country without any valid documentation;
and (c) rejected asylum seekers who are stranded in Turkey. The data, however,
differentiating between these three groups crossing borders and using Turkey as
a transit country with the help of human smugglers is not very clear. First of all,
there is only partial statistics pertaining to nationalities, which can be roughly
estimated based on the apprehension figures of irregular migrants. Second,
limited data is collected and/or made public regarding the gender and age of
those apprehended. Third, according to public officials, there are often false
identifications of nationality and age by the migrants themselves. Ethnographic
research on the topic of migrant smuggling indicates that the earlier flows were
usually male-dominated in their early and late 20s (duygu and Tokta, 2002).
More recent research and reports released by non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) on the issue point out that not only families but single women and even
unaccompanied minors are involved more and more in these migratory flows,
and they also resort to human smuggling networks (UTSAM, 2012; Ay, 2014).
Among the overall refugee population in Turkey, 75 per cent of them constitute
women and children, and female-headed households are quite common within
the Syrian refugee community with 22 per cent (CTDC, 2015:9).
As is the case in other regions, data on migrant smuggling comes from
various government agencies that are dealing with this issue particularly. Within
this context, there are four main agencies in Turkey that collects the related
data: (a) Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM); (b) Turkish
Coast Guard; (c) Turkish Gendarmerie operating in rural areas and armed
forces at land borders; and (d) Turkish National Police through the Department
of Anti-Smuggling and Organized Crime. While border crossing data has been
available on a daily basis by the Turkish General Staff (TGS) since 2006, there
has been a limitation of publicized data over the last two years. More recently,
DGMM started to disseminate limited statistics on irregular migration, migrant
smuggling and human trafficking, and the Turkish Coast Guard began making
its data on sea border passages available on their websites (duygu and Aksel,
2015). In their annual reports, the Turkish Coast Guard, the gendarmerie and the
Turkish National Police provide limited data on irregular migration and migrant
smuggling. Currently, government agencies of Republic of Turkey neither
146
6.Turkey
distinguish in their data between smuggled and other irregular migrants, nor
do they inform whether apprehensions are made at the borders or inside the
country.
There has never been an established tradition of collecting data on
migrant smuggling in Turkey, and irregular migration figures were made partially
accessible to public in Turkey. However, the collection and dissemination of data
on this issue have become even more problematic in the recent years. Although
a more systematic collection of apprehended irregular migrants and migrant
smugglers were made in Turkey between 1995 and 2010, reaching accurate
data to make an informed and comparative analysis for scientific research has
become more difficult. It is observed that ever since the outbreak of the Syrian
refugee crisis in 2011, it has become more difficult for government agencies to
keep a reliable and up-to-date data partly due to security concerns and partly
due to the inflow of great number of refugees especially from the Syrian Arab
Republic and Afghanistan. Therefore, it would not be wrong to suggest that
figures available on apprehended cases of irregular migrants and migrant
smugglers may not represent the entirety of the overall flows and intensity of
the situation.43 Moreover, there might be some overlapping or multiple entries
of nationalities. Dissemination of data is only at the national level, even though
it is collected at the provincial level, making comparisons between provinces
impossible.
The most recent establishment of the Department of Human Smuggling
and Trafficking in Persons by the Turkish National Police proves that there is a
political will to tackle with the issue more seriously at the national level. Another
welcoming recent development is the decision to improve migration-related
data, including migrant smuggling in and out of Turkey via Turkish Statistical
Institute and DGMM.
In addition to government agencies of Turkey, various international
organizations have been active in collecting and compiling data on irregular
migration, trafficking and human smuggling. The European Union harmonization
process and IOMs efforts in obtaining data through close collaboration with
government officials and NGOs working in migration issues paved the way for
access to basic data on migrant smuggling. Other agencies that are also active
on similar issues, such as Frontex and ICMPD a Vienna-based international
research centre are good sources for collecting data on irregular migration and
human smuggling.
43
Several studies in the past, such as those published by the Turkish Academy of Science (Iduygu and Toktas,
2005) and the Turkish Statistical Institute (Sirkeci, 2009), discussed the unavailability of reliable migration
data in Turkey.

147
The Turkish Criminal Code (Article 79) defines migrant smuggling in Turkey
as unlawful entry of a foreigner in the country or facilitate stay in the country;
unlawful transfer of Turkish citizens or foreigners abroad. The person who
facilitates illegal entry or exit is considered a migrant smuggler, even if it is a failed
attempt and will be prosecuted under criminal law and subject to imprisonment
from 3 to 8 years and punished with a punitive fine up to 10,000 days. If this
criminal activity puts migrants lives in danger and/or there is any exploitation,
physical or emotional abuse detected, and if the human smuggler is affiliated
with an organization, then the punishment to be given will be harsher.
Despite detailed definitions provided by two Palermo Protocols and Turkish
Criminal Code on trafficking in human beings and migrant smuggling, there
was an initial confusion about the terminology in Turkey. So, these two terms
continued to be used as synonymous by researchers, policymakers and even by
the law enforcement agencies for some time. Within the last decade, Turkish
security forces have become more informed about the concepts of irregular
migration, human smuggling and trafficking in human beings. Nevertheless, the
tendency to refer to migrant smugglers as kaak (Turkish word for any smuggler
with no differentiation whether it is smuggling of goods, drugs or persons) and/
or organizatr (organizer) still continues.

The research on migrant smuggling in Turkey as part of irregular migration
started in the mid-1990s. Research directly on migrant smuggling, however, is
very limited with some exceptions (duygu and Tokta, 2002; duygu, 2004;
Narl, 2006; eker and Erdal, 2009; Baird, 2014; li et al., 2015). There are also
a number of commissioned IOM research projects. The first one was a pioneer
in the field of irregular migration and smuggling and trafficking issues and
introduced the term of transit migration in Turkey for the first time (duygu,
1995). The second IOM Report on Irregular Migration in Turkey included for the
first time a number of face-to-face interviews with apprehended migrants, as
well as human smugglers, and underscored the complexity of migrant smuggling
in Turkey and the Middle East targeting the European Union (duygu, 2003).
Another commissioned report by IOM was on the relationship between irregular
migration and women trafficking in Turkey, as well as its media coverage and
public perceptions (Erder and Kaka, 2003). The third IOM Report on Irregular
Migration in Turkey focuses on the policy changes and developments between
the years of 2006 and 2011 (duygu and Aksel, 2012).
Within the last two decades, a series of master and PhD dissertations
were written in various disciplines, mainly in sociology, geography and social
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6.Turkey
anthropology, concentrating on certain specific groups living in Turkey

temporarily. They are more qualitative in nature, providing invaluable
ethnographic details regarding different groups of migrants present. Akcapar
(2006; 2010) focused in different parts of Turkey (stanbul, Ankara, Van, Kayseri)
and in Western Europe (Belgium and Germany) on the relationship of migrant
networks and the use of human smugglers among the Iranian asylum seekers,
rejected cases and transit migrants. De Clerck (2013) carried out fieldwork for
her PhD dissertation with Senegalese in Istanbul, and she points out how a
transit country may become a place of destination when some transit migrants
with aspirations to go to Europe changed their minds after failed attempts. In his
study on African migration towards Turkey, Fait (2013) incorporated discussions
on the relations between irregular migrants and migrant smugglers. Deniz
(2000) and Ylmaz (2014) further took up the intertwined problem of asylum,
irregular migration and human smuggling and trafficking. Another ethnographic
study in zmir province portrays the relationship of migrant intentions and
human smuggling networks (Wissinck, Dvell and van Eerdewijk, 2013). Based
on ethnographic research with human smugglers and migrants, Baird (2014)
analysed human smuggling between Turkey and Greece as a survival strategy for
international migrants.
There is, however, limited research carried out in international relations
and political science disciplines. There is even less research carried out within
the perspective of demographics, economy and legal studies. Several police
academy researchers in Ankara conducted studies focusing on the criminal aspect
of migrant smuggling, often portraying the abuse and coercion of migrants at
the hands of human smugglers (iekli, 2005; eker and Erdal, 2010; UTSAM,
2012; li, Sever and Sever, 2015). Some police officers and military personnel
conducted graduate research on the topic focusing on criminal aspects of migrant
smuggling and human/migrant security considerations (Kahya, 2012; Ay, 2014).
Growing awareness on the topic recently paved the way for the
establishment of migration research centres at several universities.44 These
centres organized workshops and conducted interdisciplinary research projects
on migration in general. ICMPDs reports (2015) also focus on the relationship
between migrant smuggling and irregular migration analysing different routes
taken by migrants through Turkey. These studies combined desk-based research
with mainly secondary data and were interdisciplinary in character, as a number
of researchers and scholars were involved from different academic institutions
and backgrounds.
44
MiReKoc at Ko University, Istanbul, Migration Center at Istanbul Bilgi University and HUGO at Hacettepe
University in Ankara, Turkey.

149
Regarding mixed survey methods using quantitative and qualitative data

on migrant exploitation, abuse and/or deaths, survey or other data on migrants
views on smuggling, there are reports released by certain NGOs and international
NGOs: Amnesty International (2015), Human Rights Watch (2008), Helsinki
Citizens Assembly (2007), GLOBAL: Policy and Strategy think-tank (2015), and the
Association for Solidarity with Refugees (Mlteci-Der) (2007). As far as the policy
utility of the research on irregular migrant and smuggling, it can be concluded
that although those conducted for international organizations and compiled by
NGOs and international NGOs include some policy recommendations, related
academic research has almost never been policy-oriented.
CASE STUDY: Smuggling Syrians from Turkey to Greece
The massive exodus of Syrian refugees creates a grave migrant smuggling problem spanning
from the Middle East and Turkey to Europe and even further. The Syrian civil war is,
unfortunately, in its fifth year and does not look to end anytime soon. Even as this chapter on
Turkey is being written, more than 100,000 Syrians from Aleppo are at the doors of Turkey. It is
expected that this would create a significant spillover effect on Europe and other destination
countries as well. Here is one case of a Syrian family who was smuggled from Turkey to a Greek
island:
Aziz and his family are from Homs, Syrian Arab Republic. Due to the civil war and escalating
violence, they left their country in 2013 and came to Turkey. They belong to the majority of
Syrians who were not settled in refugee camps. They got temporary refugee status in Turkey.
After staying a short while with friends in Gaziantep not far from the Syrian border, they found
accommodation near Aksaray, Istanbul. Soon enough, they realized they were going to stay
in Turkey much longer than they expected. However, when their savings ran out, as Istanbul
is very expensive, Aziz found a job in the informal economy with the help of another Syrian
refugee. By the end of 2014, he made up his mind to go to Greece with human smugglers
and then to Germany to start a new life. He heard many stories from his friends who took the
land route to Greece and Bulgaria and knew it was a difficult journey to cross the Evros River
that involves lots of walking at night and hiding during the day. With two small children, he
decided to take the shorter and cheaper sea route instead, despite the perils involved. The
first smuggler ran off with the money. So, the second time, they wanted to find a trusted
smuggler and contacted one Syrian national with good reputation in social media. The use of
social media such as Facebook, WhatsApp and Viber is quite common among the migrants
in Turkey who would like to use the service provided by human smugglers. In the spring of
2015, the smuggler took him and his family to Izmir by bus. There were many others with
them in the bus, including a Bangladeshi refugee (possibly a Rohingya), two Iraqis, some other
Syrians, and an Afghan family. The Afghans tried to cross the Aegean twice on their own with
no success. First, their boat was caught by the Turkish Coast Guard and confiscated. Then,
the second time, they could not inflate the boat they purchased from the local market. They
changed places regularly and were told to be ready to leave anytime. Since it is not the high
season, they were asked to pay USD 1,400 for the two of them. The children would travel free.
During the summer months when the sea is calmer, the prices soar greatly and go up as high as
USD 1,500 per person. Refugees and asylum seekers from the Syrian Arab Republic spend large
sums of money and are desperate to take the risks to reach Europe. He understood that this
Syrian smuggler a refugee himself with good command of Turkish as far as he could tell was
only an intermediary and in communication with others involved in the smuggling business.
Aziz gave half of this money in Istanbul to the Syrian intermediary, and the rest was deposited
to an office called Secure Your Money along with a password. They were then transferred
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6.Turkey
from Izmir to a coastal small town (probably esme, Bodrum or Assos) by another man. After
a short waiting period, they got on the small rubber boat very early in the morning while it is
still dark with 25 others and reached Greek island after 45 minutes. Only then he gave the rest
of the money alongside with the password to the smuggling network. He and his family were
then transferred to Athens and then eventually found their way to Germany. His was one of
the lucky families from the Syrian Arab Republic as many of them were not treated well, or
worse still lost their lives at sea during this so-called journey of hope.45

As the recent large irregular flows mainly from the Syrian Arab Republic,
Iraq, and Afghanistan targeting the European Union countries showed,
uncontrolled migration is one of the major concerns for European countries. The
ever-increasing migration pressures driven by a combination of reasons, such as
economic and/or political deprivation and civil wars, have not only affected those
countries of final destination, such as Germany and Scandinavian countries, but
also the smaller European Union countries, such as Greece, Serbia and Croatia,
which were simply caught off-guard in dealing with the large everyday flows. No
doubt that the high number of refugees already living in Turkey and its unique
location on the migration routes between the Middle East and Europe has a
spillover effect on European countries and beyond.46
As a response to restrictive migration policies in the European Union,
migrants and refugees still desperately try to cross borders through Turkey
despite harsh winter conditions. This clearly indicates the demand and supply
side of migrant smuggling in the region. The geographical limitation Turkey still
withholds is probably another reason why refugees from the Middle East and
South Asia move further on not only for better living standards but also to find
more permanent solutions for their displacement. In mid-February 2016, NATO
decided to deploy fleets in the Aegean Sea to monitor and end the operations of
human smuggling. Moreover, 28 European Union leaders and the Turkish Prime
Minister signed a deal on 18 March 2016 to put an end to irregular migration
flows from Turkey to the European Union and close down migrant smuggling
networks. According to the agreement, all new irregular migrants crossing from
Turkey to the Greek islands as of 20 March 2016 will be returned to Turkey on
Since ethnographic work was not carried out for this chapter, the authors compiled anecdotal evidence
from a number of different sources: ODI Insights: Journeys to Europe, February 2016 (www.odi.org/
publications/10317-journeys-europe-role-policy-migrant-decision-making); Spiegel Online, 10 February
2016: (www.spiegel.de/international/europe/refugee-smuggling-a-big-business-in-the-balkans-a-1051461.
html); various Turkish dailies covering the issue of migrant smuggling; CNNTURK Turkish news channel
(5N1K).
46
According to the UNHCR, Turkey is hosting the highest number of asylum seekers and refugees since 2015
with 2.7 million.
45

151
4 April 2016 in line with the bilateral readmission agreement between Greece
and Turkey.47 In return for every Syrian being returned to Turkey from the Greek
islands, another Syrian will be resettled to the European Union. While these are
welcoming developments to curb migrant smuggling networks and put an end
to migrants losing their lives while crossing the seas, there is a grave danger in
limiting the genuine asylum seekers access to their right to seek refuge and
protection in the European Union regardless of their nationality of origin.
Turkeys position as a transit and destination country for immigrants and
asylum seekers who are in search for better economic and social conditions
became ever more apparent than before. Yet, detailed and scientific reports
focusing on human smuggling networks, the role of migrant networks, and
methods used have so far been very limited. Managing migration requires better
understanding of the complex dynamics between irregular migration, human
smuggling and trafficking. The time is ripe with ground-breaking, interdisciplinary
research, which can promise to bring together all these complexities with
innovative research approaches.48 Previous research and fieldwork carried out
in Turkey suggest that there is a pressing need for more comprehensive research
for filling the gap on critical information about changing regional dynamics that
eventually alter the processes of migrant smuggling in the Middle East and
beyond. It is also important to deconstruct human smuggling in the region by
documenting the following: (a) historical comparative perspectives with regard
to countries of origin, transit and destination; (b) profiles of migrant smugglers
and categories of smuggled migrants; (c) gender-specific problems faced by
migrants in the smuggling process; (d) different payment methods, such as
the frequent use of so-called hawala system; (e) methods of recruitment and
often complicated smugglermigrant relationship; (f) migrant-initiated smallscale smuggling operatives. Such research providing specific quantitative and
qualitative data on migrant smuggling would make it possible to establish more
reliable statistics to see the overall picture that is necessary on how these
smuggling networks operate. The lack of reliable information and data hinder the
active engagement of policymakers and civil society in finding lasting solutions
to this age-old problem affecting millions and causing deaths of many people on
their so-called journey of hope.
For details of the European UnionTurkey agreement, see http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16963_en.htm

48
See for example, Siegel and McGregors research on the role of social media among irregular Afghan migrants
to facilitate their migration project to the Netherlands.
47
152
6.Turkey
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7
AFGHANISTAN
Nassim Majidi and Richard Danziger
Introduction
Large-scale migration from Afghanistan has been a phenomenon since the
late 1970s when the country first experienced instability, conflict and a shattered
economy. Since then, the number of Afghans leaving has fluctuated in function
of the degree of instability and economic hardship in the country, with Afghans
continuously and increasingly on the move.49 Due to the large presence of
registered refugees and undocumented Afghans in the neighbouring countries
of the Islamic Republic of Iran (hereinafter referred to as Iran)50 and Pakistan,51
an overview of smuggling from Afghanistan must also cover Iran and Pakistan,
not only as transit and destination countries but also as countries of origin.
The transition of responsibility for national security from international
to Afghan forces in 2014 has led to renewed insecurity (UNAMA, 2016) and a
sharp economic downturn, which in turn has given rise to an Afghan exodus52
of a dimension not seen since the 2001 invasion and overthrow of the Taliban
regime. Policymakers and practitioners struggle to estimate the numbers of
Afghans currently leaving Afghanistan and its region through irregular means, so
the focus is on the number of asylum seekers arriving in Europe. In 2015, Afghans
were the second largest group of asylum seekers in Europe after Syrians.53 With
very limited regular pathways for migration,54 smuggling has been the traditional
Other papers relate the background and history of Afghan migration. The most recent resources include the
IOM Afghanistan Migration Profile (2014b), Koser (2014), Schmeidl (2014), Majidi (2016).
50
Islamic Republic of Iran is the country name in the UNTERM database. For editorial and spacing reasons, Iran
will be used in this chapter.
51
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 2014 estimated the number of Afghans in
Pakistan to be 2.5 million, and 1.95 million in Iran.
52
Afghan Analysts Networks (2015) series of analysis pieces titled Afghan exodus launched in November
2015 and ongoing at the time of this research (see www.afghanistan-analysts.org/an-afghan-exodus-factsfigures-trends/).
53
IOM number of asylum seekers in 2015.
54
The Government of Afghanistan is now embarking on its first National Labour Migration Strategy to be
formally launched in 2016 to complement the countrys National Labour Policy.
49

161
response to the demand for migration, a demand that has dramatically increased
in 2015.55
Against this backdrop, the legal framework shows national and regional
gaps. Afghanistan ratified the Palermo Protocol on Trafficking on 15 August 2014
but not the Smuggling Protocol. The Government of Afghanistan has limited
capacity to fulfill its obligations under the Trafficking Protocol and is handicapped
by national legislation that is not aligned with the international treaty. The
Governments of Iran and Pakistan have ratified neither the Smuggling nor the
Trafficking Protocols leaving a regional policy gap. While the two protocols
are part of a criminal justice treaty, both also have provisions with regard to
protection. Furthermore, discussions on smuggling have primarily focused on the
transnational trade of goods and narcotics within the framework of transnational
organized crime rather than on human smuggling. As noted in IOMs Migration
Profile for Afghanistan, the long history of drug production and smuggling in the
country has led to the expansion of migrant smuggling. Cross-border networks
and routes are used both for the smuggling of goods and narcotics, as well as
for human smuggling and trafficking operations (IOM, 2014b:22). When Afghan
and regional policymakers and their international partners turn their focus to
migrant smuggling, it has mainly been addressed through a law enforcement
and border control lens largely overlooking questions of protection and broader
migration policy.
This chapter presents the trends in smuggling of Afghans before delving
into the data collected by researchers, international organizations and other
actors data that is often anecdotal and secondary. This chapter shows the
limited state of research on smuggling in and out of Afghanistan. The authors
argue for the need to re-conceptualize smuggling in Afghanistan as a precondition
to strengthening future research.

Routes
Precise route and destinations are not always preselected by the migrant.
They may result from negotiations with the smuggler on cost and the smugglers
advice. Those who can afford to pay for forged documentation will leave by air,
or will be able to go further on to Western countries in Europe, North America
and Australia. Those who cannot afford to pay more than a few hundred dollars
will be limited to being smuggled to neighbouring countries. Smugglers may also
55
Eurostat reports 181,300 asylum applications by Afghans in 2015. In 2014, the number was 41,405. IOM
reports the arrival of 208,858 Afghans in Greece in 2015.
162
7. Afghanistan
reorient transit and destination due to border closures, strengthened controls

or increased risks en route, or due to actual or perceived easing of immigration
policies, such as was the case with Germany in the summer of 2015.56
In 2013, Dimitriadi wrote that routes are determined by the points of
departure, ethnicity and geography, with those departing from southern and
eastern Afghanistan (typically Pashtun) travelling to Pakistan first, while those
situated in other areas of Afghanistan opt for travel directly through Iran. Recent
surveying of Afghans in the Balkans shows that nearly all transit Iran with
10 per cent first passing through Pakistan. Of those surveyed, 82 per cent
left directly from Afghanistan (IOM DTM report, 2016b). It should be noted,
however, that people were not surveyed randomly, nor were the survey results
re-weighted, meaning that the results may not reflect the Afghan population
currently migrating to Europe irregularly and should therefore be treated with
caution.
Smuggling to and through Pakistan

Irregular Afghan migrants enter Pakistan almost exclusively by land,
either on foot or by bus. The long border between Afghanistan and Pakistan is
mountainous and highly porous. Many migrants do not engage the services of
smugglers to cross the Afghan border as they can enter through official border
crossing points without identification documents and with little difficulty.
There are two main routes: the first involves travel via Jalalabad in the eastern
part of the country across the Torkham border to Peshawar in North-western
Pakistan. The second route leads from Kandahar across the border at Chaman
and through Quetta in Baluchistan Province. Once in Pakistan, Afghan migrants
follow the same principal smuggling routes and methods as Pakistani nationals:
overland through Baluchistan to Iran and onward to Europe, or via air to SouthEast Asia with Australia as the final destination. The latter route is far more costly
requiring not only airline tickets but often forged passports and/or visas.
Smuggling to and through Iran

Tehran is the major hub and staging post for the smuggling of Afghan
nationals in Iran. Apart from being the capital, it lies on the main route between
the south-east of the country and the north-west bordering Turkey. There,
smuggled migrants organize the next step of their journey to Europe. Iran is the
most important transit and destination country for irregular Afghan migrants
56
Danziger (2015) interview with Abdul Ghafoor, Afghanistan Migrants Advice and Support Organization,
September 2015.

163
(though it should be noted that a certain number of Afghans travel to Iran legally
with visas how many of these then opt to be smuggled to Turkey and Europe
is unknown). From Tehran, Afghan migrants are smuggled across the border into
Turkey in the mountainous, remote areas of Iranian Azerbaijan near the cities
of Urmia and Salmas, and on towards Van and Tatvan on the other side of the
border. This is often done by taxi with smuggled migrants travelling in groups of
two to five and then regrouping with others near the border. The migrants who
travel by foot are often guided across the border in groups of 50100 persons, a
journey that can take between 12 and 15 hours (United Nations Office on Drugs
and Crime (UNODC), 2015). From Eastern Turkey, the migrants travel to Istanbul
where their onward smuggling to Western Europe is organized (UNODC, 2015).
In the past, many Afghans would leave Turkey through the land borders with
Bulgaria and Greece, but the vast majority now travel across the sea to Greece
(IOM DTM report, 2016b).
Smuggling through Central Asia and the Russian Federation

Afghanistan and the former Soviet Union traditionally had close ties based
on trade and cooperation and even today, many Afghans travel legally to the
States of the former Soviet Union for the purposes of business or education.
Since the 1990s (that is, after the Soviet occupation), irregular Afghan migrants
have transited the Commonwealth of Independent States to reach the European
Union, although there is little data available. Although difficult and expensive
to obtain, visas for some of the Commonwealth of Independent States are
available to Afghans who can therefore leave their country without resorting to
smugglers (the land border between Afghanistan and its northern neighbours
are generally well guarded). In 2015, 700 migrants crossed into Finland from the
Russian Federation (IOM DTM report, 2016a), almost half of them were Afghans;
however, it is not clear how many of them used the services of smugglers. The
majority of these migrants cross into Lapland, Finlands northernmost region.
New routes to the Gulf countries

In recent years, routes to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) States have
expanded with an estimated number of 500,000 Afghans with irregular status in
Saudi Arabia alone (Arab News, 2013). Schmeidl (2014) describes the region as
being host to as many Afghans as in Europe, while acknowledging that figures
may in reality be double. Estimates include 300,000 to 600,000 Afghan migrant
workers (not necessarily irregular) in the United Arab Emirates.57 Anecdotal
evidence indicates that a considerable number of Afghans from provinces in
57
Sources cited in Schmeidl (2014), p. 20.
164
7. Afghanistan
the south-east bordering Pakistan travel to GCC States on Pakistani passports.58

Many Afghans travel to the GCC States legally (including to Mecca for Haj). There
are two different patterns of migration to the Gulf countries: (a) migrants who
intend to stay to find employment opportunities; and (b) migrants who transit
to other destinations in South-East Asia or Europe. For migrants travelling
irregularly, generally those who intend to remain in Saudi Arabia are smuggled
from Pakistan to Iran and then by boat across to Saudi Arabia. Some Afghan
and Pakistani nationals are smuggled by boat from Pakistan or Iran to Oman,
with some continuing by land to the United Arab Emirates. Migrants who fly
from Pakistan to Riyadh or Jeddah on fraudulent travel or identity documents
typically use Saudi Arabia as a transit point en route to Western Europe. Other
destinations in the Gulf, such as Abu Dhabi or Dubai also constitute transit points
for migrants who then continue by air to Europe or South-East Asia and from
there by sea to Australia.
New routes to Malaysia and Indonesia through Dubai or India

In the past, Afghans heading for Australia would transit through or
originate from Pakistan (see above). Ongoing research however shows that
Afghan migrants are now also leaving directly from Afghanistan along two
different routes: through Dubai or New Delhi on to Malaysia and Singapore to the
final transit stop in Indonesia.59 Both routes are taken with legal documentation
and visas acquired beforehand or through the services of specialized smugglers.
IOMs office in Jakarta reports that some Afghans travel from Iran via Qatar to
Malaysia and then Indonesia. Travel from Malaysia can be by air to Surabaya or
Jakarta or by sea to Medan.
58
59
Danziger interview with Jabar Naimi, Governor of Khost Province in Khost, July 2014.
Samuel Hall (2016) ongoing research.

165
Map 7.1: Afghan migration flows to Europe
Source: IOM.
Categories of smugglers and smuggled migrants

For Afghan migrants, social networks, local connections and personal
relations combine to select ones smuggler and create a bond of trust. Afghans
will pay high prices to those smugglers who have a proven reputation for having
been successful in ensuring their clients arrive safely to their destination. Afghans
rely first on a local smuggler someone from their village, neighbourhood or
district who have been referred to them through a friend or a relative. The local
smuggler, or facilitator, will take care of the first leg of the journey to the Iranian
border. There, migrants will stay in one of a network of hotels that facilitates
the work of the smugglers, provides a boost to the local economy, and allows
migrants to prepare for the most difficult legs of their journey.60 From there, and
by phone, the next stage is organized. A local smuggler from any given province
of Afghanistan will create a link with another smuggler on the other side of the
border. A multistaged smuggling process spans borders. Many of the smugglers
are prior migrants themselves. In focus groups led in Kabul in 2012 with taxi
drivers calling themselves travel agents,61 over half of them had migrated to
Majidi 2008 research at the AfghanistanIranian border documenting the facilitators of irregular migration
of migrant workers to Iran.
61
Majidi 2012 interviews with Afghan migrants in France and returnees in Afghanistan.
60
166
7. Afghanistan
Europe and returned, and all of them had an experience of migrating at least to
Iran and Pakistan.
As a result of the growing demand for migration, research by UNODC in
Afghanistan and Pakistan reveals that the principal smuggling agents are usually
stationed outside of Afghanistan and employ a network of facilitators around
the point of origin. This has evolved into a transnational business that depends
on locals for access, contacts and local knowledge. Local agents in transit and
at destination are usually nationals of that country. For example, Iranians offer
collateral services to smuggled migrants travelling through the country, such as
accommodation, transportation from Tehran to the Turkish border or, in some
cases, transportation or guidance across the border into Turkey. Turkish or Greek
nationals mostly carry out the smuggling from Turkey into Greece. The same
appears to be the case in the neighbouring countries of Serbia, Bulgaria, Hungary
or Slovakia.62 According to UNODC (2015), citing Turkish and Austrian authorities,
the nationality of smugglers involved in the migration of Afghans and active in
these countries show a diverse set of nationalities not limited to Afghanistan.
Smugglers nationalities include Iran, Iraq, Georgia, Hungary, Myanmar, Pakistan,
Romania, the Russian Federation, Syrian Arab Republic and Turkey.
Research undertaken by UNODC in Afghanistan and Pakistan suggests
that the vast majority (more than 90%) of the smuggled migrants are men
aged between 18 and 35 years of age.63 By sending a young male abroad, the
hope of the family is that there will
be reunification in the country of
65+
destination later (Schmeidl, 2014).
This may be changing, as IOMs DTM
3564
report of 24 March 201664 shows that
1834
82 per cent of Afghans surveyed were
1417
travelling in a group, and 62 per cent of
013
these were with family members. Thirty
16,000
12,000
8,000
4,000
0
-4,000
per cent of them in turn reported being
with spouse and children.
Source: EASO, 2014.
Alarmingly, the number of unaccompanied minors (UAMs) being
smuggled already considerable in the past has been steadily growing. As
with young men, families choose one or more of their children to be smuggled
abroad so that they can become established in a destination country, support
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 2015.
UNODC, 2012.
64
See limitations of DTM methodology as described in the Overview section above.
62
63

167
remaining relatives with remittances and facilitate and sometimes finance later
migration of other relatives. The number of Afghan UAMs in Europe in 2015
was estimated at 45,300,65 representing just over half of all UAMs arriving in
the European Union. This is in sharp contrast to the previous year when 5,800
Afghan UAMs arrived (25% of the total number but still the largest group by
nationality). Sweden received 23,480 asylum applications from Afghan UAMs in
2015, compared to 3,777 Syrian claims. In 2014, Sweden reported 1,547 Afghan
UAMs the largest nationality represented.66 Of 4,601 Afghans in Indonesia as
of 30 March 2016, 204 are UAMs. Afghans represent 66 per cent of UAMs in
Indonesia.67 In contrast to the high proportion of UAMs among Afghans travelling
to Europe, of the 227,601 Afghans deported from Iran in 2015, only 2,082 were
identified as UAMs.68
Organization of smuggling
Migration has a cost whether the journey is to a nearby village, town
or city or further afield, financial resources will be needed. Apart from the
smugglers profit, the smuggling fee includes the cost of transportation and food
and, for those able to pay the highest sums, the obtaining of passports and visas,
real or forged. Migrants will often sell their main assets or will go into debt to
finance their project. The financing of smuggling becomes a collective enterprise
with entire families contributing funds. While one party provides smuggling
services and accepts to be paid in installments, the other party families,
relatives or even the broader community has to complete payments within a
given period. Delays in payment can lead to abuse or exploitation. Case studies
of migrant smuggling turned into human trafficking, or of smuggled migrants
forced to carry drugs, populate accounts of smuggling in Afghanistan.
Smugglers provide a service of smuggling packages that have evolved
and adapted to restrictions at border crossings. Smugglers services offer
transnational solutions in the form of re-entry packages: one in five of the
men interviewed (Majidi, 2008) declared having been arrested on the way to
their final destination in Iran with attempts to cross the border anew within days
of their deportation. The repeated attempts covered by fees have been most
recently confirmed by Donini, Monsutti and Scalettaris (2016). Services now also
include a fee installment by border, with a price tag attached to every border
successfully crossed, not requiring financial investments if border crossings
fail and not requiring advance payments. These packages differ depending on
Eurostat, 2016.
Wilkens, 2016; Swedish Migration Board.
67
Correspondence with IOM Jakarta.
68
IOM Kabul Cross Border Return and Reintegration Project Annual Report 2016.
65
66
168
7. Afghanistan
the starting location, destination and fees, at an estimated cost of USD 3,000
to smuggle Afghans through Iran and Turkey, and USD 5,500 to reach Greece
(Stamouli, 2016). Figures of USD 4,000 to USD 6,000 to reach Europe are widely
cited. IOM interviews with Afghans who have arrived in Balkan countries show
74 per cent of respondents paying USD 1,000 to USD 5,000 and 16 per cent
paying more than USD 5,000. The cost of travel to Indonesia was reported by
Al Jazeera in March 2014 as being between USD 8,000 to USD 12,500. More
recent interviews with Afghan asylum seekers in Indonesia by IOM indicate costs
ranging from USD 4,200 to USD 7,000. Smuggled migrants may also opt to travel
by air, the most practiced route for the wealthier Afghans leaving their country,
as well as for vulnerable groups, including women and the elderly. This is the
most expensive service as it requires the input of specialized smugglers who can
arrange for passports, visas and plane tickets. The cost ranges from USD 20,000
to USD 25,000.
The step-by-step organization of the migration journey, and the multiple
chains of smugglers involved, has meant that migrants have to pay in installments
along the way. There are primarily two agreed-upon methods of payment:
(a) third-party guarantee; and (b) direct guarantee.69 The method of thirdparty guarantee involves an upfront deposit by the migrant with a third-party
guarantor who either pays entirely or in installments depending on the agreed
upon milestones en route, such that a first payment will be released when
the migrant reaches Tehran, a second on arrival in Ankara or Istanbul, and the
last after successfully crossing into Greece. This method seems to be the most
common for migrants leaving from Eastern Afghanistan. The second method
requires the migrant to carry money and pay cash for the different legs of the
trip. This appears to be the most common method of payment for relatively
inexpensive services, such as boat trips from the Iranian coast to the Persian Gulf
countries (particularly Oman). Similarly, migrants pay cash to cross the border
from Afghanistan into Iran or at checkpoints in Turkey.
Researchers highlight the frequent use of the Hawala money transfer
system for smuggling activities in Afghanistan where the low penetration of
the banking system, low levels of literacy and the lack of official identification
documentations are all obstacles to transfers through formal banking
institutions.70 This informal money transfer system protects both sides, as there
is no record keeping: short-term records are destroyed when transactions are
settled, and phone-based applications including Skype, Viber and WhatsApp
used to organize the payments helps elude detections (Legorano and Parkinson,
2015).
69
70
UNODC, 2012.
Heckmann, 2014.

169
Services to Europe include meetings with families and relatives at

departure to explain the migration process, including the lack of guarantee of
success. Smugglers discuss with clients the different options, such as shorter or
longer migration routes with longer travel entailing stops in Iran, Turkey and
other countries where migrants can work to pay for the following leg of their
journey. They may also match migrants from one location with other Afghan
migrants as travelling companions. As a result, the smuggler is not just a travel
agent, as they often describe themselves, but often a provider of advisory
services for planning and financing the migration project. Some smugglers can
be fixers and caretakers; others may engage in exploitative or abusive practices
conspiring with other smugglers, employers or officials along the way to gouge
more money from the migrant or their family. When migrants run out of money,
they have to work locally to finance the next leg of their journey. They may be
forced to work in exploitative conditions as has been reported (Majidi, 2008).
The case study presented in this chapter shows the vulnerability associated with
smuggled migrants and the thin line between trafficking and forced labour.
Human costs
The cost of migration is not just financial: there are very real human
costs too. Crossing straight into Iran from Afghanistan is increasingly dangerous.
Although no baseline exists, from January to September 2015, IOM received
and assisted at the Zaranj border 59 Afghans shot, injured and deported (after
treatment) by Iranian border police. During the same period, 22 bodies of
Afghans shot and killed by the police were received.71 Reports of shootings in
border areas by Iranian police have focused on deaths of drug smugglers from
Pakistan and Iran in 2015. Yet these shootings have also affected migrants and
their smugglers attempting to cross the border for the difficult and dangerous
journey from Afghanistan, through Iran, to Europe.72 These events remain
under-reported and are indicative of a general lack of information and data on
smuggling and counter-smuggling initiatives in Afghanistan and its region.
Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan are known for their arduous terrain and
harsh climate. Afghans have to travel through desert and steppes as they head
south-westwards towards Iran. Those opting to travel through Pakistan via
Peshawar have to cross the traditionally insecure mountainous areas of the
Hindu Kush, and the increasingly unsure districts of Nangarhar province. Reports
from migrants by foot through Iran are rife with the risks they faced: lack of water
71
72
Statistics compiled by IOM Zaranj Office.

IOM reports on returnees from Iran (2014).
170
7. Afghanistan
and food, days and nights spent walking in the desert, and the migrants (often
minors) risking their lives and dying on the journey. Although no data exists on
the number of Afghans dying while crossing Iran into Turkey, IOM counts 55
Afghans as having drowned at sea in 2014 while crossing from Turkey to Greece.
In 2015, this number increased to 78 and as of 15 May 2016, 51 Afghans have
drowned at sea, indicating an alarming trend.
The presence of Afghanistans UAMs has raised the profile of smuggling
in protection terms. Indeed, smuggled Afghans in general are represented by
an important number of minors, a significant proportion of whom, according
to European Partner States data, were unaccompanied.73 UNODC reports from
Greece, Indonesia and Scandinavian countries in 2015 show that UAMs, mainly
teenage boys, are found among groups of smuggled migrants (UNODC, 2015:21).
It is difficult to do justice to the human costs incurred by smuggled Afghans
and their families in this brief overview, but it is important to underline that the
risks of the journey itself are compounded by the increasingly difficult conditions
experienced by the migrants on arrival at the destination country. Under these
circumstances, if the number of smuggled Afghans is sharply increasing, one
can but consider the corresponding increase in despair over insecurity and the
absence of prospects at home.

There are serious data problems [] not only because of inadequate
legal and policy tools but, also due to terminological confusions
International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), 2013:38
As referred to in the introduction, a key obstacle to research is the
confusion over both the terms and concepts of trafficking, smuggling, kidnapping
and abduction. This is the case in the treatment of smuggling by the Government
of Afghanistan. As reported in November 2015, the Ministry of Refugees and
Repatriation (MoRR) has called on the Ministry of Interior Affairs (MoI) to crack
down on human traffickers in a bid to stop Afghans from fleeing the country.
According to the Ministry, the number of human traffickers has significantly
increased in recent months as thousands of Afghans continue to seek refuge in
Europe. [] Many individuals and groups were arrested last week for deceiving
people and trafficking them illegally to foreign countries, MoI spokesman Sediq
73
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member
States of the European Union(Frontex), 2010.

171
Sediqqi said. This discourse illustrates the lack of clarity in the Governments
stance on smuggling in Afghanistan:
The terminology focuses on trafficking and not smuggling, thereby
confusing the two.
The accent is put on the criminal nature of smuggling rather than
as a service albeit illegal.
The crime is not situated within a migration context: there is no
reference to a policy on migration.
The lack of clarity in the terms used is a key challenge: smuggling and
trafficking are used interchangeably, betraying a legal blur on the differences
between the two. The 2008 Afghan Law on Countering Abduction and Human
Trafficking/Smuggling gives a definition of trafficking in line with the international
one. However, the ambiguity of the Dari term used for human trafficking
undermines the laws effectiveness by perpetuating confusion around trafficking
concepts. The Dari word, ghachag-e insan, is used interchangeably to refer to
both human trafficking and smuggling. Additionally, the word ghachag is used
commonly to refer to all types of illegal transport, be it of drugs, arms or persons.
National legislation is obliged to be more precise if it is to be enforceable. A
2013 study (Samuel Hall, 2013) emphasized the use of the term tejarat-e insan
meaning human trade to refer specifically to trafficking and therefore set it
apart from smuggling.
The authorities focus on law enforcement to the total exclusion of
protection, along with the confusion between trafficking and smuggling, has
severely limited the effectiveness of their response to both phenomena. This
situation makes it both more challenging to identify the victims of trafficking, as
well as formulate policies that would offer support or protection to smuggled
migrants, or offer alternative choices to would-be migrants. It also undercuts the
will to prosecute real traffickers when they are confused with smugglers who
often enjoy popular support. The second obstacle to the collection of data on
migrant smuggling is the nature of borders. While the western border with Iran
is well demarcated, the eastern Durand line dividing Pakistan and Afghanistan,
while recognized internationally, is not accepted by all Afghans. The fluidity and
porous nature of this border makes data collection (and research) on smuggling
all the more challenging.
A third challenge arises from the overall refugee context within which
movements of Afghans to Iran and Pakistan take place. For the period stretching
from the late 1970s to 2002 with some interruptions there was a general
172
7. Afghanistan
acceptance that conditions inside Afghanistan were such that it warranted

considering all Afghans fleeing their country for Iran and Pakistan as refugees.
The concept of smuggling was largely only applied to secondary movements:
whether Afghans used the services of smugglers to cross into neighbouring
countries was not considered relevant. The lack of information management
systems at a national or regional level means that any initiative to provide up-todate estimates is lost. Only UNODC has a systematic approach to data collection,
which is used to populate the agencys regional reports at the Asia level.
In Afghanistan, the main collectors of data related to smuggling are as
follows:
-- UNODC, with its overview of migrant smuggling in Asia.74
-- IOMs activities on counting undocumented Afghan returnees at
the borders since 2011 and collecting data on vulnerabilities. To
date, no data has been collected on smuggling, although with
the new interest in the phenomenon, there have been attempts
to use some of these data as proxy indicators.
-- IOMs Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), which has, since
8 October 2015, been collecting data on Afghans (and other
nationals) arriving in the Balkans. The DTM gathers information
inter alia on routes, cost of journey, motives and intentions. The
major constraint is that these surveys are perforce very short as
the respondents are still on the move. Other limitations include
the ad hoc selection of respondents and the fact that they need
to be confident enough to be interviewed in a public space,
leading to a bias towards young single males who speak English
(survey forms are translated, but the verbal interview is in
English). In short, the sample is not statistically representative,
and the results should be treated with caution.
-- Think tanks and research institutes the Afghanistan Research
and Evaluation Unit (AREU), the Liaison Office and Samuel Hall
have taken the lead on migration research in the country,
collecting qualitative data on smuggling covering all provinces
of Afghanistan, including border regions, mainly through case
studies, focus group discussions and feedback from community
elders. AREUs research from 2006 documents cross-border
and regional migration and population movement dynamics
inclusive of smuggling trends. The focus of a study on Afghans
74
UNODC, 2015.

173
in Quetta75 was specifically on transnational trade and crossborder goods smuggling, looking at the livelihoods dynamics
of Afghans in Pakistan who use the border as a resource to
generate income. The focus is on the smuggling of goods flour,
blankets and cooking oil rather than people.
-- Communications and consulting companies based in Afghanistan
such as Wise Afghanistan has published a scoping study in 2010
on counter-smuggling for the Government of Australia. The study
specifically focused on the Hazara population with an overview
of trends in four selected provinces to assess the situational
awareness and communications channels that maintain the
people-smuggling network from Afghanistan to Australia.
-- Media reporting on smuggling with detailed information on
the organization, geography and risks of smuggling provided by
journalists, with recent examples of publications including the
2012 New York Times article by Luke Mogelson, on The Scariest
Little Corner of the World, describing the dangers of the route
for both smugglers and migrants, and the coverage of Afghan
migration to Europe by the Wall Street Journal.
Other information available publicly is based on secondary data and
published by organizations based outside of Afghanistan. These include the
following:
(a) ICMPDs 2013 Afghanistan Migration Country Report based on an
initiative that is part of the Budapest Process. The report estimates illegal
trade/smuggling to represent between 6.5 to 8 per cent of the official
GDP based on secondary data but without specifying the methodology.
Such estimates remain unverified by other sources (ICMPD, 2013:8). The
ICMPD reports treatment of smuggling focuses on secondary research
collected on the following:
-----
The cost of smuggling;

Payment agreements;
Smugglermigrant relations; and
Minors migration.
(b) Non-governmental organizations in Pakistan that have published

information on Afghan migrants focusing on migrant smuggling and
75
AREU, 2005.
174
7. Afghanistan
irregular migration to Pakistan. The latest study dates back to 2009 with
the work of Basic Education for Awareness Reforms and Empowerment
(BEFARe) in Peshawar and ActionAid.76
However, much of the research either remains a one-off attempt at
collecting data, soon outdated by new trends in migration, or anecdotal, with
evidence collected being a side project or part of a larger research project with a
different focus. Only UNODC has focused specifically on collecting and analysing
data on smuggling, with a focus on narcotics first and migrant smuggling second.
Recommendations in IOMs 2014 Afghanistan Migration Profile call for the need
for field research, with a particular focus on migrant smuggling to fill the data
gap.

Methods used for data collection on smuggling are as follows:
Qualitative data individual interviews, focus group discussions,
individual or provincial case studies based on semi-structured
interviews;
Secondary data widely used by commentators and analysts; and
Quantitative data rarely available and broadly lacking other than
by UNODC.
In 2015, the new indicator of choice used as a proxy to estimate the scope
of irregular migration out of Afghanistan became the number of new passports
issued. With only one passport office in Kabul, crowds there grew over the year
2015 as widely reported in the media. In October, 6,0007,000 new passport
applications were being made daily, up from 5,000 in August and 1,000 in early
2014 (IOM). However, this was misleading as an indicator since many people
were applying for new machine-readable passports before the International
Civil Aviation Organization deadline for State compliance. Furthermore, irregular
migration does not equate to smuggling, although the two are closely linked due
to the very low rates of visa obtention by Afghans. In order to travel abroad, they
must do so irregularly, and often rely on the services of a smuggler. Other proxy
indicators worth exploring further could be the following:
Number of deportations from Iran;
Number of Afghans detained near the Turkish border by Iranian
authorities; and
76
Azam, 2009.

175
Number of departures from Afghanistan to be complemented by

knowledge of migration intentions.
Online resources providing information based on secondary data available
on illicit trade in Afghanistan (www.havocscope.com/) give estimates of the
migrant smuggling industry ranging up to USD 1 billion, and the prices paid
to smugglers between USD 700 to get to Iran and USD 25,000 to London, but
without further information on data sources.
Three main concerns persist with regards to research on migrant smuggling
out of Afghanistan:
-- Absence of data and systematic data collection IOM
Afghanistan has a presence at the two major border crossings
with Iran (and also the principal official border crossing with
Pakistan). The organization works with officials from the
MoRR on counting returnees, but there are major challenges
to conducting more in-depth surveys of migrants. These
challenges include the following: (a) large number of returnees
(over 250,000 yearly) and their wish to proceed to their final
destination as rapidly as possible; (b) the need to be careful not
to raise expectations that the questions will lead to assistance;
and (c) resource constraints. IOM is however working on a
more systematic approach, including following up on returnees
through a new information management system being developed
for MoRR. All the above only capture data on returning Afghans
(for the most part forcibly returned.) IOMs planned Migration
Information Centres, once opened, will be useful in capturing
data on intentions.
-- Little focus or advocacy on protection of migrants which,
apart from the direct impact this has on vulnerable or abused
migrants, also reduces the States self-recognition as duty
bearer of human rights. This in turn means that smugglers are
comforted in their roles as useful and much appreciated service
providers (which the good ones are) and not perceived enough
as criminals whose clients can end up as victims of violence,
abuse or exploitation.
-- Non-existent regional initiatives to address smuggling: Despite
the regional nature of smuggling, in Afghanistan, Pakistan
and Iran, the discourse has focused on refugee management
and refugee returns, primarily through United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees operations, with only timid
176
7. Afghanistan
attempts to discuss the reality of smuggling that nurture a

fluid, continuous and dynamic movement of populations from
Afghanistan outwards.
Academic efforts have helped to fill this gap in knowledge and data on
smuggling. Scholars have undertaken smuggling research through three main
disciplinary approaches under the social science disciplines.
First, an economic analysis of the investments and costs of smuggling.
Academics such as Khalid Koser (Koser, 2008; Koser and Marsden, 2013) have
argued for the need to take an economic analysis approach to understanding
the dynamics of smuggling out of Afghanistan, with a cost-benefit analysis of the
investment made by families in Afghanistan who sent a family member to the
United Kingdom. This study (Koser, 2008:17) looks at the question of investment
and returns on investment after an initial period of two years spent in the United
Kingdom. The conclusion from this study was that the initial investment and
risks incurred were considered as worthwhile.
Second, a social network analysis conducted by Triandafyllidou and
Maroukis (2012) based on the importance of transnational networks and the
organization of smuggling networks from Afghanistan to Europe via Turkey. This
included their modus operandi, costs, means of transport and duration of the
journeys. This research was conducted at the level of the Asian region, with
Afghanistan being just one case study.
Third, the sociopolitical implications of Afghan mobility have been studied
with a close look at categories of migrants, motives for migration and routes
(Triandafyllidou and Maroukis, 2012; Schmeidl, 2014) taken by Afghans, via
the Iranian border or via Pakistani Balochistan, documenting the centrality of
Quetta as a transit city. This approach has also documented the risks of the
border crossings and the use of smugglers services. Schmeidl (2014) discusses
numbers, categories and how smugglers select and specialize in routes that
respond to the priorities of Afghan families, with Europe being the most coveted
destination for education, health care and long-term settlement.
While there have been several donor government-funded research projects
on human trafficking in Afghanistan,77 there has been no such funded research
in the past on people smuggling. The UNODC report referred to covers people
smuggling throughout Asia and is not Afghanistan-specific. The vast majority
77
The most prominent of these have all been funded by the Government of the United States: IOM (2003,
2008, 2013), Hagar International (2014) and AREU (in progress).

177
of government-funded research on mobile populations has been dedicated to

refugees. A new development is for the establishment of IOM DTM capacity in
Afghanistan and Pakistan, which does not specifically target smuggled migrants,
although they are likely to be the principal category of migrants captured by the
surveys.
CASE STUDY: The thin line between smuggling, trafficking and forced labour in Afghanistan
Research shows that smuggling can turn into trafficking and forced labor in complex regional
dynamics. This case study shows how smuggling and trafficking can overlap, and is taken
from the Samuel Hall (2013) study for IOM titled Old Practice, New Chains: Modern Slavery
in Afghanistan.
One victim, a 36-year-old Afghan of Uzbek ethnicity in Northern Afghanistan, reports having
been approached by a smuggler a distant relative when he lived in the province of Balkh.
He was told that a company in Saudi Arabia would provide him with employment in a factory,
at USD 520 per month, and accommodation. He travelled to Saudi Arabia by plane with a
forged passport and visa. He worked as described in his discussions with the smuggler, but
only to realize that he would be paid one third of the promised wage (USD 185). In addition,
he would have to repay the costs of his irregular migration (about USD 400 for a forged
passport and visa). The amount was deducted from his monthly wage. He was later both
underpaid, working extra hours up to 16 hours without additional pay, and paid late,
with delays in receiving his wages. He could not report it to anyone, as he could not leave the
factory without permission, and his forced passport and visa were with his employer. Once
he settled the loan, he was able to leave his job and return to Mazar city in Balkh.
Another victim, Muzamel, aged 15, was interviewed in Herat city in Western Afghanistan
while he was working as a cleaner in Daikundi Hotel, a guesthouse where Afghans lived,
mainly migrants on their way to cross the border with Iran. He himself lived in Iran with
his family but had been arrested and deported back to Afghanistan. As he did not have any
family in Afghanistan, he was offered to work instead of paying for a room at the nearest
hotel in Herat city. At the hotel, he met a man who took him under his responsibility. He was
a smuggler who promised to take him back to Iran. In order to pay the fees, the smuggler
required that he continue working at the hotel until his debt had been cleared. Eventually,
he spent one year working as a dishwasher in the hotel, still waiting for sufficient funds to
cross the border into Iran. He had not been paid any amount since he had begun working
and was only being fed and given shelter for free.
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7. Afghanistan

The timing seems ripe in 2016 to set up a system to support the
Government of Afghanistan and build the capacity of governmental authorities
from national to subnational levels in identifying, preventing and responding
to smuggling. Efforts towards improved information systems are currently being
led by IOM in Afghanistan with the Government.
Renewed conflict in Afghanistan and uncertainties about its political and
economic future have led Afghans to emigrate in search of protection and better
living conditions. If the traditional directions of the flows of irregular migrants
from Afghanistan were primarily directed towards the neighbouring countries
(Pakistan and Iran), Europe has been an increasingly popular destination for
migrants in recent years. However, with respect to the size of irregular migration,
the reviewed literature provides little information about the scope of migrant
smuggling with departure from inside Afghanistan.
The organizational aspects of smuggling of migrants are the main interest
of research on smuggling. This includes the routes, the methods used and the
criminal organizations behind the process. This is explained by the fact that the
main actors conducting research on the subject are judiciary or law enforcement
institutions. Further research is needed to understand the following: (a) profiles
of the smugglers; (b) human and social costs of migrant smuggling; (c) role
of corruption; and (d) fees paid to smugglers and their involvement in other
criminal activities including human trafficking. Furthermore, there has been a
sharp increase in women and minors migrating irregularly from Afghanistan,
and there is an urgent need to explore their relationships with smugglers, and
especially their vulnerability to exploitation. Indeed, there is a complete absence
of studies specifically focusing on gender issues, and very little concerning the
irregular migration of minors especially considering the scale of the latter.
The need for smuggling data is clear in Afghanistan: there are no
comprehensive statistics and only broad estimates on smuggling from one of
the highest producing countries of irregular migration in the world. As just one
example, it is unknown how many of the Afghans arriving in Europe through the
facilitation of smugglers began their journey in Afghanistan rather than Iran or
Pakistan.
What, therefore, can be done to improve data and research on this subject
in Afghanistan?

179
First, serious thought needs to be directed at conceptualizing smuggling

and trafficking within the context of Afghanistan. As previously mentioned,
there continues to be confusion between trafficking and smuggling both with
regard to the word itself in Dari, as well as the actual concepts. The crime of
trafficking in Afghanistan is often confused with simple abduction, a confusion
reinforced by the existing legislation (although this is under review). There is
much to be said for moving away from the use of trafficking when applied to
a mixed migration scenario, and substituting migrant abuse and exploitation,
which can better capture the protection needs of smuggled or other irregular
migrants. Equally, there is the need to consider how and when to use smuggling
as a descriptor of a facilitated irregular cross-border movement.
Second, major gaps need to be addressed on the protection as opposed
to law enforcement side of smuggling. Anecdotal and actual evidence of
exploitation, abuse and worse of adults and children have been raised in research
but not systematically enough to be able to develop policies and programmes.
The building of an evidence base on smuggling must be informed by protectionrelated issues, including those that lead to Afghans requesting the services of
smugglers in the first place.
The presence of researchers on the ground shows that access is possible
even in nominally insecure areas of the country. It is therefore possible to
collect data on smuggling through field-based research in Afghanistan without
necessarily going very far afield. Conducting research on smuggling is actually
easier than is commonly acknowledged for several reasons, such as the
following: (a) smuggling is a common and widespread phenomenon; (b) it is
demand driven, when described by smugglers themselves; and (c) it is part of
the experience of a very large number of Afghans. Rare is the Afghan who does
not have a relative or acquaintance who has not used a smuggler to migrate,
let alone know a smuggler themselves. As already mentioned, an important
gap in the knowledge is that of the profile of smugglers. Knowing more about
and humanizing the smuggler, along with improved data on protection issues,
is key to developing sound policies and programmes dealing with outmigration
from Afghanistan as a whole. At a time of sharply rising migration, and with
Afghanistan being the second most important source country in the world for
asylum seekers, the priority must be on launching a full-scale study on smuggling
that takes into account the phenomenon as viewed both from the point of view
of the Protocol, as well as that of the Afghans who place their futures and
sometimes their lives in the smugglers hands.
180
7. Afghanistan
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7. Afghanistan
8
SOUTH ASIA
Dinuk Jayasuriya and Ramesh Sunam
Introduction
The South Asian region comprising Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan,
India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka is a hub of irregular and regular
migration flows. Widespread news coverage of Indian and Nepalese migrants
illegally entering the United States through Guatemala and Mexico (Irfan, 2012;
Wells, 2013), and Bangladeshi and Rohingya migrants roaming in Kuala Lumpur
to make their way to Australia for seeking asylum (ABC, 2015) are some of the
examples of what irregular migration looks like in the region. While all forms of
irregular migration may not involve smuggling, most cases of irregular migration
from and to Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka are undertaken with the
assistance of migrant smugglers (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC), 2015). The dynamics of irregular migration in the region is largely
rooted in political conflicts, ethnic violence, economic disparities, deep poverty
and food insecurity. Nevertheless, it also reflects the aspirations of relatively
educated and wealthy individuals and families to settle in western developed
countries.
Much of the discussion relating to people smuggled from Bangladesh, Sri
Lanka, Pakistan and India has focused on those seeking protection (Jayasuriya
and McAuliffe, 2013; Koser, 2008; Rajan, 2014; Saha, 2012; United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2015a; UNODC, 2013). They have
been smuggled within the region (for example, Sri Lankans to India, Pakistanis
to Sri Lanka and Bangladeshis to Pakistan) and beyond, to Europe and other
developed countries, such as the United States, Canada, Australia and New
Zealand (UNODC, 2015). Many attempt to seek asylum in these countries, while
others remain there as unauthorized workers. People from Bangladesh, India,
Pakistan and Sri Lanka are also smuggled for labour purposes to the Middle East
(Saha, 2012; UNODC, 2015). They may continue to work illegally, and from there,
some may also migrate onwards to a developed destination country.

187
In destination countries, migrant smugglers from Bangladesh, India,

Pakistan and Sri Lanka, are largely depicted as criminals with some accused
of abuse and starving their captives by the media, politicians and academia
(Chowdhury, 2015; Shepherd, 2014; UNHCR, IOM and UNODC, 2015). This
depiction is echoed by those in transit countries, and highlighted in graphic detail
by the Rohingya from Bangladesh whose mass graves were found in Thailand
(Barry, 2015). Yet, in source countries, those involved in the smuggling process
are not necessarily considered exploitative, but sometimes considered as heroes,
helping people escape their difficult situations (Raghavan and Jayasuriya, 2016a,
2016b). Many smugglers rely on their reputations, and so successful ventures
generate more business for them.
The apparent contradiction in conceptualizations of smugglers could
in part be due to where smugglers (or those in the smuggling business) are
interviewed. Initially, in source countries presumably those respondents who
are planning on undertaking irregular migration with the assistance of a migrant
smuggler have not experienced the hardships in transit may not fully appreciate
the risks of transit, or may have been informed by their networks that the risks
are worth taking. If these people are engaging migrant smugglers, they may
do so with an underlying level of trust, and hence have positive views towards
smugglers. A smuggler may also be part of a chain of smugglers, and actually be
more of recruiter or facilitator rather than the main smuggler (Raghavan and
Jayasuriya, 2016a, 2016b). Conversely, those who have undertaken the journey
and experienced hardships may have a different view of migrant smugglers.
This conceptualization may also be different depending on the source country
in question; Rohingya who languish in camps in Thailand before their family
members can buy their freedom may or may not face different levels and types
of abuse at the hands of smugglers (and traffickers) compared with Sri Lankans
who entered Australia irregularly in 2011 and 2012. Such examples often blur
the difference between trafficking and migrant smuggling.
In source and destination countries, irregular migrants who are seeking
asylum have been conceptualized by some as opportunistic, queue jumpers and
driven by economic factors, while others present them as legitimate sufferers of
human rights abuse and persecution (Howie, 2014). For governments in source
countries protecting their human rights records and reputation, and governments
in destination countries trying to limit the flows of irregular asylum seekers, the
narrative seems to be the former. For human rights advocates, family members
of asylum seekers and some sections of the asylum seekers communities, the
latter conceptualization may be more accurate. Academia, to an extent, exists in
the middle; showing irregular migrants may have both economic and protection
reasons for migration (Dimitriadi, 2013; European Commission, Directorate
188
8. South Asia
General for Migration and Home Affairs, 2009; Jayasuriya and McAuliffe, 2014;
McAuliffe, 2013; UNODC, 2013), with some research showing that protection
factors are more prominent than economic factors among refugees who arrived
irregularly (McAuliffe, 2013).
All South Asian countries have been parties to at least one important
international legal instrument related to migration, Bhutan being the exception.
The 2000 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime has
been widely supported (see Table 8.1). Only India is party to the 2000 Protocol
against the Smuggling of Migrants and the 2000 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress
and Punish Trafficking in Persons, so is Afghanistan to the 1951 Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees, and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status
of Refugees. Afghanistan and Sri Lanka are the only countries from the region
supporting the 1990 UN Migrant Workers Convention.
Table 8.1: Countrys signatory status to relevant international migration instruments
1951 Refugees Convention and 1967
Protocol1
1974 SOLAS Convention2
Bangladesh
India
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
1982
1980
1985
1983
1986
1985
1990 UN Migrant Workers Convention1
2011
1996
2000 Convention against Transnational

Organized Crime3
2011
2011
2010
2006
2000 Anti-smuggling Protocol1
2011
2000 Anti-trafficking Protocol
2011
1978 SOLAS Protocol
Sources: (1) United Nations migration country profiles. Available from

MigGMGProfiles/indicators/files (accessed 14 April 2016).
http://esa.un.org/
(2) Australian Maritime Safety Authority. Available from https://imo.amsa.gov.au/public/

parties/solas74.html, https://imo.amsa.gov.au/public/parties/solas78protocol.html
(accessed 14 April 2016).
(3) United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. UN

Treaty Collection. Available from https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.
aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-12&chapter=18&clang=_en (accessed 14 April
2016).
This chapter focuses on the South Asian countries of Bangladesh, India

and Sri Lanka, as well as Pakistan. It presents an overview of migrant smuggling
in the region, explains the types of smugglers, and discusses the costs associated
with migrant smuggling. Available data and existing research related to migrant
smuggling is then reviewed before providing concluding remarks.

189

Australia, Europe and the United States are important destinations for
migrant smugglers in South Asia (Asia Foundation, 2013; Saha, 2012; Shelley,
2014). Evidence also shows that Asia and the South Asian region itself host a
significant proportion of smuggled irregular migrants, albeit largely unrecorded
(Kumar, 2012; Reddy, 2012). The region is both a destination and source region
for smuggled migrants. As UNODC (2015) highlights, migrant smugglers support
the vast majority of the smuggled migrants from the planning phase to phases
involving seeking work and asylum or further migration. While there remains a
paucity of information, a review of the available data and research on India, Sri
Lanka, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Nepal provides important insights into migrants
flows and their demographics, smuggling routes and profiles of smugglers, as
well as costs and exploitation associated with migrant smuggling.
Migrant smuggling: Mapping migrants, routes and smugglers

Migrant smuggling to Europe and the United States
The routes for irregular migration to Europe and the United States are
varied (see Figure 8.1 for major routes). Indian, Sri Lankan, Bangladeshi and
Pakistani irregular migrants are smuggled overland and by air to Europe and the
United States. The smuggling to Europe occurs via Central Asia and the Russian
Federation; the Islamic Republic of Iran, Turkey and Greece through the Western
Balkans and occasionally via West Africa (European Commission, Directorate
General for Migration and Home Affairs, 2015; Saha, 2012; Triandafyllidou
and Maroukis, 2012; UNODC, 2015; Yousef, 2013). Other lesser-used pathways
occur through the Gulf countries, where migrants reach through regular
processes (Raghavan and Jayasuriya, 2016a, 2016b; Saha, 2012; Yousef, 2013).
Recent studies show that some Sri Lankans pass through India first, regularly or
irregularly, prior to flying to Europe (Raghavan and Jayasuriya, 2016a, 2016b).
Most of the cases of illegal entry into United States via land route had
been via Mexico or Canada (Saha, 2012). More recently, anecdotal evidence
suggests that increasingly Indian and Nepali migrants are smuggled to the United
States (Irfan, 2012; Wells, 2013). Guatemala and Ecuador both introduced visa
waiver schemes to Indian nationals in recent years, which were then used as
intermediary countries to enter the United States (Irfan, 2012; Saha, 2012). Most
of the migrants smuggled to Europe and the United States are asylum seekers
who apply for refugee status. They are mostly educated and belong to better-off
families, with the exception of some war or ethnic victims (Saha, 2012).
190
8. South Asia
Figure 8.1: Major migrant smuggling routes from South Asia
Sources: li et al. (2015); Irfan (2012); Raghavan and Jayasuriya (2016a, 2016b); Saha (2012);
UNODC (2013).
Migrant smuggling within Asia and to the Gulf

Irregular migrants from South Asia largely travel through Malaysia first
and then the Indonesian islands of Bali, Flores and Lombok prior to embarking
to Australia (UNODC, 2011). Many choose to remain (or are stuck) in Malaysia
and Indonesia, while others, including many Rohingya from Bangladesh, arrive
in Thailand (UNHCR, 2015a). Although the primary transit route to Australia
occurs through Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia, a recent study revealed that
migrant smugglers use various routes for entering Australia, largely through
passenger ships, fishing boats or cargo ships (Raghavan and Jayasuriya, 2016a).
Main alternative routes include the following: (a) PakistanIslamic Republic
of IranTurkeySouth AfricaAustralia; (b) PakistanSouth AfricaAustralia;
(c) PakistanChinaHong Kong, ChinaAustralia; (d) PakistanChinaThailand
Australia; (e) PakistanAbu Dhabi many other locations through shipsAustralia;
(f) PakistanLibyamany other locations through shipsAustralia.
In terms of gender, most migrants smuggled for the purposes of seeking
asylum are young men (UNODC, 2015; McAuliffe, 2013). Among Bangladeshi
asylum seekers, reports suggest only 4.6 per cent of irregular migrants are female
(UNODC, 2015). In the case of Indian irregular migrants, a significant minority
(one third) of female irregular migrants were female (Saha, 2012). There are
also reports of unaccompanied minors; for example, approximately 40 per cent
of interviewed individuals in Malaysia from Bangladesh were unaccompanied
minors under the age of 18 years (UNHCR, 2015b).
191
Some irregular migrants from Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka
are smuggled to Middle Eastern countries, such as Qatar, Bahrain, Oman,
Libya, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates for domestic labour.
These irregular migrants are predominantly women from poor socioeconomic
background (Paoletti et al., 2014). Migrants reach these countries through
regular channels; in the most part, smugglers arrange visitor visas for migrants
and later these migrants, mostly women, end up working as housemaids (Asia
Foundation, 2013; Paoletti et al., 2014). Other migrants from Bangladesh,
Pakistan, Nepal and Sri Lanka, with the assistance of migrant smugglers (through
falsified documents and regular travel, or irregular travel), also travel to Malaysia,
Thailand and Indonesia for work. A small proportion of these migrants (in the
Gulf and Asian countries) may also undertake further irregular migration to
Western countries to seek asylum.
There are well-documented cases of exploitation by migrant smugglers in
the region. A recent example was rape and other forms of abuse committed by
migrant smugglers against Rohingya from Bangladesh (UNHCR, IOM and UNODC,
2015), although some claim that this has been the norm in migrant smuggling
for decades rather than the exception (Chowdhury, 2015).
Smugglers in South Asia: Their numbers and types/profiles
The role of smugglers is critical in shaping the flows of migrant smuggling. A
key reason is that this form of migration involves multiple transit countries, overt
and covert strategies, diverse authorities and actors to be negotiated with (such
as for preparing fake documents), as well as various modes of transportation.
Studies show that smugglers involved in irregular migration form a multiscaled and well-networked (or loose) structure starting right from the place of
origin of migrants to destination countries (Raghavan and Jayasuriya, 2016a;
UNODC, 2015). Smugglers working at multiple scales differ in terms of the role
they play, the forms of power they can exercise and benefits/income they gain.
Despite these differences, they work closely through more or less established
strategies or formal/informal institutions (Saha, 2012). Pastore, Monzini and
Sciortino (2006:20) argue that migrant smugglers are little more than loose
networks linking largely independent clusters of practical competencies.
Further, the number of smugglers is hard to estimate, and it has been reported
that some former irregular migrants use their knowledge to become migrant
smugglers (UNODC, 2015).
Field research in Pakistan and Sri Lanka involving interviews with migrant
smugglers highlighted multilayered networks of smugglers with more or less
192
8. South Asia
clear roles (Raghavan and Jayasuriya, 2016a). Multilayered smugglers include

local village sub-agents, main agents, logistic handling agents, transit country
agents and destination country agents, each performing various specific roles
from motivating people for irregular migration, dealing with State authorities for
fake documents to facilitating travel.
In specific terms, Figure 8.2 presents types of smugglers and levels
identified during fieldwork in Sri Lanka (Raghavan and Jayasuriya, 2016b). The
case in India and Nepal is similar where local agents recruit migrants and the
migration progressed with the support received from main and transit country
agents (Paoletti et al., 2014; UNODC, 2015). However, there appears to be
limited information relating to the types/profile of migrant smugglers in India,
Nepal and Bangladesh.
As Figure 8.2 indicates, while the hierarchical structure may exist for travel
to Australia and Europe, Canadian officials stated that irregular migration to
Canada from Sri Lanka did not follow a hierarchical structure and that smugglers
operated among loose networks (UNODC, 2015).
Figure 8.2: Multilevel structure of migrant smugglers
Source: Raghavan and Jayasuriya (2016b).

193
Costs to migrants
Financial costs of irregular migration are likely to vary depending on type
of destination country (Europe, the United States or others), the likelihood of
success in getting asylum or work, modes of transportation and the number
of transit countries. Considering these variations, agents in Sri Lanka and India
charged the potential migrants the most, followed by agents in Bangladesh and
Pakistan. Drawing from various sources, the UNODC report presents different
costs (UNODC, 2015) relating to migrant smuggling from Bangladesh and India
(see Table 8.2). For example, from Sri Lanka to France, the cost was EUR 5,000
while from Sri Lanka to Canada, it ranged from USD 20,000 to USD 60,000. Costs
for irregular migration from Pakistan and Sri Lanka were drawn from Raghavan
and Jayasuriya (2016a) and Raghavan and Jayasuriya (2016b). In Pakistan, they
vary from USD 3,400 to USD 11,000, while in Sri Lanka, the costs are higher, at
between USD 18,000 to USD 23,000.
The estimated profit being made varies depending on who is asked the
question. Research in Pakistan and Sri Lanka revealed that the migrant smuggler
(and people in their network) received a 25 per cent profit margin while potential
asylum seekers believed migrant smugglers received up to 60 per cent profit
margin (Raghavan and Jayasuriya, 2016a, 2016b). The UNODC estimates that
migrant smugglers in India earn between USD 250 and USD 750 per migrant.
Table 8.2: Estimated costs of irregular migration
Origin country
Bangladesh^
India^
194
Destination
Costs
France
USD 13,000
Greece
USD 3,000 to USD 13,000
Turkey
USD 4,000 to USD 6,000
Middle Eastern countries
USD 2,300 to USD 2,600
Malaysia
USD 2,700
United Kingdom
USD 7,800
Italy
USD 9,100
United States
USD 6,605
India
USD 40 to USD 60
Europe
USD 6,500 to USD 30,000
United Kingdom
USD 22,500 to USD 42,000
Canada
USD 65,000
United States
USD 25,000 to USD 50,000
Australia and New Zealand
USD 13,000
8. South Asia
Pakistan^^
Sri Lanka*
Germany
USD 11,000
Sweden
USD 6,800
Indonesia (Jakarta)
USD 7,000
Greece
USD 4,000
Islamic Republic of Iran
USD 3,400
Turkey; South Africa; Hong Kong, China;

Bangkok; Abu Dhabi; Libya
USD 5,500
Dubai
USD 1,481
Canada
USD 7,000 to USD 16,700
London
USD 21,000 to USD 33,000
Switzerland
USD 22,000
Germany
USD 18,800 to USD 23,000
Italy
USD 8,333 to USD 19,500
France
USD 18,800 to USD 27,800
New Zealand
USD 23,000
Sources: ^ UNODC, 2015.

^^ Raghavan and Jayasuriya, 2016a.
* Raghavan and Jayasuriya, 2016b.
Box 8.1: Examples of research into smuggling in Pakistan and Sri Lanka
In June 2015, Australian-based researchers conducted qualitative interviews with potential
asylum seekers and migrant smugglers in Pakistan and Sri Lanka (Raghavan and Jayasuriya,
2016a, 2016b). The interviews with smugglers focused on service transactions, including
marketing, services provided, the various roles of smugglers, communications methods used
and delivery methods. The research was undertaken as a component of broader research into
irregular migration and smuggling in Central and South Asia.
There were 20 potential asylum seekers in Pakistan and another 20 in Sri Lanka randomly
selected for in-depth interviews from a larger sample frame of 3,000 households in Pakistan and
1,800 households in Sri Lanka. There were 12 smugglers in Sri Lanka and 12 agents in Pakistan
interviewed about their service operations by connecting with them through local contacts.
In most cases, researchers presented themselves to smugglers as potential clients wanting to
travel overseas. This raises ethical issues about the research techniques applied, although by
presenting as clients, the researchers were able to gather data that may otherwise have not
been readily accessible. The research employed classic market research techniques, which
are useful in the context of research on migrant smuggling business-related interactions and
deliverables.

195
Figure 8.3: Smuggling as a set of business-related interactions and deliverables
Some key results were similar across the two countries: (a) marketing was
generally through word of mouth using a referral-based system; (b) smugglers
were viewed as agents facilitating the migration process as opposed to people
to be feared; and (c) smugglers had linkages with local authorities. Other results
were slightly different, such as those relating to specific service offerings by
smugglers, and business structures.
The studies supplement intelligence on smuggling gathered using
traditional intelligence techniques, by providing a much more robust and
rigorous approach to examining smuggling. The studies produced over 200
pages of transcripts that were transcribed and analysed in NVivo.
The data was gathered for two reasons: (a) hopefully assist policymakers
directly on the roles and operations of smugglers; and (b) contribute to the
broader research agenda on migrant smuggling, including through academic
and other channels. The findings support previous work on smuggling (Salt
and Stein, 1997; Koser, 2008) while also delving more deeply into aspects of
smuggling processes.
196
8. South Asia

There is a dearth of data on migrant smuggling in general, and on migrant
smuggling relating to Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka in particular. The
following represent some quotes relating to data on migrant smuggling:
With respect to Bangladesh and Pakistan: Most of the statistical
details regarding the concerned issues [migrant smuggling] are
speculative and not very reliable (Mehdi, 2010:4).
With respect to India: At present no systematic data on irregular
migration is maintained either at the state or the national level
(Saha, 2012:21).
General quote: The collection of updated and reliable statistical
data was a significant challenge. (UNODC, 2013:8).
General quote: Taken together, a lack of conceptual clarity and
shortage of reliable data mean that it is virtually impossible to
provide accurate estimates of the scale of refugee smuggling
Koser (2011:261).
While there is information on refugee numbers (which may include some
smuggled migrants), there appears to be no central location for statistical data on
the number of smuggled migrants, or the characteristics of smuggled migrants
from Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. This is highlighted by UNODC
(2015), having to approach host governments to provide them with information
on the number of people detected attempting illegal entry into a country. The
reasons are understandable. First, all smuggled migrants are not identified by
any authority. Second, even among smuggled migrants who apply for asylum
(and hence are identified) or are caught, records need to be maintained and
shared publicly.
Applications to Eurostat may allow researchers to access information on
refusal rates for asylum applications (one being no travel documentation), which
provides an insight into the number of migrants smuggled, but does not provide
a reliable estimation. Australia does not appear to publicly release information
relating to people who were smuggled to Australia by sea or air, and neither do
other preferred destination countries, such as Canada and the United States.
The same is the case among labour migrants to Gulf States. Ad hoc information
appears in some UN reports, drawn from interviews on the ground and unknown
sources (UNHCR, 2015b). There is also some information relating to convicted
migrant smugglers, sourced through the University of Queenslands Migrant
Smuggling Database (University of Queensland, 2016).
197
Ultimately, the data that is collected on information such as smuggling

fees, routes, views towards smugglers, estimates of migrant smuggled and
demographic characteristics of smugglers is generally sourced by researchers
using primary data.
The limited statistical data, largely sourced from UNODC reports (UNODC,
2013 and 2015), is presented below.
Bangladesh
Bangaldeshis are thought to have migrated irregularly to India with
approximately 25,000 entering each year, to Pakistan with approximately
1,000,000 in total (Medhi, 2010), and the Maldives with approximately 35,000 in
total (UNODC, 2015:37). About 10,000 irregular migrants live in Malaysia, while
12,000 to 20,000 of those living in the United States are thought to have arrived
irregularly (UNODC, 2015:37). Other countries have lower reported levels of
irregular migrants; in 2012, 52 were detected in Italy, 193 in Australia, 771 in
Spain, 781 in France and 1,190 in the United Kingdom (UNODC, 2015).
Overall, these numbers suggest that Bangaldeshis are generally smuggled
into neighbouring countries, while with respect to developed countries, most
appear to be smuggled to the United States.
There are estimates of around 30,000 Rohingya living in refugee camps
in Bangladesh, with a further 270,000 irregular Rohingya migrants residing
in the country (UNHCR, IOM and UNODC, 2015). Malaysia and Thailand are
destination countries for Rohingya, although the exact numbers sourced from
Bangladesh versus Myanmar are uncertain. For example, UNHCR estimates that
87,000 people, mainly Rohingya and also Bengalis, have been smuggled from
Bangladesh and Myanmar to Thailand between January 2014 and April 2015
(UNHCR, 2015b).
India
India is host to irregular migrants from Bangladesh, Nepal and now to a
lesser extent, Sri Lanka. In 2012, most Indian irregular migrants were detected
living illegally in the United Kingdom (2,880), followed by Australia (2,691),
Germany (1,215), France (1,030) and to a lesser extent, Belgium, Italy, New
Zealand and Spain. Other destination countries include Canada, Denmark, the
Netherlands and the United States (UNHCR, 2015b). The irregular migrant
population of Indian nationals in European Union Member States is estimated at
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8. South Asia
between 1.9 million and 3.8 million people, while between 430,000 and 618,000
Indian nationals were estimated as residing in the United Kingdom illegally, and
240,000 in the United States (UNHCR, 2015b). However, according to Pitkanen
and Korepla (2014), in 2013, the proportion of Indians living irregularly in
the United Kingdom is less than 10,000 people and lower than that in other
European Union Member States. Pitknen and Korepla (2014) source their data
from Eurostat.
Pakistan
Pakistan is a destination country for people, such as Hazara, from
Afghanistan. In 2013, it was estimated that there were 4 million irregular migrants
in Pakistan, with approximately 2.7 million being Afghans (UNODC, 2013).
According to the UNODC (2015:12), the main destination countries for
smuggled migrants from Pakistan are Germany, Scandinavian countries, and the
United Kingdom, although Austria, Belgium, France and Italy are also popular
destination countries. Australia was a popular destination country for irregular
migrants from Pakistan in 2012. However, subsequent to changes in Australian
policy, irregular migrants from Pakistan reduced dramatically.
According to the Federal Investigation Agency, over 50,000 irregular
migrants were deported to Pakistan in 2011 and 2012 (UNODC, 2013).
Sri Lanka
Key destination countries for Sri Lankans are Australia (for which irregular
migration has considerably decreased from 2011 highs), Canada, France,
Germany, India, Italy, Malaysia, New Zealand, the United Arab Emirates and the
United States. While information relating to asylum applications exists, there
appears to be limited data involving the number of actual irregular migrants,
with 2012 data showing up to 2,812 Sri Lankans attempted to enter Canada
irregularly, while 6,412 irregular migrants arrived in Australia in 2012 (UNODC,
2015). In 2011 and 2012, Australia was a key destination country; however,
driven in part by strong policy responses by the Government of Australia, the
trend has shifted towards Europe and Canada.

199

Much of the existing literature relating to smuggling focuses on irregular
migration to Europe from traditional source countries, which includes Pakistan.
However, the focus on research of smuggling activities in Sri Lanka, India and
Bangladesh is limited. The existing literature has been discussed categorizing
them into two groups: (a) grey literature; and (b) academic research. Although
the boundary between these categories is not always clear, the literature under
the purview of academic research employs systematic methodology and passes
through rigorous peer review process compared to the grey literature, which
may place less emphasis on these factors.
Grey literature
There exist a large number of publications covering issues around irregular
migration from South Asia in the form of reports and policy briefs produced by
governmental, non-governmental and multilateral organizations. Based on the
analysis of 31 publications (albeit not an exhaustive list), over two thirds of the
relevant research has been specifically funded by international organizations,
although over three quarters of the two thirds were undertaken in partnership
with private institutions and/or academia. The funded work is largely applied
research. Many of these studies have policy implications and suggestions;
however, some specifically refrain from providing policy advice, although the
results can be used to frame policy. Some grey literature examines the status
and conditions faced by irregular migrants from Bangladesh, including Rohingya
in Thailand and Malaysia (UNHCR, IOM and UNODC, 2015) and policy proposals
to address irregular migration in Bangladesh and Myanmar (UNHCR, 2015a).
The literature on Pakistan discusses the migrant smuggling market, offering
insights into the roles and networks of smugglers, trends of human trafficking
and migrant smuggling (UNODC, 2013), cross-border migration between
Afghanistan and Pakistan (Davin and Majidi, 2009). Studies on Sri Lanka analyse
the migrant smuggling market and the role of smugglers and networks (Raghavan
and Jayasuriya, 2016b), characteristics of migrants and the decision-making
processes (Howie, 2014; Hugo and Dissanayake, 2014), and drivers of irregular
migration (Jayasuriya and McAuliffe, 2013). There are also some multi-country
studies; for instance, McAuliffe (2013) examines the views of irregular migrants,
including those coming from Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka in terms
of decision-making, drivers and migration journeys. Others explore drivers of
irregular migration and the size of migrant flows (Jayasuriya and McAuliffe,
2013), smugglers business model (Raghavan and Jayasuriya, 2016a and 2016b;
Barker, 2013), and the trends of migrant smuggling, complexity and challenges
(UNODC, 2015).
200
8. South Asia
Several criticisms may apply to the quality of grey literature, including

lack of critical scrutiny, systematic research methodology and peer reviews (see
Carling in this volume, for a nuanced discussion). While some grey publications
on irregular migration is of high quality and peer reviewed (such as Government
of Australias irregular migration research programme publications), many suffer
from these caveats. Despite enormous variations among grey literature, they are
largely qualitative and draw on secondary sources.
Academic literature
There has been limited academic research on irregular migration in South
Asia, let alone on migrant smuggling. However, in recent years, the academic
literature on irregular migration is burgeoning, offering rich insights into various
aspects of irregular migration and, to some extent, on migrant smuggling. Several
studies have analysed trends and volume of irregular migration and drivers of
such migration in India (Rajan, 2014; Saha, 2012), Bangladesh (Rahman and
Kabir, 2012), Afghanistan and Sri Lanka (Ganguly-Scrase and Sheridan, 2012),
and Pakistan and Bangladesh (Kassim and Zin, 2011). While Rajan (2014)
investigates migration in general, the study presents a section with statistics
of irregular migration from India to Europe drawn from Eurostat. Analysing
cases of 1,173 irregular migrants recorded at the international airport in Delhi,
Saha (2012) investigates trends and volumes of irregular migration, as well as
migrants demographic profile, exploring reasons for irregular migration. Based
on interviews with internally displaced people in Afghanistan and Sri Lanka,
Ganguly-Scrase and Sheridan (2012) explore migrants differing perspectives for
the internal displacement and the factors shaping their decisions for seeking
asylum.
The process involved in irregular migration, migration routes, the role
of migrant smugglers and their profiles have also been studied (li, Sever and
Sever, 2015; Koser, 2011; Leman and Janssens, 2012; Rahman and Kabir, 2012;
Saha, 2012). Drawing on empirical research in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Koser
(2008) follows the money for 50 migrants smuggled to the United Kingdom to
illuminate the financing of smuggling how smuggling operates in terms of costs
of irregular migration, and terms of payments and distribution of smuggling fees
among different layers of smugglers and their supporters. It shows the evidence
of a money-back guarantee on smuggling, which is an arrangement making
payment to a third party, who then releases the payment to the smuggler only
after migrants arrive in their destination. li et al. (2015) provide in-depth
insights into understanding profile and perspectives of migrant smugglers and
the operation of migrant smuggling by interviewing 174 smugglers and 262 illegal
migrants found in Istanbul from 2007 to 2013. Similarly, Leman and Janssens
201
(2012) investigated entrepreneurial culture among Albanian smugglers and

traffickers, analysing 43 Albanian judicial files in Belgium from 1995 to 2005, as
well as the personal agency of the smuggled and practices in shaping specific
entrepreneurial culture. Drawing on surveys of over 35,000 households in
Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Afghanistan and Australia, McAuliffe and
Jayasuriya (2016) show that asylum policy was a key reason why refugees sought
asylum in Australia.
Further, irregular migration within South Asia has also been studied
(Kumar, 2012; Rahman and Kabir, 2012). Kumar (2012) highlights open border
between Nepal and India as a conduit for irregular migration despite several
benefits. Based on the review of the existing literature, Reddy (2012) investigates
patterns of irregular, cross-border illegal migration in the South Asian region.
Some research has also considered the implications of irregular migration on
families left behind, such as in the case of Bangladeshi migration to Italy (Rahman
and Kabir, 2012).
The review of the existing literature suggests that more research is needed
to unpack the process of migrant smuggling throughout the migration journey
and actors involved. Similarly, further in-depth studies into migrant smugglers
are required to explore smugglers throughout the migration journey, their
roles, sharing of fees and risks they face. Equally important is transnational links
between smuggled migrants and their family members residing back home.
In terms of geographical focus, almost all Sri Lankan-based research was
undertaken by Australian-based researchers, while Indian and Pakistani research
was funded by European-affiliated institutions. Bangladesh-specific research
was rare, and those that did exist appear to be funded by the UNHCR.
Each country is unique, as is the smuggling process from each country. As
such, it is difficult to present details that are applicable to all studies. Generic
information is that smugglers appear to operate using business models, with
different layers and structures depending on the country of origin and country
of destination. The fees vary considerably from source countries, with agents
in Sri Lanka and India charging the most, followed by agents in Bangladesh and
Pakistan.
Methodology
The methodologies applied are largely qualitative, with only approximately
one fifth using quantitative techniques. This appears reasonable, given the
difficulty obtaining scale for interviewing smuggled irregular migrants, as well
202
8. South Asia
as the migrant smugglers. Several studies used qualitative methods, mainly

interviews and focus group discussions. For instance, Koser (2008) interviewed
50 families of smuggled migrants and 10 migrant smugglers and facilitators,
contributing towards better articulation of the business model. Leman and
Janssens (2011) studied smugglers and traffickers in Belgium using 43 Albanian
judicial files from 1995 to 2005. Regarding few quantitative studies, Rahman
and Kabir (2012) used household remittance survey undertaken by IOM in
Bangladesh. Rajan (2014) drew on secondary resources (that is, Eurostat). A
study combined qualitative and quantitative data quantitative interviews with
404 respondents and focus group interviews with government officials (Kassim
and Zin, 2011). li et al. (2015) and McAuliffe and Jayasuriya (2016) also draw
on quantitative data. Unlike the case of West and Central Africa (see Carling, in
this volume), research involving extensive ethnographic engagement at transit
points, along smuggling routes as well as that employing multisited fieldwork is
rare in South Asia.
Academic research and policy nexus

Academic research reviewed here generally provides no specific policy
recommendations although the results may have policy utility (such as McAuliffe
and Jayasuriya, 2015; li, Sever and Sever, 2015; Leman and Janssens, 2011;
Reddy, 2012). Yet, some studies have explicitly discussed policy implications.
For instance, Koser (2008) discusses how to combat the migrant smuggling
business model. From a source-country perspective, Saha (2012) highlights the
importance of sharing information between the European Union and India and
encouraging officials to participate in anti-migrant smuggling campaigns. From
the perspective of a receiving country, Kassim and Zin (2011) explore policy
options for addressing the problems of irregular migrants in Malaysia. Similarly,
in view of the Australian context, Ganguly-Scrase and Sheridan (2012) offer policy
options for addressing migrant smuggling, considering the broader political and
individual contexts of prospective asylum seekers.

This chapter demonstrates that while there has been promising progress
in terms of data and research on international migrant smuggling and irregular
migration in general in South Asia, there remains a substantial gap. There is
limited information on smuggling activities in Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri
Lanka. When information exists, it is presented in an ad hoc and unsystematic
manner. Given the dynamic nature of smuggling, a concern can be raised that
what is the norm now could be different a short time later. Key examples are

203
the spike in irregular migration from Sri Lanka to Australia in 2012, as well as
the large number of Rohingya fleeing Bangladesh in 2015. These flows may be
influenced by policies of destination and source countries, as well as respective
economic, security and political situations and even technological advances
(McAuliffe and Jayasuriya, 2016; McAuliffe, 2016).
In the foreseeable future, several potential changes can be expected in
relation to migrant smuggling. The fees charged by migrant smugglers change,
depending on supply and demand factors, as well as restrictions imposed by
different countries. The flows to certain countries may be diverted to others,
depending in part on the relative tightening and loosening of irregular migration
policies. The favoured routes may change, which may also impact on migrant
smugglers profits. The structure of smuggling operations may evolve over time.
Regular research and intelligence gathering in source countries would
present policymakers with information on the evolving cost structures and
operations of migrant smugglers. This could be employed cost-effectively using
qualitative techniques, such as commissioning researchers to interview migrant
smugglers in local communities. Quantitative techniques may allow a greater
understanding as to the migrant smuggling market, however could be more
costly. Such information could equip policymakers with a greater understanding
of the migrant smuggling processes, but also present insights into how such
processes can be disrupted and as a result, hopefully protect migrants from
exploitation and abuse.
To sum up, this chapter suggests that three major aspects of migrant
smuggling need to be further investigated. First, while drivers of irregular
migration and migrant smuggling are studied, the literature examines largely
individual or household characteristics. Research that accounts for not only
individual characteristics of the smuggled migrant and the smuggler, but also
broader structures, such as political, economic, environmental and cultural
factors, including social networks and the role of social media, need to be
undertaken to develop a fuller understanding. Such research can combine both
quantitative and qualitative research approaches, involving multisited fieldwork
along major migrant smuggling routes connecting source, transit and destination
countries. Second, while the grey literature on smugglers and how they work
is abundant, systematic research is required to understand the perspectives of
smugglers risks and benefits situating them in a context where they live,
along with their connections with government authorities. Finally, the need
for research is paramount to understanding transnational links between the
smuggled migrants and their family members living back home in terms of social
and economic implications.
204
8. South Asia
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9
SOUTH-EAST ASIA AND AUSTRALIA
Anne Gallagher and Marie McAuliffe
Introduction
Internal displacement, refugee and stateless populations and asylum
and irregular labour migration flows have long posed challenges for South-East
Asia as a region. Multiple drivers of irregular migration such as conflict, interethnic and broader community violence, natural disasters, profound inequality
and lack of opportunity feature in many parts of the region. Entry and border
management are particularly challenging because of archipelagic and isolated
borders, and further complicated by traditions of informal (often seasonal)
migration for work. Illicit migratory practices, such as the corrupt behaviour
that facilitates migrant smuggling and human trafficking, are endemic and have
proved difficult to manage. The political, economic and social costs of irregular
migration are growing for most States of the region, and it is unsurprising that
this issue is now firmly established on the political, policy and research agendas
in both South-East Asia78 and Australia. Within this broader landscape, migrant
smuggling has emerged as a persistent feature of irregular migration and a
source of pressing concern to governments of the region.
While the situation has been markedly different in Australia (where the
focus has remained squarely on traditional forced migrant categories of asylum
seekers and refugees), the policy discourses in South-East Asia have tended to
focus on irregular migration and illegal/irregular migrants, with a strong
leaning towards labour migration and migrant workers (Nethery and Silverman,
2015; Kneebone, 2015). This reflects the nature of international migration in
the region: the search for work has always been the primary driver for irregular
migration in South-East Asia (UNODC, 2015:vi). However, it is also apparent
that there has been a preference on the part of policymakers to conceptualize
and depict international migration in the region in specific ways, including by
downplaying asylum flows and populations in need of international protection.
78
The United Nations defines South-East Asia as Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Lao Peoples
Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste and Viet Nam
(see United Nations Statistics Division, 2013).

211
This conceptualization has been evident for decades. For example, during the
Comprehensive Plan of Action for Indo-Chinese Refugees in the 1980s and
1990s, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)79 persistently but
ambiguously referred to refugees as illegal immigrants/displaced persons
(refugees) from Indochina (ASEAN, 1979).
The region as a whole has struggled to embrace the ideals and many of
the practices associated with safeguarding migrants rights whether regular
or irregular migrants, migrant workers, asylum seekers/refugees, students or
smuggled and trafficked migrants. This can be seen in the weakness of legal and
policy frameworks (both national and regional) relevant to the rights of migrants,
including asylum seekers and refugees. In contrast, there has been a strong focus
on countering the transnational criminal aspects of migration, as reflected in
the regions embrace of relatively new international instruments and procedures
developed to address the involvement of organized criminal groups in migration,
including through trafficking and smuggling. For example, as shown in Table 9.1,
all States in the region are party to the 2000 United Nations Convention against
Transnational Crime, almost all are party to the related Protocol to Prevent,
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children
(Trafficking Protocol), and most are party to the related Protocol against the
Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air (Smuggling Protocol). Conversely,
few States in the region are party to the Refugee Convention (and related
Protocol), even fewer have ratified the International Labour Organization (ILO)
and UN migrant workers conventions and UN statelessness conventions.
79
ASEAN Member States include the following: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, the Lao Peoples
Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Viet Nam, with TimorLeste and Papua New Guinea attending as observers.
212
9. South-East Asia and Australia

213
2006
1975 ILO
Migrant
Workers
Convention1
2011*
1973
Either UN
conventions on
statelessness2
2004
1995
2012
1990 UN
Migrant
Workers
Convention1
2012
2009
2013
2007
2002
2004
2004
2003
2009
2005
2008
2004
2000 Convention
against
Transnational
Organized Crime2
2009
2002
2004
2003
2009
2005
2004
2000 Protocol
against
Smuggling of
Migrants1
2012
2009
2013
2015
2002
2004
2009
2003
2009
2007
2005
2000 Protocol to
Prevent, Supress and
Punish Trafficking in
Persons1
*Note: The Philippines ratified the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons but not the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness.
Sources: 1. United Nations migration country profiles. Available from http://esa.un.org/MigGMGProfiles/indicators/files (accessed 8 September 2015);
2. UN Treaty Collection. Available from https://treaties.un.org/ (accessed 8 September 2015).
Viet Nam
2003
Thailand
Timor-Leste
Singapore
Malaysia
Lao Peoples
Democratic
Republic
1981
Indonesia
Philippines
1992
Cambodia
Myanmar
1954
Brunei
Darussalam
Australia
1951 Refugee
Convention
and 1967
Protocol1
Table 9.1: Ratification of selected international instruments by countries in South-East Asia
The growing profile of migrant smuggling has resulted in the allocation of

funds by concerned States to support research and other works of international
organizations in this area. Partly as a result of this support, international
organizations operating within this region have been very active, particularly
over the past several years. Some examples of activities include the following:
(a) capacity-building, technical assistance and training of officials in antismuggling techniques and approaches by the UN Office on Drugs and Crime
(UNODC) and International Organization for Migration (IOM); (b) assisting
victims of smuggling and/or trafficking by IOM and the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); (c) providing a level of protection to those
escaping persecution via smuggling by the UNHCR; and (d) advocating for the
rights of migrants (including smuggled migrants) by IOM, UNHCR and ILO. Of
particular relevance to this chapter on migrant smuggling research and data is
a range of work undertaken by the UNODCs Regional Office for South-East Asia
and the Pacific that has shed light on aspects of migrant smuggling in the region
while also providing useful resources for researchers, analysts, policymakers and
practitioners.80 This chapter draws on this work, most notably UNODCs online
Bibliographic Database on Migrant Smuggling and Related Conduct (launched
in October 2014),81 its annotated bibliographies on migrant smuggling in Asia
(UNODC, 2012 and 2014a), as well as its 2015 research report on migrant
smuggling in Asia (UNODC, 2015).82 Importantly, the definition of smuggling
applied in the region, particularly by UNODC in its various roles but also by States
generally, is based on the definition in the Smuggling Protocol (the unauthorized
movement of individuals across national borders for the financial or other benefit
of the smuggler) with its attendant focus on transnational criminal practices. As
discussed later in this chapter, researchers have tended to examine smuggling
through different lenses, including as a form of sociocultural practice, as well as
a business/service industry.
International organizations working in the region, especially IOM, ILO
and UNODC, have been consistently active on the issue of trafficking in persons
but have not deeply engaged with the links between trafficking and migrant
smuggling. The exploitative aspects of migrant smuggling, including its overlap
with trafficking in persons, has been an occasional focus of attention for human
rights organizations and other civil society actors in the region. For example, in
collaboration with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
(OHCHR), the Bangkok-based Global Alliance on Trafficking in Persons has been
conducting research on migrant smuggling in the region (Global Alliance against
In particular, the Coordination and Analysis unit headed by Sebastian Baumeister.
Available from www.unodc.org/cld/index-sherloc-bib.jspx
82
The research was led by Professor Andreas Schloenhardt, University of Queensland and Professorial Research
Fellow at the University of Vienna.
80
81
214
Trafficking in Women, 2011) and contributed to the subsequent development

of a set of principles and guidelines on human rights at international borders
(OHCHR, 2014).
In this chapter, with its focus up until the end of 2015, we provide a brief
overview of migrant smuggling in the region before outlining the main data
available on the issue. We then provide a critical review of the research literature
in the field published over the last five years. In concluding, we highlight that
while significant improvements have been made in the region in recent years in
relation to data and research on migrant smuggling, ongoing challenges remain
in filling data and research gaps. We offer some suggestions as to how these
gaps may be constructively addressed.

Given its clandestine nature, and that both smugglers and smuggled
migrants are often (but not always) seeking to evade detection by border
authorities, migrant smuggling in the region is difficult to accurately assess and
analyse. That said, in South-East Asia, irregular migration flows and the number
of irregular migrants residing in countries are thought to be significant. For
example, in a recent report on migrant smuggling in the region, UNODC asserted
that, In South-East Asia high levels of irregular migration take place within the
region, particularly from the countries of the Mekong subregion to Thailand
and Malaysia and also from Indonesia to Malaysia. These movements are, to a
significant extent, facilitated by smugglers. (UNODC, 2015:57)
As is the case in other regions, the visibility of smuggling routes in SouthEast Asia is uneven some routes being highly visible, while others remain
largely in the dark. The most visible routes tend to be the maritime smuggling
routes within the region, particularly those from Bangladesh and Myanmar
across the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea to Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia,
as well as those from Indonesia (and Sri Lanka) to Australia both of which
consist mainly of asylum seekers. Other known smuggling routes dominated by
irregular migrant workers (those between Indonesia and Malaysia, for example)
are much less visible.83
While the exact composition and nature of migrant smuggling flows are
difficult to ascertain, it is possible to deduce the regions major smuggling routes
(see Figure 9.1) from (the usually easier to map) irregular migrant populations.
83
However, note recent research discussed in the next section by Hugo and colleagues has provided valuable
insights into these smuggling routes (Hugo, Tan and Napitupulu, 2014).

215
For example, Malaysia currently hosts over 2 million irregular migrant workers,
well over half of them from Indonesia (Djafar and Hassan, 2012:704). It is
reasonable to assume that while not all were smuggled, many used a smuggler
at some point in their journey. It follows that the route between Malaysia and
Indonesia is likely a busy and lucrative one for smugglers. The same may be said
of the large populations of Myanmar, Lao and Cambodian irregular migrant
workers in Thailand.
Figure 9.1: Migrant smuggling routes in South-East Asia and Australia
Source: IOM, 2015.
Certainly the link between migrant smuggling and irregular migration

for work appears to be a strong one within the region. The expense and heavy
administrative burden attached to regular labour migration channels have
encouraged the development of informal networks of recruiters, brokers and
transporters who often work together to facilitate irregular entry (Bustamante,
2007). UNODC cites the example of irregular migration from Cambodia to
Thailand, which can cost a tenth of what migrants are required to pay to use
regular channels (UNODC, 2015:61). Irregular migration networks feed high
region-wide demand for low and semi-skilled workers across many sectors
including construction, fisheries, manufacturing, agricultural work and domestic
service. While the profile of irregular migrant workers is correspondingly diverse,
216
it has been asserted that younger men comprise the majority of flows, and that
they are more likely to use the services of smugglers than women, who will more
often migrate irregularly as part of a family group (UNODC, 2015:61).
Smugglers are a similarly diverse group, reflecting the multitude of tasks
involved in smuggling operations. For example, smuggling from the Middle East
to Australia via Indonesia involves high-level organizers who typically share the
nationality of their clients and a multitude of intermediaries and local operators
providing everything from fraudulent documentation to crewing of smuggling
vessels (UNODC, 2013:4547). Much smuggling within the region appears to be
opportunistic or involving only loosely connected groups. There is little evidence
of the presence of highly organized criminals except to the extent that largescale involvement of corrupt officials such as was revealed in the Rohingya84
case can be characterized as organized criminal activity. This picture may be
different for smuggling operations through and from South-East Asia, which are
relatively riskier and require a higher degree of organization.
While smugglers can help to ensure a safe border crossing, irregular
migration in South-East Asia is fraught with dangers. Smuggling only compounds
the risks. The perils of facilitated maritime crossings in the region, often
in overcrowded, unseaworthy and poorly crewed vessels, have been well
documented.85 Land crossings can also be deadly. In 2008, a group of 121
Myanmar migrants who paid smugglers to transport them to Thailand in a
seafood storage lorry began to suffocate after the air-conditioning unit failed.
Though they managed to alert the driver, he refused to stop. Fifty-four migrants,
most of them women, had died by the time the container was opened. No arrests
were made, except of survivors who were quickly deported back to Myanmar.86
Facilitated irregular migration within South-East Asia often morphs into
abuse and exploitation that may rise to the level of human trafficking. In fact,
in this region, there can often be little to distinguish between what Kyle and
Dale have referred to as migrant exporting schemes and slave importing
operations (Kyle and Dale, 2011). The smuggled Rohingya asylum seekers who
ended up being sold into forced labour in Thailand (see Box 9.1) provide an
example of this slippage, as does the debt-financed and facilitated migration
of poor Indonesian women into domestic service in Malaysia (Andreviski and
Note that the term Rohingya as used to describe the Muslim peoples of Rakhine State, Myanmar, is not
accepted by the Government of the Union of Myanmar, which in June 2016 issued an order directing Stateowned media to use the term Muslim community in Rakhine State.
85
On deaths of smuggled maritime asylum seekers en route to Australia, see Weber and Pickering (2014) at pp.
177206.
86
See MacKinnon (2008); Human Rights Watch (2010) at p. 90 and note 226. For a useful and detailed analysis
of this case, see Gjerdingen (2009).
84

217
Lyneham, 2014). The following case study explains how the intersection between
smuggling and trafficking operates in this setting.
Box 9.1: The intersection between migrant smuggling and human trafficking in practice
Thirty-two-year-old Heni came to Malaysia on March 2009. ... She used the service of an
agent who was an acquaintance from her village, and paid RM1,500 to the agent. She came
to Malaysia with 15 others using social visit passports. In Penang, the agent took away all their
passports and sent them to employers who needed them. She worked in Gelugor, Penang and
was paid RM500 a month. The agent took all of her salary for the first four months. she was
captured by the authorities when she stayed at a friends house in Relau, Penang (Ajis, Askandar
and Awang, 2015:129).
Smuggling of asylum seekers and refugees

Available information appears to confirm that migrant smuggling plays
an important role in moving asylum seekers and refugees through and out of
the region. While acknowledging this link, it is important to note significant
exceptions, especially in relation to sudden onset, large-scale movements
caused by transnational or civil conflict. For example, smuggling did not appear
to be a part of the refugee flows from Viet Nam in the 1970s and 1980s, nor
of the much more recent displacement of refugees from Myanmar into Chinas
Yunnan Province as a result of civil conflict in early 2015 (Perlez, 2015). Generally
however, it is apparent that many asylum seekers and refugees moving within,
into and out of the region rely on migrant smugglers for some or all of their
journey, and that some irregular flows involving smugglers are mixed, comprising
migrants in need of international protection, as well as those who do not need
protection (McAuliffe, forthcoming; UNODC, 2015).87
Asylum flows within the region are dominated by movement from
Myanmar. The bulk of non-Myanmar asylum flows are moderate in comparison
and have flowed largely to countries outside South-East Asia, including to
China,88 France, the United States, Papua New Guinea, India and Australia (see
Table 9.4). There appears to be a particularly heavy reliance on smuggling by
asylum seekers and refugees travelling by boat from Coxs Bazar in Bangladesh
to Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia (UNHCR, 2015; McAuliffe, 2015). Another
prominent route until the end of 2013 was that taken by maritime asylum seekers
from other regions including South Asia, Central Asia and the Middle East to
Irregular maritime flows from Coxs Bazar, for example, comprise asylum seekers, refugees and migrant
workers.
88
The 300,000 Vietnamese in China moved to China between 1979 and 1982 and have integrated into the
Chinese community and are awaiting citizenship. In March 2006, UN High Commissioner for Refugees
Antnio Guterres described the situation as one of the most successful integration programmes in the
world.
87
218
Australia, smuggled through transit countries including Indonesia, Malaysia and

Thailand (Koser and McAuliffe, 2013; Barker, 2013). Not all the major routes are
maritime. Asylum flows originating from South-East Asia to much more distant
countries, particularly the United States and France, involve smuggling via air
travel (UNODC, 2015:6869). In addition, land crossings between Myanmar and
Thailand, as well as Myanmar and Bangladesh (and to a lesser extent, Indonesia
and Papua New Guinea) have historically been intertwined with smuggling
(UNODC, 2015:69).

Hard data on an unregulated, illicit activity such as migrant smuggling
is difficult to collect, challenging to access and sensitive to report. While it is
apparent that all States have some degree of data collection capability in
relation to irregular migration flows, irregular migrant populations and migrant
smuggling, this capability appears to be highly variable between States in the
region. In addition, there may be government reluctance to share data, which
may be related to a desire to avoid scrutiny or controversy. Information may
also be restricted because it pertains to law enforcement investigations and
prosecutions. Irrespective of the underlying motivations, the impact is significant.
UNODC, the lead UN agency concerned with migrant smuggling, explains the
difficulties encountered in seeking to establish what is happening:
A major obstacle for any research conducted in this field is the lack of
complete and reliable data and the difficulties in accessing data kept by
various state institutions.A large number of governments do not specifically
collect information on the question of whether a persons illegal entry or
illegal stay was facilitated and whether this facilitation was motivated by
a financial or material benefit, which would be in line with obligations
under the Smuggling of Migrants Protocol. Thus, many governments do
not distinguish in their statistics if a person was a smuggled migrant (an
irregular migrant who resorted to the assistance of migrant smugglers) or
if an irregular migrant entered or stayed in a country without the assistance
of migrant smugglers there is tremendous discrepancy between what
is recorded regarding persons who were detected when attempting to
illegally enter a country or when already illegally staying in a country and
the data recorded regarding smuggled migrants. This represents a major
challenge to researching and depicting migrant smuggling (UNODC,
2015:4).

219
The summary of data contained in the 2015 UNODC report (Table 9.2),
with its many unknowns, caveats and broad estimations, provides further
insight into the very real impediments to estimating and reporting on smuggling
in South-East Asia. But, as noted above, this has not prevented the emergence
of general agreement on broad trends. It is generally acknowledged that migrant
smuggling is characterized as follows: (a) widespread throughout South-East
Asia, acting mainly to support specific sectors of national economies that rely
heavily on unregulated labour; (b) often merges with human trafficking (as well
as other illicit activities such as drug smuggling); and (c) facilitated by corrupted
authorities and officials. These factors conspire to pose very significant risks to
migrants rights and well-being, irrespective of the reasons underpinning their
unauthorized migration.
220

221
110,854
470,000+
765,000
Unknown Unknown
Unknown Unknown
Lao Peoples
Democratic Republic
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
Singapore
Thailand
Timor-Leste
Viet Nam
Residing in
Unknown
Philippines, Malaysia, Myanmar
France, Germany, United

Kingdom, Sweden, Czech
Republic, United States
2,500,000 Up to 80% of all

Cambodia, Lao Peoples
3,000,000 irregular migrants Democratic Republic, Myanmar
Unknown
Unknown
Indonesia, Bangladesh,
Myanmar, Cambodia, Lao
Peoples Democratic Republic,
Philippines, Sri Lanka and Viet
Nam
From
Source: Summary of UNODC data contained in UNODC, 2015:5759.

Note: The UNODC research team compiled the data based on returned surveys from participating countries (see UNODC (2015)), pp. 410).
Unknown
Malaysia, United States,

Singapore, China (Hong Kong),
United Kingdom, Saudi Arabia,
United Arab Emirates
Unknown
Unknown
Destination
Smuggled
migrants
Unknown
35 million
Unknown
Irregular
migrants
Up to 90% of all
Bangladesh, Pakistan, India,
irregular migrants Malaysia, Thailand
44,000
Thailand
Malaysia
Several
million
Indonesia
Unknown
Thailand
120,000 to
Unknown
180,000
Cambodia
Smuggled
migrants
Brunei Darussalam
Irregular
migrants
Origin
Table 9.2: Estimated numbers of irregular migrants and persons smuggled
The transnational criminal focus applied to smuggling in the region means

that some data collected and coordinated at a regional level is kept out of the
public domain on the (usually unspoken) grounds that its circulation could
help smugglers. This is the case for the Voluntary Reporting System on Migrant
Smuggling and Related Conduct (VRS-MSRC). The VRS-MSRC was developed by
UNODC in support of the Bali Process, and is a web-based data collection system
that assists States in collecting, sharing and using data on these issues. The data
variables collected as part of the VRS-MSRC are in Table 9.3. The sensitive nature
of the data collected would appear to preclude it being in the public arena as
it relates to individuals, operations, smugglers behaviour and intelligence
gathering. UNODC actively encourages States participation in the VRS-MSRC
and recognizes that participation is linked to maintaining a confidential system
for data-sharing purposes. Notwithstanding the number of States participating
in the VRS-MSRC (20 States as of July 2014) (UNODC, 2014b),89 sensitivities and
tensions are evident. The majority of the 45 Member States of the Bali Process
do not participate, with some expressing concerns about data sharing. China, for
example, indicated at a recent Commission on Crime Prevention and Criminal
Justice meeting that States have the right to keep secrets about their borders
and the workings of their law enforcement agencies that they are under no
obligation to share, [and]that the sharing of information could lead to data
being leaked to human smuggling organizations (Vanguard, 2015).
Table 9.3: Data variables collected in the VRS-MSRC
Source: Baumeister, 2013.

89
See UNODC VRS-MSRC leaflet (2014b). Participating countries in the region include Australia, Cambodia,
Indonesia, the Lao Peoples Democratic Republic, the Philippines and Thailand.
222
Further sensitivities and tensions involved in collecting and sharing data

on migrant smuggling exist, including between States, on a confidential basis. In
explaining the challenges encountered in operation of the VRS-MSRC, UNODC
has highlighted a range of factors, such as the following: (a) competition
among agencies at the national level and lack of coordination and cooperation
between them; (b) differences between States with regard to the understanding
of key terms and the data collected; and (c) mistrust and lack of international
cooperation. Political will to genuinely share data is often compromised and,
even where such will is present, there will often be operational difficulties
translating it into effective action (Baumeister, 2013). The extent to which
the VRS-MSRC has been successful in meeting the Bali Process and UNODCs
data-sharing objectives is unclear. It is also unclear the extent to which nongovernment researchers and analysts (possibly under the guidance of UNODC)
have had access to de-identified smuggling data collected in the VRS-MSRC, or
whether this possibility has been explored. According to senior officials however,
the VRS-MSRC continues to operate, and work is underway on improving data
networks, collection, management and reporting, as well as a future phase to
include translation of support documents to languages other than English and
the possibility of extending the system to capture human trafficking-related
data (Bali Process Ad Hoc Group Senior Officials Meeting, 2015).
At the State level, very little data on migrant smuggling is publicly available.
In some cases, data that used to be available has been significantly reduced. For
example, until September 2013, the Government of Australia routinely released
basic information on smuggled maritime migrants and Suspected Illegal Entry
Vessels (SIEVs) intercepted by authorities. However, the commencement of
Australias military-led Operation Sovereign Borders in 2013 was accompanied by
new and substantial restrictions on the release of information about smuggled
migrants and SIEVs. This approach was justified as necessary to carefully manage
the release of information to protect our people and avoid assisting smugglers
(Campbell, 2014:8). The change in approach has undoubtedly made it harder
for smugglers to remain abreast of the success or otherwise of their ventures.
Likewise, it has made it more difficult for researchers, analysts, commentators
and others to gain information on maritime smuggling to Australia, although
some limited information on maritime smuggling ventures and responses is
made available publicly but usually long after events have taken place.90
90
See for example About the Operation Sovereign Borders, website of the Department of Immigration and
Border Protection, Government of Australia. Available from www.border.gov.au/about/operation-sovereignborders

223
Data on smuggling of asylum seekers and refugees

Just as estimates of irregular migrant populations can provide an
indication of migrant smuggling flows, UNHCR data provides useful insights
into migrant smuggling routes to, within and through the region. This data can
also help identify smuggling patterns and changes in smuggling dynamics, as
well as potential smuggling hotspots that could be preemptively addressed
through multifaceted policy interventions aimed at addressing underlying
causes (such as reducing inter-ethnic violence in specific communities), not
just counter-smuggling activities. Asylum seeker application statistics, which
indicate movements possibly (or in some cases undoubtedly) involving migrant
smuggling, are especially valuable in this respect (see Table 9.4). Statistics
on refugee populations (including those in refugee-like situations), as well as
internally displaced and stateless populations, can also highlight populations at
risk of migrant smuggling.
224

225
Viet Nam
378,756
7,931
109
51,240
6,916
40
142,430
376,500
1,913,021
11,000
506,197
6,370
810,000
40,000
20,524
Stateless
11,000
506,197
148,800
1,186,500
40,000
20,524
Total
Internal at-risk populations

Internally
displaced
313,418
13
231
59
668
479,001
468
7,482
14,408
13,062
25
Refugees (1)
888,019
3,140
10
413
38
1,118
51,347
957
117
1,773
263
Asylumseekers
As an origin country
31
316,558
23
644
97
1,786
530,348
1,425
7,599
16,181
13,325
Total
(2) Figures do not include 80,000 Filipino Muslims currently in Malaysia without status, and as reported in the other category in UNHCRs Global
Trends 2014.
138,169
331
150,621
11,186
103
78,343
Total
Notes: (1) Refugees include persons in refugee-like situations.
Source: UNHCR, 2015.
130,238
222
Timor-Leste
Thailand
Singapore
Philippines (2)
99,381
Malaysia (2)
Myanmar
4,270
Indonesia
Lao Peoples
Democratic
Republic
63
Cambodia
22,745
55,598
Australia
Brunei
Darussalam
Asylum seekers
Refugees (1)
As a receiving country
Table 9.4: At-risk populations in the region: Refugees, asylum seekers, internally displaced and stateless persons, 2014
Data on abuse, exploitation and deaths of smuggled migrants

As noted previously, smuggling can often involve abuse and exploitation
of the migrants involved, either during their journey or at destination (and also
on return, if indebted). In some cases, abuse and exploitation may lead to the
identification of a migrant smuggling situation, and thereby contributes to a
deeper understanding of smuggling patterns and trends. An example is provided
by the Rohingya crisis of 2014, aspects of which are dealt with in Box 9.2. In this
case, details of the smuggling experience of the migrants emerged only after the
severe exploitation they experienced at the hands of smugglers came to light.91
Intergovernmental organizations and private sector bodies are playing
an increasingly active role in mapping trafficking routes and calculating
numbers of victims.92 This information can provide an important contribution
to understanding migrant smuggling because of the links and overlaps between
the two practices. In the Asia-Pacific region, it is generally accepted that while
only a small percentage of irregular migrants are trafficked for exploitation,
most victims of trafficking are irregular migrants subject to exploitation such
as forced labour in a country that is not their own but to which they travelled in
order to obtain work. In such situations, trafficking may be part of the smuggling
process (as appears to be the case for some smuggled Rohingya asylum
seekers), or it may take place after the migrant is smuggled across the border.
Either way, data on trafficking can be potentially useful as a supplementary
source of insight. The situation of Thailand provides a useful illustration. The
Global Slavery Index, produced by the non-governmental organization (NGO)
Walk Free, estimates the number of persons held in slavery in Thailand
to be almost half a million, with victims many of them irregular migrants
who have been smuggled originating largely from neighbouring countries
including Cambodia, the Lao Peoples Democratic Republic and Myanmar.93 The
US Department of States annual Trafficking in Persons Report also highlights
the link between smuggling and trafficking, affirming that officials on both
sides of the border with Cambodia, the Lao Peoples Democratic Republic and
Myanmar are complicit in smuggling undocumented migrants, some of whom
become subject to trafficking and related exploitation (US Department of State,
2014:372376). Given the likelihood that a significant proportion of those using
irregular migration channels are relying on paid facilitators at some point, the
following can be reasonably assumed: (a) smuggling plays an important role
See for example, Yi (2016); Buckley and Barry (2015); Human Rights Watch (2015); Stoakes (2015); Tufft
(2015); US Department of State (2014).
92
See for example, UNODC (2014c); and Verit (2014).
93
Note that the methodology used to arrive at this figure has been criticized as inadequate, including by one
of the authors of the present chapter. See Gallagher (2014).
91
226
in the provision of exploitable labour to Thailand; (b) the number of irregular

migrants smuggled into Thailand each year likely runs into the tens or even
hundreds of thousands; and (c) major smuggling routes exist between Thailand
and its immediate neighbours. Another important indicator of smuggling routes,
which can also point to smuggling practices, is the estimated number of deaths
en route. IOMs missing migrant data project systematically collects and reports
on migrant deaths, including as part of migrant smuggling ventures.
Box 9.2: The Rohingya of Coxs Bazar
Myanmar has long regarded its Rohingya minority as irregular migrants,94 and they have been
the subject of long-term intergenerational systematic discrimination (Ullah, 2011; Southwick,
2015). This is most pointedly demonstrated by the Rohingyas inability to secure citizenship
in Myanmar, rendering them stateless. In 2012, following extreme inter-ethnic violence in
Myanmars Rakhine province, large numbers of Rohingya fled to Bangladeshs district of Coxs
Bazar adjacent to Rakhine province. Further displacement from Bangladesh has occurred over
time, but most dramatically in May 2015 when thousands of Rohingya and Bengalis became
stranded at sea after being abandoned by migrant smugglers (Newland, 2015).
The Rohingya of Coxs Bazar are widely acknowledged as being an irregular migrant population
at serious risk of displacement, although little information or data are available on them
(Parnini, 2013; Ullah, 2011). Challenges of accessing the population are significant. Most of
what is known about the Rohingya of Coxs Bazar comes from UNHCR (as a service provider and
advocate), NGOs and human rights groups operating outside Bangladesh and Myanmar,95 as
well as a small number of researchers who have conducted research on the population. Most
research and information gathering, however, occurs after Rohingya have fled Bangladesh
(and Myanmar) to neighbouring countries, including Malaysia and Thailand.96
Recent fieldwork conducted in Coxs Bazar, however, has shed light on the prevalence of
specific smuggling processes in specific populations. In late 2014, a survey of 4,757 households
in Coxs Bazar97 was conducted involving both Rohingya and non-Rohingya households. The
survey found that 94 per cent of Rohingya respondents had at least one household member
who (n=1,073) wanted to migrate internationally on a visa, but of these, just 2 per cent
indicated that this type of migration was likely (McAuliffe and Jayasuriya, 2016). Unauthorized
migration to seek asylum was considered much more likely by Rohingya respondents (46% had
at least one household member who wanted to seek asylum; 33% had at least one household
member who considered they were likely to do so; 26% had at least one household member
who was planning to do so). This was in stark contrast to non-Rohingya respondents (3%
had at least one household member who wanted to seek asylum; 3% were likely to do so;
2% were planning to do so). Alarmingly, Rohingya were much more likely to be targeted by
migrant smugglers, with at least one person in 27 per cent of households surveyed having
been approached directly by smugglers during the previous 12 months compared with
6 per cent of non-Rohingya households.
Note that the term Rohingya as used to describe the Muslim peoples of Rakhine State, Myanmar, is not
accepted by the Government of the Union of Myanmar, which in June 2016 issued an order directing Stateowned media to use the term Muslim community in Rakhine State.
95
Including the Arakan Project Bangkok, Fortify Rights Bangkok, Human Rights Watch.
96
See, for example, Anwar (2013); Azis (2014); Amnesty International (2015).
97
The survey was undertaken by Dr Dinuk Jayasuriya, Development Policy Centre, Australian National
University, and commissioned by the Irregular Migration Research Programme in the Australian Department
of Immigration and Border Protection.
94

227
Given extremely limited household incomes, very low education levels and compromised
health of Rohingya (ibid.), the attractiveness of Rohingya in the eyes of smugglers was not
entirely clear. Their capacity to pay for smuggling both before and after the smuggling process
was not immediately apparent. The results were even more unexpected in light of results of
other groups at risk of displacement and smuggling (for example, 8% of Hazara households in
Pakistan and 17% of households in Afghanistan were approached by smugglers).
The May 2015 events, however, shed new light on the smuggling of Rohingya, bringing into
stark relief the uneasy nexus between migrant smuggling and trafficking. It became clear
initially through investigative journalism resulting in the exposure of Thai trafficking networks98
that Rohingya (and Bengali) of Coxs Bazar were being smuggled into sophisticated trafficking
networks operating out of Thailand. In July 2015, the Thai attorney generals office charged
104 people (including Thai officials) with human trafficking offences stemming from an
investigation into jungle camps and mass graves found on the ThaiMalaysian border where
Rohingya and others were held prisoners for ransom or sold into servitude (Barron and Lone,
2015).
The regional responses to the May 2015 humanitarian crisis, which were fragmented,
inconsistent and uncoordinated, demonstrated that despite a strong focus on countersmuggling and anti-trafficking, the region was ill-prepared for an irregular flow of around
7,000 people, some of whom were refugees (McAuliffe, forthcoming). The lack of research on
Rohingya and the paucity of data on their irregular movements in the region was brought into
clear focus following the crisis.

There is a growing body of research on migrant smuggling in South-East
Asia and Australia, notwithstanding the difficulties in undertaking research on
a sensitive issue that is largely clandestine in nature. To assess the nature and
extent of research on smuggling in the region, the starting point was UNODCs
October 2014 Annotated Bibliography on Migrant Smuggling in Asia (UNODC,
2014a).99 The bibliography includes 76 publications from both academic and
grey literature, with a focus on migrant smuggling in South-East Asia or Australia
published between late 2010 and early 2014. The criteria used to compile the
bibliography comprised a mix of key subject words and terms (such as irregular
migration, smuggling and routes), as well as all countries in Asia.100 To
supplement the UNODC bibliography, searches (for English-language materials
only) were conducted in Google scholar and ProQuest to locate additional
materials published in 2014 and 2015 (up until the end of 2015), which took
the number of research publications up to 104. A list of research published
since UNODCs 2014 Annotated Bibliography is in the appendix. While gaps
are inevitable, the authors assess that the identified material provides both a
98
99
100
Reuters journalists Jason Szep and Andrew Marshall, among many others.
Note that the geographical scope of the bibliography is wider than that of the present chapter.
The full list of criteria can be found at pages 35 of the report.
228
substantial and representative proportion of all recent relevant literature on the

subject of migrant smuggling.
Within identified research, smuggling was mainly examined in the context
of irregular migration with around 70 per cent of all material referencing
irregular migration. Much of the research focused on smuggling patterns and
underlying factors, with relatively less focus on smuggling practices (see Table
9.5). This is understandable as researching smuggling practices necessarily
requires fieldwork that is difficult to conduct, time and resource intensive and
possibly involves risks to both researchers and their subjects (both migrants and
smugglers). Quantitative assessments of migrant smuggling were clearly difficult
to undertake, with only four research publications including such assessments.
Significantly, none of these were academic (published by academic publishers,
principally in academic journals and books), instead published by international
organizations or governments. Data accessibility is likely to be a key factor in the
limited focus quantitative assessments reflected in the literature.
Table 9.5: Research topics related to migrant smuggling in South-East Asia or Australia,
20102015
Research topic
Smuggling
Number of research publications

104
Routes
49
Factors underpinning irregular migration
47
Modus operandi of smugglers
23
Profile of smuggled migrants
20
Human and social cost of smuggling
21
Fees
19
Profile of smugglers
13
Organization of smuggling
Quantitative assessment
Source: UNODC, 2015; authors own research.
Most of the research (60%) was academic as defined above. Government

agencies were the second most active source of published research (17%),
although it should be noted that most of this was produced through the
Government of Australias Irregular Migration Research Program, which
supported academic and applied research on irregular migration (McAuliffe
and Parrinder, 2015). Subtracting this source, the percentage of identified
publications from government sources falls to 8 per cent. Publications of
international organizations (principally UNODC) represent around 10 per cent of
the total pool. Some of these were supported financially by the Government of
229
Australia. The remaining research was published by civil society (such as Human
Rights Watch and Amnesty International) and private sector researchers.101
Analysis of the identified research confirms a strong focus on qualitative
research methods, with 63 per cent of the research involving qualitative
methods and a further 19 per cent employing mixed methods. Only five studies
employed quantitative methods, two of which were completed as part of
Australias Irregular Migration Research Program. Given the difficulties accessing
study subjects for empirical research (including potential or actual migrants and
migrant smugglers), as well as the challenges accessing quantitative data for
secondary analysis, it is not surprising that the main research methods employed
were qualitative. The high reliance on qualitative research methods may also
reflect disciplinary approaches: legal research for example, which rarely employs
quantitative methods, was much more prevalent in the identified research.
This was especially pronounced for research on Australia, with around a third
of all Australia-focused research being undertaken within a legal disciplinary
framework.
The geographic focus of the literature was highly uneven with Australiafocused research accounting for almost two thirds of the total research; the
IndonesiaAustralia maritime smuggling corridor being the primary topic of
interest. The IndonesiaMalaysia smuggling corridor also received significant
attention, as did the smuggling systems in the Greater Mekong region. There was
little smuggling research identified on Singapore (six publications), the Philippines
(eight), Viet Nam (seven) and the Lao Peoples Democratic Republic (eight), and
an absence of any work focusing on Timor-Leste and Brunei Darussalam.
Much of the identified research focuses on the policy and political
discourses of the region, particularly around border management and countermigrant smuggling, and often through a law enforcement lens. This is not to say
that researchers agree with those discourses but rather that they have provided a
focus for critically examining migrant smuggling in the region. By using dominant
discourses as a starting point, researchers have made contributions to the
ongoing development of a more sophisticated understanding of manifestations
of the migrant smuggling phenomenon, including through applying sociocultural
analytical frameworks. Alternative conceptualizations are provided, for example,
through the recasting of assumed frames of reference, including in relation to
territoriality and the development of informal migration industries (McNevin,
2015).
101
One research publication identified by UNODC was self-published.
230
Other researchers have examined the practical implications of the

smugglermigrant power imbalance, including how exploitation and abuse
occurs, as well as the business structures and processes that act to support
smuggling operations (Amri, 2015; Missbach, 2015; Zulyadi, Subramaniam
and Kamello, 2014). In their research on the nexus between smuggling and
trafficking in Malaysia, Ajis, Askandar and Awang use case studies to illustrate
key findings and provide greater depth to data collected on aspects of smuggling
and irregular migration.
With a heavy leaning towards normative frameworks, law enforcement
and criminology, the research findings of key researchers in the field of
migrant smuggling in the region have clear implications for policy. The work of
Schloenhardt, Missbach and Gallagher, for example, while acknowledging their
differing disciplines and approaches, all offer insights that are policy relevant,
particularly as they relate to understanding how counter migrant smuggling
approaches are able to be subverted or may otherwise be unsuccessful. As
Schloenhardt and Cottrell (2014:285) argue in their analysis of the aspects of
Australian legislation on the financing of smuggling:
While the objective of preventing the financing of a heinous crime and the
cutting off of support provided to migrant smugglers might be a laudable
goal, the offences of supporting people smuggling introduced run the
risk of criminalising conduct that is not only widespread, but that is also
not inherently illegal it is extremely doubtful that the new anti-migrant
smuggling financing regime can and will achieve its stated purpose.

The quality and quantity of data on migrant smuggling and irregular
migration in South-East Asia and Australia has improved significantly over the
past several years. It is now understood, better than ever before, how smuggling
happens, who is involved, and what the consequences are. The capacity to
assess and predict the impact of anti-smuggling laws, policies and practices is
correspondingly enhanced (see Schloenhardt and Cottrell, 2014; and McAuliffe,
forthcoming).
That said, significant challenges remain. The body of research examined
in this chapter confirms that available information is uneven and incomplete.
For example, the high profile of Australia as a destination country for smuggled
migrants and the relatively greater capacity of Australia to conduct and support
research has resulted in a skewing of information and analysis towards the
situation as it affects that country. This is the case even though smuggling
231
elsewhere in the region appears to be more problematic for both migrants and
States. Data collection is heavily skewed towards law enforcement, with little
information available on the experiences of smuggled migrants, including their
abuse and exploitation. Available information provides little insight into how
national policies and regional cooperation frameworks have or have not worked
in relation to specific incidents of migrant smuggling.
Advancing regional understanding of migrant smuggling and supporting
multifaceted evidence-based policy will require these and other shortcomings
to be addressed. Priorities identified by the authors of this chapter include the
following:
A greater focus on perspectives of smuggling from transit and
country of origin, including on the role of corruption in facilitating
movement and shaping the experiences of smuggled migrants.
This will require improved support for the involvement of national
researchers and institutions in academic and applied research.
More attention to the experiences of smuggled migrants including
their experiences of abuse and exploitation.
Greater attention to linking knowledge about the mechanics of
migrant smuggling (what is happening, to whom and with what
consequences) with knowledge of migrant smuggling policy and
practice with a view to understanding how one impacts the other.
This will require closer links between States in the region and
researchers from academia and international organizations.
Broader and more consistent use of tools such as the UNODC
VRS-MSRC. Ongoing monitoring of the systems functioning
will be important to ensure it continues to meet the needs of
participating States and attracts the participation of States not
currently involved.
Case-based / situational research and analysis aimed at
securing information and insight into national and regional
capacity to respond to major smuggling-related events. Recent
commitments by Bali Process leaders to undertake a review
of the regional response to the May 2015 irregular migration
events in the Andaman Sea in order to share lessons and develop
recommendations aimed at improving contingency planning is an
important step forward in this regard.102
See tenth ad Hoc Group (AHG) Senior Officials Meeting of the Bali Process on People Smuggling, Trafficking
in Persons and Related Transnational Crime (Bali Process) held in Bangkok on 2 February 2016, Co-Chairs
Final Statement, para. 11.
102
232
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241
10
NORTH-EAST ASIA
Jiyoung Song
Introduction
This chapter examines existing data and research on migrant smuggling in
North-East Asia, namely China, Japan, the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea
(hereafter referred to as North Korea), the Republic of Korea (hereafter referred
to as South Korea),103 Mongolia, and the eastern part of the Russian Federation.
The biggest source countries are China and North Korea, followed by a smaller
source from Mongolia and the Russian Federation. The destination countries
are South Korea and Japan. Data is severely limited not only because of the
clandestine nature of migrant smuggling but also because of the two source
countries undemocratic and developing status. The destination countries have
limited priorities to share information with researchers on monitoring and
updating illegal entries of migrants, prosecution of smugglers and referral of
smuggled migrants.
In North-East Asia, migrant smuggling takes place within the broader regional
context of geopolitics, security and development that have impact on decisionmaking of individuals and their families out of the country through irregular
migration. The region narrowly defines irregular migration as undocumented
labour migrants and smuggled people. Subsequently, the literature on the
region is limited to these two areas and do not include trafficking in persons or
asylum seeking. This problem is exacerbated by the lack of specific legislation on
migrant smuggling among countries in the region. More often than not, migrant
smuggling is subsumed under general laws aimed at reducing irregular migration.
Where anti-smuggling laws do exist, enforcement and implementation often
remain weak. This leads to the absence of official criminal justice statistics on
migrant smuggling, including the number of smuggled migrants detected by law
enforcement and border officials, and the number of smugglers prosecuted in
general (Kangaspunta, 2007).
103
Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea and Republic of Korea are the country names in the UNTERM
database. For editorial and spacing reasons, North Korea and South Korea respectively will be used in this
chapter.

243
North-East Asia as a region does not actively cooperate on counter-smuggling

initiatives. Table 10.1 presents the current status of ratification of the United
Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, and the two
supplementary Protocols: the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, and the Protocol against
the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air. China and North Korea have
not signed the Palermo Protocol on people smuggling. China prioritizes bilateral
relations with North Korea on illegal border crossings and repatriates everyone
back to North Korea regardless of their reasons for entering China. Japan has not
ratified the Palermo Protocol.
Table 10.1: Ratification status of North-East Asian countries (as of December 2015)
UN Transnational Organized
Crime Convention
Palermo Protocol on
Trafficking
Palermo Protocol on
Smuggling
China
23 Sep 2003
8 Feb 2010 (acceded)
Japan
12 Dec 2000 (signed only)
9 Dec 2002 (signed only)
South Korea
5 Nov 2015
5 Nov 2015
5 Nov 2015
North Korea
Mongolia
27 Jun 2008 (acceded)
Russian
Federation
26 May 2004
26 May 2004
26 May 2004
Source: Signatories to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Crime and its
Protocols, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Available from www.
unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/signatures.html (accessed on 11 July 2016).
One of the few international agreements China has committed to is the

2002 Joint Declaration with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
on Non-Traditional Security, which include the issues of migrant smuggling and
trafficking in persons. Since 2004, there have been interministerial meetings of
the Coordinated Mekong Ministerial Initiative against Trafficking among China
and five South-East Asian countries on counter-trafficking.
History and geopolitics have been the blocking factors for regional
cooperation between China, Japan, North Korea, South Korea and the Russian
Federation. China, North Korea and the Russian Federation are traditional coldwar allies, whereas Japan and South Korea are close to the United States. North
Korea and South Korea are technically at war as the 19501953 Korean War
ended with an armistice, not with a peace treaty. Borders are strictly guarded.
Internal mobility is highly limited in China and the North Korea, as are crossborder movements.
244
10. North-East Asia
The following sections provide the overviews of the situations of migrant

smuggling in North-East Asia, data collection and research methodologies,
followed by a critical review of the current literature in the field. Key limitations
and challenges in pursuing scientific research with reliable data are analysed. In
concluding, a few examples of good practices are outlined.

Estimates of smuggled migrants
The biggest smuggled migrant population in and out of North-East Asia is
the mainland Chinese who use illegal channels to move to more developed and
welfare States in Europe, North America or Australia. Approximately 36,000 and
12,000 Chinese irregular migrants entered the European Union and the United
States in 2010 respectively (UNODC, 2013, 2015). The Canadian Border Services
Agency recently estimated that 92 per cent of all Chinese irregular migrants
arriving in Canada engaged a smuggler at some stage during their journey
(UNODC, 2015).
Table 10.2: Chinese nationals detected attempting illegal entry
2008
Canada
Total
2009
2010
2011
First half
of 2013
2012
613
717
1,013
1,237
1,479
400
By land
27
11
10
By sea
603
681
998
1,220
1,469
389
186
By air
France
Total
3,560
1,576
361
267
239
Germany
Total
1,308
1,434
1,045
800
938
Italy
Total
323
316
250
128
177
86
By land
176
155
75
62
40
11
142
158
By sea
By air
Philippines
Thailand
1
136
75
Total
1,273
768
By air
1,273
768
302
384
Total
604
620
175
336
66
271
Source: Recreated from UNODC, 2015.
North Korean migrant smuggling takes mixed forms of irregular and regular
migration through China and South-East Asia to South Korea (Song 2013, 2015b).
Between 2006 and 2011, more than 2,000 North Koreans entered South Korea
245
annually. According to the South Korean Ministry of Unification, approximately 80

per cent of the 1,894 North Koreans who arrived in South Korea in 2004 engaged
brokers. The US State Department further estimated that between 30,000 and
50,000 refugees from North Korea entered China; other organizations estimated
anywhere between 100,000 and 300,000 (Tanaka, 2008).
Table 10.1: North Korean arrivals in South Korea
Source: The South Korean Ministry of Unification. Available from www.unikorea.go.kr/content.

do?cmsid=1440, accessed 4 December 2015.
The biggest destination country in North-East Asia is Japan. According to

Japanese authorities, among those who were deported in 2014, 844 migrants
had entered illegally, which made up about 8 per cent. The number has been
declining from 3,867 in 2010 and the proportion of illegal entry in the violation
of Immigration Control Acts has also been decreasing. Therefore, the Japanese
Immigration Bureau evaluates that it is considered that the countermeasures
to prevent illegal entry have been quite effective (Japan Immigration Bureau,
2014). In addition, 6,702 migrants were caught in situations of illegal work, most
of them Chinese and Filipino nationals (ibid.).
Smuggling routes
The United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) identified the
overall smuggling routes in East Asia. Figure 10.1 has been updated from the
UNODC report. North Korean smuggling routes have particularities not captured
by the UNODC analysis, as can be seen in Figure 10.2 (Song, 2013).
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10. North-East Asia
Figure 10:1: Destination countries from East Asia
Source: Created by the author from Google.

Figure 10.2: North Korean migrant smuggling routes
Source: Song, 2013.

247
Profile of smuggled migrants

Smuggled migrants from China are largely driven by economic
opportunities abroad. Migrants tend to originate from Eastern China, who are
from relatively wealthy backgrounds and able to afford high smuggling fees
(UNODC, 2013 and 2015). In particular, Fujian province remains a key point of
origin for Chinese migrants smuggled to Western destinations, including North
America and Europe (UNODC, 2015). While most Chinese smuggled migrants
detected by German authorities are between 20 and 49 years old, one third are
children nine years old and younger (UNODC, 2013). Smuggled Chinese migrants
apprehended in Canada, the United Kingdom and the Philippines also fall within
similar age ranges that of between 18 and 40 years old (UNODC, 2015).
Smuggled North Koreans in China are driven to cross into China by major
political, environmental, food and health security problems. The majority of
smuggled or trafficked North Korean are women. Seventy-five per cent of
migrants from North Korea who arrived in the South between 2006 and 2011
were women (Song, 2013; UNODC, 2015). Approximately 80 per cent of smuggled
North Korean refugees who are now residing in South Korea originated from
regions bordering China, such as North Hamkyong and Ryanggang, reflecting the
very strict limits on internal movement within North Korea and the inability of
people from other regions to reach the border with China. Irregular migrants are
generally between the ages of 20 and 30 years old, which could be a reflection of
the physically demanding nature of border crossing, as well as youth aspirations
(UNODC, 2015). Some Korean-Chinese (ethnically Korean Chinese citizens)
pretend to be North Korean to access South Korean subsidies and citizenship.
Profile of migrant smugglers

Migrant smuggling out of China operates in a highly organized fashion.
Information on migrant smugglers in the region often revolves around their
modus operandi and relationship with migrants. Networks facilitating migrant
smuggling are well established. The smuggling of migrants to Europe involves
a combination of national groups and non-national networks (UNODC, 2012
and 2015). The Chinese migrant smuggling business is primarily dominated by
Chinese males between 20 and 50 years of age, involving three to four core
individuals (UNODC, 2013). Chinese women are also involved in the smuggling
trade. According to UNODC estimates in 2013, approximately one out of eight
Chinese smugglers are women. Literature suggests that the smuggling of Chinese
migrants to Western Europe involve highly organized groups who maintain a
significant degree of control and oversight over the operation (UNODC, 2015).
A study in 2010 suggests that Chinese smuggling organizations form at least
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10. North-East Asia
a three-tiered structure: (a) big smugglers or snakeheads at the top tier;

(b) brokers or coordinators in the middle; and (c) local smugglers or recruiters
at the bottom.
The smuggling of North Koreans is carried out by both professional
Han-Chinese smugglers and Christian missionaries (Han, 2013; Song, 2013).
The latter are South Koreans or Korean-Americans who also run underground
churches in China and/or safehouses in South-East Asia. They have several local
stations and use locals to provide temporary shelters. Some of these locals in
Lao Peoples Democratic Republic, Cambodia and Viet Nam are well-connected
with the authorities who turn a blind eye on smuggling activities in return for
cash exchange. North Korean migrants with family members who already settle
in South Korea pay for smugglers through these underground church networks.
When North Koreans are settled in South Korea, they are given lump sum cash
by the Government of South Korea. Smugglers target the government subsidies.
Already settled North Korean defectors in the South also operate smuggling
through their contacts in China and North Korea, as well as those inside North
Korea.
Costs of smuggling
The cost of migrant smuggling varies according to factors including but
not limited to the following: (a) distance; (b) destination; (c) level of difficulty;
(d) mode of transport; and (e) migrant-smuggler relationship. Journeys within
Asia can cost from a few hundred dollars, up to USD 10,000 or more (Chonghaile,
2015). Chinese smuggled migrants pay between USD 7,500 and USD 50,000 for
a journey to Europe. The high fees are in part attributed to the complex and
sophisticated migrant smuggling methods. It could also be a reflection of the
relative wealth of smuggled migrants (UNODC, 2015). The estimated cost for a
Chinese migrant to be smuggled into the United States in 2008 was around USD
50,000 (UNODC, 2013).
Smugglers operating in North Korea charge anything between USD 1,250
and USD 19,950 per migrant to either accompany individuals across the border,
or inform them of where and when it is safe to cross (Tanaka, 2008). The land
journey from North Korea to China costs around USD 3,500 and from China to
South Korea another USD 2,500 (Williamson, 2011).
Main vulnerabilities of smuggled migrants

Smuggled migrants are exposed to many risks that may endanger their
lives and well-being. Overland smuggling routes in North-East Asia are physically
249
demanding. Smuggled migrants often have to cross dangerous terrain and thick
jungle areas, sometimes at night. Migrants may not be physically or mentally
prepared for such journeys. Migrants smuggled by sea, on the other hand, face
deadly risks when their journeys are exacerbated by the monsoon seasons, as
well as smugglers using unseaworthy vessels and incompetent crew (UNODC,
2015). It is not uncommon to find smugglers abandoning migrants midway
through their journeys. Smuggled migrants also risk being held captive in
smuggler camps, until family or friends pay ransom for their remaining journey.
However, in North-East Asia, the patterns of migrant smuggling have shown a
mixed form of the Chinese snakehead model and the South Korean missionary
model. The gravity of violence might be less than in South-East Asia. However,
rapes, physical and verbal abuses, confinement and psychological stress occur
and have been witnessed by researchers (Song, 2013, 2014 and 2015b).
Smuggled migrants also face heightened vulnerability to exploitation and human
trafficking (UNODC, 2015).

Existing data-collecting organizations
There is a huge gap in data collecting and sharing among the governments
in North-East Asia. It is not clear whether the governments monitor, collect
and update data on migrant smuggling separately from other undocumented
migration or human trafficking. There is no data released from the two biggest
smuggling sending countries, Mainland China and North Korea. South Korea and
Japan occasionally release figures of forged travel documents, illegal entry or
illegal work that are only a part of the entire picture of migrant smuggling. UNODC
is one of the few, if not the only organization, that attempts to consolidate all
sources on migrant smuggling in North-East Asia as in other regions. UNODC relies
on quantitative and qualitative sources from the following: (a) governments,
national agencies and international organizations; (b) publicly available official
sources; and (c) academic literature. With regards to (a), Japan and the two
special administrative regions of China Hong Kong and Macau submit data to
UNODC. Sources from academic literature are limited to qualitative interviews
with little systematic data collection due to the geopolitical sensitivity in the
region. Collaborative data sharing among China, North Korea, South Korea and
Japan is highly unlikely. Gaps in data collection in the region is the major problem
in this region. The following sections highlight two long-standing, overlapping
issues, which include the following: (a) lack of or accessibility of accurate data;
and (b) lack of clarity with terminology.
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10. North-East Asia
Problems with accessibility

Given the clandestine nature of migrant smuggling, information on the
subject matter remains scarce and incomplete. Expecting the exact or even
estimated number of smuggled migrants and the number of migrant smugglers
is unrealistic. Therefore, most data sources engage in qualitative analysis.
Among the sources reviewed in the first volume of Migrant Smuggling in Asia:
An Annotated Bibliography, 95 are based on qualitative research, 49 are based
on mixed research methods, and only six are based exclusively on quantitative
research methods (UNODC, 2012). Where quantitative data exists, they are
often based on estimates with little or no explanation given on how the numbers
were calculated. For example, some sources reviewed in the aforementioned
report provide little or almost no information about their research methodology,
although all selected literature were empirically based and largely descriptive,
which is inevitable.
There is also an uneven geographical coverage of information on migrant
smuggling in North-East Asia. In the first volume of Migrant Smuggling in
Asia: An Annotated Bibliography, only one country is included in the report
China. While North Korea, Japan, Mongolia and South Korea were included
in the search criteria in the subsequent volume published in 2014, the report
makes no further mention of the distribution of sources based on geographical
coverage. As UNODC (2015) noted, there is a disparity between how well certain
routes and migrant groups are documented. This may distort the true scale and
characteristics of migrant smuggling in the region.
The key obstacle to collecting accurate and reliable data on migrant
smuggling in North-East Asia is the lack of official statistics in this area.
Governments in the region rarely collect and update such data (UNODC, 2012
and 2015). In other words, there is a lack of information on how much irregular
migration is self-organized and how much of it is facilitated by third parties for
profit.
To encourage data collection and sharing among various State authorities,
the UNODC Regional Office for South-East Asia and the Pacific launched the
Voluntary Reporting System on Migrant Smuggling and Related Conduct (VRSMSRC) in 2013. The VRS-MSRC database offers 13 search categories, among
which include illegal entries, illegal residences and smuggled migrants (UNODC,
n.d.). Having these disparate categories could help authorities distinguish
smuggled migrants from the general category of irregular migrants, thereby
enhancing data accuracy. However, as of July 2014, there are only 19 participating
States and territories, two of which are from North-East Asia Hong Kong and
251
Japan. Further, the information shared can only be accessed by the participating
States. As such, the VRS-MSRC is limited in two aspects: (a) in addressing the
uneven geographic coverage of information sources on migrant smuggling; and
(b) official data still remains inaccessible to non-participating States, academics
and practitioners in the field of migrant smuggling. Nevertheless, carefully
collected and national and regional data is useful for developing effective national
and regional instruments to tackle migrant smuggling. The VRS-MSRC initiative
is relatively new; it remains to be seen whether it will be an effective tool for
collecting and sharing data on migrant smuggling. There are more doubts than
trust about the VRS-MSRC and data sharing in general in the region.
Lack of clarity with terminology and conceptualization

The region shares the global problem with confounding data and
information on migrant smuggling with the other irregular migration categories.
This is evident in Migrant Smuggling in Asia: An Annotated Bibliography. In Asia
as a whole, of the 154 documents reviewed, 65 of these provided information on
migrant smuggling, 117 on undocumented migration and 66 on human trafficking
(UNODC, 2012). The data on undocumented migrants or human trafficking are
often used as a measure for migrant smuggling in the region, even in relatively
advanced countries such as South Korea and Japan. Given that migrant smuggling
is a form of facilitated irregular migration, one may expect to find information
about migrant smuggling in existing sources that examine undocumented
migration. In fact, there is a larger pool of literature on undocumented migration
vis--vis migrant smuggling. However, in many instances, discussions are very
general. Sources reviewed often do not indicate to what extent undocumented
migration, including the illegal entry or illegal stay, is facilitated by a third party
for profit, or entirely self-directed (UNODC, 2012 and 2015). Additionally, some
sources use terms such as illegal migrant and illegal worker interchangeably,
although these are not entirely synonymous.
Likewise, authorities do not clearly distinguish between human trafficking
and migrant smuggling cases, in the latter case, either administratively or in official
statistics (UNODC, 2012). In its review of existing research on migrant smuggling
in Asia, UNODC (2012:33) also noted that studies, describing themselves as
focused on human trafficking, are indeed primarily on migrant smuggling or
undocumented migration. In this regard, confounding the operationalization
of different terminologies limits the ability to draw conclusive information on
migrant smuggling.
There is also confusion in the conceptualization of smuggled migrants and
smugglers. Traditional images of smuggled migrants as potential victims and
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10. North-East Asia
smugglers as criminals have evolved over the years. First, from a border security
perspective, the illegality of migrants movements makes migrants offenders
of national immigration laws, which often denies full protection from receiving
countries in the first place. Second, however, smuggled migrants vulnerability
exposes them to physical and verbal abuses by smugglers and employers
and becomes target for human trafficking. Third, not all smuggled migrants
are irregular labour migrants; asylum seekers are also smuggled by Christian
missionaries. Fourth, not all people smuggling involves financial transaction;
there are altruistic or religious smuggling in relatively safe hands. Fifth, there
are female smugglers who play different roles than their male fellow smugglers;
while men operate on the transfer of people, women offer care, food and shelter.
Sixth, todays smuggled migrants may become tomorrows smugglers through
accumulated networks. Without understanding this complex nature of migrant
smuggling, policymakers cannot properly respond to it.

Main academic inquiries and scope of research
The main academic inquiries on human smuggling in North-East Asia have
traditionally focused on smuggled migrants and smugglers socioeconomic
profile, causes of and motivations for their movements, smuggling routes
and social networks. Scholars work on the securitization of migration and the
conceptualization of migrant smuggling within broader irregular migration
frameworks. Human security and development have been linked to irregular
migration. The scope of the research is currently not geographically proportional.
While topics on Chinese outbound migrant smuggling to the United States and
Europe are dominant, there is a paucity of academic research on human smuggling
in and out of other parts of North-East Asia. Studies on North Korean migrants
have increased over the past years, both in English and Korean languages.
Empirical data on migrant smuggling in Mongolia or the Russian Federation is
almost non-existent (Drbohlav, Stych and Dzrov, 2013; Lee, 2005).
Current research on China focuses extensively on migratory streams from
Fujian Province to the United States (Chu, 2011; Lu, Liang and Chunyu, 2013;
Sheng and Bax, 2012; Zhang and Chin, 2002; Zhang, Chin and Miller, 2007).
While there is also a body of literature on human smuggling from China to
Europe (Chin, 2003; Laczko, 2003; Lu, Liang and Chunyu, 2013; Pieke et al., 2004;
Silverstone, 2011), there appears to be disagreement on the extent to which
such migratory flows are occurring. Studies are concerned with how human
smuggling continues to perpetuate despite strict controls (Li, 2012; Lu, Liang

253
and Chunyu, 2013). The main motivations for illegal migration are identified
to be economic and sociocultural (Liang et al., 2008). While largely driven by
economic ambition, smuggled migrants are seldom poor and desperate. Rather,
migration is seen as a way of earning social prestige (Chin, 2003; Chu, 2011;
Silverstone, 2011). Sheng and Bax (2012) examined the trajectory of irregular
emigration and argued that a process of defolding or deceleration of the
cumulative causation model of migration has taken place in recent years, in
part contributed by more restrictive migratory controls.
Many researchers highlight the unique role of personal connections, or
guanxi, in the continual success of human smuggling trade (Silverstone, 2011;
Zhang, 2013). Zhang, Chin and Miller (2007) claim that human smuggling is
essentially a business built on a myriad of guanxi. In the same vein, Lu, Liang
and Chunyu (2013) found that when barriers to migration are high, especially as
measures against illegal migration becomes more stringent over time, resources
such as migrant social, political and human capital play a crucial role in the
emigration process. In this regard, many sociologists explore the relationship
between smugglers (snakeheads or she tou in Chinese) and smuggled migrants
(snakes), and how snakeheads are perceived in the unique context of China.
Snakeheads are mostly ordinary people, easily accessible by prospective
migrants through the conduit of family or friends (Silverstone, 2011; Zhang
and Chin, 2015). Family and friends thus form a large client base, especially for
female smugglers (Zhang, Chin and Miller, 2007).
Anti-smuggling efforts and rhetoric have long operated under the
assumption that Chinese human smugglers are connected with traditional
crime organizations with elaborate international networks. To uncover these
assumptions, academics have attempted to build theories around the operational
and organizational features of snakeheads (Silverstone, 2011; Zhang and Chin,
2002 and 2015). Herein, Zhang and Chin (2002) highlight the difference between
organized crime and the enterprise model: the latter is characterized by flexible
and adaptive network of enterprising individuals, in contrast to the hierarchical,
centralized and bureaucratic nature of organized crime. Empirical research
suggests that snakeheads tend to take the form of an enterprise model, and are
unlikely to present as large organized crime networks (Silverstone, 2011; Zhang
and Chin, 2015). Snakeheads generally consist of peer-group entrepreneurs that
operate on one-on-one (or dyadic) transactions with limited hierarchy. Further,
most snakeheads took efforts not to entangle themselves with gangs or other
crime groups in the Chinese community.
In contrast to the common belief that brokers are unscrupulous criminals,
research found that snakeheads are highly regarded in their communities (Chin,
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10. North-East Asia
2003; Li, 2012; Silverstone, 2011). Historically, the emergence of snakeheads

was tied to a fever of going abroad among many Chinese citizens who did
not have the means to do so legally (Liang, 2001). Accordingly, ordinary people
in the countryside often perceive snakeheads as good migration brokers who
help fellow villagers realize their dreams of upward mobility through illegal
migration (Chin, 2003; Li, 2012). Likewise, smugglers do not see themselves as
criminals. Rather, they expressed an altruistic motive in providing a valuable
service to the Chinese who want to emigrate but cannot do so legally (Li, 2012;
Silverstone, 2011). Herein, current literature demonstrates an engagement in
exploring the boundaries and intersections between the licit and illegal nature
of human smuggling in China: the latter is considered licit (that is, permissible)
by participants and the average people, but illegal in the formal sense at the
national level (Li, 2012).
The Chinese materials on migrant smuggling emphasize the negative
impact of migrant smuggling on Chinas border security and social stability
(Zhizhong, 2006; Dan, 2004; Runlong, 2001; Dai, 2006; Zhongzhi, 2007; Zhongyi,
2013). A large portion of the literature seeks to offer feasible solutions to mitigate
the perceived threats caused by migrant smuggling (Lijun, 2013; Charles, 2008).
Cases include irregular migrants from North Korea, Myanmar and Thailand to
China (Chuanyu, 2012; Qi, 2011; Li, 2012; Xue, 2015) and ethnic Koreans from
China to South Korea (Xue, 2015). Migrant smuggling, or irregular migration
in general, from China to other countries has been identified as a shameful
phenomenon (Fei, 2005). This causes problems with data accessibility. The data
relies on the UNODC (Zhigang, 2014; Runlong, 2001). There is also the persistent
problem with the lack of clarity in terminology. For instance, toudu (stowaway),
yimin zousi (migrant smuggling) and renkou fanmai (human trafficking) are often
used interchangeably.
Most research on North Korean migrant smuggling is discussed in
the geopolitical contexts of refugees and trafficking in persons (Chan and
Schloenhardt, 2007; Davis, 2006; Kim, 2010; Lagon, 2008; Lee, 2004; Lee, 2001
2002; Lohman, 1996; Margesson, Chanlett-Avery and Bruno, 2007). While Andrei
Lankov (2004, 2008) identifies geopolitical and security constraints of the North
Korean regime for the growing number of smuggling and unauthorized crossings
to China, Kyung-Ae Park (2010, 2013) adopts a more people-centred approach to
transnational organized crime and refugees, focusing on non-traditional security
issues in North Korea. There are numerous policy-oriented reports from nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) (Butler, 2009; Committee for Human Rights
in North Korea, 2009; Havel, Bondevik and Wiesel, 2008; Human Rights Watch,
2002, 2008; International Crisis Group, 2006; Muico, 2005). In addition to NGO
reports, a few scholars start investigating the roles of Christian missionaries in
255
smuggled refugees in China and South-East Asia (Han, 2013; Song, 2013) and
unaccompanied North Korean minors in China (McPhee, 2014).
While the studies on the Chinese snakeheads have many implications for
North Korean migrant smuggling that present much resemblance in smuggling
operations by Christian missionaries, scholars working on Japan still focus on the
traditional roles of yakuza (Friman, 2013; Jones et al., 2011) in the smuggling
and trafficking of women from Thailand to Japan in Japans sex industry.
Research on migrant smuggling in Japan has evolved over the past decade. Early
research dealt with ethnic Koreans illegally entering post-war Japan from 1946
until the 1970s (Morris-Suzuki, 2006). In recent years, studies focus on Chinese
and Vietnamese migrants. Many claim that migrants were smuggled into Japan
under the guise of education or training, or what was considered as back door
or side door immigration (Blanger et al., 2011; Friman, 2013; Liu-Farrer, 2011;
Peck, 1998; Sheng and Bax, 2012; Yamamoto, 2010). This was an unintended
consequence of the Government of Japans decision to expand visa categories to
include student visas, among others, in a bid to address labour shortages in the
late 1980s (Yamamoto, 2010). As the student visa application process became
more stringent, Sheng and Bax (2012) found that smuggling fees associated with
self-financed study in Japan have decreased.
New topics for research on migrant smuggling continuously emerge.
Secondary migration of North Koreans to North America or Western Europe
involves the dual nationality of North Koreans (Song, 2015a; Wolman, 2012).
North Koreans exploit their dual nationality to acquire South Korean citizenship
and passport and travel to the United Kingdom, for example, to apply refugee
status. Some of the asylum applicants are not even North Koreans, but ethnically
Korean Chinese citizens. Studies on interregional brokered marriage migration
between South-East and North-East Asia present different stages of brokered
marriages from elements of human trafficking to sham marriages to obtain
citizenships (Cheng and Choo, 2015; Davin, 2007; Jones, 2012; Nathan, 2013;
Song, 2015b; van Liempt, 2014). Internal marriage migration in China also shows
similar trends in marriage fraud (Liu et al., 2014).

Research reviewed in this chapter does not represent the reality of
migrant smuggling in and out of the region. It is only a fraction of what is actually
happening on the ground. There are significant limitations on data collection
and regional cooperation against people smuggling in the region due to the
geopolitical power imbalance and ongoing security concerns. China is too big
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10. North-East Asia
not to be dominant in the region. North Korea and South Korea are still at war
and, therefore, any unauthorized cross-border movements between the two
are inherently military and political. The only way North Koreans can be free is
through illegal border crossings to China. South Korea and Japan have potential
to develop studies on migrant smuggling, as both share the same concerns on
economic migrant smuggling from less developed regions and possible mass
exodus from North Korea. Their shared history of colonial period and wartime
atrocity, however, has been a blocking factor for more rigorous academic
collaboration. Mongolia and the Russian Federation have research potential in
the long run. Building research and institutional capacity would have to go in
hand with regional cooperation as the number of regular and irregular migrants
grows and reaches a tipping point.
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Chan, E. and A. Schloenhardt

2007 North Korean Refugees and International Refugee Law. International
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267
11
LATIN AMERICA
Gabriella E. Sanchez
Introduction
Latin America constitutes one of the most important corridors for irregular
migration globally, yet as other authors in this issue highlight in regard to their
corresponding regions, empirical engagements with smuggling activity have
been scarce. The images of migrants riding atop of trains or crossing desolate
deserts often mobilized to represent irregular migration flows in this continent
communicate a feeling of urgency that while relevant, far from represents the
dynamics of a sometimes highly visible yet still poorly understood practice.
This chapter examines the references to the dynamics of irregular
migration facilitation in Mexico, Central America and South America present in
the literature on irregular and transit migration. Recent developments on human
mobility pertaining to population flows from and within the Caribbean also
constitute an important element of the larger Latin-American migratory system,
and therefore their dimensions are included in this chapter where relevant. Yet
it is again important to emphasize that the empirical work on irregular migration
facilitation processes throughout the entire region has been limited, and that
data are therefore scant, particularly outside of the Central American and
Mexican routes.
While much interest has been placed on the role of transnational smuggling
networks, as well as on the criminally organized efforts behind the provision of
smuggling services throughout Latin America, historically, irregular migration
processes in the continent have often involved less nefarious mechanisms, and
are in fact more directly connected to the long culture of migration across the
continent, and to the transnational ties these migratory journeys have created
(Spener, 2014 and 2009; Lpez Castro, 1998; Kandel and Massey, 2002). Every
year, thousands of people leave their places of origin for the United States and
Europe the top destinations for migrants from Latin America with the purpose
of migrating relying on methods that are far from violent or dark (obtaining valid
visas through legal channels, overstaying legitimate entry permits, borrowing

269
travel documents from friends and family members or purchasing or renting the
former for a one-time use, for example) (Kyle and Liang, 2001; Spener, 2009).
Historically, there is also a vast system of brokerage services not unique to
Latin America were licit and illicit services that facilitate travel processes
are marketed (such as the provision of travel documents by travel agencies,
mechanisms to obtain false or forged passports and other legal documents that
may allow for legal travel).104 Yet increasing restrictions by migrant destination
countries imposed upon individuals unable to fulfil elaborate requirements are
key elements in the decision of those seeking to migrate and who are unable to
secure the protections afforded by visas and passports to opt for the services
of facilitators or brokers of migratory transits, known throughout the Americas
as coyotes or polleros.
Within the Americas, contemporary migration journeys have often been
explained as part of efforts to flee from the deteriorating human security
conditions in Central America and Mexico (afflicted by conflicts connected to
the presence of organized criminal groups, namely drug trafficking organizations
and transnational gangs) (Human Rights Watch, 2016), as responses to
economic insecurity throughout the continent (Red de Documentacin de las
Organizaciones Defensoras de Migrantes (REDODEM), 2013 and 2014), and
as part of projects involving the reunification of families separated by earlier
migrations (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2013).
Yet alongside migration efforts, it is also fundamental to highlight Latin Americas
role as a transit point in the journeys of transcontinental migrants fleeing war
zones or conflict regions throughout Africa, the Middle East and Asia. While
acknowledged in the migration literature, transcontinental transit migration
in the Americas is one of the least explored themes on human mobility in the
region, and one that requires prompt empirical engagement.
As noted by other authors in this report, there are particular socioeconomic
and political factors that have made the study of smuggling the facilitation of
transborder, irregular migration for a fee or in-kind payment a complicated
proposition. In the Americas, the overall state of insecurity along many of
the most transited migration corridors, namely those in Northern and NorthEastern Mexico (where thousands of migrants in transit have been reported
dead or missing) (Comisin Interamericana de Derechos Humanos (CIDH), 2013;
Comisin Nacional de los Derechos Humanos (CNDH), 2009 and 2011) and the
documented levels of corruption involving State actors throughout the region
104
Alpes (2013) has extensively documented the reliance of Cameroonian migrants on brokers. Kyle and Liang
(2001) provided perspectives of the facilitation of Chinese migration by migration merchants, a term
originally coined by Kyle (2000), who they refer to as an example of the embedded commodification of
migration: the individuals who profit from the migration of others regardless of legality.
270
11. Latin America
(lvarez and Fernndez Zubieta, 2009) often obstaculize the collection of data.
Furthermore, fear of detection by criminal organizations engaged in activities
ranging from drug trafficking to extortion, kidnapping and human trafficking
and State authorities has forced migrants in transit to improvise the course
of their journeys in ways that often take them into more remote areas where
their levels of vulnerability (as in the risk of sustaining physical injury or death)
increase significantly (Vogt, 2013; Stillman, 2015; Knippen, Boggs and Meyer,
2015) and where research conditions are less than optimal. Yet, and while the
overall security conditions along the Mexican migration corridor have often
limited researchers ability to carry out fieldwork, a significant body of literature
on migrants experiences has emerged in the form of journalistic coverage, grey
literature and ethnographic research, allowing to map migration conditions
to some extent. Simultaneously, it must be acknowledged that academic
research, given the historical preponderance of the Mexican and, to a lesser
degree, the Central American migratory to the United States, is often limited
on its engagements with other regions and processes in the continent, which
are nonetheless worthy of examination (such as irregular migration from and
within South America and the Caribbean into the United States through Mexico
and intra- and transcontinental migration dynamics). The focus on the Northern
and Central regions of the continent has also further limited the possibility
of framing connections between these flows and those taking place in South
America and the Caribbean, which often rely on similar routes and mechanisms.
A more inclusive, Pan-American engagement with the smuggling phenomena
would translate into an improved, continent-wide understanding of smuggling
facilitation and other irregular migration practices.105
While governments throughout the continent have often found
opportunities to articulate a steady message concerning migrants and the need
to foster conditions to preserve their rights and safety, actions in the area of
migrant protection have not been as consistent. The 2000 Protocol against the
Smuggling of Migrants has been signed and/or confirmed by most countries
across the continent, and efforts to typify human trafficking and smuggling
as statutory offenses have been successful in the context of the Palermo
Protocols.106 Yet the international community has often pointed out immigration
policy and enforcement practices throughout Latin America have repeatedly had
a counterproductive effect on the human security of migrants, whose negative
encounters and interactions with criminal organizations and State actors have
been well documented in the literature (Casillas, 2010a and 2015; CNDH, 2009
105
106
For an extended discussion on reframing migration studies from within, refer to Herreras La Migracin
desde el Lugar de Origen.
Mexico signed and ratified the Palermo Protocols in 2003. The federal legislation that typified human
trafficking as a crime known as the Law to Prevent and Punish Human Trafficking was enacted in 2007.

271
and 2011).
This chapter provides an overview of the literature on irregular migration
in Latin America, particularly in regard to the Mexican and Central American
cases, which are the regions most frequently discussed in academic, policy and
journalism spheres. It also refers to the body of South American scholarship,
particularly the case of Ecuador (which visa policies have been identified as
having played a role on the arrival and transit of Caribbean and transcontinental
migrants to that part of the continent), and to the Caribbean, where efforts
on the part of their residents to reach the United States or Central American
countries and Mexico, have also been the focus of some academic and policyrelated work, albeit to a lesser degree than that of other parts of the continent.
While acknowledging migrants and those behind their transits rely on a wide
range of routes and methods to articulate and achieve their mobility goals, this
chapter recognizes the historical importance of migration flows throughout
the Americas, where the United States continues to be at the top of the list
of migrants target destinations, and where Mexico as a transit country plays a
critical role in the experience of thousands of irregular migrants in transit. It is
also important to highlight that the experiences of migrants are also dependent
on ones own identity, which play a role in the degree and kinds of vulnerability
they face. The experience of a Mexican national travelling through Mexico, for
example, involves far different risks than those involving the journeys of Central
American migrants, who face deportation and removal by Mexican authorities
(Casillas, 2007); women are more likely to die while crossing borders (Pickering
and Cochrane, 2013). In summary, the practice of travelling irregularly is a
fundamental element of Latin Americas culture of migration, and should, for
that matter, be understood as connected to decades-long, complex historical and
272
11. Latin America
socioeconomic processes of great importance and in need of further analysis.

Figure 11.1: Migration flows in Latin America and the Caribbean
Source: Sanchez, 2016.

The United States is the primary migrant destination country in the
Americas. To a lesser degree, European destinations primarily Spain and Italy
also constitute important target countries among South American migrants,
although visa restrictions in Europe have impacted migratory flows (Herrera,
2011; Jokisch, 2014; Herrera, Carrillo and Torres, 2005; Escobar Garca and
lvarez Velasco, 2013). Within the continent and over the last decade, the
stronger economies of Brazil, Chile and Argentina also attracted significant
number of migrants from neighbouring countries (particularly Peru and Bolivia)
(IOM, 2013; Vsquez, 2014), and journalistic accounts and anecdotal evidence
point to a significant increase in transcontinental migration, primarily from
Africa, the Middle East and South-East Asia to countries such as Ecuador and
Brazil (Cowie, 2014; Fox, 2016; UNHCR, 2010). While there are no precise
statistics involving the presence of transcontinental migrants in the Latin
America (Comisin Especial de Asuntos Migratorios (CEAM), 2010 ) let alone
data pertaining to those whose journeys are the result of smuggling efforts

273
journalistic reports suggest many of them travel to Brazil or Ecuador where they
can benefit from visa systems that grant them visas upon arrival, which are then
used to fly or trek across Central America, where they often file asylum claims
(Fox, 2016; CEAM, 2010; UNHCR, 2010). Many of these journeys reportedly take
place with the assistance of smuggling facilitators or a vast network of brokers
who, as documented in other regions, provide travel assistance (Alpes, 2013).
While travel patterns are known to change rapidly and in response to
immigration enforcement measures, indicators of criminal activity, social unrest
or the availability of shelters or migrant reception centres, it is also possible
to identify some core routes and means of transportation favoured by those
in transit. While migrants may also travel by sea or air, the most documented
transits have been those occurring by land. The flows most often discussed in
the literature are those occurring from south to north, involving the journeys
of Central American migrants who enter Mexico on foot through that countrys
southern border, in the states of Chiapas and Tabasco (Guevara, 2015; lvarez
Velasco, 2015). Migrants from the Caribbean (Cuba) and Asia also opt to cross
into Mexico through Belize (Casillas, 2007). Once in Mexico, migrants with the
least amount of social and economic capital often rely on the travel infrastructure
created by the presence of the Mexican railroad system. Known as La Bestia, the
Mexican cargo train system connects the countrys southern border with cities
on the United StatesMexico border and provides a basic, if highly precarious,
way to travel. Images of migrants riding atop of the train as stowaways have
become iconic representations of migration flows in Latin America, the journey
into Mexico often described as an often dangerous proposition, migrants
travelling across regions under the control of criminal organizations and through
security checkpoints, where State and non-State actors are known to engage in
predatory practices, ranging from demands for bribes to mass kidnapping and
extortion against those in transit (CNDH, 2009 and 2011; Casillas, 2010a).
The experience of Central American migrants travelling through Mexico
constitutes the most often discussed process in the topic of Latin American
migration at the moment, in part as a response to the dramatic reduction in the
number of Mexican migrants travelling irregularly to the United States (Passel,
Cohn and Gonzlez-Barrera, 2014), but also given its volume and its visibility in
the context of the security crises connected to gang and drug-trafficking related
violence afflicting Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras (Ribando Seelke, 2014;
Wolf, 2012). While there are no specific numbers pertaining to smuggled Central
American migrants who travel through Mexico, data collected by the Mexican
authorities provide a window into the dynamics of their migration. In the period
comprised between January and September of 2015, a total of 118,000 Central
Americans were removed from Mexico, which represented an increase of almost
40,000 migrants from the prior year, when 80,736 deportations involving Central
274
11. Latin America
Americans were recorded (Melndez, 2015).

Irregular migrants travel in Latin America in multiple ways. Many do so on
their own or in small groups, without the assistance of smugglers. Others draw
from their social capital, relying on smuggling facilitators whose recommended
services are purchased back in the countries of origin, along the migrant trail,
or through service packages directly negotiated by friends and relatives already
residing in the destination country (Hagan, 2008; Spener, 2009; Sanchez, 2015).
Smuggler-organized travel mechanisms, strategies and costs vary widely, and are
often devised with the goal of eliminating or reducing the impact of encounters
with law enforcement or criminal organizations who have been documented as
engaging in abusive, often violent practices, and in some instances to partner
with the goal of profiting financially from migrants (Martnez, 2015). In fact,
travelling with smugglers despite their illicit nature is often described by
migrants as a legitimate, necessary security strategy on their part and that of
their families.107 The prices paid to smugglers or brokers for individual services
or all-inclusive journeys vary greatly along corridors, but also among individual
migrants, whose families may purchase specialized crossing services to further
reduce the likelihood of risk, injury and detection (yet this is a level of security
that is often beyond the reach of most migrants, primarily those with minimal
financial resources). Yet perhaps as a general rule, the costs involved in human
smuggling are often dependent upon the distance, destination, route and travel
method hired, and are often negotiable (Casillas, 2010a; Snchez, 2015).
While the overland transits of migrants dominate the migration literature,
migrants also travel by air, even though airport controls and security mechanisms
alongside higher costs connected to the provision of official travel documents
and identifications and bribes make this a travel option restricted to those with
the resources to afford it (Vsquez Larios, 2016; CNN, 2015; SIPSE, 2015). Central
America has also become a transit region for Caribbean, transcontinental and
South American migrants, who taking advantage of flexible visa policies
travel by air to cities in the region prior to taking the land route into Mexico.108
Reports of informants paying significantly higher smuggling fees to ensure their relatives do not travel
across specific routes (Hagan, 2008) have been documented by researchers. Some smugglers are known to
provide specialized services for children or pregnant women (Sanchez, 2015 and 2016) that while costlier,
imply a reduced level of risk for those in transit.
108
An exception worth to notice was the one involving the creation of special provisions allowing for the
transit of Cuban nationals. In January 2016, an agreement allowing for the exit of an estimated 8,000 Cuban
nationals stranded in Costa Rica for several weeks was reached by the Governments of Ecuador, Costa Rica
and Mexico after the refusal by the Government of Nicaragua to admit them. The first group of 180 Cuban
nationals left Costa Rica for Mexico, from where they were expected to travel to the United States. Refugee
service agencies on the United States border with Mexico in El Paso, Texas, expected the number of Cuban
nationals requesting parole under the Cuban Adjustment Act through the local point of entry to reach
3,500 (Associated Press, 2016).
107

275
Some Cuban nationals and residents from other Caribbean countries such as
the Dominican Republic have also opted for flying to Central America as part of
their migration journeys (Mark, 2016; Kyle and Scarcelli, 2009). Panama has in
this sense become an important migrant destination (CEAM, 2010; Dyer, 2016).
Here, migrants often turn themselves to the authorities, who unable to verify
their identities often grant exit visas that allow those in transit to continue with
their journeys (Fox, 2016), often by hiring the services of smugglers or brokers of
specific services that may ease their path into Mexico and beyond.
Visa regulations in Brazil, and until recently in Ecuador, have played
a role in easing the journeys of many migrants, including those embarking in
transcontinental journeys. Able to apply for a visa upon arrival,migrants fly into
Brazil and then on to Ecuador from where journeys by air, boat or overland
through Central America into Mexico and onto the United States, can be arranged
with smugglers. Smuggling journeys can also be arranged from Colombia, where
boat operators transport paying migrants to Panama. For those lacking financial
resources trekking on their own the Darien Gap in order to reach Panama often
constitutes their only option (Jackson, 2015; Correa lvarez, 2013).
Maritime travel is also an alternative. Some Ecuadorians travel to
Guatemala by boat, where they are then instructed to dress in local tribal garb
a practice often used by smugglers for their clients to pass for locals during
their journeys into Mexico (Stone-Cadena, 2014). In the Caribbean, smuggling
scholarship has most often focused on the journeys of Cuban nationals seeking
to reach the United States by boat. While there are in fact legal mechanisms in
place for Cubans to be admitted into the United States and receive relief, they
must first obtain a permit to leave the island, a taxing and complicated process
that plays a role in the decision to travel irregularly instead. Numbers indicate
most Cuban nationals rely on irregular migratory journeys on their quest to reach
the United States (Wassem, 2009). Many travel from the island to Colombia and
then onto Panama, following the route of the Darien (Correa lvarez, 2013).
Haitians and Dominicans also seek to reach US territory, relying on boats or
dinghies known as yolas that take them across the Mona Passage into Puerto
Rico (Ferguson, 2003:30; Duany, Hernndez Angueira and Rey, 1995). As in the
case of many other clandestine migration efforts, this method and route are
often lethal, given the poor conditions of the boats used. Many in the Caribbean
opt to travel to Mexico (Mexican coasts lie only 120 mi away from Cuba) from
where they embark in journeys to the United States, travelling along the coasts
of the Gulf of Mexico the route preferred also by many Central American
migrants. The Pacific coast is often relied upon by migrants of Asian or other
transcontinental origin) seeking to reach the Western United States (Casillas,
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2007).
The journeys most often documented in the literature are those involving
overland transits. In this context, migrants are highly likely to die or sustain injuries
as a result of environmental exposure (Martnez, Cobo and Narvez, 2015), face
encounters with criminal groups involved in kidnapping and extortion, or arrested
and deported by authorities. Not a single country in the Americas maintains
precise records involving migrant fatalities, injuries or assaults, reports and
numbers being simple approximations of a larger phenomenon. Furthermore,
there is not a unified, government-sponsored system to support the reporting of
migrant related deaths or disappearances, and methods to quantify these vary
across regions (IOM, 2014).109 Yet the disappearance of hundreds of migrants in
transit through Mexico have been documented over a number of years, and the
findings of mass graves along the most traversed migrant routes (Izcara Palacios,
2012; Casillas, 2010a) serve as evidence of the lethal nature of many irregular
transits and the lack of governmental oversight. Migrants report coming across
human remains in the context of their journeys, or having lost friends or relatives
along the way to the environment, accidents or violence fatalities that are far
from reflected in official counts. In this context, it is important to highlight that
the dangers faced by migrants in the context of their journeys are not solely the
result of the smugglers inability to provide guidance or support, but are also the
result of a combination of factors present in the migrant trail and which often
further increase the conditions of vulnerability faced by those in transit (Reineke
and Martnez, 2014). Humanitarian organizations along the migrant trail have,
for instance, reported a significant reduction in the number of migrants who
relied on their services and stayed at their shelters following the implementation
on the part of the Government of Mexicos Plan Frontera Sur (REDODEM, 2014),
a change that suggests migrants opted for more hidden, remote routes in order
to avoid detections. While the Plan was advertised as a mechanism to enhance
the protection of migrant human rights, some organizations have noted it has
instead led to the arrest and deportation of larger number of migrants and
further increased their vulnerability (Guevara, 2015; WOLA, 2015).
In summary, irregular migration routes in Latin America run from south to
109
The efforts involving civil society including the friends and families of missing and dead migrants at
creating a mechanism that allows to account for missing and dead migrants must be acknowledged.
Multiple groups across the Americas, in collaboration with community organizations within the United
States and along the United StatesMexico border, have embarked in a series of continental, regional and
local efforts to devise standardized mechanisms that have allowed for the location of missing migrants and
the identification and recovery of human remains so that they can eventually be returned to their relatives.
The work of Centro Colibr in Tucson, Arizona, the Committee of Missing Migrants Families from Progreso
in Honduras, and the Argentine Forensic Anthropology Team, among many others, has been central in this
effort.

277
north, but also within the continent, while often adapting to conditions on the
ground primarily those related to immigration enforcement controls or reports
of criminal activity, at varying costs and relying on a wide range of methods.
Overland journeys pose specific challenges, including not only environmental
exposure but the potential for interactions with criminal groups and authorities
whose actions play a decisive role on migrant safety and well-being.

Official data on migrant smuggling as occurring in the Americas are scant
at best. Gathering reliable, recent and comprehensive data particularly of the
kind involving criminalized, illicit activities is challenging for several reasons.
First of all, the very clandestine nature of the practice reduces the possibility
of systematically collecting information. Data that could potentially provide
perspectives on the facilitation of migrant smuggling in the region tends to
be embedded in the larger body of irregular migration statistics. Across the
continent, State organisms in charge of migration collect numbers pertaining to
irregular border crossing attempts, immigration-related arrests and deportations,
yet do not disaggregate data pertaining to smuggling-initiated or related
transits. Furthermore and as previously outlined, there is no official, centralized
mechanism in Latin America that collects and/or addresses reports concerning
the disappearance or death of migrants in transit that could also allow drawing
informed conclusions on the connection of these incidents to smuggling related
practices. In fact, it is often only in the context of migrant tragedies such as the
murder of 72 men and women presumed to be migrants in transit in the town
of San Fernando, Tamaulipas, Mexico in 2010 that concerted efforts to collect
detailed information pertaining to smuggling have been carried out, although
the data are not always released to the public, neither for research or analytical
purposes (Casillas, 2010a).
Data collection on smuggling flows is not systematically nor centrally
performed. Official figures on irregular migration in countries across the
Americas are on occasion accessible to the public online,110 but its quality is
often questionable. Methodologies are not explained; databases and numbers
are hard to access; websites present outdated information or have not been
updated for long periods of time. The scrutiny over migrant rights violations
that multiple government agencies across the continent have faced may also
play a part on their reluctance to disclose or fully disseminate information. In
the case of Mexico, there have been attempts on the part of the State to collect
Refer to www.politicamigratoria.gob.mx/es_mx/SEGOB/Boletines_Estadisticos or www.paisano.gob.mx/
index.php/component/content/article/65-estadisticas
110
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11. Latin America
and disseminate migration-related data in light of multiple recommendations

from human rights organizations emerging from specific events involving the
mistreatment of migrants in transit. Statistics provided by the Mexican authorities,
however, suggest an increased emphasis on managing migration flows through
removal (Guevara, 2015; Knippen, Boggs and Meyer, 2015) and not necessarily
improvements to migrants safety. There has been an overall increase in the
number of arrests and deportations of Central American migrants in Mexico.
Data indicate that between July 2014 and June 2015, the apprehensions carried
out by the Government of Mexico along the southern border involving Central
American migrants increased 71 per cent (WOLA, 2015).
The concerns expressed by international organizations on the experiences
of migrants in transit particularly along the Mexican corridor have also lead
to an onslaught of efforts involving the collection, cataloguing and analysis of
data on irregular migration and the practices identified as associated with the
phenomenon as it occurs in Mexico. The international human rights community,
researchers, think tanks and migrant advocacy groups in the Americas have
extensively documented the incidence of violent acts against migrants in
transit the disturbing incidence of kidnappings and extortion practices,
human trafficking and sexual exploitation among others that negatively impact
migrants safety (Knippen, Boggs and Meyer, 2015). The data collected through
these efforts have provided an important body of reference concerning the
experiences of migrants who travel through Mexico, and have been used as
a way to generate awareness over the perils of migrants in transit, seeking to
improve security conditions for those who transit through Mexico.
While the extensive number of reports pertaining to the experience of
migrants in transit addresses a significant gap in the collective knowledge on
irregular migration, the collected data often present limitations. For example,
reports often rely on the testimonial data collected among the most accessible
of migrants and who tend to be among the most vulnerable those who
become in contact with the authorities as a result of their arrest, incarceration
or deportation, or who have experienced an act of violence or intimidation so
significant that agencies, advocates and researchers became involved in the
documentation of the case. Furthermore, the emphasis paid to documenting
the experiences of Central American migrants in Mexico has led to scholarship
from other regions and for the experiences of other migrants to be left outside
of analysis of irregular migration flows. Methodologically, the emphasis on
documenting violence has often excluded the experiences of those who travel
under less precarious conditions, who relied on other mechanisms to achieve
their journeys, or who travel along less explored corridors and/or routes,
preventing the ability to provide a more comprehensive picture of irregular
279
migration flows.
In terms of official data, statistics are often aggregated in a fashion that
emphasizes the nationalities of particular migrants in the Mexican case for
example, that involves the classification of arrests involving Central American
migrants according to their countries of origin, while contacts involving African
or other transcontinental migrants are not identified.
In summary, while there is an abundance of data on routes followed by
migrants, the conditions along their paths and the risks they face, and on the
treatment they receive at the hands of State and non-State actors, and of official
statistics providing numbers involving the arrest and deportation of specific
populations, information on smuggling practices, systematically organized and/
or available to the public for analysis is virtually inexistent. The hyper-visibility
of specific forms of irregular migration particularly the kind involving specific
geographical regions and corridors often obscures other trends present in the
continent, making the possibility of systematically collecting data and conducting
comparative analysis on migration a complicated proposition.
Box 11.1: Women as smuggling facilitators
The call came in early on a Saturday morning. The voice on the other side of the line was filled
with excitement. My boy is on his way! He crossed on Thursday night; he got across really quick,
just one try and he was on this side! It was still too early for me to make sense of anything my
interlocutor was saying. But from the tone of her voice, I inferred that the day she had longed
for had finally arrived. Her youngest brother had finally managed to cross the border with the
assistance of a coyote the colloquial term used to designate human smuggling facilitators in
what appeared to be record time. When I asked which coyote had accomplished the feat, the
voice replied a bit annoyed by what she probably interpreted as my inability to understand the
magnitude of the event: It was not a man. It was a lady.
Despite the ubiquity of smuggling representations, the facilitation of irregular migration
continues to be an understudied area in migration. This is particularly evident in the case of
women, whose experiences as smuggling facilitators have hardly been the subject of empirical
research let alone theorization.
Research conducted among women who work as smuggling facilitators indicates that their
participation often constitutes a supplemental income-generating activity, as it is carried out in
addition to permanent and/or more stable jobs in the mainstream economy (Sanchez, 2016).
Smugglings flexible schedule and highly specific division of labour often translates into women
being able to complete tasks without compromising childcare demands or the employment
obligations that constitute their main source of income (Sanchez, 2015). A study conducted
among women on the United StatesMexico border further revealed that the majority of
women involved in the facilitation of irregular migration were irregular migrants themselves
(Sanchez, 2016).
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11. Latin America
While the roles performed in smuggling are highly gendered the activities most commonly
identified in smuggling like guiding desert treks, driving or providing security or protection being
most often performed by men womens roles in smuggling are also central to the success of
border crossings. Women in smuggling recruit customers, coordinate logistics, provide room and
board for those in transit, fix meals for smuggling teams, and are often in charge of negotiating
and collecting fees. Their compensation is also highly feminized, for roles typically performed
by men are paid at a higher rate than those performed by women; oftentimes, women working
alongside their spouses or romantic partners are even less likely than women working on their
own to receive any kind of financial compensation.
Participation in human smuggling by women constitutes an activity often devoid of the social
stigma attached to other markets, such as sex work or drug trafficking. Perceived among those
who rely on it as a mechanism for mobility if not entirely as a benevolent action carried out
on behalf of the larger community (Spener, 2014) participation in smuggling constitutes from
the perspective of its actors a legitimate employment alternative amid the precarity of life along
the migrant trail.

Research on the dynamics specific to human smuggling facilitation from
Latin America is scant. The majority of the work on irregular migration carried
out across the region has identified migration facilitation primarily from a
criminological perspective, leading in turn to the focus on specific practices,
routes or populations that become constructed as more relevant than others.
Therefore, most work involving irregular migration in the Americas has been
primarily focused on documenting the transits of Central American migrants
travelling through Mexico and the details pertaining to their journeys, but not
to smuggling itself. References to smuggling practices appear embedded in
narratives or data on irregular migration processes, and are most often reported
in the context of violent transits.
This section divides the research on migrant smuggling in the Americas
in three kinds: (a) investigative journalism; (b) grey literature; and (c) academic
research. Engagement with the topics of migrant smuggling and smugglers
varies across publications. Only a few directly address migrant smuggling, as
most of the literature has focused on the study of transit and irregular migration
across the continent, and refers to smuggling facilitation only in passing, or
in the context of inquests into criminal activity or migrant victimization (in
other words, migrant smuggling is most often described as a deviant, violent
practice). Research on irregular migration in Latin America falls primarily into
three categories: (a) identifies the experiences of migrants in transit; (b) seeks
to document the security conditions along migrant routes; and (c) focused on
describing the migration experience as present in specific cities or regions,
primarily those identified as critical on the migration trail. A significant body of

281
research has also emerged on the topic of human trafficking in the context of
irregular migration, literature that often suggests the transformation of human
smuggling into trafficking, or describes it as such by relying on the incorrect use
of both terms as interchangeable. The role of local, humanitarian organizations,
such as shelters, churches and ordinary citizens at providing assistance to
migrants has also received attention, although to a lesser degree and often in
the context of migrant transits analyses. Lastly, some publications that delve on
the topic of missing and dead migrants have sought to raise awareness over
the lack of data on migrant fatalities and the virtual absence of State-sponsored
mechanisms allowing migrants families to report the missing or locate or
recover their remains.
Investigative journalism
Investigative journalism has been behind the production of the majority
of the stories and research on irregular migration in the Americas, although with
varying degrees of quality and effectiveness. The topic has indeed generated a
substantial amount of coverage reliant on dramatic stories of often graphic nature
and depictions of human tragedy and pain where migrants and their families are
monolithically represented as victims. There is an onslaught of articles, books,
documentaries and movies on irregular migration within the Americas, often
produced and/or funded by global news organizations or foreign journalists who,
having travelled to some of the most notable migration corridors in the continent
(Central America and Mexico, or the United StatesMexico borderlands), produce
material that is often dubbed as representing the human side of the migration
phenomenon in a fashion that often lacks context and further fuels notions of
migration as problematic and in need of control. Journalisms reliance on social
media has further allowed for the mass diffusion of these messages, many times
sensationalistic in nature, to a global audience and for these messages in turn
to be construed and mobilized as factual evidence of the risks migration flows
pose to destination countries. Books, such as Enriques Journey (Nazario, 2013)
on the journeys of unaccompanied minors from Central America to the United
States, or The Beast (Martnez, 2014) on migrants encounters with organized
crime in their journeys through Mexico, have been translated and adapted for
western and English readers and enjoyed great editorial success an acclaim
of a kind neither book received in Latin America. Journalistic coverage by Latin
American investigative journalists themselves remains relatively unknown,
marginalized as part of the global coverage on irregular migration across the
continent that favours European and American authors, sources and storylines.
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11. Latin America
Simultaneously, some journalistic inquests have attempted to provide

more critical perspectives into migration transits and their facilitation. Reports on
the community dimensions of migration and the importance of solidarity during
the transit (Fox, 2016; Round Earth Media, 2016) and those that are effective at
integrating anthropological inquiry to the analysis of activities such as migrant
kidnapping and extortion (Stillman, 2015; Trujillo, 2011) have provided a much
nuanced and needed analyses of migration processes as taking place on the
ground.
Grey literature
There is a large body of grey literature pertaining to irregular migration
in the Americas. The majority of these reports, completed or commissioned by
intergovernmental organizations, international non-governmental organizations,
research institutions, foundations and other private organizations has primarily
concerned the security conditions faced by migrants in transit along the Mexican
corridor (Amnesty International, 2010; Human Rights Watch, 2016; Sin Fronteras,
2013a and 2013b; Ruiz, 2004) while also reporting on the varying ability of State
actors at providing the necessary protections to those who travel irregularly
(UNHCR, 2013). Human rights protections have been at the core of many of these
documents in light of the widespread reports of corruption, threats and violence
targeting migrants during their transits (Mxico Unido Contra la Delincuencia,
2012; Quiroz Rendn, 2011; REDODEM, 2013). Some reports have also sought
to raise awareness over the challenges faced by unaccompanied minors not only
during transit but once they arrive to the United StatesMexico border (USCCB,
2013; Stinchcomb and Hershberg, 2014; Sin Fronteras and INCEDES, 2011;
Passel, Cohn and Gonzlez-Barrera, 2014; Cavendish and Cortzar, 2011). The
majority of these reports refer to migrant smuggling as a negative consequence
of increased enforcement, however often framing smuggling and its facilitators
themselves solely as violent, organized criminal entities.
It is important to remark that as in the case of journalistic coverage,
grey literature products reflect a specific editorial line and a particular agenda
reflective of the organizations that commission or sponsor them. In this sense,
some publications have been developed seeking to generate improved migrant
conditions (INEDIM, 2011; FIDH, 2008; CIDH, 2013); others are developed in
order to report on ongoing security trends to inform political circles (Evans,
2014; Evans and Franzblau, 2013), while others seek to systematically collect and
organize data on a particular topic for reference and policy development purposes
(Ribando Seelke, 2014; Wassem, 2009; Rosemblum et al., 2012). While many of
these publications may seek to furnish data objectively and impartially, they may
often reinscribe perceptions of migration processes taking place in occurring in
283
the region in a fashion that may allow for and justify the implementation of
policies and practices by outside actors and interests. Hyper-represented,
highly visible topics such as human smuggling may often be narrated without
context, further inscribing ill-informed perceptions on conflict and violence that
further limit the ability of readers to engage with social phenomena in a critical,
comprehensive fashion.
Academic research
The processes tied to irregular transit migration in the Americas have
generated significant interest in academic circles, which in turn falls within
specific parameters. The majority of the empirically based academic production
has focused on the journeys of Mexican and Central American migrants bound
for the United StatesMexico border, and on the experiences of Central
American migrants through Mexico. Work on the dynamics of irregular
migration as present in South America and the Caribbean is scarce. Academic
research conducted by Latin American researchers has had limited diffusion
internationally, as it is published most frequently in Spanish, further limiting
access to the conceptualization of migration processes from the perspective
of the global south. Yet the work is also often reflective of the trends followed
by foreign researchers that is, it focuses primarily on the Central American
experience, and on the precarity associated with the transits of Central American
migrants through Mexico. The work discussed in this section primarily reflects
the ethnographic work conducted on the topic, which has been carried out by
social scientists from the Americas and abroad (primarily American researchers).
Research on irregular migration in the Americas can be broadly
catalogued in terms of its methodological approach, alongside with the themes
it examines. There is a significant body of research that has involved mapping
of migrants experiences while on transit based on the analysis of primary and
secondary data collected from surveys and interviews on security conditions
on the ground, incidence of violence and interactions with State and non-State
actors.111 There is also important ethnographic work conducted at specific sites
along the migration corridors, in the context of doctoral or dissertation-related
projects that provides important empirical information on the experiences of
111
One of the most significant efforts at surveying border crossing dynamics contemporarily has been
the one conducted in the context of the Migrant Border Crossing Study (MBCS), initially developed at
the University of Arizona. While focused on the experiences of migrants deported by the US migration
enforcement system, the data collected by the MBCS researchers pertaining to 1,113 interviewees are
a fundamental source of information leading to improved understandings on the nature of the border
crossings, smuggling practices and violent events faced by irregular migrants. The initial report can be
found on https://sociology.columbian.gwu.edu/sites/sociology.columbian.gwu.edu/files/downloads/UA_
Immigration_Report2013print.pdf
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11. Latin America
migrants and their interactions with actors including smugglers and that
provide urgently needed critical perspectives. A related body of work has
sought to document the experiences of specific populations such as women,
unaccompanied minors, and lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender migrants.
The treatment of the role of organized crime in migration transits (either as
elements in the facilitation of migration or as groups sabotaging migrants
efforts to migrate) also occupies an important place in the migration scholarship,
especially given the visibility of drug trafficking activity in the continent and in
Mexico and Central America in particular. While not as abundant, there is also a
smaller corpus of scholarship on irregular migration from or into South America
and out of and across the Caribbean, which perhaps constitutes the work to
closest engage with description of smuggling and brokerage practices. The
importance of this body of work also resides on its attention to the dynamics of
population flows within the continent and to destinations other than the United
States (which has historically dominated the scholarly focus on migration).
Research pertaining to migrant transits and that examines the role of
smugglers includes work on the conditions contributing to migrants vulnerability
(Meza and Cullar lvarez, 2009; Casillas, 2015, 2010a and 2010b); migrant routes
and security trends (Anguiano, 2015; Miguel Len, 2011; Casillas, 2007; Arriola
Vega, 2012; Guevara, 2015; Martnez, Cobo and Narvez, 2015), the experiences
of migrant women (Prez and Roldn, 2011; Daz and Kuhner, 2007; Herrera,
2011), the services provided to migrants by civil organizations (Anaya and Daz
de Len, 2012; Moreno and Nio Contreras, 2013); and the documentation of
the experiences of unaccompanied minors (Caballeros, 2011; Paris and Zenteno,
2015; Musalo, Frydman and Ceriani, 2015). There is a smaller body of work on
sexuality as experienced in transit contexts (Infante et al., 2013; Cant, 2009).112
Inquests into the lesser explored Caribbean corridor have yielded work on the
facilitation of smuggling from Trinidad and Tobago (Waldropt-Bonair et al., 2013),
Haiti and the Dominican Republic into Puerto Rico (Duany, 1995), and from Cuba
into the United States (Brown, 2002; Capote Gonzlez, 2011; Robinson, 2010)
and Ecuador (Correa lvarez, 2013).
The ethnographic work in the region also involves research conducted
along smuggling routes and has focused on specific geographic locations
(Ramrez Gallegos and lvarez Velasco, 2009), often relying on the system of
humanitarian migrant houses and shelters established across the Mexican
112
Scholarship that is essential to further frame the experience of border crossings and sexuality involves the
work of Luibheid on migration, sexualities and racialization (2002; Lubheid and Cantu, 2005) and GonzlezLpez (2005) on the sexual lives of migrants. While these scholars research focuses on the migrant
experience in the United States and the United StatesMexico border, it has vast implications on the
theoretical engagements with the experiences of irregular migrants in transit in and from Latin America.

285
migratory corridor. Brigden (2015) employed a multisited fieldwork strategy in El

Salvador, Mexico and the United States to trace the improvisational practices of
migrants travelling irregularly. Following a similar methodology, Guevara (2015)
mapped the reliance of migrants on the humanitarian shelters that are set up
along Mexicos South Pacific route, as connected to the interactions of migrants
and their families with smugglers. Vogt (2013) traced the commodification
of migrants and their victimization by groups of organized criminals and the
solidification of predatory smuggling and kidnapping practices. The work of
lvarez Velasco (2015) has been fundamental at mapping the migratory spaces
between the United States, Mexico and Ecuador and their configuration into
a migratory system that identifies the complexities of the smuggler-migrant
relationship. Stone-Cadenas research on indigenous coyotes in Ecuador has also
bridged the gap on the ethnographic work linking migration from South America
to the United States, examining the strategies of mobility and social networking
deployed by migrants and smugglers in Ecuadors Southern Highlands (2014).
While lesser explored, work on the journeys of transcontinental migrants from
West Africa to South America is also part of the ethnographic production in the
region. The doctoral work of Uriarte-Blsamo and the ensuing publication of her
book (2009) provided important insights into the experience of Ghanaian and
Nigerian migrants travelling by boat to Argentina, Uruguay and the Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela.

For generations, migration processes have been an integral part of the
history of Latin America and a fundamental element of the identity of its people.
While mainstream migration perspectives continue to frame migrants primarily
as economic actors seeking to travel to locations where they can improve their
economic potential (Herrera, 2003), the approach has historically and structurally
failed to acknowledge the complexity of the factors leading to migration and the
individual desires of those who migrate. Among these knowledge gaps lies the
lack of scholarly engagements with the processes connected with the facilitation
of irregular migration, which, amid State narratives of national security and
claims over sovereignty, has become increasingly treated as a security threat,
its cultural and community dimensions often ignored by methodological
approaches that favour discourses of crime, victimization and violence. This
is not to suggest that migrant smuggling is not violent, or that its facilitators
are not likely to engage in abusive or exploitative behaviour a statement of
that nature would not only be nave but amiss. Instead, the statement calls
for the recognition of the need for approaches that are critical of how the
focus on violence as inherent to smuggling that has dominated scholarly and
policy engagements with smuggling facilitation in the Americas has limited the
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11. Latin America
possibility of examining the complex and important relationships established

within community contexts and networks that seek to facilitate migration and
improve the living condition of their members.
As this publication seeks to highlight, smuggling journeys are precarious,
and the conditions under which they take place as a result of migrants inability
and not unwillingness to secure visas or passports have real and documentable
impacts on the physical and emotional well-being of those who travel irregularly,
their families and their communities. As noted, scholarship documenting the
vulnerability of migrants and the roles State and non-State actors play as factors
of said vulnerability is abundant. There is in fact no shortage of data on the
experiences of irregular migrants, whose very accessibility to researchers trying
to map victimization processes merits examinations into the ethics of data
collection processes. Yet the data and research that have to this date been
favoured in analysis of migration have failed to engage with scholars from Latin
America itself in an academic dialogue and in collaborative efforts. Furthermore,
there have been no concerted efforts to systematically and comparatively engage
with the data pertaining to migration processes continentally, what has often
resulted in heavily localized analyses of clandestine migrations that examine
only the most striking, visible or graphic of examples, rendering those that
are less violent or that lack sensationalistic tones irrelevant. A clear example
of this selective process involves the abundance of scholarship on the Mexican
migratory corridors, where what amounts to some of the most extreme examples
of violence associated with irregular migration (mass kidnappings, extortion and
the discovery of mass graves containing migrant remains) have been hugely
documented, while the challenges faced by transcontinental migrants traversing
the Darien Gap or across the Atlantic (less accessible areas for journalists and
scholars) have been largely ignored by investigative inquiries of all kinds.
Smuggling practices are often seen as presenting a specific business
model; many researchers continue to describe them along the lines of supply
and demand where migrants are often depicted as irrational entities, willing to
pay and lose what are described as exorbitant fees imposed by smugglers,
who are in turn described as driven by greed and not concerned with the safety
of those travelling with them. The reliance on the business paradigm further
obscures the sociocultural dimensions that are connected to smugglers and
their use as elements of a sophisticated system of protection a form of human
security from below that is articulated by migrants and their families in an
attempt to improve their chances to succeed in their journeys and reduce the
likelihood of injury or death (Sanchez, 2015 and 2016). Furthermore, until the
reliance on smuggling is not acknowledged as a response to, and as embedded
within a wider system of structural inequality that dictates access to human
287
security mechanisms, efforts to engage with the topic of irregular migration

or eradicate smuggling practices by deterrence, criminalization and legislation
implementation alone will continue to fail.
References
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12
THE UNITED STATES
Sheldon X. Zhang
Introduction
This chapter concerns human smuggling activities in the United States,
a signatory country since 2000 to the United Nations Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime (or the Palermo Convention).113 Organized human
smuggling activities are nothing new to the United States, a country that has
seen various ethnic groups attempting to cross the borders through unofficial
channels. In this chapter, recent trends of irregular migration will be presented
and gaps in research and empirical data will be discussed.
For the much of the United StatesMexico history, border security has
been closely pegged to the politics between the two countries. It is the longest, as
well as the most dramatic meeting point between a rich and a poor country, and
between law enforcement and law evasion (Andreas, 2009). The unprecedented
build-up in border control since 1993 was especially jarring in an era of growing
global commerce when politicians and corporations join hands to break down
nation State barriers for better flows of goods and services, as epitomized in the
North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (ibid.).
Migrant smuggling has long been an enabling factor in the long history of
irregular immigration in North America. Two types of unauthorized migrants tend
to make regular use of smuggling services. The first group of migrants consists
mostly of indigenous farmers from interior Mexico, mainly central-western
States, such as Michoacan, Guanajuato and Jalisco, and of migrants from other
Latin American countries further south. These indigenous migrants often trek
their way towards the United StatesMexico border by freight trains and trucks
or other means. Upon arrival at the border regions, they will find a smuggler to
arrange for the trip north. The second group consists of illegal migrants from
other parts of the world, such as Asia and Eastern Europe, collectively called
113
The formal rectification of the Palermo Protocols by the University States was on 3 November 2005. The list
of all countries and their signatory status to the Convention can be found at https://treaties.un.org/PAGES/
ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-12&chapter=18&clang=_en

303
other than Mexicans (or OTMs in official parlance). These migrants tend to
be financially better off and have traversed vast distances over various transit
countries. They too rely on a network of smugglers to move across the border
and enter the United States. Historically, the United States southern border
was mostly used by Mexicans who trekked back and forth for seasonal jobs and
returned home for holidays, while OTMs made up only a small fraction of the
total unauthorized border crossings (Cornelius and Lewis, 2007). However, as
shown in Table 12.1, this trend has changed significantly in the past 15 years.
Now there are as many unauthorized crossings by OTMs as Mexicans.
Migrant smuggling activities around San Diego reflect what goes on
elsewhere along the United StatesMexico border. Some smugglers form
family enterprises and utilize familial networks on both sides of the border,
while others are nothing more than a few loosely affiliated entrepreneurs who
happen to know where border patrol is the least intense and where there are
no fences and ground sensors. The more complex the smuggling operations,
the more smugglers and social networks will be involved. Smugglers in general
form temporary business alliances, and the organization of smugglers can best
be understood as that of a task force, in which activities are temporary but
specialized; enterprising agents deal directly with each other on a one-to-one
basis. Such dyadic transactions are of vital importance to those involved in this
business because they maximize the profits for the parties involved and minimize
exposure to potential law enforcement activities. This transactional style is not
unique to migration smuggling but to all transnational criminal enterprises, as
shown in the research work on Chinese human smuggling organizations (Zhang,
2008) and Mexican smugglers (Sanchez, 2015).
Migrant smuggling may conjure up different images to people, and
different definitions may lead to diverse understandings and views on this
social and economic phenomenon. Regardless of what people read in news
stories or watch in the movies, transnational migrant smuggling is essentially an
underground travel service, paddled by groups enterprising agents to facilitate
the illegal entry by foreign nationals into another country.
The United Nations first tracked views and perceptions towards
international migration in 1976; most Member States showed little interest,
considering it a topic of secondary concern (Commission on Population and
Development, 1997). Countries with explicit immigration policies were decidedly
a minority. By 1995, 40 per cent of countries had developed policies specific
towards regulating levels of immigration. Now all developed countries and the
vast majority of developing countries have measures in place to control the
flows of migrants, mostly attempting to lower immigration. Even countries with
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12. United States
a long history of admitting large numbers of foreign nationals for permanent

settlement (namely Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United States) have
increased admission criteria, giving greater preference to those with valuable
skills (Zhang, 2007).
People migrate for various reasons; and the decision to uproot from ones
familiar surroundings is often complex and multifaceted some compelling (wars
and religious persecutions) while others economic (seeking better livelihood).
There are macrolevel factors related to societal and structural changes that
influence irregular migration, which in turn produce patterned differences along
major demographic profiles, such as gender, ethnicity and social class. However,
microlevel factors are just as important in understanding individual choices
of smuggling routes and destinations. Irregular migration and its concomitant
smuggling activities represent a direct response to a States effort to restrict
the influx of migrants into ones own territories. When legitimate venues are
blocked, those who desire to move may seek other migration options, including
the possibility of entering a country illegally or irregularly. An illicit or informal
marketplace thus emerges where enterprising agents converge to provide the
needed travel services for a fee. These services range from procurement of
necessary travel documents for destination or transit countries, transportation,
guides and shelters at various transit points.
However, the desire to move to other countries is often met with resistance
to receive. The past few decades saw increased weariness and hostility in
developed countries towards low-skilled migrants in general and illegal migrants
in particular. This is true in the United States as well as in most, if not all, Western
countries, where illegal immigration has become a major political issue that
galvanizes the populace. In the United States, and most particularly since 9/11
altered the migration and security discourse, illegal migration is viewed as one
of many threats to national security. Such criminalizing responses contribute
to a perception that human smugglers are criminals preying on the weak and
desperate while threatening national security, and while smuggling is much
more complex, there is some element of truth in this.

The United States is a major destination country for transnational
migration, legal and illegal. It is home to nearly 40 million, or 13 per cent of the
total population (US Census Bureau, 2012). Latin Americans account for over
half (53%) of all foreign-born residents in the United States, or 21.2 million.
Among the total Latin Americans who are foreign born, 11.7 million, or over

305
half (55%), were born in Mexico. Mexicans account for 29 per cent of all foreignborn population in the United States.
For the most part of United States history, immigration was unregulated
until the late nineteenth century. In those early days, practically anyone who
could afford the fare to cross the Atlantic was allowed to enter the country. For
instance, between 1870 and 1900, close to 12 million immigrants arrived in the
United States most for economic reasons, while many others for political and
social reasons. The vast majority of these immigrants were of European origins
(Bodnar, 1985).
The early legislative attempts at controlling the nations borders in the
United States were outright racial in nature, reflecting economic as well as
cultural tensions between European labourers who dominated the political
machines of the time and the newly arrivals from Asia. For example, one of the
first major restrictions on the free flow of immigration into the United States was
aimed at one specific ethnic group the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, barring
skilled as well as non-skilled Chinese labourers from entering the country for
10 years. The Act was renewed in 1892 for another 10 years.114 The Chinese
Exclusion Act was followed by official Government of the United States policies
to exclude or limit the number of immigrants from other Asian countries. Finally,
with the passing of the Immigration Act of 1924, the United States Congress
while imposing quota on so-called national origins to restrict the flow of
immigration completely excluded immigrants from Asia. It should be noted
that the Immigration Act of 1924 also included discriminatory quota restrictions
against ethnic Europeans, such as Italians, Poles and Hungarians.
As the United States tightened its control over whom it allowed to admit,
legitimate channels became either blocked or inadequate, thus giving rise to
an illegitimate marketplace where logistical services could be purchased to
evade immigration control. There is no shortage of historical stories on various
ethnic groups that sought such services to enter the United States through illegal
means. For instance, in the 1920s, many Eastern European Jews were desperate
to escape post-war economic and political turmoil. In response to US legislation
that set quotas on Jewish immigrants entering the country, many resorted to
document vendors and middlemen to acquire fraudulent identity papers for the
journey to the United States (Garland, 2008).
114
For a quick overview of the major immigration laws passed by the US Congress that affected foreign
relations, refer to the official list of these acts and official analysis at https://history.state.gov/milestones
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12. United States
During the 1980 and 1990s, Chinese migrant smuggling rings were so
successful in launching land, air and maritime operations to send thousands
upon thousands of illegal immigrants into the United States that the country
panicked over the prospect of being invaded by the most populous country
in the world (Zhang, 2008). In fact, few transnational human smugglers were
as audacious and ingenious as the Chinese. They were well known more than a
century ago in the United States, following the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882.115
The early Chinese human smugglers were no less ingenious in their methods
of developing and securing smuggling routes than their contemporaries. For
example, following the 1906 San Francisco earthquake and ensuing fire that
destroyed most government buildings and their records, the paper son racket
was quickly developed. Many Chinese immigrants in San Francisco claimed to
have U.S.-born children residing in China, and the government could do nothing
but reissue their citizenship documents, which quickly became a hot commodity
and circulated back to China and enabled many young men to come to San
Francisco.
Migrant smuggling is not a homogenous criminal activity. These days, the
means of transportation, use of way stations and safe houses, the price of the trip,
conditions of travel, and immigration status upon arrival can vary significantly
from one smuggler to another. Long gone are the days when all immigrants
needed was enough money to afford a ticket onboard a steamboat that sailed
for weeks to reach New Yorks Elise Island or San Franciscos Angle Island and be
herded through immigration inspections. There are many strategies that human
smugglers use these days to circumvent regular immigration control.
There are no data that directly measure the volumes and characteristics
of unauthorized migrants in the United States. The most cited estimates of
unauthorized immigrant populations in the United States are produced by
two entities: the Pew Hispanic Center (PHC) and the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS). The most frequently used data sources for estimating
unauthorized immigrant population are the American Community Survey (ACS),
used by DHS, and the Current Population Survey (CPS), used by PHC. Because
neither source directly gathers data on the respondents legal status but asks
instead if they were foreign-born, these estimates are indirect. By subtracting
the legal residents, which the federal government has the records, from the
counts of all foreign-born in the CPS or ACS, one uses the remaining, or residual,
foreign-born as the basis for the estimation of unauthorized residents. Although
different in how they determine the legal status of the respondents, both
115
The Act by the US Congress was specifically targeting Chinese labourers who were perceived to be
competing for jobs against the United States citizens. The Act is available online from www.ourdocuments.
gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=47

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estimates are close to each other (see Passel and Cohn, 2011; Hoefer, Rytina and
Baker, 2012). However, estimates on unauthorized immigrants already inside the
United States cannot be used as a proxy to examine migrant smuggling activities.
Not all illegal residents arrived in the United States with the help of smugglers.
Another data source that offers a proxy of the volume of migrant smuggling
activities is the official statistics on the arrests of migrants attempting to cross
into the United States as shown in the following figure.
Figure 12.1: Arrests of foreign nationals at United States borders
Figure 12.1 depicts the trends of the number of apprehensions of

unauthorized migrants attempting to cross into the United States. It appears
that over the past decade, the volume of illegal crossings into the United States
have been on a steady decline, particularly among Mexicans. In the past two
years, the number of arrests at the border for Mexicans and those from other
countries (that is, other than Mexicans or OTMs) were about the same. It
appears increased border security and intensified deportation efforts of illegal
immigrants by the Government of the United States have produced some
deterrence effect, contrary to what Cornelius and Lewis (2007) had argued.
However, other causes may also have contributed to the observed declines. For
instance, improved economic situation in Mexico may have reduced the push
factor would-be migrants, and the impact of global financial crisis on the United
States domestic job market (Papademetriou and Terrazas, 2009). The hostile
social climate and anti-immigrant sentiments among Americans may also make
the country a less desirable place to go, at least for the Mexicans.
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12. United States
Migrant smuggling in San Diego

San Diego, California, sits on the busiest border crossing in the United States with Mexico.
On average, San Diego processes border crossings of 40,000 vehicles, 25,000 pedestrians,
and 200 buses daily; and one in every six persons entering the United States does so either
through the San Ysidro or Otay Mesa ports of entry. With a population close to 3 million,
San Diego County resembles other large metropolitan areas with established immigrant
communities and economic infrastructure adept at absorbing large numbers of legal and
unauthorized immigrants.
San Diegos vibrant and expanding agricultural and horticultural businesses are labourintensive and highly dependent on migrant labourers, most of whom are from Mexico.
There are about 124,000 unauthorized Mexicans in San Diegos labour force (Zhang, 2012).
In a survey of 112 employers in San Diego County in the mid-1990s, Cornelius (1998) found
high levels of reliance on immigrant labour throughout the San Diego economy. Migrant
workers made up 92 per cent in agriculture and food processing. One out of five firms in the
study reported that more than 90 per cent of its local workforce consists of immigrants, and
1 out of 10 admitted that they have a 100 per cent foreign-born labour force.
Various attempts have been made by human smugglers to transport unauthorized migrants
into the United States through this busy port of entry. Strategies to smuggle unauthorized
migrants through San Diego can be grouped into two main categories: (1) concealment; and
(2) false identity papers (Zhang, 2007). Concealment is a common strategy but oftentimes
involves clever ways of hiding migrants inside various cavities of a vehicle or commercial
merchandise. Identity papers are also used frequently by smugglers to send clients through
the checkpoints.
In the past two decades, San Diego County has become an important destination or lengthy
way station for migrants, particularly following the 9/11 events (Zhang et al., 2014). By
staying close to the border area, unauthorized migrants can reenter the United States faster
should they be deported. It is well known in this region that, when detained by immigration
officials, most unauthorized migrants claim to be residents of Mexicali or Tijuana, which
border with San Diego, so they are less likely to be deported into the interiors of Mexico
or Central American countries, and can make it back to the United States quickly. This has
become an important migration strategy particularly when many migrants have endured
untold hardships, including kidnapping, raping, beatings and robbing during their journey
towards Mexicos northern border. Border securitization did not just begin after the 9/11
events. Since 1993, the Government of the United States has stepped up its efforts to reduce
the flow of unauthorized entry from Mexico through hardening its border fences, resulting
in significant increase in organized smuggling activities, costs of border crossing, as well as
deaths and abuses along the United States southern border (Cornelius and Lewis, 2007).
Overview of data on migrant smuggling

Believe it or not, for a country with such a long history of irregular
migration, there are no publicly available data on migrant smuggling in the
United States. The closest data are probably the official statistics on the number
of unauthorized migrants who are apprehended at the borders with Mexico
or Canada. While immigration officials along the United StatesMexico border
routinely collect the country origins of apprehended migrants, transportation
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routes and methods, as well as border crossing fees charged by smugglers, such
data are never made available for academic research purposes. Furthermore,
official data when published in government reports do not distinguish between
migrants who crossed the border with peers, on their own, or with the help of a
smuggler, thus making it impossible for inferential analysis of migrant smuggling
activities.
Although there are no data in the United States that pertain directly to
human smuggling activities, let alone on smugglers, there are data on illegal
migration, which researchers have been using to derive or estimate the volumes
of migrants being smuggled into the United States and analyse their demographic
profiles.
Apprehension records collected by US Border Patrol (USBP)

The USBP maintains a database of all individual apprehensions made by
border patrol agents. Aside from demographic information taken at the time of
an arrest, such as sex, age, country of citizenship, and (if a Mexican national)
state of birth, agents also record where the arrest takes place and ask if the
apprehended migrant sought assistance from a smuggler and how much was
paid for the smuggling service. Although the Government of the United States
publishes aggregate statistics from this data source, the underlying disaggregated
data are not made available for academic research.
Researchers who are privy to this data source have also found serious
limitations (Roberts et al., 2010). Apprehended migrants often do not reveal that
they are being smuggled because smugglers, once identified, may face criminal
charges in the United States. Migrant smuggling relies on social networks within
which both clients and smugglers interact. It is uncommon for migrants to
maintain personal relationships with smugglers because these smugglers may
be referred by friends or relatives who have already established trust. As Roberts
et al. (2010) found in their analysis of smuggling costs resulting from intensified
border enforcement, historically, roughly 80 per cent of all apprehension records
do not contain information on the use of smugglers, and about 94 per cent do not
contain information on smuggling cost. Moreover, there are significant variations
in the smuggling recording rates across different USBP sectors or stations, which
may reflect variability in patrol agents field interrogation practices or actual
variations in the number of migrants who use smuggling services (ibid.).
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Mexican Migration Project (MMP) Survey116

The MMP survey was created in 1982 through a collaboration between
researchers from Princeton University (United States) and University of
Guadalajara (Mexico) to collect social-behavioural and economic data on both
sides of the border to understand the complex process of Mexican migration to
the United States. Survey takers visit households elected through a sampling
procedure in selected Mexican towns and villages typically with high volumes
of outward migration to the United States. The survey measures changes in
social and demographic profiles of households with members who migrated to
the United States. Two to five Mexican communities are surveyed each year,
with 200 households typically being surveyed in each community. Following the
completion of the household surveys in Mexico, MMP then conducts interviews
in the United States with members of select households from the same
communities and who have settled in the United States. Migration experiences
are captured in these surveys that include any use of smuggling services. The
MMP makes its data files, code books and associated publications public.
Neither of the above-mentioned databases concerns specifically with
migrant smuggling, although the MMP data contain enough details to tease
out patterns of migrant smuggling activities. Large-scale research on migrant
smuggling, using systematic data collection methods such as surveys, is unheard
of in North America. Instead, research on migrant smuggling is mostly being
undertaken by a few independent researchers, mostly anthropologists and
sociologists, over the years. Most methods used in data collection are qualitative
and ethnographic in nature. One recent example was a field study on Mexican
smugglers on both sides of the border (Sanchez, 2015). In the years prior to
the publication of her book, Sanchez traversed both sides of the United States
Mexican border, talking to smugglers of all types, young and old, men and
women, self-proclaimed do-gooders and deceptive entrepreneurs looking for
easy prey.
Clearly, there is a need for a more stable venue where migrant smuggling
data can be systematically collected and stored by an organization with stable
funding and administrative support. Entry by unauthorized migrants has always
been a major policy, as well as political issue in the United States and will remain
so for the foreseeable future. For the purpose of supplementing official data
and supporting government policymaking, an independent and stable data
warehouse is sorely needed to provide alternative venues for researchers to
analyse and disseminate smuggling research on a regular basis.
116
Details about the history and design of this study, as well as data access are available from http://mmp.opr.
princeton.edu/

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Research on migrant smuggling in the United States involves a multitude
of issues and perspectives, depending on the disciplinary interests of the
researchers. The following reflects some of the major themes of human
smuggling research.
Describing trends in human smuggling

In 2014, members of an Armenian-led migrant smuggling ring were
caught transporting Armenian nationals through the San Ysidro port of entry in
San Diego (US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), 2014). Armenian
smugglers employed the classic identity fraud of training clients to assume
the identity of another person. Their clients in this case were charged up to
USD 18,000 each, and moved through a series of third countries. First, they were
flown into Moscow using fraudulent Russian passports, and then into Cancun,
Mexico. Once inside Mexico, they were transported overland to Tijuana, which
borders with San Diego, where they were provided valid United States legal
permanent resident cards (that is, green cards) or passport cards.
Explaining unique patterns in transnational migration and concomitant

smuggling operations
Economic opportunities, or differences in earnings, are often used to
explain much of population migration. Other than in relation to armed conflicts
where people flee for their lives, people mostly move in order to seek better
work or living conditions. The increasing immigrant populations in general have
been attributed to the growing employment opportunities in such industries,
such as construction, agriculture and food processing plants (Moreno, 2005).
However, wage differentials are inadequate to explain transnational
migration alone. For instance, Mexicans make up the largest group of illegal
immigrants in the United States, accounting for 29 per cent of all foreign-born
population in the country or 11.7 million (US Census Bureau, 2012). Within
Mexico, the majority of illegal migrants have traditionally come from the centralwestern States, such as Michoacan, Guanajuato and Jalisco; however, migrants
from Oaxaca and Guerrero have also increased rapidly in recent years (Lewis,
2005). According to one estimate, the lions share of the migrants came from
about 5 per cent of its municipios (counties) in interior Mexico (Cornelius, 2005).
One then must ask why transnational migrants do not come evenly from the
most destitute regions of the world or country and why migrants tend to come
from concentrated regions in their home countries (Zhang, 2008).
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12. United States
Migration, either regular or irregular, follows a few predictable patterns.

At the micro or personal level, disparities in earnings draw individuals from lowwage countries towards high-wage countries with prospect for greater personal
or family wealth. Wage differences between sending and receiving countries are
the most important factors for people to move (Harris and Todaro, 1970; Mahler,
1995). At the macrolevel, countries with shortage in labour attempt to recruit
workers from abroad to fill the demand of the economy. As the economy expands
or contracts, the labour market fluctuates and countries in need of labour thus
respond by encouraging or discouraging immigration. Individual labourers, on
the other hand, adjust and adapt to the cycles of economy. A state of equilibrium
is thus achieved through periodic redistributions of labour through migration
(Massey et al., 1998). International population migration thus becomes an
equalizing mechanism to balance the distribution of economic resources across
countries (Massey et al., 2002). Labour markets in post-industrial nations have
become bifurcated, with high pay and steady jobs on one end, low pay and
unstable jobs on the other. The dual labour markets are particularly salient in
major cities, such as Los Angeles and New York where managerial, administrative,
financial and technical jobs have achieved high levels of concentration and also
created high demands for low-wage services. Such a bifurcated labour market
structurally depends on a steady influx of cheap foreign labour to sustain itself
(Piore, 1979).
Beyond the earning disparity factor

Although wage differentials or relative deprivation and the prospect of
elevating ones family status and financial standing in the sending country provide
a strong incentive for people to migrate, it is not a sufficient condition. Far more
people in developing countries are aware of the earning differentials and dream
of a life as an immigrant in a Western country than those who actually take the
journey. The fact that not more people from developing countries participate
in transnational migration suggests that the decision to migrate involves more
than monetary factors. Access to migrant smugglers and the ability to purchase
quality smuggling services become important factors in this decision-making
process.
Kinship and community ties, legal barriers and human smugglers, airlines,
railways and shipping companies, and even law firms, human rights groups
and anti-immigration activists are all part of this complex picture, each group
playing out some roles that directly or indirectly affect the flow and direction of
legal as well as illegal migration (Pieke, 1999). In practice, most migrants follow
existing networks to particular destinations rather than simply moving to the
country where most money can be made (Zhang, 2007). Facilitators (or migrant
smugglers) are important players in these existing migration networks.
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Families send their members to distant places in search of jobs to assure

the overall financial well-being of the family. These migrants effectively become
an insurance policy for the aging parents and other family members against crop
failure, market crash and a host of other adverse economic conditions at home.
In return, a family increases its resources to deal with a host of current and
future financial uncertainties. Economists have long perceived such migration
practice as a collective act to maximize a familys income, minimize risks and
loosen constraints associated with a variety of market failures (Stark and Bloom,
1985). Migrants are rational actors who calculate social and personal costs
against potential profits in their decision-making and move to a foreign country
where they can expect positive financial returns. Therefore, any attempt to seek
and procure smuggling services must be factored into this calculus of costs and
benefits. Wage differences are not the only incentive that motivates people to
move, and migration decisions are not made by isolated actors. They are taken
within larger units of interrelated people, such as families or households and
sometimes an entire community (Stark, 1991).
Still, other scholars argue that transnational migration of labour forces
reflect the penetration and expansion of the competitive market economy
advocated and promoted by the Western countries. This world system perspective
perceives the global marketplace as being dominated by a few core nations
that command vast amounts of capital and resources. As a result, the global
economic system is moving towards greater interdependent and integrated, with
other countries on the periphery are supplying not only surplus labour but also
consumer markets. However, the global expansion of a market economy causes
disruptions to the traditional economic systems and livelihoods and therefore
dislocation in these peripheral regions into the world, which in turn generate
population migration (Morawska, 1990). Therefore, transnational irregular
migration does not necessarily represent a lack of economic development in the
sending countries but disruptive development itself, because historically, it is not
the poorest countries that dominated international migration but countries that
experienced economic development. These theories all try to explain the same
phenomenon from different angles and at different levels of analysis. There are,
however, consistent elements in transnational migration that these theories
attempt to explain.
The nexus between organized crime and migrant smuggling

The UN Palermo Convention suggests two changes in the development
of organized transnational migrant smuggling activities: (1) migrant smuggling
is an organized crime that contributes to the increase of transnational irregular
migration; and (2) migrant smuggling has grown into a serious international
problem that demands international attention and counter strategies.
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Once migrant smuggling is framed as organized crime, it takes on political

significance and pushes for coordinated international efforts if the Western
countries desire to reduce the flow of unauthorized population. However,
Gallagher and David (2014) contend that these concerted efforts on identifying
and responding to migrant smuggling only attracted international attention in the
1980s and 1990s when the United States and European countries experienced
large influxes of unauthorized migrants. The focus of attention is now cast on
those who facilitate irregular migration, rather than on the underlying causes for
people to resort to irregular channels to migrate. As if by doing so, these nations
can put an end to the flow of irregular migration; or at the minimum, human
smugglers are considered major contributors to unauthorized transnational
migration.
The nexus between migrant smuggling and organized crime has been
a contested issue. Around the time when the Palermo Protocol was passed,
migrant smuggling caught much attention in the United States, particularly
about Chinese human smuggling. Chinese organized crime was blamed for much
of the human smuggling activities from mainland China to the United States. For
instance, the Government of the United States reports as well as the INTERPOL
intelligence analysis all pointed to criminal organizations in Taiwan, Province
of China and Hong Kong, China as the primary players in these spectacular
smuggling operations from mainland China to the United States and European
destinations.117
It should be noted that there is a long debate on the differences between
organized crime and crime that is organized, and Finckenauer (2007) argues
that organized crime needs to possess the cultural and organizational attributes
similar to those of the Italian mafia. It is beyond the scope of this paper to
debate over whether migrant smuggling should be classified as organized
crime. Suffice it to say, migrant smuggling is a coordinated activity that involves
multiple individuals over some distances. Like many other organized crime
entities, migrant smugglers conspire against and circumvent government control
over their enterprising activities. If one chooses to define organized crime
loosely as any enterprising activities, in which individual entrepreneurs with the
financial wherewithal and right connections form loosely affiliations to provide
underground travel services, then migrant smuggling fits the organized crime
narrative.
117
For a detailed discussion on how the Government of the United States as well as European officials
claimed the linkage between Chinese human smuggling and traditional Chinese organized crime groups,
see Chapter 9 Human Smuggling and Traditional Chinese Organized Crime in Chinese Human Smuggling
Organizations (Zhang, 2008).

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Zhang and Chin (2003) propose a different strategy to reconcile the different
perspectives on organized crime grouping organized criminal activities into
two main categories: (a) territorial; and (b) non-territorial. Traditional organized
crimes, such as prostitution, drug distribution, loansharking, protection and
extortion, are mostly territorial where there are well-defined neighbourhoods.
A territorial criminal entity tends to be monopolistic and boundary-delimited.
Issues, such as legacy, identity and loyalty are of vital importance to these
criminal organizations. These criminal organizations also tend to be hierarchically
arranged, with a godfather sitting above layers of lieutenants and street soldiers.
Little empirical research is available to substantiate the involvement of
traditional organized crime in transnational migrant smuggling. No empirical
researchers have staked out any such claims that they found any evidence
to suggest the involvement of any traditional criminal organizations in the
transnational migrant smuggling businesses.
However, if one foregoes Finckenauers position and extends the
definition of organized crime, then there is ample empirical evidence to suggest
that human smugglers are collectively an organized criminal entity, albeit loose
affiliations of entrepreneurs who share little more than a desire to make money
through illicit means. In fact, the most successful migrant smugglers are nothing
but brokers who know where to acquire and deploy the necessary resources to
move clients through different way stations to their eventual destination. For
instance, after an eight-month investigation, an investigation by the Pittsburg
Tribune-Review found that most migrant smugglers along the United States
Mexico borders were American citizens, doing the smuggling gig just for quick
cash.118 After a review of court records, the investigators found that 92 per cent
of all convictions in the United States for migrant smuggling were tied to just the
southernmost counties of four States along the Mexico border. A total of 3,254
smugglers were convicted between 1 January 2013 and 31 December 2014.
Three of every five coyotes caught in the southern borderlands were US citizens
who smuggled immigrants in exchange for money, drugs or both. Americans
play key roles in the smuggling operations, especially driving unauthorized aliens
across vast distances and interfacing with other Americans. Their payment varies
tremendously depending on the type of services they provide, such as guiding
migrants around border checkpoints and transporting them to safehouses.
118
In a series of reports collectively titled The American Coyotes, investigator Carl Prine and photographer
Justin Merriman spent eight months traversing the United StatesMexican border regions, talking to
smugglers and migrants, and observing their business transactions. The full collection of the stories can be
found at http://triblive.com/americancoyotes/
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12. United States
In a market environment where goods and services cannot be openly

advertised and traded, brokers are functionally imperative in connecting
otherwise disjointed partners for business transactions (Burt, 2005). The nodal
positions occupied by the brokers also controls access to the desired services or
goods. As long as the asymmetries of information and access remain, the broker
will benefit from this competitive edge (Burt, 1992; Morselli and Roy, 2008).
For the non-territorial transnational migrant smuggling rings, much more
research is needed. Little is known about how smugglers of different ethnic and
national backgrounds mobilize resources and find partners to collaborate in
the transportation of unauthorized migrants. Much empirical work is needed
to develop and test theoretical understandings of how loosely affiliated groups
of individuals seem capable of accomplishing seemingly complex criminal
operations over vast distances. From cross-border migrant smuggling to drug
trafficking, there is no shortage of successful stories as well as spectacular
failures. Criminal entrepreneurs have managed to carve out profitable niche
market for offering underground travel services to whoever is willing to pay.
Migrant smugglers are capable of ingenious use of social networks and counterenforcement maneuverings.
Emerging nexus between drug trafficking and migrant smuggling

What has emerged in recent years from recent field activities by this author
in San Diego and research colleagues elsewhere along the United StatesMexico
border is that an increasing number of unauthorized migrants from Mexico
reported that they were often forced by their smugglers to carry drug-stuffed
backpacks when crossing into the United States. Official reports also suggest
such a trend. For instance, in a recent case, three Mexican men were caught
using a 27-foot fishing boat of the Texas coast of Padre Island National Seashore
for smuggling unauthorized migrants into the United States (US ICE, 2016). The
three Mexican smugglers launched their boat from Playa Bagdad in the northern
Mexican state of Tamaulipas, right near the United States border, and headed
towards the Corpus Christi area. The trip was short but daring. These smugglers
reportedly were operating their boat in the dark of the night without its lights
on and with multiple tanks of leaking fuel. There were eight unauthorized
passengers onboard. Along with the human cargoes, the Customs and Border
Patrol officers also discovered 10 bundles of marijuana wrapped in plastic,
weighing 530 pounds. There has been an increase of reports on overlapping
activities between drug traffickers and migrant smugglers.

317
However, no prior research in the United States has found evidence to that
pointed to overlaps between drug trafficking and migrant smuggling activities.
In other words, drug traffickers and migrant smugglers seemed to occupy
separate marketplaces. Much research is needed to substantiate such overlaps
and provide explanations as why and how these two markets are merging. One
possible hypothesis is that intensified border security reduces geographical
places and forces both drug traffickers and migrant smugglers to converge onto
a few available transportation routes. While little empirical exists to explain
how these two groups of enterprising agents may interact within restricted
geography, it is fair to speculate that the better armed ones, mostly the drug
traffickers, most likely prevail in the control of the physical pathways into the
United States. Migrants thus are increasingly being used as couriers to move
drugs into the United States either as a condition of their smuggling operation
or as a form of payment. There is little research on whether drug traffickers are
forcing out the migrant smugglers or that migrant smugglers have expanded to
collaborate with drug traffickers for additional income.

Following the 9/11 events in the United States, migrant smuggling as
a research topic has received scant attention. One would think that migrant
smuggling may be translated into border security issues or carry national
security implications. However, current discourse on national security, especially
on anti-terrorist activities, takes places largely without any reference to migrant
smuggling. This lack of official attention on migrant smuggling can saliently
evidence the number of open solicitations by the federal government for funding
migrant smuggling related studies. This author is not aware of any in the past 15
years. In fact, other than the survey of 300 unauthorized Chinese migrants in
New York City by Chin (1999) who attempted to understand the trans-Pacific
smuggling operations, no one else has carried out a similar study inside the
United States since.
Patterns and changes in migrant smuggling in the United States reflect
a multitude of social, economic and political factors. But few researchers are
currently funded to engage in systematic data collection to study this topic. The
changing roles and functions of migrant smugglers may provide much information
to policymakers, as well as law enforcement agencies on the broader societal and
economic conditions under which migration takes place. For instance, following
the significant build-up in security along the United StatesMexico border, illegal
crossings by individual migrants themselves have largely disappeared. In the face
of increased costs and hazards, migrants routinely seek human smugglers for a
multitude of services, ranging from personal protection to food and shelters,
and to transportation.
318
12. United States
Most policymakers as well as border security agency administrators are

aware of the growing dependence of unauthorized migrants on smugglers,
but little research is available to study the complexity of migrant smuggling
(including its variations and interconnections with other migration dynamics). In
an election year and with inflammatory statements made against unauthorized
migrants, it is easy to find simplistic proposals and one-dimensional policies that
claim to produce drastic outcomes. Few anticipate any possible consequences,
such as subjecting migrants to extreme exploitation, violence and even death.
Migrant smuggling rises and falls in response to the needs in the market of
irregular migration. Many factors seem to influence the direction of unauthorized
immigration, from broad labour market conditions to tightening of border
control. In the past decade or so, irregular migration from Mexico to the United
States seemed to march on its own beat, a steady decline, irrespective of the
fluctuations of the labour and economic conditions in the United States. Illegal
migration seems to have its own barometers that measure the informal economy
of the host country and responds to a far more complex set of conditions than
mere economic factors. Parasitic to this irregular migration, migrant smugglers
will most likely fluctuate also depending on the demand by unauthorized
migrants for their services. Efforts to control unauthorized immigration create
and maintain a marketplace where enterprising agents with the right social
connections and resources converge to provide smuggling services. Once in
business, human smugglers can only hope for more clients and thus may have
indeed become a major contributor to sustained illegal migration.
Similar to other illicit enterprises, transnational migrant smuggling
activities expand and contract in response to political and social conditions that
interfere with the illicit marketplace. In general, the greater a destination country
attempts to reduce its influx of unauthorized migrants, the greater the need for
professional assistance provided by these human smugglers. Entrepreneurs of
diverse backgrounds and resources find one another, motivated by a common
desire to make money, to form transient alliances or networks, and enable
fee-paying migrants to move successively from one way station to the next.
Along the way, most migrants probably arrive uneventfully while others fall
prey to unscrupulous vendors. Unfortunately, in North America, there is little
systematic research on how immigrants seek out smugglers, and how smugglers
form alliances and distribute profits. Moreover, as border security becomes
tightened, smuggling channels are limited for migrant smuggling as well as drug
trafficking. Is it inevitable that the reduced money-making opportunities will
lead to coalition of human smugglers and drug traffickers? Little is known about
the social organization of human smugglers both as a social phenomenon and as
a criminal enterprise.
319
There is much need to understand the social organization of migrant

smuggling within the broader context of irregular transnational migration. A
collective and coordinated effort is needed to move current on migrant smuggling
in the United States, which remains haphazard and individual endeavors, to a
higher and more policy relevant level.
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Acknowledgements
The editors would like to acknowledge the Government of Turkey for its support of the Comprehensive
Global Approach to Counter Migrant Smuggling and Enhanced Migrant Protection project under which
this report is prepared, the hard work and support of all of the authors, as well as the many thousands of
migrants who have participated in studies on migrant smuggling throughout the world.
This report was conceived and commissioned by Dr Frank Laczko, Head, IOM Global Migration Data Analysis
Centre, who managed the report project with assistance from Marie McAuliffe (as consultant), Tara Brian and
Julia de Bresser. The report was sub-edited by Melissa Borlaza and the layout done by Anna Lyn Constantino
under the leadership of the head of the IOM Publications Unit, Valerie Hagger, and support from Maria Paula
Subia.
The opinions expressed in the report are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
International Organization for Migration (IOM) or the Republic of Turkey. The designations employed and the
presentation of material throughout the report do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on
the part of IOM or the Republic of Turkey concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or
of its authorities, or concerning its frontiers or boundaries.
Title:
ISBN:
Subjects:
Cover photo:
Migrant Smuggling Data and Research: A global review of the emerging evidence base /
edited by M.L. McAuliffe and F. Laczko
978-92-9068-730-6
International migration; migrant smuggling; irregular migration.
Valerie Hagger, 2013
Publisher:
International Organization for Migration

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Tel.: +41.22.717 91 11

Fax: +41.22.798 61 50

E-mail: [email protected]

Website: www.iom.int
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All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted
in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the
prior written permission of the publisher.
IOM is committed to the principle that humane and orderly migration benefits migrants and society. As
an intergovernmental organization, IOM acts with its partners in the international community to: assist in
meeting the operational challenges of migration; advance understanding of migration issues; encourage
social and economic development through migration; and uphold the human dignity and well-being of
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MIGRANT SMUGGLING DATA AND RESEARCH: A global review of the emerging evidence base

17 route des Morillons, P.O. Box 17

A global review of the

William Lacy Swing

Dinuk Jayasuriya is research director at Red Elephant Research and a

Migrant Smuggling Data and Research:

Marie McAuliffe is the newly appointed head of the Migration Policy

Mapping of Migration Routes from Africa to Europe and Drivers of Migration in

Migrant Smuggling Data and Research:

Ramesh Sunman is a research officer at Red Elephant Research and a

West and Central Africa......................................................................25

South Asia........................................................................................ 187

South-East Asia and Australia...........................................................211

The United States.............................................................................303

Migrant Smuggling Data and Research:

Migrant Smuggling Data and Research:

Concepts and definitions

Financial motives are central to the business model concept proposed

definition in Australia, for example, requires the smuggling of another person(s)

Migrant Smuggling Data and Research:

Figure 1: The smuggling spectrum

Source: McAuliffe and Mence, 2014.

Migrant Smuggling Data and Research:

Overview of data on migrant smuggling

Finally, it could be argued that collecting data on migrant smuggling is

Overview of research on migrant smuggling

research based on surveys of migrants, which can supplement useful qualitative

on aspects of migrant smuggling, including in specific (sub)regions

time on aspects of smuggling. Its potential as a powerful analytical

commonplace than is readily admitted. Robust research is able to

Migrant Smuggling Data and Research:

Quarterly Risk Analysis Reports. Frontex, Warsaw.

International Organization for Migration (IOM)

Migrant Smuggling Data and Research:

Laczko, F. and M. Rango

Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat (RMMS)

Migrant Smuggling Data and Research:

van Liempt, I. and J. Doomernik

Migrant Smuggling Data and Research:

2. West and Central Africa

Map 2.1: Map of West and Central Africa

Source: Carling, 2016.

Overview of migrant smuggling in the region

Migrant Smuggling Data and Research:

2. West and Central Africa

distances in sparsely populated areas with extreme environmental

Migrant Smuggling Data and Research:

Review of data on migrant smuggling

2. West and Central Africa

Summary statistics are sometimes on the borderline of what can be

Migrant Smuggling Data and Research:

2. West and Central Africa

Source: UNHCR (asylum applications) and World Bank (population).

Moving on from summary statistics, the second form of data to consider

Migrant Smuggling Data and Research:

There are apparently no large-scale surveys that specifically address

2. West and Central Africa

qualitative data often contain detailed descriptions that render individuals

Migrant Smuggling Data and Research: