Weapons For Mass Destruction

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Weapons of mass destruction

Contents
1

Overview

1.1

Weapon of mass destruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.1.1

Early uses of the term . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.1.2

Denitions of the term . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.1.3

Treaties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.1.4

Use, possession and access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.1.5

United States politics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.1.6

Media coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.1.7

Public perceptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.1.8

In popular culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.1.9

Common hazard symbols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.1.10 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.1.11 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1.1.12 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10

1.1.13 Further reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10

1.1.14 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

10

Types

12

2.1

Biological warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12

2.1.1

Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12

2.1.2

History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

12

2.1.3

Modern BW operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

14

2.1.4

List of BW institutions, programs, projects and sites by country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

17

2.1.5

List of people associated with BW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

18

2.1.6

In popular culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

18

2.1.7

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

19

2.1.8

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

19

2.1.9

Further reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

21

2.1.10 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

22

Chemical warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

22

2.2.1

Denition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

22

2.2.2

History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

22

2.2.3

Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

32

2.2

ii

CONTENTS

2.3

2.4

2.2.4

Sociopolitical climate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

37

2.2.5

Chemical weapons destruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

38

2.2.6

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

40

2.2.7

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

40

2.2.8

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

43

2.2.9

Further reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

43

2.2.10 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

44

Nuclear weapon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

44

2.3.1

Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

45

2.3.2

Weapons delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

47

2.3.3

Nuclear strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

48

2.3.4

Governance, control, and law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

50

2.3.5

Controversy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

52

2.3.6

Costs and technology spin-os . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

53

2.3.7

Non-weapons uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

54

2.3.8

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

57

2.3.9

Notes and references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

58

2.3.10 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

61

2.3.11 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

61

Radiological weapon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

62

2.4.1

Explanation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

62

2.4.2

History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

62

2.4.3

Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

63

2.4.4

Military uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

63

2.4.5

Dirty bombs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

63

2.4.6

Salted bomb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

63

2.4.7

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

64

2.4.8

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

64

2.4.9

External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

64

Proliferation

65

3.1

Nuclear proliferation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

65

3.1.1

Non-proliferation eorts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

65

3.1.2

Dual use technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

66

3.1.3

International cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

67

3.1.4

Unsanctioned nuclear activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

69

3.1.5

Breakout capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

77

3.1.6

Arguments for and against proliferation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

77

3.1.7

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

79

3.1.8

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

80

3.1.9

External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

82

Chemical weapon proliferation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

83

3.2

CONTENTS

3.3

iii

3.2.1

Chemical weapon details, per nation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

83

3.2.2

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

87

3.2.3

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

87

3.2.4

Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

87

List of missiles by country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

88

3.3.1

Argentina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

88

3.3.2

Australia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

88

3.3.3

Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

88

3.3.4

Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

88

3.3.5

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

88

3.3.6

European joint-venture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

88

3.3.7

France

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

88

3.3.8

Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

89

3.3.9

India

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

90

3.3.10 Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

90

3.3.11 Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

92

3.3.12 Israel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

92

3.3.13 Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

92

3.3.14 North Korea

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

93

3.3.15 Norway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

93

3.3.16 Pakistan

93

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3.3.17 South Korea

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

93

3.3.18 Russia and the USSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

93

3.3.19 Serbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

93

3.3.20 South Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

94

3.3.21 Sweden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

94

3.3.22 Taiwan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

94

3.3.23 Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

94

3.3.24 United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

94

3.3.25 United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

95

3.3.26 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

96

3.3.27 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

97

Countries

98

4.1

Albania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

98

4.1.1

Biological and nuclear weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

98

4.1.2

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

98

4.1.3

Notes and references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

98

Algeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

99

4.2.1

Notes and references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

99

4.2.2

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

99

Argentina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

99

4.2

4.3

iv

CONTENTS

4.4

4.5

4.6

4.7

4.8

4.3.1

Missile systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

99

4.3.2

Chemical weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

99

4.3.3

Nuclear weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

99

4.3.4

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

4.3.5

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

4.3.6

Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

4.3.7

External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

Australia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.4.1

Biological weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

4.4.2

Chemical weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100

4.4.3

Nuclear weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101

4.4.4

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

4.4.5

Further reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.5.1

Nuclear program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

4.5.2

Technological capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

4.5.3

Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104

4.5.4

Legislation and conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

4.5.5

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

4.5.6

Notes and references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105

4.5.7

External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

Bulgaria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
4.6.1

Missile program

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

4.6.2

Chemical weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

4.6.3

Biological weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

4.6.4

Nuclear weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

4.6.5

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

4.6.6

References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

4.6.7

External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

Burma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
4.7.1

Chemical weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

4.7.2

Nuclear weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

4.7.3

Notes and references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.8.1

Nuclear weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

4.8.2

Chemical weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

4.8.3

Biological weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

4.8.4

Disarmament . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

4.8.5

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

4.8.6

Notes and references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114

4.8.7

Further reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

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4.8.8
4.9

v
External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
4.9.1

Chemical weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

4.9.2

Biological weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

4.9.3

Nuclear weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116

4.9.4

Missile ranges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120

4.9.5

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120

4.9.6

Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120

4.9.7

Further reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122

4.9.8

External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122

4.10 France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122


4.10.1 History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
4.10.2 Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
4.10.3 Current nuclear doctrine and strategy

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

4.10.4 Antinuclear tests protests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125


4.10.5 Veterans' associations and symposium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
4.10.6 Test victims compensation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
4.10.7 Non-nuclear WMDs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
4.10.8 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
4.10.9 Notes and references . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
4.10.10 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
4.10.11 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
4.11 Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
4.11.1 History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
4.11.2 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
4.11.3 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
4.12 India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
4.12.1 Biological weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
4.12.2 Chemical weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
4.12.3 Nuclear weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
4.12.4 International response

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

4.12.5 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134


4.12.6 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
4.12.7 Further reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
4.12.8 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
4.13 Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
4.13.1 Nuclear weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
4.13.2 Biological weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
4.13.3 Chemical weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
4.13.4 Delivery systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
4.13.5 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152

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4.13.6 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
4.13.7 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
4.14 Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
4.14.1 Program development 1960s - 1980s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
4.14.2 IranIraq War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
4.14.3 The 1991 Persian Gulf War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
4.14.4 Between Persian Gulf Wars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
4.14.5 2003 Iraq War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
4.14.6 2009 Declaration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
4.14.7 Media perception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
4.14.8 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
4.14.9 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
4.14.10 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
4.15 Israel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
4.15.1 Nuclear weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
4.15.2 Nuclear weapons delivery

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176

4.15.3 Chemical weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176


4.15.4 Biological weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
4.15.5 In literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
4.15.6 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177
4.15.7 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
4.16 Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
4.16.1 Bioweapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
4.16.2 Chemical weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
4.16.3 Nuclear weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
4.16.4 Delivery systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179
4.16.5 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
4.16.6 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
4.17 Libya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
4.17.1 Nuclear program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
4.17.2 Chemical Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
4.17.3 Ballistic missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
4.17.4 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
4.17.5 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
4.18 Netherlands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
4.18.1 United States-NATO nuclear weapons sharing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
4.18.2 Dutch production of CW precursor chemicals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 184
4.18.3 Poison gas experiments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
4.18.4 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
4.18.5 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
4.19 North Korea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185

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vii

4.19.1 History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186


4.19.2 Nuclear weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
4.19.3 Biological and chemical weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
4.19.4 Delivery systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
4.19.5 Exports related to ballistic missile technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192
4.19.6 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
4.19.7 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
4.19.8 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
4.20 Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
4.20.1 History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
4.20.2 Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
4.20.3 Weapons development agencies

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208

4.20.4 Delivery systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209


4.20.5 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
4.20.6 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 210
4.20.7 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
4.20.8 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
4.21 Poland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
4.21.1 Chemical weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
4.21.2 Biological weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
4.21.3 Nuclear . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
4.21.4 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
4.21.5 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
4.22 Romania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
4.22.1 Nuclear program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
4.22.2 Anti-nuclear rallies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217
4.22.3 Deals with other countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
4.22.4 After the 1989 Revolution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
4.22.5 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
4.22.6 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
4.22.7 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
4.23 Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
4.23.1 Nuclear weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 218
4.23.2 Biological weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
4.23.3 Chemical weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220
4.23.4 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
4.23.5 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
4.23.6 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
4.24 Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
4.24.1 Nuclear program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
4.24.2 Nuclear sharing with Arab States of the Persian Gulf nuclear programs . . . . . . . . . . . 224

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4.24.3 Recent developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
4.24.4 Missile capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
4.24.5 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
4.24.6 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
4.24.7 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
4.25 South Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
4.25.1 Nuclear weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
4.25.2 Biological and chemical weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
4.25.3 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
4.25.4 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
4.25.5 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
4.25.6 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
4.26 Sweden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
4.26.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
4.26.2 Early studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
4.26.3 Connection between nuclear weapons program and civilian use of nuclear energy . . . . . . 231
4.26.4 Beginning of the nuclear program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
4.26.5 Basic materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
4.26.6 1950s: The Government favors nuclear program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
4.26.7 Nuclear resistance begins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
4.26.8 Defense research and design research

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235

4.26.9 Freedom of action and enhanced defense research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236


4.26.10 The civilian research and nuclear weapons programs diverge

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236

4.26.11 Plutonium problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237


4.26.12 Pondering over purchases of nuclear material from the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
4.26.13 Planned nuclear devices

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238

4.26.14 Planned delivery systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239


4.26.15 Intended employment of nuclear weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240
4.26.16 The shift in opinion at the ministry of defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240
4.26.17 The 1980 referendum

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241

4.26.18 The end of nuclear weapons program and Swedish disarmament policy . . . . . . . . . . . 241
4.26.19 Reasons to abandon nuclear program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
4.26.20 Disarmament of Swedish nuclear sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
4.26.21 After the nuclear weapons program: defense research and support for disarmament . . . . . 243
4.26.22 Sweden and non-proliferation movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243
4.26.23 Documents from the nuclear weapons program

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243

4.26.24 Controversies around activities after 1985 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244


4.26.25 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244
4.26.26 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244
4.26.27 Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
4.26.28 Further reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246

CONTENTS

ix

4.26.29 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246


4.27 Syria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
4.27.1 History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
4.27.2 Chemical weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
4.27.3 Biological weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
4.27.4 Nuclear program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 247
4.27.5 Delivery systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
4.27.6 International partnerships . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
4.27.7 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
4.27.8 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
4.27.9 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
4.28 Taiwan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
4.28.1 Nuclear weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
4.28.2 Chemical weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
4.28.3 Missile technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
4.28.4 Ratication of international treaties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
4.28.5 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
4.28.6 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
4.28.7 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
4.29 Ukraine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
4.29.1 Background information on Russian and Ukrainian relationship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
4.29.2 Budapest Memorandum

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253

4.29.3 France and China's commitments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254


4.29.4 2014 Crimean crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
4.29.5 Reference list . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254
4.30 United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
4.30.1 Biological weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
4.30.2 Chemical weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256
4.30.3 Nuclear weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256
4.30.4 Radiological weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
4.30.5 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
4.30.6 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
4.30.7 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 257
4.31 United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
4.31.1 Nuclear weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258
4.31.2 Biological weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
4.31.3 Chemical weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260
4.31.4 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 261
4.31.5 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
4.31.6 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262
5

Treaties

264

CONTENTS
5.1

List of weapons of mass destruction treaties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264


5.1.1

General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264

5.1.2

Delivery systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264

5.1.3

Biological weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264

5.1.4

Chemical weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264

5.1.5

Nuclear weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264

5.1.6

See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265

Text and image sources, contributors, and licenses

266

6.1

Text . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266

6.2

Images . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278

6.3

Content license . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286

Chapter 1

Overview
1.1 Weapon of mass destruction

through the Cold War, the term came to refer more


to non-conventional weapons. The application of the
For the Hip-hop album, see Weapons of Mass Destruc- term to specically nuclear and radiological weapons
is traced by William Sare to the Russian phrase
tion (album).
" " oruzhiye massovogo
porazheniya (weapons of mass destruction).
A weapon of mass destruction (WMD or WoMD)
is a nuclear, radiological, chemical, biological or other He credits James Goodby (of the Brookings Instituweapon that can kill and bring signicant harm to a large tion) with tracing what he considers the earliest known
number of humans or cause great damage to human-made English-language use soon after the nuclear bombing of
structures (e.g. buildings), natural structures (e.g. moun- Hiroshima and Nagasaki (although it is not quite verbatains), or the biosphere. The scope and application of tim): a communique from a 15 November 1945, meeting
the term has evolved and been disputed, often signify- of Harry Truman, Clement Attlee and Mackenzie King
ing more politically than technically. Coined in refer- (probably drafted by Vannevar Bush or so Bush claimed
ence to aerial bombing with chemical explosives, it has in 1970) referred toweapons adaptable to mass destruccome to distinguish large-scale weaponry of other tech- tion.
nologies, such as chemical, biological, radiological, or
nuclear. This dierentiates the term from more technical ones such as chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear weapons (CBRN).

That exact phrase, says Sare, was also used by Bernard


Baruch in 1946 (in a speech at the United Nations probably written by Herbert Bayard Swope).* [5] The same
phrase found its way into the very rst resolution adopted
by the United Nations General assembly in January 1946
in London, which used the wording "...the elimination
1.1.1 Early uses of the term
from national armaments of atomic weapons and of all
other weapons adaptable to mass destruction.* [6] This
The rst use of the term weapon of mass destruction
resolution also created the Atomic Energy Commission
on record is by Cosmo Gordon Lang, Archbishop of Can(predecessor of the International Atomic Energy Agency
terbury, in 1937 in reference to the aerial bombardment
(IAEA)).
of Guernica, Spain:
An exact use of this term was given in a lecture "Atomic
Energy as an Atomic Problemby J. Robert OppenWho can think at this present time without
heimer. The lecture was delivered to the Foreign Service
a sickening of the heart of the appalling slaughand the State Department, on 17 September 1947. The
ter, the suering, the manifold misery brought
lecture is reprinted in The Open Mind (New York: Simon
by war to Spain and to China? Who can think
and Schuster, 1955).
without horror of what another widespread war
would mean, waged as it would be with all the
new weapons of mass destruction?* [1]

It is a very far reaching control which


would eliminate the rivalry between nations in
this eld, which would prevent the surreptitious
arming of one nation against another, which
would provide some cushion of time before
atomic attack, and presumably therefore before
any attack with weapons of mass destruction,
and which would go a long way toward removing atomic energy at least as a source of conict
between the powers.

At the time, the United States (with help from Western


Allies) had yet to develop and use nuclear weapons.
Japan conducted research on biological weapons (see Unit
731),* [2] and chemical weapons had seen wide battleeld
use in World War I. They were outlawed by the Geneva
Protocol of 1925.* [3] Italy used mustard gas against civilians and soldiers in Ethiopia in 1935-36.* [4]
Following the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki that ended World War II, and progressing
1

CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW

The term was also used in the introduction to the hugely that became the primary justication for the 2003 invainuential U.S. government document known as NSC-68 sion of Iraq. However, no WMD were found in Iraq.
written in April 1950.* [7]
(Old stockpiles of chemical munitions including sarin and
During a speech at Rice University on 12 September mustard agents were found, but none were* considered to
1962, president John F. Kennedy spoke of not lling be in a usable condition due to corrosion.) [13]
space with weapons of mass destruction, but with instruments of knowledge and understanding.* [8] The following month, during a televised presentation about the
Cuban Missile Crisis on 22 October 1962, Kennedy made
reference tooensive weapons of sudden mass destruction.* [9]"

Because of its prolic use and (worldwide) public prole during this period, the American Dialect Society
voted weapons of mass destruction(and its abbreviation,WMD) the word of the year in 2002,* [14] and in
2003 Lake Superior State University added WMD to its
list of terms banished for "Mis-use, Over-use and General
*
An early use of the exact phrase in an international treaty Uselessness". [15]
was in the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, however no def- In its criminal complaint against the main suspect of
inition was provided.
the Boston Marathon bombing of 15 April 2013, the
FBI refers to a pressure-cooker improvised bomb as a
weapon of mass destruction.* [16]
Evolution of its use
During the Cold War, the term weapons of mass destructionwas primarily a reference to nuclear weapons.
At the time, in the West the euphemism strategic
weaponswas used to refer to the American nuclear arsenal, which was presented as a necessary deterrent against
nuclear or conventional attack from the Soviet Union (see
Mutual Assured Destruction).
Subsequent to Operation Opera, the destruction of a preoperational nuclear reactor inside Iraq by the Israeli Air
Force, Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin countered
criticism by saying that on no account shall we permit an enemy to develop weapons of mass destruction
against the people of Israel.This policy of pre-emptive
action against real or perceived WMD became known as
the Begin Doctrine.
The term weapons of mass destructioncontinued
to see periodic use throughout this time, usually in the
context of nuclear arms control; Ronald Reagan used it
during the 1986 Reykjavk Summit, when referring to
the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.* [10] Reagan's successor,
George H.W. Bush, used the term in an 1989 speech
to the United Nations, using it primarily in reference to
chemical arms.* [11]

1.1.2 Denitions of the term


United States
Strategic The most widely used denition ofweapons
of mass destructionis that of nuclear, biological, or
chemical weapons (NBC) although there is no treaty or
customary international law that contains an authoritative denition. Instead, international law has been used
with respect to the specic categories of weapons within
WMD, and not to WMD as a whole. While nuclear,
chemical and biological weapons are regarded as the three
major types of WMDs,* [17] some analysts have argued
that radiological materials as well as missile technology
and delivery systems such as aircraft and ballistic missiles
could be labeled as WMDs as well.* [17]
The abbreviations NBC (for nuclear, biological and
chemical) or CBR (chemical, biological, radiological) are
used with regards to battleeld protection systems for
armored vehicles, because all three involve insidious toxins that can be carried through the air and can be protected against with vehicle air ltration systems.
However, there is an argument that nuclear and biological
weapons do not belong in the same category as chemical and "dirty bomb" radiological weapons, which have
limited destructive potential (and close to none, as far
as property is concerned), whereas nuclear and biological weapons have the unique ability to kill large numbers
of people with very small amounts of material, and thus
could be said to belong in a class by themselves.

The end of the Cold War reduced U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons as a deterrent, causing it to shift its focus
to disarmament. With the 1990 invasion of Kuwait and
1991 Gulf War, Iraq's nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons programs became a particular concern of the
rst Bush Administration.* [12] Following the war, Bill
Clinton and other western politicians and media continued to use the term, usually in reference to ongoing at- The NBC denition has also been used in ocial U.S.
tempts to dismantle Iraq's weapons programs.
documents, by the U.S. President,* [18]* [19] the U.S.
Agency,* [20] the U.S. Department
After the 11 September 2001 attacks and the 2001 an- Central Intelligence
*
*
and the U.S. Government Acthrax attacks in the United States, an increased fear of Defense, [21] [22]
*
[23]
countability
Oce.
of non-conventional weapons and asymmetrical war-

fare took hold in many countries. This fear reached a Other documents expand the denition of WMD to also
crescendo with the 2002 Iraq disarmament crisis and the include radiological or conventional weapons. The U.S.
alleged existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq military refers to WMD as:

1.1. WEAPON OF MASS DESTRUCTION


Chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear
weapons capable of a high order of destruction or causing mass casualties and exclude the
means of transporting or propelling the weapon
where such means is a separable and divisible
part from the weapon. Also called WMD.* [24]
This may also refer to nuclear ICBMs (intercontinental
ballistic missiles).

3
weapons systems and in most years greatly exceed the
toll of the atomic bombs that devastated Hiroshima and
Nagasaki".* [27]
An additional condition often implicitly applied to WMD
is that the use of the weapons must be strategic. In other
words, they would be designed to "have consequences
far outweighing the size and eectiveness of the weapons
themselves".* [28] The strategic nature of WMD also denes their function in the military doctrine of total war as
targeting the means a country would use to support and
supply its war eort, specically its population, industry,
and natural resources.

The signicance of the words separable and divisible part


of the weapon is that missiles such as the Pershing II and
the SCUD are considered weapons of mass destruction,
while aircraft capable of carrying bombloads are not.
Within U.S. civil defense organizations, the category is
In 2004, the United Kingdom's Butler Review recognized now Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and
the considerable and long-standing academic debate Explosive (CBRNE), which denes WMD as:
about the proper interpretation of the phraseweapons of
mass destruction". The committee set out to avoid the
(1) Any explosive, incendiary, poison gas,
general term but when using it, employed the denition of
bomb, grenade, or rocket having a propellant
United Nations Security Council Resolution 687, which
charge of more than four ounces [113 g],
dened the systems which Iraq was required to abandon:
missile having an explosive or incendiary charge
of more than one-quarter ounce [7 g], or mine
or device similar to the above. (2) Poison
Nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable mategas. (3) Any weapon involving a disease orrial or any sub-systems or components or any reganism. (4) Any weapon that is designed to research, development, support or manufacturing falease radiation at a level dangerous to human
cilities relating to [nuclear weapons].
life.* [29]
Chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of
agents and all related subsystems and components
and all research,development,support and manufac- Military For the general purposes of national defense,* [30] the U.S. Code* [31] denes a weapon of mass
turing facilities.
destruction as:
Ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres and related major parts, and repair and pro any weapon or device that is intended, or has the
duction facilities.* [25]
capability, to cause death or serious bodily injury to
a signicant number of people through the release,
Chemical weapons expert Gert G. Harigel considers only
dissemination, or impact of:
nuclear weapons true weapons of mass destruction, be toxic or poisonous chemicals or their precurcause only nuclear weapons are completely indiscrimisors
nate by their explosive power, heat radiation and radioactivity, and only they should therefore be called a weapon
a disease organism
of mass destruction. He prefers to call chemical and bi radiation or radioactivity* [32]
ological weaponsweapons of terrorwhen aimed against
civilians and weapons of intimidationfor soldiers.
For the purposes of the prevention of weapons
Testimony of one such soldier expresses the same viewproliferation,* [33] the U.S. Code denes weapons
point.* [26] For a period of several months in the winter
of mass destruction as chemical, biological, and
of 20022003, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul
nuclear weapons, and chemical, biological, and nuclear
Wolfowitz frequently used the term weapons of mass
materials used in the manufacture of such weapons.
terror,apparently also recognizing the distinction be- *
[34]
tween the psychological and the physical eects of many
things currently falling into the WMD category.
Gustavo Bell Lemus, the Vice President of Colombia, at 9 Criminal (civilian) For the purposes of US criminal
*
July 2001 United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade law concerning terrorism, [35] weapons of mass destrucin Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects, tion are dened as:
quoted the Millennium Report of the UN SecretaryGeneral to the General Assembly, in which Ko Annan
said that small arms could be described as WMD because the fatalities they cause "dwarf that of all other

any destructive devicedened as any explosive,


incendiary, or poison gas - bomb, grenade, rocket
having a propellant charge of more than four ounces,

CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW
missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of
more than one-quarter ounce, mine, or device similar to any of the devices described in the preceding
clauses* [36]

(C) any weapon involving a biological agent, toxin,


or vector (as those terms are dened in section 178
of this title); or

(D) any weapon that is designed to release radiation


any weapon that is designed or intended to cause
or radioactivity at a level dangerous to human life;
death or serious bodily injury through the release,
dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous Under the same statute, conspiring, attempting, threatenchemicals, or their precursors
ing, or using a Weapon of Mass Destruction may be im any weapon involving a biological agent, toxin, or prisoned for any term of years or for life, and if resulting
in death, be punishable by death or by imprisonment for
vector
any terms of years or for life. They can also be asked to
any weapon that is designed to release radiation or pay a maximum ne of $250,000.* [43]
radioactivity at a level dangerous to human life* [37]
The Washington Post reported on 30 March 2006: Jurors asked the judge in the death penalty trial of Zacarias
The Federal Bureau of Investigation's denition is similar Moussaoui today to dene the term 'weapons of mass deto that presented above from the terrorism statute:* [38] struction' and were told it includes airplanes used as missiles. Moussaoui was indicted and tried for the use of
any destructive deviceas dened in Title 18 airplanes as WMD.
USC Section 921: any explosive, incendiary, or poison gas - bomb, grenade, rocket having a propellant The surviving Boston Marathon bombing suspect,
charge of more than four ounces, missile having an Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, was charged in June 2013 with the
explosive or incendiary charge of more than one- federal oense of use of a weapon of mass destrucquarter ounce, mine, or device similar to any of the tionafter he and his brother Tamerlan Tsarnaev allegedly placed crude shrapnel bombs, made from pressure
devices described in the preceding clauses
cookers packed with ball bearings and nails, near the n any weapon designed or intended to cause death or ish line of the Boston Marathon. Their alleged terrorist
serious bodily injury through the release, dissemi- act resulted in three deaths and at least 264 injuries.
nation, or impact of toxic or poisonous chemicals or
their precursors
any weapon involving a disease organism

1.1.3 Treaties

any weapon designed to release radiation or radioac- See also: Arms control and List of weapons of mass
destruction treaties
tivity at a level dangerous to human life
any device or weapon designed or intended to cause
The development and use of WMD is governed by sevdeath or serious bodily injury by causing a malfunceral international conventions and treaties, although not
tion of or destruction of an aircraft or other vehicle
all countries have signed and ratied them:
that carries humans or of an aircraft or other vehicle whose malfunction or destruction may cause said
Partial Test Ban Treaty
aircraft or other vehicle to cause death or serious
bodily injury to humans who may be within range
Outer Space Treaty
of the vector in its course of travel or the travel of
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
its debris.
Indictments and convictions for possession and use of
WMD such as truck bombs,* [39] pipe bombs,* [40] shoe
bombs,* [41] and cactus needles coated with a biological
toxin* [42] have been obtained under 18 USC 2332a.
As dened by 18 USC 2332 (a), a Weapon of Mass Destruction is:
(a) any destructive device as dened in section 921
of the title;

Seabed Arms Control Treaty


Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT, has not entered into force as of 2012)
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC)
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)

1.1.4 Use, possession and access

(B) any weapon that is designed or intended to Nuclear weapons


cause death or serious bodily injury through the release, dissemination, or impact of toxic or poisonous Main article: List of countries with nuclear weapons
The only country to have used a nuclear weapon in war
chemicals, or their precursors;

1.1. WEAPON OF MASS DESTRUCTION

U.S. nuclear warheads, 19452002

An atomic-bomb blueprint

is the United States, which dropped two atomic bombs


on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War II. There are eight countries that have
declared they possess nuclear weapons and are known
to have tested a nuclear weapon, only ve of which are
members of the NPT. The eight are China, France, India,
North Korea, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and
the United States.

Fear of WMD, or of threats diminished by the possession


of WMD, has long been used to catalyze public support
for various WMD policies. They include mobilization of
pro- and anti-WMD campaigners alike, and generation of
popular political support. The term WMD may be used
as a powerful buzzword* [45] or to generate a culture of
Israel is considered by most analysts to have nuclear fear.* [46] It is also used ambiguously, particularly by not
weapons numbering in the low hundreds as well, but distinguishing among the dierent types of WMD.* [47]
maintains an ocial policy of nuclear ambiguity, neither
denying nor conrming its nuclear status. In 2015, the A television commercial called Daisy, promoting DemoUnited States conrmed that Israel does indeed have ther- crat Lyndon Johnson's 1964 presidential candidacy, inmonuclear arms, disclosing a decades-long collaboration voked the fear of a nuclear war and was an element in
Johnson's subsequent election.
on weapons technology development.* [44]
South Africa developed a small nuclear arsenal in the More recently, the threat of potential WMD in Iraq was
1980s but disassembled them in the early 1990s, mak- used by President George W. Bush as justication for
*
ing it the only country to have fully given up an inde- the 2003 invasion of Iraq. [48] Broad reference to Iraqi
WMD
in
general
was
seen
as an element of President
pendently developed nuclear weapons arsenal. Belarus,
*
Bush's
arguments.
[47]
The
claim that Iraq possessed
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine inherited stockpiles of nuclear
Weapons
of
Mass
Destruction
(WMD) led to the invaarms following the break-up of the Soviet Union, but resion
of
Iraq
in
2003
by
Coalition
forces.
linquished them to the Russian Federation.
Countries with access to nuclear weapons through nuclear
sharing agreements include Belgium, Germany, Italy, the
Netherlands, and Turkey. North Korea has claimed to
have developed and tested nuclear devices. Although outside sources have been unable to unequivocally support
the state's claims, North Korea has ocially been identied to have nuclear weapons.

1.1.5

United States politics

Due to the indiscriminate impact of WMD, the fear of


a WMD attack has shaped political policies and campaigns, fostered social movements, and has been the central theme of many lms. Support for dierent levels
of WMD development and control varies nationally and
internationally. Yet understanding of the nature of the
threats is not high, in part because of imprecise usage of
the term by politicians and the media.

Over 500 munitions were discovered throughout Iraq


since 2003 containing chemical agents mustard and Sarin
gas, produced in the 1980s and no longer usable as originally intended.* [49]
In 2004, Polish troops found nineteen 1980s-era rocket
warheads, thwarting an attempt by militants to buy them
at $5000 each. Some of the rockets contained extremely
deteriorated nerve agent.* [50]
The American Heritage Dictionary denes a weapon of
mass destruction as:a weapon that can cause widespread
destruction or kill large numbers of people, especially a
nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon.* [51] In other
words, it does not have to be nuclear, biological or chemical (NBC). For example, the terrorist for the Boston
Marathon bombings was charged under United States law
18 U.S.C. 2332A* [52] for using a weapon of mass destruction* [53] and that was a pressure cooker bomb. In
other words, it was a weapon that caused large-scale death
and destruction, without being an NBC weapon.

CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW

1.1.6

Media coverage

In 2004, the Center for International and Security Studies


at Maryland (CISSM) released a report* [54] examining
the medias coverage of WMD issues during three separate periods: nuclear weapons tests by India and Pakistan in May 1998; the US announcement of evidence
of a North Korean nuclear weapons program in October 2002; and revelations about Iran's nuclear program
in May 2003. The CISSM report notes that poor coverage resulted less from political bias among the media than
from tired journalistic conventions. The reports major
ndings were that:
1. Most media outlets represented WMD as a monolithic menace, failing to adequately distinguish between weapons programs and actual weapons or to
address the real dierences among chemical, biological, nuclear, and radiological weapons.
2. Most journalists accepted the Bush administration
s formulation of the War on Terroras a campaign against WMD, in contrast to coverage during
the Clinton era, when many journalists made careful
distinctions between acts of terrorism and the acquisition and use of WMD.
3. Many stories stenographically reported the incumbent
administrations perspective on WMD, giving too little critical examination of the way ocials framed
the events, issues, threats, and policy options.

3. When people ignore corrections, they do so irrespective of how certain they are that the corrections occurred.
A poll conducted between June and September 2003
asked people whether they thought evidence of WMD
had been discovered in Iraq since the war ended. They
were also asked which media sources they relied upon.
Those who obtained their news primarily from Fox News
were three times as likely to believe that evidence of
WMD had been discovered in Iraq than those who relied on PBS and NPR for their news, and one third more
likely than those who primarily watched CBS.
Based on a series of polls taken from JuneSeptember
2003.* [56]
In 2006 Fox News reported the claims of two Republican lawmakers that WMDs had been found in Iraq,* [57]
based upon unclassied portions of a report by the
National Ground Intelligence Center. Quoting from the
report, Senator Rick Santorum said Since 2003, coalition forces have recovered approximately 500 weapons
munitions which contain degraded mustard or sarin nerve
agent. According to David Kay, who appeared before the US House Armed Services Committee to discuss these badly corroded munitions, they were leftovers,
many years old, improperly stored or destroyed by the
Iraqis.* [58] Charles Duelfer agreed, stating on NPR's
Talk of the Nation: When I was running the ISG the
Iraq Survey Group we had a couple of them that had
been turned in to these IEDs, the improvised explosive
devices. But they are local hazards. They are not a major, you know, weapon of mass destruction.* [59]

4. Too few stories proered alternative perspectives


to ocial line, a problem exacerbated by the
journalistic prioritizing of breaking-news stories and
the inverted pyramidstyle of storytelling.
Later, wikileaks would show that WMDs of these kinds
continued to be found as the Iraqi occupation continIn a separate study published in 2005,* [55] a group of ued.* [60]
researchers assessed the eects reports and retractions
in the media had on peoples memory regarding the Many news agencies, including Fox News, reported the
search for WMD in Iraq during the 2003 Iraq War. The conclusions of the CIA that, based upon the investigation
study focused on populations in two coalition countries of the Iraq Survey Group, WMDs are yet to be found in
*
*
(Australia and USA) and one opposed to the war (Ger- Iraq. [61] [62]
many). Results showed that US citizens generally did not
correct initial misconceptions regarding WMD, even fol1.1.7 Public perceptions
lowing disconrmation; Australian and German citizens
were more responsive to retractions. Dependence on the
Awareness and opinions of WMD have varied during the
initial source of information led to a substantial minority
course of their history. Their threat is a source of unease,
of Americans exhibiting false memory that WMD were
security, and pride to dierent people. The anti-WMD
indeed discovered, while they were not. This led to three
movement is embodied most in nuclear disarmament, and
conclusions:
led to the formation of the British Campaign for Nuclear
1. The repetition of tentative news stories, even if they Disarmament in 1957.
are subsequently disconrmed, can assist in the cre- In order to increase awareness of all kinds of WMD, in
ation of false memories in a substantial proportion of 2004 the nuclear physicist and Nobel Peace Prize winpeople.
ner Joseph Rotblat inspired the creation of The WMD
*
2. Once information is published, its subsequent correc- Awareness Programme [63] to provide trustworthy and
tion does not alter people's beliefs unless they are sus- up to date information on WMD world wide.
picious about the motives underlying the events the
news stories are about.

In 1998 University of New Mexico's Institute for Public Policy released their third report* [64] on US percep-

1.1. WEAPON OF MASS DESTRUCTION

tions including the general public, politicians and scien- Radioactive weaponry/hazard symbol
tists of nuclear weapons since the breakup of the Soviet
Union. Risks of nuclear conict, proliferation, and terrorism were seen as substantial.
While maintenance of a nuclear US arsenal was considered above average in importance, there was widespread
support for a reduction in the stockpile, and very little
support for developing and testing new nuclear weapons.
Also in 1998, but after the UNM survey was conducted,
nuclear weapons became an issue in India's election of
March,* [65] in relation to political tensions with neighboring Pakistan. Prior to the election the Bharatiya Janata
Party (BJP) announced it woulddeclare India a nuclear
weapon stateafter coming to power.
BJP won the elections, and on 14 May, three days after
India tested nuclear weapons for the second time, a public
opinion poll reported that a majority of Indians favored
the countrys nuclear build-up.
On 15 April 2004, the Program on International Policy
Attitudes (PIPA) reported* [66] that US citizens showed
high levels of concern regarding WMD, and that preventing the spread of nuclear weapons should bea very important US foreign policy goal, accomplished through
multilateral arms control rather than the use of military
threats.

Radioactivity

The international radioactivity symbol (also known as


trefoil) rst appeared in 1946, at the University of California, Berkeley Radiation Laboratory. At the time, it
was rendered as magenta, and was set on a blue backA majority also believed the US should be more forth- ground.* [68]
coming with its biological research and its Nuclear NonIt is drawn with a central circle of radius R, the blades
Proliferation Treaty commitment of nuclear arms reduchaving an internal radius of 1.5R and an external radius
tion, and incorrectly thought the US was a party to various
of 5R, and separated from each other by 60.* [69] It is
non-proliferation treaties.
meant to represent a radiating atom.
A Russian opinion poll conducted on 5 August 2005 inThe International Atomic Energy Agency found, howdicated half the population believes new nuclear powers
ever, that the symbol is unintuitive and can be variously
*
have the right to possess nuclear weapons. [67] 39% beinterpreted by those uneducated in its meaning, and that
lieves the Russian stockpile should be reduced, though not
its role as a hazard warning was compromised as it did not
fully eliminated.
clearly indicate dangerto many non-Westerners and
children who encountered it. As a result of research, a
new radiation hazard symbol was developed to be placed
1.1.8 In popular culture
near the most dangerous parts of radiation sources feaMain article: Weapons of mass destruction in popular turing a skull, someone running away, and*using the color
red rather than yellow as the background. [70]
culture
Weapons of mass destruction and their related impacts
have been a mainstay of popular culture since the beginning of the Cold War, as both political commentary
and humorous outlet. The actual phrase weapons of
mass destructionhas been used similarly and as a way
to characterise any powerful force or product since the
Iraqi weapons crisis in the lead up to the Coalition invasion of Iraq in 2003.

1.1.9

Common hazard symbols

Main article: Hazard symbol

Biological weaponry/hazard symbol


Developed by Dow Chemical company in the 1960s for
their containment products.* [71]
According to Charles Dullin, an environmental-health engineer who contributed to its development:* [69]
We wanted
something that
was memorable
but meaningless,
so we could
educate people

CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW

[4] William R. Cullen (2008). Is Arsenic an Aphrodisiac?:


The Sociochemistry of an Element. Royal Society of
Chemistry. p. 241.
[5]Weapons of Mass Destruction, New York Times Magazine, 19 April 1998, p.22. Retrieved 24 February 2007.
[6]UNODA - Nuclear Weapons Home. Un.org. Retrieved
14 May 2012.
[7] NSC-68 United States Objectives and Programs for National Security. Fas.org. Retrieved 5 August 2010.
[8] John F. Kennedy Moon Speech Rice Stadium.
nasa.gov. Retrieved 30 June 2015.
[9] Kennedy JF (1962-10-22). Televised remarks to the
American people re the Soviet military buildup on the
island of Cuba
[10] CNN Cold War Historical Documents: ReaganGorbachev transcripts. Web.archive.org. 18 May 2008.
Archived from the original on 18 May 2008. Retrieved
14 May 2012.

Biohazard

as to what it
means.

1.1.10

See also

Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the


United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction
Commission on the Prevention of WMD proliferation and terrorism
Ethnic bioweapons
Fallout shelter
NBC suit
Nuclear terrorism
Orbital bombardment
Russia and weapons of mass destruction
The Bomb (lm)
United States and weapons of mass destruction
Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission

1.1.11

References

[1]Archbishop's Appeal,Times (London), 28 December


1937, p. 9.
[2] Biological Weapons Program Japan. Fas.org. Retrieved 5 August 2010.
[3] Eric Croddy (1997). Chemical and Biological Warfare:
An Annotated Bibliography. Scarecrow Press. p. 30.

[11] Excerpts From Bush's Speech at the Opening of the


U.N. General Assembly ". New York Times (Union Of
Soviet Socialist Republics (Ussr)). 26 September 1989.
Retrieved 5 August 2010.
[12] MICHAEL WINES, Special to The New York Times (30
September 1990). Confrontation in the Gulf; U.S. Explores New Strategies to Limit Weapons of Mass Destruction ". New York Times (IRAQ). Retrieved 5 August
2010.
[13] Munitions Found in Iraq Meet WMD Criteria, Military.com, report led by American Forces Press Service,
29 June 2006
[14] American Dialect Society. Americandialect.org. 13
January 2003. Retrieved 5 August 2010.
[15] Lake Superior State University:: Banished Words List::
2003. Lssu.edu. Retrieved 5 August 2010.
[16] Criminal Complaint United States vs Dzhokhar Tsarnaev. The Washington Post. Retrieved 23 April 2013.
[17] Reed, Laura (2014). Weapons of Mass Destruction
. Hampshire College. Hampshire College. Retrieved 21
October 2014.
[18] Archived April 2, 2010 at the Wayback Machine
[19] Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents Volume 37, Issue 19 (May 14, 2001)" (PDF). Frwebgate.access.gpo.gov. Retrieved 14 May 2012.
[20] CIA Site Redirect Central Intelligence Agency
[21] Archived October 1, 2004 at the Wayback Machine
[22] Archived June 1, 2006 at the Wayback Machine
[23] Weapons of Mass Destruction: State Department Oversight of Science Centers Program (PDF). Retrieved 5
August 2010.

1.1. WEAPON OF MASS DESTRUCTION

[24] Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Dtic.mil. 12 April 2001. Retrieved 5
August 2010.
[25] Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction:
Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors (HC 898),
London: The Stationery Oce, 2004, 14.
[26] A Soldier's Viewpoint on Surviving Nuclear, Chemical
and Biological Attacks. Sightm1911.com. Retrieved 5
August 2010.
[27] Colombia. Web.archive.org. 2 September 2007.
Archived from the original on 2 September 2007. Retrieved 14 May 2012.Template:Dead link 2013.06.08

[43]
[44]Critical Technological Assessment in Israel and NATO
Nations. US Dept of Defense (Released by FOIA request). 1987.
[45] David T. Wright Weapons of mass distraction.
Thornwalker.com. 13 April 1998. Retrieved 5 August
2010.
[46] Weapons of Mass Destruction Are Overrated as a Threat
to America: Newsroom: The Independent Institute. Independent.org. 28 January 2004. Retrieved 5 August
2010.
[47] Archived 11 October 2007 at the Wayback Machine

[28] What makes a weapon one of mass destruction? Times


OnlineArchived March 11, 2007 at the Wayback Machine
[29] Capt. G. Shane Hendricks, Dr. Margot J. Hall (2007).
The History and Science of CBRNE Agents, Part I
(PDF). American Institute of Chemists. p. 1. Retrieved
July 4, 2014.
[30] US CODE: Title 50 War and National Defense.
.law.cornell.edu. 23 March 2010. Retrieved 5 August
2010.
[31] US CODE: 50, ch. 40Defense Against Weapons of
Mass Destruction. .law.cornell.edu. 23 March 2010.
Retrieved 5 August 2010.

[48] War Pimps, by Jerey St. Clair [Weapons of Mass


Deception: The Uses of Propaganda in President Bush's
War on Iraq, by John Stauber and Sheldon Rampton]".
Theava.com. 13 August 2003. Retrieved 5 August 2010.
[49] Munitions Found in Iraq Meet WMD Criteria, Ocial
Says. US Department of Defense. Retrieved 1 April
2014.
[50] Troops 'foil Iraq nerve gas bid'". BBC. 2 July 2004.
Retrieved 7 December 2007.
[51] American Heritage Dictionary: Weapon of mass destruction

[32] US CODE: 50, ch. 40, 2302. Denitions.


.law.cornell.edu. 23 March 2010. Retrieved 5 August
2010.

[52] 18 U.S.C. 2332A

[33] US CODE: 50, ch. 43Preventing Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism. .law.cornell.edu.
23 March 2010. Retrieved 5 August 2010.

[54] Archived October 22, 2004 at the Wayback Machine by


Prof. Susan Moeller

[34] US CODE: 50, ch. 43; 2902. Denitions.


.law.cornell.edu. 23 March 2010. Retrieved 5 August
2010.
[35] US CODE: Chapter 113BTerrorism. .law.cornell.edu.
28 June 2010. Retrieved 5 August 2010.
[36] US CODE: Title 18, 921.
Denitions.
.law.cornell.edu. 13 September 1994. Retrieved 5
August 2010.

[53] Court case]

[55] Psychological Science Journal Information. Blackwellpublishing.com. Retrieved 5 August 2010.


[56] Misperceptions, the Media and the Iraq War at the
Wayback Machine (archived February 10, 2006), PIPA,
2 October 2003
[57] Report: Hundreds of WMDs Found in Iraq. Fox News.
22 June 2006.
[58] Kay, David. House Armed Services Committee Hearing, 29 June 2006

[37] US CODE: Title 18, 2332a. Use of weapons of mass


destruction. .law.cornell.edu. 28 June 2010. Retrieved
5 August 2010.

[59] Duelfer, Charles. Expert: Iraq WMD Find Did Not Point
to Ongoing Program NPR. 22 June 2006

[38] What is A Weapon of Mass Destruction. Fbi.gov. 30


March 2007. Retrieved 5 August 2010.

[60] Shachtman, Noah (23 October 2010).WikiLeaks Show


WMD Hunt Continued in Iraq With Surprising Results
. Wired.com.

[39] 8/95 Grand Jury Indictment Of McVeigh & Nichols.


Lectlaw.com. Retrieved 5 August 2010.
[40] FindLaw for Legal Professionals Case Law,
Federal and State Resources, Forms, and Code.
Caselaw.lp.ndlaw.com. Retrieved 5 August 2010.
[41] U.S. v. Richard C. Reid (PDF). Retrieved 5 August
2010.
[42] The Free Lance-Star - Jul 14, 1998

[61] CIA's Final Report: No WMD Found in Iraq.


MSNBC. 25 April 2005.
[62] Iraq WMD Inspectors End Search, Find Nothing. Fox
News. 26 April 2005.
[63] wmdawareness.org.uk
[64] John Pike. Sandia National Laboratories News Releases. Globalsecurity.org. Retrieved 5 August 2010.

10

CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW

[65] John Pike. 17 Days in May India Nuclear Forces.


Globalsecurity.org. Retrieved 5 August 2010.

Michael Evans,What makes a weapon one of mass


destruction?" (6 February 2004), The Times.

[66] The Pipa/Knowledge Networks Poll (PDF).


Web.archive.org. 29 September 2005. Archived from
the original (PDF) on 29 September 2005. Retrieved 14
May 2012.

Bruce Schneier, "Denition of 'Weapon of Mass


Destruction'" (6 April 2009), Schneier on Security.

[67] Russian public opinion on nuclear weapons (5 August


2005). Russian public opinion on nuclear weapons
Blog Russian strategic nuclear forces. Russianforces.org. Retrieved 5 August 2010.

Stefano Felician, Le armi di distruzione di massa,


CEMISS, Roma, 2010,
George Moraetes, "'Nuclear Power Plant Cybersecurity'" (30 December 2014), Pulse on LinkedIn Featured in Oil & Energy.

[68] Origin of the Radiation Warning Symbol (Trefoil)".


[69] Biohazard and radioactive Symbol, design and proportions (PDF).
[70] Linda Lodding, "Drop it and Run! New Symbol Warns of
Radiation Dangers and Aims to Save Lives,IAEA Bulletin
482 (March 2007): 7072.
[71] Biohazard Symbol History.

1.1.12

Bibliography

Bentley, Michelle. Weapons of Mass Destruction:


The Strategic Use of a Concept (Routledge, 2014.)
On the usage of the term in American policy
Cirincione, Joseph, ed. Repairing the Regime: Preventing the Spread of Weapons of Mass Destruction
(Routledge, 2014)
Croddy, Eric A. ed. Weapons of Mass Destruction:
An Encyclopedia of Worldwide Policy, Technology,
and History (2 vol 2004); 1024pp excerpt
Curley, Robert, ed. Weapons of Mass Destruction
(Britannica Educational Publishing, 2011)

International law
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540
David P. Fidler, "Weapons of Mass Destruction and
International Law" (February 2003), American Society of International Law.
Joanne Mariner, "FindLaw Forum: Weapons of
mass destruction and international law's principle
that civilians cannot be targeted" (20 November
2001), CNN.
Media
Media Coverage of Weapons of Mass Destruction
at the Wayback Machine (archived February 17,
2006), by Susan D. Moeller, Center for International
and Security Studies at Maryland, 2004.
Memory for fact, ction, and misinformation,
by Stephan Lewandowsky, Werner G.K. Stritzke,
Klaus Oberauer, and Michael Morales, Psychological Science, 16(3): 190195, 2005.

Graham Jr, Thomas, and Thomas Graham. Common sense on weapons of mass destruction (UniverEthics
sity of Washington Press, 2011)
Horowitz, Michael C., and Neil Narang. Poor
Mans atomic bomb? exploring the relationship
betweenweapons of mass destruction.Journal
of Conict Resolution (2013) online
Hutchinson, Robert. Weapons of Mass Destruction:
The no-nonsense guide to nuclear, chemical and biological weapons today (Hachette UK, 2011)

1.1.13

Jacob M. Appel, "Is All Fair in Biological Warfare?,Journal of Medical Ethics, June 2009.
Public perceptions
Steven Kull et al., Americans on WMD Proliferation (15 April 2004), Program on International Policy Attitudes/Knowledge Networks survey.

Further reading

Denition and origin


"WMD: Words of mass dissemination" (12 February 2003), BBC News.
Bentley, Michelle,War and/of Worlds: Constructing WMD in U.S. Foreign Policy,Security Studies
22 (Jan. 2013), 6897.

1.1.14 External links


Journal dedicated to CBRNE issues
United Nations: Disarmament at the Wayback Machine (archived June 24, 2005)
US Department of State at the Wayback Machine
(archived March 13, 2007)

1.1. WEAPON OF MASS DESTRUCTION


Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI)
Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI)
Federation of American Scientists (FAS)
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
GlobalSecurity.org
Avoiding Armageddon, PBS
FAS assessment of countries that own weapons of
mass destruction
National Counterproliferation Center Oce of the
Director of National Intelligence
HLSWatch.com: Homeland Security Watch policy
and current events resource
Oce of the Special Assistant for Chemical Biological Defense and Chemical Demilitarization Programs, Ocial Department of Defense web site that
provides information about the DoD Chemical Biological Defense Program
Terrorism and the Threat From Weapons of Mass
Destruction in the Middle East at the Wayback Machine (archived April 29, 2001)
Iranian Chemical Attacks Victims (Payvand News
Agency)
Iran: 'Forgotten Victims' Of Saddam Hussein Era
Await Justice
Comparison of Chinese, Japanese and Vietnamese
translations
Nuclear Age Peace Foundation
The WMD Awareness Programme, Inspired by the
1995 Nobel Peace Prize winner Professor Sir Joseph
Rotblat, The WMD Awareness Programme is dedicated to providing trustworthy and up to date information on Weapons of Mass Destruction world
wide.
Radius Engineering International Inc. Radius Engineering International Inc, ed. Nuclear Weapons
Eects (PDF). Retrieved 20 December 2010.
These tables describe the eects of various nuclear
blast sizes. All gures are for 15 mph (13 kn; 24
km/h) winds. Thermal burns represent injuries to an
unprotected person. The legend describes the data.
Gareth Porter, Documents linking Iran to nuclear
weapons push may have been fabricated, TheRawStory, 10 November 2008
Gareth Porter, The Iranian Nuke Forgeries: CIA
Determines Documents were Fabricated, CounterPunch, 29 December 2009

11

Chapter 2

Types
2.1 Biological warfare

shorter incubation periods.* [2]

For the use of biological agents by terrorists, see 2.1.1 Overview


bioterrorism.
Germ Warfareredirects here. For the M*A*S*H Oensive biological warfare, including mass production,
episode, see Germ Warfare (M*A*S*H).
stockpiling and use of biological weapons, was outlawed
by the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention (BWC). The
Biological warfare (BW)also known as germ warfare rationale behind this treaty, which has been ratied or ac*
is the use of biological toxins or infectious agents such ceded to by 170 countries as of April 2013, [3] is to preas bacteria, viruses, and fungi with the intent to kill or vent a biological attack which could conceivably result in
incapacitate humans, animals or plants as an act of war. large numbers of civilian casualties and cause severe disBiological weapons (often termedbio-weapons,bi- ruption to economic and societal infrastructure. Many
ological threat agents, or bio-agents) are living countries, including signatories of the BWC, currently
organisms or replicating entities (viruses, which are not pursue research into the defense or protection against
universally considered alive) that reproduce or repli- BW, which is not prohibited by the BWC.
cate within their host victims. Entomological (insect) A nation or group that can pose a credible threat of mass
warfare is also considered a type of biological weapon. casualty has the ability to alter the terms on which other
This type of warfare is distinct from nuclear warfare and nations or groups interact with it. Biological weapons alchemical warfare, which together with biological warfare low for the potential to create a level of destruction and
make up NBC, the military acronym for nuclear, biologi- loss of life far in excess of nuclear, chemical or convencal, and chemical warfare using weapons of mass destruc- tional weapons, relative to their mass and cost of develtion (WMDs). None of these are conventional weapons, opment and storage. Therefore, biological agents may be
which are primarily eective due to their explosive, useful as strategic deterrents in addition to their utility as
kinetic, or incendiary potential.
oensive weapons on the battleeld.* [4]* [5]
Biological weapons may be employed in various ways to As a tactical weapon for military use, a signicant probgain a strategic or tactical advantage over the enemy, ei- lem with a BW attack is that it would take days to
ther by threats or by actual deployments. Like some of be eective, and therefore might not immediately stop
the chemical weapons, biological weapons may also be an opposing force. Some biological agents (smallpox,
useful as area denial weapons. These agents may be lethal pneumonic plague) have the capability of person-toor non-lethal, and may be targeted against a single indi- person transmission via aerosolized respiratory droplets.
vidual, a group of people, or even an entire population. This feature can be undesirable, as the agent(s) may be
They may be developed, acquired, stockpiled or deployed transmitted by this mechanism to unintended populaby nation states or by non-national groups. In the latter tions, including neutral or even friendly forces. While
case, or if a nation-state uses it clandestinely, it may also containment of BW is less of a concern for certain crimibe considered bioterrorism.* [1]
nal or terrorist organizations, it remains a signicant conThere is an overlap between biological warfare and chem- cern for the military and civilian populations of virtually
ical warfare, as the use of toxins produced by living all nations.
organisms is considered under the provisions of both
the Biological Weapons Convention and the Chemical
Toxins and psychochemical 2.1.2 History
Weapons Convention.
weapons are often referred to as midspectrum agents. Unlike bioweapons, these midspectrum agents do not re- Main article: History of biological warfare
produce in their host and are typically characterized by
12

2.1. BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

13

Rudimentary forms of biological warfare have been practiced since antiquity.* [6] During the 6th century BC,
the Assyrians poisoned enemy wells with a fungus that
would render the enemy delirious. In 1346, the bodies of Mongol warriors of the Golden Horde who had
died of plague were thrown over the walls of the besieged
Crimean city of Kaa. Specialists disagree over whether
this operation may have been responsible for the spread
of the Black Death into Europe.* [7]* [8]* [9]* [10]
It has been claimed that the British Marines used
smallpox in New South Wales in 1789.* [11] Historians have long debated inconclusively whether the British
Army used smallpox in an episode against Native Americans in 1763.* [12]
By 1900 the germ theory and advances in bacteriology
brought a new level of sophistication to the techniques for
possible use of bio-agents in war. Biological sabotagein
the form of anthrax and glanderswas undertaken on behalf of the Imperial German government during World
War I (19141918), with indierent results.* [13] The
Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibited the use of chemical
weapons and biological weapons.
With the onset of World War II, the Ministry of Supply in the United Kingdom established a BW program at
Porton Down, headed by the microbiologist Paul Fildes.
The research was championed by Winston Churchill and
soon tularemia, anthrax, brucellosis, and botulism toxins
had been eectively weaponized. In particular, Gruinard
Island in Scotland, during a series of extensive tests
was contaminated with anthrax for the next 56 years.
Although the UK never oensively used the biological
weapons it developed on its own, its program was the rst
to successfully weaponize a variety of deadly pathogens
and bring them into industrial production.* [14]
When the USA entered the war, mounting British pressure for the creation of a similar research program for an
Allied pooling of resources, led to the creation of a large
industrial complex at Fort Detrick, Maryland in 1942 under the direction of George W. Merck.* [15] The biological and chemical weapons developed during that period were tested at the Dugway Proving Grounds in Utah.
Soon there were facilities for the mass production of anthrax spores, brucellosis, and botulism toxins, although
the war was over before these weapons could be of much
operational use.* [16]
The most notorious program of the period was run by
the secret Imperial Japanese Army Unit 731 during the
war, based at Pingfan in Manchuria and commanded by
Lieutenant General Shir Ishii. This unit did research
on BW, conducted often fatal human experiments on
prisoners, and produced biological weapons for combat
use.* [17] Although the Japanese eort lacked the technological sophistication of the American or British programs, it far outstripped them in its widespread application and indiscriminate brutality. Biological weapons
were used against both Chinese soldiers and civilians in

Shiro Ishii, commander of Unit 731, which performed live human vivisections and other biological experimentation.

several military campaigns.* [18] In 1940, the Japanese


Army Air Force bombed Ningbo with ceramic bombs
full of eas carrying the bubonic plague.* [19] Many of
these operations were ineective due to inecient delivery systems,* [17] although up to 400,000 people may
have died.* [20] During the Zhejiang-Jiangxi Campaign
in 1942, around 1,700 Japanese troops died out of a total
10,000 Japanese soldiers who fell ill with disease when
their own biological weapons attack rebounded on their
own forces.* [21]* [22]
During the nal months of World War II, Japan planned
to use plague as a biological weapon against U.S. civilians
in San Diego, California, during Operation Cherry Blossoms at Night. The plan was set to launch on 22 September 1945, but it was not executed because of Japan's surrender on 15 August 1945.* [23]* [24]* [25]* [26]
In Britain, the 1950s saw the weaponization of plague,
brucellosis, tularemia and later equine encephalomyelitis and vaccinia viruses, but the programme was unilaterally cancelled in 1956. The United States Army Biological Warfare Laboratories weaponized anthrax, tularemia,
brucellosis, Q-fever and others.
In 1969, the UK and the Warsaw Pact, separately, introduced proposals to the UN to ban biological weapons, and
US President Richard Nixon terminated production of
biological weapons, allowing only scientic research for
defensive measures. The Biological and Toxin Weapons

14

CHAPTER 2. TYPES

Convention was signed by the US, UK, USSR and other


nations, as a ban ondevelopment, production and stockpiling of microbes or their poisonous products except in
amounts necessary for protective and peaceful research
in 1972. However, the Soviet Union continued research
and production of massive oensive biological weapons
in a program called Biopreparat, despite having signed
the convention.* [27] By 2011, 165 countries had signed
the treaty and none are proventhough nine are still suspected* [28]to possess oensive BW programs.* [28]

2.1.3

Modern BW operations

Oensive
It has been argued that rational people would never use
biological weapons oensively. The argument is that biological weapons cannot be controlled: the weapon could
backre and harm the army on the oensive, perhaps
having even worse eects than on the target. An agent
like smallpox or other airborne viruses would almost certainly spread worldwide and ultimately infect the user's
home country. However, this argument does not necessarily apply to bacteria. For example, anthrax can easily
be controlled and even created in a garden shed; the FBI
suspects it can be done for as little as $2,500 using readily
available laboratory equipment.* [29] Also, using microbial methods, bacteria can be suitably modied to be effective in only a narrow environmental range, the range of
the target that distinctly diers from the army on the offensive. Thus only the target might be aected adversely.
The weapon may be further used to bog down an advancing army making them more vulnerable to counterattack
by the defending force.

Anti-personnel Ideal characteristics of a biological


agent to be used as a weapon against humans are high
infectivity, high virulence, non-availability of vaccines,
and availability of an eective and ecient delivery system. Stability of the weaponized agent (ability of the
agent to retain its infectivity and virulence after a prolonged period of storage) may also be desirable, particularly for military applications, and the ease of creating
one is often considered. Control of the spread of the agent
may be another desired characteristic.
The primary diculty is not the production of the biological agent, as many biological agents used in weapons
can often be manufactured relatively quickly, cheaply and
easily. Rather, it is the weaponization, storage and delivery in an eective vehicle to a vulnerable target that pose
signicant problems.
For example, Bacillus anthracis is considered an eective
agent for several reasons. First, it forms hardy spores,
perfect for dispersal aerosols. Second, this organism is
not considered transmissible from person to person, and
thus rarely if ever causes secondary infections. A pulmonary anthrax infection starts with ordinary inuenzalike symptoms and progresses to a lethal hemorrhagic
mediastinitis within 37 days, with a fatality rate that is
90% or higher in untreated patients.* [30] Finally, friendly
personnel can be protected with suitable antibiotics.
A large-scale attack using anthrax would require the creation of aerosol particles of 1.5 to 5 m: larger particles
would not reach the lower respiratory tract, while smaller
particles would be exhaled back out into the atmosphere.
At this size, conductive powders tend to aggregate because of electrostatic charges, hindering dispersion. So
the material must be treated to insulate and neutralize
the charges. The weaponized agent must be resistant to
degradation by rain and ultraviolet radiation from sunlight, while retaining the ability to eciently infect the
human lung. There are other technological diculties as
well, chiey relating to storage of the weaponized agent.
Agents considered for weaponization, or known to
be weaponized, include bacteria such as Bacillus anthracis, Brucella spp., Burkholderia mallei, Burkholderia
pseudomallei, Chlamydophila psittaci, Coxiella burnetii,
Francisella tularensis, some of the Rickettsiaceae (especially Rickettsia prowazekii and Rickettsia rickettsii),
Shigella spp., Vibrio cholerae, and Yersinia pestis. Many
viral agents have been studied and/or weaponized, including some of the Bunyaviridae (especially Rift Valley fever virus), Ebolavirus, many of the Flaviviridae
(especially Japanese encephalitis virus), Machupo virus,
Marburg virus, Variola virus, and Yellow fever virus.
Fungal agents that have been studied include Coccidioides
spp..* [31]* [32]

The international biological hazard symbol

Toxins that can be used as weapons include ricin,


staphylococcal enterotoxin B, botulinum toxin, saxitoxin,
and many mycotoxins. These toxins and the organisms
that produce them are sometimes referred to as select

2.1. BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

15

agents. In the United States, their possession, use, and Attacking animals is another area of biological warfare
transfer are regulated by the Centers for Disease Control intended to eliminate animal resources for transportaand Prevention's Select Agent Program.
tion and food. In the First World War, German agents
The former US biological warfare program categorized were arrested attempting to inoculate draft animals with
its weaponized anti-personnel bio-agents as either Lethal anthrax, and they were believed to be responsible for
Agents (Bacillus anthracis, Francisella tularensis, Bo- outbreaks of glanders in horses and mules. The British
tulinum toxin) or Incapacitating Agents (Brucella suis, tainted small feed cakes with anthrax in the Second World
Coxiella burnetii, Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus, War as a potential means of attacking German cattle for
food denial, but never employed the weapon. In the
Staphylococcal enterotoxin B).
1950s, the United States had a eld trial with hog cholera.
During the Mau Mau Uprising in 1952, the poisonous
latex of the African milk bush was used to kill cattle.* [34]
Anti-agriculture
Unconnected with inter-human wars, humans have deliberately introduced the rabbit disease Myxomatosis, originating in South America, to Australia and Europe, with
The United States developed an anti-crop capability dur- the intention of reducing the rabbit population which
ing the Cold War that used plant diseases (bioherbicides, had devastating but temporary results, with wild rabbit
or mycoherbicides) for destroying enemy agriculture. Bi- populations reduced to a fraction of their former size but
ological weapons also target sheries as well as water- survivors developing immunity and increasing again.
based vegetation. It was believed that destruction of enemy agriculture on a strategic scale could thwart SinoSoviet aggression in a general war. Diseases such as Entomological warfare Main article: Entomological
wheat blast and rice blast were weaponized in aerial spray warfare
tanks and cluster bombs for delivery to enemy watersheds
in agricultural regions to initiate epiphytotics (epidemics Entomological warfare (EW) is a type of biological waramong plants). When the United States renounced its of- fare that uses insects to attack the enemy. The concept
fensive biological warfare program in 1969 and 1970, the has existed for centuries and research and development
vast majority of its biological arsenal was composed of have continued into the modern era. EW has been used
these plant diseases. Enterotoxins and Mycotoxins were in battle by Japan and several other nations have develnot aected by Nixon's order.
oped and been accused of using an entomological warThough herbicides are chemicals, they are often grouped fare program. EW may employ insects in a direct atwith biological warfare and chemical warfare because tack or as vectors to deliver a biological agent, such as
they may work in a similar manner as biotoxins or bioreg- plague. Essentially, EW exists in three varieties. One
ulators. The Army Biological Laboratory tested each type of EW involves infecting insects with a pathogen and
*
agent and the Army's Technical Escort Unit was respon- then dispersing the insects over target areas. [35] The insible for transport of all chemical, biological, radiologi- sects then act as a vector, infecting any person or animal
cal (nuclear) materials. Scorched earth tactics or destroy- they might bite. Another type of EW is a direct insect
ing livestock and farmland were carried out in the Viet- attack against crops; the insect may not be infected with
nam war (cf. Agent Orange)* [33] and Eelam War in Sri any pathogen but instead represents a threat to agriculture. The nal method uses uninfected insects, such as
Lanka.
bees, wasps, etc., to directly attack the enemy.* [36]
Biological warfare can also specically target plants
to destroy crops or defoliate vegetation. The United
States and Britain discovered plant growth regulators Defensive
(i.e., herbicides) during the Second World War, and initiated a herbicidal warfare program that was eventually Main article: Biodefense
used in Malaya and Vietnam in counterinsurgency operations.
Anti-crop/anti-vegetation/anti-sheries

Anti-livestock
In 1980s Soviet Ministry of Agriculture had successfully developed variants of foot-and-mouth disease, and
rinderpest against cows, African swine fever for pigs, and
psittacosis to kill chicken. These agents were prepared
to spray them down from tanks attached to airplanes over
hundreds of miles. The secret program was code-named
Ecology.* [31]

Research and development into medical countermeasures In 2010 at The Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and Their Destruction
in Geneva* [37] the sanitary epidemiological reconnaissance was suggested as well-tested means for enhancing the monitoring of infections and parasitic agents, for
practical implementation of the International Health Regulations (2005). The aim was to prevent and minimize

16

CHAPTER 2. TYPES

the consequences of natural outbreaks of dangerous in- 6. Stable endemic disease, but with an unexplained infectious diseases as well as the threat of alleged use of crease in relevance.
biological weapons against BTWC States Parties.
7. Rare transmission (aerosols, food, water).
8. No illness presented in people who were/are not exposed to common ventilation systems (have separate
closed ventilation systems) when illness is seen in persons in close proximity who have a common ventilation
system.

Role of public health and disease surveillance It is


important to note that all classical and modern biological weapons organisms can be obtained from plants and
animal who are infected with the diseases, one of the exceptions is, commonly known, smallpox.* [38]
9. Dierent and unexplained diseases coexisting in the
Indeed, in the largest biological weapons accident same patient without any other explanation.
known the anthrax outbreak in Sverdlovsk (now
Yekaterinburg) in the Soviet Union in 1979, sheep became ill with anthrax as far as 200 kilometers from the
release point of the organism from a military facility in
the southeastern portion of the city and still o limits to
visitors today, see Sverdlovsk Anthrax leak).* [39]
Thus, a robust surveillance system involving human clinicians and veterinarians may identify a bioweapons attack
early in the course of an epidemic, permitting the prophylaxis of disease in the vast majority of people (and/or
animals) exposed but not yet ill.
For example, in the case of anthrax, it is likely that by 24
36 hours after an attack, some small percentage of individuals (those with compromised immune system or who
had received a large dose of the organism due to proximity to the release point) will become ill with classical
symptoms and signs (including a virtually unique chest Xray nding, often recognized by public health ocials if
they receive timely reports).* [40] The incubation period
for humans is estimated to be about 11.8 days to 12.1
days. This suggested period is the rst model that is independently consistent with data from the largest known
human outbreak. These projections renes previous estimates of the distribution of early onset cases after a release and supports a recommended 60-day course of prophylactic antibiotic treatment for individuals exposed to
low doses of anthrax.* [41] By making these data available
to local public health ocials in real time, most models of
anthrax epidemics indicate that more than 80% of an exposed population can receive antibiotic treatment before
becoming symptomatic, and thus avoid the moderately
high mortality of the disease.* [40]

10. Rare illness that aects a large, disparate population


(respiratory disease might suggest the pathogen or agent
was inhaled).
11. Illness is unusual for a certain population or age-group
in which it takes presence.
12. Unusual trends of death and/or illness in animal populations, previous to or accompanying illness in humans.
13. Many eected reaching out for treatment at the same
time.
14. Similar genetic makeup of agents in eected individuals.
15. Simultaneous collections of similar illness in noncontiguous areas, domestic, or foreign.
16. An abundance of cases of unexplained diseases and
deaths.

Identication of bioweapons The goal of biodefense


is to integrate the sustained eorts of the national and
homeland security, medical, public health, intelligence,
diplomatic, and law enforcement communities. Health
care providers and public health ocers are among the
rst lines of defense. In some countries private, local,
and provincial (state) capabilities are being augmented by
and coordinated with federal assets, to provide layered
defenses against biological weapon attacks. During the
rst Gulf War the United Nations activated a biological
and chemical response team, Task Force Scorpio, to respond to any potential use of weapons of mass destruction
on civilians.

The traditional approach toward protecting agriculture,


Common epidemiologic clues that may signal biolog- food, and water: focusing on the natural or unintentional
introduction of a disease is being strengthened by focused
ical attack From most specic to least specic:* [42]
eorts to address current and anticipated future biologi1. Single cause of a certain disease caused by an uncom- cal weapons threats that may be deliberate, multiple, and
mon agent, with lack of an epidemiological explantation. repetitive.
2. Unusual, rare, genetically engineered strain of an The growing threat of biowarfare agents and bioterrorism
agent.
has led to the development of specic eld tools that per3. High morbidity and mortality rates in regards to pa- form on-the-spot analysis and identication of encountered suspect materials. One such technology, being detients with the same or similar symptoms.
veloped by researchers from the Lawrence Livermore Na4. Unusual presentation of the disease.
tional Laboratory (LLNL), employs a sandwich immunoassay, in which uorescent dye-labeled antibodies
5. Unusual geographic or seasonal distribution.

2.1. BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

17

aimed at specic pathogens are attached to silver and gold


nanowires.* [43]
In the Netherlands, the company TNO has designed
Bioaerosol Single Particle Recognition eQuipment
(BiosparQ). This system would be implemented into
the national response plan for bioweapon attacks in the
Netherlands.* [44]
Researchers at Ben Gurion University in Israel are developing a dierent device called the BioPen, essentially
a Lab-in-a-Pen, which can detect known biological
agents in under 20 minutes using an adaptation of the
ELISA, a similar widely employed immunological technique, that in this case incorporates ber optics.* [45]
Genetic Warfare
Theoretically, novel approaches in biotechnology,
such as synthetic biology could be used in the future to design novel types of biological warfare
agents.* [46]* [47]* [48]* [49] Special attention has to be
laid on future experiments (of concern) that:* [50]
1. Would demonstrate how to render a vaccine ineective;
2. Would confer resistance to therapeutically useful antibiotics or antiviral agents;
3. Would enhance the virulence of a pathogen or render a nonpathogen virulent;
4. Would increase transmissibility of a pathogen;
5. Would alter the host range of a pathogen;
6. Would enable the evasion of diagnostic/detection
tools;
7. Would enable the weaponization of a biological
agent or toxin
Most of the biosecurity concerns in synthetic biology,
however, focused on the role of DNA synthesis and the
risk of producing genetic material of lethal viruses (e.g.
1918 Spanish u, polio) in the lab.* [51]* [52]* [53]

2.1.4

List of BW institutions, programs,


projects and sites by country

United States
Main article: United States biological weapons program

Researchers working in Class III cabinets at the U.S. Army Biological Warfare Laboratories, Camp Detrick, Maryland (1940s).

Building 470
One-Million-Liter Test Sphere
Operation Whitecoat (195473)
U.S. biological defense program (1956
present)
United States Army Medical Unit (USAMU; 195669)
U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of
Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID; 1969
present)
National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC)
U.S. entomological warfare program

Operation Big Itch


Operation Big Buzz
Operation Drop Kick
Operation May Day

Project Bacchus
Project Clear Vision
Project SHAD
Project 112
Horn Island Testing Station
Fort Terry
Granite Peak Installation
Vigo Ordnance Plant
United Kingdom

Fort Detrick, Maryland

Main article: United Kingdom and weapons of mass


U.S. Army Biological Warfare Laboratories destruction Biological weapons
(194369)

18

CHAPTER 2. TYPES

Porton Down

Japan

Gruinard Island

Main article: Special Research Units

Nancekuke
Operation Vegetarian (1942-1944)
Open-air eld tests:
Operation Harness o Antigua, 19481950.
Operation Cauldron o Stornoway, 1952.
Operation Hesperus o Stornoway, 1953.

Unit 731
Zhongma Fortress
Kaimingjie germ weapon attack
Khabarovsk War Crime Trials
Epidemic Prevention and Water Purication Department

Operation Ozone o Nassau, 1954.


Operation Negation o Nassau, 1954-5.

Iraq

Soviet Union and Russia

Main articles: Iraqi biological weapons program and


Iraq and weapons of mass destruction

Main article: Soviet biological weapons program

(passim)

Biopreparat (18 labs and production centers)


Stepnagorsk Scientic and Technical Institute for Microbiology, Stepnogorsk, northern
Kazakhstan

Al Hakum
Salman Pak facility
Al Manal facility

Institute of Ultra Pure Biochemical Prepara- South Africa


tions, Leningrad, a weaponized plague center
Main article: South Africa and weapons of mass destruc Vector State Research Center of Virology
tion Biological and chemical weapons
and Biotechnology (VECTOR), a weaponized
smallpox center
Institute of Applied Biochemistry, Omutninsk

Project Coast

Kirov bioweapons production facility, Kirov,


Kirov Oblast

Delta G Scientic Company

Zagorsk smallpox production facility, Zagorsk

Roodeplaat Research Laboratories

Berdsk bioweapons production facility, Berdsk

Protechnik

Bioweapons research facility, Obolensk


Sverdlovsk bioweapons production facility Canada
(Military Compound 19), Sverdlovsk, a
Grosse Isle, Quebec, site (193945) of research into
weaponized anthrax center
anthrax and other BW agents
Institute of Virus Preparations
Poison laboratory of the Soviet secret services
Vozrozhdeniya
Project Bonre

Experimental Station Sueld, Sueld, Alberta

2.1.5 List of people associated with BW


2.1.6 In popular culture
Main article: Biological warfare in popular culture

Project Factor

2.1. BIOLOGICAL WARFARE

2.1.7

See also

2.1.8

References

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19

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in Eighteenth-Century North America: Beyond Jeffery Amherst. Journal of American History 86 (4):
15521580. JSTOR 2567577.

[68] MIT Security Studies Program (SSP): Jeanne


Guillemin. MIT. Retrieved 8 March 2010.

Keith, Jim (1999). Biowarfare In America. Illuminet Press. ISBN 1-881532-21-6

[69] Lewis, Paul (4 September 2002). Sheldon Harris, 74,


Historian Of Japan's Biological Warfare. The New York
Times. Retrieved 8 March 2010.
[70] Miller, Judith (2001). Biological Weapons and America's
Secret War. New York: Simon & Schuster. p. 67. ISBN
0-684-87158-0.
[71] Matthew Meselson Harvard Belfer Center for Science and International Aairs. Harvard. Retrieved 8
March 2010.

Chevrier, Marie Isabelle; Chomiczewski, Krzysztof;


Garrigue, Henri, eds. (2004). The Implementation
of Legally Binding Measures to Strengthen the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: Proceedings
of the NATO Advanced Study Institute, Held in Budapest, Hungary, 2001. Volume 150 of NATO science series: Mathematics, physics, and chemistry
(illustrated ed.). Springer. ISBN 140202097X. Retrieved 10 March 2014.
Croddy, Eric A.; Wirtz, James J., eds. (2005).
Weapons of Mass Destruction. Jerey A. Larsen,
Managing Editor. ABC-CLIO. ISBN 1851094903.
Retrieved 10 March 2014.

2.1.9

Further reading

Alibek, K. and S. Handelman. Biohazard: The


Chilling True Story of the Largest Covert Biological
Weapons Program in the World Told from Inside
by the Man Who Ran it. Delta (2000) ISBN 0-38533496-6
Appel, J. M. Is all fair in biological warfare? The
controversy over genetically engineered biological
weapons, Journal of Medical Ethics, Volume 35, pp.
429432 (2009).
Crosby, Alfred W., Ecological Imperialism: The
Biological Expansion of Europe, 9001900 (New
York, 1986).
Dembek, Zygmunt (editor), Medical Aspects of Biological Warfare; Washington, DC: Borden Institute
(2007).

Knollenberg, Bernhard, General Amherst and


Germ Warfare,Mississippi Valley Historical Review
(1954), 41#3 489494. British war against Indians
in 1763 in JSTOR
Leitenberg, Milton, and Raymond A. Zilinskas. The
Soviet Biological Weapons Program: A History (Harvard University Press, 2012) 921 pp
Mangold, Tom and Goldberg, Je (1999). Plague
Wars: a true story of biological warfare. Macmillan,
London. ISBN 0-333-71614-0
Maskiell, Michelle, and Adrienne Mayor. Killer
Khilats: Legends of Poisoned Robes of Honour in
India. Parts 1 & 2.Folklore [London] 112 (Spring
and Fall 2001): 2345, 16382.
Mayor, Adrienne, Greek Fire, Poison Arrows &
Scorpion Bombs: Biological and Chemical Warfare
in the Ancient World. Overlook, 2003, rev. ed.
2009. ISBN 1-58567-348-X.
Orent, Wendy (2004). Plague, The Mysterious Past
and Terrifying Future of the World's Most Dangerous
Disease. Simon & Schuster, Inc., New York, NY.
ISBN 0-7432-3685-8
Pala, Christopher (19??), Anthrax Island
Preston, Richard (2002), The Demon in the Freezer,
New York: Random House.
Rzsa, Lajos (2009).
The motivation for
biological aggression is an inherent and common aspect of the human behavioural repertoire (PDF). Medical Hypotheses 72: 217219.
doi:10.1016/j.mehy.2008.06.047.
Warner, Jerry; Ramsbotham, James; Tunia,
Ewelina; Vadez, James J. (May 2011). Analysis
of the Threat of Genetically Modied Organisms
for Biological Warfare. Washington, DC: National
Defense University. Retrieved 8 March 2015.
Woods, Lt Col Jon B. (ed.), USAMRIIDs Medical
Management of Biological Casualties Handbook, 6th
edition, U.S. Army Medical Institute of Infectious
Diseases, Fort Detrick, Maryland (April 2005).

22

CHAPTER 2. TYPES

Zelico, Alan and Bellomo, Michael (2005). Mi- century. The entire class known as Lethal Unitary Chemcrobe: Are we Ready for the Next Plague?. AMA- ical Agents and Munitions have been scheduled for elimCOM Books, New York, NY. ISBN 0-8144-0865-6 ination by the CWC.* [2]
Under the Convention, chemicals that are toxic enough to
be used as chemical weapons, or that may be used to man2.1.10 External links
ufacture such chemicals, are divided into three groups ac Biological weapons and international humanitarian cording to their purpose and treatment:
law, ICRC
Schedule 1 Have few, if any, legitimate uses.
WHO: Health Aspects of Biological and Chemical
These may only be produced or used for research,
Weapons
medical, pharmaceutical or protective purposes (i.e.
testing of chemical weapons sensors and protective
Biological Warfare.
National Library of
clothing). Examples include nerve agents, ricin,
Medicine. Retrieved 2013-05-28.
lewisite and mustard gas. Any production over 100
U.S Army site
g must be reported to the OPCW and a country can
have a stockpile of no more than one tonne of these
chemicals.

2.2 Chemical warfare

For other uses, see Chemical warfare (disambiguation).

Schedule 2 Have no large-scale industrial uses,


but may have legitimate small-scale uses. Examples
include dimethyl methylphosphonate, a precursor to
sarin also used as a ame retardant, and thiodiglycol,
a precursor chemical used in the manufacture of
mustard gas but also widely used as a solvent in inks.

Chemical warfare (CW) involves using the toxic properties of chemical substances as weapons. This type of
warfare is distinct from nuclear warfare and biological
warfare, which together make up NBC, the military
Schedule 3 Have legitimate large-scale industrial
acronym for nuclear, biological, and chemical (warfare
uses. Examples include phosgene and chloropicrin.
or weapons), all of which are considered "weapons of
Both have been used as chemical weapons but phosmass destruction" (WMDs). None of these fall ungene is an important precursor in the manufacture
der the term conventional weapons which are primarof plastics and chloropicrin is used as a fumigant.
ily eective due to their destructive potential. With
The OPCW must be notied of, and may inspect,
proper protective equipment, training, and decontaminaany plant producing more than 30 tonnes per year.
tion measures, the primary eects of chemical weapons
can be overcome. Many nations possess vast stockpiles of
weaponized agents in preparation for wartime use. The 2.2.2 History
threat and the perceived threat have become strategic
tools in planning both measures and counter-measures.
Ancient times

Chemical weapons have been used for millennia in the


form of poisoned spears and arrows, but evidence can be
found for the existence of more advanced forms of chemChemical warfare is dierent from the use of
conventional weapons or nuclear weapons because ical weapons in ancient and classical times.
the destructive eects of chemical weapons are not Ancient Greek myths about Hercules poisoning his arprimarily due to any explosive force. The oensive rows with the venom of the Hydra monster are the earuse of living organisms (such as anthrax) is considered liest references to toxic weapons in western literature.
biological warfare rather than chemical warfare; how- Homer's epics, the Iliad and the Odyssey, allude to poiever, the use of nonliving toxic products produced by soned arrows used by both sides in the legendary Trojan
living organisms (e.g. toxins such as botulinum toxin, War (Bronze Age Greece).* [3]
ricin, and saxitoxin) is considered chemical warfare un- Some of the earliest surviving references to toxic
der the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention warfare appear in the Indian epics Ramayana and
(CWC). Under this Convention, any toxic chemical, Mahabharata.* [4] TheLaws of Manu,a Hindu treatise
regardless of its origin, is considered a chemical weapon on statecraft (c. 400 BC) forbids the use of poison and re
unless it is used for purposes that are not prohibited (an arrows, but advises poisoning food and water. Kautilya's
important legal denition known as the General Purpose "Arthashastra", a statecraft manual of the same era, conCriterion).* [1]
tains hundreds of recipes for creating poison weapons,

2.2.1

Denition

About 70 dierent chemicals have been used or toxic smokes, and other chemical weapons. Ancient
stockpiled as chemical warfare agents during the 20th Greek historians recount that Alexander the Great en-

2.2. CHEMICAL WARFARE

23

countered poison arrows and re incendiaries in India at Early modern era


the Indus basin in the 4th century BC.* [3]

The Art of War described the use of re weapons against the


enemy.

Arsenical smokes were known to the Chinese as far back


as c. 1000 BC* [5] and Sun Tzu's "Art of War" (c. 200
BC) advises the use of re weapons. In the second century BC, writings of the Mohist sect in China describe
the use of bellows to pump smoke from burning balls
of mustard and other toxic vegetables into tunnels being
dug by a besieging army. Other Chinese writings dating
around the same period contain hundreds of recipes for
the production of poisonous or irritating smokes for use
in war along with numerous accounts of their use. These
accounts describe an arsenic-containing soul-hunting
fog, and the use of nely divided lime dispersed into
the air to suppress a peasant revolt in 178 AD.

Christoph Bernhard von Galen tried using toxic fumes whilst besieging the city of Groningen in 1672.

Historian and philosopher David Hume, in his history of


England, recounts how in the reign of Henry III (r.1216
- 1272) the English Navy destroyed an invading French
eet, by blinding the enemy eet with quicklime,the
old name for calcium oxide. DAlbiney employed a
stratagem against them, which is said to have contributed
to the victory: Having gained the wind of the French,
he came down upon them with violence; and throwing in
The earliest recorded use of gas warfare in the West dates their faces a great quantity of quicklime, which he purback to the fth century BC, during the Peloponnesian posely carried on board, he so blinded them, that they
*
War between Athens and Sparta. Spartan forces besieg- were disabled from defending themselves. [8]
ing an Athenian city placed a lighted mixture of wood, Leonardo da Vinci proposed the use of a powder of sulpitch, and sulfur under the walls hoping that the nox- de, arsenic and verdigris in the 15th century:
ious smoke would incapacitate the Athenians, so that
they would not be able to resist the assault that followed.
throw poison in the form of powder upon galSparta was not alone in its use of unconventional tactics
leys. Chalk, ne sulde of arsenic, and powin ancient Greece; Solon of Athens is said to have used
dered verdegris may be thrown among enemy
hellebore roots to poison the water in an aqueduct leading
ships by means of small mangonels, and all
from the River Pleistos around 590 BC during the siege
those who, as they breathe, inhale the powder
*
of Kirrha. [3]
into their lungs will become asphyxiated.
There is archaeological evidence that the Sasanians deployed chemical weapons against the Roman army in the
third century AD. Research carried out on the collapsed It is unknown whether this powder was ever actually used.
tunnels at Dura-Europos in Syria suggests that the Ira- In the 17th century during sieges, armies attempted to
nians used bitumen and sulfur crystals to get it burn- start res by launching incendiary shells lled with sulfur,
ing. When ignited, the materials gave o dense clouds of tallow, rosin, turpentine, saltpeter, and/or antimony.
choking gases which killed 20 Roman soldiers in a matter Even when res were not started, the resulting smoke
and fumes provided a considerable distraction. Although
of two minutes.* [6]
In the late 15th century, Spanish conquistadors encoun- their primary function was never abandoned, a variety of
tered a rudimentary type of chemical warfare on the is- lls for shells were developed to maximize the eects of
land of Hispaniola. The Tano threw gourds lled with the smoke.
ashes and ground hot peppers at the Spaniards to create a In 1672, during his siege of the city of Groningen,
blinding smoke screen before launching their attack.* [7] Christoph Bernhard von Galen, the Bishop of Mnster,

24

CHAPTER 2. TYPES

employed several dierent explosive and incendiary devices, some of which had a ll that included Deadly
Nightshade, intended to produce toxic fumes. Just three
years later, August 27, 1675, the French and the Holy Roman Empire concluded the Strasbourg Agreement, which
included an article banning the use of perdious and
odioustoxic devices.
Industrial era

men without suering is to be considered illegitimate warfare is incomprehensible. War is


destruction, and the more destructive it can be
made with the least suering the sooner will be
ended that barbarous method of protecting national rights. No doubt in time chemistry will be
used to lessen the suering of combatants, and
even of criminals condemned to death.
Later, during the American Civil War, New York school
teacher John Doughty proposed the oensive use of
chlorine gas, delivered by lling a 10-inch (254 millimeter) artillery shell with two to three quarts (two to three
liters) of liquid chlorine, which could produce many cubic feet (a few cubic meters) of chlorine gas. Doughty
s plan was apparently never acted on, as it was probably* [10] presented to Brigadier General James Wolfe
Ripley, Chief of Ordnance, who was described as being
congenitally immune to new ideas.
A general concern over the use of poison gas manifested
itself in 1899 at the Hague Conference with a proposal
prohibiting shells lled with asphyxiating gas. The proposal was passed, despite a single dissenting vote from
the United States. The American representative, Navy
Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, justied voting against the
measure on the grounds thatthe inventiveness of Americans should not be restricted in the development of new
weapons.
World War I Main article: Chemical weapons in
World War I
The Hague Declaration of 1899 and the Hague Conven-

Lyon Playfair proposed the industrial manufacture of cyanide


artillery shells for use during the Crimean War.

The modern notion of chemical warfare emerged from


the mid-19th century, with the development of modern
chemistry and associated industries. The rst proposal
for the use of chemical warfare was made by Lyon Playfair, Secretary of the Science and Art Department, in
1854 during the Crimean War. He proposed a cacodyl
cyanide artillery shell for use against enemy ships as way
to solve the stalemate during the siege of Sevastopol. The
proposal was backed by Admiral Thomas Cochrane of
the Royal Navy. It was considered by the Prime Minister, Lord Palmerston, but the British Ordnance Department rejected the proposal asas bad a mode of warfare
as poisoning the wells of the enemy.Playfairs response
was used to justify chemical warfare into the next century:
*
[9]
There was no sense in this objection. It is considered a legitimate mode of warfare to ll shells
with molten metal which scatters among the enemy, and produced the most frightful modes of
death. Why a poisonous vapor which would kill

Tear gas casualties from the Battle of Estaires, April 10, 1918.

tion of 1907 forbade the use of poison or poisoned


weaponsin warfare, yet more than 124,000 tons of gas
were produced by the end of World War I. The French
were the rst to use chemical weapons during the First
World War, using the tear gases ethyl bromoacetate and
chloroacetone.
One of Germany's earliest uses of chemical weapons occurred on October 27, 1914 when shells containing the
irritant dianisidine chlorosulfonate were red at British
troops near Neuve-Chapelle, France.* [5] Germany used

2.2. CHEMICAL WARFARE

25
mon disposal method among all the participants in several bodies of water. Over time, the salt water causes
the shell casings to corrode, and mustard gas occasionally
leaks from these containers and washes onto shore as a
wax-like solid resembling ambergris.

Interwar years In 1919, the Royal Air Force dropped


arsenic gas on Bolshevik troops during the British intervention in the Russian Civil War.* [14]
After World War I chemical agents were occasionally
used to subdue populations and suppress rebellion.
A Canadian soldier with mustard gas burns, ca. 19171918.

In 1920, the Arab and Kurdish people of Mesopotamia


revolted against the British occupation, which cost the
British dearly. As the Mesopotamian resistance gained
strength, the British resorted to increasingly repressive
measures. Much speculation was made about aerial bombardment of major cities with gas in Mesopotamia, with
Winston Churchill, then-Secretary of State at the British
War Oce, arguing in favor of gas.* [15]* [16]

another irritant, xylyl bromide, in artillery shells that


were red in January 1915 at the Russians near Bolimw,
in present-day Poland.* [11] The rst full-scale deployment of deadly chemical warfare agents during World
War I was at the Second Battle of Ypres, on April 22,
1915, when the Germans attacked French, Canadian and The Bolsheviks also employed poison gas in 1921 durAlgerian troops with chlorine gas. Deaths were light, ing the Tambov Rebellion. An order signed by milithough casualties relatively heavy.
tary commanders Tukhachevsky and Vladimir AntonovA total 50,965 tons of pulmonary, lachrymatory, and Ovseyenko stipulated: The forests where the bandits are
vesicant agents were deployed by both sides of the con- hiding are to be cleared by the use of poison gas. This must
ict, including chlorine, phosgene, and mustard gas. Of- be carefully calculated, so that the layer of gas penetrates
*
cial gures declare about 1.3 million casualties directly the forests and kills everyone hiding there. [17]
caused by chemical warfare agents during the course of During the Rif War in Spanish Morocco in 19211927,
the war. Of these, an estimated 100,000-260,000 casu- combined Spanish and French forces dropped mustard
alties were civilians. Nearby civilian towns were at risk gas bombs in an attempt to put down the Berber rebelfrom winds blowing the poison gases through. Civilians lion. (See also: Chemical weapons in the Rif War)
rarely had a warning system put into place to alert their
neighbors of the danger. In addition to poor warning sys- In 1925, 16 of the world's major nations signed the
tems, civilians often did not have access to eective gas Geneva Protocol, thereby pledging never to use gas in
warfare again. Notably, while the United States delegamasks.* [12]* [13]
tion under Presidential authority signed the Protocol, it
languished in the U.S. Senate until 1975, when it was nally ratied.
Beginning in the nal week of 1935 and continuing into
1936, Fascist Italy used mustard gas during its invasion
of Ethiopia in the Second Italo-Abyssinian War. Ignoring the Geneva Protocol, which it signed seven years earlier, the Italian military dropped mustard gas in bombs,
sprayed it from airplanes, and spread it in powdered form
on the ground. The Italians inicted a reported 150,000
chemical casualties on the Ethiopians, mostly from mustard gas.
Football team of British soldiers with gas masks, Western Front,
1916.

Nerve agents Shortly after the end of World War I,


Germany's General Sta enthusiastically pursued a recapture of their preeminent position in chemical warfare.
In 1923, Hans von Seeckt pointed the way, by suggesting
that German poison gas research move in the direction of
delivery by aircraft in support of mobile warfare. Also
After the war, most of the unused German chemical war- in 1923, at the behest of the German army, poison gas
fare agents were dumped into the Baltic Sea, a com- expert Dr. Hugo Stoltzenberg negotiated with the USSR
To this day, unexploded World War I-era chemical ammunition is still uncovered when the ground is dug in former battle or depot areas and continues to pose a threat
to the civilian population in Belgium and France and less
commonly in other countries.

26

The chemical structure of sarin nerve gas, developed in Germany


in 1939.

to build a huge chemical weapons plant at Trotsk, on the


Volga river.
Collaboration between Germany and the USSR in poison
gas continued on and o through the 1920s. In 1924,
German ocers debated the use of poison gas versus nonlethal chemical weapons against civilians.

CHAPTER 2. TYPES

Japanese Special Naval Landing Force wearing gas masks and


rubber gloves during a chemical attack near Chapei in the Battle
of Shanghai.* [21]

weapons, such as tear gas, were used only sporadically


in 1937 but in early 1938, the Imperial Japanese Army
began full-scale use of sneeze and nausea gas (red), and
from mid-1939, used mustard gas (yellow) against both
Kuomintang and Communist Chinese troops.* [24]

Chemical warfare was revolutionized by Nazi Germany's


discovery of the nerve agents tabun (in 1937) and sarin According to historians Yoshiaki Yoshimi and Seiya Mat(in 1939) by Gerhard Schrader, a chemist of IG Farben. suno, the chemical weapons were authorized by specic
orders given by Emperor Hirohito himself, transmitted
IG Farben was Germany's premier poison gas manufac- by the chief of sta of the army. For example, the Emturer during World War II, so the weaponization of these peror authorized the use of toxic gas on 375 separate ocagents cannot be considered accidental.* [18] Both were casions during the Battle of Wuhan from August to Octurned over to the German Army Weapons Oce prior tober 1938.* [25] They were also profusely used during
to the outbreak of the war.
the invasion of Changde. Those orders were transmitThe nerve agent soman was later discovered by Nobel ted either by prince Kotohito Kan'in or general Hajime
Prize laureate Richard Kuhn and his collaborator Kon- Sugiyama.* [26] The Imperial Japanese Army had used
rad Henkel at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Medical mustard gas and the US-developed (CWS-1918) blister
Research in Heidelberg in spring 1944.* [19]* [20] The agent lewisite against Chinese troops and guerrillas. ExGermans developed and manufactured large quantities of periments involving chemical weapons were conducted
several agents, but chemical warfare was not extensively on live prisoners (Unit 731 and Unit 516).
used by either side. Chemical troops were set up (in Ger- The Japanese also carried chemical weapons as they
many since 1934) and delivery technology was actively swept through Southeast Asia towards Australia. Some
developed.
of these items were captured and analyzed by the AlWorld War II
Imperial Japanese Army Despite the 1899 Hague
Declaration IV, 2 - Declaration on the Use of Projectiles the Object of Which is the Diusion of Asphyxiating or Deleterious Gases,* [22] Article 23 (a) of the 1907
Hague Convention IV - The Laws and Customs of War
on Land,* [23] and a resolution adopted against Japan by
the League of Nations on May 14, 1938, the Imperial
Japanese Army frequently used chemical weapons. Because of fear of retaliation, however, those weapons were
never used against Westerners, but against other Asians
judged inferiorby imperial propaganda. According
to historians Yoshiaki Yoshimi and Kentaro Awaya, gas

lies. Historian Geo Plunkett has recorded how Australia


covertly imported 1,000,000 chemical weapons from the
United Kingdom from 1942 onwards and stored them
in many storage depots around the country, including
three tunnels in the Blue Mountains to the west of Sydney. They were to be used as a retaliatory measure if
the Japanese rst used chemical weapons.* [27] Buried
chemical weapons have been recovered at Marrangaroo
and Columboola.* [27]* [28]

Nazi Germany Recovered documents suggest that


German intelligence incorrectly thought that the Allies
also knew of the nerve agent compounds, interpreting
their lack of mention in the Allies' scientic journals
as evidence that information about them was being sup-

2.2. CHEMICAL WARFARE

27

The Germans may have used poison gas on survivors from the
Battle of Kerch, May 1942

pressed. Germany ultimately decided not to use the new


nerve agents, fearing a potentially devastating Allied retaliatory nerve agent deployment.* [29]
Stanley P. Lovell, Deputy Director for Research and Development of the Oce of Strategic Services, reports in
his book Of Spies and Stratagems that the Allies knew the
Germans had quantities of Gas Blau available for use in
the defense of the Atlantic Wall. The use of nerve gas on
the Normandy beachhead would have seriously impeded
the Allies and possibly caused the invasion to fail altogether. He submitted the question Why was nerve gas
not used in Normandy?" to be asked of Hermann Gring
during his interrogation. Gring answered that the reason
gas was not used had to do with horses. The Wehrmacht
was dependent upon horse-drawn transport to move supplies to their combat units, and had never been able to
devise a gas mask horses could tolerate; the versions they
developed would not pass enough pure air to allow the
horses to pull a cart. Thus, gas was of no use to the German Army under most conditions.* [30]

The British stockpiled chemical weapons to use in case of a German invasion. Pictured is a chemical warfare bulk contamination vehicle.

planned to use mustard gas and phosgene to help repel a German invasion in 1940-1941,* [33]* [34] and
had there been an invasion may have also deployed it
against German cities.* [35] General Brooke, in command
of British anti-invasion preparations during World War
II said that he "...had every intention of using sprayed
mustard gas on the beaches" in an annotation in his diary.* [36] The British manufactured mustard, chlorine,
lewisite, phosgene and Paris Green and stored them at
airelds and depots for use on the beaches.* [35]

The mustard gas stockpile was enlarged in 1942-1943 for


possible use by Bomber Command against German cities,
One reported incident indicates the German army eventu- and in 1944 for possible retaliatory use if German forces
ally used poison gas on survivors of the Battle of Kerch on used chemical weapons against the D-Day landings.* [33]
the Eastern Crimean peninsula. After the battle in midMay 1942, roughly 3000 soldiers and civilians not evacu- Winston Churchill issued a memorandum advocating a
ated by sea were besieged in a series of caves and tunnels chemical strike on German cities using poison gas and
in the nearby Adzhimuskai quarry. After holding out for possibly anthrax. Although the idea was rejected, it has
*
approximately three months, poison gas was released provoked debate. [37] In July 1944, fearing that rocket
into the tunnels, killing all but a few score of the Soviet attacks on London would get even worse, and saying he
would only use chemical weapons if it werelife or death
defenders.* [31]
for usor would shorten the war by a year,* [38]
In February 1943, German troops stationed in Kuban re- Churchill wrote a secret memorandum asking his miliceived a telegram.* [32]
tary chiefs to think very seriously over this question
of using poison gas.He said it is absurd to consider
morality on this topic when everybody used it in the last
...Russians should be eventually cleared out
war without a word of complaint...
of the mountain range with gas.
The Joint Planning Sta, however, advised against the use
The troops also received two wagons of toxin anti- of gas because it would inevitably provoke Germany to
retaliate with gas. They argued that this would be to the
dotes.* [32]
Allies' disadvantage in France both for military reasons
and because it mightseriously impair our relations with
Western allies The Western allies did not use chemi- the civilian population when it became generally known
cal weapons during the Second World War. The British that chemical warfare was rst employed by us.* [39]

28

CHAPTER 2. TYPES

Accidental release
On the night of December 2, 1943, German Ju 88
bombers attacked the port of Bari in Southern Italy, sinking several American shipsamong them the SS John Harvey, which was carrying mustard gas intended for use in
retaliation by the Allies if German forces initiated gas
warfare. The presence of the gas was highly classied,
and authorities ashore had no knowledge of it, which increased the number of fatalities since physicians, who had
no idea that they were dealing with the eects of mustard gas, prescribed treatment improper for those suering from exposure and immersion.

Porton Down was rst established in 1916 and became the centre

The whole aair was kept secret at the time and for many for the development of chemical weapons.
years after the war. According to the U.S. military account, Sixty-nine deaths were attributed in whole or in
part to the mustard gas, most of them American merchant
seamen* [40] out of 628 mustard gas military casual- tories of Imperial Chemical Industries was investigating
a class of organophosphate compounds (organophosphate
ties.* [41]
esters of substituted aminoethanethiols),* [44] for use as
The large number of civilian casualties among the Italian a pesticide. In 1954, ICI put one of them on the marpopulation was not recorded. Part of the confusion and ket under the trade name Amiton. It was subsequently
controversy derives from the fact that the German attack withdrawn, as it was too toxic for safe use.
was highly destructive and lethal in itself, also apart from
the accidental additional eects of the gas (the attack was The toxicity did not go unnoticed, and samples of it were
nicknamedThe Little Pearl Harbor), and attribution of sent to the research facility at Porton Down for evaluation.
the causes of death between the gas and other causes is far After the evaluation was complete, several members of
from easy.* [42]* [43] Rick Atkinson, in his book The Day this class of compounds were developed into a new group
of Battle, describes the intelligence that prompted Allied of much more lethal nerve agents, the V agents. The bestleaders to deploy mustard gas to Italy. This included Ital- known of these is probably VX, assigned the UK Rainbow
ian intelligence that Adolf Hitler had threatened to use Code Purple Possum, with the Russian V-Agent coming
*
gas against Italy if the state changed sides, and prisoner a close second (Amiton is largely forgotten as VG). [45]
of war interrogations suggesting that preparations were On the defensive side, there were years of dicult work
being made to use anew, egregiously potent gasif the to develop the means of prophylaxis, therapy, rapid dewar turned decisively against Germany. Atkinson con- tection and identication, decontamination and more efcludes,No commander in 1943 could be cavalier about fective protection of the body against nerve agents, caa manifest threat by Germany to use gas.
pable of exerting eects through the skin, the eyes and
respiratory tract.
Post-war
After World War II, the Allies recovered German artillery
shells containing the three German nerve agents of the
day (tabun, sarin, and soman), prompting further research
into nerve agents by all of the former Allies.

Tests were carried out on servicemen to determine the


eects of nerve agents on human subjects, with one
recorded death due to a nerve gas experiment. There have
been persistent allegations of unethical human experimentation at Porton Down, such as those relating to the
death of Leading Aircraftman Ronald Maddison, aged
20, in 1953. Maddison was taking part in sarin nerve
agent toxicity tests. Sarin was dripped onto his arm and
he died shortly afterwards.* [46]

Although the threat of global thermonuclear war was


foremost in the minds of most during the Cold War, both
the Soviet and Western governments put enormous resources into developing chemical and biological weapons. In the 1950s the Chemical Defence Experimental Establishment became involved with the development of CS, a
riot control agent, and took an increasing role in trauma
Britain In the late 1940s and early 1950s, British post- and wound ballistics work. Both these facets of Porton
war chemical weapons research was based at the Porton Down's work had become more important because of the
Down facility. Research was aimed at providing Britain situation in Northern Ireland.* [47]
with the means to arm itself with a modern nerve agent In the early 1950s, nerve agents such as sarin were probased capability and to develop specic means of defence duced in small quantitiesabout 20 tons were made from
against these agents.
1954 until 1956. CDE Nancekuke was an important facRanajit Ghosh, a chemist at the Plant Protection Labora- tory for stockpiling chemical weapons. Small amounts

2.2. CHEMICAL WARFARE

29

of VX were produced there, mainly for laboratory test


purposes, but also to validate plant designs and optimise
chemical processes for potential mass production. However, full-scale mass production of VX agent never took
place, with the 1956 decision to end the UK's oensive
chemical weapons programme.* [48] In the late 1950s,
the chemical weapons production plant at Nancekuke was
mothballed, but was maintained through the 1960s and
1970s in a state whereby production of chemical weapons
could easily re-commence if required.* [49]

sonal Protective Technology Laboratory (NPPTL), along


with the U.S. Army Research, Development and Engineering Command (RDECOM), Edgewood Chemical
and Biological Center (ECBC), and the U.S. Department
of Commerce National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) published the rst of six technical performance standards and test procedures designed to evaluate
and certify respirators intended for use by civilian emergency responders to a chemical, biological, radiological,
or nuclear weapon release, detonation, or terrorism incident.

United States In 1952, the U.S. Army patented a process for the Preparation of Toxic Ricin", publishing a method of producing this powerful toxin. In
1958 the British government traded their VX technology with the United States in exchange for information on
thermonuclear weapons. By 1961 the U.S. was producing large amounts of VX and performing its own nerve
agent research. This research produced at least three
more agents; the four agents (VE, VG, VM, VX) are collectively known as theV-Seriesclass of nerve agents.

To date NIOSH/NPPTL has published six new respirator


performance standards based on a tiered approach that
relies on traditional industrial respirator certication policy, next-generation emergency response respirator performance requirements, and special live chemical warfare agent testing requirements of the classes of respirators identied to oer respiratory protection against
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)
agent inhalation hazards. These CBRN respirators are
commonly known as open-circuit self-contained breathing apparatus (CBRN SCBA), air-purifying respirator
(CBRN APR), air-purifying escape respirator (CBRN
APER), self-contained escape respirator (CBRN SCER)
and loose- or tight-tting powered air-purifying respirators (CBRN PAPR). Current NIOSH-approved/certied
CBRN respirator concept standards and test procedures
can be found at the webpage.* [52]

Between 1951 and 1969, Dugway Proving Ground was


the site of testing for various chemical and biological
agents, including an open-air aerodynamic dissemination test in 1968 that accidentally killed, on neighboring farms, approximately 6,400 sheep by an unspecied
nerve agent.* [50]

From 1962 to 1973, the Department of Defense planned


134 tests under Project 112, a chemical and biological
weapons vulnerability-testing program.In 2002, the
Soviet Union There were numerous reports of chemPentagon admitted for the rst time that some of tests
ical weapons being used during the Soviet war in
used real chemical and biological weapons, not just harmAfghanistan, sometimes against civilians.* [53]* [54]
less simulants.* [51]
Due to the secrecy of the Soviet Union's government,
Specically under Project SHAD, 37 secret tests were
very little information was available about the direction
conducted in California, Alaska, Florida, Hawaii, Maryand progress of the Soviet chemical weapons until relaland and Utah. Land tests in Alaska and Hawaii used
tively recently. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russian
artillery shells lled with sarin and VX, while Navy trichemist Vil Mirzayanov published articles revealing illeals o the coasts of Florida, California and Hawaii tested
gal chemical weapons experimentation in Russia.
the ability of ships and crew to perform under biological and chemical warfare, without the crew's knowledge. In 1993, Mirzayanov was imprisoned and red from his
The code name for the sea tests was Project Shipboard job at the State Research Institute of Organic Chemistry
and Technology, where he had worked for 26 years. In
Hazard and Defense"SHADfor short.* [51]
March 1994, after a major campaign by U.S. scientists
In October 2002, the Senate Armed Forces Subcomon his behalf, Mirzayanov was released.* [55]
mittee on Personnel held hearings as the controversial
news broke that chemical agents had been tested on thou- Among the information related by Vil Mirzayanov was
sands of American military personnel. The hearings were the direction of Soviet research into the development of
chaired by Senator Max Cleland, former VA administra- even more toxic nerve agents, which saw most of its success during the mid-1980s. Several highly toxic agents
tor and Vietnam War veteran.
were developed during this period; the only unclassiUnited States chemical respiratory protection stan- ed information regarding these agents is that they are
dardization
known in the open literature only as Foliantagents
(named after the program under which they were develvarious code designations, such as A-230
In December 2001, the United States Department of oped) and by
*
[56]
and
A-232.
Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), National Institute for Occu- According to Mirzayanov, the Soviets also developed
pational Safety and Health (NIOSH), and National Per- weapons that were safer to handle, leading to the develop-

30
ment of the binary weapons, in which precursors for the
nerve agents are mixed in a munition to produce the agent
just prior to its use. Because the precursors are generally
signicantly less hazardous than the agents themselves,
this technique makes handling and transporting the munitions a great deal simpler.
Additionally, precursors to the agents are usually much
easier to stabilize than the agents themselves, so this technique also made it possible to increase the shelf life of the
agents a great deal. During the 1980s and 1990s, binary
versions of several Soviet agents were developed and are
designated as "Novichok" agents (after the Russian word
for newcomer).* [57] Together with Lev Fedorov, he
told the secret Novichok story exposed in the newspaper
The Moscow News.* [58]
Use in post-WWII conicts
Stalag 13 prison camp The earliest successful use of
chemical agents in a non-combat setting was in 1946.
Motivated by a desire to obtain revenge on Germans for
the Holocaust, three members of a Jewish group calling
themselves Dahm Y'Israel Nokeam (Avenging Israel's
Blood) hid in a bakery in the Stalag 13 prison camp
near Nuremberg, Germany, where several thousand SS
troops were being detained. The three applied an arseniccontaining mixture to loaves of bread, sickening more
than 2,000 Nazi troops, of whom more than 200 required
hospitalization.

CHAPTER 2. TYPES
been experimental, and the bombs were described as
home-made, amateurish and relatively ineective. The
Egyptian authorities suggested that the reported incidents
were probably caused by napalm, not gas.
There were no reports of gas during 1964, and only a
few were reported in 1965. The reports grew more frequent in late 1966. On December 11, 1966, fteen gas
bombs killed two people and injured thirty-ve. On January 5, 1967, the biggest gas attack came against the village of Kitaf, causing 270 casualties, including 140 fatalities. The target may have been Prince Hassan bin Yahya,
who had installed his headquarters nearby. The Egyptian government denied using poison gas, and alleged that
Britain and the US were using the reports as psychological warfare against Egypt. On February 12, 1967, it said
it would welcome a UN investigation. On March 1, U
Thant, the then Secretary-General of the United Nations,
said he was powerlessto deal with the matter.
On May 10, 1967 the twin villages of Gahar and Gadafa
in Wadi Hirran, where Prince Mohamed bin Mohsin was
in command, were gas bombed, killing at least seventyve. The Red Cross was alerted and on June 2, 1967,
it issued a statement in Geneva expressing concern. The
Institute of Forensic Medicine at the University of Berne
made a statement, based on a Red Cross report, that the
gas was likely to have been halogenous derivativesphosgene, mustard gas, lewisite, chloride or cyanogen bromide.
The gas attacks stopped for three weeks after the SixDay War of June, but resumed in July, against all parts
of royalist Yemen. Casualty estimates vary, and an assumption, considered conservative, is that the mustardand-phosgene-lled aerial bombs caused approximately
1,500 fatalities and 1,500 injuries.

Vietnamese border raids in Thailand There is


some evidence suggesting that Vietnamese troops used
phosgene gas against Cambodian resistance forces in
Thailand during the 1984-1985 dry-season oensive on
the Thai-Cambodian border.* [59]* [60]* [61]

IranIraq War

The International Red Cross hospital at Uqd, North Yemen,


where the use of chemical weapons was alleged to have occurred.

North Yemen The rst attack of the North Yemen


Civil War took place on June 8, 1963 against Kawma,
a village of about 100 inhabitants in northern Yemen,
killing about seven people and damaging the eyes and
lungs of 25 others. This incident is considered to have

See also: Iraqi chemical warfare

The IranIraq War began in 1980 when Iraq attacked


Iran. Starting from 1983, Iraq began to employ mustard gas and tabun delivered by bombs dropped from airplanes; approximately ve percent of all Iranian casualties
are directly attributable to the use of these agents.
Chemical weapons employed by Saddam Hussein killed
and injured numerous Iranians and Iraqi Kurds. According to Iraqi documents, assistance in developing chemical weapons was obtained from rms in many countries, including the United States, West Germany, the
Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and France.* [62]

2.2. CHEMICAL WARFARE


About 100,000 Iranian soldiers were victims of Iraq's
chemical attacks. Many were hit by mustard gas. The
ocial estimate does not include the civilian population
contaminated in bordering towns or the children and relatives of veterans, many of whom have developed blood,
lung and skin complications, according to the Organization for Veterans. Nerve gas agents killed about 20,000
Iranian soldiers immediately, according to ocial reports. Of the 80,000 survivors, some 5,000 seek medical
treatment regularly and about 1,000 are still hospitalized
with severe, chronic conditions.* [63]* [64]* [65]

31
its own chemical weapons program remained uncertain,
South Africa also deceptively bombarded Cuban and Angolan units with coloured smoke in an attempt to induce
hysteria or mass panic.* [69] According to Defence Minister Magnus Malan, this would force the Cubans to share
the inconvenience of having to take preventative measures such as donning NBC suits, which would cut combat
eectiveness in half. The tactic was eective: beginning
in early 1988 Cuban units posted to Angola were issued
with full protective gear in anticipation of a South African
chemical strike.* [69]

On 29 October 1988, personnel attached to Angola's


59 Brigade, accompanied by six Soviet military adviHalabja Main article: Halabja poison gas attack
sors, reported being struck with chemical weapons on
the banks of the Mianei River.* [71] The attack occurred
Shortly before the war ended in 1988, the Iraqi Kurdish shortly after one in the afternoon. Four Angolan soldiers
village of Halabja was exposed to multiple chemical lost consciousness while the others complained of violent
agents, killing about 5,000 of the town's 50,000 resi- headaches and nausea. That November the Angolan repdents.* [66]
resentative to the UN accused South Africa of employing
During the Gulf War in 1991, Coalition forces began a poison gas near Cuito Cuanavale for the rst time.* [71]
ground war in Iraq. Despite the fact that they did possess chemical weapons, Iraq did not use any chemical
Falklands War Technically, the reported employment
agents against coalition forces. The commander of the
of tear gas by Argentine forces during the 1982 invaAllied Forces, General Norman Schwarzkopf, suggested
sion of the Falkland Islands constitutes chemical warthis may have been due to Iraqi fear of retaliation with
fare.* [72] However, the tear gas grenades were employed
nuclear weapons.
as nonlethal weapons to avoid British casualties. The barrack buildings the weapons were used on proved to be
Angola During the Cuban intervention in Angola, deserted in any case. The British claim that more lethal,
United Nations toxicologists certied that residue from but legally justiable as they are not considered chemical
both VX and sarin nerve agents had been discovered weapons under the Chemical Weapons Convention, white
*
in plants, water, and soil where Cuban units were con- phosphorus grenades were used. [73]
ducting operations against National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) insurgents.* [67] In Syrian Civil War
1985, UNITA made the rst of several claims that their
forces were the target of chemical weapons, specically
organophosphates. The following year guerrillas reported
being bombarded with an unidentied greenish-yellow
agent on three separate occasions. Depending on the
length and intensity of exposure, victims suered blindness or death. The toxin was also observed to have killed
plant life.* [68] Shortly afterwards, UNITA also sighted
strikes carried out with a brown agent which it claimed
resembled mustard gas.* [69] As early as 1984 a research
team dispatched by the University of Ghent had examined patients in UNITA eld hospitals showing signs of Some of the victims of the Ghouta, Syria attack, 21 August 2013
exposure to nerve agents, although it found no evidence
Main article: Syrian Civil War Chemical weapons
of mustard gas.* [70]
The UN rst accused Cuba of deploying chemical
weapons against Angolan civilians and partisans in
1988.* [67] Wouter Basson later disclosed that South
African military intelligence had long veried the use
of unidentied chemical weapons on Angolan soil; this
was to provide the impetus for their own biological warfare programme, Project Coast.* [67] During the Battle
of Cuito Cuanavale, South African troops then ghting
in Angola were issued with gas masks and ordered to rehearse chemical weapons drills. Although the status of

Terrorism
For many terrorist organizations, chemical weapons
might be considered an ideal choice for a mode of attack,
if they are available: they are cheap, relatively accessible, and easy to transport. A skilled chemist can readily synthesize most chemical agents if the precursors are
available.

32
In July 1974, a group calling themselves the Aliens of
America successfully rebombed the houses of a judge,
two police commissioners, and one of the commissioners cars, burned down two apartment buildings,
and bombed the Pan Am Terminal at Los Angeles International Airport, killing three people and injuring eight.
The organization, which turned out to be a single resident
alien named Muharem Kurbegovic, claimed to have developed and possessed a supply of sarin, as well as four
unique nerve agents named AA1, AA2, AA3, and AA4S.
Although no agents were found at the time Kurbegovic
was arrested in August 1974, he had reportedly acquired
all but oneof the ingredients required to produce a
nerve agent. A search of his apartment turned up a variety of materials, including precursors for phosgene and a
drum containing 25 pounds of sodium cyanide.* [74]

CHAPTER 2. TYPES
In early 2007, multiple terrorist bombings had been reported in Iraq using chlorine gas. These attacks wounded
or sickened more than 350 people. Reportedly the
bombers were aliated with Al-Qaeda in Iraq,* [77] and
they have used bombs of various sizes up to chlorine
tanker trucks.* [78] United Nations Secretary-General
Ban Ki-moon condemned the attacks asclearly intended
to cause panic and instability in the country.* [79]
Chemical weapons treaties
See also: Destruction of chemical weapons and Chemical
Weapons Convention
The Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and the Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, or the Geneva Protocol, is an international treaty which prohibits the use of chemical and
biological weapons in warfare. Signed into international
Law at Geneva on June 17, 1925 and entered into force
on February 8, 1928, this treaty states that chemical and
biological weapons arejustly condemned by the general
opinion of the civilised world.* [80]

U.S. Navy Seabees don their MCU-2P gas masks

The rst successful use of chemical agents by terrorists against a general civilian population was on June
27, 1994, when Aum Shinrikyo, an apocalyptic group
based in Japan that believed it necessary to destroy the
planet, released sarin gas in Matsumoto, Japan, killing
eight and harming 200. The following year, Aum Shinrikyo released sarin into the Tokyo subway system killing
12 and injuring over 5,000.
States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention. Light colOn 29 December 1999, four days after Russian forces ored territories are those states parties that have declared stockbegan an assault of Grozny, Chechen terrorists exploded piles of chemical weapons and/or have known production faciltwo chlorine tanks in the town. Because of the wind con- ities for chemical weapons.
ditions, no Russian soldiers were injured.* [75]
Chemical Weapons Convention The most recent
In 2001, after carrying out the attacks in New York City arms control agreement in International Law, the Conon September 11, the organization Al-Qaeda announced vention of the Prohibition of the Development, Producthat they were attempting to acquire radiological, biolog- tion, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on
ical and chemical weapons. This threat was lent a great their Destruction, or the Chemical Weapons Convention,
deal of credibility when a large archive of videotapes was outlaws the production, stockpiling, and use of chemobtained by the cable television network CNN in August ical weapons. It is administered by the Organisation
2002 showing, among other things, the killing of three for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), an
dogs by an apparent nerve agent.* [76]
intergovernmental organisation based in The Hague.* [81]
On October 26, 2002, Russian special forces used
a chemical agent (presumably KOLOKOL-1, an
aerosolized fentanyl derivative), as a precursor to an 2.2.3 Technology
assault on Chechen terrorists, ending the Moscow theater
hostage crisis. All 42 of the terrorists and 120 out of 850 Although crude chemical warfare has been employed in
hostages were killed during the raid. Of the hostages many parts of the world for thousands of years,* [82]
who died, all but one or two died from the eects of the modernchemical warfare began during World War I see Chemical weapons in World War I.
agent.

2.2. CHEMICAL WARFARE

33
agent (CWA). About 70 dierent chemicals have been
used or stockpiled as chemical warfare agents during the
20th and 21st centuries. These agents may be in liquid,
gas or solid form. Liquid agents that evaporate quickly are
said to be volatile or have a high vapor pressure. Many
chemical agents are made volatile so they can be dispersed over a large region quickly.
The earliest target of chemical warfare agent research was
not toxicity, but development of agents that can aect a
target through the skin and clothing, rendering protective
gas masks useless. In July 1917, the Germans employed
mustard gas. Mustard gas easily penetrates leather and
fabric to inict painful burns on the skin.
Chemical warfare agents are divided into lethal and incapacitating categories. A substance is classied as incapacitating if less than 1/100 of the lethal dose causes incapacitation, e.g., through nausea or visual problems. The
distinction between lethal and incapacitating substances
is not xed, but relies on a statistical average called the
LD50 .

A Swedish Army soldier wearing a chemical agent protective suit


(C-vtskeskydd) and protection mask (skyddsmask 90).

Initially, only well-known commercially available chemicals and their variants were used. These included chlorine
and phosgene gas. The methods used to disperse these
agents during battle were relatively unrened and inefcient. Even so, casualties could be heavy, due to the
mainly static troop positions which were characteristic
features of trench warfare.

Persistency Chemical warfare agents can be classied


according to their persistency, a measure of the length of
time that a chemical agent remains eective after dissemination. Chemical agents are classied as persistent
or nonpersistent.
Agents classied as nonpersistent lose eectiveness after
only a few minutes or hours or even only a few seconds.
Purely gaseous agents such as chlorine are nonpersistent,
as are highly volatile agents such as sarin. Tactically, nonpersistent agents are very useful against targets that are to
be taken over and controlled very quickly.
Apart from the agent used, the delivery mode is very important. To achieve a nonpersistent deployment, the agent
is dispersed into very small droplets comparable with the
mist produced by an aerosol can. In this form not only
the gaseous part of the agent (around 50%) but also the
ne aerosol can be inhaled or absorbed through pores in
the skin.

Germany, the rst side to employ chemical warfare on


the battleeld,* [83] simply opened canisters of chlorine
upwind of the opposing side and let the prevailing winds
do the dissemination. Soon after, the French modied
artillery munitions to contain phosgene a much more
eective method that became the principal means of delivery.* [84]
Modern doctrine requires very high concentrations alSince the development of modern chemical warfare in most instantly in order to be eective (one breath should
World War I, nations have pursued research and devel- contain a lethal dose of the agent). To achieve this, the
opment on chemical weapons that falls into four major primary weapons used would be rocket artillery or bombs
categories: new and more deadly agents; more ecient and large ballistic missiles with cluster warheads. The
methods of delivering agents to the target (dissemina- contamination in the target area is only low or not existion); more reliable means of defense against chemical tent and after four hours sarin or similar agents are not
weapons; and more sensitive and accurate means of de- detectable anymore.
tecting chemical agents.
By contrast, persistent agents tend to remain in the environment for as long as several weeks, complicating decontamination. Defense against persistent agents requires
Chemical warfare agents
shielding for extended periods of time. Non-volatile liquid agents, such as blister agents and the oily VX nerve
agent, do not easily evaporate into a gas, and therefore
See also: List of chemical warfare agents
present primarily a contact hazard.
A chemical used in warfare is called a chemical warfare The droplet size used for persistent delivery goes up to

34

CHAPTER 2. TYPES

1 mm increasing the falling speed and therefore about


80% of the deployed agent reaches the ground, resulting
in heavy contamination. Deployment of persistent agents
is intended to constrain enemy operations by denying access to contaminated areas.

Most chemical weapons are assigned a one- to three-letter


"NATO weapon designationin addition to, or in place
of, a common name. Binary munitions, in which precursors for chemical warfare agents are automatically mixed
in shell to produce the agent just prior to its use, are inPossible targets include enemy ank positions (averting dicated by a "2following the agent's designation (for
possible counterattacks), artillery regiments, commando example, GB-2 and VX-2).
posts or supply lines. Because it is not necessary to deliver Some examples are given below:
large quantities of the agent in a short period of time, a
wide variety of weapons systems can be used.
Delivery
A special form of persistent agents are thickened agents.
These comprise a common agent mixed with thickeners
The most important factor in the eectiveness of chemto provide gelatinous, sticky agents. Primary targets for
ical weapons is the eciency of its delivery, or dissemithis kind of use include airelds, due to the increased pernation, to a target. The most common techniques include
sistency and diculty of decontaminating aected areas.
munitions (such as bombs, projectiles, warheads) that allow dissemination at a distance and spray tanks which disseminate from low-ying aircraft. Developments in the
Classes Chemical weapons are inert agents that come
techniques of lling and storage of munitions have also
*
in four categories: choking, blister, blood and nerve. [85]
been important.
The agents are organized into several categories according to the manner in which they aect the human body. Although there have been many advances in chemiThe names and number of categories varies slightly from cal weapon delivery since World War I, it is still difsource to source, but in general, types of chemical war- cult to achieve eective dispersion. The dissemination is highly dependent on atmospheric conditions befare agents are as follows:
cause many chemical agents act in gaseous form. Thus,
There are other chemicals used militarily that are not
weather observations and forecasting are essential to opscheduled by the Chemical Weapons Convention, and
timize weapon delivery and reduce the risk of injuring
thus are not controlled under the CWC treaties. These
friendly forces.
include:
Defoliants and herbicides that destroy vegetation,
but are not immediately toxic or poisonous to human beings. Their use is classied as herbicidal warfare. Some batches of Agent Orange, for instance,
used by the British during the Malayan Emergency
and the United States during the Vietnam War, contained dioxins as manufacturing impurities. Dioxins, rather than Agent Orange itself, have long-term
cancer eects and for causing genetic damage lead- Dispersion of chlorine in World War I
ing to serious birth deformities.
Dispersion Dispersion is placing the chemical agent
Incendiary or explosive chemicals (such as napalm, upon or adjacent to a target immediately before dissemiextensively used by the United States during the nation, so that the material is most eciently used. DisKorean War and the Vietnam War, or dynamite) be- persion is the simplest technique of delivering an agent to
cause their destructive eects are primarily due to its target. The most common techniques are munitions,
re or explosive force, and not direct chemical ac- bombs, projectiles, spray tanks and warheads.
tion. Their use is classied as conventional warfare.
World War I saw the earliest implementation of this technique. The actual rst chemical ammunition was the
Viruses, bacteria, or other organisms. Their use is
French 26 mm cartouche suocante rie grenade, red
classied as biological warfare. Toxins produced by
from a are carbine. It contained 35g of the tear-producer
living organisms are considered chemical weapons,
ethyl bromoacetate, and was used in autumn 1914 with
although the boundary is blurry. Toxins are covered
little eect on the Germans.
by the Biological Weapons Convention.
The Germans on the other hand tried to increase the
eect of 10.5 cm shrapnel shells by adding an irritant
Designations For more details on this topic, see dianisidine chlorosulfonate. Its use went unnoticed
chemical weapon designation.
by the British when it was used against them at Neuve
Chapelle in October 1914. Hans Tappen, a chemist in

2.2. CHEMICAL WARFARE


the Heavy Artillery Department of the War Ministry, suggested to his brother, the Chief of the Operations Branch
at German General Headquarters, the use of the teargases benzyl bromide or xylyl bromide.

35
creased the eective range of gas, making any target
within reach of guns vulnerable. Second, gas shells could
be delivered without warning, especially the clear, nearly
odorless phosgene there are numerous accounts of gas
shells, landing with a ploprather than exploding, being initially dismissed as dud high explosive or shrapnel
shells, giving the gas time to work before the soldiers were
alerted and took precautions.

Shells were tested successfully at the Wahn artillery range


near Cologne on 9 January 1915, and an order was placed
for 15 cm howitzer shells, designated T-shellsafter
Tappen. A shortage of shells limited the rst use against
the Russians at Bolimw on 31 January 1915; the liquid The major drawback of artillery delivery was the difailed to vaporize in the cold weather, and again the ex- culty of achieving a killing concentration. Each shell had
periment went unnoticed by the Allies.
a small gas payload and an area would have to be subThe rst eective use were when the German forces at jected to saturation bombardment to produce a cloud to
the Second Battle of Ypres simply opened cylinders of match cylinder delivery. A British solution to the problem
chlorine and allowed the wind to carry the gas across en- was the Livens Projector. This was eectively a largeemy lines. While simple, this technique had numerous bore mortar, dug into the ground that used the gas cylindisadvantages. Moving large numbers of heavy gas cylin- ders themselves as projectiles - ring a 14 kg cylinder up
ders to the front-line positions from where the gas would to 1500 m. This combined the gas volume of cylinders
with the range of artillery.
be released was a lengthy and dicult logistical task.
Over the years, there were some renements in this technique. In the 1950s and early 1960s, chemical artillery
rockets and cluster bombs contained a multitude of submunitions, so that a large number of small clouds of the
chemical agent would form directly on the target.

Aerial photograph of a German gas attack on Russian forces


circa 1916

Stockpiles of cylinders had to be stored at the front line,


posing a great risk if hit by artillery shells. Gas delivery depended greatly on wind speed and direction. If the
wind was ckle, as at Loos, the gas could blow back, causing friendly casualties.
Gas clouds gave plenty of warning, allowing the enemy
time to protect themselves, though many soldiers found
the sight of a creeping gas cloud unnerving. This made An American-made MC-1 gas bomb
the gas doubly eective, as, in addition to damaging the
enemy physically, it also had a psychological eect on the Thermal dissemination Thermal dissemination is the
intended victims.
use of explosives or pyrotechnics to deliver chemical
Another disadvantage was that gas clouds had limited agents. This technique, developed in the 1920s, was a
penetration, capable only of aecting the front-line major improvement over earlier dispersal techniques, in
trenches before dissipating. Although it produced limited that it allowed signicant quantities of an agent to be disresults in World War I, this technique shows how simple seminated over a considerable distance. Thermal dissemination remains the principal method of disseminating
chemical weapon dissemination can be.
Shortly after thisopen canisterdissemination, French chemical agents today.
forces developed a technique for delivery of phosgene
in a non-explosive artillery shell. This technique overcame many of the risks of dealing with gas in cylinders.
First, gas shells were independent of the wind and in-

Most thermal dissemination devices consist of a bomb or


projectile shell that contains a chemical agent and a central burstercharge; when the burster detonates, the
agent is expelled laterally.

36
Thermal dissemination devices, though common, are not
particularly ecient. First, a percentage of the agent is
lost by incineration in the initial blast and by being forced
onto the ground. Second, the sizes of the particles vary
greatly because explosive dissemination produces a mixture of liquid droplets of variable and dicult to control
sizes.

CHAPTER 2. TYPES
and velocity, and the direction and velocity of the aircraft
greatly inuence particle size. There are other drawbacks
as well; ideal deployment requires precise knowledge of
aerodynamics and uid dynamics, and because the agent
must usually be dispersed within the boundary layer (less
than 200300 ft above the ground), it puts pilots at risk.

Signicant research is still being applied toward this technique. For example, by modifying the properties of
the liquid, its breakup when subjected to aerodynamic
stress can be controlled and an idealized particle distribution achieved, even at supersonic speed. Additionally, advances in uid dynamics, computer modeling, and
weather forecasting allow an ideal direction, speed, and
altitude to be calculated, such that warfare agent of a predetermined particle size can predictably and reliably hit a
Despite the limitations of central bursters, most nations target.
use this method in the early stages of chemical weapon
development, in part because standard munitions can be Protection against chemical warfare
adapted to carry the agents.
The ecacy of thermal detonation is greatly limited by
the ammability of some agents. For ammable aerosols,
the cloud is sometimes totally or partially ignited by the
disseminating explosion in a phenomenon called ashing.
Explosively disseminated VX will ignite roughly one third
of the time. Despite a great deal of study, ashing is still
not fully understood, and a solution to the problem would
be a major technological advance.

Israel Defense Forces Yanshufbattalion soldiers at chemical


warfare defense exercise

Soviet chemical weapons canisters from a stockpile in Albania

Aerodynamic dissemination Aerodynamic dissemination is the non-explosive delivery of a chemical agent


from an aircraft, allowing aerodynamic stress to disseminate the agent. This technique is the most recent major
development in chemical agent dissemination, originating
in the mid-1960s.
This technique eliminates many of the limitations of thermal dissemination by eliminating the ashing eect and
theoretically allowing precise control of particle size. In
actuality, the altitude of dissemination, wind direction

Ideal protection begins with nonproliferation treaties


such as the Chemical Weapons Convention, and detecting, very early, the signatures of someone building a chemical weapons capability. These include a
wide range of intelligence disciplines, such as economic
analysis of exports of dual-use chemicals and equipment, human intelligence (HUMINT) such as diplomatic, refugee, and agent reports; photography from
satellites, aircraft and drones (IMINT); examination of
captured equipment (TECHINT); communications intercepts (COMINT); and detection of chemical manufacturing and chemical agents themselves (MASINT).
If all the preventive measures fail and there is a clear and
present danger, then there is a need for detection of chemical attacks,* [86] collective protection,* [87]* [88]* [89]
and decontamination. Since industrial accidents can
cause dangerous chemical releases (e.g., the Bhopal disaster), these activities are things that civilian, as well as
military, organizations must be prepared to carry out. In
civilian situations in developed countries, these are duties
of HAZMAT organizations, which most commonly are
part of re departments.

2.2. CHEMICAL WARFARE


Detection has been referred to above, as a technical
MASINT discipline; specic military procedures, which
are usually the model for civilian procedures, depend on
the equipment, expertise, and personnel available. When
chemical agents are detected, an alarm needs to sound,
with specic warnings over emergency broadcasts and the
like. There may be a warning to expect an attack.
If, for example, the captain of a US Navy ship believes
there is a serious threat of chemical, biological, or radiological attack, the crew may be ordered to set Circle
William, which means closing all openings to outside air,
running breathing air through lters, and possibly starting a system that continually washes down the exterior
surfaces. Civilian authorities dealing with an attack or
a toxic chemical accident will invoke the Incident Command System, or local equivalent, to coordinate defensive
measures.* [89]

37
In some cases, it might be necessary to neutralize
them chemically, as with ammonia as a neutralizer for
hydrogen cyanide or chlorine. Riot control agents such as
CS will dissipate in an open area, but things contaminated
with CS powder need to be aired out, washed by people
wearing protective gear, or safely discarded.
Mass decontamination is a less common requirement for
people than equipment, since people may be immediately aected and treatment is the action required. It is
a requirement when people have been contaminated with
persistent agents. Treatment and decontamination may
need to be simultaneous, with the medical personnel protecting themselves so they can function.* [90]
There may need to be immediate intervention to prevent
death, such as injection of atropine for nerve agents. Decontamination is especially important for people contaminated with persistent agents; many of the fatalities after
the explosion of a WWII US ammunition ship carrying
mustard gas, in the harbor of Bari, Italy, after a German
bombing on 2 December 1943, came when rescue workers, not knowing of the contamination, bundled cold, wet
seamen in tight-tting blankets.

Individual protection starts with a gas mask and, depending on the nature of the threat, through various levels of
protective clothing up to a complete chemical-resistant
suit with a self-contained air supply. The US military denes various levels of MOPP (mission-oriented protective posture) from mask to full chemical resistant suits; For decontaminating equipment and buildings exposed
Hazmat suits are the civilian equivalent, but go farther to
to persistent agents, such as blister agents, VX or other
include a fully independent air supply, rather than the l- agents made persistent by mixing with a thickener, special
ters of a gas mask.
equipment and materials might be needed. Some type of
Collective protection allows continued functioning of neutralizing agent will be needed; e.g. in the form of a
groups of people in buildings or shelters, the latter which spraying device with neutralizing agents such as Chlomay be xed, mobile, or improvised. With ordinary rine, Fichlor, strong alkaline solutions or enzymes. In
buildings, this may be as basic as plastic sheeting and other cases, a specic chemical decontaminant will be retape, although if the protection needs to be continued for quired.* [89]
any appreciable length of time, there will need to be an
air supply, typically an enhanced gas mask.* [88]* [89]

2.2.4 Sociopolitical climate


The study of chemicals and their military uses was
widespread in China and India. The use of toxic materials has historically been viewed with mixed emotions
and moral qualms in the West. The practical and ethical
problems surrounding poison warfare appeared in ancient
Greek myths about Hercules' invention of poison arrows
and Odysseus's use of toxic projectiles. There are many
instances of the use of chemical weapons in battles documented in Greek and Roman historical texts; the earliest
example was the deliberate poisoning of Kirrha's water
Members of the Ukrainian Armys 19th Nuclear, Biological and supply with hellebore in the First Sacred War, Greece,
Chemical Battalion practice decontamination drill, at Camp Ar- about 590 BC.* [91]
ifjan, Kuwait

One of the earliest reactions to the use of chemical agents


was from Rome. Struggling to defend themselves from
the Roman legions, Germanic tribes poisoned the wells of
their enemies, with Roman jurists having been recorded
as declaring armis bella non venenis geri, meaning
war is fought with weapons, not with poisons.Yet the
Romans themselves resorted to poisoning wells of besieged cities in Anatolia in the 2nd century BCE.* [3]

Decontamination Decontamination varies with the


particular chemical agent used. Some nonpersistent
agents, including most pulmonary agents (chlorine,
phosgene, and so on), blood gases, and nonpersistent
nerve gases (e.g., GB), will dissipate from open areas, although powerful exhaust fans may be needed to clear out
Before 1915 the use of poisonous chemicals in battle was
buildings where they have accumulated.

38
typically the result of local initiative, and not the result of
an active government chemical weapons program. There
are many reports of the isolated use of chemical agents in
individual battles or sieges, but there was no true tradition
of their use outside of incendiaries and smoke. Despite
this tendency, there have been several attempts to initiate
large-scale implementation of poison gas in several wars,
but with the notable exception of World War I, the responsible authorities generally rejected the proposals for
ethical reasons.
For example, in 1854 Lyon Playfair (later 1st Baron Playfair, GCB, PC, FRS (1 May 1818 29 May 1898), a
British chemist, proposed using a cacodyl cyanide-lled
artillery shell against enemy ships during the Crimean
War. The British Ordnance Department rejected the proposal asas bad a mode of warfare as poisoning the wells
of the enemy.

Eorts to eradicate chemical weapons


See also: List of chemical arms control agreements

August 27, 1874: The Brussels Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War is signed,
specically forbidding the employment of poison
or poisoned weapons, although the treaty was not
adopted by any nation whatsoever and it never went
into eect.
September 4, 1900: The First Hague Convention,
which includes a declaration banning the use of
projectiles the object of which is the diusion of
asphyxiating or deleterious gases,enters into force.

CHAPTER 2. TYPES
Despite numerous eorts to reduce or eliminate them,
some nations continue to research and/or stockpile chemical warfare agents. To the right is a summary of the
nations that have either declared weapon stockpiles or
are suspected of secretly stockpiling or possessing CW
research programs. Notable examples include United
States and Russia.
In 1997, future US Vice President Dick Cheney opposed
the signing ratication of a treaty banning the use chemical weapons, a recently unearthed letter shows. In a letter
dated April 8, 1997, then Halliburton-CEO Cheney told
Sen. Jesse Helms, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that it would be a mistake for America to join the Convention.Those nations most likely to
comply with the Chemical Weapons Convention are not
likely to ever constitute a military threat to the United
States. The governments we should be concerned about
are likely to cheat on the CWC, even if they do participate,reads the letter,* [95] published by the Federation
of American Scientists.
The CWC was ratied by the Senate that same month.
Since then, Albania, Libya, Russia, the United States, and
India have declared over 71,000 metric tons of chemical
weapon stockpiles, and destroyed about a third of them.
Under the terms of the agreement, the United States and
Russia agreed to eliminate the rest of their supplies of
chemical weapons by 2012. Not having met its goal, the
U.S. government estimates remaining stocks will be destroyed by 2017.

2.2.5 Chemical weapons destruction

January 26, 1910: The Second Hague Convention


enters into force, prohibiting the use of poison or India
poisoned weaponsin warfare.
February 6, 1922: After World War I, the
Washington Arms Conference Treaty prohibited the
use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases. It was
signed by the United States, Britain, Japan, France,
and Italy, but France objected to other provisions in
the treaty and it never went into eect.
February 8, 1928: The Geneva Protocol enters into
force, prohibiting the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids,
materials or devicesandbacteriological methods
of warfare.

Chemical weapon proliferation


Main article: Chemical weapon proliferation

In June 1997, India declared that it had a stockpile of


1044 tonnes of sulphur mustard in its possession. India's declaration of its stockpile came after its entry
into the Chemical Weapons Convention, that created the
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons,
and on January 14, 1993 India became one of the original signatories to the Chemical Weapons Convention. By
2005, from among six nations that had declared their possession of chemical weapons, India was the only country
to meet its deadline for chemical weapons destruction and
for inspection of its facilities by the Organisation for the
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons.* [96]* [97] By 2006,
India had destroyed more than 75 percent of its chemical
weapons and material stockpile and was granted an extension to complete a 100 percent destruction of its stocks by
April 2009. On May 14, 2009 India informed the United
Nations that it has completely destroyed its stockpile of
chemical weapons.* [98]

2.2. CHEMICAL WARFARE


Iraq
See also: Iraqi chemical warfare

39
(18,241 tonnes) of its stockpile at destruction facilities located in Gorny (Saratov Oblast) and Kambarka (Udmurt Republic) - where operations have nished - and Schuch'ye (Kurgan Oblast), Maradykovsky
(Kirov Oblast), Leonidovka (Penza Oblast) whilst installations are under construction in Pochep (Bryansk
Oblast) and Kizner (Udmurt Republic).* [103]* [104] As
August 2013, 76 percent (30,500 tonnes) were destroyed,* [105] and Russia leaves the Cooperative Threat
Reduction (CTR) Program, which partially funded chemical weapons destruction.* [106]

The Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Rogelio Prter,
welcomed Iraq's decision to join the OPCW as a signicant step to strengthening global and regional efforts to prevent the spread and use of chemical weapons.
The OPCW announced The government of Iraq has
deposited its instrument of accession to the Chemical
Weapons Convention with the Secretary General of the
United Nations and within 30 days, on 12 February 2009,
will become the 186th State Party to the Convention. United States
Iraq has also declared stockpiles of chemical weapons,
and because of their recent accession is the only State See also: United States and weapons of mass destruction
Chemical weapons
Party exempted from the destruction time-line.* [99]
Japan
During the Second Sino-Japanese War (19371945)
Japan stored chemical weapons on the territory of
mainland China. The weapon stock mostly containing mustard gas-lewisite mixture.* [100] The weapons
are classied as abandoned chemical weapons under
the Chemical Weapons Convention and from September
2010 Japan has started their destruction in Nanjing using
mobile destruction facilities in order to do so.* [101]
Russia
Russia signed into the Chemical Weapons Convention on
January 13, 1993 and ratied it on November 5, 1995.
Declaring an arsenal of 39,967 tons of chemical weapons
in 1997, by far the largest arsenal, consisting of blister
agents: Lewisite, Sulfur mustard, Lewisite-mustard mix,
and nerve agents: Sarin, Soman, and VX. Russia met its
treaty obligations by destroying 1 percent of its chemical agents by the 2002 deadline set out by the Chemical Weapons Convention, but requested an extension on
the deadlines of 2004 and 2007 due to technical, nancial, and environmental challenges of chemical disposal.
Since, Russia has received help from other countries
such as Canada which donated C$100,000, plus a further C$100,000 already donated, to the Russian Chemical Weapons Destruction Program. This money will be
used to complete work at Shchuch'ye and support the
construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility
at Kizner (Russia), where the destruction of nearly 5,700
tonnes of nerve agent, stored in approximately 2 million
artillery shells and munitions, will be undertaken. Canadian funds are also being used for the operation of a
Green Cross Public Outreach Oce, to keep the civilian
population informed on the progress made in chemical
weapons destruction activities.* [102]

On November 25, 1969, President Richard Nixon unilaterally renounced the use of chemical weapons and renounced all methods of biological warfare. He issued a
decree halting the production and transport of all chemical weapons which remains in eect. From May 1964
to the early 1970s the USA participated in Operation
CHASE, a United States Department of Defense program
that aimed to dispose of chemical weapons by sinking
ships laden with the weapons in the deep Atlantic. After
the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of
1972, Operation Chase was scrapped and safer disposal
methods for chemical weapons were researched, with the
U.S. destroying several thousand tons of mustard gas by
incineration at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, and nearly
4,200 tons of nerve agent by chemical neutralisation at
Tooele Army Depot.* [107]
The U.S. ratied the Geneva Protocol which banned the
use of chemical and biological weapons on January 22,
1975. In 1989 and 1990, the U.S. and the Soviet Union
entered an agreement to both end their chemical weapons
programs, including binary weapons. In April 1997, the
United States ratied the Chemical Weapons Convention,
this banned the possession of most types of chemical
weapons. It also banned the development of chemical
weapons, and required the destruction of existing stockpiles, precursor chemicals, production facilities, and their
weapon delivery systems.

The U.S. began stockpile reductions in the 1980s with the


removal of outdated munitions and destroying its entire
stock of 3-Quinuclidinyl benzilate (BZ or Agent 15) at
the beginning of 1988. In June 1990 the Johnston Atoll
Chemical Agent Disposal System began destruction of
chemical agents stored on the Johnston Atoll in the Pacic, seven years before the Chemical Weapons Treaty
came into eect. In 1986 President Ronald Reagan made
an agreement with the Chancellor, Helmut Kohl to remove the U.S. stockpile of chemical weapons from Germany. In 1990, as part of Operation Steel Box, two ships
As of July 2011, Russia has destroyed 48 percent were loaded with over 100,000 shells containing Sarin

40

CHAPTER 2. TYPES

and VX where taken from the U.S. Army weapons storage depots such as Miesau and then-classied FSTS (Forward Storage / Transportation Sites) and transported from
Bremerhaven, Germany to Johnston Atoll in the Pacic,
a 46-day nonstop journey.* [108]

Saint Julien Memorial


Sardasht (A town attacked with chemical weapons
during the IranIraq War.)

Stink bomb
In May 1991, President George H. W. Bush committed
United States Army Medical Research Institute of
the United States to destroying all of its chemical weapons
Chemical Defense
and renounced the right to chemical weapon retaliation.
In 1993, the United States signed the Chemical Weapons
Weapon of mass destruction
Treaty, which required the destruction of all chemical
weapon agents, dispersal systems, and production facili Zyklon B
ties by April 2012. The U.S. prohibition on the transport
of chemical weapons has meant that destruction facilities
had to be constructed at each of the U.S.'s nine storage 2.2.7 Notes
facilities. The U.S. met the rst three of the four deadlines set out in the treaty, destroying 45% of its stockpile [1] Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Proof chemical weapons by 2007. Due to the destruction of
duction, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and
on Their Destruction (CWC): Annexes and Original Sigchemical weapons, under the United States policy of Pronatories. Bureau of Arms Control, Verication and
portional Response, an attack upon the United States or
Compliance. Retrieved 19 January 2012.
its Allies would trigger a force-equivalent counter-attack.
Since the United States only maintains nuclear Weapons
[2] Disarmament lessons from the Chemical Weapons Conof Mass Destruction, it is the stated policy that the United
vention Archived July 14, 2015 at the Wayback Machine
States will regard all WMD attacks (Biological, chemical,
or nuclear) as a nuclear attack and will respond to such an [3] Mayor 2003
attack with a nuclear strike.* [109]
As of 2012, stockpiles have been eliminated at 7 of the 9
chemical weapons depots and 89.75% of the 1997 stockpile has been destroyed by the treaty deadline of April
2012.* [110] Destruction will not begin at the two remaining depots until after the treaty deadline and will use neutralization, instead of incineration.

2.2.6

See also

1990 Chemical Weapons Accord

[4] ed. by M. Bothe ...; Michael Bothe, Natalino Ronzitti,


Allan Rosas (1998), The New Chemical Weapons Convention - Implementation and Prospects, Martinus Nijho
Publishers, p. 17, ISBN 90-411-1099-2
[5] Richardt, Andre (2013), CBRN Protection: Managing the
Threat of Chemical, Biological, Radioactive and Nuclear
Weapons, Germany: Wiley-VCH Verlag & Co., p. 4,
ISBN 978-3-527-32413-2
[6] Science Daily, dated January 19, 2009 Sciencedaily.com

Ali Hassan al-Majid

[7] Charles C. Mann (2011), 1493: Uncovering the New


World Columbus Created, Random House Digital, p. 9,
ISBN 978-0-307-59672-7

Area denial weapon

[8] David Hume, History of England, Volume II.

Biological warfare

[9] Eric Croddy (2002). Chemical and Biological Warfare: A Comprehensive Survey for the Concerned Citizen.
Springer. p. 131.

Chemical Weapons Convention


Chemical weapon designation
Chemical weapons and the United Kingdom
Exotic pollution
Lethal Unitary Chemical Agents and Munitions
List of chemical warfare agents
List of highly toxic gases
Operation Red Hat
Ronald Maddison
Psychochemical weapon

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Biologic, or Radiologic Attacks, retrieved 2007-10-22
[89] US Department of Defense (29 September 2000),
Multiservice Tactics, Techniques, and Procedure for NBC
Defense of Theater Fixed Sites, Ports, and Airelds (FM
3-11.34/MCRP 3-37.5/NWP 3-11.23/AFTTP(I) 3-2.33)
(PDF), GlobalSecurity.org, retrieved 2007-10-22

2.2. CHEMICAL WARFARE

43

[90] Ciottone, Gregory R; Arnold, Jerey L (January 4, 2007), [109] Not with Impunity: Assessing US Policy for ReCBRNE - Chemical Warfare Agents, EMedicine, retaliating to a Chemical or Biological Attack. Airtrieved 2007-10-22
power.maxwell.af.mil. Retrieved 2011-09-16.
[91] Adrienne Mayor,Greek Fire, Poison Arrows & Scorpion [110] Army Agency Completes Mission to Destroy Chemical
Weapons, USCMA, January 21, 2012
Bombs: Biological and Chemical Warfare in the Ancient
WorldOverlook-Duckworth, 2003, rev ed with new Introduction 2008
[92] STATUS OF PARTICIPATION IN THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION AS AT 14 OCTOBER 2013. Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons. OPCW. 14 October 2013.
[93] SIGNATORY STATES. Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. OPCW. 2 September 2013.
[94] Myanmar Joins Chemical Weapons Convention.
OPCW. 9 July 2015.
[95] In Surprise Testimony Cheney Renews Opposition to CWC
(PDF), United States Senate, 1997-04-08, archived from
the original (PDF) on December 17, 2008, retrieved
2009-01-04.
[96] India declares its stock of chemical weapons - India
Abroad | HighBeam Research
[97] India to destroy chemical weapons stockpile by 2009.
DominicanToday.com. Retrieved 2011-09-16.
[98] India destroys its chemical weapons stockpile. Zeenews.india.com. 2009-05-14. Retrieved 2011-09-16.
[99] Iraq Joins the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Opcw.org. Retrieved 2011-09-16.
[100] Abandoned Chemical Weapons (ACW) in China.
Nti.org. Archived from the original on August 29, 2011.
Retrieved 2011-09-16.
[101] Ceremony Marks Start of Destruction of Chemical
Weapons Abandoned by Japan in China. Opcw.org. Retrieved 2011-09-16.
[102] Canada Contributes to Russias Chemical Weapons
Destruction Programme. Opcw.org. Retrieved 201109-16.
[103] http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/tucker41.pdf
[104] Research Library: Country Proles: China Chemical
. NTI. Archived from the original on June 5, 2011. Retrieved 2011-09-16.
[105] Russia destroys over 76 percent of its chemical weapons
stockpile.
[106] Guarino, Douglas P. New U.S.-Russian Security Deal
Greatly Scales Back Scope, Experts Say | Global Security
Newswire. NTI. Retrieved 2013-09-05.

2.2.8 References
CBWInfo.com (2001). A Brief History of Chemical
and Biological Weapons: Ancient Times to the 19th
Century. Retrieved Nov. 24, 2004.
Chomsky, Noam (Mar. 4, 2001). Prospects for
Peace in the Middle East, page 2. Lecture.
Cordette, Jessica, MPH(c) (2003).
Chemical
Weapons of Mass Destruction. Retrieved Nov. 29,
2004.
Croddy, Eric (2001), Chemical and Biological Warfare, Copernicus, ISBN 0-387-95076-1
Smart, Jeery K., M.A. (1997). History of Biological and Chemical Warfare. Retrieved Nov. 24,
2004.
United States Senate, 103d Congress, 2d Session.
(May 25, 1994). The Riegle Report. Retrieved Nov.
6, 2004.
Gerard J Fitzgerald. American Journal of Public
Health. Washington: Apr 2008. Vol. 98, Iss. 4;
p. 611
, .. (1976). .

..

2.2.9 Further reading


Leo P. Brophy and George J. B. Fisher; The Chemical Warfare Service: Organizing for War Oce of
the Chief of Military History, 1959; L. P. Brophy,
W. D. Miles and C. C. Cochrane, The Chemical
Warfare Service: From Laboratory to Field (1959);
and B. E. Kleber and D. Birdsell, The Chemical
Warfare Service in Combat (1966). ocial US history;
Gordon M. Burck and Charles C. Flowerree; International Handbook on Chemical Weapons Proliferation 1991

[107] Rocky Mountain Arsenal | Region 8 | US EPA.


Epa.gov. Retrieved 2011-09-16.

L. F. Haber. The Poisonous Cloud: Chemical Warfare in the First World War Oxford University Press:
1986

[108] The Oceans and Environmental Security: Shared U.S. and


Russian Perspectives.

James W. Hammond Jr; Poison Gas: The Myths Versus Reality Greenwood Press, 1999

44

CHAPTER 2. TYPES

Jiri Janata, Role of Analytical Chemistry in Defense 2.3 Nuclear weapon


Strategies Against Chemical and Biological Attack,
Annual Review of Analytical Chemistry, 2009
A-bombredirects here. For other uses, see A-bomb
Ishmael Jones, The Human Factor: Inside the (disambiguation).
CIA's Dysfunctional Intelligence Culture, Encounter
Books, New York 2008, revised 2010, ISBN 9781-59403-382-7. WMD espionage.
Benoit Morel and Kyle Olson; Shadows and Substance: The Chemical Weapons Convention Westview Press, 1993
Adrienne Mayor, Greek Fire, Poison Arrows &
Scorpion Bombs: Biological and Chemical Warfare
in the Ancient WorldOverlook-Duckworth, 2003,
rev ed with new Introduction 2008
Geo Plunkett, Chemical Warfare in Australia:
Australia's Involvement In Chemical Warfare 1914
- Today, (2nd Edition), 2013.. Leech Cup Books.
A volume in the Army Military History Series published in association with the Army History Unit.
Jonathan B. Tucker. Chemical Warfare from World
War I to Al-Qaeda (2006)

2.2.10

External links

Chemical weapons and international humanitarian The mushroom cloud of the atomic bombing of the Japanese city
law
of Nagasaki on August 9, 1945 rose some 11 miles (18 km) above
the bomb's hypocenter.

ATSDR Case Studies in Environmental Medicine:


Cholinesterase Inhibitors, Including Insecti- A nuclear weapon is an explosive device that derives
cides and Chemical Warfare Nerve Agents U.S. its destructive force from nuclear reactions, either ssion
Department of Health and Human Services
(ssion bomb) or a combination of ssion and fusion
Russian Biological and Chemical Weapons, about (thermonuclear weapon). Both reactions release vast
quantities of energy from relatively small amounts of matthe danger posed by non-state weapons transfers
ter. The rst ssion (atomic) bomb test released the
Gaddum Papers at the Royal Society
same amount of energy as approximately 20,000 tons of
TNT (see Trinity (nuclear test)). The rst thermonuclear
Chemical Weapons stored in the United States
(hydrogen) bomb test released the same amount of
*
The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical energy as approximately 10,000,000 tons of TNT. [1]
Weapons OPCW
A thermonuclear weapon weighing little more than 2,400
pounds (1,100 kg) can produce an explosive force comparable to the detonation of more than 1.2 million tons
Classes of Chemical Agents U.S. National Library (1.1 million tonnes) of TNT.* [2] A nuclear device no
of Medicine
larger than traditional bombs can devastate an entire city
by blast, re, and radiation. Nuclear weapons are conChemical warfare agent potency, logistics, human
sidered weapons of mass destruction, and their use and
damage, dispersal, protection and types of agents
control have been a major focus of international relations
(bomb-shelter.net)
policy since their debut.
"'War of Nerves': A History of Chemical Weapons Nuclear weapons have been used twice in nuclear war(interview with Jonathan Tucker from National Pub- fare, both times by the United States against Japan near
lic Radio Talk of the Nation program, May 8, 2006 the end of World War II. On 6 August 1945, the U.S.
Army Air Forces detonated a uranium gun-type ssion
Chemical weapons in World War II
bomb codenamed "Little Boy" over the Japanese city
Our Army's Defense Against Poison Gas. of Hiroshima; three days later, on 9 August, the U.S.
Popular Science, February 1945, pp. 106111.
Army Air Forces detonated a plutonium implosion-type

Chemical Warfare in Australia

2.3. NUCLEAR WEAPON


ssion bomb codenamed "Fat Man" over the Japanese
city of Nagasaki. The bombings resulted in the deaths
of approximately 200,000 civilians and military personnel from acute injuries sustained from the explosions.* [3]
The ethics of the bombings and their role in Japan's surrender remain the subject of scholarly and popular debate.
Since the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki,
nuclear weapons have been detonated on over two thousand occasions for the purposes of testing and demonstration. Only a few nations possess such weapons or are
suspected of seeking them. The only countries known to
have detonated nuclear weaponsand acknowledge possessing them are (chronologically by date of rst test)
the United States, the Soviet Union (succeeded as a nuclear power by Russia), the United Kingdom, France, the
People's Republic of China, India, Pakistan, and North
Korea. Israel is also believed to possess nuclear weapons,
though it does not acknowledge having them.* [4]* [5]* [6]
One state, South Africa, fabricated nuclear weapons in
the past, but as its apartheid regime was coming to an
end, it disassembled its arsenal, acceded to the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty, and accepted full-scope international safeguards.* [7] The Federation of American Scientists estimated there were more than 17,000 nuclear
warheads worldwide as of 2012, with around 4,300 of
them considered operational(ready for immediate
use).* [4]

2.3.1

Types

45
derive the majority of their energy from nuclear ssion
reactions alone, and those that use ssion reactions to begin nuclear fusion reactions that produce a large amount
of the total energy output.
Fission weapons
All existing nuclear weapons derive some of their explosive energy from nuclear ssion reactions. Weapons
whose explosive output is exclusively from ssion reactions are commonly referred to as atomic bombs or atom
bombs (abbreviated as A-bombs). This has long been
noted as something of a misnomer, as their energy comes
from the nucleus of the atom, just as it does with fusion
weapons.
In ssion weapons, a mass of ssile material (enriched
uranium or plutonium) is assembled into a supercritical
mass the amount of material needed to start an
exponentially growing nuclear chain reaction either by
shooting one piece of sub-critical material into another
(the gunmethod) or by compressing using explosive
lenses a sub-critical sphere of material using chemical explosives to many times its original density (the implosionmethod). The latter approach is considered more
sophisticated than the former and only the latter approach
can be used if the ssile material is plutonium.
A major challenge in all nuclear weapon designs is to ensure that a signicant fraction of the fuel is consumed
before the weapon destroys itself. The amount of energy
released by ssion bombs can range from the equivalent
of just under a ton of TNT, to upwards of 500,000 tons
(500 kilotons) of TNT.* [8]

Main article: Nuclear weapon design


There are two basic types of nuclear weapons: those that All ssion reactions necessarily generate ssion products, the radioactive remains of the atomic nuclei split
by the ssion reactions. Many ssion products are either highly radioactive (but short-lived) or moderately radioactive (but long-lived), and as such are a serious form
of radioactive contamination if not fully contained. Fission products are the principal radioactive component of
nuclear fallout.
The most commonly used ssile materials for nuclear weapons applications have been uranium-235 and
plutonium-239. Less commonly used has been uranium233. Neptunium-237 and some isotopes of americium
may be usable for nuclear explosives as well, but it is not
clear that this has ever been implemented, and even their
plausible use in nuclear weapons is a matter of scientic
dispute.* [9]
Fusion weapons

The two basic ssion weapon designs

Main article: Thermonuclear weapon


The other basic type of nuclear weapon produces a
large proportion of its energy in nuclear fusion reactions.
Such fusion weapons are generally referred to as ther-

46

CHAPTER 2. TYPES
hydrogen bombs, this is accomplished by placing a ssion
bomb and fusion fuel (tritium, deuterium, or lithium deuteride) in proximity within a special, radiation-reecting
container. When the ssion bomb is detonated, gamma
rays and X-rays emitted rst compress the fusion fuel,
then heat it to thermonuclear temperatures. The ensuing
fusion reaction creates enormous numbers of high-speed
neutrons, which can then induce ssion in materials not
normally prone to it, such as depleted uranium. Each of
these components is known as a stage, with the ssion bomb as theprimaryand the fusion capsule as the
secondary. In large, megaton-range hydrogen bombs,
about half of the yield comes from the nal ssioning of
depleted uranium.* [8]
Virtually all thermonuclear weapons deployed today use
the two-stagedesign described above, but it is possible to add additional fusion stageseach stage igniting a
larger amount of fusion fuel in the next stage. This technique can be used to construct thermonuclear weapons of
arbitrarily large yield, in contrast to ssion bombs, which
are limited in their explosive force. The largest nuclear
weapon ever detonated the Tsar Bomba of the USSR,
which released an energy equivalent of over 50 million
tons (50 megatons) of TNTwas a three-stage weapon.
Most thermonuclear weapons are considerably smaller
than this, due to practical constraints from missile warhead space and weight requirements.* [12]

The basics of the TellerUlam design for a hydrogen bomb: a ssion bomb uses radiation to compress and heat a separate section
of fusion fuel.

monuclear weapons or more colloquially as hydrogen


bombs (abbreviated as H-bombs), as they rely on fusion
reactions between isotopes of hydrogen (deuterium and
tritium). All such weapons derive a signicant portion,
and sometimes a majority, of their energy from ssion.
This is because a ssion weapon is required as a triggerfor the fusion reactions, and the fusion reactions can
themselves trigger additional ssion reactions.* [10]
Only six countriesUnited States, Russia, United Kingdom, People's Republic of China, France and Indiahave
conducted thermonuclear weapon tests. (Whether India has detonated atrue, multi-staged thermonuclear
weapon is controversial.)* [11] Thermonuclear weapons
are considered much more dicult to successfully design
and execute than primitive ssion weapons. Almost all
of the nuclear weapons deployed today use the thermonuclear design because it is more ecient.

Edward Teller, often referred to as the father of the hydrogen

Thermonuclear bombs work by using the energy of a s- bomb


sion bomb to compress and heat fusion fuel. In the TellerUlam design, which accounts for all multi-megaton yield Fusion reactions do not create ssion products, and thus

2.3. NUCLEAR WEAPON


contribute far less to the creation of nuclear fallout than
ssion reactions, but because all thermonuclear weapons
contain at least one ssion stage, and many high-yield
thermonuclear devices have a nal ssion stage, thermonuclear weapons can generate at least as much nuclear
fallout as ssion-only weapons.

47
large enough quantities, and there is no evidence that it is
feasible beyond the military domain.* [15] However, the
U.S. Air Force funded studies of the physics of antimatter in the Cold War, and began considering its possible
use in weapons, not just as a trigger, but as the explosive itself.* [16] A fourth generation nuclear weapon design is related to, and relies upon, the same principle as
Antimatter-catalyzed nuclear pulse propulsion.* [17]

Other types
Main articles: boosted ssion weapon, neutron bomb 2.3.2 Weapons delivery
and radiological bomb
See also: Nuclear weapons delivery, nuclear triad,
Strategic bomber, Intercontinental ballistic missile and
There are other types of nuclear weapons as well. For Submarine-launched ballistic missile
example, a boosted ssion weapon is a ssion bomb that Nuclear weapons delivery the technology and systems
increases its explosive yield through a small amount of
fusion reactions, but it is not a fusion bomb. In the
boosted bomb, the neutrons produced by the fusion reactions serve primarily to increase the eciency of the
ssion bomb.
Some weapons are designed for special purposes; a
neutron bomb is a thermonuclear weapon that yields a
relatively small explosion but a relatively large amount
of neutron radiation; such a device could theoretically
be used to cause massive casualties while leaving infrastructure mostly intact and creating a minimal amount of
fallout. The detonation of any nuclear weapon is accompanied by a blast of neutron radiation. Surrounding a nuclear weapon with suitable materials (such as
The rst nuclear weapons were gravity bombs, such as this "Fat
cobalt or gold) creates a weapon known as a salted bomb. Man" weapon dropped on Nagasaki, Japan. They were very
This device can produce exceptionally large quantities of large and could only be delivered by heavy bomber aircraft
radioactive contamination.
Research has been done into the possibility of pure fusion
bombs: nuclear weapons that consist of fusion reactions
without requiring a ssion bomb to initiate them. Such
a device might provide a simpler path to thermonuclear
weapons than one that required development of ssion
weapons rst, and pure fusion weapons would create signicantly less nuclear fallout than other thermonuclear
weapons, because they would not disperse ssion products. In 1998, the United States Department of Energy
divulged that the United States had, "...made a substantial
investmentin the past to develop pure fusion weapons,
but that,The U.S. does not have and is not developing a
pure fusion weapon, and that, No credible design for
a pure fusion weapon resulted from the DOE investment
.* [13]

used to bring a nuclear weapon to its targetis an important aspect of nuclear weapons relating both to nuclear
weapon design and nuclear strategy. Additionally, development and maintenance of delivery options is among
the most resource-intensive aspects of a nuclear weapons
program: according to one estimate, deployment costs
accounted for 57% of the total nancial resources spent
by the United States in relation to nuclear weapons since
1940.* [18]

Antimatter, which consists of particles resembling ordinary matter particles in most of their properties but
having opposite electric charge, has been considered as
a trigger mechanism for nuclear weapons.* [14] A major obstacle is the diculty of producing antimatter in

With the advent of miniaturization, nuclear bombs can be


delivered by both strategic bombers and tactical ghterbombers, allowing an air force to use its current eet with
little or no modication. This method may still be considered the primary means of nuclear weapons delivery;

Historically the rst method of delivery, and the method


used in the two nuclear weapons used in warfare, was
as a gravity bomb, dropped from bomber aircraft. This
is usually the rst method that countries developed, as
it does not place many restrictions on the size of the
weapon and weapon miniaturization requires considerMost variation in nuclear weapon design is for the purpose able weapons design knowledge. It does, however, limit
of achieving dierent yields for dierent situations, and attack range, response time to an impending attack, and
in manipulating design elements to attempt to minimize the number of weapons that a country can eld at the
weapon size.* [8]
same time.

48

CHAPTER 2. TYPES
of long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)
and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) has
given some nations the ability to plausibly deliver missiles
anywhere on the globe with a high likelihood of success.
More advanced systems, such as multiple independently
targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), can launch multiple
warheads at dierent targets from one missile, reducing
the chance of a successful missile defense. Today, missiles are most common among systems designed for delivery of nuclear weapons. Making a warhead small enough
to t onto a missile, though, can be dicult.* [8]
Tactical weapons have involved the most variety of delivery types, including not only gravity bombs and missiles
but also artillery shells, land mines, and nuclear depth
charges and torpedoes for anti-submarine warfare. An
atomic mortar was also tested at one time by the United
States. Small, two-man portable tactical weapons (somewhat misleadingly referred to as suitcase bombs), such as
the Special Atomic Demolition Munition, have been developed, although the diculty of combining sucient
yield with portability limits their military utility.* [8]

A demilitarized and commercial launch of the Russian Strategic


Rocket Forces R-36 ICBM; also known by the NATO reporting
name: SS-18 Satan. Upon its rst elding in the late 1960s, the
SS-18 remains the single highest throw weight missile delivery
system ever built.

2.3.3 Nuclear strategy


Main articles: Nuclear strategy and Deterrence theory
See also: Nuclear peace, Essentials of PostCold War
Deterrence, Single Integrated Operational Plan, nuclear
warfare and On Thermonuclear War

the majority of U.S. nuclear warheads, for example, are


free-fall gravity bombs, namely the B61.* [8]
Nuclear warfare strategy is a set of policies that deal with
preventing or ghting a nuclear war. The policy of trying to prevent an attack by a nuclear weapon from another country by threatening nuclear retaliation is known
as the strategy of nuclear deterrence. The goal in deterrence is to always maintain a second strike capability (the
ability of a country to respond to a nuclear attack with
one of its own) and potentially to strive for rst strike status (the ability to completely destroy an enemy's nuclear
forces before they could retaliate). During the Cold War,
policy and military theorists in nuclear-enabled countries
worked out models of what sorts of policies could prevent one from ever being attacked by a nuclear weapon,
and developed weapon game theory models that create
the greatest and most stable deterrence conditions.
Montage of an inert test of a NATO Trident SLBM (submarine
launched ballistic missile), from submerged to the terminal, or
re-entry phase, of the multiple independently targetable reentry
vehicles

More preferable from a strategic point of view is a nuclear weapon mounted onto a missile, which can use
a ballistic trajectory to deliver the warhead over the
horizon. Although even short-range missiles allow for
a faster and less vulnerable attack, the development

Dierent forms of nuclear weapons delivery (see above)


allow for dierent types of nuclear strategies. The goals
of any strategy are generally to make it dicult for an
enemy to launch a pre-emptive strike against the weapon
system and dicult to defend against the delivery of the
weapon during a potential conict. Sometimes this has
meant keeping the weapon locations hidden, such as deploying them on submarines or land mobile transporter
erector launchers whose locations are very hard for an
enemy to track, and other times, this means protecting
them by burying them in hardened missile silo bunkers.

2.3. NUCLEAR WEAPON

The now decommissioned United States' Peacekeeper missile was


an ICBM developed to entirely replace the minuteman missile in
the late 1980s. Each missile, like the heavier lift Russian SS-18
Satan, could contain up to ten nuclear warheads (shown in red),
each of which could be aimed at a dierent target. A factor in
the development of MIRVs was to make complete missile defense
very dicult for an enemy country.

Other components of nuclear strategies have included using missile defense (to destroy the missiles before they
land) or implementation of civil defense measures (using
early-warning systems to evacuate citizens to safe areas
before an attack).
Note that weapons designed to threaten large populations, or to generally deter attacks are known as strategic
weapons. Weapons designed for use on a battleeld in
military situations are called tactical weapons.
There are critics of the very idea of nuclear strategy for
waging nuclear war who have suggested that a nuclear war
between two nuclear powers would result in mutual annihilation. From this point of view, the signicance of
nuclear weapons is purely to deter war because any nuclear war would immediately escalate out of mutual distrust and fear, resulting in mutually assured destruction.
This threat of national, if not global, destruction has been
a strong motivation for anti-nuclear weapons activism.
Critics from the peace movement and within the military establishment have questioned the usefulness of such
weapons in the current military climate. According to an
advisory opinion issued by the International Court of Justice in 1996, the use of (or threat of use of) such weapons
would generally be contrary to the rules of international
law applicable in armed conict, but the court did not
reach an opinion as to whether or not the threat or use
would be lawful in specic extreme circumstances such
as if the survival of the state were at stake.
Another deterrence position in nuclear strategy is that
nuclear proliferation can be desirable. This view argues
that, unlike conventional weapons, nuclear weapons successfully deter all-out war between states, and they succeeded in doing this during the Cold War between the

49
U.S. and the Soviet Union.* [19] In the late 1950s and
early 1960s, Gen. Pierre Marie Gallois of France, an
adviser to Charles DeGaulle, argued in books like The
Balance of Terror: Strategy for the Nuclear Age (1961)
that mere possession of a nuclear arsenal, what the French
called the force de frappe, was enough to ensure deterrence, and thus concluded that the spread of nuclear
weapons could increase international stability. Some very
prominent neo-realist scholars, such as the late Kenneth
Waltz, formerly a Political Science at UC Berkeley and
Adjunct Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University,
and John Mearsheimer of University of Chicago, have
also argued along the lines of Gallois. Specically, these
scholars have advocated some forms of nuclear proliferation, arguing that it would decrease the likelihood of total
war, especially in troubled regions of the world where
there exists a unipolar nuclear weapon state. Aside from
the public opinion that opposes proliferation in any form,
there are two schools of thought on the matter: those, like
Mearsheimer, who favor selective proliferation,* [20] and
those of Kenneth Waltz, who was somewhat more noninterventionist.* [21]* [22]
The threat of potentially suicidal terrorists possessing nuclear weapons (a form of nuclear terrorism) complicates
the decision process. The prospect of mutually assured
destruction may not deter an enemy who expects to die
in the confrontation. Further, if the initial act is from a
stateless terrorist instead of a sovereign nation, there is no
xed nation or xed military targets to retaliate against. It
has been argued by the New York Times, especially after
the September 11, 2001 attacks, that this complication is
the sign of the next age of nuclear strategy, distinct from
the relative stability of the Cold War.* [23] In 1996, the
United States adopted a policy of allowing the targeting
of its nuclear weapons at terrorists armed with weapons
of mass destruction.* [24]
Robert Gallucci, president of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, argues that although traditional deterrence is not an eective approach toward
terrorist groups bent on causing a nuclear catastrophe,
Gallucci believes that the United States should instead
consider a policy of expanded deterrence, which focuses
not solely on the would-be nuclear terrorists but on those
states that may deliberately transfer or inadvertently lead
nuclear weapons and materials to them. By threatening
retaliation against those states, the United States may be
able to deter that which it cannot physically prevent.
.* [25]
Graham Allison makes a similar case, arguing that the
key to expanded deterrence is coming up with ways of
tracing nuclear material to the country that forged the ssile material. After a nuclear bomb detonates, nuclear
forensics cops would collect debris samples and send
them to a laboratory for radiological analysis. By identifying unique attributes of the ssile material, including
its impurities and contaminants, one could trace the path
back to its origin.* [26] The process is analogous to iden-

50

CHAPTER 2. TYPES

tifying a criminal by ngerprints. The goal would be


twofold: rst, to deter leaders of nuclear states from selling weapons to terrorists by holding them accountable for
any use of their own weapons; second, to give leader every incentive to tightly secure their nuclear weapons and
materials.* [26]

2.3.4

Governance, control, and law

Main articles:
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces Treaty, START I, Strategic Oensive
Reductions Treaty, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty and New START
Because of the immense military power they can confer,

The International Atomic Energy Agency was created in 1957


to encourage peaceful development of nuclear technology while
providing international safeguards against nuclear proliferation.

to underground nuclear testing, to prevent contamination from nuclear fallout, whereas the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (1968) attempted to place restrictions on the types of activities signatories could participate in, with the goal of allowing the transference of nonmilitary nuclear technology to member countries without
fear of proliferation.
In 1957, the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) was established under the mandate of the United
Nations to encourage development of peaceful applications for nuclear technology, provide international safeguards against its misuse, and facilitate the application
of safety measures in its use. In 1996, many nations
signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,* [28] which
prohibits all testing of nuclear weapons. A testing ban
imposes a signicant hindrance to nuclear arms development by any complying country.* [29] The Treaty requires
the ratication by 44 specic states before it can go into
force; as of 2012, the ratication of eight of these states
is still required.* [28]
Additional treaties and agreements have governed nuclear
weapons stockpiles between the countries with the two
largest stockpiles, the United States and the Soviet Union,
and later between the United States and Russia. These
include treaties such as SALT II (never ratied), START
I (expired), INF, START II (never ratied), SORT, and
New START, as well as non-binding agreements such as
SALT I and the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives* [30] of
1991. Even when they did not enter into force, these
agreements helped limit and later reduce the numbers and
types of nuclear weapons between the United States and
the Soviet Union/Russia.

Nuclear weapons have also been opposed by agreethe political control of nuclear weapons has been a key
ments between countries. Many nations have been deissue for as long as they have existed; in most countries
clared Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, areas where nuthe use of nuclear force can only be authorized by the
clear weapons production and deployment are prohibhead of government or head of state.* [27]
ited, through the use of treaties. The Treaty of Tlatelolco
In the late 1940s, lack of mutual trust was preventing (1967) prohibited any production or deployment of nuthe United States and the Soviet Union from making clear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, and
ground towards international arms control agreements. the Treaty of Pelindaba (1964) prohibits nuclear weapons
The RussellEinstein Manifesto was issued in London on in many African countries. As recently as 2006 a
July 9, 1955 by Bertrand Russell in the midst of the Cold Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone was estabWar. It highlighted the dangers posed by nuclear weapons lished amongst the former Soviet republics of Central
and called for world leaders to seek peaceful resolutions Asia prohibiting nuclear weapons.
to international conict. The signatories included eleven
In the middle of 1996, the International Court of Juspre-eminent intellectuals and scientists, including Albert
tice, the highest court of the United Nations, issued an
Einstein, who signed it just days before his death on April
Advisory Opinion concerned with the "Legality of the
18, 1955. A few days after the release, philanthropist
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons". The court ruled
Cyrus S. Eaton oered to sponsor a conferencecalled for
that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would
in the manifestoin Pugwash, Nova Scotia, Eaton's birthviolate various articles of international law, including the
place. This conference was to be the rst of the Pugwash
Geneva Conventions, the Hague Conventions, the UN
Conferences on Science and World Aairs, held in July
Charter, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
1957.
In view of the unique, destructive characteristics of nuBy the 1960s steps were being taken to limit both the clear weapons, the International Committee of the Red
proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries and Cross calls on States to ensure that these weapons are
the environmental eects of nuclear testing. The Partial never used, irrespective of whether they consider them
Test Ban Treaty (1963) restricted all nuclear testing

2.3. NUCLEAR WEAPON

51

lawful or not.* [31]

treated that aspect of the agreement asdecorativeand


*
Additionally, there have been other, specic actions without force. [33]
meant to discourage countries from developing nuclear Only one countrySouth Africahas ever fully renounced
arms. In the wake of the tests by India and Pakistan nuclear weapons they had independently developed. The
in 1998, economic sanctions were (temporarily) levied former Soviet republics of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and
against both countries, though neither were signatories Ukraine returned Soviet nuclear arms stationed in their
with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. One of the countries to Russia after the collapse of the USSR.
stated casus belli for the initiation of the 2003 Iraq War Proponents of nuclear disarmament say that it would
was an accusation by the United States that Iraq was ac- lessen the probability of nuclear war occurring, especially
tively pursuing nuclear arms (though this was soon dis- accidentally. Critics of nuclear disarmament say that it
covered not to be the case as the program had been dis- would undermine the present nuclear peace and detercontinued). In 1981, Israel had bombed a nuclear reactor rence and would lead to increased global instability. Varbeing constructed in Osirak, Iraq, in what it called an at- ious American elder statesmen,* [34] who were in oce
tempt to halt Iraq's previous nuclear arms ambitions; in during the Cold War period, have been advocating the
2007, Israel bombed another reactor being constructed in elimination of nuclear weapons. These ocials include
Syria.
Henry Kissinger, George Shultz, Sam Nunn, and William
In 2013, Mark Diesendorf says that governments of
France, India, North Korea, Pakistan, UK, and South
Africa have used nuclear power and/or research reactors
to assist nuclear weapons development or to contribute
to their supplies of nuclear explosives from military reactors.* [32]

Perry. In January 2010, Lawrence M. Krauss stated that


no issue carries more importance to the long-term health
and security of humanity than the eort to reduce, and
perhaps one day, rid the world of nuclear weapons.* [35]

Disarmament
Main article: Nuclear disarmament
Nuclear disarmament refers to both the act of reducing
45,000
Number of warheads

40,000

United States
USSR/Russia

35,000
30,000
25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
0

1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010


Year

Ukrainian workers use equipment provided by the U.S. Defense


Threat Reduction Agency to dismantle a Soviet-era missile silo.
After the end of the Cold War, Ukraine and the other nonRussian, post-Soviet republics relinquished Soviet nuclear stockpiles to Russia.

In the years after the end of the Cold War, there have
been numerous campaigns to urge the abolition of nuclear
weapons, such as that organized by the Global Zero movement, and the goal of aworld without nuclear weapons
or eliminating nuclear weapons and to the end state of a was advocated by United States President Barack Obama
nuclear-free world, in which nuclear weapons are com- in an April 2009 speech in Prague.* [36] A CNN poll from
pletely eliminated.
April 2010 indicated that the American public was nearly
*
Beginning with the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty and evenly split on the issue. [37]
continuing through the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Some analysts have argued that nuclear weapons have
Treaty, there have been many treaties to limit or re- made the world relatively safer, with peace through
duce nuclear weapons testing and stockpiles. The 1968 deterrence and through the stabilityinstability paradox,
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has as one of its explicit including in south Asia.* [38]* [39] Kenneth Waltz has
conditions that all signatories must pursue negotiations argued that nuclear weapons have helped keep an unin good faithtowards the long-term goal of complete easy peace, and further nuclear weapon proliferation
disarmament. The nuclear weapon states have largely might even help avoid the large scale conventional wars
The USSR and USA nuclear weapon stockpiles throughout the
Cold War until 2005, with a precipitous drop in total numbers
following the end of the Cold War in 1991.

52

CHAPTER 2. TYPES

that were so common prior to their invention at the Notable nuclear weapons accidents
end of World War II.* [22] But former Secretary Henry
Kissinger says there is a new danger, which cannot be ad- See also: United States military nuclear incident termidressed by deterrence: The classical notion of deter- nology
rence was that there was some consequences before which
aggressors and evildoers would recoil. In a world of suicide bombers, that calculation doesnt operate in any
February 13, 1950: a Convair B-36B crashed in
comparable way.* [40] George Shultz has said,If you
northern British Columbia after jettisoning a Mark
think of the people who are doing suicide attacks, and
IV atomic bomb. This was the rst such nuclear
people like that get a nuclear weapon, they are almost by
weapon loss in history.
*
denition not deterrable. [41]
Further information: See List of states with nuclear
weapons for statistics on possession and deployment

United Nations
Main article: United Nations Oce for Disarmament
Aairs
The UN Oce for Disarmament Aairs (UNODA) is a
department of the United Nations Secretariat established
in January 1998 as part of the United Nations SecretaryGeneral Ko Annan's plan to reform the UN as presented
in his report to the General Assembly in July 1997.* [42]
Its goal is to promote nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation and the strengthening of the disarmament
regimes in respect to other weapons of mass destruction,
chemical and biological weapons. It also promotes disarmament eorts in the area of conventional weapons, especially land mines and small arms, which are often the
weapons of choice in contemporary conicts.

2.3.5

Controversy

See also: Nuclear weapons debate and History of the


anti-nuclear movement

7 June 1960: the 1960 Fort Dix IM-99 accident destroyed a Boeing CIM-10 Bomarc nuclear missile
and shelter and contaminated the BOMARC Missile Accident Site in New Jersey.
24 January 1961: the 1961 Goldsboro B-52 crash
occurred near Goldsboro, North Carolina. A B-52
Stratofortress carrying two Mark 39 nuclear bombs
broke up in mid-air, dropping its nuclear payload in
the process.* [44]* [45]
1965 Philippine Sea A-4 crash, where a Skyhawk
attack aircraft with a nuclear weapon fell into the
sea.* [46] The pilot, the aircraft, and the B43 nuclear
bomb were never recovered.* [47] It was not until the
1980s that the Pentagon revealed the loss of the onemegaton bomb.* [48]
January 17, 1966: the 1966 Palomares B-52 crash
occurred when a B-52G bomber of the USAF collided with a KC-135 tanker during mid-air refuelling
o the coast of Spain. The KC-135 was completely
destroyed when its fuel load ignited, killing all four
crew members. The B-52G broke apart, killing
three of the seven crew members aboard.* [49]
Of the four Mk28 type hydrogen bombs the B52G carried,* [50] three were found on land near
Almera, Spain. The non-nuclear explosives in two
of the weapons detonated upon impact with the
ground, resulting in the contamination of a 2-squarekilometer (490-acre) (0.78 square mile) area by
radioactive plutonium. The fourth, which fell into
the Mediterranean Sea, was recovered intact after a
2-month-long search.* [51]

Ethics
Even before the rst nuclear weapons had been developed, scientists involved with the Manhattan Project were
divided over the use of the weapon. The role of the two
atomic bombings of the country in Japan's surrender and
the U.S.'s ethical justication for them has been the subject of scholarly and popular debate for decades. The
question of whether nations should have nuclear weapons,
or test them, has been continually and nearly universally
controversial.* [43]

January 21, 1968: the 1968 Thule Air Base B-52


crash involved a United States Air Force (USAF) B52 bomber. The aircraft was carrying four hydrogen
bombs when a cabin re forced the crew to abandon the aircraft. Six crew members ejected safely,
but one who did not have an ejection seat was killed
while trying to bail out. The bomber crashed onto
sea ice in Greenland, causing the nuclear payload to
rupture and disperse, which resulted in widespread
radioactive contamination.

2.3. NUCLEAR WEAPON

53

Nuclear fallout
Main article: Nuclear fallout
Over 500 atmospheric nuclear weapons tests were conducted at various sites around the world from 1945 to
1980. Radioactive fallout from nuclear weapons testing was rst drawn to public attention in 1954 when the
Castle Bravo hydrogen bomb test at the Pacic Proving
Grounds contaminated the crew and catch of the Japanese
shing boat Lucky Dragon.* [52] One of the shermen
died in Japan seven months later, and the fear of contaminated tuna led to a temporary boycotting of the popular staple in Japan. The incident caused widespread concern around the world, especially regarding the eects of
nuclear fallout and atmospheric nuclear testing, andprovided a decisive impetus for the emergence of the antinuclear weapons movement in many countries.* [52]
As public awareness and concern mounted over the possible health hazards associated with exposure to the nuclear
fallout, various studies were done to assess the extent
of the hazard. A Centers for Disease Control and Prevention/ National Cancer Institute study claims that fall- Women Strike for Peace during the Cuban Missile Crisis
out from atmospheric nuclear tests would lead to perhaps
11,000 excess deaths amongst people alive during atmospheric testing in the United States from all forms of cancer, including leukemia, from 1951 to well into the 21st
century.* [53]* [54] As of March 2009, the U.S. is the only
nation that compensates nuclear test victims. Since the
Radiation Exposure Compensation Act of 1990, more
than $1.38 billion in compensation has been approved.
The money is going to people who took part in the tests,
notably at the Nevada Test Site, and to others exposed to
the radiation.* [55]* [56]
Demonstration against nuclear testing in Lyon, France, in the
1980s.

Public opposition
Peace movements emerged in Japan and in 1954 they
converged to form a unied Japanese Council Against
Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs. Japanese opposition to nuclear weapons tests in the Pacic Ocean was
widespread, and an estimated 35 million signatures
were collected on petitions calling for bans on nuclear
weapons.* [57]

ergy Commission dumping radioactive waste in the sea


19 kilometres from Boston.* [60] In 1962, Linus Pauling
won the Nobel Peace Prize for his work to stop the atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons, and the Ban the
Bombmovement spread.* [43]
In 1963, many countries ratied the Partial Test Ban
Treaty prohibiting atmospheric nuclear testing. Radioactive fallout became less of an issue and the antinuclear weapons movement went into decline for some
years.* [52]* [61] A resurgence of interest occurred amid
European and American fears of nuclear war in the
1980s.* [62]

In the United Kingdom, the rst Aldermaston March


organised by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament(CND) took place at Easter 1958, when, according to the CND, several thousand people marched for
four days from Trafalgar Square, London, to the Atomic
Weapons Research Establishment close to Aldermaston
in Berkshire, England, to demonstrate their opposition 2.3.6 Costs and technology spin-os
to nuclear weapons.* [58]* [59] The Aldermaston marches
continued into the late 1960s when tens of thousands of See also: Global Positioning System, Nuclear weapons
people took part in the four-day marches.* [57]
delivery, History of computers, ENIAC and Swords to
In 1959, a letter in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists was ploughshares
the start of a successful campaign to stop the Atomic En-

54

CHAPTER 2. TYPES

According to an audit by the Brookings Institution, between 1940 and 1996, the U.S. spent $8.75 trillion in
present-day terms* [63] on nuclear weapons programs. 57
percent of which was spent on building nuclear weapons
delivery systems. 6.3 percent of the total, $549 billion
in present-day terms, was spent on environmental remediation and nuclear waste management, for example
cleaning up the Hanford site, and 7 percent of the total,
$615 billion was spent on making nuclear weapons themselves.* [64]

2.3.7

Non-weapons uses

was intended to highlight the peaceful applications of


nuclear explosive devices and thereby create a climate of
world opinion that is more favorable to weapons development and tests.* [69] The Operation Plowshare program
included 27 nuclear tests designed towards investigating
these non-weapons uses from 1961 through 1973. Due
to the inability of the U.S. physicists to reduce the ssion fraction of small, approximately 1 kiloton, yield nuclear devices that would have been required for many civil
engineering projects, when long term health and cleanup costs from ssion products were included in the cost,
there was virtually no economic advantage over conventional explosives, except for potentially the very largest of
projects.* [70]* [71]

Main article: Peaceful nuclear explosions

Civil engineering and energy production


See also: Athabasca oil sands Project oilsand and
Project Gnome
Apart from their use as weapons, nuclear explosives have

Map of all proposed routes for a tunnel and/or canal route from
the Mediterranean Sea to the Qattara Depression.
No route was shorter than 55 kilometers in length. Canalcutting investigations began with the buggy salvo shot of Operation Crosstie in 1967.

The Qattara Depression Project, as developed by Professor Friedrich Bassler, who during his appointment to the
West German ministry of economics in 1968, put forth
a plan to create a Saharan lake and hydroelectric power
station by blasting a tunnel between the Mediterranean
The 1962 Sedan nuclear test formed a crater 100 m (330 ft) sea and the Qattara Depression in Egypt, an area that lies
deep with a diameter of about 390 m (1,300 ft), as a means below sea level. The core problem of the entire project
of investigating the possibilities of using peaceful nuclear explo- was the water supply to the depression. Calculations by
sions for large-scale earth moving. If this test was conducted Bassler showed that digging a canal or tunnel would be
in 1965+, when improvements in device design were realized, a too expensive, therefore Bassler determined that the use
100-foldreduction in radiation release was considered feasi- of nuclear explosive devices, to excavate the canal or tunble.* [65] The 140 kiloton Soviet Chagan (nuclear test), companel, would be the most economical. The Egyptian governrable in yield to the Sedan test of 104 kt, formed Lake Chagan,
ment declined to pursue the idea.* [72]
reportedly used as a watering hole for cattle and human swimming.* [66]* [67]* [68]

The Soviet Union conducted a much more exhaustive program than Plowshare, with 239 nuclear tests, between
1965 and 1988. Furthermore, many of the tests
were considered economic applications, not tests, in
the Nuclear Explosions for the National Economy program.* [73]

been tested and used, in a similar manner to chemical


high explosives, for various non-military uses. These
have included large-scale earth moving, isotope production and the stimulation and the closing-o of the ow of
natural gas.
These included one 30 kiloton explosion being used to
At the peak of the Atomic Age, the United States initi- close the Uzbekistani Urtabulak gas well in 1966 that
ated Operation Plowshare, involving peaceful nuclear had been blowing since 1963, and a few months later a
explosions. The United States Atomic Energy Com- 47 kiloton explosive was used to seal a higher pressure
mission chairman announced that the Plowshares project blowout at the nearby Pamuk gas eld.* [74]

2.3. NUCLEAR WEAPON

55

The public records for devices that produced the highest


proportion of their yield via fusion-only reactions are possibly the Taiga Soviet peaceful nuclear explosions of the
1970s, with 98% of their 15 kiloton explosive yield being derived from fusion reactions, a total ssion fraction
of 0.3 kilotons in a 15 kt device.* [75]* [76]

rst Teller-Ulam thermonuclear device test Ivy Mike.


The rapid capture of so many neutrons required in the
synthesis of einsteinium would provide the needed direct experimental conrmation of the so-called r-process,
the multiple neutron absorptions needed to explain the
cosmic nucleosynthesis (production) of all heavy chemThe repeated detonation of nuclear devices underground ical elements heavier than nickel on the periodic table,
in salt domes, in a somewhat analogous manner to the in supernova explosions, before beta decay, with the rprocess explaining the existence of many stable elements
explosions that power a car internal combustion engine(in
*
that it would be a heat engine) has also been proposed as a in the universe. [79]
means of fusion power, in what is termed PACER.* [77] The worldwide presence of new isotopes from atmoOther investigated uses for peaceful nuclear explosions spheric testing beginning in the 1950s led to the 2008
were underground detonations to stimulate, by a process development of a reliable way to detect art forgeries.
analogous to fracking, the ow of petroleum and natural Paintings created after that period may contain traces of
gas in tight formations, this was most developed in the caesium-137 and strontium-90, isotopes that did not exist
Soviet Union, with an increase in the production of many in nature before 1945.* [80]* [81] (Fission products were
well heads being reported.* [74]
produced in the natural nuclear ssion reactor at Oklo
about 1.7 billion years ago, but these decayed away before the earliest known human painting.)* [82]
Physics
Both climatology and particularly aerosol science, a subeld of atmospheric science, were largely created to answer the question of how far and wide fallout would travel.
Similar to radioactive tracers used in hydrology and materials testing, fallout and the neutron activation of nitrogen gas served as a radioactive tracer that was used
to measure and then help model global circulations in
the atmosphere by following the movements of fallout
aerosols.* [83]* [84]
After the Van Allen Belts surrounding Earth were published about in 1958, James Van Allen suggested that a
nuclear detonation would be one way of probing the magnetic phenomenon, data obtained from the August 1958
Project Argus test shots, a high altitude nuclear explosion investigation, were vital to the early understanding
of Earth's magnetosphere.* [85]* [86]

The element einsteinium was rst discovered, in minute quantities, following the analysis of the fallout from the rst thermonuclear atmospheric test.* [78]

The discovery and synthesis of new chemical elements by


nuclear transmutation, and their production in the necessary quantities to allow the studying of their properties,
was carried out in nuclear explosive device testing. For
example, the discovery of the short lived einsteinium and
fermium, both created under the intense neutron ux environment within thermonuclear explosions, followed the

An artist's conception of the NASA reference design for the


Project Orion spacecraft powered by nuclear pulse propulsion.

Soviet nuclear physicist and Nobel peace prize recipient


Andrei Sakharov also proposed the idea that earthquakes
could be mitigated and particle accelerators could be

56

CHAPTER 2. TYPES

made by utilizing nuclear explosions,* [87]* [88] with the


latter created by connecting a nuclear explosive device
with another of his inventions, the explosively pumped
ux compression generator,* [89] to accelerate protons to
collide with each other to probe their inner workings, an
endeavor that is now done at much lower energy levels
with non-explosive superconducting magnets in CERN.
Sakharov suggested to replace the copper coil in his MK
generators by a big superconductor solenoid to magnetically compress and focus underground nuclear explosions
into a shaped charge eect. He theorized this could focus
1023 positively charged protons per second on a 1 mm2
surface, then envisaged making two such beams collide
in the form of a supercollider.* [90]
Underground nuclear explosive data from peaceful nuclear explosion test shots have been used to investigate the composition of Earth's mantle, analogous to the
exploration geophysics practice of mineral prospecting
with chemical explosives in "deep seismic sounding"
reection seismology.* [91]* [92]* [93]
Project A119, proposed in the 1960s, which as Apollo
scientist Gary Latham explained, would have been the
detonating of a smallishnuclear device on the Moon
in order to facilitate research into its geologic makeup.* [94] Analogous in concept to the comparatively
low yield explosion created by the water prospecting
(LCROSS)Lunar Crater Observation and Sensing Satellite mission, which launched in 2009 and released the
Centaurkinetic energy impactor, an impactor with a
mass of 2,305 kg (5,081 lb), and an impact velocity of
about 9,000 km/h (5,600 mph),* [95] releasing the kinetic
energy equivalent of detonating approximately 2 tons of
TNT (8.86 GJ).

A nuclear shaped charge design that was to provide nuclear pulse


propulsion to the Project Orion vehicle.

propulsion for spacecraft.


Ground ight testing by Professor Leik Myrabo, using
a non-nuclear, conventionally powered pulsed laser testbed, successfully lifted a lightcraft 72 meters in altitude by a method similar to ablative laser propulsion in
2000.* [97]

A powerful solar system based soft X-ray, to ultraviolet,


laser system has been calculated to be capable of propelling an interstellar spacecraft, by the light sail princiPropulsion use
ple, to 11% of the speed of light.* [98] In 1972 it was also
calculated that a 1 Terawatt, 1-km diameter x-ray laser
Although likely never achieving orbit due to aerodynamic with 1 angstrom wavelength impinging on a 1-km diamdrag, the rst macroscopic object to obtain Earth orbital eter sail, could propel a spacecraft to Alpha Centauri in
velocity was amanhole coverpropelled by the detona- 10 years.* [99]
tion of test shot Pascal-B, before sputnik obtained orbital
velocity, and also successfully became the rst satellite,
in October 1957. The use of a subterranean shaft and Asteroid impact avoidance
nuclear device to propel an object to escape velocity has
Main article: Asteroid impact avoidance
since been termed a thunder well.* [96]
The direct use of nuclear explosives, by using the impact See also: B83 nuclear bomb
of propellant plasma from a nuclear shaped charge acting
on a pusher plate, has also been seriously studied as a po- A proposed means of averting an asteroid impacting with
tential propulsion mechanism for space travel (see Project Earth, assuming low lead times between detection and
Orion).
Earth impact, is to detonate one, or a series, of nuclear
Edward Teller, in the United States, proposed the use of explosive devices, on, in, or in a stand-o proximity oria nuclear detonation to power an explosively pumped soft entation with the asteroid, with the latter method occurX-ray laser as a component of a ballistic missile defense ring far enough away from the incoming threat to prevent
shield, this would destroy missile components by transfer- the potential fracturing of the near-Earth object, but still
ring momentum to the vehicles surface by laser ablation. close* enough to generate a high thrust laser ablation efThis ablation process is one of the damage mechanisms fect. [102]
of a laser weapon, but it is also the basis of pulsed laser A 2007 NASA analysis of impact avoidance strategies

2.3. NUCLEAR WEAPON

57

2.3.8 See also


The Atomic Age Wikipedia book
History
History of nuclear weapons
Atomic spies
German nuclear energy project
Japanese atomic program
Soviet atomic bomb project
Artist's impression of the impact event that resulted in
the CretaceousPaleogene extinction event, which killed the
Dinosaurs some 65 million years ago. A natural impact with an
explosive yield of 100 teratons of TNT (4.21023 J).* [100] The
most powerful man-made explosion, the Tsar Bomba, by comparison had a yield almost 2 million times smaller 57 megatons
of TNT (2.41017 J).* [101] The 1994 Comet ShoemakerLevy
9 impacts on planet Jupiter, the Tunguska and Chelyabinsk
asteroidEarth collisions of 1908 and 2013 respectively, have
served as an impetus for the analysis of technologies that could
prevent the destruction of human life by impact events.

using various technologies stated:* [103]

Los Alamos National Laboratory


Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
Lists of nuclear disasters and radioactive incidents
Nuclear and radiation accidents, including nuclear
weapons accidents
Nevada Test Site
Project Gnome
Military strategy

Nuclear stand-o explosions are assessed


to be 10100 times more eective than the
non-nuclear alternatives analyzed in this study.
Other techniques involving the surface or
subsurface use of nuclear explosives may be
more ecient, but they run an increased risk of
fracturing the target near-Earth object. They
also carry higher development and operations
risks.

Civil Defense
Fractional Orbital Bombardment System
Mutual Assured Destruction
Weapon of mass destruction
Nuclear strategy
More technical details

Analysis of the uncertainty involved in nuclear device


asteroid deection shows that the ability to protect the
planet does not imply the ability to also target the planet,
which is the case with all non-nuclear alternatives, such
as the controversial gravity tractor technology. A nuclear
explosion that changed an asteroid's velocity by 10 m/s
(20%) would be adequate to push it out of an Earthimpacting orbit. However, if the uncertainty of the velocity change is more than a few plus or minus percent,
there would be no chance of directing the asteroid to a
particular target.

Eects of nuclear explosions


Intercontinental ballistic missile
Neutron bomb
Nuclear bombs and health
Nuclear weapon yield

However, if the need arises to use nuclear explosive


devices to prevent an asteroid impact event, it may Popular culture
face the legal issue that the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space and the 1996
Nuclear weapons in popular culture
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty ban nuclear
weapons in space.
The Butter Battle Book

58

CHAPTER 2. TYPES

Proliferation and politics


Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in
Latin America and the Caribbean
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
International Court of Justice advisory opinion on
legality of nuclear weapons
List of states with nuclear weapons
List of nuclear weapons
Nth Country Experiment
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
Nuclear weapons and the United Kingdom
The Letters of last resort (United Kingdom)
Nuclear weapons and Russia
Nuclear weapons and the United States
Paranuclear
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
Three Non-Nuclear Principles, of Japan

2.3.9

Notes and references

[1] See Trinity (nuclear test) and Ivy Mike.


[2] Specically the 1970 to 1980 designed and deployed US
B83 nuclear bomb, with a yield of up to 1.2 megatons.
[3] Frequently Asked Questions #1. Radiation Eects Research Foundation. Retrieved Sep 18, 2007. total number
of deaths is not known precisely ... acute (within two to
four months) deaths ... Hiroshima ... 90,000 166,000
... Nagasaki ... 60,000 80,000
[4] Federation of American Scientists: Status of World Nuclear Forces. Fas.org. Retrieved 2012-12-29.
[5] Nuclear Weapons Israel. Fas.org. Jan 8, 2007. Retrieved 2010-12-15.
[6] See also Mordechai Vanunu
[7] Nuclear Weapons South Africa. Fas.org. May 29,
2000. Retrieved 2011-04-07.
[8] The best overall printed sources on nuclear weapons design are: Hansen, Chuck. U.S. Nuclear Weapons: The
Secret History. San Antonio, TX: Aerofax, 1988; and the
more-updated Hansen, Chuck, "Swords of Armageddon:
U.S. Nuclear Weapons Development since 1945" (CDROM & download available). PDF. 2,600 pages, Sunnyvale, California, Chuklea Publications, 1995, 2007. ISBN
978-0-9791915-0-3 (2nd Ed.)

[9] David Albright and Kimberly Kramer (2005-08-22).


Neptunium 237 and Americium: World Inventories and
Proliferation Concerns(PDF). Institute for Science and
International Security. Retrieved 2011-10-13.
[10] Carey Sublette, Nuclear Weapons Frequently Asked
Questions: 4.5.2 Dirtyand CleanWeapons, accessed 10 May 2011.
[11] On India's alleged hydrogen bomb test, see Carey Sublette,
What Are the Real Yields of India's Test?.
[12] Sublette, Carey. The Nuclear Weapon Archive. Retrieved 2007-03-07.
[13] U.S. Department of Energy, Restricted Data Declassication Decisions, 1946 to the Present (RDD-8) (January 1,
2002), accessed November 20, 2011.
[14] Page discussing the possibility of using antimatter as
a trigger for a thermonuclear explosion. Cui.unige.ch.
Retrieved 2013-05-30.
[15] Andre Gsponer; Jean-Pierre Hurni (1970). Paper discussing the number of antiprotons required to ignite a
thermonuclear weapon. In G. Velarde and E. Minguez,
eds., Proceedings of the th International Conference on
Emerging Nuclear Energy Systems, Madrid, June /July ,
(World Scientic, Singapore, 1987) 166169 (Arxiv.org)
4 (30). arXiv:physics/0507114.
[16] Keay Davidson, Chronicle Science Writer (2004-10-04).
Air Force pursuing antimatter weapons: Program was
touted publicly, then came ocial gag order. Sfgate.com. Retrieved 2013-05-30.
[17] Fourth Generation Nuclear Weapons. Retrieved 24
October 2014.
[18] Stephen I. Schwartz, ed., Atomic Audit: The Costs
and Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940.
Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1998.
See also Estimated Minimum Incurred Costs of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Programs, 19401996, an excerpt from
the book. Archived July 16, 2012 at the Wayback Machine
[19] Creveld, Martin Van (2000). Technology and War
II:Postmodern War?". In Charles Townshend. The Oxford History of Modern War. New York, USA: Oxford
University Press. p. 349. ISBN 0-19-285373-2.
[20] Mearsheimer, John (2006). Conversations in International Relations: Interview with John J. Mearsheimer
(Part I)" (PDF). International Relations 20 (1): 105123.
doi:10.1177/0047117806060939.See page 116
[21] Kenneth Waltz, More May Be Better,in Scott Sagan
and Kenneth Waltz, eds., The Spread of Nuclear Weapons
(New York: Norton, 1995).
[22] Kenneth Waltz,The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More
May Better, Adelphi Papers, no. 171 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981).
[23] See, for example: Feldman, Noah. "Islam, Terror and the
Second Nuclear Age,New York Times Magazine (29 October 2006).

2.3. NUCLEAR WEAPON

59

[24] Daniel Plesch & Stephen Young, Senseless policy [41] Hugh Gusterson (30 March 2012). The new abolition, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December
ists. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
1998, page 4. Fetched from URL on 18 April 2011.
[42] ODS Team. Renewing the United Nations: A Program
[25] Gallucci, Robert (September 2006). Averting Nufor Reform (A/51/950)" (PDF). Daccess-dds-ny.un.org.
clear Catastrophe: Contemplating Extreme Responses to
Retrieved 2013-05-30.
U.S. Vulnerability. Annals of the American Academy
of Political and Social Science 607: pp.
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[27] In the United States, the President and the Secretary


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[45] James C. Oskins, Michael H. Maggelet (2008). Broken


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[28] Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive NuclearTest-Ban Treaty Organization (2010). "Status of Signature and Ratication". Accessed 27 May 2010. Of the
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Treaty. India, North Korea, and Pakistan have not signed
the Treaty.

[46] Ticonderoga Cruise Reports(Navy.mil weblist of Aug


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[29] Richelson, Jerey. Spying on the bomb: American nuclear


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New York: Norton, 2006.

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[30] The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) on Tactical


Nuclear Weapons At a Glance, Fact Sheet, Arms Control
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[49] Hayes, Ron (January 17, 2007). H-bomb incident crippled pilot's career. Palm Beach Post. Archived from the
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[31] Nuclear weapons and international humanitarian law International Committee of the Red Cross

[50] Maydew, Randall C. (1997). America's Lost H-Bomb:


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[32] Mark Diesendorf (2013). Book review: Contesting the


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[35] Lawrence M. Krauss. The Doomsday Clock Still Ticks,
Scientic American, January 2010, p. 26.
[36] Graham, Nick (2009-04-05). Obama Prague Speech
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2013-05-30.

[51] Long, Tony (January 17, 2008). Jan. 17, 1966:


H-Bombs Rain Down on a Spanish Fishing Village.
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[52] Wolfgang Rudig (1990). Anti-nuclear Movements: A
World Survey of Opposition to Nuclear Energy, Longman,
p. 54-55.
[53] Report on the Health Consequences to the American
Population from Nuclear Weapons Tests Conducted by the
United States and Other Nations. CDC. Retrieved 7
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[37] CNN Poll: Public divided on eliminating all nuclear


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[54] Committee to Review the CDC-NCI Feasibility Study of


the Health Consequences Nuclear Weapons Tests, National Research Council. Exposure of the American
Population to Radioactive Fallout from Nuclear Weapons
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[38] http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/
ESCCONTROLCHAPTER1.pdf

[55] ABC News. What governments oer to victims of nuclear tests. ABC News. Retrieved 24 October 2014.

[39] Michael Krepon The Stability-Instability Paradox.


Retrieved 24 October 2014.

[56] Radiation Exposure Compensation System: Claims to


Date Summary of Claims Received by 06/11/2009

[40] Ben Goddard (2010-01-27). Cold Warriors say no


nukes. The Hill.

[57] Jim Falk (1982). Global Fission: The Battle Over Nuclear
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60

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[58] A brief history of CND. Cnduk.org. Retrieved 201305-30.

[77] John Nuckolls, Early Steps Toward Inertial Fusion Energy (IFE)", LLNL, 12 June 1998

[59] Early defections in march to Aldermaston. London:


Guardian Unlimited. 1958-04-05.

[78] EINSTEINIUM
AND
FERMIUM,
ALBERT
GHIORSO, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NATIONAL
LABORATORY

[60] Jim Falk (1982). Global Fission: The Battle Over Nuclear
Power, Oxford University Press, p. 93.
[61] Jim Falk (1982). Global Fission: The Battle Over Nuclear
Power, Oxford University Press, p. 98.
[62] Spencer Weart, Nuclear Fear: A History of Images (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988), chapters
16 and 19.
[63] Consumer Price Index (estimate) 18002014. Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Retrieved February 27,
2014.

[79] Byrne, J. Neutrons, Nuclei, and Matter, Dover Publications, Mineola, NY, 2011, ISBN 978-0-486-48238-5
(pbk.) pp. 267.
[80] Cartlidge, Edwin (4 July 2008). Nuclear fallout used to
spot fake art. Physics World the member magazine of
the Institute of Physics. IOP Group. Retrieved 7 December 2014.
[81] Can past nuclear explosions help detect forgeries?".
Theartnewspaper.com. Archived from the original on
November 13, 2010. Retrieved 2010-11-25.

[64] Brookings Institution, Estimated Minimum Incurred


Costs of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Programs, 19401996 [82] Emsley, John (2011). Nature's Building Blocks: An A-Z
Guide to the Elements (New ed.). New York, NY: Oxford
, at http://www.brook.edu/fp/projects/nucwcost/figure1.
University Press. ISBN 978-0-19-960563-7.
htm
[65] Declassied U.S. Nuclear Test Film #35 c. 29:30 minutes
[66] Guinness World Records.Largest crater from an underground nuclear explosion. Retrieved 24 October 2014.
[67] The Soviet Nuclear Weapons Program. Retrieved 24
October 2014.
[68] Russia Today documentary that visits the lake at around
the 1 minute mark on YouTube
[69] Charles Perrow (September/October 2013 vol. 69 no. 5).
Nuclear denial: From Hiroshima to Fukushima. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Check date values in: |date=
(help)
[70] Q&A with Scott Kirsch: Digging with bombs. Usnews.com. Archived from the original on January 31,
2010. Retrieved 2010-11-25.
[71] Declassied U.S. Nuclear Test Film #35 c. 12:00 minutes
[72] http://www.miktechnology.com/pdf/Qattara%
20Depression%20Potential%20Paper-IEEE%
20Egypt%20Conference.pdf
[73] Nordyke, MD (2000-09-01).
The Soviet Program
for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosions (PDF).
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. pp. 3435.
doi:10.2172/793554. Report no.: UCRL-ID-124410
Rev 2; US Department of Energy contract no.: W-7405Eng48.
[74] Nordyke, M. D. (2000-09-01). Extinguishing Runaway
Gas Well Fires. The Soviet Program for Peaceful Uses of
Nuclear Explosions (PDF). Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory. pp. 3435. doi:10.2172/793554. Report
no.: UCRL-ID-124410 Rev 2. U. S. Department of Energy contract no.: W-7405-Eng48.
[75] Disturbing the Universe Freeman Dyson
[76] The Soviet Program for Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Explosions by Milo D. Nordyke. Science & Global Security,
1998, Volume 7, pp. 1117. See test shot Taiga.

[83] Entangled histories: Climate science and nuclear weapons


research
[84] Nuclear weapons' surprising contribution to climate science. Phys.org. 2012-07-13. Retrieved 2013-05-30.
[85] Going Nuclear Over the Pacic | Past Imperfect.
Blogs.smithsonianmag.com. Retrieved 2013-05-30.
[86] https://www.fas.org/irp/threat/mctl98-2/p2sec06.pdf
SECTION VI NUCLEAR WEAPONS EFFECTS
TECHNOLOGY II-6-28.
[87] Archived November 6, 2013 at the Wayback Machine
[88] Viktor Adamsky and Yuri Smirnov. 1994. Moscow's
Biggest Bomb: the 50-Megaton Test of October 1961
Cold War International History Project Bulletin, Issue 4,
Fall 1994
[89] Sakharov, A. D. (1966).
Magnetoimplosive
Generators. Soviet Physics Uspekhi 9 (2): 294.
doi:10.1070/PU1966v009n02ABEH002876.
[90] https://libraries.mit.edu/archives/research/collections/
collections-mc/mc572.html
[91] Travel time analysis of P waves arising from six underground nuclear explosion at Novaya Zemlya. Annalsofgeophysics.eu. Retrieved 2013-05-30.
[92] Upper Mantle Heterogeneities from Active and Passive
Seismology. Springer.com. 1997-04-16. Retrieved
2013-05-30.
[93] A Database Of Deep Seismic Sounding Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Recordings For Seismic Monitoring Of
Northern Eurasia (PDF). Retrieved 2013-05-30.
[94] Moon madness. The Sydney Morning Herald. December 21, 1969. p. 19. Retrieved September 9, 2011.
[95] NASA's LCROSS Mission Changes Impact Crater.
NASA. 2009-09-29. Retrieved 2009-11-21.

2.3. NUCLEAR WEAPON

[96] Operation Plumbbob. Retrieved 24 October 2014.


[97] Laser Propulsion Thrusters for Space Transportation.
springer.com. Retrieved 1 April 2015.
[98] Roundtrip Interstellar Travel Using Laser-Pushed Lightsails. VOL. 21, NO. 2, MARCH-APRIL 1984 J. SPACECRAFT. Robert Forward et. al(PDF). Retrieved 201305-30.
[99] W.E Mockel, Propulsion by impinging Laser beams.
Journal of Spacecraft and rockets. 9, no 12 p 942 (1972).
[100] Covey et al.
[101] Adamsky and Smirnov, 19.
[102] Dillow, Clay (9 April 2012). How it Would Work:
Destroying an Incoming Killer Asteroid With a Nuclear
Blast. Popular Science (Bonnier). Retrieved 6 January
2013.
[103] http://neo.jpl.nasa.gov/neo/report2007.html Near-Earth
Object Survey and Deection Analysis of Alternatives
Report to Congress March 2007

2.3.10

Bibliography

See also: List of books about nuclear issues

Bethe, Hans Albrecht. The Road from Los Alamos.


New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991. ISBN 0671-74012-1

61
Holloway, David. Stalin and the Bomb. New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1994. ISBN 0-300-06056-4
The Manhattan Engineer District, "The Atomic
Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki" (1946)
(French) Jean-Hugues Oppel, Rveillez le prsident,
ditions Payot et rivages, 2007 (ISBN 978-2-74361630-4). The book is a ction about the nuclear
weapons of France; the book also contains about ten
chapters on true historical incidents involving nuclear weapons and strategy.
Smyth, Henry DeWolf. Atomic Energy for Military Purposes. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1945. (Smyth Report the rst declassied
report by the US government on nuclear weapons)
The Eects of Nuclear War. Oce of Technology
Assessment, May 1979.
Rhodes, Richard. Dark Sun: The Making of the
Hydrogen Bomb. New York: Simon and Schuster,
1995. ISBN 0-684-82414-0
Rhodes, Richard. The Making of the Atomic Bomb.
New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986 ISBN 0-68481378-5
Weart, Spencer R. Nuclear Fear: A History of Images. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1988. ISBN 0-674-62836-5
Weart, Spencer R. The Rise of Nuclear Fear. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012. ISBN
0-674-05233-1

DeVolpi, Alexander, Minkov, Vladimir E., Simonenko, Vadim A., and Stanford, George S. Nuclear Shadowboxing: Contemporary Threats from 2.3.11 External links
Cold War Weaponry. Fidlar Doubleday, 2004 (Two
volumes, both accessible on Google Book Search)
Nuclear Weapon Archive from Carey Sublette is a
(Content of both volumes is now available in the
reliable source of information and has links to other
2009 trilogy by Alexander DeVolpi: Nuclear Insources and an informative FAQ.
sights: The Cold War Legacy)
The Federation of American Scientists provide solid
Glasstone, Samuel and Dolan, Philip J. The Efinformation on weapons of mass destruction, includfects of Nuclear Weapons (third edition). Washinging nuclear weapons and their eects
ton, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Oce, 1977.
Alsos Digital Library for Nuclear Issues contains
Available online (PDF).
many resources related to nuclear weapons, including a historical and technical overview and search NATO Handbook on the Medical Aspects of NBC Deable bibliography of web and print resources.
fensive Operations (Part I Nuclear). Departments
of the Army, Navy, and Air Force: Washington,
Video archive of US, Soviet, UK, Chinese and
D.C., 1996
French Nuclear Weapon Testing at sonicbomb.com
Hansen, Chuck. U.S. Nuclear Weapons: The Secret
The National Museum of Nuclear Science & HisHistory. Arlington, TX: Aerofax, 1988
tory (United States)located in Albuquerque, New
Mexico; a Smithsonian Aliate Museum
Hansen, Chuck, "Swords of Armageddon: U.S. nuclear weapons development since 1945" (CD-ROM
& download available). PDF. 2,600 pages, Sunnyvale, California, Chucklea Publications, 1995,
2007. ISBN 978-0-9791915-0-3 (2nd Ed.)

Nuclear Emergency and Radiation Resources


The Manhattan Project: Making the Atomic Bomb
at AtomicArchive.com

62

CHAPTER 2. TYPES

Los Alamos National Laboratory: History (U.S. nu- Factors such as: energy and type of radiation, half-life,
clear history)
longevity, availability, shielding, portability, and the role
of the environment will determine the eect of the ra Race for the Superbomb, PBS website on the history diological weapon. Radioisotopes that pose the greatest
of the H-bomb
security risk include: 137Cs, used in radiological medical
equipment, 60Co, 241Am, 252Cf, 192Ir, 238Pu, 90Sr,
Recordings of recollections of the victims of Hi- 226Ra, and 238U.
roshima and Nagasaki
All of these isotopes, except for the nal one, are created
The Woodrow Wilson Center's Nuclear Prolifera- in nuclear power plants. While the amount of radiation
tion International History Project or NPIHP is a dispersed from the event will likely be minimal, the fact
global network of individuals and institutions en- of any radiation may be enough to cause panic and disgaged in the study of international nuclear history ruption.
through archival documents, oral history interviews
and other empirical sources.

2.4.2 History

The professional history of radioactive weaponry may be


traced to a 1940 science ction story, "Solution Unsat2.4 Radiological weapon
isfactory"* [5] by Robert A. Heinlein and a 1943 memo
from James Bryant Conant, Arthur Holly Compton and
A radiological weapon or radiological dispersion deHarold Urey to Brigadier General Leslie Groves, head of
vice (RDD) is any weapon that is designed to spread
the Manhattan Project.
radioactive material with the intent to kill and cause disruption. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, Transmitting a report entitled, Use of Radioactive Maan RDD is any device, including any weapon or equip- terials as a Military Weapon,the Groves memo states:
ment, other than a nuclear explosive device, specically
designed to employ radioactive material by disseminating it to cause destruction, damage, or injury by means
of the radiation produced by the decay of such material
.* [1]* [2]
One type of RDD is aconventional explosive combined
with some type of radiological material, also known as
a dirty bomb. It is not a true nuclear weapon and does not
yield the same explosive power. It uses conventional explosives to spread radioactive material, most commonly
the spent fuels from nuclear power plants or radioactive
medical waste. It is not a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD), but rather, as researcher Peter Probst calls
it, a weapon of mass disruption(Hughes, 2002). In
fact, eective dispersal ranges are rather limited. Most
deaths (if any) would come from the initial explosion
(non-nuclear), but it does depend on the type of radiological material used. (Department of Homeland Security [DHS], 2003).* [1]* [3]* [4]
Another version is the salted bomb, a true nuclear weapon
designed to produce larger amounts of nuclear fallout
than a regular nuclear weapon.

2.4.1

Explanation

Radiological weapons of mass destruction have been suggested as a possible weapon of terrorism used to create
panic and casualties in densely populated areas. They
could also render a great deal of property uninhabitable
for an extended period, unless costly remediation were
undertaken. The radiological source and quality greatly
impacts the eectiveness of a radiological weapon.

October 30, 1943 memo from Drs. Conant, Compton, and


Urey to Brigadier General L. R. Groves, Manhattan District, Oak
Ridge, Tennessee; declassied June 5, 1974.

As a gas warfare instrument the material


would ... be inhaled by personnel. The amount
necessary to cause death to a person inhaling
the material is extremely small. It has been estimated that one millionth of a gram accumu-

2.4. RADIOLOGICAL WEAPON


lating in a person's body would be fatal. There
are no known methods of treatment for such a
casualty.... It cannot be detected by the senses;
It can be distributed in a dust or smoke form
so nely powdered that it will permeate a standard gas mask lter in quantities large enough
to be extremely damaging....
Radioactive warfare can be used [...] To
make evacuated areas uninhabitable; To contaminate small critical areas such as rail-road
yards and airports; As a radioactive poison gas
to create casualties among troops; Against large
cities, to promote panic, and create casualties
among civilian populations.
Areas so contaminated by radioactive dusts
and smokes, would be dangerous as long as a
high enough concentration of material could be
maintained.... they can be stirred up as a ne
dust from the terrain by winds, movement of
vehicles or troops, etc., and would remain a potential hazard for a long time.
These materials may also be so disposed as
to be taken into the body by ingestion instead of
inhalation. Reservoirs or wells would be contaminated or food poisoned with an eect similar to that resulting from inhalation of dust or
smoke. Four days production could contaminate a million gallons of water to an extent that
a quart drunk in one day would probably result
in complete incapacitation or death in about a
month's time.
The United States, however, chose not to pursue radiological weapons during World War II, though early on in the
project considered it as a backup plan in case nuclear ssion proved impossible to tame. Some US policymakers
and scientists involved in the project felt that radiological weapons would qualify as chemical weapons and thus
violate international law.

2.4.3

Deployment

One possible way of dispersing the material is by using a


dirty bomb, a conventional explosive which disperses radioactive material. Dirty bombs are not a type of nuclear
weapon, which requires a nuclear chain reaction and the
creation of a critical mass. Whereas a nuclear weapon
will usually create mass casualties immediately following
the blast, a dirty bomb scenario would initially cause only
minimal casualties from the conventional explosion.

63

2.4.4 Military uses


Radiological weapons are widely considered to be militarily useless for a state-sponsored army and are initially
not hoped to be used by any military forces. Firstly, the
use of such a weapon is of no use to an occupying force, as
the target area becomes uninhabitable (due to the fallout
caused by radioactive poisoning of the involved environment).
Furthermore, area-denial weapons are generally of limited use to an attacking army, as it slows the rate of advance.

2.4.5 Dirty bombs


A dirty bomb is a radiological weapon dispersed with
conventional explosives.
There is currently (as of 2007) an ongoing debate about
the damage that terrorists using such a weapon might inict. Many experts believe that a dirty bomb such that terrorists might reasonably be able to construct would be unlikely to harm more than a few people and hence it would
be no more deadly than a conventional bomb. Furthermore, the casualties would be a result of the initial explosion, because alpha and beta emitting material needs to
be inhaled to do damage to the human body. Gamma radiation emitting material is so radioactive that it can't be
deployed without wrapping an amount of shielding material around the bomb that would make transport by car or
plane impossible without risking detection. Because of
this a dirty bomb with radioactive material around an explosive device would be almost useless, unless said shielding was removed shortly before detonation. This is not
only because of the eectiveness but also because this
material would be easy to clean up. Furthermore, the
possibility of terrorists making a gas or aerosol that is radioactive is very unlikely because of the complex chemical work to achieve this goal.* [6]
Hence, this line of argument goes, the objectively dominant eect would be the moral and economic damage
due to the massive fear and panic such an incident would
spur. On the other hand, some believe that the fatalities
and injuries might be in fact much more severe. This
point was made by physicist Peter D. Zimmerman (King's
College London) who reexamined the Goinia accident
which is arguably comparable.* [7] and popularized in a
subsequent ctionalized account produced by the BBC
and broadcast in the United States by PBS.* [8] The latter
program showed how shielding might be used to minimize the detection risk.

Means of radiological warfare that do not rely on any specic weapon, but rather on spreading radioactive contam- 2.4.6 Salted bomb
ination via a food chain or water table, seem to be more
eective in some ways, but share many of the same prob- Main article: Salted bomb
lems as chemical warfare.

64

CHAPTER 2. TYPES

A salted bomb is a theoretical nuclear weapon designed to


produce enhanced quantities of radioactive fallout, rendering a large area uninhabitable. As far as is publicly
known none have ever been built.

2.4.7

See also

Biological warfare
Chemical warfare
Cobalt bomb
Lists of nuclear disasters and radioactive incidents
Nuclear fallout
Nuclear weapon
Radioactive contamination
Weapon of mass destruction
Nuclear terrorism

2.4.8

References

[1] Rickert, Paul (2005-12-31). The Likely Eect of a Radiological Dispersion Device. Liberty University. pp.
2, 3. Retrieved 21 October 2014.
[2] Ford, J. (March 1998). Radiological Dispersion Devices: Assessing the transnational threat. National Defense University - Institute for National Strategic Studies
- Strategic Forum. Archived from the original on December 12, 2005. Retrieved December 31, 2005.
[3] Hughes, D. (4 March 2002). When terrorists go nuclear. Popular Mechanics. Archived from the original
on September 19, 2005. Retrieved December 31, 2005.
[4] Radiological Dispersion Devices Fact Sheet. Department of Homeland Security. 10 February 2003. Archived
from the original on December 29, 2005. Retrieved December 31, 2005.
[5] Full story at publisher's web site
[6]
[7] Dirty Bombs: The Threat Revisited in Defense Horizons,
Feb. 2004, a publication of the National Defense University
[8] Dirty Bomb

2.4.9

External links

Annotated bibliography for radiological dispersal


devices (RDD) from the Alsos Digital Library for
Nuclear Issues. This page has no results.

Chapter 3

Proliferation
3.1 Nuclear proliferation

acquired, nuclear weapons: India, Pakistan, North Korea,


and Israel. None of these four is a party to the NPT, although North Korea acceded to the NPT in 1985, then
See also: Chemical weapon proliferation
Nuclear proliferation is the spread of nuclear weapons, withdrew in 2003 and conducted announced nuclear tests
in 2006, 2009, and 2013. One critique of the NPT is
that it is discriminatory in recognizing as nuclear weapon
states only those countries that tested nuclear weapons before 1968 and requiring all other states joining the treaty
to forswear nuclear weapons.
Research into the development of nuclear weapons was
undertaken during World War II by the United States (in
cooperation with the United Kingdom and Canada), Germany, Japan, and the USSR. The United States was the
rst and is the only country to have used a nuclear weapon
World map with nuclear weapons development status repre- in war, when it used two bombs against Japan in August
1945. With their loss during the war, Germany and Japan
sented by color.
ceased to be involved in any nuclear weapon research.
Five nuclear weapons statesfrom the NPT
In August 1949, the USSR tested a nuclear weapon.* [1]
Other states known to possess nuclear weapons
States formerly possessing nuclear weapons
The United Kingdom tested a nuclear weapon in October
States suspected of being in the process of developing nuclear 1952. France developed a nuclear weapon in 1960. The
weapons and/or nuclear programs
People's Republic of China detonated a nuclear weapon
States which at one point had nuclear weapons and/or nuclear in 1964. India exploded a nuclear device in 1974, and
weapons research programs
Pakistan tested a weapon in 1998. In 2006, North Korea
States that possess nuclear weapons, but have not widely adopted
conducted a nuclear test.
them

ssionable material, and weapons-applicable nuclear


technology and information to nations not recognized as
Nuclear Weapon Statesby the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, also known as the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty or NPT. Leading experts on nuclear proliferation, such as Etel Solingen of the University
of California, Irvine, suggest that states' decisions to build
nuclear weapons is largely determined by the interests of
their governing domestic coalitions.

3.1.1 Non-proliferation eorts


Early eorts to prevent nuclear proliferation involved
intense government secrecy, the wartime acquisition
of known uranium stores (the Combined Development
Trust), and at times even outright sabotagesuch as the
bombing of a heavy-water facility thought to be used for a
German nuclear program. None of these eorts were explicitly public, because the weapon developments themselves were kept secret until the bombing of Hiroshima.

Proliferation has been opposed by many nations with and


without nuclear weapons, the governments of which fear
that more countries with nuclear weapons may increase
the possibility of nuclear warfare (up to and including the
so-called "countervalue" targeting of civilians with nuclear weapons), de-stabilize international or regional relations, or infringe upon the national sovereignty of states.

Earnest international eorts to promote nuclear nonproliferation began soon after World War II, when the
Truman Administration proposed the Baruch Plan* [2] of
1946, named after Bernard Baruch, America's rst representative to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. The Baruch Plan, which drew heavily from the
AchesonLilienthal Report of 1946, proposed the veriFour countries besides the ve recognized Nuclear able dismantlement and destruction of the U.S. nuclear
Weapons States have acquired, or are presumed to have arsenal (which, at that time, was the only nuclear arse65

66
nal in the world) after all governments had cooperated
successfully to accomplish two things: (1) the establishment of an international atomic development authority,which would actually own and control all militaryapplicable nuclear materials and activities, and (2) the
creation of a system of automatic sanctions, which not
even the U.N. Security Council could veto, and which
would proportionately punish states attempting to acquire
the capability to make nuclear weapons or ssile material.
Baruch's plea for the destruction of nuclear weapons invoked basic moral and religious intuitions. In one part of
his address to the UN, Baruch said, Behind the black
portent of the new atomic age lies a hope which, seized
upon with faith, can work out our salvation. If we fail,
then we have damned every man to be the slave of Fear.
Let us not deceive ourselves. We must elect World Peace
or World Destruction.... We must answer the world's
longing for peace and security.* [3] With this remark,
Baruch helped launch the eld of nuclear ethics, to which
many policy experts and scholars have contributed.
Although the Baruch Plan enjoyed wide international
support, it failed to emerge from the UNAEC because
the Soviet Union planned to veto it in the Security Council. Still, it remained ocial American policy until 1953,
when President Eisenhower made his "Atoms for Peace"
proposal before the U.N. General Assembly. Eisenhower's proposal led eventually to the creation of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1957.
Under theAtoms for Peaceprogram thousands of scientists from around the world were educated in nuclear
science and then dispatched home, where many later pursued secret weapons programs in their home country.* [4]
Eorts to conclude an international agreement to limit the
spread of nuclear weapons did not begin until the early
1960s, after four nations (the United States, the Soviet
Union, the United Kingdom and France) had acquired
nuclear weapons (see List of states with nuclear weapons
for more information). Although these eorts stalled in
the early 1960s, they renewed once again in 1964, after China detonated a nuclear weapon. In 1968, governments represented at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament
Committee (ENDC) nished negotiations on the text of
the NPT. In June 1968, the U.N. General Assembly endorsed the NPT with General Assembly Resolution 2373
(XXII), and in July 1968, the NPT opened for signature
in Washington, DC, London and Moscow. The NPT entered into force in March 1970.

CHAPTER 3. PROLIFERATION
means for weapons construction to develop rudimentary,
but working, nuclear explosive devices are considered to
be within the reach of industrialized nations.
Since its founding by the United Nations in 1957, the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has promoted two, sometimes contradictory, missions: on the
one hand, the Agency seeks to promote and spread internationally the use of civilian nuclear energy; on the
other hand, it seeks to prevent, or at least detect, the diversion of civilian nuclear energy to nuclear weapons, nuclear explosive devices or purposes unknown. The IAEA
now operates a safeguards system as specied under Article III of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of
1968, which aims to ensure that civil stocks of uranium,
plutonium, as well as facilities and technologies associated with these nuclear materials, are used only for peaceful purposes and do not contribute in any way to proliferation or nuclear weapons programs. It is often argued that
proliferation of nuclear weapons to many other states has
been prevented by the extension of assurances and mutual defence treaties to these states by nuclear powers, but
other factors, such as national prestige, or specic historical experiences, also play a part in hastening or stopping
nuclear proliferation.* [5]

3.1.2 Dual use technology


Dual-use technology refers to the possibility of military
use of civilian nuclear power technology. Many technologies and materials associated with the creation of a nuclear power program have a dual-use capability, in that
several stages of the nuclear fuel cycle allow diversion of
nuclear materials for nuclear weapons. When this happens a nuclear power program can become a route leading to the atomic bomb or a public annex to a secret bomb
program. The crisis over Irans nuclear activities is a case
in point.* [6]

Many UN and US agencies warn that building more nuclear reactors unavoidably increases nuclear proliferation
risks.* [7] A fundamental goal for American and global
security is to minimize the proliferation risks associated
with the expansion of nuclear power. If this development
ispoorly managed or eorts to contain risks are unsuccessful, the nuclear future will be dangerous.* [6] For
nuclear power programs to be developed and managed
safely and securely, it is important that countries have domestic good governancecharacteristics that will enSince the mid-1970s, the primary focus of non- courage proper nuclear operations and management:* [6]
proliferation eorts has been to maintain, and even inThese characteristics include low degrees
crease, international control over the ssile material and
of corruption (to avoid ocials selling maspecialized technologies necessary to build such devices
terials and technology for their own personal
because these are the most dicult and expensive parts
gain as occurred with the A.Q. Khan smugof a nuclear weapons program. The main materials
gling network in Pakistan), high degrees of powhose generation and distribution is controlled are highly
litical stability (dened by the World Bank as
enriched uranium and plutonium. Other than the acquisilikelihood that the government will be destation of these special materials, the scientic and technical
bilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or

3.1. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION


violent means, including politically-motivated
violence and terrorism), high governmental
eectiveness scores (a World Bank aggregate
measure of the quality of the civil service
and the degree of its independence from political pressures [and] the quality of policy formulation and implementation), and a strong
degree of regulatory competence.* [6]

3.1.3

International cooperation

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty


Main article: Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
At present, 189 countries are States Parties to the Treaty
on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, more commonly known as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty or
NPT. These include the ve Nuclear Weapons States
(NWS) recognized by the NPT: the People's Republic
of China, France, Russian Federation, the UK, and the
United States.

67
be suitable for bomb production.
Scope of safeguards
See also: Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting
and Control of Nuclear Materials
Traditional safeguards are arrangements to account for
and control the use of nuclear materials. This verication is a key element in the international system which
ensures that uranium in particular is used only for peaceful purposes.
Parties to the NPT agree to accept technical safeguard
measures applied by the IAEA. These require that operators of nuclear facilities maintain and declare detailed
accounting records of all movements and transactions involving nuclear material. Over 550 facilities and several hundred other locations are subject to regular inspection, and their records and the nuclear material being
audited. Inspections by the IAEA are complemented by
other measures such as surveillance cameras and instrumentation.

Notable non-signatories to the NPT are Israel, Pakistan, The inspections act as an alert system providing a warning
and India (the latter two have since tested nuclear of the possible diversion of nuclear material from peaceweapons, while Israel is considered by most to be an un- ful activities. The system relies on;
acknowledged nuclear weapons state). North Korea was
1. Material Accountancy tracking all inward and outonce a signatory but withdrew in January 2003. The leward transfers and the ow of materials in any nugality of North Korea's withdrawal is debatable but as of
clear facility. This includes sampling and analysis
9 October 2006, North Korea clearly possesses the capaof nuclear material, on-site inspections, and review
bility to make a nuclear explosive device.
and verication of operating records.
International Atomic Energy Agency
Main article: International Atomic Energy Agency
The IAEA was established on 29 July 1957 to help nations
develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Allied to
this role is the administration of safeguards arrangements
to provide assurance to the international community that
individual countries are honoring their commitments under the treaty. Though established under its own international treaty, the IAEA reports to both the United Nations
General Assembly and the Security Council.
The IAEA regularly inspects civil nuclear facilities to verify the accuracy of documentation supplied to it. The
agency checks inventories, and samples and analyzes materials. Safeguards are designed to deter diversion of nuclear material by increasing the risk of early detection.
They are complemented by controls on the export of sensitive technology from countries such as UK and United
States through voluntary bodies such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The main concern of the IAEA is that uranium not be enriched beyond what is necessary for commercial civil plants, and that plutonium which is produced
by nuclear reactors not be rened into a form that would

2. Physical Security restricting access to nuclear materials at the site.


3. Containment and Surveillance use of seals, automatic cameras and other instruments to detect unreported movement or tampering with nuclear materials, as well as spot checks on-site.
All NPT non-weapons states must accept these full-scope
safeguards. In the ve weapons states plus the non-NPT
states (India, Pakistan and Israel), facility-specic safeguards apply. IAEA inspectors regularly visit these facilities to verify completeness and accuracy of records.
The terms of the NPT cannot be enforced by the IAEA
itself, nor can nations be forced to sign the treaty. In reality, as shown in Iraq and North Korea, safeguards can
be backed up by diplomatic, political and economic measures.
While traditional safeguards easily veried the correctness of formal declarations by suspect states, in the
1990s attention turned to what might not have been declared. While accepting safeguards at declared facilities,
Iraq had set up elaborate equipment elsewhere in an attempt to enrich uranium to weapons grade. North Korea attempted to use research reactors (not commercial

68
electricity-generating reactors) and a reprocessing plant
to produce some weapons-grade plutonium.
The weakness of the NPT regime lay in the fact that no
obvious diversion of material was involved. The uranium
used as fuel probably came from indigenous sources, and
the nuclear facilities were built by the countries themselves without being declared or placed under safeguards.
Iraq, as an NPT party, was obliged to declare all facilities but did not do so. Nevertheless, the activities were
detected and brought under control using international
diplomacy. In Iraq, a military defeat assisted this process.
In North Korea, the activities concerned took place before the conclusion of its NPT safeguards agreement.
With North Korea, the promised provision of commercial power reactors appeared to resolve the situation for a
time, but it later withdrew from the NPT and declared it
had nuclear weapons.

CHAPTER 3. PROLIFERATION
situation and the kind of nuclear materials it has.
This will involve greater judgement on the part of
IAEA and the development of eective methodologies which reassure NPT States.
As of 3 July 2015, 146 countries have signed Additional
Protocols and 126 have brought them into force. The
IAEA is also applying the measures of the Additional
Protocol in Taiwan.* [8] Under the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action, Iran has agreed to implement its protocol provisionally. Among the leading countries that have
not signed the Additional Protocol are Egypt, which says
it will not sign until Israel accepts comprehensive IAEA
safeguards,* [9] and Brazil, which opposes making the
protocol a requirement for international cooperation on
enrichment and reprocessing,* [10] but has not ruled out
signing.* [11]
Limitations of safeguards

Additional Protocol
In 1993 a program was initiated to strengthen and extend
the classical safeguards system, and a model protocol was
agreed by the IAEA Board of Governors 1997. The measures boosted the IAEA's ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities, including those with no connection to the
civil fuel cycle.
Innovations were of two kinds. Some could be implemented on the basis of IAEA's existing legal authority
through safeguards agreements and inspections. Others
required further legal authority to be conferred through
an Additional Protocol. This must be agreed by each
non-weapons state with IAEA, as a supplement to any
existing comprehensive safeguards agreement. Weapons
states have agreed to accept the principles of the model
additional protocol.
Key elements of the model Additional Protocol:
The IAEA is to be given considerably more information on nuclear and nuclear-related activities, including R & D, production of uranium and thorium (regardless of whether it is traded), and nuclear-related
imports and exports.
IAEA inspectors will have greater rights of access.
This will include any suspect location, it can be at
short notice (e.g., two hours), and the IAEA can deploy environmental sampling and remote monitoring techniques to detect illicit activities.

The greatest risk from nuclear weapons proliferation


comes from countries which have not joined the NPT
and which have signicant unsafeguarded nuclear activities; India, Pakistan, and Israel fall within this category.
While safeguards apply to some of their activities, others
remain beyond scrutiny.
A further concern is that countries may develop various
sensitive nuclear fuel cycle facilities and research reactors
under full safeguards and then subsequently opt out of
the NPT. Bilateral agreements, such as insisted upon by
Australia and Canada for sale of uranium, address this by
including fallback provisions, but many countries are outside the scope of these agreements. If a nuclear-capable
country does leave the NPT, it is likely to be reported by
the IAEA to the UN Security Council, just as if it were
in breach of its safeguards agreement. Trade sanctions
would then be likely.
IAEA safeguards can help ensure that uranium supplied
as nuclear fuel and other nuclear supplies do not contribute to nuclear weapons proliferation. In fact, the
worldwide application of those safeguards and the substantial world trade in uranium for nuclear electricity
make the proliferation of nuclear weapons much less
likely.
The Additional Protocol, once it is widely in force, will
provide credible assurance that there are no undeclared
nuclear materials or activities in the states concerned.
This will be a major step forward in preventing nuclear
proliferation.

States must streamline administrative procedures so


that IAEA inspectors get automatic visa renewal and
can communicate more readily with IAEA head- Other developments
quarters.
The Nuclear Suppliers Group communicated its guide Further evolution of safeguards is towards evalua- lines, essentially a set of export rules, to the IAEA in
tion of each state, taking account of its particular 1978. These were to ensure that transfers of nuclear

3.1. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

69

material or equipment would not be diverted to unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activities,
and formal government assurances to this eect were required from recipients. The Guidelines also recognised
the need for physical protection measures in the transfer of sensitive facilities, technology and weapons-usable
materials, and strengthened retransfer provisions. The
group began with seven members the United States, the
former USSR, the UK, France, Germany, Canada and
Japan but now includes 46 countries including all ve
nuclear weapons states.

3.1.4 Unsanctioned nuclear activity

The International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation is an international project involving 25 partner countries, 28 observer and candidate partner countries, and the International Atomic Energy Agency, the
Generation IV International Forum, and the European
Commission. Its goal is to "[..] provide competitive,
commercially-based services as an alternative to a state
s development of costly, proliferation-sensitive facilities,
and address other issues associated with the safe and secure management of used fuel and radioactive waste.
*
[12]

In May 1998 India and Pakistan each exploded several


nuclear devices underground. This heightened concerns
regarding an arms race between them, with Pakistan involving the People's Republic of China, an acknowledged
nuclear weapons state. Both countries are opposed to the
NPT as it stands, and India has consistently attacked the
Treaty since its inception in 1970 labeling it as a lopsided
treaty in favor of the nuclear powers.

According to Kenneth D. Bergeron's Tritium on Ice: The


Dangerous New Alliance of Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear Power, tritium is not classied as a 'special nuclear
material' but rather as a 'by-product'. It is seen as an important litmus test on the seriousness of the United States'
intention to nuclear disarm. This radioactive super-heavy
hydrogen isotope is used to boost the eciency of ssile
materials in nuclear weapons. The United States resumed
tritium production in 2003 for the rst time in 15 years.
This could indicate that there is a potential nuclear arm
stockpile replacement since the isotope naturally decays.

NPT Non Signatories


India, Pakistan and Israel have beenthresholdcountries
in terms of the international non-proliferation regime.
They possess or are quickly capable of assembling one
or more nuclear weapons. They have remained outside
the 1970 NPT. They are thus largely excluded from trade
in nuclear plant or materials, except for safety-related devices for a few safeguarded facilities.

Relations between the two countries are tense and hostile,


and the risks of nuclear conict between them have long
been considered quite high. Kashmir is a prime cause
of bilateral tension, its sovereignty being in dispute since
1948. There is persistent low level bilateral military conict due to alleged backing of insurgency by Pakistan in
India, and correspondingly Indian sponsoring of terrorism in Pakistan * [15]* [16] along with the disputed status
of Kashmir.

Both engaged in a conventional arms race in the 1980s,


including sophisticated technology and equipment capable of delivering nuclear weapons. In the 1990s the arms
race quickened. In 1994 India reversed a four-year trend
of reduced allocations for defence, and despite its much
In May 1995, NPT parties rearmed their commitment smaller economy, Pakistan was expected to push its own
to a Fissile Materials Cut-o Treaty to prohibit the pro- expenditures yet higher. Both have lost their patrons: Induction of any further ssile material for weapons. This dia, the former USSR, and Pakistan, the United States.
aims to complement the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
of 1996 (not entered into force as of 2011) and to codify But it is the growth and modernization of China's nucommitments made by the United States, the UK, France clear arsenal and its assistance with Pakistan's nuclear
and Russia to cease production of weapons material, as power programme and, reportedly, with missile technolwell as putting a similar ban on China. This treaty will ogy, which exacerbate Indian concerns. In particular, as
also put more pressure on Israel, India and Pakistan to viewed by Indian strategists, Pakistan is aided by China's
People's Liberation Army.
agree to international verication.
On 9 August 2005, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei issued a
fatwa forbidding the production, stockpiling and use of
nuclear weapons. Khamenei's ocial statement was
made at the meeting of the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) in Vienna.* [13] As of February 2006
Iran formally announced that uranium enrichment within
their borders has continued. Iran claims it is for peaceful purposes but the United Kingdom, France, Germany,
and the United States claim the purpose is for nuclear
weapons research and construction.* [14]

India Nuclear power for civil use is well established


in India. Its civil nuclear strategy has been directed towards complete independence in the nuclear fuel cycle,
necessary because of its outspoken rejection of the NPT.
This self-suciency extends from uranium exploration
and mining through fuel fabrication, heavy water production, reactor design and construction, to reprocessing and
waste management. It has a small fast breeder reactor
and is planning a much larger one. It is also developing
technology to utilise its abundant resources of thorium as
a nuclear fuel.
India has 14 small nuclear power reactors in commer-

70

CHAPTER 3. PROLIFERATION

cial operation, two larger ones under construction, and an advanced heavy-water thorium cycle is under developten more planned. The 14 operating ones (2548 MWe ment.
total) comprise:
India exploded a nuclear device in 1974, the so-called
Smiling Buddha test, which it has consistently claimed
two 150 MWe BWRs from the United States, which was for peaceful purposes. Others saw it as a response to
started up in 1969, now use locally enriched uranium China's nuclear weapons capability. It was then univerand are under safeguards,
sally perceived, notwithstanding ocial denials, to possess, or to be able to quickly assemble, nuclear weapons.
two small Canadian PHWRs (1972 & 1980), also In 1999 it deployed its own medium-range missile and
under safeguards, and
has developed an intermediate-range missile capable of
reaching targets in China's industrial heartland.
ten local PHWRs based on Canadian designs, two
In 1995 the United States quietly intervened to head o a
of 150 and eight 200 MWe.
proposed nuclear test. However, in 1998 there were ve
two new 540 MWe and two 700 MWe plants at more tests in Operation Shakti. These were unambiguTarapur (known as TAPP: Tarapur Atomic Power ously military, including one claimed to be of a sophisticated thermonuclear device, and their declared purpose
Project)
wasto help in the design of nuclear weapons of dierent
yields and dierent delivery systems.
The two under construction and two of the planned ones
are 450 MWe versions of these 200 MWe domestic prod- Indian security policies are driven by:
ucts. Construction has been seriously delayed by nancial and technical problems. In 2001 a nal agreement
its determination to be recognized as a dominant
was signed with Russia for the country's rst large nuclear
power in the region
power plant, comprising two VVER-1000 reactors, under
its increasing concern with China's expanding nua Russian-nanced US$3 billion contract. The rst unit is
clear weapons and missile delivery programmes
due to be commissioned in 2007. A further two Russian
units are under consideration for the site. Nuclear power
its concern with Pakistan's capability to deliver nusupplied 3.1% of India's electricity in 2000.
clear weapons deep into India
Its weapons material appears to come from a Canadiandesigned 40MW researchreactor which started up in It perceives nuclear weapons as a cost-eective political
1960, well before the NPT, and a 100MW indigenous unit counter to China's nuclear and conventional weaponry,
in operation since 1985. Both use local uranium, as India and the eects of its nuclear weapons policy in provokdoes not import any nuclear fuel. It is estimated that India ing Pakistan is, by some accounts, considered incidenmay have built up enough weapons-grade plutonium for tal. India has had an unhappy relationship with China.
After an uneasy ceasere ended the 1962 war, relations
a hundred nuclear warheads.
between the two nations were frozen until 1998. Since
It is widely believed that the nuclear programs of India then a degree of high-level contact has been established
and Pakistan used CANDU reactors to produce ssion- and a few elementary condence-building measures put
able materials for their weapons; however, this is not ac- in place. China still occupies some territory which it capcurate. Both Canada (by supplying the 40 MW research tured during the aforementioned war, claimed by India,
reactor) and the United States (by supplying 21 tons of and India still occupies some territory claimed by China.
heavy water) supplied India with the technology neces- Its nuclear weapon and missile support for Pakistan is a
sary to create a nuclear weapons program, dubbed CIRUS major bone of contention.
(Canada-India Reactor, United States). Canada sold India the reactor on the condition that the reactor and any American President George W. Bush met with India
by-products would be employed for peaceful purposes Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to discuss India's inonly.. Similarly, the United States sold India heavy wa- volvement with nuclear weapons. The two countries
ter for use in the reactor only... in connection with re- agreed that the United States would give nuclear power
search into and the use of atomic energy for peaceful pur- assistance to India.
poses. India, in violation of these agreements, used the
Canadian-supplied reactor and American-supplied heavy Pakistan Over the several years, the Nuclear power inwater to produce plutonium for their rst nuclear explo- frastructure has been well established by Pakistan which
sion, Smiling Buddha.* [17] The Indian government con- is dedicated for the industrial and economic development
troversially justied this, however, by claiming that Smil- of the country.* [18] Its current nuclear policy is directed
ing Buddha was a peaceful nuclear explosion.
and aimed to promote the socio-economic development
The country has at least three other research reactors in- of the people as aforemost priority";* [19] and to fulll
cluding the tiny one which is exploring the use of thorium the energy, economic, and industrial needs from the nuas a nuclear fuel, by breeding ssile U-233. In addition, clear sources.* [19] Currently, there are three operational

3.1. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

71
Pakistan was exposed to a kind of "nuclear
threat and blackmail" unparalleled elsewhere..... (...)... If the world's community
failed to provide political insurance to Pakistan and other countries against the nuclear
blackmail, these countries would be constraint
to launch atomic bomb programs of their
own!... [A]ssurances provided by the United
Nations were not Enough!"...
Zulkar Ali Bhutto, statement written in "Eating
Grass", source* [24]

In 2003, Libya admitted that the nuclear weapons-related material including these centrifuges, known as Pak-1, were acquired
from Pakistan

mega-commercial nuclear power plants while three larger


ones are under construction.* [18] The nuclear power supplies 787MW (roughly ~3.6%) of electricity as of 2012,
and the country has projected to produce 8800MW electricity by 2030.* [20] Infrastructure established by the
IAEA and the U.S. in the 1950s1960s were based on
peaceful research and development and economic prosperity of the country.* [21]
Although the civil-sector nuclear power was established
in the 1950s, the country has an active nuclear weapons
program which was started in the 1970s.* [21] The
bomb program has its roots after East-Pakistan gained
its independence as Bangladesh after India's successful intervention led to a decisive victory on Pakistan in
1971.* [21] This large-scale but clandestine atomic bomb
project was directed towards the development of ingenious development of reactor and military-grade plutonium. In 1974, when India surprised the outer world
with its successful detonation of its own bomb, codename
Smiling Buddha, it becameimperative for Pakistanto
pursue the weapons research.* [22] According to leading
scientist in the program, it became clear once India detonated the bomb, "Newton's third law" came intooperation, from then on it was a classic case of "action and reaction".* [22] Earlier eorts were directed towards mastering the plutonium technology from France, but plutonium route was partially slowed down when the plan was
failed after the U.S. intervention to cancel the project.
Contrary to popular perception, Pakistan did not forego
theplutoniumroute and covertly continued its indegenious research under Munir Khan and it succeeded with
plutonium route in the early 1980s. Reacting on India's
nuclear test (Smiling Buddha), Bhutto and the country's
elite political and military science circle sensed this test
as nal and dangerous anticipation to Pakistan's moral
and physical existence.* [23] With Aziz Ahmed on his
side, Bhutto launched a serious diplomatic oense and
aggressively maintained at the session of the United Nations Security Council:

After 1974, Bhutto's government redoubled its effort, this time equally focused on uranium and plutonium.* [25] Pakistan had established science directorates
in almost all of her embassies in the important countries of the world, with theoretical physicist S.A. Butt
being the director.* [25] Abdul Qadeer Khan then established a network through Dubai to smuggle URENCO technology to Engineering Research Laboratories.* [26]* [27]* [28]* [29]* [30]* [31] Earlier, he worked
with Physics Dynamics Research Laboratories (FDO), a
subsidiary of the Dutch rm VMF-Stork based in Amsterdam. Later after joining, the Urenco, he had access through photographs and documents of the technology.* [4] Against the popular perception, the technology
that A.Q. Khan had brought from Urenco was based on
rst generation civil rector technology, lled with many
serious technical errors, though it was authentic and vital link for centrifuge project of the country. After the
British Government stopped the British subsidiary of the
American Emerson Electric Co. from shipping the components to Pakistan, he describes his frustration with a
supplier from Germany as: That man from the German
team was unethical.* [4] When he did not get the order
from us, he wrote a letter to a Labour Party member and
questions were asked in [British] Parliament.* [4] By
1978, his eorts were paid o and made him into a national hero.* [4] In 1981, as a tribute, President General
Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, renamed the research institute
after his name.* [4]
In early 1996, Prime minister Benazir Bhutto made it
clear thatif India conducts a nuclear test, Pakistan could
be forced tofollow suit.* [32]* [33] In 1997, her statement was echoed by Prime minister Nawaz Sharif who
maintained to the fact that: Since 1972, [P]akistan
had progressed signicantly, and we have left that stage
(developmental) far behind. Pakistan will not be made
a hostageto India by signing the CTBT, before (India).!"* [34] In May 1998, within weeks of India's nuclear
tests, Pakistan announced that it had conducted six underground tests in the Chagai Hills, ve on the 28th and one
on the 30th of that month. Seismic events consistent with
these claims were recorded.
In 2004, the revelation of A.Q. Khan's eorts led the exposure of many defunct European consortium who de-

72

CHAPTER 3. PROLIFERATION

ed export restrictions in the 1970s, and many of defunct


Dutch companies exported thousands of centrifuges to
Pakistan as early as 1976.* [35] Many centrifuge components were apparently manufactured in Malaysian Scomi
Precision Engineering with the assistance of South Asian
and German companies, and used a UAE-based computer company as a false front.* [36]

tion program with North Korea was under Dr. A. Q.


Khan Research Laboratories. At this time China was under U.S. pressure not to supply the M Dongfeng series of
missiles to Pakistan. It is believed by experts that possibly with Chinese connivance and facilitation, the latter
was forced to approach North Korea for missile transfers. Reports indicate that North Korea was willing to
It was widely believed to have direct involvement of the supply missile sub-systems including rocket motors, inertial guidance systems, control and testing equipment for
government of Pakistan.* [37] This claim could not be
veried due to the refusal of the government of Pakistan US$50 million.
to allow IAEA to interview the alleged head of the nuclear It is not clear what North Korea got in return. Joseph S.
black market, who happened to be no other than A.Q. Bermudez Jr. in Jane's Defence Weekly (27 November
Khan. Confessing his crimes later a month on national 2002) reports that Western analysts had begun to questelevision, he bailed out the government by taking full tion what North Korea received in payment for the misresponsibility.* [37] Independent investigation conducted siles; many suspected it was the nuclear technology. The
by IISS conrmed that he had control over the import- KRL was in charge of both uranium program and also
export deals, and his acquisition activities were largely of the missile program with North Korea. It is therefore
unsupervised by Pakistan governmental authorities.* [37] likely during this period that cooperation in nuclear techAll of his activities went undetected for several years. He nology between Pakistan and North Korea was initiated.
duly confessed of running the atomic proliferation ring Western intelligence agencies began to notice exchange
from Pakistan to Iran and North Korea.* [38] He was im- of personnel, technology and components between KRL
mediately given presidential immunity.* [37] Exact nature and entities of the North Korean 2nd Economic Commitof the involvement at the governmental level is still un- tee (responsible for weapons production).
clear, but the manner in which the government acted cast A New York Times report on 18 October 2002 quoted
doubt on the sincerity of Pakistan.* [37]
U.S. intelligence ocials having stated that Pakistan was
North Korea Main article: North Korea and weapons
of mass destruction Nuclear weapons
The Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (or better
known as North Korea), joined the NPT in 1985 and
had subsequently signed a safeguards agreement with the
IAEA. However, it was believed that North Korea was
diverting plutonium extracted from the fuel of its reactor
at Yongbyon, for use in nuclear weapons. The subsequent
confrontation with IAEA on the issue of inspections and
suspected violations, resulted in North Korea threatening to withdraw from the NPT in 1993. This eventually
led to negotiations with the United States resulting in the
Agreed Framework of 1994, which provided for IAEA
safeguards being applied to its reactors and spent fuel
rods. These spent fuel rods were sealed in canisters by
the United States to prevent North Korea from extracting plutonium from them. North Korea had to therefore
freeze its plutonium programme.
During this period, Pakistan-North Korea cooperation in
missile technology transfer was being established. A high
level delegation of Pakistan military visited North Korea in AugustSeptember 1992, reportedly to discuss the
supply of missile technology to Pakistan. In 1993, PM
Benazir Bhutto repeatedly traveled to China, and the paid
state visit to North Korea. The visits are believed to be
related to the subsequent acquisition technology to developed its Ghauri system by Pakistan. During the period 19921994, A.Q. Khan was reported to have visited North Korea thirteen times. The missile coopera-

a major supplier of critical equipment to North Korea.


The report added that equipment such as gas centrifuges
appeared to have been part of a barter dealin which
North Korea supplied Pakistan with missiles. Separate
reports indicate (The Washington Times, 22 November
2002) that U.S. intelligence had as early as 1999 picked
up signs that North Korea was continuing to develop nuclear arms. Other reports also indicate that North Korea had been working covertly to develop an enrichment
capability for nuclear weapons for at least ve years and
had used technology obtained from Pakistan (Washington
Times, 18 October 2002).

Israel Israel is also thought to possess an arsenal of potentially up to several hundred nuclear warheads based
on estimates of the amount of ssile material produced
by Israel.* [39] This has never been openly conrmed or
denied however, due to Israel's policy of deliberate ambiguity.* [40]
An Israeli nuclear installation is located about ten kilometers to the south of Dimona, the Negev Nuclear Research Center. Its construction commenced in 1958, with
French assistance. The ocial reason given by the Israeli
and French governments was to build a nuclear reactor
to power a "desalination plant", in order to green the
Negev. The purpose of the Dimona plant is widely assumed to be the manufacturing of nuclear weapons, and
the majority of defense experts have concluded that it
does in fact do that. However, the Israeli government refuses to conrm or deny this publicly, a policy it refers to
as ambiguity.

3.1. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION


Norway sold 20 tonnes of heavy water needed for the reactor to Israel in 1959 and 1960 in a secret deal. There
were no safeguardsrequired in this deal to prevent
usage of the heavy water for non-peaceful purposes. The
British newspaper Daily Express accused Israel of working on a bomb in 1960.* [41] When the United States intelligence community discovered the purpose of the Dimona plant in the early 1960s, it demanded that Israel
agree to international inspections. Israel agreed, but on
a condition that U.S., rather than IAEA, inspectors were
used, and that Israel would receive advanced notice of all
inspections.

73
Nuclear arms control in South Asia
Main articles: Lahore Summit and Agra summit

The public stance of the two states on non-proliferation


diers markedly. Pakistan has initiated a series of regional security proposals. It has repeatedly proposed a
nuclear free zone in South Asia and has proclaimed its
willingness to engage in nuclear disarmament and to sign
the Non-Proliferation Treaty if India would do so. It
has endorsed a United States proposal for a regional ve
Some claim that because Israel knew the schedule of the power conference to consider non-proliferation in South
inspectors' visits, it was able to hide the alleged purpose Asia.
of the site from the inspectors by installing temporary India has taken the view that solutions to regional security
false walls and other devices before each inspection. The issues should be found at the international rather than the
inspectors eventually informed the U.S. government that regional level, since its chief concern is with China. It
their inspections were useless due to Israeli restrictions therefore rejects Pakistan's proposals.
on what areas of the facility they could inspect. In 1969,
Instead, the 'Gandhi Plan', put forward in 1988, prothe United States terminated the inspections.
posed the revision of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which
In 1986, Mordechai Vanunu, a former technician at the it regards as inherently discriminatory in favor of the
Dimona plant, revealed to the media some evidence of Is- nuclear-weapon States, and a timetable for complete nurael's nuclear program. Israeli agents arrested him from clear weapons disarmament. It endorsed early proposals
Italy, drugged him and transported him to Israel, and for a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and for an internaan Israeli court then tried him in secret on charges of tional convention to ban the production of highly enriched
treason and espionage,* [42] and sentenced him to eigh- uranium and plutonium for weapons purposes, known as
teen years imprisonment. He was freed on 21 April 2004, the 'cut-o' convention.
but was severely limited by the Israeli government. He
The United States for some years, especially under the
was arrested again on 11 November 2004, though formal
Clinton administration, pursued a variety of initiatives
charges were not immediately led.
to persuade India and Pakistan to abandon their nuclear
Comments on photographs taken by Mordechai Vanunu weapons programs and to accept comprehensive internainside the Negev Nuclear Research Center have been tional safeguards on all their nuclear activities. To this
made by prominent scientists. British nuclear weapons end, the Clinton administration proposed a conference
scientist Frank Barnaby, who questioned Vanunu over of the ve nuclear-weapon states, Japan, Germany, India
several days, estimated Israel had enough plutonium for and Pakistan.
about 150 weapons.* [43] Ted Taylor, a bomb designer
India refused this and similar previous proposals, and
employed by the United States of America has conrmed
countered with demands that other potential weapons
the several hundred warhead estimate based on Vanunu's
states, such as Iran and North Korea, should be invited,
photographs.
and that regional limitations would only be acceptable if
According to Lieutenant Colonel Warner D. Farr in a they were accepted equally by China. The United States
report to the USAF Counterproliferation Center while would not accept the participation of Iran and North KoFrance was previously a leader in nuclear research Is- rea and these initiatives have lapsed.
rael and France were at a similar level of expertise afAnother, more recent approach, centers on 'capping'
ter the war, and Israeli scientists could make signithe production of ssile material for weapons purposes,
cant contributions to the French eort.* [44] In 1986
which would hopefully be followed by 'roll back'. To this
Francis Perrin, French high-commissioner for atomic enend, India and the United States jointly sponsored a UN
ergy from 1951 to 1970 stated that in 1949 Israeli sciGeneral Assembly resolution in 1993 calling for negotientists were invited to the Saclay nuclear research facilations for a 'cut-o' convention. Should India and Pakity, this cooperation leading to a joint eort including
istan join such a convention, they would have to agree to
sharing of knowledge between French and Israeli scienhalt the production of ssile materials for weapons and to
tists especially those with knowledge from the Manhattan
accept international verication on their relevant nuclear
*
*
*
Project. [45] [46] [47]
facilities (enrichment and reprocessing plants). It appears
See also: Israel and weapons of mass destruction
that India is now prepared to join negotiations regarding
such a Cut-o Treaty, under the UN Conference on Disarmament.
Bilateral condence-building measures between India

74

CHAPTER 3. PROLIFERATION

and Pakistan to reduce the prospects of confrontation


have been limited. In 1990 each side ratied a treaty not
to attack the other's nuclear installations, and at the end
of 1991 they provided one another with a list showing the
location of all their nuclear plants, even though the respective lists were regarded as not being wholly accurate.
Early in 1994 India proposed a bilateral agreement for a
'no rst use' of nuclear weapons and an extension of the
'no attack' treaty to cover civilian and industrial targets as
well as nuclear installations.

developing nuclear weapons.* [65]

Egypt In 2004 and 2005, Egypt disclosed past undeclared nuclear activities and material to the IAEA. In
2007 and 2008, high enriched and low enriched uranium
particles were found in environmental samples taken in
Egypt.* [48] In 2008, the IAEA states Egypt's statements
were consistent with its own ndings.* [49] In May 2009,
Reuters reported that the IAEA was conducting further
investigation in Egypt.* [50]* [51]

After inspections in Iraq following the UN Gulf War


cease-re resolution showed the extent of Iraq's clandestine nuclear weapons program, it became clear that the
IAEA would have to broaden the scope of its activities.
Iraq was an NPT Party, and had thus agreed to place all
its nuclear material under IAEA safeguards. But the inspections revealed that it had been pursuing an extensive
clandestine uranium enrichment programme, as well as a
nuclear weapons design programme.

Iraq Up to the late 1980s it was generally assumed that


any undeclared nuclear activities would have to be based
on the diversion of nuclear material from safeguards.
States acknowledged the possibility of nuclear activities
entirely separate from those covered by safeguards, but it
was assumed they would be detected by national intelligence activities. There was no particular eort by IAEA
Having promoted the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to attempt to detect them.
since 1954, India dropped its support in 1995 and in 1996 Iraq had been making eorts to secure a nuclear potential
attempted to block the Treaty. Following the 1998 tests since the 1960s. In the late 1970s a specialised plant,
the question has been reopened and both Pakistan and Osiraq, was constructed near Baghdad. The plant was
India have indicated their intention to sign the CTBT. In- attacked during the IranIraq War and was destroyed by
dian ratication may be conditional upon the ve weapons Israeli bombers in June 1981.
states agreeing to specic reductions in nuclear arsenals.
Not until the 1990 NPT Review Conference did some
The UN Conference on Disarmament has also called
states raise the possibility of making more use of (for exupon both countriesto accede without delay to the Nonample) provisions for special inspectionsin existing
Proliferation Treaty, presumably as non-weapons states.
NPT Safeguards Agreements. Special inspections can be
undertaken at locations other than those where safeguards
routinely apply, if there is reason to believe there may be
NPT signatories
undeclared material or activities.

Iran Main article: Iran and weapons of mass destruc- The main thrust of Iraq's uranium enrichment program
was the development of technology for electromagnetic
tion Nuclear weapons
isotope
separation (EMIS) of indigenous uranium. This
See also: Nuclear program of Iran
uses the same principles as a mass spectrometer (albeit on
a much larger scale). Ions of uranium-238 and uraniumIn 2003, the IAEA reported that Iran had been in breach 235 are separated because they describe arcs of dierent
of its obligations to comply with provisions of its safe- radii when they move through a magnetic eld. This proguard agreement.* [52] In 2005, the IAEA Board of Gov- cess was used in the Manhattan Project to make the highly
ernors voted in a rare non-consensus decision to nd enriched uranium used in the Hiroshima bomb, but was
Iran in non-compliance with its NPT Safeguards Agree- abandoned soon afterwards.
ment and to report that non-compliance to the UN Security Council.* [53]* [54] In response, the UN Security The Iraqis did the basic research work at their nuclear
Council passed a series of resolutions citing concerns research establishment at Tuwaitha, near Baghdad, and
about the program.* [55]* [56]* [57]* [58]* [59] Iran's rep- were building two full-scale facilities at Tarmiya and Ash
resentative to the UN argues sanctions compel Iran to Sharqat, north of Baghdad. However, when the war broke
abandon its rights under the Nuclear Nonproliferation out, only a few separators had been installed at Tarmiya,
Treaty to peaceful nuclear technology.* [60] Iran says its and none at Ash Sharqat.
uranium enrichment program is exclusively for peaceful The Iraqis were also very interested in centrifuge enrichpurposes* [61]* [62] and has enriched uranium to less ment, and had been able to acquire some components inthan 5 percent,consistent with fuel for a nuclear power cluding some carbon-bre rotors, which they were at an
plant and signicantly below the purity of WEU (around early stage of testing. In May 1998, Newsweek reported
90%) typically used in a weapons program.* [63]* [64] that Abdul Qadeer Khan had sent Iraq centrifuge designs,
The director general of the International Atomic Energy which were apparently conscated by the UNMOVIC ofAgency, Yukiya Amano, said in 2009 he had not seen cials. Iraqi ocials saidthe documents were authentic
any evidence in IAEA ocial documents that Iran was but that they had not agreed to work with A. Q. Khan,

3.1. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

75

fearing an ISI sting operation, due to strained relations


between two countries.* [66] The Government of Pakistan and A. Q. Khan strongly denied this allegation whilst
the government declared the evidence to befraudulent
.* [67]
They were clearly in violation of their NPT and safeguards obligations, and the IAEA Board of Governors
ruled to that eect. The UN Security Council then ordered the IAEA to remove, destroy or render harmless
Iraq's nuclear weapons capability. This was done by mid1998, but Iraq then ceased all cooperation with the UN,
so the IAEA withdrew from this work.
The revelations from Iraq provided the impetus for a very
far-reaching reconsideration of what safeguards are intended to achieve.
See also: Iraq and weapons of mass destruction

to Myanmar where they had settled down, to help Myanmar's project. Recently, the David Albright-led Institute
for Science and International Security (ISIS) rang alarm
bells about Myanmar attempting a nuclear project with
North Korean help. If true, the full weight of international pressure will be brought against Myanmar, said ofcials familiar with developments. But equally, the information that has been peddled by the defectors is also
preliminaryand could be used by the west to turn the
screws on Myanmaron democracy and human rights issuesin the run-up to the elections in the country in 2010.
During an ASEAN meeting in Thailand in July 2009, US
secretary of state Hillary Clinton highlighted concerns of
the North Korean link. We know there are also growing concerns about military cooperation between North
Korea and Burma which we take very seriously,Clinton said.* [74] However, in 2012, after contact with the
American president, Barack Obama, the Burmese leader,
Thein Sein, renounced military ties with DPRK (North
Korea).* [75]

Libya Main article: Libya and nuclear technology


Libya possesses ballistic missiles and previously pursued nuclear weapons under the leadership of Muammar
Gadda. On 19 December 2003, Gadda announced that
Libya would voluntarily eliminate all materials, equipment and programs that could lead to internationally proscribed weapons, including weapons of mass destruction
and long-range ballistic missiles.* [68]* [69]* [70] Libya
signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in
1968 and ratied it in 1975, and concluded a safeguards
agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) in 1980.* [71] In March 2004, the IAEA Board
of Governors welcomed Libya's decision to eliminate
its formerly undeclared nuclear program, which it found
had violated Libya's safeguards agreement, and approved
Libya's Additional Protocol.* [69]* [72] The United States
and the United Kingdom assisted Libya in removing
equipment and material from its nuclear weapons program, with independent verication by the IAEA.* [70]

Myanmar A report in the Sydney Morning Herald


and Searchina, a Japanese newspaper, report that two
Myanmarese defectors saying that the Myanmar junta
was secretly building a nuclear reactor and plutonium extraction facility with North Korea's help, with the aim of
acquiring its rst nuclear bomb in ve years. According to the report, The secret complex, much of it in
caves tunnelled into a mountain at Naung Laing in northern Burma, runs parallel to a civilian reactor being built at
another site by Russia that both the Russians and Burmese
say will be put under international safeguards.* [73] In
2002, Myanmar had notied IAEA of its intention to
pursue a civilian nuclear programme. Later, Russia announced that it would build a nuclear reactor in Myanmar. There have also been reports that two Pakistani scientists, from the AQ Khan stable, had been dispatched

North Korea The Democratic People's Republic of


Korea (DPRK) acceded to the NPT in 1985 as a condition for the supply of a nuclear power station by the
USSR. However, it delayed concluding its NPT Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, a process which should
take only 18 months, until April 1992.
During that period, it brought into operation a small gascooled, graphite-moderated, natural-uranium (metal) fuelledExperimental Power Reactorof about 25 MWt (5
MWe), based on the UK Magnox design. While this was
a well-suited design to start a wholly indigenous nuclear
reactor development, it also exhibited all the features of
a small plutonium production reactor for weapons purposes. North Korea also made substantial progress in the
construction of two larger reactors designed on the same
principles, a prototype of about 200 MWt (50 MWe), and
a full-scale version of about 800 MWt (200 MWe). They
made only slow progress; construction halted on both in
1994 and has not resumed. Both reactors have degraded
considerably since that time and would take signicant
eorts to refurbish.
In addition it completed and commissioned a reprocessing plant that makes the Magnox spent nuclear fuel safe,
recovering uranium and plutonium. That plutonium, if
the fuel was only irradiated to a very low burn-up, would
have been in a form very suitable for weapons. Although
all these facilities at Yongbyon were to be under safeguards, there was always the risk that at some stage, the
DPRK would withdraw from the NPT and use the plutonium for weapons.
One of the rst steps in applying NPT safeguards is for
the IAEA to verify the initial stocks of uranium and plutonium to ensure that all the nuclear materials in the country have been declared for safeguards purposes. While
undertaking this work in 1992, IAEA inspectors found

76

CHAPTER 3. PROLIFERATION

discrepancies which indicated that the reprocessing plant


had been used more often than the DPRK had declared,
which suggested that the DPRK could have weaponsgrade plutonium which it had not declared to the IAEA.
Information passed to the IAEA by a Member State (as
required by the IAEA) supported that suggestion by indicating that the DPRK had two undeclared waste or other
storage sites.

rst beginning in April 2004 concerning North Korea's


weapons program.

Once the DPRK's non-compliance had been reported to


the UN Security Council, the essential part of the IAEA's
mission had been completed. Inspections in the DPRK
continued, although inspectors were increasingly hampered in what they were permitted to do by the DPRK's
claim of a special status. However, some 8,000 corroding fuel rods associated with the experimental reactor
have remained under close surveillance.

facilities and conducted a second nuclear test on 25 May


2009.

On 10 January 2005, North Korea declared that it was


in the possession of nuclear weapons. On 19 September
2005, the fourth round of the Six-Party Talks ended with
a joint statement in which North Korea agreed to end its
nuclear programs and return to the NPT in exchange for
diplomatic, energy and economic assistance. However,
In February 1993 the IAEA called on the DPRK to al- by the end of 2005 the DPRK had halted all six-party
low special inspections of the two sites so that the initial talks because the United States froze certain DPRK interstocks of nuclear material could be veried. The DPRK national nancial assets such as those in a bank in Macau.
refused, and on 12 March announced its intention to with- On 9 October 2006, North Korea announced that it has
draw from the NPT (three months' notice is required). In performed its rst-ever nuclear weapon test. On 18 DeApril 1993 the IAEA Board concluded that the DPRK cember 2006, the six-party talks nally resumed. On 13
was in non-compliance with its safeguards obligations and February 2007, the parties announcedInitial Actionsto
reported the matter to the UN Security Council. In June implement the 2005 joint statement including shutdown
1993 the DPRK announced that it had suspendedits and disablement of North Korean nuclear facilities in exwithdrawal from the NPT, but subsequently claimed a change for energy assistance. Reacting to UN sanctions
special statuswith respect to its safeguards obligations. imposed after missile tests in April 2009, North Korea
This was rejected by IAEA.
withdrew from the six-party talks, restarted its nuclear

Following bilateral negotiations between the United


States and the DPRK, and the conclusion of the Agreed
Framework in October 1994, the IAEA has been given
additional responsibilities. The agreement requires a
freeze on the operation and construction of the DPRK's
plutonium production reactors and their related facilities,
and the IAEA is responsible for monitoring the freeze until the facilities are eventually dismantled. The DPRK
remains uncooperative with the IAEA verication work
and has yet to comply with its safeguards agreement.
While Iraq was defeated in a war, allowing the UN the opportunity to seek out and destroy its nuclear weapons programme as part of the cease-re conditions, the DPRK
was not defeated, nor was it vulnerable to other measures,
such as trade sanctions. It can scarcely aord to import
anything, and sanctions on vital commodities, such as oil,
would either be ineective or risk provoking war.
Ultimately, the DPRK was persuaded to stop what appeared to be its nuclear weapons programme in exchange,
under the agreed framework, for about US$5 billion in
energy-related assistance. This included two 1000 MWe
light water nuclear power reactors based on an advanced
U.S. System-80 design.
In January 2003 the DPRK withdrew from the NPT.
In response, a series of discussions among the DPRK,
the United States, and China, a series of six-party talks
(the parties being the DPRK, the ROK, China, Japan,
the United States and Russia) were held in Beijing; the

On 12 February 2013, North Korea conducted an


underground nuclear explosion with an estimated yield of
6 to 7 kilotonnes. The detonation registered a magnitude
4.9 disturbance in the area around the epicenter.
See also: North Korea and weapons of mass destruction
and Six-party talks
Russia Main article: Russia and weapons of mass
destruction Nuclear weapons
Security of nuclear weapons in Russia remains a matter of concern. According to high-ranking Russian SVR
defector Tretyakov, he had a meeting with two Russian
businessman representing a state-created C-W corporation in 1991. They came up with a project of destroying
large quantities of chemical wastes collected from Western countries at the island of Novaya Zemlya (a test place
for Soviet nuclear weapons) using an underground nuclear blast. The project was rejected by Canadian representatives, but one of the businessmen told Tretyakov
that he keeps his own nuclear bomb at his dacha outside
Moscow. Tretyakov thought that man was insane, but the
businessmen(Vladimir K. Dmitriev) replied:Do not
be so naive. With economic conditions the way they are
in Russia today, anyone with enough money can buy a
nuclear bomb. It's no big deal really.* [76]
South Africa In 1991, South Africa acceded to the
NPT, concluded a comprehensive safeguards agreement
with the IAEA, and submitted a report on its nuclear material subject to safeguards. At the time, the state had a
nuclear power programme producing nearly 10% of the
country's electricity, whereas Iraq and North Korea only

3.1. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION


had research reactors.
The IAEA's initial verication task was complicated by
South Africa's announcement that between 1979 and
1989 it built and then dismantled a number of nuclear
weapons. South Africa asked the IAEA to verify the conclusion of its weapons programme. In 1995 the IAEA
declared that it was satised all materials were accounted
for and the weapons programme had been terminated and
dismantled.

77
United States, which would supply certain warheadrelated components.* [84]* [85] Some of the ssile materials for the UK Trident warhead were purchased from the
United States.* [85] Declassied U.S. Department of Energy documents indicate the UK Trident warhead system
was involved in non-nuclear design activities alongside
the U.S. W76 nuclear warhead tted in some U.S. Navy
Trident missiles,* [86] leading the Federation of American Scientists to speculate that the UK warhead may share
design information from the W76.* [87] It ought to be emphasized that none of these activities crosses the threshold
of proliferation as dened by the NPT.

South Africa has signed the NPT, and now holds the distinction of being the only known state to have indigenously produced nuclear weapons, and then veriably disUnder the Mutual Defence Agreement 5.37 tonnes of
mantled them.* [77]
UK-produced plutonium was sent to the United States in
return for 6.7 kg of tritium and 7.5 tonnes of highly enSyria Main article: Syria and weapons of mass de- riched uranium over the period 19601979. A further
0.47 tonne of plutonium was swapped between the UK
struction
and United States for reasons that remain classied.* [88]
Some of the UK produced plutonium was used in 1962
On 6 September 2007, Israel bombed an ocially
by the United States for a nuclear weapon test of reactorunidentied site in Syria which it later asserted was a
grade plutonium.* [89]
nuclear reactor under construction (see Operation Orchard).* [78] The alleged reactor was not asserted to be The United States has supplied nuclear weapon delivery
operational and it was not asserted that nuclear material systems to support the UK nuclear forces since before the
had been introduced into it.* [48] Syria said the site was signing of the NPT. The renewal of this agreement is due
a military site and was not involved in any nuclear activ- to take place through the second decade of the 21st cen*
*
ities.* [48] The IAEA requested Syria to provide further tury. [90] [91]
access to the site and any other locations where the debris
and equipment from the building had been stored.* [48]
Syria denounced what it called the Western fabrica- 3.1.5 Breakout capability
tion and forging of factsin regards to the incident.* [79]
IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei criticized For a state that does not possess nuclear weapons, the caand with
the strikes and deplored that information regarding the pability to produce one or more weapons quickly
*
little
warning
is
called
a
breakout
capability.
[92]
matter had not been shared with his agency earlier.* [80]
Excurse: United States cooperation on nuclear
weapons with the United Kingdom Whilst not at
variance with the NPT, United States cooperation on nuclear weapons with the United Kingdom will be addressed
as an excurse in the current section listing violations of
that international agreement.

Japan, with its civil nuclear infrastructure and


experience, has a stockpile of separated plutonium
that could be fabricated into weapons relatively
quickly.* [93]

Iran, according to some observers, may be


seeking (or have already achieved) a breakout capability, with its stockpile of low-enriched uranium and its capability to enrich further to weapons
grade.* [94]* [95]

The United States and the United Kingdom have been


cooperating on nuclear weapons prior to, and following
the entry into force of the NPT. In particular, the United
States has given the UK considerable assistance with nuclear weapon design and construction since the 1958 US
UK Mutual Defence Agreement. A 1974 CIA prolifer- 3.1.6 Arguments for and against proliferation assessment noted that In many cases [the UK's
ation
sensitive technology in nuclear and missile elds] is based
on technology received from the United States and could Main article: Nuclear peace
not legitimately be passed on without U.S. permission.
*
[81]
There has been much debate in the academic study of
The U.S. President authorized the transfer of nuclear International Security as to the advisability of proliferweapon partsto the UK between at least the years ation. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Gen. Pierre
1975 to 1996.* [82]* [83] The UK National Audit Of- Marie Gallois of France, an adviser to Charles DeGaulle,
ce noted that most of the UK Trident warhead devel- argued in books like The Balance of Terror: Strategy for
opment and production expenditure was incurred in the the Nuclear Age (1961) that mere possession of a nuclear

78

CHAPTER 3. PROLIFERATION

arsenal, what the French called the force de frappe, was


enough to ensure deterrence, and thus concluded that the
spread of nuclear weapons could increase international
stability.

tries included in the aforementioned laissez-faire distribution could predispose the transfer of nuclear materials
or a bomb falling into the hands of groups not aliated
with any governments. Such countries would not have the
Some very prominent neo-realist scholars, such as political will or ability to safeguard attempts at devices
Kenneth Waltz, Emeritus Professor of Political Science being transferred to a third party. Not being deterred by
at UC Berkeley and Adjunct Senior Research Scholar at self-annihilation, terrorism groups could push forth their
Columbia University, and John Mearsheimer, R. Wendell own nuclear agendas or be used as shadow fronts to carry
out the attack plans by mentioned unstable governments.
Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, continue to argue along
the lines of Gallois (though these scholars rarely acknowl- Arguments against both positions
edge their intellectual debt to Gallois and his contemporaries). Specically, these scholars advocate some forms There are numerous arguments presented against both seof nuclear proliferation, arguing that it will decrease the lective and total proliferation, generally targeting the very
likelihood of war, especially in troubled regions of the neorealist assumptions (such as the primacy of military
world. Aside from the majority opinion which opposes security in state agendas, the weakness of international
proliferation in any form, there are two schools of thought institutions, and the long-run unimportance of economic
on the matter: those, like Mearsheimer, who favor se- integration and globalization to state strategy) its prolective proliferation,* [96] and those such as Waltz, who ponents tend to make. With respect to Mearsheimer's
advocate a laissez-faire attitude to programs like North specic example of Europe, many economists and
Korea's.
neoliberals argue that the economic integration of EuTotal proliferation
In embryo, Waltz argues that the logic of mutually assured destruction (MAD) should work in all security environments, regardless of historical tensions or recent hostility. He sees the Cold War as the ultimate proof of
MAD logic the only occasion when enmity between
two Great Powers did not result in military conict. This
was, he argues, because nuclear weapons promote caution
in decision-makers. Neither Washington nor Moscow
would risk a nuclear apocalypse to advance territorial or
power goals, hence a peaceful stalemate ensued (Waltz
and Sagan (2003), p. 24). Waltz believes there to be
no reason why this eect would not occur in all circumstances.
Selective proliferation
John Mearsheimer would not support Waltz's optimism
in the majority of potential instances; however, he has argued for nuclear proliferation as policy in certain places,
such as postCold War Europe. In two famous articles,
Professor Mearsheimer opines that Europe is bound to return to its preCold War environment of regular conagration and suspicion at some point in the future. He advocates arming both Germany and Ukraine with nuclear
weaponry in order to achieve a balance of power between
these states in the east and France/UK in the west. If this
does not occur, he is certain that war will eventually break
out on the European continent (Mearsheimer (1990), pp.
556 and (1993), pp. 5066).
Another separate argument against Waltz's open proliferation and in favor of Mearsheimer's selective distribution is the possibility of nuclear terrorism. Some coun-

rope through the development of the European Union has


made war in most of the European continent so disastrous economically so as to serve as an eective deterrent.
Constructivists take this one step further, frequently arguing that the development of EU political institutions has
led or will lead to the development of a nascent European
identity, which most states on the European continent
wish to partake in to some degree or another, and which
makes all states within or aspiring to be within the EU
regard war between them as unthinkable.
As for Waltz, the general opinion is that most states are
not in a position to safely guard against nuclear use, that
he underestimates the long-standing antipathy in many
regions, and that weak states will be unable to prevent
or will actively provide for the disastrous possibility
of nuclear terrorism. Waltz has dealt with all of these objections at some point in his work; though to many, he
has not adequately responded (Betts (2000)).
The Learning Channel documentary Doomsday: On
The Brinkillustrated 40 years of U.S. and Soviet nuclear
weapons accidents. Even the 1995 Norwegian rocket incident demonstrated a potential scenario in which Russian democratization and military downsizing at the end
of the Cold War did not eliminate the danger of accidental nuclear war through command and control errors.
After asking: might a future Russian ruler or renegade
Russian general be tempted to use nuclear weapons to
make foreign policy? The documentary writers revealed a
greater danger of Russian security over its nuclear stocks,
but especially the ultimate danger of human nature to
want the ultimate weapon of mass destruction to exercise political and military power. Future world leaders
might not understand how close the Soviets, Russians,
and Americans were to doomsday, how easy it all seemed
because apocalypse was avoided for a mere 40 years between rivals, politicians not terrorists, who loved their

3.1. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION


children and did not want to die, against 30,000 years of
human prehistory. History and military experts agree that
proliferation can be slowed, but never stopped (technology cannot be uninvented).* [97]
Proliferation begets proliferation

79
mament, however they have not succeeded due to protests
from those states that already have nuclear weapons. In
light of this, India viewed nuclear weapons as a necessary
right for all nations as long as certain states were still in
possession of nuclear weapons. India stated that nuclear
issues were directly related to national security.
Years before India's rst underground nuclear test in
1998, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was
passed. Some have argued that coercive language
was used in an attempt to persuade India to sign the
treaty, which was pushed for heavily by neighboring
China.* [101] India viewed the treaty as a means for countries that already had nuclear weapons, primarily the ve
nations of the United Nations Security Council, to keep
their weapons while ensuring that no other nations could
develop them.* [102]

Proliferation begets proliferation is a concept described


by Scott Sagan in his article, Why Do States Build
Nuclear Weapons?". This concept can be described as
a strategic chain reaction. If one state produces a nuclear weapon it creates almost a domino eect within
the region. States in the region will seek to acquire nuclear weapons to balance or eliminate the security threat.
Sagan describes this reaction best in his article when he
states, Every time one state develops nuclear weapons
to balance against its main rival, it also creates a nuclear
threat to another region, which then has to initiate its own
3.1.7 See also
nuclear weapons program to maintain its national security(Sagan, pg. 70). Going back through history we
Alsos Digital Library for Nuclear Issues
can see how this has taken place. When the United States
demonstrated that it had nuclear power capabilities after
Chemical weapon proliferation
the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the Russians
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
started to develop their program in preparation for the
Cold War. With the Russian military buildup, France and
Fissile Material Cut-o Treaty
the United Kingdom perceived this as a security threat
International Atomic Energy Agency
and therefore they pursued nuclear weapons (Sagan, pg
71).
International Science and Technology Center
Iran Former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has been a frequent critic of the concept of nuclear apartheid as it has been put into practice by several countries, particularly the United States. In an interview with CNN's Christiane Amanpour, Ahmadinejad said that Iran wasagainst 'nuclear apartheid,' which
means some have the right to possess it, use the fuel,
and then sell it to another country for 10 times its value.
We're against that. We say clean energy is the right of
all countries. But also it is the duty and the responsibility
of all countries, including ours, to set up frameworks to
stop the proliferation of it.Hours after that interview,
he spoke passionately in favor of Iran's right to develop
nuclear technology, claiming the nation should have the
same liberties.* [98]
Iran is a signatory of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty and claims that any work done in regards to nuclear technology is related only to civilian uses, which is
acceptable under the treaty. Iran violated its safeguards
obligations under the treaty* [99] by performing uraniumenrichment in secret, after which the United Nations
Security Council ordered Iran to suspend all uraniumenrichment until July of 2015.* [100]
India India has also been discussed in the context of
nuclear apartheid. India has consistently attempted to
pass measures that would call for full international disar-

Institute of Nuclear Materials Management


List of nuclear weapons tests
List of states with nuclear weapons
Nuclear disarmament
Nuclear power
Nuclear-weapon-free zone
Nuclear warfare
Nuclear weapon
Nuclear terrorism
Nuclear ethics
Renovation of the nuclear weapon arsenal of the
United States
Seabed Arms Control Treaty
Tehran International Conference on Disarmament
and Non-Proliferation, 2010
Ten Threats identied by the United Nations
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons
2010 Nuclear Security Summit

80

3.1.8

CHAPTER 3. PROLIFERATION

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[55] Security Council demands Iran suspend uranium enrichment by 31 August, or face possible economic, diplomatic
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[36] Bill Powell; Tim McGirk (14 February 2005).The Man


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[56] Security Council imposes sanctions on Iran for failure


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[47] http://www.wrmea.org/wrmea-archives/
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december-1986/694-israels-nuclear-arsenal.html
[48] International Atomic Energy Agency: Safeguards Statement for 2008 and Background to the Safeguards Statement
[49] International Atomic Energy Agency: Safeguards Annual
Report (2008)
[50] Reuters: High-enriched uranium traces found in Egypt:
IAEA
[51] ABC News: IAEA: Weapons Grade Uranium Traces
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[52] GOV/2003/75, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
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[53] IAEA Board of Governors:Implementation of the NPT
Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran
(September 2005)
[54] IAEA Board of Governors:Implementation of the NPT
Safeguards Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran
(February 2006)

[57] SECURITY COUNCIL TOUGHENS SANCTIONS


AGAINST IRAN, ADDS ARMS EMBARGO. UN
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[59] United Nations Security Council: Resolution 1835, Security Council Rearms Earlier Resolutions on Iran's Uranium Enrichment, Calls on Country to Comply with Obligations 'Fully and Without Delay'
[60] Security Council Imposes Sanctions on Iran for failure
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[61] AFP:Six powers to meet soon over Iran's nuclear program
[62] Tehran Times: Iran wants new nuclear fuel talks
[63] Council on Foreign Relations: Iran's Nuclear Program
[64] American Institute of Physics: The gas centrifuge and nuclear weapons proliferation
The most dicult step in building a nuclear weapon is the production of ssile material
[65] Westall, Sylvia (3 July 2009).No sign Iran seeks nuclear
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[66] Documents Indicate A.Q. Khan Oered Nuclear
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[67] Fitzpatrick, Mark (2007). "Dr. A. Q. Khan and the rise
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the United States, Arms Control Association.
[69] News Update on IAEA & Libya, Chronology of Key
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[70] Rohlng, Joan. Libya: Nuclear Programme Overview
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[71] GOV/2004/12, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
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Jamahiriya, Report by the Director General, International
Atomic Energy Agency, 20 February 2004.

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[72] Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement of


the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya: Resolution
adopted by the Board on 10 March 2004(PDF). International Atomic Energy Agency. 10 March 2004. Retrieved
7 April 2013.

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[89] Additional Information Concerning Underground Nuclear Weapon Test of Reactor-Grade Plutonium. U.S.
Department of Energy. June 1994. Retrieved 15 March
2007.

[73] Searchina, Reasons for digging tunnels in Burma, 11


August 2009.

[90] Disarmament Diplomacy: In The News (or Should Be)


- US-UK Nuclear Weapons Cooperation Up for Renewal
. Acronym.org.uk. Retrieved 20 February 2013.

[74] Myanmar building nuke reactor, says media report.


The Times of India, 2 August 2009.

[91] United Nations Association of the UK |" (PDF). Unauk.org. Retrieved 20 February 2013.

[75] Goodbye clenched st, hello sweaty palm. The


Economist. 17 November 2012. Retrieved 25 November
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[92] Has Iran Achieved a Nuclear Weapons Breakout Capability? Not Yet, But Soon. Nonproliferation for Global
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[76] Pete Earley,Comrade J: The Untold Secrets of Russia's


[93] Gvosdev, Nikolas. The Realist Prism: Iran Nuclear
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, Penguin Books, 2007, ISBN 978-0-399-15439-3, pages
column. Worlds Politics Review. Retrieved 27 Decem114121.
ber 2013.
[77] Nuclear Weapons Program. WMD Around the World
[94] Waltz, Kenneth. Why Iran Should Get the Bomb.
South Africa. Federation of American Scientists. 2000.
Foreign Aairs. Retrieved 27 December 2013.
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[95] "Breakout time: Report details how Iran could achieve
[78] 6 September 2007 Air strike at globalsecurity.org. Reundetectable nuclear capability. World Tribune. Retrieved 24 October 2007.
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[79] Syria rejects U.S. allegations on existence of nuclear activities. News.xinhuanet.com. 25 April 2008. Retrieved
15 May 2009.
[80] IAEA slams U.S. for withholding data on alleged Syrian
nuclear reactor. Haaretz.com. Retrieved 15 May 2009.

[96] Mearsheimer, John (2006). Conversations in International Relations: Interview with John J. Mearsheimer
(Part I)" (PDF). International Relations 20 (1): 105123.
doi:10.1177/0047117806060939. See page 116
[97] Doomsday: On The Brink, The Learning Channel, 1997

[81] Prospects for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [98] Iranian president: No 'nuclear apartheid', CNN
(PDF). Special National Intelligence Estimate. CIA. 23
August 1974. p. 40. SNIE 4-1-74. Retrieved 20 January [99] Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Com2008.
mitments, Bureau of Verication and Compliance, U.S.
Department of State, 30 August 2005
[82] National Security Decision Memorandum 276. United
States National Security Council. 15 October 1974. Re[100] UN Security Council Resolution 1737
trieved 15 March 2007.
[101] Against Nuclear Apartheid, Jaswant Singh
[83] National Security Directive 61 (PDF). The White
House. 2 July 1991. Retrieved 15 March 2007.
[102] Options, Mike Moore, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
[84] Dan Plesch (March 2006). The Future of Britains
WMD (PDF). Foreign Policy Centre. p. 15. Retrieved
15 March 2007.

3.1.9 External links

[85] Ministry of Defence and Property Services Agency: Control and Management of the Trident Programme. National
Audit Oce. 29 June 1987. para. 1.1, 3.27, A4.4. ISBN
0-10-202788-9.
[86] Stockpile Stewardship Plan: Second Annual Update (FY
1999)" (PDF). U.S. Department of Energy. April 1998.
Retrieved 15 March 2007.

Ploughshares Fund Video: A World Without Nuclear Weapons


National Counterproliferation Center Oce of the
Director of National Intelligence
Norways conicted relationship with nuclear
weapons Richard Lennan

[87] Britain's Next Nuclear Era. Federation of American


Scientists. 7 December 2006. Archived from the original
on 6 February 2007. Retrieved 15 March 2007.

Ocial website of the International Atomic Energy


Agency (IAEA)

[88] Plutonium and Aldermaston an historical account


(PDF). UK Ministry of Defence. 4 September 2001. Retrieved 15 March 2007.

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists A non-technical


public policy and global security magazine that has
reported on nuclear proliferation issues since 1945.

3.2. CHEMICAL WEAPON PROLIFERATION

83

Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center Publica- 3.2.1 Chemical weapon details, per nation
tions from Harvard faculty and fellows on nuclear
Albania
proliferation.
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament or CND, is a Main article: Albania and weapons of mass destruction
UK-based non-proliferation movement based in the
UK which advocates a complete ban on all nuclear Albania, as a party to the Chemical Weapons Convenweaponry.
tion, declared in March 2003 a stockpile of 16 tons of
chemical agents. On July 11, 2007, with the help of
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace's Non- the U.S. government's NunnLugar Cooperative Threat
proliferation Website
Reduction program, the Ministry of Defence announced
successful destruction of the entire stockpile.
Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
Council for a Livable World
Federation of American Scientists

Angola
Angola has been accused of using chemical weapons in
its civil war.* [3]

International Physicians for the Prevention of


Nuclear War or IPPNW, is a US-based non- China
proliferation movement advocating amongst other
According to the testimony Assistant Secretary of State
things, a complete ban on all nuclear weaponry.
for Intelligence and Research Carl W. Ford before the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, it is very prob International Society for the Prevention of Nuclear
able that China has an advanced chemical warfare proWar or ISPNW, is a US-based non-proliferation
gram, including research and development, production,
movement advocating the full control of the world's
and weaponization capabilities. Furthermore, there is
nuclear arsenal by a restructured UN.
considerable concern from the U.S. regarding China's
contact and sharing of chemical weapons expertise with
Monterey Institute of International Studies, Center other states of proliferation concern, including Syria and
for Nonproliferation Studies
Iran. Chinese government has declared that it had possessed small arsenal of chemical weapons in the past but
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's that it had destroyed it before ratifying Convention. It has
research on disarmament, arms control and non- declared only two former chemical production facilities
proliferation
that may have produced mustard gas and Lewisite.* [4]

3.2 Chemical weapon proliferation


See also: Nuclear proliferation
Many nations continue to research and/or stockpile
chemical weapon agents despite numerous eorts to reduce or eliminate them. Most states have joined the
Chemical Weapons Convention, which requires the destruction of all chemical weapons by 2012. Twelve nations have declared chemical weapons production facilities and six nations have declared stockpiles of chemical
weapons. All of the declared production facilities have
been destroyed or converted to civilian use after the treaty
went into force. According to the United States government, at least 17 nations currently have active chemical
weapons programs.
To the right is a summary of the nations that have either
declared weapon stockpiles, or are suspected of secretly
stockpiling or possessing CW research programs.

Cuba
According to a United Nations nding which cited suspicious residue aecting plant and animal life during the
Cuban intervention in Angola, sarin and VX had been deployed against Angolan militants by the Cuban Army.* [5]
Egypt
Egypt has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention
and has long appeared on various lists as having an oensive chemical weapons capability, and is thought to possess production facilities for sarin, VX, mustard gas, and
phosgene. Additionally, it is possible that Egypt may possess limited stockpiles of chemical bombs, rockets and
shells.
The reasons for this belief are several:
Egypt is known to have employed mustard gas in the
Yemeni civil war from 1963 to 1967.

84

CHAPTER 3. PROLIFERATION

In the early 1970s, Egypt is believed to have supplied Iraq


Syria with mustard gas and nerve agents.
Well before Operation Desert Storm or the U.N. inspec In the 1980s, Egypt supplied Iraq with mustard gas
tions that followed it, Iraq had already begun to build
and nerve agents, and related production and deploychemical weapons. After launching a research eort in
ment technology.
the 1970s, Iraq was able to use chemical weapons in its
war against Iran and to kill large numbers of its own KurIn testimony before the Subcommittee on Seapower,
dish population in the 1980s. During the rst Gulf War,
Strategic and Critical Materials in 1991, US Navy Rear
there were fears that Iraq would launch chemical-tipped
Admiral Thomas Brooks cited this evidence in identifymissiles at its neighbors, particularly Israel, but Iraq reing Egypt as a probablechemical weapons possessor.
frained for fear of U.S. retaliation. During Operation
More recent analyses are more careful by estimation the Iraqi Freedom, coalition troops again feared they might
current status of chemical weapons program in Egypt. be hit with chemical weapons, though this did not come
Only one facility has been identied aslikely involved to pass.
in the oensive activities. Although the oensive proBy 1991, as part of the 1991 Gulf War ceasere agreegram may be still in existence, it does not seem that Egypt
ment, the United Nations passed Resolution 687 which
has a considerable stockpile of operational weapons.* [6]
established its Special Commission (UNSCOM). The
UNSCOM was charged with the task of destroying, removing, or rendering harmlessall chemical and biologEthiopia
ical weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subIn 1991 Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks identied Ethiopia systems and components and all research, development,
as aprobablechemical weapons possessor in testimony support and manufacturing facilities.
before Congress. Ethiopia has ratied CWC in 1996 and By the time UNSCOM left Iraq in December 1998, it
did not declare any oensive CW program. From that had eliminated a large portion of Iraq's chemical weapon
time no evidence has been presented to contradict this potential. UNSCOM had overseen the destruction or instatement.
capacitation of more than 88,000 lled or unlled chemIndia
In 1997, in compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention, the Indian government declared that it possessed
a chemical weapons stockpile and opened its related facilities for inspection. Also in compliance with the CWC,
it has destroyed its chemical weapons stockpile.* [7]

ical munitions, over 600 tons of weaponized or bulk


chemical agents, some 4,000 tons of precursor chemicals, some 980 pieces of key production equipment, and
some 300 pieces of analytical equipment. Notwithstanding these extraordinary achievements, there remained important uncertainties regarding Iraq's holdings of chemical weapons, their precursors, and munitions.
Israel

Iran
As of December 2004, Israel has signed but not ratied the Chemical Weapons Convention, and according
to the Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service,
Israel has signicant stores of chemical weapons of its
own manufacture. It possesses a highly developed chemical and petrochemical industry, skilled specialists, and
stocks of source material, and is capable of producing
According to the Center for Strategic and International several nerve, blister and incapacitating agents.
Studies, Iran currently maintains at least two major facil- In 1974, in a hearing before the U.S. Senate Armed Serities for the research and production of chemical weapon vices Committee, General Almquist stated that Israel had
agents. Iran began its production of nerve agents no later an oensive chemical weapons capability.
than 1994.
In 1992, El Al Flight 1862 bound for Tel Aviv crashed
Near the end of the IranIraq War, Iran is supposed to
have made limited use of chemical weapons, and since
that time has been steadily building stockpiles of cyanide
(cyanogen chloride), phosgene, and mustard gas. The
delivery vehicles Iran possesses includes artillery shells,
mortars, rockets, and aerial bombs.

Iran signed the Chemical Weapons Convention on January 13, 1993 and ratied it on November 3, 1997, and
denies allegations of having clandestine CW program in
violation of CWC. In the ocial declaration submitted to
OPCW Iranian government admitted that it had produced
mustard gas in 1980s but that ceased the oensive program and destroyed the stockpiles of operational weapons
after the end of war with Iraq.* [8]

outside Amsterdam. In the course of the crash investigation, it was revealed that amongst the plane's cargo
was fty gallons of dimethyl methylphosphonate, a chemical that can be used in the production of the nerve
agent sarin. The dimethyl methylphosphonate was bound
for the Israel Institute for Biological Research in Ness
Ziona, a top secret military installation outside Tel Aviv
that was also responsible for producing the poison used

3.2. CHEMICAL WEAPON PROLIFERATION


in a September 1997 assassination attempt on a leader
of the Palestinian militant organization Hamas (Khaled
Mashal). According to Israeli ocials, the substance was
only for defensive research purposes, to test lters for gas
masks.

85
Myanmar (Burma)

In October 1998, the London Sunday Times reported


that Israeli F-16 ghters were equipped to carry chemical weapons, and that their crews have been trained on
the use of such weapons.

Intelligence regarding Myanmar's chemical weapon status is mixed, and sometimes contradictory. In the late
1990s, US naval intelligence identied Myanmar (then
referred to as Burma) as developing chemical weapons
capabilities. Later, other ocials contridicted that statement, claiming that the evidence supporting Burma's
chemical stockpile development was primarily based
upon circumstantial evidence.* [12] However, in 1991, in
testimony before the Subcommittee on Seapower, Strategic and Critical Materials in 1991, US Navy Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks identied Myanmar as a probable
chemical weapons possessor.

According to more recent analyses, there is no evidence


of production or stockpiling the chemical weapons by Israel.* [9] The oensive CW program almost certainly existed in the past but its current status is unknown.* [10]

In July 2014 ve journalists in Myanmar were sentenced


to 10 years in jail after publishing a report saying Myanmar was planning to build a new chemical weapons plant
on farmland in the country's Magwe Region.* [13]

The 1993 the U.S. Congress Oce of Technology Assessment WMD proliferation assessment recorded Israel
as a country generally reported as having undeclared offensive chemical warfare capabilities.

Myanmar signed the Chemical Weapons Convention on


14 January 1993,* [1] and ratied the agreement on 8 July
Japan
2015.* [14] The convention entered into eect 7 August
*
*
As of December 1993, Japan has signed the Chemi- 2015. [15] [16]
cal Weapons Convention. Japan ratied the Chemical
Weapons Convention in 1995. However, JSDF possess
chemical weapons facilities and some samples for use North Korea
in development of protection against chemical weapons
which it said JGSDF Central NBC protection Troop. In North Korea did not sign CWC and is believed to have
maintained an extensive chemical weapons program since
1995, JGSDF admitted possession of samples of sarin.
mid-1950s. The program includes research, production, stockpiling and weaponisation of large quantities of
chemical agents (perhaps as many as 5000 tons), includLibya
ing blister, nerve, choking, psychoincapacitant, vomiting
Libya produced limited quantities of chemical weapons and riot control agents. Several dozen facilities has been
during the 1980s, and is known to have used such identied as likely involved in the oensive program. The
weapons in combat at least once when it attempted to use production capability of these facilities is estimated as
4500 tons of chemical agents per year. North Korean
chemical weapons against Chadian troops in 1987.
armed forces have also large quantities of delivery sysSince then, Libya constructed what is believed to be the
tems that could carry chemical warheads, including diflargest chemical weapon production facility in the develferent artillery systems, aerial bombs, mines, tactical baloping world in the Rabta industrial complex. This facility
listic missiles (SCUD), and long-range ballistic missiles
was the cornerstone of the Libyan CW program, and has
(Nodong and Taepodong systems). However, the techproduced mustard gas, sarin, and phosgene since producnological advancement of this program is uncertain, and
tion began in the late 1980s. In March 1990 a suspicious
some sources doubt whether North Korea is able to prore broke out there following accusations by the United
duce large quantities of nerve agents or to t the chemical
*
States. [11]
warheads on its long-range ballistic missiles.* [17]
Strict United Nations sanctions from 1992 to 1999 rendered Rabta inactive. Libya's chemical program was
completely abandoned on December 19, 2003 along with Pakistan
their other weapons of mass destruction programs as
part of a program to get sanctions lifted and normal- In 1991 Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks identied Pakistan
ize relations with foreign governments. In 2004, be- as a probablechemical weapons possessor in testitween 27 February and 3 March, Libya destroyed 3,200 mony before Congress. However, more recent analyses
chemical weapon artillery shells under supervision of the indicate that although Pakistan, as many other countries
Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons with well-developed chemical industry, has technical ca(OPCW). On March 5, 2004, Libya declared a stock- pabilities for the production of chemical weapons, there
pile of 23 tons of mustard gas as well as precursors for is no evidence that it has ever possessed such weapons.
sarin and other chemicals. Libya ocially acceeded to Pakistan has ratied CWC in 1997 and did not declare
the Chemical Weapons Convention in June 2004.
any oensive activities in this area.* [18]

86

CHAPTER 3. PROLIFERATION

See also Naela Chohan, First woman and civilian to head is thought that South Korea is the state partyreferred
the National Authority on the Implementation of the to in Chemical Weapons Convention materials. There
Chemical Weapons Convention in Pakistan.
are reports that South Korea is operating a secret facility
in Yeongdong County, Chungcheongbuk-do Province for
the destruction of chemical agents.
Russia
Russia has destroyed about 25,000 metric tons of chemical weapons, or 62 percent of its 40,000-ton stockpile
as of April 29, 2012 - the deadline set by the Chemical Weapons Convention for complete arsenal destruction. Russia has already postponed the completion until
2015, but expects 2020 to be more realistic.* [19]
Serbia and Montenegro

Sudan
Some past reports of uncertain credibility indicated that
Sudan may have used chemical weapons against the rebels
in the southern part of this country. Sudan accessed to
CWC in 1999 and did not declare any oensive CW program. U.S. Department of State claims that it lacks sucient evidence to determine whether Sudan is engaged in
activities prohibited by CWC.* [20]

The former Yugoslavia is known to have produced a variety of chemical weapons (CW). The majority of stockpiled CW is believed to have been inherited by its successor, Serbia.
Syria
Reports indicate that the former Yugoslavia's Army produced large quantities of sarin (50 tons), sulfur mustard, Main articles: Syria and weapons of mass destruction
phosgene, the incapacitant BZ (allegedly a stockpile of and Syria chemical weapons program
300 tons), and tear gas. At least four chemical warfare
production facilities have been identied in Serbia: Prva On September 14, 2013, the United States and Russia anIskra in Baric; Miloje Blagojevic in Lucani; and Milojie nounced an agreement that would lead to the elimination
Zakic and Merima in Krusevic. While the Trajal plant of Syria's chemical weapon stockpiles by mid-2014.* [21]
in Krusevic has been shut down, serious questions exist Syria ocially acceded to the CWC on October 14,* [22]
about accounting and previous production and storage of but has yet to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It
chemical materials there, as well the lack of accounting is believed Syria rst received chemical weapons in 1973
on the other three sites.
from Egypt in the form of artillery shells. Since then it
Yugoslavia used its CW technologies to develop chemical
munitions for Iraq prior to the rst Gulf War in theLittle
Hawkprogram and chemical munitions for the Orkan
MLRS system under the KOL15program. There
have been allegations that CW were used in the area of
the former Yugoslavia: both Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian
Croats alleged that Bosnian government forces used chlorine during the conict in Bosnia; Bosnian Serbs allegedly
used BZ against Moslem refugees in July 1995; and the
FRY Army may have used BZ against Kosovo Albanians in 1999. Mysterious deaths during the 1999 NATO
bombings of suspected chemical facilities have also been
attributed to CW production.

is thought Syria has one of the most advanced chemical


weapons programs in the Middle East
Syrias Chemical Arsenal
Syria is thought to have amassed large quantities of Sarin,
Tabun, Mustard and is currently weaponizing VX. Exact
quantities are hard to know although the CIA has estimated Syria to possess several hundred liters of chemical
weapons with hundreds of tons of agents produced annually.
Production

Syria has 4 main production sites. One just North of


Damascus, one near Homs, one in Hama and one, al-Sar
The former Yugoslavia signed the Geneva Protocol in South East of Aleppo
1929. In April 2000, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC).
South Korea

Taiwan

U.S. Congress was informed in 1989 that Taiwan could


have acquired oensive chemical weapons capability, including stockpiles of sarin. The alleged facilities include
Tsishan and Kuanhsi. Taiwanese authorities acknowledged only the existence of defensive research program.
On April 18, 1997, South Korea signed the Chemical Because of Taiwan's non-state status, it cannot join the
Weapons Convention and made a secret declaration. It CWC.* [23]
Prior to 1997, South Korea was strongly suspected of
possessing an active chemical weapons program, and was
identied as a probablechemical weapons possessor
by the United States.

3.2. CHEMICAL WEAPON PROLIFERATION


United States
Main article: United States chemical weapons program

87

[13] Report on chemical weapons earn Myanmar journalists


jail term with hard labour. Myanmar News.Net. Retrieved 11 July 2014.
[14] Myanmar Joins Chemical Weapons Convention.

OPCW. 9 July 2015.


The United States has possessed a stockpile of chemical weapons since World War I. It banned the produc- [15] Chemical weapons ban goes into force in Myanmar.
tion or transport of chemical weapons in 1969. The U.S.
Myanmar News.Net. The News International. 8 August
began chemical weapons disposal in the 1960s, rst by
2015.
deep-sea burial. By the 1970s, incineration was the disposal method used. The use of chemical weapons was [16] Myanmar Joins Chemical Weapons Convention. BioPrepWatch. 9 August 2015.
renounced in 1991 and the U.S. signed the Chemical
Weapons Convention in 1993. 89.75% of the treaty de- [17] See North Korea's prole on NTI
clared stockpile was destroyed by January 2012.
[18] NTI Research Library: country prole: Pakistan - chemical weapons

Vietnam

3.2.2

See also

Weapon of mass destruction


Chemical Weapons Convention
Ten Threats identied by United Nations

3.2.3

References

[19] Russia may delay chemical weapons destruction until


2020. Panarmenian.Net. Retrieved 2013-09-05.
[20] http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/52113.pdf
[21] Smith-Spark, Laura; Cohen, Tom (September 14, 2013).
U.S., Russia agree to framework on Syria chemical
weapons. CNN. Retrieved 14 October 2013.
[22] Syria chemical weapons: OPCW plea for short ceaseres. BBC. October 14, 2013. Retrieved 14 October
14, 2013. Check date values in: |accessdate= (help)
[23] NTI: country prole Taiwan

[1] SIGNATORY STATES. Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. OPCW. 2 September 2013.
[2] Myanmar Joins Chemical Weapons Convention.
OPCW. 9 July 2015.
[3] Pothuraju, Babjee (JulyDecember 2012). Chemical
Weapons Prole of Angola. Institute for Defence Studies
and Analyses. Retrieved 2013-09-14.
[4] NTI Research Library: country prole: China
[5] Hawk, Kathleen Dupes; Villella, Ron; Varona, Adolfo
Leyva de (30 July 2014). Florida and the Mariel Boatlift
of 1980: The First Twenty Days. University of Alabama
Press. ISBN 978-0817318376. Retrieved 11 October
2014.
[6] NTI Research Library: country prole: Egypt - chemical
weapons
[7] India destroys its chemical weapons stockpile.
[8] Iranian Use of Chemical Weapons: A Critical Analysis of
Past Allegations
[9] NTI country prole - Israel
[10] NTI country prole - Israel (chemical weapons).
[11] United Nations General Assembly Session 45 Document
179.A/45/179 page 2. 23 March 1990. Retrieved 200711-16.
[12] Report of the Henry L. Stimson Center, Chemical Weapons Proliferation Concerns; found online
at http://www.stimson.org/cbw/?SN=CB20011220137#
myanmar (accessed 20 March 2008).

3.2.4 Resources
National Counterproliferation Center - Oce of the
Director of National Intelligence
Economist. (May 2, 1997). Chemical Weapons.
Just Checking,The Economist 347, p. 42.
Mahnaimi, Uzi (Oct., 1998). Israeli Jets Equipped
For Chemical Warfare. London Sunday Times
Monterey Institute of International Studies. (Apr 9,
2002). Chemical and Biological Weapons: Possession and Programs Past and Present. Retrieved Dec.
21, 2004.
Senate Armed Services Committee, FY 1975 Authorization Hearing, Part 5, March 7, 1974
Shoham, Dany. (1998). Chemical and Biological
Weapons in Egypt. The Nonproliferation Review 5
(Spring-Summer 1998), 4858.
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's
research on disarmament, arms control and nonproliferation * [1]
Russian Biological and Chemical Weapons, a useful page about non-state weapons transfers with a
lot of links to information from CRS, the GAO and
NGOs.
[1] http://www.sipri.org/research/disarmament

88

CHAPTER 3. PROLIFERATION

3.3 List of missiles by country

MAA-1A Piranha Short-range infrared homing airto-air missile.

This list of missiles by country displays the names of


missiles in order of the country where they originate
(were developed), with the countries listed alphabetically
and annotated with their continent (and defence alliance,
if applicable). In cases where multiple nations have developed or produced a missile, it is listed under each signicantly participating nation. Within the lists of each
country, missiles are ordered by designation and/or calling name (the latter being especially relevant for Russian/Soviet missiles). In some cases multiple listings are
used, in order to provide cross-references for easier navigation.

MAA-1B Piranha Air to air missile, also known as


Piranha II.
MSS-1.2 AC Anti-tank guided missile.
MSA-3.1 AA Anti-aircraft guided missile.
MAS-5.1 Air-to-ground missile
MAR-1 Anti-radiation missile.
MAN-1 (MANSUP) Anti-ship missile

This is not a list of missiles in operational service by a 3.3.4 Canada


particular country; nor a list of military rockets.
ERYX (joint French/Canadian)
For an alphabetical list by missile name, see the list of
missiles.
Velvet Glove

3.3.1

Argentina

Alacrn

3.3.5 China
See also entries under #Taiwan.

AS-25K anti-ship, air-ground ASM


Cndor I (with major contributions of German technology)
Cndor II (in cooperation with several MiddleEastern countries)
Cndor III
Martin Pescador MP-1000 anti-ship, air-ground
ASM
Mathogo anti-tank, wire-guided

3.3.6 European joint-venture


AIM-132 ASRAAM
MBDA Aster
MBDA Meteor
IRIS-T
Martel - Anglo-French: Models AJ 168 and AS.37
MIM-115 Roland
Taurus KEPD 150/350

3.3.2

Australia

Ikara
Malkara (joint Australian/British)
Nulka active missile decoy designed to seduce antiship missiles away from their targets

3.3.7 France
AASM
Aerospatiale AS-12
Apache
AS.30

3.3.3

Brazil

A-Darter Fifth generation short range infrared homing air-to-air missile (joint South Africa/Brazil)
FOG-MPM Fiber Optics Guided Multiple Purpose
Missile.
AVMT-300 GPS and/or laser-guided long range
missile

ASMP
Crotale surface-to-air missile
ENTAC
ERYX (joint French/Canadian)
HOT (Franco-German) anti-tank missile
Exocet

3.3. LIST OF MISSILES BY COUNTRY

89

Hads (cancelled)
M5
M45
M51
Magic
Meteor
MICA

Model of IDAS of the German Navy.

MILAN (Franco-German) anti-tank missile


MISTRAL (Multinational) surface-to-air missile

Taurus KEPD 350

Pluton

AGM Armiger

Matra R530

IRIS-T

Super 530

IRIS-T SL

ROLAND 2
many/France)

surface-to-air

missile

(Ger-

Scalp EG (Uk-French-Italy)
Nord SS.10
Aerospatiale AS.11/SS.11
Nord SS.12

3.3.8

Germany

IDAS (missile)
PARS 3 LR
RBS-15 (Sweden/Germany)
GMLRS
MEADS
RIM-116 RAM
LFK NG
MBDA Meteor (Multinational)
HOT (Franco German) anti-tank missile
MILAN
German missiles of WW2
V-1 ying bomb
V-2 rocket
Enzian missile
Wasserfall missile

A modern Germany Air Force IRIS-T infrared homing air-to-air


missile

Ruhrstahl X-4 missile


Schmetterling

AS.34 Kormoran 1/2

Rheinbote

MIM-115 Roland (replaced by LFK NG)

Rheintochter

ESSM

Henschel Hs 293

EuroSpike (Israel/Germany)

Fritz X

SM-2 IIIA

Feuerlilie

90

CHAPTER 3. PROLIFERATION

3.3.9

India

BrahMos-NG (under development)

Akash: Surface to air missile

Astra : Beyond Visual Range Air to Air missile

Trishul: Surface to air missile

Nirbhay : Long Range subsonic cruise missile

Nag : Anti tank missile

Prahaar : Tactical short range Ballistic Missile

Prithvi-I (SS-150) : surface to surface Ballistic Missile

Helina : Air launched anti tank missile.

Prithvi-II (SS-250) : surface to surface Ballistic


Missile

Cannon Launched guided missile (CLGM)


Barak 8 : Long range surface to air missile

Prithvi-III (SS-350) : surface to surface Ballistic


Missile

Pradyumna Ballistic Missile Interceptor : Ballistic


Missile interceptor, surface to air missile.

Agni-I MRBM : surface to surface Ballistic Missile

Ashwin Ballistic Missile Interceptor : Ballistic Missile interceptor / anti aircraft missile (Range = 150
km+).

Agni-II IRBM : surface to surface Ballistic Missile


Agni-III IRBM :surface to surface Ballistic Missile

Agni-IV IRBM : surface to surface Ballistic Missile 3.3.10

Iran

Agni-V ICBM : surface to surface Ballistic Missile

As of 2009, Iran has an active interest in developing,


acquiring, and deploying a broad range of ballistic misAgni-VI ICBM : surface to surface Ballistic Missile siles, as well as developing a space launch capability. In
Dhanush (missile) :Ship launched surface to surface mid-July 2008, Iran launched a number of ballistic missiles during military exercises, reportedly including the
Ballistic Missile
medium-range Shahab-3. Iran announced other missile
K 15 : Submarine launched Ballistic Missile
and space launch tests in August and November 2008. In
February 2009, Iran announced it launched a satellite into
K 4 : Submarine launched Ballistic Missile
orbit and ocially achieved a presence in space.* [1]

K 5 : Submarine launched Ballistic Missile


Shaurya : surface to surface hypersonic tactical missile

Raduga Kh-55 Air-launched strategic cruise missile

Toophan 1
Brahmos

BrahMos : Fastest Cruise Missile in the world.


Brahmos II : Hypersonic missile (under development)
BrahMos-A : Air launched Cruise Missile.
BrahMos-M

Toophan 2
Toophan 5
Saeghe 1-2
I-RAAD & I-RAAD-T
Fateh-110

3.3. LIST OF MISSILES BY COUNTRY

91
Qiam 1
Shahab-1
Shahab-2
Shahab-3 B,C,D
Shahab-4

SS-N-22 Sunburn Anti-ship missiles

Shahab-5
Shahab-6
Ghadr-110
Ghadr-111
Sayyad, upgraded copy of HQ-2, Sayyad-1A has IR
tracking.
Shahin I & II, Reverse engineer of MIM-23 Hawk.

P-800 Oniks(SS-NX-26 Yakhont) Anti-ship cruise missile

R-17E, variant of Russian Scud B


SS-N-22 Sunburn
SS-NX-26 Yakhont
Raduga Kh-55, also called X-55
Noor
Kowsar
Silkworm, Capable of manufacture the missiles.

SA-2 Guideline Anti-air defense missile

Hoot

Fajr-2

Saegheh

Fajr-3, MIRV

Zelzal-1

Fajr-5

Zelzal-2

Fajr-8, upgrades copy of S-200, Iranian upgrades

Zelzal-3

Tondar-69

Ashoura

Oghab

Sejjil 1, 2

Samid

Nasr-1

92

3.3.11

CHAPTER 3. PROLIFERATION

Iraq

3.3.13 Japan

Al-Samoud 2

AAM-1 (Type 69 Air-to-Air Missile)

Ababil-100

AAM-2 (Program was canceled)

Al Fahd 300

AAM-3 (Type 90 Air-to-Air Missile)

Al Fahd 500

AAM-4 (Type 99 Air-to-Air Missile)

Al Hussein

AAM-4B

Al Hijarah

AAM-5 (Type 04 Air-to-Air Missile)

Al Abbas

AAM-5B (Development)

Badr 2000

ASM-1 (Type 80 Air-to-Ship Missile)

Project 144

ASM-1C (Type 91 Air-to-Ship Missile)

Tammuz-1

ASM-2 (Type 93 Air-to-Ship Missile)

Al Abid

ATM-1 (Type 64 Anti-Tank Missile)

Scud

3.3.12

ASM-2B

Israel

Arrow missile (Anti-ballistic)


Barak 1 (Naval point defense)
Barak 8 (Naval area defense)
Delilah missile (Cruise missile of several variants:
drone, air-to-ground, possible anti-radiation variant
as well)
David's Sling/Magic Wand (Anti medium range
missile)
Gabriel missile (Ship-to-ship and air-to-ship variants)
Iron Dome (anti-short range rocket)
Jericho II IRBM (Ground-to-ground ballistic)
Jericho III ICBM (Ground-to-ground ballistic)
LAHAT (Guided anti-tank)
Nimrod (Guided anti-tank)
Popeye missile (Air-to-ground cruise missile. U.S.
designation AGM-142 Have Nap. Possibly larger
derivatives exist as well, including a submarinelaunched variant)
Python 5 (Air-to-air, also ground-to-air variant
named SPYDER)

ATM-2 (Type 79 Anti-Landing craft and Anti-Tank


Missile)
ATM-3 (Type 87 Anti-Tank Missile)
ATM-4 (Type 96 Multi-Purpose Missile System)
ATM-5 (Type 01 Light Anti-Tank Missile)
ATM-6 (Medium-Range Multi-Purpose Missile)
SAM-1 (Type 81 Short-Range Surface-to-Air Missile)
SAM-1B
SAM-1C
SAM-2 (Type 91 Portable Surface-to-Air Missile)
SAM-2B
SAM-3 (Type 93 Short-Range Surface-to-Air Missile)
SAM-4 (Type 03 Medium-Range Surface-to-Air
Missile)
SAM-4B (Development)
Type 11 Short-Range Surface-to-Air Missile
SSM-1 (Type 88 Surface-to-Ship Missile)
SSM-1C
SSM-1B (Type 90 Ship-to-Ship Missile Missile)
SM-3 Block-II/IIA (Joint development with U.S)

Derby (Air-to-air, also known as the Alto)

Type 73 (Type 73 lightweight torpedo)

Shavit (Space launcher)

Type 80 (Type 80 heavyweight torpedo)

Spike/Gil missile (Portable guided anti-tank of


several variants including a longer a range tactical ground-to-ground/air-to-ground variant named
Spike NLOS or Tamuz)

Type 89 (Type 89 heavyweight torpedo)


Type 97 (Type 97 lightweight torpedo)
Type 07 (Type 07 Vertical Launched ASROC)

3.3. LIST OF MISSILES BY COUNTRY

93

3.3.14

North Korea

Shaheen I

3.3.15

Norway

Ghauri II

Penguin (American designation AGM-119)


Naval Strike Missile

Shaheen II
Shaheen-III
Ghaznavi

3.3.16

Pakistan

Abdali-II
Dongfeng
Hatf-I/IA
Abdali-I
Nasr (Hatf-IX)

3.3.17 South Korea


Baeksangeo (White Shark) heavyweight torpedo
Cheolmae-2 (KM-SAM) surface-to-air missile
Cheongsangeo (Blue Shark) lightweight torpedo
Chiron surface-to-air missile
C-Star ship-to-ship missile
Haeseong anti-ship missile
Hongsangeo (Red Shark) rocket-based torpedo and
anti-submarine missile (K-ASROC)
Hyunmoo III cruise missile
The Ghauri ballistic missile (centre) on display at the IDEAS 2008
defence exhibition, Karachi, mounted in its launch mechanism on
the transporter erector launcher (TEL).

KM-SAM surface-to-air missile


Pegasus surface-to-air missile
K-SAAM surface-to-air missile

Anza Mk.1, Mk.2, Mk.3

Hyun-Gung anti-tank missile

H-2 SOW

KGGB GPS-guided Air-to-surface missile

H-4 SOW - rocket-boosted, precision-guided glide


bomb
3.3.18
Ra'ad (Hatf VIII) - air-launched cruise missile
Barq
Baktar-Shikan

Russia and the USSR

By Russian designation
The NATO reporting name of each missile is shown in
parentheses behind the proper name.

Babur (Hatf VII) - ground-launched cruise missile


(submarine-launched version under development)
By NATO name
Hatf-VIII (Ra'ad) - Air-launched Cruise Missile developed exclusively for launch from Aerial Plat- 3.3.19 Serbia
forms.
ALAS (Advanced Light Attack System) Long-range
Ghauri I
multipurpose guided missile

94

3.3.20

CHAPTER 3. PROLIFERATION

South Africa

RSA Series
RSA-1 (Variant of the Jericho II second stage for
use as a mobile missile)* [3]
RSA-2 (Variant of the Jericho II)* [4]
RSA-3 (Variant of the Shavit)* [5]
RSA-4 (Upper stages of the Shavit with a heavy rst
stage)* [6]

3.3.22 Taiwan
See also entries under #China.
Hsiung Feng I (HF-1) (ship-to-ship)
Hsiung Feng II (HF-2) (guided multiplatform antiship)
Hsiung Feng IIE (HF-2E) (land attack cruise missile
variant of HF-2)
Hsiung Feng III (HF-3) (antiship and/or land attack
cruise missile)
Sky Bow I (TK-1) (SAM)

(Above missiles made by Houwteq)

Sky Bow II (TK-2) (SAM)


Sky Bow III (TK-3) (SAM)

Other

Sky Spear (Short range SSBM)

A-Darter
R-Darter
ZT3 Ingwe
Mokopa
MUPSOW
Torgos Air-Launched Cruise Missile
Umkhonto
(Above missiles made by Denel Dynamics)

Sky Sword I (TC-1) (air-to-air)


Sky Sword II (TC-2) (air-to-air)
Yun Feng (long-range cruise missile)

3.3.23 Turkey
HGK (bomb)
Mzrak-U
Mzrak-O
Roketsan Cirit
SOM (missile)
T-LORAMIDS

3.3.21

Sweden

RBS-15
RB 04
Rb 05
RBS 70

J-600T Yldrm

3.3.24 United Kingdom


AIM-132 ASRAAM
Bloodhound Surface-to-air
Blowpipe Man portable Surface-to-air
Blue Steel Nuclear Stand O Bomb

RBS 23

Blue Streak

KEPD 350

Blue Water - surface to surface nuclear

BILL 1
BILL 2
Bantam

Brakemine WWII SAM project


Brimstone
Fairey Fireash Air-to-air
Fairey Stooge anti-ship missile

3.3. LIST OF MISSILES BY COUNTRY

95

Fire Shadow

Joint Designation System of 1947

Firestreak Air-to-air

Test Vehicle Designations* [9]

Green Cheese

Sequence Numbers:

Javelin Surface-to-air

Air Force: Consecutive numerical sequence for each missile mission type.

Malkara (joint Australian/British)


MBDA Meteor (European)
Rapier Surface-to-air
Red Dean
Red Hebe
Red Top Air-to-air
Sea Cat Surface-to-air

Army: Single numerical sequence until 1948 when the


sequence numbers were restarted.
Navy: Initially even numbers transitioning to sequential.
Sample Vehicle Designation SSM-A-2 Navaho
Sample Test Vehicle DesignationRTV-G-1 WAC Corporal
United States Air Force Designation Systems

Sea Dart Surface-to-air

United States Air Force Designation System, 1947


1951

Sea Eagle

The list of missiles sorted by ascending Air Force 1947


1951 designations.* [9]

Sea Skua
Sea Slug Surface-to-air

United States Air Force Designation System, 1951


1955* [9]

Sea Viper (Aster Missile) Surface-to-air

During this timeframe, the U.S. Air Force treated missiles as pilotless aircraft.* [9]

Sea Wolf Surface-to-air


Skybolt ALBM
Skyash
Starburst
Starstreak
Storm Shadow (British-French)
Swingre Ground to ground, anti-tank

The list of missiles sorted by ascending Air Force 1951


1955 designations.
1

A version of the Falcon missile was briey designated


the F-104 before it was re-designated as the F-98.* [9]
2

The X-11 and X-12 designations were assigned to one


and three engine test missiles that would have been used
to develop a ve engine version of the Atlas missile.* [9]
United States Air Force Designation System, 1955
1963* [9]

Thunderbird

For all basic missions except GAR (which started at 1)


the sequence number started after 67 which was the last
bomber designation used for guided missiles.* [9]

Tigercat

Sample Air Force 19551963 designation: XSM-73

UB.109T - cruise missile


Vickers Vigilant

3.3.25

United States

Missile Design Series (Unied)

The list of missiles sorted by ascending Air Force 1955


1963 designations.
United States Navy Designation Systems
United States Navy Designation System 1941 1945* [9]

The list of missiles sorted by ascending Navy 1941 - 1945


US DoD 4120 Mission Design Series (MDS) Designadesignations.
tors and Symbols for Guided Missiles, Rockets, Probes,
Boosters, and Satellites.* [7]
Interstate BDR
Sample Missile MDS - BGM-109G* [7]
LBD Gargoyle
The list of U. S. missiles, sorted by ascending MDS number:
LBE-1 Glomb

96

CHAPTER 3. PROLIFERATION

LBP-1 Glomb

M13 Shillelagh

LBT-1 Glomb

XM14 Pershing
M15 Sergeant

United States Navy Designation System 1946 1947* [9]

M16 Hawk

The list of missiles sorted by ascending Navy 1946-1947


designations.* [9]

M18 Hawk

United States Navy Designation System 1947 - 1963

XM19 Pershing

The list of missiles sorted by ascending Navy 1947-1963


designations.* [9]
United States Army Designation Systems

M50 Honest John


United States Undesignated Missiles

United States Army Designation System 1941 - The list of undesignated United States missiles sorted al1947* [9]
phabetically:
The list of missiles sorted by ascending Army 1941-1947 1 Australian target missile briey used by the United
designations.
States Navy.
2

JB-1 Bat
JB-2 Doodle Bug
JB-3 Tiamet
JB-4 Project MX-607
JB-5 Project MX-595

The United States procured Rapier missile systems for


the air defense of United States Air Force Bases in the
United Kingdom.
United States Missiles with X Designations
The list of X designated United States missiles numerically:

JB-6 Project MX-600


JB-7 Project MX-605

X-7

JB-8 GAPA

X-8

JB-9 Project MX-626

X-9 Shrike

JB-10 Bat

X-10

United States Army Designation System 1948 - 1955


The list of missiles sorted by ascending Army 1948 1955 designations.* [9]
United States Army Designation System 1955 - 1963
The list of missiles sorted by ascending Army 1955-1963
designations.* [9]
M1 Nike-Ajax
M2 Corporal

X-11
X-12
X-17
X-41
X-42
X-43 Hyper-X
X-51

M3 Hawk
M4 Lacrosse
M6 Nike-Hercules
M8 Redstone
M9 Redstone

3.3.26 See also


List of missiles
List of currently active missiles of the United States
military

3.3. LIST OF MISSILES BY COUNTRY

3.3.27

References

[1] This article incorporates public domain material from the


Congressional Research Service documentIran's Ballistic Missile Programs: An Overview.
[2] http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6700585.stm
[3] RSA-1. astronautix.com. 2007-10-20.
[4] RSA-2. astronautix.com. 2007-10-20.
[5] RSA-3. astronautix.com. 2007-10-20.
[6] RSA-4. astronautix.com. 2007-10-20.
[7] Oce of the Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L), DoD
4120.15-L Model Designation of Military Aerospace Vehicles, Department of Defense, May 12, 2004
[8] Bridges Derek. (2007) M-Missiles, , retrieved December
25, 2007
[9] Andreas Parsch, Pre-1963 Designations of U.S. Missile
and Drones, , Retrieved November 17, 2007.
[10] Missile's Mission: Picking O The Strays, October 1950,
Popular Science detailed article

97

Chapter 4

Countries
4.1 Albania
Albania once possessed a stockpile of weapons of mass
destruction. This stockpile of chemical weapons included 16,678 kilograms (36,769 lb) of mustard agent,
lewisite, adamsite, and chloroacetophenone.
Albania was among the initial countries who signed the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1993.* [1] The
treaty, which came into force in 1997, requires the declaration of chemical stockpiles, and the destruction of all
chemical weapons, delivery systems and production facilities. One of only six nations to declare a stockpile,
Albania made its declaration in March 2003,* [2] after
the discovery, in December 2002, of 600 bulk containers
of chemicals in an abandoned bunker. The material was
probably acquired by Communist leader Enver Hoxha in
the mid-1970s from China although no documentation
was found.* [3]

On 11 July 2007, the Organisation for the Prohibition of


Chemical Weapons (OPCW) conrmed the destruction
of the entire chemical weapons stockpile in Albania,* [4]
making Albania the rst nation to completely destroy all
of its chemical weapons under the terms of the CWC.
Costs were approximately 48 million U.S. dollars. The
United States assisted with and funded the destruction operations under the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction.* [5]

4.1.1 Biological and nuclear weapons


Albania acceded to the Biological Weapons Convention on June 3, 1992, banning biological weapons. It
also acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in
September 1990.* [6] Albania joined the Geneva Protocol on 20 December 1989, banning chemical and
biological weapons and deposited its accession to the
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty on 23 April
2003.* [6]

4.1.2 See also


Cold war
Kosovo

4.1.3 Notes and references


[1] Membership of the OPCW, http://www.opcw.org/en/
membership_menu.html
[2] Kerry Boyd,Albania Has Chemical Arms; CWC Review
Conference Meets, Arms Control Association, June
2003, accessed July 27, 2007
[3]Albania's Chemical Cache Raises Fears About Others, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/
A61698-2005Jan9.html, Joby Warrick, Washington Post,
January 10, 2005, accessed July 27, 2007
[4] U.S. Department of State, Albania First Country to Destroy All Of Its Chemical Weapons, July 13, 2007, accessed July 27, 2007

Albanian chemical weapons.

98

4.3. ARGENTINA

[5] Nunn-Lugar Destroys Chemical Weapons Stockpile in Albania, http://lugar.senate.gov/record.cfm?id=279351&,


Press Release of Senator Lugar, July 19, 2007, accessed
July 27, 2007
[6] Status of Multilateral Arms Regulation and Disarmament
Agreements,
http://disarmament.un.org/TreatyStatus.
nsf/NPT%20(in%20alphabetical%20order)?OpenView,
UN Oce for Disarmament Aairs (UNODA), accessed
July 27, 2007

99

4.3.1 Missile systems


During the 1980s, the Alacrn (English: Scorpion) and
Cndor 2 (English: Condor) missiles were developed.
The Cndor 2, with a range of around 1,000 kilometres,
was reportedly scrapped during the Menem administration under pressure from the United States government.
The current status of the Alacrn remains unknown.

4.2 Algeria

4.3.2 Chemical weapons

In 1991, the government of the United States said it had


unearthed details of the alleged construction of a nuclear
reactor in Algeria.* [1] The Washington Times accused the
country of developing nuclear weapons with the help of
the Chinese government.* [1] The Algerian government
admitted it was building a reactor, but denied any secrecy
or military purpose.* [1] Surveillance from U.S. satellites
also suggested that the reactor would not be used for military purposes.* [1] China had secretly made an agreement
in 1983 to assist Algeria in developing a nuclear reactor.* [1]

Argentina acceded to the Geneva Protocol on May 12,


1969 and has been active in non-proliferation eorts, ratied the Biological Weapons Convention in 1979 and the
Chemical Weapons Convention on October 2, 1995.
In September 1991 Argentina, together with Brazil and
Chile, signed the Mendoza Declaration, which commits
signatories not to use, develop, produce, acquire, stock,
or transfer directly or indirectly chemical or biological
weapons.

In November of 1991, succumbing to international 4.3.3 Nuclear weapons


pressure, Algeria placed the reactor under IAEA safeguards.* [1] Algeria signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
See also: National Atomic Energy Commission and
Treaty in January 1995, and ratied the Chemical
INVAP
*
Weapons Convention [2] In August 2001, Algeria ac*
ceded to the Biological Weapons Convention. [3]
Argentina conducted a nuclear weapon research program during the National Reorganization Process regime.
4.2.1 Notes and references
Government ocials at the time conrmed, in November
1983, that research carried out at the Balseiro Institute's
[1] The Nuclear Vault: The Algerian Nuclear Problem.
research reactor had yielded the capacity for weaponsGwu.edu. Retrieved 2013-03-14.
grade uranium enrichment.* [1] The program was aban[2] Member States of the Organisation for the Prohibition doned, however, shortly after the return of democracy,
of Chemical Weapons. OPCW. Retrieved 2013-03-14. on December 10, 1983. In 1991 the parliaments of Argentina and Brazil ratied a bilateral inspection agree[3]
ment that created the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) to
verify both countries' pledges to use nuclear energy only
4.2.2 References
for peaceful purposes. On February 10, 1995, Argentina
Ref. Albright, David; Corey Hinderstein (May acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a nonJune 2001). Algeria: Big deal in the desert?". nuclear weapon state. Argentina continues to use nuclear
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 57 (3): 4552.
power in non-military roles, and is noted as an exporter
of civilian use nuclear technology.
http://www.atomicarchive.com/Almanac/Testing.
shtml

4.3 Argentina
Argentina has a history with the development of
weapons of mass destruction. Under the National Reorganization Process, Argentina began a nuclear weapons
program in the early 1980s, but this was abolished when
democracy was restored in 1983.

In 2010, the government announced that it would start


working in the creation of a nuclear submarine.* [2]
Those types of submarines only use atomic energy for
propulsion. The announcement was highly criticized by
politicians from opposing parties.* [3]
In accord with three presidential decrees of 1960,
1962 and 1963, Argentina supplied about 90 tons of
unsafeguarded yellowcake (uranium oxide) to Israel to
fuel the Dimona reactor, reportedly creating the ssile
material for Israel's rst nuclear weapons.* [4]

100

4.3.4

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

See also

4.4.1 Biological weapons

Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Australia has advanced research programs in
immunology, microbiology and genetic engineering
Control of Nuclear Materials
that support an industry providing world class vaccines
for domestic use and export.* [2] It also has an extensive
Brazilian nuclear weapons program
wine industry and produces microorganisms on an
industrial scale to support other industries including
agriculture, food technology and brewing. The dual-use
4.3.5 References
nature of these facilities mean that Australia, like any
country with advanced biotechnological industries,
[1] National Geographic. August 1986. p.243.
could easily produce biological warfare agents. Some
disease research laboratories in Australia own strains of
[2] Promete Garr que se construir un submarino nuclear en
the Ebola virus. The Australian Microbial Resources
el pas (Spanish)
Research Network lists 37 culture collections, many
of which hold samples of pathogenic organisms for
[3] La oposicin, entre las duras crticas y la irona (Spanish)
legitimate research purposes.* [3]
[4] The Israel-Argentina Yellowcake Connection. National Security Archive (George Washington University).
25 June 2013. Retrieved 6 August 2013.

History

In the wake of the Japanese advance through South


East Asia during World War II, the secretary of the
4.3.6 Sources
Australian Department of Defence, F.G. Shedden, wrote
to Macfarlane Burnet on 24 December 1946 and invited
The Nuclear Club: Membership has its kilotons. him to attend a meeting of top military ocers to discuss
CBC News Online. April 12, 2006. Archived from biological warfare.* [4]
the original on 14 April 2006. Retrieved April 2006. In September 1947, Burnet was invited to join the chemical and biological warfare subcommittee of the New
Nuclear Threat Initiative. Argentina. Archived Weapons and Equipment Development Committee and
from the original on 19 April 2006. Retrieved May subsequently prepared a secret report titledNote on War
1, 2006.
from a Biological Angle.* [5] In 1951 the subcommittee
recommended thata panel reporting to the chemical and
biological warfare subcommittee should be authorised to
4.3.7 External links
report on the oensive potentiality of biological agents
likely to be eective against the local food supplies of
*
The Woodrow Wilson Center's Nuclear Prolifer- South-East Asia and Indonesia. [4]
ation International History Project Conference on The activities of the chemical and biological warfare
Brazilian and Argentine Nuclear Programs (English) subcommittee were scaled back soon after, as Prime

4.4 Australia

Minister Robert Menzies was more interested in trying to acquire nuclear weapons.* [4] Australia signed the
Biological Weapons Convention on 10 April 1972 and deposited a certicate of ratication on 5 October 1977.* [6]

Australia is not known or believed to possess weapons


of mass destruction, although it has participated in ex- 4.4.2 Chemical weapons
tensive research into nuclear, biological and chemical
weapons in the past.
Australia conducted extensive research into chemical
Australia chairs the Australia Group, an informal group- weapons during World War II. Although Australia has
ing of countries that seek to minimise the risk of assist- never produced chemical weapons, it did stockpile chem*
ing chemical and biological weapon proliferation. All ical weapons sourced from the USA and Britain. [7]
states participating in the Australia Group are parties to Chemical weapons known to have been stockpiled inthe Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological cluded mustard gas, phosgene, lewisite, adamsite and CN
Weapons Convention, and strongly support eorts un- gas.
der those Conventions to rid the world of chemical and
biological weapons.* [1] As with chemical and biological
weapons, Australia does not possess nuclear weapons and
is not at all known to be seeking to develop them.

Some of the stockpiled weapons in the form of mortar


and artillery shells, aerial bombs and bulk agents were
sent to New Guinea for potential use against Japanese
tunnel complexes.* [7] No actual use of the weapons was

4.4. AUSTRALIA

An observer examining an unexploded 25 pound gas shell following a trial of gas weapons at Singleton, New South Wales in
1943.

101

Operation Hurricane, a 25kt nuclear test, Monte Bello Islands,


Australia

recorded although there were many trials using 'live' weapons, both for international prestige and because of
chemical weapons (such as shown in the picture to the the small size of the country's military. While Scherger's
British and American counterparts were encouraging, the
right).
Macmillan and Eisenhower governments were not. Prime
After World War II, the chemical weapons were disposed
Minister Robert Menzies' government decided that doof by burning, venting (for phosgene) or by dumping
mestic production would be too dicult due to cost and
at sea. Some 21,030 tons of chemical weapons were
international politics.* [12]
dumped in the seas o Australia near Brisbane, Sydney
and Melbourne. This has been covered in a Defence Australia hosted British nuclear testing in Monte Bello Isreport by Geo Plunkett. A complete history of Aus- lands (Operation Hurricane), Emu Field and Maralinga
tralia's involvement with chemical weapons - titled Chem- between 1952 and 1963. Maralinga was developed as
*
ical Warfare in Australia - has been published in book a joint facility with a shared funding arrangement. [13]
form by the Army History Unit (Defence Department) in During the 1950s, Australia participated in the develop2013 (2nd Edn) Again it is authored by Geo Plunkett . ment of the Blue Streak missile, a Medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) intended for delivery of a nuclear
A stockpile of 1,000 pound phosgene bombs was discovwarhead. The Australian HIFAR nuclear reactor at Luered at Embi Aireld in 1970 and disposed of by Auscas Heights, Sydney, operated from 1958 to 2006 and has
tralian Army personnel, and, up to 1990, drums of musnow been replaced by the OPAL reactor in 2006.
tard gas were still being discovered in the bush where
they had been tested.* [7] Another stockpile of chemi- The new reactor is designed to use low-enriched uranium
*
cal weapons was discovered at Maxwelton, Queensland in fuel and an open pool light water system. [14] Australia
1989.* [4] Australia signed the Chemical Weapons Con- has substantial deposits of uranium which account for
*
vention in January 1993 and ratied it with the Chemical 30% of the world's known reserves. [15] Until 1996 government policy restricted exploitation of uranium deWeapons (Prohibition) Act in 1994.* [7]
posits to three established mines. A fourth site at Four
Mile uranium mine was approved in July 2009.* [16] Current policy is to develop the export potential of Australia's
4.4.3 Nuclear weapons
uranium industry by allowing mining and export of uraAustralia does not have nuclear weapons and is not nium under strict international agreements designed to
thought to be seeking to develop them, although several prevent nuclear proliferation.* [17]
federal governments have investigated the idea and may Although the RAAF continued to occasionally investihave done some research into the question.* [8] Australia gate obtaining nuclear weapons during the 1960s,* [12]
investigated acquiring tactical nuclear weapons from the Australia signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
United Kingdom or the United States as early as 1956 on 27 February 1970 and ratied the treaty on 23
when Athol Townley, Minister for Air, wrote to Philip January 1973.* [18] Sir Philip Baxter rst head of the
McBride, Minister for Defence, recommending the ac- Australian Atomic Energy Commission (AAEC), now
quisition of tactical nuclear weapons to arm Australia's the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology OrEnglish Electric Canberra bombers and CAC Sabre ght- ganisation (ANSTO) and rst Vice Chancellor of the
ers.* [9]* [10]* [11]
University of New South Wales openly advocated AusAir Chief Marshal Frederick Scherger and Minister tralia acquiring a weapons grade plutonium stockpile and
for Air Athol Townley supported acquiring nuclear thus nuclear weapons.* [19]

102
During the 1970s and 1980s, ANSTO scientists developed centrifuge enrichment technology, claimed to be
comparable with the commercial URENCO centrifuge
technology of the time. Such technology, if deployed
on an industrial scale, would have been capable in principle of producing highly enriched uranium for nuclear
weapons. The research lost government funding in the
mid-1980s.* [20]
A commercial-scale enrichment plant would also be capable of producing sucient highly enriched uranium
for a nuclear weapons program. An Australian company
has been actively developing a novel process for uranium
enrichment, Separation of Isotopes by Laser Excitation
(SILEX).* [21]

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
As part of Air Sta Requirement (Operational Requirement/Air) 36 for bomber aircraft in the 1950s, the Royal
Australian Air Force specied a requirement foran offensive tactical strike capabilityand strategic defence
of Australiawith targetsas far north as the Kra Peninsula". The bomber was required to have a range of not
less than 4,000 nautical miles (7,400 km) and be capable
of carrying at least 20,000 pounds (9,100 kg) of conventional bombs or one BLUE DANUBE nuclear weapon
(which had been air dropped at Maralinga on 11 October
1956).* [24] Locally manufactured versions of the Avro
Vulcan or Handley Page Victor nuclear bombers were
some of the options considered.

The then Prime Minister of Australia, John Howard, be- 4.4.4 References
gan a study in 2006 into the issues surrounding an increase in Australia's uranium usage.* [22] Amongst the [1] The Australia Group : An Introduction. The Australia
Group. Archived from the original on 20 February 2006.
topics of the study will be a domestic uranium enrichment
Retrieved 18 April 2006.
plant for supplying low-enriched fuel for nuclear power
reactors, either domestic or foreign.
[2] Biotechnology capability overview.
Austrade.
Delivery platforms

Archived from the original on 27 August 2006. Retrieved


23 April 2006.
[3] Culture Collections. Australian Microbial Resources
Research Network. Retrieved 19 April 2006.
[4] Bromage, David (2002).Australia: Biological weapons
. Federation of American Scientists. Archived from the
original on 17 May 2006. Retrieved 18 April 2006.
[5] Nicholson, Brendan (10 March 2002).Burnet's solution:
The plan to poison S-E Asia. Melbourne: The Age.
Archived from the original on 8 April 2006. Retrieved 18
April 2006.

An Australian F-111

Like virtually every other developed nation and most


larger developing nations, Australia has weapons systems
which could be used to deliver nuclear weapons to its
neighbours, if nuclear weapons were developed.* [23] The
Royal Australian Air Force has 71 F/A-18 Hornet strike
ghters and 24 F/A-18F Super Hornet strike ghters. The
Royal Australian Air Force is looking at options to purchase a further 18 F/A-18F Super Hornets due to delays
in the production and arrivals of the Lockheed Martin F35 Lightning II.

[6] Convention on the Prohibition of the Development,


Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (biological)
and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction. Australian Government Publishing Service. Retrieved 18
April 2006.
[7] Australia: Chemical weapons. Federation of American
Scientists. 2 September 2002. Archived from the original
on 8 July 2006. Retrieved 24 June 2006.
[8] Broinowski, Richard (2003). Fact or Fission?. Scribe
Publications. ISBN 1-920769-03-X.
[9] National Archives of Australia, Department of Defence;
A5954 1400/15 Re-equipment of RAAF Bomber and
Fighter Squadrons with atomic weapons, 1956
[10] National Archives of Australia, Department of Defence;

Australia previously operated the Douglas A-4 Skyhawk


A1209 1957/4067 Nuclear Weapons for the Australian
ground-attack aircraft and the English Electric Canberra
Forces, 1956-1958
and General Dynamics F-111C bombers, which were
theoretically capable of delivering nuclear weapons, and [11] National Archives of Australia, Prime Minister's Department; A1945 186/5/3 Procurement of nuclear weapons
F-111G tactical bombers which converted from United
for Australian forces, 1957
States Air Force FB-111A strategic nuclear bombers.
Prior to the delivery of the F-111C, Australia briey [12] Lax, Mark. From Controversy to Cutting Edge: A History
operated the McDonnell Douglas F-4E leased from the
of the F-111 in Australian Service. Canberra, Australia:
United States Air Force, standard Block 43/44 models
Air Power Development Centre, Department of Defence
capable of delivering nuclear weapons.
(Australia). pp. 1112. ISBN 9781920800543.

4.5. BRAZIL

[13] British nuclear tests at Maralinga. National Library of


Australia. 2001. Archived from the original on 9 February 2006. Retrieved 8 May 2006.
[14] ANSTO(PDF). Australian Nuclear Science and Technology Organisation. Archived from the original (PDF)
on 28 May 2006. Retrieved 18 April 2006.
[15] Australia's Uranium. Uranium Information Centre.
Archived from the original on 6 April 2006. Retrieved 19
April 2006.

103
ended, and Brazil is considered free of weapons of mass
destruction.* [8]
Brazil is one of several countries that have forsworn
nuclear weapons under the terms of the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty* [9] but possess the key technologies
needed to produce nuclear weapons.* [7]* [10]* [11]* [12]

4.5.1 Nuclear program

In the 1950s, President Getlio Vargas encouraged the


development of independent national nuclear capabilities.* [2] During the 1970s and 80s, Brazil and Argentina
embarked on a nuclear competition.* [1] Through tech[17] Uranium mining-Key text. Australian Academy of nology transfers from West Germany, which did not
Science. Archived from the original on 5 April 2006. Rerequire IAEA safeguards, Brazil pursued a covert nutrieved 19 April 2006.
clear weapons program known as theParallel Program
*
[18] Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons , [2] with enrichment facilities (including small scale cen(PDF). Australian Government Publishing Service. Re- trifuge enrichment plants, a limited reprocessing capabiltrieved 19 April 2006.
ity, and a missile program).* [1] In 1987, President Sarney
announced that Brazil had enriched uranium to 20%.* [2]
[16] Grattan, Michelle; Fitzgerald, Barry (15 July 2009).
Garrett gives nod to uranium mine. The Age (Melbourne). Retrieved 13 March 2011.

[19] Hymans, Jacques E.C. Isotopes and Identity: Australia


and the Nuclear Weapons Option, 1949-1999 (PDF).
Center for Non-Proliferation Studies. Retrieved 24 June
2006.

[20] Andrew Fowler; Renata Gombac (15 June 2007). Uranium enrichment program revived after 20 years (program transcript). The 7.30 Report (Australian Broadcasting Corporation). Retrieved 7 July 2007.
[21] Silex. Archived from the original on 4 May 2006.
Retrieved 18 April 2006.
[22] Australia in nuclear power review. BBC. 6 June 2006.
Retrieved 24 June 2006.
[23] 50th Anniversary of the ANZUS Treaty. United States
Australian Embassy. Archived from the original on 17
July 2006. Retrieved 24 June 2006.
[24] National Archives of Australia, Department of Defence;
A1945 1/501/694 PART 1 Royal Australian Air Force.
Air sta requirement (Operational Requirement/Air 36).
Bomber aircraft., 1954 - 1958

In 1990, President Fernando Collor de Mello symbolically closed the Cachimbo test site, in Par, and exposed the militarys secret plan to develop a nuclear
weapon.* [1] Brazil's National Congress opened an investigation into the Parallel Program.* [2] Congress members visited numerous facilities, including the Institute of
Advanced Studies (IEAv) in So Jos dos Campos.* [2]
They also interviewed key players in the nuclear program, such as former President Joo Figueiredo and retired Army General Danilo Venturini, the former head
of the National Security Council under Figueiredo.* [2]
The congressional investigation exposed secret bank accounts, code-namedDelta, which were managed by the
National Nuclear Energy Commission and used for funding the program.* [2] The congressional report revealed
that the IEAv had designed two atomic bomb devices, one
with a yield of twenty to thirty kilotons and a second with
a yield of twelve kilotons.* [2] The same report revealed
that Brazil's military regime secretly exported eight tons
of uranium to Iraq in 1981.* [2]* [13]

In 1991, Brazil and Argentina renounced their nuclear rivalry.* [1] On 13 December 1991, they signed the Quadri4.4.5 Further reading
partite agreement, at the IAEA headquarters, creating the
BrazilianArgentine Agency for Accounting and Con Plunkett, Geo (2013). Chemical Warfare in Aus- trol of Nuclear Materials and allowing fullscope IAEA
tralia: Australia's Involvement in Chemical Warfare safeguards of Argentine and Brazilian nuclear installa1914 Today (2nd ed.). Leech Cup Books. ISBN tions.* [1]
9780987427908.
Brazil ocially opened the Resende enrichment plant in
May 2006.* [14] Brazil's enrichment technology development, and the plant itself, involved substantial discussions
4.5 Brazil
with the IAEA and its constituent nations. The dispute
came down to whether IAEA inspectors would be allowed
In the 1970s and 80s, during the military regime, to inspect the machines themselves. The Brazilian govBrazil had a secret program intended to develop nuclear ernment did not allow the inspection of the centrifugal
weapons.* [1]* [2]* [3]* [4]* [5]* [6]* [7] The program was cascade halls, arguing that this would reveal technologdismantled in 1990, ve years after the military regime ical secrets (probably relating to the use of a magnetic

104

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

lower bearing in place of the more common mechani- Cachimbo Test Site
cal bearing).* [15] The Brazilian authorities stated that,
as Brazil is not part of any "axis of evil", the pressure for Main article: Campo de Provas Brigadeiro Velloso
full access to inspection - even in universities - could be
construed as an attempt to pirate industrial secrets.* [16]
91817S 545647W / 9.3047S 54.9464W
They also claimed that their technology is better than
that of the United States and France, mainly because the
centrifugal axis is not mechanical, but electromagnetic.
Eventually, after extensive negotiations, agreement was
reached that while not directly inspecting the centrifuges,
the IAEA would inspect the composition of the gas entering and leaving the centrifuge. Then U.S. Secretary of
State, Colin Powell, stated in 2004 that he was sure that
Brazil had no plans to develop nuclear weapons.* [17]

4.5.2

Technological capability

It is likely that Brazil has retained the technological capacity and knowhow to produce and deliver a nuclear
weapon.* [7] Experts at the Los Alamos National Laboratory have concluded that in view of its previous nuclear activities, Brazil is in a position to produce nuclear
weapons within three years.* [18] If Brazil decided to pursue a nuclear weapon, the centrifuges at the Resende enrichment plant could be recongured to produce highly
enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. Even a small enrichment plant like Resende could produce several nuclear weapons per year, but only if Brazil was willing to
do so openly.* [10]* [15]* [19]

Brazilian Navy's Nuclear Propulsion Development Facility in


July, 2007. This facility produces Uranium hexauoride gas for
Uranium enrichment.

The Cachimbo test site, ocially named Brigadeiro Velloso Test Site (Portuguese: Campo de Provas Brigadeiro
Velloso), is located in the State of Par and covers 45,000
square kilometres, an area larger than the Netherlands. It
is within this military area that a 320 meters-deep hole at
the Cachimbo Mountain Range was site for nuclear explosives tests. The shaft has been public knowledge since
1986 and was allegedly abandoned in September 1990,
when President Fernando Collor de Mello used a small
The Brazilian Navy is currently developing a nuclear sub- shovel to symbolically seal up the hole.* [23]
marine eet, and in 2007 authorised the construction of
a prototype submarine propulsion reactor.* [20] In 2008,
France agreed to transfer technology to Brazil for the Army's Technology Center (Guaratiba)
joint development of the nuclear submarine hull.* [21]
230045S 433350W / 23.0124S 43.5639W

4.5.3

Facilities

Aramar Experimental Center


232349S 473604W / 23.397S 47.601W
The Aramar Experimental Center (Portuguese: Centro
Experimental de Aramar) located in Iper in the State of
So Paulo, was inaugurated in 1988 as the rst uraniumonly enrichment plant in Brazil. The facility is run by the
Brazilian Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN) and the
Brazilian Navy. In addition to the Centrifuge Enrichment
Plant, the facility also hosts an Isotopic Enrichment Laboratory and several Small Nuclear Centers (Portuguese:
Pequenas Centrais Nucleares, or PCNs). The enrichment
laboratories are under the National Safeguards control
and national inspections are carried out by the Safeguards
Division of CNEN.* [22]

The Army's Technology Center (Portuguese: Centro Tecnolgico do Exrcito, or CTEx) located in Guaratiba
in the State of Rio de Janeiro is the site of the
plutonium-producing reactor facility, known as 'The Atlantic Project', managed by the Brazilian Army's Special
Projects Institute IPE. Reports indicate that the gasgraphite reactor would be capable of producing plutonium for atomic bombs.* [24]

Aerospace Technology and Science Department (So


Jos dos Campos)
231244S 455230W / 23.212290S 45.875120W
The Aerospace Technology and Science Department
(Portuguese: Departamento de Cincia e Tecnologia Aerospacial, or DCTA) is a research facility located in So
Jos dos Campos, in the State of So Paulo where nuclear
research is also conducted.* [25]

4.5. BRAZIL
Resende (Engenheiro Passos) Nuclear Fuel Factory
Main article: Resende Nuclear Fuel Factory
223014S 443846W / 22.504S 44.646W
The Resende Nuclear Fuel Facility (Portuguese: Fbrica
de Combustveis Nucleares, or FCN) is a nuclear enrichment facility located in Resende, in the State of Rio de
Janeiro. The plant is managed by the Nuclear Industries of Brazil (Portuguese: Indstrias Nucleares do Brasil, or INB) and by the Brazilian Navy. Currently the plant
produces enough HEU for 26 to 31 implosion type warheads.* [26]* [27]

4.5.4

Legislation and conventions

105

[4] Tracking Nuclear Proliferation - Brazil PBS NewsHour.


Retrieved on 2010-10-06.
[5] States Formerly Possessing or Pursuing Nuclear Weapons:
Brazil The Nuclear Weapon Archive. Retrieved on 201010-06.
[6] Country Proles Global Security Institute. Retrieved on
2010-10-06.
[7] Countries and issues of nuclear strategic concern: Brazil
SIPRI. Retrieved on 2010-10-06.
[8] Life without the bomb BBC. Retrieved on 2010-10-06.
[9] Albright, Lampreia hail Brazil's accession to NPT
Federation of American Scientists. Retrieved on 201010-06.
[10] Brazils Nuclear Puzzle Wisconsin Project on Nuclear
Arms Control. Retrieved on 2010-10-06.

Brazil's 1988 Constitution states in Article 21 that all


nuclear activity within the national territory shall only be [11] Brazil and the Bomb German Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved on 2010-10-06.
admitted for peaceful purposes and subject to approval by
*
the National Congress. [28]
[12] Not-Quite-Nuclear Nations Newsweek. Retrieved on
2010-10-06.
Brazil acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
on September 18, 1998, ratied the Geneva Protocol on [13] Congressional Report on theParallel Program. Senate
28 August 1970, the Biological Weapons Convention on
of Brazil. Retrieved on 2012-03-23. (Portuguese).
27 February 1973, and the Chemical Weapons Conven[14] BBC News: Brazil joins world's nuclear club BBC News.
tion on 13 March 1996.

Brazil signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1967, making


Brazil a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

Retrieved on 2010-10-06.

[15] How Brazil Spun the Atom Institute of Electrical and


Electronics Engineers. Retrieved on 2010-10-06.

Brazil is also an active participant in the International


Atomic Energy Agency and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, [16] Urnio: Brasil no contra a inspeo internacional, mas
contra aumento da inspeo que pode apropriar-se da tecmultinational agencies concerned with reducing nuclear
nologia desenvolvida pelo pas Jornal da Cincia. Reproliferation by controlling the export and re-transfer of
trieved on 2010-10-06. (Portuguese).
materials that may be applicable to nuclear weapon development.
[17] BBC News: US sure of Brazil nuclear plans BBC News.
Retrieved on 2010-10-06.

4.5.5

See also

Angra Nuclear Power Plant


National Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN)
Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and
Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC)
Argentinian nuclear weapons program

4.5.6

Notes and references

[18] Brazil and the Bomb German Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved on 2011-10-23.
[19] Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): Resende Nuclear
Fuel Factory (FCN) Globalsecurity.org. Retrieved on
2010-10-06.
[20] Sarah Diehl and Eduardo Fujii (March 2008), Brazils
Pursuit of a Nuclear Submarine Raises Proliferation Concerns, WMD Insights, archived from the original on 200805-09, retrieved 2008-03-27
[21] Paul D. Taylor (June 2009).Why Does Brazil Need Nuclear Submarines?". Proceedings Magazine (U.S. Naval
Institute) 135 (6). Retrieved 26 October 2011.

[1] Brazil: Nuclear Inventory Reachingcriticalwill.org. Retrieved on 2010-10-06.

[22] WMD Facilities: Aramar Experimental Center, Iper


Globalsecurity.org. Retrieved on 2010-10-06.

[2] Brazil: Nuclear Weapons Programs Globalsecurity.org.


Retrieved on 2010-10-06.

[23] WMD Facilities: Cachimbo Globalsecurity.org.


trieved on 2010-10-06.

Re-

[3] Brazil, IAEA Reach Inspection Agreement Arms Control


Association. Retrieved on 2010-10-06.

[24] WMD Facilities: Guaratiba Globalsecurity.org.


trieved on 2010-10-06.

Re-

106

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

[25] WMD Facilities: So Jos dos Campos Globalsecurity.org. Retrieved on 2010-10-06.

4.6 Bulgaria

[26] WMD Facilities: Resende Nuclear Fuel Factory (FCN)


Globalsecurity.org. Retrieved on 2010-10-06.

Bulgaria has developed weapons of mass destruction,


most notably chemical weapons. Chemical weapons production was concentrated in Smyadovo. This indigenous production capability was probably achieved with
the help on the USSR.* [1] As of 2011 Bulgaria does not
possess any weapons of mass destruction.

[27] INB Activities on the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Americas Nuclear Energy Symposiums. Retrieved on 2010-10-06.
[28] Constitution of Brazil: Article 21; XXIII; a V-Brazil. Retrieved on 2009-09-06.

4.5.7

External links

Ocial sites
Indstrias Nucleares do Brasil Brazilian Nuclear Industries (English)

4.6.1 Missile program


Bulgaria had a signicant missile arsenal, including
67 SCUD-B, 50 FROG-7 and 24 SS-23 ballistic missiles.* [2] Since the USSR planned to rapidly deploy its
own nuclear weapons in Bulgaria in case a war broke out,
the missiles were not armed with warheads, but only prepared to launch Soviet weapons.* [2]

Centro de Desenvolvimento da Tecnologia Nuclear


Center of Nuclear Technology Development (En- The SS-23 systems had conventional warheads plus a
WMD launching capability. The nuclear missile launchglish)
ing pads and equipment were dismantled in 1991. The
Instituto de Pesquisas Energticas Nucleares Na- rst missile brigade was created in 1961.* [3] In 1994 the
tional Nuclear Energy Research Institute (Por- country bought 46 conventional warheads for its SCUDs
tuguese)
from Russia.* [2] All SCUD, FROG and SS-23 missiles
were destroyed in 2002. Currently Bulgaria operates a
Instituto de Engenharia Nuclear Nuclear Engineerdozen SS-21 Scarab-A launchers, but information over
ing Institute (Portuguese)
the exact number of missiles is classied. They are all
Centro Regional de Cincias Nucleares Central-West armed with conventional warheads of 160 kg each.
Nuclear Sciences Regional Center (Portuguese)
Comisso Nacional de Energia Nuclear National 4.6.2 Chemical weapons
Nuclear Energy Commission (Portuguese)
Information over Bulgaria's chemical weapons is scarce.
Eletronuclear Manages Brazil's nuclear power plants
The only known chemical weapons production facility is
(Portuguese)
located near Smyadovo, which now produces chemicals
Associao Brasileira de Energia Nuclear Brazilian for civilian purposes. The country ratied the Chemical
Weapons Convention in 1994 and dismantled them by
Association of Nuclear Energy (Portuguese)
2000.
Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and
Control of Nuclear Materials (English) (Portuguese)
(Spanish)
4.6.3 Biological weapons
Campo de Provas Brigadeiro Velloso Cachimbo Test
Bulgaria has signed and ratied the Biological Weapons
Site (Portuguese)
Convention, and there is no information indicating that
Departamento de Cincia e Tecnologia Aeroespa- the country has ever developed such weapons.
cial Brazilian Air Force - Aerospace Technology and
Science Department (Portuguese)

4.6.4 Nuclear weapons

Scientic sites

Bulgaria has never developed nuclear weapons, although


some treaties with the Soviet Union guaranteed the de Jornal da Cincia's article (in Portuguese)
ployment of Soviet warheads on Bulgarian territory in
case of a war with NATO. Its SS-23 missiles were
Academic Sites
nuclear-capable.* [4] In the mid-1990s, journalist Goran
Gotev investigated a testimony of an anonymous Soviet
Collection of Archival Documents on the Brazilian Army captain published in Komsomolskaya Pravda, who
Nuclear Program hosted by the Wilson Center Dig- described in detail an alleged Soviet-Bulgarian nuclear
ital Archive (English)
weapons facility which hosted 70 warheads for tactical

4.7. BURMA

107

missiles.* [5] The site consisted of four three-storey [7] FOREIGN MINISTRY: THERE ARE NO NUCLEAR
WEAPONS IN BULGARIA. Novinite. 6 December
apartment blocks, barracks, a cafeteria, a sports eld,
2001. Retrieved 24 March 2013.
a social club, a store, and a plaza, and had 130 personnel. The unit was disbanded in 1989, the warheads
[8]
were quickly shipped to Ukraine and all equipment, uni "", Dnevnik, 12 May 2011
forms and photos that were present at the facility were
destroyed. Another Russian Army ocial later denied [9] Nuclear Scientic and Experimental Centre
the story.* [5] However, in the 1980s four Bulgarian Air
Force majors received training in the Soviet Union on re- [10] (in bulgarian)
leasing nuclear weapons from MiG-29BN aircraft.* [6]
In 2001 the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry denied thepresenceof nuclear weapons in Bulgaria.* [7]
4.6.7
The country has the potential to establish a military nuclear program, having a nuclear powerplant at Kozloduy
with its own plutonium storage facility.* [8] A nuclear
research facility with a 200 kW pool-type reactor is in
operation in Soa.* [9] The reactor of the facility produces some nuclear material, which is stored near Novi
Khan.* [10]
As part of its eorts to safeguard potentially weaponsusable atomic material, the United Nations nuclear
watchdog assisted Bulgaria with the removal of highly
enriched uranium stored at the shut-down research reactor in Soa. The substance, which was 36% enriched
and took the form of fresh fuel, was airlifted in December 2003 to Russia, the original supplier, according to
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Agency
safeguards inspectors monitored and veried the packaging of the fuel, which Moscow says it will re-fabricate into
low-enriched uranium.* [1]

4.6.5

Satellite images of an alleged nuclear facility


Act on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and
on Control of Toxic Chemicals and the Precursors
thereof, a 2002 act banning the production and storage of nuclear weapons in Bulgaria

4.7 Burma
Burma (Myanmar) is widely suspected to have initiated
a nuclear weapons programme.* [1] If such a program
does exist, Burma's technical and nancial limitations
may make it dicult for the program to succeed.* [2]
Burma has faced persistent accusations of using chemical
weapons; however, the NTI has stated there is no evidence to suggest that Myanmar has a chemical weapons
program.Burma is a member of nuclear, but not chemical or biological, non-proliferation treaties.* [3]

See also

Military of Bulgaria

4.6.6

External links

References

[1] GlobalSecurity.org - Bulgaria special weapons


[2] StandartNews.com " ,
1973 . (in Bulgarian)
[3] Duma.bg " !" (in bulgarian)

4.7.1 Chemical weapons


The rst public indications of Burma's possible possession of chemical weapons came in testimony delivered
to the United States Congress in 1991 by Rear Adm.
Thomas Brooks, Director of Naval Intelligence of the
United States Navy,* [4] in which Burma was included
on a list of nations that probably possesschemical
weapons. However, the United States then took Burma
o the list of nations with chemical weapons programmes
in 1993.* [3]

In 2005 Belgian photojournalist Thierry Falise reported


speaking to two deserters from the Burmese Army who,
during their time in service, werereportedly told to take
special precautions because they were handling chemical shells.* [5] The deserters described seeing artillery[5] "" "
men wearing masks and gloves to re the munitions. In
,
a separate report from the same year, Dr. Martin Pan " (in Bulgarter, a physician and the president of Christian Solidarity
ian). Tema. Retrieved 24 March 2013.
Worldwide, reported treating injuries of anti-government
[6] A Soviet Major taught me how to drop a nuclear bomb Karenni rebels that were consistent with a chemical
. Pressa Daily. 18 January 2014. Retrieved 22 January attack,and claimed that strong circumstantial evi2014.
dence exists for the use of chemicals, particularly nerve
[4] U.S., Bulgaria Reach Deal To Destroy Missiles. Arms
Control Association. August 2002. Retrieved 24 March
2013.

108

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

agents, pulmonary agents and possibly blister agents.


*
[6] In response to the Christian Solidarity Worldwide report, the Burmese government denied the use of chemical
weapons. * [7] The NTI has stated that without further
investigation it is not clear if the reports refer to agents
recognized under international law as chemical weapons
or to riot control agents - the latter is most likely.* [3]

Sai Thein Win, a former major in the military of Myanmar.* [15]* [16] A UN report said there was evidence that
North Korea had been exporting nuclear technology to
Burma, Iran and Syria.* [17]
Based on Win's evidence, Robert Kelley, a former
weapons inspector, said he believed Burma has the intent to go nuclear and it is... expending huge resources
along the way.But as of 2010, experts said that Burma
was a long way from succeeding, given the poor quality
of their current materials.* [17] Despite Kelley's analysis,
some experts are uncertain that a nuclear weapons programme exists; for example, the Institute for Science and
International Security notes ambiguity as to whether certain equipment is used for uranium production, or for innocently producing rare earth metals or metals such as
titanium or vanadium.* [18] The U.S. expressed concern in 2011 about possible NPT violations, but by 2012
stated that its concerns had beenpartially allayed.* [19]

In January 2014 Unity Weekly, a Burmese magazine, reported that Burma was making chemical weapons. The
magazine claimed that the military had seized hundreds
of hectares of land to build a chemical weapons factory in Burma's Magway Region and quoted workers
at the factory who said it produced chemical weapons.
The magazine also claimed Chinese technicians were often seen around the factory. In response, the Burmese
government sentenced the head of Unity Weekly, along
with four Unity Weekly journalists, to 10 years in
prison and hard labor under colonial-era espionage laws.
The Burmese government claims the factory produces
military equipmentbut does not produce chemical
weapons.* [8]* [9]* [10] Security experts remain uncon- 4.7.3 Notes and references
vinced that the facility in Magway is being used to produce chemical weapons, but some, including prominent [1] , Sydney Morning Herald, August 24, 2009, Accessed
November 17, 2009.
journalist Bertil Lintner, suggest that the site is tied to
a secretive North Korean program to develop missile [2] Myanmar (Country Proles)". NTI. Archived from the
parts.* [11]
original on 2014-07-09. Retrieved 9 August 2014. Kelley
Burma signed the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993
but has yet to ratify the agreement.

4.7.2

Nuclear weapons

In 2007 Russia and Burma did a controversial nuclear


research center deal. According to them, The centre
will comprise a 10MW light-water reactor working on
20%-enriched uranium-235, an activation analysis laboratory, a medical isotope production laboratory, silicon
doping system, nuclear waste treatment and burial facilities.* [12]
According to an August 2009 report published in the
Sydney Morning Herald, Burma is working to develop a
nuclear weapon by 2014. The reported eort, purportedly being undertaken with assistance from North Korea,
involves the construction of a nuclear reactor and plutonium extraction facilities in caves tunneled into a mountain at Naung Laing, a village in the Mandalay division
.* [13] The information cited in the newspaper story reportedly originated from two high-ranking defectors who
had settled in Australia.

further argued, however, that it would be extremely dicult for Myanmar, given its limited technical and nancial
capabilities, to develop nuclear weapons successfully.
[3] Myanmar (Country Proles)". NTI. Archived from the
original on 2014-07-09. Retrieved 26 October 2013.
[4] Chemical Arms; Navy Report Asserts Many Nations Seek
Or Have Poison Gas, New York Times, March 10, 1991,
Accessed August 9, 2009.
[5] Burmese junta uses chemical weapons , The Sunday
Times, May 8, 2005, Accessed August 9, 2009.
[6] Burma 'using chemical weapons', The Guardian, April 21,
2005, Accessed August 9, 2009.
[7] http://www.voanews.com/burmese/archive/2005-04/
2005-04-22-voa5.cfm?moddate=2005-04-22
[8] Report on chemical weapons earn Myanmar journalists
jail term with hard labour. Myanmar News.Net. Retrieved 11 July 2014.
[9] 10 years of hard labor: 'Back to square one' for Myanmar
press freedoms?". Retrieved 12 July 2014.
[10] Myanmar Court Sentences Journalists to Prison and

On June 3, 2010, a ve year investigation by an antiHard Labor. 10 July 2014. Retrieved 12 July 2014.
government Myanmar broadcaster, the Democratic Voice
Miliof Burma (DVB), found evidence that allegedly shows the [11] Arterbury, John (13 July 2014).
tary facility hides secrets from the world.
country's military regime begun a programme to develop
http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/investigation/
nuclear weapons.* [14] The DVB said evidence of Myan420248/military-facility-hides-secrets-from-the-world
mar's nuclear programme came from top-secret docu(Bangkok Post). Retrieved 19 September 2014.
ments smuggled out of the country over several years, including hundreds of les and other evidence provided by [12] Russia and Burma in nuclear deal. BBC 15 May 2007

4.8. CANADA

109

both NORAD and NATO. In 1964 Canada sent its White


Paper on Defence to U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara to ensure he would not, nd anything in
[14] Expert says Burma planning nuclear bomb".
these references contrary to any views [he] may have exDemocratic Voice of Burma. 3 June 2010.
pressed.* [3]
[13] Revealed: Burmas nuclear bombshell, Sydney Morning
Herald, August 1, 2009, Accessed August 10, 2009.

[15] Myanmar 'nuclear plans' exposed. Al Jazeera. 4 June


2010.
[16] Myanmar Nuclear Weapon Program Claims Supported by
Photos, Jane's Reports, Bloomberg, 22 July 2010
[17] Burma 'trying to build nuclear weapon'". BBC News. 4
June 2010.
[18] Myanmar (Country Proles)". NTI. Archived from the
original on 2014-07-09. Retrieved 9 August 2014. However, a number of outside experts were skeptical of the
DVB's allegations and Kelley's supporting analysis. ISIS,
for example, agrees that some of the equipment depicted
in the report could be used in producing uranium metal,
but stated it could alternatively be used for producing
rare earth metals or metals such as titanium or vanadium.

Canada withdrew three of the four nuclear-capable


weapons systems by 1972. The single system retained,
the AIR-2 Genie delivered 1.5 kiloton of force, and was
designed to strike enemy aircraft as opposed to ground
targets, and may not qualify as a weapon of mass destruction given its limited yield.

Early history: World War II and into the Cold War

[19] Myanmar (Country Proles)". NTI. Archived from the


original on 2014-07-09. Retrieved 9 August 2014. The
U.S. State Department expressed concern about Burmas
NPT compliance in 2011, however in its 2012 compliance
report it stated that its concerns were partially allayed
by 2012.

4.8 Canada
Canada has not maintained and positioned weapons of
mass destruction since 1984 as of 1998* [1] and has
signed treaties repudiating possession of them. Canada
ratied the Geneva Protocol in 1930 and the Nuclear
North American Warning Lines
Non-proliferation Treaty in 1970, but still sanctions contributions to American military programs.
Canadas military relationship with the United States
has grown signicantly since the Second World War.
Although the Dominion of Canada came into being on
4.8.1 Nuclear weapons
July 1, 1867, Canadian foreign policy was determined
in Britain. Canada entered the Great War in 1914 when
Introduction
Great Britain declared war on Germany and the AustriaWith the French emphasis on nuclear deterrence follow- Hungarian Empire. Canadian foreign policy became ining the Soviet Union's atom bomb test, Canadian coop- dependent in December 1931 with the passage of the
*
eration with the US required the alignment of Canadian Statute of Westminster. [4] In 1939 Canada declared war
doctrine with defensive elements of American nuclear on Germany a week later than Great Britain, on September 10, 1939.* [5] The United States did not enter the war
weapons doctrine.
until December 7, 1941.* [6]
The rst US nuclear weapon came to Canada in 1950
when the United States Air Force Strategic Air Command One of the rst formal agreements for military cooperastationed 11 model 1561 Fat Man atomic bombs at CFB tion was made in August 1940. Known as the Ogdensburg
Agreement, it established the Permanent Joint Board
Goose Bay, Newfoundland and Labrador.* [1]
on Defence.* [7] Both nations are founding members of
From 1963 to 1984, Canada elded a total of four tactical the United Nations* [8] as well as the North Atlantic
nuclear weapons systems which deployed several hundred Treaty Organization (NATO).* [9] They signed the NOnuclear warheads.* [2]
RAD Agreement in 1957 and created the North AmeriThroughout the Cold War, Canada was closely aligned can Air Defense Command* [10] to defend the continent
with defensive elements of United States programs in against attacks from the USSR.

110
In the 1942 Quebec Agreement, the United Kingdom and
the United States agreed to develop the "Tube Alloys"
Project and created a committee to manage the project
which included C. D. Howe, the Canadian Minister of
Munitions and Supply. This was the code name for the
British Uranium Committee project which had worked
on a theoretical design for an atomic bomb. One significant contribution was a calculation of the critical mass
of uranium. The mass was less than earlier estimates and
suggested that development of a ssion bomb was practical.* [11] Tube Alloyswas part of a shipment of the
most secret scientic research in Great Britain that was
sent to the United States for safekeeping when the threat
of German invasion was signicant. Materials included
the cavity magnetron which was essential to RADAR,
British information related to the German Enigma machines, Jet Engine designs as well as Tube Alloys.
Canada's only specic role in the Manhattan Project was
providing raw material, including uranium ore from a
northern mine which may have been used in the construction of the atom bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima
in 1945.* [12]* [13] Canada would continue to supply ssionable material to the US and other allies throughout
the Cold War although Canada never developed indigenous nuclear weapons as did NATO allies France and the
United Kingdom.* [14]
Canada was little more than just a third-party supplier
of rare materials, with a few exceptions. After briey
allowing nuclear weapons to be temporarily stationed in
Goose Bay, Labrador, Canada agreed to a long term lease
of the Goose Bay base to the US Strategic Air Command.* [15] The Americans were refused permission to
stockpile bomb casings for the B-36 at Goose Bay. These
bombs would have been armed in wartime with materials
brought from the United States. Goose Bay was used as
a base for air refueling tankers which were to support the
SAC B-47 and B-52 bomber forces.

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
more is due to the decline of the bomber threat and reductions in Canadian military spending.
Inventory of Canadas nuclear armaments
BCIM-10 OMARC; Warhead: W40 7-10 kiloton
MGR-1 Honest John; Warhead W7 8-61 kiloton
CF-104 Starghter; Warhead: B57 bomb 5-20 kilotons; B28 bomb 70-350 kt; B43 bomb 1 Mt
Voodoo weapons test; Combat Warhead: W25 1.5
kilotons
On New Year's Eve in 1963, the Royal Canadian Air
Force delivered a shipment of nuclear warheads to the
Bomarc missile site near RCAF Station North Bay.* [18]
The Government of Canada never publicly admitted to
the presence of nuclear weapons on Canadian bases in
Canada and Germany but their presence was common
knowledge at the time. It is generally understood that
the Bomarc missile warheads were delivered on this cold
(13 degrees Celsius) winter night when a group of
protesters stood down from a vigil at the gates of the missile site. It was said they assumed that the RCAF would
be unlikely to work on this traditional evening of celebration. The delivery was photographed by the press and this
revealed to the world that the delivery had taken place.
The warheads were never in the sole possession of
Canadian personnel. They were the property of the
Government of the United States and were always under
the direct supervision of aCustodial Detachmentfrom
the United States Air Force (or Army, in the case of Honest John warheads).

Through 1984, Canada would deploy four American designed nuclear weapons delivery systems accompanied by
In 1951 the Pinetree Line was established north of the hundreds of US-controlled warheads:
US-Canadian border, and in 1953 Canada built the Mid 56 CIM-10 BOMARC surface-to-air missiles.* [19]
Canada Air Warning Line, which was manned by the
*
Canadian military. [16] In 1954 the Distant Early Warn 4 MGR-1 Honest John rocket systems armed with
ing Line (DEW) was established jointly by the US and
a total of 16 W31 nuclear warheads the Canadian
*
Canada in the Arctic. [17] The Pinetree Line was built
Army
deployed in Germany.* [19]
to control the air battle between the NORAD interceptor forces and manned Soviet bombers. Beginning with
108 nuclear W25 Genie rockets carried by 54 CFGround-controlled interception updated from the Second
101 Voodoos.* [19]
World War, the system has been computerized and automated with at least four new generations of technology
estimates of 90 to 210 tactical (20-60 kiloton) nubeing employed. It was clear, even in the early years of
clear warheads assigned to 6 CF-104 Starghter
the Cold War, that on paper, Canada and the US were
squadrons (about 90 aircraft) based with NATO in
to be jointly responsible for the defence of the continent.
Europe (there is a lack of open sources detailing exIn execution, Canadian investment in air defence has deactly how many warheads were deployed).* [20]
creased signicantly with the decline of the intercontinental strategic bomber threat. In the 1950s the RCAF In practice, each of 36 NATO squadrons (initially six
contributed fourteen squadrons of CF-100 interceptors Canadian squadrons Number 1 Air Division RCAF)
and this was reduced to three squadrons of CF-101s by would provide two aircraft and pilots to a Quick Reaction
1970. Some of this is due to improved technology but Alert facility. The 'Q' aircraft could be launched with an

4.8. CANADA
armed US nuclear weapon within 15 minutes of receiving the 'go' order. This arrangement was called the NATO
Quick Reaction Alert Force. It provided a dispersed force
upwards of 100 strike aircraft for use on short notice.
Missions were targeted at troop concentrations, airelds,
bridges, assembly and choke points and other tactical targets in order to slow the massive tank formations of the
Red Army as they poured into the Fulda Gap and on towards the Rhine River.

111
representation.* [25]
The DEW Line and Pinetree Line radar systems formed
the backbone of continental air defence in the 1950s and
1960s. The most likely routes for Soviet aircraft attacking the United States came through Canada. In particular,
the Eastern Seaboard of the United States would be approached through the UK-Iceland-Greenland gap and a
line of search radars ran down the coast of Labrador and
on to Gander Newfoundland. These stations were supported by RCAF CF-101 interceptors at Bagotville Quebec and Chatham New Brunswick, as well as USAF F102 interceptors stationed at Stephenville Newfoundland
(Harmon Air Base). These were presumably equipped
with nuclear-armed AIM-26 Nuclear Falcon missiles as
this was a standard conguration on the F-102.

In total, there were between 250 and 450 nuclear warheads on Canadian bases between 1963 and 1972. There
were at most 108 Genie missiles armed with 1.5 kiloton W25 warheads present from 1973 to 1984. There
may have been fewer due to attrition of CF-101s as the
program aged and as incoming CF-18s became combatqualied.* [21] In addition, between 1968 and 1994 the Canada hosted no intercontinental strategic bombers but
United States stored the Mk 101 Lulu and B57 nuclear the Strategic Air Command base at Goose Bay Labrador
bombs at Naval Station Argentia, Newfoundland.* [22]
hosted a large number of KC-135 air refueling tankers.
This number decreased signicantly through the years as These were intended to top up the fuel tanks of the outvarious systems were withdrawn from service. The Hon- bound B-52 strike force headed for targets in the USSR.
est John was retired by the Canadian Army in 1970. The They also supported the SAC Airborne Alert Force and
Bomarc missile was phased out in 1972 and the CF-104 would have refueled any surviving bombers returning
Strike/Attack squadrons in West Germany were reduced from the USSR.
in number and reassigned to conventional ground attack
at about the same time. From late in 1972, the CF-101
interceptor force remained as the only nuclear-armed sys- Incineration without representation
tem in Canadian use until it was replaced by the CF-18
For the Canadian public, incineration without reprein 1984.* [23]
sentationled to a popular belief that the doctrine of
The CF-18 aircraft is equipped with the AIM-7, AIM- mutual assured destruction (MAD) was in Canadas best
9 and several more advanced air-to-air missiles. All of interest. MAD was the Cold War doctrine which held
these employ conventional warheads. These missiles are that as long as both the US and USSR possessed signimore reliable, accurate and have longer range than the cant nuclear arsenals, any nuclear war would assuredly denuclear-tipped, short-range and unguided Genie. They stroy both nations, thereby discouraging either state from
are also free of the encumbering security procedures and launching any nuclear oensive. For Canadians, MAD
considerable political baggage associated with nuclear was appealing in this light, as Canada was unlikely to
warheads.
emerge from any nuclear exchange unscathed given its
position between the two countries, as any weapons shot
down or falling short were likely to fall on Canadian soil.
Cold War relationship with the US
In Prime Minister Pierre Trudeaus 1971 Defence White
Paper, this dynamic was noted:
Canadas Cold War military doctrine and fate was inextricably tied with that of the United States. The two
One of the most important changes in internations shared responsibility for continental air defence
national aairs in recent years had been the inthrough NORAD (North American Air Defense Comcrease in stability of nuclear deterrence, and
mand) and both belonged to NATO and contributed
the emergence of what is, in eect, nuclear
forces in Europe. Should nuclear war with the USSR have
parity between the United States and the Soviet
broken out, Canada would have been crippled. Prime
Union. Each side now has sucient nuclear
Minister Brian Mulroneys 1987 Canadian White Paper
strength to assure devastating retaliation in the
on Defence acknowledged this reality citing that, Soevent of a surprise attack by the other, and thus
viet strategic planners must regard Canada and the United
neither could rationally consider launching a
States as a single set of military targets no matter what
*
deliberate attack.* [26]
political posture we might assume. [24] This sums up
Canadas Cold War predicament well, as Canadas
geo-political relationship with the US meant that Canada Even as late as 1987, Prime Minister Mulroneys Dewould inevitably be widely devastated by any US-Soviet fence White Paper acknowledged that,each superpower
nuclear exchange - whether it was targeted or not. It led now has the capacity to obliterate the other,the structo a familiar phrase of the time, incineration without ture of mutual deterrence today is eective and stable.

112
The Government believes that it must remain so.* [27]
Given the prospect of incineration without representation, Canadians seemed to feel that the doctrine which
most encouraged restraint was the strategically soundest
one to support.

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
Canada allowed for forward deployment of US bombers
and participated actively and extensively in the NORAD
program; as well, Canada cooperated with the US when
it came to research, early warning, surveillance and communications.* [31] Canada was second only to West Germany in hosting nuclear related facilities.* [32] In short,
the Canadian Government was thoroughly committed to
supporting US nuclear doctrine and deployments through
the Cold War, in spite of any popular reservations concerning this dynamic.

Canadians were still nervous about US foreign policy,


however. In 1950, when U.S. President Harry S. Truman announced that Washington had not entirely ruled
out the use of nuclear weapons in Korea, Prime Minister
Lester B. Pearson recalled the remarks caused Ottawa to
collectively shudder.* [28] One Cold War contempo- While it has no more permanently stationed nuclear
rary observer even remarked that,
weapons as of 1984, Canada continues to cooperate
with the United States and its nuclear weapons program. Canada allows testing of nuclear weapon delivCanadians often think that their neighbour to
ery systems; nuclear weapon carrying vessels are perthe south exhibits wild swings of emotional
mitted to visit Canadian ports; and aircraft carrying nuattachments with other countries; that it is
clear warheads are permitted to y in Canadian airspace
impatient, is prone to making sweeping judgwith the permission of the Canadian government.* [33]
ments, and generally lacks sophistication and
There is, however, popular objection to this federal
subtlety in its approach to the Soviet bloc and
policy. Over 60% of Canadians live in cities or ar*
the cold war. [29]
eas designated Nuclear Weapons Free, reecting a
contemporary disinclination towards nuclear weapons in
However, if Canadian leadership was nervous about US Canada.* [33] Canada also continues to remain under the
foreign policy, they did not voice their discontent through NATO 'nuclear umbrella'; even after disarming itself in
actions. Canada was consistently and signicantly co- 1984, Canada has maintained support for nuclear armed
operative with the United States when it came to nu- nations as doing otherwise would be counter to Canadian
clear weapons doctrine and deployments through the Cold NATO commitments.* [34]
War.
Continued cooperation with the US to present

4.8.2 Chemical weapons

During both World War I and World War II, Canada was
a major producer and developer of chemical weapons
for the Allied war eort. These were used in combat in
World War I, but not in World War II. Human experimentation was carried out during World War II, with CFB
Sueld becoming the leading research facility. Thousands of Canadian soldiers were exposed to mustard gas,
blister gas, tear gas, and other agents, and some were permanently injured as a result.* [35] Following both world
wars, Canadian military forces returning home were directed to dump millions of tons of unexploded ordnance
(UXOs) into the Atlantic Ocean o ports in Nova Scotia; an undetermined amount of these UXOs are known
to be chemical weapons.* [36] The 1972 London Convention prohibited further marine dumping of UXOs, however the chemical weapons existing o the shores of Nova
NORAD blast doors
Scotia for over 60 years continue to bring concern to local
The Government of Canada formally agreed to every ma- communities and the shing industry.
jor North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) strate- Human testing of chemical weapons such as sarin and VX
gic document, including those that implied a US strike- gas continued in Canada well into the 1960s, and dangerrst policy.* [30] This may suggest that successive Cana- ous defoliation agents were tested at CFB Gagetown from
dian governments were willing to follow US and NATO 1956 to 1967. Tests at CFB Gagetown of Agent Orange
doctrine even if said doctrine was counter to the pub- and the more toxic Agent Purple in 1966 and 1967 caused
licly favoured (and politically supported) doctrine of Mu- a variety of acute and chronic illnesses among soldiers
tual Assured Destruction. Professors J.T. Jockel and J.J. and civilians working there.* [37] These tests left Canada
Sokolsky explore this assertion in-depth in their article with large stockpiles of chemical weapons. Canada evenCanada's Cold War Nuclear Experience. Furthermore, tually abandoned the use of lethal chemical weapons, and

4.8. CANADA
had to devote a great deal of eort to safely destroying
them. Since 1990, the Biological and Chemical Defence
Review Committee has conducted annual site visits and
inspections to verify that all remaining military activities
involving chemical warfare agents are defensive in nature. Canada ratied the Chemical Weapons Convention
on September 26, 1995.* [38] Canada still employs Riot
control agents which are classied as non-lethal weapons.

4.8.3

Biological weapons

Canada had a biological warfare research program in the


early to middle part of the 20th century. Canadian research involved developing protections against biowarfare
attacks and for oensive purposes, often with the help of
the UK and the US.* [39] Canada has thus experimented
with such things as weaponized anthrax, botulinum toxin,
ricin, rinderpest virus, Rocky Mountain spotted fever,
plague, Brucellosis and tularemia. CFB Sueld is the
leading research centre. Canada says it has destroyed
all military stockpiles and no longer conducts toxin warfare research. As with chemical weapons, the Biological
and Chemical Defence Review Committee has since
1990 conducted annual site visits and inspections at CFB
Sueld and elsewhere to verify that all remaining military activities involving biological warfare agents are
purely defensive in nature. Canada ratied the Biological
Weapons Convention on September 18, 1972.
Of particular interest is that Canada's Sir Frederick Banting, the discoverer of insulin, served as an Army Major in
World War II. There have been some claims that he was a
key biological warfare researcher. Like many of his peers
in senior positions during the Second World War, Banting
had served as a Medical Ocer with the Canadian Expeditionary Force in the Great War. This experience would
have made clear to him the depths of cruelty inherent in
modern warfare. He is credited with raising the alarm
about the potential development of biological and chemical weapons by Germany in London in 1939. His inuence on members of Churchill's administration may have
contributed to a later decision to conduct germ warfare
research at Porton Down. Banting was killed in 1941 in
the crash of a Hudson bomber just east of Gander, Newfoundland, while en route to England for work related to
his research on the Franks ying suit. This was about a
year prior to work on Anthrax that took place at Grossele, Quebec beginning in 1942.

113
on the issue of disarmament; the need for increased border defence, particularly in the Territories, has recently
overshadowed other issues in military circles.
Canada maintains a division of its Foreign Aairs department devoted to pursuing these ends. It also dedicates signicant resources in trying to verify that current
treaties are being obeyed, passing much information on
to the United Nations. In the 1970s, Canada discussed
building a reconnaissance satellite to monitor adherence
to such treaties, but these plans were shelved. A public
furor arose in 1983, when the Canadian government approved a plan to test cruise missiles in Alberta.* [40]
Canada continues to promote peaceful nuclear technology exemplied by the CANDU reactor. Unlike most
designs, the CANDU does not require enriched fuel, and
in theory is therefore much less likely to lead to the development of weaponized missile fuel. However, like
all power reactor designs, CANDU reactors produce and
use plutonium in their fuel rods during normal operation
(roughly 50% of the energy generated in a CANDU reactor comes from the in situ ssion of plutonium created
in the uranium fuel),* [41] and this plutonium could be
used in a nuclear explosive if separated and converted
to metallic form (albeit only as reactor-grade plutonium,
and therefore of limited military usefulness). Accordingly, CANDU reactors, like most power reactors in the
world, are subject to safeguards under the United Nations
which prevent possible diversion of plutonium. CANDU
reactors are designed to be refuelled while running, which
makes the details of such safeguards signicantly dierent from other reactor designs. The end result, however,
is a consistent and internationally accepted level of proliferation risk.
A common accusation is that India used Canadian reactors to produce plutonium for weapons. India owns two
licensed CANDU reactors and began nuclear weapons
tests shortly after they became operational in 1972. However, international observers have concluded that no plutonium was diverted from the safeguarded CANDU reactors. The plutonium for the initial bombs came from
the older CIRUS reactor built by Canada (see Nuclear
Weapons above), but the material for India's most recent
nuclear test, Operation Shakti, is thought to come from
the locally-designed Dhruva reactor. India has also built
a number of reactors, not under IAEA safeguards, that
were derived from the CANDU design and are used for
power generation. These may also be used for plutonium
production.

Canada has volunteered to help destroy some of the leftover chemical weapons of the USSR. There is also talk of
taking Soviet nuclear fuel and using it as fuel in CANDU
Canada is a member of every international disarmament reactors, but this is controversial.
organization and is committed to pushing for an end to
nuclear weapons testing, reduction in nuclear arsenals,
a ban on all chemical and biological weapons, bans on 4.8.5 See also
weapons in outer space, and blocks on nuclear proliferation. However, in recent years it has become less vocal
Defence Research and Development Canada

4.8.4

Disarmament

114

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

Gerald Bull
Canadian Joint Incident Response Unit (CJIRU)

[19] Clearwater, John (1998). Canadian Nuclear Weapons:


The Untold Story. Dundurn Press Ltd. p. 21.

Canadian Voice of Women for Peace

[20] Clearwater, John (1998). Canadian Nuclear Weapons:


The Untold Story. Dundurn Press Ltd. p. 22.

Biological and Chemical Defence Review Committee

[21] Clearwater, John (1998). Canadian Nuclear Weapons:


The Untold Story. Dundurn Press Ltd. p. 23.

4.8.6

Notes and references

[1] Clearwater, John (1998). Canadian Nuclear Weapons:


The Untold Story. Dundurn Press Ltd. p. 18.
[2] Clear water, John (1998). Canadian Nuclear Weapons:
The Untold Story. Dundurn Press Ltd. p. 15.
[3] Clear water, John (1999). U.S. Nuclear Weapons in
Canada. Dundurn Press Ltd. p. 12.
[4] Final Report of the French Constitutional Drafting Committee, Statute of Westminster, 1931 - Enactment No. 17

[22] Clearwater, John (1998). Canadian Nuclear Weapons:


The Untold Story. Dundurn Press Ltd. p. 205.
[23] History of the Custody and Deployment of Nuclear
Weapons: July 1945 through 1977. Oce of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defence (Atomic Energy)".
[24] Government of Canada, Department of National Defence
(1987). Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy
for Canada. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services
Canada. p. 10.
[25] Jockel, J.T.; J.J. Sokolsky (1999). Canadas Cold War
Nuclear Experience. Queens Quarterly (Special Issue):
111.

[5] CBC Archives, On This Day, Sept. 10, 1939


[6] FDR Pearl Harbor Speech. December 8, 1941. Retrieved
2011-02-05. December 7th, 1941, a day that will live in
infamy
[7] Ogdensburg Agreement.
[8] United Nations.
[9] NATO.
[10] NORAD.
[11] Fisher, David E (1988). A Race on the Edge of Time:
Radar - The Decisive Weapon of Dorld War II. McGrawHill Book Company (p. 268). p. 371.
[12] Stacey, C. P. (1970). Arms, Men and Government: The
War Policies of Canada, 1939 - 1945 (PDF). The Queen's
Printer by authority of the Minister of National Defence.
p. 514.

[26] Government of Canada, Minister of National Defence


(1971). White Paper on Defence: Defence in the 70s. Ottawa: Queen's Printer. p. 4.
[27] Government of Canada, Department of National Defence
(1987). Challenge and Commitment: A Defence Policy
for Canada. Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services
Canada. p. 17.
[28] Pearson, Lester B (1973). Mike: The Memoirs of the
Right Honourable Lester B. Pearson, vol.2, 1948-1957.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press. p. 165.
[29] Conant, Melvin (1962). The Long Polar Watch: Canada
and the Defence of North America. New York: Harper &
Bros. p. 67.
[30] Jockel, J.T.; J.J. Sokolsky (1999). Canadas Cold War
Nuclear Experience. Queens Quarterly (Special Issue):
115.

[13] Selin, Shannon (1988). Canada as a Nuclear WeaponFree Zone: A Critical Analysis. Canadian Centre for Arms
Control and Disarmament Issue Brief No. 10. p. 5.

[31] Jockel, J.T.; J.J. Sokolsky (1999). Canadas Cold War


Nuclear Experience. Queens Quarterly (Special Issue):
116.

[14] Keating, Tom (1988). Canada, NATO and the Bomb. Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers Ltd. p. 68.

[32] Arkin, William (1985). Nuclear Battleelds: Global Links


in the Arms Race. Cambridge, MA: Ballinger. p. 78.

[15] Whitaker, Reginald (1994). Cold War Canada: the Making of a National Insecurity State 1945-1957. Toronto:
University of Toronto Press. p. 144.

[33] Selin, Shannon (1988). Canada as a Nuclear WeaponFree Zone: A Critical Analysis. Canadian Centre for Arms
Control and Disarmament Issue Brief No. 10. p. 6.

[16] Whitaker, Reginald (1994). Cold War Canada: the Making of a National Insecurity State 1945-1957. Toronto:
University of Toronto Press. pp. xvi.

[34]Canada's Position on Nuclear Weapons Free Zones.


The Disarmament Bulletin (Summer-Autumn): 12. 1986.

[17] Whitaker, Reginald (1994). Cold War Canada: the Making of a National Insecurity State 1945-1957. Toronto:
University of Toronto Press. pp. xx.
[18]The Globe and Mail. 2 January 1964. p. 2.
Check date values in: |date= (help); Missing or empty |title= (help)

[35] Campion-Smith, Bruce (2005-07-18). Nerve Gas Tests


Revealed. Toronto Star.
[36] Sea-dumped munitions: An unseen threat
[37] Elliott, Louise (2006-08-11). Agent Orange and Agent
Purple. CBC Indepth (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation). Retrieved 2006-08-13.

4.9. CHINA

115

arsenal amongst the ve nuclear weapon states acknowledged by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons; in terms of warheads, they are ranked 3rd in
megatonnage. According to some estimates, the country
[39] Bryden, John. Deadly Allies: Canada's Secret War
could more than doublethe number of warheads
1937-1947. ISBN 0-7710-1724-3.
on missiles that could threaten the United States by the
[40] Cruise missile testing coming to Canada - CBC, July 15, mid-2020s.* [7]
[38] CHEMICAL & BIO WEAPONS MEMBERSHIP
(PDF). http://www.nti.org/''. Nuclear Threat Initiative.
Retrieved 8 January 2015.

1983.
[41] Rouben, Ben, Introduction to Reactor Physics CANTEACH, September, 2002.

4.8.7

Further reading

Early in 2011, China published a defense white paper,


which repeated its nuclear policies of maintaining a minimum deterrent with a no-rst-use pledge. Yet China has
yet to dene what it means by aminimum deterrent posture. This, together with the fact that it is deploying
four new nuclear-capable ballistic missiles, invites concern as to the scale and intention of Chinas nuclear upgrade.* [7]

John Clearwater (1998), Canadian nuclear


weapons: the untold story of Canada's Cold War
arsenal, Dundurn Press Ltd., ISBN 978-1-55002299-5
4.9.1

Chemical weapons

John Clearwater (1999). U.S. nuclear weapons in


Canada. Dundurn Press Ltd. ISBN 978-1-55002- China signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
on January 13, 1993. The CWC was ratied on April
329-9.
25, 1997.* [8] In the ocial declaration submitted to the
Sean M. Maloney (25 July 2007). Learning to love OPCW, the Chinese government declared that it had posthe bomb: Canada's nuclear weapons during the sessed a small arsenal of chemical weapons in the past but
Cold War. Potomac Books, Inc. ISBN 978-1- that it had destroyed it before ratifying the Convention. It
57488-616-0.
has declared only three former chemical production facilities that may have produced mustard gas, phosgene and
Andrew Richter (2002), Avoiding Armageddon: Lewisite.* [9]
Canadian military strategy and nuclear weapons,
China was found to have supplied Albania with a small
1950-63, UBC Press, ISBN 978-0-7748-0888-0
stockpile of chemical weapons in the 1970s during the
Cold War.* [10]

4.8.8

External links

Edwards, G. Canada and the Bomb: Past and Future 4.9.2 Biological weapons
Montreal Gazette. 9 August 1998.
China is currently a signatory of the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention and Chinese ocials have stated
that China has never engaged in biological activities with
4.9 China
oensive military applications. However, China was rehad an active biological weapons program
The People's Republic of China has developed and pos- ported to have
in the 1980s.* [11]
sessed weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and nuclear weapons. The rst of China's nuclear Kanatjan Alibekov, former director of one of the Soviet
weapons tests took place in 1964, and its rst hydrogen germ-warfare programs, said that China suered a seribomb test occurred in 1967. Tests continued until 1996, ous accident at one of its biological weapons plants in the
when China signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty late 1980s. Alibekov asserted that Soviet reconnaissance
(CTBT). China has acceded to the Biological and Toxin satellites identied a biological weapons laboratory and
Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1984 and ratied the plant near a site for testing nuclear warheads. The SoviChemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1997.
ets suspected that two separate epidemics of hemorrhagic
The number of nuclear warheads in China's arsenal is a fever that swept the region in the late 1980s were caused
Chinese scientists were
state secret and is therefore unknown. There are vary- by an accident in a lab where
*
[12]
weaponizing
viral
diseases.
ing estimates of the size of China's arsenal. A 2011
Georgetown University study estimated that China has
as many as 3,000 warheads* [6] hidden in underground
tunnels, whereas China is estimated by the Federation of
American Scientists to have an arsenal of about 180 active nuclear weapon warheads and 240 total warheads as
of 2009, which would make it the second smallest nuclear

US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright expressed her


concerns over possible Chinese biological weapon transfers to Iran and other nations in a letter to Senator
Robert E. Bennett (R-Utah) in January 1997.* [13] Albright stated that she had received reports regarding transfers of dual-use items from Chinese entities to the Ira-

116

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

nian government which concerned her and that the United


States had to encourage China to adopt comprehensive
export controls to prevent assistance to Iran's alleged biological weapons program. The United States acted upon
the allegations on January 16, 2002, when it imposed
sanctions on three Chinese rms accused of supplying
Iran with materials used in the manufacture of chemical
and biological weapons. In response to this, China issued
export control protocols on dual use biological technology in late 2002.* [14]

4.9.3

Nuclear weapons

Satellite image of the testing site 4 days after China's rst atomic
bomb test

History
Mao Zedong decided to begin a Chinese nuclear-weapons
program during the First Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1954
1955 over the Quemoy and Matsu Islands. While he did
not expect to be able to match the large American nuclear arsenal, Mao believed that even a few bombs would
increase China's diplomatic credibility. Construction of
uranium-enrichment plants in Baotou and Lanzhou began in 1958, and a plutonium facility in Jiuquan and the
Lop Nur nuclear test site by 1960. The Soviet Union provided assistance in the early Chinese program by sending
advisers to help in the facilities devoted to ssile material
production,* [15] and in October 1957 agreed to provide
a prototype bomb, missiles, and related technology. The
Chinese, who preferred to import technology and components to developing them within China, exported uranium
to the Soviet Union, and the Soviets sent two R-2 missiles
in 1958.* [16]
That year, however, Soviet leader Nikita Khruschev told
Mao that he planned to discuss arms control with the
United States and Britain. China was already opposed to
Khruschev's post-Stalin policy of "peaceful coexistence".
Although Soviet ocials assured China that it was under
the Soviet nuclear umbrella, the disagreements widened
the emerging Sino-Soviet split. In June 1959 the two
nations formally ended their agreement on military and
technology cooperation,* [16] and in July 1960 all Soviet
assistance with the Chinese nuclear program was abruptly
terminated and all Soviet technicians were withdrawn
from the program.* [17]
The American government under John F. Kennedy and
Lyndon B. Johnson was concerned about the program and
studied ways to sabotage or attack it, perhaps with the
aid of Taiwan or the Soviet Union, but Khruschev was
not interested. The Chinese conducted their rst nuclear
test, code-named 596, on 16 October 1964,* [15] and acknowledged that their program would have been impossible to complete without the Soviet help.* [16] China's
last nuclear test was on July 29, 1996. According to the
Australian Geological Survey Organization in Canberra,
the yield of the 1996 test was 15 kilotons. This was
China's 22nd underground test and 45th test overall.* [18]

Size
China has made signicant improvements in its
miniaturization techniques since the 1980s. There have
been accusations, notably by the Cox Commission, that
this was done primarily by covertly acquiring the U.S.'s
W88 nuclear warhead design as well as guided ballistic
missile technology. Chinese scientists have stated that
they have made advances in these areas, but insist that
these advances were made without espionage.
The international community has debated the size of the
Chinese nuclear force since the nation rst acquired such
technology. Because of strict secrecy it is very dicult
to determine the exact size and composition of China's
nuclear forces. Estimates vary over time. Several declassied U.S. government reports give historical estimates. The 1984 Defense Intelligence Agency's Defense
Estimative Brief estimates the Chinese nuclear stockpile
as consisting of between 150 and 160 warheads.* [19] A
1993 United States National Security Council report estimated that China's nuclear deterrent force relied on 60
to 70 nuclear armed ballistic missiles.* [20] The Defense
Intelligence Agency's The Decades Ahead: 1999 - 2020
report estimates the 1999 Nuclear Weapons' Inventory
as between 140 and 157.* [21] In 2004 the U.S. Department of Defense assessed that China had about 20
intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of targeting the
United States.* [22] In 2006 a U.S. Defense Intelligence
Agency estimate presented to the Senate Armed Services
Committee was thatChina currently has more than 100
nuclear warheads.* [23]
A variety of estimates abound regarding China's current
stockpile. Although the total number of nuclear weapons
in the Chinese arsenal is unknown, as of 2005 estimates
vary from as low as 80 to as high as 2,000. The 2,000warhead estimate has largely been rejected by diplomats
in the eld. It appears to have been derived from a 1990sera Usenet post, in which a Singaporean college student
made unsubstantiated statements concerning a supposed
2,000 warhead stockpile.* [24]* [25]
In 2004, China stated that among the nuclear-weapon

4.9. CHINA

117
weapons.* [34] Yesin's statements, however, have incited
backlash. His claims may have originated from the same
Usenet post that previous dubious assertions of 2,000 or
more nuclear warheads stemmed from.* [35]
As of 2011, the Chinese nuclear arsenal was estimated to
contain 55-65 ICBM's.* [36]
In 2012, STRATCOM commander C. Robert Kehler said
that the best estimates where in the range of several
hundredwarheads and FAS estimated the current total
to be approximately 240 warheads.* [37]
The U.S. Department of Defense 2013 report to Congress
on China's military developments stated that the Chinese nuclear arsenal consists of 50-75 ICBM's, located
in both land-based silo's and Ballistic missile submarine
platforms. In addition to the ICBM's, the report stated
that China has approximately 1,100 Short-range ballistic
missiles, although it does not have the warhead capacity
to equip them all with nuclear weapons.* [38]
Nuclear policy

A mock-up of China's rst nuclear bomb.

China is one of the ve nuclear weapons states (NWS)


recognized by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,
states, China... possesses the smallest nuclear arsenal, which China ratied in 1992. China is the only
implying China has fewer than the United Kingdom's NWS* [39] to give an unqualied security assurance to
200 nuclear weapons.* [26] Several non-ocial sources non-nuclear-weapon states:
estimate that China has around 400 nuclear warheads.
However, U.S. intelligence estimates suggest a much
China undertakes not to use or threaten to use
smaller nuclear force than many non-governmental organuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon
nizations.* [27]
States or nuclear-weapon-free zones at any
time or under any circumstances.* [40]
In 2011, high estimates of the Chinese nuclear arsenal
again emerged. One three-year study by Georgetown
University raised the possibility that China had 3,000
nuclear weapons, hidden in a sophisticated tunnel network.* [28] The study was based on state media footage
showing tunnel entrances, and estimated a 4,800 km
(3,000 mile) network. The tunnel network was revealed
after the 2008 Sichuan earthquake collapsed tunnels in
the hills. China has conrmed the existence of the tunnel
network.* [29]* [30] In response, the US military was ordered by law to study the possibility of this tunnel network
concealing a nuclear arsenal.* [31] However, the tunnel
theory has come under substantial attack due to several
apparent aws in its reasoning. From a production standpoint, China probably does not have enough ssile material to produce 3,000 nuclear weapons. Such an arsenal would require 9-12 tons of Plutonium as well as
45-75 tons of enriched uranium and a substantial amount
of Tritium.* [32]* [33] The Chinese are estimated to have
only 2 tons of weapons grade plutonium, which limits
their arsenal to 450-600 weapons, despite a 16 ton disposable supply of uranium, theoretically enough for 1,000
warheads. Additionally, the PRC's supply of Tritium limits its stockpile to around 300 weapons.* [32]

Chinese public policy has always been one of the "no rst
use rule" while maintaining a deterrent retaliatory force
targeted for countervalue targets.* [1]
In 2005, the Chinese Foreign Ministry released a white
paper stating that the governmentwould not be the rst
to use [nuclear] weapons at any time and in any circumstance. In addition, the paper went on to state that this
no rst usepolicy would remain unchanged in the future and that China would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon states or
nuclear-weapon-free zones.* [41]
China normally stores nuclear warheads separately from
their launching systems, unless there is a heightened
threat level.* [42]
Historically, China has been implicated in the development of the Pakistani nuclear program. In the early
1980s, China is believed to have given Pakistan apackageincluding uranium enrichment technology, highenriched uranium, and the design for a compact nuclear
weapon.* [43]

Amitai Etzioni of the Institute for Communitarian Policy


In 2012, a retired Russian ocer, Viktor Yesin, Studies has suggested that the prevention of nuclear prostated that the Chinese arsenal was at 1,800 nuclear liferation could be a fruitful area of cooperation between

118
China and the United States, by which each country could
trust but verifythe other's intentions and help them
move away from the current distrust both sides exhibit in
their dealings with each other.* [44]
Delivery systems estimates
2010 IISS Military Balance The following are estimates of China's strategic missile forces from the
International Institute of Strategic Studies Military Balance 2010.* [45] According to these estimates, China
has up to 90 inter-continental range ballistic missiles
(66 land-based ICBMs and 24 submarine-based JL-2
SLBMs), not counting MIRV warheads.

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
have also deployed up to 10 Solid-fueled mobile DF-31
ICBMs, with a range of 7,200+ km and possibly up to 3
MIRVs.* [52] China has also developed the DF-31A, an
intercontinental ballistic missile with a range of 11,200+
km with possibly 3-6 multiple independently targetable
reentry vehicle (MIRV) capability.
China stores many of its missiles in huge underground tunnel complexes; US Representative Michael
Turner* [53] referring to 2009 Chinese media reports said
This network of tunnels could be in excess of 5,000 kilometers (3,110 miles), and is used to transport nuclear
weapons and forces,,* [54] the Chinese Army newsletter calls this tunnel system an underground Great Wall of
China.* [55]

2010 DoD annual PRC military report The follow- Medium range ballistic missiles
ing are estimates from the United States Department of
Defense 2010 report to Congress concerning the Military Approximately 55% of China's missiles are in the
medium range category, targeted at regional theater tarPower of the People's Republic of China* [46]
gets.* [47]* :61
2006 FAS & NRDC report The following table is an
overview of PRC nuclear forces taken from a November DF-3A/CSS-2 Main article: DF-3A
2006 report by Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris,
and Matthew G. McKinzie of the Federation of American Scientists and the Natural Resources Defense Council titled Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War DF-21/CSS-5 Main article: DF-21
Planning.* [47]* :202
Situation in 201314 After increasing under Bush,
the number of Chinese nuclear armed missiles capable
of reaching North America leveled o under Obama
with delays in bringing forth new capabilities such as
MIRV and operational sub launched missiles.* [48] The
U.S. DOD 2013 report to Congress continued to state
that China had 5075 ICBM's.* [38] However the United
States-China Economic and Security Review Commission stated that it was possible for China to nally have an
operational Submarine-launched ballistic missile capability by the end of the year.* [49] The USChina Economic
and Security Review Commission stated in November
2014 that patrols with nuclear-armed submarines would
take place before the end of the year, giving China its
rst credible sea-based nuclear deterrent.* [50]
Land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles

Tactical cruise missiles


The CJ-10 long-range cruise missile made its rst public
appearance during the military parade on the 60th Anniversary of the People's Republic of China as a part of
the Second Artillery Corps' long range conventional missile forces; the CJ-10 represents the next generation in
rocket weapons technology in the PLA. A similar naval
cruise missile, the YJ-62, was also revealed during the
parade; the YJ-62 serves as the People's Liberation Army
Navy's latest development into naval rocketry.
Long range ballistic missiles
The Chinese categorize long-range ballistic missiles as
ones with a range between 3000 and 8000 km.* [47]* :103

Main articles: Second Artillery Corps, DF-4, DF-5, DF-4/CSS-3 Main article: DF-4
DF-31 and DF-41
The Dongfeng 5A is a single-warhead, three-stage, liquidfueled missile with a range of 13,000+ km. In 2000,
General Eugene Habiger of the U.S. Air Force, thencommander of the U.S. Strategic Command, testied before Congress that China has 18 silo-based DF-5s.* [51]
Since the early 21st century, the Second Artillery Corps

The Dong Feng 4 or DF-4 (also known as the CSS3) is a long-range two-stage Chinese intermediate-range
ballistic missile with liquid fuel (nitric acid/UDMH). It
was thought to be deployed in limited numbers in underground silos beginning in 1980.* [47]* :67 The DF-4 has a
takeo thrust of 1,224.00 kN, a takeo weight of 82,000
kg, a diameter of 2.25 m, a length of 28.05 m, and a

4.9. CHINA
n span of 2.74 m. It is equipped with a 2190 kg nuclear warhead with 3300 kt explosive yield, and its range
is 5,500 km.* [47]* :68 The missile uses inertial guidance,
resulting in a relatively poor CEP of 1,500 meters.
Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)

119
The ChangJian-10 (Long Sword 10) is a cruise missile
developed by China, based on the Hongniao missile family. It has a range of 2,200 km. Although not conrmed,
it is suspected that the CJ-10 could carry nuclear warheads. An air-launched variant (named CJ-20) has also
been developed.* [57]* [58]

DF-5A/CSS-4 Mod 2 Main article: DF-5

HongNiao missile family Main article: Hongniao


missile

The Dongfeng 5 or DF-5 is a 3 stage Chinese ICBM. It


has a length 32.6 m and a diameter of 3.35 m. It weighs
183 tonnes and has an estimated range of 12,00015,000
kilometers.* [47]* :7172 The DF-5 had its rst ight in
1971 and was in operational service 10 years later. One
of the downsides of the missile was that it took between
30 and 60 minutes to fuel.

There are three missiles in this family: the HN-1, HN-2,


and HN-3. Reportedly based on the Kh-SD/65 missiles,
the Hongniao (or Red Bird) missiles are some of the rst
nuclear-capable cruise missiles in China. The HN-1 has
a range of 600 km, the HN-2 has a range of 1,800 km,
and the HN-3 has a range of 3,000 km.* [59]* [60]* [61]

DF-31/CSS-10 Main article: DF-31

ChangFeng missile family Main article: Changfeng


missile

The Dong Feng 31 (or CSS-10) is a medium-range, three


stage, solid propellant intercontinental ballistic missile There are 2 missiles in the Chang Feng (or Long Wind)
developed by the People's Republic of China. It is a land- family: CF-1 and CF-2. These are the rst domestically
developed long-range cruise missiles for China. The CFbased variant of the submarine-launched JL-2.
1 has a range of 400 km while the CF-2 has a range of
800 km. Both variants can carry a 10 kt nuclear warhead.* [59]* [60]
DF-41/CSS-X-10 Main article: DF-41
The DF-41 (or CSS-X-10) is an intercontinental ballis- Sea-based weapons
tic missile believed to be under development by China.
It may be designed to carry Multiple independently tar- Main articles: JL-1 and JL-2
getable reentry vehicles (MIRV), delivering multiple nuclear warheads.
The submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) stockpile of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is
thought to be relatively new. China launched its rst
Nuclear cruise missiles
second-generation nuclear submarine in April 1981. The
The US DoD estimated in 2006 that the PRC was devel- navy currently has a 1 Type 092 Xia class SSBN at
oping ground- and air-launched cruise missiles that could roughly 8000 tons displacement. A second Type 092 was
easily be converted to carry nuclear warheads once devel- reportedly lost in an accident in 1985. The Type 092 is
equipped with 12 JL-1 SLBMs with a range of 2150
oped.* [56]
2500 km. The JL-1 is a modied DF-21 missile. It is suspected that the Type 092 is being converted into a cruise
missile submarine.
DH-10 Main article: DH-10
The DongHai 10 (DH-10) is a cruise missile developed in the People's Republic of China. According to
Jane's Defense Weekly, the DH-10 is a second-generation
land-attack cruise missile (LACM), with over 4,000 km
range, integrated inertial navigation system, GPS, terrain contour mapping system, and digital scene-matching
terminal-homing system. The missile is estimated to have
a circular error probable (CEP) of 10 meters.
CJ-10

Main article: CJ-10

The Chinese navy has developed Type 094 ballistic missile submarine, open source satellite imagery has shown
that at least 2 of these have been completed. This submarine will be capable of carrying 12 of the longer ranged,
more modern JL-2s with a range of approximately 14000
km.
China is also developing the Type 096 submarine,
claimed to be able to carry up to 24 JL-2 ballistic missiles
each. Some Chinese sources states that the submarine is
already undergoing trials.* [62]
Also a new nuclear attack submarine is under development, the Type 095 submarine.* [63]* [64]

120

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

Heavy bomber group


China's bomber force consists mostly of Chinese-made
versions of Soviet aircraft. The People's Liberation Army
Air Force has 120 H-6s (a variant of the Tupolev Tu-16).
These bombers are outtted to carry nuclear as well as
conventional weapons. While the H-6 eet is aging, it is
not as old as the American B-52 Stratofortress.* [47]* :93
98 The Chinese have also produced the Xian JH-7 Flying Leopard ghter-bomber with a range and payload
exceeding the F-111 (currently about 80 are in service)
capable of delivering a nuclear strike. China has also
bought the advanced Sukhoi Su-30 from Russia; currently, about 100 Su-30s (MKK and MK2 variants) have
been purchased by China. The Su-30 is capable of carrying tactical nuclear weapons.* [47]* :102
China is alleged to be testing rumored new H-8 and H-9
strategic bombers which are either described as an upgraded H-6 or an aircraft in the same class as the US B-2,
able to carry nuclear weapons.* [65]* [66]* [67]

4.9.6 Notes
[1] Fact Sheet:China: Nuclear Disarmament and Reduction of. Ministry of Foreign Aairs. 27 April 2004.
Retrieved 2010-04-06.
[2] China's nuclear arsenal. BBC News. 1999-07-15.
[3] http://bos.sagepub.com/content/71/4/77.full.pdf
[4] http://bos.sagepub.com/content/71/4/77.full.pdf
[5] http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/
DF-41ChinasanswertotheUSBMDefforts_
ArjunSubramaniam_121112
[6] China 'has up to 3,000 nuclear weapons hidden in tunnels', three-year study of secret documents reveals. Daily
Mail (London). 2011-11-30.
[7] Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris (November/December 2011 vol. 67 no. 6). Chinese nuclear
forces, 2011. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. pp. 81
87. Check date values in: |date= (help)
[8] States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention

4.9.4

Missile ranges

Maximum Ranges for Chinas Conventional SRBM


Force. Note: China currently is capable of deploying ballistic missile forces to support a variety of regional contingencies.

[9] NTI Research Library: country prole: China


[10] Albania's Chemical Cache Raises Fears About Others
, Washington Post, 10 January 2005, page A01.
[11] Roland Everett Langford, Introduction to Weapons of
Mass Destruction: Radiological, Chemical, and Biological, Wiley-IEEE, 2004

Medium and Intercontinental Range Ballistic Missiles. Note: China currently is capable of targeting [12] William J Broad, Soviet Defector Says China Had Acciits nuclear forces throughout the region and most of
dent at a Germ Plant, New York Times, April 5, 1999
the world, including the continental United States.
Newer systems, such as the DF-31, DF-31A, and [13] Leonard Spector, Chinese Assistance to Iran's Weapons
of Mass Destruction and Missile Programs, Carnegie EnJL-2, will give China a more survivable nuclear
dowment for International Peace, September 12, 1996
force.
Surface-to-Air Missile Coverage over the Taiwan
Strait. Note: This map depicts notional coverage
provided by Chinas SA-10, SA-20 SAM systems,
as well as the soon-to-be acquired S-300PMU2. Actual coverage would be non-contiguous and dependent upon precise deployment sites.

4.9.5

See also

People's Liberation Army


Program 863

[14] Nuclear Threat Initiative, Country Prole: China


[15] Burr, W.; Richelson, J. T. (20002001). Whether to
Strangle the Baby in the Cradle": The United States and
the Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960-64. International
Security 25 (3): 5499. doi:10.2307/2626706 (inactive
2015-01-09). JSTOR 2626706.
[16] Jersild, Austin. Sharing the Bomb among Friends: The
Dilemmas of Sino-Soviet Strategic Cooperation. Cold
War International History Project, Wilson Center. Retrieved 28 October 2013.
[17] John Lewis and Litai Xue, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford University Press, 1991), 53, 61, 121.

China space program

[18]Chinese Nuclear Tests Allegedly Cause 750,000 Deaths


Epoch Times. March 30, 2009.

List of states with nuclear weapons

[19] http://www.gwu.edu/~{}nsarchiv/news/19990527/
01-01.htm

Republic of China and weapons of mass destruction

[20] Report to Congress on Status of China, India and Pakistan Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs. Fas.org.
Retrieved 2010-04-06.

China's nuclear test series

4.9. CHINA

[21]
[22] 1.doc (PDF). Retrieved 2010-04-06.
[23] http://www.dia.mil/publicaffairs/Testimonies/
statement24.html
[24] https://groups.google.com/forum/?fromgroups#!topic/
soc.culture.taiwan/tOzuUZc1C_c
[25] http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/4799/
collected-thoughts-on-phil-karber

121

[41] China Publishes White Paper on Arms Control.


China.org.cn. 1 September 2005. Retrieved 15 October
2013.
[42] Hugh Chalmers (January 2014). A Disturbance in the
Force (PDF) (Report). Royal United Services Institute.
p. 4. Retrieved 4 February 2014.
[43] Matthew Kroenig, Exporting the Bomb: Technology
Transfer and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons (Cornell
University Press, 2010), 1.

[26] name=MOFA-factsheet-2004>Fact Sheet:China: Nuclear Disarmament and Reduction of. Ministry of Foreign Aairs. 27 April 2004. Retrieved 2010-04-06.

[44] Etzioni, Amitai, MAR: A Model for US-China Relations,The Diplomat, September 20, 2013, .

[27] The ambiguous arsenal | thebulletin.org.


Web.archive.org.
Archived from the original on
2006-09-28. Retrieved 2010-04-06.

[46] Oce of the Secretary of Defense - Annual Report to


Congress: Military Power of the People's Republic of
China 2010 (PDF)

[28] https://fas.org/nuke/guide/china/Karber_
UndergroundFacilities-Full_2011_reduced.pdf
[29] Fernandez, Yusuf. Obama against Chinese Nuclear
Great Wall. PressTV. Retrieved 25 March 2013.

[47] Kristensen, Hans M; Robert S. Norris; Matthew G. McKinzie. Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning. Federation of American Scientists and Natural Resources Defense Council, November 2006.

[30] China 'has up to 3,000 nuclear weapons hidden in tunnels', three-year study of secret documents reveals. Daily
Mail (London). 2011-11-30. Retrieved 25 March 2013.

[48] Kristensen, Hans M. (19 April 2013). Chinese ICBM


Force Leveling Out?". Strategic Security Blog. Federation
of American Scientists. Retrieved 19 April 2013.

[31] MINNICK, WENDELL (Jan 5, 2013). New U.S. Law


Seeks Answers On Chinese Nuke Tunnels. Defense
News. Retrieved 25 March 2013.

[49] MINNICK, WENDELL (11 November 2013). US Report: 1st Sub-launched Nuke Missile Among China's Recent Strides. defensenews.com. Gannett Government
Media Corporation. Retrieved 11 November 2013.

[32] https://fas.org/blogs/security/2011/12/chinanukes/
[33] http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2009/
March/Maples%2003-10-09.pdf

[45] IISS Military Balance 2010

[50] Tweed, David (9 December 2014). China Takes Nuclear Weapons Underwater Where Prying Eyes Can't See
. bloomberg.com. Retrieved 9 December 2014.

[34] Robertson, Matthew (June 28, 2012). Nuclear Arsenal [51]


in China Much Bigger Than Believed, Says Expert Strategists and arms control experts disagree over recent report [52] DongFeng 31A (CSS-9) Intercontinental Ballistic Missile. SinoDefence.com. Retrieved 2010-04-06.
. Epoch Times. Retrieved 25 March 2013.
[35] http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/5460/
yesin-on-chinas-nukes

[53] http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/10/
u-s-lawmaker-warns-of-chinas-nuclear-strategy

[36] http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2011_cmpr_final.
pdf

[54] straitstimes.com

[37] Kristensen, Hans. STRATCOM Commander Rejects


High Estimates for Chinese Nuclear Arsenal. FAS, 22
August 2012.
[38] Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People.s Republic of China 2013
(PDF) (Report). Oce of the Secretary of Defense.
2013. Retrieved 23 October 2013.
[39] Kaegan McGrath and Vasileios Savvidis (1 February
2009). UNSC Resolution 1887: Packaging Nonproliferation and Disarmament at the United Nations. Nuclear
Threat Initiative. Retrieved 17 September 2012.
[40] Statement on security assurances issued on 5 April 1995
by the Peoples Republic of China(PDF). United Nations. 6 April 1995. S/1995/265. Retrieved 20 September 2012.

[55] China Builds Underground 'Great Wall' Against Nuke Attack The Chosun Ilbo, Dec. 14, 2009.
[56] U.S. Department of Defense, Oce of the Secretary of
Defense, Military Power of the Peoples Republic of
China, 2006, May 23, 2006, pp. 26, 27.
[57] Sword 20 cruise missiles loaded on to H-6M bombers
. Global Military. 2009-12-10. Retrieved 2010-04-06.
[58] " 28 CJ-10 ( )_ ".
Mil.huanqiu.com. Retrieved 2010-04-06.
[59] John Pike. Land-Attack Cruise Missiles (LACM)".
Globalsecurity.org. Retrieved 2010-04-06.
[60] Land-Attack Cruise Missile (LACM)".
SinoDefence.com. 2007-05-07. Retrieved 2010-04-06.
[61] HN-2. MissileThreat. Retrieved 2010-04-06.

122

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

[62] Global Security Newswire. NTI. Retrieved 2010-0406.


[63] Chinese fast developing advanced submarines Taipei
Times, Dec 06, 2006.
[64] http://www.deagel.com/Nuclear-Attack-Submarines/
Type-095_a001843001.aspx
[65] " 8 ()_
_ ". Mil.news.sina.com.cn. Retrieved 2010-0406.

Fact Sheet: China: Nuclear Disarmament and Reduction, Ministry of Foreign Aairs, People's Republic of China, 2004/04/27
FY04 Report to Congress on PRC Military Power,
U.S. Department of Defense
Status of Nuclear Powers and Their Nuclear Capabilities, Federation of American Scientists
Nuclear Threat Initiative on China

[66] " 8 _ _
". News.xinhuanet.com. Retrieved 2010-04-06.

PLA Strategic Missile Force - Chinese Defence Today

[67] Google Translate. Translate.google.com. 2008-11-11.


Retrieved 2010-04-06.

Jerey Lewis, The ambiguous arsenal, Bulletin


of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2005.

4.9.7

Nuclear Notebook: Chinese nuclear forces, 2003,


Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Nov/Dec 2003.

Further reading

Federation of American Scientists et al. (2006).


Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning

Defense Estimative Brief, Nuclear Weapons Systems in China, Defense Intelligence Agency, 24
April 1984

China Nuclear Forces Guide Federation of American Scientists

Report to Congress on Status of China, India and


Pakistan Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs,
United States National Security Council, July 28,
1993

4.9.8

External links

Nuclear Files.org Information on the background of


nuclear weapons in China
Nuclear Files.org Current information on nuclear
stockpiles in China
Parallel History Project On Cooperative Security,
Account of Soviet-China nuclear technology transfer, October 2002
Chinese nuclear forces, 2008, Robert S. Norris and
Hans M. Kristensen, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
Annotated bibliography for the Chinese nuclear
weapons program from the Alsos Digital Library for
Nuclear Issues

4.10 France

France is known to have an arsenal of weapons of mass


destruction. France is one of the veNuclear Weapons
Archival Documents on the Chinese Nuclear Pro- Statesunder the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, but
gram at The Wilson Center Digital Archive
is not known to possess or develop any chemical or
biological weapons.* [2]* [3] France was the fourth counChinese Nuclear Weapon Testing Video at try to test an independently developed nuclear weapon in
sonicbomb.com
1960, under the government of Charles de Gaulle. The
French military is currently thought to retain a weapons
First nuclear test Video - 596 test
stockpile of around 300 operational nuclear warheads,
Conference on U.S.-China Strategic Nuclear Dy- making it the third-largest in the world, speaking in terms
namics, June 2021, 2006
of warheads, not megatons.* [4] The weapons are part of

4.10. FRANCE
the national Force de frappe, developed in the late 1950s
and 1960s to give France the ability to distance itself from
NATO while having a means of nuclear deterrence under
sovereign control.

123

decisions to build an atomic bomb were taken, and a successful test took place in 1960. Since then France has
developed and maintained its own nuclear deterrent, one
intended to defend France even if the United States reFrance did not sign the Partial Test Ban Treaty, which fused to risk its* own cities by assisting Western Europe in
gave it the option to conduct further nuclear tests un- a nuclear war. [10]
til it signed and ratied the Comprehensive Test Ban In 1986 Francis Perrin, French high-commissioner for
Treaty in 1996 and 1998 respectively. France denies cur- atomic energy from 1951 to 1970, stated that in 1949
rently having chemical weapons, ratied the Chemical Israeli scientists were rst invited to the Saclay Nuclear
Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1995, and acceded to Research Centre, this cooperation leading to a joint eort
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) in including sharing of knowledge between French and Is1984. France had also ratied the Geneva Protocol in raeli scientists especially those with knowledge from the
Manhattan Project.* [11]* [12]* [13] In 1956 as part their
1926.
military alliance during the Suez Crisis the French agreed
to secretly build the Dimona nuclear reactor in Israel and
soon after agreed to construct a reprocessing plant for the
4.10.1 History
extraction of plutonium at the site. By 1960, two years
France was one of the nuclear pioneers, going back to into the administration of Charles de Gaulle, cooperation
the work of Marie Skodowska Curie. Curies last as- cooled following a successful test with the French asking
sistant Bertrand Goldschmidt became the father of the that Israel cease its weapons program and submit to ina proliferation scandal aect
French Bomb. French Professor Frederic Joliot-Curie, ternational inspections lest
*
French
foreign
relations.
[14]
According to Lieutenant
High Commissioner for Atomic Energy, was approached
Colonel
Warner
D.
Farr
in
a
report
to the USAF Counterprevious to President Roosevelt creating the Briggs Adproliferation
Center
while
France
was
previously a leader
visory Committee on Uranium in 1939 about the possiin
nuclear
research
Israel
and
France
were at a simibilities of creating an atomic bomb; Joliot-Curie told the
lar
level
of
expertise
after
the
war,
and
Israeli
scientists
New York Herald Tribune that theReport on atomic Encould
make
signicant
contributions
to
the
French
eort.
ergy for Military Purposesin 1945 wrongfully omitted
*
Progress
in
nuclear
science
and
technology
in
France
and
the contributions of French scientists. [5]
Israel remained closely linked throughout the early fties.
After WW-II France's former position of leadership suf- Israeli scientists probably helped construct the G-1 plutofered greatly because of the instability of the Fourth nium production reactor and UP-1 reprocessing plant at
Republic, and the lack of nance available.* [6] During Marcoule.* [15]
the Second World War Goldschmidt invented the nowstandard method for extracting plutonium while work- In 1957 Euratom was created, and under cover of the
ing as part of the British/Canadian team participating peaceful use of nuclear power the French signed deals
to work together on nuclear
in the Manhattan Project. But after the Liberation in with Germany and Italy
*
weapons
development.
[16]
The West German Chancel1945, France had to start its own program almost from
lor
Konrad
Adenauer
told
his
cabinet that he wanted
scratch. Nevertheless, the rst French reactor went critto
achieve,
through
EURATOM,
as quickly as possible,
ical in 1948 and small amounts of plutonium were exthe
chance
of
producing
our
own
nuclear
weapons.* [17]
tracted in 1949. There was no formal commitment to
a nuclear weapons program at that time, although plans The idea was short-lived. In 1958 de Gaulle became Preswere made to build reactors for the large scale produc- ident and Germany and Italy were excluded.
tion of plutonium.* [7]
France developed its nuclear and thermonuclear bombs
However, in the 1950s a civilian nuclear research pro- without outside assistance. The United States, however,
gram was started, a byproduct of which would be began providing technical assistance in the early 1970s
plutonium. In 1956 a secret Committee for the Military through the 1980s. The aid was secret, unlike the reApplications of Atomic Energy was formed and a devel- lationship with the British nuclear program. The Nixon
opment program for delivery vehicles was started. The administration, unlike previous presidencies, did not opintervention of the United States in the Suez Crisis that pose its allies' possession of atomic weapons and beyear is credited with convincing France that it needed to lieved that the Soviets would nd having multiple nuclearaccelerate its own nuclear weapons program to remain a armed Western opponents more dicult. Because the
global power.* [8] In 1957, soon after Suez and the re- Atomic Energy Act of 1946 prohibited sharing inforsulting diplomatic tension with both the USSR and the mation on nuclear weapon design, a method known as
United States, French president Ren Coty decided on negative guidanceor "Twenty Questions" was used;
the creation of the C.S.E.M. in the then French Sahara, French scientists described to their American countera new nuclear tests facility replacing the C.I.E.E.S.* [9] parts their research, and were told whether they were corWith the return of Charles de Gaulle to the presidency rect. Areas in which the French received help included
of France in the midst of the May 1958 crisis, the nal MIRV, radiation hardening, missile design, intelligence

124
on Soviet anti-missile defences, and advanced computer
technology. Because the French program attracted the
best brainsof the nation, the Americans beneted from
French research as well. The relationship also improved
the two nations' military ties; despite its departure from
NATO's command structure in 1966, France developed
two separate nuclear targeting plans, one nationalfor
the Force de Frappe's role as a solely French deterrent,
and one coordinated with NATO.* [10]

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
gion were present at the test sites, without any signicant
protection. At most, some took a shower after each test
according to L'Humanit.* [24] Gerboise Rouge (5kt), the
third atomic bomb, half as powerful as Hiroshima, exploded on 27 December 1960, provoking protests from
Japan, USSR, Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria and Ghana.* [25]

After the independence of Algeria on 5 July 1962, and


following the 19 March 1962 Evian agreements, the
French military moved the test site to another location in
France is understood to have tested neutron or enhanced the Algerian Sahara, around 150 km north of Tamnarasradiation bombs in the past, apparently leading the eld set, near the village of In Eker. Underground nuclear
with an early test of the technology in 1967* [18] and an explosion testing was performed in drifts in the Taourirt
Tan Afella mountain, one of the granite Hoggar Mounactualneutron bomb in 1980.* [19]
tains. The Evian agreements included a secret article
which stated thatAlgeria concede... to France the use of
4.10.2 Testing
certain air bases, terrains, sites and military installations
which are necessary to it [France]" during ve years.
There were 210 French nuclear tests from 1960 through
1995. Seventeen of them were done in the Algerian Sa- The C.S.E.M. was therefore replaced by the Centre
( Military Experhara between 1960 and 1966, starting in the middle of d'Exprimentations Militaires des Oasis
iments
Center
of
the
Oasis
)
underground
nuclear testing
the Algerian War. 193 were carried out in French Polyfacility.
A
total
of
13
underground
nuclear
tests were carnesia.* [20]* [21]
ried out at the In Eker site from 7 November 1961 to 16
A summary table of French nuclear testing by years can February 1966. By July 1, 1967, all French facilities were
be found here: France's nuclear testing series.
evacuated.
Saharan experiments centers (196066)
Further information: Gerboise Bleue and Agathe (atomic
test)
After studying Runion, New Caledonia, and Clipperton
Island, General Charles Ailleret, head of the Special
Weapons Section, proposed two possible nuclear test sites
for France in a January 1957 report: French Algeria in the
Sahara Desert, and French Polynesia. Although he recommended against Polynesia because of its distance from
France and lack of a large airport, Ailleret stated that Algeria should be chosenprovisionally, likely due in part
to the Algerian War.* [22]

An accident happened on May 1, 1962, during the


"Bryl" test, four times more powerful than Hiroshima
and designed as an underground shaft test.* [26] Due to
improper sealing of the shaft, radioactive rock and dust
were released into the atmosphere. Nine soldiers of the
621st Groupe d'Armes Spciales unit were heavily contaminated by radiation.* [27] The soldiers were exposed
to as much as 600 mSv. The Minister of Armed Forces,
Pierre Messmer, and the Minister of Research, Gaston
Palewski, were present. As many as 100 additional personnel, including ocials, soldiers and Algerian workers
were exposed to lower levels of radiation, estimated at
about 50 mSv, when the radioactive cloud produced by
the blast passed over the command post, due to an unexpected change in wind direction. They escaped as they
could, often without wearing any protection. Palewski
died in 1984 of leukemia, which he always attributed to
the Beryl incident. In 2006, Bruno Barillot, specialist of
nuclear tests, measured on the site 93 microsieverts by
hour of gamma ray, equivalent to 1% of the ocial admissible yearly dose.* [24] The incident was documented
in the 2006 docudrama "Vive La Bombe!.* [28]

A series of atmospheric nuclear tests was conducted by


the Centre Saharien d'Exprimentations Militaires
( Saharan Military Experiments Center) from February 1960
until April 1961. The rst, called "Gerboise bleue"
( blue
jerboa) took place on 13 February 1960 in Algeria.
The explosion took place at 40 km from the military base
at Hammoudia near Reggane, which is the last town on
the Tanezrouft Track heading south across the Sahara to
Mali, and 700 km/435 mi. south of Bchar.* [23] The Saharan facilities
device had a 70 kiloton yield. Although Algeria became
C.I.E.E.S. (Centre Interarmes d'Essais d'Engins
independent in 1962, France was able to continue with
Spciaux): Hammaguir, 120 km/75 mi southwest of
underground nuclear tests in Algeria through 1966. The
Colomb-Bchar, Algeria:
General Pierre Marie Gallois was named le pre de la
bombe A (Father of the A-bomb).
used for launching rockets from 1947 to
Three further atmospheric tests were carried out from 1
1967.* [29]
April 1960 to 25 April 1961 at Hammoudia. Military,
workers and the nomadic Touareg population of the re C.S.E.M. (Centre Saharien d'Exprimentations Mili-

4.10. FRANCE

125

taires): Reggane, west of In-Salah, Tanezrouft, Algeria:


used for atmospheric tests from 1960 to 1961.
C.E.M.O. (Centre d'Exprimentations Militaires des
Oasis): In Ekker, in the Hoggar, 150 km/93 mi from
Tamanrasset, Tan Afella, Algeria:
used for underground tests from 1961 to 1967.
Pacic experiments center (19661996)
Despite its initial choice of Algeria for nuclear tests, the
French government decided to build Faa'a International
Airport in Tahiti, spending much more money and resources than would be justied by the ocial explanation
of tourism. By 1958, two years before the rst Sahara
test, France began again its search for new testing sites
due to potential political problems with Algeria and the
possibility of a ban on above-ground tests. Many overseas
France islands were studied, as well as performing underground tests in the Alps, Pyrenees, or Corsica; however,
engineers found problems with most of the possible sites
in metropolitan France.* [22]

The French nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle


and the American nuclear-powered carrier USS Enterprise (left),
each of which carry nuclear-capable ghter aircraft

at any given time, which coincides with the UK's policy.* [30]
In 2006, French President Jacques Chirac noted that
France would be willing to use nuclear weapons against a
state attacking France via terrorist means. He noted that
the French nuclear forces had been congured for this option.* [31]

On 21 March 2008, President Nicolas Sarkozy announced that France will reduce its aircraft deliverable
nuclear weapon stockpile (which currently consists of 60
By 1962 France hoped in its negotiations with the TN 81 warheads) by a third (i.e. 20 warheads), thus
Algerian independence movement to retain the Sahara bringing the total French nuclear arsenal to fewer than
as a test site until 1968, but decided that it needed to 300 warheads.* [32]* [33]
be able to also perform above-ground tests of hydrogen
bombs, which could not be done in Algeria. Mururoa
and Fangataufa in French Polynesia were chosen that 4.10.4 Antinuclear tests protests
year. President Charles de Gaulle announced the choice
on 3 January 1963, describing it as a benet to Polyne- Further information: Nuclear-free zone New Zealand
sia's weak economy. The Polynesian people and leaders
broadly supported the choice, although the tests became
controversial after they began, especially among Polyne By 1968 only France and China were detonatsian separatists.* [22]
ing nuclear weapons in the open air and the contamination caused by the H-bomb blast led to a
A total of 193 nuclear tests were carried out in Polynesia
global protest movement against further French atfrom 1966 to 1996. On 24 August 1968 France detonated
mospheric tests.* [7]
its rst thermonuclear weaponcodenamed Canopusover
Fangataufa. A ssion device ignited a lithium-6 deuteride
secondary inside a jacket of highly enriched uranium to
create a 2.6 megaton blast.
Simulation programme (19962012)
More recently, France has used supercomputers to simulate and study nuclear explosions.

4.10.3

Current nuclear doctrine and strategy

French law requires that at least one out of four nuclear


submarines would be on patrol in the Atlantic Ocean

From the early 1960s New Zealand peace groups


CND and the Peace Media had been organising
nationwide anti nuclear campaigns in protest of
atmospheric testing in French Polynesia. These
included two large national petitions presented to
the New Zealand government which led to a joint
New Zealand and Australian Government action to
take France to the International Court of Justice
(1972).* [34]
In 1972, Greenpeace and an amalgam of New
Zealand peace groups managed to delay nuclear
tests by several weeks by trespassing with a ship
in the testing zone. During the time, the skipper,
David McTaggart, was beaten and severely injured
by members of the French military.

126
In 1973 the New Zealand Peace Media organised an
international otilla of protest yachts including the
Fri, Spirit of Peace, Boy Roel, Magic Island and the
Tanmure to sail into the test exclusion zone.* [35]
In 1973, New Zealand Prime Minister Norman
Kirk as a symbolic act of protest sent two navy
frigates, HMNZS Canterbury and HMNZS Otago,
to Moruroa.* [36] They were accompanied by
HMAS Supply, a eet oiler of the Royal Australian
Navy.* [37]
In 1985 the Greenpeace ship Rainbow Warrior was
bombed and sunk by the French DGSE in Auckland,
New Zealand, as it prepared for another protest of
nuclear testing in French military zones. One crew
member, Fernando Pereira of Portugal, photographer, drowned on the sinking ship while attempting to recover his photographic equipment. Two
members of DGSE were captured and sentenced,
but eventually repatriated to France in a controversial aair.

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
One hundred fty thousand civilians, without taking into
account the local population, are estimated to have been
on the location of nuclear tests, in Algeria or in French
Polynesia.* [24] One French veteran of the 1960s nuclear
tests in Algeria described being given no protective clothing or masks, while being ordered to witness the tests at
so close a range that the ash penetrated through the arm
he used to cover his eyes.* [41] One of several veteran
s groups claiming to organise those suering ill eects,
AVEN had 4500 members in early 2009.* [40]

4.10.6 Test victims compensation

In both Algeria and French Polynesia there have been


long standing demands for compensation from those who
claim injury from Frances nuclear testing program. The
government of France had consistently denied, since the
late 1960s, that injury to military personnel and civilians
had been caused by their nuclear testing.* [42] Several
French veterans and African and Polynesian campaign
groups have waged court cases and public relations strug French president Jacques Chiracs decision to run gles demanding government reparations. In May 2009, a
a nuclear test series at Mururoa in 1995, just one group of twelve French veterans, in the campaign group
year before the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was Truth and Justice, who claim to have suered health
to be signed, caused worldwide protest, including an eects from nuclear testing in the 1960s had their claims
embargo of French wine. These tests were meant to denied by the government Commission for the Indemniprovide the nation with enough data to improve fur- cation of Victims of Penal Infraction (CIVI), and again
ther nuclear technology without needing additional by a Paris appeals court, citing laws which set a statute of
limitations for damages to 1976.* [43] Following this reseries of tests.* [38]
jection, the government announced it would create a 10m
The French Military conducted almost 200 nuclear Euro compensation fund for military and civilian victims
tests at Mururoa and Fangataufa atolls over a thirty- of its testing programme; both those carried out in the
year period ending 1996, 46 of them atmospheric, 1960s and the Polynesian tests of 19901996.* [42] Deof which ve were without signicant nuclear yield. fence Minister Herv Morin said the government would
In August 2006, an ocial French government re- create a board of physicians, overseen by a French judge
port by INSERM conrmed the link between an in- magistrate, to determine if individual cases were caused
crease in the cases of thyroid cancer and France by French testing, and if individuals were suering from
s atmospheric nuclear tests in the territory since illnesses on a United Nations Scientic Committee on
1966.* [39]
the Eects of Atomic Radiation list of eighteen disorders
linked to exposure to testing.* [42]* [44] Pressure groups,
including the Veterans group Truth and Justicecrit4.10.5 Veterans' associations and sympo- icised the programme as too restrictive in illnesses covsium
ered and too bureaucratic. Polynesian groups said the bill
would also unduly restrict applicants to those who had
An association gathering veterans of nuclear tests been in small areas near the test zones, not taking into
(AVEN, "Association des vtrans des essais nuclaires") account the pervasive pollution and radiation.* [45] Alwas created in 2001.* [40] Along with the Polynesian gerian groups had also complained that these restrictions
NGO Moruroa e tatou, the AVEN announced on 27 would deny compensation to many victims. One AlgeNovember 2002 that it would depose a complaint against rian group estimated there were 27,000 still living vicX (unknown) for involuntary homicide and putting some- tims of ill eects from the 196066 testing there, while
ones life in danger. On 7 June 2003, for the rst time, the French government had given an estimate of just
the military court of Tours granted an invalidity pension 500.* [46]
to a veteran of the Sahara tests. According to a poll made
by the AVEN with its members, only 12% have declared
being in good health.* [24] An international symposium 4.10.7 Non-nuclear WMDs
on the consequences of test carried out in Algeria took
place on 13 and 14 February 2007, under the ocial France states that it does not currently possess chemical
weapons. The country ratied the Chemical Weapons
oversight of President Abdelaziz Bouteika.

4.10. FRANCE

127

Convention (CWC) in 1995, and acceded to the


Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) in
1984. France had also ratied the Geneva Protocol in
1926.

[7] Origin of the Force de Frappe (Nuclear Weapon Archive)

During World War I in August 1914 France, not Germany as commonly believed, was actually the rst to use
chemical weapons though this was only a nonlethal tear
gas attack (xylyl bromide). Once the war had slowed to
trench warfare and new methods to attain an advantage
were sought the German Army initiated a chlorine gas attack against the French Army at Ypres on 15 April 1915
opening a new type of warfare but failing that day to exploit the break in the French line. In time, the more potent phosgene replaced chlorine in use by armies on the
western front including France leading to massive casualties on both sides of the conict though later the eects
were mitigated by development of protective clothing and
masks. At the outbreak of World War II, France had a
stockpile of mustard gas and phosgene but did not use
them against the invading Axis army. Testing of chemical
weapons occurred at a site called B2-Namous in Algeria
though other sites likely existed.* [47]* [48]

[9]

4.10.8

See also

Anti-nuclear protests
Force de frappe
French 'Simulation' project (to replace live nuclear
testing) (in French, French Wikipedia)
List of states with nuclear weapons
Moruroa
Nuclear-free zone - New Zealand
Weapons of Mass Destruction

4.10.9

Notes and references

[1] http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab14.asp
[2] CNS - Chemical and Biological Weapons Possession and
Programs Past and Present. Federation of American
Scientists. Retrieved 2008-03-21.
[3]France and the Chemical Weapons Convention. French
Ministry of Foreign and European Aairs. Retrieved
2008-03-21.
[4] Table of French Nuclear Forces (Natural Resources Defense Council, 2002)

[8] Stuck in the Canal, Fromkin, David - Editorial in The New


York Times, 28 October 2006

[10] Ullman, Richard H. (Summer 1989).The Covert French


Connection. Foreign Policy 75: 333. JSTOR 1148862.
[11] https://fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/nuke/farr.htm
[12] http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/israel/nuke.
html
[13] http://www.wrmea.org/wrmea-archives/
95-washington-report-archives-1982-1987/
december-1986/694-israels-nuclear-arsenal.html
[14] https://fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/nuke/
[15] http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/cpc-pubs/farr.htm
[16] Die Erinnerungen, Franz Josef Strauss - Berlin 1989, p.
314
[17] Germany, the NPT, and the European Option
(WISE/NIRS Nuclear Monitor)
[18] BBC News: Neutron bomb: Why 'clean' is deadly
[19] UK parliamentary question on whether condemnation was
considered by Thatcher government
[20] Treize ans aprs le dernier des essais nuclaires franais,
l'indemnisation des victimes en marche. Herv ASQUIN,
AFP. 27 May 2009.
[21] Four decades of French nuclear testing. Julien PEYRON,
France24. Tuesday 24 March 2009.
[22] Regnault, Jean-Mark (October 2003).
France's
Search for Nuclear Test Sites, 19571963. The
Journal of Military History 67 (4): 12231248.
doi:10.1353/jmh.2003.0326. JSTOR 3396887.
[23] French Senate report #179: The rst French tests in the
Sahara
[24] La bombe atomique en hritage, L'Humanit, February
21, 2007 (French)
[25] 1960: France explodes third atomic bomb, BBC On This
Day (English)
[26] Frances Nuclear Weapons
[27] Dossier de prsentation des essais nuclaires et leur suivi
au Sahara
[28] VIVE LA BOMBE!

[5] NEW YORK HERALD TRIBUNE, EUROPEAN


EDITION, 'JOLIOT-CURIE RIPS AMERICA FOR
ATOMIC ENERGY REPORT'". Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.

[29] http://fuseurop.univ-perp.fr/sahara_e.htm

[6] Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): Nuclear


Weapons. GlobalSecurity.org.

[31] "France 'would use nuclear arms'". BBC News, Thursday


19 January 2006

[30] "Nuclear submarines collide in Atlantic'". The Guardian,


February 16th, 2009

128

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

[32] Nuclaire : Mise l'eau du terrible devant Sarkozy France - LCI


[33] France cuts its nuclear weapons by a third. The Daily
Telegraph (London).
[34] http://www.disarmsecure.org/publications/papers/index.
html
[35] http://library.bullerdc.govt.nz/cgi-bin/library/liinquiry?
acc=00000711
[36] http://www.mururoavet.com/
[37] Frame, Tom (2004). No Pleasure Cruise: The Story of the
Royal Australian Navy. Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin. p.
251. ISBN 1-74114-233-4.
[38] Les essais nucleaires report of the French Senate (in
French)
[39] Licheld, John (4 August 2006). France's nuclear tests
in Pacic 'gave islanders cancer'". The Independent (London). Retrieved 18 October 2012.
[40] Les victimes des essais nuclaires enn reconnues. MarieChristine Soigneux, Le Montange (Clermont-Ferrand).
27 May 2009.
[41] Jai particip au premier essai dans le Sahara
DANIEL BOURDON, 72 ans, de Thourotte. Le Parisien.
24 May 2009.
[42] Government earmarks 10 million for nuclear test victims. France 24. Tuesday 24 March 2009.
[43] Court denies nuclear test victims compensation. France
24. Friday 22 May 2009
[44] Essais nuclaires franais au sud de lAlgrie: La France
dnit six critres.La voix de loranie(Oran, Algeria).
21 May 2009.
[45] Nuclear compensation bill falls short of expectations.
France24. Wednesday 27 May 2009
[46] VICTIMES ALGRIENNES DES ESSAIS NUCLAIRES FRANAIS. Sur quels critres sera valu
le handicap?. L'Expression (Algeria), 18 May 2009, p.24
[47] http://firstworldwar.com/weaponry/gas.htm
[48] https://fas.org/nuke/guide/france/cbw/

4.10.10

Bibliography

(French) Jean-Hugues Oppel, Rveillez le prsident,


ditions Payot et rivages, 2007 (ISBN 978-2-74361630-4). The book is a ction about the nuclear
weapons of France; the book also contains about ten
chapters on true historical incidents involving nuclear weapons and strategy (during the second half
of the twentieth century).

4.10.11 External links


In-depth background of the Development of the
French Program
Video archive of French Nuclear Testing at
sonicbomb.com
A Change in the French Nuclear Doctrine?, Rault,
Charles - ISRIA, 25 January 2006.
Country overview: France (from the Nuclear Threat
Initiative)
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
Nuclear Notebook: French nuclear forces,
2008, September/October 2008.
Nuclear policy:
France stands alone
July/August 2004
The French atomic energy program September
1962
Greenpeace movie (on the French bombing of the
Rainbow Warrior, a ship about to protest French nuclear tests)
Nuclear Files.org (current information on nuclear
stockpiles in France)
(French) Archives sur le Centre d'Exprimentations
Nuclaires du Pacique (C.E.P.) Moruroa, Hao et
Fangataufa
Annotated bibliography for the French nuclear
weapons program from the Alsos Digital Library for
Nuclear Issues
The Woodrow Wilson Center's Nuclear Proliferation International History Project The Wilson
Center's Nuclear Proliferation International History Project has primary source documents on USFrench nuclear relations.

4.11. GERMANY

4.11 Germany
Though Germany is one of the most technologically advanced countries in the world, since World War II it has
generally refrained from using this technology to outt
its own armed forces with weapons of mass destruction
(WMD), although it participates in the NATO nuclear
weapons sharing arrangements and trains for delivering
nuclear weapons.
Germany is among the powers which possess the ability to
create nuclear weapons but has agreed not to do so (under
the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as reafrmed by the Two Plus Four Treaty). Along with most
other industrial nations, Germany produces components
that can be used for creating deadly agents, chemical
weapons, and other WMD. Alongside other companies
from the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, India, the
United States, Belgium, Spain, and Brazil, German companies provided Iraq with precursors of chemical agents
used by Iraq to engage in chemical warfare during the
IranIraq War.* [1]

129
man but refrained from their use on the battleeld. In
total, Germany produced about 78,000 tons of chemical
weapons.* [4] By 1945 the nation produced about 12,000
tons of tabun and 1,000 pounds (450 kg) of sarin.* [4] Delivery systems for the nerve agents included 105 mm and
150 mm artillery shells, a 250 kg bomb and a 150 mm
rocket.* [4] Even when the Soviets neared Berlin, Adolf
Hitler was persuaded not to use tabun as the nal trump
card. The use of tabun was opposed by Hitler's Minister of Armaments, Albert Speer, who, in 1943, brought
IG Farben's nerve agent expert Otto Ambros to report to
Hitler. He informed Hitler that the Allies had stopped
publication of research into organophosphates (a type of
organic compound that emcompasses nerve agents) at the
beginning of the war, that the essential nature of nerve
gases had been published as early as the turn of the century, and that he believed that Allies could not have failed
to produce agents like tabun. This was not in fact the case,
but Hitler accepted Ambros's deduction, and Germany's
tabun arsenal remained unused. * [5]

Cold War and beyond

4.11.1

History

World War I
Main article: Use of poison gas in World War I
As one of the major combatants in World War I, Germany used and developed what we would today describe
as weapons of mass destruction. During World War I,
Germany developed and used chemical weapons, for instance mustard gas. These kinds of weapon were subsequently also employed by the Allies.
The use of chemical weapons in warfare during the Great
War was allegedly in violation of clause IV.2 'Declaration concerning the Prohibition of the Use of Projectiles
with the Sole Object to Spread Asphyxiating Poisonous
Gases' of the 1899 Hague Declarations, and more explicitly in violation of the 1907 Hague Convention on Land
Warfare, which explicitly forbade the use of poison or
poisoned weaponsin warfare.* [2]* [3]
World War II

As part of the accession negotiations of West Germany


to the Western European Union at the London and Paris
Conferences, the country was forbidden (by Protocol
No III to the revised Treaty of Brussels of 23 October 1954) to possess Nuclear, Biological or Chemical
weapons. This was reiterated in domestic law by the War
Weapons Control Act (Kriegswaenkontrollgesetz).* [6]
During the Cold War, nuclear weapons were deployed in
Germany by both the United States (in West Germany)
and the Soviet Union (in East Germany). Despite not being among the nuclear powers during the Cold War, Germany had a political and military interest in the balance
of nuclear capability. In 1977, after the Soviet deployment of the new SS-20 IRBM, West German chancellor
Helmut Schmidt expressed concern over the capability of
NATO's nuclear forces compared to those of the Soviets.
Later in the Cold War under the chancellorship of Helmut
Kohl, the West German government expressed concern
about the progress of the nuclear arms race. Particularly,
they addressed the eagerness of Germany's NATO allies,
the United States and United Kingdom, to seek restrictions on long-range strategic weapons while modernizing
their short-range and tactical nuclear systems. Germany
wanted to see such short range systems eliminated, because their major use was not deterrence but battleeld
employment. Germany itself, straddling the division of
the Eastern and Western blocs in Europe, was a likely battleeld in any escalation of the Cold War and battleeld
use of nuclear weapons would be devastating to German
territory.

During World War II, Germany worked to develop


nuclear weapons, though Allied scientists ultimately beat
the Germans to this goal - the international team included
many displaced migr scientists from Germany itself;
see German nuclear energy project. German scientists
also did research on other chemical weapons during the
war, including human experimentation with mustard gas. In 1957 the European Atomic Energy Community (EuThe rst nerve gas, tabun, was invented by the German ratom) was created to promote the use of nuclear energy
researcher Gerhard Schrader in 1937.
in Europe. Under cover of the peaceful use of nuclear
During the war, Germany stockpiled tabun, sarin, and so- power, West Germany hoped to develop the basis of a

130

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

nuclear weapons programme with France and Italy.* [7]


The West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer told his
cabinet that hewanted to achieve, through EURATOM,
as quickly as possible, the chance of producing our own
nuclear weapons.* [8] The idea was short-lived. In 1958
Charles De Gaulle became President of France and Germany and Italy were excluded from the weapons project.
Euratom continued as the European agency for the peaceful use of nuclear technology, becoming part of the structure of the European Economic Community in 1967.
Germany ratied the Geneva Protocol on 25 April 1929,
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on 2 May 1975,
the Biological Weapons Convention on 7 April 1983 and
the Chemical Weapons Convention on 12 August 1994.
These dates signify ratication by the Federal Republic
of Germany (West Germany), during the division of Germany the NPT and the BWC were ratied separately by
the German Democratic Republic (East Germany) (on 31
October 1969 and 28 November 1972, respectively).

operations could arguably contravene both the objective


and the spirit of the NPT.
Like other countries of its size and wealth, Germany has
the skills and resources to create its own nuclear weapons
quite quickly if desired. The Zippe-type centrifuge was,
indeed, invented by captured Germans working in the Soviet Union in the 1950s, and URENCO operates a centrifuge uranium enrichment plant in Germany. There are
also several power reactors in Germany that could be used
to produce bomb-grade plutonium if desired. Such a development is, of course, highly unlikely in the present benign security environment. In 2007, former defence secretary Rupert Scholz stated that Germany should strive
to become a nuclear power.* [10] In September 2007 the
French president Nicolas Sarkozy oered Germany to
participate in the control over the French nuclear arsenal. Chancellor Merkel and foreign minister Steinmeier
declined the oer however, stating that Germany had
no interest in possessing nuclear weapons.* [11] Due to
concerns over Vladimir Putin's actions, Merkel reversed
her position, stating to the German press, As long as
there are nuclear weapons in the world, we need to have
these capabilities, as NATO says.* [12]

Before German reunication in 1990, both West and East


Germany ratied the Treaty on the Final Settlement with
Respect to Germany. Germany rearmed its renunciation of the manufacture, possession, and control of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. In addition to
banning a foreign military presence in the former East 4.11.2 References
Germany, the treaty also banned nuclear weapons or nuclear weapon carriers to be stationed in the area, making [1] Al Isa, I. K. (1-12-2003) Fresh information on the Iraqi
it a permanent Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone. The German
chemical program; Iraqi money and German brains cooperated in building chemical weapons. Al Zaman, London.
military was allowed to possess conventional weapons
Federation of atomic scientists. Referenced 21-11-2006.
systems with nonconventional capabilities, provided that
they were outtted for a purely conventional role.
The United States provides about 60 tactical B61 nuclear bombs for use by Germany under a NATO nuclear
weapons sharing agreement. The bombs are stored at
Bchel and Ramstein Air Bases, and in time of war would
be delivered by Luftwae Panavia Tornado warplanes.
As well as being a breach of the Protocols to the (revised)
Treaty of Brussels, many countries believe this violates
Articles I and II of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT), where Germany has committed:
"... not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other
nuclear explosive devices or of control over
such weapons or explosive devices directly,
or indirectly ... or otherwise acquire nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices ...
.
The U.S. insists its forces control the weapons and that
no transfer of the nuclear bombs or control over them is
intendedunless and until a decision were made to go to
war, at which the [NPT] treaty would no longer be controlling, so there is no breach of the NPT. However
German pilots and other sta practice handling and delivering the U.S. nuclear bombs.* [9] Even if the NATO
argument is considered legally correct, such peacetime

[2] Telford Taylor (1 November 1993). The Anatomy of the


Nuremberg Trials: A Personal Memoir. Little, Brown
and Company. ISBN 0-3168-3400-9. Retrieved 20 June
2013.
[3] Thomas Graham, Damien J. Lavera (May 2003).
Cornerstones of Security: Arms Control Treaties in the Nuclear Era. University of Washington Press. pp. 79.
ISBN 0-2959-8296-9. Retrieved 5 July 2013.
[4] Smart, Jeery K. Medical Aspects of Chemical and Biological Warfare: Chapter 2 - History of Chemical and Biological Warfare: An American Perspective, (PDF: p. 14),
Borden Institute, Textbooks of Military Medicine, PDF
via Maxwell-Gunter Air Force Base, accessed 4 January
2009.
[5] Paxman, J.; Harris, R. (2002). A Higher Form of Killing:
The Secret History of Chemical and Biological Warfare
(2002 Rando edition). Random House Press. ISBN 08129-6653-8 pp.8284.
[6] Kriegswaenkontrollgesetz. War Weapons Control Act
(last modied 11 Oct 2002).
[7] Die Erinnerungen, Franz Josef Strauss - Berlin 1989, p.
314
[8] Germany, the NPT, and the
(WISE/NIRS Nuclear Monitor)

European

[9] Nassauer, O. (2001) Nuclear sharing: is it legal?

Option

4.12. INDIA

131

its obligations. There is no clear evidence, circumstantial or otherwise, that directly points toward an oensive
BW program. India does possess the scientic capability
[11] Spiegel Online: Spiegel- Sarkozy bot Deutschland
and infrastructure to launch an oensive BW program,
Beteiligung an Atomwaen an 15.September 2007 (Gerbut has chosen not to do so. In terms of delivery, India
man)
also possesses the capability to produce aerosols and has
[12] Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Merkel Shifts Stance to Say numerous potential delivery systems ranging from crop
NATO Must Keep Nuclear Defence,October 22, 2010 dusters to sophisticated ballistic missiles.* [12]
[10] Tagesspiegel: Ex-Minister: Atomwaen fr Deutschland
27 January 2007 (German)

No information exists in the public domain suggesting interest by the Indian government in delivery of biological
agents by these or any other means. To reiterate the latter
point, in October 2002, the then President Dr. A. P. J.
Abdul Kalam asserted that India will not make biological weapons. It is cruel to human beings.* [12]

4.11.3

External links

Germany, The NPT, and the European Option,


Matthias Kntzel, WISE
4.12.2

Chemical weapons

Nerve gases: history at Espionageinfo.com


Further information: Chemical weapon

4.12 India

In 1992, India signed the Chemical Weapons Convention


(CWC), stating that it did not have chemical weapons
and the capacity or capability to manufacture chemical
weapons. By doing this India became one of the original
signatories of the Chemical Weapons Convention [CWC]
in 1993,* [13] and ratied it on 2 September 1996. According to India's ex-Army Chief General Sunderji, a
country having the capability of making nuclear weapons
does not need to have chemical weapons, since the dread
of chemical weapons could be created only in those countries that do not have nuclear weapons. Others suggested
that the fact that India has found chemical weapons dispensable highlighted its condence in the conventional
weapons system at its command.

India is known to possess weapons of mass destruction


in the form of nuclear weapons and, in the past, chemical
weapons. Though India has not made any ocial statements about the size of its nuclear arsenal, recent estimates suggest that India has 110 nuclear weapons,* [7]* [3]
consistent with earlier estimates that it had produced
enough weapons-grade plutonium for up to 75110 nuclear weapons.* [8] In 1999 India was estimated to have
800 kg of separated reactor-grade plutonium, with a total
amount of 8300 kg of civilian plutonium, enough for approximately 1,000 nuclear weapons.* [9]* [10] India is not
a signatory to the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT), which it argues entrenches the status quo of the In June 1997, India declared its stock of chemical
existing nuclear weapons states whilst preventing general weapons (1,044 tonnes of sulphur mustard).* [14]* [15]
nuclear disarmament.* [11]
By the end of 2006, India had destroyed more than
India has signed and ratied both the Biological Weapons 75 percent of its chemical weapons/material stockpile
and was granted extension for destroying (the remainConvention and the Chemical Weapons Convention.
ing stocks by April 2009) and was expected to achieve
100 percent destruction within that time frame.* [14] India informed the United Nations in May 2009 that it had
4.12.1 Biological weapons
destroyed its stockpile of chemical weapons in compliFurther information: History of biological warfare
ance with the international Chemical Weapons Convention. With this India has become third country after
*
*
India has a well-developed biotechnology infrastructure South Korea and Albania to do so. [16] [17] This was
that includes numerous pharmaceutical production facil- cross-checked by inspectors of the United Nations.
ities bio-containment laboratories (including BSL-3 and
BSL-4) for working with lethal pathogens. It also has
highly qualied scientists with expertise in infectious diseases. Some of India's facilities are being used to support research and development for biological weapons
(BW) defence purposes. India has ratied the Biological
Weapons Convention (BWC) and pledges to abide by

India has an advanced commercial chemical industry, and


produces the bulk of its own chemicals for domestic consumption. It is also widely acknowledged that India has
an extensive civilian chemical and pharmaceutical industry and annually exports considerable quantities of chemicals to countries such as the United Kingdom, United
States and Taiwan.* [18]

132

4.12.3

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

Nuclear weapons

lished in 2003, with an Air Force ocer, Air Marshal


Asthana, as the Commander-in-Chief. The joint services
SNC is the custodian of all of India's nuclear weapons,
Further information: Strategic Forces Command
As early as 26 June 1946, Jawaharlal Nehru, soon to be missiles and assets. It is also responsible for executing
all aspects of India's nuclear policy. However, the civil
leadership, in the form of the CCS (Cabinet Committee
on Security) is the only body authorised to order a nuclear strike against another oending strike: In eect, it
is the Prime Minister who has his ngeron the button.
The National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon signalled a signicant shift from "No rst use" to no rst
use against non-nuclear weapon statesin a speech on
the occasion of Golden Jubilee celebrations of National
Defence College in New Delhi on 21 October 2010, a
doctrine Menon said reected India's strategic culture,
Range of Indian missiles
with its emphasis on minimal deterrence.* [25]* [26] In
April 2013 Shyam Saran, convener of the National SecuIndia's rst Prime Minister, announced:
rity Advisory Board, armed that regardless of the size
India's nuclear program started on March 1944 and its of a nuclear attack against India, be it a miniaturised verwill retaliate massively to
three-stage indigenous eorts in technology were estab- sion or a bigmissile, India
*
inict
unacceptable
damage.
[27]
lished by Dr. Homi Bhabha when he founded the nuclear research centre, the Institute of Fundamental Research.* [20]* [21] India's loss of territory to China in
a brief Himalayan border war in October 1962, provided the New Delhi government impetus for developing nuclear weapons as a means of deterring potential Land-based ballistic missiles
Chinese aggression.* [22] India rst tested a nuclear device in 1974 (code-named "Smiling Buddha"), which it
called a "peaceful nuclear explosion.The test used plutonium produced in the Canadian-supplied CIRUS reactor,
and raised concerns that nuclear technology supplied for
peaceful purposes could be diverted to weapons purposes.
This also stimulated the early work of the Nuclear Suppliers Group.* [23] India performed further nuclear tests
in 1998 (code-named "Operation Shakti"). In 1998, as
a response to the continuing tests, the United States and
Japan imposed sanctions on India, which have since been
lifted.
India's no-rst-use policy
India has a declared nuclear no-rst-use policy and is in
the process of developing a nuclear doctrine based on
credible minimum deterrence.In August 1999, the Indian government released a draft of the doctrine* [24]
which asserts that nuclear weapons are solely for deterrence and that India will pursue a policy of retaliation
only. The document also maintains that Indiawill not
be the rst to initiate a nuclear rst strike, but will respond
with punitive retaliation should deterrence failand that
decisions to authorise the use of nuclear weapons would
be made by the Prime Minister or his 'designated successor(s)'.* [24] According to the NRDC, despite the escalation of tensions between India and Pakistan in 2001
2002, India remained committed to its nuclear no-rstuse policy.

The Indian Army's Agni II missile on parade.

The land-based nuclear weapons of India are under the


control of and deployed by the Indian Army, using a
variety of both vehicles and launching silos. They currently consist of three dierent types of ballistic missiles, the Agni-I, the Agni-II, Agni-III and the Army's
variant of the Prithvi missile family the Prithvi-I. Additional variants of the Agni missile series are currently
under-development, including the most recent, the AgniIV and Agni-V, which are due to enter full operational
service in the near future. Agni-VI is also under development, with an envisioned range of 60008000 km and
features such as Multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) or Maneuverable reentry vehicles
India's Strategic Nuclear Command was formally estab- (MARVs).* [28]* [29]

4.12. INDIA

The Indian Air Force's Jaguar attack aircraft are believed to have
a secondary nuclear-strike role.

Strategic bombing
The current status of India's air-based nuclear weapons
is unclear. In addition to their ground-attack role, however, it is believed that the Dassault Mirage 2000s and
SEPECAT Jaguars of the Indian Air Force are able
to provide a secondary nuclear-strike role.* [30] The
SEPECAT Jaguar was designed to be able to carry and
deploy nuclear weapons and the Indian Air Force has
identied the jet as being capable of delivering Indian
nuclear weapons.* [31] The most likely delivery method
would be the use of bombs that were free-falling and unguided.* [32]
Sea-based ballistic missiles

133

Surface warships such as the Shivalik class frigates (shown) may


in future be equipped with the nuclear armed Dhanush ballistic
missiles.

sia provided technological aid to the naval nuclear propulsion program.* [37]* [38] The submarines will be armed
with up to 12 Sagarika (K-15) missiles armed with nuclear warheads. Sagarika is a submarine-launched ballistic missile with a range of 700 km. This missile has a
length of 8.5 meters, weighs seven tonnes and can carry
a pay load of up to 500 kg.* [39] Sagarika has already
been test-red from an underwater pontoon, but now
DRDO is planning a full-edged test of the missile from
a submarine and for this purpose may use the services
of the Russian Navy.* [40] India's DRDO is also working on a submarine-launched ballistic missile version of
the Agni-III missile, known as the Agni-III SL. According to Indian defence sources, the Agni-III SL will have a
range of 3,500 kilometres (2,200 mi).* [41] The new missile will complement the older and less capable Sagarika
submarine-launched ballistic missiles. However, the Arihant class ballistic missile submarines will be only capable of carrying a maximum of four Agni-III SL.

The second is a ship-launched system based around the


short range ship-launched Dhanush ballistic missile (a
variant of the Prithvi missile). It has a range of around
300 km. In the year 2000 the missile was test-red
from INS Subhadra (a Sukanya class patrol craft). INS
Subhadra was modied for the test and the missile was
launched from the reinforced helicopter deck. The results were considered partially successful.* [42] In 2004,
the missile was again tested from INS Subhadra and this
time the results were reported successful.* [43] In December 2005 the missile was tested again, but this time from
Conceptual drawing of the INS Arihant.
the destroyer INS Rajput. The test was a success with the
missile
hitting the land based target.* [44]
The Indian Navy has developed two sea-based delivery systems for nuclear weapons, completing Indian ambitions for a nuclear triad,which will be deployed in
4.12.4 International response
2015.* [33]* [34]
The rst is a submarine-launched system consisting of at
least four 6,000 tonne (nuclear-powered) ballistic missile
submarines of the Arihant class. The rst vessel, INS
Arihant, has been launched and will complete extensive
sea-trials before being commissioned and declared operational. She is the rst nuclear-powered submarine to be
built by India.* [35]* [36] A CIA report claimed that Rus-

India is not a signatory to either the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty (CTBT), but did accede to the Partial Test
Ban Treaty in October 1963. India is a member of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and four of
its 17 nuclear reactors are subject to IAEA safeguards.
India announced its lack of intention to accede to the

134

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

NPT as late as 1997 by voting against the paragraph of a


General Assembly Resolution* [47] which urged all nonsignatories of the treaty to accede to it at the earliest possible date.* [48] India voted against the UN General Assembly resolution endorsing the CTBT, which was adopted
on 10 September 1996. India objected to the lack of
provision for universal nuclear disarmament within a
time-bound framework.India also demanded that the
treaty ban laboratory simulations. In addition, India opposed the provision in Article XIV of the CTBT that requires India's ratication for the treaty to enter into force,
which India argued was a violation of its sovereign right
to choose whether it would sign the treaty. In early February 1997, Foreign Minister I. K. Gujral reiterated India's
opposition to the treaty, saying that India favors any
step aimed at destroying nuclear weapons, but considers
that the treaty in its current form is not comprehensive
and bans only certain types of tests.

man of India's National Security Advisory Board)". irgamag.com. [] These include a modest arsenal, nuclearcapable aircraft and missiles, both in xed underground
silos as well as [] mounted on mobile rail and roadbased platforms. These land-based missiles include both
Agni-II (1,500 km) as well as Agni-III (2,500 km) missiles. The range and accuracy of further versions for
example, Agni V (5,000 km), which was tested successfully only recently will improve with the acquisition of
further technological capability and experience
[5] New chief of India's military research complex reveals
brave new mandate. India Today. 4 July 2013. Retrieved 4 July 2013.
[6] Strategic Forces Command res AGNI-3 successfully
. Business Standard. 23 December 2013. Retrieved 23
December 2013. (Second operational test ring by the
Strategic Forces Command).
[7] Pakistan has 10 more nuclear weapons than India, nds

study.
In August 2008, the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) approved safeguards agreement with India un[8] Weapons around the world. physicsworld.com. Reder which the former will gradually gain access to Intrieved 31 August 2010.
*
dia's civilian nuclear reactors. [49] In September 2008,
the Nuclear Suppliers Group granted India a waiver al- [9] India's Nuclear Weapons Program.
http:
//nuclearweaponarchive.org.
Retrieved 26 June
lowing it to access civilian nuclear technology and fuel
2012.
from other countries.* [50] The implementation of this
waiver makes India the only known country with nuclear [10] India's and Pakistan's Fissile Material and Nuclear
weapons which is not a party to the NPT but is still alWeapons Inventories, end of 1999. Institute for Scilowed to carry out nuclear commerce with the rest of the
ence and International Security. Retrieved 26 June 2012.
world.* [51]
[11] US wants India to sign NPT Business Standard, 7 May

Since the implementation of the NSG waiver, India


2009.
has signed nuclear deals with several countries including France,* [52] United States,* [53] Mongolia, [12] Research Library: Country Proles: India Biological
Chronology. NTI. Archived from the original on 4 June
Namibia,* [54] Kazakhstan* [55] and Australia* [56]
2011. Retrieved 16 July 2010.
while the framework for similar deals with Canada and
*
*
United Kingdom are also being prepared. [57] [58]
[13] [pointer]=49

4.12.5

See also

Indian Armed Forces


Weapons of mass destruction

4.12.6

References

[1] Sachin Parashar, TNN, 28 August 2009, 12.55am IST (28


August 2009). Kalam certies Pokharan II, Santhanam
stands his ground India. The Times of India. Retrieved
31 August 2010.

[14] India to destroy chemical weapons stockpile by 2009.


Dominican Today. Retrieved 30 April 2013.
[15] Smithson, Amy Ganey, Frank, Jr.; 700+ words. India
declares its stock of chemical weapons. Retrieved 30
April 2013.
[16] Zee News India destroys its chemical weapons stockpile. Zeenews.india.com. 14 May 2009. Retrieved 30
April 2013.
[17]
[18] Research Library: Country Proles: India Biological
Chronology. NTI. Retrieved 16 July 2010.

[2] Carey Sublette. What Are the Real Yields of India's


Test?". Carey Sublette. Retrieved 12 January 2013.

[19] B. M. Udgaonkar, Indias nuclear capability, her security


concerns and the recent tests, Indian Academy of Sciences,
January 1999.

[3] Federation of American Scientists: Status of World Nuclear Forces. Fas.org. early 2013. Retrieved 4 June
2013. Check date values in: |date= (help)

[20] Chengappa, Raj (2000). Weapons of peace : the secret


story of India's quest to be a nuclear power. New Delhi:
Harper Collins Publishers, India. ISBN 81-7223-330-2.

[4] Saran, Shyam (25 April 2013).Is Indias Nuclear Deterrent Credible? (Statement given by Shyam Saran, Chair-

[21] et. al (30 March 2001). The Beginning: 19441960.


Nuclear weapon archive. Retrieved 15 January 2013.

4.12. INDIA

[22] Bruce Riedel (28 June 2012).JFK's Overshadowed Crisis. The National Interest. Retrieved 7 July 2012.
[23]
[24] Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on
Indian Nuclear Doctrine. Indianembassy.org. Retrieved
30 April 2013.
[25] Speech by NSA Shri Shivshankar Menon at NDC on
The Role of Force in Strategic Aairs". Retrieved 27
July 2015.
[26] NSA Shivshankar Menon at NDC (Speech) : india
Blooms
[27] Bagchi, Indrani. Even a midget nuke strike will lead
to massive retaliation, India warns Pak The Economic
Times. The Economic Times. Retrieved 30 April 2013.
[28] Advanced Agni-6 missile with multiple warheads likely
by 2017. Retrieved 1 October 2013.
[29] Subramanian, T.S. Agni-VI all set to take shape. Retrieved 1 October 2013.
[30] Indian Nuclear Forces, 14 July 2012.

135

[44] Dhanush, naval surface-to-surface missile, test red successfully. domain-b.com. 31 March 2007. Retrieved
31 August 2010.
[45] India s Dhanush Undergoes 1st Night Test - SP's Naval
Forces. Retrieved 27 July 2015.
[46] Press Trust of India (25 March 2014). India test res
long range N-missile launched from under sea. Retrieved
27 July 2015.
[47] United Nations General Assembly Session 52 Verbatim
67.A/52/PV.67 9 December 1997. Retrieved 22 August
2007.
[48] United Nations General Assembly Session 52 ResolutionA/RES/52/38 page 16. {{{date}}}. Retrieved 22
August 2007.
[49] IAEA approves India nuclear inspection deal IAEA.
iaea.org. Retrieved 2 October 2008.
[50] Nuclear Suppliers Group Grants India Historic Waiver
MarketWatch. Marketwatch.com. 6 October 2008.
Archived from the original on 20 October 2008. Retrieved 2 October 2008.

[31] India plans to impart power punch to Jaguar ghters, October 2012.

[51] AFP: India energised by nuclear pacts. Google News.


Agence France-Presse. 3 hours ago. Retrieved 2 October
2008. Check date values in: |date= (help)

[32] CDI Nuclear Issues Area Nuclear Weapons Database:


French Nuclear Delivery Systems. cdi.org. Retrieved
16 July 2010.

[52] India, France agree on civil nuclear cooperation. Redi.com. Retrieved 16 July 2010.

[33] Peri, Dinakar (12 June 2014). Indias Nuclear Triad


Finally Coming of Age. The Diplomat. Retrieved 10
March 2015.

[53] Bush signs India-US nuclear deal into law Home.


livemint.com. 9 October 2008. Retrieved 16 July 2010.

[54] TNN, 15 September 2009, 02.41am IST (15 September


2009). India, Mongolia sign civil, nuclear cooperation
[34] Nuclear triad weapons ready for deployment: DRDO
pact India. The Times of India. Retrieved 16 July
.
2010.
[35] Unnithan, Sandeep (28 January 2008). The secret undersea weapon. India Today. Retrieved 11 November
2012.
[36]Indian nuclear submarine, India Today, August 2007
edition
[37] Russia helped India's nuke programme: CIA. Press
Trust of India. 9 January 2003. Retrieved 2 January 2013.
[38] Russia helped Indian nuclear programme, says CIA.
The Dawn. 9 January 2009. Retrieved 2 January 2013.
[39] Sagarika missile test-red successfully. The Hindu
(Chennai, India). 27 February 2008. Retrieved 31 August
2010.

[55] Sanjay Dutta, TNN, 23 January 2009, 01.35am IST (23


January 2009).Kazakh nuclear, oil deals hang in balance
International Business Business. The Times of India.
Retrieved 16 July 2010.
[56] SUHASINI HAIDARSeptember 6, 2014 05:35
IST.
http://www.thehindu.com/news/national/
nuclear-deal-will-finally-allow-australian-uranium-to-india-tony-abbott/
article6383173.ece. Missing or empty |title= (help)
[57] UK, Canada eye India's nuclear business (18 January
2009). UK, Canada eye India's nuclear business.
NDTV.com. Retrieved 16 July 2010.
[58]

[40] Coming from India's defense unit: ASTRA missile.


Redi.com. 31 December 2004. Retrieved 31 August
2010.

4.12.7 Further reading

[41] Agni-III test-red successfully. Hinduonnet.com. 7


May 2008. Retrieved 31 August 2010.

Abraham, Itty (1998). The Making of the Indian Atomic


Bomb. Science, Secrecy, and the Postcolonial State. London and New York: Zed Books. ISBN 9788125016151.

[42] Nuclear Data Table of Indian Nuclear Forces, 2002


Pahuja, Om Parkash (2001). India: A Nuclear Weapon
. NRDC. Retrieved 16 July 2010.
[43]

State. New Delhi: Ocean Books. ISBN 978-81-8710069-0.

136

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

Perkovich, George (1999). India's Nuclear Bomb: The


Impact on Global Proliferation. Berkeley, Los Angeles,
and London: University of California Press. ISBN 9780-520-23210-5.
Szalontai, Balzs (2011). The Elephant in the Room:
The Soviet Union and Indias Nuclear Program, 19671989. Nuclear Proliferation International History Project
Working Paper #1. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson
Center Press.

4.12.8

External links

Indian nuclear weapons program at nuclearweaponarchive.org.


At nuclearles.org:
Nuclear India's nuclear confrontation
with Pakistan
Nuclear weapon stockpiles
CIA on India's nuclear program
India's missile testing ranges
Video interviews taken at the 2008 NPT PrepCom
on the United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy
Cooperation Act
Annotated bibliography for India's nuclear weapons
program at the Alsos Digital Library for Nuclear Issues.
Woodrow Wilson Center's Nuclear Proliferation International History Project, including a collection of
primary-source documents on Indian nuclear development.
The National Security Archive's Nuclear Vault
features a number of compilations of declassied
US government documents related to India's nuclear
program.

4.13 Iran
This article is about Iran and weapons of mass destruction. For Iran's nuclear power program, see Nuclear
program of Iran.
Iran, ocially the Islamic Republic of Iran, is not
known to currently possess weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and has signed treaties repudiating the possession of weapons of mass destruction including the Biological Weapons Convention,* [1] the
Chemical Weapons Convention,* [2] and the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).* [3] Iran has rst-hand
knowledge of WMD eectsover 100,000 Iranian troops

and civilians were victims of chemical weapons during the 1980s IranIraq War.* [4]* [5] On ideological
grounds, a public and categorical religious decree (fatwa)
against the development, production, stockpiling and use
of nuclear weapons has been issued by the Supreme
Leader of Iran Ayatollah Ali Khamenei along with other
clerics,* [6]* [7] though it is approved by some relatively
minor clerics.* [8] Later versions of this fatwa forbid only
theuseof nuclear weapons, but said nothing about their
production.* [9] Iran has stated its uranium enrichment
program is exclusively for peaceful purposes.* [10]* [11]
The IAEA has conrmed the non-diversion of declared
nuclear material in Iran but has also said itneeds to have
condence in the absence of possible military dimensions to Irans nuclear program.* [12]* [13] The IAEA
has pointed out that Iran is not implementing the requirements of United Nations Security Council Resolutions
and needs to cooperate to clarify outstanding issues and
meet requirement to provide early design information on
its nuclear facilities.* [14]
In December 2014, a Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms
Control report by Lincy and Milhollin based on International Atomic Energy Agency data concluded that Iran
could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for one
nuclear warhead in 1.7 months * [15] In 2012, sixteen
U.S. intelligence agencies, including the CIA, reported
that Iran was pursuing research that could enable it to
produce nuclear weapons, but was not attempting to do
so.* [16] The senior ocers of all of the major American
intelligence agencies stated that there was no conclusive
evidence that Iran has made any attempt to produce nuclear weapons since 2003.* [17] In a 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, the United States Intelligence Community assessed that Iran had ended allnuclear weapon design and weaponization workin 2003.* [18] U.S. Defense
Secretary Leon Panetta stated in January 2012 that Iran
was pursuing a nuclear weapons capability, but was not
attempting to produce nuclear weapons.* [19] In 2009,
U.S. intelligence assessed that Iranian intentions were
unknown.* [20]* [21] Some European intelligence believe
Iran has resumed its alleged nuclear weapons design
work.* [22] Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said
he had seen no evidence of any nuclear weapons program
in Iran,* [23] while Russian President Dmitry Medvedev
said Iran was close to having the capability to produce
nuclear weapons.* [24]* [25] Iran has called for nuclear
weapons states to disarm and for the Middle East to be
a nuclear weapon free zone.* [26]
After the IAEA voted in a rare non-consensus decision
to nd Iran in non-compliance with its NPT Safeguards
Agreement and to report that non-compliance to the UN
Security Council,* [27]* [28] the Council demanded that
Iran suspend its nuclear enrichment activities* [29]* [30]
and imposed sanctions against Iran* [31]* [32]* [33]* [34]
when Iran refused to do so.* [35] Former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad argued that the sanctions
were illegal.* [36] The IAEA has been able to verify the

4.13. IRAN

137

non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, but is incongruent for a country [US] who itself is a producer
not the absence of undeclared activities.* [37] The Non- of weapons of mass destruction to take such a decision.
Aligned Movement has called on both sides to work * [49] Mohamed ElBaradei, director of the IAEA at the
through the IAEA for a solution.* [38]
time, said he had no evidence Iran was building nuclear
In November 2009, the IAEA Board of Governors weapons and accused US* leaders of adding fuel to the
adopted* [39] a resolution against Iran which urged Iran rewith their rhetoric. [50] Speaking in Washington in
to apply the modied Code 3.1 to its Safeguard Agree- November 2007, days before the IAEA was to publish its
ment,* [40] urged Iran to implement and ratify the Ad- latest report, Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Shaul Mofaz
called for ElBaradei to be sacked, saying: The policies
ditional Protocol,* [40] and expressed serious concern
that Iran had not cooperated on issues that neededto be followed by ElBaradei endanger world peace. His irresponsible attitude of sticking his head in the sand over
claried to exclude the possibility of military dimensions
*
to Iran's nuclear program. [41] Iran said thehasty and Iran's nuclear programme should lead to his impeachment.Israel and some western governments fear Iran
undueresolution wouldjeopardize the conducive envi*
ronment vitally neededfor successful negotiations [41] is using its nuclear programme as a covert means to develop weapons, while Iran says it is aimed solely at proand lead to cooperation not exceeding its legal obligaducing electricity. For its part in the conict-ridden Mid*
tions to the body. [42]
dle East, Israel is a member of the IAEA, but it is not itself
a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and
is widely believed to currently be the only nuclear-armed
4.13.1 Nuclear weapons
state in the region.* [51]
See also: Nuclear program of Iran
History
Overview
In September 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors, in
a rare non-consensus decision with 12 abstentions,* [43]
recalled a previous Iranian policy of concealmentregarding its enrichment program* [44] and found that Iran
had violated its NPT Safeguards Agreement.* [45] Another IAEA report stated there is no evidence that the
previously undeclared nuclear material and activities ...
were related to a nuclear weapons program.* [44] Iran
has claimed that the military threat posed by Israel and
the United States is forcing it to restrict the release of information on its nuclear program.* [46] Gawdat Bahgat of
the National Defense University speculates that Iran may
have a lack of condence in the international community
which was reinforced when many nations, under pressure
from the United States, rejected or withdrew from signed
commercial deals with the Iranian nuclear authority.* [47]

Irans nuclear program began as a result of the Cold


War alliance between the United States and the shah of
Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who emerged as an important American ally in the Persian Gulf.* [52] Under
the Atoms for Peace program, Iran received basic nuclear research facilities from the United States. In return,
Tehran signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in 1968. Fueled by high oil prices
in the 1970s, Iran sought to purchase large-scale nuclear
facilities from Western suppliers in order to develop nuclear power and fuel-cycle facilities with both civilian and
potential military applications.* [52] In March 1974, the
shah established the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran
(AEOI).* [53] Sensing a heightened risk of nuclear proliferation, the United States convinced western allies to
limit the export of nuclear fuel-cycle facilities to Iran.
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, whose
revolution displaced the shah's monarchy in 1979 and
ruled the newly established Islamic Republic of Iran until his death in 1989, placed little emphasis on nuclear
weapons development because it was viewed as a suspicious western innovation.* [54] During that time, many
of Irans top scientists ed the country while the United
States organized an international campaign to block any
nuclear assistance to Iran.

On 31 July 2006, the Security Council passed a resolution


demanding Iran suspend its enrichment program.* [35]
On 23 December 2006, the UN Security Council imposed sanctions against Iran,* [31] which were later tightened on 24 March 2007,* [32] because Iran refused to suspend enrichment. Iran's representative to the UN argued
that the sanctions compelled Iran to abandon its rights under the NPT to peaceful nuclear technology.* [31] The Following the death of Ayotollah Khomeini, the leadNon-Aligned Movement called on both sides to work ership of President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and
through the IAEA for a solution.* [38]
Supreme Leader Ali Hosseini Khamenei sought to reUS intelligence predicted in August 2005 that Iran vive Irans overt nuclear civilian program and expand
could have the key ingredients for a nuclear weapon undeclared nuclear activities during the 1990s. Accordby 2015.* [48] On 25 October 2007, the United States ing to a strategic dossier from International Institute for
declared the Revolutionary Guards a proliferator of Strategic Studies, Iran turned away from Western supweapons of mass destruction, and the Quds Force a pliers and obtained nuclear assistance from Russian and
supporter of terrorism.* [49] Iran responded that it China in a number of key areas, including uranium min-

138
ing, milling and conversation, as well as technology for
heavy-water research reactors.* [52] However, Washington intervened with Moscow and Beijing to prevent Iran
from fully acquiring its list of nuclear power and fuelcycle facilities. The 1990s also saw Iran expand its furtive
nuclear research into conversion, enrichment and plutonium separation. Most importantly, on the basis of
additional centrifuge assistance from the A.Q. Khan network, Iran was able to begin the construction of pilotscale and industrial-scale enrichment facilities at Natanz
around 2000.* [52] Full exposure of Irans nuclear activities came in 2002, when an Iranian exiled opposition
group, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI)
declared the Natanz project in August of that year. Since
that time, international pressure on Iran has remained
steady, hampering but not halting the countrys nuclear
development.* [52] Iran remains legally bound to the NPT
and states its support for the treaty.
There are various estimates of when Iran might be able
to produce a nuclear weapon, should it choose to do so:
A 2005 assessment by the International Institute for
Strategic Studies concluded if Iran threw caution
to the wind, and sought a nuclear weapon capability as quickly as possible without regard for international reaction, it might be able to produce enough
HEU for a single nuclear weapon by the end of this
decade, assuming no technical problems. The report concludes, however, that it is unlikely that Iran
would atly ignore international reactions and develop nuclear weapons anyway.* [55]
A 2005 US National Intelligence Estimate stated
that Iran was ten years from making a nuclear
weapon.* [56]
In 2006 Ernst Uhrlau, the head of German
intelligence service, said Tehran would not be able
to produce enough material for a nuclear bomb before 2010 and would only be able to make it into a
weapon by about 2015.* [57]
A 2007 annual review the International Institute for
Strategic Studies in London stated that If and
when Iran does have 3,000 centrifuges operating
smoothly, the IISS estimates it would take an additional 9-11 months to produce 25 kg of highly
enriched uranium, enough for one implosion-type
weapon. That day is still 23 years away at the earliest.* [58]
The former head of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei,
said on 24 May 2007 that Iran could take between
3 and 8 years to make a bomb if it went down that
route.* [58]
On 22 October 2007, Mohamed ElBaradei repeated
that, even assuming Iran was trying to develop a nuclear bomb, they would require between another

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
three and eight years to succeed, an assessment
shared by all the intelligence services.* [59]
In December 2007, the United States National Intelligence Estimate (representing the consensus view
of all 16 American intelligence agencies) concluded
with a high level of condencethat Iran had
halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003 and
with moderate condencethat the program remains frozen as of mid-2007. The new estimate
says that the enrichment program could still provide
Iran with enough raw material to produce a nuclear
weapon sometime by the middle of next decade,
but that intelligence agencies "do not know whether
it currently intends to develop nuclear weapons" at
some future date.* [60]* [61] Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said 70 percent of the U.S.
report wastrue and positive,but denied its allegations of Iran having had a nuclear weapons program
before 2003. Russia has said there was no proof
Iran has ever run a nuclear weapons program.* [62]
The former head of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei,
stated that he had seen maybe some studies about
possible weaponization, but no evidenceof
an active weaponization programas of October
2007.* [63] Thomas Fingar, former Chairman of the
National Intelligence Council until December 2008,
in reference to the 2007 Iran NIE and using intelligence to anticipate opportunities and shape the future, said intelligence has a recently reinforced
propensity to underscore, overstate, or 'hype' the
ndings in order to get people to pay attentionand
that the 2007 NIE was intended to send the message
you do not have a lot of time but you appear to
have a diplomatic or non-military option.* [64] A
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) is the most authoritative written judgment concerning a national
security issue prepared by the Director of Central
Intelligence.* [65]
The U.S. Director of National Intelligence said in
February 2009 that Iran would not realistically be
able to a get a nuclear weapon until 2013, if it chose
to develop one.,* [66] and that US intelligence does
not know whether Iran intends to develop nuclear
weapons, but believes Iran could at least be keeping the option to develop them open.* [67] Mossad
Chief Meir Dagan was more cautious, saying recently that it would take the Iranians until 2014.
German, French, and British intelligence say that
under a worst-case scenario it would take Iran a minimum of 18 months to develop a nuclear weapon
if it chose to build one, and it would have to rst
purify its uranium and weaponize its uranium.* [66]
An anonymous source in the German Foreign Intelligence Service (BND) whose rank was not provided has gone further and claimed Iran could produce a nuclear bomb and conduct an underground
test in 6 months if it wanted to and further asserted

4.13. IRAN
that Iran had already mastered the full uranium enrichment cycle, and possessed enough centrifuges to
produce weapons-grade uranium.* [68]* [69] Physicists say that if Iran were to choose to develop a nuclear weapon, it would have to withdraw from the
International Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and
expel International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors from the country.* [70] George Friedman, head
of the global intelligence company Stratfor, has said
Iran isdecades awayfrom developing any credible
nuclear-arms capacity.* [71]

139
withdrew from its voluntary adherence to the Additional
Protocol.* [78]

On 12 May 2006, claims that highly enriched uranium


(well over the 3.5% enriched level) was reported to have
been found at a site where Iran has denied such sensitive atomic work, appeared. They have found particles of highly enriched uranium [HEU], but it is not clear
if this is contamination from centrifuges that had been
previously found [from imported material] or something
new,said one diplomat close to the UN International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). These reports have not
yet been ocially conrmed by the IAEA (as of 1 June
On 12 February 2010 US think tank expert David 2006).* [79]* [80]* [81]
Albright, the head of the Institute for Science and
International Security, said in a report that Iran was On 31 July 2006, the United Nations Security Council
seeking to make sucient weapons-grade ura- passed a resolution demanding that Iran suspend its ura*
nium. His claim was criticized by former chief nium enrichment activities. [35]
U.N. weapons inspector Scott Ritter.* [72]
In late 2006, New traces of plutonium and enriched
uranium potential material for atomic warheads have
An IAEA report issued 8 November 2011 provided been found [by the IAEA] in a nuclear waste facility in
detailed information outlining the IAEA's concerns Iran.However, A senior U.N. ocial who was faabout the possible military dimensions of Iran's nu- miliar with the report cautioned against reading too much
clear program, noting that Iran had pursued a struc- into the ndings of traces of highly enriched uranium and
tured program or activities relevant to the develop- plutonium, saying Iran had explained both and they could
ment of nuclear weapons.* [73]
plausibly be classied as byproducts of peaceful nuclear
activities.* [82] In 2007 these traces were determined
to have come from leaking used highly enriched uranium
IAEA
fuel from the Tehran Research Reactor, which the U.S.
supplied to Iran in 1967, and the matter was closed.* [83]
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is an
autonomous international organization that seeks to pro- In July 2007 the IAEA announced that Iran has agreed
mote the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to inhibit its to allow inspectors to visit its Arak nuclear plant, and by
August 2007 a plan for monitoring the Natanz uranium
use for military purposes.
enrichment plant will have been nalised.* [84]
On 6 March 2006, the IAEA Secretariat reported that
"the Agency has not seen indications of diversion of nu- In August 2007 the IAEA announced that Iran has agreed
clear material to nuclear weapons or other nuclear ex- to a plan to resolve key questions regarding its past nuclear
plosive devices ... however, after three years of inten- activities. The IAEA described this as asignicant step
sive verication, there remain uncertainties with regard forward.* [85]
to both the scope and the nature of Iran's nuclear pro- In September 2007 the IAEA announced it has been able
gramme".* [74] However, the inspectors did nd some to verify that Iran's declared nuclear material has not been
sensitive documents, including instructions and diagrams diverted from peaceful use. While the IAEA has been unon how to make uranium into a sphere, which is only nec- able to verify some important aspectsregarding the
essary to make nuclear weapons. Iran furnished the IAEA nature and scope of Iran's nuclear work, the agency and
with copies, claiming not to have used the information for Iranian ocials agreed on a plan to resolve all outstandweapons work, which it had obtained along with other ing issues, Director-General Mohamed ElBaradei said at
technology and parts in 1987 and the mid-1990s.* [75] It the time.* [86] In an interview with Radio Audizioni Italis thought this material was sold to them by Abdul Qadeer iane the same month, ElBaradei remarked thatIran does
Khan,* [76] though the documents did not have the nec- not constitute a certain and immediate threat for the interessary technical details to actually manufacture a bomb. national community.* [87] In October 2007, ElBaradei
On 18 December 2003, Iran voluntarily signed, but did
not ratify or bring into force, an Additional Protocol
that allows IAEA inspectors access to individuals, documentation relating to procurement, dual-use equipment,
certain military-owned workshops, and research and development locations.* [77] Iran agreed voluntarily to implement the Additional Protocol provisionally, however
when the IAEA reported Iran's non-compliance to the
United Nations Security Council on 4 February 2006 Iran

amplied these remarks, telling Le Monde that, even if


Iran did intend to develop a nuclear bomb, they would
needbetween another three and eight years to succeed
. He went on to note that all the intelligence services
agree with this assessment and that he wanted to get
people away from the idea that Iran will be a threat from
tomorrow, and that we are faced right now with the issue
of whether Iran should be bombed or allowed to have the
bomb.* [59]

140

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

In late October 2007, according to the International Herald Tribune, the former head of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, stated that he had seen no evidenceof Iran
developing nuclear weapons. The IHT quoted ElBaredei
as stating that,
We have information that there has been
maybe some studies about possible weaponization,said Mohamed ElBaradei, who led the
International Atomic Energy Agency. That's
why we have said that we cannot give Iran a
pass right now, because there is still a lot of
question marks.
But have we seen Iran having the nuclear material that can readily be used into
a weapon? No. Have we seen an active
weaponization program? No.
The IHT report went on to say thatElBaradei said he was
worried about the growing rhetoric from the U.S., which
he noted focused on Iran's alleged intentions to build a
nuclear weapon rather than evidence the country was actively doing so. If there is actual evidence, ElBaradei said
he would welcome seeing it.* [63]
In November 2007 ElBaradei circulated a report to
the upcoming meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors.* [88]* [89]* [90] Its ndings conclude that Iran has
made important strides towards clarifying its past activities, including provided access to documentation and ocials involved in centrifuge design in the 1980s and 1990s.
Answers provided by Iran regarding the past P-1 and P2 centrifuge programs were found to be consistent with
the IAEA's own ndings. However, Iran has ignored the
demands of the UN Security council, and has continued
to enrich uranium in the past year. The IAEA is not
able to conclusively conrm that Iran isn't currently enriching uranium for military purposes, as its inspections
have been restricted to workshops previously declared as
part of the civilian uranium enrichment program, and requests for access to certain military workshops have been
denied; the report noted that As a result, the agency's
knowledge about Iran's current nuclear program is diminishing. The report also conrmed that Iran now possesses 3000 centrifuges, a 10-fold increase over the past
year, though the feed rate is below the maximum for a
facility of this design. Data regarding the P-2 centrifuge,
which Ahmadinejad has claimed will quadruple production of enriched uranium, was provided only several days
before the report was published; the IAEA plan to discuss
this issue further in December. In response to the report
the US has vowed to push for more sanctions, whilst Iran
has called for an apology from the US.* [91]
In his nal November 2009 statement to the IAEA Board
of Governors, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei said the Agency
continued to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear
material in Iran, but that other issues of concern had
reached a dead endunless Iran were to fully cooperate with the agency. ElBaradei stated it would be helpful

if we were able to share with Iran more of the material


that is at the centre of these concerns, and also said it
would be helpful if Iran fully implemented the Subsidiary
Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement and fully implemented the Additional Protocol. ElBaradei said Iran's
failure to report the existence of a new fuel enrichment facility until September 2009 was inconsistent with its obligations under the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement. ElBaradei closed by saying international negotiations represented a unique opportunity to
address a humanitarian need and create space for negotiations.* [92]
On 18 February 2010 the IAEA released a new report on
Iran's nuclear program. Ivan Oelrich and Ivanka Barzashka, writing in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, suggestedthe media has seriously misrepresented the actual
contents of the reportand thatin fact, no new information has been revealed.They wrote that there was no
independent assessment that Iran is engaged in weapons
workand that this was hardly the rst time that the
agency has discussed potential evidence of Tehran's nuclear weapons research.* [93] Iran's envoy to the UN
atomic watchdog criticized Western powers for interpreting the IAEA report in anexaggerated, selective and inaccuratemanner.* [94] PressTV reported that the report
veried the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in
Iran and that Iran started enriching uranium to a higher
level in the presence of IAEA inspectors.* [95]
In an April 2010 interview with the BBC, former IAEA
Director General Mohamed ElBaradei said Western nations were seeking harsher sanctionsout of frustration
. I don't think Iran is developing, or we have new information that Iran is developing, a nuclear weapon today ..
there is a concern about Iran's future intentions, but even
if you talk to MI6 or the CIA, they will tell you they are
still four or ve years away from a weapon. So, we have
time to engage,he said. ElBaradei further said the building of trust between the parties would not happen until
the two sides sit around the negotiating table and address
their grievances. Sooner or later that will happen.* [96]

Alleged weaponization studies See also: Nuclear


program of Iran The Laptop and Alleged Studies
Former IAEA Director General ElBaradei said in 2009
that the agency had been provided withno credible evidencethat Iran is developing nuclear weapons,* [97] but
the New York Times reported in January 2009 that the
IAEA is investigating U.S. allegations Project 110 and
Project 111 could be names for Iranian eorts for designing a nuclear warhead and making it work with an Iranian
missile.* [98] We are looking to those suppliers of information to help us on the question of authenticity, because that is really a major issue. It is not an issue that involves nuclear material; it's a question of allegations,ElBaradei further said.* [99] ElBaradei has strongly denied

4.13. IRAN

141

reports that the agency had concluded Iran had developed


technology needed to assemble a nuclear warhead,* [100]
when a November 2009 article in The Guardian said the
allegations included Iran's weapon design activities using
two point implosion designs.* [101]

clear programme.The Agency is still awaiting a reply


from Iran to its request to meet relevant Iranian authorities in connection with these issues, the report said. The
report further said,it would be helpful if Member States
which have provided documentation to the Agency would
that documentation with Iran, as
The New York Times article cited classied US in- agree to share *more of
*
appropriate.
[107]
[108]
telligence reports asserting that Professor Mohsen
Fakhrizadeh is in charge of the projects, while Iranian Russia has denied allegations of continued Russian asocials assert these projects are a ction made up by sistance to Iran's nuclear weapons programas totally
the United States.* [98] The article further reported that groundlessand said the November 2009 IAEA report
while the international agency readily concedes that the rearmed the absence of a military component in Iran's
evidence about the two projects remains murky, one of eorts in the nuclear eld.* [109]
the documents it briey displayed at a meeting of the In December 2009, The Times claimed that a document
agency's member countries in Vienna last year, from Mr. from an unnamed Asian intelligence agency described the
Fakrizadeh's projects, showed the chronology of a mis- use of a neutron source which has no use other than in a
sile launching, ending with a warhead exploding about nuclear weapon, and claimed the document appeared to
650 yards above ground approximately the altitude from be from an oce in Iran's Defense Ministry and may have
which the bomb dropped on Hiroshima was detonated. been from around 2007.* [110]* [111] Norman Dombey,
*
[98] Gordon Oehler, who ran the CIA's nonproliferation professor emeritus of theoretical physics at Sussex Unicenter and served as deputy director of the presidential versity, wrote in that nothing in the published 'intellicommission on weapons of mass destruction, wrote if gence documents' shows Iran is close to having nuclear
someone has a good idea for a missile program, and he has weaponsand argued that it is unlikely that nuclear
really good connections, he'll get that program through.. weapon projects would be distributed among several uniBut that doesn't mean there is a master plan for a nuclear versities, or weapon parts marketed to research centres.
weapon.* [102] Outside experts note that the parts of * [112] A senior U.N. ocial who saw the document said
the report made public lack many dates associated with it may or may not be authentic, that it was unclear when
Iran's alleged activities meaning it is possible Iran had a the document was written, and that it was unclear whether
Project 110 at one time, but scrapped it as US intelligence any experiments had ever actually been performed.* [113]
insists.* [103] The Washington Post reports thatnowhere The C.I.A. did not declare whether it believes the docuare there construction orders, payment invoices, or more
ment was real, and European spy agencies also did not
than a handful of names and locations possibly connected give any authentication to the document.* [114] Western
to the projects.* [104] Former IAEA Director Mohamed
intelligence agencies said that, if genuine, it was unclear
ElBaradei said the Agency didn't have any information whether the paper provided any new insights into the state
that nuclear material has been used and didn't have any
of Iranian weapons research.* [114]It's very troubling
information that any components of nuclear weapons had if real,said Thomas B. Cochran, a senior scientist in the
been manufactured.* [99] Iran has asserted that the docunuclear program of the Natural Resources Defense Counments are a fabrication, while the IAEA has urged Iran cil.* [114] The Institute for Science and International Seto be more cooperative and Member States to provide curity, said that iturges caution and further assessment
more information about the allegations to be shared with of the document and noted that the document does not
Iran.* [105]
mention nuclear weapons .. and we have seen no eviIn August 2009 an article in the Israeli newspaper
Haaretz alleged that ElBaradei had censoredevidence obtained by IAEA inspectors over the preceding
few months.* [106] ElBaradei has angrily rejected claims
from Israel, France and the US that he had suppressed the
internal IAEA report, saying all relevant and conrmed
information had been presented to member states.* [97]
ElBaradei said he and the Agency have repeatedly said
the rumors of censorship were totally baseless, totally
groundless. All information that we have received that
has been vetted, assessed in accordance with our standard
practices, has been shared with the Board.* [99]
On 16 November 2009 the Director General provided
a report to the Board of Governors. The report stated
there remain a number of outstanding issues which give
rise to concerns, and which need to be claried to exclude
the existence of possible military dimensions to Iran's nu-

dence of an Iranian decision to build them.* [114] Anton Khlopkov, the founding director of the Center for Energy and Security Studies, said the media leak may be being used as a pretext for inciting the campaign against
Iran.* [115] Former Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny
Primakov has also said after the public publications of
the documentsRussia has no concrete information that
Iran is planning to construct a weapon.* [116] Russia's
representative to the IAEA, Alexander Zmeyevskiy, has
noted that though the IAEA is in possession of these documents, the IAEA's ndingsdo not contain any conclusions about the presence of undeclared nuclear activities
in Iran.* [117] Iran pointed out the claims had not been
veried by the International Atomic Energy Agency and
argued that some countries are angry that our people
defend their nuclear rights.* [118] I think that some
of the claims about our nuclear issue have turned into a

142

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

repetitive and tasteless joke,Iranian President Mahmoud Iran has criticized the European Union because it beAhmadinejad said in response to the documents.* [119]
lieves it has taken no steps to reduce the danger of nuclear weapons in the Middle East.* [26] Iran has called on
the state of Israel to sign the NPT, accept inspection of
Iranian stance
its nuclear facilities, and place its nuclear facilities under
IAEA safeguards.* [26] Iran has proposed that the Middle
Main article: Nuclear program of Iran The Iranian East be established as a proposed Nuclear Weapon Free
viewpoint
Zone.* [26]
Iran states that the purpose of its nuclear program is the
generation of power and that any other use would be a violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, of which
it is a signatory, as well as being against Islamic religious
principles. Iran claims that nuclear power is necessary for
a booming population and rapidly industrialising nation.
It points to the fact that Iran's population has more than
doubled in 20 years, the country regularly imports gasoline and electricity, and that burning fossil fuel in large
amounts harms Iran's environment drastically. Additionally, Iran questions why it shouldn't be allowed to diversify its sources of energy, especially when there are fears
of its oil elds eventually being depleted. It continues to
argue that its valuable oil should be used for high value
products and export, not simple electricity generation.
Furthermore, Iran argues that nuclear power makes fairly
good economic sense. Building reactors is expensive,
but subsequent operating costs are low and stable, and
increasingly competitive as fossil-fuel prices rise.* [120]
Iran also raises funding questions, claiming that developing the excess capacity in its oil industry would cost it
$40 billion, not to speak of paying for the power plants.
Harnessing nuclear power costs a fraction of this, considering Iran has abundant supplies of accessible uranium
ore.* [121] These claims have been echoed by Scott Ritter, the former UN weapons inspector in Iraq. Roger
Stern, of Johns Hopkins Department of Geography and
Environmental Engineering, agreesIran's claims to need
nuclear power could be genuine.* [122]
Iran states it has a legal right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes under the NPT, and further says that it
has constantly complied with its obligations under the
NPT and the Statute of the International Atomic Energy
Agency.* [123] Twelve other countries are known to operate uranium enrichment facilities. Iran states thatthe
failure of certain Nuclear- Weapon States to fulll their
international obligations continue to be a source of threat
for the international community.* [26] Iran also states
thatthe only country that has ever used nuclear weapons
still maintains a sizable arsenal of thousands of nuclear
warheadsand calls for a stop to the transfer of technology to non-NPT states.* [26] Iran has called for the development of a follow-up committee to ensure compliance
with global nuclear disarmanent.* [124] Iran and many
other nations without nuclear weapons have said that the
present situation whereby Nuclear Weapon States monopolise the right to possess nuclear weapons ishighly discriminatory, and they have pushed for steps to accelerate
the process of nuclear disarmament.* [125]

On 3 December 2004, Iran's former president and an Islamic cleric, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani alluded to Iran's
position on nuclear energy:

God willing, we expect to soon join the club


of the countries that have a nuclear industry,
with all its branches, except the military one,
in which we are not interested. We want to get
what we're entitled to. I say unequivocally that
for no price will we be willing to relinquish our
legal and international right. I also say unequivocally to those who make false claims: Iran is
not pursuing nuclear weapons, but it will not
give up its rights. Your provocation will not
make us pursue nuclear weapons. We hope that
you come to your senses soon and do not get the
world involved in disputes and crises.* [126]
On 14 November 2004, Iran's chief nuclear negotiator
said that his country agreed to voluntarily and temporarily suspend the uranium enrichment program after pressure from the European Union on behalf of the United
Kingdom, France and Germany, as a condence-building
measure for a reasonable period of time, with six months
mentioned as a reference.
Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has publicly
stated Iran is not developing nuclear weapons. On
9 August 2005 Iran's Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei, issued a fatwa that the production, stockpiling
and use of nuclear weapons are forbidden under Islam and
that Iran shall never acquire these weapons. The text of
the fatwa has not been released although it was referenced
in an ocial statement at a meeting of the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna.* [127]
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in a 2005
speech to the U.N. General Assembly saidWe are concerned that once certain powerful states completely control nuclear energy resources and technology, they will
deny access to other states and thus deepen the divide between powerful countries and the rest of the international
community ... peaceful use of nuclear energy without
possession of a nuclear fuel cycle is an empty proposition.* [128]
On 6 August 2005, Iran rejected a 34 page European
Union proposal intended to help Iran build a safe,
economically viable and proliferation-proof civil nuclear
power generation and research program.The Europeans,

4.13. IRAN
with US agreement, intended to entice Iran into a binding
commitment not to develop uranium enrichment capability by oering to provide fuel and other long-term support that would facilitate electricity generation with nuclear energy. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid
Reza Ase rejected the proposal saying,We had already
announced that any plan has to recognize Iran's right to
enrich uranium.* [129] After the Iranian Revolution,
Germany halted construction of the Bushehr reactor, the
United States cut o supply of highly enriched uranium
(HEU) fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor, and Iran
never received uranium from France which it asserted it
was entitled to. Russia agreed not to provide an enrichment plant and terminated cooperation on several other
nuclear-related technologies, including laser isotope separation; China terminated several nuclear projects (in return, in part for entry into force of a U.S.-China civil
nuclear cooperation agreement); and Ukraine agreed not
to provide the turbine for Bushehr. Iran argues that
these experiences contribute to a perception that foreign
nuclear supplies are potentially subject to being interrupted.* [130]
Iran resumed its uranium enrichment program in January
2006, prompting the IAEA to refer the issue to the UN
Security Council.

143
also close down their nuclear fuel production activities
. The White House's spokesperson Tony Snow rejected
the oer and called it a false oer.* [136]
Iran has said that U.N. Security Council sanctions aimed
at curtailing its uranium-enrichment activities unfairly
target its medical sector. We have thousands of patients a month at our hospital alone .. If we can't help
them, some will die. It's as simple as that,said an Iranian nuclear medicine specialist. An Iranian Jew from
California claimed I don't believe in these sanctions...
They hurt normal people, not leaders. What is the use of
that?" Vice President of the Atomic Energy Organization
of Iran Ghannadi framed the debate as a humanitarian issue, This is about human beings. . . . When someone
is sick, we should give medicine.Iran informed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that fuel obtained from Argentina in 1993 would run out by the end
of 2010, and that it could produce the uranium itself or
buy the uranium from abroad.* [137]
In February 2010, to refuel the Tehran Research Reactor which produces medical isotopes,* [138] Iran began using a single cascade to enrich uranium up to
19.8%",* [139]* [140] to match the previously foreign
supplied fuel.* [141] 20% is the upper threshold for low
enriched uranium (LEU).* [142] Though HEU enriched
to levels exceeding 20% is considered technically usable
in a nuclear explosive device,* [143] this route is much
less desirable because far more material is required to
achieve a sustained nuclear chain reaction.* [144] HEU
enriched to 90% and above is most typically used in a
weapons development program.* [145]* [146]

On 21 February 2006, Rooz, a news website run by Iranian exiles (the Fedayeen Khalq [People's Commandos]
leftist terrorist group),* [131] reported that Hojatoleslam
Mohsen Gharavian, a student of Qom's fundamentalist
cleric Mesbah Yazdi, spoke about the necessity of using
nuclear weapons as a means to retaliate and announced
that based on religious law, everything depends on our In an interview in October 2011, President Ahmadinejad
purpose.* [132] In an interview with the Islamic Repub- of Iran said:
lic News Agency the same day, Gharavian rejected these
reports, saying We do not seek nuclear weapons and
"We have already expressed our views about
the Islamic religion encourages coexistence along with
nuclear bombs. We said those who are seeking
peace and friendship...these websites have tried to misto build nuclear bombs or those who stockpile,
quote me.* [133]
they are politically and mentally retarded. We
On 11 April 2006, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahthink they are stupid because the era of nuclear
madinejad announced Iranian scientists working at the
bombs is over. [Why] for example, should Iran
pilot facility at Natanz had successfully enriched uranium
continue its eorts and tolerate all international
to the 3.5 percent level, using a small cascade of 164
treasures only to build a nuclear bomb, or a few
gas centrifuges. In the televised address from the city
nuclear bombs that are useless? They can never
of Mashhad he said, I am ocially announcing that
be used!"* [147]
Iran has joined the group of those countries which have
nuclear technology".* [134]
On 22 February 2012, in a meeting in Tehran with the diIn May 2006 some members of the Iranian legislature rector and ocials of the Atomic Energy Organization of
("Majlis" or Parliament) sent a letter to UN Secretary- Iran (AEOI) and nuclear scientists, Leader of the Islamic
General Ko Annan threatening to withdraw from the Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei said:
NPT if Iran's right to peaceful use of nuclear technology
"The Iranian nation has never pursued and
under the treaty was not protected.* [135]
will never pursue nuclear weapons. There is
On 21 February 2007, the same day the UN deadline to
no doubt that the decision makers in the counsuspend nuclear activities expired, Mahmoud Ahmadinetries opposing us know well that Iran is not after
jad made the following statement: If they say that we
nuclear weapons because the Islamic Republic,
should close down our fuel production facilities to resume
logically, religiously and theoretically, considers
talks, we say ne, but those who enter talks with us should
the possession of nuclear weapons a grave sin

144

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
and believes the proliferation of such weapons
is senseless, destructive and dangerous.* [148]

The U.S. stance


See also: United States and weapons of mass destruction

In 2005, the United States stated that Iran has


violated both Article III and Article II of the
NPT.* [149] The IAEA Board of Governors, in
a rare divided vote, found Iran in noncompliance
with its NPT safeguards agreement for a 1985
2003 policy of concealment* [44] regarding
its eorts to develop enrichment and reprocessing technologies.* [27] The United States,* [150] the
IAEA* [151] and others* [152] consider these technologies to be of particular concern because they can
be used to produce ssile material for use in nuclear
weapons.
The United States has argued that Iran's concealment of eorts to develop sensitive nuclear technology is prima facie evidence of Iran's intention to
develop nuclear weapons, or at a minimum to develop a latent nuclear weapons capability. Others
have noted that while possession of the technology
contributes to the latency of non-nuclear weapon
states in their potential to acquire nuclear weapons
but that such latency is not necessarily evidence of
intent to proceed toward the acquisition of nuclear
weapons, sinceintent is in the eye of the beholder
.* [153]
The United States has also provided information to
the IAEA on Iranian studies related to weapons design, activities, including the intention of diverting a
civilian nuclear energy program to the manufacture
of weapons, based on a laptop computer reportedly
linked to Iranian weapons programs. The United
States has pointed to other information reported by
the IAEA, including the Green Salt Project, the possession of a document on manufacturing uranium
metal hemispheres, and other links between Iran's
military and its nuclear program, as further indications of a military intent to Iran's nuclear program.* [154] The IAEA has said U.S. intelligence
provided to it through 2007 has proven inaccurate or
not led to signicant discoveries inside Iran;* [155]
however, the US, and others have recently provided
more intelligence to the agency.* [156]
In May 2003, The Swiss ambassador to Iran sent the
State Department a two page document, reportedly
approved by Ayatollah Khamanei, outlining a road
map towards normalization of relations between the
two states. The Iranians oered full transparency

of its nuclear programme and withdrawal of support


from Hamas and Hezbollah in exchange for security assurances and normalization of diplomatic relations. The Bush Administration did not respond
to the proposal, as senior U.S. ocials doubted its
authenticity.* [157]* [158]
The United States acknowledges Iran's right to nuclear power, and has joined with the EU-3, Russia
and China in oering nuclear and other economic
and technological cooperation with Iran if it suspends uranium enrichment. This cooperation would
include an assured supply of fuel for Iran's nuclear
reactors.* [159]
A potential reason behind U.S. resistance to an Iranian nuclear program lies in Middle Eastern geopolitics. In essence, the US feels that it must guard
against even the possibility of Iran obtaining a nuclear weapons capability. Some nuclear technology
is dual-use; i.e. it can be used for peaceful energy
generation, and to develop nuclear weapons, a situation that resulted in India's nuclear weapons program in the 1960s. A nuclear-armed Iran would dramatically change the balance of power in the Middle
East, weakening US inuence. It could also encourage other Middle Eastern nations to develop nuclear
weapons of their own further reducing US inuence
in a critical region.* [160]
In 2003, the United States insisted that Tehran be
held accountablefor seeking to build nuclear arms
in violation of its agreements.* [161] In June 2005,
the US secretary of state Condoleezza Rice required
former IAEA head Mohamed ElBaradei to either
toughen his stance on Iranor fail to be chosen
for a third term as IAEA head.* [162] The IAEA
has on some occasions criticised the stance of the
U.S. on Iran's program.* [163] The United States denounced Iran's successful enrichment of uranium to
fuel grade in April 2006, with spokesman Scott McClellan saying, they continue to show that Iran is
moving in the wrong direction. In November 2006,
Seymour Hersh described a classied draft assessment by the Central Intelligence Agencychallenging the White House's assumptions about how close
Iran might be to building a nuclear bomb. He continued, The CIA found no conclusive evidence,
as yet, of a secret Iranian nuclear-weapons program
running parallel to the civilian operations that Iran
has declared to the International Atomic Energy
Agency,adding that a current senior intelligence ofcial conrmed the assessment.* [164] On 25 February 2007, The Daily Telegraph reported that the
United States Fifth Fleet, including the Nimitz-class
supercarriers Eisenhower, Nimitz and Stennisprepares to take on Iran".* [165]

4.13. IRAN
In March 2006, it was reported that the US State
Department had opened an Oce of Iranian Affairs (OIA) overseen by Elizabeth Cheney, the
daughter of Vice President Dick Cheney. The ofce's mission was reportedly to promote a democratic transition in Iran.* [166] and to help defeatthe Iranian regime.* [167] Iran argued the ofce was tasked with drawing up plans to overthrow
its government. One Iranian reformer said after the
oce opened that many partners are simply too
afraid to work with us anymore, and that the oce
hada chilling eect.* [168] The US Congress has
reportedly appropriated more than $120 million to
fund the project.* [169] Investigative journalist Seymour Hersh also revealed in July 2008 Congress also
agreed to a $400-million funding request for a major
escalation in covert operations inside Iran.* [170]
The Bush Administration repeatedly refused to rule
out use of nuclear weapons against Iran. The
U.S. Nuclear Posture Review made public in 2002
specically envisioned the use of nuclear weapons
on a rst strike basis, even against non-nuclear
armed states.* [171] Investigative reporter Seymour
Hersh reported in 2006 that the Bush administration had been planning the use of nuclear weapons
against Iran.* [172] When specically questioned
about the potential use of nuclear weapons against
Iran, President Bush claimed that All options
were on the table.According to the Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists, the president of the United
States directly threatened Iran with a preemptive nuclear strike. It is hard to read his reply in any other
way.* [173]
In September 2007, Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Secretary of State, cautioned the IAEA not to interfere with international diplomacy over Iran's alleged
weapons program. She said the IAEA's role should
be limited to carrying out inspections and oering
aclear declaration and clear reporting on what the
Iranians are doing; whether and when and if they
are living up to the agreements they have signed.
Former IAEA Director General ElBaradei called
for less emphasis on additional UN sanctions and
more emphasis on enhanced cooperation between
the IAEA and Tehran. Iran has agreed with IAEA
requests to answer unresolved questions about its nuclear program. ElBaradei often criticized what he
calledwar mongering,only to be told by Rice to
mind his business.* [174]
In December 2007, the United States National Intelligence Estimate (which represents the consensus
view of all 16 American spy agencies) concluded,
with a high level of condence, that Iran had
halted all of its nuclear weapons program in 2003
and that the program remains frozen. The new

145
estimate says that the enrichment program could
still provide Iran with enough raw material to produce a nuclear weapon sometime by the middle of
next decade but that intelligence agencies do not
know whether it currently intends to develop nuclear
weaponsat some future date. Senator Harry Reid,
the majority leader, said he hoped the administration
wouldappropriately adjust its rhetoric and policy
.* [60]* [61]
On 2 February 2009, the thirtieth anniversary of the
Islamic Revolution in Iran, Iran launched its rst
domestically produced* [175] satellite Omid (meaning Hope) in to space.* [176] Iran's President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad described the successful
launching of the Omid data-processing satellite as
a very big source of pride for Iran and said the
project improved Iran's status in the world.* [177]
The United States claimed Iran's activities could be
linked to the development of a military nuclear capability and that the activities were of great concern.* [178] The U.S. specically said it would
continue to address the threats posed by Iran, including those related to its missile and nuclear programs.* [179] Despite the U.S. saying it would
use all elements of its national power to deal with
Tehran's actions,* [180] Iran said the launch was a
step to remove the scientic monopoly certain world
countries are trying to impose on the world.* [181]
Iraqi National Security Advisor Muwafaq al-Rubaie
said Iraq was very pleased with the launch of Iran's
peaceful data-processing national satellite.* [182]
In March 2009, Richard N. Haass, President of the
Council on Foreign Relations, wrote that U.S. policy must be thoroughly multilateral and suggested
recognizing Iranian enrichment while getting Iran
to agree to limits on its enrichment. In return,
some of the current sanctions in place would be suspended. In addition, Iran should be oered assured
access to adequate supplies of nuclear fuel for the
purpose of producing electricity. Normalization of
political ties could be part of the equation,Haass
said.* [183] In October 2009, Ploughshares Fund
President Joseph Cirincione outlined ve persistent myths about Iran's nuclear program": that Iran
is on the verge of developing a nuclear weapon, that
a military strike would knock out Iran's program,
that we can cripple Iran with sanctions, that a
new government in Iran would abandon the nuclear
program, and that Iran is the main nuclear threat in
the Middle East.* [184]
In 2009, Independent U.S. Security Consultant
Linton F. Brooks wrote that in an ideal futureIran
has abandoned its plans for nuclear weapons due to
consistent international pressure under joint U.S.
Russian leadership. Iran has implemented the Ad-

146

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
ditional Protocol and developed commercial nuclear power under strict International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards using a fuel leasing
approach with fuel supplied by Russia and spent fuel
returned to Russia.* [185]

A 2009 U.S. congressional research paper says U.S.


intelligence believes Iran ended nuclear weapon
design and weaponization workin 2003.* [20] The
intelligence consensus was armed by leaders of
the U.S. intelligence community. Some advisors
within the Obama administration rearmed the intelligence conclusions,* [186] while other top advisersin the Obama administration say they no
longer believethe key nding of the 2007 National
Intelligence Estimate".* [187] Thomas Fingar, former Chairman of the National Intelligence Council
until December 2008, said that the original 2007
National Intelligence Estimate on Iran became
contentious, in part, because the White House instructed the Intelligence Community to release an
unclassied version of the report's key judgments
but declined to take responsibility for ordering its
release.* [188]
Lieutenant General Ronald Burgess, the chief of the
Defense Intelligence Agency, said in January 2010
that there is no evidence that Iran has made a decision to build a nuclear weapon and that the key ndings of a 2007 National Intelligence Estimate are all
still correct.* [189]
On 20 July 2011, Frederick Fleitz, a former CIA analyst and House Intelligence Committee sta member, took issue with a February 2011 revision of the
2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran's nuclear weapons program in a Wall Street Journal oped titled "America's Intelligence Denial on Iran.In
the op-ed, Fleitz claimed the new estimate had serious problems and underplayed the threat from Iran's
pursuit of nuclear weapons program much as the
2007 version did. However, Fleitz stated that he was
not permitted by CIA censors to discuss his specic
concerns about the estimate. Fleitz also claimed the
estimate had a four-member outside review board
that he viewed as biased since three of the reviewers held the same ideological and political views and
two of them were from the same Washington DC
think tank. He noted that the CIA prevented him
from releasing the names of the outside reviewers
of the 2011 Iran estimate.

an Israeli attack would only delay Iran's program by


one or two years. General Michael V. Hayden, former CIA Director, said in January 2012 that Israel
was not able to inict signicant damage on Iran's
nuclear sites. He said, They only have the ability to make this worse.* [190] In February 2012,
Admiral William J. Fallon, who retired in 2008 as
head of U.S. Central Command, said, No one
that I'm aware of thinks that there's any real positive outcome of a military strike or some kind of
conict.He advocated negotiating with Iran and deterring Iran from aggressive actions and said,Let's
not precipitate something.* [191]* [192] General
Martin Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Sta, said in August 2012 that a unilateral Israeli
attack on Iran would delay but not destroy Iran's nuclear program and that he did not wish to becomplicitin such an attack. He also stated that sanctions
were having an eect and should be given time to
work, and that a premature attack might damage the
'international coalition' against Iran.* [193] Former
Defense Secretary and former CIA Director Robert
Gates stated in October 2012 that sanctions were beginning to have an eect and that the results of an
American or Israeli military strike on Iran could, in
my view, prove catastrophic, haunting us for generations in that part of the world.* [194]
In 2011, the senior ocers of all of the major
American intelligence agencies stated that there was
no conclusive evidence that Iran has made any attempt to produce nuclear weapons since 2003.* [16]
In January 2012, U.S. Defense Secretary Leon
Panetta stated that Iran was pursuing a nuclear
weapons capability, but was not attempting to produce nuclear weapons.* [19]
In 2012, sixteen United States intelligence agencies,
including the CIA, reported that Iran was pursuing research that could enable it to produce nuclear
weapons, but was not attempting to do so.* [16]
Other international responses

United Nations In 2009, the United Nations built a


seismic monitoring station in Turkmenistan near its border with Iran, to detect tremors from nuclear explosions.
The UN Security Council has demanded Iran freeze all
forms of uranium enrichment.* [35] Iran has argued these
demands unfairly compel it to abandon its rights under
Several high U.S. military and intelligence ocials the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty to *peaceful nuclear
have stated that the eects of an Israeli attack on technology for civilian energy purposes. [31]
Iran's nuclear facilities would not be preventive. De- On 29 December 2009, Zongo Saidou, a sanctions adfense Secretary Leon E. Panetta said in December visor for the U.N., said that as far as he knew, none of
2011, and Lt. Gen. James R. Clapper, director the U.N.'s member nations had alerted the sanctions comof National Intelligence, said in February 2012 that mittee about allegations of sales of uranium to Iran from

4.13. IRAN
Kazakhstan. We don't have any ocial information yet
regarding this kind of exchange between the two countries,Saidou said. I don't have any information; I
don't have any proof,Saidou said.* [195] An intelligence
report from an unknown country alleged that rogue employees of Kazakhstan were prepared to sell Iran 1,350
tons of puried uranium ore in violation of UN Security
Council sanctions.* [196] Russia said it had no knowledge
of an alleged Iranian plan to import puried uranium ore
from Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan denied the reports.* [197]
Such fabrications of news are part of the psychological warfare (against Iran) to serve the political interests
of the hegemonic powers,Iran said.* [198] Askar Abdrahmanov, the ocial representative of the Ministry for
Foreign Aairs of Kazakhstan, said the references to
the anonymous sources and unknown documents show
groundlessness of these insinuations.* [199]

147
against Iran that would damage regional stability and interfere with the ow of oil. But China will not stop Israel
if it decides to attack Iran. For all these reasons, Israel
and the Middle East need a country like China. Israel
needs China's power.* [203]
In March 2012, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi
said thatChina is opposed to any country in the Middle
East, including Iran, developing and possessing nuclear
weapons., adding that Iran nonetheless has the right to
pursue nuclear activities for peaceful purposes.* [204]
France See also: France and weapons of mass destruction
On 16 February 2006 French Foreign Minister Philippe
Douste-Blazy said No civilian nuclear programme can
explain the Iranian nuclear programme. It is a clandestine
military nuclear programme.* [205]

China See also: People's Republic of China and


In January 2007, former French President Jacques
weapons of mass destruction
Chirac, speaking o the recordto reporters from
The New York Times, indicated that if Iran possessed
The Chinese Foreign Ministry supports the peaceful resa nuclear weapon, the weapon could not be used.
olution of the Iran nuclear issue through diplomacy and
Chirac alluded to mutually assured destruction when he
negotiations. In May 2006 Chinese Foreign Ministry
stated:* [206]
spokesperson Liu Jianchao stated As a signatory to the
Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran enjoys the right to peaceWhere will it drop it, this bomb? On Isful use of nuclear power, but it should also full its corrael? It would not have gone 200 meters into
responding responsibility and commitment. He added
the atmosphere before Tehran would be razed.
It is urgently needed that Iran should fully cooperate with
the IAEA and regain the condence of the international
community in its nuclear program.* [200]
Russia See also: Russia and weapons of mass destrucIn April 2008, several news agencies reported that China tion
had supplied the IAEA with intelligence on Iran's nuclear program following a report by Associated Press
reporter George Jahn based on anonymous diplomatic
sources.* [156] Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson
Jiang Yu described these reports ascompletely groundless and out of ulterior motives.* [201]

In 2005, Russian Advisor to Minister of Atomic Energy


Lev Ryabev asserted that neither the signing by Iran of
the NPT, the adoption of the Additional Protocol (which
provides for the right of inspection of any facility at any
time with no prior notice), placement of nuclear facilities
under IAEA safeguards, nor Russia's and Iran's commitments to repatriate spent nuclear fuel to Russia is seen as
a good enough argument by the United States.Ryabev
argued thatat the same time, such requirements are not
imposed on, for example, Brazil, which has been developing its nuclear power industry and nuclear fuel cycle,
including uranium enrichment.* [207]

In January 2010, China reiterated its calls for diplomatic


eorts on the Iran nuclear issue over sanctions. Dialogue and negotiations are the right ways of properly
solving the Iran nuclear issue, and there is still room for
diplomatic eorts,said Chinese spokesperson Jiang Yu.
We hope the relevant parties take more exible and pragmatic measures and step up diplomatic eorts in a bid to
On 5 December 2007 Russian Foreign Minister Sergey
resume talks as soon as possible,said Jiang.* [202]
nuclear
In September 2011 Israeli newspaper Haaretz reported Lavrov said he had seen no evidence of any
*
weapons
program
in
Iran,
no
matter
how
old.
[208]
On
several statements about Iran's nuclear program and
Vladimir
Putin
visited
Tehran,
Iran
to
16
October
2007
China's foreign policy in the Middle East, made by inparticipate
in
the
Second
Caspian
Summit,
where
he
met
dependent Chinese expert on the Middle East who re*
cently visited Israel at the invitation of Signal, an with Iranian leader Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. [209] At a
organization that furthers academic ties between Israel press conference after the summit Putin said that Iran
peaceful nuclear programs
and China. Yin Gang of the Chinese Academy of So- has the right to develop their
*
[210]
without
any
restrictions.
cial Sciences has expressed his opinion on China policies
toward region, and according to Haaretz he made surpris- In 2009, Russian Major-General Pavel S. Zolotarev aring statement: China is opposed to any military action gued Iran's security could be partially be assured by sup-

148

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

plying Iran with modern missile and air defense systems


and oering for Iran to take part in the work of one of
the data exchange centers in exchange forconcrete nonproliferation obligations.* [211]
In May 2009, the EastWest Institute released a joint U.S.Russian Threat Assessment on Iran's Nuclear and Missile Potential. The report concluded that there was no
IRBM/ICBM threat from Iran and that such a threat, even
if it were to emerge, is not imminent.The report said
there was no specic evidence that Iran was seeking the
ability to attack Europe and that it is indeed dicult
to imagine the circumstances in which Iran would do so.
The report said if Iran did pursue this capability, it would
need six to eight years to develop a missile capable of carrying a 1,000 kilogram warhead 2,000 kilometers. The
report said Iran endingIAEA containment and surveillance of the nuclear material and all installed cascades at
the Fuel Enrichment Planmight serve as an early warning of Iranian intentions.* [212]
In December 2009, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov said that the Iran nuclear issue would be resolved by diplomatic methods exclusively. It is absolutely clear that the problem can be settled exclusively
by political and diplomatic methods and any other scenarios, especially use-of-force scenarios, are completely
unacceptable,Lavrov said.* [213] Yevgeny Primakov, a
former Russian prime minister considered the doyen of
Moscow's Middle East experts, said he did not believe
that Iran had made a decision to acquire nuclear weapons.
Russia has no concrete information that Iran is planning
to construct a weapon. It may be more like Japan, which
has nuclear readiness but does not have a bomb,Primakov said.* [116]
In February 2012, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir
Putin said that Russia opposes Iran developing nuclearweapons capability. Russia is not interested in Iran becoming a nuclear power. It would lead to greater risks to
international stability., Putin said.* [214]

United Kingdom See also:


weapons of mass destruction

United Kingdom and

The United Kingdom is part of the EU3+3 (UK, France,


Germany, US, China and Russia) group of countries that
are engaged in ongoing discussions with Iran.* [215] The
UK is therefore one of the countries that has stated that
Iran would be provided with enriched fuel and support
to develop a modern nuclear power program if it, in the
words of the Foreign Oce spokesperson "suspends all
enrichment related activities, answer all the outstanding
issues relating to Iran's nuclear programme and implement the additional protocol agreed with the IAEA".* [216]
The UK (with China, France, Germany and Russia) put
forward the three Security Council resolutions that have
been passed in the UN.

On 8 May 2006, Former Deputy Commander-in-Chief


of British Land Forces, General Sir Hugh Beach, former
Cabinet Ministers, scientists and campaigners joined a
delegation to Downing Street opposing military intervention in Iran. The delegation delivered two letters to Prime
Minister Tony Blair from 1,800 physicists warning that
the military intervention and the use of nuclear weapons
would have disastrous consequences for the security of
Britain and the rest of world. The letters carried the signatures of academics, politicians and scientists including
some of 5 physicists who are Nobel Laureates.
CASMII delegation

Israel See also: Israel and weapons of mass destruction


Israel, which is not a party to the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty and which is widely believed to
possess nuclear weapons,* [217] has frequently claimed
that Iran is actively pursuing a nuclear weapons program.* [218] Arguing an existential threat from Iran
, Israel has issued several veiled and explicit threats to attack Iran.* [219]* [220]* [221] Mike Mullen, former chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Sta, has cautioned that
an Israeli air attack on Iran would be high-risk and warned
against Israel striking Iran.* [222]
George Friedman, head of the global intelligence company Stratfor, has said Iran isdecades awayfrom developing any credible nuclear-arms capacity and that an attack on Iran would have grave repercussions for the global
economy.* [71] If Iran ever did develop nuclear weapons,
Israeli academic Avner Cohen has observed that the
prospect of a deliberate Iranian rst nuclear strike on Israel, an out-of the-blue scenario, is virtually nonexistent...
[T]he chances of Iran or for that matter any other nuclear power unleashing a nuclear strike against Israel,
which has nuclear capabilities itself, strike me as close to
zero.* [223]
Walter Pincus of the Washington Post has written
that Israel's stance on nuclear arms complicates eorts
against Iran.* [224] Gawdat Bahgat of the National Defense University believes Iran's nuclear program is partially formed on the potential threat of a nuclear Israel.* [47] Iran and the Arab League have proposed
the that the Middle East be established as a Nuclear
Weapon Free Zone.* [26]* [200] Israel said in May 2010
it would not consider taking part in nuclear weapon-free
zone discussions or joining the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty.* [225] The UN Security Council has also pushed
for a nuclear-weapon free zone in the Middle East, and
has urged all countries to sign and adhere the 1970 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.* [226]
In May 2010, Israel reportedly deployed Dolphin class
submarines with nuclear missiles capable of reaching any
target in Iran in the Persian Gulf. Their reported missions
were to deter Iran, gather intelligence, and to potentially

4.13. IRAN
land Mossad agents on the Iranian coast.* [227]
Netherlands
According to a Dutch newspaper, the Netherlands had
launched an operation to inltrate and sabotage the Iranian weapons industry, but ended the operation due to increasing fears of an American or Israeli attack on Iran's
nuclear facilities.* [228]

149
Indonesia, the world's most populous Muslim-majority
nation and a non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council abstained from a vote in March 2008 on
a U.N. resolution to impose a third set of sanctions on
Iran.* [231] It was the only country out of the 10 nonpermanent members to abstain. Indonesian President
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono speaking at a joint news conference with Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in
Tehran in March 2008 said* [232]
"Iran's nuclear program is of a peaceful nature
and must not be politicized"

Muslim countries
Pakistan, which has the second largest Muslim popuThe A.Q. Khan network, established to procure equip- lation in the world is not a member of the Nuclear
ment and material for Pakistan's nuclear weapons pro- Non-Proliferation Treaty and already possesses nuclear
gram (gas-centrifuge-based programme), also supplied weapons.
Iran with critical technology for its uranium enrichment On 12 May 2006 AP published an interview with Pakprogram, and helped put Iran on a fast track toward istan's former Chief of Army Sta of Pakistan Army
becoming a nuclear weapons power.* [229]
General Mirza Aslam Beg In the AP interview, Beg detailed nearly 20 years of Iranian approaches to obtain conventional arms and then technology for nuclear weapons.
He described an Iranian visit in 1990, when he was Chief
of Army Sta.
They didn't want the technology. They
asked: 'Can we have a bomb?' My answer was:
By all means you can have it but you must make
it yourself. Nobody gave it to us.
World map with nuclear weapons development status represented by color.
Five nuclear weapons statesfrom the NPT
Other states known to possess nuclear weapons
States formerly possessing nuclear weapons
States suspected of being in the process of developing nuclear
weapons and/or nuclear programs
States which at one point had nuclear weapons and/or nuclear
weapons research programs
States that possess nuclear weapons, but have not widely adopted
them

Beg said he is sure Iran has had enough time to develop


them. But he insists the Pakistani government didn't
help, even though he says former Prime Minister Benazir
Bhutto once told him the Iranians oered more than $4
billion for the technology.
In an article in 2005 about nuclear proliferation he stated
"I would not like my future generations to live in
the neighborhood of "nuclear capable Israel."
"Countries acquire the (nuclear) capability on
their own, as we have done it. Iran will do
the same, because they are threatened by Israel."* [233]

The 2008 Annual Arab Public Opinion Poll, Survey of


the Anwar Sadat Chair for Peace and Development at
the University of Maryland, College Park conducted in
The San Francisco Chronicle reported on 31 October
Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia and the
2003, that Grand Ayatollahs, like Ayatollah Yousef
UAE in March 2008 noted the following as a key ndSanei, and Iranian clerics led by Ayatollah Ali Khamenei
ing.* [230]
have repeatedly declared that Islam forbids the development and use of all weapons of mass destruction. SF"In contrast with the fears of many Arab govGate.com quoted Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as saying:
ernments, the Arab public does not appear to
"The Islamic Republic of Iran, based on its
see Iran as a major threat. Most believe that
fundamental religious and legal beliefs, would
Iran has the right to its nuclear program and
never resort to the use of weapons of mass dedo not support international pressure to force
struction. In contrast to the propaganda of our
it to curtail its program. A plurality of Arabs
enemies, fundamentally we are against any pro(44%) believes that if Iran were to acquire nuduction of weapons of mass destruction in any
clear weapons, the outcome would be more posform."* [6]
itive for the region than negative.

150

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

On 21 April 2006, at a Hamas rally in Damascus, Anwar of the right of a country to expertise in the eld of nuclear
Raja, the Lebanon-based representative of the Popular energy for peaceful purposes.* [238]
Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a party that achieved
4.25% of the votes and holds 3 out the 132 seats in the
Palestinian Legislative Council following the election de- The Non-Aligned Movement
clared:
The Non-Aligned Movement has said that the present situation whereby Nuclear Weapon States monopolise the
"The Muslim, Iranian, ghting people now posright to possess nuclear weapons is highly discriminasess nuclear capabilities. My brother, the Iratory, and they have pushed for steps to accelerate the
nian representative sitting here, let me tell you
process of nuclear disarmament.* [125]
that we, the Palestinian people, are in favour of
Iran having a nuclear bomb, not just energy for
On 16 September 2006 in Havana, Cuba, all of the 118
peaceful purposes."* [234]
Non-Aligned Movement member countries, at the sumOn 3 May 2006 Iraqi Shia cleric Ayatollah Ahmad Husseini Al Baghdadi, who opposes the presence of US
forces in Iraq and is an advocate of violent jihad was interviewed on Syrian TV. In his interview he said:* [235]
"How can they face Iran? How come Israel
has 50 nuclear bombs? Why are they selective? Why shouldn't an Islamic or Arab country
have a nuclear bomb? I am not referring to the
Iranian program, which the Iranians say is for
peaceful purposes. I am talking about a nuclear
bomb."
"This Arab Islamic nation must obtain a nuclear
bomb. Without a nuclear bomb, we will continue to be oppressed,"

mit level, declared supporting Iran's nuclear program for


civilian purposes in their nal written statement.* [239]
That is a clear majority of the 192 countries comprising
the entire United Nations, which comprise 55% of the
world population.
On 11 September 2007 the Non-Aligned Movement rejected any interferencein Iran's nuclear transparency
deal with U.N. inspectors by Western countries through
the UN Security Council.* [38]
On 30 July 2008 the Non-Aligned Movement welcomed
the continuing cooperation of Iran with the IAEA and
rearmed Iran's right to the peaceful uses of nuclear
technology. The movement further called for the establishment of a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle
East and called for a comprehensive multilaterally negotiated instrument which prohibits threats of attacks on
nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.* [240]

The Baku declaration A declaration signed on 20


June 2006 by the foreign ministers of 56 nations of
the 57-member Organisation of the Islamic Conference
stated thatthe only way to resolve Iran's nuclear issue is 4.13.2 Biological weapons
to resume negotiations without any preconditions and to
enhance co-operation with the involvement of all relevant Iran ratied the Biological Weapons Convention on 22
parties.
August 1973.* [1]
Qatar and Arab vote against the U.N. Security Council resolution 31 July 2006: The UN Security Council
gives until 31 August 2006 for Iran to suspend all uranium
enrichment and related activities or face the prospect
of sanctions.* [236] The draft passed by a vote of 141
(Qatar, which represents Arab states on the council, opposing). The same day, Iran's U.N. Ambassador Javad
Zarif qualied the resolution as arbitraryand illegal because the NTP protocol explicitly guarantees under international law Iran's right to pursue nuclear activities for peaceful purposes. In response to today's
vote at the UN, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad said that his country will revise his position vis--vis
the economic/incentive package oered previously by the
G-6 (5 permanent Security council members plus Germany.)* [237]

Iran has advanced biology and genetic engineering research programs supporting an industry that produces
world-class vaccines for both domestic use and export.* [241] The dual-use nature of these facilities means
that Iran, like any country with advanced biological research programs, could easily produce biological warfare
agents.

A 2005 report from the United States Department of


State claimed that Iran began work on oensive biological weapons during the IranIraq War, and that their
large legitimate bio-technological and bio-medical industry could easily hide pilot to industrial-scale production capabilities for a potential BW program, and could
mask procurement of BW-related process equipment.
The report further said thatavailable information about
Iranian activities indicates a maturing oensive program
with a rapidly evolving capability that may soon include
In December 2006, the Gulf Cooperation Council called the ability to deliver these weapons by a variety of means
for a nuclear weapons free Middle East and recognition .* [242]

4.13. IRAN
According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, Iran is known
to possess cultures of the many biological agents for legitimate scientic purposes which have been weaponised
by other nations in the past, or could theoretically be
weaponised. Although they do not allege that Iran has
attempted to weaponise them, Iran possesses sucient
biological facilities to potentially do so.* [243]

4.13.3

Chemical weapons

151
stockpiled chemical weapons including blister, blood,
choking, and probably nerve agents, and the bombs and
artillery shells to deliver them. It further claimed that
during the rst half of 2001, Iran continued to seek production technology, training, expertise, equipment, and
chemicals from entities in Russia and China that could be
used to help Iran reach its goal of having indigenous nerve
agent production capability.* [246] However the certainty
of this assessment declined and in 2007 the U.S. Defense
Intelligence Agency limited its public assessment to just
noting that Iran has a large and growing commercial
chemical industry that could be used to support a chemical agent mobilization capability.* [247]
Iran is a signatory of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which bans chemical weapons, delivery systems, and
production facilities.* [2] Iran has reiterated its commitment to the CWC and its full support for the work of the
OPCW, in particular in view of the considerable suering
these weapons have caused to the Iranian people.* [248]
Iran has not made any declaration of a weapons stockpile
under the treaty.* [249]

4.13.4 Delivery systems


Iranian soldier with gas mask under Chemical bombardment by
Iraqi forces in the battleeld during the IranIraq War.

Iran has experienced attack by chemical warfare (CW)


on the battleeld and suered hundreds of thousands
of casualties, both civilian and military, in such attacks
during the 198088 IranIraq War. As a result, Iran
has promulgated a very public stance against the use of
chemical weapons, making numerous vitriolic comments
against Iraq's use of such weapons in international forums. Iran is not known to have resorted to using chemical weapons in retaliation for Iraqi chemical weapons
attacks during the IranIraq War, though it would have
been legally entitled to do so under the then-existing international treaties on the use of chemical weapons which
only prohibited the rst use of such weapons. Following
its experiences during the IranIraq War, Iran signed the
Chemical Weapons Convention on 13 January 1993 and
ratied it on 3 November 1997. In the ocial declaration
submitted to OPCW Iranian government admitted that it
had produced mustard gas in 1980s but that ceased the
oensive program and destroyed the stockpiles of operational weapons after the end of war with Iraq.* [244]

Missiles
A Shahab-4 with a range of 2,000 km and a payload of
1,000 kg is believed to be under development. Iran has
stated the Shahab-3 is the last of its war missiles and
the Shahab-4 is being developed to give the country the
capability of launching communications and surveillance
satellites. A Shahab-5, an intercontinental ballistic missile with a 10,000 km range, has been alleged but not
proven to be under development.* [250]
Iran has 12 X-55 long range cruise missiles purchased
without nuclear warheads from Ukraine in 2001. The X55 has a range of 2,500 to 3,000 kilometers.* [251]
Iran's most advanced missile, the Fajr-3, has an unknown
range but is estimated to be 2,500 km. The missile is
radar evading and can strike targets simultaneously using
multiple warheads.* [252]
On 2 November 2006, Iran red unarmed missiles to begin 10 days of military war games. Iranian state television reported dozens of missiles were red including Shahab-2 and Shahab-3 missiles. The missiles had
ranges from 300 km to up to 2,000 km...Iranian experts
have made some changes to Shahab-3 missiles installing
cluster warheads in them with the capacity to carry 1,400
bombs.These launches come after some United Statesled military exercises in the Persian Gulf on 30 October 2006, meant to train for blocking the transport of
weapons of mass destruction.* [253]

In an interview with Gareth Porter, Mohsen Raghdoost,


the minister of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
throughout the eight-year Iran-Iraq war, described how
supreme leader Ayatollah Khomeini had twice blocked
his proposal to begin working on both nuclear and chemical weapons, which Raghdoost interpreted as a fatwa
against their use and production, because it was issued by
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152

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

place on 12 November 2008.* [254]


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the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of

4.13.5

See also

Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action


United Nations Security Council Resolution 1747
Nuclear program of Iran
Operation Merlin
Green Salt Project
Iranian Space Agency

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160

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

[258] PressTV Iran successfully tests Sejjil 2 missile. Edition.presstv.ir. 20 May 2009. Retrieved 23 November
2011.

Forced to Fuel (Harvard Int'l Law Review, Vol. 26


No. 4 Winter 2005) lays out the case for nuclear
energy in Iran, by Prof. Muhammad Sahimi.

[259] msoltan (20 May 2009).Iran Successfully Tests Sejjil-2


Missile. YouTube. Retrieved 23 November 2011.

If Iran Gets Nukes by Abolghasem Bayyena,


Antiwar.com, 17 January 2006

4.13.7

External links

Annotated Google map of Iranian nuclear sites


In Focus : IAEA and Iran

Gareth Porter, The Iranian Nuke Forgeries: CIA


Determines Documents were Fabricated, CounterPunch, 29 December 2009, .
Rethinking U.S. Policy Toward Iran, Jayshree Bajoria| Hungton Post| 23 September 2011

Q & A with Director General of the IAEA on Iran,


International Atomic Energy Agency, 22 February Political statements
2008, Video (5 min 43 s), Transcript.
Iran's Continuing Pursuit of Weapons of Mass De Report by the Director General of IAEA:
struction Testimony by John R. Bolton, Under SecImplementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreeretary for Arms Control and International Security,
ment and relevant provisions of Security Council
before the House International Relations Commitresolutions 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) in the
tee Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central
Islamic Republic of Iran, 22 February 2008,
Asia, Washington DC, 24 June 2004
GOV/2008/4.
Iranian Response to UN Security Council Resolu Technical Addendum to the Joint Threat Assesstion Ambassador Javad Zarif's statement to the UN
ment on the Iran's Nuclear and Missile Potential: A
Security Counsel in response to the resolution reTechnical Assessment of Iran's Ballistic Missile Proquiring Iran to suspend enrichment, 31 July 2006.
gram, by Theodore Postol, 6 May 2009.
Video-Interviews with Ali Asghar Soltanieh (Amb.
Iran) during the NPT PrepCom 2008
Analysis
Towards Transatlantic Cooperation in Meeting the
Iranian Nuclear Challenge analysis by George
Perkovich, IFRI Proliferation Papers n14, 2005
Iran's Nuclear History, Prof. Mohammad Sahimi,
Chairman of Chemical and Petroleum Engineering
at the University of Southern California, and member of the Union of Concerned Scientists, 2 October
2003
Iran's Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities: A Pattern of
Peaceful Intent? PDF (2.36 MB), US State Department, September 2005presentation of US position.
Satellite photography and quotes from Iranian leaders are documented and analyzed.

Organizations
CASMII The Campaign Against Sanctions and
Military Intervention in Iran

4.14 Iraq
The fth president of Iraq, Saddam Hussein,* [1] was internationally condemned for his use of chemical weapons
during the 1980s against Iranian and Kurdish civilians
during and after the IranIraq War. In the 1980s, Saddam
pursued an extensive biological weapons program and a
nuclear weapons program, though no nuclear bomb was
built.

Iran as a Pioneer Case for Multilateral Nuclear ArAfter the Persian Gulf War, the United Nations located
rangements. Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Inand destroyed large quantities of Iraqi chemical weapons
stitute of Technology.
and related equipment and materials throughout the early
Europe's Iran Policy: Breaking out of the Spiral of 1990s, with varying degrees of Iraqi cooperation and ob*
Mistrust by Prof. Volker Perthes, head of the Ger- struction. [2] In response to diminishing Iraqi cooperaman Institute for International and Security Aairs tion with UNSCOM, the United States called for withdrawal of all UN and IAEA inspectors in 1998, resulting
in Berlin
in Operation Desert Fox. The United States and the UK
Iran needs nuclear energy, not weapons, Le Monde asserted that Saddam Hussein still possessed large hidden
diplomatique, November 2005 questions whether stockpiles of WMD in 2003, and that he was clandestinely
Iran's nuclear program was really clandestine as procuring and producing more. Inspections by the UN to
commonly claimed.
resolve the status of unresolved disarmament questions

4.14. IRAQ

161

restarted between November 2002 and March 2003,* [3]


under UN Security Council Resolution 1441, which demanded Saddam giveimmediate, unconditional and active cooperationwith UN and IAEA inspections, shortly
before his country was attacked.* [4]

station. Moscow would approve only if the station was


regulated by the International Atomic Energy Agency,
but Iraq refused. Yet an agreement of co-operation
was signed on April 15, which superseded the one from
1959.* [14]

During the lead-up to war in 2003, United Nations


weapons inspector Hans Blix said that Iraq made significant progress toward resolving open issues of disarmament noting theproactivebut not alwaysimmediate
cooperation as called for by UN Security Council Resolution 1441. He concluded that it would takebut months
to resolve the key remaining disarmament tasks.* [5] The
United States asserted this was a breach of Resolution
1441, but failed to convince the UN Security Council to
pass a new resolution authorizing the use of force due to
lack of evidence.* [6]* [7]* [8]

After 6 months Paris agreed to sell 72 kg of 93%


Uranium* [15] and built a nuclear power plant without
International Atomic Energy Agency control at a price of
$3 billion.

Despite being unable to get a new resolution authorizing


force and citing section 3 of the Joint Resolution passed
by the U.S. Congress,* [9] President George W. Bush asserted peaceful measures could not disarm Iraq of the
weapons he alleged it to have and launched a second Gulf
War. Later U.S.-led inspections found out that Iraq had
earlier ceased active WMD production and stockpiling.
The report also found that Iraq had worked covertly to
maintain the intellectual and physical capacity to produce
WMDs and intended to restart production once sanctions
were lifted.* [10]

4.14.1

Program development 1960s - 1980s

In the early 1970s, Saddam Hussein ordered the creation


of a clandestine nuclear weapons program.* [16] Iraq's
weapons of mass destruction programs were assisted by
a wide variety of rms and governments in the 1970s
and 1980s.* [17]* [18]* [19]* [20]* [21] As part of Project
922, German rms such as Karl Kobe helped build Iraqi
chemical weapons facilities such as laboratories, bunkers,
an administrative building, and rst production buildings
in the early 1980s under the cover of a pesticide plant.
Other German rms sent 1,027 tons of precursors of
mustard gas, sarin, tabun, and tear gasses in all. This
work allowed Iraq to produce 150 tons of mustard agent
and 60 tons of Tabun in 1983 and 1984 respectively,
continuing throughout the decade. Five other German
rms supplied equipment to manufacture botulin toxin
and mycotoxin for germ warfare. In 1988, German engineers presented centrifuge data that helped Iraq expand
its nuclear weapons program. Laboratory equipment and
other information was provided, involving many German
engineers. All told, 52% of Iraq's international chemical weapon equipment was of German origin. The State
Establishment for Pesticide Production (SEPP) ordered
culture media and incubators from Germany's Water Engineering Trading.* [22]

Western help with Iraq's WMD program

Baghdad Nuclear Research Facility - 10 March 1991. The


Tuwaythah Nuclear Research Facility, Baghdad, Post-strike.

1959 August 17 USSR and Iraq wrote an agreement


about building a nuclear power plant and established a nuclear program as part of their mutual understanding.* [11]

The United States exported support for Iraq during the


IranIraq war over $500 million worth of dual use exports
to Iraq that were approved by the Commerce department. Among them were advanced computers, some of
which were used in Iraq's nuclear program.* [23] The nonprot American Type Culture Collection and the Centers for Disease Control sold or sent biological samples
of anthrax, West Nile virus and botulism to Iraq up until
1989, which Iraq claimed it needed for medical research.
A number of these materials were used for Iraq's biological weapons research program, while others were used for
vaccine development.* [24] For example, the Iraqi military settled on the American Type Culture Collection
strain 14578 as the exclusive anthrax strain for use as a
biological weapon, according to Charles Duelfer.* [25]

1968 a Soviet supplied IRT-2000 research reactor


together with a number of other facilities that could In the late 1980s, the British government secretly gave
be used for radioisotope production was built close to the arms company Matrix Churchill permission to supBaghdad.* [12]* [13]
ply parts for Saddam Hussein's weapons program, while
1975 Saddam Hussein arrived in Moscow and asked British Industry supplied Gerald Bull as he developed
about building an advanced model of an atomic power the Iraqi supergun. In March 1990, a case of nuclear

162

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

triggers bound for Iraq were seized at Heathrow Airport. The Scott Report uncovered much of the secrecy
that had surrounded the Arms-to-Iraq aair when it became known.* [26] The British government also nanced
a chlorine factory that was intended to be used for manufacturing mustard gas.* [27]

4.14.2

IranIraq War

In 1980, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency led a report stating that Iraq had been actively acquiring chemical
weapons capacities for several years, which later proved
to be accurate.* [28] In November 1980, two months into
the IranIraq War, the rst reported use of chemical
weapons took place when Tehran radio reported a poison
gas attack on Susangerd by Iraqi forces.* [29] The United
Nations reported many similar attacks occurred the following year, leading Iran to develop and deploy a mustard
gas capability. By 1984, Iraq was using poison gas with
great eectiveness against Iranian human waveattacks. Chemical weapons were used extensively against
Iran during the IranIraq War.* [30]* [31] On January 14,
1991, the Defense Intelligence Agency said an Iraqi agent
described, in medically accurate terms, military smallpox
casualties he said he saw in 1985 or 1986. Two weeks
later, the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center reported that eight of 69 Iraqi prisoners of war whose blood
was tested showed a current immunity to smallpox, which
had not occurred naturally in Iraq since 1971; the same
prisoners had also been inoculated for anthrax. The assumption being that Iraq used both smallpox and anthrax
during this war* [32] All of this occurring while Iraq was
a party to the Geneva Protocol on September 8, 1931, the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on October 29, 1969,
signed the Biological Weapons Convention in 1972, but
did not ratify until June 11, 1991. Iraq has not signed to
the Chemical Weapons Convention.
The Washington Post reported that in 1984 the CIA secretly started providing intelligence to the Iraqi army during the Iran-Iraq War. This included information to target chemical weapons strikes. The same year it was conrmed beyond doubt by European doctors and UN expert missions that Iraq was employing chemical weapons
against the Iranians.* [33] Most of these occurred during
the IranIraq War, but WMDs were used at least once to
crush the popular uprisings against Kurds in 1991.* [20]
Chemical weapons were used extensively, with more
than 100,000 Iranian soldiers as victims of Saddam Hussein's chemical weapons during the eight-year war with
Iraq,* [34] Iran today is the world's second-most aicted
country by weapons of mass destruction, only after Japan.
The ocial estimate does not include the civilian population contaminated in bordering towns or the children
and relatives of veterans, many of whom have developed
blood, lung and skin complications, according to the Organization for Veterans. Nerve gas agents killed about
20,000 Iranian soldiers immediately, according to o-

cial reports. Of the 90,000 survivors, some 5,000 seek


medical treatment regularly and about 1,000 are still hospitalized with severe, chronic conditions. Many others
were hit by mustard gas. Despite the removal of Saddam
Hussein and his administration by American forces, there
is deep resentment and anger in Iran that it was Western
nations that helped Iraq develop and direct its chemical
weapons arsenal in the rst place and that the world did
nothing to punish Iraq for its use of chemical weapons
throughout the war. For example, the United States and
the UK blocked condemnation of Iraq's known chemical
weapons attacks at the UN Security Council. No resolution was passed during the war that specically criticized
Iraq's use of chemical weapons, despite the wishes of the
majority to condemn this use. On March 21, 1986 the
United Nation Security Council recognized that chemical weapons on many occasions have been used by Iraqi
forces against Iranian forces"; this statement was opposed
by the United States, the sole country to vote against it in
the Security Council (the UK abstained).* [35]
On March 23, 1988 western media sources reported from
Halabja in Iraqi Kurdistan, that several days before Iraq
had launched a large scale chemical assault on the town.
Later estimates were that 7,000 people had been killed
and 20,000 wounded. The Halabja poison gas attack
caused an international outcry against the Iraqis. Later
that year the U.S. Senate proposed the Prevention of
Genocide Act of 1988, cutting o all U.S. assistance to
Iraq and stopping U.S. imports of Iraqi oil. The Reagan administration opposed the bill, calling it premature,
and eventually prevented it from taking eect, partly due
to a mistaken DIA assessment which blamed Iran for
the attack. At the time of the attack the town was held
by Iranian troops and Iraqi Kurdish guerrillas allied with
Tehran.* [36] The Iraqis blamed the Halabja attack on Iranian forces. This was still the position of Saddam Hussein
in his December 2003 captivity. On August 21, 2006, the
trial of Saddam Hussein and six codefendants, including
Hassan al-Majid (Chemical Ali), opened on charges
of genocide against the Kurds. While this trial does not
cover the Halabja attack, it does cover attacks on other
villages during the Iraqi Anfaloperation alleged to
have included bombing with chemical weapons.* [37]
Chemical weapon attacks
Main article: Iraqi chemical weapons program
(Source:* [20])

4.14.3 The 1991 Persian Gulf War


Main article: Gulf War
On August 2, 1990 Iraq invaded Kuwait and was widely
condemned internationally.* [38] The policy of the United

4.14. IRAQ
States on Hussein's government changed rapidly, as it
was feared Saddam intended to attack other oil-rich nations in the region such as Saudi Arabia. As stories of
atrocities from the occupation of Kuwait spread, older
atrocities and his WMD arsenal were also given attention. Iraq's nuclear weapons program suered a serious
setback in 1981 when the Osiraq reactor, which would
have been capable of breeding weapons-usable nuclear
material, was bombed by Israel before it could be commissioned.* [15] David Albright and Mark Hibbs, writing
for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, disagree with
this view, however. There were far too many technological challenges unsolved, they say.* [39] An international
coalition of nations, led by the United States, liberated
Kuwait in 1991.* [40]
In the terms of the UN ceasere set out in Security Council Resolution 686, and in Resolution 687, Iraq was forbidden from developing, possessing or using chemical,
biological and nuclear weapons by resolution 686. Also
proscribed by the treaty were missiles with a range of
more than 150 kilometres. The UN Special Commission on weapons (UNSCOM) was created to carry out
weapons inspections in Iraq, and the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) was to verify the destruction of
Iraq's nuclear program.* [41]* [42]

163
in hospitals and microbiology/molecular biology research
laboratories. In hospitals, swabs from patients are placed
in dishes containing growth medium for diagnostic purposes. Iraq's hospital consumption of growth medium
was just 200 kg a year; yet in 1988, Iraq imported 39 tons
of it. Shown this evidence by UNSCOM, Taha admitted to the inspectors that she had grown 19,000 litres of
botulinum toxin;* [45] 8,000 litres of anthrax; 2,000 litres
of aatoxins, which can cause liver failure; Clostridium
perfringens, a bacterium that can cause gas gangrene; and
ricin. She also admitted conducting research into cholera,
salmonella, foot and mouth disease, and camel pox, a disease that uses the same growth techniques as smallpox,
but which is safer for researchers to work with. It was because of the discovery of Taha's work with camel pox that
the U.S. and British intelligence services feared Saddam
Hussein may have been planning to weaponize the smallpox virus. Iraq had a smallpox outbreak in 1971 and the
Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Center (WINPAC) believed the Iraqi government retained contaminated material.* [32]

UNSCOM also learned that, in August 1990, after Iraq's


invasion of Kuwait, Taha's team was ordered to set up a
program to weaponize the biological agents. By January
1991, a team of 100 scientists and support sta had lled
157 bombs and 16 missile warheads with botulin toxin,
and 50 bombs and ve missile warheads with anthrax. In
an interview with the BBC, Taha denied the Iraqi govern4.14.4 Between Persian Gulf Wars
ment had weaponized the bacteria. We never intended
to use it, she told journalist Jane Corbin of the BBC's
UNSCOM inspections 1991-1998
Panorama program.We never wanted to cause harm or
damage to anybody.However, UNSCOM found the muMain article: United Nations Special Commission
nitions dumped in a river near al-Hakam. UNSCOM also
discovered that Taha's team had conducted inhalation exThe United Nations Special Commission on Iraq (UN- periments on donkeys from England and on beagles from
SCOM) was set up after the 1990 invasion of Kuwait Germany. The inspectors seized photographs showing
to inspect Iraqi weapons facilities. It was headed rst beagles having convulsions inside sealed containers.
by Rolf Ekus and later by Richard Butler. During several visits to Iraq by UNSCOM, weapons inspectors in- The inspectors feared that Taha's team had experimented
terviewed British-educated Iraqi biologist Rihab Rashid on human beings. During one inspection, they discovered
Taha. According to a 1999 report from the U.S. Defense two primate-sized inhalation chambers, one measuring 5
Intelligence Agency, the normally mild-mannered Taha cubic meters, though there was no evidence the Iraqis had
exploded into violent rages whenever UNSCOM ques- used large primates in their experiments. According to
tioned her about al-Hakam, shouting, screaming and, on former weapons inspector Scott Ritter in his 1999 book
one occasion, smashing a chair, while insisting that al- Endgame: Solving the Iraq Crisis, UNSCOM learned that,
Hakam was a chicken-feed plant.* [43] There were a between July 1 and August 15, 1995, 50 prisoners from
few things that were peculiar about this animal-feed pro- the Abu Ghraib prison were transferred to a military post
duction plant, Charles Duelfer, UNSCOM's deputy ex- in al-Haditha, in the northwest of Iraq. Iraqi opposition
ecutive chairman, later told reporters, beginning with groups say that scientists sprayed the prisoners with anthe extensive air defenses surrounding it.The facility was thrax, though no evidence was produced to support these
allegations. During one experiment, the inspectors were
destroyed by UNSCOM in 1996.* [44]
told, 12 prisoners were tied to posts while shells loaded
In 1995, UNSCOM's principal weapons inspector, Dr. with anthrax were blown up nearby. Ritter's team deRod Barton from Australia, showed Taha documents ob- manded to see documents from Abu Ghraib prison showtained by UNSCOM that showed the Iraqi government ing a prisoner count. Ritter writes that they discovered the
had just purchased 10 tons of growth medium from records for July and August 1995 were missing. Asked
a British company called Oxoid. Growth media is a to explain the missing documents, the Iraqi government
mixture of sugars, proteins and minerals that provides charged that Ritter was working for the CIA and refused
nutrients for microorganisms to grow. It can be used

164
UNSCOM access to certain sites like Baath Party headquarters.* [46] Although Ekus has said that he resisted
attempts at such espionage, many allegations have since
been made against the agency commission under Butler,
charges which Butler has denied.* [47]* [48]
In April 1991 Iraq provided its rst of what would be several declarations of its chemical weapons programs.* [49]
Subsequent declarations submitted by Iraq in June 1992,
March 1995, June 1996 came only after pressure from
UNSCOM.* [49] In February 1998, UNSCOM unanimously determined that after seven years of attempts to
establish the extent of Iraq's chemical weapons programs,
that Iraq had still not given the Commission sucient information for them to conclude that Iraq had undertaken
all the disarmament steps required by the UNSC resolutions concerning chemical weapons.* [49]
In August 1991 Iraq had declared to the UNSCOM biological inspection team that it did indeed have a biological weapons program but that it was for defensive purposes.* [49] Iraq then provided its rst biological weapons
declaration shortly after. After UNSCOM determined
such declarations to be incomplete, more pressure was
placed on Iraq to declare fully and completely.* [49] A
second disclosure of the biological weapons came in
March 1995. After UNSCOM's investigations and the
discovery of inreutable evidence, Iraq was forced to
admit for the rst time the existence of an oensive
biological weapons program.* [49] But Iraq still denied
weaponization. Further UNSCOM pressure resulted in a
third prohibited biological weapons disclosure from Iraq
in August 1995. Only after General Hussein Kamel alMajid, Minister of Industry and Minerals and former Director of Iraq's Military Industrialization Corporation,
with responsibility for all of Iraq's weapons programs,
ed Iraq for Jordan, Iraq was forced to reveal that its biological warfare program was much more extensive than
was previously admitted and that the program included
weaponization.* [49] At this time Iraq admitted that it had
achieved the ability to produce longer-range missiles than
had previously been admitted to.* [49] At this point Iraq
provides UNSCOM and IAEA with more documentation that turns out Hussein Kamel al-Majid had hidden
on chicken farm. These documents gave further revelation to Iraq's development of VX gas and its attempts to
develop a nuclear weapon.* [49] More declarations would
follow in June 1996 and September 1997. However, in
April and July 1998, the biological weapons team and
UNSCOM Executive Chairman assessed that Iraq's declarations were as yet unveriableand incomplete
and inadequate, seven years after the rst declarations
were given in 1991.* [49]

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
at impeding UNSCOM's work. Iraq is not disarming
, Ritter said on August 27, 1998, and in a second statement, Iraq retains the capability to launch a chemical
strike.In 1998 the UNSCOM weapons inspectors left
Iraq. There is considerable debate about whether they
werewithdrawn,expelledfrom the country by Iraqi
ocials (as alleged by George W. Bush in his axis of
evilspeech), or they chose to leave because they felt their
hands were tied suciently to see the mission as hopeless. According to Butler himself in his book Saddam
Deant, it was U.S. Ambassador Peter Burleigh, acting
on instructions from Washington, who suggested Butler
pull his team from Iraq in order to protect them from the
forthcoming U.S. and British airstrikes which eventually
took place from December 1619, 1998.
Between inspections: 1998-2003
In August, 1998, absent eective monitoring, Scott Ritter remarked that Iraq could reconstitute chemical biological weapons, long-range ballistic missiles to deliver
these weapons, and even certain aspects of their nuclear
weaponization program.* [50]
In June, 1999, Ritter responded to an interviewer, saying: When you ask the question, 'Does Iraq possess
militarily viable biological or chemical weapons?' the answer is no! It is a resounding NO. Can Iraq produce today chemical weapons on a meaningful scale? No! Can
Iraq produce biological weapons on a meaningful scale?
No! Ballistic missiles? No! It is 'no' across the board.
So from a qualitative standpoint, Iraq has been disarmed.
Ritter later accused some UNSCOM personnel of spying,
and he strongly criticized the Bill Clinton administration
for misusing the commission's resources to eavesdrop on
the Iraqi military.* [51] According to Ritter: Iraq today (1999) possesses no meaningful weapons of mass destruction capability.* [52]
In June 2000, Ritter penned a piece for Arms Control
Today entitled The Case for Iraq's Qualitative Disarmament.* [53] 2001 saw the theatrical release of his documentary on the UNSCOM weapons inspections in Iraq, In
Shifting Sands: The Truth About Unscom and the Disarming of Iraq. The lm was funded by an Iraqi-American
businessman who, unknown to Ritter, had received Oilfor-Food coupons from the Iraqi administration.* [54]
In 2002, Scott Ritter stated that, by 1998, 9095% of
Iraq's nuclear, biological and chemical capabilities, and
long-range ballistic missiles capable of delivering such
weapons, had been veried as destroyed. Technical 100%
verication was not possible, said Ritter, not because Iraq
still had any hidden weapons, but because Iraq' had preemptively destroyed some stockpiles and claimed they
had never existed. Many people were surprised by Ritter's turnaround in his view of Iraq during a period when
no inspections were made.* [55]

In August 1998, Ritter resigned his position as UN


weapons inspector and sharply criticized the Clinton administration and the UN Security Council for not being
vigorous enough about insisting that Iraq's weapons of
mass destruction be destroyed. Ritter also accused UN
Secretary General Ko Annan of assisting Iraqi eorts During the 20022003 build-up to war Ritter criticized

4.14. IRAQ
the Bush administration and maintained that it had provided no credible evidence that Iraq had reconstituted a
signicant WMD capability. In an interview with Time
in September 2002 Ritter said there were attempts to
use UNSCOM for spying on Iraq.* [56] According to the
New York Times and Washington Post media of Jan. 8,
1999, In March [1998], in a last-ditch attempt to uncover Saddam Hussein's covert weapons and intelligence
networks, the United States used the United Nations inspection team to send an American spy into Baghdad
to install a highly sophisticated electronic eavesdropping
system.* [57]* [58]

165
weapons to defend Iraq and the Arab nation.* [62]
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in
Britain published in September 2002 a review of Iraq's
military capability, and concluded that Iraq could assemble nuclear weapons within months if ssile material from
foreign sources were obtained.* [63] However, IISS also
concluded that without such foreign sources, it would take
years at a bare minimum.
The time to Iraq obtaining a nuclear weapon with ssile
materials was viewed as being overly optimistic by some
critics (that is, by the Federation of American Scientists
and the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists).

UNSCOM encountered various diculties and a lack


of cooperation by the Iraqi government. In 1998, UNSCOM was withdrawn at the request of the United States 4.14.5
before Operation Desert Fox. Despite this, UNSCOM's
own estimate was that 90-95% of Iraqi WMDs had been
successfully destroyed before its 1998 withdrawal. After that, for four years (from 1998 to 2002) Iraq remained without any outside weapons inspectors. During this time speculations arose that Iraq had actively resumed its WMD programs. In particular, various gures
in the George W. Bush administration as well as Congress
went so far as to express concern about nuclear weapons.
There is dispute about whether Iraq still had WMD
programs after 1998 and whether its cooperation with
the United Nations Monitoring, Verication and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) was complete. Chief
weapons inspector Hans Blix said in January 2003 that
access has been provided to all sites we have wanted
to inspectand Iraq had cooperated rather wellin
that regard, although Iraq appears not to have come
to a genuine acceptance of the disarmament.* [59] On
March 7, in an address to the Security Council, Hans
Blix stated:"Against this background, the question is now
asked whether Iraq has cooperatedimmediately, unconditionally and activelywith UNMOVIC, as is required
under paragraph 9 of resolution 1441 (2002)... while the
numerous initiatives, which are now taken by the Iraqi
side with a view to resolving some long-standing open
disarmament issues, can be seen as active, or even
proactive, these initiatives 34 months into the new
resolution cannot be said to constitute immediatecooperation. Nor do they necessarily cover all areas of relevance.Some U.S. ocials understood this contradictory
statement as a declaration of noncompliance.
There were no weapon inspections in Iraq for nearly four
years after the UN departed from Iraq in 1998, and Iraq
asserted that they would never be invited back.* [60] In
addition, Saddam had issued a secret orderthat Iraq
did not have to abide by any UN Resolution since in his
view the United States had broken international law
.* [61]
In 2001, Saddam stated: we are not at all seeking to
build up weapons or look for the most harmful weapons
. . . however, we will never hesitate to possess the

2003 Iraq War

February 5, 2003 - United States Secretary of State Colin Powell


holding a model vial of anthrax while giving the presentation to
the United Nations Security Council.

Possession of WMDs was cited by the United States as


the primary motivation instigating the Iraq War.
Prelude
See also: Rationale for the Iraq War and The Iraq War
Main articles: Iraq disarmament crisis and The UN
Security Council and the Iraq war
In late 2002 Saddam Hussein, in a letter to Hans Blix, invited UN weapons inspectors back into the country. Subsequently the Security Council issued resolution 1441 authorizing new inspections in Iraq. The carefully worded
UN resolution put the burden on Iraq, not UN inspectors, to prove that they no longer had weapons of mass
destruction. The United States claimed that Iraq's latest
weapons declaration left materials and munitions unaccounted for; the Iraqis claimed that all such material had
been destroyed, something which had been stated years
earlier by Iraq's highest ranking defector, Hussein Kamel
al-Majid. According to reports from the previous UN
inspection agency, UNSCOM, Iraq produced 600 metric tons of chemical agents, including mustard gas, VX
and sarin, and nearly 25,000 rockets and 15,000 artillery

166
shells, with chemical agents, that are still unaccounted
for.
In January 2003, United Nations weapons inspectors reported that they had found no indication that Iraq possessed nuclear weapons or an active program. Some former UNSCOM inspectors disagree about whether the
United States could know for certain whether or not Iraq
had renewed production of weapons of mass destruction.
Robert Gallucci said, If Iraq had [uranium or plutonium], a fair assessment would be they could fabricate a
nuclear weapon, and there's no reason for us to assume
we'd nd out if they had.Similarly, former inspector
Jonathan Tucker said, Nobody really knows what Iraq
has. You really can't tell from a satellite image what's going on inside a factory.However, Hans Blix said in late
January 2003 that Iraq had not genuinely accepted UN
resolutions demanding that it disarm.* [64] He claimed
there were some materials which had not been accounted
for. Since sites had been found which evidenced the
destruction of chemical weaponry, UNSCOM was actively working with Iraq on methods to ascertain for certain whether the amounts destroyed matched up with the
amounts that Iraq had produced.* [65]* [66] In the next
quarterly report, after the war, the total amount of proscribed items destroyed by UNMOVIC in Iraq can be
gathered.* [67] Those include:

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
totality doesn't amount to much, but which is
still prohibited ... We can't give Iraq a clean
bill of health, therefore we can't close the
book on their weapons of mass destruction.
But simultaneously, we can't reasonably talk
about Iraqi non-compliance as representing
a de-facto retention of a prohibited capacity
worthy of war.* [68]

Ritter also argued that the WMDs Saddam had in his possession all those years ago, if retained, would have long
since turned to harmless substances. He stated that Iraqi
Sarin and tabun have a shelf life of approximately ve
years, VX lasts a bit longer (but not much longer), and nally he said botulinum toxin and liquid anthrax last about
three years.* [69]* [70]
Legal justication
Main article: Legality of the Iraq War
On March 17, 2003, Lord Goldsmith, Attorney Gen-

50 deployed Al-Samoud 2 missiles


Various equipment, including vehicles, engines and
warheads, related to the AS2 missiles
2 large propellant casting chambers
14 155 mm shells lled with mustard gas, the mustard gas totaling approximately 49 litres and still at
high purity
Approximately 500 ml of thiodiglycol
Some 122 mm chemical warheads
Some chemical equipment
224.6 kg of expired growth media

President George W. Bush addresses the nation from the Oval


Oce, March 19, 2003, to announce the beginning of Operation
Iraqi Freedom.* [71] The people of the United States and our
friends and allies will not live at the mercy of an outlaw regime
that threatens the peace with weapons of mass murder.The Senate committee found that many of the administration's pre-war
statements about Iraqi WMD were not supported by the underlying intelligence.

In an attempt to counter the allegations that some WMD


arsenals (or capability) were indeed hidden from inspectors, Scott Ritter would argue later;
eral of the UK, set out his government's legal justication
for an invasion of Iraq. He said that Security Council
resolution 678 authorised force against Iraq, which was
There's no doubt Iraq hasn't fully complied
with its disarmament obligations as set forth
suspended but not terminated by resolution 687, which
by the Security Council in its resolution. But
imposed continuing obligations on Iraq to eliminate its
on the other hand, since 1998 Iraq has been
weapons of mass destruction. A material breach of resofundamentally disarmed: 90-95% of Iraq's
lution 687 would revive the authority to use force under
weapons of mass destruction capacity has been
resolution 678. In resolution 1441 the Security Council
veriably eliminated ... We have to remember
determined that Iraq was in material breach of resolution
that this missing 5-10% doesn't necessarily
687 because it had not fully carried out its obligations to
constitute a threat ... It constitutes bits and
disarm. Although resolution 1441 had given Iraq a nal
pieces of a weapons program which in its
chance to comply, UK Attorney General Goldsmith wrote

4.14. IRAQ
it is plain that Iraq has failed so to comply. Most member governments of the United Nations Security Council
made clear that after resolution 1441 there still was no authorization for the use of force. Indeed, at the time 1441
was passed, both the U.S. and UK representatives stated
explicitly that 1441 contained no provision for military
action. Then-U.S. Ambassador John D. Negroponte was
quoted as saying:
There's no automaticityand this is a
two-stage process, and in that regard we have
met the principal concerns that have been expressed for the resolution [...] Whatever violation there is, or is judged to exist, will be dealt
with in the council, and the council will have an
opportunity to consider the matter before any
other action is taken.* [72]
The British ambassador to the UN, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, concurred:
We heard loud and clear during the negotiations the concerns about automaticity
and hidden triggers- the concern that on
a decision so crucial we should not rush into
military action; that on a decision so crucial
any Iraqi violations should be discussed by the
Council. Let me be equally clear in response,
as one of the co-sponsors of the text we have
adopted: there is noautomaticityin this Resolution.* [73]
The UN itself never had the chance to declare that Iraq
had failed to take its nal opportunityto comply as
the U.S. invasion made it a moot point. American President George W. Bush stated that Saddam Hussein had
48 hours to step down and leave Iraq.* [74] As the deadline approached, the United States announced that forces
would be sent to verify his disarmament and a transition
to a new government.
Coalition expanded intelligence
On May 30, 2003, Paul Wolfowitz stated in an interview with Vanity Fair magazine that the issue of weapons
of mass destruction was the point of greatest agreement
among Bush's team among the reasons to remove Saddam Hussein from power. He said, The truth is that
for reasons that have a lot to do with the U.S. government
bureaucracy, we settled on the one issue that everyone
could agree on, which was weapons of mass destruction
as the core reason, but, there have always been three fundamental concerns. One is weapons of mass destruction,
the second is support for terrorism, the third is the criminal treatment of the Iraqi people. Actually I guess you
could say there's a fourth overriding one which is the connection between the rst two.* [75]

167
In an interview with BBC in June 2004, David Kay, former head of the Iraq Survey Group, made the following
comment:Anyone out there holding as I gather Prime
Minister Blair has recently said the prospect that, in fact,
the Iraq Survey Group is going to unmask actual weapons
of mass destruction, [is] really delusional.
In 2002, Scott Ritter, a former UNSCOM weapons inspector heavily criticized the Bush administration and
media outlets for using the testimony of alleged former
Iraqi nuclear scientist Khidir Hamza, who defected from
Iraq in 1994, as a rationale for invading Iraq:
We seized the entire records of the Iraqi
Nuclear program, especially the administrative
records. We got a name of everybody, where
they worked, what they did, and the top of the
list, Saddam'sBombmaker[which was the title of Hamza's book, and earned the nickname
afterwards] was a man named Jafar Dhia Jafar, not Khidir Hamza, and if you go down the
list of the senior administrative personnel you
will not nd Hamza's name in there. In fact, we
didn't nd his name at all. Because in 1990, he
didn't work for the Iraqi nuclear program. He
had no knowledge of it because he worked as
a kickback specialist for Hussein Kamel in the
Presidential Palace.
He goes into northern Iraq and meets up
with Ahmad Chalabi. He walks in and says,
I'm Saddam's Bombmaker. So they call
the CIA and they say,We know who you are,
you're not Saddam's 'Bombmaker', go sell your
story to someone else.And he was released,
he was rejected by all intelligence services at
the time, he's a fraud.
And here we are, someone who the CIA
knows is a fraud, the US Government knows is
a fraud, is allowed to sit in front of the United
States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
and give testimony as a expert witness. I got
a problem with that, I got a problem with the
American media, and I've told them over and
over and over again that this man is a documentable fraud, a fake, and yet they allow
him to go on CNN, MSNBC, CNBC, and testify as if he actually knows what he is talking
about.* [76]
On June 4, 2003, U.S. Senator Pat Roberts announced
that the U.S. Select Committee on Intelligence that he
chaired would, as a part of its ongoing oversight of the
intelligence community, conduct a Review of intelligence
on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. On July 9, 2004,
the Committee released the Senate Report of Pre-war
Intelligence on Iraq. On July 17, 2003, the British

168
Prime Minister Tony Blair said in an address to the U.S.
Congress, that history would forgive the United States and
United Kingdom, even if they were wrong about weapons
of mass destruction. He still maintained thatwith every
ber of instinct and convictionIraq did have weapons
of mass destruction.
On February 3, 2004, British Foreign Secretary Jack
Straw announced an independent inquiry, to be chaired
by Lord Butler of Brockwell, to examine the reliability of
British intelligence relating to alleged weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq.* [77] The Butler Review was published July 14, 2004.

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
sein had invaded a country, he had used
weapons of mass destruction, he had the capability of making weapons of mass destruction,
he was ring at our pilots. He was a state sponsor of terror. Removing Saddam Hussein was
the right thing for world peace and the security
of our country.
In a speech before the World Aairs Council of Charlotte,
NC, on April 7, 2006, President Bush stated that hefully
understood that the intelligence was wrong, and [he was]
just as disappointed as everybody elsewhen U.S. troops
failed to nd weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.* [78]
Intelligence shortly before the 2003 invasion of Iraq was
heavily used as support arguments in favor of military intervention, with the October 2002 C.I.A. report on Iraqi
WMDs considered to be the most reliable one available
at that time.* [79]
According to the CIA's report, all U.S. intelligence experts agree that Iraq is seeking nuclear weapons. There
is little question that Saddam Hussein wants to develop
nuclear weapons.Senator John Kerry (D-Mass.) - Congressional Record, October 9, 2002* [80]

On May 29, 2003, Andrew Gilligan appears on the BBC's


Today program early in the morning. Among the contentions he makes in his report are that the government
ordered
(the September Dossier, a British Government
Presentation slide used by U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell at
dossier
on
WMD) to be sexed up, to be made more exthe UN Security Council in the lead up to the 2003 invasion of
citing, and ordered more facts to be...discovered.The
Iraq
broadcast is not repeated.* [81]
In the buildup to the 2003 war, the New York Times pubOn May 27, 2003, a secret Defense Intelligence Agency
lished a number of stories claiming to prove that Iraq posfact-nding mission in Iraq reported unanimously to intelsessed WMD. One story in particular, written by Judith
ligence ocials in Washington that two trailers captured
Miller helped persuade the American public that Iraq
in Iraq by Kurdish troopshad nothing to do with biologihad WMD: in September 2002 she wrote about an intercal weapons.The trailers had been a key part of the argucepted shipment of aluminum tubes which the NYT said
ment for the 2003 invasion; Secretary of State Colin Powwere to be used to develop nuclear material. It is now
ell had told the United Nations Security Council, We
generally understood that they were not intended (or well
have rsthand descriptions of biological weapons factosuited) for that purpose but rather for artillery rockets.
ries on wheels and on rails. We know what the fermenters
The story was followed up with television appearances by
look like. We know what the tanks, pumps, compressors
Colin Powell, Donald Rumsfeld and Condoleezza Rice all
and other parts look like.The Pentagon team had been
pointing to the story as part of the basis for taking milisent to investigate the trailers after the invasion. The team
tary action against Iraq. Miller's sources were introduced
of experts unanimously foundno connection to anything
to her by Ahmed Chalabi, an Iraqi exile favorable to a
biological"; one of the experts told reporters that they priU.S. invasion of Iraq. Miller is also listed as a speaker for
vately called the trailers the biggest sand toilets in the
The Middle East Forum, an organization which openly
world.The report was classied, and the next day, the
declared support for an invasion. In May 2004 the New
CIA publicly released the assessment of its Washington
York Times published an editorial which stated that its
analysts that the trailers weremobile biological weapons
journalism in the build up to war had sometimes been
production.The White House continued to refer to the
lax. It appears that in the cases where Iraqi exiles were
trailers as mobile biological laboratories throughout the
used for the stories about WMD were either ignorant as
year, and the Pentagon eld report remained classied. It
to the real status of Iraq's WMD or lied to journalists to
is still classied, but a Washington Post report of April
achieve their own ends.
12, 2006 disclosed some of the details of the report. AcDespite the intelligence lapse, Bush stood by his decision cording to the Post:
to invade Iraq stating:
A spokesman for the DIA asserted that the
But what wasn't wrong was Saddam Husteam's ndings were neither ignored nor sup-

4.14. IRAQ
pressed, but were incorporated in the work of
the Iraqi Survey Group, which led the ocial
search for Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.
The survey group's nal report in September
2004 15 months after the technical report
was written said the trailers were impracticalfor biological weapons production and
were almost certainly intendedfor manufacturing hydrogen for weather balloons.* [82]
General Tommy Franks was quoted as saying: I think
no one in this country probably was more surprised than I
when weapons of mass destruction were not used against
our troops as they moved toward Baghdad.* [83]
On February 6, 2004, U.S. President George W. Bush
named an Iraq Intelligence Commission, chaired by
Charles Robb and Laurence Silberman, to investigate
U.S. intelligence, specically regarding the 2003 invasion of Iraq and Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. On
February 8, 2004, Dr Hans Blix, in an interview on BBC
TV, accused the U.S. and UK governments of dramatising the threat of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, in
order to strengthen the case for the 2003 war against the
government of Saddam Hussein.
Iraq Survey Group
On May 30, 2003, The U.S. Department of Defense
briefed the media that it was ready to formally begin the
work of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), a fact nding mission from the coalition of the Iraq occupation into the
WMD programs developed by Iraq, taking over from the
British-American 75th Exploitation Task Force.
Various nuclear facilities, including the Baghdad Nuclear
Research Facility and Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center, were found looted in the month following the invasion. (Gellman, May 3, 2003) On June 20, 2003, the
International Atomic Energy Agency reported that tons
of uranium, as well as other radioactive materials such as
thorium, had been recovered, and that the vast majority
had remained on site. There were several reports of radiation sickness in the area. It has been suggested that the
documents and suspected weapons sites were looted and
burned in Iraq by looters in the nal days of the war.* [84]

169
but probably with a dierent mix of capabilities to
that which previously existed. Saddam aspired to
develop a nuclear capabilityin an incremental fashion, irrespective of international pressure and the resulting economic risksbut he intended to focus on
ballistic missile and tactical chemical warfare (CW)
capabilities;"* [86]
3.Iran was the pre-eminent motivator of [Iraq's
WMD] policy. All senior level Iraqi ocials considered Iran to be Iraq's principal enemy in the region.
The wish to balance Israel and acquire status and inuence in the Arab world were also considerations,
but secondary.* [86]
4.The former Regime had no formal written strategy
or plan for the revival of WMD after sanctions. Neither was there an identiable group of WMD policy makers or planners separate from Saddam. Instead, his lieutenants understood WMD revival was
his goal from their long association with Saddam and
his infrequent, but rm, verbal comments and directions to them.* [86]
5.Saddam did not consider the United States a natural
adversary, as he did Iran and Israel, and he hoped
that Iraq might again enjoy improved relations with
the United States, according to Tariq 'Aziz and the
presidential secretary.* [86]
6. Evidence of the maturity and signicance of the pre1991 Iraqi Nuclear Program but found that Iraq's
ability to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program
progressively decayed after that date;
7. Concealment of nuclear program in its entirety, as
with Iraq's BW program. Aggressive UN inspections after Desert Storm forced Saddam to admit the
existence of the program and destroy or surrender
components of the program;
8. After Desert Storm, Iraq concealed key elements of
its program and preserved what it could of the professional capabilities of its nuclear scientic community;

1.Saddam Husayn so dominated the Iraqi Regime


that its strategic intent was his alone. He wanted to
end sanctions while preserving the capability to reconstitute his weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
when sanctions were lifted.* [86]

9.Saddam's primary goal from 1991 to 2003 was to


have UN sanctions lifted, while maintaining the security of the Regime. He sought to balance the need
to cooperate with UN inspections to gain support
for lifting sanctions with his intention to preserve
Iraq's intellectual capital for WMD with a minimum
of foreign intrusiveness and loss of face. Indeed,
this remained the goal to the end of the Regime, as
the starting of any WMD program, conspicuous or
otherwise, risked undoing the progress achieved in
eroding sanctions and jeopardizing a political end to
the embargo and international monitoring;"* [86]

2.Saddam wanted to recreate Iraq's WMD capability


which was essentially destroyed in 1991after sanctions were removed and Iraq's economy stabilized,

10. A limited number of post-1995 activities would


have aided the reconstitution of the nuclear weapons
program once sanctions were lifted.

On September 30, 2004, the U.S. Iraq Survey Group issued its Final Report.* [85] Among its key ndings were:

170

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

The report found that The ISG has not found evidence
that Saddam possessed WMD stocks in 2003, but [there
is] the possibility that some weapons existed in Iraq, although not of a militarily signicant capability.It also
concluded that there was a possible intent to restart all
banned weapons programs as soon as multilateral sanctions against it had been dropped, with Hussein pursuing WMD proliferation in the future: There is an extensive, yet fragmentary and circumstantial, body of evidence suggesting that Saddam pursued a strategy to maintain a capability to return to WMD after sanctions were
lifted...* [87] No senior Iraqi ocial interviewed by the
ISG believed that Saddam had forsaken WMD forever.
On October 6, 2004, the head of the Iraq Survey Group
(ISG), Charles Duelfer, announced to the U.S. Senate
Armed Services Committee that the group found no evidence that Iraq under Saddam Hussein had produced and
stockpiled any weapons of mass destruction since 1991,
when UN sanctions were imposed.* [88]
After he was captured by U.S. forces in Baghdad in 2003,
Dr. Mahdi Obeidi, who ran Saddam's nuclear centrifuge
program until 1997, handed over blueprints for a nuclear
centrifuge along with some actual centrifuge components,
stored at his home buried in the front yard awaiting
orders from Baghdad to proceed. He said,I had to maintain the program to the bitter end.In his book The Bomb
in My Garden, the Iraqi physicist explains that his nuclear
stash was the key that could have unlocked and restarted
Saddam's bombmaking program. However, it would require a massive investment and a re-creation of thousands
of centrifuges in order to reconstitute a full centrifugal
enrichment program.
In a January 26, 2004 interview with Tom Brokaw of
NBC news, Kay described Iraq's nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons programs as being in a rudimentarystage. He also stated that What we did nd, and
as others are investigating it, we found a lot of terrorist
groups and individuals that passed through Iraq.* [89]
In responding to a question by Brokaw as to whether Iraq
was agathering threatas President Bush had asserted
before the invasion, Kay answered:
Tom, an imminent threat is a political judgment. It's not a technical judgment. I think
Baghdad was actually becoming more dangerous in the last two years than even we realized. Saddam was not controlling the society
any longer. In the marketplace of terrorism and
of WMD, Iraq well could have been that supplier if the war had not intervened.
In June 2004, the United States removed 2 tons of lowenriched uranium from Iraq, sucient raw material for a
single nuclear weapon.* [90]
Demetrius Perricos, then head of UNMOVIC, stated that
the Kay report contained little information not already

known by UNMOVIC.* [91] Many organizations, such


as the journal Biosecurity and Bioterrorism, have claimed
that Kay's report is a worst case analysis.* [92]

Captured documents
Main article: Operation Iraqi Freedom documents
Operation Iraqi Freedom documents refers to some
48,000 boxes of documents, audiotapes and videotapes
that were captured by the U.S. military during the 2003
invasion of Iraq. Many of these documents seem to make
clear that Saddam's regime had given up on seeking a
WMD capability by the mid-1990s. Associated Press
reported, Repeatedly in the transcripts, Saddam and
his lieutenants remind each other that Iraq destroyed its
chemical and biological weapons in the early 1990s, and
shut down those programs and the nuclear-bomb program, which had never produced a weapon.At one 1996
presidential meeting, top weapons program ocial Amer
Mohammed Rashid, describes his conversation with UN
weapons inspector Rolf Ekeus:We don't have anything
to hide, so we're giving you all the details.At another
meeting Saddam told his deputies,We cooperated with
the resolutions 100 percent and you all know that, and
the 5 percent they claim we have not executed could take
them 10 years to (verify). Don't think for a minute that
we still have WMD. We have nothing.* [93] U.S. Congressman Peter Hoekstra called for the U.S. government
to put the remaining documents on the Internet so Arabic speakers around the world can help translate the documents.* [94]

Recovered chemical weapons


Since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, several reported nds of
chemical weapons were announced. During the invasion
itself, there were half a dozen incidents in which the U.S.
military announced that it had found chemical weapons.
Most of these cases resulted in eld tests showing falsepositives.
A post-war case occurred on January 9, 2004, when Icelandic munitions experts and Danish military engineers
discovered 36 120-mm mortar rounds containing liquid
buried in Southern Iraq. While initial tests suggested that
the rounds contained a blister agent, subsequent analysis
by American and Danish experts showed that no chemical
agent was present.* [95]
On May 2, 2004, a shell containing mustard gas was found
in the middle of a street west of Baghdad. The Iraq Survey Group investigation reported that it had been previously stored improperly, and thus the gas was ineectiveas a useful chemical agent. Ocials from the
Defense Department commented that they were not certain if use was to be made of the device as a bomb.* [96]

4.14. IRAQ
On May 16, 2004, a 152 mm artillery shell was used as
an improvised bomb.* [97] The shell exploded and two
U.S. soldiers were treated for minor exposure to a nerve
agent (nausea and dilated pupils). On May 18 it was reported by U.S. Department of Defense intelligence ofcials that tests showed the two-chambered shell contained the chemical agent sarin, the shell beinglikelyto
have contained three to four liters of the substance (in the
form of its two unmixed precursor chemicals prior to the
aforementioned explosion that had not eectively mixed
them).* [96] Former U.S. weapons inspector David Kay
told the Associated Press that he doubted the shell or
the nerve agent came from a hidden stockpile, although
he didn't rule out that possibility.Kay also considered it
possible that the shell wasan old relic overlooked when
Saddam said he had destroyed such weapons in the mid1990s.* [98] It is likely that the insurgents who planted
the bomb did not know it contained sarin, according to
Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt, and another U.S. ocial conrmed that the shell did not have the markings of a chemical agent.* [98] The Iraq Survey Group later concluded
that the shell probably originated with a batch that was
stored in a Al Muthanna CW complex basement during
the late 1980s for the purpose of leakage testing.* [97]
In a July 2, 2004, article published by The Associated
Press and Fox News, it was reported that sarin gas warheads dating back to the last IranIraq War were found
in South Central Iraq by Polish Allies. The Polish troops
secured munitions on June 23, 2004,* [99] but it turned
out that the warheads did not in fact contain sarin gas but
were all empty and tested negative for any type of chemicalsand it transpired that the Poles had bought the shells
for $5,000 each.* [100]

171
These munitions meet the technical denition of weapons
of mass destruction, according to the commander of the
National Ground Intelligence Center. These are chemical weapons as dened under the Chemical Weapons
Convention, and yes ... they do constitute weapons of
mass destruction,Army Col. John Chu told the House
Armed Services Committee. The munitions addressed
in the report were produced in the 1980s, according to
Army Lt. Gen. Michael D. Maples. Badly corroded, they
could not currently be used as originally intended, though
agent remaining in the weapons would be very valuable
to terrorists and insurgents, Maples said.* [105]
On July 2008, 550 metric tonnes ofyellowcakethe last
major remnant of Saddam Hussein's nuclear program, a
huge stockpile of concentrated natural uranium, arrived
in Montreal as part of a top-secret U.S. operation. This
transport of the seed material for higher-grade nuclear enrichment, included a two-week airlift from Baghdad and
a voyage across two oceans. The Iraqi government sold
the yellowcake to a Canadian uranium producer, Cameco
Corp., in a transaction the ocial described as worth
tens of millions of dollars.* [106]
In October 2014, the New York Times reported that
U.S. servicemen had been exposed and injured during
the disposal and destruction of abandoned 4,990 chemical weapons that had been discovered in Iraq.* [107]
CBS News reported that the U.S. government had
concealed the injuries to the troops by chemical
weapons.* [108]* [109] US soldiers reporting exposure to
mustard gas and sarin allege they were required to keep
their exposure secret, sometimes declined admission to
hospital and evacuation home despite the request of their
commanders.* [109]

The Washington Post reported that the U.S. military


announced in 2004 in Iraq that several crates of the old
shells had been uncovered and that they contained a blis- Theories in the aftermath of the 2003 war
ter agent that was no longer active.It said the shellshad
Main article: WMD conjecture in the aftermath of the
been buried near the Iranian border, and then long forgot2003 Iraq War
ten, by Iraqi troops during their eight-year war with Iran,
*
which ended in 1988. [101]
On June 21, 2006 Rick Santorum claimed that we
have found weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, chemical
weapons, citing a declassied June 6 letter to Pete Hoekstra saying that since the 2003 invasion, a total of approximately 500 weapons munitions which contain degraded mustard or sarin nerve agenthad been found scattered throughout the country.* [102]* [103]
On June 21, 2006 the U.S. House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence released key
points from a classied report from the National Ground
Intelligence Center on the recovery of a small number of
degraded chemical munitions in Iraq. The report stated
thatCoalition forces have recovered approximately 500
weapons munitions which contain degraded mustard or
sarin nerve agent.All are thought to be pre-Gulf War
munitions.* [104]

4.14.6 2009 Declaration


Iraq became a member state of the Chemical Weapons
Convention in 2009, declaring two bunkers with lled
and unlled chemical weapons munitions, some precursors, as well as ve former chemical weapons production
facilitiesaccording to OPCW Director General Rogelio Prter.* [110] No plans were announced at that time
for the destruction of the material, although it was noted
that the bunkers were damaged in the 2003 war and even
inspection of the site must be carefully planned.
The declaration contained no surprises, OPCW
spokesman Michael Luhan indicated. The production
facilities were put out of commissionby airstrikes
during the 1991 conict, while U.N. personnel afterward secured the chemical munitions in the bunkers.

172

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

Luhan stated at the time: These are legacy weapons,


remnants.He declined to discuss how many weapons
were stored in the bunkers or what materials they
contained. The weapons were not believed to be in a
usable state.* [110]

4.14.7

Media perception

In a study published in 2005,* [111] a group of researchers


assessed the eects reports and retractions in the media
had on people's memory regarding the search for WMD
in Iraq during the 2003 Iraq War. The study focused
on populations in two coalition countries (Australia and
USA) and one opposed to the war (Germany). Results
showed that US citizens generally did not correct initial
misconceptions regarding WMD, even following disconrmation; Australian and German citizens were more responsive to retractions. Dependence on the initial source
of information led to a substantial minority of Americans
exhibiting false memory that WMD were indeed discovered, which was essentially false.* [112] This led to three
conclusions:

Demetrius Perricos
Dodgy Dossier
In Shifting Sands: The Truth About Unscom and the
Disarming of Iraq
Iraqi biological weapons program
Iraqi chemical weapons program
Iraqi aluminum tubes
Mobile weapons laboratory
Oce of Special Plans
Operation Opera
Operation Rockingham
Project Babylon, a project with unknown objectives
commissioned by Iraqi president Saddam Hussein to
build a series of superguns
Yellowcake forgery

1. The repetition of tentative news stories, even if they


are subsequently disconrmed, can assist in the cre- 4.14.9 References
ation of false memories in a substantial proportion of
[1] Saddam Hussein. The Famous People website. Repeople.
trieved 28 August 2013.

2. Once information is published, its subsequent correction does not alter people's beliefs unless they are suspicious about the motives underlying the events the
news stories are about.
3. When people ignore corrections, they do so irrespective of how certain they are that the corrections occurred.
A poll conducted between June and September 2003
asked people whether they thought evidence of WMD
had been discovered in Iraq since the war ended. They
were also asked which media sources they relied upon.
Those who obtained their news primarily from Fox News
were three times as likely to believe that evidence of
WMD had been discovered in Iraq than those who relied on PBS and NPR for their news, and one third more
likely than those who primarily watched CBS.

[2] Cleminson, Ronald.


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2003.* [113]

[8] Farley, Maggie (2003-02-06). "''Los Angeles Times'':


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4.14.8

[9] Text of Joint Resolution Authorizing the Use of Force on


Iraq, Joint Resolution on Iraq, October 11, 2002

See also

Alexander Coker
At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA
Corinne Heraud
Death of David Kelly

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Arming Iraq: How the
Check date values in: |date= (help)
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[64] Blix: Iraq can't account for deadly gas, germs.
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[65] Blix, Hans (February 28, 2003). Twelfth quarterly report of the Executive Chairman of the United Nations
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[66] Karon, Tony (February 24, 2003). Why Saddam Might
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[72] Maggie Farley and Maura Reynolds (November 8, 2002).
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[76] The Iraqi Threat: How Real Is It?". October 2002. Retrieved 2011-01-06.
[77] Iraq WMD inquiry details unveiled. BBC News.
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[91] Pincus, Walter (December 14, 2003). U.N. inspector:
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2 October 2003
[95] Mortar shells from Iraq had no chemical agents. Daily
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[96] Porteus, Liza (May 19, 2004). Tests Conrm Sarin in
Iraqi Artillery Shell. FOX News. Retrieved 2006-0429.
[97] Iraq's Chemical Warfare Program Annex F. Archived
from the original on June 23, 2005. Retrieved 2005-0629.
[98] Iraq Sarin Find Worries U.S.. CBS News. May 17,
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[99] Polish Troops Find Sarin Warheads. FOX News. July
2, 2004. Archived from the original on May 30, 2006.
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[100] Pincus, Walter (July 3, 2004). Chemicals Not Found in
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[101] Lawmakers Cite Weapons Found in Iraq. washingtonpost.com. June 22, 2006. Retrieved 2009-08-01.
[102] De-classied Report (PDF). House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. June
21, 2006. Archived from the original (PDF) on June 28,
2006. Retrieved 2006-04-29.

Congressional Research Service (CRS) Reports regarding Iraq


WMD theories and conspiracies Prospect magazine
LookSmart - Iraq WMD Controversy directory category
Washington Post article by Arthur Keller a former
CIA case worker who worked on trying to nd
WMDs in Iraq
Richard S. Tracey, Trapped by a Mindset: The Iraq
WMD Intelligence Failure, 23 January 2007, Air &
Space Power Journal.
Teaser of upcoming documentary lm Land of Confusion featuring Pennsylvania Army National Guard
Soldiers assigned to the Iraq Survey Group in 200405.
Annotated bibliography for the Iraqi nuclear
weapons program from the Alsos Digital Library
for Nuclear Issues

176

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

4.15 Israel
Israel is widely believed to possess weapons of mass
destruction, and to be one of four nuclear-armed countries not recognized as a Nuclear Weapons State by the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).* [1] The US
Congress Oce of Technology Assessment has recorded
Israel as a country generally reported as having undeclared chemical warfare capabilities, and an oensive
biological warfare program.* [2] Ocially Israel neither
conrms nor denies possessing nuclear weapons.

4.15.1

ate ambiguity on whether it has nuclear weapons. The


policy held that Israel would not be the rst to introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle East.* [16] Former International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Mohamed ElBaradei regarded Israel as a state possessing nuclear weapons.* [17] Much of what is known
about Israel's nuclear program comes from revelations in
1986 by Mordechai Vanunu, a technician at the Negev
Nuclear Research Center who served an 18-year prison
sentence as a result. Israel has not signed the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty, but supports establishment of
a Middle East Zone free of weapons of mass destruction.* [18]

Nuclear weapons

Main article: Nuclear weapons and Israel


See also: Samson Option and Vela incident

4.15.3 Chemical weapons

It is believed that Israel had possessed an operational nuclear weapons capability by 1967, with the mass production of nuclear warheads occurring immediately after the
Six-Day War.* [2] Although no ocial statistics exist, it
has been estimated that Israel possesses from 75 to as
many as 400 nuclear weapons.* [3]* [4]* [5]* [6] It is unknown if Israel's reported thermonuclear weapons are in
the megaton range. * [7] Israel is also reported to possess a wide range of dierent systems, including neutron
bombs, tactical nuclear weapons, and suitcase nukes.* [8]
Israel is believed to manufacture its nuclear weapons at
the Negev Nuclear Research Center.

4.15.2

Nuclear weapons delivery

Main articles: Nuclear weapons delivery, Nuclear triad,


Jericho (missile), Popeye Turbo and F-15I
Nuclear weapons delivery mechanisms include Jericho
intercontinental ballistic missiles, with a range of 11,500
km, and which are believed to provide a second-strike
option. Israel's nuclear-capable ballistic missiles are believed to be buried so far underground that they would
survive a nuclear attack.* [9]* [10] Additionally, Israel is
believed to have an oshore nuclear second-strike capability, using submarine-launched nuclear-capable cruise
missiles, which can be launched from the Israeli Navy's
Dolphin-class submarines.* [11] The Israeli Air Force has
F-15I and F-16I Sufa ghter aircraft are capable of delivering nuclear weapons at long distances using conformal fuel tanks and their aerial refueling eet of modied
Boeing 707's.* [12]

PDF le of the CIA report as described. This version is partially


complete, showing only the relevant passages on Israel.

Israel has signed but not ratied the Chemical Weapons


Convention (CWC).* [19] In 1983 a report by the CIA
stated that Israel, after nding itself surrounded by
frontline Arab states with budding CW capabilities, became increasingly conscious of its vulnerability to chemical attack... undertook a program of chemical warfare
preparations in both oensive and protective areas... In
late 1982 a probable CW nerve agent production facility
and a storage facility were identied at the Dimona Sensitive Storage Area in the Negev Desert. Other CW agent
production is believed to exist within a well-developed Israeli chemical industry.* [20]

In 2006, then Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert appeared to acknowledge that Israel had nuclear weapons
when he stated on German TV that Iran was aspiring to have nuclear weapons as America, France, Israel,
Russia.* [13]* [14]* [15] This admission was in contrast There are also speculations that a chemical weapons proto the long-running Israeli government policy of deliber- gram might be located at the Israel Institute for Biological

4.15. ISRAEL
Research (IIBR* [21]) in Ness Ziona.* [22]
190 liters of dimethyl methylphosphonate, a CWC schedule 2 chemical used in the synthesis of sarin nerve gas,
was discovered in the cargo of El Al Flight 1862 after it
crashed in 1992 en route to Tel Aviv. Israel insisted the
material was non-toxic, was to have been used to test lters that protect against chemical weapons, and that it had
been clearly listed on the cargo manifest in accordance
with international regulations. The shipment was from a
U.S. chemical plant to the IIBR under a U.S. Department
of Commerce license.* [23]
In 1993, the U.S. Congress Oce of Technology Assessment WMD proliferation assessment recorded Israel as
a country generally reported as having undeclared oensive chemical warfare capabilities.* [2] Former US deputy
assistant secretary of defense responsible for chemical
and biological defense Dr. Bill Richardson said in 1998
I have no doubt that Israel has worked on both chemical
and biological oensive things for a long time... There's
no doubt they've had stu for years.* [24]

4.15.4

Biological weapons

Israel is believed to have developed an oensive


biological warfare capability.* [2] The US Congress Ofce of Technology Assessment records Israel as a country possessing a long-term, undeclared biological warfare
program.* [2] Israel is not a signatory to the Biological
Weapons Convention (BWC).* [25] It is assumed that the
Israel Institute for Biological Research in Ness Ziona develops vaccines and antidotes for chemical and biological warfare.* [26] It has not been possible to conclude
whether Israel currently maintains an oensive biological weapons program; it is speculated that Israel retains
an active ability to produce and disseminate biological
weapons.* [27]

4.15.5

In literature

John Douglas-Gray's thriller The Novak Legacy

4.15.6

References

[1] Background Information, 2005 Review Conference of


the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. United Nations. Retrieved 2006-07-02.
[2] Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Assessing the Risks (PDF). U.S. Congress Oce of Technology Assessment. August 1993. OTA-ISC-559. Retrieved
2008-12-09.
[3] http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/israel/nuke.
html. Retrieved May 3, 2015. Missing or empty |title=
(help)

177

[4] Toukan, Abdullah, Senior Associate; Cordesman, Anthony H., Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy. Study on
a Possible Israeli Strike on Irans Nuclear Development
Facilities (PDF). Center for Strategic and International
Studies. Retrieved April 2, 2015.
[5] Brower, Kenneth S., A Propensity for Conict: Potential Scenarios and Outcomes of War in the Middle
East,Jane's Intelligence Review, Special Report no. 14,
(February 1997), 14-15.
[6] Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance. Arms
Control Association. Retrieved 2007-05-30.
[7] http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/31/
does-israel-really-have-a-thermonuclear-weapon/.
Missing or empty |title= (help)
[8] Hersh, Seymour M. The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear
Arsenal and American Foreign Policy. New York: Random House, 1991. ISBN 0-394-57006-5 p.220
[9] Plushnick-Masti, Ramit (2006-08-25). Israel Buys 2
Nuclear-Capable Submarines. The Washington Post.
Retrieved 2010-05-20.
[10] http://www.scribd.com/doc/6088311/
Missile-Survey-Ballistic-and-Cruise-Missiles-of-Foreign-Countries
[11] Alon Ben-David (1 October 2009). Israel seeks sixth
Dolphin in light of Iranian 'threat'". Jane's Defence
Weekly. Retrieved 2009-11-03.
[12] John Pike.Israel Air Force - Israel. globalsecurity.org.
[13] Israeli PM in nuclear arms hint. BBC Online. 200612-12. Retrieved 2015-07-30.
[14] In a Slip, Israels Leader Seems to Conrm Its Nuclear
Arsenal. The New York Times. 2006-12-12. Retrieved
2015-07-30.
[15] Israeli PM admits to nuclear weapons. ABC Online.
2006-12-12. Retrieved 2015-07-30.
[16] Dawoud, Khaled (1999-12-02). Redening the bomb
. Al-Ahram Weekly. Retrieved 2006-07-02.
[17] Mohamed ElBaradei (27 July 2004). Transcript of
the Director General's Interview with Al-Ahram News
. International Atomic Energy Agency. Retrieved 200706-03.
[18] 43 nations to seek Middle East free of WMDs.
MSNBC.com. 2008-07-13. Retrieved 2011-09-06.
[19] United Nations Treaty Collection. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and
Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction. Accessed 14 January 2009.
[20] 1NIE on Israeli Chemical Weapons. scribd.com.
[21] IIBR, IL.
[22] Cohen, Avner.Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons:
History, Deterrence, and Arms Control (PDF). Retrieved 2010-04-27.

178

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

[23] Israel says El Al crash chemical 'non-toxic'". BBC.


1998-10-02. Archived from the original on 2003-08-18.
Retrieved 2006-07-02.

The Bomb That Never Is, by Avner Cohen, Bulletin


of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2000, Vol 56,
No. 3 pp. 2223

[24] Stein, Je (1998-12-02). Debunking the ethnobomb"". Salon.com. Retrieved 2006-07-11.

Israel and the Bomb (Columbia University press,


1998), including declassied documents.

[25] Membership of the Biological Weapons Convention


. United Nations Oce At Geneva. Retrieved 12 March
2011.

Obsessive secrecy undermines democracy By


Reuven Pedatzur Ha'aretz. Tuesday, August 8,
2000Cohen published Israel and the Bombin
the United States, and a Hebrew translation of the
book has appeared here. In the eyes of the defense
establishment, Cohen has committed a double sin.

[26] Nes Ziyyona. GlobalSecurity.org. April 28, 2005.


Retrieved 2007-02-11. Israel is believed to have the capacity to produce chemical warfare agents, and probably
has stocks of bombs, rockets, and artillery shells. Public reports that a mustard and nerve gas production facility was established in 1982 in the Dimona restricted area
are apparently erroneous. Israel is also probably poised
to rapidly produce biological weapons, though there are
no public reports of currently active production eort or
associated locations.Israel's primary chemical and biological warfare facility is at Nes Ziyyona [Noss Ziona],
near Tel Aviv. The Israeli Institute for Bio-Technology is
believed to be the home of both oensive and defensive
research.
[27] Normark, Magnus; Anders Lindblad; Anders Norqvist;
Bjrn Sandstrm; Louise Waldenstrm (December 2005).
Israel and WMD: Incentives and Capabilities (PDF).
FOI. p. 38. Retrieved 2007-02-11. Israel does not stockpile or produce BW in large-scale today. However, we
assess that Israel has a breakout capability for biological
weapons and also CW, i.e. the knowledge needed to implement theoretical knowledge into the practical management of production and deployment of CBW. The knowledge base would be the one that was built during the 1950s
and 1960s where todays advanced research can be used
to upgrade potential BW and CW agents and their behaviour in the environment. We have not found any conclusive evidence that show that Israels oensive programs still remain active today.

4.15.7

External links

*Israel, WMD Overview, Nuclear Threat Initiative, May 2014.


Israeli Nuclear History, Archival Document Collection at the Wilson Center Digital Archive
, Avner Cohen Collection at the Wilson Center's Nuclear Proliferation International History Project
Israel Crosses the Threshold, National Security
Archive Electronic Brieng Book No. 189, by
Avner Cohen and William Burr, April 28, 2006
(originally published at Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2006)

Fighting to preserve the tattered veil of secrecy By


Ronen Bergman The publication of Dr. Avner Cohen's book and of the Vanunu trial transcripts set o
alarm bells for the Defense Ministry's chief of security, who is striving to protect the traditional opacity
regarding Israel's nuclear aairs.
Blast, from the past to the present By Yirmiyahu
Yovel Ha'aretz. 28 July 2000If, in the context of the
peace agreements and talks with the United States,
Israel were to conrm its nuclear capability - while
committing itself to no nuclear testing and pledging
to build its defense system on conventional weapons
as in the past - maybe then it might achieve at least
de facto recognition, if not international legitimacy,
for its nuclear weaponry, to be used only as a last
resortand a tool for safeguarding peace after Israel
withdraws.
The Third Temple's Holy Of Holies: Israel's Nuclear Weapons Warner D. Farr, LTC, U.S. Army,
September 1999
Israel: Plutonium Production The Risk Report Volume 2 Number 4 (JulyAugust 1996).
Israel: Uranium Processing and Enrichment The
Risk Report Volume 2 Number 4 (JulyAugust
1996).
Israel The Nuclear Potential of Individual Countries
Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Problems of Extension Appendix 2 Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service 6 April 1995
The Samson Option. Israel's Nuclear Arsenal and
American Foreign Policy Seymour M Hersh, [New
York: Random House, 1991]

4.16 Japan

Bibliography of Israeli Nuclear Science Publications Beginning in the mid-1930s, the nation of Japan
conducted numerous attempts to acquire and develop
by Mark Gorwitz, June 2005
weapons of mass destruction. The 1943 Battle of
Israeli Nuclear Forces, 2002, Bulletin of the Atomic Changde saw Japanese use of both bioweapons and
Scientists, September/October 2002
chemical weapons, and the Japanese conducted a serious,

4.16. JAPAN

179

though futile, nuclear weapon program. After the end of NBC protection Troop.
World War II the nation was forced to cease all produc- In 1995, JGSDF admitted possession of sarin for samtion and abandoned their experiments.
ples.
Since World War II, Japan has become a nuclear-capable
state, said to a be a screwdrivers turnaway from nuclear weapons, having the capacity, the know-how, and 4.16.3 Nuclear weapons
the materials to make a nuclear bomb. Japan has consistently eschewed any desire to have nuclear weapons, and Main article: Japanese nuclear weapon program
no mainstream Japanese party has ever advocated acquisition of nuclear weapons or any weapons of mass deA Japanese program to develop nuclear weapons was construction. Such weapons are forbidden by the Japanese
ducted during World War II. Like the German nuclear
constitution.
weapons program, it suered from an array of problems,
and was ultimately unable to progress beyond the laboratory stage before the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and
4.16.1 Bioweapons
Nagasaki and the Japanese surrender in August 1945.
Main article: Unit 731

The postwar Constitution forbids the establishment of offensive military forces, and in 1967 it adopted the Three
During the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) and World Non-Nuclear Principles, ruling out the production, posWar II, Unit 731 and other Special Research Units of the session, or introduction of nuclear weapons.
Imperial Japanese Army conducted human experimen- While there are currently no known plans in Japan to
tation on thousands, mostly Chinese, Russian, American produce nuclear weapons, it has been argued that Japan
and other nationalities as well as some Japanese criminals has the technology, raw materials, and the capital to profrom the Japanese mainlands.* [1] In military campaigns, duce nuclear weapons within one year if necessary, and
the Japanese army used biological weapons on Chinese some analysts consider it a de facto nuclear state for this
soldiers and civilians.
reason.* [3] For this reason Japan is often said to be a
*
*
This employment was largely viewed as ineective, due screwdriver's turn [4] [5] away from possessing nuto inecient delivery systems. However, information has clear weapons.
surfaced in the last decade, which alleges a more active
Japanese usage. For example, rsthand accounts testify
the Japanese infected civilians through the distribution of 4.16.4 Delivery systems
plague-infested foodstus, such as dumplings and vegetaMain articles: M-V, Epsilon (rocket) and J-I
bles.
During Changde chemical weapon attack attacks, the
Japanese also employed biological warfare by intentionally spreading cholera, dysentery, typhoid, bubonic
plague, and anthrax. Other battles include: Kaimingye
germ weapon attack.

4.16.2

Chemical weapons

The Japanese used mustard gas and the blister agent


Lewisite, against Chinese troops and guerillas in China,
amongst others during the Changde chemical weapon attack.

Solid fuel rockets are the design of choice for military applications as they can remain in storage for long periods,
and then reliably launch at short notice.
Lawmakers made national security arguments for keeping Japan's solid-fuel rocket technology alive after
ISAS was merged into the Japan Aerospace Exploration
Agency, which also has the H-IIA liquid-fuelled rocket,
in 2003. The ISAS director of external aairs, Yasunori
Matogawa, said, It seems the hard-line national security proponents in parliament are increasing their inuence, and they aren't getting much criticismI think we
re moving into a very dangerous period. When you consider the current environment and the threat from North
Korea, its scary.* [6]

Experiments involving chemical weapons were conducted on live prisoners (Unit 516). As of 2005, 60 years
after the end of the war, canisters that were abandoned by Toshiyuki Shikata, a government adviser and former lieuJapan in their hasty retreat are still being dug up in con- tenant general, indicated that part of the rationale for
struction sites, causing injuries and allegedly even deaths. the fth M-V Hayabusa mission was that the reentry and
In December 1993, Japan signed the Chemical Weapons landing of its return capsule demonstrated that Japan's
Convention, ratied it in 1995 and was thus a state party ballistic missile capability is credible.* [7]
upon entering into force in 1997.* [2]
At a technical level the M-V design could be weaponised
However, JSDF possess chemical weapons facilities and quickly (as an Intercontinental ballistic missile) although
some samples for protection which it said JGSDF Central this would be politically unlikely.* [8]

180

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

4.16.5

See also

Japan's non-nuclear weapons policy


Nuclear latency

1980.* [4] The United States and the United Kingdom assisted Libya in removing equipment and material from its
nuclear weapons program, with independent verication
by the IAEA.* [3]

Libya acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention effective 5 February 2004* [5] and began destroying its
chemical munitions later that year,* [6] but missed the
4.16.6 References
deadlines for converting one chemical weapons produc[1] AII POW-MIA Unit 731
tion facility to peaceful use and for destroying its stockpile of mustard agent.* [7] In October 2014, Libya asked
[2]Member states of the OPCW. OPCW. Retrieved 2010- for foreign assistance to transport its 850 tonnes stock09-17.
pile of precursor chemicals for making nerve gas out of
*
[3] John H. Large (May 2, 2005). THE ACTUAL Libya for destruction. [8] In February 2015, Libyan miliAND POTENTIAL DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR tary sources told media that unidentied armed men have
WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY IN THE AREA OF captured large amounts of Libyas chemical weapons,
NORTH EAST ASIA (KOREAN PENINSULAR AND including mustard gas and sarin.* [9]* [10]
JAPAN)" (PDF). R3126-A1. Archived from the original
(PDF) on 2007-07-10.
[4] Nuclear Scholars Initiative 2010: Recap of Seminar
Four. CSIS. Retrieved 29 June 2010.

4.17.1 Nuclear program

Since Libya's eorts to rollback its clandestine nuclear


program in late 2003, Libya had sought to nuclear
weapons program, allegedly to counter the covert Israeli
nuclear program.* [3] In July 1968, Libya became signatory party of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
under King Idris, ratifying the NPT treaty in 1975 under Colonel Muammar Gadda as well as concluding the
[6] Karl Schoenberger (July 11, 2003). Japan ponders nuclear weapons. Detroit Free Press. Archived from the IAEA safeguards agreement with the USSR in 1980. In
1981, the Soviet Union supplied a 10 MW research reacoriginal on June 25, 2004.
tor at Tajura.* [3]
[5] Brumel, Geo (November 2004). Nuclear proliferation special: We have the technology. Nature. 432437 432 (7016): 4327. Bibcode:2004Natur.432..432B.
doi:10.1038/432432a. PMID 15565123. Retrieved 29
June 2010.

[7] Chester Dawson (28 October 2011).In Japan, Provocative Case for Staying Nuclear. Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 13 November 2011.
[8] William E. Rapp (January 2004).Paths Diverging? The
Next Decade in the US-Japan Security Alliance(PDF).
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. p. 82.
Retrieved 29 October 2012. 119. Japan has the weapons
grade plutonium, technology for weaponization, and delivery means in the M-V-5 rocket, indigenous, solid fueled, 1800kg payload capacity, to go nuclear very rapidly
should it choose. This dramatic step, however, would require a complete loss of faith in the American nuclear umbrella

4.17 Libya
Libya possesses chemical weapons and ballistic missiles and previously pursued nuclear weapons under the
leadership of Muammar Gadda. On 19 December
2003, Gadda announced that Libya would voluntarily eliminate all materials, equipment and programs that
could lead to internationally proscribed weapons, including weapons of mass destruction and long-range
ballistic missiles.* [1]* [2]* [3] Libya signed the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 and ratied it
in 1975, and concluded a safeguards agreement with
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in

During the 1980s, Gadda had reportedly employed


an illicit nuclear proliferation networks and various
black market sources, including Swiss nuclear engineer Friedrich Tinner, to start developing the nuclear
weapons.* [3] However, by the time its nuclear program
was roll back by Muammar Gadda, with an assistance
from the U.S. and IAEA, Libya's nuclear program remained in very early developmental and initial stages.* [3]
Foreign assistance
Despite commitment to NPT, which Libya became partied of it in 1968, Gadda's had ambition of possessing of
nuclear weapons soon after seizing the control of Libya
from King Idris.* [11] The most famous buying foray
was in 1970 when Libyan leaders paying a state visit to
China.* [12] Gadda and his Prime Minister Abdessalam
Jalloud made an unsuccessful attempt to convince China
to sell tactical nuclear weapons to Libya.* [12] In a bilateral meeting with Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai, Colonel
Gadda unsuccessful attempt to convince Enlai to sell
him a nuclear bomb.* [3]* [13] Qadda's justication towards the intentions for nuclear weapons were his concern over the Israeli nuclear capability, and publicly expressed his desire to obtain nuclear weapons. After being
invited by Prime Minister Zulkar Ali Bhutto to attend
the 2nd OIC conference (OIC) in Lahore, Libya negoti-

4.17. LIBYA

181

ated and was delegated to participate in its nuclear pro- gic decision to start the program with a new attitude.* [3]
gram, Project-706, in 1974.* [14]
Libya employed a large number of black market network,
In 1977, the Libyan technicians were departed to Pak- rst reeving the 20 pre-assembled centrifuges and compoistan but by the time Libyans joined the program, the nents for an additional* 200 centrifuges and related parts
martial law was taken in eect against Bhutto in response from foreign suppliers. [15] The pre-assembled rotors for
to end the political deadlock.* [14] Before Pakistan's A- centrifuges were used to install a completed single cenbomb project succeeded, Libya had been taken out of the trifuge at the Al Hashan site, which was rst successfully
equation as the new President General Zia-ul-Haq had tested in October 2000.
distrusted and strongly disliked Gadda.* [14] On immediate eects, Libyans were asked to leave the country
and the Libyan Intelligence made attempts to inltrate
Pakistan's high-powered research institutes, but such attempts were thwarted by ISI who intercepted and arrested
these Libyan agents.* [13]
With relations severed with Pakistan, Gadda normalized relations with India in 1978, and Gadda reached
a mutual understanding with India for civil nuclear cooperation, as part of as part of India's Atoms for Peace
program. With the Indian Prime minister Indira Gandhi
visiting Libya in 1984, a nuclear energy pact was signed
by Libya and India, but it is unclear how much interaction and cooperation took place.* [3]* [15] Throughout the
1980s, Libyan eorts continue to push for acquiring nuclear weapons from various sources. In an ingenious persuasion to uranium enrichment in 1978, Libya made an
eort to gain access to uranium ore, uranium conversion
facilities, and enrichment techniques that together would
have enabled Libya to produce weapons-grade uranium.
The approach failed in 1979, and in 1980 Libya decided
to pursue a plutonium-based pathway to nuclear weapons.
Libya imported 1,200 tons of uranium ore concentrate
from French-controlled mines in Niger without declaring
it to the IAEA, as required by its safeguards agreement.
In 1982, Libya attempted to enter in an agreement with
Belgium for purchasing a small plant for manufacturing
UF4 . At the time, Libya had no declared nuclear facilities
that required UF4 , and the purchase was refused.* [3]
In 1980, Libya began to build its nuclear infrastructure
from various nuclear black market sources. The centrifuges materials and expertise were provided by Swiss
national, Friedrich Tinner. Tinner's work on centrifuges
took place at the TNRF aimed at producing gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment. By the late 1980s, nancial constraints and economic sanctions were imposed by
the United States in the 1980s, further hampering the nuclear program. Work was completed by Tinner in 1992,
but Libya remained unable to produce an operating centrifuge.* [3] After the end of Cold War, Gadda bluntly
persuaded the U.S. President Bill Clinton to uplift the
sanctions by allowing the disarmament of its nuclear program.* [16]
In 1995, Gadda renewed calls for nuclear weapons and
pursued new avenues for nuclear technology procurement, while publicizing the NPT.* [17] In 1997, Libya received technical documentation and materials on gas centrifuges from various sources, as Libya had made a strate-

In 2000, Libya accelerated its eorts, still headed by Tinner. Libya received many documents on the design and
operation of centrifuges, but the program suered many
setbacks in evaluating these designs as they were too dicult to interpret and bring into operation. Libya ultimately
told IAEA investigators that it had no national personnel competent to evaluate these designs at that time, and
due to its extreme diculty, Libya would have had to ask
the supplier for help if it had decided to pursue a nuclear
weapon.* [3]

Soviet Union In 1979, Libya pursued peaceful nuclear


cooperation with the Soviet Union, under IAEA safeguards. In 1981, the Soviet Union agreed to build a
10MW research reactor at Tajoura, under IAEA safeguards. The Libyan nuclear program repeatedly suered
under mismanagement and loss of academic generation.
The Tajura facility was run under the Soviet experts and
staed by a small number of inexperienced Libyan specialists and technicians. Known as the Tajura Nuclear
Research Facility (TNRF), Libya conducted illegal uranium conversion experiments there. An unnamed nuclear weapon state, whose name has been kept secret by
the IAEA, also allegedly assisted Libya in these experiments. Nuclear expert David Albright of the Institute for
Science and International Security said the Soviet Union
and China were the most likely suspects.* [3]
In 1984, Libya negotiated with the Soviet Union for a
supply of nuclear power plants, but its out-of-date technology dissatised Colonel Gadda. Gadda negotiated
with Belgium but the talks failed. In 1984, Libya negotiated with Japan for a pilot-scale uranium conversion facility. A Japanese company supplied Libya with the technology, and the sale was apparently arranged directly with
the Japanese instead of through middlemen.* [15]
In 1991, Libya tried to exploit the chaos generated by
the collapse of the Soviet Union to gain access to nuclear
technology, expertise, and materials.* [18] In 1992, it
was reported by an ocial of the Kurchatov Institute in
Moscow claimed that Libya had unsuccessfully tried to
recruit two of his colleagues to work at the Tajoura Nuclear Research Center in Libya.* [18] Other reports also
suggested that Russian scientists had been hired to work
on a covert Libyan nuclear program.* [18] In March 1998,
Russia and Libya signed a contract with the Russian consortium, the Atomenergoeksport for a partial overhaul of
the Tajoura Nuclear Research Center.* [19]

182
Dismantlement
Main article: Disarmament of Libya

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
weapons ingredients remain to be destroyed.* [29]
According to the New York Times, on February 2014, the
United States and Libya have discreetly destroyed what
both sides say were the last remnants of Col. Muammar al-Qadda's lethal arsenal of chemical arms. They
used a transportable oven technology to destroy hundreds
of bombs and artillery rounds lled with deadly mustard
agent.* [30]

The Clinton administration diplomat, Martin Indyk,


maintained that the negotiations and diplomatic eorts
rolling back Libyan nuclear program were started as
early as Bill Clinton assuming the presidency in the
1990s.* [19]
In September 2014, OPCW said Libya still has around
850 tonnes of industrial chemicals that could be used to
produce chemical weapons.* [31] In October 2014, Libya
4.17.2 Chemical Program
asked for foreign assistance to transport its 850 tonnes
stockpile of raw materials for making nerve gas out of
Chemical weapons
Libya for destruction.* [8] In a meeting at the OPCW
Headquarter on 5 February 2015, the Minister of ForThe chemical weapons program was also actively main- eign Aairs of Libya and the Director-General of OPCW
tained by Libya under the dictatorship of Muammar agreed on the need to complete the destruction of the reGadda, but it was ostensibly decommissioned in the maining precursor chemicals.* [32]
2000s and early 2010s as Gadda sought to normalise reOn 21 February 2015, Asharq Al-Awsat reported that
lations with the Western world. Libya joined the Chemian anonymous Libyan army ocial stated extremists had
cal Weapons Convention in 2004, and declared 24.7 metseized large amounts of Muammar Gaddas chemric tonnes of mustard gas, 1390 metric tonnes of chemiical weapons from multiple locations. The ocial
cal precursors for making sarin, as well as 3563 unloaded
warned that the targeted caches included mustard gas and
chemical weapon munitions(aerial bombs).* [20]* [21]
sarin.* [9]* [33]* [34] The North Africa Post later reported
The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical that chemical weapons were stolen by armed men who
Weapons (OPCW) supervised the destruction of Libya's stormed the chemical factory in the Jufra district where
chemical weapons caches through February 2011, when the weapons were stored. Military sources reportedly
it was forced to suspend its operations due to the upris- stated that among the chemical weapons are mustard gas
ing against Gadda and the resulting deterioration of the and sarin.* [10]
country's stability. At this point the Libyan government
had destroyed 40% of its precursor materials and 55% of
its mustard gas, as well as 3500 chemical weapon muni- 4.17.3 Ballistic missiles
tions.* [22] In early September 2011, OPCW DirectorGeneral Ahmet zmc said reports he had received Libyan Army forces loyal to Gadda reportedly red sevindicated that the remaining weapons were secure and eral Scud-B surface-to-surface missiles at areas in revolt
had not fallen into the hands of militant groups.* [23] A against the regime, including Misrata and Ajdabiya, durstockpile of mustard gas, which the OPCW reported the ing the Libyan Civil War, but the weapons missed their
regime may have attempted to hide from inspectors over- targets.* [35]* [36]* [37] Several more Scuds, with launchseeing the chemical weapons program's dismantlement, ers, were found by anti-Gadda ghters near Tripoli and
was reportedly found in the Jufra District by anti-Gadda Sirte.* [38]* [39]
ghters less than two weeks later.* [24] In late September
it was reported by the Wall Street Journal that a major ammunition complex, including chemical-weapons-capable 4.17.4 References
artillery shells, was unguarded and open to looting.* [25]
In December 2012 a senior Spanish intelligence ocial [1] Chronology of Libya's Disarmament and Relations with
the United States, Arms Control Association.
said that Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb probably
also has non-conventional arms, basically chemical, as a
[2] News Update on IAEA & Libya, Chronology of Key
result of the loss of control of arsenals, with Libya the
Events, (December 2003 - September 2008), Interna*
most likely source. [26]
tional Atomic Energy Agency.
Libya's National Transitional Council is cooperating with
the OCPW regarding the destruction of all legacy chemical weapons in the country.* [27] After assessing the
chemical stockpiles, the Libyan government will receive
a deadline from the OPCW to destroy the weapons.* [28]
As of September 2013, 1.6 metric tons of mustard blister
agent loaded in artillery rounds, 2.5 metric tons of congealed mustard agent, and 846 metric tons of chemical

[3] Rohlng, Joan. Libya: Nuclear Programme Overview


. Nuclear Threat Initiative. Nuclear Threat Initiative. Retrieved 11 August 2011.
[4] GOV/2004/12, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards
Agreement of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya, Report by the Director General, International
Atomic Energy Agency, 20 February 2004.

4.17. LIBYA

183

[17] Joshua Sinai, Libya's Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction,Nonproliferation Review 4, Spring-Summer
1997, p. 97.
[18] jack Kelley, Russian Nuke Experts Wooed,USA Today, 8 January 1992; Libya Denies Oers to Soviets,
Washington Post, 11 January 1992.
[19] Joseph Cirincione with Jon B. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass
Destruction (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2002), p. 307.
[20] OPCW, Libya: Facts and Figures
[21] Libya's CW Capabilities (PDF). June 2011.
[22] Nuclear Threat Initiative, 30 September 2011, Senate
Delegation Positive About Security of Libyan WMD Materials

[5] The Chemical Weapons Convention Enters Into Force


in Libya, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons, 2 February 2004.
[6] Zanders, Jean Pascal (19 May 2011).Destroying Libya's
Chemical Weapons: Deadlines and Delays. James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS). Retrieved
13 August 2011.
[7] Zanders, Jean Pascal (May 19, 2011).Uprising in Libya:
The False Specter of Chemical Warfare. James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS). Retrieved 13
August 2011.
[8] NBC Weapons: Libya Needs Help To Be Gas Free.
StrategyPage.com. 30 October 2014.

[23] Libya: Chemical Weapons Secure According To U.N.


Watchdog. The Hungton Post. 7 September 2011.
Retrieved 25 September 2011.
[24] Black, Ian (22 September 2011).Libyan rebels discover
Gadda's chemical weapons. The Guardian (London).
Retrieved 25 September 2011.
[25] Nuclear Threat Initiative, 3 October 2011, Libyan
Weapons Depot Unguarded, Open to Looters
[26] Daily Telegraph, 10 December 2012, Al Qaeda may have
chemical weapons, Spain's counter-terror chief warns
[27] Libya's NTC pledges to destroy chemical weapons:
OPCW
[28] Chemical weapons inspectors to return to Libya

[9] Libya militias capture chemical weapons: army ocial [29] Barnes, Diane (11 September 2013). Destruction
of Libyan Chemical-Loaded Arms Remains on Hold.
. Asharq Al-Awsat. 21 February 2015.
Global Security Newswire (NTI). Retrieved 26 October
[10] Libya: Unidentied armed men attack chemical factory,
2013.
ee with chemical weapons. The North Africa Post. 23
[30] Libyas Cache of Toxic Arms All Destroyed. New
February 2015.
York Times. 2 February 2014. Retrieved 4 February 2014.
[11] et. al. The Program begins: 1968. NTI 2003. Re[31] Libya asks chemical weapons watchdog to remove stocktrieved 24 April 2013.
pile. Daily Times. 24 September 2014. Retrieved 27
[12] The Risk Report Volume 1 Number 10 (December 1995)
September 2014.
Page 1, 3-4. Libya Has Trouble Building the Most
Deadly Weapons. The Risk Report Volume 1 Number [32] Libyan Minister of Foreign Aairs Visits the OPCW
. OPCW. 5 February 2015.
10 (December 1995) Page 1, 3-4. Wisconsin Project reports. Retrieved 24 April 2013.
[33] Report: Chemical weapons in Libya 'seized by extremists'". i24news. 21 February 2015.
[13] Nazi, Nazir Naji (2010). Colonel Gadda's Libya and
his Nuclear ambitions. Nazir Nazi and Jang Group of
[34] Libyan Army ocial tells Arab paper that militias capMedia.
tured chemical weapons. The Jerusalem Post. 22 February 2015.
[14] Stengel, Richard (3 June 1985). Who has the Bomb?".
Time (magazine). pp. 7/13. Archived from the original
[35] Libya conict: Gadda forces 'launched Scud missile'".
on 3 June 1985. Retrieved 23 February 2011.
BBC News. 16 August 2011. Retrieved 25 September
2011.
[15] Pike, John E.Libyan nuclear programme. Global Security. Retrieved 8 December 2011.
[36] Gadha's Forces Fired 3 Scuds at Misrata: NATO.
[16] The Iraq War did not Force Gada's Hand | Brookings
DefenseNews. 23 August 2011. Retrieved 25 September
Institution
2011.

184

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

[37]Libyan Rebels Advance on Sirte Amid Protests Over Appointments. San Francisco Chronicle. 29 August 2011.
Retrieved 25 September 2011.
[38] Gadda missiles could be scrapped. IOL News. 22
September 2011. Retrieved 25 September 2011.
[39] Scud missile battery sits unguarded outside Tripoli.
TVNZ. 5 September 2011. Retrieved 25 September 2011.

4.17.5

See also

Foreign relations of Libya


Nuclear technology

USAFE Commander General Roger Brady being shown a disarming procedure on a dummy at Volkel Air Base.

4.18 Netherlands

The NDBs were stored under U.S. Marine guard at RAF


St. Mawgan, Cornwall, UK, which also held 60 similar weapons for the use of RAF Shackleton and Nimrod
aircraft. The storage arrangements were agreed in 1965
between the British Prime Minister Harold Wilson and
President Johnson in a secret memorandum now declassied in the UK archives.* [1]

Although the Netherlands does not have weapons of


mass destruction made by itself, the country participates in the NATO nuclear weapons sharing arrangements and trains for delivering U.S. nuclear weapons, i.e.
it has weapons of mass destruction made by another country.
At present (2008), the USAF still provides 22 tactical
The Netherlands is also one of the producers of compo- B61 nuclear bombs for use by the Netherlands under
nents that can be used for creating deadly agents, chem- the NATO nuclear weapons sharing agreement. These
ical weapons and other kinds of weapons of mass de- weapons are stored at Volkel Air Base and, in time of war,
struction. Several Dutch companies provided the United they may be delivered by Royal Netherlands Air Force F*
States, Israel and Pakistan with components for these 16 warplanes. [2] (The Dutch government has never formally admitted or denied the presence of these weapons,
weapons.
but former prime ministers Dries van Agt and Ruud LubThe Netherlands ratied the Geneva Protocol on 31 Octo- bers both acknowledged their presence in 2013.* [3]* [4])
ber 1930. It also ratied the Biological Weapons Convention on 10 April 1972 and the Chemical Weapons Con- Many countries believe that this violates Articles I and II
of the NPT, where the Netherlands has committed:
vention on 30 June 1995.

4.18.1

United
States-NATO
weapons sharing

nuclear

The Netherlands ratied the Nuclear Non-Proliferation


Treaty (NPT) on 2 May 1975.
In the past (1960's till 1990's), the Netherlands took part
in the deployment of NATO nuclear artillery shells for its
self-propelled howitzers and missile artillery units. These
8 inch shells and warheads for Honest John, and later
Lance, missiles were stored at the special ammunition
stores at 't Harde and Havelterberg. These weapons are
no longer operational.
Until 2006, Royal Netherlands Navy P-3 Orion aircraft,
and their predecessors the P-2 Neptunes, based at former Airbase Valkenburg near Leiden and Curaao in
the Caribbean were assigned U.S. Navy Nuclear Depth
Bombs (NDB) for use in anti-submarine warfare. These
weapons were originally the Mk 101 Lulu, which yielded
11 kt; later, they were replaced by the Mk-57 (also referred to as the B-57).

"... not to receive the transfer from any transfer


or whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such
weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly ... or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons
or other nuclear explosive devices ....
The U.S. insists that its forces control the weapons and
that no transfer of the nuclear bombs or control over them
is intended unless and until a decision were made to
go to war, at which the [NPT] treaty would no longer be
controlling, so there is no breach of the NPT.* [5]

4.18.2 Dutch production of CW precursor


chemicals
Alongside companies from the United Kingdom, France,
Germany, the United States, Belgium, Spain, India, and
Brazil, Dutch companies provided Iraq with the chemicals used as precursors to produce chemical weapons for
use against Iran in the IranIraq War.

4.19. NORTH KOREA


2000 Iranians who suered from chemical warfare during
the IranIraq War (19801988) submitted an indictment
some years ago with a Tehran court against nine companies that had provided Saddam Hussein with these chemicals. 455 American and European companies provided
aid to Iraq during its war with Iran and two thirds of the
companies were German. The United Nations published
a 12,000-page report about the conict and named the
entire suite of companies involved.

185
UK-U.S. Memorandum of Understanding of Use
of Nuclear Weapons. 1965. DEFE 24/691E28., Contained in an exchange of letters between
Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Pres Lyndon
B.Johnson, declassied 2002, and now in the UK
National Archives, London led as DEFE 24/691E28

To Dutch Navy weapons sharing and storage.

4.18.3

Poison gas experiments


Radiator. Southern Region CND. April 1984.

On 20 February 2008, it was revealed that the Netherlands had conducted chemical warfare experiments with
nerve gas in the early 1950s. These experiments were
conducted by the TNO organization on the request of
the Defense Department. They consisted of the use of
sarin, tabun, soman, and a modied French gas called
Stof X (Substance X), which was more poisonous than
sarin. The experiments were carried out on animals in the
village of Harskamp and on the Vliehors bombing range,
located on the island of Vlieland. After 1956, the only experiments were those conducted jointly with France and
Belgium in the desert of Algeria, which utilized 6 kilograms of Stof X. The reason behind these experiments
was the fear of an attack by the Soviet Union.* [6]

4.18.4

Notes

4.19 North Korea


Nuclear program of North Korearedirects here. For
its nuclear power program, see Nuclear power in North
Korea.
North Korea (ocially the Democratic People's Republic of Korea or DPRK) declared in 2009 that it had developed a nuclear weapon, and probably possesses a small
stockpile of relatively simple nuclear weapons. North Korea may also have a chemical and/or biological weapons
capability.* [5] Since 2003, North Korea is no longer a
party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

[1] The National Archives, London. DEFE 24/691 E28 p6.

On October 9, 2006, North Korea announced it had


successfully conducted its rst nuclear test. An under[2] Kristensen, Hans (February 2005). U.S. Nuclear ground explosion was detected, its yield was estimated as
Weapons in Europe (PDF).
less than a kiloton, and some radioactive output was detected.* [6]* [7]* [8]
[3] "'22 atoombommen in kluizen basis Volkel'". RTL
Nieuws. RTL Nederland. 10 June 2013. Retrieved 26 On January 6, 2007, the North Korean government furDecember 2013.
ther conrmed that it had nuclear weapons.* [9]
In April 2009, reports surfaced that North Korea has become afully edged nuclear power, an opinion shared
by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director
General Mohamed ElBaradei.* [10] On May 25, 2009,
[5] Brian Donnelly, Foreign and Commonwealth Oce.
North Korea conducted a second nuclear test, resulting
The Nuclear Weapons Non-Proliferation Articles I, II in an explosion estimated to be between 2 and 7 kiloand VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nu- tons.* [11] The 2009 test, like the 2006 test, is believed to
clear Weapons. Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear have occurred at Mantapsan, Kilju County, in the northWeapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. Retrieved
eastern part of North Korea.* [12]
[4] "'Een typisch geval van klassenjustitie (2)'". RTL Nieuws.
RTL Nederland. 4 December 2013. Retrieved 26 December 2013.

2009-08-07

On February 11, 2013, the U.S. Geological Survey detected a magnitude 5.1 seismic disturbance,* [13] reported to be a third underground nuclear test.* [14] North
Korea has ocially reported it as a successful nuclear
4.18.5 References
test with a lighter warhead that delivers more force than
before, but has not revealed the exact yield. Multiple
Norris, Robert S.; Andrew Burrows; Richard Field- South Korean sources estimate the yield at 69 kilohouse (1994). Vol.5. British, French and Chinese tons, while the German Federal Institute for Geosciences
Nuclear Weapons. Nuclear Weapons Databook. and Natural Resources estimates the yield at 40 kilotons.* [15]* [16]* [17]
Oxford: Westview Press. ISBN 0-8133-1612-X.
[6] NRC newspaper, 19 feb. 2008

186

4.19.1

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

History

See also: Timeline of North Korea nuclear program


The nuclear program can be traced back to about 1962,
when North Korea committed itself to what it calledallfortressization, which was the beginning of the hypermilitarized North Korea of today.* [18] In 1963 North
Korea asked the Soviet Union for help in developing
nuclear weapons, but was refused. The Soviet Union
agreed to help North Korea develop a peaceful nuclear
energy program, including the training of nuclear scientists. Later, China, after its nuclear tests, similarly rejected North Korean requests for help with developing
nuclear weapons.* [19]
Soviet specialists took part in the construction of the
Yongbyon Nuclear Scientic Research Center* [20] and
began construction of an IRT-2000 research reactor in
1963, which became operational in 1965 and was upgraded to 8 MW in 1974.* [21] In 1979 North Korea indigenously began to build in Yongbyon a second research
reactor, an ore processing plant and a fuel rod fabrication
plant.* [22]
North Korea's nuclear weapons program dates back to the
1980s. Focusing on practical uses of nuclear energy and
the completion of a nuclear weapon development system,
North Korea began to operate facilities for uranium fabrication and conversion, and conducted high-explosive detonation tests.* [18] In 1985 North Korea ratied the NPT,
but did not conclude the required safeguards agreement
with the IAEA until 1992. In early 1993, while verifying
North Korea's initial declaration, the IAEA concluded
that there was strong evidence this declaration was incomplete. When North Korea refused the requested special
inspection, the IAEA reported its non-compliance to the
UN Security Council. In 1993, North Korea announced
its withdrawal from the NPT, but suspended that withdrawal before it took eect.* [23]
Under the 1994 Agreed Framework, the U.S. government agreed to facilitate the supply of two light water reactors to North Korea in exchange for North Korean disarmament.* [24]* [25] Such reactors are considered more proliferation-resistant than North Korea's
graphite-moderated reactors,* [26] but not proliferation proof.* [27] Implementation of the Agreed Framework oundered, and in 2002 the Agreed Framework
fell apart, with each side blaming the other for its failure. By 2002, Pakistan had admitted that North Korea
had gained access to Pakistan's nuclear technology in the
late 1990s.* [28] Based on evidence from Pakistan, Libya,
and multiple confessions from North Korea itself, the
United States accused North Korea of non-compliance
and halted oil shipments; North Korea later claimed its
public confession of guilt had been deliberately misconstrued. By the end of 2002, the Agreed Framework was
ocially dead.

In 2003, North Korea again announced its withdrawal


from the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty.* [23] In 2005, It
admitted to having nuclear weapons but vowed to close
the nuclear program.* [29]* [30]
On March 17, 2007, North Korea told delegates at international nuclear talks that it is preparing to shut down
its main nuclear facility. The agreement was reached following a series of six-party talks, involving North Korea, South Korea, China, Russia, Japan, and the United
States begun in 2003. According to the agreement, a
list of its nuclear programs will be submitted and the
nuclear facility will be disabled in exchange for fuel
aid and normalization talks with the United States and
Japan.* [31] This was delayed from April due to a dispute
with the United States over Banco Delta Asia, but on July
14, International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors conrmed the shutdown of North Korea's Yongbyon nuclear
reactor and consequently North Korea began to receive
aid.* [32] This agreement fell apart in 2009, following a
North Korean missile test.
In February 2012, North Korea announced that it would
suspend uranium enrichment at the Yongbyon Nuclear
Scientic Research Center and not conduct any further
tests of nuclear weapons while productive negotiations
involving the United States continue. This agreement included a moratorium on long-range missiles tests. Additionally, North Korea agreed to allow IAEA inspectors to monitor operations at Yongbyon. The United
States rearmed that it had no hostile intent toward the
DPRK and was prepared to improve bilateral relationships, and agreed to ship humanitarian food aid to North
Korea.* [33]* [34]* [35] The United States called the move
important, if limited, but said it would proceed cautiously and that talks would resume only after North Korea made steps toward fullling its promise.* [33] However, after North Korea conducted a long-range missile
test in April 2012, the United States decided not to proceed with the food aid.* [36]

4.19.2 Nuclear weapons


Overview
See also: Timeline of North Korea nuclear program
North Korea had been suspected of maintaining a clandestine nuclear weapons development program since the
early 1980s when it constructed a plutonium-producing
Magnox nuclear reactor at Yongbyon. Various diplomatic
means had been used by the international community to
attempt to limit North Korea's nuclear program to peaceful power generation and to encourage North Korea to
participate in international treaties.
In May 1992, North Korea's rst inspection by the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) uncovered
discrepancies suggesting that North Korea had repro-

4.19. NORTH KOREA

187

cessed more plutonium than declared. IAEA requested


access to additional information and access to two nuclear
waste sites at Yongbyon.* [23]* [37]* [38] North Korea rejected the IAEA request and announced on March 12,
1993, an intention to withdraw from the NPT.* [23]
In 1994, North Korea pledged, under the "Agreed Framework" with the United States, to freeze its plutonium programs and dismantle all its nuclear weapons programs
in return for several kinds of assistance, including construction of two modern nuclear power plants powered
by light-water reactors.
By 2002, the United States believed that North Korea
was pursuing both uranium enrichment technology and
plutonium reprocessing technologies in deance of the
Agreed Framework. North Korea reportedly told American diplomats in private that they were in possession
of nuclear weapons, citing American failures to uphold
their own end of the Agreed Frameworkas a motivating force. North Korea later clariedthat it did
not possess weapons yet, but that it had a rightto
possess them, despite the Agreed Framework. In late USGS image of the earthquake caused by the nuclear test.
2002 and early 2003, North Korea began to take steps
to eject International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors
*
*
while re-routing spent fuel rods for plutonium reprocess- ducted. [39] [44]
ing for weapons purposes. As late as the end of 2003,
North Korea claimed that it would freeze its nuclear pro- Fissile material production
gram in exchange for additional American concessions,
but a nal agreement was not reached. North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003.
On October 9, 2006, North Korea demonstrated its nuclear capabilities with its rst underground nuclear test,
detonating a plutonium based device* [39] and the estimated yield was 0.21 kiloton.* [8] The test was conducted at P'unggye-yok, and U.S. intelligence ocials
later announced that analysis of radioactive debris in air
samples collected a few days after the test conrmed that
the blast had taken place.* [39] The United Nations Security Council condemned the test in Resolution 1874.
On January 6, 2007, the North Korean government further conrmed that it had nuclear weapons.* [9]
In February 2007, following the six-party talks disarmament process, Pyongyang agreed to shut down its main
nuclear reactor.* [40] On October 8, 2008, IAEA inspectors were forbidden by the North Korean government to
conduct further inspections of the site.* [41]
On April 25, 2009, the North Korean government announced that the country's nuclear facilities had been reactivated,* [42] and that spent fuel reprocessing for armsgrade plutonium has been restored.* [43]
On May 25, 2009, North Korea conducted its second
underground nuclear test. The U.S. Geological Survey
calculated its origin in proximity of the site of the rst 5 MWe experimental reactor at Yongbyon Nuclear Scientic Renuclear test. The test was more powerful than the pre- search Center
vious test, estimated at 2 to 7 kilotons.* [11] The same
day, a successful short range missile test was also con- Plutonium facilities North Korea's plutonium-based
nuclear reactors are located at the Yongbyon Nuclear

188

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

Scientic Research Center, about 90 km north of


Pyongyang.
One Soviet-supplied IRT-2000 research reactor,
completed in 1967.* [45] Uranium irradiated in this
reactor was used in North Korea's rst plutonium
separation experiments in 1975.* [46] Nevertheless,
the primary purpose of the reactor is not to produce
plutonium and North Korea has had trouble acquiring enough fuel for constant operation. The U.S. Department of Energy estimated that this reactor could
have been used to produce up to 12 kg of plutonium, though the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence
Committee said that the amount was no more than
a few hundred grams.* [47]
A newer nuclear reactor with a capacity of 5MWe.
This gas-graphite moderated Magnox type reactor
is North Korea's main reactor, where practically all
of its plutonium has been produced. A full core
consists of 8,000 fuel rods and can yield a maximum of 2729 kg of plutonium if left in the reactor for optimal burnup.* [48] The North Korean
Plutonium Stock, Mid-2006, it is estimated to be
able to produce 0.9 grams of plutonium per thermal
megawatt every day of its operations. The material
required to make a single bomb is approximately
four to eight kilograms.* [49] Often, North Korea
has unloaded the reactor before reaching the maximum burnup level. There are three known cores
which were unloaded in 1994 (under IAEA supervision in accordance with the Agreed Framework),
2005, and 2007.
In 1989, the 5MWe reactor was shut down
for a period of seventy to a hundred days.
In this time it is estimated that up to fteen
kilograms of plutonium could have been extracted. In 1994, North Korea unloaded its reactors again. The IAEA had these under full
surveillance until later being denied the ability to observe North Korean power plants.* [50]
Under normal operation, the reactor can produce about 6 kg of plutonium per year although
the reactor would need to be shut down and
the fuel rods extracted to begin the plutonium
separation process. Hence, plutonium separation stages alternate with plutonium production
stages. Reprocessing (also known as separation) is known to have taken place in 2003 for
the rst core and 2005 for the second core.
Two Magnox reactors (50MWe and 200MWe), under construction at Yongbyon and Taechon. If completed, 50MWe reactor would be capable of producing 60 kg of plutonium per year, enough for
approximately 10 weapons and 200MWe reactor
220 kg of plutonium annually, enough for approximately 40 weapons. Construction was halted in

1994 about a year from completion in accord with


the Agreed Framework, and by 2004 the structures
and pipework had deteriorated badly.* [51]* [52]
Fuel reprocessing facility that recovers uranium and
plutonium from spent fuel using the PUREX process. Based on extended Eurochemic reprocessing
plant design at the Mol-Dessel site in Belgium.* [53]
In 1994 its activity was frozen in accord with the
Agreed Framework.* [23] On April 25, 2009, North
Korean news agency KCNA, reported the resumption of reprocessing of spent fuel to recover plutonium.* [54]
On March 12, 1993, North Korea said that it planned
to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) and refused to allow IAEA inspectors access to its
nuclear sites. By 1994, the United States believed that
North Korea had enough reprocessed plutonium to produce about 10 bombs with the amount of plutonium increasing.* [55] Faced with diplomatic pressure after UN
Security Council Resolution 825 and the threat of American military air strikes against the reactor, North Korea
agreed to dismantle its plutonium program as part of the
Agreed Framework in which South Korea and the United
States would provide North Korea with light water reactors and fuel oil until those reactors could be completed.
Because the light water reactors would require enriched
uranium to be imported from outside North Korea, the
amount of reactor fuel and waste could be more easily tracked, making it more dicult to divert nuclear
waste to be reprocessed into plutonium. However, the
Agreed Framework was mired in diculties, with each
side blaming the other for the delays in implementation;
as a result, the light water reactors were never nished.
In late 2002, after fuel aid was suspended, North Korea
returned to using its old reactors.
In 2006, there were eight sites identied as potential test
explosion sites for current (and future) tests according to
a statement by the South Korean Parliament. These sites
are distinguished from a number of other nuclear materials production facilities in that they are thought to be
most closely identied with a military, or potentially military purpose:* [56]
1. Hamgyong Bukdo (North Hamgyong) Province 2
Sites:
Chungjinsi Nuclear fuel storage site, military base
and unidentied underground facility
Kiljugun Extensive military buildup with motorized troop formations and construction of new advanced underground facility Site of May 25, 2009,
Nuclear Test.
Phunggyere Site of October 9, 2006, Nuclear Test

4.19. NORTH KOREA

189

2. Chagangdo Province 1 Site: Kanggyesi Production


center of North Korea's advanced equipment and munitions since 1956. Also, extensive intelligence of highly
advanced underground facility.

In December 2002, claiming North Korean noncompliance, the United States persuaded the KEDO
Board to suspend fuel oil shipments, which led to the
end of the Agreed Framework. North Korea responded
3. Pyongan Bukdo (North Pyongan) Province 4 Sites: by announcing plans to reactivate a dormant nuclear fuel
processing program and power plant north of Pyongyang.
North Korea soon thereafter expelled United Nations in Yongbyonsi 2 Sites Location of Yongbyon Nu- spectors and announced a unilateral withdrawalfrom
clear Research Center, and the facility's Experimen- the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
tal Test Explosion facility and two unidentied underground facilities. In addition, there is a gas- In 2007, a Bush administration ocial assessed that,
graphite reactor, HE test site, nuclear fuel fabrica- while there was still ahigh condencethat North Korea
acquired materials that could be used in a productiontion site, nuclear waste storage site
scaleuranium program, there is only amid-condence
Kusungsi Between 1997 and September 2002, ap- level such a production-scale uranium (rather than merely
proximately 70 test explosions of North Korean mu- plutonium) program exists.* [61]* [62]
nitions took place. Also, existence of underground
facility
Stockpile estimates and projections
Taechongun 200MWe Nuclear Energy Plant construction site. Location of unidentied underground Institute for Science and International Security For
facility and nuclear arms/energy related facilities 2013, the Institute for Science and International Security
known to exist
gives a mid-range estimate of 12 to 27 nuclear weapon
4. Pyongan Namdo (South Pyongan) Province 1 Site:
Pyongsungsi Location of National Science Academy
and extensive underground facility whose purpose is not
known.

equivalents, including plutonium and uranium stockpiles. By 2016, North Korea is projected to have 14 to 48
nuclear weapon equivalents. (For uranium weapons, each
weapon is assumed to contain 20 kilograms of weaponsgrade uranium.)* [4]

Highly enriched uranium program


North Korea FAS As of 2012, the Federation of American Scienpossesses uranium mines containing an estimated 4 mil- tists estimates North Korea has fewer than 10 plutonium
lion tons of high grade uranium ore.* [57]
warheads.* [63]
Prime minister Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan allegedly,
through Pakistan's former top scientist, Abdul Qadeer
Khan, supplied key data, stored on CDs, on uranium en- SIPRI As of January 2013, the Stockholm InternaInstitute estimates North Korea has
richment and information to North Korea in exchange tional Peace Research
*
6
to
8
warheads.
[64]
for missile technology around 19901996, according to
U.S. intelligence ocials. President Pervez Musharraf
and Prime minister Shaukat Aziz acknowledged in 2005
4.19.3 Biological and chemical weapons
that Khan had provided centrifuges and their designs to
*
North Korea. [58] In May 2008, Khan, who had previNorth Korea acceded to the Biological Weapons Convenously confessed to supplying the data on his own initiative, retracted his confession, claiming that the Pakistan tion in 1987, and the Geneva Protocol on January 4, 1989,
but has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Government forced him to be a scapegoat. He also
claimed that North Korea's nuclear program was well ad- The U.S. Department of Defense believes North Korea
probably has a chemical weapons program and is likely
vanced before his visits to North Korea.* [59]
*
Highly enriched uranium (HEU) program was publicized to possess a stockpile of weapons. [5] The United States
in October 2002 when the United States asked North Ko- believes that North Korea maintains a biological weapons
rean ocials about the program.* [60] Under the Agreed capability and infrastructure, and has the munitions procapacity to deploy biological agents if it chose to
Framework, North Korea explicitly agreed to freeze plu- duction
*
[65]
do
so.
tonium programs (specically, its graphite moderated
reactors and related facilities). The agreement also
committed North Korea to implement the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, in
which both Koreas committed not to have enrichment or
reprocessing facilities. The United States argued North
Korea violated its commitment not to have enrichment
facilities.

North Korea reportedly acquired the technology necessary to produce tabun and mustard gas as early as the
1950s.* [66] Since 1989 North Korea has been believed
to have the capability to indigenously produce nerve, blister, choking and blood chemical agents in bulk. Furthermore, North Korea has spent substantial resources in defensive measures such as extensive training in the use of

190

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

gas masks, suits, detectors and decontamination systems Early 2000s North Korea's ability to deliver weapons
for both the civilian populace and the military.
of mass destruction to a hypothetical target is somewhat
North Korea maintains at least eight industrial facilities limited by its missile technology. As of 2005, North Komissiles estimated as 900
that are capable of creating biochemical weaponry. The rea's total range with its Nodong
*
km
with
a
1,000
kg
payload,
[70]
enough to reach South
United States estimates North Korea's likely stockpile of
Korea,
and
parts
of
Japan,
Russia
and China. It is not
chemical weaponry from at least a few hundred tons, to
known
if
this
missile
is
capable
of
carrying the nuclear
*
at most a few thousand tons. [67]
weapons North Korea may have developed.
In 2009 the International Crisis Group reported that
the consensus expert view was that North Korea had a The BM25 Musudan is a North Korean designed
stockpile of about 2,500 to 5,000 tonnes of chemical intermediate-range ballistic missile with range capabiliweapons, including mustard gas, sarin (GB) and other ties of up to 1,550 miles (2,490 km), and could carry a
nerve agents.* [68] The South Korean government also es- nuclear warhead. As of 2010, Western sources had no
system had ever been tested,
timated the stockpile as about 2,500 to 5,000 tonnes in indication that the *missile
*
or
was
operational.
[72]
[73]
North Korea has also de*
2010. [65]
veloped the Taepodong-1 missile, which has a range of
North Korea may have also begun the production of bi- 2,500 km, but it is unlikely to have been deployed.* [70]
nary agents. Binary agents are toxic only when the two
missile, with
chemicals (normally physically separated) are combined. With the development of the Taepodong-2
*
an
expected
range
of
5,0006,000
km,
[74]
North KoBy creating binary agents, North Korea can increase their
rea
could
hypothetically
deliver
a
warhead
to almost
safety when handling hazardous material.* [67] North Koall
countries
in
Southeast
Asia,
as
well
as
the
western
rean military units conduct regular nuclear, biological,
side
of
North
America.
The
Taepodong-2
missile
was
and chemical (NBC) training exercises in a chemical enunsuccessfully tested on July 4, 2006. U.S. intelligence
vironment. North Korean chemical and biological warfare units are equipped with decontamination and detec- estimates that the weapon will not be operational for another 11 years. The Taepodong-2 could theoretically
tion equipment.* [67] In 2010, the Omaha World-Herald
reported that North Korea has chemical weapons which hit the western United States and other U.S. interests
in the Western hemisphere. The current model of the
could cause millions of casualties in South Korea, where
gas masks are only provided to the military and top gov- Taepodong-2 could not carry nuclear warheads to the
United States. Former CIA director George Tenet has
ernment ocials.* [69]
claimed that, with a light payload, Taepodong-2 could
reach western parts of Continental United States, though
with low accuracy. A few Taepodong-2 missiles may ex4.19.4 Delivery systems
ist, but launch procedures are lengthy and visible.* [70]
See also: Strategic Rocket Forces (North Korea) and
North Korean missile tests

2009 On April 5, 2009, North Korea launched the


Unha-2 space booster (allegedly based on the long-range
Taepodong-2). Although the launch was more successful than the 2006 test, the third stage still failed to sepaHistory
rate properly. The UN Security Council condemned the
In the 1960s, DPRK rst received shipments of short- launch *as a violation of previous Security Council resorange ballistic missiles from its main ally, the Soviet lutions. [75]
Union. The rst weapons of this kind to be delivered were This means North Korea may be able to develop/deploy
the tactical FROG-series.* [70] In the late 1970s or early mobile ICBMs, which can survive a U.S. rst strike,
1980s, the DPRK received several longer range Scud-B within 710 years.* [76]
missiles from Egypt (which in turn received those misOn July 2, 2009, North Korea test red a series of at
siles from the USSR, Bulgaria and Poland). The USSR
least four surface-to-ship cruise missiles into the Sea of
had refused to supply Scuds to North Korea.* [70] A loJapan (East Sea). Two days later, on July 4, they procal production basis was established, and the rst modiceeded to test re a further seven Scud-type ballistic mised copy was named Hwasong-5. With time, more adsiles into the same sea.* [77] The tests are seen by world
vanced types of missiles were developed. Eventually
powers as a symbol of deance to the United Nations
North Korea equipped itself with ballistic missiles, caset over North Korea after their nuclear test on May 25,
pable of reaching Japan. In the 1990s, North Korea sold
2009.* [78] These launches come only a week after U.S.
medium-sized nuclear capable missiles to Pakistan in a
President Barack Obama extended U.S. economic sancdeal facilitated by China.* [71]
tions against North Korea.* [79] This is also a response to
the UN sanctions that were imposed in June 2009, after
Pyongyang's nuclear test in May 2009, as well as the new
Testing
UN resolution that any nation can inspect a North Ko-

4.19. NORTH KOREA

191

rean vessel that the investigating nation believes is carrying weaponry.* [79] It has been suggested that the test
ring of missiles is an act of deance against the United
States national holiday, Independence Day.* [77]
Japan Ministry of Defense's analyst Takesada points out
that North Korea's desire of unication is similar to North
Vietnam, and warns of the possibility of North Korea's
compulsory merger with South Korea by threats of nuclear weapons, taking advantage of any possible decrease
in the U.S. military presence in South Korea, after North
Korea deploys several hundred mobile ICBMs aimed at
the United States.* [80]

Hwasong-5 initial Scud modication. Roadmobile, liquid-fueled missile, with an estimated


range of 330 km. It has been tested successfully.
It is believed that North Korea has deployed some
150200 such missiles on mobile launchers.
Hwasong-6 later Scud modication. Similar to
the Hwasong-5, yet with an increased range (550
700 km) and a smaller warhead (600750 kg). Apparently this is the most widely deployed North Korean missile, with at least 400 missiles in use.
Nodong-1 larger and more advanced Scud modication. Liquid-fueled, road-mobile missile with a
650 kg warhead. First production variants had inertial guidance, later variants featured GPS guidance,
which improves CEP accuracy to 190250 m.* [85]
Range is estimated to be between 1,300 and 1,600
km.

Delivery systems

Canada
USA
(Alaska)
Russia

China
India

North
Korea
South
Korea

USA
(Hawaii)

Japan

Nodong, 1000 km
Taepodong-1, 2200 km
Guam
Musudan, 4000 km
Indonesia
Taepodong-2, 6000 km
Australia

Estimated maximum range of some North Korean missiles * [81]

Taepodong-1 three-stage technology demonstrator testbed. First stage was adapted from a Rodong1. Second stage was adapted from a Hwasong6. A satellite-delivery launch was attempted in
1998. The satellite failed, but the rst two stages
apparently functioned adequately. According to
some analysts, the Taepodong-1, if developed into
an ICBM platform, could have a range of nearly
6,000 km with a third stage and a payload of less
than 100 kg.* [86]* [87] The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency estimates that the Taepodong-1 was
a test-bed, not intended or usable as a weapon.* [88]
The US National Air and Space Intelligence Center
made a similar assessment.* [89]

There is evidence that North Korea has been able to


miniaturize a nuclear warhead for use on a ballistic missile.* [82] Re-entry technology to protect the warheads en Untested / failed
route to their targets is lacking.* [83] The April 2012 display of missiles purporting to be ICBMs were declared
Taepodong-2 North Korea's domestic ICBM atfakes by Western analysts, and indicated North Korea was
tempt. First test occurred in 2006, when the misa long way from having a credible ICBM.* [84] In Decemsile failed 40 seconds after launch. Estimates of the
ber 2012, North Korea placed a satellite into orbit for the
range vary widely from 4,500 to 10,000 kilometers
rst time.
(most estimates put the range at about 6,700 km).
As of 2012, the Taepodong-2 has not yet been deployed.* [5]
Successfully tested
KN-1 a short-range anti-ship cruise missile. Its
range is estimated to be around 160 kilometers, and
is most probably an improved version of the Soviet
Termit missile (NATO codename "Styx").
KN-2 Toksa a short-range, solid-fueled, highly
accurate mobile missile, modied copy of the Soviet OTR-21. Unknown number in service, apparently deployed either in the late 1990s or early 2000s
(decade).

Musudan believed to be a modied copy of the


Soviet R-27 Zyb SLBM, untested as of 2013. Originally believed to have been tested as the rst or
second stage of Unha, but debris analysis showed
that the Unha used older technology than it is believed the Musudan uses.* [70] Also known under
the names Nodong-B, Taepodong-X and BM25,
predicted to have a range of 2,5004,000 km assuming R-27 technology is used.* [90]

192

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

4.19.5

Exports related to ballistic missile


technology

In April 2009 the United Nations named the Korea Mining and Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) as
North Korea's primary arms dealer and main exporter of
equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional
weapons. The UN lists KOMID as being based in the
Central District, Pyongyang.* [91] However it also has ofces in Beijing and sales oces worldwide which facilitate weapons sales and seek new customers for North Korean weapons.* [92]
KOMID has sold missile technology to Iran* [93] and has
done deals for missile related technology with the Taiwanese.* [94] KOMID representatives were also involved
in a North Korean deal to mass-produce Kornet anti-tank
guided missiles for Syria* [95] and KOMID has also been
responsible for the sale of equipment, including missile
technologies, gunboats, and multiple rocket artilleries,
worth a total of over $100 million, to Africa, South America, and the Middle East.* [96]
North Korea's military has also used a company called
Hap Heng to sell weapons overseas. Hap Heng was based
in Macau in the 1990s to handle sales of weapons and
missile and nuclear technology to nations such as Pakistan and Iran. Pakistan's medium-range ballistic missile,
the Ghauri, is considered to be a copy of North Korea's
Rodong 1. In 1999, intelligence sources claim that North
Korea had sold missile components to Iran.* [97] Listed
directors of Hap Heng include Kim Song in and Ko Myong Hun.* [98] Ko Myong Hun is now a listed diplomat
in Beijing* [99] and may be involved in the work of KOMID.* [100]
A UN sanctions committee report stated that North Korea
operates an international smuggling network for nuclear
and ballistic missile technology, including to Myanmar
(Burma), Syria, and Iran.* [101]
Export partners
Many countries have bought North Korean ballistic missiles or have received assistance from North Korea to establish local missile production.

missile-related technology.* [103]


Egypt
Egypt has received technologies and assistance for
manufacture of both the Hwasong-5 and Hwasong6, and may have provided guidance systems or
information on longer-range missiles to North
Korea from the Condor/Badr program.
Iran
Iran was one of the rst countries to buy North
Korean missiles. Iran has established local production for the Hwasong-5 (Shahab-1), Hwasong-6
(Shahab-2) and the Rodong-1 (Shahab-3). Iran
also possesses some 19 land-based BM25 Musudan
missiles, according to a leaked, classied U.S.
State Department cable,* [104] however Iran has
never displayed these missiles causing some U.S.
intelligence ocials to doubt the missiles were
transferred to Iran.* [72]
Libya
Libya during the reign of Muammar Gadda had
been known to receive technological assistance,
blueprints and missile parts from North Korea.* [105]
Syria
Syria originally obtained the SCUD-B from North Korea. North Korea may have assisted Syria in development of the SCUD-C and/or the SCUD-D. As of
2013, Syria relies on foreign assistance from multiple countries, including North Korea, for advanced
missile components and technologies.* [106]
United Arab Emirates
25 Hwasong-5s were purchased from North Korea
in 1989. The Military of the United Arab Emirates
were not satised with the quality of the missiles,
and they were kept in storage.* [107]
Vietnam
Acquired Hwasong-5/6 missiles in 1998.

Yemen
Known to have bought Hwasong-5 missiles from
Pakistan
North Korean entities continued to provide assisthe DPRK in the 1990sa total of 15 missiles, 15
tance to Pakistan's ballistic missile program during
TELs with 15 HE warheads.* [108]
the rst half of 1999 in return for nuclear weapons
technology.* [102] Such assistance is critical to
Islamabad's eorts to produce ballistic missiles. Rejection by a potential export partner
In April 1998, Pakistan ight-tested the Ghauri
MRBM, which is based on North Korea's Nodong
Nigeria
In January 2004, the Nigerian government anmissile. Also in April 1998, the United States
nounced that North Korea had agreed to sell it
imposed sanctions against Pakistani and North
missile technology, but a month later Nigeria
Korean entities for their role in transferring Missile
rejected the agreement under U.S. pressure.* [109]
Technology Control Regime Category I ballistic

4.19. NORTH KOREA

4.19.6

See also

North KoreaPakistan relations


Nuclear power in North Korea
Foreign relations of North Korea
North KoreaUnited States relations
List of Korea-related topics
Sohae Satellite Launching Station
2002 State of the Union Address
List of North Korean nuclear tests

4.19.7

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196

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

North Korea's missile arsenal Key facts (based on


South Korean defense ministry data); AFP, June 1,
2005

4.20 Pakistan

Normalizing Japan: Supporter, Nuisance, or


Wielder of Power in the North Korean Nuclear
Talks An analysis of Japan's role in the Six-Party
Talks by Linus Hagstrm.

engineers on 20 January 1972, in Multan, which came


to known as "Multan meeting".* [21]* [22] Bhutto was the
main architect of this programme, and it was here that
Bhutto orchestrated nuclear weapons programme and rallied Pakistan's academic scientists to build the atomic
bomb in three years for national survival.* [23] At the
Multan meeting, Bhutto also appointed Munir Ahmad
Khan as chairman of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC), who, until then, had been working as Director at the nuclear power and Reactor Division of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in Vienna,
Austria. In December 1972, Abdus Salam led the establishment of Theoretical Physics Group (TPG) as he called
scientists working at ICTP to report to Munir Ahmad
Khan. This marked the beginning of Pakistan's pursuit of
nuclear deterrence capability. Following India's surprise
nuclear test, codenamed Smiling Buddha in 1974, the rst
conrmed nuclear test by a nation outside the permanent
ve members of the United Nations Security Council, the

Pakistan began focusing on nuclear weapons develop North Korea: Problems, Perceptions and Proposals ment in January 1972 under Prime Minister Zulkar Ali
Bhutto, who delegated the program to the Chairman of
Oxford Research Group, April 2004
PAEC Munir Ahmad Khan with a commitment to have
Second nuclear test conducted by North Korea on the bomb ready by the end of 1976.* [10]* [11]* [12] Since
May 25, 2009
PAEC, consisting of over twenty laboratories and projects
under nuclear engineer, Munir Ahmad Khan* [13] was
Nuclear Files.org Information on the North Korean
falling behind schedule and having considerable dinuclear program including links to source docuculty producing ssile material, Abdul Qadeer Khan was
ments
brought from Europe by Zulkar Ali Bhutto at the end
Annotated bibliography for the North Korean nu- of 1974. As pointed out by Houston Wood, Professor
clear weapons program from the Alsos Digital Li- of Mechanical & Aerospace Engineering, University of
Virginia, Charlottesville, USA in his article on gas cenbrary
trifuges, "The most dicult step in building a nuclear
A.Q. Khan hand in North Korea bomb, by Venkate- weapon is the production of ssile material",* [14]* [15]
san Vembu, Daily News & Analysis, October 10, so this work in producing ssile material as head of
2006
the Kahuta Project was pivotal to Pakistan developing
the capability to detonate a nuclear bomb by the end of
The February 13 Action Plan and the Prospects 1984.* [16]* [17]
for the North Korean Nuclear Issue analysis by
Narushige Michishita, IFRI Proliferation Papers n The Kahuta Project started under the supervision of a
coordination board that oversaw the activities of ERL
17, 2007
and the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC).
North Korean International Documentation Project The Board consisted of Mr A G N Kazi (secretary genContains primary source documents related to the eral, nance), Mr Ghulam Ishaq Khan (secretary genDPRK's eorts to obtain nuclear technology dating eral, defence)* [18] and Mr Agha Shahi (secretary genback to the mid-1960s
eral, foreign aairs) and reported directly to Prime Minister Zulkar Ali Bhutto. Mr. Ghulam Ishaq Khan and
TIME Archives A Collection of stories regarding General Tikka Khan * [19] appointed military engineer,
North Korea's Nuclear Program
Major General Ali Nawab to the program. Eventually,
Chung Min Lee, The Evolution of the North Ko- the supervison passed to Lt General Zahid Ali Akbar in
rean Nuclear Crisis: Implications for Iran, Prolif- President General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq's Administration. Moderate uranium enrichment for the production of
eration Papers, Paris, IFRI, Winter 2009
ssile material was achieved at KRL by April 1978.* [20]
Norris, Robert S. and Kristensen, Hans M.,North Pakistan's nuclear weapons development was in response
Koreas nuclear program, 2005, Bulletin of the to neighboring India's development of its nuclear proAtomic Scientists, May/June 2005
gramme. Bhutto called a meeting of senior scientists and

Critiquing the Idea of Japanese Exceptionalism:


Japan and the Coordination of North Korea Policy
An analysis of Japan's role in the nuclear talks prior
to the commencement of the Six-Party Talks. Also
by Linus Hagstrm.
North Korea: Economic Sanctions
Chronology of U.S. North Korean Nuclear and
Missile Diplomacy
North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Development and
Diplomacy Congressional Research Service.
IISS North Koreas Ballistic Missile Programme

4.20. PAKISTAN

197

goal to develop nuclear weapons received considerable in the 1960s by several ocials and senior scientists, Pakimpetus.* [24]
istan followed a strict non-nuclear weapon policy from
Finally, on 28 May 1998, a few weeks after India's 1956 until 1971, as PAEC under its chairman Ishrat Hussecond nuclear test (Operation Shakti), Pakistan deto- sain Usmani made no eorts to acquire nuclear fuel cypurposes of an active nuclear weapons pronated ve nuclear devices in the Ras Koh Hills in the cle for the
*
gramme.
[29]
Chagai district, Balochistan. This operation was named
Chagai-I by Pakistan, the underground iron-steel tunnel having been long-constructed by provincial martial
law administrator General Rahimuddin Khan during the
1980s. The last test of Pakistan was conducted at the
sandy Kharan Desert under the codename Chagai-II,
also in Balochistan, on 30 May 1998. Pakistan's ssile
material production takes place at Nilore, Kahuta, and
Khushab/Jauharabad, where weapons-grade plutonium
is rened. Pakistan thus became the seventh country
in the world to successfully develop and test nuclear
weapons.* [25] Although, according to a letter sent by
A.Q. Khan to General Zia, the capability to detonate a nuclear bomb using highly enriched uranium as ssile material produced at KRL had been achieved by KRL in
1984.* [16]* [17]

4.20.1

History

See also: Project-706


After the Partition of India in 1947, India and Pakistan
have been in conict over several issues, including the disputed territory of Azad Jammu and Kashmir.* [26] The
uneasy relationships with India, Afghanistan, the former
Soviet Union, and the energy shortage explains its motivation to become a nuclear power as part of its defence
and energy strategies.* [27]
Initial non-weapon policy
Main article: Nuclear energy in Pakistan
On 8 December 1953, Pakistan media welcomed the U.S.
Atoms for Peace initiatives, followed by the establishment of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC)
in 1956.* [28] In 1953, Foreign minister Muhammad Zafarullah Khan publicly stated thatPakistan does not have
a policy towards the atom bombs.* [29] Following the
announcement, on 11 August 1955, the United States and
Pakistan reached an understanding concerning the peaceful and industrial use of nuclear energy which also includes a $350,000 worth pool-type reactor.* [29] Before
1971, Pakistan's nuclear development was peaceful but
an eective deterrent against India, as Benazir Bhutto
maintained in 1995.* [27] Pakistan's nuclear energy programme was established and started in 1956 following
the establishment of PAEC. Pakistan became a participant in U.S. President Eisenhower's Atoms for Peace program. PAEC's rst chairman was Dr. Nazir Ahmad. Although proposals to develop nuclear weapons were made

In 1961, the PAEC set up a Mineral Center at Lahore and


a similar multidisciplinary Center was set up in Dhaka, in
the then East Pakistan. With these two centres, the basic
research work started.
The rst thing that was to be undertaken was the search
for uranium. This continued for about three years from
1960 to 1963. Uranium deposits were discovered in
the Dera Ghazi Khan district, and the rst-ever national
award was given to the PAEC. Mining of uranium began
in the same year. Dr. Abdus Salam and Dr. Ishrat Hussain Usmani also sent a large number of scientists to pursue doctorate degrees in the eld of nuclear technology
and nuclear reactor technology. In December 1965, thenforeign minister Zulkar Ali Bhutto visited Vienna where
he met IAEA nuclear engineer, Munir Ahmad Khan. At
a Vienna meeting on December, Khan informed Bhutto
about the status of Indian nuclear program.
The next landmark under Dr. Abdus Salam was the establishment of PINSTECH Pakistan Institute of Nuclear
Science and Technology, at Nilore near Islamabad. The
principal facility there was a 5MW research reactor, commissioned in 1965 and consisting of the PARR-I, which
was upgraded to 10 MWe by Nuclear Engineering Division under Munir Ahmad Khan in 1990.* [30] A second Atomic Research Reactor, known as PARR-II, was a
Pool-type, light-water, 2730 kWe, training reactor that
went critical in 1989 under Munir Ahmad Khan.* [31]
The PARR-II reactor was built and provided by PAEC
under the IAEA safeguards as IAEA had funded this
mega project.* [31] The PARR-I reactor was, under the
agreement signed by PAEC and ANL, provided by the
U.S. Government in 1965, and scientists from PAEC and
ANL had led the construction.* [30] Canada build Pakistan's rst civil-purpose nuclear power plant. The Ayub
Khan Military Government made then-science advisors
to the Government Abdus Salam as the head of the IAEA
delegation. Abdus Salam began lobbying for commercial
nuclear power plants, and tirelessly advocated for nuclear
power in Pakistan.* [32] In 1965, Salam's eorts nally
paid o, and a Canadian rm signed a deal to provide
137MWe CANDU reactor in Paradise Point, Karachi.
The construction began in 1966 as PAEC its general contractor as GE Canada provided nuclear materials and nancial assistance. Its project director was Parvez Butt, a
nuclear engineer, and its construction completed in 1972.
Known as KANUPP-I, it was inaugurated by Zulkar Ali
Bhutto as President, and began its operations in November 1972. Currently, Pakistan Government is planning to
build another 400MWe commercial nuclear power plant.
Having known as KANUPP-II, the PAEC completed its
feasibility studies in 2009. However, the work is put on

198
hold since 2009.
In 1965,* [33] amidst skirmishes that led up to the IndoPakistani War of 1965, Zulkar Ali Bhutto announced:
In the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, which was the second of four openly declared Indo-Pakistani wars and
conicts, Pakistan solicited Central Treaty Organization
(CENTO) assistance,* [36] but came under arms supply embargo in United Nations Security Council Resolution 211.* [37] Foreign minister (later Prime minister)
Zulkar Ali Bhutto aggressively began the advocating the
option of nuclear weapons programmesbut such attempts were dismissed by Finance minister Muhammad
Shoaib and chairman Ishrat Hussain Usmani.* [29] Pakistani scientists and engineers' working at IAEA became
aware of advancing Indian nuclear program towards making the bombs. Therefore, In October 1965, Munir Khan,
director at the Nuclear Power and Reactor Division of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), met with
Bhutto on emergency basis in Vienna, revealing the facts
about the Indian nuclear programme and Bhabha Atomic
Research Centre in Trombay. At this meeting Munir
Khan concluded: a (nuclear) India would further undermine and threaten Pakistan's security, and for her survival, Pakistan needed a nuclear deterrent....
Understanding the sensitivity of the issue, Bhutto arranged a meeting with President Ayub Khan 11 December 1965 at Dorchester Hotel in London. Munir Khan
pointed out to the President that Pakistan must acquire
the necessary facilities that would give the country a nuclear weapon capability, which were available free of
safeguards and at an aordable cost, and there were no
restrictions on nuclear technology, that it was freely available, and that India was moving forward in deploying
it, as Munir Khan maintained. When asked about the
economics of such programme, Munir Ahmad Khan estimated the cost of nuclear technology at that time. Because things were less expensive, the then costs were not
more than US$150 million. After hearing the proposal
President Ayub Khan swiftly denied the proposal, saying
that Pakistan was too poor to spend that much money and
that, if Pakistan ever needed the atomic bomb, it could
somehow acquire it o the shelf.

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
of weapons-grade plutonium annually.* [28] PAEC selected a team ve senior scientists, including geophysicist
Dr. Ahsan Mubarak,* [28] who were sent to Sellaeld
to receive technical training.* [28] Later Mubarak's team
advised the government not to acquire the whole reprocessing plant, only key parts important to building
the weapons, while the plant would be built indigenously.* [28]
The PAEC in 1970 began work on a pilot-scale plant at
Dera Ghazi Khan for the concentration of uranium ores.
The plant had a capacity of 10,000 pounds a day.* [40] In
1989, Munir Ahmad Khan signed a nuclear cooperation
deal and, since 2000, Pakistan has been developing two
more nuclear power plants with an agreement signed with
China. Both these plants are of 300 MW capacity and
are being built at Chashma city of Punjab province. The
rst of these, CHASNUPP-I, began producing electricity
in 2000, and 'CHASNUPP-II', began its operation in fall
of 2011. In 2011, the board of governors of International
Atomic Energy Agency gave approval of Sino-Pak Nuclear Deal, allowing Pakistan legally to build the 300-MW
'CHASNUPP-III' and 'CHASNUPP-VI' reactors.* [41]
Development of nuclear weapons
Main articles: Bangladesh liberation war, Indo-Pakistani
War of 1971 and Project-706

The Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 was a crushing defeat for Pakistan, which led to it losing roughly 56,000
square miles (150,000 km2 ) of territory as well as losing millions of its citizens to the newly created state of
Bangladesh.* [42] In addition to the psychological setback for Pakistan,* [42] it had failed to gather any signicant material support or assistance from its key allies, the United States and the People's Republic of
China.* [43]* [44] Pakistan seemed to be isolated internationally, and in great danger; it felt that it could rely on
no one but itself.* [43] Prime Minister Zulqar Ali Bhutto
wasobsessedwith India's nuclear program.* [45]* [46]
At a United Nations Security Council meeting, Bhutto
drew comparisons between the Instrument of Surrender
Pakistan's weaker conventional weapon military in com- that ended the 1971 war, and the Treaty of Versailles,
parison to India and the Indian nuclear programme that which Germany was forced to sign in 1919. There,
started in 1967 promped Pakistan's clandestine develop- Bhutto vowed never to allow a repeat.
ment of nuclear weapons.* [38] Although Pakistan began
At the Multan meeting on 20 January 1972, Bhutto stated,
the development of nuclear weapons in 1972, Pakistan reWhat Raziuddin Siddiqui, a Pakistani, contributed for
sponded to India's 1974 nuclear test (see Smiling Buddha)
the United States during the Manhattan Project, could
with a number of proposals for a nuclear-weapon-free
also be done by scientists in Pakistan, for their own peozone to prevent a nuclear arms race in South Asia.* [39]
ple.* [47] Siddiqui was a Pakistani theoretical physicist
On many dierent occasions, India rejected the ofwho, in the early 1940s, worked on both the British nufer.* [39]
clear program and the Manhattan Project.* [48]
In 1969, after a long negotiation, the United Kingdom
In December 1972, Dr. Abdus Salam directed a seAtomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) signed a formal
cretly coded memo to Pakistani scientists working at the
agreement to supply Pakistan with a nuclear fuel reproInternational Centre for Theoretical Physics (ICTP) in
cessing plant capable of extracting 360 grams (13 oz)
Italy to report to the Chairman of the Pakistan Atomic

4.20. PAKISTAN
Energy Commission (PAEC), Munir Ahmad Khan, informing them about the program what was to be equivalent of the U.S. "Manhattan Project.* [49] In an eort
to instill a sense of pride, Salam noted that the heads of
the Manhattan Engineer District were theoreticians, and
informed the scientists at ICTP that a similar division was
being established at PAEC; this marked the beginning
of the Theoretical Physics Group(TPG).* [50]* [51]
Other theoreticians at Quaid-e-Azam University would
also join the TPG, then led by Salam who had done
ground-breaking work for TPG.* [52] Among them was
Riazuddin, Fayyazuddin, Masud Ahmad, and Faheem
Hussain who were the cornerstone of the TPG.* [53]* [54]

199
nium but parallel eorts were mounted toward weaponsgrade uranium after India's test, the Smiling Buddha, in
1974.* [69]
In 1983, Khan was convicted in absentia by the Court of
Amsterdam for stealing centrifuge blueprints, though the
conviction was overturned on a legal technicality.* [70]
A nuclear proliferation ring was established by Khan
through Dubai to smuggle URENCO nuclear technology
to KRL after founding the Zippe method for the gas centrifuge * [70]* [71]* [72]* [73]* [74]

On 11 March 1983, PAEC, led by Munir Ahmad Khan,


carried out its rst subcritical testing of a working nuclear device. This is also called a cold test, and was coTedious mathematical work on fast neutron calculations, denamed Kirana-I. There were 24 more cold tests from
relativity, complex hydrodynamics and quantum mechan- 198394.* [75]
ics were conducted by the TPG led by Salam until 1974
when he left Pakistan in protest, though he kept close Coordination between each site was overseen by the Dicontact with TPG.* [55] No such endeavours of the kind rectorate of Technical Development (DTD) under Dr.
had taken place in the country and computerized numer- Zaman Sheikh (a chemical engineer) and Hafeez Qureshi,
*
ical control (CNC) and basic computing facilities were a mechanical engineer. [76] The DTD was established by
*
non-existent at that time (though later acquired). [56] For Munir Ahmad Khan in 1974 at the Metallurgical Labthis purpose, the calculations on the high-performance oratory and was tasked with development of tampers,
computing and numerical analysis were performed by reective and explosive lenses, optics, and triggering
*
Dr. Tufail Naseem, a PhD graduate in mathematics mechanisms that are crucial in atomic weapons. [76]
First
implosion
design
was
built
by
TPG
in
1977
and
from Cambridge University, assisted by other members
the
DTD
eventually
conducted
the
cold-test
on
11
March
of Mathematics Division the division of pure mathemat*
ics at PAEC under Dr. Raziuddin Siddiqui and Asghar 1983, codename Kirana-I. [76] Between 1983 and 1990,
*
*
PAEC
carried
out
24
more
cold tests of various nuclear
Qadir. [57] [58] About the lack of CNC facilities, Muweapon
designs
and
shifted
its focused towards tactical
nir Ahmad Khan famously marked: If the Americans
designs
in
1987
that
could
be
delivered by all Pakistan
could do it without CNC machines in the 1940s, why can't
*
*
Air
Force
ghter
aircraft.
[77]
we do the same now.. [59] With Abdus Salam departuring, Munir Ahmad eventually led the TPG and assisted in Dr. Ishrat Hussain Usmani's contribution to the nuclear
the calculations.* [60] Two types of weapon design were energy programme is also fundamental to the developanalyzed: the Gun-type ssion weapon and the implosion ment of atomic energy for civilian purposes as he, with
nuclear weapon.* [61] The program turned to the more eorts led by Salam, established PINSTECH, that subtechnically dicult implosion-type weapon design, con- sequently developed into Pakistan's premier nuclear retrary to the relatively simple 'gun-type' weapon.* [62]
search institution.* [78] In addition to sending hundreds
In 1974, Abdul Qadeer Khan a metallurgist, joined the of young Pakistanis abroad for training, he laid the founprogram and pushed for the feasibility of highly en- dations of the Muslim world's rst nuclear power reacriched uranium (HEU) ssile material and collaborated tor KANUPP, which was inaugurated by Munir Ahmad
*
under Bashiruddin Mahmood at the PAEC a moved Khan in 1972. [79] Scientists and engineers under Khan
*
that irked Khan. [63] Preliminary studies on gaseous developed the nuclear capability for Pakistan within the
centrifuge were already studied by PAEC in 1967 but late 1970s, and under his leadership PAEC had carried
yielded few results.* [64] Khan advanced uranium enrich- out a cold test of nuclear devices at Kirana Hills, eviment from the expertise he had from the Urenco Group dently made from non-weaponized plutonium. The forin the Netherlands. Under Khan's supervision, the Khan mer chairman of PAEC, Munir Khan, was credited as one
Research Laboratories (KRL) was set-up and engaged in of the pioneers of Pakistan's atomic bomb by a study from
clandestine eorts to obtain the necessary materials tech- the London International Institute for Strategic Studies
*
nology and electronic components for its developing ura- (IISS), on Pakistan's atomic bomb program. [23]
*
nium enrichment capabilities. [65]
The TPG succeeded in the earlier implosion-type weapon
design in 197778, with the rst cold test conducted in
1983 by Ishfaq Ahmad.* [67] The program evolved towards the boosted ssion weapon designs that were eventually used in the Chagai-I tests in 1998.* [68] Enormous
production was undertaken by the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission for feasibility of weapons grade pluto-

Policy
Main article: Minimum Credible Deterrence (Pakistan)
Pakistan acceded to the Geneva Protocol on 15 April
1960. As for its Biological warfare capability, Pak-

200
istan is not widely suspected of either producing biological weapons or having an oensive biological programme.* [80] However, the country is reported to have
well developed bio-technological facilities and laboratories, devoted entirely to the medical research and applied
healthcare science.* [80] In 1972, Pakistan signed and
ratied the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
(BTWC) in 1974.* [80] Since then Pakistan has been a
vocal and staunch supporter for the success of the BTWC.
During the various BTWC Review Conferences, Pakistan's representatives have urged more robust participation from state signatories, invited new states to join the
treaty, and, as part of the non-aligned group of countries,
have made the case for guarantees for states' rights to engage in peaceful exchanges of biological and toxin materials for purposes of scientic research.* [80]

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
Modernisation and expansion

Pakistan is increasing its capacity to produce plutonium


at its Khushab nuclear facility, a Washington-based science think tank has reported.* [85] The sixth nuclear test
(codename: Chagai-II) on 30 May 1998, at Kharan was
a quiet successful test of a sophisticated, compact, but
powerful plutonium bombdesigned to be carried by
aircraft, vessels, and missiles. The Pakistanis are believed
to be spiking their plutonium based nuclear weapons with
tritium. Only a few grams of tritium can result in an increase of the explosive yield by 300% to 400%.* [86]
Citing new satellite images of the facility, the Institute
for Science and International Security (ISIS) said the imagery suggests construction of the second Khushab reactor is likely nished and that the roof beams are being
placed on top of the third Khushab reactor hall".* [87] A
Pakistan is not known to have an oensive chemical
third and a fourth* [88] reactor and ancillary buildings are
weapons programme, and in 1993 Pakistan signed and
observed to be under construction at the Khushab site.
ratied the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and
has committed itself to refrain from developing, manu- In an opinion published in The Hindu, former Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran wrote that Pakistan's exfacturing, stockpiling, or using chemical weapons.* [81]
panding nuclear capability is no longer driven solely
Pakistan is not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty
by its oft-cited fears of Indiabut by the "paranoia about
(NPT) and is not bound by any of its provisions. In 1999,
U.S. attacks on its strategic assets.* [89]* [90] Noting rePrime Ministers Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan and Atal Bicent changes in Pakistan's nuclear doctrine, Saran said
hari Vajpayee of India signed the Lahore Declaration,
the Pakistan Military and civilian elite is convinced that
agreeing to a bilateral moratorium on further nuclear testthe United States has also become a dangerous adversary,
ing. This initiative was taken a year after both countries
which seeks to disable, disarm or take forcible posseshad publicly tested nuclear weapons. (See Pokhran-II,
sion of Pakistan's nuclear arsenals and its status as nuclear
Chagai-I and II)
power.* [90]
Since the early 1980s, Pakistan's nuclear proliferation
As of 2014, Pakistan has been reportedly developing
activities have not been without controversy. However,
smaller, more tactical nuclear weapons for potential use
since the arrest of Abdul Qadeer Khan, the government
on the battleeld exclusively. This is consistent with earhas taken concrete steps to ensure that Nuclear proliferlier statements from a meeting of the National Command
ation is not repeated and have assured the IAEA about
Authority (which directs nuclear policy and development)
the transparency of Pakistan's upcoming Chashma Nusaying Pakistan is developinga full-spectrum deterrence
clear Power Complex series of Nuclear Power Plants.
capability to deter all forms of aggression.* [91]
In November 2006, The International Atomic Energy
Agency Board of Governors approved an agreement with
the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission to apply safe- Arms control proposals
guards to new nuclear power plants to be built in the country with Chinese assistance.* [82]
Pakistan has over the years proposed a number of bilateral or regional non-proliferation steps and condence
building measures to India, including :* [92]

Protections
In May 2009, during the anniversary of Pakistan's rst
nuclear weapons test, former Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif claimed that Pakistan's nuclear security is the strongest in the world.* [83] According to Dr.
Abdul Qadeer Khan, Pakistan's nuclear safety program
and nuclear security program is the strongest program in
the world and there is no such capability in any other
country for radical elements to steal or possess nuclear
weapons.* [84]

A joint Indo-Pakistan declaration renouncing the


acquisition or manufacture of nuclear weapons, in
1978.* [93]
South Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, in
1978.* [94]
Mutual inspections by India and Pakistan of each
other's nuclear facilities, in 1979.* [95]
Simultaneous adherence to the NPT by India and
Pakistan, in 1979.* [96]
A bilateral or regional nuclear test-ban treaty, in
1987.* [97]

4.20. PAKISTAN
A South Asia Zero-Missile Zone, in 1994.* [98]
India rejected all six proposals.* [99]* [100]
However, India and Pakistan reached three bilateral
agreements on nuclear issues. In 1989, they agreed not
to attack each other's nuclear facilities.* [101] Since then
they have been regularly exchanging lists of nuclear facilities on 1 January of each year.* [102] Another bilateral
agreement was signed in March 2005 where both nations
would alert the other on ballistic missile tests.* [103] In
June 2004, the two countries signed an agreement to set
up and maintain a hotline to warn each other of any accident that could be mistaken for a nuclear attack. These
were deemed essential risk reduction measures in view of
the seemingly unending state of misgiving and tension between the two countries, and the extremely short response
time available to them to any perceived attack. None of
these agreements limits the nuclear weapons programs of
either country in any way.* [104]
Disarmament policy
Pakistan has blocked negotiation of a Fissile Material
Cuto Treaty as it continues to produce ssile material
for weapons.* [105]* [106]
In a recent statement at the Conference on Disarmament,
Pakistan laid out its nuclear disarmament policy and what
it sees as the proper goals and requirements for meaningful negotiations:
A commitment by all states to complete veriable
nuclear disarmament;
Eliminate the discrimination in the current nonproliferation regime;
Normalize the relationship of the three ex-NPT nuclear weapon states with those who are NPT signatories;
Address new issues like access to weapons of mass
destruction by non-state actors;
Non-discriminatory rules ensuring every state's right
to peaceful uses of nuclear energy;
Universal, non-discriminatory and legally binding
negative security assurances to non-nuclear weapon
states;
A need to address the issue of missiles, including development and deployment of Anti-ballistic missile
systems;
Strengthen existing international instruments to prevent the militarisation of outer space, including development of ASATs;

201
Tackle the growth in armed forces and the accumulation and sophistication of conventional tactical
weapons.
Revitalise the UN disarmament machinery to
address international security, disarmament and
proliferation challenges.
Pakistan has repeatedly stressed at international forums
like the Conference on Disarmament that it will give up
its nuclear weapons only when other nuclear armed states
do so, and when disarmament is universal and veriable.
It rejects any unilateral disarmament on its part.* [107]

4.20.2 Infrastructure
Uranium
Pakistan's uranium infrastructure is based on the use
of gas centrifuges to produce highly enriched uranium
(HEU) at the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) at
Kahuta.* [4] Responding to India's nuclear test in 1974,
Munir Khan launched the uranium program, codename
Project-706 under the aegis of the PAEC.* [108] Physical
chemist, Dr. Khalil Qureshi, did most of the calculations as a member of the uranium division at PAEC,
which undertook research on several methods of enrichment, including gaseous diusion, jet nozzle and
molecular laser isotope separation techniques, as well as
centrifuges.* [109] Abdul Qadeer Khan ocially joined
this program in 1976, bringing with him centrifuge designs he mastered at URENCO, the Dutch rm where he
had worked as a senior scientist. Later that year, the government separated the program from PAEC and moved
the program to the Engineering Research Laboratories
(ERL), with A.Q. Khan as its senior scientist.* [110] To
acquire the necessary equipment and material for this
program, Khan developed a procurement ring. Electronic
materials were imported from the United Kingdom by
two liaison ocers posted to the High Commission of
Pakistan in London and Bonn Germany.* [111] The army
engineer and ex-technical liaison ocer, Major-General
Syed Ali Nawab discreetly oversaw KRL operations in
the 1970s including procuring the electronics that were
marked as common items.* [111]* [112] This ring
was also illicitly used decades later, in the late 1980s
and 90s to provide technology to Libya (under Muammar
Gadda), North Korea, and Iran.* [113] Despite these efforts, it is claimed Khan Research Laboratories suered
setbacks until PAEC provided technical assistance.* [114]
Although, A.Q. Khan disputes it and counter claims that
PAEC is merely trying to take credit for KRL's success
and that PAEC hindered progress at KRL after the two
programs had been separated by Bhutto in 1976.* [115]
In any case, KRL achieved modest enrichment of Uranium by 1978 and was ready to detonate an HEU uranium
bomb by 1984. In contrast PAEC was unable to enrich

202

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

any Uranium or produce weapons grade ssile material were only two logistic problems faced by PAEC. One
until 1998.
was that Pakistan did not want to be an irresponsible state
The uranium program proved to be a dicult, chal- and the PAEC under Munir Ahmed Khan did not divert
lenging and most enduring approach to scale up to spent fuel from the safeguarded KANUPP for reprocessindustrial levels to military-grade.* [116] Producing HEU ing at the New Labs. The second one was allocation of
as a ssile material is even more dicult and chal- resources.
lenging than extracting plutonium and Pakistan experimented with HEU as an implosion design as contrary to other nuclear states.* [117] Little and rudimentary knowledge was available of gas centrifuges at that
time, and HEU ssile material was only known to the
world for nuclear power usage; its military applications
for HEU were non-existent.* [118] Commenting on the
diculty, mathematician Tasneem Shah; who worked
with A.Q. Khan, was quoted in the book Eating Grass
that "hydrodynamical problem in centrifuge was simply
stated, but extremely dicult to evaluate, not only in
order of magnitude but in detailing also.* [116] Many
of Khan's fellow theorists were unsure about the feasibility of the enriched uranium on time despite Khan's
strong advocacy.* [116] One scientist recalled his memories in Eating Grass: No one in the world has used the
[gas] centrifuge method to produce weapon grade material.... [T]his was not going to work, he [A.Q. Khan] is
simply wasting time.* [116] Despite A.Q. Khan having diculty getting his peers to listen to him, he aggressively continued his research and the program was
made feasible in the shortest time possible.* [116] His efforts won him praise from Pakistan's politicians and military science circles, and he was now debuted as thefather of the uraniumbomb.* [116] On 28 May 1998, it
was the KRL's HEU that ultimately created the nuclear
chain reaction which led the successful detonation of
boosted ssion devices in a scientic experiment codenamed Chagai-I.* [116]

Alternatively, it is hard to believe that Pakistan had the


engineering capability to produce plutonium for nuclear
bombs in the early 70s, when it couldn't even complete the
less dicult step of subcritical, cold testing until 1983 in
Kirana Hills. After all, according to Houston Wood, Professor of Mechanical & Aerospace Engineering, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, USA in his article on gas
centrifuges,The most dicult step in building a nuclear
weapon is the production of ssile material.* [14]* [15]
There would have been no need to bring A.Q. Khan if
Pakistan had the capability to produce ssile plutonium
in the early 70s. Pakistan had to bring Dr. A.Q. Khan
from Europe to develop ssile uranium after PAEC failed
to produce ssile plutonium by the 1976 deadline.* [12]
As opposed to uranium, the parallel plutonium programme is indigenous, locally developed and culminated
under the scientic directorship of PAEC chairman Munir Ahmad Khan.* [24] Since 1972, earlier eorts were
directed towards plutonium and necessary infrastructure
was built by Bhutto as early as the 1970s.* [24] Contrary
to popular perception, Pakistan did not forego or abandon
the plutonium program and pursued it along with the uranium route.* [24] Despite many setbacks and international
embargo, PAEC continued its research on plutonium and
created a separated electromagnetic isotope separation
program alongside the enrichment program, under Dr. G
D Allam, a theoretical physicist.* [24]

Towards the end of the 1970s, the PAEC began to pursue


plutonium production capabilities. Consequently, Pakistan built the 4050 MW (megawatt, thermal) Khushab
Plutonium
Reactor Complex at Joharabad, and in April 1998, Pakistan announced that the nuclear reactor was operational.
The Khushab reactor project was initiated in 1986 by
Munir Khan, who informed the world that the reactor
was totally indigenous, i.e. that it was designed and built
by Pakistani scientists and engineers. Various Pakistani
industries contributed in 82% of the reactor's construction. The Project-Director for this project was Sultan
Bashiruddin Mahmood. According to public statements
made by the U.S. Government ocials, this heavy-water
reactor can produce up to 8 to 10 kg of plutonium per
year with increase in the production by the development
of newer facilities,* [119] sucient for at least one nuclear weapon.* [120] The reactor could also produce H3
if it were loaded with Li6 , although this is unnecessary
for the purposes of nuclear weapons, because modern
nuclear weapon designs use 6 Li directly. According to
J. Cirincione of Carnegie Endowment for International
The televised screen-shot of Chagai-I on 28 May 1998.
Peace, Khushab's Plutonium production capacity has alAs for Pakistan's plutonium capability, it has always been lowed Pakistan to develop lighter nuclear warheads that
there, from the early 1970s onwards. However, there would be easier to deliver to any place in the range of the

4.20. PAKISTAN

203

ballistic missiles.
The Plutonium electromagnetic separation takes place
at the New Laboratories, a reprocessing plant, which
was completed by 1981 by PAEC and is next to the
Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology
(PINSTECH) near Islamabad, which is not subject to
IAEA inspections and safeguards.
In late 2006, the Institute for Science and International
Security released intelligence reports and imagery showing the construction of a new plutonium reactor at the
Khushab nuclear site. The reactor is deemed to be large
enough to produce enough plutonium to facilitate the
creation of as many as 40 to 50 nuclear weapons a
year.* [121]* [122]* [123] The New York Times carried A truck-mounted launch system (TEL) armed with 4 Babur cruise
the story with the insight that this would be Pakistan's missiles on display at the IDEAS 2008 defence exhibition in
third plutonium reactor,* [124] signalling a shift to dual- Karachi, Pakistan.
stream development, with Plutonium-based devices supplementing the nation's existing HEU stream to atomic
warheads. On 30 May 1998, Pakistan proved its plutonium capability in a scientic experiment and sixth nuclear test: codename Chagai-II.* [116]
Stockpile

Truck-mounted Missiles on display at the IDEAS 2008 defence


exhibition in Karachi, Pakistan.

mated that Pakistan had built 2448 HEU-based nuclear


warheads with HEU reserves for 3052 additional warheads.* [126]* [127] In 2003, the U.S. Navy Center for
Contemporary Conict estimated that Pakistan possessed
between 35 and 95 nuclear warheads, with a median of
60.* [128] In 2003, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace estimated a stockpile of approximately 50
weapons. By contrast, in 2000, U.S. military and intelligence sources estimated that Pakistan's nuclear arsenal
may be as large as 100 warheads.* [129]
The actual size of Pakistan's nuclear stockpile is hard
for experts to gauge owing to the extreme secrecy which
surrounds the program in Pakistan. However, in 2007,
retired Pakistan Army's Brigadier-General Feroz Khan,
Pakistani Missiles on display at the IDEAS 2008 defence exhibipreviously second in command at the Strategic Arms Dition in Karachi, Pakistan.
vision of Pakistans' Military told a Pakistani newspaper
Pakistan had about 80 to 120 genuine warheads.
Estimates of Pakistan's stockpile of nuclear warheads that
*
*
[130]
[131]
vary. The most recent analysis, published in the Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists in 2010, estimates that Pakistan Pakistan tested plutonium capability in the sixth nuclear
has 7090 nuclear warheads.* [125] In 2001, the U.S.- test, codename Chagai-II, on 30 May 1998 at Kharan
based Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) esti- Desert.

204
The critical mass of a bare mass sphere of 90% enriched uranium-235 is 52 kg. Correspondingly, the critical mass of a bare mass sphere of plutonium-239 is 810
kg. The bomb that destroyed Hiroshima used 60 kg of
U-235 while the Nagasaki Pu bomb used only 6 kg of
Pu-239. Since all Pakistani bomb designs are implosiontype weapons, they will typically use between 1525 kg
of U-235 for their cores. Reducing the amount of U235 in cores from 60 kg in gun-type devices to 25 kg in
implosion devices is only possible by using good neutron
reector/tamper material such as beryllium metal, which
increases the weight of the bomb. And the uranium, like
plutonium, is only usable in the core of a bomb in metallic
form.
However, only 24 kg of plutonium is needed for the
same device that would need 2025 kg of U-235. Additionally, a few grams of tritium (a by-product of plutonium production reactors and thermonuclear fuel) can
increase the overall yield of the bombs by a factor of
three to four. The sixth Pakistan nuclear test, codename Chagai-II, (30 May 1998) at Kharan Desert was a
successful test of a sophisticated, compact, but powerful
bomb designed to be carried by missiles. A whole range
and variety of weapons using Pu-239 can be easily built,
both for aircraft delivery and especially for missiles (in
which U-235 cannot be used). So if Pakistan wants to be
a nuclear power with an operational weapon capability,
both rst and second strike, based on assured strike platforms like ballistic and cruise missiles (unlike aircraft),
the only solution is with plutonium, which has been the
rst choice of every country that built a nuclear arsenal.

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
sumed HEU. So it is safe to assume that between 1986
and 2005 (prior to the 2005 earthquake), KRL produced
1500 kg of HEU. Accounting for losses in the production
of weapons, it can be assumed that each weapon would
need 20 kg of HEU; sucient for 75 bombs as in 2005.
Pakistan's rst nuclear tests were made in May 1998,
when six warheads were tested under codename ChagaiI and Chagai-II. It is reported that the yields from these
tests were 12 kt, 30 to 36 kt and four low-yield (below 1
kt) tests. From these tests Pakistan can be estimated to
have developed operational warheads of 20 to 25 kt and
150 kt in the shape of low weight compact designs and
may have 300500 kt* [132] large-size warheads. The
low-yield weapons are probably in nuclear bombs carried
on ghter-bombers such as the Dassault Mirage III and tted to Pakistan's short-range ballistic missiles, while the
higher-yield warheads are probably tted to the Shaheen
series and Ghauri series ballistic missiles.* [132]
Second strike capability
According to a U.S. congressional report, Pakistan has
addressed issues of survivability in a possible nuclear conict through second strike capability. Pakistan has been
dealing with eorts to develop new weapons and at the
same time, have a strategy for surviving a nuclear war.
Pakistan has built hard and deeply buried storage and
launch facilities to retain a second strike capability in a
nuclear war.* [133] In January 2000, two years past after the atomic tests, U.S. intelligence ocials stated that
previous intelligence estimates overstated the capabilities of India's homegrown arsenal and understate those of
Pakistan.* [134] The United States Central Command
commander, General Anthony Zinni, a friend of Musharraf,* [134] told the NBC that longtime assumptions, that
India had an edge in the South Asian strategic balance of
power, were questionable at best. Don't assume that the
Pakistan's nuclear capability is inferior to the Indians,
General Zinni quoted to NBC.* [134]

Ultra-centrifugation for obtaining U-235 cannot be done


simply by putting natural uranium through the centrifuges. It requires the complete mastery over the front
end of the nuclear fuel cycle, beginning at uranium mining and rening, production of uranium ore or yellow
cake, conversion of ore into uranium dioxide (UO
2) (which is used to make nuclear fuel for natural uranium reactors like Khushab and KANUPP), conversion
of UO2 into uranium tetrauoride (UF
It was conrmed that Pakistan has built Soviet-style
4) and then into the feedstock for enrichment (UF
road-mobile missiles, state-of-the-art air defences around
6).
strategic sites, and other concealment measures. In 1998,
The complete mastery of uorine chemistry and proPakistan had 'at least six secret locations' and since then
duction of highly toxic and corrosive hydrouoric acid
it is believed Pakistan may have many more such secret
and other uorine compounds is required. The UF6 is
sites. In 2008, the United States admitted that it did not
pumped into the centrifuges for enrichment. The process
know where all of Pakistan's nuclear sites are located.
is then repeated in reverse until UF4 is produced, leading
Pakistani defence ocials have continued to rebu and
to the production of uranium metal, the form in which
deect American requests for more details about the loU-235 is used in a bomb.
cation and security of the country's nuclear sites.* [135]
It is estimated that there are approximately 10,000
20,000 centrifuges in Kahuta. This means that with P2
machines, they would be producing between 75100 kg MIRV capability
of HEU since 1986, when full production of weaponsgrade HEU began. Also the production of HEU was Pakistani engineers are also said to be in the advance
voluntarily capped by Pakistan between 1991 and 1997, stages of developing MIRV technology for its missiles.
and the ve nuclear tests of 28 May 1998 also con- This would allow the military to t several warheads on
the same ballistic missile and then launch them at sepa-

4.20. PAKISTAN

205

rate targets.* [136]

it.* [145] Talking to a media correspondents and Indian


parliamentarians, Li Peng frankly quoted: We do not
help Pakistan in its atomic bomb projects. Pakistan is a
friendly country with whom we have good economic and
political relations.* [145]

Personnel
In 2010, Russian foreign ministry ocial Yuriy Korolev stated that there are somewhere between 120,000
to 130,000 people directly involved in Pakistan's nuclear
and missile programs, a gure considered extremely large
for a developing country.* [137]

In 1986, it was reported that both countries have signed


a mutual treaty of peaceful use of civil nuclear technology agreement in which China would supply Pakistan a
civil-purpose nuclear power plant. A grand ceremony
was held in Beijing where Pakistan's then-Foreign Minister Yakub Khan signed on behalf of Pakistan in the presForeign co-operation
ence of Munir Khan and Chinese Prime Minister. Therefore, in 1989, Pakistan reached agreement with China for
Historically, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has the supply of the 300-MW commercial CHASHNUPP-1
been repeatedly charged with allegedly transferring mis- nuclear power plant.
sile and related materials to Pakistan.* [138] Despite
China strongly dismissing the charges and accusations, In February 1990, President Franois Mitterrand of
the United States alleged China to have played a ma- France visited Pakistan and announced that France had
jor role in the establishment of Pakistan's atomic bomb agreed to supply a 900 MWe commercial nuclear power
development infrastructure.* [138] There are also unof- plant to Pakistan. However, after the Prime Minister
cial reports in Western media that the nuclear weapon Benazir Bhutto was dismissed in August 1990, the French
technology and the weapon-grade enriched uranium was nuclear power plant deal went into cold storage and the
transferred to Pakistan by China.* [139]* [140] China has agreement could not be implemented due to nancial
consistently maintained that it has not sold any weapon constraints and the Pakistani government's apathy. Also
parts or components to Pakistan or anyone else.* [138] in February 1990, Soviet Ambassador to Pakistan, V.P.
On August 2001, it was reported that U.S. ocials con- Yakunin, said that the USSR was considering a request
fronted China numerous times over this issue and pointed from Pakistan for the supply of a nuclear power plant.
out rather bluntly* [138] to Chinese ocials that The Soviet and French civilian nuclear power plant was
the evidences from intelligence sources was powerful. on its way during the 1990s. However, Bob Oakley, the
*
[138] But they had been rebued by the Chinese, who U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan, expressed U.S. displeasure
and Pakhave retorted by referring to the U.S. support for Taiwan's at the recent agreement made between France
*
istan
for
the
sale
of
a
nuclear
power
plant.
[146]
After the
military build-up which Beijing says is directed against
*
U.S.
concerns
the
civilian-nuclear
technology
agreements
it. [138]
were cancelled by France and Soviet Union.
The former U.S. ocials have also disclosed that China
had allegedly transferred technology to Pakistan and con- Declassied documents from 1982, released in 2012 unducting putative test for it in 1980.* [141] However, se- der the U.S. Freedom of Information Act, said that U.S.
nior scientists and ocials strongly dismissed the U.S. intelligence detected that Pakistan was seeking suspicious
from Belgium, Finland, Japan, Sweden and
disclosure, and in 1998 interview given to Kamran procurements
*
Turkey.
[147]
Khan, Abdul Qadeer Khan maintained to the fact that,
due to its sensitivity, no country allows another coun- According to more recent reports, it has been alleged
try to use their tests site to explode the devices,al- that North Korea had been secretly supplying Pakistan
though the UK conducted such tests in Australia and with ballistic missile technology in exchange for nuclear
the United States.* [3] His statement was also traced by weapons technology.* [148]
Samar Mubarakmand who acknowledged that cold tests
were carried out, under codename Kirana-I, in a test
site which was built by the Corps of Engineers under
Doctrine
the guidance of the PAEC.* [3]* [142] According to a
2001 Department of Defense report, China has supplied
Pakistan with nuclear materials and has provided criti- See also: Nuclear doctrine of Pakistan
cal technical assistance in the construction of Pakistan's
nuclear weapons development facilities, in violation of Pakistan refuses to adopt a "no-rst-use" doctrine, inthe Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, of which China dicating that it would strike India with nuclear weapons
is a signatory.* [143]* [144] In 2001 visit to India, the even if India did not use such weapons rst. Pakistan's
Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National asymmetric nuclear posture has signicant inuence on
People's Congress Li Peng rejected all the accusations India's decision ability to retaliate, as shown in 2001 and
against China to Indian media and strongly maintained on 2008 crises, when non-state actors carried out deadly
the ground that his country was not giving any nuclear attacks on Indian soil, only to be met with a relatively
arms to Pakistan nor transferring related-technology to subdued response from India. A military spokersper-

206
son stated that Pakistan's threat of nuclear rst-use
deterred India from seriously considering conventional
military strikes.* [149] India is Pakistan's primary geographic neighbour and primary strategic competitor,
helping drive Pakistan's conventional warfare capability
and nuclear weapons development: The two countries
share an 1800-mile border and have suered a violent
historyfour wars in less than seven decades. The past
three decades have seen India's economy eclipse that of
Pakistan's, allowing the former to outpace the latter in
defence expenditure at a decreasing share of GDP. In
comparison to population, India is more powerful than
Pakistan by almost every metric of military, economic,
and political power and the gap continues to grow,a
Belfer Center for Science and International Aairs report
claims.* [150]

Theory of deterrence
Main articles: N-deterrence and Nuclear deterrence
The theory of N-deterrencehas been frequently being interpreted by the various government-in-time of effect of Pakistan. Although the nuclear deterrence theory was ocially adopted in 1998 as part of Pakistan's
defence theory,* [151] on the other hand, the theory has
had been interpreted by the government since in 1972.
The relative weakness in defence warfare is highlighted
in Pakistan's nuclear posture, which Pakistan considers its
primary deterrent from Indian conventional oensives or
nuclear attack. Nuclear theorist Brigadier-General Feroz
Hassan Khan adds: The Pakistani situation is akin to
NATO's position in the Cold War. There are geographic
gaps and corridors similar to those that existed in Europe ... that are vulnerable to exploitation by mechanized
Indian forces ... With its relatively smaller conventional
force, and lacking adequate technical means, especially in
early warning and surveillance, Pakistan relies on a more
proactive nuclear defensive policy.* [152]

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
ory of defense is not view to enter into a "nuclear race",
but to follow a policy of "peaceful co-existence" in the
region, it cannot remain oblivious to the developments
in South Asia.* [153] The Pakistan Government ofcials and strategists have consistently emphasised that
nuclear deterrence is intended by maintaining a balance
to safeguard its sovereignty and ensure peace in the region.* [154]
Pakistan's motive for pursuing a nuclear weapons development program is never to allow another invasion
of Pakistan.* [155] President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq allegedly told the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in
1987 that, If your forces cross our borders by an inch,
we are going to annihilate your cities.* [156]
Pakistan has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
According to the United States Department of Defense
report cited above, Pakistan remains steadfast in its refusal to sign the NPT, stating that it would do so only
after India joined the Treaty. Pakistan has responded to
the report by stating that the United States itself has not
ratied the CTBT. Consequently, not all of Pakistan's nuclear facilities are under IAEA safeguards. Pakistani ofcials have stated that signature of the CTBT is in Pakistan's best interest, but that Pakistan will do so only after
developing a domestic consensus on the issue, and have
disavowed any connection with India's decision.
The Congressional Research Service, in a report published on 23 July 2012, said that in addition to expanding
its nuclear arsenal, Pakistan could broaden the circumstances under which it would be willing to use nuclear
weapons.* [157]
Nuclear Command and Control

Main articles: Pakistan National Command Authority,


Joint Chiefs of Sta Committee, National Security
Council of Pakistan, Strategic Planning Division,
Defence Committee of the Cabinet (Pakistan), Nuclear
Indian political scientist Vipin Narang, however, argues command and control and Threat Matrix (database)
that Pakistan's asymmetric escalation posture, or the
rapid rst use of nuclear weapons against conventional at- The government institutional organisation authorised to
tacks to deter their outbreak, increases instability in South make critical decisions about Pakistan's nuclear posturAsia. Narang supports his arguments by noting to the fact ing is the NCA.* [158] The NCA has its genesis since
that since India's assured retaliation nuclear posture has the 1970s* [158] and has been constitutionally established
not deterred these provocations, Pakistan's passive nu- in February 2000.* [158] The NCA is composed of two
clear posture has neutralised India's conventional options civic-military committees that advises and console both
for now; limited retaliation would be militarily futile, and Prime minister and the President of Pakistan, on the demore signicant conventional retaliation is simply o the velopment and deployment of nuclear weapons; it is also
table.* [149]
responsible for war-time command and control. In 2001,
The strategists in Pakistan Armed Forces has ceded nuclear assets and a degree of nuclear launch code authority to lower-level ocers to ensure weapon usability in a
"fog of war" scenario, making credible its deterrence doctrine.* [149] On further military perspective, the Pakistan
Air Force (PAF), has retrospectively contended thatthe-

Pakistan further consolidated its nuclear weapons infrastructure by placing the Khan Research Laboratories and
the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission under the control of one Nuclear Defense Complex. In November
2009, Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari announced that
he will be replaced by Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gi-

4.20. PAKISTAN
lani as the chairman of NCA.* [159] The NCA consists of
the Employment Control Committee (ECC) and the Development Control Committee (DCC), both now chaired
by the Prime Minister.* [160] The Foreign minister and
Economic Minister serves as a deputy chairmen of the
ECC, the body which denes nuclear strategy, including the deployment and employment of strategic forces,
and would advise the prime minister on nuclear use. The
committee includes key senior cabinet ministers as well as
the respective military chiefs of sta.* [160] The ECC reviews presentations on strategic threat perceptions, monitors the progress of weapons development, and decides
on responses to emerging threats.* [160] It also establishes
guidelines for eective command-and-control practices
to safeguard against the accidental or unauthorised use
of nuclear weapons.* [160]
The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Sta Committee is
the deputy chairman of the Development Control Committee (DCC), the body responsible for weapons development and oversight which includes the nation's military and scientic, but not its political, leadership.* [160]
Through DCC, the senior civilian scientists maintains a
tight control of scientic and ethical research; the DCC
exercises technical, nancial and administrative control
over all strategic organisations, including national laboratories and scientic research and development organisations associated with the development and modernisation of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.* [160]
Functioning through the SPD, the DCC oversees the systematic progress of weapon systems to full the force
goals set by the committee.* [160]
Under the Nuclear Command Authority, its secretariat,
Strategic Plans Division (SPD), is responsible for the
physical protection and to ensure security of all aspects
of country's nuclear arsenals.* [161] The SPD functions
under the Joint Chiefs of Sta Committee at the Joint
Headquarters (JS HQ) and reports directly to the Prime
Minister.* [161] The comprehensive nuclear force planning is integrated with conventional war planning at the
National Security Council (NSC).* [161] According to
the ocials of Pakistan's military science circles, it is
the high-prole civic-military committee consisting the
Cabinet ministers, President, Prime minister and the four
services chiefs, all of whom who reserves the right to order the deployment and the operational use of the nuclear
weapons.* [161] The nal and executive political decisions on nuclear arsenals deployments, operational use,
and nuclear weapons politics are made during the sessions of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet, which
is chaired by the Prime minister.* [162] It is this DCC
Council where the nal political guideles, discussions
and the nuclear arsenals operational deployments are approved by the Prime minister.* [162] The DCC reafrmed its policies on development of nuclear energy and
arsenals through the country's media.* [162]

207
U.S. security assistance
From the end of 2001 the United States has provided material assistance to aid Pakistan in guarding its nuclear
material, warheads and laboratories. The cost of the program has been almost $100 million. Specically the USA
has provided helicopters, night-vision goggles and nuclear
detection equipment.* [163]
During this period Pakistan also began to develop a modern export control regulatory regime with U.S. assistance. It supplements the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration Megaports program at Port Qasim,
Karachi, which deployed radiation monitors and imaging
equipment monitored by a Pakistani central alarm station.* [164]
Pakistan turned down the oer of Permissive Action Link
(PAL) technology, a sophisticatedweapon releaseprogram which initiates use via specic checks and balances,
possibly because it feared the secret implanting ofdead
switches. But Pakistan is since believed to have developed and implemented its own version of PAL and U.S.
military ocials have stated they believe Pakistan's nuclear arsenals to be well secured.* [165]* [166]
Security concerns of the United States Since 2004
the U.S. government has reportedly been concerned
about the safety of Pakistani nuclear facilities and
weapons. Press reports have suggested that the United
States has contingency plans to send in special forces to
helpsecure the Pakistani nuclear arsenal.* [167]* [168]
Lisa Curtis of The Heritage Foundation giving testimony
before the United States House Foreign Aairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade concluded that preventing Pakistan's nuclear weapons and
technology from falling into the hands of terrorists should
be a top priority for the U.S.* [169] However Pakistan's
government has ridiculed claims that the weapons are not
secure.* [167]
Diplomatic reports published in the United States diplomatic cables leak revealed American and British worries
over a potential threat posed by Islamists. In February
2009 cable from Islamabad, former US Ambassador to
Pakistan Anne W. Patterson saidOur major concern is
not having an Islamic militant steal an entire weapon but
rather the chance someone working in [Pakistani government] facilities could gradually smuggle enough material
out to eventually make a weapon.* [170]
A report published by The Times in early 2010 states
that the United States is training an elite unit to recover
Pakistani nuclear weapons or materials should they be
seized by militants, possibly from within the Pakistani nuclear security organisation. This was done in the context
of growing Anti-Americanism in the Pakistani Armed
Forces, multiple attacks on sensitive installations over the
previous 2 years and rising tensions. According to former
U.S. intelligence ocial Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, U.S. con-

208
cerns are justied because militants have struck at several
Pakistani military facilities and bases since 2007. According to this report, the United States does not know
the locations of all Pakistani nuclear sites and has been
denied access to most of them.* [171] However, during a
visit to Pakistan in January 2010, the U.S. Secretary of
Defense Robert M. Gates denied that the United States
had plans to take over Pakistan's nuclear weapons.* [172]

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
robust regime that includes "multilayered mechanisms
and processes to secure our strategic assets, and have provided maximum transparency on our practices. We have
reassured the international community on this issue over
and over again and our track record since the time our
atomic bomb programme was made overt has been unblemished.* [181]

On 7 September 2013, the U.S. State Department said


Pakistan has a professional and dedicated security force
that fully understands the importance of nuclear security.Pakistan had earlier rejected claims in U.S. media that the Obama Administration was worried about
the safety of Pakistani nuclear weapons, saying the counAccording to Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, a former investigator try has* a professional and robust system to monitor its
with the CIA and the U.S. Department of Energy there is nukes. [182]
a greater possibility of a nuclear meltdown in Pakistan
than anywhere else in the world. The region has more National Security Council
violent extremists than any other, the country is unstable,
and its arsenal of nuclear weapons is expanding.* [174]
Economic Coordination Committee (ECC)
A study by Belfer Center for Science and International
Aairs at Harvard University titled 'Securing the Bomb
2010', found that Pakistan's stockpile faces a greater
threat from Islamic extremists seeking nuclear weapons
than any other nuclear stockpile on earth.* [173]

Nuclear weapons expert David Albright author of 'Peddling Peril' has also expressed concerns that Pakistan's
stockpile may not be secure despite assurances by both
Pakistan and U.S. government. He stated Pakistan has
had many leaks from its program of classied information and sensitive nuclear equipment, and so you have to
worry that it could be acquired in Pakistan,* [175]

Development Control Committee (DCC)


Employment Control Committee (ECC)
Financial Monitoring Unit (FMU)

A 2010 study by the Congressional Research Service ti- Strategic combat commands
tled 'Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Se Air Force Strategic Command (AFSC)
curity Issues' noted that even though Pakistan had taken
several steps to enhance Nuclear security in recent years
Army Strategic Forces Command (ASFC)
'Instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability
of these reforms into question.'* [176]
Naval Strategic Forces Command (NSFC)
In April 2011, IAEA's deputy director general Denis
Flory declared Pakistan's nuclear programme safe and
secure.* [177]* [178] According to the IAEA, Pakistan is 4.20.3 Weapons development agencies
currently contributing more than $1.16 million in IAEA's
Nuclear Security Fund, making Pakistan as 10th largest National Engineering & Scientic Commission
(NESCOM)
contributor.* [179]
In response to a November 2011 article in The Atlantic
written by Jerey Goldberg highlighting concerns about
the safety of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, the
Pakistani Government announced that it would train an
additional 8,000 people to protect the country's nuclear
arsenal. At the same time, the Pakistani Government
also denounced the article. Training will be completed
no later than 2013.* [180]

National Development Complex (NDC), Islamabad


Project Management Organization (PMO), Khanpur
Air Weapon Complex (AWC), Hasanabdal
National Centre for Physics (NCP), Islamabad

Maritime Technologies Complex (MTC), Karachi


Pakistan consistently maintains that it has tightened
the security over the several years.* [181] In 2010, the
Chairman Joint Chiefs General Tariq Majid exhorted to Ministry of Defense Production
the world delegation at the National Defence University
that, World must accept Pakistan as nuclear power. Pakistan Ordnance Factories (POF), Wah
*
[181] While dismissing all the concerns on the safety of
Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC), Kamra
country's nuclear arsenal, General Majid maintains to the
fact: We are shouldering our responsibility with utmost
Defense Science and Technology Organization
vigilance and condence. We have put in place a very
(DESTO), Chattar

4.20. PAKISTAN
Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC)

209
Material Research Division.

Directorate of Technical Development

Quality Control and Assurance Unit.

Directorate of Technical Equipment

Rocket Bodies Manufacturing Unit.

Directorate of Technical Procurement

Solid Composite Propellant Unit.

Directorate of Science & Engineering Services

Liquid Composite Propellant Unit

Institute of Nuclear Power, Islamabad

Space and Atmospheric Research Center (space


Center), Karachi

Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science & Technology


(PINSTECH)
New Laboratories, Rawalpindi

Static Test Unit, Karachi


Tilla Satellite Launch Center, Tilla, Punjab

Pilot Reprocessing Plant


PARR-1 and PARR-2 Nuclear Research Reactors

Ministry of Industries & Production

Center for Nuclear Studies (CNS), Islamabad

State Engineering Corporation (SEC)

Computer Training Center (CTC), Islamabad

Heavy Mechanical Complex Ltd. (HMC)

Nuclear Track Detection Center (Solid State Nuclear Track Detection Center)

Pakistan Steel Mills Limited, Karachi.

Khushab Reactor, Khushab

4.20.4 Delivery systems

Atomic Energy Minerals Centre, Lahore

Land

Hard Rock Division, Peshawar

As of 2011, Pakistan possesses a wide variety of nuclear


capable medium range ballistic missiles with ranges up
to 2500 km.* [183] Pakistan also possesses nuclear tipped
Baghalchur Uranium Mine, Baghalchur
Babur cruise missiles with ranges up to 700 km. In April
Dera Ghazi Khan Uranium Mine, Dera Ghazi Khan 2012, Pakistan launched a Hatf-4 Shaheen-1A, said to
be capable of carrying a nuclear warhead designed to
Issa Khel/Kubul Kel Uranium Mines and Mills, Mi- evade missile-defense systems.* [184] The Babur cruise
missile range can also be extended to 1000 km or more.
anwali
These land-based missiles are controlled by Army StrateMultan Heavy Water Production Facility, Multan, gic Forces Command of Pakistan Army.
Punjab
Pakistan is also believed to be developing tactical nuclear
Uranium Conversion Facility, Islamabad
weapons for use on the battleeld with ranges up to 60
km such as the Nasr missile. According to Jerey Lewis,
Golra Ultracentrifuge Plant, Golra
director of the East Asia Non-proliferation Program at
the Monterey Institute of International Studies, citing a
Sihala Ultracentrifuge Plant, Sihala
Pakistani news article,* [185] Pakistan is developing its
Directorate of Quality Assurance,Islamabad
own equivalent to the Davy Crockett launcher with miniaturised warhead that may be similar to the W54.* [186]
New Labs Nilore,Islamabad

Mineral Sands Program, Karachi

Space and Upper Atmospheric Research Commission


(SUPARCO)
Aerospace Institute, Islamabad.
Computer Center, Karachi.
Control System Laboratories.
Sonmian Satellite Launch Center, Sonmiani Beach.
Instrumentation Laboratories, Karachi.

Air
The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) is believed to have practised "toss-bombing" in the 1980s and 1990s, a method
of launching weapons from ghter-bombers which can
also be used to deliver nuclear warheads. The PAF has
two dedicated units (No. 16 Black Panthers and No. 26
Black Spiders) operating 18 aircraft in each squadron (36
aircraft total) of the JF-17 Thunder, believed to be the
preferred vehicle for delivery of nuclear weapons.* [187]
These units are major part of the Air Force Strategic

210

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

Command, a command responsible for nuclear response. 4.20.5 See also


The PAF also operates a eet of F-16 ghters, of which
Chronology of Pakistan's rocket tests
18 were delivered in 2012 and conrmed by General
Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, are capable of carrying nuclear
Nuclear power in Pakistan
weapons. With a third squadron being raised, this would
bring the total number of dedicated nuclear capable air Pakistan Army
craft to a total of 54.* [188] The PAF also possesses the
Ra'ad air-launched cruise missile which has a range of
Pakistan Navy
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Khan, Feroze Hassan (7 November 2012). Eating


Grass: The making of Pakistan atomic bomb. Stanford, CA, United States,: Stanford Security Studies.
ISBN 978-0804776011.

[187] First Squadron of JF-17 Thunder inducted in PAF.


Associated Press of Pakistan. Retrieved 3 January 2014.

216

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

Sattar, Abdul (1994). Reducing Nuclear Dangers 4.20.8


in South Asia(PDF). The Nonproliferation Review.
Retrieved 11 October 2013.

External links

Rehman, Shahid-ur- (1999). Long Road to Chagai.


Islamabad, Pakistan: Printwise Publications. ISBN
9698500006.
Bhutto, ZA (15 April 1969). The Myth of Independence. Berkeley, CA, US: Oxford University Press,
USA. ISBN 978-0192151674.

4.20.7

References

Bibliography and literature


Rais, Rasul Baksh (25 November 2008).Debating
rst use (asp). Daily Times.
Ganguly, umit; Kapur, S. Paul (2010). India,
Pakistan, and the bomb debating nuclear stability
in South Asia ([Online-Ausg.] ed.). New York:
Columbia University Press. ISBN 0231512821.
Haider, Taj (27 March 2000). CTBT: Security
Perspectives. Dawn (Taj Haider, Karachi University).
Lodhi, Maliha (6 November 2012).Nuclear compulsion. The News Internationa.
Lieven, Anatol. Pakistan a hard country (1st ed.).
New York: PublicAairs. ISBN 1610390237.
Luongo, Kenneth N. (December 2007). Building Condence in nuclear safety in Pakistan(asp).
Arms Control Associations.
Saleem, Farukh. Tipping point. Daily Times.
Retrieved 11 October 2013.
Cohen, Stephen P. (2004). The idea of Pakistan (1.
paperback ed.). Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 0815715021.
Khan, Feroze Hassan (7 November 2012). Eating
Grass: The making of Pakistan atomic bomb. Stanford, CA, United States,: Stanford Security Studies.
ISBN 978-0804776011.
Sattar, Abdul (1994). Reducing Nuclear Dangers
in South Asia(PDF). The Nonproliferation Review.
Retrieved 11 October 2013.

Why He Went Nuclear by Douglas Frantz and


Catherine Collins
Nuclear Files.org Pakistan's nuclear conict with
India- background and the current situation
Defense Export Promotion Organization Ministry
of Defense
Pakistani & Indian Missile Forces (Tarmuk missile mentioned here)
Annotated bibliography on Pakistan's nuclear
weapons from the Alsos Digital Library
The Woodrow Wilson Center's Nuclear Proliferation International History Project The Wilson
Center's Nuclear Proliferation International History
Project contains a collection of primary source documents on Pakistani nuclear development.
THE MAN WHO DESIGNED PAKISTANS
BOMB

4.21 Poland

Poland is not known or believed to possess weapons of


Rehman, Shahid-ur- (1999). Long Road to Chagai. mass destruction. During the Cold War, Soviet nuclear
Islamabad, Pakistan: Printwise Publications. ISBN warheads were stockpiled in Poland and designated to deploy within the People's Army of Poland. Poland was also
9698500006.
working with Russia to help eliminate the large stock Bhutto, ZA (15 April 1969). The Myth of Indepen- piles of chemical and biological weapons developed by
dence. Berkeley, CA, US: Oxford University Press, the Warsaw Pact countries. Poland ratied the Geneva
Protocol on 4 February 1929.
USA. ISBN 978-0192151674.

4.22. ROMANIA

4.21.1

Chemical weapons

217

4.22 Romania

Poland ratied the Chemical Weapons Convention in August of 1995 and did not declare any oensive program
or chemical weapons stockpiles. In 2004 during the G8
Summit, the Polish-Russian agreement in the sphere of
chemical weapons destruction was reached. The chemical weapons agreement will assist Russia in disposing of
its lewisite stockpiles.

In the 1980s, during the rule of Nicolae Ceauescu,


Romania had a secret program intended to develop
nuclear weapons, violating its ratication of the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty from 1970.* [1] The program
was dismantled after the Romanian Revolution and currently, Romania is considered free of weapons of mass
destruction, using nuclear power just for civilian purposes.* [1]

4.21.2

4.22.1 Nuclear program

Biological weapons

Poland ratied the Biological Weapons Convention on 25 While Romania had a nuclear research program since
January 1973 and is not known to have conducted any 1949, for the rst decades, it focused on the usage of raactivity prohibited by the BWC.
dioactive isotopes in medicine and industry. The military program was started in 1978, together with the program for the rst power plant. The WMD research program (Programul Dunrea - Danube Program) was con4.21.3 Nuclear
ducted at the Mgurele Nuclear Research Institute, under
the strict supervision of the Securitate.* [2]
Poland has never possessed nuclear weapons. Formerly,
Poland was part of the Warsaw Pact. This meant that it According to Mihai Blnescu, the former director of
was equipped with aircraft (such as MiG-21, Su-7 and the research institute, the program had three departSu-22), as well as short range ballistic missiles (such as ments: one which dealt with the development of nuclear
R-300 Elbrus, 9K52 Luna-M and OTR-21 Tochka) that weapons, one for the development of medium-range miscould be used to deliver Soviet nuclear weapons. These siles and a third which dealt with chemical and biological
could and probably would be provided in time of war.* [1] weapons.* [2]
Prior to the end of the World War II, the Soviet Union The defection of Securitate general Ion Mihai Pacepa
maintained large amounts of troops on Polish territory. was, according to Lucia Hossu Longin, at least in part
These troops were equipped with nuclear weapons. In related to the order given to him by Ceauescu, to obtain
1991, Poland announced that they would remove the nu- the technology for a certain element needed in the develclear capable delivery systems from their weapons inven- opment of nuclear weapons.* [3]
tory. They decided to keep about 40 of the OTR-21
Tochka systems armed with conventional warheads for In July 1989, the Hungarian Foreign Minister Gyula Horn
self-defense.* [2] These launchers have now been com- accused Romania of posing military threats to Hungary,
pletely retired. In the 1970s there was an idea to develop through its nuclear program and a medium-range missiles
a hydrogen bomb which was kept secret from the Soviet development program. Horn claimed that high-level Romanian ocials announced that Romania is capable of
Union, however it was scrapped very quickly.
building such weapons, but the Romanian Government
denied such claims.* [4]

4.21.4

References

[1] Luczak 1996, pp. 1921.


[2] Kapstein; Ethan B. Kapstein; Michael Mastanduno
(1999). Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies After the Cold War. Columbia University Press. p. 403.
ISBN 0-231-11308-0.

4.21.5

Bibliography

4.22.2 Anti-nuclear rallies


Despite of this secret program, Ceauescu's government
did organize massive rallies against nuclear proliferation.
For instance, at one such rally in December 1981, he addressed a crowd of 300,000 arguing that people in both
East and West should stop those who are preparing
atomic war.* [5] He also urged the US and USSR to
end the arms race which led to the placement of mediumrange nuclear missiles in Europe, arguing that only by
stopping this race could humanity ... be saved from
a catastrophe.* [6]

Luczak, Wojciech (July 1996). Poland's Atomic In 1989, Ceauescu claimed that Romania had the techAdventure. Air International 51 (1): pp. 1821. nology to build nuclear weapons, but that he remained
ISSN 0306-5634.
rmly resolved to ght against nuclear weapons.* [7]

218

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

4.22.3

Deals with other countries

Romania was also involved on the black market of nuclear


technology and materials: after 1989, it was revealed that
in 1986, the Ceauescu Government improperly diverted
a supply of 14 tonnes* [8] of heavy water originating in
Norway to India.* [9] Heavy water is an important ingredient in the creation of nuclear weapons and the shipment
to India was another violation of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty.

4.22.4

After the 1989 Revolution

4.22.7 External links


How to Become a Customer: Lessons from the Nuclear Negotiations between the U.S., Canada and
Romania in the 1960s
http://adevarul.ro/cultura/istorie/
ceausescusi-programul-nuclear-romaniei-1_
510eb9c04b62ed5875d0aaba/index.html

4.23 Russia

According to the Federation of American Scientists, an


organization that assesses nuclear weapon stockpiles, in
2013, Russia possessed an estimated 8,500 total nuclear warheads of which 1,800 were strategically operational.* [2] The organization also claims that the U.S. had
an estimated total 7,700 nuclear warheads of which 1,950
were strategically operational.* [3] Other sources however
say that the U.S. has more nuclear warheads and the actual numbers remain a subject of estimations and ongoing
constant discussion depending on their respective source.
The gures are, by necessity, only estimates becausethe
In 2003, Romania handed over to the IAEA 15 kg of exact number of nuclear weapons in each country's poshighly enriched uranium fuel for the research reactor.* [1] session is a closely held national secret.* [3] In addition to nuclear weapons, Russia declared an arsenal of
39,967 tons of chemical weapons in 1997,* [4] of which
4.22.5 See also
57% have been destroyed.* [5]* [6] The Soviet Union ratied the Geneva Protocol on April 5, 1928 with reser Radu (weapon)
vations. The reservations were later dropped on January
18, 2001. Russia is also party to the Biological Weapons
Convention and the Chemical Weapons Convention. The
4.22.6 References
Soviet Union had a peak stockpile of 45,000 nuclear warheads in 1988.* [7] It is estimated that from 1949 to 1991
[1] Tracking Nuclear Proliferation Romania at PBS, May 2,
the Soviet Union produced approximately 55,000 nuclear
2005
warheads.* [8]
After the 1989 Romanian Revolution, Romania announced the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) that it had 100 mg of plutonium separated
in 1985 at the Piteti Nuclear Research Institute and
it allowed the IAEA full access to its facilities for
inspection and monitoring of other violations of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty.* [1] According to a 1992
article in Nucleonics Week, the plutonium was made
using a TRIGA research reactor, given to Romania by
the United States in the 1970s.* [1]

[2] "'Baietelul' lui Ceausescu, mort in fasa, Evenimentul


Zilei, 10 December 2002
[3] Pacepa a fugit din ar pentru c Ceauescu l-a obligat
s obin un element pentru fabricarea bombei atomice,
spune L. Hossu Longin, Realitatea TV, July 5, 2009
[4] Hungary Accuses Rumania of Military Threats, The New
York Times, July 11, 1989

4.23.1 Nuclear weapons


History
Soviet era

Main article: Soviet atomic bomb project

[5]300,000 in Romania Protest Nuclear Weapons, The


Washington Post, December 6, 1981, p. A19

Post-Soviet era At the dissolution of the Soviet Union


in 1991, Soviet nuclear weapons were deployed in four
[6]End the arms race, Romanian leader says, Pittsburgh of the new republics: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and
Post-Gazette October 16, 1984, p. 12
Kazakhstan. In May 1992, these four states signed the
[7]Romanian Nuclear Claim, San Jose Mercury News, Lisbon Protocol, agreeing to join the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, with Russia the sucApril 16, 1989, Page 19A
cessor to the Soviet Union as a nuclear state, and the other
[8] India is pressed on atom project, New York Times, three states joining as non-nuclear states.
February 12, 1992
[9] Romania Is Reported in Nuclear Deal With India, New
York Times, April 30, 1990

Ukraine agreed to give up its weapons to Russia, in exchange for guarantees of Ukrainian territory from Russia, the UK and the USA, known as the Budapest Mem-

4.23. RUSSIA

219

orandum on Security Assurances. China and France also Nuclear proliferation


made statements in support of the memorandum.* [9]

Nuclear arsenal of Russia


The exact numbers of nuclear warheads remain a subject
of estimations and ongoing constant discussion depending on their respective source. The Federation of American Scientists estimates that Russia possesses 4,650 active nuclear warheads, while the U.S. has 2,468.* [3]
Alexander Khramchikhin, an analyst at the Institute for
Political and Military Analysis said Russia has 3,100 nuclear warheads while the U.S. has some 5,700.* [10] According to 2011 data from the New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Oensive Arms facts sheet,
the United States has the largest number of deployed nuclear weapons in the world, 300 more than Russia.* [11]
Mid-2007 Russia was estimated to have around 3,281 active strategic nuclear warheads in its arsenal.* [12] Russia also has a large number of tactical nuclear weapons,
although there are no treaty requirements for it to publish data on these weapons so the exact numbers are unknown.* [13] An estimate by Hans M. Kristensen and
Robert Norris estimate Russia has approximately 2,000
deployed tactical warheads.* [14] Strategic nuclear forces
of Russia include:* [12]

After the Korean War, the Soviet Union transferred nuclear technology and weapons to the People's Republic
of China as an adversary of the United States and NATO.
According to Ion Mihai Pacepa,Khrushchevs nuclearproliferation process started with Communist China in
April 1955, when the new ruler in the Kremlin consented
to supply Beijing a sample atomic bomb and to help with
its mass production. Subsequently, the Soviet Union built
all the essentials of Chinas new military nuclear industry.* [17]
Russia is one of the ve Nuclear Weapons States
(NWS) under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT), which Russia ratied (as the Soviet Union) in
1968.
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, a
number of Soviet-era nuclear warheads remained on the
territories of Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. Under
the terms of the Lisbon Protocol to the NPT, and following the 1995 Trilateral Agreement between Russia,
Belarus, and the USA, these were transferred to Russia,
leaving Russia as the sole inheritor of the Soviet nuclear
arsenal. It is estimated that the Soviet Union had approximately 45,000 nuclear weapons stockpiled at the time of
its collapse.

The collapse of the Soviet Union allowed for a warm1. Land based Strategic Rocket Forces: 489 missiles
ing of relations with NATO. Fears of a nuclear holocarrying up to 1,788 warheads; they employ immocaust lessened. In September 1997, the former secrebile (silos), like SS-18 Satan, and mobile delivery
tary of the Russian Security Council Alexander Lebed
systems, like SS-27 Topol M.
claimed 100 suitcase sizednuclear weapons were unaccounted for. He said he was attempting to inventory
2. Sea based Strategic Fleet: 12 submarines carrying
the weapons when he was red by President Boris Yeltsin
up to 609 warheads; they should be able to emin October 1996.* [18] In 2005, Sergey Sinchenko, a legploy, in a near future, delivery systems like SS-N-30
islator from the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, said 250 nuBulava.
clear weapons were unaccounted for. When comparing
3. Strategic Aviation: 79 bombers carrying up to 884 documents of nuclear weapons transferred from Ukraine
to weapons received by Russia, there was a 250-weapon
cruise missiles.
discrepancy.* [19] Indeed, several US politicians have expressed worries and promised legislation addressing the
As of July 2009, Russia's strategic arsenal reportedly threat.* [20]
shrunk to 2,723 warheads, including: 367 ICBMs with
In 2002, the United States and Russia agreed to reduce
1,248 warheads, 13 SSBNs with 591 warheads and 76
their stockpiles to not more than 2,200 warheads each in
*
bombers with 884 warheads. [15]
the SORT treaty. In 2003, the US rejected Russian proposals to further reduce each nation's nuclear stockpiles
to 1,500. Russia, in turn, refused to discuss reduction of
Nuclear weapons in Russian military doctrine
tactical nuclear weapons.* [21]
Main article: Military doctrine of Russia

Russia is actively producing and developing new nuclear


weapons. Since 1997 it manufactures Topol-M (SS-27)
According to a Russian military doctrine stated in 2010, ICBMs.
nuclear weapons could be used by Russiain response to There were allegations that Russia contributed to North
the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass de- Korean nuclear program, selling it the equipment for the
struction against it or its allies, and also in case of aggres- safe storage and transportation of nuclear materials.* [22]
sion against Russia with the use of conventional weapons Nevertheless, Russia condemned Korean nuclear tests
when the very existence of the state is threatened.* [16] since then.* [23]

220

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

According to high-ranking Russian SVR defector Sergei Vladimir. These weapons were tested at several faciliTretyakov, a businessman told him that he keeps his own ties most often at Rebirth Island(Vozrozhdeniya) in
nuclear bomb at his dacha outside Moscow.* [24]
the Aral Sea by ring the weapons into the air above monkeys tied to posts, the monkeys would then be monitored
to determine the eects. According to Alibek, although
Nuclear sabotage allegations from Russia
Soviet oensive program was ocially ended in 1992,
Russia may be still involved in the activities prohibited
The highest-ranking GRU defector Stanislav Lunev de- by BWC.* [28]
scribed alleged Soviet plans for using tactical nuclear
In 1993, the story about the Sverdlovsk anthrax leak was
weapons for sabotage against the United States in the
published in Russia. The incident occurred when spores
event of war. He described Soviet-made suitcase nukes
of anthrax were accidentally released from a military faidentied as RA-115s (or RA-115-01s for submersible
cility in the city of Sverdlovsk (formerly, and now again,
weapons) which weigh from fty to sixty pounds. These
Yekaterinburg) 900 miles east of Moscow on April 2,
portable bombs can last for many years if wired to an elec1979. The ensuing outbreak of the disease resulted in
tric source. In case there is a loss of power, there is a
94 people becoming infected, 64 of whom died over a
battery backup. If the battery runs low, the weapon has a
period of six weeks.* [28]
transmitter that sends a coded message either by satellite or directly to a GRU post at a Russian embassy or
consulate..* [25]
Lunev was personally looking for hiding places for
weapons caches in the Shenandoah Valley area.* [25] He
said that it is surprisingly easy to smuggle nuclear
weapons into the USeither across the Mexican border or
using a small transport missile that can slip though undetected when launched from a Russian airplane.* [25] US
Congressman Curt Weldon supported claims by Lunev,
but Weldon said later the FBI discredited Lunev, saying that he exaggerated things.* [26] Searches of the areas identied by Lunev who admits he never planted
any weapons in the US have been conducted, but
law-enforcement ocials have never found such weapons
caches, with or without portable nuclear weaponsin the
US.* [27]

4.23.2

Biological weapons

Main article: Soviet biological weapons program


Soviet program of biological weapons was initially developed by the Ministry of Defense of the Soviet Union (between 1945 and 1973).* [28]
The Soviet Union signed the Biological Weapons Convention on April 10, 1972 and ratied the treaty on
March 26, 1975. However, it subsequently augmented
its biowarfare programs. After 1975, the program of Biological weapons was run primarily by the civilian
Biopreparat agency, although it also included numerous
facilities run by the Soviet Ministry of Defense, Ministry
of Agriculture, Ministry of Chemical Industry, Ministry
of Health, and Soviet Academy of Sciences.* [28]
According to Ken Alibek, who was deputy-director of
Biopreparat, the Soviet biological weapons agency, and
who defected to the USA in 1992, weapons were developed in labs in isolated areas of the Soviet Union including mobilization facilities at Omutininsk, Penza and
Pokrov and research facilities at Moscow, Stirzhi and

4.23.3 Chemical weapons


Russia signed the Chemical Weapons Convention on January 13, 1993, and ratied it on November 5, 1997.
Russia declared an arsenal of 39,967 tons of chemical
weapons in 1997 consisting of:
blister agents: Lewisite, mustard, Lewisite-mustardmix (HL)
nerve agents: Sarin, Soman, VX
Ratication was followed by three years of inaction on
chemical weapons destruction because of the August
1998 Russian nancial crisis.
Russia met its treaty obligations by destroying 1% of its
chemical agents by the Chemical Weapons Convention's
2002 deadline,* [29] but requested technical and nancial assistance and extensions on the deadlines of 2004
and 2007 due to the environmental challenges of chemical disposal. This extension procedure spelled out in the
treaty has been utilized by other countries, including the
United States. The extended deadline for complete destruction (April 2012) was not met.* [5] As of October
2011, Russia has destroyed 57% of its stockpile. Russia also destroyed all of its declared Category 2 (10,616
MTs) and Category 3 chemicals.* [6]
Russia has stored its chemical weapons (or the required
chemicals) which it declared within the CWC at 8 locations: in Gorny (Saratov Oblast) (2.9% of the declared stockpile by mass) and Kambarka (Udmurt Republic) (15.9%) stockpiles already have been destroyed.
In Shchuchye (Kurgan Oblast) (13.6%), Maradykovsky
(Kirov Oblast) (17.4%) and Leonidovka (Penza Oblast)
(17.2%) destruction takes place, while installations are
under construction in Pochep (Bryansk Oblast) (18.8%)
and Kizner (Udmurt Republic) (14.2%).* [4]

4.23. RUSSIA
Novichok agents
Main article: Novichok agent

221

[8] Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Retrieved October


24, 2014.
[9] The Budapest Memorandum and Crimea. VOA. Retrieved October 24, 2014.

In addition to the chemical weapons declared under the


convention, Russia is expected to be in possession of a [10] What the Russian papers say | What Russian papers say |
RIA Novosti
series of nerve agents developed in the 1970s and 1980s,
some of which are one order of magnitude more lethal
[11]U.S. has 'nuclear superiority' over Russia. RIA Novosti.
(based on LD50 exposure testing) than VX (the agent
2011-10-25.
*
with the lowest LD50 in the US arsenal). [30] The agents
are termed Novichok (newcomer) agents.
[12] Russia's nuclear capabilities by Adrian Blomeld,
Telegraph, 5 June 2007

Disposal facilities

[13] Russia prole Nuclear Threat Initiative

Russia has a number of factories for destruction of its


chemical weapons arsenal: Gorny in Saratov Oblast,
Kambarka in Udmurtia, Leonidovka Penza Oblast,
Maradykovsky in Kirov Oblast, Shchuchye in Kurgan
Oblast and the latest one Pochep in the Bryansk Oblast 70
km from the border with Ukraine, built with funds from
Italy in accordance with the agreement signed between
the two countries.* [31]* [32] The last Russian chemical
disposal facility in Kizner, Udmurtia, was opened on December 2013.* [33]

[14] Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris, Russian nuclear


forces, 2012,Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.. Retrieved October 24, 2014.

4.23.4

See also

Father of all bombs


United States and weapons of mass destruction
Nuclear weapons and the United States
List of Russian weaponry makers
Defence industry of Russia
Military doctrine of Russia

4.23.5

References

[1] http://bos.sagepub.com/content/71/3/84.full.pdf
[2] Status of World Nuclear Forces. Federation of American Scientists. July 16, 2009. Retrieved 23 July 2009.
[3] Federation of American Scientists :: Status of World Nuclear Forces
[4] Russia prole. NTI.org. 2009. Retrieved 2010-09-17.
[5] Global Campaign to Destroy Chemical Weapons Passes
60 Percent Mark. OPCW. 8 July 2010 (Accessed 19 August 2010)
[6] Opening Statement by the Director-General to the Conference of the States Parties at its Sixteenth Session.
OPCW. 28 November 2011. Retrieved 1 May 2012.
[7] Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, "Global nuclear
stockpiles, 1945-2006,Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
62, no. 4 (July/August 2006), 64-66.

[15] Russian strategic nuclear forces (November 2009)


[16] Russian military doctrine (in Russian)
[17] Tyrants and the Bomb - by Ion Mihai Pacepa, National
Review, October 17, 2006
[18] Russian Ocials Deny Claims Of Missing Nuclear
Weapons. Retrieved October 24, 2014.
[19] Russian and Ukrainian Ocials Deny New Allegations
That Nuclear Warheads Were Lost in the 1990s
[20] Nuclear Dangers: Fear Increases of Terrorists Getting
Hands on 'Loose' Warheads as Security Slips. October
19, 1997. Retrieved October 24, 2014.
[21] Russia's Nuclear Policy in the 21st Century Environment analysis by Dmitri Trenin, IFRI Proliferation Papers n13,
2005
[22] Russia secretly oered North Korea nuclear technology
- by a Special Correspondent in Pyongyang and Michael
Hirst, Telegraph, September 7, 2006.
[23]Russia expresses serious concern over DPRK nuke issue
. Retrieved October 24, 2014.
[24] Pete Earley,Comrade J: The Untold Secrets of Russia's
Master Spy in America After the End of the Cold War
, Penguin Books, 2007, ISBN 978-0-399-15439-3, pages
114-121.
[25] Stanislav Lunev. Through the Eyes of the Enemy: The Autobiography of Stanislav Lunev, Regnery Publishing, Inc.,
1998. ISBN 0-89526-390-4.
[26] Nicholas Horrock,FBI focusing on portable nuke threat
, UPI (20 December 2001).
[27] Steve Goldstein and Chris Mondics, Some Weldonbacked allegations unconrmed; Among them: A plot to
crash planes into a reactor, and missing suitcase-size Soviet atomic weapons.Philadelphia Inquirer (15 March
2006) A7.

222

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

[28] Alibek, K. and S. Handelman. Biohazard: The Chilling


True Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weapons Program in the World Told from Inside by the Man Who Ran
it. Delta (2000) ISBN 0-385-33496-6
[29] News
[30] Tucker, J. B.; War of Nerves; Anchor Books; New York;
2006; pp 232-233.
[31] ""Russia opens new chemical weapons destruction plant
, RIA Novosti, November 2010. RIA Novosti. Retrieved
October 24, 2014.
[32] ""Italy to help Russia destroy chemical weapons"". RIA
Novosti. Retrieved October 24, 2014.
[33] New Chemical Weapons Destruction Facility Opens at
Kizner in the Russian Federation

4.23.6

External links

4.24 Saudi Arabia

Video archive of the Soviet Union's Nuclear Testing


at sonicbomb.com
Saudi Arabia is not known to have a nuclear weapons
program. From an ocial and public standpoint, Saudi
New Video: A World Without Nuclear Weapons
Arabia has been an opponent of nuclear weapons in the
Middle East, having signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Abolishing Weapons of Mass Destruction: Address- Treaty, and is a member of the coalition of countries
ing Cold War and Other Wartime Legacies in the demanding a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in the Middle
Twenty-First Century By Mikhail S. Gorbachev
East.* [1]* [2] Studies of nuclear proliferation have not
identied Saudi Arabia as a country of concern.* [3]
Russia's Nuclear Policy in the 21st Century Environment - analysis by Dmitri Trenin, IFRI Proliferation However, over the years there have been media reports of
Saudi Arabia's intent to purchase a nuclear weapon from
Papers n13, 2005
an outside source. In 2003, a leaked strategy paper laid
Nuclear Threat Initiative on Russia by National out three possible options for the Saudi government: to
acquire a nuclear deterrent, to ally with and become proJournal
tected by an existing nuclear nation, or to try to reach
UK statement on the chemical weapons convention agreement on having a nuclear-free Middle East. UN
ocials and weapon specialists have suggested this re- Link is not available now
view was prompted by a distancing of relations with the
US, concerns over Iran's nuclear program, and the lack
1999 Nuclear stockpile estimate
of international pressure on Israel to give up its nuclear
*
Nuclear Notebook: Russian nuclear forces, 2006, weapons. [4]
Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April
2006.
Nuclear Files.org Current information on nuclear
4.24.1
stockpiles in Russia

Nuclear program

Chemical Weapons in Russia: History, Ecology, Saudi Arabia has denied manufacturing nuclear weapons
Politics by Lev Fedorov, Moscow, Center of Eco- under its peaceful civilian nuclear program. Saudi Arabia has allegedly funded a military nuclear program and
logical Policy of Russia, 27 July 1994
received scientic assistance from various countries, including the United States and Pakistan. According to
History of the Russian Nuclear Weapons Program
Western media reports, Saudi Arabia also provided funds
for nuclear programs in the Arab world and was behind
The Arsenals of Nuclear Weapons Powers
providing nancial assistance to enable physics experi Nuclear pursuits, 2012
ments necessary for developing nuclear weapons.

4.24. SAUDI ARABIA

223

Nuclear Deal with United States

bia had entered a secret agreement on nuclear cooperation


providing Saudi Arabia with nuclear weapons technology
In May 2008, the United States and Saudi Arabia signed in return for access to cheap oil for Pakistan.* [8]
a memorandum of understanding, as part of the United In March 2006, the German magazine Cicero reported
States' vintage Atoms for Peace program, to boost Saudi that Saudi Arabia had, since 2003, received assistance
eorts for a civilian nuclear program.* [5]
from Pakistan to acquire nuclear missiles and warheads.
Pakistan's involvement

Satellite photos allegedly reveal an underground city with


nuclear silos containing Ghauri rockets in Al-Sulaiyil,
south of the capital Riyadh.* [9] Pakistan has denied aiding Saudi Arabia in its nuclear ambitions.* [10]

Main articles: PakistanSaudi Arabia relations and


Science in Pakistan
Historically, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have had extremely cordial relations which sometimes are described
as a special relationship.* [6] Many of Pakistan's political scientists and historians have stated that Saudi interest in nuclear technology began in the 1970s after Prime
Minister Zulkar Ali Bhutto convened a meeting of Pakistan's leading theoretical physicists (who went on to join
the King Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals), at
which Prime Minister Bhutto pointed out advances made
in the Israeli and the Indian nuclear programme, which
he took as attempts to intimidate the Muslim world, with
the Saudi royal government during a visit by the Saudi
royal family to Pakistan in 1974, as part of the 2nd OIC
conference at Lahore.* [6]

Chinese-Saudi atomic collaboration


Main articles: Sino-Arab relations, People's Republic
of ChinaSaudi Arabia relations and PakistanSaudi
Arabia relations

On January 2012, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao signed


a mutual cooperation deal on nuclear energy with King
Abdullah, during Premier Jiabao's visit to the Middle
East.* [11]* [12] The details of such cooperation were not
fully provided by the government-controlled Saudi Press
Agency, but according to Hashim Yamani, president of
the King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable EnIt is widely believed that Saudi Arabia has been a major - ergy, the kingdom has planned 16 commercial nuclear
*
nancier of Pakistan's own integrated atomic bomb project power reactors by 2030. [13]
since 1974, a programme founded by former prime minister Zulkar Ali Bhutto.* [6]* [7] In the 1980s, Chief
Martial Law Administrator and President General Ziaul-Haq paid a state visit to Saudi Arabia where he unocially told the King that: Our achievements are Saudi nancing of Iraqi nuclear program
yours.* [6] This cooperation was allegedly furthered
by socialist prime minister Benazir Bhutto in 1995. In In 1994, Muhammad Khilewi, second-in-command of
1998, the conservative Prime minister Nawaz Sharif in- the Saudi mission to the United Nations, applied for
formed Saudi Arabia condentially before ordering the asylum in the United States. He provided a packet
nuclear tests (see Chagai-I and Chagai-II) in the Weapon- of 10,000 documents that allegedly described long-time
testing labs-III (WTL) located in the Chagai remote site Saudi support of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program. Acin Balochistan Province of Pakistan.* [6] In June 1998, cording to these documents, during Saddam Hussein's
the Prime Minister paid a farewell visit to King Fahd and regime in Iraq the Saudis supported the Iraqi nuclear
publicly thanked the Saudi government for supporting the program with $5 billion, on the condition that workable
country after the tests.* [6] Shortly thereafter, Saudi Min- nuclear technology and possibly even nuclear weapons
ister of Defense Prince Sultan went with Prime Minis- would be transferred to Saudi Arabia.* [14] Khilewi obter Sharif on a tour of a classied institute, the Kahuta tained asylum in the US, with the consent of Saudi AraResearch Laboratories (KRL), where leading scientist bia. Khilewi's allegations have not been conrmed by
Abdul Qadeer Khan briefed the Prince and Prime Minis- any other source. US ocials have stated that they have
ter Sharif on nuclear physics and sensitive issues involving no evidence of Saudi assistance to Iraqi nuclear developnuclear explosive devices.* [6]
ment.* [15] Saudi ocials denied the allegations.* [2]
Since 1998, the Western's diplomats and intelligence
agencies have long believed that an agreement exists in
which Pakistan would sell Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads
and its own nuclear technology should security in the
Persian Gulf deteriorate. Both countries have sharply
denied the existence of such an agreement.* [7] In 2003,
globalsecurity.org reported that Pakistan and Saudi Ara-

Senior Clinton administration ocials responsible for


Mideast aairs at the time Khilewi sought asylum, including Robert Pelletreau of the State Department and Bruce
Riedel of the National Security Council, said they found
nothing in Khilewi's debriengs to back up the Media reports about a Saudi nuclear program.There was nothing
there,Pelletreau said. (Vartan 2005)

224

4.24.2

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

Nuclear sharing with Arab States of atomic bomb projects and in return has the option to buy
the Persian Gulf nuclear programs ve to six nuclear warheads o the shelf.* [21]

Main article: Nuclear sharing


2013 revelations
The Arab States of the Persian Gulf plan to start their own
joint civilian nuclear program. An agreement in the nal
days of the Bush administration provided for cooperation
between the United Arab Emirates and the United States
of America in which the United States would sell the UAE
nuclear reactors and nuclear fuel. The UAE would, in return, renounce their right to enrich uranium for their civilian nuclear program. At the time of signing, this agreement was touted as a way to reduce risks of nuclear proliferation in the Persian Gulf. However, Mustafa Alani of
the Dubai-based Gulf Research Center stated that, should
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty collapse, nuclear
reactors such as those slated to be sold to the UAE under this agreement could provide the UAE with a path
toward a nuclear weapon, raising the specter of further
nuclear proliferation.* [16] In March 2007, foreign ministers of the six-member Gulf Cooperation Council met
in Saudi Arabia to discuss progress in plans agreed in December 2006, for a joint civilian nuclear program.* [17]

4.24.3

Recent developments

In 2011, Prince Turki al-Faisal, who has served as the


Saudi intelligence chief and as ambassador to the United
States has suggested that the kingdom might consider producing nuclear weapons if it found itself between the
atomic arsenals of Iran and Israel.* [18] In 2012, it was
conrmed that Saudi Arabia would launch its own nuclear weapons program immediately if Iran successfully
developed nuclear weapons. In such an eventuality, Saudi
Arabia would start work on a new ballistic missile platform, purchase nuclear warheads from overseas and aim
to source uranium to develop weapons-grade material.
Ocials in the West believe Saudi Arabia and Pakistan
have an understanding in which Islamabad would supply
the kingdom with warheads if security in the Persian Gulf
was threatened. A Western ocial told The Times that
Riyadh could have the nuclear warheads in a matter of
days of approaching Islamabad. Pakistan's ambassador
to Saudi Arabia, Mohammed Naeem Khan was quoted
as saying that Pakistan considers the security of Saudi
Arabia not just as a diplomatic or an internal matter but
as a personal matter.Naeem also said that the Saudi
leadership considered Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to be
one country. Any threats to Saudi Arabia is also a threat
to Pakistan.* [19] Other vendors were also likely to enter
into a bidding war if Riyadh indicated that it was seeking
nuclear warheads. Both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have
denied the existence of any such agreement.* [20] Western intelligence sources have told The Guardian that the
Saudi monarchy has paid for up to 60% of the Pakistan's

In November 2013, a variety of sources told BBC Newsnight that Saudi Arabia had invested in Pakistani nuclear weapons projects and believes it could obtain nuclear bombs at will. Earlier in the year, a senior NATO
decision maker told Mark Urban, a senior diplomatic and
defense editor, that he had seen intelligence reporting that
nuclear weapons made in Pakistan on behalf of Saudi
Arabia are now sitting ready for delivery. In October
2013, Amos Yadlin, a former head of Israeli military intelligence, told a conference in Sweden that if Iran got
the bomb, the Saudis will not wait one month. They
already paid for the bomb, they will go to Pakistan and
bring what they need to bring.Since 2009, when King
Abdullah of Saudi Arabia warned visiting US special envoy to the Middle East Dennis Ross that if Iran crossed
the threshold, we will get nuclear weapons, the kingdom has sent the Americans numerous signals of its intentions. Gary Samore, who until March 2013 was President
Barack Obama's counter-proliferation adviser, told BBC
Newsnight: I do think that the Saudis believe that they
have some understanding with Pakistan that, in extremis,
they would have claim to acquire nuclear weapons from
Pakistan.* [22]

Response
According to the US based think-tank, the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, the BBC report on
possible nuclear sharing between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia is partially incorrect. There is no indication of the validity or credibility of the BBCs sources, nor does the article expand on what essentially constitutes an unveried
lead. Furthermore, if Pakistan were to transfer nuclear
warheads onto Saudi soil, it is highly unlikely that either
nation would face any international repercussions if both
nations were to follow strict nuclear sharing guidelines
similar to that of NATO.* [23] A research paper produced
by the British House of Commons Defence Select Committee states that as long as current NATO nuclear sharing
arrangements remain in place, NATO states would have
few valid grounds for complaint if such a transfer were to
occur.* [24]

2015
In May 2015, in response to The Sunday Times of London report that the Saudis hadtaken the 'strategic decision' to acquire 'o-the-shelf' atomic weapons from Pakistan,amid growing fears of a nuclear-armed Iran* [25]
a Saudi defense ocial dismissed it as speculation.* [26]

4.24. SAUDI ARABIA

4.24.4

Missile capability

Main article: Royal Saudi Strategic Missile Force


In 1987 it was reported that Saudi Arabia purchased
between 50 and 60 Chinese-made CSS-2 intermediaterange ballistic missiles equipped with a high explosive
warhead, which have a range of 2,800 km with a payload
of either 2,150 or 2,500 kg together with between 10 and
15 transporter erector launchers.* [27] The ballistic missiles are the main weapons of the Royal Saudi Strategic
Missile Force which is a separate branch of Saudi Arabia armed forces. In 2013 the existence of the Royal
Saudi Strategic Missile Force is an ocial information
published in mass-media.* [28]

4.24.5

See also

Nuclear energy in Saudi Arabia

225

[12] Ghazanfar Ali Khan (16 January 2012). Kingdom,


China ink nuclear cooperation pact. The Arab news,
GEO TV, Jang News Group, The News Internationals. Retrieved 11 February 2012.
[13] NTI, Nuclear Threat Initiative. Back to Global Security
Newswire Home About Global Security Newswire Contact Us China, Saudi Arabia Ink Atomic Collaboration
Deal. The NTI. Nuclear Threat Initiative, NTI. Retrieved
11 February 2012.
[14] Saudi Arabia Special Weapons
[15] http://cns.miis.edu/research/wmdme/saudi.htm#1
Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, James
Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
[16] Dareini, Ali Akbar (21 January 2009).US-UAE nuclear
energy pact has messages for Iran. Associated Press. p.
1. Retrieved 10 September 2014.
[17] Saudi defends Gulf Arab atom plans, criticizes Iran | International | Reuters
[18] Saudi Arabia May Seek Nuclear Weapons, Prince Says
. The New York Times. 6 December 2011.

4.24.6

References

[1] Parties to the NPT


[2] Akaki Dvali.
Center for Nonproliferation Studies
(nti.org) (March 2004). Will Saudi Arabia Acquire Nuclear Weapons?; Arnaud de Borchgrave. Washington
Times (22 October 2003)
[3] Oce of Technology Assessment (OTA), US Congress,
Technologies Underlying Weapons of Mass Destruction
(Washington, DC: US Government Printing Oce,
12/93), p. 239
[4] The Guardian (18 September 2003). Saudis consider nuclear bomb
[5] reportonbusiness.com: Purchase this article

[19] http://worldnews.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2012/02/10/
10369793-report-saudi-arabia-to-buy-nukes-if-iran-tests-a-bomb
[20] Saudi Arabia threatens to go nuclear if Iran does. Fox
News. 10 February 2012.
[21] Borger, Julian (11 May 2010). Pakistan's bomb and
Saudi Arabia. The Guardian (London).
[22] Mark Urban (6 November 2013).Saudi nuclear weapons
'on order' from Pakistan. BBC. Retrieved 7 November
2013.
[23] http://poniforum.csis.org/blog/
no-price-is-right-why-the-bbc-is-incorrect-about-a-saudi-arabia-p
[24] The future of NATO and European defence (PDF). Defence Select Committee (Report) (UK Parliament). 4
March 2008: Ev 80. Retrieved 2 April 2015.

[6] Bruce Riedel. Saudi Arabia: Nervously Watching Pakistan: For the Saudi Arabia Kingdom, Pakistan remains
a unique partner. Brookings 1775 Massachusetts Ave,
NW, Washington, DC 20036. Brookings Inc. Retrieved
14 December 2011.

[25] http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/world_news/
Middle_East/article1557090.ece

[7] Tomlinson, Hugh (11 February 2012). Saudi Arabia to


acquire nuclear weapons to counter Iran. The Australian
(originally from The Times. Retrieved 11 February 2012.

[27] http://web.archive.org/web/20080524155801/http:
//www.missilethreat.com/missilesoftheworld/id.3/
missile_detail.asp

[8] Pakistan, Saudi Arabia in secret nuke pact


[9]Saudia [sic] Arabia working on secret nuclear program
with Pakistan help report ", AFX News
[10] "Pakistan rejects report on N-help to Saudis", Daily Times
(Pakistan), (30 March 2006).
[11] Daily star, Reuters (16 January 2012). Saudi Arabia,
China sign nuclear cooperation deal. Daily star, Reuters.
Retrieved 11 February 2012.

[26] http://edition.cnn.com/2015/05/19/world/
saudi-pakistan-nuclear-report/

[28] Arabic:
Student's Graduation at the Strategic
Missile Force Center and Academy. Saudid.com. 10
May 2013. Archived from the original on 2013-11-26.

4.24.7 External links


King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable Energy (Arabic) (K.A.CARE is a city that aims to develop nuclear energy in Saudi Arabia)

226

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

4.25 South Africa


From the 1960s to the 1980s, South Africa pursued
research into weapons of mass destruction, including
nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Six nuclear weapons were assembled.* [2] Before the anticipated changeover to a majority-elected African National
Congress government in the 1990s, the South African
government dismantled all of its nuclear weapons, the
rst nation in the world which voluntarily gave up all nuclear arms it had developed itself.
The country has been a signatory of the Biological
Weapons Convention since 1975, the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons since 1991, and the
Chemical Weapons Convention since 1995.

4.25.1

Nuclear weapons

Spare bomb casings from South Africa's nuclear weapon programme

The Republic of South Africa's ambitions to develop nuclear weapons began in 1948 after giving commission
to South African Atomic Energy Corporation (SAAEC),
the forerunner corporation to oversee nation's uranium
mining and industrial trade.* [1] In 1957, South Africa
reached an understanding with the United States after signing a 50-year collaboration under the U.S.sanctioned programme, the Atoms for Peace.* [1] The
treaty concluded the South African acquisition of a single nuclear research reactor and an accompanying supply of the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) fuel, located in Pelindaba.* [1] In 1965, the American subsidiary,
the Allis-Chalmers Corporation, delivered the 20MW research nuclear reactor, SAFARI-1, along with ~90% HEU
fuel to South African nuclear authority.* [1] In 1967,
South Africa decided to pursue the plutonium capability
and constructed its own reactor, SAFARI-2 reactor also at
Pelindaba, that went critical using 606kg of 2% enriched
uranium fuel, and 5.4 tonnes of heavy water, both supplied by the United States.* [1]

tor's cooling system used molten sodium.* [1] However


in 1969, the project was abandoned by the South African
government because the reactor was draining resources
from the uranium enrichment program that was initiated
in 1967.* [1] South Africa began focusing on the success of its uranium enrichment programme which was
seen by its scientists as easier compared to plutonium.* [1]
South Africa was able to mine uranium ore domestically,
and used aerodynamic nozzle enrichment techniques to
produce weapons-grade material. South Africa is suspected of having received technical assistance from various sources, including assistance from Israel in building its rst nuclear device. In 1969, a pair of senior
South African scientists met with Sltan Mahmoud, a
nuclear engineer from Pakistan based at the University
of Birmingham, to conduct studies, research and independent experiments on uranium enrichment.* [3] The
South African and Pakistani scientists studied the use of
aerodynamic-jet nozzle process to enrich the fuel at the
University of Birmingham, later building their national
programs in the 1970s.* [3] However it is not clear how
much knowledge they gained and to what extent they cooperated.* [3] South Africa gained sucient experience
with the nuclear technology to capitalize on the promotion of the U.S. government's Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE) program.* [1] Finally in 1971, South African
minister of mines Carl de Wet gave approval of the country's own PNE programme with the publicly stated objective of using PNEs in the mining industry. The date when
the South African PNE programme transformed into a
weapons program is a matter of some dispute.* [1]
South Africa developed a small nite deterrence arsenal
of gun-type ssion weapons in the 1980s. Six were constructed and another was under construction at the time
the program ended.* [4]
Testing the rst device
The South African Atomic Energy Board (AEB) selected
a test site in the Kalahari Desert at the Vastrap weapons
range north of Upington. Two test shafts were completed
in 1976 and 1977. One shaft was 385 metres deep, the
other, 216 metres. In 1977, the AEB established its own
high-security weapons research and development facilities at Pelindaba, and during that year the program was
transferred from Somchem to Pelindaba. In mid-1977,
the AEB produced a gun-type devicewithout a highly enriched uranium (HEU) core. Although the Y-Plant was
operating, it had not yet produced enough weapons-grade
uranium for a device. As has happened in programmes
in other nations, the development of the devices had outpaced the production of the ssile material.

Atomic Energy Commission ocials say that a cold


test(a test without uranium-235) was planned for August 1977. An Armscor ocial who was not involved at
The SAFARI-2 reactor was intended to be moderated by the time said that the test would have been a fully instruheavy water, fueled by natural uranium while the reac- mented underground test, with a dummy core. Its major

4.25. SOUTH AFRICA

227

purpose was to test the logistical plans for an actual detonation.


How that test was cancelled has been well publicised.
Soviet intelligence detected test preparations and in early
August alerted the United States; U.S. intelligence conrmed the existence of the test site with an overight
of a Lockheed SR-71 spy plane.* [5] On 28 August, the
Washington Post quoted a U.S. ocial:I'd say we were
99 percent certain that the construction was preparation
for an atomic test.* [6]
RSA-3 3 stage LEO rocket
The Soviet and Western governments were convinced that
South Africa was preparing for a full-scale nuclear test.
During the next two weeks in August, the Western nations pressed South Africa not to test. The French foreign The missiles were to be based on the RSA-3 and RSAminister warned on 22 August of grave consequences 4 launchers that had already been built and tested for
for French-South African relations. Although he did not the South African space programme. According to Al
elaborate, his statement implied that France was willing J Venter author of How South Africa built six atom bombs
to cancel its contract to provide South Africa with the these missiles were incompatible with the available large
Koeberg nuclear power reactors.
South African nuclear warheads, he claims that the RSA
In 1993 Wynand de Villiers said that when the test site series being designed for a 340 kg payload would sugwas exposed, he ordered its immediate shutdown. The gest a warhead of some 200 kg, well beyond SA's
site was abandoned and the holes sealed. One of the best eorts of the late 1980s.Venter's analysis is that
shafts was temporarily reopened in 1988 in preparation the RSA series was intended to display a credible defor another test, which did not take place; the move was livery system combined with a separate nuclear test in
intended to strengthen South Africa's bargaining posi- a nal diplomatic appeal to the world powers in an
intended to be
tion during negotiations to end the war with Angola and emergency even though they were never
*
used
in
a
weaponized
system
together.
[9]
Three rockCuba.* [7]
ets had already been launched into suborbital trajectories in the late 1980s in support of development of the
RSA-3 launched Greensat Orbital Management System
Viable delivery
(for commercial satellite applications of vehicle tracking
and regional planning). Following the decision in 1989
to cancel the nuclear weapons program, the missile programs were allowed to continue until 1992, when military
funding ended, and all ballistic missile work was stopped
by mid-1993. In order to join the Missile Technology
Control Regime the government had to allow American
supervision of the destruction of key facilities applicable
to both the long range missile and the space launch programmes.* [10]
Alleged collaboration with Israel
See also: IsraelSouth Africa Agreement
SAAF Canberra T.4

The warheads were originally congured to be delivered from one of several aircraft types then in service
with the South African Air Force (SAAF), including the
Canberra B12 and the Hawker Siddeley Buccaneer. Concerns about the vulnerability of the aging aircraft to the
Cuban anti-aircraft defence network in Angola subsequently led the SADF to investigate missile-based delivery systems.* [8]

David Albright and Chris McGreal have claimed that


South African projects to develop nuclear weapons during
the 1970s and 1980s were undertaken with some cooperation from Israel.* [11]* [12]* [13] The United Nations Security Council Resolution 418 of 4 November 1977 introduced a mandatory arms embargo against South Africa,
also requiring all states to refrain fromany co-operation
with South Africa in the manufacture and development of
nuclear weapons.* [14]

Main article: Jericho (missile) South African RSA According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, in 1977 Israel
Series
traded 30 grams of tritium for 50 tonnes of South African

228
uranium and in the mid-1980s assisted with the development of the RSA-3 and RSA-4 ballistic missiles, which
are similar to Israeli Shavit and Jericho missiles.* [15]
Also in 1977, according to foreign press reports, it was
suspected that South Africa signed a pact with Israel that
included the transfer of military technology and the manufacture of at least six nuclear bombs.* [16]

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
South Africa ended its nuclear weapons programme in
1989. All the bombs (six constructed and one under construction) were dismantled and South Africa acceded to
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
when South African Ambassador to the United States
Harry Schwarz signed the treaty in 1991. On 19 August
1994, after completing its inspection, the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conrmed that one partially completed and six fully completed nuclear weapons
had been dismantled. As a result, the IAEA was satised that South Africa's nuclear programme had been
converted to peaceful applications. Following this, South
Africa joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as a
full member on 5 April 1995. South Africa played a
leading role in the establishment of the African Nuclear
Weapon Free Zone Treaty (also referred to as the Treaty
of Pelindaba) in 1996, becoming one of the rst members
in 1997. South Africa also signed the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 1996 and ratied it in 1999.

In September 1979, a US Vela satellite detected a double


ash over the Indian Ocean that was suspected, but never
conrmed, to be a nuclear test, despite extensive air sampling by WC-135 aircraft of the United States Air Force.
If the Vela Incident was a nuclear test, South Africa is
one of the countries, possibly in collaboration with Israel,
that is suspected of carrying it out. No ocial conrmation of its being a nuclear test has been made by South
Africa, and expert agencies have disagreed on their assessments. In 1997, South African Deputy Foreign Minister Aziz Pahad stated that South Africa had conducted
a test, but later retracted his statement as being a report
of rumours.* [17]
The Treaty of Pelindaba came into eect on 15 July 2009
*
In February 1994 Commodore Dieter Gerhardt, former once it had been ratied by 28 countries. [25] This treaty
commander of South Africa's Simon's Town naval base requires that parties will not engage in the research, dewho was later convicted of spying for the USSR, was re- velopment, manufacture, stockpiling acquisition, testing,
possession, control or stationing of nuclear explosive deported to have said:
vices in the territory of parties to the treaty and the dumpIn 2000, Gerhardt claimed that Israel agreed in 1974 to ing of radioactive wastes in the African zone by treaty
arm eight Jericho II missiles withspecial warheadsfor parties. The African Commission on Nuclear Energy, in
South Africa.* [20]
order to verify compliance with the treaty, has been es*
In 2010, The Guardian released South African govern- tablished and will be headquartered in South Africa. [26]
ment documents that it alleged conrmed the existence
of Israel's nuclear arsenal. According to The Guardian,
4.25.2 Biological and chemical weapons
the documents were associated with an Israeli oer to
sell South Africa nuclear weapons in 1975.* [21]* [22] IsIn October 1998, the report of the South African Truth
rael categorically denied these allegations and said that
and Reconciliation Commission included a chapter on
the documents do not indicate any oer for a sale of nuProject Coast, a clandestine government chemical and biclear weapons. Israeli President Shimon Peres said that
ological warfare program conducted during the 1980s and
The Guardian article was based on selective interpre1990s. Project Coast started in 1983, ostensibly to protation... and not on concrete facts.* [23] Avner Cohen,
duce equipment for defensive purposes, including masks
author of Israel and the Bomb and the forthcoming The
and protective suits. Despite vehement assertions to the
Worst-Kept Secret: Israel's Bargain with the Bomb, said
contrary, some testimony appeared to show that the proNothing in the documents suggests there was an actual
gramme went well beyond defensive purposes.
oer by Israel to sell nuclear weapons to the regime in
Pretoria.* [24]

4.25.3 See also


Dismantling

African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty

South African forces feared the threat of a "domino effect" in favour of communism, represented in southern
Africa by Cuban proxy forces in Angola and threatening
Namibia. In 1988 South Africa signed the Tripartite Accord with Cuba and Angola, which led to the withdrawal
of South African and Cuban troops from Angola and independence for Namibia. The pre-emptive elimination
of nuclear weapons was expected to make a signicant
contribution toward regional stability and peace, and also
to help restore South Africa's credibility in regional and
international politics.

History of biological warfare


Helikon vortex separation process
Military history of South Africa
Nuclear weapons and Israel
South African Border War
Denel Overberg Test Range
Cold War

4.25. SOUTH AFRICA

4.25.4

Notes

[1] Executive release. South African nuclear bomb. Nuclear Threat Initiatives. Nuclear Threat Initiatives, South
Africa (NTI South Africa). Retrieved 13 March 2012.

229

[19] Proliferation: A ash from the past David Albright, The


Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Nov 1997, pp. 15
[20] Tracking Nuclear Proliferation. PBS Newshour. 2
May 2005.

[2] John Pike. Nuclear Weapons Program South Africa [21] McGreal, Chris (24 May 2010). Revealed: how Israel oered to sell South Africa nuclear weapons. The
. Globalsecurity.org. Retrieved 15 May 2011.
Guardian (UK). Retrieved 24 May 2010.
[3] Chaudhry, PhD (Political science), M.A. Separating Myth from Reality The Uranium Enrichment [22] McGreal, Chris (24 May 2010). The memos and
minutes that conrm Israel's nuclear stockpile. The
programme: Building Kahuta Research Laboratories
Guardian
(UK). Retrieved 24 May 2010.
(KRL)". Professor Mohammad Ali Chaudhry (professor
of Political Science). M.A. Chaudhry's article published [23] Kershner, Isabel (24 May 2010).Israel Denies It Oered
at the The Nation, 1999. Retrieved 5 March 2012.
South Africa Warheads. The New York Times.
[4] South Africa: Nuclear Case Closed?" (PDF). National
Security Archive. 19 December 1993. Retrieved 26 August 2008.

[24] Avner Cohen: Yitzhak Rabin would have opposed sale


of nuclear weapons. The Independent (London). 25 May
2010.

[5] U.S. Military Involvement in Southern Africa. South End


Press. 1978. ISBN 0-89608-041-2.

[25] disarmament.un.org - Pelindaba Treaty - View chronological order by deposit

[6] South Africa and the Aordable Bomb. Bulletin of


the Atomic Scientists. Jul 1994: 41.

[26] African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty. Department of Foreign Aairs, Republic of South Africa. Retrieved 2006-07-28.

[7] Frank V. Pabian.South Africas Nuclear Weapon Program: Lessons For U.S. Non Proliferation Policy(PDF).
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. p. 8.
Retrieved 8 December 2008.
[8] http://books.google.com/books?id=M7wIryQK6UkC&
pg=PA10
[9] http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?
option=com_content&view=article&id=5942:
book-review-how-sa-built-six-atom-bombs-&catid=57:
Book%20Reviews&Itemid=141

[27] Roy E. Horton, USAF Institute for National Security


Studies (1999). Out of (South) Africa: Pretoria's Nuclear
Weapons Experience. Dianne Publishing. p. 17.

4.25.5 References
Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, Miriam Rajkumar. Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and
Chemical Threats. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, 2005.

[10] Jericho
[11] Chris McGreal (7 February 2006). Brothers in arms
Israel's secret pact with Pretoria. The Guardian (London).

4.25.6 External links

[12] South Africa and the aordable bomb (David Albright)


South Africa and the aordable bomb. Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists. August 1994.

Birth and Death of the South African Nuclear


Weapons Programme, Waldo Stumpf, Atomic Energy Corporation of South Africa, October 1995

[13] Unknown author. RSA Nuclear Weapons Program.


Federation of American Scientists.

South Africa and the nuclear option, Marcus Duvenhage, 1998

[14] UNSCR 418 of 4 November 1977: States should refrain


from any co-operation with South Africa in the manufacture and development of nuclear weapons"". United
Nations. Retrieved 15 May 2011.

Out of South Africa: Pretorias Nuclear Weapons


Experience (in pdf), Lt. Col. Roy E. Horton,
ACDIS Occasional Paper, Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security, University of Illinois, August 2000

[15] South Africa: Missile. Nuclear Threat Initiative.


November 2011.
[16] P.W. Botha felt Israel had betrayed him. Jerusalem
Post. 2 November 2006. Retrieved 2 November 2006.

Out of (South) Africa: Pretorias Nuclear Weapons


Experience, Roy E. Horton, USAF Institute for National Security Studies, August 1999

[17] Aziz Pahad's statement and retraction discussed here.


Nuclearweaponarchive.org. Retrieved 15 May 2011.

Nuclear Files.org guide to proliferation South


Africa

[18] South Africa and the aordable bomb, David Albright,


The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Jul 1994, pp 37.

The Nuclear Weapon Archive account of South


Africa

230
Israel conducted nuclear experiment in 1979

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

4.26.1 Background

South Africa's Nuclear Autopsy: The Risk Report,


Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, 1996
Nuclear verication in South Africa, Adolf von
Baeckmann, Gary Dillon and Demetrius Perricos,
IAEA Bulletin Volume 37 Number 1
Annotated bibliography for the South African Nuclear Program from the Alsos Digital Library for
Nuclear Issues
South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Storage Vault
Israel and the South African Bomb
The Woodrow Wilson Center's Nuclear Proliferation International History Project The Wilson
Center's Nuclear Proliferation International History
Project conatins primary source material on South
Africa's nuclear weapons program.

4.26 Sweden
Fronticepiece of an 1946 edition of the Smyth Report, scanned
from original

During the nal phase of World War II, the Swedish Government saw value in the future of nuclear energy, especially the Allied interest in Swedens uranium-containing
black shale deposits. This led to suggestions that Sweden should establish state control over its natural resources, including uranium. Specically, such controls
would include export controls on uranium in collaboration with the American and British governments, exclusive Swedish controls over uranium ore, and a ban on
commercial mining of uranium.* [1]
FOA's old building in Ursvik, Sundbyberg. This building is now
a pre-school.

After World War II, Sweden considered building nuclear


weapons to defend themselves against an oensive assault
from the Soviet Union. From 1945 to 1972* [1] the government ran a clandestine nuclear weapons program
under the guise of civilian defense research at the Swedish
Defence Research Agency (FOA).
By the late 1950s the work had reached the point where
underground testing was feasible. However, at this time
the Riksdag prohibited research and development of nuclear weapons, pledging that research should be done only
for the purpose of defense against nuclear attack. They
reserved the right to continue development of oensive
weapons in the future.
The option to continue development of weapons was
abandoned in 1966, and Sweden's subsequent signing of
the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 began the
wind-down of the program, which nally concluded in
1972.

Through its advisors, including Manne Siegbahn among


others, the government realized the link between its ore
and nuclear weapons. After American Ambassador Hershel Johnson brought up that question in a conversation
with Cabinet Secretary Stig Sahlin on July 27, 1945, the
issue was raised at the government meeting on August 2.
On September 11, Sweden committed itself to establish
state control over mining and export of uranium. Sweden rejected the American suggestion of a right to purchase Swedish uranium as well as a right to veto proposed
Swedish uranium exports.* [2]
The opening of the Cold War and fears of an attack by
the Soviet Union led to increasing interest in Sweden possessing its own nuclear arsenal. They were only interested in tactical nuclear weapons that would be used in
a defensive role on Swedish territory or nearby seas.* [3]
For reasons not directly related to security, Sweden never
considered strategic nuclear weapons that could reach the
Soviet Union. British and U.S. ideas heavily inuenced
the Swedish Defense Forcesdoctrinal thinking at that
time.

4.26. SWEDEN

4.26.2

Early studies

231
tinct from other nuclear weapon programs - traditionally solely state-run.* [8] When the anti-nuclear weapons
movement began to gain inuence during the late 1950s
and became stronger during the 1960s, the connection
between military and civilian nuclear research become
viewed with suspicion.

Physics-oriented defense research started in Sweden during World War II, and drew many outstanding Swedish
physicists to the Military Institute of Physics (MFI)
founded in 1941. Here the focus was on conventional
weapons. In 1945, MFI merged with two other organizations to form the Defense Research Institute (FOA)
in compliance with a 1944 proposal to reorganize the 4.26.4
Swedish defense research.* [4] Research at the FOA was
focused on such things as jet engines, rocket technology,
shaped charge systems, and radars.

Beginning of the nuclear program

In August 1945, just a few days after the Hiroshima


bombing, Swedens Supreme Commander of the Armed
Forces, Helge Jung, made a request via newly appointed research ocer Torsten Schmidt that the recently founded FOA should nd out what was known
about those new weapons.* [5] FOA's rst report to the
Commander-in-Chief in late 1945 was largely based on
the Smyth Report, the ocial US report on Manhattan
project and physics behind it, was published on August
12.* [6]

4.26.3

Connection
between
nuclear
weapons program and civilian
use of nuclear energy

As soon as nuclear bombs became known, both nuclear


weapons and nuclear energy drew signicant attention
in many countries. Immediately after the Smyth Report
came out, discussions around peaceful use of nuclear enSupreme Commander of the Swedish Armed Forces chief Nils
ergy in the US began.
Studies of military and civilian use of nuclear energy started in Sweden even before the end of
1945. In November 1945, the Atomic Committee
(Atomkommitten, AC) was founded. AC was an advisory committee of experts with the mission to work out
a defense plan and outline the alternative pathways for
the development of civilian nuclear program (nuclear energy). In 1947, the government established the atomic
energy company AB Atomenergi, 57 percent owned by
the Government and the remaining 43 percent owned by
a number of private companies active in the mining, steel
and manufacturing industries. The company's task was to
develop civilian nuclear power.* [7]

Swedlund and chief of sta Richard kerman on their rst day


in oce in April 1, 1951

In October 1945, FOA made a request for additional


funding for studies of nuclear weapons. The funding was
eventually granted. Beginning in 1946, Sweden quickly
established a well-organized and well-funded nuclear
weapons research program (under guise of civilian defense research) divided into ve distinct areas: research,
plutonium production, construction funding for reactors
and enrichment facilities, acquisition of delivery systems,
and testing and assembly of nuclear weapons.* [11] The
Department of Nuclear Physics was founded in early
1946 within FOA's department of Physics (FOA 2), and
by mid-1946 there were about 20 FOA-researchers and
similar number of external researchers engaged in research on nuclear weapons or nuclear energy. Sweden
found itself in a favorable position as it was, and still is,
very rich in natural uranium. However, the ore grade is
quite low (mostly shale), and therefore requires extensive mining and milling. The natural uranium was subsequently supposed to be reprocessed and used as a fuel
in the reactors (plutonium recycling).

Even though much of the military research was kept in


secret, it seems that the connection between the military
and civilian projects was initially was not controversial,
and necessary because of the lack of available resources
and expertise. AB Atomenergi had a close relationship
with FOA from the start, and signed a co-operation agreement in 1948. The FOA had already established a research area south of Stockholm (FOA Grindsjoen) that
became the epicentre for military research and development (R&D).* [8] Thus, the Swedish nuclear program In 1947, AB Atomenergi (AE) was founded under iniemerged as a joint government-business venture quite dis- tiative of the Atom Committee with the goal of building

232

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

experimental reactors and developing methods to extract


uranium from low-grade Swedish deposits for both civilian and military needs. Since 1948, a division of functions occurred between FOA and AB Atomenergi. AE
focused on developing methods to separate plutonium
from uranium and ssion products (reprocessing) in order to allow the plutonium to be used as fuel in the reactors (plutonium recycling). This procedure would enable
a more ecient use of the natural uranium.* [12] While
FOA's uranium activities were carried out, a collaboration agreement was drawn up (with nal approval by the
Government in 1950) to make sure that military research
could benet from the recently launched civilian nuclear
activities.* [13]
The actual start of the nuclear weapons program occurred
in 1948. In February, the FOA's board decided to turn
defense research toward work on nuclear weapons, perhaps because of the divisions that occurred between FOA
and AB Atomenergi. Only a few days after the decision,
the Commander-in-Chief, Nils Swedlund, assigned the
FOA to explore possibilities for Sweden to acquire nuclear weapons. The exploration was carried out quickly,
and on May 4, 1948, the report was nalized with Gustaf
Ljunggren (Chief of FOA 1, Department of Chemistry)
and Torsten Magnusson (Chief of FOA 2) as signatories. Central in the investigation was that that they advocated for investing in nuclear weapons based on plutonium rather than on highly enriched uranium (U-235)
since the uranium option turned out to be technically
more dicult. The investigation also included a summarized plan for a Swedish nuclear weapons project with
primary estimates of time and expenses. According to
the report,the time framework was determined by the installation of reactors, mining of the raw material for them
and production of plutonium in the reactors rather than
the construction of the nuclear weapon itself. The contributing factor for this estimate was the misestimated
critical mass of a plutonium pit, believing it to be 2050
kg instead of the actual 6 kg.* [14]

Plutonium ring

Since Norway also initiated a nuclear program, the


Swedes believed they could barter with their neighbor
given the absence of high-quality uranium resources in
Norway. Under secrecy, Sweden purchased ve tons of
heavy water from Norway. Later, they planned to produce heavy water at a plant in Ljungaverk. Acquisition
of graphite was thought to be straightforward. Access to
the required amount of plutonium remained the key technological question throughout the entire Swedish nuclear
weapons program.

Already in Autumn 1948, criticism came out in a joint


statement by AB Atomenergi and Atom Commission.
The FOA reports predicted a military monopoly over
Swedish uranium resources to the detriment of civilian
research, and that much larger resources were being assigned to plutonium production. The feasibility of the
plutonium project was under question. That was the
rst sign of antagonism of interests between military and
civilian nuclear proponents. The plans had been predicated on the idea that each nuclear device required 50 kg
rather than 6 kg of plutonium. None of those involved in
4.26.5 Basic materials
the project realized that this was, in fact, an overestimation. Although the program was scaled to produce 5-10
In order to create the plutonium needed for nuclear
weapons per year, given the estimated production of 1
weapons, the plan was to run heavy water reactors where
kg of Pu-239 per day, it was actually scaled to produce
uranium would be turned into plutonium-239 (Pu-239).
sixty.* [16]
The basic materials needed in large amounts included,
uranium, heavy water, and graphite, materials hard to obtain because of American export controls established to 4.26.6 1950s: The Government favors nuprevent other countries from acquiring nuclear weapons.
clear program
Signicant amounts of uranium existed as admixture in
the Swedish black shale deposits that had already been In the early 1950s, the rivalry between the United States
used during WWII by Swedish shale oil companies to and the USSR accelerated markedly. Nuclear arms proproduce fuel, whose strategic value was rst realized fol- duction proliferation increased as signicantly as the Solowing Allied propositions.* [1] Ranstad was projected to viet Union exploded its rst nuclear bomb in 1949, and in
be a major source of uranium.* [15]
1953, their rst hydrogen bomb. The Korean War broke
Heavy water was primarily thought to be gained from out and the US adopted the strategy of massive retaliaNorway, where the reactors had already been installed. tion following any use of nuclear weapons. This policy

4.26. SWEDEN

233
Ministry and Commander-in-Chief avoided laying out
any concrete plans for nuclear weapons acquisition in
the 1954 report, even Swedens ocial military publications were openly advocating nuclear armament. Although two years earlier, Air Forces Chief Bengt Nordenskild had already advocated for Swedish possession
of nuclear weapons, his comments were understood to be
personal opinion and did not stoke much debate at the
time.* [19]

The R1 nuclear reactor below the Royal Institute of Technology


in Stockholm, Sweden.

The Swedish parliament decided to carry out the heavy


water program aimed at producing reactors loaded with
natural uranium. The program was called den svenska
linjen (the Swedish line), and was one of the largest
Bengt Nordenskild, 1941
industrial projects in Swedish history.* [12] Another feature of the Sweden's nuclear policy was that the program
boosted the strategic value of Scandinavia as a potential remain mostly under state control.
location for strategic bombers within striking distance of TheSwedish lineincluded the following design princithe USSR.
ples: - to use natural uranium as fuel since Sweden had an
In 1952, Air Force Chief Bengt Nordenskild pro- abundant stock of uranium; - to use heavy water instead
posed that Sweden should move beyond the defensive re- of light water as a moderator; - to be able to refuel the
search on nuclear weapons and their eects. FOA re- reactor so that the used fuel can be replaced by the Plutoisotope composition at certain phase of the process.
searched the potential acquisition of nuclear weapons. nium
*
[20]
In 1954, Nils Swedlund, Commander-in-Chief of the
Swedish forces, publicly declared that nuclear weapons
were crucial for the country's national security. The
1954 report discussed new kinds of weapons including
autonomous weapons, electronic warfare, and NBC (Nuclear/Biological/Chemical) weapons. Swedlund wrote in
the preface to the report that Sweden needed protection and countermeasures against those new weapons,
and needed to acquire the most appropriate and feasible ones for Sweden itself.* [17] It was also emphasized
that Sweden's nonaligned status implied that Sweden, unlike neighboring NATO-members, Denmark and Norway, did not benet from any nuclear weapons guarantees from a superpower. In his assessment, Swedens
position between two superpowers and the rapidly changing technological environment, argued for Swedish possession of nuclear weapons.* [18] Although the Defense

The rst Swedish nuclear reactor, R1, was started in 1951


and it was placed in a dug out cavern below Kungliga
Tekniska Hgskolan (the Royal Institute of Technology
in Stockholm). It was a small experimental reactor with
a thermal power of 1 MW. The purpose of R1 was not
to produce power or plutonium but to gain insight into
reactor physics.* [20] Also, the uranium extraction site in
Kvarntorp reached its intended production capacity. In
1953, the Swedish scientists realized that the critical mass
for the plutonium fueled nuclear weapons had been overestimated and the gure was reduced down to 510 kg
in a report by Sigvard Eklund, which meant that the production requirement for plutonium was signicantly less
than it was earlier anticipated. In 1955, FOA concluded
that Sweden would be able to produce nuclear weapons
once it had a plutonium reactor.* [12]

234

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

In 1956 a second reactor, R2, was bought from the United


States under bilateral safeguards. A third reactor, better
known as gesta, was designed as a dual-use facility to
produce electricity and a small amount of plutonium in
a crisis. In 1957, FOA suggested using gesta to produce a small number of weapons quickly. A fourth power
reactor, Marviken, was set to produce larger quantities
of nuclear fuel for an arsenal of 100 weapons. In May
1957, the Supreme Commander gave FOA the task of
carrying out a new study of the possibilities to produce
nuclear weapons focused on the plutonium option.* [12]
Marviken was located approximately 150 km away from
Stockholm. Initially it was designed as 100 MW pressurized heavy water reactor that had a secondary circuit,
where steam is produced from plain water. In the meantime, parallel to the pressurized reactor, a larger and more
complicated design of reactor was under way. The alternative construction included superheating mechanism,
internal reshuing machine, and a complex process of
boiling water, which ultimately complicated design and
raised serious concerns.* [20]
At a Government meeting in November 1955, the question about acquiring nuclear weapons by Sweden was
raised for the rst time. The opposition Conservative
Party called for procurement of nuclear weapons, raising the public salience of the issue. In the 1955 polls,
the majority of the Swedish population, the ruling Social
Democrats, and the armed services voted in favor of a
Sweden armed with nuclear weapons.* [12] The Social
Democrats were ambivalent: the majority was skeptical
about the nuclear weapons program, whereas their leader
and the then Prime Minister Tage Erlander leaned toward
the nuclear option. The split in the ruling party became
public knowledge. In 1956, an anti-nuclear faction of the
party made it clear that they would not support the acquisition of nuclear weapons. As the party's crisis deepened in 1957, the majority of Social Democrats and the
electorate apparently favored going nuclear. In 1957, the
Commander-in-Chief in his report took an ocial position on the acquisition of tactical nuclear weapons by
Sweden. That same year, the FOA (upon the Chief's
request) undertook a detailed study of what would be
needed to develop Swedish plutonium-based nuclear devices with estimates for timeframe and costs. Much was
related to studies of plutonium and its properties, research
that required very complex and highly protected facilities
because of plutonium's many hazards.* [21]

Tage Erlander 1952

clear weapons, but to provide increased funding for defense research in nuclear weapons, and to give the term
nuclear weaponsa very broad interpretation.* [22]

4.26.7 Nuclear resistance begins

The ocial position taken by Swedlund in 1957 brought


the nuclear question into the realm of public policy debates in Sweden. Initially, the center-right politicians and
the media were mostly positive while the social democrats
were largely split. During the events that followed, the
Government tried again to avoid taking an explicit position despite the fact that the defense position was laid out
based on the Swedlund's position from 1957 and tensions
were increasing globally. The pragmatic solution was to sten Undn
not directly invest into the development of Swedish nuThe United States was concerned with the prospect of a

4.26. SWEDEN
nuclear Sweden, which jeopardized the world with further nuclear proliferation. In 1956, the United States
and Sweden signed an agreement on civilian nuclear energy cooperation. The two parties agreed to exchange information regarding the construction, operation and development of research reactors. The Swedish government committed itself to providing the AEC with information regarding nuclear energy developments in Sweden.* [23] The deal also implied that the US nuclear umbrella would protect Sweden, and so there was no need
for any nuclear arms. In May 1956, the National Federation of Social Democratic Women in Sweden took
a stand against nuclear weapons, which heretofore had
not been a major public issue in Sweden.* [24] Swedlund's position became the focal point for an intense debate in the media during 1957. The FOA's chief director, Hugo Larsson, also helped to energize the debate with an interview in Dagens Eko in 1957, in which
he said that Sweden had the resources to build nuclear
weapons, which could be completed in 1963-1964.* [25]
Among the proponents of Swedish nuclear weapons program was Dagens Nyheter's chief editor, Herbert Tingsten, and former Social Democratic Defense Minister
Per Edvin Skld.* [26] Even the prospective leader of the
Liberal People's Party, Per Ahlmark, was an advocate
of Swedish nuclear weapons.* [27] Many of opponents of
Swedish nuclear weapons development were found on the
cultural left. The nuclear weapons issue would appear frequently in the press cultural pages. Meanwhile, among
the opponents were Inga Thorsson, Ernst Wigfors, and
sten Unden. The editor of Folket i bild, Per Anders
Fogelstrm, advocated against Swedish nuclear weapons
in the magazine, and published a book Instead of the
Atomic Bombtogether with Social Democratic student
politician, Roland Morell. In 1957, they launched a petition against Swedish nuclear weapons, that was signed by
95,000 people and was handed over to Tage Erlander in
February 1958.* [24]
The polls from the 1960s also reected a rising public indignation with nuclear weapons program. A grassroot movement - Aktionsgruppen mot svenska atomvapen, AMSA (the Action Group Against Swedish
Atomic Bombs) - was founded in the late 1950s, and
became very successful in its struggle against Swedish
nuclear weapon intentions.* [28] Being a member of the
U.N. Security Council, Sweden advanced a proposal for
a nuclear test moratorium in 1957. The international
disarmament discussions and the nonproliferation norms
emerging from the mid-1950s onwards and leading in
1968 to the NPT also aected the Swedish public debate
and strengthened the arguments against Swedish nuclear
weapons acquisition.* [28]

235

4.26.8 Defense research and design research

In July 1958, the FOA laid out two dierent research programs:* [29] - S-programunder the title Research
for Protection and Defense Against Atomic Weapons.
- L-programentitled Research for Preparation of
Data for the Design of Nuclear Explosive Devices.The
draft of the L-program was in essence an update of the
data collected for the Commander-in-Chief a year earlier.
The S-program, that emerged now for the rst time, was
described as a program to develop the knowledge about
nuclear weapons which required the creation of Swedish
defensive doctrine without nuclear weapons, which would
be adopted to ght a war in which a nuclear strike could
occur. Despite a completely dierent description of the
purpose, the S-program included similar activities as the
L-program, except it was stripped-down to around 75%
of the cost. The S-program t both the Chief's goal to
acquire nuclear weapons and the Social Democratic Government's ambivalence, which the FOA under its new
chief director, Martin Fehrm, had apparently realized.
Thus, with such a proposition, the Government could
fund almost all research activities necessary to pursue the
Swedish nuclear weapons program, yet it asserted not to
do so.
Regardless of the S-program's design, Swedlund decided
to get immediate approval for the L-program. In separate
discussions between the Chief and defense minister Sven
Andersson in Autumn 1958 regarding nuclear weapons
and the budget plan for the coming nancial years, Andersson made it clear that he favored the acquisition of nuclear weapons, but the split within the Social Democrats
was so stark that it was better to not bring up the matter for
discussion. Prime Minister Erlander's view was to study
the question within the committee of the party and to
come up with a proposition by the annual party congress
in 1960. Andersson attempted to persuade the Chief to
not request budgetary resources for the L-program, because they would likely be rejected. Despite Andersson
s suggestions, the Commander-in-Chief instead opted to
include funds for L-program in his scal year 1959/1960
budget proposal. Swedlunds diaries and other documents suggest that he had limited understanding of the
political game, not least within the parties, even though
his own statements in 1957 contributed to the creation of
nuclear weapons resistance. He also believed that many
of the senior politicians would be able to handle the issue
as he desired. His lack of exibility and belief that personal connections would overcome political opposition
ultimately killed his funding request for L-program.* [30]
While the L-program was left unfunded, FOA was given
a large allocation for scal year 1959/1960 forincreased
research in atomic-, missile-, countermeasure-, and other
areasin which the S-program was relevant.* [31]

236

4.26.9

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

Freedom of action and enhanced design. He emphasized, however, that he was uncertain
about the eect it would have on the nuclear weapons
defense research

Olof Palme headed a parliamentary committee on the nuclear


issue.

In November 1958, Tage Erlander convened a party


Atomic Weapons Committee (AWC) where advocates
from both sides and military experts got together. The
Prime Minister was initially inclined to take the pronuclear side, in the meantime he did not want to risk
dividing the party over the nuclear issue. The Social Democrats, who kept losing their electorate, had to
build a coalition with the adamantly anti-nuclear Communists.* [32] Olof Palme was Secretary of the Working
Group on the nuclear issue.

issue and would delay the nal decision on production


until closer to the estimated date of completion in
1963.* [33] Thus, Palme preferred to postpone the crucial decision for years, with the goal of avoiding a serious
split in the party, as opposed to a dicult compromise
necessary to satisfy the desires of both sides for the
long run. The implication of this doctrine meant that
almost any nuclear weapons research could be pursued
under the terms defense researchand freedom
of action, while the Social Democratic leadership
and the government had partially included the nuclear
opponentslines in their public declarations. With the
nuclear opponents essentially co-opted, AMSA's activity
was diminished, and the Swedish peace movement
started focusing primarily on advocating reduction of
nuclear arsenals in the major nuclear powers. When
the government brought up the issue in 1961, Erlander
said that he himself now swung in the negative direction
regarding the nuclear program, as compared to his
views 34 years earlier, which he had never announced
publicly. The decision that was expected to be made in
the coming years remained suspended. The research was
continued and the freedom of action doctrine was intact.
Erlander's scientic adviser, Torsten Gustafson, was
one of those advocating for the continued investment in
research.* [36]

Palme presented his report on November 12, 1959. The 4.26.10


report suggests that Sweden should chose to maintain its
freedom of action, i.e. not to commit to any views in the
issue of nuclear weapons acquisition. As a concession
to the nuclear opponents, Palme suggested to postpone
the nal decision on the acquisition of nuclear weapons.
Freedom of action should be maintained through continued nuclear weapons research and a clear demonstration
to the nuclear weapons supporters that the research would
not imply any real delay as the civil nuclear program had
been pursued in parallel to the military program for several years. The research was not explicitly promoted as
a replacement for L-program, rather it was promoted as
expanded defense research. This report implied that
the drafted 1958 S-program could be continued and in
fact moved even closer to the L-program in scope.* [33]
The leadership of the Social Democratic party adopted
the working group's line on December 14, 1959, so did
the Party Congress in 1960.* [34] The Government Directive to FOA was issued on June 17, 1960.* [35] As a
result, in 1958, the Swedish government prohibited research and development (R&D) of nuclear weapons. Regardless, research activities related to how best to defend
against a nuclear weapons attack were continued.* [32]

The civilian research and nuclear


weapons programs diverge

In talks between Prime Minister Erlander and


Commander-in-Chief Swedlund in 1959, Erlander
conrmed that the program on enhanced defense research would give results with regard to the warhead US President Dwight D. Eisenhower

4.26. SWEDEN

237

Following the 1956 decision regarding Swedens


roadmap towards nuclear power, the civilian nuclear program began to outpace the military nuclear program.
This was in spite of the fact that the Swedish line
was adopted partially to maintain Swedens Freedom
of action with respect to nuclear weapons development.
The two programs diverged for multiple reasons. Although AB Atomenergi was part of the nuclear weapons
program, its primary goal was to develop nuclear reactors suitable for power production, in the process staying
ahead of energy suppliers such as Vattenfall and Asea.
In the early 1950s, Sweden also gained access to American knowledge regarding nuclear technology. American
President Dwight D. Eisenhower launched the Atoms for
Peace program in his speech in December 1953. In 1955, Control room in gesta
the program was followed by the publication of a large
amount of documents at the International Conference on
the Peaceful Use of Atomic Energy in Geneva.
weapons program. For many research purposes, such as
Through this program, Sweden was able to obtain ma- metallurgy, plutonium containing more than 7% Pu-240
terials from America both faster and cheaper than had could be used, although this isotopic mixture could not
it relied on internal production.* [37] However, such ac- be used as weapons-grade plutonium. Plutonium of this
cess required comprehensive assurances that the mate- composition could be obtained relatively easily from the
rials were used only for civil purposes.* [38] On July 1, reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel from civilian reactors.
1955, the rst agreement was signed between Sweden and However, to do so would require explicit violation of the
the United States regarding nuclear material. A second agreed upon safeguards. A prerequisite for such activiagreement on cooperation in civil nuclear research was ties would be conducting the nuclear reprocessing solely
signed on January 18, 1956. As a result, Sweden got ac- in Sweden, although the capacity to do *so did not exist
cess to some previously classied materials, and the op- when reactor R3 was put into operation. [41] Thus, Reportunity to import small amounts of enriched uranium actor R3 was less useful to the nuclear weapons program
and heavy water at prices lower than those from Nor- than it was originally intended.
way. The agreement required guarantees that the ma- As a result, in 1957 the Swedish Government started to
terials would not be used for the production of nuclear study the opportunity to set up and operate one or possiweapons or for any other military purposes.* [39]
bly two purely military reactors for plutonium production
The safeguards that AB Atomenergi issued for the R3 re- located in caverns underground. In July 1958, upon the
actor (gestaverket) in 1957 implied challenges for the study the AB Atomenergi and FOA concluded that a milnuclear weapons program. It was not started up until itary reactor, using aluminum fuel elements and heavy
1963, and was put under bilateral safeguards according water as moderator, would lead to lower costs of producto an April 1958 agreement with the United States be- tion than if they used civil reactors. However, that kind
cause it was to use U.S.-supplied fuel. The main source of reactor would require signicant investments, and belocation, it would take
was supposed to be the Marviken reactor. However, Mar- cause of its proposed underground
*
4.5
years
to
build
the
reactor.
[42]
The decreased civilviken's reactor design was found to be poor and work was
*
ian
interest
in
domestic
supply
of
raw
materials resulted
abandoned in 1970. [40] From 1959 onwards, Swedish
in
revision
of
plans
to
build
nuclear
weapons
facilities in
interest in pursuing a uranium mill at Ranstad (the conSweden
in
1959
and
1960.
However,
now
they
required
struction of which was decided in 1958 and scheduled to
a
uranium
facility,
heavy
water
reactor,
and
reprocessing
open in 1963) and a domestic supply of heavy water deThis led to a sharp
clined. The idea of domestic supply of nuclear fuel and plant to be able to supply plutonium.
*
[41]
These facilities
increase
in
time
and
cost
estimates.
other strategic materials was thus gradually abandoned
were
included
in
none
of
the
1958
drafts,
neither in the
and the Swedish contribution tothe Swedish linecame
Snor
Lprograms.
Thus
their
funding
was
not included
to be limited down to the design and construction of nu*
in
the
program
for
extended
defense
research
approved
clear reactors. [41]
by the Government. The Ministry of Defense and FOA's
assessment of the situation in 1961 concluded that it was
solely plutonium supply that was the limiting factor* [35]
4.26.11 Plutonium problem
for the nuclear weapons program. From 1961 onwards,
As the civilian nuclear program pursued energy, the the Ministry of Defense announced that the program's
problem of getting access to plutonium, for both re- schedule was postponed for this reason.* [43] The only
search and subsequent production of nuclear weapons, plutonium that ever existed in Sweden was 100 grams reloomed as the biggest technical problem for the nuclear ceived from the United Kingdom for research purposes.

238

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

After Sweden gave up the idea of domestic plutonium


production, the work was handed over to the Institute of
Atom Energy (IFA) in Kjeller, Norway.* [44]

4.26.12

Pondering over purchases of nuclear material from the United


States

W48

MGR-1 Honest John

In 1954, when the Commander-in-Chief advocated for


Swedish nuclear weapons, internal production was not
the only option considered. An agreement with Western powers that would quickly come to Swedens aid, or
a purchase of a small number of nuclear weapons from
the West, most likely the US, were options also considered. The latter option appeared to be the best from both
time and cost perspective, as far as it was possible. After
1954, the Swedish Government made inroads regarding
the possibility of purchasing nuclear weapons from the
US. The Swedish Government knew that American legislation forbid such exports but they hoped to be favorably
treated, regardless of the fact that they were not a NATO
member-state. The Swedish Government believed the US
would be interested in a well-defended Sweden as a bulwark against Soviet aggression.* [44]
FOA's Torsten Magnusson met with the American envoy
Howard A. Robinson in November 1954, and Malte Jacobsson from the Atom Committee talked to Counter Admiral Lewis Strauss from Atomic Energy Commission in
April 1955. Sweden indicated that it would be interested
in purchasing approximately 25 nuclear devices.* [44] In
1957, Ambassador Erik Boheman raised the question at
the US State Department, while the Swedish Ministry
of Defense inquired about sending Swedish ocers to
train on the use of nuclear weapons. Boheman also mentioned that Denmark and Norway had already purchased
weapons systems that could carry nuclear warheads, although neither country had devices to deploy on such systems. The American response was dismissive because
Sweden, as a non-NATO state, did not have any mutual

defense agreement with the US, which was a requirement


in American law to even consider nuclear weapons cooperation. The message was clear - if Sweden reconsidered its nonalignment policy, the US would consider a
new request from Sweden, otherwise discussions would
be fruitless. Analysis from the US State Department in
1959, showed that Sweden did not have to be a NATOmember for the proposed nuclear weapons sales, but it
had to, at the very minimum, have an agreement with the
US regarding use of nuclear weapons, which would imply Sweden renouncing nonalignment. On April 6, 1960,
the US National Security Council decided that the Americans should not support the Swedish ownership of nuclear
weapons, nor did it approve of the idea of a Swedish nuclear weapons program. The US Government believed
that Western interests would be best served against the
Soviet Union if Sweden invested its limited resources in
conventional weapons, rather than an expensive nuclear
weapons program.* [45]
In 1960, while Sweden was deciding on its stance toward nuclear weapons, Swedish representatives, through
their contacts with the American Department of Defense gained access to some secret information in the
late 1960s. This information included nuclear weapons
tactics, reconnaissance requirements, ideas regarding the
necessity of quick decision-making, and nuclear physics
data.* [46] Swedish representatives also looked at the
MGR-1 Honest John weapons system that could utilize
W7 or W31 nuclear warheads. For artillery purposes, the
US developed a W48 projectile for 155 mm artillery with
0.072 kiloton eect. Any plans for such a small Swedish
nuclear device have never been recovered.

4.26.13 Planned nuclear devices


The planned Swedish bombs intended to utilize Pu-239
as the ssile material. When the early drafts (circa 1955)
were replaced by the more concrete estimates a proposed
design, one of the rst drafts was a bomb weighing 400
500 kg and 35 cm in diameter. A bomb of those di-

4.26. SWEDEN

239

Schematic design of a 1956 Swedish atomic bomb (which was


never built)

mensions could have been carried by the A 32 Lansen.


A study conducted by the nuclear explosive group in
1961-1962 outlined a plan to acquire 100 tactical nuclear Bandkanon 1
bombs with approximate yields of 20 kt.* [47]
aircraft.* [49] From 1957 to 1959, Saab developed Robot
330, a land attack missile with 500 km range, which was
4.26.14 Planned delivery systems
designed to carry nuclear warheads.* [50] The project was
shut down due to excessive costs.

A Saab 32 Lansen at Kristianstad Airshow 2006

In military studies concerning the deployment of nuclear


weapons, Swedish plans focused on bombs dropped by
ground-attack aircraft. The Swedes planned to have a
relatively small number of tactical nuclear weapons; the
Saab 36 bomber was supposed to be able to carry an 800
kg free falling nuclear weapon, but the plans for the it
were cancelled in 1957.* [48] Thus, it was Air Force's
most modern ghter-bomber that was intended to carry
nuclear weapons as well as other weaponry. Had the program followed its original schedule, the Saab A32 Lansen
would have been the relevant platform. According to the
revised schedule in which nuclear weapons would have
appeared rst in the 1970s, the AJ 37 Viggen would have
also been relevant.
The studies of nuclear payloads also briey discussed
the possibility of using land-based missiles with a range
of about 100 km, as well as nuclear-armed torpedoes.
The most likely conguration would have been Sjormenclass submarine ring modied Torped 61 torpedoes.
Little else is known about these alternative plans, since the
Swedish program focused mainly on bombs dropped by

Some other types of weapons outlined and developed


during the 1950 60s were designed as carriers for nuclear weapons among them, the Saab A36, a strategic bomber, Bandkanon 1, a 155 mm artillery piece,
and Robot 08, an anti-ship missile. These claims have
been circulating since the times when the defense studies were still classied. There were certainly rst drafts
concerning the physical shape of Swedish nuclear weapon
when the Saab A36 was under development, but the
project A36 was soon abandoned in favor of the Saab AJ
37 Viggen when the rst detailed military (rather than
merely physical or technical) studies were conducted in
196162. Thus, even if the A36 was not designed to be
an integral part of the nuclear weapons program itself, it
was constructed specically as a nuclear weapons carrier.
A36 pilots were to specialize in this task.* [51]
As for Robot 08, the previously classied documents
provide no support for the claim that something other
than aerial bombs would have been prioritized. Nucleararmed anti-ship missiles (as the RBS-15 is believed to
have such a non-conventional option capablity), as well as
nuclear-armed torpedoes, would primarily have been targeted at naval transportation. However, the study of nuclear devices came to the conclusion that a bomb dropped
in the home port would have the greatest impact. At sea,
naval eets would be dispersed to reduce casualties from
nuclear attack.* [49] Statements about plans on nuclear
ammunition for 155 mm Swedish artillery greater than 25
km range should be viewed with even greater skepticism.
Since the US developed nuclear ammunition for its 155
mm artillery and the USSR developed ammunition for
its 152 mm, certainly a Swedish device was technically
possible. The only American type of device of this calibre that was actually completed, W48, had only a 72 ton
yield even though it required as much plutonium as a signicantly higher yielding device. Explosives with greater
eect were primarily used in artillery with 203 mm and

240

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

280 mm barrels. These artillery projectiles used a dierent design principal, linear implosion instead of a traditional spherical implosion bomb. Such designs sacriced
eciency and yield to reduce the payloads diameter.
Since Swedens plutonium supply was always a limiting
factor in its nuclear program, and cost-eectiveness was a
concern, it is unlikely that Sweden would have sacriced
multiple aerial bombs to build one battleeld device, especially when taking into account the reduced yield and
additional development expenses.

4.26.15

Intended employment of nuclear


weapons

conventional forces.* [52] In order to prevent the elimination of nuclear striking ability by a surprise attack, the
Swedish Government outlined a system where the majority of warheads would be stored divided amongst heavily
defended caverns, and the rest would move between airbases. These plans were named as Ahasverus system
and can be compared to the idea of second-strike capability.* [53]

4.26.16 The shift in opinion at the ministry


of defense

Saab JA 37 37447 Swedish Air Force

Harbour and shipyard in Gdask - were considered as a potential


target on the Baltic Sea

After the ardent nuclear advocate Nils Swedlund retired and turned the post of Commander-in-Chief over to
Torsten Rapp, some ocials in the Ministry of Defense
began to express doubts regarding the nuclear weapons
program. This can be understood in light of delays caused
by plutonium enrichment challenges and growing cost estimates. The rst skeptical views came from the Air
Force and were announced in 1961 by Air Chief of Sta
Stig Norn to his counterparts in other branches of the
military and to the elected Defense Chief of Sta, Carl
Eric Almgren in connection with the preparation work for
the 1962 report. As result, a special working group, the
nuclear explosive group, was formed under the leadership
of Colonel ke Mangrd. This group worked from June
1961 until February 1962 and conducted comprehensive
analyses of the consequences and the military value of
possession of nuclear weapons. Through inuence of the
Air Force, the 1962 report expressed a more ambivalent
position towards nuclear weapons than the 1957 report,
though it was still largely positive.* [54]

From the beginning, the Swedes dismissed the opportunity to acquire their own strategic nuclear forces that
could reach an adversary's major population centers, because Sweden had no strategic bombers. Instead, the
Swedish Government sought to develop tactical nuclear
weapons to be used against militarily signicant targets
in Sweden's neighboring countries, in the event of war.
The prime example of such a target could be enemy ports
on the Baltic Sea, another such target could be enemy air
bases.* [47] As most ports were located in close proximity to civilian population centers, they too would suer if
Swedish nuclear weapons were used. With this in mind,
the Ministry of Defense arrived at the conclusion that any
such use would have major political consequences, even It may seem paradoxical that the Air Force changed opinif the device employed was a tactical rather than strategic ion on nuclear weapons given the expansion of the relnuclear weapon.* [47]
ative importance of the US Air Force following AmerThe Swedish Government intended to possess tactical ica's adoption of nuclear weapons.* [55] At the time, hownuclear weapons primarily as a deterrent against attacks ever, the Air Force was facing an expensive acquisition of
on Sweden. Assuming the aggressor was not deterred, the Saab 37 Viggen, and feared that a full-scale nuclear
they would have been forced to make signicant tacti- weapons program would compete with it for resources.
cal adjustments due to the risk of being subject to nu- One of the points that Norn wanted to investigate was
clear attack. Much of the tactical adjustments would have what conventional forces Sweden could acquire if it delargely been the commitment of a larger amount of time cided not to develop nuclear weapons. It should be noted
and resources to the attack. In this respect, the posses- that it was the plan that the United States suggested Swesion of nuclear weapons would help to restore balance of den to follow in 1960.* [56] However, it remains unclear

4.26. SWEDEN

241

whether or not this suggestion inuenced Swedens de- 4.26.18


fense ocials.
The rumor that Swedlund was replaced by an Air Force
ocer sometimes arises given that the Ministry of
Defense chose to prioritize new aircraft over nuclear
weapons. Some have pointed out that the increase in exibility was likely due to replacing Swedlund with somebody new, as his successor did not have a strong opinion one way or the other.* [54] In the 1965 report, the
Commander-in-Chief took another step away from assuming a nuclear armed Sweden. Although they were
still advocating for Swedish nuclear weapons in general
terms, they were no longer emphasized in defense planning. They felt that there was an imminent risk that
Swedish nuclear possession would be prohibited as a result of the ongoing disarmament negotiations. The report
also looked favorably on the notion of defending Sweden
with modern conventional forces as they now embraced
the Margin Doctrine. The Margin Doctrine assumed that
an invasion of Sweden would not occur in isolation, but
rather as a part of a major conict; in such a situation, a
large power (e.g. the USSR) would be unlikely to deploy
its full military forces against Sweden.* [57]

The end of nuclear weapons program and Swedish disarmament


policy

In the late 1950s, Swedish Minister for Foreign Aairs


sten Undn advocated for the nuclear test ban treaty
in the UN.* [61] Since 1962 Sweden has been actively
involved in the international disarmament negotiations.
Once the decision to cease oensive nuclear weapons research activities was made, the Swedish government was
seeking to create an international legal framework to regulate nuclear weapons related research and activities. On
4 December 1961, the UN General Assembly, based on a
Swedish initiative, adopted Resolution 1664 (XVI). The
resolution called on the UN Secretary-General to investigate the circumstances under which non-nuclear weapon
states would give up the nuclear option.* [62]

In March 1962, Sweden joined seven other neutral countries, members of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament
Committee, a predecessor to the Conference on Disarmament (CD). In 1968, Sweden signed the Nuclear nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and thereby publicly committed itself against acquisition of nuclear weapons. Shortly
after joining the NPT, Sweden became a founding member of the Zangger Committee, which was designed to
work out the exact denitions of the material and equipment to be restricted by the NPT. The Committee drafted
aTrigger Listofsource or special ssionable materialsand equipment or materials especially designed or
prepared for the processing, use, or production of ssile
4.26.17 The 1980 referendum
materials.* [63] In continuation, Sweden has occupied
an active position in generating of new agreements that
would control the export of the listed items to non-NPT
The debate among the major Swedish political parties states. These agreements and Trigger List have subseover the nuclear program had been intensied throughout quently constituted the rst major agreement on nuclear
the 1970s. In 1973, the ruling Center Party declared that export regulations.* [64]
it was against Sweden's nuclear power program, thereby
letting the coalition government to become a leader in The negotiations between the Soviet Union, Great
the anti-nuclear movement aimed at the program's com- Britain, and the US in August 1962 ended in an agreeplete elimination. The Three Mile Island accident in the ment to abandon all nuclear weapons tests in the atmoUnited States in 1979 undermined public condence in sphere, outer space, and underwater. Leaders of other
the safety of Sweden's nuclear program. The afore men- states were also encouraged to sign the treaty, which came
tioned political and societal divisions over the Swedish as a surprise to Sweden. After a brief time for consideranuclear program led to a referendum on the subject held tion, the Swedish government decided sign the Treaty dein 1980.* [58] The referendum was of a non-binding, spite their Freedom of action doctrine. In the meantime,
tests thus
advisorynature and there was no option to vote in fa- the Treaty did not prohibit underground nuclear
*
[65]
the
Freedom
of
action
could
be
maintained.
vor of nuclear energy. The referendum's result heavily
favored option two, 39.1 percent of the votes, and option After the CTBT entered into force in 1963, the FOA
three, 38.7 percent of the votes, with option three receiv- was assigned to build a seismographic complex to moning 18.9 percent of the 4.7 million votes cast, representing itor the compliance with the treaty. The Swedish nea 75.7 percent voter turnout.* [59] The 1980 referendum gotiators were quiet on the question of non-proliferation
induced the Swedish parliament to decide that Sweden's for years, particularly in view of the Swedish freedom
nuclear power program should bephased-outby 2010 of action doctrine. Until 1965, there was an ocial diand no further nuclear power plants should be built. That rective to not raise the issue. The situation changed in
decision made Sweden to be the rst out of ve countries early 1966. In March 1966, Undersecretary of the Dethat have approved a national nuclear phase-out policy: fense Department Karl Frithiofson in his speech before
the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences publicly
Belgium, Germany, Italy, and Spain.* [60]

242

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

announced that it was of no interest to Sweden to acquire Karl Frithiofson in his speech in March 1966 announced
nuclear weapons, which was a slight dierence from the that Sweden gave up its plans to acquire nuclear weapons,
Freedom of action doctrine.* [66]
which in its turn put the end to the freedom of action doctrine. In 1968, the doctrine was turned into defense investigation, and with the signature of the NPT in 1968 FOA
of dismantling of nuclear-weapons re4.26.19 Reasons to abandon nuclear pro- began the process
lated research.* [66]

gram

Firstly, it appeared increasingly problematic to nd room


for a nuclear weapons program in the defense economy;
secondly, the situation was proving that future wars would
be likely waged with conventional weapons (especially,
after studying the NATO's exible response doctrine);
thirdly, it was decided (yet unclear how) that Sweden was
covered by the US nuclear umbrella.* [67] Just before the
Government's position became known, the Defense Ministry announced that Sweden's security would be undermined if the country joined the non-proliferation agreement, because the treaty addressed small countries that
hadn't acquired any nuclear weapons yet, while the US
and the Soviet Union's nuclear possessions remained untouched. Thus, Sweden was under risk to yield its Freedom of action to nothing in return, while the nuclear
threat against the country would remain.* [66]
The United States was not particularly in favor of a nuclear Sweden. The cooperation agreement between Sweden and the United States, that established bilateral safeguards for Swedish nuclear installations, forbade Sweden from using equipment and materials to develop nuclear weapons. In the meantime, the use of U.S. uranium
would mean accepting inspection requirements, which
would prevent the uranium in question from being used
for weapons production. The more Swedens research in
nuclear weapons was becoming dependent on U.S. military assistance, the more the United States was willing to
steer Sweden away from implementing its plans to create
a nuclear weapon.* [68]
Finally, Swedish politicians and diplomats across party
lines have been very outspoken about nonproliferation
and disarmament. The most well-known individuals include Dr. Hans Blix, Rolf Ekeus, and Henrik Salander, who have chaired, or currently chair, the United Nations Monitoring, Verication and Inspection Commission, the United Nations Special Commission, and the
Middle Powers Initiative, respectively. Additionally, the
late Anna Lindh, Sweden's former minister for foreign affairs, took the lead in promotion of non-proliferation policy, which eventually aected the European Union's strategy to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Lindh also instigated the International
WMD Commission, chaired by Blix, which in 2006 released its study, which oers over 60 recommendations
on how to reduce the threat posed by WMD.* [68] The negotiations resulted in the non-proliferation treaty, which
was ready for signature in 1968. Sweden signed the treaty
on 19 August 1968, immediately after West Germany had
done the same.* [69]

4.26.20 Disarmament of Swedish nuclear


sites
The roll-up of FOA's nuclear weapons research started
in 1967 while the shift to another defense research direction (conventional weapons-related) occurred. From
1968 onward, the remained nuclear weapons-related research focused on security issues, whereas the activities
directly related to the nuclear program were completed
in 1972. The plutonium laboratory in Ursvik was shut
down.* [70]
Reactor R2 went critical in 1960. In 1963, FOA halted
criticality experiments, and by July 1972, even theoretical research using its acquired plutonium was shut down.
Earlier, primarily due to cost, Sweden opted to use U.S.designed light water reactors using important uranium
in lieu of heavy water reactors operating on indigenous
uranium. Also, the Swedish supreme commander announced that the country abandoned the nuclear option
in 1965. Another key event was an electrical problem at
the gesta that jeopardized the reactors cooling system.
Although a meltdown was averted, the Swedish government was informed. The public, however, was kept in the
dark until 1993, as the government was afraid that such
a disclosure would endanger public support for nuclear
energy.* [60] The year 1974 also marked the nal disassembly of all plutonium facilities and a reorganization of
FOA that dispersed its nuclear expertise. The gesta reactor was permanently shut down. Vattenfall, the contractor responsible for the Marviken reactor, became increasingly skeptical of the projects chances for success. Two
key areas were mentioned: the idea of using superheated
water and the reshuing machine. Additionally, it became apparent that the plant would not satisfy the safety
standards established by the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission in the late 1960s. By 1969, the plans to build a
superheated reactor were scrapped.* [20]
The rst commercial nuclear power plant Oskarshamn 1
was commissioned in 1972 and was followed by another
eleven units sited at Barsebck, Oskarshamn Ringhals and
Forsmark in the time period up to 1985. The twelve
commercial reactors constructed in Sweden comprise 9
BWRs (ASEA-ATOM design) and 3 PWRs (Westinghouse design).* [71] In 2004, Studsvik Nuclear (an institute established in 1958 for the Swedish nuclear program
with research reactors) decided to permanently shut down
the two research reactors (R2 and R20) at the Studsvik
site. They were closed in June 2005. The decision was

4.26. SWEDEN
taken on economical grounds, the licenses had recently
been extended until 2014, subject to certain conditions.
The reactors were mainly used for commercial materials testing purposes, isotope production, neutron source
for research purposes, medical applications and higher
education. They are currently under decommissioning.
*
[72] Foreign observers judged that Swedish nuclear capabilities reached a very advanced level and that, at the
end of its nuclear program, Sweden was technically capable of building a nuclear weapon within a short time.* [73]

4.26.21

After the nuclear weapons program: defense research and support for disarmament

Nuclear weapons related activity, however, continued at


FOA even after the dismantling was completed in 1972,
but to a much lesser extent. Resources in 1972 amounted
about the third of the stock in 1964-1965.* [70] Actual
defense research on nuclear weapons eects continued.
It did not include design research or any part of the Freedom of action doctrine. Paradoxically, that part of the
nuclear research was given a low priority because defense researchwas merely a politically correct name.
The remaining technical expertise in construction of nuclear weapons was later utilized in dierent disarmament
contexts.

243
By 1984, Sweden had signed and ratied the Antarctic
Treaty. The Treaty was established in 1961 to ban all
military activity in Antarctica. The Antarctic Treaty was
not, however, the rstnonarmamenttreaty that Sweden
signed. Previously it had participated in the establishment
of the Outer Space Treaty in 1967, which restricts the
placement of nuclear weapons or other types of weapons
of mass destruction in space.* [32] The 1986 Chernobyl
nuclear disaster evoked fears of radiation and safety. As a
reaction to it, the Social Democratic-led Swedish government set 1995/1996 as years to start the implementation
of a phase-out plan, including the shut-down of two nuclear reactors.* [76] Additionally, in 1999 and 2005 two
other nuclear reactors (Barsebck I and Barsebck II, respectively) were closed. In 1992, in order to improve
safety of Russian nuclear power plants, Sweden started
cooperating with Russia on nuclear safety, radiation protection, nonproliferation, and proper nuclear waste management.* [77]

Sweden has also been an active participant at various international nonproliferation and disarmament meetings
throughout the years. In 1998, Sweden was a founding
member of the "New Agenda Coalition" (NAC). NAC
called on the nuclear weapon states to commit to their disarmament obligations under Article VI of the NPT. At
the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the NAC proposed
the13 Stepsthereby breaking the meeting's deadlock.
The13 Stepsprovided a series of steps to meet the disarmament obligations contained in Article VI.* [32] Regarding the challenges of the phasing-out of nuclear en4.26.22 Sweden and non-proliferation ergy in Sweden, the International Energy Agency's (IEA)
movement
2004 review of Swedish energy policies called on Sweden to consider the costs of replacing nuclear power and
In 1974, a multilateral export control regime - the the potential implications for energy security, greenhouse
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) - was created as a suc- gas emissions, and economic growth.* [78]
cessor to the Zangger Committee. The NSG established
general guidelines on nuclear transfers and dual-use tech- However, regardless of potential risks associated with
nologies to further restrict the management of nuclear nuclear plants, the IEA's 2004 and 2008 reviews of
exports. Sweden as well as seven other states (Belgium, Swedish energy policy elicited that abolishing nuclear enCzechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Italy, ergy would be very dicult, as around 45% of electricthe Netherlands, Poland, and Switzerland), joined the ity in Sweden originates from nuclear power. It also assumed that in the post-Kyoto period targets for reducing
NSG between 1976 and 1977.* [32]
greenhouse gas emissions would be stricter.* [79] In the
In 1980, Prime Minister Olof Palme established the In- meantime, with years public opinion against nuclear endependent Commission on Disarmament and Security Is- ergy has diminished. In 2009, 62 percent of Swedes supsues, also known as the Palme Commission. The Com- ported a Swedish nuclear program. Only 19 percent was
mission favored the demilitarization of space, the elimi- against.* [80] As a result, the phase-out policy was abannation of chemical arms from Europe, and the reduction doned in early 2009.
of conventional weapons. The commission also advocated negotiations in Europe to reduce political tensions
among the states and political actors that could have a potential for military conict.* [74] In the early 1980s, Swe- 4.26.23 Documents from the nuclear
weapons program
den was one of 58 nations signatory to the Convention on
the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. In compliance with the Convention, Sweden adopted the Nuclear According to the Swedish rules of secrecy, classied docActivities Act and the Nuclear Activities Ordinance in uments can be released after 40 years. Many documents
1984. The Acts were designed to prevent unlawful deal- on the Swedish nuclear program's development phase
ings with nuclear material and thereby ensure the safety and most intensive periods had therefore been gradually
opened to public during the 1990s, and laid the foundaof nuclear activities.* [75]

244

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

tion for studies for such experts as Wilhelm Agrell and [9] Melin, Jan (2 April 2001). Svensk atombomb utvecklades trots frbud. Ny Teknik (in Swedish).
Thomas Jonter. Certain documents that are still classied can only be released after 70 years thus, these doc[10] Swedish plutonium to the United States. Swedish Rauments on the Swedish nuclear program are not publicly
diation Safety Authority. 2012-03-27.
available yet.
[11] Cole 1997, p. 233

4.26.24

Controversies around activities after 1985

[12] Jonter 2010, p. 71


[13] Agrell 2002, pp. 5657

In 1985, newspaper Ny Teknik published some articles


on the Swedish nuclear weapons acquisition and some
facts that were previously unknown .The newspaper presented them as revelations. Ny Teknik argued that activities at FOA continued which appeared to be in direct
conict with the government's decision in 1958.* [9] As
a result, the government appointed the then Legal Counsel of the Defense Department Olof Forssberg to investigate the issue. Forssberg's investigative work Swedish
nuclear weapons research 1945-1972was completed in
1987. It concluded that no research had been conducted
beyond the approved decision on defense research.* [81]

[14] Agrell 2002, pp. 7176

In November 1994, the Washington Post came out with


an announcement that Sweden could have kept its nuclear
weapons option open on the sly. That statement stemmed
from the fact that the R3 reactor in gesta facility was still
in place, but it was not subject to the ongoing inspection
within the NPT framework. The reactor was shut down
in 1974, but not dismantled. The Swedish Nuclear Power
Inspectorate (SKI) pointed out that the reason for the facility not to be covered by the inspection was that Sweden
signed the NPT in 1975 (not in 1968 when the NPT was
ratied). Only then R3 was taken out of service and all
ssile material was removed. Since none of the remaining components of the reactor had been maintained since
1974, the site was not viewed as an immediate subject for
the SKI inspection.* [82]

[22] Agrell 2002, pp. 159160

4.26.25

[30] Agrell 2002, pp. 164167

See also

Sweden and weapons of mass destruction

4.26.26

References

[1] Agrell 2002, p. 53


[2] Jonter 1999, pp. 910
[3] Interviews with Swedish ocers and ocials cited in Reiss
Without the Bomb, p. 47

[15] Uranet et al. en


[16] Agrell 2002, pp. 7176
[17] Agrell 2002, pp. 131132
[18] Agrell 2002, pp. 133134
[19] Jonter 1999, p. 30
[20] Visit to Marviken. Nuclear power? Yes, please!.
[21] Agrell 2002, pp. 155159

[23] Jonter 2010, p. 70


[24] Sundgren, et al. fred,
[25] Lindskog, Lars G. (December 2001). Svenskt nej
till atomvapen - viktigt std fr NPT-avtalet (English:
Swedish no to nuclear weapons - important support for
the NPT)". Infobladet Lkare mot krnvapen (87).
[26] Agrell 2002, p. 169
[27] Ahlmark, Per (1961). Vr elndiga utrikesdebatt. In
Hans Hederberg. Unga liberaler. Bonniers.
[28] Jonter 2010, p. 73
[29] Agrell 2002, pp. 160163

[31] Agrell 2002, pp. 171-172


[32] Bergens 2010
[33] Agrell 2002, pp. 170171
[34] Agrell 2002, p. 25
[35] Agrell 2002, pp. 261262
[36] Agrell 2002, pp. 258259
[37] Jonter 1999, pp. 2021

[4] Agrell 2002, p. 42

[38] Agrell 2002, pp. 174175

[5] Agrell 2002, p. 48

[39] Jonter 1999, pp. 2224

[6] Agrell 2002, pp. 5051

[40] Arnett 1998, pp. 3243

[7] Jonter 2010, p. 62

[41] Agrell 2002, pp. 180181

[8] Persbo, 2009 & Part 1

[42] Agrell 2002, pp. 178179

4.26. SWEDEN

245

[43] Agrell 2002, p. 265

[70] Agrell 2002, pp. 310312

[44] Jonter 1999, pp. 3033

[71] Holmberg 2008, p. 3

[45] Jonter, 1999 & Agrell 2002, pp. 301-302

[72] Holmberg 2008, p. 4

[46] Agrell 2002, pp. 304305

[73] The Militarily Critical Technologies List: Section 5


Nuclear Weapons Technology(PDF). Oce of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology,
U.S. Department of Defense. February 1998. p. II-57.

[47] Agrell 2002, pp. 290294


[48]Saab aircraft that never were, Urban's (Google Blogger)
(World wide web log), SE: Canit, 2012-12-13, The project
was cancelled in 1957 and all resources concentrated on
Viggen. However, it wasn't until 1966 parliament nally
decided Sweden wasn't going to get nuclear weapons..
[49] Agrell 2002, pp. 29094.
[50] Wentzel 1994, pp. 3942.
[51] Andersson, Lennart (2010). B:s klubba Flygvapnets attackeskader under Kalla Kriget; Frsvaret och Kalla Kriget
(in Swedish). Svenskt Militrhistoriskt Biblioteks Frlag.
p. 71. ISBN 978-91-85789-74-0.
[52] Agrell 2002, pp. 154
[53] Agrell 2002, p. 295
[54] Agrell 2002, pp. 282287

[74] Lubna Qureshi Olof Palme and Nuclear Disarmament: A


Work in Progress, p. 55
[75] OECD, Nuclear Legislation in OECD Countries: Regulatory and Institutional Framework for Nuclear Activities
[76] The International Atomic Energy Agency's Nuclear Energy Assessment of Sweden 2002, p. 812
[77] Sweden. Model Nuclear Inventory 2007. Women's
International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF).
Archived from the original on 12 August 2007.
[78] Energy Eciency Updates (2004)" International Energy
Agency, p. 7
[79] Energy Policies of IEA Countries - Sweden- 2008 Review,International Energy Agency Review, p. 11

[55] Agrell 2002, pp. 134135

[80]Krnkraften ter en het frga (English: Nuclear power


again a hotly debated topic)". Swedish Public Radio.
February 3, 2009.

[56] Jonter 1999, pp. 3338

[81] Agrell 2002, p. 10

[57] Agrell 2002, pp. 307308

[82] Agrell 2002, pp. 317318

[58] Kberger, Tomas (JanApr 2007). History of nuclear


power in Sweden. Estudos Avanados (So Paulo) 21
(59): 229.

4.26.27 Sources

[59] Numbers collected from the ocial Swedish governmental


website detailing all Swedish referendums
[60] Bergens 2009
[61] Agrell 2002, pp. 167168
[62] Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Chronology of Key Events
(July 1945 Present)". International Atomic Energy
Agency.
[63] Zangger Committee(PDF). Inventory of International
Nonproliferation Organization and Regimes. James Martin
Center for Nonproliferation Studies. 14 May 2012.
[64] Strulak, Tadeusz (1993).The Nuclear Suppliers Group
(PDF). Nonproliferation Review 1 (1): 23.
[65] Prawitz, Jan (2001) Det svenska spelet om nedrustningen. Totalfrsvarets forskningsinstitut (FOI). Lst 5 oktober 2009
[66] Agrell 2002, p. 305
[67] Prawitz, 2001 & Agrell 2002, p. 305
[68] Jonter 2010, p. 70
[69] Prawitz 2001

Agrell, Wilhelm (2002), Svenska frintelsevapen,


Lund: Historiska Media, ISBN 91-89442-49-0.
Arnett, Eric (5 Feb 2008), Norms and nuclear
proliferation: Sweden's lessons for assessing Iran
(PDF), The Nonproliferation Review, The Project
on Military Technology, Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) (MIIS) 5 (2): 32
43, doi:10.1080/10736709808436705 Check date
values in: |year= / |date= mismatch (help).
Bergens, Johan (February 10, 2010), The Rise of
a White Knight State: Sweden's Nonproliferation and
Disarmament History, NTI.
Bergens, Johan (November 11, 2009), Sweden Reverses Nuclear Phase-out Policy, NTI
Cole, Paul (1997), Atomic Bombast: Nuclear
Weapon Decision-Making in Sweden, 194672,
Washington Quarterly 20 (2)
Holmberg, Per Hedberg Sren (April 2008),
Swedish Nuclear Power Policy. A Compilation of
Public Record Material, The Research Project. Energy Opinion in Sweden, Gothenburg: Department
of Political Science, University of Gothenburg

246

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

Jonter, Thomas (1999), Sverige, USA och krnen- 4.27 Syria


ergin Framvxten av en svensk krnmneskontroll
19451995 (in Swedish), Uppsala: Historiska insti- Syria has researched, manufactured, and allegedly used
tutionen Uppsala universitet, ISSN 1104-1374.
weapons of mass destruction.
Jonter, Thomas (2010),The Swedish Plans to Acquire Nuclear Weapons, 19451968: An Analysis
of the Technical Preparations, Science & Global
Security 18: 6186.
Kberger, Tomas (JanApr 2007), History of nuclear power in Sweden, Estudos Avanados (So
Paulo) 21 (59): 229.
Persbo, Andreas (November 16, 2009), The Blue
and Yellow Bomb 1, Arms Control Wonk.

On September 14, 2013, the United States and Russia


announced an agreement that would lead to the elimination of Syria's chemical weapon stockpiles by 2014.* [1]
In October 2013, the OPCW-UN Joint Mission destroyed
all of Syria's declared chemical weapons manufacturing
and mixing equipment.* [2] Several months later, Syria
disclosed that it maintained a ricin chemical weapons
program, which the Syrian government claims has fallen
in to the hands of Syrian Opposition forces in the east
of the country.* [3] The following month Syria, further
disclosed that it had 4 more previously hidden chemical weapons production sites.* [4] The Israeli intelligence
community believes the Syrian government retains several tons of chemical weapons.* [5]

Prawitz, Jan (2001), Det svenska spelet om nedrustningen (in Swedish), Totalfrsvarets forskningsinstiThe Syria le at the International Atomic Energy Agency
tut (FOI).
(IAEA) remains open, amid Syria's failure to respond to
the IAEA's questions about a facility, destroyed in 2007
Reiss, Without the Bomb, Interviews with Swedish
by Israel, that the IAEA concluded was very likely
ocers and ocials, in Arnett 1998.
a nuclear reactor, including the whereabouts the reactor's
nuclear fuel.* [6] In January 2015, it was reported that the
Wentzel, Viggo (1994), D21. Bits & bytes, Syrian government is suspected to be building a nuclear
Datasaabs historia, Datasaabs vnner, Linkping: plant in Al-Qusayr, Syria, allegedly with the aim of deHur det brjade, pp. 79, ISBN 91-972464-09.
veloping nuclear weapons.* [7]

4.26.28

Further reading

Skoglund, Clas (2009), Det bsta frsvarsbeslutet


som aldrig kom till stnd (in Swedish), Svenskt
Militrhistoriskt Biblioteks Frlag, ISBN 978-9185789-57-3 (inb.)
Agrel, Wilhelm (2009), Fredens Illusioner - Det
svenska nationella frsvarets nedgng och fall 19882009 (in Swedish), Atlantis, ISBN 978-91-7353417-8 (inb.)

4.27.1 History
Following the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights
during the 1967 Six-Day War, and South Lebanon in
1978, the Syrian government has regarded Israeli military power as a threat to Syrian security.* [8] Syria rst
acquired chemical weapons, from Egypt, in 1973 as a
military deterrent against Israel before launching the Yom
Kippur War.* [8] Despite the fact that Syrian ocials did
not explicitly declare the chemical weapons capability,
they implied it through speeches and in addition warned
of retaliations. Internal Syrian chemical weapons capability may have been developed alongside indirect Russian, German, Chinese and Indian technical and logistical
support.* [8]

Bjreman, Carl (2009), r av uppgng, r av


nedgng - Frsvarets desvg under beredskapsren
och det kalla kriget (in Swedish), Svenskt Militrhistoriskt Biblioteks Frlag, ISBN 978-91-85789-58-0
According to security analyst Zuhair Diab, Israeli nuclear
(inb.)
weapons were a primary motivation for the Syrian chemical weapons program. Their rivalry with Iraq and Turkey
were also important considerations.* [8]

4.26.29

External links

SKI: Frsvarets forskningsanstalt och planerna p


svenska krnvapen, mars 2001
P3 Dokumentr - Svenska krnvapenprogrammet
Ny Teknik: Den svenska atombomben

On July 23, 2012 Syria implicitly conrmed it possessed a


stockpile of chemical weapons which it says are reserved
for national defense against foreign countries.* [9] During the Syrian civil war in August 2012, the Syrian military restarted chemical weapons testing at a base on the
outskirts of Aleppo.* [10]* [11] Chemical weapons were
a major point of discussion between the Syrian government and world leaders, with military intervention being

4.27. SYRIA

247

considered by the West as a potential consequence of the cylindersas abandoned chemical weaponsand told the
use of such weapons.* [12]
OPCW thatthe items did not belong tothem.* [24] On
14 June 2014, the Joint OPCW-UN Mission conrmed
that the cylinders contained sarin.* [24] On 7 July 2014,
4.27.2 Chemical weapons
the U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon informed the
U.N. Security Council about the ndings.* [24]
Main articles: Syria chemical weapons program and Use
In December 2013 investigative journalist Seymour
of chemical weapons in the Syrian civil war
Hersh controversially reported that multiple US intelligence agencies had allegedly produced top secret assessments in the summer of 2013, regarding Syrian rebel's
supposed chemical weapons capabilities. The alleged asSyria's chemical weapons program
sessments were said by Hersh to have concluded that the
Syria's chemical weapons program began in the 1970s Al-Nusra Front and Al-Qaeda in Iraq were capable of acwith weapons and training from Egypt and the Soviet quiring, producing, and deploying sarin gasin quantity
Union, with production of chemical weapons in Syria .* [25] A spokesman for the Director of National Intellibeginning in the mid-1980s. In September 2013 Syria gence replied that Hersh's report wassimply false.* [26]
joined the Chemical Weapons Convention (formally acceding on 14 October), and agreed to the destruction of
its weapons, to be supervised by the Organisation for the 4.27.3 Biological weapons
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, as required by the
considered not to have biological
Convention. Syria had been one of a handful of states Syria is *generally
*
weapons.
[8]
[9]
However,
there are some reports of an
which had not ratied the Convention, and joined after
active
biological
weapons
research
and production prointernational condemnation of the August 2013 Ghouta
gram.
According
to
NATO
Consultant
Dr Jill Dekker,
chemical attack, which Western states held the Syrian
Syria
has
worked
on:
anthrax,
plague,
tularemia, bogovernment responsible for (whilst Syria and Russia held
tulism,
smallpox,
aatoxin,
cholera,
ricin
and camelpox,
the Syrian rebels of the Syrian civil war responsible).
and
has
used
Russian
help
in
installing
anthrax
in missile
Prior to September 2013 Syria had not publicly admitwarheads.
She
also
stated
they
view
their
bio-chemical
ted to possessing chemical weapons, although Western
*
intelligence services believed it to hold a massive stock- arsenal as part of a normal weapons program. [27]
pile.* [13] In September 2013, French intelligence put the
Syrian stockpile at 1,000 tonnes, including Yperite, VX
4.27.4 Nuclear program
andseveral hundred tonnes of sarin.* [14] In October
2013, the OPCW found a total of 1,300 tons of chemiSyria is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
cal weapons.* [15] On 16 October 2013, the OPCW and
and maintains a civil nuclear program. On September
the United Nations formally established a joint mission to
6, 2007, Israel unilaterally bombed a site in Syria which
oversee the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons
it believed had hosted a nuclear reactor under construcprogram by mid-2014.
tion. U.S. intelligence ocials claimed low condence
that the site was meant for weapons development.* [29]
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has said the site in disSyrian opposition chemical weapons capability
cussion was justa military site under construction* [30]
*
The Syrian government claims that the opposition has the and that Syria's goal is a nuclear-free Middle East. [31]
capacity to launch large chemical attacks such as those Syria allowed the IAEA to visit the site on June 23, 2008,
seen at Ghouta. Sources such as the United States* [16] taking environmental samples that revealed the presence
and Human Rights Watch* [17] disagree, claiming there is of man-made uranium and other materials consistent with
no signicant evidence the opposition has any signicant a reactor. On May 24, 2011, IAEA Director General
Amano released a report which assessed that the dechemical weapons capability.
stroyed facility was a reactor, and the IAEA Board of
According to Syria, on 1 June 2013, the Syrian Army Governors voted 17-6 (with 11 abstentions) to report this
seized two cylinders holding the nerve agent sarin from as non-compliance to the UN Security Council.
Syrian opposition ghters in Hama.* [18] A Syrian military source told SANA, the ocial news agency in
Syria, that the Syrian Army seized two containers with Open nuclear programs
sarin together with automatic ries, pistols and homemade bombs (IEDs) in a rebel hideout in the al-Faraieh Syria is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
neighborhood (also spelled Al-Faraya)* [19] of the city of Treaty and has repeatedly attempted to purchase small
Hama,* [20]* [21]* [22] which has been the scene of ght- research type nuclear reactors from China, Russia, Aring between government troops and armed opposition gentina, or other countries. Despite these purchases begroups.* [23] The Syrian government declared the two ing openly disclosed and IAEA monitored, international

248

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

pressure has caused all these reactor purchases to be cancelled. Syria has open and IAEA monitored nuclear research programs including a Chinese made non-reactor
miniature neutron source.* [28]
On November 26, 2008 the IAEA Board of Governors
approved technical aid for Syria despite Western allegations that the country had a secret atomic program that
could eventually be used to make weapons. China, Russia and developing nations, criticized Western political interferencethat they said undermined the IAEA's
programme to foster civilian atomic energy development.* [32] The top U.N. nuclear ocial also strongly rebuked Western powers for trying to deny the request, saying this shouldn't be done without evidence and merely on
Intelligence photo of the alleged reactor head and fuel channels
the existence of an investigation.* [33]
under construction

Alleged nuclear reactor

Satellite photo of the destroyed site

further claimed that the nuclear reactor was not yet operational and no nuclear material had been introduced into
it.* [35] Top U.S. intelligence ocials claimed that the
site was meant for weapons development.* [29]
Western press reports asserted that the Israeli air strike
followed a shipment delivery to Syria by a North Korean freighter, and that North Korea was suspected to be
supplying a reactor to Syria for a nuclear weapons program.* [36] On October 24, 2007 the Institute for Science
and International Security released a report which identied a site in eastern Syria's Deir ez-Zor Governorate
province as the suspected reactor. The report speculated
about similarities between the Syrian building and North
Korea's Yongbyon Nuclear Scientic Research Center,
but said that it was too early to make a denitive comparison.* [37] On October 25, 2007, Western media said
the main building and any debris from it following the air
strike had been completely dismantled and removed by
the Syrians.* [38]
After refusing to comment on the reports for six months,
the Bush administration briefed Congress and the IAEA
on April 24, 2008, saying that the U.S. Government was
convincedthat Syria had been building a covert nuclear reactorthat was not intended for peaceful purposes.* [39] The brieng included releases of satellite
photographs of the bombed site and overhead and ground
level intelligence photographs of the site under construction, including the alleged reactor vessel steel shell before concrete was poured and of the alleged reactor head
structure.* [40]

Reaction to allegations On June 23, 2008, IAEA inspectors were allowed to visit the Dair Alzour site (also
referred to as Al Kibar), and take samples of the debris. On November 19, 2008 an IAEA report stated
Bombing of alleged reactor On September 6, 2007, that a signicant number of natural uranium partiIsrael bombed an ocially unidentied site in Syria clesproduced as a result of chemical processing were
which it believed had been a nuclear reactor under con- found at the Al Kibar site;* [41] however, the IAEA did
struction.* [34] This was called Operation Orchard. It was not nd sucient evidence to prove Syria is developing
Intelligence photo of the alleged reactor vessel under construction

4.27. SYRIA
nuclear weapons.* [42] Some American nuclear experts
have speculated about similarities between the alleged
Syrian reactor and North Korea's Yongybon reactor* [43]
but IAEA Director General ElBaradei has pointed out
that there was uranium but it doesn't mean there was
a reactor.* [44] ElBaradei has shown dissatisfaction
with the United States and Israel for only providing the
IAEA with photos of the bombed facility in Syria,* [45]
and has also urged caution against prematurely judging
Syria's atomic program by reminding diplomats about
false U.S. claims that Saddam Hussein had weapons of
mass destruction.* [46] Russia, China, Iran, and nonaligned countries have also supported giving Syria nuclear
guidance despite pressure from the United States.* [46]

249

4.27.5 Delivery systems


The U.S. National Air and Space Intelligence Center reported in 2009 that Syria possessed road-mobile Scud-D
and Tochka missiles, with fewer than 100 launchers.* [57]
In addition Syria has aircraft and artillery delivery systems.

4.27.6 International partnerships

United States diplomatic cables revealed that two Indian


rms aided Syrian chemical and biological weapon makers in trying to obtain Australia Group-controlled equipment.* [58]* [59] One cable stated that India has a genJoseph Cirincione, an expert on nuclear proliferation and eral obligation as a Chemical Weapons Convention State
head of the Washington-based Ploughshares Fund, com- Party to never, under any circumstances, assist anyone in
mented we should learn rst from the past and be very the development of chemical weapons.* [59]
cautious about any intelligence from the US about other
country's weapons.* [47] Syria has denounced the In 2012, Iranian and North Korean ocials and scienfabrication and forging of factsin regards to the inci- tists were brought to bases and testing areas* to aid in the
development and use of chemical weapons. [10]
dent.* [48]
IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei criticized In November 2014, the anti-government Syrian Obserthe strikes and deplored that information regarding the vatory for Human Rights reported that ve nuclear scienmatter had not been shared with his agency earlier.* [29] tists, one of which that was Iranian national, were assasSyria has declined to let the IAEA visit other military sinated by a gunman in Damascus. The pro-government
sites the United States recently made allegations about, Al-Watan's account diered, reporting thatfour nuclear
arguing it fears that too much openness on its part would scientists and electrical engineerswere killed. Al-Watan
encourage the U.S. to push for years of relentless inter- suggested the Nusra *Front might be behind the attack;
national scrutiny.* [49] Syria has said it will voluntarily others suspect Israel. [60]
cooperate with the IAEA further if it isn't at the expense of disclosing our military sites or causing a threat
4.27.7
to our national security.* [50]
The Non-Aligned Movement has called for the establishment of a nuclear weapons free zone in the Middle East
and called for a comprehensive multilaterally negotiated
instrument which prohibits threats of attacks on nuclear
facilities devoted to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.* [51]
The Gulf Cooperation Council has also appealed for a
nuclear weapons free Middle East and recognition of the
right of a country to expertise in the eld of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.* [52] The IAEA has also approved a resolution urging all Middle East nations to renounce atomic bombs.* [53]

IAEA non-compliance nding


For nearly three years, Syria refused the IAEA requests
for further information on or access to the Dair Alzour
site. On May 24, 2011, IAEA Director General Amano
released a report concluding that the destroyed building was very likelya nuclear reactor, which Syria
was required to declare under its NPT safeguards agreement.* [54] On June 9, 2011, the IAEA Board of Governors found that this constituted non-compliance, and
reported that non-compliance to the UN Security Council.* [55] The vote was 176, with 11 abstentions.* [56]

See also

Syrian Scientic Studies and Research Center, The


Syrian government agency and industrial complex,
which according to security analysts and western
intelligence agencies, is responsible for developing
and manufacturing non-conventional weapons.* [61]
Syria Accountability and Lebanese Sovereignty
Restoration Act, a 2003 act of the 108th United
States Congress which asserts that Syrias acquisition of weapons of mass destruction threatens the
security of the Middle East and the national security
interests of the United States

4.27.8 References
[1] Smith-Spark, Laura; Cohen, Tom (September 14, 2013).
U.S., Russia agree to framework on Syria chemical
weapons. CNN. Retrieved 14 September 2013.
[2] Loveday Morris and Michael Birnbaum (October 31,
2013). Syria has destroyed chemical weapons facilities, international inspectors say. The Washington Post.
Retrieved October 31, 2013.
[3] Mike Corder (17 September 2011).Syria had ricin program: OPCW document. The Daily Star. Associated
Press. Retrieved 21 September 2013.

250

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

[4] Syria declares new chemical weapons facilities. BBC


News. August 8, 2014. Retrieved October 10, 2014.

[23]Syrian army captures party of sarin from rebels in Hama


. Voice of Russia. 2 June 2013.

[5] Harel, Amos. Israeli intelligence: Syria retains small


WMD capacity. Haaretz. Retrieved 1 October 2014.

[24] Two 'abandoned' cylinders seized in Syria contained


sarin: UN. The Straits Times. Reuters. 8 July 2014.

[6] Dahl, Fredrik.Russia fails to remove Syria nuclear probe


from UN atomic watchdog's agenda. Haaretz. Retrieved
19 September 2014.

[25] Hersh, Seymour (8 December 2013). Whose Sarin?".


London Review of Books. Retrieved 10 December 2013.

[7] Follath, Erich (January 9, 2015). Evidence Points to


Syrian Push for Nuclear Weapons. Der Spiegel. Retrieved January 10, 2015.

[26] Dylan Byers White House: Sy Hersh report 'false'",


Politico, 9 December 2013
[27] Syria's Bio-Warfare Threat: an interview with Dr. Jill
Dekker. New English Review. Retrieved 16 July 2012.

[8] M. Zuhair Diab (Fall 1997). Syria's Chemical and Biological Weapons: Assessing capabilities and motivations [28] Syria - Nuclear Weapons Programs at globalsecurity.org,
accessed October 24, 2007.
(PDF). The Nonproliferation Review 5 (1). Retrieved 28
August 2013.
[29] IAEA slams U.S. for withholding data on alleged Syrian
nuclear reactor
[9] MacFarquhar, Neil (2012-07-23). Syria Says Chemical
Arms Reserved for Attack From Abroad. New York
[30] Syria president denies building nuclear reactor. Agence
Times. Retrieved 2012-07-23.
France-Presse. 2008-04-27. Retrieved 2013-06-04.
[10] Syria Tested Chemical Weapons Systems, Witnesses
Say. Der Spiegel. 17 September 2012. Retrieved 18 [31] Daiji Sadamori,Assad: Syria Not Seeking to be Nuclear
State,Asahi Shimbun, 27 October 2006
September 2012.
[11] Report: Syria tested chemical weapons delivery systems
in August. Haaretz. 17 September 2012. Retrieved 18
September 2012.

[32] IAEA seeks compromise over Syrian nuclear aid issue:


diplomats. Middle East Times. 25 November 2008. Retrieved 2013-06-04.

[12] France warns of Syrian chemical weapons attack. Associated Press. 3 September 2012. Retrieved 18 September 2012.

[33] Nuclear Threat Initiative: ElBaradei Lashes Critics of Syrian Nuclear Aid Request. Globalsecuritynewswire.org. Retrieved 2013-06-04.

[13] Congressional Research Service, 12 September 2013,


Syria's Chemical Weapons: Issues for Congress

[34] 6 September 2007 Air strike at globalsecurity.org, accessed October 24, 2007.

[14] Willsher, Kim (2 September 2013).Syria crisis: French


intelligence dossier blames Assad for chemical attack.
The Guardian.

[35] IAEA: Statement by IAEA Director General Mohamed


ElBaradei regarding Syria

[15] Spencer, Richard (29 October 2013). Syria: inspectors nd 1,300 tons of chemical weapons. Telegraph.
Retrieved 31 October 2013.

[36] N. Korea, Syria May Be at Work on Nuclear Facility,


Glenn Kessler, Washington Post, September 13, 2007;
Page A12

[16] Is It Possible The Syrian Rebels (Not Assad) Used


Chemical Weapons?". NPR.org. 27 August 2013. Retrieved 24 October 2014.

[37] SUSPECT REACTOR CONSTRUCTION SITE IN


EASTERN SYRIA: THE SITE OF THE SEPTEMBER 6
ISRAELI RAID?, David Albright and Paul Brannan, October 23, 2007

[17] Dan Murphy (23 September 2013). Syrian rebels and


chemical weapons: a disinformation operation?". The
Christian Science Monitor. Retrieved 24 October 2014.

[38] Photos Show Cleansing of Suspect Syrian Site, William


J. Broad and Mark Mazzetti, New York Times, accessed
October 25, 2007.

[18] Syrian army seizes sarin cylinders from militants in


Hama. Press TV. 2 June 2013.

[39] Statement by the Press Secretary(Press release). White


House. April 24, 2008. Retrieved 2013-06-04.

[19] Al-Faraya, Hamah, Syria. Google Maps.

[40] Syrian Alleged and North Korean Reactor Photos.


Cryptome. 26 April 2008. Retrieved 2013-06-04.

[20] Syrian Military seizes Sarin Gas fromrebels"". Nsnbc


international. 2 June 2013.
[21] Syria claims sarin seizure at rebel hideout as Russia
blocks UN's Qusair resolution. RT. 2 June 2013.
[22] Syrian army captures sarin containers with rebels in
Hama. Xinhuanet. 2 June 2013.

[41] IAEA: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic (November 19, 2008)"
(PDF). Retrieved 2013-06-04.
[42] "''Xinhua'': IAEA nds insucient evidence for Syria's
nuclear weapons development. News.xinhuanet.com.
2008-11-20. Retrieved 2013-06-04.

4.28. TAIWAN

251

[43] Warrick, Joby (2008-11-19). Bombed Syrian Site Appears to Have Been Nuclear Reactor. Washington Post.
Retrieved 2008-11-19.

[60] Aji, Albert; Hadid, Diaa (November 10, 2014). Syria's


Assad Says He'll Study UN Cease-Fire Oer. ABC
News. Retrieved November 10, 2014.

[44] "''BBC'': Syria nuclear clues 'not damning'". BBC News.


2008-11-17. Retrieved 2013-06-04.

[61] Special Weapons Agencies. GlobalSecurity.

[45] "''Xinhua News'':IAEA chief: Report on Syrian nuclear


plans needs more time"". News.xinhuanet.com. 2008-0926. Retrieved 2013-06-04.

4.27.9 External links

[46] Star Tribune: UN nuclear agency chief urges caution


against Syria by recalling false claims against Iraq
[47] Ewen MacAskill in Washington (25 April 2008). US
claims North Korea helped build Syria reactor plant.
Guardian. Retrieved 2013-06-04.
[48] Syria rejects U.S. allegations on existence of nuclear activities. News.xinhuanet.com. 2008-04-25. Retrieved
2013-06-04.
[49] Diplomats: Syria to Block IAEA From Probing Suspected Nuclear Sites. Foxnews.com. 2007-08-05. Retrieved 2013-06-04.
[50] Syria rebus nuclear inspectors. BBC News. 200810-03. Retrieved 2013-06-04.
[51] XV Ministerial Conference of the Non-Aligned Movement (July 2008): Statement on the Islamic Republic of
Iran's Nuclear Issue(PDF). 11 August 2008. Retrieved
2013-06-04.

Syria Special Weapons Guide at globalsecurity.org


Syria Prole at Nuclear Threat Initiative

4.28 Taiwan
Not to be confused with People's Republic of China and
weapons of mass destruction.
The Republic of China (Taiwan) denies having any
weapons of mass destruction. There is no evidence
of Taiwan possessing any chemical or nuclear weapons
though it has pursued nuclear weapons in the past.

4.28.1 Nuclear weapons


Research program

[52] The Closing Statement Of the Twenty-Seventh Session of


the Supreme Council of the Cooperation Council for the
Arab States of the Gulf (December 2006)

The development of nuclear weapons by the Republic of


China has been a contentious issue, as it had been trig*
[53] Gordinier, Je (4 October 2008). IAEA calls for non- gered by PRC's rst nuclear test in 1964. [1] The U.S.,
nuclear Mideast in heated vote. International Herald hoping to avoid escalating tensions in the Taiwan Strait,
has continually opposed arming the Republic of China
Tribune. Retrieved 2013-06-04.
with nuclear weapons after 1979. Accordingly, the Re[54] GOV/2011/30, Implementation of the NPT Safeguards public of China adheres to the principles of the nuclear
Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic, Report by the Non-Proliferation Treaty and has stated that it does not
Director General, May 24, 2011.
intend to produce nuclear weapons, on the ocial basis.
[55] GOV/2011/41, Implementation of the NPT safeguards Past nuclear research by the ROC makes it athreshold
agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic, Resolution nuclear state.
adopted by the Board of Governors on 9 June 2011.

In 1967, a nuclear weapons program began under the aus[56] IAEA Refers Syria To Security Council, Voice of Amer- pices of the Institute of Nuclear Energy Research (INER)
at the Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology.
ica Editorial, June 17, 2011.
The Republic of China was able to acquire nuclear tech[57] Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat (PDF). National Air nology from abroad (including a research reactor from
and Space Intelligence Center (Report) (Air Force Intelli- Canada and low-grade plutonium from the United States)
gence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency). April allegedly for a civilian energy system, but in actuality to
2009. NASIC-1031-0985-09. Retrieved 20 February
develop fuel for nuclear weapons.* [2]
2013.

During the 1970s, the Republic of China had an active program to produce plutonium using heavy water
reactors. However, after the International Atomic Energy
[59] Rice, Susan (2008-12-30). Shield S04B-08: Syria Agency found evidence of the Republic of China's efarranging to acquire CW equipment from two In- forts to produce weapons-grade plutonium, Taipei agreed
dian companies. WikiLeaks. WikiLeaks cable: in September 1976 under U.S. pressure to dismantle its
08STATE135048. Archived from the original on 2012- nuclear weapons program. A study by the Mitre Corpo12-03. Retrieved 2012-12-03.
ration in 1977 included Taiwan in a list of insecure
[58] US suspected Indian cos role in Iran N-plan. The Times
of India. December 19, 2010. Retrieved March 9, 2011.

252

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

nuclear threshold statesstates with the technical capability to develop nuclear weapons and the security motivations to seriously contemplate such an option. The other
states were Israel, South Africa, South Korea, and Yugoslavia.* [3] U.S. intelligence believed that the Republic
of China also had designed devices suitable for nuclear
testing.* [4] ROC successfully conducted its diminutive
nuclear test in southern Taiwan in the 1980s.* [5]
A secret program was revealed when Colonel Chang
Hsien-yi, deputy director of nuclear research at INER,
who was secretly working for the CIA, defected to the
U.S. in December 1987 and produced a cache of incriminating documents. General Hau Pei-tsun claimed that
scientists in Taiwan had already produced a controlled
nuclear reaction. Under pressure from the U.S., the program was halted.
During the 19951996 Taiwan Strait crisis, then Republic
of China President Lee Teng-hui proposed to reactivate
the program, but was forced to back down a few days later
after drawing intense criticism.* [6]

Current status

4.28.4 Ratication
treaties

of

international

The Republic of China ratied the Geneva Protocol on


August 7, 1929 and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) in 1970 before PRC entered UN. Following UN
General Assembly Resolution 2758 (1971) the United
Nations does not recognize the Republic of China as a
legitimate political entity, and as such does not recognize
any right that the ROC has to join international multilateral treaties. Because of its controversial political status,
the ROC has not been allowed to join either the Biological
Weapons Convention nor the Chemical Weapons Convention, but it has stated that it will abide by both treaties
nevertheless. In addition, the ROC has stated that it will
continue to abide by the NPT, notwithstanding Resolution 2758.* [8] Taiwan was one of the original members of
the NPT in 1968. After the Peoples Republic of China
took Taiwans place at the United Nations in 1971, in effect Taiwan ceased to be active as a participating party to
the ocial NPT activities. However, it signed a trilateral
agreement with the United States and the IAEA in 1971
stating that it would continue to abide by the terms of the
NPT as a ratication party. While not a member of the
IAEA, Taiwan does continue to subscribe to the IAEA
s safeguards under two agreements, INFCIRC/133 and
INFCIRC/158.* [9]

There is no evidence that the ROC possesses any nuclear weapons or any programs to produce them, although
it does have the general technological ability to develop
the ability to enrich uranium or process plutonium. The
Republic of China's nuclear power plants use imported 4.28.5 See also
enriched uranium and are subject to International Atomic
China and weapons of mass destruction
Energy Agency inspection.
The People's Republic of China has announced that any
Republic of China possession of nuclear weapons is
grounds for an immediate attack. Attempts by ROC ofcials to form a dialogue with the PRC on the subject of
weapons of mass destructions have been rebued.

Ballistic missile submarine


National Revolutionary Army
Whampoa Military Academy
Chiang Kai-shek

4.28.2

Chemical weapons

The Republic of China may be in possession of small


quantities of sarin. However, the Republic of China government has stated that any such materials are only for
defensive research purposes and that it does not have any
intention of producing oensive chemical weapons.

4.28.3

Missile technology

In response to former Defense Minister Tsai Ming-hsien's


announcement that the ROC has developed medium
range missiles, the Ministry of National Defense (MND)
said that he should be more conscious of national security. In this book God Bless Taiwan,Tsai stated
that the missile had been test red in southern Taiwan on
February 2008 and that its performance was credible.* [7]

History of the Republic of China


Military of the Republic of China
Kuomintang
List of states with nuclear weapons
Timeline of the Republic of China's nuclear program

4.28.6 References
[1] http://www.china.org.cn/english/congress/228244.htm
[2] Roy, Denny (2003). Taiwan: A Political History. Cornell
University Press. ISBN 0-8014-8805-2.
[3] Report of the Nuclear Energy Policy Study Group,
Nuclear Power Issues and Choices (Cambridge, MA:
Ballinger Publishing Co., 1977), p. 284.

4.29. UKRAINE

[4] The 22 September 1979 Event (PDF). Interagency


Intelligence Memorandum. National Security Archive.
December 1979. p. 5 (paragraph 4). MORI DocID:
1108245. Retrieved 2006-11-01.

253

4.29.2 Budapest Memorandum


Main article:
Assurances

Budapest Memorandum on Security

[5] http://www.chinanews.com/2000-1-7/26/14868.html
[6] Albright, David; Gay, Corey (1 January 1998). Taiwan:
Nuclear nightmare averted. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Retrieved 18 May 2015 via HighBeam Research.
(subscription required (help)).
[7] MND declines to conrm whether Taiwan has mediumrange missile.
[8] http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/npt/china/acc/
washington
[9] http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/taiwan_3.pdf?_=
1381971852

4.28.7

External links

On December 5, 1994 the leaders of Ukraine, Russia,


Britain and the United States signed a memorandum to
provide Ukraine with security assurances in connection
with its accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon
state. The four parties signed the memorandum, containing a preamble and six paragraphs. The memorandum
reads as follows:* [4]
The United States of America, the Russian Federation,
and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland,
Welcoming the accession of Ukraine to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as non-nuclearweapon State,
Taking into account the commitment of Ukraine to eliminate all nuclear weapons from its territory within a specied period of time,

Deployments by country, 1951-1977 The Bulletin Noting the changes in the world-wide security situation,
including the end of the Cold War, which have brought
of the Atomic Scientists, Nov/Dec 1999
about conditions for deep reductions in nuclear forces.
United States Secretly Deployed Nuclear Bombs In Conrm the following:
27 Countries and Territories During Cold War
1. The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of
America rearm their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with the principles of the Final Act of the Confer4.29 Ukraine
ence on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to respect
the independence and sovereignty and the existing bor4.29.1 Background information on Rus- ders of Ukraine.

sian and Ukrainian relationship

On December 1 1991 Ukraine, the second most powerful republic in the USSR, voted overwhelmingly for independence, which ended any realistic chance of the Soviet
Union staying together even on a limited scale.* [1] More
than 90% of the electorate expressed their support for
the Declaration of Independence of Ukraine, and they
elected the chairman of the parliament, Leonid Kravchuk
to serve as the rst president of the country. At the meeting in Brest, Belarus on December 8, followed by the
Alma Ata meeting on December 21, the leaders of Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine formally dissolved the Soviet
Union and formed the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS).

2. The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great


Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of
America rearm their obligation to refrain from the
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of Ukraine, and that none of their
weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in selfdefence or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations.

3. The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great


Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of
America rearm their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with the principles of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to refrain
from economic coercion designed to subordinate to their
After the dissolution of the USSR, about one third of So- own interest the exercise by Ukraine of the rights inherviet nuclear arsenal, as well as a signicant means of its ent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any
design and production, remained within Ukrainian ter- kind.
ritory.* [2] On Ukrainian territory at the time were 130 4. The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great
UR-100N intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) with Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of
six warheads each, 46 RT-23 Molodets ICBMs with ten America rearm their commitment to seek immediate
warheads apiece, as well as 33 heavy bombers, totaling United Nations Security Council action to provide assisapproximately 1,700 warheads.* [3]
tance to Ukraine, as a non-nuclear-weapon State party to

254
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
if Ukraine should become a victim of* [4] an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which
nuclear weapons are used.

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
ing by the spirit of the Sino-Ukrainian joint communiqu of 4 January 1992 on the establishment
of diplomatic relations, the Sino-Ukrainian joint
communiqu of 31 October 1992 and the SinoUkrainian joint statement of 6 September 1994,
China recognizes and respects the independence,
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, and
stands ready to further develop friendly and cooperative Sino-Ukraine relations on the basis of the Five
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.

5. The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great


Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of
America rearm, in the case of Ukraine, their commitment not to use nuclear weapons against any nonnuclearweapon State party to the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, except in the case of
an attack on themselves, their territories or dependent territories, their armed forces, or their allies, by such a State Thus, China's pledge, similar to France's, does not pledge
to involve UN or consultative mechanisms in case of criin association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State.
sis. However, it does pledge to respect the sovereignty
6. Ukraine, the Russian Federation, the United Kingand territorial integrity of Ukraine.
dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United
States of America will consult in the event a situation
arises that raises a question concerning these commit- 4.29.4 2014 Crimean crisis
ments.* [4]
This Memorandum will become applicable upon signa- Despite Russia's claimed annexation of Crimea, the Govture. Signed in four copies having equal validity in the ernment of Ukraine has rearmed its decision in 1994
to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a nonEnglish, Russian, and Ukrainian languages.
nuclear-weapon state.* [7] Nonetheless, some Ukrainians
and foreign policy commentators argue that if Ukraine
4.29.3 France and China's commitments had not removed its nuclear weapons, Russia would have
been deterred from aggression against Ukraine. Certain
France and China also provided Ukraine with assurances Ukrainian leaders are angered by Western Europe and the
similar to the Budapest Memorandum, but with some sig- United States, who advised them to remove their nuclear
nicant dierences. For instance, France's pledge does arsenal.
not contain the promises laid out in paragraphs 4 and 6 After Yanukovych ed and was replaced, a power vacabove, to refer any aggression to the UN Security Coun- uum opened and Russia* [8] annexed Crimea. Russia
cil, nor to consult in the event of a question regarding the intervened through nationalist and cultural rhetoric statcommitments.* [5]
ing that they were protecting ethnic Russians from atChina's pledge takes a dierent form entirely, dating from tacks in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. The memorandum
was violated because the Russian military intervened in
4 December, and reading as follows:* [6]
Ukraine.* [9]
The Chinese Government welcomes the decision of
Ukraine to destroy all nuclear weapons on its territory, and commends the approval by the Verkhovna
Rada of Ukraine on 16 November of Ukraines
accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear-weapon State.
China fully understands the desire of Ukraine for
security assurance. The Chinese Government has
always maintained that under no circumstances will
China use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against
non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free
zones. This principled position also applies to
Ukraine. The Chinese Government urges all other
nuclear-weapon States to undertake the same commitment, so as to enhance the security of all nonnuclear-weapon States, including Ukraine.

Pavlo Rizanenko, a member of the Ukrainian parliament


(Udar Party headed by Vitali Klitschko) told USA Today that Ukraine may have to arm themselves with their
own nuclear weapons if the USA and other world leaders do not hold up their end of the agreement. He said
We gave up nuclear weapons because of this agreement.
Now, there's a strong sentiment in Ukraine that we made
a big mistake.* [8] He also said that, In the future, no
matter how the situation is resolved in Crimea, we need
a much stronger Ukraine. If you have nuclear weapons,
people don't invade you.* [10]
On 13 December 2014 Ukrainian President Petro
Poroshenko stated that he did not want Ukraine to become a nuclear power again.* [11]

The Chinese Government has constantly opposed 4.29.5 Reference list


the practice of exerting political, economic or other
[1] Nohlen, D & Stver, P (2010) Elections in Europe: A data
pressure in international relations. It maintains that
handbook, p1976 ISBN 9783832956097
disputes and dierences should be settled peacefully
through consultations on an equal footing. Abid- [2] Dahlburg, Decemb.Ukraine Votes to Quit Soviet Union

4.30. UNITED KINGDOM

255

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and has an independent


nuclear deterrent. The UK has been estimated to have a
stockpile of approximately 160 active nuclear warheads
and 225 nuclear warheads in total.* [3] It had renounced
[3] Norris, Robert S. (JanuaryFebruary 1992).The Soviet the use of chemical and biological weapons in 1956 and
Nuclear Archipelago. Arms Control Today (Arms Con- subsequently destroyed its general stocks.
: Independence: More than 90% of Voters Approve Historic Break with Kremlin. The President-elect Calls for
Collective Command of the Country's Nuclear Arsenal.
LA Times. Retrieved April 15, 2014.

trol Association) 22 (1): 24 via JSTOR. (subscription


required (help)).
[4] Budapest Memorandums on Security Assurances. Retrieved December 12, 2014.
[5] Page K-8, Full text in French of France's Security Assurance to Ukraine
[6] Letter dated 12 December 1994 from the Permanent Representative of China to the United Nations addressed to
the Secretary-General, from UN Oce of Disarmament
Aairs
[7] Joint Statement by the United States and Ukraine, March
25, 2014.
[8] Dorell, Oren. Ukraine May Have to Go Nuclear, Says
Kiev Lawmaker. USA Today. Retrieved 15 April 2014.
[9] Kramer, Andrew. Ukraine Reports Russian Invasion
on a New Front. The New York Times. Retrieved 15
September 2014.
[10] Koren, Marina. The Ukraine Crisis Is Unsettling
Decades-Old Nuclear-Weapons Agreements. Retrieved
April 15, 2014.
[11] Ukraine has no ambitions to become nuclear power again
Poroshenko, Interfax-Ukraine (13 December 2014)

External links
The Ukraine Crisis is Unsettling Decades-old Nuclear Weapons Agreements
Ukraine Votes to Quit Soviet Union : Independence:
More than 90% of Voters Approve Historic Break
with Kremlin. The President-elect Calls for Collective Command of the Country's Nuclear Arsenal
Russia, Ukraine, and the Breakup of the Soviet
Union

4.30.1 Biological weapons


Further information: History of biological warfare
One of the well-known recorded incidents of biological warfare by the British was during Pontiac's Rebellion
(1763-1766). In June 1763, the British Army approved
the use of smallpox using blankets during their meeting
with the besieging Native Americans at Fort Pitt in a desperate attempt to drive them out. During the meeting
with the Native Americans at Fort Pitt, British ocers
infected them with blankets lled with smallpox, hoping
to inoculate the Native Americans with some blankets
that may fall into their hands. This attempt was successful and smallpox that started by the British at Fort Pitt
spread into other areas, killing between 400,000-500,000
(possibly up to 1.5 million) Native American Indians men, women, and children - during and years after the
war.* [4]* [5]* [6]
During the Second World War, British scientists studied the use of biological weapons, including a test using
anthrax on the Scottish island of Gruinard which left it
contaminated and fenced o for nearly fty years, until
an intensive four-year programme to eradicate the spores
was completed in 1990. They also manufactured ve
million linseed-oil cattle cakes with a hole bored into
them for addition of anthrax spores between 1942 and
mid-1943. These were to be dropped on Germany using specially designed containers each holding 400 cakes,
in a project known as Operation Vegetarian. It was intended that the disease would destroy the German beef
and dairy herds and possibly spread to the human population. Preparations were not complete until early 1944.
Operation Vegetarian was only to be used in the event of
a German anthrax attack on the United Kingdom.* [7]

Oensive weapons development continued after the war


into the 1950s with tests of plague, brucellosis, tularemia
and later equine encephalomyelitis and vaccinia viruses
Ukraine May Have to Go Nuclear, Says Kiev Law(the latter as a relatively safe simulant for smallpox).
makerThe Ukraine Crisis Is Unsettling DecadesIn particular ve sets of trials took place at sea using
Old Nuclear-Weapons Agreements
aerosol clouds and animals.
Memorandums on Security Assurances, 1994

4.30 United Kingdom

Operation Harness o Antigua in 1948-1949.

The United Kingdom possesses, or has possessed, a variety of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons. The United Kingdom
is one of the ve ocial nuclear weapon states under the

Operation Cauldron o Stornoway in 1952. The


trawler Carella unknowingly sailed through a cloud
of pneumonic plague bacilli (yersinia pestis) during
this trial. It was kept under covert observation until

256

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

the incubation period had elapsed but none of the Many ex-servicemen have complained about suering
crew fell ill.* [8]
long term illnesses after taking part in tests on nerve
agents. It was alleged that before volunteering they
Operation Hesperus o Stornoway in 1953.
were not provided with adequate information about the
experiments and the risk, in breach of the Nuremberg
Operation Ozone o Nassau in 1954.
Code of 1947. Alleged abuses at Porton Down became the subject of a lengthy police investigation called
Operation Negation o Nassau in 1954-5.
Operation Antler, which covered the use of volunteers in
testing a variety of chemical weapons and countermeaThe programme was cancelled in 1956 when the British
sures from 1939 until 1989. An inquest was opened on 5
government renounced the use of biological and chemical
May 2004 into the death on 6 May 1953 of a serviceman,
weapons. It ratied the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Ronald Maddison, during an experiment using sarin. His
Convention in March 1975.
death had earlier been found by a private MoD inquest
to have been as a result of misadventurebut this was
quashed by the High Court in 2002. The 2004 hearing
4.30.2 Chemical weapons
closed on 15 November, after a jury found that the cause
of Maddison's death was application of a nerve agent
Main article: Chemical weapons and the United Kingdom
in a non-therapeutic experiment.
The UK was a signatory of the Hague Conventions (1899
and 1907) which outlawed the use of poison gas in war- 4.30.3 Nuclear weapons
fare. However, during the First World War, in retaliation
to the use of chlorine by Germany against British troops Main article: Nuclear weapons and the United Kingdom
from April 1915 onwards, British forces deployed chlo- The United Kingdom has four Vanguard class subrine themselves for the rst time during the Battle of Loos
on 25 September 1915. By the end of the war, poison gas
use had become widespread on both sides and by 1918 a
quarter of artillery shells were lled with gas and Britain
had produced around 25,400 tons of toxic chemicals.
Britain used a range of poison gases, originally chlorine
and later phosgene, diphosgene and mustard gas. They
also used relatively small amounts of the irritant gases
chloromethyl chloroformate, chloropicrin, bromacetone
and ethyl iodoacetate. Gases were frequently mixed, for
example white star was the name given to a mixture of
equal volumes of chlorine and phosgene, the chlorine
helping to spread the denser but more toxic phosgene.
Despite the technical developments, chemical weapons
suered from diminishing eectiveness as the war progressed because of the protective equipment and training
which the use engendered on both sides. See Use of poison gas in World War I.
After the war, the Royal Air Force dropped mustard gas
on Bolshevik troops in 1919, and Winston Churchill, secretary of state for war and air, suggested that the RAF use
it in Iraq in 1920 during a major revolt there. Historians
are divided as to whether or not gas was in fact used.* [9]
The UK ratied the Geneva Protocol on 9 April 1930.
The UK signed the Chemical Weapons Convention on 13
January 1993 and ratied it on 13 May 1996.

A Trident missile launched from a submerged ballistic missile


submarine.

marines armed with nuclear-tipped Trident missiles. The


principle of operation is based on maintaining deterrent
eect by always having at least one submarine at sea, and
was designed during the Cold War period. One submarine is normally undergoing maintenance and the remaining two are in port or on training exercises.

Despite the signing of the Geneva Protocol, the UK carried out extensive testing of chemical weapons from the
early 1930s onwards. In the Rawalpindi experiments,
hundreds of Indian soldiers were exposed to mustard gas
in an attempt to determine the appropriate dosage to use
on battleelds. Many of the subjects suered severe Each submarine carries up to sixteen Trident II D-5 missiles, which can each carry up to twelve warheads, for
burns from their exposure to the gas.* [10]

4.30. UNITED KINGDOM


a maximum of 192 warheads per sub. However, the
British government announced in 1998 that each submarine would carry only 48 warheads (halving the limit specied by the previous government), which is an average of
three per missile. However one or two missiles per submarine are probably armed with fewer warheads forsubstrategicuse causing others to be armed with more.
The British-designed warheads are thought to be selectable between 0.3 kilotons, 510 kt and 100 kt; the
yields obtained using either the unboosted primary, the
boosted primary, or the entire physics package. The
United Kingdom has purchased the rights to 58 missiles
under the Polaris Sales Agreement (modied for Trident)
from the United States Navy'spool. These missiles are
tted with United Kingdombuilt warheads and are exchanged when requiring maintenance. Under the agreement the United States was given certain assurances by
the UK regarding the use of the missiles, however the
United States does not have any veto on the use of British
nuclear weapons.* [11]
The United Kingdom is one of the veNuclear Weapons
States(NWS) under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty, which the UK ratied in 1968.

257

[3] Status of World Nuclear Forces Federation of American


Scientists
[4] Crawford, Native Americans of the Pontiac's War, 245
250
[5] Phillip M. White (June 2, 2011). American Indian
Chronology: Chronologies of the American Mosaic.
Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 44.
[6] D. Hank Ellison (August 24, 2007). Handbook of Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents. CRC Press. p. 123140. ISBN 0-8493-1434-8.
[7] Changing Direction: British Military Planning for Postwar Strategic Defence, 1942-47 by Julian Lewis
[8] Fenton, Ben (2005-09-20). Trawler steamed into germ
warfare site and no one said a word. London: Daily
Telegraph. Retrieved 26 May 2010.
[9] British Relations with Iraq. BBC News. February 10,
2003.
[10] Rosenberg, Jennifer (September 4, 2007).Mustard Gas
Tested on Indian Soldiers.
[11] Assistant Director (Deterrence Policy) (19 July 2005),

Freedom of Information request about the UK nuclear deThe UK permits the U.S. to deploy nuclear weapons from
terrent (PDF), Ministry of Defence, retrieved 2013-11-20
its territory, the rst having arrived in 1954.* [12] During
the 1980s nuclear armed USAF Ground Launched Cruise [12] Hans M. Kristensen (February 1978), History of the CusMissiles were deployed at RAF Greenham Common and
tody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons: July 1945
RAF Molesworth. As of 2005 it is believed that about
through September 1977, U.S. Department of Defense, retrieved 2006-05-23
110 tactical B61 nuclear bombs are stored at RAF Lakenheath for deployment by USAF F-15E aircraft.* [13]
[13] Hans M. Kristensen (February 2005), U.S. Nuclear

In March 2007, the UK Parliament voted to renew the


Weapons in Europe (PDF), Natural Resources Defense
Council, retrieved 2006-05-23
country's Trident nuclear submarine system at a cost of
20bn.* [14] In July 2008, The Guardian claimed that the
[14] Trident plan wins Commons support, BBC News, March
decision had already been made to replace and upgrade
14, 2007, retrieved 2006-05-23
Britain's nuclear warhead stockpile at a cost of 3bn, extending the life of the warheads until 2055.* [15]
[15] Britain plans to spend 3bn on new nuclear warheads
, The Guardian (London), 25 July 2008

4.30.4

Radiological weapons

[16] Radiological weapon

The United Kingdom tested a 1 kiloton bomb incorpo- 4.30.7 External links
rating a small amount of cobalt as an experimental radiochemical tracer at their Tadje testing site in Maralinga
Video archive of the UK's Nuclear Testing at
range, Australia on September 14, 1957.* [16]
sonicbomb.com

4.30.5

See also

British Armed Forces

4.30.6

References

[1] The British Nuclear Stockpile, 1953-2013, Bulletin of


the Atomic Scientists, 1 July 2013
[2] http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datainx.asp

FAS bulletin
The Nuclear Threat Initiative on the United Kingdom
Churchill's Anthrax Bombs - A Debate by Julian
Lewis and Professor RV Jones
The Plan that Never Was: Churchill and the 'Anthrax Bomb' by Julian Lewis
Nuclear Files.org Current information on nuclear
stockpiles in the United Kingdom

258

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

4.31 United States

Land-based intercontinental
missiles, or ICBMs;

The United States is known to have possessed three


types of weapons of mass destruction: nuclear
weapons, chemical weapons, and biological weapons.
The U.S. is the only country to have used nuclear weapons
in combat in the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and
Nagasaki in World War II. It had secretly developed the
earliest form of the atomic weapon during the 1940s under the title "Manhattan Project".* [2] The United States
pioneered the development of both the nuclear ssion and
hydrogen bombs (the latter involving nuclear fusion). It
was the world's rst and only nuclear power for four years
before being joined in the "nuclear club" by the Soviet
Union. The United States has the second largest number
of deployed nuclear weapons in the world, after Russia.
*
[3]

Sea-based, nuclear submarine-launched


ballistic missiles, or SLBMs; and

4.31.1

Nuclear weapons

U.S. nuclear warhead stockpiles, 1945-2002.

Main article: Nuclear weapons and the United States


Nuclear weapons have been used twice in wartime: two
nuclear weapons were used by the United States against
Japan in World War II in the atomic bombings of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Altogether, the two bombings
killed an estimated 140,000 civilians and military personnel and injured another 130,000. The atomic bombings
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were the rst and only time
the U.S. employed weapons of mass destruction against
an enemy state in warfare.
The U.S. conducted an extensive nuclear testing program.
1,054 tests were conducted between 1945 and 1992. The
exact number of nuclear devices detonated is unclear because some tests involved multiple devices while a few
failed to explode or were designed not to create a nuclear
explosion. The last nuclear test by the United States was
on September 23, 1992; the U.S. has signed but not ratied the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

ballistic

Air-based nuclear weapons of the U.S.


Air Force's heavy bomber group
The United States is one of the ve Nuclear Weapons
Statesunder the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,
which the U.S. ratied in 1968. On October 13, 1999, the
U.S. Senate rejected ratication of the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty, having previously ratied the Partial
Test Ban Treaty in 1963. The U.S. has not, however,
tested a nuclear weapon since 1992, though it has tested
many non-nuclear components and has developed powerful supercomputers in an attempt to duplicate the knowledge gained from testing without conducting the actual
tests themselves.
In the early 1990s, the U.S. stopped developing new nuclear weapons and now devotes most of its nuclear efforts into stockpile stewardship, maintaining and dismantling its now-aging arsenal. The administration of George
W. Bush decided in 2003 to engage in research towards
a new generation of small nuclear weapons, especially
earth penetrators.* [4] The budget passed by the United
States Congress in 2004 eliminated funding for some
of this research including the "bunker-busting or earthpenetrating" weapons.
The exact number of nuclear weapons possessed by the
United States is dicult to determine. Dierent treaties
and organizations have dierent criteria for reporting nuclear weapons, especially those held in reserve, and those
being dismantled or rebuilt:
As of 1999, the U.S. was said to have
12,000 nuclear weapons of all types
stockpiled.* [5]
In its Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START) declaration for 2003, the U.S.
listed 5968 deployed warheads as dened
by START rules.* [6]
For 2007, the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists listed the U.S. with about 5,400
total nuclear warheads: around 3,575
strategic and 500 nonstrategic warheads;
and about 1,260 additional warheads held
in the inactive stockpile. Other warheads
are in some step of the disassembly process.* [7]
The exact number as of Sept. 30, 2009,
was 5,113 warheads, according to a U.S.
fact sheet released May 3, 2010.* [8]

Currently, the United States nuclear arsenal is deployed In 2002, the United States and Russia agreed in the SORT
in three areas:
treaty to reduce their deployed stockpiles to not more

4.31. UNITED STATES


than 2,200 warheads each. In 2003, the U.S. rejected
Russian proposals to further reduce both nation's nuclear
stockpiles to 1,500 each.* [9] In 2007, for the rst time
in 15 years, the United States built some new warheads.
These were to replace some older warheads as part of the
Minuteman III upgrade program.* [10] 2007 also saw the
rst Minuteman III missiles removed from service as part
of the drawdown. Overall, stockpiles and deployment
systems continue to decline in number under the terms
of the New START treaty.

259
single warhead missiles. However, since the abandonment of the START II treaty, the U.S. is said to be considering retaining 500 warheads on 450 missiles.* [10] The
U.S. goal under the SORT treaty is to reduce from 1,600
warheads deployed on over 500 missiles in 2003 to 500
warheads on 450 missiles in 2012. The rst Minuteman
III were removed under this plan in 2007 while, at the
same time, the warheads deployed on Minuteman IIIs began to be upgraded from smaller W62s to larger W87s
from decommissioned Peacekeeper missiles.* [10]

In 2014, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists released a re- The number of deployed Minuteman ICBMs are schedport, stating that there are a total of 2,530 warheads kept uled to reduce to 400 by 2018.* [12]
in reserve, and 2,120 actively deployed. Of the warheads
actively deployed, the number of strategic warheads rests
at 1,920 (subtracting 200 bombs that are deployed, Heavy bomber group
but are not consideredstrategic). The amount of warheads being actively disabled rests at about 2,700 warheads, which brings the total United States inventory to
about 7,400 warheads.* [11]
Land-based ICBMs

B-2 Spirit stealth strategic bomber.

The U.S. Air Force also operates a strategic nuclear


bomber eet. The bomber force consists of 93 B-52
Stratofortresses, and 20 B-2 Spirits. All 64 B-1s were
retrotted to operate in a solely conventional mode by
2007 and are no longer counted as nuclear platforms.
In addition to this, the U.S. military can also deploy
smallertacticalnuclear weapons either through cruise
missiles or with conventional ghter-bombers. The U.S.
maintains about 400 nuclear gravity bombs capable of use
by F-15, F-16, and F-35.* [10] Some 350 of these bombs
are deployed at seven airbases in six European NATO
countries;* [10] of these, 180 tactical B61 nuclear bombs
fall under a nuclear sharing arrangement.* [13]

A Minuteman III ICBM test launch.

The U.S. Air Force currently operates 450 ICBMs, located primarily in the northern Rocky Mountain states
and the Dakotas. These are all of the Minuteman III
ICBM variants. Peacekeeper missiles were phased out of
the Air Force inventory in 2005. All USAF Minuteman
II missiles have been destroyed in accordance with the
START treaty and their launch silos imploded and buried
then sold to the public. To comply with the START II
most U.S. multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, or MIRVs, have been eliminated and replaced with

As of 2014, 96 B-52s and B-2s may have nuclear weapons


deployed on them. The number of nuclear-capable deployed B-52s and B-2s will shrink to 60 by 2018.* [12]
Sea-based ICBMs
The U.S. Navy currently has 18 Ohio-class submarines
deployed, of which 14 are ballistic missile submarines.
Each submarine is equipped with a maximum complement of 24 Trident II missiles. Approximately 12
U.S. attack submarines were equipped to launch nuclear
Tomahawk missiles, but these weapons were removed
from service by 2013.* [14] Sea-launch weapons make up

260

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

USS Kentucky (SSBN-737), an Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine.

the majority of weapons declared under START II rules. E120 biological bomblet, developed before the U.S. ratied the
Some Trident missiles are equipped with the W88 war- Biological Weapons Convention.
head.
The number of Deployed and Non-Deployed SLBMs on Negotiations for a legally binding verication protocol
the Ohio-Class SSBNs as of 2014 is 336. This will shrink to the BWC proceeded for years. In 2001, negotiations
ended when the Bush administration rejected an eort by
by 2018 to 280, 240 which will be deployed.* [12]
other signatories to create a protocol for verication, arguing that it could be abused to interfere with legitimate
biological research.

4.31.2

Biological weapons

The U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious


Main article: United States biological weapons program Diseases, located in Fort Detrick, Maryland, produces
small quantities of biological agents, for use in biological
weapons defense research. According to the U.S. governThe United States oensive biological weapons program ment, this research is performed in full accordance with
was instigated by President Franklin Roosevelt and the the BWC.
U.S. Secretary of War in October 1941.* [15] Research
occurred at several sites. A production facility was built In September 2001, shortly after the September 11 terat Terre Haute, Indiana but testing with a benign agent rorist attacks on New York and Washington D.C. there
demonstrated contamination of the facility so no pro- was series of mysterious anthrax attacks aimed at U.S.
duction occurred during World War II.* [16] A more ad- media oces and the U.S. Senate which killed ve peovanced production facility was constructed in Pine Blu, ple. The anthrax used in the attacks was the Ames strain,
Arkansas, which began producing biological agents in which was rst studied at Fort Detrick and then dis1954. Fort Detrick, Maryland later became a production tributed to other labs around the world. See 2001 anthrax
facility as well as a research site. The U.S. developed anti- attacks for more information.
personnel and anti-crop biological weapons.* [17] Several deployment systems were developed including aerial
spray tanks, aerosol spray canisters, grenades, rocket 4.31.3 Chemical weapons
warheads and cluster bombs. (See also U.S. Biological
Main article: United States chemical weapons program
Weapon Testing)
In mid-1969, the UK and the Warsaw Pact, separately, introduced proposals to the UN to ban biological weapons,
which would lead to a treaty in 1972. The U.S. cancelled
its oensive biological weapons program by executive order in November 1969 (microorganisms) and February
1970 (toxins) and ordered the destruction of all oensive
biological weapons, which occurred between May 1971
and February 1973. The U.S. ratied the Geneva Protocol on January 22, 1975. The U.S. ratied the Biological
Weapons Convention (BWC) which came into eect in
March 1975.* [Kissinger 1969]

In World War I, the U.S. produced its own chemical munitions, including phosgene and mustard gas. The U.S.
only created about 4% of the total chemical weapons produced for that war and just over 1% of the era's most effective weapon, mustard gas. (U.S. troops suered less
than 6% of gas casualties.) Although the U.S. had begun a
large-scale production of Lewisite, for use in an oensive
planned for early 1919, in fact, the U.S. never deployed
any chemical weapons.* [18]* [19]
Chemical weapons were not used by the Allies or Ger-

4.31. UNITED STATES


many during World War II, but such weapons were deployed to Europe from the United States. In 1943, German bombers attacked the port of Bari in Southern Italy,
sinking several American ships among them John Harvey, which was carrying mustard gas. The presence of
the gas was highly classied, and, according to the U.S.
military account, Sixty-nine deaths were attributed in
whole or in part to the mustard gas, most of them American merchant seamenout of 628 mustard gas military
casualties.* [Navy 2006]* [Niderost] The aair was kept
secret at the time and for many years. After the war,
the U.S. both participated in arms control talks involving chemical weapons and continued to stockpile them,
eventually exceeding 30,000 tons of material.

261
ical weapons by sinking ships laden with the weapons in
the deep Atlantic. The U.S. began to research safer disposal methods for chemical weapons in the 1970s, destroying several thousand tons of mustard gas by incineration and nearly 4,200 tons of nerve agent by chemical
neutralization.* [25]
The U.S. entered the Geneva Protocol in 1975 (the same
time it ratied the Biological Weapons Convention). This
was the rst operative international treaty on chemical
weapons to which the U.S. was party. Stockpile reductions began in the 1980s, with the removal of some outdated munitions and destruction of the entire stock of
BZ beginning in 1988. In 1990, destruction of chemical
agents stored on Johnston Atoll in the Pacic began, seven
years before the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
came into eect. In 1986, President Ronald Reagan began removal of the U.S. stockpile of chemical weapons
from Germany* [26] (see Operation Steel Box). In 1991,
President George H.W. Bush unilaterally committed the
U.S. to destroying all chemical weapons and renounced
the right to chemical weapon retaliation.

In 1993, the U.S. signed the CWC, which required the


destruction of all chemical weapon agents, dispersal systems, chemical weapons production facilities by 2012.
Both Moscow and U.S. missed the CWC's extended
deadline of April 2012 to destroy all of their chemical weapons.* [27] The United States destroyed 89.75%
of the original stockpile of nearly 31,100 metric tons
(30,609 long tons) of nerve and mustard agents under the
terms
of the treaty.* [28] Chemical weapons destruction
Honest John missile warhead cutaway, showing M134 Sarin
resumed in 2015 with expected completion by 2023.* [29]
bomblets (photo c. 1960)
After the war, all of the former Allies pursued further
research on the three new nerve agents developed by 4.31.4 See also
the Nazis tabun, sarin, and soman. Over the following decades, thousands of American military volunteers
Defense Threat Reduction Agency - The U.S. Dewere exposed to warfare agents during Cold War testpartment of Defense's ocial Combat Support
ing programs, as well as in accidents. (In 1968, one
Agency for countering weapons of mass destruction.
such accident killed approximately 6,400 sheep when an
agent drifted out of Dugway Proving Ground during a
Dugway sheep incident
test.* [20]) The U.S. also investigated a wide range of
possible nonlethal, psychobehavioral chemical incapac Enduring Stockpile - the name of the United States's
itating agents including psychedelic indoles such as LSD
remaining arsenal of nuclear weapons following the
and marijuana derivatives, as well as several glycolate anend of the Cold War.
ticholinergics. One of the anticholinergic compounds,
3-quinuclidinyl benzilate, was assigned the NATO code
List of U.S. biological weapons topics
BZ and was weaponized at the beginning of the 1960s
for possible battleeld use. Alleged use of chemi Operation Paperclip - the codename under which
cal agents by the U.S. in the Korean (195053) and
the U.S. intelligence and military services extricated
Vietnam (1955-1975) Conicts has never been substanscientists from Germany, during and after the nal
tiated.* [21]* [22]* [23]
stages of World War II.
In late 1969, President Richard Nixon unilaterally re Russia and weapons of mass destruction
nounced the rst use of chemical weapons (as well as
all methods of biological warfare).* [24] He issued a uni United States Army Chemical Corps
lateral decree halting production and transport of chemical weapons which remains in eect. From 1967 to
United States missile defense
1970 in Operation CHASE, the U.S. disposed of chem-

262

4.31.5

CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES

References

[24] Biological Weapons Convention

[1] Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (PDF). Retrieved 5


March 2015.

[25] http://www.cma.army.mil/fndocumentviewer.aspx?
docid=003676901

[2] The world's nuclear stockpile. 7 April 2010.

[26] Broadus, James M., et al. The Oceans and Environmental


Security: Shared U.S. and Russian Perspectives, (Google
Books), p. 103, Island Press, 1994, (ISBN 1559632356),
accessed October 25, 2008.

[3] The world's nuclear stockpile. Aljazeera. 2010-04-07.


[4] BBC NEWS | Americas|Mini-nukes on US agenda
[5] Nuclear Forces Guide

[27] http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/11/us/
u-s-chemical-weapons/index.html

[6]
[7] U.S. nuclear forces, 2008 The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
[8] News article 3, May 2010

[28] Army Agency Completes Mission to Destroy Chemical


Weapons, USCMA, January 21, 2012
[29] US to restart chemical weapon neutralisation, chemistyworld, Nina Notman, 9 February 2015

[9] Nuclear Arms Control: The U.S.-Russian Agenda


[10] Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (PDF). Thebulletin.metapress.com. Retrieved 2013-03-30.
[11] http://m.bos.sagepub.com/content/70/1/85.full.pdf

* ^ Michael Barletta and Christina Ellington (1998).


Obtain Microbial Seed Stock for Standard or Novel
Agent. Iraq's Biological Weapons Program. Center
for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of
International Studies. Retrieved 2006-09-18.

[12] http://www.defense.gov/documents/
Fact-Sheet-on-US-Nuclear-Force-Structure-under-the-New-START-Treaty.
* ^ Center for Nonproliferation Studies (2003).
pdf
[13]Belgium, Germany Question U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe,
Oliver Meier,
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_06/Belgium_
Germany_Tactical.asp, June 2005
[14] US Navy Instruction Conrms Retirement of Nuclear
Tomahawk Cruise Missile.. Federation Of American
Scientists. Retrieved 24 October 2014.
[15] Committees on Biological Warfare, 1941-1948
[16] United States: Biological Weapons, https://fas.org/nuke/
guide/usa/cbw/bw.htm, Federation of American Scientists, October 19, 1998
[17] United States
[18] D. Hank Ellison (August 24, 2007). Handbook of Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents, Second Edition. CRC
Press. p. 456. ISBN 0-8493-1434-8.
[19] Hershberg, James G. (1993). James B. Conant : Harvard
to Hiroshima and the making of the nuclear age. Stanford,
Cal.: Stanford University Press. p. 47. ISBN 0-80472619-1.
[20] Is Military Research Hazardous To Veterans' Health?
Lessons Spanning Half A Century. December 8, 1994.
Report for the Committee On Veterans' Aairs

BW Agents. Iraq Prole. Nuclear Threat Initiative. Archived from the original on 2005-03-08.
Retrieved 2006-09-18.

* ^ Henry A. Kissinger (ca. November 1969).


Draft NSDM re United States Policy on Warfare
Program and Bacteriological/Biological Research
Program(PDF). Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC
Files. The National Security Archive. Retrieved
2006-09-18. Check date values in: |date= (help)
Note: Declassied United States Government Document
* ^ Naval Armed Guard Service: Tragedy at Bari,
Italy on December 2, 1943. Frequently Asked
Questions. United States Department of the Navy,
Naval Historical Center. August 8, 2006. Retrieved
2006-09-18. Note Original Source: Oce of the
Chief of Naval Operations. History of the Armed
Guard Aoat, World War II.(Washington, 1946):
166-169.
* ^ Niderost, Eric.German Raid on Bari. World
War II. Retrieved 2006-09-18. Note Original URL
redirected to the URL shown here; article lacks date
or volume reference.

[21] 007 Incapacitating Agents


[22] Julian Ryall (10 June 2010). Did the US wage germ
warfare in Korea?". London: Daily Telegraph. Retrieved
2010-06-15.
[23] North Korea Persists in 54 year-old Disinformation.
US Department of State. 9 Nov 2005. Archived from the
original on 2005-11-12. Retrieved 2005-11-12.

4.31.6 External links


New START Treaty Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Oensive Arms
Video archive of the US's Nuclear Testing at
sonicbomb.com

4.31. UNITED STATES


Iraq links germs for weapons to U.S. and France
by Philip Shenon,The New York Times, March
16, 2003 late edition nal, section 1, p. 18, retrieved
October 8, 2006
United States Nuclear Forces Guide
Abolishing Weapons of Mass Destruction: Addressing Cold War and Other Wartime Legacies in the
Twenty-First Century By Mikhail S. Gorbachev
Nuclear Threat Initiative on United States (note:
wrongfully writes that the original commitment to
destroy all chemical weapons was for 2004 although
this deadline was only for 45% of the stockpiles)
Nuclear testing history
U.S. Army Chemical Weapons Agency website
Map of US WMD's from NY Indymedia
Nuclear Notebook: U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2006 by
Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen. Bulletin
of the Atomic Scientists, January/February 2006.
Lessons Lost, by Joseph Cirincione. Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists, November/December 2005.
Nuclear Files.org Current information on nuclear
stockpiles in the United States
U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe: New report provides unprecedented details Nukestrat, February
2005
Putin: U.S. pushing others into nuclear ambitions
(February 2007)
New nuclear warhead design for US
U.S. government settles on design for new nuclear
warheads
US announces plans to build new nuclear warheads
U.S. picks design for new generation of nuclear warheads
Bush administration picks Lawrence Livermore
warhead design
Trends in U.S. Nuclear Policy - analysis by William
C. Potter, IFRI Proliferation Papers n11, 2005
The Woodrow Wilson Center's Nuclear Proliferation International History Project or NPIHP is a
global network of individuals and institutions engaged in the study of international nuclear history
through archival documents, oral history interviews
and other empirical sources.

263

Chapter 5

Treaties
5.1 List of weapons of mass de- 5.1.4 Chemical weapons
struction treaties
Main article: List of chemical arms control agreements
A variety of treaties and agreements have been enacted
to regulate the use, development and possession of var Brussels Convention on the Law and Customs of
ious types of weapons of mass destruction. Treaties
War (not adopted but relevant language incorpomay regulate weapons use under the customs of war
rated into Hague Convention)
(Hague Conventions, Geneva Protocol), ban specic
types of weapons (Chemical Weapons Convention, Bi Chemical Weapons Convention
ological Weapons Convention), limit weapons research
Geneva Protocol
(Partial Test Ban Treaty, Comprehensive Nuclear-TestBan Treaty), limit allowable weapons stockpiles and de Hague Convention
livery systems (START I, SORT) or regulate civilian
use of weapon precursors (Chemical Weapons Conven Strasbourg Agreement
tion, Biological Weapons Convention). The history of
weapons control has also included treaties to limit eec Treaty of Versailles
tive defense against weapons of mass destruction in order
Washington Naval Treaty
to preserve the deterrent doctrine of mutual assured destruction (Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty) as well as treaties
to limit the spread of nuclear technologies geographically
(African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty, Nuclear 5.1.5 Nuclear weapons
Non-Proliferation Treaty).
Non-proliferation

5.1.1

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear


Material

General

Non-Proliferation Treaty

Environmental Modication Convention

Seabed Arms Control Treaty

Protocol I and Protocol II of the Geneva Conventions

Outer Space Treaty


Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency

5.1.2

Delivery systems

International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (not a treaty)

By region Main article: Nuclear-weapon-free zone

African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty

5.1.3

Antarctic Treaty

Biological weapons

Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone

Biological Weapons Convention

Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany

Geneva Protocol
264

5.1. LIST OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION TREATIES

265

Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in


Latin America and the Caribbean

Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical


Weapons

South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone

General Purpose Criterion

South Pacic Nuclear Free Zone Treaty


Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty
IndiaUnited States Civil Nuclear Agreement
Weapons limitation
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty
Fissile Material Cut-o Treaty (not completed)
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
McCloyZorin Accords
Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
SALT I (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks)
SALT II
Strategic Oensive Reductions Treaty (SORT)
START I (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty)
START II
START III (not completed)
New START (2010)
Cooperation
1958 USUK Mutual Defence Agreement
Nassau Agreement
Polaris Sales Agreement
Quebec Agreement (with Canada)

5.1.6

See also

Arms control
Nuclear arms race
Nuclear-free zone
Nuclear proliferation
Nuclear weapon
Nuclear warfare
Nuclear-weapon-free zone
International Atomic Energy Agency

Chapter 6

Text and image sources, contributors, and


licenses
6.1 Text
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266

6.1. TEXT

267

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Sue Rangell, AlleborgoBot, Padness, Isis07, Fatboy112, Ztshp, Choppen5, Lightbreather, Tiddly Tom, FrikaC, Gerakibot, Yintan, Vanished User 8a9b4725f8376, Wizzard2k, Lhs12, Ageslimit, Lightmouse, Int21h, Anyeverybody, Sergiogr, Escape Orbit, Sasha Callahan,
Martarius, Sfan00 IMG, Zear+shauna, ClueBot, Avenged Eightfold, Tennehoun, The Thing That Should Not Be, Littlenate2470, Come to
paddy, Dlabtot, Termine, Evilgmk102, Boing! said Zebedee, Nanobear~enwiki, Harland1, Technosurfer, Otolemur crassicaudatus, John
J. Bulten, Passargea, Pinaul, SamuelTheGhost, Dr. B. R. Lang, Excirial, Eeekster, Itsjustme3506, Spartan203, Coinmanj, PointedArrow, L.tak, Legacypac, Etip, Usbdriver, Joeawfjdls453, Jellysh dave, Aitias, Versus22, SoxBot III, Apparition11, So7a, DumZiBoT,
XLinkBot, Feinoha, MensaDropout, Doc9871, SilvonenBot, Badgernet, WikiDao, Gazimo, SkyLined, Shrewczar, Addbot, Sesslar20,
Slimybilly, SHUBH 2008, Don'tKnowItAtAll, CurtisSwain, Betterusername, Non-dropframe, Tom Ketchum, Fieldday-sunday, CanadianLinuxUser, Ccacsmss, LAAFan, Punkrockpiper, Exor674, Herr Gruber, Arunrama, Y3nngy0, Tide rolls, Adhirk, Crusademedia, Jarble,
CountryBot, Nachbarnebenan, Legobot, Luckas-bot, Yobot, VengeancePrime, Kartano, Sprachpeger, Mauler90, Donfbreed, Bill Ladd,
AnomieBOT, 1exec1, VX, Galoubet, Materialscientist, Vitold Muratov, Primalchaos3, Cd89go, GB fan, ArthurBot, B. Fairbairn, Xqbot,
Cureden, Capricorn42, Bihco, Punkrokpiper, Bodinagamin, Srich32977, Wieninger, Tsuchida54, Sugoi47, Mark Schierbecker, RibotBOT,
Kyng, Amaury, Level3, Nukillis, A.amitkumar, XRealistX, 58Extraten, FrescoBot, Pepper, Trinity54, Hanoidan, Gwitt16, Ben76266, BenzolBot, CircleAdrian, Atlantia, PigFlu Oink, NTTScooch, Pinethicket, Jonesey95, Hamtechperson, RedBot, 6partaker, James Doehring,
Latricerocks, Retired user 0001, Lotje, Factchequer, Reaper Eternal, Jerd10, Tbhotch, Minimac, Floppy Face, DARTH SIDIOUS 2,
Peacock486, RjwilmsiBot, DexDor, DRAGON BOOSTER, Frankfortin, EmausBot, John of Reading, Orphan Wiki, Nima1024, Johnjeffcoat, Immunize, Ajraddatz, Nuujinn, Super48paul, Active Banana, Carlos9841, Tommy2010, Wikipelli, Thebirdlover, Akerans, Asorg,
Access Denied, H3llBot, Kipruso333, Jay-Sebastos, Joseph Maykish, Wikiolihaslam, Konboy, Manwoody, Insommia, DASHBotAV, Qwertyiscool1234567, Whoop whoop pull up, Chucknorris98, ClueBot NG, Catlemur, Vacation9, Reilly O'Baba, Widr, Starchyapple, Names
are hard to think of, Novusuna, Titodutta, Ramaksoud2000, Chubbymuns7, BG19bot, Suthechamp, Hallows AG, Amp71, KendallK1, Aaron Tovish, Spielberg00, Sebastian505, MrBill3, Bhettinga, Tungstic, Kydon Shadow, AVG1998, BattyBot, Cyberbot II, Jray310,
SD5bot, Ducknish, Dominiktesla, Mysterious Whisper, XXzoonamiXX, Lugia2453, The Anonymouse, Minecraft42, Epicgenius, Imnmgriefer, Sonanto, Eyesnore, VDisney785, 123awesomeme, Tango303, Oysvorf, Antiochus the Great, Kunibertus, IQ125, Ugog Nizdast,
Limnalid, Digimaster002, Mebeingyou, Azure Anteater, Darktedybear, Skr15081997, Alpaca7, Nimish27582987, 69mayHurt, Narliu,
Institution of Mass Destruction and Pure Evil, KasparBot, Catman4891, MrFuzzehly and Anonymous: 953
Biological warfare Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biological_warfare?oldid=679548954 Contributors: AxelBoldt, Magnus
Manske, Trelvis, LC~enwiki, Mav, Bryan Derksen, Timo Honkasalo, Koyaanis Qatsi, Malcolm Farmer, Andre Engels, Roadrunner,
Heron, Ram-Man, Lorenzarius, Zocky, Lexor, DopeshJustin, Dante Alighieri, Gabbe, TakuyaMurata, Bon d'une cythare, Mbessey,
Minesweeper, NuclearWinner, Ihcoyc, Kingturtle, Darkwind, Astudent, Ghewgill, Darkonc, Adam Bishop, PaulinSaudi, Andrevan, Viajero, Ike9898, Sue D. Nymme, GulDan, Morwen, Thue, Raul654, Francs2000, Kulkuri, Robbot, Astronautics~enwiki, Moriori, Korath,
RedWolf, Psychonaut, Lowellian, SEKIUCHI, Mirv, Nilmerg, Hadal, JesseW, Wikibot, Wereon, Vikingstad, Reytan, Wayland, Dave6,
Giftlite, FleaPlus, Everyking, Varlaam, Dmmaus, Get-back-world-respect, Matthead, Deus Ex, JRR Trollkien, Wmahan, Chowbok, Geni,
Antandrus, Jossi, Aequo, Ellsworth, Imjustmatthew, Discospinster, ElTyrant, Rich Farmbrough, Pjacobi, Vsmith, Zen-master, ArnoldReinhold, Paul August, Stereotek, Bender235, Terrapin, ReallyNiceGuy, Dpotter, CanisRufus, El C, Walden, Kross, Chairboy, Aude, RoyBoy,
Palm dogg, Richard Cane, Thu, Bobo192, Sentience, Harald Hansen, Infocidal, Smalljim, Nectarowed, Clawson, MITalum, Sriram sh,
Roy da Vinci, Obradovic Goran, Nsaa, OGoncho, Jumbuck, Preuninger, Danski14, Alansohn, Eleland, LtNOWIS, Great Scott, SlimVirgin, Rwendland, Kelson Vibber, Wtmitchell, Velella, TaintedMustard, Evil Monkey, Netkinetic, Kelba, Ceyockey, Dtobias, Bacteria, Guy
M, Madchester, Pol098, Ruud Koot, Firien, JRHorse, Bluemoose, SDC, Hughcharlesparker, MarcoTolo, Graham87, Cuvtixo, WBardwin,
Magister Mathematicae, Ketiltrout, Sj, Rjwilmsi, Koavf, Azwethinkweizm, Josiah Rowe, TAS, Chemo~enwiki, Tomtheman5, Dar-Ape,
MChew, FlaBot, Mirror Vax, Ground Zero, TheMidnighters, Harmil, Nivix, RexNL, Kolbasz, EronMain, Scott Mingus, Chobot, Bgwhite,
Gwernol, Roboto de Ajvol, YurikBot, Wavelength, Crotalus horridus, Eraserhead1, Sceptre, Jlittlet, RussBot, Apzelic, Epolk, DanMS,
Rsrikanth05, Thane, NawlinWiki, -OOPSIE-, Grafen, Johann Wolfgang, Rjensen, Endurance, Zagalejo, Riczan, Wangi, 3 Lwi, Cinik,
Woling, Haemo, Cstaa, Tonym88, Wknight94, Mugunth Kumar, Nikkimaria, Theda, Arthur Rubin, NHSavage, Reid Kirby, Cassini83,
CWenger, Jack Upland, Meegs, Zvika, Borisbaran, Sardanaphalus, SmackBot, AndreniW, IddoGenuth, Nsayer, Reedy, Prodego, CSZero,
Chronodm, ComaDivine, Gilliam, Hmains, Skizzik, Autarch, Johannjs, Tree Biting Conspiracy, PrimeHunter, DHN-bot~enwiki, Darth
Panda, Rucky, Snowmanradio, Addshore, Krich, Nakon, Localzuk, Kai Barry, Ohconfucius, Mcgowan30, NessieVL, Mouse Nightshirt,
SuperTycoon, Bic1313, Khazar, John, Soumya92, Gobonobo, Breno, Joelo, NYCJosh, Ocatecir, PseudoSudo, Nobunaga24, Tasc,
Jon186, Ahmetcosar, MTSbot~enwiki, Mollyb07, Dl2000, Hu12, D. C. Brescia, Fredil Yupigo, Twas Now, Radiant chains, Tawkerbot2, Jon m, Chris55, Lahiru k, Alexander Iwaschkin, Liam Skoda, CmdrObot, Mattbr, JarredLAX, Searles2sels, Runningonbrains, Jesse
Viviano, ShelfSkewed, MarsRover, Zozoz, Meodipt, Akshayshah, Danrok, Go229, Khatru2, Tec15, Caris42, Chasingsol, Nebarnix, ID
burn, JCO312, Nabokov, Cancun771, Casliber, BetacommandBot, JamesAM, Thijs!bot, Wandalstouring, Epbr123, Barticus88, Cfenton,
Hcberkowitz, Leedeth, John robinson, John254, Neilajh, James086, Escarbot, AntiVandalBot, Seaphoto, Jj137, TimVickers, Luxomni,
LibLord, Throughyourteeth, Myanw, Siobhan2, Eleos, JAnDbot, Husond, MER-C, The Transhumanist, Airbreather, Flying tiger, RebelRobot, CarolineBogart, Z22, Jaysweet, Bongwarrior, Kolindigo, VoABot II, Meredyth, Psy wombats, Sivart345, Sodabottle, Redwoodseed, Bubba hotep, Santa naz, EagleFan, Styrofoam1994, Valerius Tygart, IvoShandor, Scottalter, Arjun01, Blacken, Psycherhexic, R'n'B,
MapleTree, Fconaway, Jarhed, Nuclearfusion, Tgeairn, Pharaoh of the Wizards, Jwichman, Falkvinge, Maurice Carbonaro, Cdamama,
Hodja Nasreddin, Rawr1337, Dispenser, Ncmvocalist, TheTrojanHought, JayJasper, Adamdaley, The Transhumanist (AWB), QuickClown,
Ko Soi IX, Warlordbcm1, Frescohen, ChaoticGhost, Lifeboatpres, AzureCitizen, DorganBot, Xpanzion, Egghead06, DSRH, Sonnyp,
Philip Trueman, DoorsAjar, TXiKiBoT, Oshwah, Mercy, Gag5678, SlateGrey, A4bot, Sarenne, Andres rojas22, Lechatjaune, Lexington50, Cessc, Anna Lincoln, Tricky Wiki44, Don4of4, PKDASD, MarkMarek, LeaveSleaves, UnitedStatesian, , Jbutler18, Meters, AjitPD, Burntsauce, Kermanshahi, Jake73, Brianga, Bobo The Ninja, Doc James, EmxBot, Statesman 88, Defender 911, SieBot,
StAnselm, Coee, Waldhorn, Becook, Afmayor, Mcmchugh99, Oxymoron83, Rohansh121, Lightmouse, Salex1093, Fratrep, Belligero,
StaticGull, Mario ami, Martarius, ClueBot, Deviator13, Binksternet, Jackollie, GeneCallahan, Jan1nad, Mgreenham, Chessy999, Uncle
Milty, Niccobb, Niceguyedc, Otolemur crassicaudatus, Trivialist, Cirt, Arunsingh16, Auntof6, Ahmed91981, Excirial, Jusdafax, Diplodoc,
Etip, CowboySpartan, Thingg, Porkins8888, Aitias, 7, Versus22, Calvince19, Goodvac, DumZiBoT, Canadian Monkey, Digiweb, AgnosticPreachersKid, EnWikinombre, Shadow600, Vanilla Subpoena, WikHead, Sonyray, Snapperman2, Thomassayslearningissofun,
Kitkatkatkit, Addbot, Betterusername, Eichikiyama, Nohomers48, AkhtaBot, Martindo, Download, Debresser, Gpeterw, Green Squares,

268

CHAPTER 6. TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

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Librsh, Donfbreed, Guy1890, THEN WHO WAS PHONE?, Tempodivalse, Catiline63, ZapThunderstrike, DiverDave, Disturbedstudent, AnomieBOT, Basilwoon08, Anne McDermott, Dogwood123, 1exec1, Haroldco, Kingpin13, Materialscientist, The High Fin Sperm
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Shoey, Zereshk, Axeman89, Trick, Markaci, Feezo, James I Hall, Woohookitty, Bellhalla, TigerShark, TomTheHand, Deeahbz, Kilter, Ruud Koot, Jrkarp, Kelisi, Valkyrian Einherjar, Chris Buckey, Wayward, Jon Harald Sby, Tokek, FuckingHero, Karam.Anthony.K,
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Borbrav, Badagnani, Sekhui, Rjensen, Dmoss, Rmky87, Lockesdonkey, BOT-Superzerocool, Karl Meier, Bota47, Wknight94, SamuelRiv,
Yummy123, Theda, NHSavage, De Administrando Imperio, Tevildo, Daschtrois, CWenger, Fram, Nick-D, DVD R W, Sardanaphalus,
Vanka5, SmackBot, Roger Davies, Pavlovi, Pgk, Ikip, KocjoBot~enwiki, Thunderboltz, Bwithh, Delldot, Cla68, Edgar181, Cool3, Peter
Isotalo, Gilliam, Folajimi, Hmains, Betacommand, YMB29, Chris the speller, Master Jay, Keegan, Persian Poet Gal, MalafayaBot, Hibernian, Moshe Constantine Hassan Al-Silverburg, Deli nk, Sadads, DHN-bot~enwiki, MercZ, Rcbutcher, Can't sleep, clown will eat me, OrphanBot, Buttered Bread, TKD, Ryanluck, El guero, Mayooresan, Jwy, MartinCollin, Sammy1339, A5b, Ligulembot, Zeamays, Pilotguy,
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6.1. TEXT

269

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270

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6.1. TEXT

271

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tensor, Philip Trueman, Zidonuke, Chris-marsh-usa, Britsin, Martin451, Sniperz11, LeaveSleaves, E.P.Y. Foundation, Dranate, Agent
of the Reds, Dylock, Andy Dingley, Haziq191, Mil Insights, Turgan, Nonprowonk, NPguy, AlleborgoBot, InconX, Brenont, Sonicology,
Henrypen, Triwbe, Smsarmad, Boxingame, Radon210, Nopetro, Rdacteur Tibet, Steven Crossin, Megansmith18, Int21h, Abrichte, Mtys, Svick, FifeOpp08, ClueBot, Lothar of the Hill People, The Thing That Should Not Be, Ewawer, Mild Bill Hiccup, Polyamorph,
Excirial, Jusdafax, NuclearWarfare, L.tak, Bracton, Etip, Razorame, Versus22, DumZiBoT, Spitre, Alexius08, Lkcutler, Addbot, AlbertEin, Tassedethe, Lightbot, Legobot, AzureFury, AnomieBOT, DemocraticLuntz, Materialscientist, Citation bot, Htomelds, Quebec99, Schnugglepu, Nicholbb, Omnipaedista, Erujiu12, LivingBot, LOLthulu, Ehorn86, Anhaidao, 58Extraten, FrescoBot, GenericBob,
Trinity54, Ironboy11, Hotstu29, Saimondo, Citation bot 1, PigFlu Oink, Travoltamarch, Lineslarge, Poliphile, Bcs09, Utility Monster,
TobeBot, Silenceisgod, Vrenator, Grantbonn, SEVEREN, Suusion of Yellow, ArwinJ, RjwilmsiBot, John of Reading, Immunize, Boundarylayer, Agsrivaths, Dewritech, Brookstcollins, GoingBatty, Memarshall, Kh2reed, Espbu, H3llBot, DBG Heuser, Mrfrodo96, Araliist,
WingsGoesWiki, Kamilhamad, ClueBot NG, Kevin Gorman, Asukite, Ozymandias495, Widr, ClaireFanch, Helpful Pixie Bot, Joe Bodacious, Technical 13, D Namtar, Weird.Tesseract, Mgilb4, BattyBot, Teammm, Nawaz Ali seeni, FiveFourTwo, Cyberbot II, Davidchallmd,
GoShow, SD5bot, Khazar2, Webclient101, SFK2, Thomasedoyle2, Nomian, Hillbillyholiday, Colecrazy1, AndyHarwell, Jamesmcmahon0, Evano1van, EvergreenFir, Akuri, Gafeg, Coercive Diplomacy, Gavleson, SassyVoldy, Monkbot, Bobsbugsbegone2014, KH-1, Jtxxtj,
Leblan.evan18, WordsDontBue, Arson23333 and Anonymous: 383
Chemical weapon proliferation Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chemical_weapon_proliferation?oldid=675412588 Contributors:
Rmhermen, Jdlh, Plop, Darrien, Edcolins, Shahab, Altmany, Cmdrjameson, Rd232, Ynhockey, Rwendland, ClockworkSoul, SDC, Mirror Vax, Russavia, Wiki alf, Danlaycock, Deville, Sardanaphalus, SmackBot, Chris the speller, Martin Blank, Can't sleep, clown will eat
me, Bolivian Unicyclist, Goatchurch, Oo7565, Uchohan, Geniac, Sebras, Puddhe, Valerius Tygart, Oh Snap, MarkMarek, NEThomasYoung, CarlosPn, Jeanschindler, ClueBot, Plastikspork, Chrisrev, Auntof6, Gtstricky, Micmachete, Lightbot, Drpickem, Yobot, Guy1890,
AnomieBOT, Travoltamarch, Full-date unlinking bot, IRISZOOM, John of Reading, ClaireFanch, BG19bot, Katangais, Erlbaeko, FrederickE, BattyBot, Factsearch, XXzoonamiXX, Pvpoodle, Ttlaz123, Gavleson and Anonymous: 24
List of missiles by country Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_missiles_by_country?oldid=679095727 Contributors: Rlandmann, Wernher, Riddley, Alan Liefting, Urhixidur, Karl Dickman, Darren Olivier, Loren36, RJHall, Joshbaumgartner, Andrew Gray,
Rwendland, RJFJR, BDD, Strongbow, Tabletop, GraemeLeggett, Graham87, BD2412, JIP, Search4Lancer, Ketiltrout, Wikiliki, Scimitar,
Bgwhite, Borgx, Gaius Cornelius, Muruga86, Welsh, Megapixie, Black Falcon, MaeseLeon, Sardanaphalus, SmackBot, Deon Steyn, Dual
Freq, Ajay ijn, TheGerm, OrphanBot, Lord Eru, Tdrss, Nkcs, MilborneOne, Joelo, Melody Concerto, Alan.ca, Iridescent, FairuseBot, Nobleeagle, Mmab111, DangerousPanda, The ed17, MarsRover, AndrewHowse, Necessary Evil, CMarshall, DumbBOT, Monster
eagle, JamesAM, Sulaimandaud, DPdH, Mentisto, Seaphoto, Marokwitz, Alphachimpbot, Sarmadys, Robina Fox, Chanakyathegreat,
Dildar Hussain, Two way time, Askari Mark, AtticusX, JamesBWatson, Flayer, Diego bf109, Jeroje, BilCat, Brucelipe, DerHexer, Adil
zia, Raza0007, Rettetast, R'n'B, CommonsDelinker, KTo288, Nono64, Luciferrr, Rebell18190, Nobuts, Kingj123, McSly, M-le-mot-dit,
Tatrgel, WOSlinker, Steventee, Sdsds, Sniperz11, Sreejith.V.K, Bahamut0013, 4wajzkd02, Skybolt101, Smsarmad, Flyer22, Zaibaslim,
JetLover, Jdaloner, Khvalamde, Dodger67, ImageRemovalBot, Martarius, Sfan00 IMG, Pyroash, Andremun, Manishearth, Socrates2008,
NuclearWarfare, Wprlh, Diaa abdelmoneim, Suyogaerospace, Ytzemach, Arjuna316, Harman malhotra, Jumentodonordeste, Addbot, Alfad, The Bushranger, Drpickem, Yobot, TaBOT-zerem, Tf-2000~enwiki, Hellblazzer, AnomieBOT, Flawedspirit, Materialscientist, The
High Fin Sperm Whale, Druid.raul, Midheridoc, The Banner, Johnxxx9, Chen Guangming, Kajowi, ChavacanBen, Hj108, Mittal.fdk,
Jonathon A H, Spongefrog, FrescoBot, Grand-Duc, Harsha363, Bharatgopal, Ghi1234, HamburgerRadio, Mjnaushad, Pinethicket, ImageTagBot, Supreme Deliciousness, Tumna, Newtboy99, Jackehammond, WildBot, Sasani2, John of Reading, Look2See1, Bahudhara,
Jimmy valentine, Tolly4bolly, , KazekageTR, Pushkar215, Wagnergms, ClueBot NG, Mukahmed20, Buklaodord, Snotbot, Widr, Mattise135, Lowercase sigmabot, Soue, Charon77, Vikash76543, Garsd, DSkauai, Jesapko, BattyBot, IcyEd, Speakingsh, Vvedjk, Epicgenius, D3L74, Tentinator, Sudhanshu Nimbalkar, MrLinkinPark333, Kunalrks, RobDuch, JaconaFrere, Araviee EZ, PersianFire, Nicky
mathew, Nehakangri, Kashish Arora, Ellis.Donnie, Warrior Covert, Mustafa Ispahani, ParasVishwakarma, Squiver, 21lima and Anonymous: 232

272

CHAPTER 6. TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

Albania and weapons of mass destruction Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Albania_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction?oldid=


626217199 Contributors: Rmhermen, Seegoon, Sardanaphalus, SmackBot, C.Fred, Yonatan, Buckshot06, Nigel Ish, Smsarmad, SH84,
Addbot, Jarble, Luckas-bot, Yobot, JackieBot, Xqbot, Mynameinc, DrilBot, Vinie007, Full-date unlinking bot, Dinamik-bot, BurtAlert,
Scientic29, Infoman2264, Limnalid and Anonymous: 11
Algeria and weapons of mass destruction Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Algeria_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction?oldid=
655119191 Contributors: Skysmith, Reisio, Rjwilmsi, MZMcBride, FayssalF, Ytrottier, Milliped, Sardanaphalus, SmackBot, Reedy Bot,
Cromdog, Je G., Judge Nutmeg, NPguy, Patrick Rogel, Fireinacrowdedtheatre, Addbot, DOI bot, Jarble, Leosls, Materialscientist, Jalal
nali, Mynameinc, Atomicgurl00, Citation bot 1, Rotblats09, Trappist the monk, Dzlinker, Limnalid, Monkbot, Mcavusoglu and Anonymous: 6
Argentina and weapons of mass destruction Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Argentina_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction?
oldid=666734661 Contributors: Rmhermen, Gabbe, Choster, Pablo-ores, Rwendland, Marianocecowski, Velella, Rjwilmsi, Ytrottier,
Welsh, Sanmarcos, Jor70, Sardanaphalus, SmackBot, Hibernian, EaglesFanInTampa, OneEuropeanHeart, Gryon, Nihil aliud scit necessitas quam vincere, JForget, DPdH, AntiVandalBot, Limongi, Veritek83, Hugo999, NPguy, El bot de la dieta, Addbot, Cambalachero,
Lightbot, Jarble, Sherlock4000, Jim1138, Materialscientist, Haylli, Mynameinc, Dolce Vita Evita, Rahlgd, 777sms, DASHBot, EmausBot,
John of Reading, SporkBot, ClueBot NG, Daviddwd, FiveFourTwo, FoCuSandLeArN, Limnalid and Anonymous: 37
Australia and weapons of mass destruction Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Australia_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction?oldid=
662178800 Contributors: Robert Merkel, Rmhermen, Securiger, Fastssion, Robert Brockway, PDH, Neutrality, Rich Farmbrough, Ylee,
Bobo192, Jakew, Denniss, SteinbDJ, Rjwilmsi, Ligulem, Ground Zero, Rissole, Hawkeye7, Dmoss, Bondegezou, Nick-D, Sardanaphalus,
SmackBot, Gilliam, Hmains, Konstable, Poclando, ReeseM, Xcomradex, Dl2000, Judgesurreal777, CmdrObot, Coolcamxl, Jackyd101,
Kozuch, AntiVandalBot, Majorly, Trakesht, Ling.Nut, Blah321, ElinneaG, Johnfos, Davehi1, Jack Merridew, AWeishaupt, ClueBot,
Nathan Laing, ShipFan, GPS73, XLinkBot, Chemicalnasties, Atethnekos, Hybrazil, Jarble, Leosls, Citation bot, Fusioned Capacity, Mynameinc, AndersonH.K., Anotherclown, GainLine, Dougofborg, HGGTS350, RjwilmsiBot, DASHBot, Rail88, Thunderbox16, H3llBot,
GJGardner, Frietjes, Helpful Pixie Bot, Commandandconquergenerals, ChrisGualtieri, Limnalid and Anonymous: 37
Brazil and weapons of mass destruction Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brazil_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction?oldid=
616899998 Contributors: Robert Merkel, Rmhermen, Gabbe, Frazzydee, Owen, Gidonb, Doidimais Brasil, Fastssion, Andycjp, Oneiros,
Oknazevad, D6, Antaeus Feldspar, AKGhetto, Rwendland, Dalillama, FrankGrigg, Kosher Fan, Hdante, Rjwilmsi, Tom-b, AlexCovarrubias, RussBot, Ralph Sleigh, Ludwiglessa~enwiki, Tne80, Sardanaphalus, SmackBot, Hibernian, Victor Lopes, Writtenonsand, Joseph
Solis in Australia, CmdrObot, Steve Dufour, Guinsberg, Spartaz, Ciao 90, IvoShandor, Limongi, Uncle Dick, InspectorTiger, Hugo999,
Ashesofman, NPguy, Lightmouse, ClueBot, Ktr101, Excirial, Salms, Sulista~enwiki, Mhsb, Addbot, Jarble, Luckas-bot, Luizdl, Mynameinc, Dolce Vita Evita, Rodrigogomesonetwo, Flarkins, Oli1944, Skyerise, Full-date unlinking bot, Zedmetal~enwiki, Rail88, ZroBot,
SporkBot, Orange Suede Sofa, ClueBot NG, FiveFourTwo, Limnalid, EMP90, Vieque and Anonymous: 48
Bulgaria and weapons of mass destruction Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bulgaria_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction?oldid=
657348181 Contributors: Sardanaphalus, Vasilken, Mukadderat, BranStark, Cryptic C62, Ryan4314, Magioladitis, R'n'B, Tourbillon,
Dthomsen8, Lightbot, Jarble, Yobot, Mynameinc, Matthewrbowker, ClueBot NG, Captain Ben Sisko and Anonymous: 10
Burma and weapons of mass destruction Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Myanmar_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction?oldid=
676334920 Contributors: Anthony Appleyard, Russavia, De Administrando Imperio, Nick-D, SmackBot, Midway, Jimmy Pitt, Cydebot,
Uthantofburma, Tourbillon, Lylefor, SieBot, JL-Bot, MystBot, Addbot, Jarble, AnomieBOT, Bluecanary99, Trust Is All You Need, Gazpr,
Quantumor, ClueBot NG, Joefromrandb, Factsearch, MarchOrDie, Rolf h nelson, Limnalid, Charlotte Aryanne and Anonymous: 4
Canada and weapons of mass destruction Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Canada_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction?oldid=
672092264 Contributors: Rmhermen, SimonP, Maury Markowitz, Edward, Gabbe, Aarchiba, Evercat, The Tom, David Newton, Yggdrasil,
IceKarma, Rhombus, MaGioZal, Fastssion, Ds13, Get-back-world-respect, Farside~enwiki, Telso, Madmagic, Plasma east, Hammersfan,
Klemen Kocjancic, N328KF, Zarxos, Ylee, CanisRufus, Sharkford, Viriditas, FlorianB, Pearle, Jason One, Alansohn, Sade, Rwendland,
Bsadowski1, DV8 2XL, Xtopher, RPIRED, Astator, Kelisi, Driftwoodzebulin, Mandarax, Rjwilmsi, SpNeo, Ligulem, Leithp, Whitlock,
Ground Zero, Wavelength, PollardMD, Ytrottier, Shell Kinney, Hawkeye7, Clam0p, DarkFireTaker, EverettColdwell, JQF, Motorx, NickD, Sardanaphalus, SmackBot, KnowledgeOfSelf, Srnec, Hmains, Dvermeirre, Elagatis, Hibernian, Megalophias, Ligulembot, Mazzawi,
Iridescent, Twas Now, Korandder, Themightyquill, Gba111, NorthernThunder, Sieurll, AgentPeppermint, Plane nutz, LindaWarheads,
HuntClubJoe, STBot, J.delanoy, Johnfos, Paranoid600, Ng.j, RucasHost, Sfan00 IMG, ClueBot, The Thing That Should Not Be, EoGuy,
Pgpotvin, Robomod, Lightbot, Jarble, Legobot, Yobot, AnomieBOT, Kingpin13, Leosls, YardsGreen, Nikolaou13, Jwaustin188, AV3000,
Mynameinc, Moxy, Spongefrog, FrescoBot, Loyalist Cannons, SpaceFlight89, WordsOnLitmusPaper, Full-date unlinking bot, Cnwilliams,
Diannaa, Lespin~enwiki, Slaja, Wikipelli, Housewatcher, TurtleMelody, Palaeozoic99, ClueBot NG, Leventio, Hofmic, Helpful Pixie Bot,
BG19bot, Bikemoose, MusikAnimal, Falkirks, Eric deslauriers, BattyBot, FourthLineGoon, ChrisGualtieri, Tandrum, XXzoonamiXX,
Stelma10, Microphonics, Limnalid, Monkbot, Asdklf;, Fuebaey, Lasvegasnevada123456789 and Anonymous: 110
People's Republic of China and weapons of mass destruction Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China_and_weapons_of_mass_
destruction?oldid=679462166 Contributors: Alex.tan, Rmhermen, Roadrunner, Dante Alighieri, Gabbe, Jiang, Kaihsu, Haukurth, Furrykef, Topbanana, Korath, Oberiko, Fastssion, TDC, Everyking, Get-back-world-respect, Gzornenplatz, Rjyanco, Deus Ex, Huaiwei,
Cynix, Neutrality, Bhugh, Atchom, Alistair1978, Bender235, Ylee, Mr. Billion, Surcouf, Giraedata, Sasquatch, Holdek, Sherurcij, Rwendland, Hohum, Hypo, Crosbiesmith, Robertl234, Ipcellon, John Hill, BD2412, Rjwilmsi, Koavf, Hitssquad, FayssalF, Kallemax, Ground Zero, Kolbasz, Chobot, Benlisquare, JWB, RussBot, Dreammaker182, Arado, John Smith's, Anders.Warga, Stephenb,
Grafen, Megapixie, Danlaycock, Efreeti, Dspradau, SkerHawx, Sardanaphalus, SmackBot, YellowMonkey, Hux, Squiddy, Chris the
speller, Bluebot, Ottawakismet, Ddrfreak103, Hibernian, Thewho~enwiki, Muzi, Bolivian Unicyclist, Nakon, Esw01407, JorisvS, Publicus, EdC~enwiki, Hu12, Quaeler, Joseph Solis in Australia, RekishiEJ, FairuseBot, Logical2u, Zyxi, AndrewHowse, Cydebot, Spylab,
Aldis90, RevolverOcelotX, Hcobb, Nick Number, Luna Santin, Amberina, SkoreKeep, Aliwalla, Ingolfson, Albany NY, VoABot II, IkonicDeath, Walle83, R'n'B, KTo288, Thedeadlypython, Skier Dude, Bernard S. Jansen, DadaNeem, Veritek83, Johnfos, Kyle the bot, Turgan,
Dncdncdnc, Lowbart, Interchange88, Happysailor, CarlosPn, PianoKeys, Gomeying, Oneforlogic, ClueBot, Fasettle, Wikievil666, Arunsingh16, Puchiko, Alexbot, Socrates2008, Coinmanj, Hadoooookin, Dekisugi, Zappa711, Rosywounds, DumZiBoT, Crazy Boris with a
red beard, Otherjoke~enwiki, Addbot, Quercus solaris, Lightbot, Jarble, Luckas-bot, Yobot, AnomieBOT, Leosls, Blitzoace, Capricorn42,
Chen Guangming, Mynameinc, Ruy Pugliesi, GrouchoBot, Parabellum101, Omar77, Gnomsovet, Atomicgurl00, RedBot, Full-date unlinking bot, Poliphile, Mr.98, RjwilmsiBot, EmausBot, John of Reading, TomahawkHunter, IronChloride, H3llBot, L1A1 FAL, ClueBot NG,
Redemptionless, Gcorral, Oddbodz, Helpful Pixie Bot, BattyBot, Hsasar, Choy4311, EuroCarGT, Dexbot, Frosty, Marvel1x1, Jamesmcmahon0, FreeWorldAdvocate, Kharkiv07, Limnalid, KOT-TOK, EMP90, Abattoir666, ICPSGWU, JW19335762743, YeOldeGentleman, Queso.robusto and Anonymous: 121

6.1. TEXT

273

France and weapons of mass destruction Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/France_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction?oldid=


677986465 Contributors: Rmhermen, Rickyrab, Dante Alighieri, Gabbe, KAMiKAZOW, Rlandmann, Julesd, CBDunkerson,
David.Monniaux, AlainV, RedWolf, Altenmann, Postdlf, Rebrane, Mattaschen, DocWatson42, Oberiko, Get-back-world-respect,
Tweenk, Deus Ex, Darksun, Rich Farmbrough, Rama, Bender235, Ylee, Surcouf, John Vandenberg, Lectonar, Rwendland, Max rspct,
Dziban303, Crosbiesmith, Boothy443, Tabletop, Deltabeignet, BD2412, Rjwilmsi, Angusmclellan, Wareq, Scorpionman, RussBot, Madcoverboy, Nirvana2013, Holycharly, Danlaycock, Caerwine, BorgQueen, Nick-D, Tssha, Sardanaphalus, SmackBot, Mairibot, Bluebot,
Baumfabrik, Hibernian, Moshe Constantine Hassan Al-Silverburg, Colonies Chris, N.MacInnes, MeekSaron, Matthew, Chcknwnm,
Steven X, Alan G. Archer, Deepred6502, Tazmaniacs, Isria, EdC~enwiki, Esurnir, Newsnightmeirion, Mombas, Headbomb, Tzar~enwiki,
Dawkeye, Nick Number, SkoreKeep, Ingolfson, T L Miles, Magioladitis, Canonymous, Puddhe, Shame On You, Clich Online, J.delanoy,
Trusilver, Maurice Carbonaro, Natobxl, Belovedfreak, DadaNeem, Hugo999, VolkovBot, Johnfos, Technopat, The Random Editor, Coee,
Malcolmxl5, Benea, Fasettle, Ewawer, Zoe0, Arunsingh16, Ktr101, DumZiBoT, Lemmey, Deineka, Addbot, West.andrew.g, OlEnglish,
Jarble, Legobot, Yobot, Legobot II, Kipoc, Jean.julius, AnomieBOT, Leosls, Citation bot, Der Statistiker, LilHelpa, 219.106 , Mkolberg, Mynameinc, GrouchoBot, Gnomsovet, Biem, Atomicgurl00, FrescoBot, Bambuway, Full-date unlinking bot, Rotblats09, Poliphile,
Cnwilliams, A p3rson, ISOGuru, Ancylostomiasis, MrTranscript, Italia2006, H3llBot, SporkBot, Sailsbystars, Ebehn, ClueBot NG, Deyoea, Frietjes, Poolcode, Mouloud47, BattyBot, FiveFourTwo, SD5bot, Khazar2, Kharkiv07, YiFeiBot, Limnalid, Hugginsian, Abattoir666,
Monkbot, WC Jay and Anonymous: 96
Germany and weapons of mass destruction Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Germany_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction?
oldid=656834220 Contributors: Robert Merkel, Edward, Gabbe, Kaihsu, Timwi, Gidonb, Christopher Parham, Marcika, Freakofnurture, Michael Zimmermann, Mani1, JustPhil, Boelthorn, Darwinek, Mailer diablo, Rwendland, Alai, Jun-Dai, Mandarax, SchuminWeb,
Mark83, Russavia, DoomBringer, RussBot, Ospalh, Wknight94, American2, Sardanaphalus, SmackBot, The one092001, Hibernian,
Dl2000, Judgesurreal777, CMarshall, NorthernThunder, Cancun771, MPorciusCato, Asen y2k, Lost Boy, PresN, Jamesparkin, Roches,
JaGa, IvoShandor, DGG, Halmstad, Je G., Nubin wiki, Dreamafter, Lightmouse, Alex.muller, Matthiasb, Mlas, Tocca, Fluernutter,
Lightbot, Jarble, Yobot, Reenem, Full-date unlinking bot, Suusion of Yellow, GermanJoe, ClueBot NG, Treva26, Altar, XXzoonamiXX,
Ildottoreverde, Limnalid, Digimaster002 and Anonymous: 49
India and weapons of mass destruction Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/India_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction?oldid=
676455792 Contributors: Rmhermen, Edward, Patrick, Gabbe, Karada, Docu, Andrewa, Aarchiba, PaulinSaudi, Selket, Schutz, Oberiko,
MSGJ, Obli, Mboverload, Bobblewik, Edcolins, Golbez, Utcursch, Oneiros, Supadawg, Efriedman, Grunt, Shahab, Moverton, Rich Farmbrough, Tirthajyoti, Ashwatham, Stereotek, Mr. Billion, Livajo, Dhoom, AreJay, Maurreen, Bijal d g, Chirag, A2Kar, Alansohn, Mac
Davis, Rwendland, Wtmitchell, Vedant, DV8 2XL, Kelly Martin, Kosher Fan, Marudubshinki, Deltabeignet, Toba1, Rjwilmsi, Koavf,
Drench, Dar-Ape, Saksham, Ian Pitchford, Tu160m, Bgwhite, Deeptrivia, RussBot, Hornplease, Limulus, Anders.Warga, Thoreaulylazy,
Gaius Cornelius, Rsrikanth05, Kimchi.sg, Asherett, Thiseye, Brandon, Snkutty, Varun dt, Danlaycock, DeadEyeArrow, Cyberwizmj, Tigger69, LarryLACa, American2, Itake, PTSE, Josh3580, Anakinskywalker, Allens, Abhishekmathur, Sardanaphalus, SmackBot, Monkeyblue, Mysterius, Chackojoseph, Carl.bunderson, Chris the speller, Bluebot, Ottawakismet, Sujithk, Hibernian, Eer, ACupOfCoffee, Rama's Arrow, Sgt Pinback, NYKevin, TKB, Easwarno1, Jmlk17, MrRadioGuy, Arun Philip, Savidan, Valenciano, Legaleagle86,
Andrew c, Natebjones, Ohconfucius, Archit Patel, Pizzadeliveryboy, Sambot, Esw01407, John, Soumyasch, MilborneOne, Sir Nicholas
de Mimsy-Porpington, Evenios, Rajesh Rao, Shyamsunder, Smashingpumpkins, Rcowlagi, AdultSwim, EdC~enwiki, Skapur, Hxnagara,
Twas Now, Eluchil404, FairuseBot, WhoSaid?, SkyWalker, CmdrObot, Yourdeadin, Goatchurch, DumbBOT, Editor at Large, Cancun771,
JamesAM, Thijs!bot, Qwyrxian, RevolverOcelotX, Rosarinagazo, Nick Number, Asen y2k, AntiVandalBot, Indivisible, QuiteUnusual, Indotan, Chaitanya.lala, Saddysan, Chanakyathegreat, KuwarOnline, Andonic, Ryan4314, Raanoo, Magioladitis, Askari Mark, Flayer, Aye
Carumba Fajita Pizza, Avicennasis, Adrian J. Hunter, Cranium1, Michael.fernando, S3000, Raza0007, MartinBot, EyeSerene, Mr.Falcon,
Arjun01, R'n'B, CommonsDelinker, Tgeairn, J.delanoy, Abecedare, Natobxl, Apurv1980, Ash sul, AntiSpamBot, Master shepherd, Tatrgel,
Olegwiki, Shoessss, Joshua Issac, Bilalspike, S, Funandtrvl, Wikieditor06, Nigel Ish, RaulCovita, Hersfold, Ktalon, Nubin wiki, Shrao,
Davehi1, Vipinhari, Vishwas008, Detroit4, Nukemason4, Sniperz11, Doug, Vladsinger, Nirmarun, Falcon8765, NPguy, Chrisphmb, Arjun024, SieBot, Sonicology, Miremare, M.thoriyan, Abhishikt, Vmrgrsergr, Aspects, Fratrep, Maelgwnbot, Anchor Link Bot, Punitpankaj,
Joel Rennie, ImageRemovalBot, Dlrohrer2003, MBK004, ClueBot, Fasettle, Lamoonia, Hornet35, Mild Bill Hiccup, Great.constantine1,
Shovon76, Otolemur crassicaudatus, Cirt, Auntof6, Vidhyardhi, Lartoven, Sun Creator, Another Believer, DumZiBoT, Crazyrobin4u,
XLinkBot, Jovianeye, Richard-of-Earth, Voltigeur, Good Olfactory, UnknownForEver, MatthewVanitas, GDibyendu, Addbot, Manaspunhani, Lakshmim 84, CL, Lihaas, Debresser, CarTick, Jossejonathan, Steed Asprey - 171, Lightbot, Ias2008, Jarble, The Bushranger, Ben
Ben, Enthusiast10, Luckas-bot, Yobot, Reenem, Dilutexyz2020, AnomieBOT, Amityadav8, Jim1138, Zoomzoom316, Homoatrox, Vindastra, Julnap, Leosls, Blitzoace, Materialscientist, Deviljin60, Druid.raul, Samar60, FreeRangeFrog, Apoorv020, Johnxxx9, Mynameinc,
MerlLinkBot, Mittal.fdk, Gnomsovet, Pkhagah, Operdyne7, Thehelpfulbot, Atomicgurl00, FrescoBot, Harsha363, Bharatgopal, Teckgeek,
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6.1. TEXT

275

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674307268 Contributors: TwoOneTwo, Bryan Derksen, Robert Merkel, Rmhermen, SimonP, Boud, Ken Arromdee, GABaker, Dante
Alighieri, Gabbe, IZAK, Jll, Zero0000, Omegatron, Oaktree b, AnonMoos, R3m0t, Yosri, Gidonb, Humus sapiens, Mushroom, PBP,
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Anonymous: 40
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destruction?oldid=678439712 Contributors: The Cunctator, Mav, Robert Merkel, Tarquin, Mark, Ed Poor, Rmhermen, Roadrunner,
SimonP, Formulax~enwiki, Camembert, Fonzy, Zippy, Hephaestos, Olivier, Chuq, Mrwojo, Patrick, Dante Alighieri, Gabbe, Menchi,
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Chopchopwhitey, ZekeMacNeil, Doidimais Brasil, Kamakura, Hadal, Mushroom, Mattaschen, Alan Liefting, DocWatson42, Jacoplane,
Fastssion, TDC, Everyking, Miya, Get-back-world-respect, Bobblewik, Deus Ex, Antandrus, Scottperry, Kusunose, Rattlesnake, Comandante, Demiurge, Trevor MacInnis, Kingal86, Venu62, Jkl, Naryathegreat, Discospinster, Guanabot, KittySaturn, Warpyght, Xezbeth, Cromis, Sundaedeluxe, Bender235, Sunborn, Dkpiatt, Violetriga, Mr. Billion, El C, SpencerWilson, Bletch, Chairboy, Art LaPella,
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Tiger888, Street Scholar, Sardanaphalus, SmackBot, Innocentmind, YellowMonkey, K-UNIT, Sam8, HeartofaDog, Gilliam, Hmains, Chris
the speller, Bluebot, Persian Poet Gal, Master of Puppets, ACupOfCoee, Redline, Minister of Darkness, MTBradley, AKMask, Gracenotes, Salin, InnocentMind, Wes!, Fuhghettaboutit, AndyBQ, , Ohconfucius, Ali 786, Yahya01, Terminator50, Euchiasmus, Fast
track, Zmustafa, Green Giant, JHunterJ, Beetstra, Interlingua, EdC~enwiki, Pedrora, Simon12, Iridescent, Clarityend, FairuseBot, Tere
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from Downunder, N5iln, Gralo, Sandbreak, Hcobb, Nick Number, AnAj, Corella, Trakesht, Pknightru, Ndyguy, Samar, Scythian1, Hodgetts, Mkashif, Kidal, Ryan4314, Dildar Hussain, Russianmissile, Prateek sterling, Sushant gupta, Hullaballoo Wolfowitz, JamesBWatson,
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mc, Mfarooqumer, Hans Dunkelberg, Zuhair siddiqui, Mianhassan, Katalaveno, Plasticup, Usman, Muhammad, MatthewBurton, Rumpelstiltskin223, Jamesontai, TopGun, Signalhead, VolkovBot, Je G., Webkami, Aslamt, Uch, Mrghumman, Razzsic, Gilisa, Meters, Lamro,
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Adityagupta101, TSCL, Vmrgrsergr, Benea, Lightmouse, Anchor Link Bot, Mr. Stradivarius, JL-Bot, Joel Rennie, Zear+shauna, ClueBot, Noorkhanuk85, The Thing That Should Not Be, Lamoonia, Swapnils2106, Silence Will Speak, DarthRad, CasualObserver'48, Drmies, Mild Bill Hiccup, Shovon76, Hasantheman123, Jusdafax, Wonder scorpio2005, SyedNaqvi90, Versus22, DumZiBoT, SilvonenBot,
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Dabamizan48, Anikkuttan, Zink Dawg, Hari7478, RjwilmsiBot, Gould363, EmausBot, John of Reading, AlphaGamma1991, Dewritech,
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malik1, Vieque, Charles Bill Bob, The Prince Sky legend, Owais Khursheed, Je.est.un.autre, IRNBarren, Sizzling hnny, Randhwasingh,
Qwertyw123, Bob chasm, The Quixotic Potato and Anonymous: 473
Poland and weapons of mass destruction Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Poland_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction?oldid=
673002672 Contributors: Alex.tan, Rmhermen, Gabbe, Jll, Ineuw, Katarzyna, Kpalion, Merope, Rwendland, ClockworkSoul, SNIyer12,
Ground Zero, CalJW, Witkacy, IByte, Stephenb, Shell Kinney, Gaius Cornelius, Rsrikanth05, Oliverdl, RickReinckens, Appleseed,
robot, Deuar, Sardanaphalus, SmackBot, ERcheck, Wjanio, ArglebargleIV, Corran.pl, Esoltas, Judgesurreal777, Hydraton31, Lan
Di, XRiRax, Jeepday, Nigel Ish, CarlosPn, JJR PL, Addbot, Download, Jarble, Luckas-bot, AnomieBOT, JackieBot, Zxabot, Citation
bot, ArthurBot, Mynameinc, Full-date unlinking bot, EmausBot, Helpful Pixie Bot, XXzoonamiXX, Limnalid, Monkbot, Mcavusoglu and
Anonymous: 24
Romania and weapons of mass destruction Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Romania_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction?oldid=
665224876 Contributors: Bogdangiusca, Rwendland, Sardanaphalus, Neelix, Biruitorul, Theeurocrat, Mazarin07, Nergaal, Addbot, Jarble,

6.1. TEXT

277

ArthurBot, Xqbot, Mynameinc, Full-date unlinking bot, Beyond My Ken, SD5bot, Charles Essie, Praemonitus, Limnalid, NPIHP and
Anonymous: 3
Russia and weapons of mass destruction Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russia_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction?oldid=
679876405 Contributors: Rmhermen, Dante Alighieri, Gabbe, Tannin, IZAK, Ronabop, Bogdangiusca, Topbanana, Finlay McWalter,
Owen, DocWatson42, Oberiko, Fastssion, Everyking, Ezhiki, Get-back-world-respect, Rjyanco, Deus Ex, Beland, Thorwald, Discospinster, Rich Farmbrough, TomPreuss, Bender235, Jag123, Anittas, Rwendland, J Heath, Firsfron, Slazenger (usurped), BD2412, Ketiltrout,
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Cydebot, Epbr123, James086, JustAGal, MarkV, Superzohar, MER-C, Fetchcomms, Sarah777, Shadiac, Hellerick, R'n'B, J.delanoy,
Uncle Dick, Thaurisil, Hodja Nasreddin, Garret Beaumain, Bernard S. Jansen, Jevansen, TheNewPhobia, Homologeo, X!, Ilya1166,
SteveStrummer, Someguy1221, Mouse is back, Turgan, EJF, Flyer22, CarlosPn, Onopearls, ClueBot, LAX, Strategik, Mild Bill Hiccup,
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FeelSunny, Jim1138, Piano non troppo, Leosls, Racastremus, Fusioned Capacity, Mynameinc, GrouchoBot, Amaury, Doulos Christos,
Gnomsovet, Spongefrog, LucienBOT, Trust Is All You Need, Eightofnine, James Cusens, Pinethicket, RedBot, Rotblats09, Mercy11,
Lufen1987, Reaper Eternal, TheGrimReaper NS, MaseJr8990, Lenin1055, EmausBot, Orphan Wiki, Challisrussia, H3llBot, EWikist,
Brandmeister, Abhishekitmbm, KZfan, ClueBot NG, Catlemur, Adair2324, ORCZORR, BlitZx SiN, Dm68k, Helpful Pixie Bot, Bgarner123456789, Wasbeer, Chrisvik12, Qwerty951753, Ichek, Occidentaloccidental, DenzilUK, Iloverussia, RCFrank, EagerToddler39,
PepeEscobar, Hwr007, TwoTwoHello, Lucassandershapiro, Eckshotgunz, PussBroad, Kharkiv07, Fnordson, Mandruss, Sam Sailor, Limnalid, Ol'fussandfeathers, Abattoir666, Vladimir.putina, SmartHunter1, WC Jay, Inthefastlane, Kionay and Anonymous: 193
Nuclear program of Saudi Arabia Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_program_of_Saudi_Arabia?oldid=668672076 Contributors: KAMiKAZOW, Vfrickey, Neutrality, Rwendland, WriterHound, Arado, Equilibrial, Danlaycock, Lockesdonkey, MaeseLeon,
Sardanaphalus, SmackBot, Hmains, Ottawakismet, Paradoxsociety, Bless sins, Publicus, Vihan, Ebyabe, Beagel, Nono64, J.delanoy, Rugads5, BernardZ, Hugo999, Alborz Fallah, Sean.hoyland, Denisarona, Zeerak88, Aaronshavit, Mild Bill Hiccup, Alexbot, Kslall8765,
DumZiBoT, Kurdo777, Raed 5, Addbot, Captain-tucker, Freqsh0, Yobot, Reenem, Sys.Bak, AnomieBOT, 1exec1, Leosls, In fact, HighFlyingFish, Ironboy11, RjwilmsiBot, TjBot, Kamran the Great, EmausBot, John of Reading, SporkBot, Moody-500, BattyBot, Salfan,
Podiaebba, KOT-TOK, Human10.0, SaudAlkhaldi, Khaleejian, Mcavusoglu and Anonymous: 46
South Africa and weapons of mass destruction Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Africa_and_weapons_of_mass_
destruction?oldid=678760528 Contributors: SimonP, Patrick, Gabbe, IZAK, Zimbres, Pstudier, Wizzy, Fastssion, Duncharris, Proslaes,
Oneiros, JulieADriver, D6, Duja, Rich Farmbrough, Darren Olivier, Friism, Storm Rider, Doopokko, Andrew Gray, Ferrierd, Rwendland,
Zantastik, Evil Monkey, BlastOButter42, Pauli133, DV8 2XL, Gene Nygaard, GringoInChile, Alvis, TomTheHand, Toussaint, BD2412,
Rjwilmsi, Koavf, CalJW, John Z, Atrix20, OpenToppedBus, Niku, RussBot, Arado, Piet Delport, JD79, Grafen, Banes, Htonl, Blue
Danube, American2, Entro-p, Bondegezou, Carlosguitar, Nick-D, Matt Heard, Sardanaphalus, SmackBot, David Kernow, WikiuserNI,
Elminster Aumar, Compay~enwiki, Onebravemonkey, Flamarande, Ohnoitsjamie, Hmains, Chris the speller, Thom2002, Mikker, JelloB,
Britmax, Ohconfucius, John, Joelo, Fedallah, Ucla9030, JMK, Phase4, Cydebot, Tec15, PKT, Ideogram, AnAj, Corella, NJR ZA, Valerius Tygart, AttieHarmse, MartinBot, NeueSoutie, Jcronen1, Pekaje, RatSkrew, FuManChoo, Ybnana, Mallerd, NPguy, Gbawden, HushPuppyForYouWillSleep, Selerian, NiteSensor23, Victor Chmara, Fasettle, Plastikspork, CasualObserver'48, Niceguyedc, Rememberlands,
Socrates2008, Wdford, Jfunnyguy, DumZiBoT, Addbot, Mortense, Rock12321, Knight of Truth, LatitudeBot, Lihaas, Jarble, Drpickem,
Yobot, DiverDave, AnomieBOT, Statichazard, Leosls, Mattbondy, Keverich1, Truth or consequences-2, LilHelpa, .45Colt, ThePhantomCopyEditor, Mynameinc, Rohlg, Anotherclown, MerlLinkBot, Gnomsovet, Atomicgurl00, FrescoBot, Ironboy11, Andre Kritzinger, Killian441, Rbrausse, Plasticspork, Sh33pl0re, Rotblats09, Bluekey7, Rr parker, DiscipleOfKnowledge, Breein1007, RjwilmsiBot, EmausBot,
John of Reading, Whoop whoop pull up, ClueBot NG, Rgctobin, Jdanek007, Helpful Pixie Bot, Seergenius, Ian16th, Jeancey, RscprinterBot, FiveFourTwo, Aliwal2012, SD5bot, Khazar2, Limnalid, A. Pseudonym, Androgyne, Monkbot, WC Jay, Grandtheftautoboss52565
and Anonymous: 88
Swedish nuclear weapon program Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swedish_nuclear_weapons_program?oldid=674297207 Contributors: Maury Markowitz, Orlady, Qwertyus, Kolbasz, Wavelength, Welsh, JustAGal, Victuallers, DH85868993, Mild Bill Hiccup,
Niceguyedc, Kitchen Knife, Yobot, AnomieBOT, Cnwilliams, John of Reading, BG19bot, Mohamed CJ, Frze, BattyBot, ChrisGualtieri,
Hmainsbot1, Fortuna Imperatrix Mundi, DMattis and Anonymous: 7
Syria and weapons of mass destruction Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syria_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction?oldid=
677193508 Contributors: Boud, Tpbradbury, PBP, PFHLai, Rwendland, Geraldshields11, Woohookitty, Kosher Fan, Rjwilmsi, Jehochman, FayssalF, BananaLanguage, Gaius Cornelius, Danlaycock, Georgewilliamherbert, Evilbu, Ripcord.jones, Mebden, Paul Erik,
Sardanaphalus, SmackBot, C.Fred, Hmains, Jprg1966, Calbaer, Cydebot, Marokwitz, Andrewrutherford, Erxnmedia, Avaya1, SteveSims, Bongwarrior, KConWiki, Kimdime, Cjblair, DoorsAjar, TXiKiBoT, Littlealien182, NPguy, Flyer22, Martarius, ClueBot, VQuakr,
L.tak, Arjayay, Aitias, PCHS-NJROTC, Vanished User 1004, Addbot, Glane23, Jarble, Yobot, AnomieBOT, Metalhead94, JackieBot,
Yachtsman1, Venom087, Big Panda Bear, Coretheapple, Mynameinc, MerlLinkBot, Green Cardamom, Ironboy11, Supreme Deliciousness,
777sms, Atharv Pawar, Jerd10, Tbhotch, TjBot, EmausBot, Dewritech, GoingBatty, Greyshark09, Labnoor, ClueBot NG, Master Uegly,
Catlemur, David O. Johnson, Twillisjr, Widr, Guest2625, BG19bot, Kaltenmeyer, Darouet, FutureTrillionaire, Mor2, Katangais, Erlbaeko,
Slim0877, Fotoriety, BattyBot, AlAboud83, EuroCarGT, Ducknish, Mogism, Dhawk790, HistoricMN44, Dumbissmart:), ,
Rybec, Polyglotism, Rolf h nelson, Ugog Nizdast, Podiaebba, PLNR, Jianhui67, Limnalid, Rqasd, Ofthelion, Bucknastay, Fixuture, Information Collective, Sigg Ctable, AKS.9955, Nulla Taciti, Spooman1962, ElCommandanteVzl, Mcavusoglu, Queso.robusto and Anonymous: 72
Republic of China and weapons of mass destruction Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taiwan_and_weapons_of_mass_
destruction?oldid=668427816 Contributors: Roadrunner, Gabbe, Ralmin, Jiang, Kaihsu, Stargoat, DocWatson42, Neutrality, Loren36,
Rwendland, Schaefer, Instantnood, LukeSurl, Koavf, Ground Zero, Chobot, Gaius Cornelius, Ilmaisin, Nlu, Fang Aili, Edrigu, Wikipeditor, Sardanaphalus, SmackBot, ILBobby, David Kernow, Jprg1966, Hibernian, Multivariable, Cybercobra, Noian, Judgesurreal777, RevolverOcelotX, Ideogram, Hcobb, Dylan Lake, Nat, Stephenchou0722, Long Live Chiang Kai-shek, Master of the Orchalcos, TaerkastUA,
Jkj115, ClueBot, Alexbot, Addbot, Lightbot, Jarble, MTWEmperor, Reenem, Citation bot, Bairh, Fusioned Capacity, Mynameinc, Taiwanrox8, Juno, Yghwtrrl, JEVNK, Full-date unlinking bot, Rotblats09, Dewritech, RenamedUser01302013, Sp33dyphil, ZroBot, Jenks24,
Djruwqqqs, Albert777MAX, Limnalid and Anonymous: 38

278

CHAPTER 6. TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

Nuclear weapons and Ukraine Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_weapons_and_Ukraine?oldid=670347885 Contributors:


Thue, Bearcat, Mzajac, Caiman, Woohookitty, Drench, Ground Zero, SmackBot, C.Fred, Jprg1966, Hibernian, Mark7-2, Yulia Romero,
DDima, Marco polo, CmdrObot, Ibadibam, Cydebot, PhilKnight, Walberque, KConWiki, Beagel, Aleksandr Grigoryev, Lvivske, Falcon8765, NPguy, Donchyts, Niceguyedc, Auntof6, Datastat, Addbot, Favonian, Johnoyd6675, Jarble, Yobot, AnomieBOT, Materialscientist, Danno uk, GrouchoBot, FrescoBot, Poimal, Lopifalko, Santamoly, Sp33dyphil, Artvill, ClueBot NG, Jack Greenmaven, Stanislavovich,
Helpful Pixie Bot, BG19bot, Froginvestor, MeanMotherJr, BattyBot, Hmainsbot1, Gblack704, Abrahamic Faiths, Wuerzele, Ser GoDo,
Limnalid, B01010100, Marknapalm, Ladeal, , Vieque, Jackrickenbacker, ArtemisLogic, Ncso, Pbs2mtsu, 143212491,
Vgritsenko, MajoraMoon2000, Megmeg8, MikeWiki14, Spiderjerky, Charlotte Aryanne, Ali287, Jdcariagaa, Raphael3988, MiamiPrepperMom, Zhangphilp980, Rwilson123321, Owlpillow, Hillmontj, IntergalacticDolphin, Swendellicious and Anonymous: 34
United Kingdom and weapons of mass destruction Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Kingdom_and_weapons_of_mass_
destruction?oldid=672880766 Contributors: Rmhermen, Rbrwr, Dante Alighieri, Gabbe, Jll, Tpbradbury, Cabalamat, Finlay McWalter,
Wereon, DocWatson42, Oberiko, Lupin, Get-back-world-respect, Gzornenplatz, Rjyanco, Bobblewik, Deus Ex, Fys, Geni, Gdr, H1523702,
Estel~enwiki, Mr impossible, PDH, Bodnotbod, Sam Hocevar, Kate, Rich Farmbrough, Xezbeth, Sc147, Jaberwocky6669, CanisRufus,
Andreww, Smalljim, Cmdrjameson, Hesperian, Oldfarm, Mark Lewis, Rd232, Rwendland, Great Briton, CinnamonCinder, Nightstallion,
Crosbiesmith, Torqueing, Mark83, Gdrbot, Jamesmorrison, Midgley, RussBot, Shell Kinney, Rjensen, Howcheng, Raelone, Dspradau,
HereToHelp, Sardanaphalus, SmackBot, Jfurr1981, Mauls, Ohnoitsjamie, JackyR, PiMaster3, FedLawyer, Mistress Selina Kyle, Skinnyweed, John, La banane verte, Jxb311, CmdrObot, Whereizben, Tec15, Nabokov, Lo2u, NorwegianBlue, Dfrg.msc, Dyolf~enwiki, SkoreKeep, LeedsKing, Dricherby, Nick Cooper, Valerius Tygart, MartinBot, R'n'B, Lt. penguin, Qcomplex5, Bobbean52, Hugo999, Seattle Skier, Usergreatpower, Indiacamm, Lightmouse, Canglesea, ClueBot, Zoe0, EnigmaMcmxc, DumZiBoT, Addbot, Jarble, Jim1138,
Sandvika, Citation bot, Rhyal1, Eumolpo, Xqbot, TomB123, Mynameinc, GrouchoBot, FrescoBot, Grand-Duc, Bambuway, Jonesey95,
Rotblats09, Poliphile, Bot 418102, RjwilmsiBot, EmausBot, DiiCinta, Yattum, Kkm010, Wingman4l7, MangoWong, BattyBot, Tropiy,
XXzoonamiXX, Antiochus the Great, Kharkiv07, Limnalid, Abattoir666, WC Jay, JuiSlx90 and Anonymous: 71
United States and weapons of mass destruction Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_States_and_weapons_of_mass_
destruction?oldid=667855747 Contributors: Bryan Derksen, Rmhermen, Patrick, Michael Hardy, Dante Alighieri, Gabbe, Ixfd64, Ijon,
Jengod, Jwrosenzweig, Maximus Rex, VeryVerily, Omegatron, Thue, Bloodshedder, Francs2000, Kulkuri, Fredrik, Korath, Postdlf, Jpbrenna, ElBenevolente, DocWatson42, Oberiko, Seabhcan, Fastssion, Mark Richards, TDC, Wwoods, Abqwildcat, H-2-O, Guanaco,
Get-back-world-respect, Pascal666, Rjyanco, Deus Ex, Slowking Man, Formeruser-81, Beland, Mikko Paananen, Luke Powell, Neutrality,
WikiDon, Njh@bandsman.co.uk, Kingal86, Discospinster, Rama, Xezbeth, Bender235, Mateo SA, Mind the gap, Kaszeta, Leif, Bobo192,
TomStar81, NetBot, Mink Butler Davenport, Rwendland, Hohum, Mir~enwiki, ClockworkSoul, Johntex, Cheesedreams, Ceyockey, Alheim, Randy2063, BD2412, Kbdank71, Plau, Rjwilmsi, Lionel Elie Mamane, Leithp, Mirror Vax, Pathoschild, RexNL, Jrtayloriv, TeaDrinker, Blackberrylaw, King of Hearts, Moocha, VolatileChemical, WriterHound, Cornellrockey, Anders.Warga, Ytrottier, DarthBinky,
Kvn8907, Blacksand, Closedmouth, Curpsbot-unicodify, Katieh5584, Sardanaphalus, SmackBot, Ze miguel, Jim62sch, Hmains, Ddrfreak103, JackyR, Hibernian, CSWarren, Engwar, Hgilbert, The PIPE, John, Elon~enwiki, Joelo, Mitso Bel, Locutus, The Giant Pun,
Joseph Solis in Australia, Sketch051, CmdrObot, Harej bot, Bellerophon5685, Blindman shady, Epbr123, Nick Number, MegaTroopX,
ASDFGHJKL, Forthnoggin, Xeno, Dricherby, Magioladitis, Appraiser, Avicennasis, Catgut, Clich Online, IvoShandor, Oroso, MartinBot, Rettetast, R'n'B, Sachi bbsr, Francis Tyers, Maurice Carbonaro, Nlalic, Hodja Nasreddin, Floateruss, Bernard S. Jansen, Slipdrive44, DH85868993, Lukejon1995, Banjodog, Homologeo, Funandtrvl, Philip Trueman, SeanNovack, Vipinhari, Detroit4, Icactus,
Wassermann~enwiki, Bahamut0013, Michael Frind, EJF, Vergil Anti, Oda Mari, Wombatcat, RSStockdale, Spartan-James, Wallmark,
ClueBot, Nikidimi, VQuakr, Strategik, Mild Bill Hiccup, Winger84, Nanobear~enwiki, Somno, Dwrcan, IJosheau, Downtrip, DumZiBoT,
Ploughshares, Gggh, Addbot, Don'tKnowItAtAll, Lost on Belmont, Dynamization, Tide rolls, Lightbot, Legobot, AnomieBOT, Rjanag,
Jim1138, Neptune5000, Piano non troppo, Leosls, Apoorv020, Mynameinc, Mrhelloilike, MerlLinkBot, Shadowjams, Gnomsovet, LucienBOT, Bambuway, Adaptor40, Citation bot 1, Yghwtrrl, GaussianCopula, Rotblats09, Mercy11, Trappist the monk, Hajatvrc, MK3244,
EmausBot, Valdemar Windsor, H3llBot, SporkBot, Mchammer324, L Kensington, Cn7abc, ClueBot NG, Catlemur, BG19bot, Phd8511,
AvocatoBot, Op47, Astros4477, BattyBot, Iloverussia, SD5bot, XXzoonamiXX, Fycafterpro, Faizan, Ruby Murray, Kharkiv07, Mandruss,
Podiaebba, Jianhui67, Limnalid, Abattoir666, WC Jay and Anonymous: 232
List of weapons of mass destruction treaties Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_weapons_of_mass_destruction_treaties?
oldid=628813636 Contributors: Rmhermen, Ukexpat, Alinor, JWB, Sardanaphalus, Colonies Chris, Headbomb, TXiKiBoT, NPguy,
Alexbot, Good Olfactory, Addbot, Polemarchus, VX, Mynameinc, John of Reading, John Cline, ClueBot NG, Japinderum, Jodosma and
Anonymous: 8

6.2 Images
File:2009_North_Korean_nuclear_test.png Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e8/2009_North_Korean_
nuclear_test.png License: Public domain Contributors: http://earthquake.usgs.gov/eqcenter/recenteqsww/Maps/10/130_40.php Original
artist: USGS
File:2inchMortarsPortonDown.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/bf/2inchMortarsPortonDown.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: This is photograph PD-CRO-70 from the collections of the Imperial War Museums (collection no.
2000-11-05) Original artist: Photographer: Porton Down ocial photographer
File:4_Babur_Cruise_Missiles_on_a_Truck_at_IDEAS_2008.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/ef/4_
Babur_Cruise_Missiles_on_a_Truck_at_IDEAS_2008.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: Own work Original artist: SyedNaqvi90
(talk) (Uploads)
File:703MUNSS061108.jpg
Source:
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/5c/B61_nuclear_
bomb_-_inert_training_version.jpg
License:
Public
domain
Contributors:
http://blogs.fas.org/security/2008/06/
usaf-report-most-nuclear-weapon-sites-in-europe-do-not-meet-us-security-requirements/ Original artist: Unknown, merely noted
as US Air Force.
File:A_BCV_(Bulk_Contamination_Vehicle.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e2/A_BCV_%28Bulk_
Contamination_Vehicle.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: IWM H 25575 Original artist: Tanner A R (Lt) War Oce ocial
photographer

6.2. IMAGES

279

File:Acap.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/52/Acap.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Own work


Original artist: F l a n k e r
File:Agni-II_missile_(Republic_Day_Parade_2004).jpeg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/96/Agni-II_
missile_%28Republic_Day_Parade_2004%29.jpeg License: CC BY 3.0 br Contributors: http://img.radiobras.gov.br/Aberto/index.php/
Imagens.Principal.120.0.2004-01-31
Original artist: Antnio Milena (ABr)
File:Agni_Missile_Range_comparison.svg Source:
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a7/Agni_Missile_Range_
comparison.svg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: another Wikimedia image Original artist: Michael. SVG conversion by Srikar
Kashyap
File:Albania_chemweapcanister.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/04/Albania_chemweapcanister.jpg
License: Public domain Contributors: http://lugar.senate.gov/photos/nunn-lugar.html Original artist: US Government
File:All_proposed_routes.PNG Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a7/All_proposed_routes.PNG License: CC
BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: Own work Original artist: AlwaysUnite
File:Ambox_current_red.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/98/Ambox_current_red.svg License: CC0
Contributors: self-made, inspired by Gnome globe current event.svg, using Information icon3.svg and Earth clip art.svg Original artist:
Vipersnake151, penubag, Tkgd2007 (clock)
File:Ambox_important.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/b4/Ambox_important.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Own work, based o of Image:Ambox scales.svg Original artist: Dsmurat (talk contribs)
File:Ambox_wikify.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e1/Ambox_wikify.svg License: Public domain
Contributors: Own work Original artist: penubag
File:Anthrax_culture.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/40/Anthrax_culture.jpg License: Public domain
Contributors: http://www.armymedicine.army.mil/news/photos/fullsize/anthraxculture.cfm Original artist: U.S. Army Medical Research
Institute of Infectious Diseases photo
File:Arihant_1.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/13/Arihant_1.jpg License: Attribution Contributors:
Gagan. Created on MS Paint Original artist: gagan@BRF
File:B-2_Spirit_original.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/47/B-2_Spirit_original.jpg License: Public
domain Contributors:
This Image was released by the United States Air Force with the ID 060530-F-5040D-22 <a class='external text'
href='//commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?title=Category:Files_created_by_the_United_States_Air_Force_with_known_
IDs,<span>,&,</span>,lefrom=060530-F-5040D-22#mw-category-media'>(next)</a>.
This tag does not indicate the copyright status of the attached work. A normal copyright tag is still required. See Commons:Licensing for more information.

Original artist: Sta Sgt. Bennie J. Davis III


File:B-w-scientists.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/7c/B-w-scientists.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: http://www.detrick.army.mil/cutting_edge/chapter04.cfm#pic07 Original artist: USG
File:BGT_IDAS.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/40/BGT_IDAS.jpg License: CC-BY-SA-3.0 Contributors: ? Original artist: ?
File:Baghdad_Nuclear_Research_Facility_-_10_March_1991._The_Tuwaythah_Nuclear_Research_Facility,_Baghdad,
_Post-strike..jpg Source:
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/20/Baghdad_Nuclear_Research_Facility_-_10_
March_1991._The_Tuwaythah_Nuclear_Research_Facility%2C_Baghdad%2C_Post-strike..jpg License: Public domain Contributors:
http://www.fas.org/irp/imint/cpgw_153b.htm Original artist: Department of Defense
File:Bandkanon_1.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/27/Bandkanon_1.jpg License: CC-BY-SA-3.0 Contributors: Photo taken by myself, User:Johan Elisson. Original artist: User:Johan Elisson.
File:Banner_of_the_Armed_Forces_of_the_Russian_Federation_(obverse).svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/
commons/d/d9/Banner_of_the_Armed_Forces_of_the_Russian_Federation_%28obverse%29.svg License: Public domain Contributors:
www.mil.ru - Original artist: F l a n k e r
File:Bengt_Nordenskild,_1941.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c4/Bengt_Nordenski%C3%B6ld%
2C_1941.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: ne.se Original artist: PICA PRESSFOTO
File:Bernhardvongalen.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/fc/Bernhardvongalen.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: Transferred from en.wikipedia to Commons. - original source [1] Original artist: ?
File:Biohazard_symbol.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c0/Biohazard_symbol.svg License: Public domain Contributors: ? Original artist: ?
File:Blueprint_abomb.JPG Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/26/Blueprint_abomb.JPG License: Public domain Contributors: U.S. Military or Department of Defense Original artist: U.S. Military
File:Brahmos_imds.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/ab/Brahmos_imds.jpg License: Public domain
Contributors: Own work Original artist: One half 3544
File:Braso_Nacional_PPMM.PNG Source:
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/8f/Bras%C3%A3o_Nacional_
PPMM.PNG License: Public domain Contributors: Stio da PMPR. Original artist: Unknown
File:British_55th_Division_gas_casualties_10_April_1918.jpg Source:
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/dc/
British_55th_Division_gas_casualties_10_April_1918.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: This is photograph Q 11586 from the
collections of the Imperial War Museums (collection no. 1900-22) Original artist: Thomas Keith Aitken (Second Lieutenant)
File:Bundesarchiv_B_145_Bild-F016216-0020A,_Flugzeug_ber_der_Halbinsel_Kertsch.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.
org/wikipedia/commons/f/fd/Bundesarchiv_B_145_Bild-F016216-0020A%2C_Flugzeug_%C3%BCber_der_Halbinsel_Kertsch.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 de Contributors: This image was provided to Wikimedia Commons by the German Federal Archive (Deutsches
Bundesarchiv) as part of a cooperation project. The German Federal Archive guarantees an authentic representation only using the originals (negative and/or positive), resp. the digitalization of the originals as provided by the Digital Image Archive. Original artist: Unknown

280

CHAPTER 6. TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

File:Bush_announces_Operation_Iraqi_Freedom_2003.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/cb/Bush_


announces_Operation_Iraqi_Freedom_2003.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: Transferred from en.wikipedia to Commons.,
Current Image location: http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/images/20030319-17_address2-515h.html
Original artist: The original uploader was John Callender at English Wikipedia, White House photo by Paul Morse.
File:CIA_report-on-Israeli-Chemical-Weapons.pdf
Source:
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/
56/CIA_report-on-Israeli-Chemical-Weapons.pdf
License:
Public domain Contributors:
RT http://rt.com/news/
israel-chemical-weapons-sarin-714/, via Scribd, http://www.scribd.com/document_downloads/166817108?extension=pdf&from=
embed&source=embed Original artist: CIA
File:COA_Brazilian_Navy.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/bc/COA_Brazilian_Navy.svg License:
Public domain Contributors: www.mar.mil.br Marinha do Brasil home site. Original artist: Centro de Comunicao Social da Marinha
(Center of Social Communication of the Navy) - sent by e-mail.
File:COA_of_Brazilian_Air_Force.svg Source:
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/36/COA_of_Brazilian_Air_
Force.svg License: Public domain Contributors: [1] Original artist: Tonyje, based on militar symbol.
File:Canberra_no._458.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/8d/Canberra_no._458.jpg License: CC BY-SA
3.0 Contributors: Own work Original artist: Col Andr Kritzinger
File:Chemical_Weapons_Convention_2007.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/37/Chemical_Weapons_
Convention_2007.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Self made. Derived from "File:Chemical Weapons Convention 2007.pngby
User:Sesmith on 2007-08-07. Relesed under
Original artist: Cm001 (<a href='//commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/User_talk:Cflm001' title='User talk:Cflm001'>talk</a>)
File:Chemical_agent_protection.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/18/Chemical_agent_protection.jpg
License: CC-BY-SA-3.0 Contributors: Photo taken by myself, User:Johan Elisson. Original artist: User:Johan Elisson.
File:Chemical_weapon1.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e1/Chemical_weapon1.jpg License: CC-BYSA-3.0 Contributors: http://gallery.sajed.ir/index.php?view=detail&id=143 Original artist: Unknown
File:Chicxulub_impact_-_artist_impression.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/8c/Chicxulub_impact_
-_artist_impression.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: http://www.jpl.nasa.gov/releases/98/yucatan.html.
Original artist: The original uploader was Danielm at Dutch Wikipedia
File:ChinaABomb_2.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e9/ChinaABomb_2.jpg License: Public domain
Contributors: http://nuclearweaponarchive.org/China/ChinaTesting.html Original artist: An US intelligence satellite
File:Chinese_nuclear_bomb_-_A2923.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/fe/Chinese_nuclear_bomb_-_
A2923.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: Own work (Own photo) Original artist: Megapixie - Max Smith
File:Coat_of_Arms_of_South_Africa.png Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/ad/Coat_of_Arms_of_South_
Africa.png License: CC BY-SA 4.0 Contributors: gcis.gov.za Original artist: Schmei
File:Coat_of_arms_of_Saudi_Arabia.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/26/Coat_of_arms_of_Saudi_
Arabia.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Own work Original artist: Anuskafm
File:Coat_of_arms_of_the_Brazilian_Army.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/aa/Coat_of_arms_of_
the_Brazilian_Army.svg License: Public domain Contributors: http://www.exercito.gov.br Original artist: Brazilian Army
File:Commons-logo.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/4/4a/Commons-logo.svg License: ? Contributors: ? Original
artist: ?
File:Corpo_de_Bombeiros_Militares.PNG Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/7e/Corpo_de_Bombeiros_
Militares.PNG License: Public domain Contributors: Scan do Museu da Polcia Militar do Paran. Original artist: Unknown
File:Demonstration_cluster_bomb.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/18/Demonstration_cluster_bomb.
jpg License: Public domain Contributors: Historic American Engineering Record, Library of Congress, Call number HAER COLO,1COMCI,1-191 Original artist: U.S. Army, original print located at Rocky Mountain Arsenal, Commerce City, Colorado
File:Destroyed_Reactor.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a9/Destroyed_Reactor.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: Video released by USA federal government Original artist: Unknown
File:Dew_line_1960.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/97/Dew_line_1960.jpg License: Public domain
Contributors: wikipedia EN portal Original artist: ?
File:Dnepr_rocket_lift-off_1.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/47/Dnepr_rocket_lift-off_1.jpg License: CC BY 2.5 Contributors: ? Original artist: ?
File:Dwight_David_Eisenhower,_photo_portrait_by_Bachrach,_1952.jpg Source:
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/
commons/5/5d/Dwight_David_Eisenhower%2C_photo_portrait_by_Bachrach%2C_1952.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: This
image is available from the United States Library of Congress's Prints and Photographs division under the digital ID cph.3c17123.
This tag does not indicate the copyright status of the attached work. A normal copyright tag is still required. See Commons:Licensing for more information.

Original artist: Fabian Bachrach


File:Dzwigi_portowe_stocznia_Gdansk.jpg Source:
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/2c/Dzwigi_portowe_
stocznia_Gdansk.jpg License: CC-BY-SA-3.0 Contributors: Own work Original artist: kkic
File:E120_biological_bomblet_cutaway.JPG Source:
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/35/E120_biological_
bomblet_cutaway.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: [2], [3] Originally uploaded to en:wikipedia by Rwendland (talk contribs),
13:35, 3 August 2006 (UTC) (log). Original artist: Reprinted from van Keuren RT. Chemical and Biological Warfare, An Investigative
Guide. Washington, DC: Oce of Enforcement, Strategic Investigations Division, US Customs Service; 1990: 79.
File:EU-France.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a3/EU-France.svg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: File:Location European nation states.svg
Original artist: NuclearVacuum

6.2. IMAGES

281

File:EU-United_Kingdom.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d1/EU-United_Kingdom.svg License: CC


BY-SA 3.0 Contributors:
File:Europe-EU.svg Original artist: NuclearVacuum
File:Edit-clear.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/f/f2/Edit-clear.svg License: Public domain Contributors: The
Tango! Desktop Project. Original artist:
The people from the Tango! project. And according to the meta-data in the le, specically:Andreas Nilsson, and Jakub Steiner (although
minimally).
File:Edward_Teller_(1958)-LLNL.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/cf/Edward_Teller_%281958%
29-LLNL.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: ? Original artist: ?
File:Einsteinium.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/55/Einsteinium.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: [1], Haire, Richard G. (2006). Einsteinium. In Morss; Edelstein, Norman M.; Fuger, Jean. The Chemistry of the Actinide and
Transactinide Elements (3rd ed.). Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Springer Science+Business Media. ISBN 1-4020-3555-1. p. 1580
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File:Ensign_of_the_Indian_Air_Force.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c2/Ensign_of_the_Indian_
Air_Force.svg License: Public domain Contributors: ? Original artist: ?
File:Essais_nucleaires_manif.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/93/Essais_nucleaires_manif.jpg License: CC-BY-SA-3.0 Contributors: Community of the Ark of Lanza del Vasto. Original artist: Community of the Ark of Lanza del
Vasto.
File:Fat_man.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c2/Fat_man.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: ?
Original artist: ?
File:Fission_bomb_assembly_methods.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/cb/Fission_bomb_assembly_
methods.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Own work Original artist: Fastssion
File:Flag_of_Egypt.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/fe/Flag_of_Egypt.svg License: CC0 Contributors:
From the Open Clip Art website. Original artist: Open Clip Art
File:Flag_of_IAEA.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/54/Flag_of_IAEA.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Flag code: [1] Original artist: IAEA
File:Flag_of_India.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/4/41/Flag_of_India.svg License: Public domain Contributors:
? Original artist: ?
File:Flag_of_Indian_Army.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/ea/Flag_of_Indian_Army.svg License:
CC-BY-SA-3.0 Contributors: extracted from File:Flag_of_Indian_Army.svg Original artist: Fred the Oyster
File:Flag_of_Iran.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/ca/Flag_of_Iran.svg License: Public domain Contributors: URL http://www.isiri.org/portal/files/std/1.htm and an English translation / interpretation at URL http://flagspot.net/flags/ir'.html
Original artist: Various
File:Flag_of_Japan.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/9/9e/Flag_of_Japan.svg License: PD Contributors: ? Original artist: ?
File:Flag_of_Libya_(1977-2011).svg
Source:
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4b/Flag_of_Libya_
%281977-2011%29.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Own work Original artist: Zscout370
File:Flag_of_Nigeria.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/79/Flag_of_Nigeria.svg License: Public domain
Contributors: ? Original artist: ?
File:Flag_of_Pakistan.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/32/Flag_of_Pakistan.svg License: Public domain Contributors: The drawing and the colors were based from agspot.net. Original artist: User:Zscout370
File:Flag_of_South_Africa.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/af/Flag_of_South_Africa.svg License:
Public domain Contributors: Per specications in the Constitution of South Africa, Schedule 1 - National ag Original artist: Flag design by Frederick Brownell, image by Wikimedia Commons users
File:Flag_of_Syria.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/53/Flag_of_Syria.svg License: Public domain Contributors: see below Original artist: see below
File:Flag_of_Vietnam.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/21/Flag_of_Vietnam.svg License: Public domain Contributors: http://vbqppl.moj.gov.vn/law/vi/1951_to_1960/1955/195511/195511300001 http://vbqppl.moj.gov.vn/vbpq/Lists/
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File:Flag_of_Yemen.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/89/Flag_of_Yemen.svg License: CC0 Contributors: Open Clip Art website Original artist: ?
File:Flag_of_the_Pakistani_Army.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/da/Flag_of_the_Pakistani_Army.
svg License: CC-BY-SA-3.0 Contributors: Self-published work by Himasaram Original artist: Himasaram
File:Flag_of_the_United_Arab_Emirates.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/cb/Flag_of_the_United_
Arab_Emirates.svg License: Public domain Contributors: ? Original artist: ?
File:Flickr_-_Israel_Defense_Forces_-_\__xunadd_text_character:nN{\textquotedbl}{"}{}Yanshuf\__xunadd_text_character:
https://upload.wikimedia.org/
nN{\textquotedbl}{"}{}_Battalion_Soldiers_at_ABC_Warfare_Exercise,_Nov_2010.jpg Source:
wikipedia/commons/8/85/Flickr_-_Israel_Defense_Forces_-_%22Yanshuf%22_Battalion_Soldiers_at_ABC_Warfare_Exercise%2C_
Nov_2010.jpg License: CC BY 2.0 Contributors: YanshufBattalion Soldiers at ABC Warfare Exercise, Nov 2010 Original artist: Ori
Shifrin, Israel Defense Forces Spokesperson's Film Unit
File:Folder_Hexagonal_Icon.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/4/48/Folder_Hexagonal_Icon.svg License: Cc-bysa-3.0 Contributors: ? Original artist: ?

282

CHAPTER 6. TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

File:Gas_shell_(AWM_028467).jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e9/Gas_shell_%28AWM_028467%


29.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: This image is available from the Collection Database of the Australian War Memorial under
the ID Number: 028467
This tag does not indicate the copyright status of the attached work. A normal copyright tag is still required. See Commons:Licensing for more information.

Original artist: not stated


File:Ghouta_massacre4.JPG Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/96/Ghouta_massacre4.JPG License: CC BY
3.0 Contributors: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yp_Ju6742Z0 Original artist:
File:Groves_memo_30oct43_p1.GIF Source:
cense: PD Contributors: ? Original artist: ?

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/2/28/Groves_memo_30oct43_p1.GIF Li-

File:H-55_AS-15_Kent_2008_G1.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/81/H-55_AS-15_Kent_2008_G1.


jpg License: Public domain Contributors: Own work Original artist: George Chernilevsky
File:IAF_Jaguar.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e6/IAF_Jaguar.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: Transfered from en:wikipedia, its description page is/was here and originally from [1] Original artist: SSGT Mathew Hannen, USAF,
uploaded by User:Chanakyathegreat
File:IRBM_of_Pakistan_at_IDEAS_2008.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/ce/IRBM_of_Pakistan_
at_IDEAS_2008.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: Transferred from en.wikipedia to Commons. Original artist: SyedNaqvi90
at English Wikipedia
File:IRIS-T_air-to-air-missile.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/3b/IRIS-T_air-to-air-missile.jpg License: CC-BY-SA-3.0 Contributors: Own work Original artist: Photo taken 2005-07-16 in Koblenz by Owly K
File:India_(orthographic_projection).svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/bb/India_%28orthographic_
projection%29.svg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: This vector image was created with Inkscape. Original artist: Ssolbergj (<a
href='//commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/User_talk:Ssolbergj' title='User talk:Ssolbergj'>talk</a>)
File:Indian_Coast_Guard_flag.png Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/74/Indian_Coast_Guard_flag.png License: CC-BY-SA-3.0 Contributors: ? Original artist: ?
File:Iranische_Atomenergieorganisation_logo.svg
Source:
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/3e/
Iranische_Atomenergieorganisation_logo.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Vector made by Marsupilami based on
http://www.aeoi.org.ir/Portal/Picture/ShowPicture.aspx?ID=de999dc9-440e-4635-b370-52aaaa097591 Original artist:
Atomic
Enery Organization of Iran
File:Iraq_(orthographic_projection).svg Source:
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/59/Iraq_%28orthographic_
projection%29.svg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: Own work Original artist: Turkey (orthographic projection).svg: The Emirr
File:Japanese_Special_Naval_Landing_Forces_in_Battle_of_Shanghai_1937.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/
commons/3/39/Japanese_Special_Naval_Landing_Forces_in_Battle_of_Shanghai_1937.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: Brent
Jones: Rising Sun in the East 1937 Original artist: Unknown photographer, Ministry of the Navy
File:Lansen_1.JPG Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/28/Lansen_1.JPG License: CC BY 3.0 Contributors:
Own work Original artist: Bluescan sv.wiki
File:Libya_(orthographic_projection).svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/07/Libya_%28orthographic_
projection%29.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Own work Original artist: L'Amricain (<a href='//commons.wikimedia.org/
wiki/User_talk:L%27Am%C3%A9ricain' title='User talk:L'Amricain'>talk</a>)
File:Libya_centrifuges_2003_(at_Y12).jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/8d/Libya_centrifuges_2003_
%28at_Y12%29.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: ? Original artist: ?
File:LocationChina.png Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/01/LocationChina.png License: CC-BY-SA-3.0
Contributors: Wikipedia in English. Description page is/was here Original artist: Original uploader: Reton.
File:LocationSouthAfrica.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a1/LocationSouthAfrica.svg License: CCBY-SA-3.0 Contributors: Original by User:Vardion, Image:A large blank world map with oceans marked in blue.svg Original artist: Reiartur
File:LocationUSA.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/69/LocationUSA.svg License: CC-BY-SA-3.0 Contributors: Original by User:Vardion, Image:A large blank world map with oceans marked in blue.svg Original artist: Rei-artur
File:Location_Russia.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/37/Location_Russia.svg License: Public domain
Contributors: Own work, based on Image:BlankMap-World6.svg Original artist: User:Kelvinc
File:Locator_map_of_North_Korea.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/31/Locator_map_of_North_
Korea.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Own work Original artist: Ksiom
File:LulaLabgene.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/32/LulaLabgene.jpg License: CC BY 3.0 br Contributors: Agncia Brasil Original artist: Ricardo Stuckert/PR
File:Lyon_Playfair.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/96/Lyon_Playfair.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: National Portrait Gallery: NPG x133395 Original artist: Lock & Whiteld
File:MGR-1_Honest_John_05.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/bf/MGR-1_Honest_John_05.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: Redstone Arsenal Historical Information
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File:Malabar_2012_INS_Satpura_(F-48).jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4f/Malabar_2012_INS_
Satpura_%28F-48%29.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: http://www.navy.mil/view_image.asp?id=121565 Original artist: U.S.
Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 3rd Class Christopher Farrington
File:Maple_Leaf_(from_roundel).svg Source:
roundel%29.svg License: CC-BY-SA-3.0 Contributors:

https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/fc/Maple_Leaf_%28from_

6.2. IMAGES

Roundel_of_the_Royal_Canadian_Air_Force_(1946-1965).svg Original artist:


1965).svg: F l a n k e r

283

Roundel_of_the_Royal_Canadian_Air_Force_(1946-

File:Mc-1_gas_bomb.png Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/84/Mc-1_gas_bomb.png License: Public domain


Contributors: ? Original artist: ?
File:Medium_emblem_of_the____.svg Source:
https://upload.wikimedia.org/
wikipedia/commons/a/a5/Medium_emblem_of_the_%D0%92%D0%BE%D0%BE%D1%80%D1%83%D0%B6%D1%91%D0%BD%
D0%BD%D1%8B%D0%B5_%D0%A1%D0%B8%D0%BB%D1%8B_%D0%A0%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%81%D0%B8%D0%B9%
D1%81%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B9_%D0%A4%D0%B5%D0%B4%D0%B5%D1%80%D0%B0%D1%86%D0%B8%D0%B8.svg
License: Public domain Contributors:
www.mil.ru - Original artist: F l a n k e r
File:Members_of_the_Ukrainian_Armys_19th_CBRN-Battalion_maintaining_decontamination_skills_in_Support_of_
Operation_Iraqi_Freedom_at_Camp_Arifjan,_in_KUWAIT_on_August_3rd_2003.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/
wikipedia/commons/d/d8/Members_of_the_Ukrainian_Army%E2%80%99s_19th_CBRN-Battalion_maintaining_decontamination_
Public
skills_in_Support_of_Operation_Iraqi_Freedom_at_Camp_Arifjan%2C_in_KUWAIT_on_August_3rd_2003.jpg License:
domain Contributors: ? Original artist: US government
File:Merge-arrows.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/52/Merge-arrows.svg License: Public domain Contributors: ? Original artist: ?
File:Mergefrom.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/0f/Mergefrom.svg License: Public domain Contributors: ? Original artist: ?
File:Military_truck_carrying_IRBMs_of_Pakistani_Army.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/0/07/Military_
truck_carrying_IRBMs_of_Pakistani_Army.jpg License: CC-BY-SA-3.0 Contributors: ? Original artist: ?
File:Minuteman3launch.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/60/Minuteman3launch.jpg License: Public
domain Contributors: ? Original artist: ?
File:Moskit_missile.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/2d/Moskit_missile.jpg License: CC BY 2.5 Contributors: No machine readable source provided. Own work assumed (based on copyright claims). Original artist: No machine readable
author provided. Jno~commonswiki assumed (based on copyright claims).
File:Mustard_gas_burns.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/68/Mustard_gas_burns.jpg License: Public
domain Contributors: ? Original artist: ?
File:NASA-project-orion-artist.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/61/NASA-project-orion-artist.jpg
License: Public domain Contributors: http://mix.msfc.nasa.gov/abstracts.php?p=704 Original artist: NASA
File:NORADBlast-Doors.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/19/NORADBlast-Doors.jpg License: Public
domain Contributors: https://www.cheyennemountain.af.mil Original artist: USAF photo.
File:Nagasakibomb.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e0/Nagasakibomb.jpg License: Public domain
Contributors: http://www.archives.gov/research/military/ww2/photos/images/ww2-163.jpg National Archives image (208-N-43888) Original artist: Charles Levy from one of the B-29 Superfortresses used in the attack.
File:Naval_Ensign_of_India.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/35/Naval_Ensign_of_India.svg License:
Public domain Contributors: [1] Original artist: Original upload by Denelson83, most recent version by Fry1989.
File:Naval_Jack_of_Pakistan.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/07/Naval_Jack_of_Pakistan.svg License: Public domain Contributors: ? Original artist: ?
File:Nils_Swedlund_och_Richard_kerman.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/5a/Nils_Swedlund_
och_Richard_%C3%85kerman.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: Thede Palm: Ngra studier till T-kontorets historia. Stockholm
1999. Original artist: Unknown
File:North_Korea_nuclear.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/f1/North_Korea_nuclear.svg License: Public domain Contributors: ? Original artist: ?
File:North_Korean_missile_range.svg Source:
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/32/North_Korean_missile_
range.svg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: This le was derived from: North Korea on the globe (Japan centered).svg: <a
href='//commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:North_Korea_on_the_globe_(Japan_centered).svg' class='image'><img alt='North Korea on the globe (Japan centered).svg' src='https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/1/19/North_Korea_on_the_
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width='50'
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srcset='https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/1/19/North_Korea_on_the_globe_%28Japan_centered%29.svg/
75px-North_Korea_on_the_globe_%28Japan_centered%29.svg.png 1.5x, https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/1/
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data-le-width='1246' data-le-height='1246' /></a>
Original artist: North_Korea_on_the_globe_(Japan_centered).svg: TUBS* <a href='//commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/User_talk:TUBS'
title='User talk:TUBS'><img alt='Email Silk.svg' src='https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/5/5f/Email_Silk.svg/
15px-Email_Silk.svg.png' width='15' height='15' srcset='https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/5/5f/Email_Silk.svg/
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2x' data-le-width='16' data-le-height='16' /></a> <a href='http://toolserver.org/~{}daniel/WikiSense/Gallery.php?wikifam=
commons.wikimedia.org,<span>,&,</span>,img_user_text=TUBS'
title='Gallery'
data-x-rel='nofollow'><img
alt='Gallery'
src='https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/5/59/Gnome-emblem-photos.svg/20px-Gnome-emblem-photos.svg.png'
width='20'
height='20'
srcset='https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/5/59/Gnome-emblem-photos.svg/
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284

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Derivative of Nuclear Weapon Original artist: Speaker: Markkasan


Authors of the article
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Contributors: ? Original artist: ?
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weapon_programs_worldwide_oct2006.png License: Public domain Contributors: Transferred from en.wikipedia to Commons by User:
Liftarn using CommonsHelper. Original artist: Savantpol at en.wikipedia. Later version(s) were uploaded by Bill3000, Gerash77,
Newsnightmeirion, Asterion, Rwendland, Esoltas at en.wikipedia.
File:Office-book.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a8/Office-book.svg License: Public domain Contributors: This and myself. Original artist: Chris Down/Tango project
File:Olof_Palme_statsminister,_tidigt_70-tal.jpg Source:
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e1/Olof_Palme_
statsminister%2C_tidigt_70-tal.jpg License: CC-BY-SA-3.0 Contributors: I was the photographer Original artist: User:Oiving
File:Op_hurricane.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/9c/Op_hurricane.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: Transferred from en.wikipedia; transferred to Commons by User:Berichard using CommonsHelper. Original artist: Original
uploader was ChrisO at en.wikipedia. Later version(s) were uploaded by Pediaguy16 at en.wikipedia.
File:Operation_Castle_-_Romeo_001.jpg Source:
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a7/Operation_Castle_-_
Romeo_001.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: This image is available from the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada
Site Oce Photo Library under number XX-33. Original artist: United States Department of Energy
File:Orion_pulse_unit.png Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/ce/Orion_pulse_unit.png License: Public domain Contributors: <a data-x-rel='nofollow' class='external text' href='http://ntrs.nasa.gov/archive/nasa/casi.ntrs.nasa.gov/19770085619_
1977085619.pdf'>Nuclear Pulse Space Vehicle Study, Volume III -- Conceptual Vehicle Designs And Operational Systems</a> Original artist:
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File:Pakistan_(orthographic_projection).svg
Source:
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%28orthographic_projection%29.svg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors:
Pakistan_(orthographic_projection).svg
Original artist: Pakistan_(orthographic_projection).svg: Turkish Flame
File:Pakistan_Nuclear_Test.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/0/0d/Pakistan_Nuclear_Test.jpg License: Fair use
Contributors:
Screenshot is taken directly from the Television footage.
Original artist: ?
File:Pakistani_Air_Force_Ensign.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/ff/Pakistani_Air_Force_Ensign.
svg License: Public domain Contributors: English wikipedia image of the same name w:Image:Pakistani Air Force Ensign.svg Original
artist: Zscout370
File:People'{}s_Liberation_Army_Flag_of_the_People'{}s_Republic_of_China.svg Source:
https://upload.wikimedia.org/
wikipedia/commons/8/89/People%27s_Liberation_Army_Flag_of_the_People%27s_Republic_of_China.svg License: Public domain
Contributors: http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004-06/23/content_1542456.htm. http://law.lawtime.cn/d662410667504.html Original
artist: Created by PhiLiP / using CorelDRAW X3
File:Plutonium_ring.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/0f/Plutonium_ring.jpg License: Public domain
Contributors: Scanned from: Christensen, Dana (1995). "The Future of Plutonium Technology". Los Alamos Science (23): 170. Original artist: Los Alamos National Laboratory
File:Poison_Gas_Attack_Germany_and_Russia_1916.JPG Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a9/Poison_
Gas_Attack_Germany_and_Russia_1916.JPG License: Public domain Contributors:Popular MechanicsMagazine March 1916 Original
artist: Unknown
File:Poison_gas_attack.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/09/Poison_gas_attack.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: ? Original artist: ?
File:Portal-puzzle.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/f/fd/Portal-puzzle.svg License: Public domain Contributors: ?
Original artist: ?
File:Powell-anthrax-vial.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/12/Powell-anthrax-vial.jpg License: Public
domain Contributors: Made from video from this link: https://web.archive.org/web/20030411134510/http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/
releases/2003/02/20030205-1.html. Transferred from en.wikipedia to Commons. Original artist: United States Government
File:Powell_UN_Iraq_presentation,_alleged_Aluminum_Tube_for_Uranium_Enrichment.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.
org/wikipedia/commons/a/a0/Powell_UN_Iraq_presentation%2C_alleged_Aluminum_Tube_for_Uranium_Enrichment.jpg
License:
Public domain Contributors: http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/photos/2003/17339.htm Original artist: U.S. Department of
State
File:Question_book-new.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/9/99/Question_book-new.svg License: Cc-by-sa-3.0
Contributors:
Created from scratch in Adobe Illustrator. Based on Image:Question book.png created by User:Equazcion Original artist:
Tkgd2007
File:R1_KTH.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/f5/R1_KTH.jpg License: Public domain Contributors:
Tekniska museet Stockholm Original artist: Unknown
File:RAAF_F111.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/23/RAAF_F111.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: nellis.af.mil Original artist: Master Sgt. Kevin J. Gruenwald (U.S. Air Force)
File:RSA-3-002.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/eb/RSA-3-002.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: Own work Original artist: Leo za1

6.2. IMAGES

285

File:Radiation_warning_symbol.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/0b/Radiation_warning_symbol.svg


License: Public domain Contributors: ? Original artist: ?
File:Radioactive.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/b5/Radioactive.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Created by Cary Bass using Adobe Illustrator on January 19, 2006. Original artist: Cary Bass
File:Red_Cross_at_Uqd.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/1f/Red_Cross_at_Uqd.jpg License: Public
domain Contributors: Scanned (and slightly cropped) from: Dana Adams Schmidt, Yemen; the unknown war. (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1968). Original artist: Unknown
File:Republic_of_China_National_Emblem.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a0/Republic_of_China_
National_Emblem.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Taiwanese Beech-1900C Original artist: Sekisama
File:SA-2_Guideline.JPG Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/32/SA-2_Guideline.JPG License: CC BY 3.0
Contributors: Own work Original artist: Tourbillon
File:SS-24_silo_destruction.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/9c/SS-24_silo_destruction.jpg License:
Public domain Contributors: ? Original artist: ?
File:Saab_JA37_37447_Swedish_Air_Force_Marcel_van_Leeuwen.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/
1/1a/Saab_JA37_37447_Swedish_Air_Force_Marcel_van_Leeuwen.jpg License: CC-BY-SA-3.0 Contributors: http://www.zap16.com
Original artist: Rob Vogelaar
File:Sarin-2D-skeletal.png Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/36/Sarin-2D-skeletal.png License: Public domain Contributors: Own work Original artist: Ben Mills
File:Saudi_Arabia_map.png Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/04/Saudi_Arabia_map.png License: CC-BYSA-3.0 Contributors: ? Original artist: ?
File:Sedan_Plowshare_Crater.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/b6/Sedan_Plowshare_Crater.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: This image is available from the National Nuclear Security Administration Nevada Site Oce Photo
Library under number NF-12187. Original artist: Federal Government of the United States
File:Shiro-ishii.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/ae/Shiro-ishii.jpg License: Public domain Contributors:
Bulletin of Unit 731(an article not for sale) Original artist: Masao Takezawa
File:Skull_and_crossbones.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/53/Skull_and_crossbones.svg License:
Public domain Contributors: http://vector4u.com/symbols/skull-and-crossbones-vector-svg/ Original artist: Unknown
File:SmythReport.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/f8/SmythReport.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: ? Original artist: ?
File:Sound-icon.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/47/Sound-icon.svg License:
Derivative work from Silsor's versio Original artist: Crystal SVG icon set

LGPL Contributors:

File:South_African_nuclear_bomb_casings.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/1/10/South_African_nuclear_


bomb_casings.jpg License: Fair use Contributors:
[1], original source photojournalist Mungo Poore Original artist: ?
File:Swedish_Atomic_Bomb.png Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/17/Swedish_Atomic_Bomb.png License: Public domain Contributors: From T. Magnusson, Design and Eects of Atomic Weapons,Kosmos, Fysika Uppsatser, 34
180 (1956) Sweden. Translated and printed as JPRS:8295, Oce of Technical Services, U.S. Dept of Commerce. This diagram was
reprinted as Figure 8 in Robert W. Selden An Introduction to Fission Explosives,UCID-15554, Lawrence Radiation Laboratory, Livermore, California, July 1969. Line drawing scanned from History of the Swedish Atom Bomb,Ny Teknik No. 17, 25 April 1985,
cleaned up, re-labeled, and colored by Howard Morland, 2007. Original artist: HowardMorland
File:Symbol_book_class2.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/89/Symbol_book_class2.svg License: CC
BY-SA 2.5 Contributors: Mad by Lokal_Prol by combining: Original artist: Lokal_Prol
File:SyriaReactorPict34.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/80/SyriaReactorPict34.jpg License: Public
domain Contributors: US Government / unspecied intelligence agency Original artist: Unknown
File:SyriaReactorPict38.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e1/SyriaReactorPict38.jpg License: Public
domain Contributors: US Government / unspecied intelligence agency Original artist: Unknown
File:Syria_location_map3.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/6b/Syria_location_map3.svg License: CC
BY-SA 3.0 de Contributors: own work, using
United States National Imagery and Mapping Agency data
World Data Base II data
Original artist: NordNordWest
File:Tage_Erlander_1952.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/be/Tage_Erlander_1952.jpg License: Public
domain Contributors: From Tage Erlanders dagbcker 1952(The 1952 diaries of Tage Erlander), published by Sven Erlander, 2002
Original artist: The source says Foto: Dagens bild(Photo: Picture of the day)
File:Teller-Ulam_device_3D.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/c/c1/Teller-Ulam_device_3D.svg License:
Public domain Contributors: ? Original artist: ?
File:Text_document_with_red_question_mark.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/a/a4/Text_document_
with_red_question_mark.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Created by bdesham with Inkscape; based upon Text-x-generic.svg
from the Tango project. Original artist: Benjamin D. Esham (bdesham)
File:The_Art_of_War-Tangut_script.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/3a/The_Art_of_War-Tangut_
script.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: Original artist: Sun Tzu
File:Trident_C-4_montage.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/7f/Trident_C-4_montage.jpg License:
Public domain Contributors: ? Original artist: ?

286

CHAPTER 6. TEXT AND IMAGE SOURCES, CONTRIBUTORS, AND LICENSES

File:Trident_II_missile_image.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/99/Trident_II_missile_image.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: High Res image from Lockheed Martin NOTE: According to NTI, this image is a U.S. Department of
Defense photo, therefore is in the public domain. Also here, on US Navy web site Original artist: Unknown
File:U.S._Navy_Seabees_assigned_to_Naval_Mobile_Construction_Battalion_1_don_their_MCU-2P_gas_masks_at_the_
Naval_Construction_Battalion_Center_in_Gulfport,_Miss.,_Oct_081024-N-LD343-001.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.
org/wikipedia/commons/c/cf/U.S._Navy_Seabees_assigned_to_Naval_Mobile_Construction_Battalion_1_don_their_MCU-2P_gas_
masks_at_the_Naval_Construction_Battalion_Center_in_Gulfport%2C_Miss.%2C_Oct_081024-N-LD343-001.jpg License: Public
domain Contributors: http://www.defenseimagery.mil/imageRetrieve.action?guid=c64057b4be184cb527c164f3672784fd7ce88ec2&t=2
Original artist: MC2 Demetrius Kennon
File:USS_Enterprise_FS_Charles_de_Gaulle.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d7/USS_Enterprise_
FS_Charles_de_Gaulle.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: U.S. DefenseImagery photo VIRIN: 010516-N-6259P-003 Original artist:
U.S. Navy photo by Photographer's Mate Airman Doug Pearlman.
File:USS_Kentucky_(SSBN-737).jpg
Source:
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/08/USS_Kentucky_
%28SSBN-737%29.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: Source Original artist: U.S. Navy photo
File:US_and_USSR_nuclear_stockpiles.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/bb/US_and_USSR_nuclear_
stockpiles.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Own work Source data from: Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen,Global nuclear stockpiles,
1945-2006,Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 62, no. 4 (July/August 2006), 64-66. Online at http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/c4120650912x74k7/
fulltext.pdf Original artist: Created by User:Fastfission rst by mapping the lines using OpenOce.org's Calc program, then exporting a

graph to SVG, and the performing substantial aesthetic modications in Inkscape.


File:US_nuclear_warheads_1945-2002_graph.png Source:
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/85/US_nuclear_
warheads_1945-2002_graph.png License: Public domain Contributors: ? Original artist: ?
File:Ursvik_FOA_2009.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/0f/Ursvik_FOA_2009.jpg License: CC BYSA 3.0 Contributors: Own work Original artist: Holger.Ellgaard
File:W48_155-millimeter_nuclear_shell.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/57/W48_155-millimeter_
nuclear_shell.jpg License: Public domain Contributors:
Immediate source: Brookings Institution Original artist: US-Department of Energy
File:W87_MX_Missile_schematic.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/7c/W87_MX_Missile_schematic.
jpg License: Public domain Contributors: ? Original artist: ?
File:WMD-chemical.png Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/42/WMD-chemical.png License: CC-BY-SA-3.0
Contributors: ? Original artist: ?
File:Wiki_letter_w_cropped.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/1/1c/Wiki_letter_w_cropped.svg License:
CC-BY-SA-3.0 Contributors:
Wiki_letter_w.svg Original artist: Wiki_letter_w.svg: Jarkko Piiroinen
File:Wikinews-logo.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/24/Wikinews-logo.svg License: CC BY-SA 3.0
Contributors: This is a cropped version of Image:Wikinews-logo-en.png. Original artist: Vectorized by Simon 01:05, 2 August 2006 (UTC)
Updated by Time3000 17 April 2007 to use ocial Wikinews colours and appear correctly on dark backgrounds. Originally uploaded by
Simon.
File:Wikiquote-logo.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/fa/Wikiquote-logo.svg License: Public domain
Contributors: ? Original artist: ?
File:Women_Strike_for_Peace_NYWTS.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/88/Women_Strike_for_
Peace_NYWTS.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division. New York WorldTelegram and the Sun Newspaper Photograph Collection. http://hdl.loc.gov/loc.pnp/cph.3c28465 Original artist: New York WorldTelegram and the Sun sta photographer: Stanziola, Phil, photographer.
File:World_War_I,_British_soccer_team_with_gas_masks,_1916.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/
e6/World_War_I%2C_British_soccer_team_with_gas_masks%2C_1916.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: Bibliothque nationale
de France, dpartement Estampes et photographie, EI-13 (531) Original artist: Agence Rol
File:Yakhont.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/8/83/Yakhont.jpg License: CC BY 2.5 Contributors: Own
work Original artist: Jno
File:Yongbyon_5MWe_Magnox_reactor.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d2/Yongbyon_5MWe_
Magnox_reactor.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: http://iis-db.stanford.edu/evnts/5220/gallery/images/IMG_2009.jpg Original
artist: Keith Luse, Senior Professional Sta Member, U.S. Senate
File:gestaverket_1966.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/79/%C3%85gestaverket_1966.jpg License:
Public domain Contributors: Tekniska museet Original artist: Unknown
File:sten_Undn_-_Sveriges_styresmn.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/3/3c/%C3%96sten_Und%
C3%A9n_-_Sveriges_styresm%C3%A4n.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: Encyclopedia Sveriges styresmn 1937Original
artist: Unknown

6.3 Content license


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