Weapons For Mass Destruction
Weapons For Mass Destruction
Weapons For Mass Destruction
Contents
1
Overview
1.1
1.1.1
1.1.2
1.1.3
Treaties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.1.4
1.1.5
1.1.6
Media coverage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.1.7
Public perceptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.1.8
In popular culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.1.9
1.1.11 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.1.12 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10
10
10
Types
12
2.1
Biological warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
12
2.1.1
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
12
2.1.2
History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
12
2.1.3
Modern BW operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
14
2.1.4
17
2.1.5
18
2.1.6
In popular culture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
18
2.1.7
See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
19
2.1.8
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
19
2.1.9
Further reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
21
22
Chemical warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
22
2.2.1
Denition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
22
2.2.2
History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
22
2.2.3
Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
32
2.2
ii
CONTENTS
2.3
2.4
2.2.4
Sociopolitical climate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
37
2.2.5
38
2.2.6
See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
40
2.2.7
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
40
2.2.8
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
43
2.2.9
Further reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
43
44
Nuclear weapon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
44
2.3.1
Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
45
2.3.2
Weapons delivery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
47
2.3.3
Nuclear strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
48
2.3.4
50
2.3.5
Controversy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
52
2.3.6
53
2.3.7
Non-weapons uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
54
2.3.8
See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
57
2.3.9
58
2.3.10 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
61
61
Radiological weapon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
62
2.4.1
Explanation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
62
2.4.2
History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
62
2.4.3
Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
63
2.4.4
Military uses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
63
2.4.5
Dirty bombs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
63
2.4.6
Salted bomb . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
63
2.4.7
See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
64
2.4.8
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
64
2.4.9
External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
64
Proliferation
65
3.1
Nuclear proliferation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
65
3.1.1
Non-proliferation eorts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
65
3.1.2
66
3.1.3
International cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
67
3.1.4
69
3.1.5
Breakout capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
77
3.1.6
77
3.1.7
See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
79
3.1.8
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
80
3.1.9
External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
82
83
3.2
CONTENTS
3.3
iii
3.2.1
83
3.2.2
See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
87
3.2.3
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
87
3.2.4
Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
87
88
3.3.1
Argentina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
88
3.3.2
Australia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
88
3.3.3
Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
88
3.3.4
Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
88
3.3.5
China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
88
3.3.6
European joint-venture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
88
3.3.7
France
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
88
3.3.8
Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
89
3.3.9
India
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
90
3.3.10 Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
90
3.3.11 Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
92
3.3.12 Israel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
92
3.3.13 Japan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
92
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
93
3.3.15 Norway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
93
3.3.16 Pakistan
93
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
93
93
3.3.19 Serbia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
93
94
3.3.21 Sweden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
94
3.3.22 Taiwan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
94
3.3.23 Turkey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
94
94
95
96
3.3.27 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
97
Countries
98
4.1
Albania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
98
4.1.1
98
4.1.2
See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
98
4.1.3
98
Algeria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
99
4.2.1
99
4.2.2
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
99
Argentina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
99
4.2
4.3
iv
CONTENTS
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8
4.3.1
Missile systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
99
4.3.2
Chemical weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
99
4.3.3
Nuclear weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
99
4.3.4
4.3.5
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.3.6
Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.3.7
Australia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
4.4.1
4.4.2
4.4.3
4.4.4
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
4.4.5
Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.5.1
4.5.2
4.5.3
Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.5.4
4.5.5
4.5.6
4.5.7
Bulgaria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
4.6.1
Missile program
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
4.6.2
4.6.3
4.6.4
4.6.5
4.6.6
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
4.6.7
Burma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
4.7.1
4.7.2
4.7.3
Canada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
4.8.1
4.8.2
4.8.3
4.8.4
Disarmament . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
4.8.5
4.8.6
4.8.7
CONTENTS
4.8.8
4.9
v
External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
4.9.1
4.9.2
4.9.3
4.9.4
4.9.5
4.9.6
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
4.9.7
4.9.8
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
vi
CONTENTS
4.13.6 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
4.13.7 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
4.14 Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
4.14.1 Program development 1960s - 1980s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
4.14.2 IranIraq War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
4.14.3 The 1991 Persian Gulf War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
4.14.4 Between Persian Gulf Wars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
4.14.5 2003 Iraq War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165
4.14.6 2009 Declaration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171
4.14.7 Media perception . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
4.14.8 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
4.14.9 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
4.14.10 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
4.15 Israel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
4.15.1 Nuclear weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
4.15.2 Nuclear weapons delivery
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
CONTENTS
vii
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
viii
CONTENTS
4.24.3 Recent developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
4.24.4 Missile capability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
4.24.5 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
4.24.6 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
4.24.7 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 225
4.25 South Africa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
4.25.1 Nuclear weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226
4.25.2 Biological and chemical weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
4.25.3 See also . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
4.25.4 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
4.25.5 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
4.25.6 External links . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
4.26 Sweden . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
4.26.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
4.26.2 Early studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
4.26.3 Connection between nuclear weapons program and civilian use of nuclear energy . . . . . . 231
4.26.4 Beginning of the nuclear program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
4.26.5 Basic materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
4.26.6 1950s: The Government favors nuclear program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
4.26.7 Nuclear resistance begins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
4.26.8 Defense research and design research
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 235
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 236
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241
4.26.18 The end of nuclear weapons program and Swedish disarmament policy . . . . . . . . . . . 241
4.26.19 Reasons to abandon nuclear program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
4.26.20 Disarmament of Swedish nuclear sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242
4.26.21 After the nuclear weapons program: defense research and support for disarmament . . . . . 243
4.26.22 Sweden and non-proliferation movement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243
4.26.23 Documents from the nuclear weapons program
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243
CONTENTS
ix
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253
Treaties
264
CONTENTS
5.1
General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 264
5.1.2
5.1.3
5.1.4
5.1.5
5.1.6
266
6.1
Text . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266
6.2
Images . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278
6.3
Chapter 1
Overview
1.1 Weapon of mass destruction
CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW
The term was also used in the introduction to the hugely that became the primary justication for the 2003 invainuential U.S. government document known as NSC-68 sion of Iraq. However, no WMD were found in Iraq.
written in April 1950.* [7]
(Old stockpiles of chemical munitions including sarin and
During a speech at Rice University on 12 September mustard agents were found, but none were* considered to
1962, president John F. Kennedy spoke of not lling be in a usable condition due to corrosion.) [13]
space with weapons of mass destruction, but with instruments of knowledge and understanding.* [8] The following month, during a televised presentation about the
Cuban Missile Crisis on 22 October 1962, Kennedy made
reference tooensive weapons of sudden mass destruction.* [9]"
Because of its prolic use and (worldwide) public prole during this period, the American Dialect Society
voted weapons of mass destruction(and its abbreviation,WMD) the word of the year in 2002,* [14] and in
2003 Lake Superior State University added WMD to its
list of terms banished for "Mis-use, Over-use and General
*
An early use of the exact phrase in an international treaty Uselessness". [15]
was in the Outer Space Treaty of 1967, however no def- In its criminal complaint against the main suspect of
inition was provided.
the Boston Marathon bombing of 15 April 2013, the
FBI refers to a pressure-cooker improvised bomb as a
weapon of mass destruction.* [16]
Evolution of its use
During the Cold War, the term weapons of mass destructionwas primarily a reference to nuclear weapons.
At the time, in the West the euphemism strategic
weaponswas used to refer to the American nuclear arsenal, which was presented as a necessary deterrent against
nuclear or conventional attack from the Soviet Union (see
Mutual Assured Destruction).
Subsequent to Operation Opera, the destruction of a preoperational nuclear reactor inside Iraq by the Israeli Air
Force, Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin countered
criticism by saying that on no account shall we permit an enemy to develop weapons of mass destruction
against the people of Israel.This policy of pre-emptive
action against real or perceived WMD became known as
the Begin Doctrine.
The term weapons of mass destructioncontinued
to see periodic use throughout this time, usually in the
context of nuclear arms control; Ronald Reagan used it
during the 1986 Reykjavk Summit, when referring to
the 1967 Outer Space Treaty.* [10] Reagan's successor,
George H.W. Bush, used the term in an 1989 speech
to the United Nations, using it primarily in reference to
chemical arms.* [11]
The end of the Cold War reduced U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons as a deterrent, causing it to shift its focus
to disarmament. With the 1990 invasion of Kuwait and
1991 Gulf War, Iraq's nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons programs became a particular concern of the
rst Bush Administration.* [12] Following the war, Bill
Clinton and other western politicians and media continued to use the term, usually in reference to ongoing at- The NBC denition has also been used in ocial U.S.
tempts to dismantle Iraq's weapons programs.
documents, by the U.S. President,* [18]* [19] the U.S.
Agency,* [20] the U.S. Department
After the 11 September 2001 attacks and the 2001 an- Central Intelligence
*
*
and the U.S. Government Acthrax attacks in the United States, an increased fear of Defense, [21] [22]
*
[23]
countability
Oce.
of non-conventional weapons and asymmetrical war-
fare took hold in many countries. This fear reached a Other documents expand the denition of WMD to also
crescendo with the 2002 Iraq disarmament crisis and the include radiological or conventional weapons. The U.S.
alleged existence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq military refers to WMD as:
3
weapons systems and in most years greatly exceed the
toll of the atomic bombs that devastated Hiroshima and
Nagasaki".* [27]
An additional condition often implicitly applied to WMD
is that the use of the weapons must be strategic. In other
words, they would be designed to "have consequences
far outweighing the size and eectiveness of the weapons
themselves".* [28] The strategic nature of WMD also denes their function in the military doctrine of total war as
targeting the means a country would use to support and
supply its war eort, specically its population, industry,
and natural resources.
CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW
missile having an explosive or incendiary charge of
more than one-quarter ounce, mine, or device similar to any of the devices described in the preceding
clauses* [36]
1.1.3 Treaties
any weapon designed to release radiation or radioac- See also: Arms control and List of weapons of mass
destruction treaties
tivity at a level dangerous to human life
any device or weapon designed or intended to cause
The development and use of WMD is governed by sevdeath or serious bodily injury by causing a malfunceral international conventions and treaties, although not
tion of or destruction of an aircraft or other vehicle
all countries have signed and ratied them:
that carries humans or of an aircraft or other vehicle whose malfunction or destruction may cause said
Partial Test Ban Treaty
aircraft or other vehicle to cause death or serious
bodily injury to humans who may be within range
Outer Space Treaty
of the vector in its course of travel or the travel of
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)
its debris.
Indictments and convictions for possession and use of
WMD such as truck bombs,* [39] pipe bombs,* [40] shoe
bombs,* [41] and cactus needles coated with a biological
toxin* [42] have been obtained under 18 USC 2332a.
As dened by 18 USC 2332 (a), a Weapon of Mass Destruction is:
(a) any destructive device as dened in section 921
of the title;
An atomic-bomb blueprint
1.1.5
CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW
1.1.6
Media coverage
3. When people ignore corrections, they do so irrespective of how certain they are that the corrections occurred.
A poll conducted between June and September 2003
asked people whether they thought evidence of WMD
had been discovered in Iraq since the war ended. They
were also asked which media sources they relied upon.
Those who obtained their news primarily from Fox News
were three times as likely to believe that evidence of
WMD had been discovered in Iraq than those who relied on PBS and NPR for their news, and one third more
likely than those who primarily watched CBS.
Based on a series of polls taken from JuneSeptember
2003.* [56]
In 2006 Fox News reported the claims of two Republican lawmakers that WMDs had been found in Iraq,* [57]
based upon unclassied portions of a report by the
National Ground Intelligence Center. Quoting from the
report, Senator Rick Santorum said Since 2003, coalition forces have recovered approximately 500 weapons
munitions which contain degraded mustard or sarin nerve
agent. According to David Kay, who appeared before the US House Armed Services Committee to discuss these badly corroded munitions, they were leftovers,
many years old, improperly stored or destroyed by the
Iraqis.* [58] Charles Duelfer agreed, stating on NPR's
Talk of the Nation: When I was running the ISG the
Iraq Survey Group we had a couple of them that had
been turned in to these IEDs, the improvised explosive
devices. But they are local hazards. They are not a major, you know, weapon of mass destruction.* [59]
In 1998 University of New Mexico's Institute for Public Policy released their third report* [64] on US percep-
tions including the general public, politicians and scien- Radioactive weaponry/hazard symbol
tists of nuclear weapons since the breakup of the Soviet
Union. Risks of nuclear conict, proliferation, and terrorism were seen as substantial.
While maintenance of a nuclear US arsenal was considered above average in importance, there was widespread
support for a reduction in the stockpile, and very little
support for developing and testing new nuclear weapons.
Also in 1998, but after the UNM survey was conducted,
nuclear weapons became an issue in India's election of
March,* [65] in relation to political tensions with neighboring Pakistan. Prior to the election the Bharatiya Janata
Party (BJP) announced it woulddeclare India a nuclear
weapon stateafter coming to power.
BJP won the elections, and on 14 May, three days after
India tested nuclear weapons for the second time, a public
opinion poll reported that a majority of Indians favored
the countrys nuclear build-up.
On 15 April 2004, the Program on International Policy
Attitudes (PIPA) reported* [66] that US citizens showed
high levels of concern regarding WMD, and that preventing the spread of nuclear weapons should bea very important US foreign policy goal, accomplished through
multilateral arms control rather than the use of military
threats.
Radioactivity
1.1.9
CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW
Biohazard
as to what it
means.
1.1.10
See also
1.1.11
References
[24] Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. Dtic.mil. 12 April 2001. Retrieved 5
August 2010.
[25] Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction:
Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors (HC 898),
London: The Stationery Oce, 2004, 14.
[26] A Soldier's Viewpoint on Surviving Nuclear, Chemical
and Biological Attacks. Sightm1911.com. Retrieved 5
August 2010.
[27] Colombia. Web.archive.org. 2 September 2007.
Archived from the original on 2 September 2007. Retrieved 14 May 2012.Template:Dead link 2013.06.08
[43]
[44]Critical Technological Assessment in Israel and NATO
Nations. US Dept of Defense (Released by FOIA request). 1987.
[45] David T. Wright Weapons of mass distraction.
Thornwalker.com. 13 April 1998. Retrieved 5 August
2010.
[46] Weapons of Mass Destruction Are Overrated as a Threat
to America: Newsroom: The Independent Institute. Independent.org. 28 January 2004. Retrieved 5 August
2010.
[47] Archived 11 October 2007 at the Wayback Machine
[33] US CODE: 50, ch. 43Preventing Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism. .law.cornell.edu.
23 March 2010. Retrieved 5 August 2010.
[59] Duelfer, Charles. Expert: Iraq WMD Find Did Not Point
to Ongoing Program NPR. 22 June 2006
10
CHAPTER 1. OVERVIEW
1.1.12
Bibliography
International law
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540
David P. Fidler, "Weapons of Mass Destruction and
International Law" (February 2003), American Society of International Law.
Joanne Mariner, "FindLaw Forum: Weapons of
mass destruction and international law's principle
that civilians cannot be targeted" (20 November
2001), CNN.
Media
Media Coverage of Weapons of Mass Destruction
at the Wayback Machine (archived February 17,
2006), by Susan D. Moeller, Center for International
and Security Studies at Maryland, 2004.
Memory for fact, ction, and misinformation,
by Stephan Lewandowsky, Werner G.K. Stritzke,
Klaus Oberauer, and Michael Morales, Psychological Science, 16(3): 190195, 2005.
Graham Jr, Thomas, and Thomas Graham. Common sense on weapons of mass destruction (UniverEthics
sity of Washington Press, 2011)
Horowitz, Michael C., and Neil Narang. Poor
Mans atomic bomb? exploring the relationship
betweenweapons of mass destruction.Journal
of Conict Resolution (2013) online
Hutchinson, Robert. Weapons of Mass Destruction:
The no-nonsense guide to nuclear, chemical and biological weapons today (Hachette UK, 2011)
1.1.13
Jacob M. Appel, "Is All Fair in Biological Warfare?,Journal of Medical Ethics, June 2009.
Public perceptions
Steven Kull et al., Americans on WMD Proliferation (15 April 2004), Program on International Policy Attitudes/Knowledge Networks survey.
Further reading
11
Chapter 2
Types
2.1 Biological warfare
13
Rudimentary forms of biological warfare have been practiced since antiquity.* [6] During the 6th century BC,
the Assyrians poisoned enemy wells with a fungus that
would render the enemy delirious. In 1346, the bodies of Mongol warriors of the Golden Horde who had
died of plague were thrown over the walls of the besieged
Crimean city of Kaa. Specialists disagree over whether
this operation may have been responsible for the spread
of the Black Death into Europe.* [7]* [8]* [9]* [10]
It has been claimed that the British Marines used
smallpox in New South Wales in 1789.* [11] Historians have long debated inconclusively whether the British
Army used smallpox in an episode against Native Americans in 1763.* [12]
By 1900 the germ theory and advances in bacteriology
brought a new level of sophistication to the techniques for
possible use of bio-agents in war. Biological sabotagein
the form of anthrax and glanderswas undertaken on behalf of the Imperial German government during World
War I (19141918), with indierent results.* [13] The
Geneva Protocol of 1925 prohibited the use of chemical
weapons and biological weapons.
With the onset of World War II, the Ministry of Supply in the United Kingdom established a BW program at
Porton Down, headed by the microbiologist Paul Fildes.
The research was championed by Winston Churchill and
soon tularemia, anthrax, brucellosis, and botulism toxins
had been eectively weaponized. In particular, Gruinard
Island in Scotland, during a series of extensive tests
was contaminated with anthrax for the next 56 years.
Although the UK never oensively used the biological
weapons it developed on its own, its program was the rst
to successfully weaponize a variety of deadly pathogens
and bring them into industrial production.* [14]
When the USA entered the war, mounting British pressure for the creation of a similar research program for an
Allied pooling of resources, led to the creation of a large
industrial complex at Fort Detrick, Maryland in 1942 under the direction of George W. Merck.* [15] The biological and chemical weapons developed during that period were tested at the Dugway Proving Grounds in Utah.
Soon there were facilities for the mass production of anthrax spores, brucellosis, and botulism toxins, although
the war was over before these weapons could be of much
operational use.* [16]
The most notorious program of the period was run by
the secret Imperial Japanese Army Unit 731 during the
war, based at Pingfan in Manchuria and commanded by
Lieutenant General Shir Ishii. This unit did research
on BW, conducted often fatal human experiments on
prisoners, and produced biological weapons for combat
use.* [17] Although the Japanese eort lacked the technological sophistication of the American or British programs, it far outstripped them in its widespread application and indiscriminate brutality. Biological weapons
were used against both Chinese soldiers and civilians in
Shiro Ishii, commander of Unit 731, which performed live human vivisections and other biological experimentation.
14
CHAPTER 2. TYPES
2.1.3
Modern BW operations
Oensive
It has been argued that rational people would never use
biological weapons oensively. The argument is that biological weapons cannot be controlled: the weapon could
backre and harm the army on the oensive, perhaps
having even worse eects than on the target. An agent
like smallpox or other airborne viruses would almost certainly spread worldwide and ultimately infect the user's
home country. However, this argument does not necessarily apply to bacteria. For example, anthrax can easily
be controlled and even created in a garden shed; the FBI
suspects it can be done for as little as $2,500 using readily
available laboratory equipment.* [29] Also, using microbial methods, bacteria can be suitably modied to be effective in only a narrow environmental range, the range of
the target that distinctly diers from the army on the offensive. Thus only the target might be aected adversely.
The weapon may be further used to bog down an advancing army making them more vulnerable to counterattack
by the defending force.
15
agents. In the United States, their possession, use, and Attacking animals is another area of biological warfare
transfer are regulated by the Centers for Disease Control intended to eliminate animal resources for transportaand Prevention's Select Agent Program.
tion and food. In the First World War, German agents
The former US biological warfare program categorized were arrested attempting to inoculate draft animals with
its weaponized anti-personnel bio-agents as either Lethal anthrax, and they were believed to be responsible for
Agents (Bacillus anthracis, Francisella tularensis, Bo- outbreaks of glanders in horses and mules. The British
tulinum toxin) or Incapacitating Agents (Brucella suis, tainted small feed cakes with anthrax in the Second World
Coxiella burnetii, Venezuelan equine encephalitis virus, War as a potential means of attacking German cattle for
food denial, but never employed the weapon. In the
Staphylococcal enterotoxin B).
1950s, the United States had a eld trial with hog cholera.
During the Mau Mau Uprising in 1952, the poisonous
latex of the African milk bush was used to kill cattle.* [34]
Anti-agriculture
Unconnected with inter-human wars, humans have deliberately introduced the rabbit disease Myxomatosis, originating in South America, to Australia and Europe, with
The United States developed an anti-crop capability dur- the intention of reducing the rabbit population which
ing the Cold War that used plant diseases (bioherbicides, had devastating but temporary results, with wild rabbit
or mycoherbicides) for destroying enemy agriculture. Bi- populations reduced to a fraction of their former size but
ological weapons also target sheries as well as water- survivors developing immunity and increasing again.
based vegetation. It was believed that destruction of enemy agriculture on a strategic scale could thwart SinoSoviet aggression in a general war. Diseases such as Entomological warfare Main article: Entomological
wheat blast and rice blast were weaponized in aerial spray warfare
tanks and cluster bombs for delivery to enemy watersheds
in agricultural regions to initiate epiphytotics (epidemics Entomological warfare (EW) is a type of biological waramong plants). When the United States renounced its of- fare that uses insects to attack the enemy. The concept
fensive biological warfare program in 1969 and 1970, the has existed for centuries and research and development
vast majority of its biological arsenal was composed of have continued into the modern era. EW has been used
these plant diseases. Enterotoxins and Mycotoxins were in battle by Japan and several other nations have develnot aected by Nixon's order.
oped and been accused of using an entomological warThough herbicides are chemicals, they are often grouped fare program. EW may employ insects in a direct atwith biological warfare and chemical warfare because tack or as vectors to deliver a biological agent, such as
they may work in a similar manner as biotoxins or bioreg- plague. Essentially, EW exists in three varieties. One
ulators. The Army Biological Laboratory tested each type of EW involves infecting insects with a pathogen and
*
agent and the Army's Technical Escort Unit was respon- then dispersing the insects over target areas. [35] The insible for transport of all chemical, biological, radiologi- sects then act as a vector, infecting any person or animal
cal (nuclear) materials. Scorched earth tactics or destroy- they might bite. Another type of EW is a direct insect
ing livestock and farmland were carried out in the Viet- attack against crops; the insect may not be infected with
nam war (cf. Agent Orange)* [33] and Eelam War in Sri any pathogen but instead represents a threat to agriculture. The nal method uses uninfected insects, such as
Lanka.
bees, wasps, etc., to directly attack the enemy.* [36]
Biological warfare can also specically target plants
to destroy crops or defoliate vegetation. The United
States and Britain discovered plant growth regulators Defensive
(i.e., herbicides) during the Second World War, and initiated a herbicidal warfare program that was eventually Main article: Biodefense
used in Malaya and Vietnam in counterinsurgency operations.
Anti-crop/anti-vegetation/anti-sheries
Anti-livestock
In 1980s Soviet Ministry of Agriculture had successfully developed variants of foot-and-mouth disease, and
rinderpest against cows, African swine fever for pigs, and
psittacosis to kill chicken. These agents were prepared
to spray them down from tanks attached to airplanes over
hundreds of miles. The secret program was code-named
Ecology.* [31]
Research and development into medical countermeasures In 2010 at The Meeting of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and Their Destruction
in Geneva* [37] the sanitary epidemiological reconnaissance was suggested as well-tested means for enhancing the monitoring of infections and parasitic agents, for
practical implementation of the International Health Regulations (2005). The aim was to prevent and minimize
16
CHAPTER 2. TYPES
the consequences of natural outbreaks of dangerous in- 6. Stable endemic disease, but with an unexplained infectious diseases as well as the threat of alleged use of crease in relevance.
biological weapons against BTWC States Parties.
7. Rare transmission (aerosols, food, water).
8. No illness presented in people who were/are not exposed to common ventilation systems (have separate
closed ventilation systems) when illness is seen in persons in close proximity who have a common ventilation
system.
17
2.1.4
United States
Main article: United States biological weapons program
Researchers working in Class III cabinets at the U.S. Army Biological Warfare Laboratories, Camp Detrick, Maryland (1940s).
Building 470
One-Million-Liter Test Sphere
Operation Whitecoat (195473)
U.S. biological defense program (1956
present)
United States Army Medical Unit (USAMU; 195669)
U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of
Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID; 1969
present)
National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC)
U.S. entomological warfare program
Project Bacchus
Project Clear Vision
Project SHAD
Project 112
Horn Island Testing Station
Fort Terry
Granite Peak Installation
Vigo Ordnance Plant
United Kingdom
18
CHAPTER 2. TYPES
Porton Down
Japan
Gruinard Island
Nancekuke
Operation Vegetarian (1942-1944)
Open-air eld tests:
Operation Harness o Antigua, 19481950.
Operation Cauldron o Stornoway, 1952.
Operation Hesperus o Stornoway, 1953.
Unit 731
Zhongma Fortress
Kaimingjie germ weapon attack
Khabarovsk War Crime Trials
Epidemic Prevention and Water Purication Department
Iraq
(passim)
Al Hakum
Salman Pak facility
Al Manal facility
Project Coast
Protechnik
Project Factor
2.1.7
See also
2.1.8
References
19
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Maryland, 4th Edition: 2000.
20
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Jennifer L. Siegel (eds) Intelligence and Statecraft: The
Use and Limits of Intelligence in International Society.
Praeger, 2005.http://books.google.com/books?id=I3Q3_
Ww-5SMC&pg=PA194&dq=erich+traub&hl=en&
ei=DyJ_TPDPI4vEsAOvq_nwCg&sa=X&oi=book_
result&ct=result&resnum=10&ved=0CE4Q6AEwCQ#
v=onepage&q=erich%20traub&f=false
[66] Jamie Bisher, Baron von Rosen's 1916 Anthrax Mission,2014. Baron von Rosen's 1916 Anthrax Mission.
Retrieved 24 October 2014.
21
Endicott, Stephen and Edward Hagerman, The
United States and Biological Warfare: Secrets from
the Early Cold War and Korea, Indiana University
Press (1998). ISBN 0-253-33472-1
2.1.9
Further reading
22
CHAPTER 2. TYPES
Zelico, Alan and Bellomo, Michael (2005). Mi- century. The entire class known as Lethal Unitary Chemcrobe: Are we Ready for the Next Plague?. AMA- ical Agents and Munitions have been scheduled for elimCOM Books, New York, NY. ISBN 0-8144-0865-6 ination by the CWC.* [2]
Under the Convention, chemicals that are toxic enough to
be used as chemical weapons, or that may be used to man2.1.10 External links
ufacture such chemicals, are divided into three groups ac Biological weapons and international humanitarian cording to their purpose and treatment:
law, ICRC
Schedule 1 Have few, if any, legitimate uses.
WHO: Health Aspects of Biological and Chemical
These may only be produced or used for research,
Weapons
medical, pharmaceutical or protective purposes (i.e.
testing of chemical weapons sensors and protective
Biological Warfare.
National Library of
clothing). Examples include nerve agents, ricin,
Medicine. Retrieved 2013-05-28.
lewisite and mustard gas. Any production over 100
U.S Army site
g must be reported to the OPCW and a country can
have a stockpile of no more than one tonne of these
chemicals.
Chemical warfare (CW) involves using the toxic properties of chemical substances as weapons. This type of
warfare is distinct from nuclear warfare and biological
warfare, which together make up NBC, the military
Schedule 3 Have legitimate large-scale industrial
acronym for nuclear, biological, and chemical (warfare
uses. Examples include phosgene and chloropicrin.
or weapons), all of which are considered "weapons of
Both have been used as chemical weapons but phosmass destruction" (WMDs). None of these fall ungene is an important precursor in the manufacture
der the term conventional weapons which are primarof plastics and chloropicrin is used as a fumigant.
ily eective due to their destructive potential. With
The OPCW must be notied of, and may inspect,
proper protective equipment, training, and decontaminaany plant producing more than 30 tonnes per year.
tion measures, the primary eects of chemical weapons
can be overcome. Many nations possess vast stockpiles of
weaponized agents in preparation for wartime use. The 2.2.2 History
threat and the perceived threat have become strategic
tools in planning both measures and counter-measures.
Ancient times
2.2.1
Denition
About 70 dierent chemicals have been used or toxic smokes, and other chemical weapons. Ancient
stockpiled as chemical warfare agents during the 20th Greek historians recount that Alexander the Great en-
23
Christoph Bernhard von Galen tried using toxic fumes whilst besieging the city of Groningen in 1672.
24
CHAPTER 2. TYPES
employed several dierent explosive and incendiary devices, some of which had a ll that included Deadly
Nightshade, intended to produce toxic fumes. Just three
years later, August 27, 1675, the French and the Holy Roman Empire concluded the Strasbourg Agreement, which
included an article banning the use of perdious and
odioustoxic devices.
Industrial era
Tear gas casualties from the Battle of Estaires, April 10, 1918.
25
mon disposal method among all the participants in several bodies of water. Over time, the salt water causes
the shell casings to corrode, and mustard gas occasionally
leaks from these containers and washes onto shore as a
wax-like solid resembling ambergris.
26
CHAPTER 2. TYPES
27
The Germans may have used poison gas on survivors from the
Battle of Kerch, May 1942
The British stockpiled chemical weapons to use in case of a German invasion. Pictured is a chemical warfare bulk contamination vehicle.
planned to use mustard gas and phosgene to help repel a German invasion in 1940-1941,* [33]* [34] and
had there been an invasion may have also deployed it
against German cities.* [35] General Brooke, in command
of British anti-invasion preparations during World War
II said that he "...had every intention of using sprayed
mustard gas on the beaches" in an annotation in his diary.* [36] The British manufactured mustard, chlorine,
lewisite, phosgene and Paris Green and stored them at
airelds and depots for use on the beaches.* [35]
28
CHAPTER 2. TYPES
Accidental release
On the night of December 2, 1943, German Ju 88
bombers attacked the port of Bari in Southern Italy, sinking several American shipsamong them the SS John Harvey, which was carrying mustard gas intended for use in
retaliation by the Allies if German forces initiated gas
warfare. The presence of the gas was highly classied,
and authorities ashore had no knowledge of it, which increased the number of fatalities since physicians, who had
no idea that they were dealing with the eects of mustard gas, prescribed treatment improper for those suering from exposure and immersion.
Porton Down was rst established in 1916 and became the centre
The whole aair was kept secret at the time and for many for the development of chemical weapons.
years after the war. According to the U.S. military account, Sixty-nine deaths were attributed in whole or in
part to the mustard gas, most of them American merchant
seamen* [40] out of 628 mustard gas military casual- tories of Imperial Chemical Industries was investigating
a class of organophosphate compounds (organophosphate
ties.* [41]
esters of substituted aminoethanethiols),* [44] for use as
The large number of civilian casualties among the Italian a pesticide. In 1954, ICI put one of them on the marpopulation was not recorded. Part of the confusion and ket under the trade name Amiton. It was subsequently
controversy derives from the fact that the German attack withdrawn, as it was too toxic for safe use.
was highly destructive and lethal in itself, also apart from
the accidental additional eects of the gas (the attack was The toxicity did not go unnoticed, and samples of it were
nicknamedThe Little Pearl Harbor), and attribution of sent to the research facility at Porton Down for evaluation.
the causes of death between the gas and other causes is far After the evaluation was complete, several members of
from easy.* [42]* [43] Rick Atkinson, in his book The Day this class of compounds were developed into a new group
of Battle, describes the intelligence that prompted Allied of much more lethal nerve agents, the V agents. The bestleaders to deploy mustard gas to Italy. This included Ital- known of these is probably VX, assigned the UK Rainbow
ian intelligence that Adolf Hitler had threatened to use Code Purple Possum, with the Russian V-Agent coming
*
gas against Italy if the state changed sides, and prisoner a close second (Amiton is largely forgotten as VG). [45]
of war interrogations suggesting that preparations were On the defensive side, there were years of dicult work
being made to use anew, egregiously potent gasif the to develop the means of prophylaxis, therapy, rapid dewar turned decisively against Germany. Atkinson con- tection and identication, decontamination and more efcludes,No commander in 1943 could be cavalier about fective protection of the body against nerve agents, caa manifest threat by Germany to use gas.
pable of exerting eects through the skin, the eyes and
respiratory tract.
Post-war
After World War II, the Allies recovered German artillery
shells containing the three German nerve agents of the
day (tabun, sarin, and soman), prompting further research
into nerve agents by all of the former Allies.
29
United States In 1952, the U.S. Army patented a process for the Preparation of Toxic Ricin", publishing a method of producing this powerful toxin. In
1958 the British government traded their VX technology with the United States in exchange for information on
thermonuclear weapons. By 1961 the U.S. was producing large amounts of VX and performing its own nerve
agent research. This research produced at least three
more agents; the four agents (VE, VG, VM, VX) are collectively known as theV-Seriesclass of nerve agents.
30
ment of the binary weapons, in which precursors for the
nerve agents are mixed in a munition to produce the agent
just prior to its use. Because the precursors are generally
signicantly less hazardous than the agents themselves,
this technique makes handling and transporting the munitions a great deal simpler.
Additionally, precursors to the agents are usually much
easier to stabilize than the agents themselves, so this technique also made it possible to increase the shelf life of the
agents a great deal. During the 1980s and 1990s, binary
versions of several Soviet agents were developed and are
designated as "Novichok" agents (after the Russian word
for newcomer).* [57] Together with Lev Fedorov, he
told the secret Novichok story exposed in the newspaper
The Moscow News.* [58]
Use in post-WWII conicts
Stalag 13 prison camp The earliest successful use of
chemical agents in a non-combat setting was in 1946.
Motivated by a desire to obtain revenge on Germans for
the Holocaust, three members of a Jewish group calling
themselves Dahm Y'Israel Nokeam (Avenging Israel's
Blood) hid in a bakery in the Stalag 13 prison camp
near Nuremberg, Germany, where several thousand SS
troops were being detained. The three applied an arseniccontaining mixture to loaves of bread, sickening more
than 2,000 Nazi troops, of whom more than 200 required
hospitalization.
CHAPTER 2. TYPES
been experimental, and the bombs were described as
home-made, amateurish and relatively ineective. The
Egyptian authorities suggested that the reported incidents
were probably caused by napalm, not gas.
There were no reports of gas during 1964, and only a
few were reported in 1965. The reports grew more frequent in late 1966. On December 11, 1966, fteen gas
bombs killed two people and injured thirty-ve. On January 5, 1967, the biggest gas attack came against the village of Kitaf, causing 270 casualties, including 140 fatalities. The target may have been Prince Hassan bin Yahya,
who had installed his headquarters nearby. The Egyptian government denied using poison gas, and alleged that
Britain and the US were using the reports as psychological warfare against Egypt. On February 12, 1967, it said
it would welcome a UN investigation. On March 1, U
Thant, the then Secretary-General of the United Nations,
said he was powerlessto deal with the matter.
On May 10, 1967 the twin villages of Gahar and Gadafa
in Wadi Hirran, where Prince Mohamed bin Mohsin was
in command, were gas bombed, killing at least seventyve. The Red Cross was alerted and on June 2, 1967,
it issued a statement in Geneva expressing concern. The
Institute of Forensic Medicine at the University of Berne
made a statement, based on a Red Cross report, that the
gas was likely to have been halogenous derivativesphosgene, mustard gas, lewisite, chloride or cyanogen bromide.
The gas attacks stopped for three weeks after the SixDay War of June, but resumed in July, against all parts
of royalist Yemen. Casualty estimates vary, and an assumption, considered conservative, is that the mustardand-phosgene-lled aerial bombs caused approximately
1,500 fatalities and 1,500 injuries.
IranIraq War
31
its own chemical weapons program remained uncertain,
South Africa also deceptively bombarded Cuban and Angolan units with coloured smoke in an attempt to induce
hysteria or mass panic.* [69] According to Defence Minister Magnus Malan, this would force the Cubans to share
the inconvenience of having to take preventative measures such as donning NBC suits, which would cut combat
eectiveness in half. The tactic was eective: beginning
in early 1988 Cuban units posted to Angola were issued
with full protective gear in anticipation of a South African
chemical strike.* [69]
Terrorism
For many terrorist organizations, chemical weapons
might be considered an ideal choice for a mode of attack,
if they are available: they are cheap, relatively accessible, and easy to transport. A skilled chemist can readily synthesize most chemical agents if the precursors are
available.
32
In July 1974, a group calling themselves the Aliens of
America successfully rebombed the houses of a judge,
two police commissioners, and one of the commissioners cars, burned down two apartment buildings,
and bombed the Pan Am Terminal at Los Angeles International Airport, killing three people and injuring eight.
The organization, which turned out to be a single resident
alien named Muharem Kurbegovic, claimed to have developed and possessed a supply of sarin, as well as four
unique nerve agents named AA1, AA2, AA3, and AA4S.
Although no agents were found at the time Kurbegovic
was arrested in August 1974, he had reportedly acquired
all but oneof the ingredients required to produce a
nerve agent. A search of his apartment turned up a variety of materials, including precursors for phosgene and a
drum containing 25 pounds of sodium cyanide.* [74]
CHAPTER 2. TYPES
In early 2007, multiple terrorist bombings had been reported in Iraq using chlorine gas. These attacks wounded
or sickened more than 350 people. Reportedly the
bombers were aliated with Al-Qaeda in Iraq,* [77] and
they have used bombs of various sizes up to chlorine
tanker trucks.* [78] United Nations Secretary-General
Ban Ki-moon condemned the attacks asclearly intended
to cause panic and instability in the country.* [79]
Chemical weapons treaties
See also: Destruction of chemical weapons and Chemical
Weapons Convention
The Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases, and the Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, or the Geneva Protocol, is an international treaty which prohibits the use of chemical and
biological weapons in warfare. Signed into international
Law at Geneva on June 17, 1925 and entered into force
on February 8, 1928, this treaty states that chemical and
biological weapons arejustly condemned by the general
opinion of the civilised world.* [80]
The rst successful use of chemical agents by terrorists against a general civilian population was on June
27, 1994, when Aum Shinrikyo, an apocalyptic group
based in Japan that believed it necessary to destroy the
planet, released sarin gas in Matsumoto, Japan, killing
eight and harming 200. The following year, Aum Shinrikyo released sarin into the Tokyo subway system killing
12 and injuring over 5,000.
States parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention. Light colOn 29 December 1999, four days after Russian forces ored territories are those states parties that have declared stockbegan an assault of Grozny, Chechen terrorists exploded piles of chemical weapons and/or have known production faciltwo chlorine tanks in the town. Because of the wind con- ities for chemical weapons.
ditions, no Russian soldiers were injured.* [75]
Chemical Weapons Convention The most recent
In 2001, after carrying out the attacks in New York City arms control agreement in International Law, the Conon September 11, the organization Al-Qaeda announced vention of the Prohibition of the Development, Producthat they were attempting to acquire radiological, biolog- tion, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on
ical and chemical weapons. This threat was lent a great their Destruction, or the Chemical Weapons Convention,
deal of credibility when a large archive of videotapes was outlaws the production, stockpiling, and use of chemobtained by the cable television network CNN in August ical weapons. It is administered by the Organisation
2002 showing, among other things, the killing of three for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), an
dogs by an apparent nerve agent.* [76]
intergovernmental organisation based in The Hague.* [81]
On October 26, 2002, Russian special forces used
a chemical agent (presumably KOLOKOL-1, an
aerosolized fentanyl derivative), as a precursor to an 2.2.3 Technology
assault on Chechen terrorists, ending the Moscow theater
hostage crisis. All 42 of the terrorists and 120 out of 850 Although crude chemical warfare has been employed in
hostages were killed during the raid. Of the hostages many parts of the world for thousands of years,* [82]
who died, all but one or two died from the eects of the modernchemical warfare began during World War I see Chemical weapons in World War I.
agent.
33
agent (CWA). About 70 dierent chemicals have been
used or stockpiled as chemical warfare agents during the
20th and 21st centuries. These agents may be in liquid,
gas or solid form. Liquid agents that evaporate quickly are
said to be volatile or have a high vapor pressure. Many
chemical agents are made volatile so they can be dispersed over a large region quickly.
The earliest target of chemical warfare agent research was
not toxicity, but development of agents that can aect a
target through the skin and clothing, rendering protective
gas masks useless. In July 1917, the Germans employed
mustard gas. Mustard gas easily penetrates leather and
fabric to inict painful burns on the skin.
Chemical warfare agents are divided into lethal and incapacitating categories. A substance is classied as incapacitating if less than 1/100 of the lethal dose causes incapacitation, e.g., through nausea or visual problems. The
distinction between lethal and incapacitating substances
is not xed, but relies on a statistical average called the
LD50 .
Initially, only well-known commercially available chemicals and their variants were used. These included chlorine
and phosgene gas. The methods used to disperse these
agents during battle were relatively unrened and inefcient. Even so, casualties could be heavy, due to the
mainly static troop positions which were characteristic
features of trench warfare.
34
CHAPTER 2. TYPES
35
creased the eective range of gas, making any target
within reach of guns vulnerable. Second, gas shells could
be delivered without warning, especially the clear, nearly
odorless phosgene there are numerous accounts of gas
shells, landing with a ploprather than exploding, being initially dismissed as dud high explosive or shrapnel
shells, giving the gas time to work before the soldiers were
alerted and took precautions.
36
Thermal dissemination devices, though common, are not
particularly ecient. First, a percentage of the agent is
lost by incineration in the initial blast and by being forced
onto the ground. Second, the sizes of the particles vary
greatly because explosive dissemination produces a mixture of liquid droplets of variable and dicult to control
sizes.
CHAPTER 2. TYPES
and velocity, and the direction and velocity of the aircraft
greatly inuence particle size. There are other drawbacks
as well; ideal deployment requires precise knowledge of
aerodynamics and uid dynamics, and because the agent
must usually be dispersed within the boundary layer (less
than 200300 ft above the ground), it puts pilots at risk.
Signicant research is still being applied toward this technique. For example, by modifying the properties of
the liquid, its breakup when subjected to aerodynamic
stress can be controlled and an idealized particle distribution achieved, even at supersonic speed. Additionally, advances in uid dynamics, computer modeling, and
weather forecasting allow an ideal direction, speed, and
altitude to be calculated, such that warfare agent of a predetermined particle size can predictably and reliably hit a
Despite the limitations of central bursters, most nations target.
use this method in the early stages of chemical weapon
development, in part because standard munitions can be Protection against chemical warfare
adapted to carry the agents.
The ecacy of thermal detonation is greatly limited by
the ammability of some agents. For ammable aerosols,
the cloud is sometimes totally or partially ignited by the
disseminating explosion in a phenomenon called ashing.
Explosively disseminated VX will ignite roughly one third
of the time. Despite a great deal of study, ashing is still
not fully understood, and a solution to the problem would
be a major technological advance.
37
In some cases, it might be necessary to neutralize
them chemically, as with ammonia as a neutralizer for
hydrogen cyanide or chlorine. Riot control agents such as
CS will dissipate in an open area, but things contaminated
with CS powder need to be aired out, washed by people
wearing protective gear, or safely discarded.
Mass decontamination is a less common requirement for
people than equipment, since people may be immediately aected and treatment is the action required. It is
a requirement when people have been contaminated with
persistent agents. Treatment and decontamination may
need to be simultaneous, with the medical personnel protecting themselves so they can function.* [90]
There may need to be immediate intervention to prevent
death, such as injection of atropine for nerve agents. Decontamination is especially important for people contaminated with persistent agents; many of the fatalities after
the explosion of a WWII US ammunition ship carrying
mustard gas, in the harbor of Bari, Italy, after a German
bombing on 2 December 1943, came when rescue workers, not knowing of the contamination, bundled cold, wet
seamen in tight-tting blankets.
Individual protection starts with a gas mask and, depending on the nature of the threat, through various levels of
protective clothing up to a complete chemical-resistant
suit with a self-contained air supply. The US military denes various levels of MOPP (mission-oriented protective posture) from mask to full chemical resistant suits; For decontaminating equipment and buildings exposed
Hazmat suits are the civilian equivalent, but go farther to
to persistent agents, such as blister agents, VX or other
include a fully independent air supply, rather than the l- agents made persistent by mixing with a thickener, special
ters of a gas mask.
equipment and materials might be needed. Some type of
Collective protection allows continued functioning of neutralizing agent will be needed; e.g. in the form of a
groups of people in buildings or shelters, the latter which spraying device with neutralizing agents such as Chlomay be xed, mobile, or improvised. With ordinary rine, Fichlor, strong alkaline solutions or enzymes. In
buildings, this may be as basic as plastic sheeting and other cases, a specic chemical decontaminant will be retape, although if the protection needs to be continued for quired.* [89]
any appreciable length of time, there will need to be an
air supply, typically an enhanced gas mask.* [88]* [89]
38
typically the result of local initiative, and not the result of
an active government chemical weapons program. There
are many reports of the isolated use of chemical agents in
individual battles or sieges, but there was no true tradition
of their use outside of incendiaries and smoke. Despite
this tendency, there have been several attempts to initiate
large-scale implementation of poison gas in several wars,
but with the notable exception of World War I, the responsible authorities generally rejected the proposals for
ethical reasons.
For example, in 1854 Lyon Playfair (later 1st Baron Playfair, GCB, PC, FRS (1 May 1818 29 May 1898), a
British chemist, proposed using a cacodyl cyanide-lled
artillery shell against enemy ships during the Crimean
War. The British Ordnance Department rejected the proposal asas bad a mode of warfare as poisoning the wells
of the enemy.
August 27, 1874: The Brussels Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War is signed,
specically forbidding the employment of poison
or poisoned weapons, although the treaty was not
adopted by any nation whatsoever and it never went
into eect.
September 4, 1900: The First Hague Convention,
which includes a declaration banning the use of
projectiles the object of which is the diusion of
asphyxiating or deleterious gases,enters into force.
CHAPTER 2. TYPES
Despite numerous eorts to reduce or eliminate them,
some nations continue to research and/or stockpile chemical warfare agents. To the right is a summary of the
nations that have either declared weapon stockpiles or
are suspected of secretly stockpiling or possessing CW
research programs. Notable examples include United
States and Russia.
In 1997, future US Vice President Dick Cheney opposed
the signing ratication of a treaty banning the use chemical weapons, a recently unearthed letter shows. In a letter
dated April 8, 1997, then Halliburton-CEO Cheney told
Sen. Jesse Helms, the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, that it would be a mistake for America to join the Convention.Those nations most likely to
comply with the Chemical Weapons Convention are not
likely to ever constitute a military threat to the United
States. The governments we should be concerned about
are likely to cheat on the CWC, even if they do participate,reads the letter,* [95] published by the Federation
of American Scientists.
The CWC was ratied by the Senate that same month.
Since then, Albania, Libya, Russia, the United States, and
India have declared over 71,000 metric tons of chemical
weapon stockpiles, and destroyed about a third of them.
Under the terms of the agreement, the United States and
Russia agreed to eliminate the rest of their supplies of
chemical weapons by 2012. Not having met its goal, the
U.S. government estimates remaining stocks will be destroyed by 2017.
39
(18,241 tonnes) of its stockpile at destruction facilities located in Gorny (Saratov Oblast) and Kambarka (Udmurt Republic) - where operations have nished - and Schuch'ye (Kurgan Oblast), Maradykovsky
(Kirov Oblast), Leonidovka (Penza Oblast) whilst installations are under construction in Pochep (Bryansk
Oblast) and Kizner (Udmurt Republic).* [103]* [104] As
August 2013, 76 percent (30,500 tonnes) were destroyed,* [105] and Russia leaves the Cooperative Threat
Reduction (CTR) Program, which partially funded chemical weapons destruction.* [106]
The Director-General of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Rogelio Prter,
welcomed Iraq's decision to join the OPCW as a signicant step to strengthening global and regional efforts to prevent the spread and use of chemical weapons.
The OPCW announced The government of Iraq has
deposited its instrument of accession to the Chemical
Weapons Convention with the Secretary General of the
United Nations and within 30 days, on 12 February 2009,
will become the 186th State Party to the Convention. United States
Iraq has also declared stockpiles of chemical weapons,
and because of their recent accession is the only State See also: United States and weapons of mass destruction
Chemical weapons
Party exempted from the destruction time-line.* [99]
Japan
During the Second Sino-Japanese War (19371945)
Japan stored chemical weapons on the territory of
mainland China. The weapon stock mostly containing mustard gas-lewisite mixture.* [100] The weapons
are classied as abandoned chemical weapons under
the Chemical Weapons Convention and from September
2010 Japan has started their destruction in Nanjing using
mobile destruction facilities in order to do so.* [101]
Russia
Russia signed into the Chemical Weapons Convention on
January 13, 1993 and ratied it on November 5, 1995.
Declaring an arsenal of 39,967 tons of chemical weapons
in 1997, by far the largest arsenal, consisting of blister
agents: Lewisite, Sulfur mustard, Lewisite-mustard mix,
and nerve agents: Sarin, Soman, and VX. Russia met its
treaty obligations by destroying 1 percent of its chemical agents by the 2002 deadline set out by the Chemical Weapons Convention, but requested an extension on
the deadlines of 2004 and 2007 due to technical, nancial, and environmental challenges of chemical disposal.
Since, Russia has received help from other countries
such as Canada which donated C$100,000, plus a further C$100,000 already donated, to the Russian Chemical Weapons Destruction Program. This money will be
used to complete work at Shchuch'ye and support the
construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility
at Kizner (Russia), where the destruction of nearly 5,700
tonnes of nerve agent, stored in approximately 2 million
artillery shells and munitions, will be undertaken. Canadian funds are also being used for the operation of a
Green Cross Public Outreach Oce, to keep the civilian
population informed on the progress made in chemical
weapons destruction activities.* [102]
On November 25, 1969, President Richard Nixon unilaterally renounced the use of chemical weapons and renounced all methods of biological warfare. He issued a
decree halting the production and transport of all chemical weapons which remains in eect. From May 1964
to the early 1970s the USA participated in Operation
CHASE, a United States Department of Defense program
that aimed to dispose of chemical weapons by sinking
ships laden with the weapons in the deep Atlantic. After
the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of
1972, Operation Chase was scrapped and safer disposal
methods for chemical weapons were researched, with the
U.S. destroying several thousand tons of mustard gas by
incineration at the Rocky Mountain Arsenal, and nearly
4,200 tons of nerve agent by chemical neutralisation at
Tooele Army Depot.* [107]
The U.S. ratied the Geneva Protocol which banned the
use of chemical and biological weapons on January 22,
1975. In 1989 and 1990, the U.S. and the Soviet Union
entered an agreement to both end their chemical weapons
programs, including binary weapons. In April 1997, the
United States ratied the Chemical Weapons Convention,
this banned the possession of most types of chemical
weapons. It also banned the development of chemical
weapons, and required the destruction of existing stockpiles, precursor chemicals, production facilities, and their
weapon delivery systems.
40
CHAPTER 2. TYPES
and VX where taken from the U.S. Army weapons storage depots such as Miesau and then-classied FSTS (Forward Storage / Transportation Sites) and transported from
Bremerhaven, Germany to Johnston Atoll in the Pacic,
a 46-day nonstop journey.* [108]
Stink bomb
In May 1991, President George H. W. Bush committed
United States Army Medical Research Institute of
the United States to destroying all of its chemical weapons
Chemical Defense
and renounced the right to chemical weapon retaliation.
In 1993, the United States signed the Chemical Weapons
Weapon of mass destruction
Treaty, which required the destruction of all chemical
weapon agents, dispersal systems, and production facili Zyklon B
ties by April 2012. The U.S. prohibition on the transport
of chemical weapons has meant that destruction facilities
had to be constructed at each of the U.S.'s nine storage 2.2.7 Notes
facilities. The U.S. met the rst three of the four deadlines set out in the treaty, destroying 45% of its stockpile [1] Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Proof chemical weapons by 2007. Due to the destruction of
duction, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and
on Their Destruction (CWC): Annexes and Original Sigchemical weapons, under the United States policy of Pronatories. Bureau of Arms Control, Verication and
portional Response, an attack upon the United States or
Compliance. Retrieved 19 January 2012.
its Allies would trigger a force-equivalent counter-attack.
Since the United States only maintains nuclear Weapons
[2] Disarmament lessons from the Chemical Weapons Conof Mass Destruction, it is the stated policy that the United
vention Archived July 14, 2015 at the Wayback Machine
States will regard all WMD attacks (Biological, chemical,
or nuclear) as a nuclear attack and will respond to such an [3] Mayor 2003
attack with a nuclear strike.* [109]
As of 2012, stockpiles have been eliminated at 7 of the 9
chemical weapons depots and 89.75% of the 1997 stockpile has been destroyed by the treaty deadline of April
2012.* [110] Destruction will not begin at the two remaining depots until after the treaty deadline and will use neutralization, instead of incineration.
2.2.6
See also
Biological warfare
[9] Eric Croddy (2002). Chemical and Biological Warfare: A Comprehensive Survey for the Concerned Citizen.
Springer. p. 131.
[10] Smart, Jeery K. CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WARFARE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
DURING THE CIVIL WAR(PDF). United States Army.
US Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command.
Retrieved 7 November 2014.
[11] The First World War(a Channel 4 documentary based
on the book by Hew Strachan)
[12] D. Hank Ellison (August 24, 2007). Handbook of Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents, Second Edition. CRC
Press. pp. 567570. ISBN 0-8493-1434-8.
[13] Max Boot (August 16, 2007). War Made New: Weapons,
Warriors, and the Making of the Modern World. Gotham.
pp. 245250. ISBN 1-5924-0315-8.
41
[33] Bellamy, Christopher (4 June 1996). Sixty secret mustard gas sites uncovered. The Independent.
[34] Chemical Warfare -Suolk. Anti-Invasion defences
Suolk World War II. Retrieved 18 June 2008.
[35] Pears, Brian. Chapter 5 Invasion. Rowlands Gill and
the North-East 1939 - 1945.
[17] Nicolas Werth, Karel Bartoek, Jean-Louis Pann, JeanLouis Margolin, Andrzej Paczkowski, Stphane Courtois, The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression, Harvard University Press, 1999, hardcover, 858
pages, ISBN 0-674-07608-7
[32] , p. 468.
[52] CDC.gov
42
CHAPTER 2. TYPES
43
[90] Ciottone, Gregory R; Arnold, Jerey L (January 4, 2007), [109] Not with Impunity: Assessing US Policy for ReCBRNE - Chemical Warfare Agents, EMedicine, retaliating to a Chemical or Biological Attack. Airtrieved 2007-10-22
power.maxwell.af.mil. Retrieved 2011-09-16.
[91] Adrienne Mayor,Greek Fire, Poison Arrows & Scorpion [110] Army Agency Completes Mission to Destroy Chemical
Weapons, USCMA, January 21, 2012
Bombs: Biological and Chemical Warfare in the Ancient
WorldOverlook-Duckworth, 2003, rev ed with new Introduction 2008
[92] STATUS OF PARTICIPATION IN THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION AS AT 14 OCTOBER 2013. Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons. OPCW. 14 October 2013.
[93] SIGNATORY STATES. Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. OPCW. 2 September 2013.
[94] Myanmar Joins Chemical Weapons Convention.
OPCW. 9 July 2015.
[95] In Surprise Testimony Cheney Renews Opposition to CWC
(PDF), United States Senate, 1997-04-08, archived from
the original (PDF) on December 17, 2008, retrieved
2009-01-04.
[96] India declares its stock of chemical weapons - India
Abroad | HighBeam Research
[97] India to destroy chemical weapons stockpile by 2009.
DominicanToday.com. Retrieved 2011-09-16.
[98] India destroys its chemical weapons stockpile. Zeenews.india.com. 2009-05-14. Retrieved 2011-09-16.
[99] Iraq Joins the Chemical Weapons Convention.
Opcw.org. Retrieved 2011-09-16.
[100] Abandoned Chemical Weapons (ACW) in China.
Nti.org. Archived from the original on August 29, 2011.
Retrieved 2011-09-16.
[101] Ceremony Marks Start of Destruction of Chemical
Weapons Abandoned by Japan in China. Opcw.org. Retrieved 2011-09-16.
[102] Canada Contributes to Russias Chemical Weapons
Destruction Programme. Opcw.org. Retrieved 201109-16.
[103] http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/tucker41.pdf
[104] Research Library: Country Proles: China Chemical
. NTI. Archived from the original on June 5, 2011. Retrieved 2011-09-16.
[105] Russia destroys over 76 percent of its chemical weapons
stockpile.
[106] Guarino, Douglas P. New U.S.-Russian Security Deal
Greatly Scales Back Scope, Experts Say | Global Security
Newswire. NTI. Retrieved 2013-09-05.
2.2.8 References
CBWInfo.com (2001). A Brief History of Chemical
and Biological Weapons: Ancient Times to the 19th
Century. Retrieved Nov. 24, 2004.
Chomsky, Noam (Mar. 4, 2001). Prospects for
Peace in the Middle East, page 2. Lecture.
Cordette, Jessica, MPH(c) (2003).
Chemical
Weapons of Mass Destruction. Retrieved Nov. 29,
2004.
Croddy, Eric (2001), Chemical and Biological Warfare, Copernicus, ISBN 0-387-95076-1
Smart, Jeery K., M.A. (1997). History of Biological and Chemical Warfare. Retrieved Nov. 24,
2004.
United States Senate, 103d Congress, 2d Session.
(May 25, 1994). The Riegle Report. Retrieved Nov.
6, 2004.
Gerard J Fitzgerald. American Journal of Public
Health. Washington: Apr 2008. Vol. 98, Iss. 4;
p. 611
, .. (1976). .
..
L. F. Haber. The Poisonous Cloud: Chemical Warfare in the First World War Oxford University Press:
1986
James W. Hammond Jr; Poison Gas: The Myths Versus Reality Greenwood Press, 1999
44
CHAPTER 2. TYPES
2.2.10
External links
Chemical weapons and international humanitarian The mushroom cloud of the atomic bombing of the Japanese city
law
of Nagasaki on August 9, 1945 rose some 11 miles (18 km) above
the bomb's hypocenter.
2.3.1
Types
45
derive the majority of their energy from nuclear ssion
reactions alone, and those that use ssion reactions to begin nuclear fusion reactions that produce a large amount
of the total energy output.
Fission weapons
All existing nuclear weapons derive some of their explosive energy from nuclear ssion reactions. Weapons
whose explosive output is exclusively from ssion reactions are commonly referred to as atomic bombs or atom
bombs (abbreviated as A-bombs). This has long been
noted as something of a misnomer, as their energy comes
from the nucleus of the atom, just as it does with fusion
weapons.
In ssion weapons, a mass of ssile material (enriched
uranium or plutonium) is assembled into a supercritical
mass the amount of material needed to start an
exponentially growing nuclear chain reaction either by
shooting one piece of sub-critical material into another
(the gunmethod) or by compressing using explosive
lenses a sub-critical sphere of material using chemical explosives to many times its original density (the implosionmethod). The latter approach is considered more
sophisticated than the former and only the latter approach
can be used if the ssile material is plutonium.
A major challenge in all nuclear weapon designs is to ensure that a signicant fraction of the fuel is consumed
before the weapon destroys itself. The amount of energy
released by ssion bombs can range from the equivalent
of just under a ton of TNT, to upwards of 500,000 tons
(500 kilotons) of TNT.* [8]
46
CHAPTER 2. TYPES
hydrogen bombs, this is accomplished by placing a ssion
bomb and fusion fuel (tritium, deuterium, or lithium deuteride) in proximity within a special, radiation-reecting
container. When the ssion bomb is detonated, gamma
rays and X-rays emitted rst compress the fusion fuel,
then heat it to thermonuclear temperatures. The ensuing
fusion reaction creates enormous numbers of high-speed
neutrons, which can then induce ssion in materials not
normally prone to it, such as depleted uranium. Each of
these components is known as a stage, with the ssion bomb as theprimaryand the fusion capsule as the
secondary. In large, megaton-range hydrogen bombs,
about half of the yield comes from the nal ssioning of
depleted uranium.* [8]
Virtually all thermonuclear weapons deployed today use
the two-stagedesign described above, but it is possible to add additional fusion stageseach stage igniting a
larger amount of fusion fuel in the next stage. This technique can be used to construct thermonuclear weapons of
arbitrarily large yield, in contrast to ssion bombs, which
are limited in their explosive force. The largest nuclear
weapon ever detonated the Tsar Bomba of the USSR,
which released an energy equivalent of over 50 million
tons (50 megatons) of TNTwas a three-stage weapon.
Most thermonuclear weapons are considerably smaller
than this, due to practical constraints from missile warhead space and weight requirements.* [12]
The basics of the TellerUlam design for a hydrogen bomb: a ssion bomb uses radiation to compress and heat a separate section
of fusion fuel.
47
large enough quantities, and there is no evidence that it is
feasible beyond the military domain.* [15] However, the
U.S. Air Force funded studies of the physics of antimatter in the Cold War, and began considering its possible
use in weapons, not just as a trigger, but as the explosive itself.* [16] A fourth generation nuclear weapon design is related to, and relies upon, the same principle as
Antimatter-catalyzed nuclear pulse propulsion.* [17]
Other types
Main articles: boosted ssion weapon, neutron bomb 2.3.2 Weapons delivery
and radiological bomb
See also: Nuclear weapons delivery, nuclear triad,
Strategic bomber, Intercontinental ballistic missile and
There are other types of nuclear weapons as well. For Submarine-launched ballistic missile
example, a boosted ssion weapon is a ssion bomb that Nuclear weapons delivery the technology and systems
increases its explosive yield through a small amount of
fusion reactions, but it is not a fusion bomb. In the
boosted bomb, the neutrons produced by the fusion reactions serve primarily to increase the eciency of the
ssion bomb.
Some weapons are designed for special purposes; a
neutron bomb is a thermonuclear weapon that yields a
relatively small explosion but a relatively large amount
of neutron radiation; such a device could theoretically
be used to cause massive casualties while leaving infrastructure mostly intact and creating a minimal amount of
fallout. The detonation of any nuclear weapon is accompanied by a blast of neutron radiation. Surrounding a nuclear weapon with suitable materials (such as
The rst nuclear weapons were gravity bombs, such as this "Fat
cobalt or gold) creates a weapon known as a salted bomb. Man" weapon dropped on Nagasaki, Japan. They were very
This device can produce exceptionally large quantities of large and could only be delivered by heavy bomber aircraft
radioactive contamination.
Research has been done into the possibility of pure fusion
bombs: nuclear weapons that consist of fusion reactions
without requiring a ssion bomb to initiate them. Such
a device might provide a simpler path to thermonuclear
weapons than one that required development of ssion
weapons rst, and pure fusion weapons would create signicantly less nuclear fallout than other thermonuclear
weapons, because they would not disperse ssion products. In 1998, the United States Department of Energy
divulged that the United States had, "...made a substantial
investmentin the past to develop pure fusion weapons,
but that,The U.S. does not have and is not developing a
pure fusion weapon, and that, No credible design for
a pure fusion weapon resulted from the DOE investment
.* [13]
used to bring a nuclear weapon to its targetis an important aspect of nuclear weapons relating both to nuclear
weapon design and nuclear strategy. Additionally, development and maintenance of delivery options is among
the most resource-intensive aspects of a nuclear weapons
program: according to one estimate, deployment costs
accounted for 57% of the total nancial resources spent
by the United States in relation to nuclear weapons since
1940.* [18]
Antimatter, which consists of particles resembling ordinary matter particles in most of their properties but
having opposite electric charge, has been considered as
a trigger mechanism for nuclear weapons.* [14] A major obstacle is the diculty of producing antimatter in
48
CHAPTER 2. TYPES
of long-range intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)
and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) has
given some nations the ability to plausibly deliver missiles
anywhere on the globe with a high likelihood of success.
More advanced systems, such as multiple independently
targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), can launch multiple
warheads at dierent targets from one missile, reducing
the chance of a successful missile defense. Today, missiles are most common among systems designed for delivery of nuclear weapons. Making a warhead small enough
to t onto a missile, though, can be dicult.* [8]
Tactical weapons have involved the most variety of delivery types, including not only gravity bombs and missiles
but also artillery shells, land mines, and nuclear depth
charges and torpedoes for anti-submarine warfare. An
atomic mortar was also tested at one time by the United
States. Small, two-man portable tactical weapons (somewhat misleadingly referred to as suitcase bombs), such as
the Special Atomic Demolition Munition, have been developed, although the diculty of combining sucient
yield with portability limits their military utility.* [8]
More preferable from a strategic point of view is a nuclear weapon mounted onto a missile, which can use
a ballistic trajectory to deliver the warhead over the
horizon. Although even short-range missiles allow for
a faster and less vulnerable attack, the development
Other components of nuclear strategies have included using missile defense (to destroy the missiles before they
land) or implementation of civil defense measures (using
early-warning systems to evacuate citizens to safe areas
before an attack).
Note that weapons designed to threaten large populations, or to generally deter attacks are known as strategic
weapons. Weapons designed for use on a battleeld in
military situations are called tactical weapons.
There are critics of the very idea of nuclear strategy for
waging nuclear war who have suggested that a nuclear war
between two nuclear powers would result in mutual annihilation. From this point of view, the signicance of
nuclear weapons is purely to deter war because any nuclear war would immediately escalate out of mutual distrust and fear, resulting in mutually assured destruction.
This threat of national, if not global, destruction has been
a strong motivation for anti-nuclear weapons activism.
Critics from the peace movement and within the military establishment have questioned the usefulness of such
weapons in the current military climate. According to an
advisory opinion issued by the International Court of Justice in 1996, the use of (or threat of use of) such weapons
would generally be contrary to the rules of international
law applicable in armed conict, but the court did not
reach an opinion as to whether or not the threat or use
would be lawful in specic extreme circumstances such
as if the survival of the state were at stake.
Another deterrence position in nuclear strategy is that
nuclear proliferation can be desirable. This view argues
that, unlike conventional weapons, nuclear weapons successfully deter all-out war between states, and they succeeded in doing this during the Cold War between the
49
U.S. and the Soviet Union.* [19] In the late 1950s and
early 1960s, Gen. Pierre Marie Gallois of France, an
adviser to Charles DeGaulle, argued in books like The
Balance of Terror: Strategy for the Nuclear Age (1961)
that mere possession of a nuclear arsenal, what the French
called the force de frappe, was enough to ensure deterrence, and thus concluded that the spread of nuclear
weapons could increase international stability. Some very
prominent neo-realist scholars, such as the late Kenneth
Waltz, formerly a Political Science at UC Berkeley and
Adjunct Senior Research Scholar at Columbia University,
and John Mearsheimer of University of Chicago, have
also argued along the lines of Gallois. Specically, these
scholars have advocated some forms of nuclear proliferation, arguing that it would decrease the likelihood of total
war, especially in troubled regions of the world where
there exists a unipolar nuclear weapon state. Aside from
the public opinion that opposes proliferation in any form,
there are two schools of thought on the matter: those, like
Mearsheimer, who favor selective proliferation,* [20] and
those of Kenneth Waltz, who was somewhat more noninterventionist.* [21]* [22]
The threat of potentially suicidal terrorists possessing nuclear weapons (a form of nuclear terrorism) complicates
the decision process. The prospect of mutually assured
destruction may not deter an enemy who expects to die
in the confrontation. Further, if the initial act is from a
stateless terrorist instead of a sovereign nation, there is no
xed nation or xed military targets to retaliate against. It
has been argued by the New York Times, especially after
the September 11, 2001 attacks, that this complication is
the sign of the next age of nuclear strategy, distinct from
the relative stability of the Cold War.* [23] In 1996, the
United States adopted a policy of allowing the targeting
of its nuclear weapons at terrorists armed with weapons
of mass destruction.* [24]
Robert Gallucci, president of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, argues that although traditional deterrence is not an eective approach toward
terrorist groups bent on causing a nuclear catastrophe,
Gallucci believes that the United States should instead
consider a policy of expanded deterrence, which focuses
not solely on the would-be nuclear terrorists but on those
states that may deliberately transfer or inadvertently lead
nuclear weapons and materials to them. By threatening
retaliation against those states, the United States may be
able to deter that which it cannot physically prevent.
.* [25]
Graham Allison makes a similar case, arguing that the
key to expanded deterrence is coming up with ways of
tracing nuclear material to the country that forged the ssile material. After a nuclear bomb detonates, nuclear
forensics cops would collect debris samples and send
them to a laboratory for radiological analysis. By identifying unique attributes of the ssile material, including
its impurities and contaminants, one could trace the path
back to its origin.* [26] The process is analogous to iden-
50
CHAPTER 2. TYPES
2.3.4
Main articles:
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces Treaty, START I, Strategic Oensive
Reductions Treaty, Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty and New START
Because of the immense military power they can confer,
to underground nuclear testing, to prevent contamination from nuclear fallout, whereas the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (1968) attempted to place restrictions on the types of activities signatories could participate in, with the goal of allowing the transference of nonmilitary nuclear technology to member countries without
fear of proliferation.
In 1957, the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) was established under the mandate of the United
Nations to encourage development of peaceful applications for nuclear technology, provide international safeguards against its misuse, and facilitate the application
of safety measures in its use. In 1996, many nations
signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty,* [28] which
prohibits all testing of nuclear weapons. A testing ban
imposes a signicant hindrance to nuclear arms development by any complying country.* [29] The Treaty requires
the ratication by 44 specic states before it can go into
force; as of 2012, the ratication of eight of these states
is still required.* [28]
Additional treaties and agreements have governed nuclear
weapons stockpiles between the countries with the two
largest stockpiles, the United States and the Soviet Union,
and later between the United States and Russia. These
include treaties such as SALT II (never ratied), START
I (expired), INF, START II (never ratied), SORT, and
New START, as well as non-binding agreements such as
SALT I and the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives* [30] of
1991. Even when they did not enter into force, these
agreements helped limit and later reduce the numbers and
types of nuclear weapons between the United States and
the Soviet Union/Russia.
Nuclear weapons have also been opposed by agreethe political control of nuclear weapons has been a key
ments between countries. Many nations have been deissue for as long as they have existed; in most countries
clared Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, areas where nuthe use of nuclear force can only be authorized by the
clear weapons production and deployment are prohibhead of government or head of state.* [27]
ited, through the use of treaties. The Treaty of Tlatelolco
In the late 1940s, lack of mutual trust was preventing (1967) prohibited any production or deployment of nuthe United States and the Soviet Union from making clear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, and
ground towards international arms control agreements. the Treaty of Pelindaba (1964) prohibits nuclear weapons
The RussellEinstein Manifesto was issued in London on in many African countries. As recently as 2006 a
July 9, 1955 by Bertrand Russell in the midst of the Cold Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone was estabWar. It highlighted the dangers posed by nuclear weapons lished amongst the former Soviet republics of Central
and called for world leaders to seek peaceful resolutions Asia prohibiting nuclear weapons.
to international conict. The signatories included eleven
In the middle of 1996, the International Court of Juspre-eminent intellectuals and scientists, including Albert
tice, the highest court of the United Nations, issued an
Einstein, who signed it just days before his death on April
Advisory Opinion concerned with the "Legality of the
18, 1955. A few days after the release, philanthropist
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons". The court ruled
Cyrus S. Eaton oered to sponsor a conferencecalled for
that the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons would
in the manifestoin Pugwash, Nova Scotia, Eaton's birthviolate various articles of international law, including the
place. This conference was to be the rst of the Pugwash
Geneva Conventions, the Hague Conventions, the UN
Conferences on Science and World Aairs, held in July
Charter, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
1957.
In view of the unique, destructive characteristics of nuBy the 1960s steps were being taken to limit both the clear weapons, the International Committee of the Red
proliferation of nuclear weapons to other countries and Cross calls on States to ensure that these weapons are
the environmental eects of nuclear testing. The Partial never used, irrespective of whether they consider them
Test Ban Treaty (1963) restricted all nuclear testing
51
Disarmament
Main article: Nuclear disarmament
Nuclear disarmament refers to both the act of reducing
45,000
Number of warheads
40,000
United States
USSR/Russia
35,000
30,000
25,000
20,000
15,000
10,000
5,000
0
In the years after the end of the Cold War, there have
been numerous campaigns to urge the abolition of nuclear
weapons, such as that organized by the Global Zero movement, and the goal of aworld without nuclear weapons
or eliminating nuclear weapons and to the end state of a was advocated by United States President Barack Obama
nuclear-free world, in which nuclear weapons are com- in an April 2009 speech in Prague.* [36] A CNN poll from
pletely eliminated.
April 2010 indicated that the American public was nearly
*
Beginning with the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty and evenly split on the issue. [37]
continuing through the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Some analysts have argued that nuclear weapons have
Treaty, there have been many treaties to limit or re- made the world relatively safer, with peace through
duce nuclear weapons testing and stockpiles. The 1968 deterrence and through the stabilityinstability paradox,
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has as one of its explicit including in south Asia.* [38]* [39] Kenneth Waltz has
conditions that all signatories must pursue negotiations argued that nuclear weapons have helped keep an unin good faithtowards the long-term goal of complete easy peace, and further nuclear weapon proliferation
disarmament. The nuclear weapon states have largely might even help avoid the large scale conventional wars
The USSR and USA nuclear weapon stockpiles throughout the
Cold War until 2005, with a precipitous drop in total numbers
following the end of the Cold War in 1991.
52
CHAPTER 2. TYPES
that were so common prior to their invention at the Notable nuclear weapons accidents
end of World War II.* [22] But former Secretary Henry
Kissinger says there is a new danger, which cannot be ad- See also: United States military nuclear incident termidressed by deterrence: The classical notion of deter- nology
rence was that there was some consequences before which
aggressors and evildoers would recoil. In a world of suicide bombers, that calculation doesnt operate in any
February 13, 1950: a Convair B-36B crashed in
comparable way.* [40] George Shultz has said,If you
northern British Columbia after jettisoning a Mark
think of the people who are doing suicide attacks, and
IV atomic bomb. This was the rst such nuclear
people like that get a nuclear weapon, they are almost by
weapon loss in history.
*
denition not deterrable. [41]
Further information: See List of states with nuclear
weapons for statistics on possession and deployment
United Nations
Main article: United Nations Oce for Disarmament
Aairs
The UN Oce for Disarmament Aairs (UNODA) is a
department of the United Nations Secretariat established
in January 1998 as part of the United Nations SecretaryGeneral Ko Annan's plan to reform the UN as presented
in his report to the General Assembly in July 1997.* [42]
Its goal is to promote nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation and the strengthening of the disarmament
regimes in respect to other weapons of mass destruction,
chemical and biological weapons. It also promotes disarmament eorts in the area of conventional weapons, especially land mines and small arms, which are often the
weapons of choice in contemporary conicts.
2.3.5
Controversy
7 June 1960: the 1960 Fort Dix IM-99 accident destroyed a Boeing CIM-10 Bomarc nuclear missile
and shelter and contaminated the BOMARC Missile Accident Site in New Jersey.
24 January 1961: the 1961 Goldsboro B-52 crash
occurred near Goldsboro, North Carolina. A B-52
Stratofortress carrying two Mark 39 nuclear bombs
broke up in mid-air, dropping its nuclear payload in
the process.* [44]* [45]
1965 Philippine Sea A-4 crash, where a Skyhawk
attack aircraft with a nuclear weapon fell into the
sea.* [46] The pilot, the aircraft, and the B43 nuclear
bomb were never recovered.* [47] It was not until the
1980s that the Pentagon revealed the loss of the onemegaton bomb.* [48]
January 17, 1966: the 1966 Palomares B-52 crash
occurred when a B-52G bomber of the USAF collided with a KC-135 tanker during mid-air refuelling
o the coast of Spain. The KC-135 was completely
destroyed when its fuel load ignited, killing all four
crew members. The B-52G broke apart, killing
three of the seven crew members aboard.* [49]
Of the four Mk28 type hydrogen bombs the B52G carried,* [50] three were found on land near
Almera, Spain. The non-nuclear explosives in two
of the weapons detonated upon impact with the
ground, resulting in the contamination of a 2-squarekilometer (490-acre) (0.78 square mile) area by
radioactive plutonium. The fourth, which fell into
the Mediterranean Sea, was recovered intact after a
2-month-long search.* [51]
Ethics
Even before the rst nuclear weapons had been developed, scientists involved with the Manhattan Project were
divided over the use of the weapon. The role of the two
atomic bombings of the country in Japan's surrender and
the U.S.'s ethical justication for them has been the subject of scholarly and popular debate for decades. The
question of whether nations should have nuclear weapons,
or test them, has been continually and nearly universally
controversial.* [43]
53
Nuclear fallout
Main article: Nuclear fallout
Over 500 atmospheric nuclear weapons tests were conducted at various sites around the world from 1945 to
1980. Radioactive fallout from nuclear weapons testing was rst drawn to public attention in 1954 when the
Castle Bravo hydrogen bomb test at the Pacic Proving
Grounds contaminated the crew and catch of the Japanese
shing boat Lucky Dragon.* [52] One of the shermen
died in Japan seven months later, and the fear of contaminated tuna led to a temporary boycotting of the popular staple in Japan. The incident caused widespread concern around the world, especially regarding the eects of
nuclear fallout and atmospheric nuclear testing, andprovided a decisive impetus for the emergence of the antinuclear weapons movement in many countries.* [52]
As public awareness and concern mounted over the possible health hazards associated with exposure to the nuclear
fallout, various studies were done to assess the extent
of the hazard. A Centers for Disease Control and Prevention/ National Cancer Institute study claims that fall- Women Strike for Peace during the Cuban Missile Crisis
out from atmospheric nuclear tests would lead to perhaps
11,000 excess deaths amongst people alive during atmospheric testing in the United States from all forms of cancer, including leukemia, from 1951 to well into the 21st
century.* [53]* [54] As of March 2009, the U.S. is the only
nation that compensates nuclear test victims. Since the
Radiation Exposure Compensation Act of 1990, more
than $1.38 billion in compensation has been approved.
The money is going to people who took part in the tests,
notably at the Nevada Test Site, and to others exposed to
the radiation.* [55]* [56]
Demonstration against nuclear testing in Lyon, France, in the
1980s.
Public opposition
Peace movements emerged in Japan and in 1954 they
converged to form a unied Japanese Council Against
Atomic and Hydrogen Bombs. Japanese opposition to nuclear weapons tests in the Pacic Ocean was
widespread, and an estimated 35 million signatures
were collected on petitions calling for bans on nuclear
weapons.* [57]
54
CHAPTER 2. TYPES
According to an audit by the Brookings Institution, between 1940 and 1996, the U.S. spent $8.75 trillion in
present-day terms* [63] on nuclear weapons programs. 57
percent of which was spent on building nuclear weapons
delivery systems. 6.3 percent of the total, $549 billion
in present-day terms, was spent on environmental remediation and nuclear waste management, for example
cleaning up the Hanford site, and 7 percent of the total,
$615 billion was spent on making nuclear weapons themselves.* [64]
2.3.7
Non-weapons uses
Map of all proposed routes for a tunnel and/or canal route from
the Mediterranean Sea to the Qattara Depression.
No route was shorter than 55 kilometers in length. Canalcutting investigations began with the buggy salvo shot of Operation Crosstie in 1967.
The Qattara Depression Project, as developed by Professor Friedrich Bassler, who during his appointment to the
West German ministry of economics in 1968, put forth
a plan to create a Saharan lake and hydroelectric power
station by blasting a tunnel between the Mediterranean
The 1962 Sedan nuclear test formed a crater 100 m (330 ft) sea and the Qattara Depression in Egypt, an area that lies
deep with a diameter of about 390 m (1,300 ft), as a means below sea level. The core problem of the entire project
of investigating the possibilities of using peaceful nuclear explo- was the water supply to the depression. Calculations by
sions for large-scale earth moving. If this test was conducted Bassler showed that digging a canal or tunnel would be
in 1965+, when improvements in device design were realized, a too expensive, therefore Bassler determined that the use
100-foldreduction in radiation release was considered feasi- of nuclear explosive devices, to excavate the canal or tunble.* [65] The 140 kiloton Soviet Chagan (nuclear test), companel, would be the most economical. The Egyptian governrable in yield to the Sedan test of 104 kt, formed Lake Chagan,
ment declined to pursue the idea.* [72]
reportedly used as a watering hole for cattle and human swimming.* [66]* [67]* [68]
The Soviet Union conducted a much more exhaustive program than Plowshare, with 239 nuclear tests, between
1965 and 1988. Furthermore, many of the tests
were considered economic applications, not tests, in
the Nuclear Explosions for the National Economy program.* [73]
55
The element einsteinium was rst discovered, in minute quantities, following the analysis of the fallout from the rst thermonuclear atmospheric test.* [78]
56
CHAPTER 2. TYPES
57
Civil Defense
Fractional Orbital Bombardment System
Mutual Assured Destruction
Weapon of mass destruction
Nuclear strategy
More technical details
58
CHAPTER 2. TYPES
2.3.9
59
[24] Daniel Plesch & Stephen Young, Senseless policy [41] Hugh Gusterson (30 March 2012). The new abolition, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December
ists. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.
1998, page 4. Fetched from URL on 18 April 2011.
[42] ODS Team. Renewing the United Nations: A Program
[25] Gallucci, Robert (September 2006). Averting Nufor Reform (A/51/950)" (PDF). Daccess-dds-ny.un.org.
clear Catastrophe: Contemplating Extreme Responses to
Retrieved 2013-05-30.
U.S. Vulnerability. Annals of the American Academy
of Political and Social Science 607: pp.
5158. [43] Jerry Brown and Rinaldo Brutoco (1997). Proles in
Power: The Anti-nuclear Movement and the Dawn of the
doi:10.1177/0002716206290457. Retrieved 28 January
Solar Age, Twayne Publishers, pp. 191192.
2013.
[26] Allison, Graham (13 March 2009). How to Keep the
Bomb From Terrorists. Newsweek. Retrieved 28 January 2013.
[28] Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive NuclearTest-Ban Treaty Organization (2010). "Status of Signature and Ratication". Accessed 27 May 2010. Of the
Annex 2states whose ratication of the CTBT is required before it enters into force, China, Egypt, Iran, Israel, and the United States have signed but not ratied the
Treaty. India, North Korea, and Pakistan have not signed
the Treaty.
[48]U.S. Conrms '65 Loss of H-Bomb Near Japanese Islands. The Washington Post. Reuters. May 9, 1989. p.
A27.
[49] Hayes, Ron (January 17, 2007). H-bomb incident crippled pilot's career. Palm Beach Post. Archived from the
original on 2011-06-16. Retrieved 2006-05-24.
[31] Nuclear weapons and international humanitarian law International Committee of the Red Cross
[38] http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/
ESCCONTROLCHAPTER1.pdf
[55] ABC News. What governments oer to victims of nuclear tests. ABC News. Retrieved 24 October 2014.
[57] Jim Falk (1982). Global Fission: The Battle Over Nuclear
Power, Oxford University Press, pp. 9697.
60
CHAPTER 2. TYPES
[77] John Nuckolls, Early Steps Toward Inertial Fusion Energy (IFE)", LLNL, 12 June 1998
[78] EINSTEINIUM
AND
FERMIUM,
ALBERT
GHIORSO, LAWRENCE BERKELEY NATIONAL
LABORATORY
[60] Jim Falk (1982). Global Fission: The Battle Over Nuclear
Power, Oxford University Press, p. 93.
[61] Jim Falk (1982). Global Fission: The Battle Over Nuclear
Power, Oxford University Press, p. 98.
[62] Spencer Weart, Nuclear Fear: A History of Images (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1988), chapters
16 and 19.
[63] Consumer Price Index (estimate) 18002014. Federal
Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Retrieved February 27,
2014.
[79] Byrne, J. Neutrons, Nuclei, and Matter, Dover Publications, Mineola, NY, 2011, ISBN 978-0-486-48238-5
(pbk.) pp. 267.
[80] Cartlidge, Edwin (4 July 2008). Nuclear fallout used to
spot fake art. Physics World the member magazine of
the Institute of Physics. IOP Group. Retrieved 7 December 2014.
[81] Can past nuclear explosions help detect forgeries?".
Theartnewspaper.com. Archived from the original on
November 13, 2010. Retrieved 2010-11-25.
2.3.10
Bibliography
61
Holloway, David. Stalin and the Bomb. New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1994. ISBN 0-300-06056-4
The Manhattan Engineer District, "The Atomic
Bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki" (1946)
(French) Jean-Hugues Oppel, Rveillez le prsident,
ditions Payot et rivages, 2007 (ISBN 978-2-74361630-4). The book is a ction about the nuclear
weapons of France; the book also contains about ten
chapters on true historical incidents involving nuclear weapons and strategy.
Smyth, Henry DeWolf. Atomic Energy for Military Purposes. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1945. (Smyth Report the rst declassied
report by the US government on nuclear weapons)
The Eects of Nuclear War. Oce of Technology
Assessment, May 1979.
Rhodes, Richard. Dark Sun: The Making of the
Hydrogen Bomb. New York: Simon and Schuster,
1995. ISBN 0-684-82414-0
Rhodes, Richard. The Making of the Atomic Bomb.
New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986 ISBN 0-68481378-5
Weart, Spencer R. Nuclear Fear: A History of Images. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1988. ISBN 0-674-62836-5
Weart, Spencer R. The Rise of Nuclear Fear. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012. ISBN
0-674-05233-1
DeVolpi, Alexander, Minkov, Vladimir E., Simonenko, Vadim A., and Stanford, George S. Nuclear Shadowboxing: Contemporary Threats from 2.3.11 External links
Cold War Weaponry. Fidlar Doubleday, 2004 (Two
volumes, both accessible on Google Book Search)
Nuclear Weapon Archive from Carey Sublette is a
(Content of both volumes is now available in the
reliable source of information and has links to other
2009 trilogy by Alexander DeVolpi: Nuclear Insources and an informative FAQ.
sights: The Cold War Legacy)
The Federation of American Scientists provide solid
Glasstone, Samuel and Dolan, Philip J. The Efinformation on weapons of mass destruction, includfects of Nuclear Weapons (third edition). Washinging nuclear weapons and their eects
ton, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Oce, 1977.
Alsos Digital Library for Nuclear Issues contains
Available online (PDF).
many resources related to nuclear weapons, including a historical and technical overview and search NATO Handbook on the Medical Aspects of NBC Deable bibliography of web and print resources.
fensive Operations (Part I Nuclear). Departments
of the Army, Navy, and Air Force: Washington,
Video archive of US, Soviet, UK, Chinese and
D.C., 1996
French Nuclear Weapon Testing at sonicbomb.com
Hansen, Chuck. U.S. Nuclear Weapons: The Secret
The National Museum of Nuclear Science & HisHistory. Arlington, TX: Aerofax, 1988
tory (United States)located in Albuquerque, New
Mexico; a Smithsonian Aliate Museum
Hansen, Chuck, "Swords of Armageddon: U.S. nuclear weapons development since 1945" (CD-ROM
& download available). PDF. 2,600 pages, Sunnyvale, California, Chucklea Publications, 1995,
2007. ISBN 978-0-9791915-0-3 (2nd Ed.)
62
CHAPTER 2. TYPES
Los Alamos National Laboratory: History (U.S. nu- Factors such as: energy and type of radiation, half-life,
clear history)
longevity, availability, shielding, portability, and the role
of the environment will determine the eect of the ra Race for the Superbomb, PBS website on the history diological weapon. Radioisotopes that pose the greatest
of the H-bomb
security risk include: 137Cs, used in radiological medical
equipment, 60Co, 241Am, 252Cf, 192Ir, 238Pu, 90Sr,
Recordings of recollections of the victims of Hi- 226Ra, and 238U.
roshima and Nagasaki
All of these isotopes, except for the nal one, are created
The Woodrow Wilson Center's Nuclear Prolifera- in nuclear power plants. While the amount of radiation
tion International History Project or NPIHP is a dispersed from the event will likely be minimal, the fact
global network of individuals and institutions en- of any radiation may be enough to cause panic and disgaged in the study of international nuclear history ruption.
through archival documents, oral history interviews
and other empirical sources.
2.4.2 History
2.4.1
Explanation
Radiological weapons of mass destruction have been suggested as a possible weapon of terrorism used to create
panic and casualties in densely populated areas. They
could also render a great deal of property uninhabitable
for an extended period, unless costly remediation were
undertaken. The radiological source and quality greatly
impacts the eectiveness of a radiological weapon.
2.4.3
Deployment
63
Means of radiological warfare that do not rely on any specic weapon, but rather on spreading radioactive contam- 2.4.6 Salted bomb
ination via a food chain or water table, seem to be more
eective in some ways, but share many of the same prob- Main article: Salted bomb
lems as chemical warfare.
64
CHAPTER 2. TYPES
2.4.7
See also
Biological warfare
Chemical warfare
Cobalt bomb
Lists of nuclear disasters and radioactive incidents
Nuclear fallout
Nuclear weapon
Radioactive contamination
Weapon of mass destruction
Nuclear terrorism
2.4.8
References
[1] Rickert, Paul (2005-12-31). The Likely Eect of a Radiological Dispersion Device. Liberty University. pp.
2, 3. Retrieved 21 October 2014.
[2] Ford, J. (March 1998). Radiological Dispersion Devices: Assessing the transnational threat. National Defense University - Institute for National Strategic Studies
- Strategic Forum. Archived from the original on December 12, 2005. Retrieved December 31, 2005.
[3] Hughes, D. (4 March 2002). When terrorists go nuclear. Popular Mechanics. Archived from the original
on September 19, 2005. Retrieved December 31, 2005.
[4] Radiological Dispersion Devices Fact Sheet. Department of Homeland Security. 10 February 2003. Archived
from the original on December 29, 2005. Retrieved December 31, 2005.
[5] Full story at publisher's web site
[6]
[7] Dirty Bombs: The Threat Revisited in Defense Horizons,
Feb. 2004, a publication of the National Defense University
[8] Dirty Bomb
2.4.9
External links
Chapter 3
Proliferation
3.1 Nuclear proliferation
Earnest international eorts to promote nuclear nonproliferation began soon after World War II, when the
Truman Administration proposed the Baruch Plan* [2] of
1946, named after Bernard Baruch, America's rst representative to the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission. The Baruch Plan, which drew heavily from the
AchesonLilienthal Report of 1946, proposed the veriFour countries besides the ve recognized Nuclear able dismantlement and destruction of the U.S. nuclear
Weapons States have acquired, or are presumed to have arsenal (which, at that time, was the only nuclear arse65
66
nal in the world) after all governments had cooperated
successfully to accomplish two things: (1) the establishment of an international atomic development authority,which would actually own and control all militaryapplicable nuclear materials and activities, and (2) the
creation of a system of automatic sanctions, which not
even the U.N. Security Council could veto, and which
would proportionately punish states attempting to acquire
the capability to make nuclear weapons or ssile material.
Baruch's plea for the destruction of nuclear weapons invoked basic moral and religious intuitions. In one part of
his address to the UN, Baruch said, Behind the black
portent of the new atomic age lies a hope which, seized
upon with faith, can work out our salvation. If we fail,
then we have damned every man to be the slave of Fear.
Let us not deceive ourselves. We must elect World Peace
or World Destruction.... We must answer the world's
longing for peace and security.* [3] With this remark,
Baruch helped launch the eld of nuclear ethics, to which
many policy experts and scholars have contributed.
Although the Baruch Plan enjoyed wide international
support, it failed to emerge from the UNAEC because
the Soviet Union planned to veto it in the Security Council. Still, it remained ocial American policy until 1953,
when President Eisenhower made his "Atoms for Peace"
proposal before the U.N. General Assembly. Eisenhower's proposal led eventually to the creation of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1957.
Under theAtoms for Peaceprogram thousands of scientists from around the world were educated in nuclear
science and then dispatched home, where many later pursued secret weapons programs in their home country.* [4]
Eorts to conclude an international agreement to limit the
spread of nuclear weapons did not begin until the early
1960s, after four nations (the United States, the Soviet
Union, the United Kingdom and France) had acquired
nuclear weapons (see List of states with nuclear weapons
for more information). Although these eorts stalled in
the early 1960s, they renewed once again in 1964, after China detonated a nuclear weapon. In 1968, governments represented at the Eighteen Nation Disarmament
Committee (ENDC) nished negotiations on the text of
the NPT. In June 1968, the U.N. General Assembly endorsed the NPT with General Assembly Resolution 2373
(XXII), and in July 1968, the NPT opened for signature
in Washington, DC, London and Moscow. The NPT entered into force in March 1970.
CHAPTER 3. PROLIFERATION
means for weapons construction to develop rudimentary,
but working, nuclear explosive devices are considered to
be within the reach of industrialized nations.
Since its founding by the United Nations in 1957, the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has promoted two, sometimes contradictory, missions: on the
one hand, the Agency seeks to promote and spread internationally the use of civilian nuclear energy; on the
other hand, it seeks to prevent, or at least detect, the diversion of civilian nuclear energy to nuclear weapons, nuclear explosive devices or purposes unknown. The IAEA
now operates a safeguards system as specied under Article III of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of
1968, which aims to ensure that civil stocks of uranium,
plutonium, as well as facilities and technologies associated with these nuclear materials, are used only for peaceful purposes and do not contribute in any way to proliferation or nuclear weapons programs. It is often argued that
proliferation of nuclear weapons to many other states has
been prevented by the extension of assurances and mutual defence treaties to these states by nuclear powers, but
other factors, such as national prestige, or specic historical experiences, also play a part in hastening or stopping
nuclear proliferation.* [5]
Many UN and US agencies warn that building more nuclear reactors unavoidably increases nuclear proliferation
risks.* [7] A fundamental goal for American and global
security is to minimize the proliferation risks associated
with the expansion of nuclear power. If this development
ispoorly managed or eorts to contain risks are unsuccessful, the nuclear future will be dangerous.* [6] For
nuclear power programs to be developed and managed
safely and securely, it is important that countries have domestic good governancecharacteristics that will enSince the mid-1970s, the primary focus of non- courage proper nuclear operations and management:* [6]
proliferation eorts has been to maintain, and even inThese characteristics include low degrees
crease, international control over the ssile material and
of corruption (to avoid ocials selling maspecialized technologies necessary to build such devices
terials and technology for their own personal
because these are the most dicult and expensive parts
gain as occurred with the A.Q. Khan smugof a nuclear weapons program. The main materials
gling network in Pakistan), high degrees of powhose generation and distribution is controlled are highly
litical stability (dened by the World Bank as
enriched uranium and plutonium. Other than the acquisilikelihood that the government will be destation of these special materials, the scientic and technical
bilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or
3.1.3
International cooperation
67
be suitable for bomb production.
Scope of safeguards
See also: Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting
and Control of Nuclear Materials
Traditional safeguards are arrangements to account for
and control the use of nuclear materials. This verication is a key element in the international system which
ensures that uranium in particular is used only for peaceful purposes.
Parties to the NPT agree to accept technical safeguard
measures applied by the IAEA. These require that operators of nuclear facilities maintain and declare detailed
accounting records of all movements and transactions involving nuclear material. Over 550 facilities and several hundred other locations are subject to regular inspection, and their records and the nuclear material being
audited. Inspections by the IAEA are complemented by
other measures such as surveillance cameras and instrumentation.
Notable non-signatories to the NPT are Israel, Pakistan, The inspections act as an alert system providing a warning
and India (the latter two have since tested nuclear of the possible diversion of nuclear material from peaceweapons, while Israel is considered by most to be an un- ful activities. The system relies on;
acknowledged nuclear weapons state). North Korea was
1. Material Accountancy tracking all inward and outonce a signatory but withdrew in January 2003. The leward transfers and the ow of materials in any nugality of North Korea's withdrawal is debatable but as of
clear facility. This includes sampling and analysis
9 October 2006, North Korea clearly possesses the capaof nuclear material, on-site inspections, and review
bility to make a nuclear explosive device.
and verication of operating records.
International Atomic Energy Agency
Main article: International Atomic Energy Agency
The IAEA was established on 29 July 1957 to help nations
develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Allied to
this role is the administration of safeguards arrangements
to provide assurance to the international community that
individual countries are honoring their commitments under the treaty. Though established under its own international treaty, the IAEA reports to both the United Nations
General Assembly and the Security Council.
The IAEA regularly inspects civil nuclear facilities to verify the accuracy of documentation supplied to it. The
agency checks inventories, and samples and analyzes materials. Safeguards are designed to deter diversion of nuclear material by increasing the risk of early detection.
They are complemented by controls on the export of sensitive technology from countries such as UK and United
States through voluntary bodies such as the Nuclear Suppliers Group. The main concern of the IAEA is that uranium not be enriched beyond what is necessary for commercial civil plants, and that plutonium which is produced
by nuclear reactors not be rened into a form that would
68
electricity-generating reactors) and a reprocessing plant
to produce some weapons-grade plutonium.
The weakness of the NPT regime lay in the fact that no
obvious diversion of material was involved. The uranium
used as fuel probably came from indigenous sources, and
the nuclear facilities were built by the countries themselves without being declared or placed under safeguards.
Iraq, as an NPT party, was obliged to declare all facilities but did not do so. Nevertheless, the activities were
detected and brought under control using international
diplomacy. In Iraq, a military defeat assisted this process.
In North Korea, the activities concerned took place before the conclusion of its NPT safeguards agreement.
With North Korea, the promised provision of commercial power reactors appeared to resolve the situation for a
time, but it later withdrew from the NPT and declared it
had nuclear weapons.
CHAPTER 3. PROLIFERATION
situation and the kind of nuclear materials it has.
This will involve greater judgement on the part of
IAEA and the development of eective methodologies which reassure NPT States.
As of 3 July 2015, 146 countries have signed Additional
Protocols and 126 have brought them into force. The
IAEA is also applying the measures of the Additional
Protocol in Taiwan.* [8] Under the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action, Iran has agreed to implement its protocol provisionally. Among the leading countries that have
not signed the Additional Protocol are Egypt, which says
it will not sign until Israel accepts comprehensive IAEA
safeguards,* [9] and Brazil, which opposes making the
protocol a requirement for international cooperation on
enrichment and reprocessing,* [10] but has not ruled out
signing.* [11]
Limitations of safeguards
Additional Protocol
In 1993 a program was initiated to strengthen and extend
the classical safeguards system, and a model protocol was
agreed by the IAEA Board of Governors 1997. The measures boosted the IAEA's ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities, including those with no connection to the
civil fuel cycle.
Innovations were of two kinds. Some could be implemented on the basis of IAEA's existing legal authority
through safeguards agreements and inspections. Others
required further legal authority to be conferred through
an Additional Protocol. This must be agreed by each
non-weapons state with IAEA, as a supplement to any
existing comprehensive safeguards agreement. Weapons
states have agreed to accept the principles of the model
additional protocol.
Key elements of the model Additional Protocol:
The IAEA is to be given considerably more information on nuclear and nuclear-related activities, including R & D, production of uranium and thorium (regardless of whether it is traded), and nuclear-related
imports and exports.
IAEA inspectors will have greater rights of access.
This will include any suspect location, it can be at
short notice (e.g., two hours), and the IAEA can deploy environmental sampling and remote monitoring techniques to detect illicit activities.
69
material or equipment would not be diverted to unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activities,
and formal government assurances to this eect were required from recipients. The Guidelines also recognised
the need for physical protection measures in the transfer of sensitive facilities, technology and weapons-usable
materials, and strengthened retransfer provisions. The
group began with seven members the United States, the
former USSR, the UK, France, Germany, Canada and
Japan but now includes 46 countries including all ve
nuclear weapons states.
The International Framework for Nuclear Energy Cooperation is an international project involving 25 partner countries, 28 observer and candidate partner countries, and the International Atomic Energy Agency, the
Generation IV International Forum, and the European
Commission. Its goal is to "[..] provide competitive,
commercially-based services as an alternative to a state
s development of costly, proliferation-sensitive facilities,
and address other issues associated with the safe and secure management of used fuel and radioactive waste.
*
[12]
70
CHAPTER 3. PROLIFERATION
cial operation, two larger ones under construction, and an advanced heavy-water thorium cycle is under developten more planned. The 14 operating ones (2548 MWe ment.
total) comprise:
India exploded a nuclear device in 1974, the so-called
Smiling Buddha test, which it has consistently claimed
two 150 MWe BWRs from the United States, which was for peaceful purposes. Others saw it as a response to
started up in 1969, now use locally enriched uranium China's nuclear weapons capability. It was then univerand are under safeguards,
sally perceived, notwithstanding ocial denials, to possess, or to be able to quickly assemble, nuclear weapons.
two small Canadian PHWRs (1972 & 1980), also In 1999 it deployed its own medium-range missile and
under safeguards, and
has developed an intermediate-range missile capable of
reaching targets in China's industrial heartland.
ten local PHWRs based on Canadian designs, two
In 1995 the United States quietly intervened to head o a
of 150 and eight 200 MWe.
proposed nuclear test. However, in 1998 there were ve
two new 540 MWe and two 700 MWe plants at more tests in Operation Shakti. These were unambiguTarapur (known as TAPP: Tarapur Atomic Power ously military, including one claimed to be of a sophisticated thermonuclear device, and their declared purpose
Project)
wasto help in the design of nuclear weapons of dierent
yields and dierent delivery systems.
The two under construction and two of the planned ones
are 450 MWe versions of these 200 MWe domestic prod- Indian security policies are driven by:
ucts. Construction has been seriously delayed by nancial and technical problems. In 2001 a nal agreement
its determination to be recognized as a dominant
was signed with Russia for the country's rst large nuclear
power in the region
power plant, comprising two VVER-1000 reactors, under
its increasing concern with China's expanding nua Russian-nanced US$3 billion contract. The rst unit is
clear weapons and missile delivery programmes
due to be commissioned in 2007. A further two Russian
units are under consideration for the site. Nuclear power
its concern with Pakistan's capability to deliver nusupplied 3.1% of India's electricity in 2000.
clear weapons deep into India
Its weapons material appears to come from a Canadiandesigned 40MW researchreactor which started up in It perceives nuclear weapons as a cost-eective political
1960, well before the NPT, and a 100MW indigenous unit counter to China's nuclear and conventional weaponry,
in operation since 1985. Both use local uranium, as India and the eects of its nuclear weapons policy in provokdoes not import any nuclear fuel. It is estimated that India ing Pakistan is, by some accounts, considered incidenmay have built up enough weapons-grade plutonium for tal. India has had an unhappy relationship with China.
After an uneasy ceasere ended the 1962 war, relations
a hundred nuclear warheads.
between the two nations were frozen until 1998. Since
It is widely believed that the nuclear programs of India then a degree of high-level contact has been established
and Pakistan used CANDU reactors to produce ssion- and a few elementary condence-building measures put
able materials for their weapons; however, this is not ac- in place. China still occupies some territory which it capcurate. Both Canada (by supplying the 40 MW research tured during the aforementioned war, claimed by India,
reactor) and the United States (by supplying 21 tons of and India still occupies some territory claimed by China.
heavy water) supplied India with the technology neces- Its nuclear weapon and missile support for Pakistan is a
sary to create a nuclear weapons program, dubbed CIRUS major bone of contention.
(Canada-India Reactor, United States). Canada sold India the reactor on the condition that the reactor and any American President George W. Bush met with India
by-products would be employed for peaceful purposes Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to discuss India's inonly.. Similarly, the United States sold India heavy wa- volvement with nuclear weapons. The two countries
ter for use in the reactor only... in connection with re- agreed that the United States would give nuclear power
search into and the use of atomic energy for peaceful pur- assistance to India.
poses. India, in violation of these agreements, used the
Canadian-supplied reactor and American-supplied heavy Pakistan Over the several years, the Nuclear power inwater to produce plutonium for their rst nuclear explo- frastructure has been well established by Pakistan which
sion, Smiling Buddha.* [17] The Indian government con- is dedicated for the industrial and economic development
troversially justied this, however, by claiming that Smil- of the country.* [18] Its current nuclear policy is directed
ing Buddha was a peaceful nuclear explosion.
and aimed to promote the socio-economic development
The country has at least three other research reactors in- of the people as aforemost priority";* [19] and to fulll
cluding the tiny one which is exploring the use of thorium the energy, economic, and industrial needs from the nuas a nuclear fuel, by breeding ssile U-233. In addition, clear sources.* [19] Currently, there are three operational
71
Pakistan was exposed to a kind of "nuclear
threat and blackmail" unparalleled elsewhere..... (...)... If the world's community
failed to provide political insurance to Pakistan and other countries against the nuclear
blackmail, these countries would be constraint
to launch atomic bomb programs of their
own!... [A]ssurances provided by the United
Nations were not Enough!"...
Zulkar Ali Bhutto, statement written in "Eating
Grass", source* [24]
In 2003, Libya admitted that the nuclear weapons-related material including these centrifuges, known as Pak-1, were acquired
from Pakistan
After 1974, Bhutto's government redoubled its effort, this time equally focused on uranium and plutonium.* [25] Pakistan had established science directorates
in almost all of her embassies in the important countries of the world, with theoretical physicist S.A. Butt
being the director.* [25] Abdul Qadeer Khan then established a network through Dubai to smuggle URENCO technology to Engineering Research Laboratories.* [26]* [27]* [28]* [29]* [30]* [31] Earlier, he worked
with Physics Dynamics Research Laboratories (FDO), a
subsidiary of the Dutch rm VMF-Stork based in Amsterdam. Later after joining, the Urenco, he had access through photographs and documents of the technology.* [4] Against the popular perception, the technology
that A.Q. Khan had brought from Urenco was based on
rst generation civil rector technology, lled with many
serious technical errors, though it was authentic and vital link for centrifuge project of the country. After the
British Government stopped the British subsidiary of the
American Emerson Electric Co. from shipping the components to Pakistan, he describes his frustration with a
supplier from Germany as: That man from the German
team was unethical.* [4] When he did not get the order
from us, he wrote a letter to a Labour Party member and
questions were asked in [British] Parliament.* [4] By
1978, his eorts were paid o and made him into a national hero.* [4] In 1981, as a tribute, President General
Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, renamed the research institute
after his name.* [4]
In early 1996, Prime minister Benazir Bhutto made it
clear thatif India conducts a nuclear test, Pakistan could
be forced tofollow suit.* [32]* [33] In 1997, her statement was echoed by Prime minister Nawaz Sharif who
maintained to the fact that: Since 1972, [P]akistan
had progressed signicantly, and we have left that stage
(developmental) far behind. Pakistan will not be made
a hostageto India by signing the CTBT, before (India).!"* [34] In May 1998, within weeks of India's nuclear
tests, Pakistan announced that it had conducted six underground tests in the Chagai Hills, ve on the 28th and one
on the 30th of that month. Seismic events consistent with
these claims were recorded.
In 2004, the revelation of A.Q. Khan's eorts led the exposure of many defunct European consortium who de-
72
CHAPTER 3. PROLIFERATION
Israel Israel is also thought to possess an arsenal of potentially up to several hundred nuclear warheads based
on estimates of the amount of ssile material produced
by Israel.* [39] This has never been openly conrmed or
denied however, due to Israel's policy of deliberate ambiguity.* [40]
An Israeli nuclear installation is located about ten kilometers to the south of Dimona, the Negev Nuclear Research Center. Its construction commenced in 1958, with
French assistance. The ocial reason given by the Israeli
and French governments was to build a nuclear reactor
to power a "desalination plant", in order to green the
Negev. The purpose of the Dimona plant is widely assumed to be the manufacturing of nuclear weapons, and
the majority of defense experts have concluded that it
does in fact do that. However, the Israeli government refuses to conrm or deny this publicly, a policy it refers to
as ambiguity.
73
Nuclear arms control in South Asia
Main articles: Lahore Summit and Agra summit
74
CHAPTER 3. PROLIFERATION
Egypt In 2004 and 2005, Egypt disclosed past undeclared nuclear activities and material to the IAEA. In
2007 and 2008, high enriched and low enriched uranium
particles were found in environmental samples taken in
Egypt.* [48] In 2008, the IAEA states Egypt's statements
were consistent with its own ndings.* [49] In May 2009,
Reuters reported that the IAEA was conducting further
investigation in Egypt.* [50]* [51]
Iran Main article: Iran and weapons of mass destruc- The main thrust of Iraq's uranium enrichment program
was the development of technology for electromagnetic
tion Nuclear weapons
isotope
separation (EMIS) of indigenous uranium. This
See also: Nuclear program of Iran
uses the same principles as a mass spectrometer (albeit on
a much larger scale). Ions of uranium-238 and uraniumIn 2003, the IAEA reported that Iran had been in breach 235 are separated because they describe arcs of dierent
of its obligations to comply with provisions of its safe- radii when they move through a magnetic eld. This proguard agreement.* [52] In 2005, the IAEA Board of Gov- cess was used in the Manhattan Project to make the highly
ernors voted in a rare non-consensus decision to nd enriched uranium used in the Hiroshima bomb, but was
Iran in non-compliance with its NPT Safeguards Agree- abandoned soon afterwards.
ment and to report that non-compliance to the UN Security Council.* [53]* [54] In response, the UN Security The Iraqis did the basic research work at their nuclear
Council passed a series of resolutions citing concerns research establishment at Tuwaitha, near Baghdad, and
about the program.* [55]* [56]* [57]* [58]* [59] Iran's rep- were building two full-scale facilities at Tarmiya and Ash
resentative to the UN argues sanctions compel Iran to Sharqat, north of Baghdad. However, when the war broke
abandon its rights under the Nuclear Nonproliferation out, only a few separators had been installed at Tarmiya,
Treaty to peaceful nuclear technology.* [60] Iran says its and none at Ash Sharqat.
uranium enrichment program is exclusively for peaceful The Iraqis were also very interested in centrifuge enrichpurposes* [61]* [62] and has enriched uranium to less ment, and had been able to acquire some components inthan 5 percent,consistent with fuel for a nuclear power cluding some carbon-bre rotors, which they were at an
plant and signicantly below the purity of WEU (around early stage of testing. In May 1998, Newsweek reported
90%) typically used in a weapons program.* [63]* [64] that Abdul Qadeer Khan had sent Iraq centrifuge designs,
The director general of the International Atomic Energy which were apparently conscated by the UNMOVIC ofAgency, Yukiya Amano, said in 2009 he had not seen cials. Iraqi ocials saidthe documents were authentic
any evidence in IAEA ocial documents that Iran was but that they had not agreed to work with A. Q. Khan,
75
to Myanmar where they had settled down, to help Myanmar's project. Recently, the David Albright-led Institute
for Science and International Security (ISIS) rang alarm
bells about Myanmar attempting a nuclear project with
North Korean help. If true, the full weight of international pressure will be brought against Myanmar, said ofcials familiar with developments. But equally, the information that has been peddled by the defectors is also
preliminaryand could be used by the west to turn the
screws on Myanmaron democracy and human rights issuesin the run-up to the elections in the country in 2010.
During an ASEAN meeting in Thailand in July 2009, US
secretary of state Hillary Clinton highlighted concerns of
the North Korean link. We know there are also growing concerns about military cooperation between North
Korea and Burma which we take very seriously,Clinton said.* [74] However, in 2012, after contact with the
American president, Barack Obama, the Burmese leader,
Thein Sein, renounced military ties with DPRK (North
Korea).* [75]
76
CHAPTER 3. PROLIFERATION
77
United States, which would supply certain warheadrelated components.* [84]* [85] Some of the ssile materials for the UK Trident warhead were purchased from the
United States.* [85] Declassied U.S. Department of Energy documents indicate the UK Trident warhead system
was involved in non-nuclear design activities alongside
the U.S. W76 nuclear warhead tted in some U.S. Navy
Trident missiles,* [86] leading the Federation of American Scientists to speculate that the UK warhead may share
design information from the W76.* [87] It ought to be emphasized that none of these activities crosses the threshold
of proliferation as dened by the NPT.
South Africa has signed the NPT, and now holds the distinction of being the only known state to have indigenously produced nuclear weapons, and then veriably disUnder the Mutual Defence Agreement 5.37 tonnes of
mantled them.* [77]
UK-produced plutonium was sent to the United States in
return for 6.7 kg of tritium and 7.5 tonnes of highly enSyria Main article: Syria and weapons of mass de- riched uranium over the period 19601979. A further
0.47 tonne of plutonium was swapped between the UK
struction
and United States for reasons that remain classied.* [88]
Some of the UK produced plutonium was used in 1962
On 6 September 2007, Israel bombed an ocially
by the United States for a nuclear weapon test of reactorunidentied site in Syria which it later asserted was a
grade plutonium.* [89]
nuclear reactor under construction (see Operation Orchard).* [78] The alleged reactor was not asserted to be The United States has supplied nuclear weapon delivery
operational and it was not asserted that nuclear material systems to support the UK nuclear forces since before the
had been introduced into it.* [48] Syria said the site was signing of the NPT. The renewal of this agreement is due
a military site and was not involved in any nuclear activ- to take place through the second decade of the 21st cen*
*
ities.* [48] The IAEA requested Syria to provide further tury. [90] [91]
access to the site and any other locations where the debris
and equipment from the building had been stored.* [48]
Syria denounced what it called the Western fabrica- 3.1.5 Breakout capability
tion and forging of factsin regards to the incident.* [79]
IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei criticized For a state that does not possess nuclear weapons, the caand with
the strikes and deplored that information regarding the pability to produce one or more weapons quickly
*
little
warning
is
called
a
breakout
capability.
[92]
matter had not been shared with his agency earlier.* [80]
Excurse: United States cooperation on nuclear
weapons with the United Kingdom Whilst not at
variance with the NPT, United States cooperation on nuclear weapons with the United Kingdom will be addressed
as an excurse in the current section listing violations of
that international agreement.
78
CHAPTER 3. PROLIFERATION
tries included in the aforementioned laissez-faire distribution could predispose the transfer of nuclear materials
or a bomb falling into the hands of groups not aliated
with any governments. Such countries would not have the
Some very prominent neo-realist scholars, such as political will or ability to safeguard attempts at devices
Kenneth Waltz, Emeritus Professor of Political Science being transferred to a third party. Not being deterred by
at UC Berkeley and Adjunct Senior Research Scholar at self-annihilation, terrorism groups could push forth their
Columbia University, and John Mearsheimer, R. Wendell own nuclear agendas or be used as shadow fronts to carry
out the attack plans by mentioned unstable governments.
Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago, continue to argue along
the lines of Gallois (though these scholars rarely acknowl- Arguments against both positions
edge their intellectual debt to Gallois and his contemporaries). Specically, these scholars advocate some forms There are numerous arguments presented against both seof nuclear proliferation, arguing that it will decrease the lective and total proliferation, generally targeting the very
likelihood of war, especially in troubled regions of the neorealist assumptions (such as the primacy of military
world. Aside from the majority opinion which opposes security in state agendas, the weakness of international
proliferation in any form, there are two schools of thought institutions, and the long-run unimportance of economic
on the matter: those, like Mearsheimer, who favor se- integration and globalization to state strategy) its prolective proliferation,* [96] and those such as Waltz, who ponents tend to make. With respect to Mearsheimer's
advocate a laissez-faire attitude to programs like North specic example of Europe, many economists and
Korea's.
neoliberals argue that the economic integration of EuTotal proliferation
In embryo, Waltz argues that the logic of mutually assured destruction (MAD) should work in all security environments, regardless of historical tensions or recent hostility. He sees the Cold War as the ultimate proof of
MAD logic the only occasion when enmity between
two Great Powers did not result in military conict. This
was, he argues, because nuclear weapons promote caution
in decision-makers. Neither Washington nor Moscow
would risk a nuclear apocalypse to advance territorial or
power goals, hence a peaceful stalemate ensued (Waltz
and Sagan (2003), p. 24). Waltz believes there to be
no reason why this eect would not occur in all circumstances.
Selective proliferation
John Mearsheimer would not support Waltz's optimism
in the majority of potential instances; however, he has argued for nuclear proliferation as policy in certain places,
such as postCold War Europe. In two famous articles,
Professor Mearsheimer opines that Europe is bound to return to its preCold War environment of regular conagration and suspicion at some point in the future. He advocates arming both Germany and Ukraine with nuclear
weaponry in order to achieve a balance of power between
these states in the east and France/UK in the west. If this
does not occur, he is certain that war will eventually break
out on the European continent (Mearsheimer (1990), pp.
556 and (1993), pp. 5066).
Another separate argument against Waltz's open proliferation and in favor of Mearsheimer's selective distribution is the possibility of nuclear terrorism. Some coun-
79
mament, however they have not succeeded due to protests
from those states that already have nuclear weapons. In
light of this, India viewed nuclear weapons as a necessary
right for all nations as long as certain states were still in
possession of nuclear weapons. India stated that nuclear
issues were directly related to national security.
Years before India's rst underground nuclear test in
1998, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was
passed. Some have argued that coercive language
was used in an attempt to persuade India to sign the
treaty, which was pushed for heavily by neighboring
China.* [101] India viewed the treaty as a means for countries that already had nuclear weapons, primarily the ve
nations of the United Nations Security Council, to keep
their weapons while ensuring that no other nations could
develop them.* [102]
80
3.1.8
CHAPTER 3. PROLIFERATION
References
[1] Nash, Gary B., Julie Roy Jerey, John R. Howe, Peter
J. Frederick, Allen F. Davis, Allan M. Winkler, Charlene
Mires, and Carla Gardina Pestana. The American People,
Concise Edition Creating a Nation and a Society, Combined Volume (6th Edition). New York: Longman, 2007.
[2] The Baruch Plan | Arms Control, Deterrence and Nuclear
Proliferation | Historical Documents | atomicarchive.com
[3] Baruch, Bernard. The Baruch Plan.
[4] Catherine Collins and Douglas Frantz (2007). How you
helped build Pakistan's bomb. Asia Times Online. Retrieved 30 November 2007.
[5] Beatrice Heuser,Beliefs, Cultures, Proliferation and Use
of Nuclear Weapons, in Eric Herring (ed.): Preventing
the Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction Special Issue of
Journal of Strategic Studies Vol. 23 No. 1 (March 2000),
pp.74-100 ; Proliferation and/or Alliance? The Federal
Republic of Germany, in Leopoldo Nuti and Cyril Buffet (eds.): Dividing the Atom, special issue of Storia delle
Relazioni Internazionali (Autumn 1998).
[6] Steven E. Miller & Scott D. Sagan (Fall 2009). Nuclear
power without nuclear proliferation?". Ddalus.
[7] Kristin Shrader-Frechette (19 August 2011). Cheaper,
safer alternatives than nuclear ssion. Bulletin of the
Atomic Scientists.
[8] Status of the Additional Protocol
[9] NTI Egypt Prole
[10] When Nuclear Sheris Quarrel, The Economist, 30 October 2008.
[11] Remarks With Brazilian Foreign Minister Celso Amorim,
5 October 2004
[12] Energy.gov/ International Fuel Services and Commercial
Engagement
[13] World War 4 Report.Iran issues anti-nuke fatwa | World
War 4 Report. Ww4report.com. Retrieved 20 February
2013.
[14] CNN.com IAEA chief: Iran deal possible 6 March
2006. CNN. Retrieved 20 May 2010.
[15] Corps Commanders: RAW whipping up terrorism in
Pakistan.
[16] Pakistan asks UK over claims India funded MQM party
.
[17] The Beginning: 1944-1960. India's Nuclear Weapons
Program. Nuclear Weapon Archive. 2001. Retrieved 10
November 2006.
[18] Siddiqui, Saeed Alam. Nuclear Power Development
in Pakistan. Govt. of Pakistan. Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission report to IAEA. Retrieved 23 December 2012.
[19] Sta (27 March 2012). Civil nuclear technology: Pakistan wants end to 'discrimination'". Pakistan Tribune.
Retrieved 23 November 2012.
[20] Syed Yousaf, Raza (31 July 2012). Current Picture of
Electrical Energy In Pakistan (PDF). Pakistan Atomic
Energy Commission. Directorate-General for Nuclear
Power Generation. Retrieved 28 November 2012.
[21] Siddiqi, Muhammad Ali (20 April 1995). N-deterrent
vital to security, says PM Benazir Bhutto. Dawn Newspapers, 1995. Dawn Media Group. pp. 36. Retrieved
13 May 2012. Pakistanis are security consciousbecause of the 1971 trauma and the three wars with India.
Pakistan's programme was peaceful but was a deterrent
to Indiabecause New Delhi had detonated a nuclear device. Pakistan, thus, had to take every step to ensure its
territorial integrity and sovereignty
[22] Samdani, Zafar (25 March 2000). India, Pakistan can
build hydrogen bomb: Scientist. Dawn News Interviews.
Retrieved 23 December 2012.
[23] George Russell (3 June 1985). Who Has the Bomb.
Time Magazine, 1985. Retrieved 9 January 2013.
[24] Khan, Feroz Hassan (22 November 2012).The Route to
Nuclear Ambition. Eating grass : the making of the Pakistani bomb (google book). Stanford, California: Stanford
University Press. pp. 119120. ISBN 978-0804776011.
Retrieved 9 January 2013.
[25] Washington Release (22 August 2007). AQ Khan network was imports-exports enterprise". Daily Times,
2007. Retrieved 23 December 2012.
[26] Mush helped proliferate N-technology : AQ Khan.
The Times of India. 6 July 2008.
[27] John Pike.A.Q. Khan. Globalsecurity.org. Retrieved
20 February 2013.
[28] Armstrong, David; Joseph John Trento, National Security News Service. America and the Islamic Bomb: The
Deadly Compromise. Steerforth Press, 2007. p. 165.
ISBN 9781586421373.
[29] Eye To Eye: An Islamic Bomb. CBS News.
[30] Agencies (9 September 2009). Lankan Muslims in
Dubai supplied N-materials to Pak: A Q Khan. Express
India. Retrieved 20 February 2013.
[31] On the trail of the black market bombs. BBC News.
12 February 2004.
[32]Bhutto Warns India Against Testing Nuclear Device
Daily Telegraph (London), 6 January 1996, p. 12, by
Ahmed Rashid
[33] NTI.6 January 1996. NTI; Pakistan Television (PTV).
Retrieved 18 November 2011.
[34] NTI, Shahid Ahmed Khan.Nuclear Chronology. NTI
publications. Archived from the original on 8 November
2010. Retrieved 2 December 2011. Nawaz Sharif acknowledged his country's nuclear capability on 7 September 1997
81
[55] Security Council demands Iran suspend uranium enrichment by 31 August, or face possible economic, diplomatic
sanctions (UN News Centre Press Release, 31 July 2006)
82
CHAPTER 3. PROLIFERATION
[89] Additional Information Concerning Underground Nuclear Weapon Test of Reactor-Grade Plutonium. U.S.
Department of Energy. June 1994. Retrieved 15 March
2007.
[91] United Nations Association of the UK |" (PDF). Unauk.org. Retrieved 20 February 2013.
[92] Has Iran Achieved a Nuclear Weapons Breakout Capability? Not Yet, But Soon. Nonproliferation for Global
Security Foundation. December 2008. Retrieved 25 June
2013.
[96] Mearsheimer, John (2006). Conversations in International Relations: Interview with John J. Mearsheimer
(Part I)" (PDF). International Relations 20 (1): 105123.
doi:10.1177/0047117806060939. See page 116
[97] Doomsday: On The Brink, The Learning Channel, 1997
[81] Prospects for Further Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [98] Iranian president: No 'nuclear apartheid', CNN
(PDF). Special National Intelligence Estimate. CIA. 23
August 1974. p. 40. SNIE 4-1-74. Retrieved 20 January [99] Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Com2008.
mitments, Bureau of Verication and Compliance, U.S.
Department of State, 30 August 2005
[82] National Security Decision Memorandum 276. United
States National Security Council. 15 October 1974. Re[100] UN Security Council Resolution 1737
trieved 15 March 2007.
[101] Against Nuclear Apartheid, Jaswant Singh
[83] National Security Directive 61 (PDF). The White
House. 2 July 1991. Retrieved 15 March 2007.
[102] Options, Mike Moore, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
[84] Dan Plesch (March 2006). The Future of Britains
WMD (PDF). Foreign Policy Centre. p. 15. Retrieved
15 March 2007.
[85] Ministry of Defence and Property Services Agency: Control and Management of the Trident Programme. National
Audit Oce. 29 June 1987. para. 1.1, 3.27, A4.4. ISBN
0-10-202788-9.
[86] Stockpile Stewardship Plan: Second Annual Update (FY
1999)" (PDF). U.S. Department of Energy. April 1998.
Retrieved 15 March 2007.
83
Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center Publica- 3.2.1 Chemical weapon details, per nation
tions from Harvard faculty and fellows on nuclear
Albania
proliferation.
Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament or CND, is a Main article: Albania and weapons of mass destruction
UK-based non-proliferation movement based in the
UK which advocates a complete ban on all nuclear Albania, as a party to the Chemical Weapons Convenweaponry.
tion, declared in March 2003 a stockpile of 16 tons of
chemical agents. On July 11, 2007, with the help of
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace's Non- the U.S. government's NunnLugar Cooperative Threat
proliferation Website
Reduction program, the Ministry of Defence announced
successful destruction of the entire stockpile.
Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation
Council for a Livable World
Federation of American Scientists
Angola
Angola has been accused of using chemical weapons in
its civil war.* [3]
Cuba
According to a United Nations nding which cited suspicious residue aecting plant and animal life during the
Cuban intervention in Angola, sarin and VX had been deployed against Angolan militants by the Cuban Army.* [5]
Egypt
Egypt has not signed the Chemical Weapons Convention
and has long appeared on various lists as having an oensive chemical weapons capability, and is thought to possess production facilities for sarin, VX, mustard gas, and
phosgene. Additionally, it is possible that Egypt may possess limited stockpiles of chemical bombs, rockets and
shells.
The reasons for this belief are several:
Egypt is known to have employed mustard gas in the
Yemeni civil war from 1963 to 1967.
84
CHAPTER 3. PROLIFERATION
Iran
As of December 2004, Israel has signed but not ratied the Chemical Weapons Convention, and according
to the Russian Federation Foreign Intelligence Service,
Israel has signicant stores of chemical weapons of its
own manufacture. It possesses a highly developed chemical and petrochemical industry, skilled specialists, and
stocks of source material, and is capable of producing
According to the Center for Strategic and International several nerve, blister and incapacitating agents.
Studies, Iran currently maintains at least two major facil- In 1974, in a hearing before the U.S. Senate Armed Serities for the research and production of chemical weapon vices Committee, General Almquist stated that Israel had
agents. Iran began its production of nerve agents no later an oensive chemical weapons capability.
than 1994.
In 1992, El Al Flight 1862 bound for Tel Aviv crashed
Near the end of the IranIraq War, Iran is supposed to
have made limited use of chemical weapons, and since
that time has been steadily building stockpiles of cyanide
(cyanogen chloride), phosgene, and mustard gas. The
delivery vehicles Iran possesses includes artillery shells,
mortars, rockets, and aerial bombs.
Iran signed the Chemical Weapons Convention on January 13, 1993 and ratied it on November 3, 1997, and
denies allegations of having clandestine CW program in
violation of CWC. In the ocial declaration submitted to
OPCW Iranian government admitted that it had produced
mustard gas in 1980s but that ceased the oensive program and destroyed the stockpiles of operational weapons
after the end of war with Iraq.* [8]
outside Amsterdam. In the course of the crash investigation, it was revealed that amongst the plane's cargo
was fty gallons of dimethyl methylphosphonate, a chemical that can be used in the production of the nerve
agent sarin. The dimethyl methylphosphonate was bound
for the Israel Institute for Biological Research in Ness
Ziona, a top secret military installation outside Tel Aviv
that was also responsible for producing the poison used
85
Myanmar (Burma)
Intelligence regarding Myanmar's chemical weapon status is mixed, and sometimes contradictory. In the late
1990s, US naval intelligence identied Myanmar (then
referred to as Burma) as developing chemical weapons
capabilities. Later, other ocials contridicted that statement, claiming that the evidence supporting Burma's
chemical stockpile development was primarily based
upon circumstantial evidence.* [12] However, in 1991, in
testimony before the Subcommittee on Seapower, Strategic and Critical Materials in 1991, US Navy Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks identied Myanmar as a probable
chemical weapons possessor.
The 1993 the U.S. Congress Oce of Technology Assessment WMD proliferation assessment recorded Israel
as a country generally reported as having undeclared offensive chemical warfare capabilities.
86
CHAPTER 3. PROLIFERATION
See also Naela Chohan, First woman and civilian to head is thought that South Korea is the state partyreferred
the National Authority on the Implementation of the to in Chemical Weapons Convention materials. There
Chemical Weapons Convention in Pakistan.
are reports that South Korea is operating a secret facility
in Yeongdong County, Chungcheongbuk-do Province for
the destruction of chemical agents.
Russia
Russia has destroyed about 25,000 metric tons of chemical weapons, or 62 percent of its 40,000-ton stockpile
as of April 29, 2012 - the deadline set by the Chemical Weapons Convention for complete arsenal destruction. Russia has already postponed the completion until
2015, but expects 2020 to be more realistic.* [19]
Serbia and Montenegro
Sudan
Some past reports of uncertain credibility indicated that
Sudan may have used chemical weapons against the rebels
in the southern part of this country. Sudan accessed to
CWC in 1999 and did not declare any oensive CW program. U.S. Department of State claims that it lacks sucient evidence to determine whether Sudan is engaged in
activities prohibited by CWC.* [20]
The former Yugoslavia is known to have produced a variety of chemical weapons (CW). The majority of stockpiled CW is believed to have been inherited by its successor, Serbia.
Syria
Reports indicate that the former Yugoslavia's Army produced large quantities of sarin (50 tons), sulfur mustard, Main articles: Syria and weapons of mass destruction
phosgene, the incapacitant BZ (allegedly a stockpile of and Syria chemical weapons program
300 tons), and tear gas. At least four chemical warfare
production facilities have been identied in Serbia: Prva On September 14, 2013, the United States and Russia anIskra in Baric; Miloje Blagojevic in Lucani; and Milojie nounced an agreement that would lead to the elimination
Zakic and Merima in Krusevic. While the Trajal plant of Syria's chemical weapon stockpiles by mid-2014.* [21]
in Krusevic has been shut down, serious questions exist Syria ocially acceded to the CWC on October 14,* [22]
about accounting and previous production and storage of but has yet to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It
chemical materials there, as well the lack of accounting is believed Syria rst received chemical weapons in 1973
on the other three sites.
from Egypt in the form of artillery shells. Since then it
Yugoslavia used its CW technologies to develop chemical
munitions for Iraq prior to the rst Gulf War in theLittle
Hawkprogram and chemical munitions for the Orkan
MLRS system under the KOL15program. There
have been allegations that CW were used in the area of
the former Yugoslavia: both Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian
Croats alleged that Bosnian government forces used chlorine during the conict in Bosnia; Bosnian Serbs allegedly
used BZ against Moslem refugees in July 1995; and the
FRY Army may have used BZ against Kosovo Albanians in 1999. Mysterious deaths during the 1999 NATO
bombings of suspected chemical facilities have also been
attributed to CW production.
Taiwan
87
Vietnam
3.2.2
See also
3.2.3
References
[1] SIGNATORY STATES. Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. OPCW. 2 September 2013.
[2] Myanmar Joins Chemical Weapons Convention.
OPCW. 9 July 2015.
[3] Pothuraju, Babjee (JulyDecember 2012). Chemical
Weapons Prole of Angola. Institute for Defence Studies
and Analyses. Retrieved 2013-09-14.
[4] NTI Research Library: country prole: China
[5] Hawk, Kathleen Dupes; Villella, Ron; Varona, Adolfo
Leyva de (30 July 2014). Florida and the Mariel Boatlift
of 1980: The First Twenty Days. University of Alabama
Press. ISBN 978-0817318376. Retrieved 11 October
2014.
[6] NTI Research Library: country prole: Egypt - chemical
weapons
[7] India destroys its chemical weapons stockpile.
[8] Iranian Use of Chemical Weapons: A Critical Analysis of
Past Allegations
[9] NTI country prole - Israel
[10] NTI country prole - Israel (chemical weapons).
[11] United Nations General Assembly Session 45 Document
179.A/45/179 page 2. 23 March 1990. Retrieved 200711-16.
[12] Report of the Henry L. Stimson Center, Chemical Weapons Proliferation Concerns; found online
at http://www.stimson.org/cbw/?SN=CB20011220137#
myanmar (accessed 20 March 2008).
3.2.4 Resources
National Counterproliferation Center - Oce of the
Director of National Intelligence
Economist. (May 2, 1997). Chemical Weapons.
Just Checking,The Economist 347, p. 42.
Mahnaimi, Uzi (Oct., 1998). Israeli Jets Equipped
For Chemical Warfare. London Sunday Times
Monterey Institute of International Studies. (Apr 9,
2002). Chemical and Biological Weapons: Possession and Programs Past and Present. Retrieved Dec.
21, 2004.
Senate Armed Services Committee, FY 1975 Authorization Hearing, Part 5, March 7, 1974
Shoham, Dany. (1998). Chemical and Biological
Weapons in Egypt. The Nonproliferation Review 5
(Spring-Summer 1998), 4858.
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute's
research on disarmament, arms control and nonproliferation * [1]
Russian Biological and Chemical Weapons, a useful page about non-state weapons transfers with a
lot of links to information from CRS, the GAO and
NGOs.
[1] http://www.sipri.org/research/disarmament
88
CHAPTER 3. PROLIFERATION
3.3.1
Argentina
Alacrn
3.3.5 China
See also entries under #Taiwan.
3.3.2
Australia
Ikara
Malkara (joint Australian/British)
Nulka active missile decoy designed to seduce antiship missiles away from their targets
3.3.7 France
AASM
Aerospatiale AS-12
Apache
AS.30
3.3.3
Brazil
A-Darter Fifth generation short range infrared homing air-to-air missile (joint South Africa/Brazil)
FOG-MPM Fiber Optics Guided Multiple Purpose
Missile.
AVMT-300 GPS and/or laser-guided long range
missile
ASMP
Crotale surface-to-air missile
ENTAC
ERYX (joint French/Canadian)
HOT (Franco-German) anti-tank missile
Exocet
89
Hads (cancelled)
M5
M45
M51
Magic
Meteor
MICA
Pluton
AGM Armiger
Matra R530
IRIS-T
Super 530
IRIS-T SL
ROLAND 2
many/France)
surface-to-air
missile
(Ger-
Scalp EG (Uk-French-Italy)
Nord SS.10
Aerospatiale AS.11/SS.11
Nord SS.12
3.3.8
Germany
IDAS (missile)
PARS 3 LR
RBS-15 (Sweden/Germany)
GMLRS
MEADS
RIM-116 RAM
LFK NG
MBDA Meteor (Multinational)
HOT (Franco German) anti-tank missile
MILAN
German missiles of WW2
V-1 ying bomb
V-2 rocket
Enzian missile
Wasserfall missile
Rheinbote
Rheintochter
ESSM
Henschel Hs 293
EuroSpike (Israel/Germany)
Fritz X
SM-2 IIIA
Feuerlilie
90
CHAPTER 3. PROLIFERATION
3.3.9
India
Ashwin Ballistic Missile Interceptor : Ballistic Missile interceptor / anti aircraft missile (Range = 150
km+).
Iran
Toophan 1
Brahmos
Toophan 2
Toophan 5
Saeghe 1-2
I-RAAD & I-RAAD-T
Fateh-110
91
Qiam 1
Shahab-1
Shahab-2
Shahab-3 B,C,D
Shahab-4
Shahab-5
Shahab-6
Ghadr-110
Ghadr-111
Sayyad, upgraded copy of HQ-2, Sayyad-1A has IR
tracking.
Shahin I & II, Reverse engineer of MIM-23 Hawk.
Hoot
Fajr-2
Saegheh
Fajr-3, MIRV
Zelzal-1
Fajr-5
Zelzal-2
Zelzal-3
Tondar-69
Ashoura
Oghab
Sejjil 1, 2
Samid
Nasr-1
92
3.3.11
CHAPTER 3. PROLIFERATION
Iraq
3.3.13 Japan
Al-Samoud 2
Ababil-100
Al Fahd 300
Al Fahd 500
Al Hussein
AAM-4B
Al Hijarah
Al Abbas
AAM-5B (Development)
Badr 2000
Project 144
Tammuz-1
Al Abid
Scud
3.3.12
ASM-2B
Israel
93
3.3.14
North Korea
Shaheen I
3.3.15
Norway
Ghauri II
Shaheen II
Shaheen-III
Ghaznavi
3.3.16
Pakistan
Abdali-II
Dongfeng
Hatf-I/IA
Abdali-I
Nasr (Hatf-IX)
H-2 SOW
By Russian designation
The NATO reporting name of each missile is shown in
parentheses behind the proper name.
94
3.3.20
CHAPTER 3. PROLIFERATION
South Africa
RSA Series
RSA-1 (Variant of the Jericho II second stage for
use as a mobile missile)* [3]
RSA-2 (Variant of the Jericho II)* [4]
RSA-3 (Variant of the Shavit)* [5]
RSA-4 (Upper stages of the Shavit with a heavy rst
stage)* [6]
3.3.22 Taiwan
See also entries under #China.
Hsiung Feng I (HF-1) (ship-to-ship)
Hsiung Feng II (HF-2) (guided multiplatform antiship)
Hsiung Feng IIE (HF-2E) (land attack cruise missile
variant of HF-2)
Hsiung Feng III (HF-3) (antiship and/or land attack
cruise missile)
Sky Bow I (TK-1) (SAM)
Other
A-Darter
R-Darter
ZT3 Ingwe
Mokopa
MUPSOW
Torgos Air-Launched Cruise Missile
Umkhonto
(Above missiles made by Denel Dynamics)
3.3.23 Turkey
HGK (bomb)
Mzrak-U
Mzrak-O
Roketsan Cirit
SOM (missile)
T-LORAMIDS
3.3.21
Sweden
RBS-15
RB 04
Rb 05
RBS 70
J-600T Yldrm
RBS 23
Blue Streak
KEPD 350
BILL 1
BILL 2
Bantam
95
Fire Shadow
Firestreak Air-to-air
Green Cheese
Sequence Numbers:
Javelin Surface-to-air
Air Force: Consecutive numerical sequence for each missile mission type.
Sea Eagle
Sea Skua
Sea Slug Surface-to-air
During this timeframe, the U.S. Air Force treated missiles as pilotless aircraft.* [9]
Thunderbird
Tigercat
3.3.25
United States
96
CHAPTER 3. PROLIFERATION
LBP-1 Glomb
M13 Shillelagh
LBT-1 Glomb
XM14 Pershing
M15 Sergeant
M16 Hawk
M18 Hawk
XM19 Pershing
United States Army Designation System 1941 - The list of undesignated United States missiles sorted al1947* [9]
phabetically:
The list of missiles sorted by ascending Army 1941-1947 1 Australian target missile briey used by the United
designations.
States Navy.
2
JB-1 Bat
JB-2 Doodle Bug
JB-3 Tiamet
JB-4 Project MX-607
JB-5 Project MX-595
X-7
JB-8 GAPA
X-8
X-9 Shrike
JB-10 Bat
X-10
X-11
X-12
X-17
X-41
X-42
X-43 Hyper-X
X-51
M3 Hawk
M4 Lacrosse
M6 Nike-Hercules
M8 Redstone
M9 Redstone
3.3.27
References
97
Chapter 4
Countries
4.1 Albania
Albania once possessed a stockpile of weapons of mass
destruction. This stockpile of chemical weapons included 16,678 kilograms (36,769 lb) of mustard agent,
lewisite, adamsite, and chloroacetophenone.
Albania was among the initial countries who signed the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1993.* [1] The
treaty, which came into force in 1997, requires the declaration of chemical stockpiles, and the destruction of all
chemical weapons, delivery systems and production facilities. One of only six nations to declare a stockpile,
Albania made its declaration in March 2003,* [2] after
the discovery, in December 2002, of 600 bulk containers
of chemicals in an abandoned bunker. The material was
probably acquired by Communist leader Enver Hoxha in
the mid-1970s from China although no documentation
was found.* [3]
98
4.3. ARGENTINA
99
4.2 Algeria
4.3 Argentina
Argentina has a history with the development of
weapons of mass destruction. Under the National Reorganization Process, Argentina began a nuclear weapons
program in the early 1980s, but this was abolished when
democracy was restored in 1983.
100
4.3.4
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
See also
Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Australia has advanced research programs in
immunology, microbiology and genetic engineering
Control of Nuclear Materials
that support an industry providing world class vaccines
for domestic use and export.* [2] It also has an extensive
Brazilian nuclear weapons program
wine industry and produces microorganisms on an
industrial scale to support other industries including
agriculture, food technology and brewing. The dual-use
4.3.5 References
nature of these facilities mean that Australia, like any
country with advanced biotechnological industries,
[1] National Geographic. August 1986. p.243.
could easily produce biological warfare agents. Some
disease research laboratories in Australia own strains of
[2] Promete Garr que se construir un submarino nuclear en
the Ebola virus. The Australian Microbial Resources
el pas (Spanish)
Research Network lists 37 culture collections, many
of which hold samples of pathogenic organisms for
[3] La oposicin, entre las duras crticas y la irona (Spanish)
legitimate research purposes.* [3]
[4] The Israel-Argentina Yellowcake Connection. National Security Archive (George Washington University).
25 June 2013. Retrieved 6 August 2013.
History
4.4 Australia
Minister Robert Menzies was more interested in trying to acquire nuclear weapons.* [4] Australia signed the
Biological Weapons Convention on 10 April 1972 and deposited a certicate of ratication on 5 October 1977.* [6]
4.4. AUSTRALIA
An observer examining an unexploded 25 pound gas shell following a trial of gas weapons at Singleton, New South Wales in
1943.
101
recorded although there were many trials using 'live' weapons, both for international prestige and because of
chemical weapons (such as shown in the picture to the the small size of the country's military. While Scherger's
British and American counterparts were encouraging, the
right).
Macmillan and Eisenhower governments were not. Prime
After World War II, the chemical weapons were disposed
Minister Robert Menzies' government decided that doof by burning, venting (for phosgene) or by dumping
mestic production would be too dicult due to cost and
at sea. Some 21,030 tons of chemical weapons were
international politics.* [12]
dumped in the seas o Australia near Brisbane, Sydney
and Melbourne. This has been covered in a Defence Australia hosted British nuclear testing in Monte Bello Isreport by Geo Plunkett. A complete history of Aus- lands (Operation Hurricane), Emu Field and Maralinga
tralia's involvement with chemical weapons - titled Chem- between 1952 and 1963. Maralinga was developed as
*
ical Warfare in Australia - has been published in book a joint facility with a shared funding arrangement. [13]
form by the Army History Unit (Defence Department) in During the 1950s, Australia participated in the develop2013 (2nd Edn) Again it is authored by Geo Plunkett . ment of the Blue Streak missile, a Medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) intended for delivery of a nuclear
A stockpile of 1,000 pound phosgene bombs was discovwarhead. The Australian HIFAR nuclear reactor at Luered at Embi Aireld in 1970 and disposed of by Auscas Heights, Sydney, operated from 1958 to 2006 and has
tralian Army personnel, and, up to 1990, drums of musnow been replaced by the OPAL reactor in 2006.
tard gas were still being discovered in the bush where
they had been tested.* [7] Another stockpile of chemi- The new reactor is designed to use low-enriched uranium
*
cal weapons was discovered at Maxwelton, Queensland in fuel and an open pool light water system. [14] Australia
1989.* [4] Australia signed the Chemical Weapons Con- has substantial deposits of uranium which account for
*
vention in January 1993 and ratied it with the Chemical 30% of the world's known reserves. [15] Until 1996 government policy restricted exploitation of uranium deWeapons (Prohibition) Act in 1994.* [7]
posits to three established mines. A fourth site at Four
Mile uranium mine was approved in July 2009.* [16] Current policy is to develop the export potential of Australia's
4.4.3 Nuclear weapons
uranium industry by allowing mining and export of uraAustralia does not have nuclear weapons and is not nium under strict international agreements designed to
thought to be seeking to develop them, although several prevent nuclear proliferation.* [17]
federal governments have investigated the idea and may Although the RAAF continued to occasionally investihave done some research into the question.* [8] Australia gate obtaining nuclear weapons during the 1960s,* [12]
investigated acquiring tactical nuclear weapons from the Australia signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
United Kingdom or the United States as early as 1956 on 27 February 1970 and ratied the treaty on 23
when Athol Townley, Minister for Air, wrote to Philip January 1973.* [18] Sir Philip Baxter rst head of the
McBride, Minister for Defence, recommending the ac- Australian Atomic Energy Commission (AAEC), now
quisition of tactical nuclear weapons to arm Australia's the Australian Nuclear Science and Technology OrEnglish Electric Canberra bombers and CAC Sabre ght- ganisation (ANSTO) and rst Vice Chancellor of the
ers.* [9]* [10]* [11]
University of New South Wales openly advocated AusAir Chief Marshal Frederick Scherger and Minister tralia acquiring a weapons grade plutonium stockpile and
for Air Athol Townley supported acquiring nuclear thus nuclear weapons.* [19]
102
During the 1970s and 1980s, ANSTO scientists developed centrifuge enrichment technology, claimed to be
comparable with the commercial URENCO centrifuge
technology of the time. Such technology, if deployed
on an industrial scale, would have been capable in principle of producing highly enriched uranium for nuclear
weapons. The research lost government funding in the
mid-1980s.* [20]
A commercial-scale enrichment plant would also be capable of producing sucient highly enriched uranium
for a nuclear weapons program. An Australian company
has been actively developing a novel process for uranium
enrichment, Separation of Isotopes by Laser Excitation
(SILEX).* [21]
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
As part of Air Sta Requirement (Operational Requirement/Air) 36 for bomber aircraft in the 1950s, the Royal
Australian Air Force specied a requirement foran offensive tactical strike capabilityand strategic defence
of Australiawith targetsas far north as the Kra Peninsula". The bomber was required to have a range of not
less than 4,000 nautical miles (7,400 km) and be capable
of carrying at least 20,000 pounds (9,100 kg) of conventional bombs or one BLUE DANUBE nuclear weapon
(which had been air dropped at Maralinga on 11 October
1956).* [24] Locally manufactured versions of the Avro
Vulcan or Handley Page Victor nuclear bombers were
some of the options considered.
The then Prime Minister of Australia, John Howard, be- 4.4.4 References
gan a study in 2006 into the issues surrounding an increase in Australia's uranium usage.* [22] Amongst the [1] The Australia Group : An Introduction. The Australia
Group. Archived from the original on 20 February 2006.
topics of the study will be a domestic uranium enrichment
Retrieved 18 April 2006.
plant for supplying low-enriched fuel for nuclear power
reactors, either domestic or foreign.
[2] Biotechnology capability overview.
Austrade.
Delivery platforms
An Australian F-111
4.5. BRAZIL
103
ended, and Brazil is considered free of weapons of mass
destruction.* [8]
Brazil is one of several countries that have forsworn
nuclear weapons under the terms of the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty* [9] but possess the key technologies
needed to produce nuclear weapons.* [7]* [10]* [11]* [12]
[20] Andrew Fowler; Renata Gombac (15 June 2007). Uranium enrichment program revived after 20 years (program transcript). The 7.30 Report (Australian Broadcasting Corporation). Retrieved 7 July 2007.
[21] Silex. Archived from the original on 4 May 2006.
Retrieved 18 April 2006.
[22] Australia in nuclear power review. BBC. 6 June 2006.
Retrieved 24 June 2006.
[23] 50th Anniversary of the ANZUS Treaty. United States
Australian Embassy. Archived from the original on 17
July 2006. Retrieved 24 June 2006.
[24] National Archives of Australia, Department of Defence;
A1945 1/501/694 PART 1 Royal Australian Air Force.
Air sta requirement (Operational Requirement/Air 36).
Bomber aircraft., 1954 - 1958
In 1990, President Fernando Collor de Mello symbolically closed the Cachimbo test site, in Par, and exposed the militarys secret plan to develop a nuclear
weapon.* [1] Brazil's National Congress opened an investigation into the Parallel Program.* [2] Congress members visited numerous facilities, including the Institute of
Advanced Studies (IEAv) in So Jos dos Campos.* [2]
They also interviewed key players in the nuclear program, such as former President Joo Figueiredo and retired Army General Danilo Venturini, the former head
of the National Security Council under Figueiredo.* [2]
The congressional investigation exposed secret bank accounts, code-namedDelta, which were managed by the
National Nuclear Energy Commission and used for funding the program.* [2] The congressional report revealed
that the IEAv had designed two atomic bomb devices, one
with a yield of twenty to thirty kilotons and a second with
a yield of twelve kilotons.* [2] The same report revealed
that Brazil's military regime secretly exported eight tons
of uranium to Iraq in 1981.* [2]* [13]
In 1991, Brazil and Argentina renounced their nuclear rivalry.* [1] On 13 December 1991, they signed the Quadri4.4.5 Further reading
partite agreement, at the IAEA headquarters, creating the
BrazilianArgentine Agency for Accounting and Con Plunkett, Geo (2013). Chemical Warfare in Aus- trol of Nuclear Materials and allowing fullscope IAEA
tralia: Australia's Involvement in Chemical Warfare safeguards of Argentine and Brazilian nuclear installa1914 Today (2nd ed.). Leech Cup Books. ISBN tions.* [1]
9780987427908.
Brazil ocially opened the Resende enrichment plant in
May 2006.* [14] Brazil's enrichment technology development, and the plant itself, involved substantial discussions
4.5 Brazil
with the IAEA and its constituent nations. The dispute
came down to whether IAEA inspectors would be allowed
In the 1970s and 80s, during the military regime, to inspect the machines themselves. The Brazilian govBrazil had a secret program intended to develop nuclear ernment did not allow the inspection of the centrifugal
weapons.* [1]* [2]* [3]* [4]* [5]* [6]* [7] The program was cascade halls, arguing that this would reveal technologdismantled in 1990, ve years after the military regime ical secrets (probably relating to the use of a magnetic
104
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
lower bearing in place of the more common mechani- Cachimbo Test Site
cal bearing).* [15] The Brazilian authorities stated that,
as Brazil is not part of any "axis of evil", the pressure for Main article: Campo de Provas Brigadeiro Velloso
full access to inspection - even in universities - could be
construed as an attempt to pirate industrial secrets.* [16]
91817S 545647W / 9.3047S 54.9464W
They also claimed that their technology is better than
that of the United States and France, mainly because the
centrifugal axis is not mechanical, but electromagnetic.
Eventually, after extensive negotiations, agreement was
reached that while not directly inspecting the centrifuges,
the IAEA would inspect the composition of the gas entering and leaving the centrifuge. Then U.S. Secretary of
State, Colin Powell, stated in 2004 that he was sure that
Brazil had no plans to develop nuclear weapons.* [17]
4.5.2
Technological capability
It is likely that Brazil has retained the technological capacity and knowhow to produce and deliver a nuclear
weapon.* [7] Experts at the Los Alamos National Laboratory have concluded that in view of its previous nuclear activities, Brazil is in a position to produce nuclear
weapons within three years.* [18] If Brazil decided to pursue a nuclear weapon, the centrifuges at the Resende enrichment plant could be recongured to produce highly
enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. Even a small enrichment plant like Resende could produce several nuclear weapons per year, but only if Brazil was willing to
do so openly.* [10]* [15]* [19]
The Cachimbo test site, ocially named Brigadeiro Velloso Test Site (Portuguese: Campo de Provas Brigadeiro
Velloso), is located in the State of Par and covers 45,000
square kilometres, an area larger than the Netherlands. It
is within this military area that a 320 meters-deep hole at
the Cachimbo Mountain Range was site for nuclear explosives tests. The shaft has been public knowledge since
1986 and was allegedly abandoned in September 1990,
when President Fernando Collor de Mello used a small
The Brazilian Navy is currently developing a nuclear sub- shovel to symbolically seal up the hole.* [23]
marine eet, and in 2007 authorised the construction of
a prototype submarine propulsion reactor.* [20] In 2008,
France agreed to transfer technology to Brazil for the Army's Technology Center (Guaratiba)
joint development of the nuclear submarine hull.* [21]
230045S 433350W / 23.0124S 43.5639W
4.5.3
Facilities
The Army's Technology Center (Portuguese: Centro Tecnolgico do Exrcito, or CTEx) located in Guaratiba
in the State of Rio de Janeiro is the site of the
plutonium-producing reactor facility, known as 'The Atlantic Project', managed by the Brazilian Army's Special
Projects Institute IPE. Reports indicate that the gasgraphite reactor would be capable of producing plutonium for atomic bombs.* [24]
4.5. BRAZIL
Resende (Engenheiro Passos) Nuclear Fuel Factory
Main article: Resende Nuclear Fuel Factory
223014S 443846W / 22.504S 44.646W
The Resende Nuclear Fuel Facility (Portuguese: Fbrica
de Combustveis Nucleares, or FCN) is a nuclear enrichment facility located in Resende, in the State of Rio de
Janeiro. The plant is managed by the Nuclear Industries of Brazil (Portuguese: Indstrias Nucleares do Brasil, or INB) and by the Brazilian Navy. Currently the plant
produces enough HEU for 26 to 31 implosion type warheads.* [26]* [27]
4.5.4
105
Retrieved on 2010-10-06.
4.5.5
See also
4.5.6
[18] Brazil and the Bomb German Council on Foreign Relations. Retrieved on 2011-10-23.
[19] Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD): Resende Nuclear
Fuel Factory (FCN) Globalsecurity.org. Retrieved on
2010-10-06.
[20] Sarah Diehl and Eduardo Fujii (March 2008), Brazils
Pursuit of a Nuclear Submarine Raises Proliferation Concerns, WMD Insights, archived from the original on 200805-09, retrieved 2008-03-27
[21] Paul D. Taylor (June 2009).Why Does Brazil Need Nuclear Submarines?". Proceedings Magazine (U.S. Naval
Institute) 135 (6). Retrieved 26 October 2011.
Re-
Re-
106
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
4.6 Bulgaria
[27] INB Activities on the Nuclear Fuel Cycle Americas Nuclear Energy Symposiums. Retrieved on 2010-10-06.
[28] Constitution of Brazil: Article 21; XXIII; a V-Brazil. Retrieved on 2009-09-06.
4.5.7
External links
Ocial sites
Indstrias Nucleares do Brasil Brazilian Nuclear Industries (English)
Scientic sites
4.7. BURMA
107
missiles.* [5] The site consisted of four three-storey [7] FOREIGN MINISTRY: THERE ARE NO NUCLEAR
WEAPONS IN BULGARIA. Novinite. 6 December
apartment blocks, barracks, a cafeteria, a sports eld,
2001. Retrieved 24 March 2013.
a social club, a store, and a plaza, and had 130 personnel. The unit was disbanded in 1989, the warheads
[8]
were quickly shipped to Ukraine and all equipment, uni "", Dnevnik, 12 May 2011
forms and photos that were present at the facility were
destroyed. Another Russian Army ocial later denied [9] Nuclear Scientic and Experimental Centre
the story.* [5] However, in the 1980s four Bulgarian Air
Force majors received training in the Soviet Union on re- [10] (in bulgarian)
leasing nuclear weapons from MiG-29BN aircraft.* [6]
In 2001 the Bulgarian Foreign Ministry denied thepresenceof nuclear weapons in Bulgaria.* [7]
4.6.7
The country has the potential to establish a military nuclear program, having a nuclear powerplant at Kozloduy
with its own plutonium storage facility.* [8] A nuclear
research facility with a 200 kW pool-type reactor is in
operation in Soa.* [9] The reactor of the facility produces some nuclear material, which is stored near Novi
Khan.* [10]
As part of its eorts to safeguard potentially weaponsusable atomic material, the United Nations nuclear
watchdog assisted Bulgaria with the removal of highly
enriched uranium stored at the shut-down research reactor in Soa. The substance, which was 36% enriched
and took the form of fresh fuel, was airlifted in December 2003 to Russia, the original supplier, according to
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Agency
safeguards inspectors monitored and veried the packaging of the fuel, which Moscow says it will re-fabricate into
low-enriched uranium.* [1]
4.6.5
4.7 Burma
Burma (Myanmar) is widely suspected to have initiated
a nuclear weapons programme.* [1] If such a program
does exist, Burma's technical and nancial limitations
may make it dicult for the program to succeed.* [2]
Burma has faced persistent accusations of using chemical
weapons; however, the NTI has stated there is no evidence to suggest that Myanmar has a chemical weapons
program.Burma is a member of nuclear, but not chemical or biological, non-proliferation treaties.* [3]
See also
Military of Bulgaria
4.6.6
External links
References
108
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
Sai Thein Win, a former major in the military of Myanmar.* [15]* [16] A UN report said there was evidence that
North Korea had been exporting nuclear technology to
Burma, Iran and Syria.* [17]
Based on Win's evidence, Robert Kelley, a former
weapons inspector, said he believed Burma has the intent to go nuclear and it is... expending huge resources
along the way.But as of 2010, experts said that Burma
was a long way from succeeding, given the poor quality
of their current materials.* [17] Despite Kelley's analysis,
some experts are uncertain that a nuclear weapons programme exists; for example, the Institute for Science and
International Security notes ambiguity as to whether certain equipment is used for uranium production, or for innocently producing rare earth metals or metals such as
titanium or vanadium.* [18] The U.S. expressed concern in 2011 about possible NPT violations, but by 2012
stated that its concerns had beenpartially allayed.* [19]
In January 2014 Unity Weekly, a Burmese magazine, reported that Burma was making chemical weapons. The
magazine claimed that the military had seized hundreds
of hectares of land to build a chemical weapons factory in Burma's Magway Region and quoted workers
at the factory who said it produced chemical weapons.
The magazine also claimed Chinese technicians were often seen around the factory. In response, the Burmese
government sentenced the head of Unity Weekly, along
with four Unity Weekly journalists, to 10 years in
prison and hard labor under colonial-era espionage laws.
The Burmese government claims the factory produces
military equipmentbut does not produce chemical
weapons.* [8]* [9]* [10] Security experts remain uncon- 4.7.3 Notes and references
vinced that the facility in Magway is being used to produce chemical weapons, but some, including prominent [1] , Sydney Morning Herald, August 24, 2009, Accessed
November 17, 2009.
journalist Bertil Lintner, suggest that the site is tied to
a secretive North Korean program to develop missile [2] Myanmar (Country Proles)". NTI. Archived from the
parts.* [11]
original on 2014-07-09. Retrieved 9 August 2014. Kelley
Burma signed the Chemical Weapons Convention in 1993
but has yet to ratify the agreement.
4.7.2
Nuclear weapons
further argued, however, that it would be extremely dicult for Myanmar, given its limited technical and nancial
capabilities, to develop nuclear weapons successfully.
[3] Myanmar (Country Proles)". NTI. Archived from the
original on 2014-07-09. Retrieved 26 October 2013.
[4] Chemical Arms; Navy Report Asserts Many Nations Seek
Or Have Poison Gas, New York Times, March 10, 1991,
Accessed August 9, 2009.
[5] Burmese junta uses chemical weapons , The Sunday
Times, May 8, 2005, Accessed August 9, 2009.
[6] Burma 'using chemical weapons', The Guardian, April 21,
2005, Accessed August 9, 2009.
[7] http://www.voanews.com/burmese/archive/2005-04/
2005-04-22-voa5.cfm?moddate=2005-04-22
[8] Report on chemical weapons earn Myanmar journalists
jail term with hard labour. Myanmar News.Net. Retrieved 11 July 2014.
[9] 10 years of hard labor: 'Back to square one' for Myanmar
press freedoms?". Retrieved 12 July 2014.
[10] Myanmar Court Sentences Journalists to Prison and
On June 3, 2010, a ve year investigation by an antiHard Labor. 10 July 2014. Retrieved 12 July 2014.
government Myanmar broadcaster, the Democratic Voice
Miliof Burma (DVB), found evidence that allegedly shows the [11] Arterbury, John (13 July 2014).
tary facility hides secrets from the world.
country's military regime begun a programme to develop
http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/investigation/
nuclear weapons.* [14] The DVB said evidence of Myan420248/military-facility-hides-secrets-from-the-world
mar's nuclear programme came from top-secret docu(Bangkok Post). Retrieved 19 September 2014.
ments smuggled out of the country over several years, including hundreds of les and other evidence provided by [12] Russia and Burma in nuclear deal. BBC 15 May 2007
4.8. CANADA
109
4.8 Canada
Canada has not maintained and positioned weapons of
mass destruction since 1984 as of 1998* [1] and has
signed treaties repudiating possession of them. Canada
ratied the Geneva Protocol in 1930 and the Nuclear
North American Warning Lines
Non-proliferation Treaty in 1970, but still sanctions contributions to American military programs.
Canadas military relationship with the United States
has grown signicantly since the Second World War.
Although the Dominion of Canada came into being on
4.8.1 Nuclear weapons
July 1, 1867, Canadian foreign policy was determined
in Britain. Canada entered the Great War in 1914 when
Introduction
Great Britain declared war on Germany and the AustriaWith the French emphasis on nuclear deterrence follow- Hungarian Empire. Canadian foreign policy became ining the Soviet Union's atom bomb test, Canadian coop- dependent in December 1931 with the passage of the
*
eration with the US required the alignment of Canadian Statute of Westminster. [4] In 1939 Canada declared war
doctrine with defensive elements of American nuclear on Germany a week later than Great Britain, on September 10, 1939.* [5] The United States did not enter the war
weapons doctrine.
until December 7, 1941.* [6]
The rst US nuclear weapon came to Canada in 1950
when the United States Air Force Strategic Air Command One of the rst formal agreements for military cooperastationed 11 model 1561 Fat Man atomic bombs at CFB tion was made in August 1940. Known as the Ogdensburg
Agreement, it established the Permanent Joint Board
Goose Bay, Newfoundland and Labrador.* [1]
on Defence.* [7] Both nations are founding members of
From 1963 to 1984, Canada elded a total of four tactical the United Nations* [8] as well as the North Atlantic
nuclear weapons systems which deployed several hundred Treaty Organization (NATO).* [9] They signed the NOnuclear warheads.* [2]
RAD Agreement in 1957 and created the North AmeriThroughout the Cold War, Canada was closely aligned can Air Defense Command* [10] to defend the continent
with defensive elements of United States programs in against attacks from the USSR.
110
In the 1942 Quebec Agreement, the United Kingdom and
the United States agreed to develop the "Tube Alloys"
Project and created a committee to manage the project
which included C. D. Howe, the Canadian Minister of
Munitions and Supply. This was the code name for the
British Uranium Committee project which had worked
on a theoretical design for an atomic bomb. One significant contribution was a calculation of the critical mass
of uranium. The mass was less than earlier estimates and
suggested that development of a ssion bomb was practical.* [11] Tube Alloyswas part of a shipment of the
most secret scientic research in Great Britain that was
sent to the United States for safekeeping when the threat
of German invasion was signicant. Materials included
the cavity magnetron which was essential to RADAR,
British information related to the German Enigma machines, Jet Engine designs as well as Tube Alloys.
Canada's only specic role in the Manhattan Project was
providing raw material, including uranium ore from a
northern mine which may have been used in the construction of the atom bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima
in 1945.* [12]* [13] Canada would continue to supply ssionable material to the US and other allies throughout
the Cold War although Canada never developed indigenous nuclear weapons as did NATO allies France and the
United Kingdom.* [14]
Canada was little more than just a third-party supplier
of rare materials, with a few exceptions. After briey
allowing nuclear weapons to be temporarily stationed in
Goose Bay, Labrador, Canada agreed to a long term lease
of the Goose Bay base to the US Strategic Air Command.* [15] The Americans were refused permission to
stockpile bomb casings for the B-36 at Goose Bay. These
bombs would have been armed in wartime with materials
brought from the United States. Goose Bay was used as
a base for air refueling tankers which were to support the
SAC B-47 and B-52 bomber forces.
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
more is due to the decline of the bomber threat and reductions in Canadian military spending.
Inventory of Canadas nuclear armaments
BCIM-10 OMARC; Warhead: W40 7-10 kiloton
MGR-1 Honest John; Warhead W7 8-61 kiloton
CF-104 Starghter; Warhead: B57 bomb 5-20 kilotons; B28 bomb 70-350 kt; B43 bomb 1 Mt
Voodoo weapons test; Combat Warhead: W25 1.5
kilotons
On New Year's Eve in 1963, the Royal Canadian Air
Force delivered a shipment of nuclear warheads to the
Bomarc missile site near RCAF Station North Bay.* [18]
The Government of Canada never publicly admitted to
the presence of nuclear weapons on Canadian bases in
Canada and Germany but their presence was common
knowledge at the time. It is generally understood that
the Bomarc missile warheads were delivered on this cold
(13 degrees Celsius) winter night when a group of
protesters stood down from a vigil at the gates of the missile site. It was said they assumed that the RCAF would
be unlikely to work on this traditional evening of celebration. The delivery was photographed by the press and this
revealed to the world that the delivery had taken place.
The warheads were never in the sole possession of
Canadian personnel. They were the property of the
Government of the United States and were always under
the direct supervision of aCustodial Detachmentfrom
the United States Air Force (or Army, in the case of Honest John warheads).
Through 1984, Canada would deploy four American designed nuclear weapons delivery systems accompanied by
In 1951 the Pinetree Line was established north of the hundreds of US-controlled warheads:
US-Canadian border, and in 1953 Canada built the Mid 56 CIM-10 BOMARC surface-to-air missiles.* [19]
Canada Air Warning Line, which was manned by the
*
Canadian military. [16] In 1954 the Distant Early Warn 4 MGR-1 Honest John rocket systems armed with
ing Line (DEW) was established jointly by the US and
a total of 16 W31 nuclear warheads the Canadian
*
Canada in the Arctic. [17] The Pinetree Line was built
Army
deployed in Germany.* [19]
to control the air battle between the NORAD interceptor forces and manned Soviet bombers. Beginning with
108 nuclear W25 Genie rockets carried by 54 CFGround-controlled interception updated from the Second
101 Voodoos.* [19]
World War, the system has been computerized and automated with at least four new generations of technology
estimates of 90 to 210 tactical (20-60 kiloton) nubeing employed. It was clear, even in the early years of
clear warheads assigned to 6 CF-104 Starghter
the Cold War, that on paper, Canada and the US were
squadrons (about 90 aircraft) based with NATO in
to be jointly responsible for the defence of the continent.
Europe (there is a lack of open sources detailing exIn execution, Canadian investment in air defence has deactly how many warheads were deployed).* [20]
creased signicantly with the decline of the intercontinental strategic bomber threat. In the 1950s the RCAF In practice, each of 36 NATO squadrons (initially six
contributed fourteen squadrons of CF-100 interceptors Canadian squadrons Number 1 Air Division RCAF)
and this was reduced to three squadrons of CF-101s by would provide two aircraft and pilots to a Quick Reaction
1970. Some of this is due to improved technology but Alert facility. The 'Q' aircraft could be launched with an
4.8. CANADA
armed US nuclear weapon within 15 minutes of receiving the 'go' order. This arrangement was called the NATO
Quick Reaction Alert Force. It provided a dispersed force
upwards of 100 strike aircraft for use on short notice.
Missions were targeted at troop concentrations, airelds,
bridges, assembly and choke points and other tactical targets in order to slow the massive tank formations of the
Red Army as they poured into the Fulda Gap and on towards the Rhine River.
111
representation.* [25]
The DEW Line and Pinetree Line radar systems formed
the backbone of continental air defence in the 1950s and
1960s. The most likely routes for Soviet aircraft attacking the United States came through Canada. In particular,
the Eastern Seaboard of the United States would be approached through the UK-Iceland-Greenland gap and a
line of search radars ran down the coast of Labrador and
on to Gander Newfoundland. These stations were supported by RCAF CF-101 interceptors at Bagotville Quebec and Chatham New Brunswick, as well as USAF F102 interceptors stationed at Stephenville Newfoundland
(Harmon Air Base). These were presumably equipped
with nuclear-armed AIM-26 Nuclear Falcon missiles as
this was a standard conguration on the F-102.
In total, there were between 250 and 450 nuclear warheads on Canadian bases between 1963 and 1972. There
were at most 108 Genie missiles armed with 1.5 kiloton W25 warheads present from 1973 to 1984. There
may have been fewer due to attrition of CF-101s as the
program aged and as incoming CF-18s became combatqualied.* [21] In addition, between 1968 and 1994 the Canada hosted no intercontinental strategic bombers but
United States stored the Mk 101 Lulu and B57 nuclear the Strategic Air Command base at Goose Bay Labrador
bombs at Naval Station Argentia, Newfoundland.* [22]
hosted a large number of KC-135 air refueling tankers.
This number decreased signicantly through the years as These were intended to top up the fuel tanks of the outvarious systems were withdrawn from service. The Hon- bound B-52 strike force headed for targets in the USSR.
est John was retired by the Canadian Army in 1970. The They also supported the SAC Airborne Alert Force and
Bomarc missile was phased out in 1972 and the CF-104 would have refueled any surviving bombers returning
Strike/Attack squadrons in West Germany were reduced from the USSR.
in number and reassigned to conventional ground attack
at about the same time. From late in 1972, the CF-101
interceptor force remained as the only nuclear-armed sys- Incineration without representation
tem in Canadian use until it was replaced by the CF-18
For the Canadian public, incineration without reprein 1984.* [23]
sentationled to a popular belief that the doctrine of
The CF-18 aircraft is equipped with the AIM-7, AIM- mutual assured destruction (MAD) was in Canadas best
9 and several more advanced air-to-air missiles. All of interest. MAD was the Cold War doctrine which held
these employ conventional warheads. These missiles are that as long as both the US and USSR possessed signimore reliable, accurate and have longer range than the cant nuclear arsenals, any nuclear war would assuredly denuclear-tipped, short-range and unguided Genie. They stroy both nations, thereby discouraging either state from
are also free of the encumbering security procedures and launching any nuclear oensive. For Canadians, MAD
considerable political baggage associated with nuclear was appealing in this light, as Canada was unlikely to
warheads.
emerge from any nuclear exchange unscathed given its
position between the two countries, as any weapons shot
down or falling short were likely to fall on Canadian soil.
Cold War relationship with the US
In Prime Minister Pierre Trudeaus 1971 Defence White
Paper, this dynamic was noted:
Canadas Cold War military doctrine and fate was inextricably tied with that of the United States. The two
One of the most important changes in internations shared responsibility for continental air defence
national aairs in recent years had been the inthrough NORAD (North American Air Defense Comcrease in stability of nuclear deterrence, and
mand) and both belonged to NATO and contributed
the emergence of what is, in eect, nuclear
forces in Europe. Should nuclear war with the USSR have
parity between the United States and the Soviet
broken out, Canada would have been crippled. Prime
Union. Each side now has sucient nuclear
Minister Brian Mulroneys 1987 Canadian White Paper
strength to assure devastating retaliation in the
on Defence acknowledged this reality citing that, Soevent of a surprise attack by the other, and thus
viet strategic planners must regard Canada and the United
neither could rationally consider launching a
States as a single set of military targets no matter what
*
deliberate attack.* [26]
political posture we might assume. [24] This sums up
Canadas Cold War predicament well, as Canadas
geo-political relationship with the US meant that Canada Even as late as 1987, Prime Minister Mulroneys Dewould inevitably be widely devastated by any US-Soviet fence White Paper acknowledged that,each superpower
nuclear exchange - whether it was targeted or not. It led now has the capacity to obliterate the other,the structo a familiar phrase of the time, incineration without ture of mutual deterrence today is eective and stable.
112
The Government believes that it must remain so.* [27]
Given the prospect of incineration without representation, Canadians seemed to feel that the doctrine which
most encouraged restraint was the strategically soundest
one to support.
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
Canada allowed for forward deployment of US bombers
and participated actively and extensively in the NORAD
program; as well, Canada cooperated with the US when
it came to research, early warning, surveillance and communications.* [31] Canada was second only to West Germany in hosting nuclear related facilities.* [32] In short,
the Canadian Government was thoroughly committed to
supporting US nuclear doctrine and deployments through
the Cold War, in spite of any popular reservations concerning this dynamic.
During both World War I and World War II, Canada was
a major producer and developer of chemical weapons
for the Allied war eort. These were used in combat in
World War I, but not in World War II. Human experimentation was carried out during World War II, with CFB
Sueld becoming the leading research facility. Thousands of Canadian soldiers were exposed to mustard gas,
blister gas, tear gas, and other agents, and some were permanently injured as a result.* [35] Following both world
wars, Canadian military forces returning home were directed to dump millions of tons of unexploded ordnance
(UXOs) into the Atlantic Ocean o ports in Nova Scotia; an undetermined amount of these UXOs are known
to be chemical weapons.* [36] The 1972 London Convention prohibited further marine dumping of UXOs, however the chemical weapons existing o the shores of Nova
NORAD blast doors
Scotia for over 60 years continue to bring concern to local
The Government of Canada formally agreed to every ma- communities and the shing industry.
jor North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) strate- Human testing of chemical weapons such as sarin and VX
gic document, including those that implied a US strike- gas continued in Canada well into the 1960s, and dangerrst policy.* [30] This may suggest that successive Cana- ous defoliation agents were tested at CFB Gagetown from
dian governments were willing to follow US and NATO 1956 to 1967. Tests at CFB Gagetown of Agent Orange
doctrine even if said doctrine was counter to the pub- and the more toxic Agent Purple in 1966 and 1967 caused
licly favoured (and politically supported) doctrine of Mu- a variety of acute and chronic illnesses among soldiers
tual Assured Destruction. Professors J.T. Jockel and J.J. and civilians working there.* [37] These tests left Canada
Sokolsky explore this assertion in-depth in their article with large stockpiles of chemical weapons. Canada evenCanada's Cold War Nuclear Experience. Furthermore, tually abandoned the use of lethal chemical weapons, and
4.8. CANADA
had to devote a great deal of eort to safely destroying
them. Since 1990, the Biological and Chemical Defence
Review Committee has conducted annual site visits and
inspections to verify that all remaining military activities
involving chemical warfare agents are defensive in nature. Canada ratied the Chemical Weapons Convention
on September 26, 1995.* [38] Canada still employs Riot
control agents which are classied as non-lethal weapons.
4.8.3
Biological weapons
113
on the issue of disarmament; the need for increased border defence, particularly in the Territories, has recently
overshadowed other issues in military circles.
Canada maintains a division of its Foreign Aairs department devoted to pursuing these ends. It also dedicates signicant resources in trying to verify that current
treaties are being obeyed, passing much information on
to the United Nations. In the 1970s, Canada discussed
building a reconnaissance satellite to monitor adherence
to such treaties, but these plans were shelved. A public
furor arose in 1983, when the Canadian government approved a plan to test cruise missiles in Alberta.* [40]
Canada continues to promote peaceful nuclear technology exemplied by the CANDU reactor. Unlike most
designs, the CANDU does not require enriched fuel, and
in theory is therefore much less likely to lead to the development of weaponized missile fuel. However, like
all power reactor designs, CANDU reactors produce and
use plutonium in their fuel rods during normal operation
(roughly 50% of the energy generated in a CANDU reactor comes from the in situ ssion of plutonium created
in the uranium fuel),* [41] and this plutonium could be
used in a nuclear explosive if separated and converted
to metallic form (albeit only as reactor-grade plutonium,
and therefore of limited military usefulness). Accordingly, CANDU reactors, like most power reactors in the
world, are subject to safeguards under the United Nations
which prevent possible diversion of plutonium. CANDU
reactors are designed to be refuelled while running, which
makes the details of such safeguards signicantly dierent from other reactor designs. The end result, however,
is a consistent and internationally accepted level of proliferation risk.
A common accusation is that India used Canadian reactors to produce plutonium for weapons. India owns two
licensed CANDU reactors and began nuclear weapons
tests shortly after they became operational in 1972. However, international observers have concluded that no plutonium was diverted from the safeguarded CANDU reactors. The plutonium for the initial bombs came from
the older CIRUS reactor built by Canada (see Nuclear
Weapons above), but the material for India's most recent
nuclear test, Operation Shakti, is thought to come from
the locally-designed Dhruva reactor. India has also built
a number of reactors, not under IAEA safeguards, that
were derived from the CANDU design and are used for
power generation. These may also be used for plutonium
production.
Canada has volunteered to help destroy some of the leftover chemical weapons of the USSR. There is also talk of
taking Soviet nuclear fuel and using it as fuel in CANDU
Canada is a member of every international disarmament reactors, but this is controversial.
organization and is committed to pushing for an end to
nuclear weapons testing, reduction in nuclear arsenals,
a ban on all chemical and biological weapons, bans on 4.8.5 See also
weapons in outer space, and blocks on nuclear proliferation. However, in recent years it has become less vocal
Defence Research and Development Canada
4.8.4
Disarmament
114
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
Gerald Bull
Canadian Joint Incident Response Unit (CJIRU)
4.8.6
[13] Selin, Shannon (1988). Canada as a Nuclear WeaponFree Zone: A Critical Analysis. Canadian Centre for Arms
Control and Disarmament Issue Brief No. 10. p. 5.
[14] Keating, Tom (1988). Canada, NATO and the Bomb. Edmonton: Hurtig Publishers Ltd. p. 68.
[15] Whitaker, Reginald (1994). Cold War Canada: the Making of a National Insecurity State 1945-1957. Toronto:
University of Toronto Press. p. 144.
[33] Selin, Shannon (1988). Canada as a Nuclear WeaponFree Zone: A Critical Analysis. Canadian Centre for Arms
Control and Disarmament Issue Brief No. 10. p. 6.
[16] Whitaker, Reginald (1994). Cold War Canada: the Making of a National Insecurity State 1945-1957. Toronto:
University of Toronto Press. pp. xvi.
[17] Whitaker, Reginald (1994). Cold War Canada: the Making of a National Insecurity State 1945-1957. Toronto:
University of Toronto Press. pp. xx.
[18]The Globe and Mail. 2 January 1964. p. 2.
Check date values in: |date= (help); Missing or empty |title= (help)
4.9. CHINA
115
arsenal amongst the ve nuclear weapon states acknowledged by the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons; in terms of warheads, they are ranked 3rd in
megatonnage. According to some estimates, the country
[39] Bryden, John. Deadly Allies: Canada's Secret War
could more than doublethe number of warheads
1937-1947. ISBN 0-7710-1724-3.
on missiles that could threaten the United States by the
[40] Cruise missile testing coming to Canada - CBC, July 15, mid-2020s.* [7]
[38] CHEMICAL & BIO WEAPONS MEMBERSHIP
(PDF). http://www.nti.org/''. Nuclear Threat Initiative.
Retrieved 8 January 2015.
1983.
[41] Rouben, Ben, Introduction to Reactor Physics CANTEACH, September, 2002.
4.8.7
Further reading
Chemical weapons
4.8.8
External links
Edwards, G. Canada and the Bomb: Past and Future 4.9.2 Biological weapons
Montreal Gazette. 9 August 1998.
China is currently a signatory of the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention and Chinese ocials have stated
that China has never engaged in biological activities with
4.9 China
oensive military applications. However, China was rehad an active biological weapons program
The People's Republic of China has developed and pos- ported to have
in the 1980s.* [11]
sessed weapons of mass destruction, including chemical and nuclear weapons. The rst of China's nuclear Kanatjan Alibekov, former director of one of the Soviet
weapons tests took place in 1964, and its rst hydrogen germ-warfare programs, said that China suered a seribomb test occurred in 1967. Tests continued until 1996, ous accident at one of its biological weapons plants in the
when China signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty late 1980s. Alibekov asserted that Soviet reconnaissance
(CTBT). China has acceded to the Biological and Toxin satellites identied a biological weapons laboratory and
Weapons Convention (BWC) in 1984 and ratied the plant near a site for testing nuclear warheads. The SoviChemical Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1997.
ets suspected that two separate epidemics of hemorrhagic
The number of nuclear warheads in China's arsenal is a fever that swept the region in the late 1980s were caused
Chinese scientists were
state secret and is therefore unknown. There are vary- by an accident in a lab where
*
[12]
weaponizing
viral
diseases.
ing estimates of the size of China's arsenal. A 2011
Georgetown University study estimated that China has
as many as 3,000 warheads* [6] hidden in underground
tunnels, whereas China is estimated by the Federation of
American Scientists to have an arsenal of about 180 active nuclear weapon warheads and 240 total warheads as
of 2009, which would make it the second smallest nuclear
116
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
4.9.3
Nuclear weapons
Satellite image of the testing site 4 days after China's rst atomic
bomb test
History
Mao Zedong decided to begin a Chinese nuclear-weapons
program during the First Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1954
1955 over the Quemoy and Matsu Islands. While he did
not expect to be able to match the large American nuclear arsenal, Mao believed that even a few bombs would
increase China's diplomatic credibility. Construction of
uranium-enrichment plants in Baotou and Lanzhou began in 1958, and a plutonium facility in Jiuquan and the
Lop Nur nuclear test site by 1960. The Soviet Union provided assistance in the early Chinese program by sending
advisers to help in the facilities devoted to ssile material
production,* [15] and in October 1957 agreed to provide
a prototype bomb, missiles, and related technology. The
Chinese, who preferred to import technology and components to developing them within China, exported uranium
to the Soviet Union, and the Soviets sent two R-2 missiles
in 1958.* [16]
That year, however, Soviet leader Nikita Khruschev told
Mao that he planned to discuss arms control with the
United States and Britain. China was already opposed to
Khruschev's post-Stalin policy of "peaceful coexistence".
Although Soviet ocials assured China that it was under
the Soviet nuclear umbrella, the disagreements widened
the emerging Sino-Soviet split. In June 1959 the two
nations formally ended their agreement on military and
technology cooperation,* [16] and in July 1960 all Soviet
assistance with the Chinese nuclear program was abruptly
terminated and all Soviet technicians were withdrawn
from the program.* [17]
The American government under John F. Kennedy and
Lyndon B. Johnson was concerned about the program and
studied ways to sabotage or attack it, perhaps with the
aid of Taiwan or the Soviet Union, but Khruschev was
not interested. The Chinese conducted their rst nuclear
test, code-named 596, on 16 October 1964,* [15] and acknowledged that their program would have been impossible to complete without the Soviet help.* [16] China's
last nuclear test was on July 29, 1996. According to the
Australian Geological Survey Organization in Canberra,
the yield of the 1996 test was 15 kilotons. This was
China's 22nd underground test and 45th test overall.* [18]
Size
China has made signicant improvements in its
miniaturization techniques since the 1980s. There have
been accusations, notably by the Cox Commission, that
this was done primarily by covertly acquiring the U.S.'s
W88 nuclear warhead design as well as guided ballistic
missile technology. Chinese scientists have stated that
they have made advances in these areas, but insist that
these advances were made without espionage.
The international community has debated the size of the
Chinese nuclear force since the nation rst acquired such
technology. Because of strict secrecy it is very dicult
to determine the exact size and composition of China's
nuclear forces. Estimates vary over time. Several declassied U.S. government reports give historical estimates. The 1984 Defense Intelligence Agency's Defense
Estimative Brief estimates the Chinese nuclear stockpile
as consisting of between 150 and 160 warheads.* [19] A
1993 United States National Security Council report estimated that China's nuclear deterrent force relied on 60
to 70 nuclear armed ballistic missiles.* [20] The Defense
Intelligence Agency's The Decades Ahead: 1999 - 2020
report estimates the 1999 Nuclear Weapons' Inventory
as between 140 and 157.* [21] In 2004 the U.S. Department of Defense assessed that China had about 20
intercontinental ballistic missiles capable of targeting the
United States.* [22] In 2006 a U.S. Defense Intelligence
Agency estimate presented to the Senate Armed Services
Committee was thatChina currently has more than 100
nuclear warheads.* [23]
A variety of estimates abound regarding China's current
stockpile. Although the total number of nuclear weapons
in the Chinese arsenal is unknown, as of 2005 estimates
vary from as low as 80 to as high as 2,000. The 2,000warhead estimate has largely been rejected by diplomats
in the eld. It appears to have been derived from a 1990sera Usenet post, in which a Singaporean college student
made unsubstantiated statements concerning a supposed
2,000 warhead stockpile.* [24]* [25]
In 2004, China stated that among the nuclear-weapon
4.9. CHINA
117
weapons.* [34] Yesin's statements, however, have incited
backlash. His claims may have originated from the same
Usenet post that previous dubious assertions of 2,000 or
more nuclear warheads stemmed from.* [35]
As of 2011, the Chinese nuclear arsenal was estimated to
contain 55-65 ICBM's.* [36]
In 2012, STRATCOM commander C. Robert Kehler said
that the best estimates where in the range of several
hundredwarheads and FAS estimated the current total
to be approximately 240 warheads.* [37]
The U.S. Department of Defense 2013 report to Congress
on China's military developments stated that the Chinese nuclear arsenal consists of 50-75 ICBM's, located
in both land-based silo's and Ballistic missile submarine
platforms. In addition to the ICBM's, the report stated
that China has approximately 1,100 Short-range ballistic
missiles, although it does not have the warhead capacity
to equip them all with nuclear weapons.* [38]
Nuclear policy
Chinese public policy has always been one of the "no rst
use rule" while maintaining a deterrent retaliatory force
targeted for countervalue targets.* [1]
In 2005, the Chinese Foreign Ministry released a white
paper stating that the governmentwould not be the rst
to use [nuclear] weapons at any time and in any circumstance. In addition, the paper went on to state that this
no rst usepolicy would remain unchanged in the future and that China would not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon states or
nuclear-weapon-free zones.* [41]
China normally stores nuclear warheads separately from
their launching systems, unless there is a heightened
threat level.* [42]
Historically, China has been implicated in the development of the Pakistani nuclear program. In the early
1980s, China is believed to have given Pakistan apackageincluding uranium enrichment technology, highenriched uranium, and the design for a compact nuclear
weapon.* [43]
118
China and the United States, by which each country could
trust but verifythe other's intentions and help them
move away from the current distrust both sides exhibit in
their dealings with each other.* [44]
Delivery systems estimates
2010 IISS Military Balance The following are estimates of China's strategic missile forces from the
International Institute of Strategic Studies Military Balance 2010.* [45] According to these estimates, China
has up to 90 inter-continental range ballistic missiles
(66 land-based ICBMs and 24 submarine-based JL-2
SLBMs), not counting MIRV warheads.
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
have also deployed up to 10 Solid-fueled mobile DF-31
ICBMs, with a range of 7,200+ km and possibly up to 3
MIRVs.* [52] China has also developed the DF-31A, an
intercontinental ballistic missile with a range of 11,200+
km with possibly 3-6 multiple independently targetable
reentry vehicle (MIRV) capability.
China stores many of its missiles in huge underground tunnel complexes; US Representative Michael
Turner* [53] referring to 2009 Chinese media reports said
This network of tunnels could be in excess of 5,000 kilometers (3,110 miles), and is used to transport nuclear
weapons and forces,,* [54] the Chinese Army newsletter calls this tunnel system an underground Great Wall of
China.* [55]
2010 DoD annual PRC military report The follow- Medium range ballistic missiles
ing are estimates from the United States Department of
Defense 2010 report to Congress concerning the Military Approximately 55% of China's missiles are in the
medium range category, targeted at regional theater tarPower of the People's Republic of China* [46]
gets.* [47]* :61
2006 FAS & NRDC report The following table is an
overview of PRC nuclear forces taken from a November DF-3A/CSS-2 Main article: DF-3A
2006 report by Hans M. Kristensen, Robert S. Norris,
and Matthew G. McKinzie of the Federation of American Scientists and the Natural Resources Defense Council titled Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War DF-21/CSS-5 Main article: DF-21
Planning.* [47]* :202
Situation in 201314 After increasing under Bush,
the number of Chinese nuclear armed missiles capable
of reaching North America leveled o under Obama
with delays in bringing forth new capabilities such as
MIRV and operational sub launched missiles.* [48] The
U.S. DOD 2013 report to Congress continued to state
that China had 5075 ICBM's.* [38] However the United
States-China Economic and Security Review Commission stated that it was possible for China to nally have an
operational Submarine-launched ballistic missile capability by the end of the year.* [49] The USChina Economic
and Security Review Commission stated in November
2014 that patrols with nuclear-armed submarines would
take place before the end of the year, giving China its
rst credible sea-based nuclear deterrent.* [50]
Land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles
Main articles: Second Artillery Corps, DF-4, DF-5, DF-4/CSS-3 Main article: DF-4
DF-31 and DF-41
The Dongfeng 5A is a single-warhead, three-stage, liquidfueled missile with a range of 13,000+ km. In 2000,
General Eugene Habiger of the U.S. Air Force, thencommander of the U.S. Strategic Command, testied before Congress that China has 18 silo-based DF-5s.* [51]
Since the early 21st century, the Second Artillery Corps
The Dong Feng 4 or DF-4 (also known as the CSS3) is a long-range two-stage Chinese intermediate-range
ballistic missile with liquid fuel (nitric acid/UDMH). It
was thought to be deployed in limited numbers in underground silos beginning in 1980.* [47]* :67 The DF-4 has a
takeo thrust of 1,224.00 kN, a takeo weight of 82,000
kg, a diameter of 2.25 m, a length of 28.05 m, and a
4.9. CHINA
n span of 2.74 m. It is equipped with a 2190 kg nuclear warhead with 3300 kt explosive yield, and its range
is 5,500 km.* [47]* :68 The missile uses inertial guidance,
resulting in a relatively poor CEP of 1,500 meters.
Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)
119
The ChangJian-10 (Long Sword 10) is a cruise missile
developed by China, based on the Hongniao missile family. It has a range of 2,200 km. Although not conrmed,
it is suspected that the CJ-10 could carry nuclear warheads. An air-launched variant (named CJ-20) has also
been developed.* [57]* [58]
The Chinese navy has developed Type 094 ballistic missile submarine, open source satellite imagery has shown
that at least 2 of these have been completed. This submarine will be capable of carrying 12 of the longer ranged,
more modern JL-2s with a range of approximately 14000
km.
China is also developing the Type 096 submarine,
claimed to be able to carry up to 24 JL-2 ballistic missiles
each. Some Chinese sources states that the submarine is
already undergoing trials.* [62]
Also a new nuclear attack submarine is under development, the Type 095 submarine.* [63]* [64]
120
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
4.9.6 Notes
[1] Fact Sheet:China: Nuclear Disarmament and Reduction of. Ministry of Foreign Aairs. 27 April 2004.
Retrieved 2010-04-06.
[2] China's nuclear arsenal. BBC News. 1999-07-15.
[3] http://bos.sagepub.com/content/71/4/77.full.pdf
[4] http://bos.sagepub.com/content/71/4/77.full.pdf
[5] http://www.idsa.in/idsacomments/
DF-41ChinasanswertotheUSBMDefforts_
ArjunSubramaniam_121112
[6] China 'has up to 3,000 nuclear weapons hidden in tunnels', three-year study of secret documents reveals. Daily
Mail (London). 2011-11-30.
[7] Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris (November/December 2011 vol. 67 no. 6). Chinese nuclear
forces, 2011. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. pp. 81
87. Check date values in: |date= (help)
[8] States Parties to the Chemical Weapons Convention
4.9.4
Missile ranges
Medium and Intercontinental Range Ballistic Missiles. Note: China currently is capable of targeting [12] William J Broad, Soviet Defector Says China Had Acciits nuclear forces throughout the region and most of
dent at a Germ Plant, New York Times, April 5, 1999
the world, including the continental United States.
Newer systems, such as the DF-31, DF-31A, and [13] Leonard Spector, Chinese Assistance to Iran's Weapons
of Mass Destruction and Missile Programs, Carnegie EnJL-2, will give China a more survivable nuclear
dowment for International Peace, September 12, 1996
force.
Surface-to-Air Missile Coverage over the Taiwan
Strait. Note: This map depicts notional coverage
provided by Chinas SA-10, SA-20 SAM systems,
as well as the soon-to-be acquired S-300PMU2. Actual coverage would be non-contiguous and dependent upon precise deployment sites.
4.9.5
See also
[19] http://www.gwu.edu/~{}nsarchiv/news/19990527/
01-01.htm
[20] Report to Congress on Status of China, India and Pakistan Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Programs. Fas.org.
Retrieved 2010-04-06.
4.9. CHINA
[21]
[22] 1.doc (PDF). Retrieved 2010-04-06.
[23] http://www.dia.mil/publicaffairs/Testimonies/
statement24.html
[24] https://groups.google.com/forum/?fromgroups#!topic/
soc.culture.taiwan/tOzuUZc1C_c
[25] http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/4799/
collected-thoughts-on-phil-karber
121
[26] name=MOFA-factsheet-2004>Fact Sheet:China: Nuclear Disarmament and Reduction of. Ministry of Foreign Aairs. 27 April 2004. Retrieved 2010-04-06.
[44] Etzioni, Amitai, MAR: A Model for US-China Relations,The Diplomat, September 20, 2013, .
[28] https://fas.org/nuke/guide/china/Karber_
UndergroundFacilities-Full_2011_reduced.pdf
[29] Fernandez, Yusuf. Obama against Chinese Nuclear
Great Wall. PressTV. Retrieved 25 March 2013.
[47] Kristensen, Hans M; Robert S. Norris; Matthew G. McKinzie. Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning. Federation of American Scientists and Natural Resources Defense Council, November 2006.
[30] China 'has up to 3,000 nuclear weapons hidden in tunnels', three-year study of secret documents reveals. Daily
Mail (London). 2011-11-30. Retrieved 25 March 2013.
[49] MINNICK, WENDELL (11 November 2013). US Report: 1st Sub-launched Nuke Missile Among China's Recent Strides. defensenews.com. Gannett Government
Media Corporation. Retrieved 11 November 2013.
[32] https://fas.org/blogs/security/2011/12/chinanukes/
[33] http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/statemnt/2009/
March/Maples%2003-10-09.pdf
[50] Tweed, David (9 December 2014). China Takes Nuclear Weapons Underwater Where Prying Eyes Can't See
. bloomberg.com. Retrieved 9 December 2014.
[53] http://chinadigitaltimes.net/2011/10/
u-s-lawmaker-warns-of-chinas-nuclear-strategy
[36] http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2011_cmpr_final.
pdf
[54] straitstimes.com
[55] China Builds Underground 'Great Wall' Against Nuke Attack The Chosun Ilbo, Dec. 14, 2009.
[56] U.S. Department of Defense, Oce of the Secretary of
Defense, Military Power of the Peoples Republic of
China, 2006, May 23, 2006, pp. 26, 27.
[57] Sword 20 cruise missiles loaded on to H-6M bombers
. Global Military. 2009-12-10. Retrieved 2010-04-06.
[58] " 28 CJ-10 ( )_ ".
Mil.huanqiu.com. Retrieved 2010-04-06.
[59] John Pike. Land-Attack Cruise Missiles (LACM)".
Globalsecurity.org. Retrieved 2010-04-06.
[60] Land-Attack Cruise Missile (LACM)".
SinoDefence.com. 2007-05-07. Retrieved 2010-04-06.
[61] HN-2. MissileThreat. Retrieved 2010-04-06.
122
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
Fact Sheet: China: Nuclear Disarmament and Reduction, Ministry of Foreign Aairs, People's Republic of China, 2004/04/27
FY04 Report to Congress on PRC Military Power,
U.S. Department of Defense
Status of Nuclear Powers and Their Nuclear Capabilities, Federation of American Scientists
Nuclear Threat Initiative on China
[66] " 8 _ _
". News.xinhuanet.com. Retrieved 2010-04-06.
4.9.7
Further reading
Defense Estimative Brief, Nuclear Weapons Systems in China, Defense Intelligence Agency, 24
April 1984
4.9.8
External links
4.10 France
4.10. FRANCE
the national Force de frappe, developed in the late 1950s
and 1960s to give France the ability to distance itself from
NATO while having a means of nuclear deterrence under
sovereign control.
123
decisions to build an atomic bomb were taken, and a successful test took place in 1960. Since then France has
developed and maintained its own nuclear deterrent, one
intended to defend France even if the United States reFrance did not sign the Partial Test Ban Treaty, which fused to risk its* own cities by assisting Western Europe in
gave it the option to conduct further nuclear tests un- a nuclear war. [10]
til it signed and ratied the Comprehensive Test Ban In 1986 Francis Perrin, French high-commissioner for
Treaty in 1996 and 1998 respectively. France denies cur- atomic energy from 1951 to 1970, stated that in 1949
rently having chemical weapons, ratied the Chemical Israeli scientists were rst invited to the Saclay Nuclear
Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1995, and acceded to Research Centre, this cooperation leading to a joint eort
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC) in including sharing of knowledge between French and Is1984. France had also ratied the Geneva Protocol in raeli scientists especially those with knowledge from the
Manhattan Project.* [11]* [12]* [13] In 1956 as part their
1926.
military alliance during the Suez Crisis the French agreed
to secretly build the Dimona nuclear reactor in Israel and
soon after agreed to construct a reprocessing plant for the
4.10.1 History
extraction of plutonium at the site. By 1960, two years
France was one of the nuclear pioneers, going back to into the administration of Charles de Gaulle, cooperation
the work of Marie Skodowska Curie. Curies last as- cooled following a successful test with the French asking
sistant Bertrand Goldschmidt became the father of the that Israel cease its weapons program and submit to ina proliferation scandal aect
French Bomb. French Professor Frederic Joliot-Curie, ternational inspections lest
*
French
foreign
relations.
[14]
According to Lieutenant
High Commissioner for Atomic Energy, was approached
Colonel
Warner
D.
Farr
in
a
report
to the USAF Counterprevious to President Roosevelt creating the Briggs Adproliferation
Center
while
France
was
previously a leader
visory Committee on Uranium in 1939 about the possiin
nuclear
research
Israel
and
France
were at a simibilities of creating an atomic bomb; Joliot-Curie told the
lar
level
of
expertise
after
the
war,
and
Israeli
scientists
New York Herald Tribune that theReport on atomic Encould
make
signicant
contributions
to
the
French
eort.
ergy for Military Purposesin 1945 wrongfully omitted
*
Progress
in
nuclear
science
and
technology
in
France
and
the contributions of French scientists. [5]
Israel remained closely linked throughout the early fties.
After WW-II France's former position of leadership suf- Israeli scientists probably helped construct the G-1 plutofered greatly because of the instability of the Fourth nium production reactor and UP-1 reprocessing plant at
Republic, and the lack of nance available.* [6] During Marcoule.* [15]
the Second World War Goldschmidt invented the nowstandard method for extracting plutonium while work- In 1957 Euratom was created, and under cover of the
ing as part of the British/Canadian team participating peaceful use of nuclear power the French signed deals
to work together on nuclear
in the Manhattan Project. But after the Liberation in with Germany and Italy
*
weapons
development.
[16]
The West German Chancel1945, France had to start its own program almost from
lor
Konrad
Adenauer
told
his
cabinet that he wanted
scratch. Nevertheless, the rst French reactor went critto
achieve,
through
EURATOM,
as quickly as possible,
ical in 1948 and small amounts of plutonium were exthe
chance
of
producing
our
own
nuclear
weapons.* [17]
tracted in 1949. There was no formal commitment to
a nuclear weapons program at that time, although plans The idea was short-lived. In 1958 de Gaulle became Preswere made to build reactors for the large scale produc- ident and Germany and Italy were excluded.
tion of plutonium.* [7]
France developed its nuclear and thermonuclear bombs
However, in the 1950s a civilian nuclear research pro- without outside assistance. The United States, however,
gram was started, a byproduct of which would be began providing technical assistance in the early 1970s
plutonium. In 1956 a secret Committee for the Military through the 1980s. The aid was secret, unlike the reApplications of Atomic Energy was formed and a devel- lationship with the British nuclear program. The Nixon
opment program for delivery vehicles was started. The administration, unlike previous presidencies, did not opintervention of the United States in the Suez Crisis that pose its allies' possession of atomic weapons and beyear is credited with convincing France that it needed to lieved that the Soviets would nd having multiple nuclearaccelerate its own nuclear weapons program to remain a armed Western opponents more dicult. Because the
global power.* [8] In 1957, soon after Suez and the re- Atomic Energy Act of 1946 prohibited sharing inforsulting diplomatic tension with both the USSR and the mation on nuclear weapon design, a method known as
United States, French president Ren Coty decided on negative guidanceor "Twenty Questions" was used;
the creation of the C.S.E.M. in the then French Sahara, French scientists described to their American countera new nuclear tests facility replacing the C.I.E.E.S.* [9] parts their research, and were told whether they were corWith the return of Charles de Gaulle to the presidency rect. Areas in which the French received help included
of France in the midst of the May 1958 crisis, the nal MIRV, radiation hardening, missile design, intelligence
124
on Soviet anti-missile defences, and advanced computer
technology. Because the French program attracted the
best brainsof the nation, the Americans beneted from
French research as well. The relationship also improved
the two nations' military ties; despite its departure from
NATO's command structure in 1966, France developed
two separate nuclear targeting plans, one nationalfor
the Force de Frappe's role as a solely French deterrent,
and one coordinated with NATO.* [10]
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
gion were present at the test sites, without any signicant
protection. At most, some took a shower after each test
according to L'Humanit.* [24] Gerboise Rouge (5kt), the
third atomic bomb, half as powerful as Hiroshima, exploded on 27 December 1960, provoking protests from
Japan, USSR, Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria and Ghana.* [25]
4.10. FRANCE
125
at any given time, which coincides with the UK's policy.* [30]
In 2006, French President Jacques Chirac noted that
France would be willing to use nuclear weapons against a
state attacking France via terrorist means. He noted that
the French nuclear forces had been congured for this option.* [31]
On 21 March 2008, President Nicolas Sarkozy announced that France will reduce its aircraft deliverable
nuclear weapon stockpile (which currently consists of 60
By 1962 France hoped in its negotiations with the TN 81 warheads) by a third (i.e. 20 warheads), thus
Algerian independence movement to retain the Sahara bringing the total French nuclear arsenal to fewer than
as a test site until 1968, but decided that it needed to 300 warheads.* [32]* [33]
be able to also perform above-ground tests of hydrogen
bombs, which could not be done in Algeria. Mururoa
and Fangataufa in French Polynesia were chosen that 4.10.4 Antinuclear tests protests
year. President Charles de Gaulle announced the choice
on 3 January 1963, describing it as a benet to Polyne- Further information: Nuclear-free zone New Zealand
sia's weak economy. The Polynesian people and leaders
broadly supported the choice, although the tests became
controversial after they began, especially among Polyne By 1968 only France and China were detonatsian separatists.* [22]
ing nuclear weapons in the open air and the contamination caused by the H-bomb blast led to a
A total of 193 nuclear tests were carried out in Polynesia
global protest movement against further French atfrom 1966 to 1996. On 24 August 1968 France detonated
mospheric tests.* [7]
its rst thermonuclear weaponcodenamed Canopusover
Fangataufa. A ssion device ignited a lithium-6 deuteride
secondary inside a jacket of highly enriched uranium to
create a 2.6 megaton blast.
Simulation programme (19962012)
More recently, France has used supercomputers to simulate and study nuclear explosions.
4.10.3
126
In 1973 the New Zealand Peace Media organised an
international otilla of protest yachts including the
Fri, Spirit of Peace, Boy Roel, Magic Island and the
Tanmure to sail into the test exclusion zone.* [35]
In 1973, New Zealand Prime Minister Norman
Kirk as a symbolic act of protest sent two navy
frigates, HMNZS Canterbury and HMNZS Otago,
to Moruroa.* [36] They were accompanied by
HMAS Supply, a eet oiler of the Royal Australian
Navy.* [37]
In 1985 the Greenpeace ship Rainbow Warrior was
bombed and sunk by the French DGSE in Auckland,
New Zealand, as it prepared for another protest of
nuclear testing in French military zones. One crew
member, Fernando Pereira of Portugal, photographer, drowned on the sinking ship while attempting to recover his photographic equipment. Two
members of DGSE were captured and sentenced,
but eventually repatriated to France in a controversial aair.
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
One hundred fty thousand civilians, without taking into
account the local population, are estimated to have been
on the location of nuclear tests, in Algeria or in French
Polynesia.* [24] One French veteran of the 1960s nuclear
tests in Algeria described being given no protective clothing or masks, while being ordered to witness the tests at
so close a range that the ash penetrated through the arm
he used to cover his eyes.* [41] One of several veteran
s groups claiming to organise those suering ill eects,
AVEN had 4500 members in early 2009.* [40]
4.10. FRANCE
127
During World War I in August 1914 France, not Germany as commonly believed, was actually the rst to use
chemical weapons though this was only a nonlethal tear
gas attack (xylyl bromide). Once the war had slowed to
trench warfare and new methods to attain an advantage
were sought the German Army initiated a chlorine gas attack against the French Army at Ypres on 15 April 1915
opening a new type of warfare but failing that day to exploit the break in the French line. In time, the more potent phosgene replaced chlorine in use by armies on the
western front including France leading to massive casualties on both sides of the conict though later the eects
were mitigated by development of protective clothing and
masks. At the outbreak of World War II, France had a
stockpile of mustard gas and phosgene but did not use
them against the invading Axis army. Testing of chemical
weapons occurred at a site called B2-Namous in Algeria
though other sites likely existed.* [47]* [48]
[9]
4.10.8
See also
Anti-nuclear protests
Force de frappe
French 'Simulation' project (to replace live nuclear
testing) (in French, French Wikipedia)
List of states with nuclear weapons
Moruroa
Nuclear-free zone - New Zealand
Weapons of Mass Destruction
4.10.9
[1] http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab14.asp
[2] CNS - Chemical and Biological Weapons Possession and
Programs Past and Present. Federation of American
Scientists. Retrieved 2008-03-21.
[3]France and the Chemical Weapons Convention. French
Ministry of Foreign and European Aairs. Retrieved
2008-03-21.
[4] Table of French Nuclear Forces (Natural Resources Defense Council, 2002)
[29] http://fuseurop.univ-perp.fr/sahara_e.htm
128
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
4.10.10
Bibliography
4.11. GERMANY
4.11 Germany
Though Germany is one of the most technologically advanced countries in the world, since World War II it has
generally refrained from using this technology to outt
its own armed forces with weapons of mass destruction
(WMD), although it participates in the NATO nuclear
weapons sharing arrangements and trains for delivering
nuclear weapons.
Germany is among the powers which possess the ability to
create nuclear weapons but has agreed not to do so (under
the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as reafrmed by the Two Plus Four Treaty). Along with most
other industrial nations, Germany produces components
that can be used for creating deadly agents, chemical
weapons, and other WMD. Alongside other companies
from the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, India, the
United States, Belgium, Spain, and Brazil, German companies provided Iraq with precursors of chemical agents
used by Iraq to engage in chemical warfare during the
IranIraq War.* [1]
129
man but refrained from their use on the battleeld. In
total, Germany produced about 78,000 tons of chemical
weapons.* [4] By 1945 the nation produced about 12,000
tons of tabun and 1,000 pounds (450 kg) of sarin.* [4] Delivery systems for the nerve agents included 105 mm and
150 mm artillery shells, a 250 kg bomb and a 150 mm
rocket.* [4] Even when the Soviets neared Berlin, Adolf
Hitler was persuaded not to use tabun as the nal trump
card. The use of tabun was opposed by Hitler's Minister of Armaments, Albert Speer, who, in 1943, brought
IG Farben's nerve agent expert Otto Ambros to report to
Hitler. He informed Hitler that the Allies had stopped
publication of research into organophosphates (a type of
organic compound that emcompasses nerve agents) at the
beginning of the war, that the essential nature of nerve
gases had been published as early as the turn of the century, and that he believed that Allies could not have failed
to produce agents like tabun. This was not in fact the case,
but Hitler accepted Ambros's deduction, and Germany's
tabun arsenal remained unused. * [5]
4.11.1
History
World War I
Main article: Use of poison gas in World War I
As one of the major combatants in World War I, Germany used and developed what we would today describe
as weapons of mass destruction. During World War I,
Germany developed and used chemical weapons, for instance mustard gas. These kinds of weapon were subsequently also employed by the Allies.
The use of chemical weapons in warfare during the Great
War was allegedly in violation of clause IV.2 'Declaration concerning the Prohibition of the Use of Projectiles
with the Sole Object to Spread Asphyxiating Poisonous
Gases' of the 1899 Hague Declarations, and more explicitly in violation of the 1907 Hague Convention on Land
Warfare, which explicitly forbade the use of poison or
poisoned weaponsin warfare.* [2]* [3]
World War II
130
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
European
Option
4.12. INDIA
131
its obligations. There is no clear evidence, circumstantial or otherwise, that directly points toward an oensive
BW program. India does possess the scientic capability
[11] Spiegel Online: Spiegel- Sarkozy bot Deutschland
and infrastructure to launch an oensive BW program,
Beteiligung an Atomwaen an 15.September 2007 (Gerbut has chosen not to do so. In terms of delivery, India
man)
also possesses the capability to produce aerosols and has
[12] Deutsche Presse-Agentur, Merkel Shifts Stance to Say numerous potential delivery systems ranging from crop
NATO Must Keep Nuclear Defence,October 22, 2010 dusters to sophisticated ballistic missiles.* [12]
[10] Tagesspiegel: Ex-Minister: Atomwaen fr Deutschland
27 January 2007 (German)
No information exists in the public domain suggesting interest by the Indian government in delivery of biological
agents by these or any other means. To reiterate the latter
point, in October 2002, the then President Dr. A. P. J.
Abdul Kalam asserted that India will not make biological weapons. It is cruel to human beings.* [12]
4.11.3
External links
Chemical weapons
4.12 India
132
4.12.3
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
Nuclear weapons
4.12. INDIA
The Indian Air Force's Jaguar attack aircraft are believed to have
a secondary nuclear-strike role.
Strategic bombing
The current status of India's air-based nuclear weapons
is unclear. In addition to their ground-attack role, however, it is believed that the Dassault Mirage 2000s and
SEPECAT Jaguars of the Indian Air Force are able
to provide a secondary nuclear-strike role.* [30] The
SEPECAT Jaguar was designed to be able to carry and
deploy nuclear weapons and the Indian Air Force has
identied the jet as being capable of delivering Indian
nuclear weapons.* [31] The most likely delivery method
would be the use of bombs that were free-falling and unguided.* [32]
Sea-based ballistic missiles
133
sia provided technological aid to the naval nuclear propulsion program.* [37]* [38] The submarines will be armed
with up to 12 Sagarika (K-15) missiles armed with nuclear warheads. Sagarika is a submarine-launched ballistic missile with a range of 700 km. This missile has a
length of 8.5 meters, weighs seven tonnes and can carry
a pay load of up to 500 kg.* [39] Sagarika has already
been test-red from an underwater pontoon, but now
DRDO is planning a full-edged test of the missile from
a submarine and for this purpose may use the services
of the Russian Navy.* [40] India's DRDO is also working on a submarine-launched ballistic missile version of
the Agni-III missile, known as the Agni-III SL. According to Indian defence sources, the Agni-III SL will have a
range of 3,500 kilometres (2,200 mi).* [41] The new missile will complement the older and less capable Sagarika
submarine-launched ballistic missiles. However, the Arihant class ballistic missile submarines will be only capable of carrying a maximum of four Agni-III SL.
India is not a signatory to either the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) or the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty (CTBT), but did accede to the Partial Test
Ban Treaty in October 1963. India is a member of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and four of
its 17 nuclear reactors are subject to IAEA safeguards.
India announced its lack of intention to accede to the
134
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
man of India's National Security Advisory Board)". irgamag.com. [] These include a modest arsenal, nuclearcapable aircraft and missiles, both in xed underground
silos as well as [] mounted on mobile rail and roadbased platforms. These land-based missiles include both
Agni-II (1,500 km) as well as Agni-III (2,500 km) missiles. The range and accuracy of further versions for
example, Agni V (5,000 km), which was tested successfully only recently will improve with the acquisition of
further technological capability and experience
[5] New chief of India's military research complex reveals
brave new mandate. India Today. 4 July 2013. Retrieved 4 July 2013.
[6] Strategic Forces Command res AGNI-3 successfully
. Business Standard. 23 December 2013. Retrieved 23
December 2013. (Second operational test ring by the
Strategic Forces Command).
[7] Pakistan has 10 more nuclear weapons than India, nds
study.
In August 2008, the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) approved safeguards agreement with India un[8] Weapons around the world. physicsworld.com. Reder which the former will gradually gain access to Intrieved 31 August 2010.
*
dia's civilian nuclear reactors. [49] In September 2008,
the Nuclear Suppliers Group granted India a waiver al- [9] India's Nuclear Weapons Program.
http:
//nuclearweaponarchive.org.
Retrieved 26 June
lowing it to access civilian nuclear technology and fuel
2012.
from other countries.* [50] The implementation of this
waiver makes India the only known country with nuclear [10] India's and Pakistan's Fissile Material and Nuclear
weapons which is not a party to the NPT but is still alWeapons Inventories, end of 1999. Institute for Scilowed to carry out nuclear commerce with the rest of the
ence and International Security. Retrieved 26 June 2012.
world.* [51]
[11] US wants India to sign NPT Business Standard, 7 May
4.12.5
See also
4.12.6
References
[3] Federation of American Scientists: Status of World Nuclear Forces. Fas.org. early 2013. Retrieved 4 June
2013. Check date values in: |date= (help)
[4] Saran, Shyam (25 April 2013).Is Indias Nuclear Deterrent Credible? (Statement given by Shyam Saran, Chair-
4.12. INDIA
[22] Bruce Riedel (28 June 2012).JFK's Overshadowed Crisis. The National Interest. Retrieved 7 July 2012.
[23]
[24] Draft Report of National Security Advisory Board on
Indian Nuclear Doctrine. Indianembassy.org. Retrieved
30 April 2013.
[25] Speech by NSA Shri Shivshankar Menon at NDC on
The Role of Force in Strategic Aairs". Retrieved 27
July 2015.
[26] NSA Shivshankar Menon at NDC (Speech) : india
Blooms
[27] Bagchi, Indrani. Even a midget nuke strike will lead
to massive retaliation, India warns Pak The Economic
Times. The Economic Times. Retrieved 30 April 2013.
[28] Advanced Agni-6 missile with multiple warheads likely
by 2017. Retrieved 1 October 2013.
[29] Subramanian, T.S. Agni-VI all set to take shape. Retrieved 1 October 2013.
[30] Indian Nuclear Forces, 14 July 2012.
135
[44] Dhanush, naval surface-to-surface missile, test red successfully. domain-b.com. 31 March 2007. Retrieved
31 August 2010.
[45] India s Dhanush Undergoes 1st Night Test - SP's Naval
Forces. Retrieved 27 July 2015.
[46] Press Trust of India (25 March 2014). India test res
long range N-missile launched from under sea. Retrieved
27 July 2015.
[47] United Nations General Assembly Session 52 Verbatim
67.A/52/PV.67 9 December 1997. Retrieved 22 August
2007.
[48] United Nations General Assembly Session 52 ResolutionA/RES/52/38 page 16. {{{date}}}. Retrieved 22
August 2007.
[49] IAEA approves India nuclear inspection deal IAEA.
iaea.org. Retrieved 2 October 2008.
[50] Nuclear Suppliers Group Grants India Historic Waiver
MarketWatch. Marketwatch.com. 6 October 2008.
Archived from the original on 20 October 2008. Retrieved 2 October 2008.
[31] India plans to impart power punch to Jaguar ghters, October 2012.
[52] India, France agree on civil nuclear cooperation. Redi.com. Retrieved 16 July 2010.
136
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
4.12.8
External links
4.13 Iran
This article is about Iran and weapons of mass destruction. For Iran's nuclear power program, see Nuclear
program of Iran.
Iran, ocially the Islamic Republic of Iran, is not
known to currently possess weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and has signed treaties repudiating the possession of weapons of mass destruction including the Biological Weapons Convention,* [1] the
Chemical Weapons Convention,* [2] and the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).* [3] Iran has rst-hand
knowledge of WMD eectsover 100,000 Iranian troops
and civilians were victims of chemical weapons during the 1980s IranIraq War.* [4]* [5] On ideological
grounds, a public and categorical religious decree (fatwa)
against the development, production, stockpiling and use
of nuclear weapons has been issued by the Supreme
Leader of Iran Ayatollah Ali Khamenei along with other
clerics,* [6]* [7] though it is approved by some relatively
minor clerics.* [8] Later versions of this fatwa forbid only
theuseof nuclear weapons, but said nothing about their
production.* [9] Iran has stated its uranium enrichment
program is exclusively for peaceful purposes.* [10]* [11]
The IAEA has conrmed the non-diversion of declared
nuclear material in Iran but has also said itneeds to have
condence in the absence of possible military dimensions to Irans nuclear program.* [12]* [13] The IAEA
has pointed out that Iran is not implementing the requirements of United Nations Security Council Resolutions
and needs to cooperate to clarify outstanding issues and
meet requirement to provide early design information on
its nuclear facilities.* [14]
In December 2014, a Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms
Control report by Lincy and Milhollin based on International Atomic Energy Agency data concluded that Iran
could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for one
nuclear warhead in 1.7 months * [15] In 2012, sixteen
U.S. intelligence agencies, including the CIA, reported
that Iran was pursuing research that could enable it to
produce nuclear weapons, but was not attempting to do
so.* [16] The senior ocers of all of the major American
intelligence agencies stated that there was no conclusive
evidence that Iran has made any attempt to produce nuclear weapons since 2003.* [17] In a 2007 National Intelligence Estimate, the United States Intelligence Community assessed that Iran had ended allnuclear weapon design and weaponization workin 2003.* [18] U.S. Defense
Secretary Leon Panetta stated in January 2012 that Iran
was pursuing a nuclear weapons capability, but was not
attempting to produce nuclear weapons.* [19] In 2009,
U.S. intelligence assessed that Iranian intentions were
unknown.* [20]* [21] Some European intelligence believe
Iran has resumed its alleged nuclear weapons design
work.* [22] Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin said
he had seen no evidence of any nuclear weapons program
in Iran,* [23] while Russian President Dmitry Medvedev
said Iran was close to having the capability to produce
nuclear weapons.* [24]* [25] Iran has called for nuclear
weapons states to disarm and for the Middle East to be
a nuclear weapon free zone.* [26]
After the IAEA voted in a rare non-consensus decision
to nd Iran in non-compliance with its NPT Safeguards
Agreement and to report that non-compliance to the UN
Security Council,* [27]* [28] the Council demanded that
Iran suspend its nuclear enrichment activities* [29]* [30]
and imposed sanctions against Iran* [31]* [32]* [33]* [34]
when Iran refused to do so.* [35] Former Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad argued that the sanctions
were illegal.* [36] The IAEA has been able to verify the
4.13. IRAN
137
non-diversion of declared nuclear material in Iran, but is incongruent for a country [US] who itself is a producer
not the absence of undeclared activities.* [37] The Non- of weapons of mass destruction to take such a decision.
Aligned Movement has called on both sides to work * [49] Mohamed ElBaradei, director of the IAEA at the
through the IAEA for a solution.* [38]
time, said he had no evidence Iran was building nuclear
In November 2009, the IAEA Board of Governors weapons and accused US* leaders of adding fuel to the
adopted* [39] a resolution against Iran which urged Iran rewith their rhetoric. [50] Speaking in Washington in
to apply the modied Code 3.1 to its Safeguard Agree- November 2007, days before the IAEA was to publish its
ment,* [40] urged Iran to implement and ratify the Ad- latest report, Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Shaul Mofaz
called for ElBaradei to be sacked, saying: The policies
ditional Protocol,* [40] and expressed serious concern
that Iran had not cooperated on issues that neededto be followed by ElBaradei endanger world peace. His irresponsible attitude of sticking his head in the sand over
claried to exclude the possibility of military dimensions
*
to Iran's nuclear program. [41] Iran said thehasty and Iran's nuclear programme should lead to his impeachment.Israel and some western governments fear Iran
undueresolution wouldjeopardize the conducive envi*
ronment vitally neededfor successful negotiations [41] is using its nuclear programme as a covert means to develop weapons, while Iran says it is aimed solely at proand lead to cooperation not exceeding its legal obligaducing electricity. For its part in the conict-ridden Mid*
tions to the body. [42]
dle East, Israel is a member of the IAEA, but it is not itself
a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and
is widely believed to currently be the only nuclear-armed
4.13.1 Nuclear weapons
state in the region.* [51]
See also: Nuclear program of Iran
History
Overview
In September 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors, in
a rare non-consensus decision with 12 abstentions,* [43]
recalled a previous Iranian policy of concealmentregarding its enrichment program* [44] and found that Iran
had violated its NPT Safeguards Agreement.* [45] Another IAEA report stated there is no evidence that the
previously undeclared nuclear material and activities ...
were related to a nuclear weapons program.* [44] Iran
has claimed that the military threat posed by Israel and
the United States is forcing it to restrict the release of information on its nuclear program.* [46] Gawdat Bahgat of
the National Defense University speculates that Iran may
have a lack of condence in the international community
which was reinforced when many nations, under pressure
from the United States, rejected or withdrew from signed
commercial deals with the Iranian nuclear authority.* [47]
138
ing, milling and conversation, as well as technology for
heavy-water research reactors.* [52] However, Washington intervened with Moscow and Beijing to prevent Iran
from fully acquiring its list of nuclear power and fuelcycle facilities. The 1990s also saw Iran expand its furtive
nuclear research into conversion, enrichment and plutonium separation. Most importantly, on the basis of
additional centrifuge assistance from the A.Q. Khan network, Iran was able to begin the construction of pilotscale and industrial-scale enrichment facilities at Natanz
around 2000.* [52] Full exposure of Irans nuclear activities came in 2002, when an Iranian exiled opposition
group, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI)
declared the Natanz project in August of that year. Since
that time, international pressure on Iran has remained
steady, hampering but not halting the countrys nuclear
development.* [52] Iran remains legally bound to the NPT
and states its support for the treaty.
There are various estimates of when Iran might be able
to produce a nuclear weapon, should it choose to do so:
A 2005 assessment by the International Institute for
Strategic Studies concluded if Iran threw caution
to the wind, and sought a nuclear weapon capability as quickly as possible without regard for international reaction, it might be able to produce enough
HEU for a single nuclear weapon by the end of this
decade, assuming no technical problems. The report concludes, however, that it is unlikely that Iran
would atly ignore international reactions and develop nuclear weapons anyway.* [55]
A 2005 US National Intelligence Estimate stated
that Iran was ten years from making a nuclear
weapon.* [56]
In 2006 Ernst Uhrlau, the head of German
intelligence service, said Tehran would not be able
to produce enough material for a nuclear bomb before 2010 and would only be able to make it into a
weapon by about 2015.* [57]
A 2007 annual review the International Institute for
Strategic Studies in London stated that If and
when Iran does have 3,000 centrifuges operating
smoothly, the IISS estimates it would take an additional 9-11 months to produce 25 kg of highly
enriched uranium, enough for one implosion-type
weapon. That day is still 23 years away at the earliest.* [58]
The former head of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei,
said on 24 May 2007 that Iran could take between
3 and 8 years to make a bomb if it went down that
route.* [58]
On 22 October 2007, Mohamed ElBaradei repeated
that, even assuming Iran was trying to develop a nuclear bomb, they would require between another
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
three and eight years to succeed, an assessment
shared by all the intelligence services.* [59]
In December 2007, the United States National Intelligence Estimate (representing the consensus view
of all 16 American intelligence agencies) concluded
with a high level of condencethat Iran had
halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003 and
with moderate condencethat the program remains frozen as of mid-2007. The new estimate
says that the enrichment program could still provide
Iran with enough raw material to produce a nuclear
weapon sometime by the middle of next decade,
but that intelligence agencies "do not know whether
it currently intends to develop nuclear weapons" at
some future date.* [60]* [61] Iranian Foreign Minister Manouchehr Mottaki said 70 percent of the U.S.
report wastrue and positive,but denied its allegations of Iran having had a nuclear weapons program
before 2003. Russia has said there was no proof
Iran has ever run a nuclear weapons program.* [62]
The former head of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei,
stated that he had seen maybe some studies about
possible weaponization, but no evidenceof
an active weaponization programas of October
2007.* [63] Thomas Fingar, former Chairman of the
National Intelligence Council until December 2008,
in reference to the 2007 Iran NIE and using intelligence to anticipate opportunities and shape the future, said intelligence has a recently reinforced
propensity to underscore, overstate, or 'hype' the
ndings in order to get people to pay attentionand
that the 2007 NIE was intended to send the message
you do not have a lot of time but you appear to
have a diplomatic or non-military option.* [64] A
National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) is the most authoritative written judgment concerning a national
security issue prepared by the Director of Central
Intelligence.* [65]
The U.S. Director of National Intelligence said in
February 2009 that Iran would not realistically be
able to a get a nuclear weapon until 2013, if it chose
to develop one.,* [66] and that US intelligence does
not know whether Iran intends to develop nuclear
weapons, but believes Iran could at least be keeping the option to develop them open.* [67] Mossad
Chief Meir Dagan was more cautious, saying recently that it would take the Iranians until 2014.
German, French, and British intelligence say that
under a worst-case scenario it would take Iran a minimum of 18 months to develop a nuclear weapon
if it chose to build one, and it would have to rst
purify its uranium and weaponize its uranium.* [66]
An anonymous source in the German Foreign Intelligence Service (BND) whose rank was not provided has gone further and claimed Iran could produce a nuclear bomb and conduct an underground
test in 6 months if it wanted to and further asserted
4.13. IRAN
that Iran had already mastered the full uranium enrichment cycle, and possessed enough centrifuges to
produce weapons-grade uranium.* [68]* [69] Physicists say that if Iran were to choose to develop a nuclear weapon, it would have to withdraw from the
International Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and
expel International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors from the country.* [70] George Friedman, head
of the global intelligence company Stratfor, has said
Iran isdecades awayfrom developing any credible
nuclear-arms capacity.* [71]
139
withdrew from its voluntary adherence to the Additional
Protocol.* [78]
140
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
In late October 2007, according to the International Herald Tribune, the former head of the IAEA, Mohamed ElBaradei, stated that he had seen no evidenceof Iran
developing nuclear weapons. The IHT quoted ElBaredei
as stating that,
We have information that there has been
maybe some studies about possible weaponization,said Mohamed ElBaradei, who led the
International Atomic Energy Agency. That's
why we have said that we cannot give Iran a
pass right now, because there is still a lot of
question marks.
But have we seen Iran having the nuclear material that can readily be used into
a weapon? No. Have we seen an active
weaponization program? No.
The IHT report went on to say thatElBaradei said he was
worried about the growing rhetoric from the U.S., which
he noted focused on Iran's alleged intentions to build a
nuclear weapon rather than evidence the country was actively doing so. If there is actual evidence, ElBaradei said
he would welcome seeing it.* [63]
In November 2007 ElBaradei circulated a report to
the upcoming meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors.* [88]* [89]* [90] Its ndings conclude that Iran has
made important strides towards clarifying its past activities, including provided access to documentation and ocials involved in centrifuge design in the 1980s and 1990s.
Answers provided by Iran regarding the past P-1 and P2 centrifuge programs were found to be consistent with
the IAEA's own ndings. However, Iran has ignored the
demands of the UN Security council, and has continued
to enrich uranium in the past year. The IAEA is not
able to conclusively conrm that Iran isn't currently enriching uranium for military purposes, as its inspections
have been restricted to workshops previously declared as
part of the civilian uranium enrichment program, and requests for access to certain military workshops have been
denied; the report noted that As a result, the agency's
knowledge about Iran's current nuclear program is diminishing. The report also conrmed that Iran now possesses 3000 centrifuges, a 10-fold increase over the past
year, though the feed rate is below the maximum for a
facility of this design. Data regarding the P-2 centrifuge,
which Ahmadinejad has claimed will quadruple production of enriched uranium, was provided only several days
before the report was published; the IAEA plan to discuss
this issue further in December. In response to the report
the US has vowed to push for more sanctions, whilst Iran
has called for an apology from the US.* [91]
In his nal November 2009 statement to the IAEA Board
of Governors, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei said the Agency
continued to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear
material in Iran, but that other issues of concern had
reached a dead endunless Iran were to fully cooperate with the agency. ElBaradei stated it would be helpful
4.13. IRAN
141
dence of an Iranian decision to build them.* [114] Anton Khlopkov, the founding director of the Center for Energy and Security Studies, said the media leak may be being used as a pretext for inciting the campaign against
Iran.* [115] Former Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny
Primakov has also said after the public publications of
the documentsRussia has no concrete information that
Iran is planning to construct a weapon.* [116] Russia's
representative to the IAEA, Alexander Zmeyevskiy, has
noted that though the IAEA is in possession of these documents, the IAEA's ndingsdo not contain any conclusions about the presence of undeclared nuclear activities
in Iran.* [117] Iran pointed out the claims had not been
veried by the International Atomic Energy Agency and
argued that some countries are angry that our people
defend their nuclear rights.* [118] I think that some
of the claims about our nuclear issue have turned into a
142
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
repetitive and tasteless joke,Iranian President Mahmoud Iran has criticized the European Union because it beAhmadinejad said in response to the documents.* [119]
lieves it has taken no steps to reduce the danger of nuclear weapons in the Middle East.* [26] Iran has called on
the state of Israel to sign the NPT, accept inspection of
Iranian stance
its nuclear facilities, and place its nuclear facilities under
IAEA safeguards.* [26] Iran has proposed that the Middle
Main article: Nuclear program of Iran The Iranian East be established as a proposed Nuclear Weapon Free
viewpoint
Zone.* [26]
Iran states that the purpose of its nuclear program is the
generation of power and that any other use would be a violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, of which
it is a signatory, as well as being against Islamic religious
principles. Iran claims that nuclear power is necessary for
a booming population and rapidly industrialising nation.
It points to the fact that Iran's population has more than
doubled in 20 years, the country regularly imports gasoline and electricity, and that burning fossil fuel in large
amounts harms Iran's environment drastically. Additionally, Iran questions why it shouldn't be allowed to diversify its sources of energy, especially when there are fears
of its oil elds eventually being depleted. It continues to
argue that its valuable oil should be used for high value
products and export, not simple electricity generation.
Furthermore, Iran argues that nuclear power makes fairly
good economic sense. Building reactors is expensive,
but subsequent operating costs are low and stable, and
increasingly competitive as fossil-fuel prices rise.* [120]
Iran also raises funding questions, claiming that developing the excess capacity in its oil industry would cost it
$40 billion, not to speak of paying for the power plants.
Harnessing nuclear power costs a fraction of this, considering Iran has abundant supplies of accessible uranium
ore.* [121] These claims have been echoed by Scott Ritter, the former UN weapons inspector in Iraq. Roger
Stern, of Johns Hopkins Department of Geography and
Environmental Engineering, agreesIran's claims to need
nuclear power could be genuine.* [122]
Iran states it has a legal right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes under the NPT, and further says that it
has constantly complied with its obligations under the
NPT and the Statute of the International Atomic Energy
Agency.* [123] Twelve other countries are known to operate uranium enrichment facilities. Iran states thatthe
failure of certain Nuclear- Weapon States to fulll their
international obligations continue to be a source of threat
for the international community.* [26] Iran also states
thatthe only country that has ever used nuclear weapons
still maintains a sizable arsenal of thousands of nuclear
warheadsand calls for a stop to the transfer of technology to non-NPT states.* [26] Iran has called for the development of a follow-up committee to ensure compliance
with global nuclear disarmanent.* [124] Iran and many
other nations without nuclear weapons have said that the
present situation whereby Nuclear Weapon States monopolise the right to possess nuclear weapons ishighly discriminatory, and they have pushed for steps to accelerate
the process of nuclear disarmament.* [125]
On 3 December 2004, Iran's former president and an Islamic cleric, Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani alluded to Iran's
position on nuclear energy:
4.13. IRAN
with US agreement, intended to entice Iran into a binding
commitment not to develop uranium enrichment capability by oering to provide fuel and other long-term support that would facilitate electricity generation with nuclear energy. Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Hamid
Reza Ase rejected the proposal saying,We had already
announced that any plan has to recognize Iran's right to
enrich uranium.* [129] After the Iranian Revolution,
Germany halted construction of the Bushehr reactor, the
United States cut o supply of highly enriched uranium
(HEU) fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor, and Iran
never received uranium from France which it asserted it
was entitled to. Russia agreed not to provide an enrichment plant and terminated cooperation on several other
nuclear-related technologies, including laser isotope separation; China terminated several nuclear projects (in return, in part for entry into force of a U.S.-China civil
nuclear cooperation agreement); and Ukraine agreed not
to provide the turbine for Bushehr. Iran argues that
these experiences contribute to a perception that foreign
nuclear supplies are potentially subject to being interrupted.* [130]
Iran resumed its uranium enrichment program in January
2006, prompting the IAEA to refer the issue to the UN
Security Council.
143
also close down their nuclear fuel production activities
. The White House's spokesperson Tony Snow rejected
the oer and called it a false oer.* [136]
Iran has said that U.N. Security Council sanctions aimed
at curtailing its uranium-enrichment activities unfairly
target its medical sector. We have thousands of patients a month at our hospital alone .. If we can't help
them, some will die. It's as simple as that,said an Iranian nuclear medicine specialist. An Iranian Jew from
California claimed I don't believe in these sanctions...
They hurt normal people, not leaders. What is the use of
that?" Vice President of the Atomic Energy Organization
of Iran Ghannadi framed the debate as a humanitarian issue, This is about human beings. . . . When someone
is sick, we should give medicine.Iran informed the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that fuel obtained from Argentina in 1993 would run out by the end
of 2010, and that it could produce the uranium itself or
buy the uranium from abroad.* [137]
In February 2010, to refuel the Tehran Research Reactor which produces medical isotopes,* [138] Iran began using a single cascade to enrich uranium up to
19.8%",* [139]* [140] to match the previously foreign
supplied fuel.* [141] 20% is the upper threshold for low
enriched uranium (LEU).* [142] Though HEU enriched
to levels exceeding 20% is considered technically usable
in a nuclear explosive device,* [143] this route is much
less desirable because far more material is required to
achieve a sustained nuclear chain reaction.* [144] HEU
enriched to 90% and above is most typically used in a
weapons development program.* [145]* [146]
On 21 February 2006, Rooz, a news website run by Iranian exiles (the Fedayeen Khalq [People's Commandos]
leftist terrorist group),* [131] reported that Hojatoleslam
Mohsen Gharavian, a student of Qom's fundamentalist
cleric Mesbah Yazdi, spoke about the necessity of using
nuclear weapons as a means to retaliate and announced
that based on religious law, everything depends on our In an interview in October 2011, President Ahmadinejad
purpose.* [132] In an interview with the Islamic Repub- of Iran said:
lic News Agency the same day, Gharavian rejected these
reports, saying We do not seek nuclear weapons and
"We have already expressed our views about
the Islamic religion encourages coexistence along with
nuclear bombs. We said those who are seeking
peace and friendship...these websites have tried to misto build nuclear bombs or those who stockpile,
quote me.* [133]
they are politically and mentally retarded. We
On 11 April 2006, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahthink they are stupid because the era of nuclear
madinejad announced Iranian scientists working at the
bombs is over. [Why] for example, should Iran
pilot facility at Natanz had successfully enriched uranium
continue its eorts and tolerate all international
to the 3.5 percent level, using a small cascade of 164
treasures only to build a nuclear bomb, or a few
gas centrifuges. In the televised address from the city
nuclear bombs that are useless? They can never
of Mashhad he said, I am ocially announcing that
be used!"* [147]
Iran has joined the group of those countries which have
nuclear technology".* [134]
On 22 February 2012, in a meeting in Tehran with the diIn May 2006 some members of the Iranian legislature rector and ocials of the Atomic Energy Organization of
("Majlis" or Parliament) sent a letter to UN Secretary- Iran (AEOI) and nuclear scientists, Leader of the Islamic
General Ko Annan threatening to withdraw from the Revolution Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei said:
NPT if Iran's right to peaceful use of nuclear technology
"The Iranian nation has never pursued and
under the treaty was not protected.* [135]
will never pursue nuclear weapons. There is
On 21 February 2007, the same day the UN deadline to
no doubt that the decision makers in the counsuspend nuclear activities expired, Mahmoud Ahmadinetries opposing us know well that Iran is not after
jad made the following statement: If they say that we
nuclear weapons because the Islamic Republic,
should close down our fuel production facilities to resume
logically, religiously and theoretically, considers
talks, we say ne, but those who enter talks with us should
the possession of nuclear weapons a grave sin
144
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
and believes the proliferation of such weapons
is senseless, destructive and dangerous.* [148]
4.13. IRAN
In March 2006, it was reported that the US State
Department had opened an Oce of Iranian Affairs (OIA) overseen by Elizabeth Cheney, the
daughter of Vice President Dick Cheney. The ofce's mission was reportedly to promote a democratic transition in Iran.* [166] and to help defeatthe Iranian regime.* [167] Iran argued the ofce was tasked with drawing up plans to overthrow
its government. One Iranian reformer said after the
oce opened that many partners are simply too
afraid to work with us anymore, and that the oce
hada chilling eect.* [168] The US Congress has
reportedly appropriated more than $120 million to
fund the project.* [169] Investigative journalist Seymour Hersh also revealed in July 2008 Congress also
agreed to a $400-million funding request for a major
escalation in covert operations inside Iran.* [170]
The Bush Administration repeatedly refused to rule
out use of nuclear weapons against Iran. The
U.S. Nuclear Posture Review made public in 2002
specically envisioned the use of nuclear weapons
on a rst strike basis, even against non-nuclear
armed states.* [171] Investigative reporter Seymour
Hersh reported in 2006 that the Bush administration had been planning the use of nuclear weapons
against Iran.* [172] When specically questioned
about the potential use of nuclear weapons against
Iran, President Bush claimed that All options
were on the table.According to the Bulletin of
the Atomic Scientists, the president of the United
States directly threatened Iran with a preemptive nuclear strike. It is hard to read his reply in any other
way.* [173]
In September 2007, Condoleezza Rice, U.S. Secretary of State, cautioned the IAEA not to interfere with international diplomacy over Iran's alleged
weapons program. She said the IAEA's role should
be limited to carrying out inspections and oering
aclear declaration and clear reporting on what the
Iranians are doing; whether and when and if they
are living up to the agreements they have signed.
Former IAEA Director General ElBaradei called
for less emphasis on additional UN sanctions and
more emphasis on enhanced cooperation between
the IAEA and Tehran. Iran has agreed with IAEA
requests to answer unresolved questions about its nuclear program. ElBaradei often criticized what he
calledwar mongering,only to be told by Rice to
mind his business.* [174]
In December 2007, the United States National Intelligence Estimate (which represents the consensus
view of all 16 American spy agencies) concluded,
with a high level of condence, that Iran had
halted all of its nuclear weapons program in 2003
and that the program remains frozen. The new
145
estimate says that the enrichment program could
still provide Iran with enough raw material to produce a nuclear weapon sometime by the middle of
next decade but that intelligence agencies do not
know whether it currently intends to develop nuclear
weaponsat some future date. Senator Harry Reid,
the majority leader, said he hoped the administration
wouldappropriately adjust its rhetoric and policy
.* [60]* [61]
On 2 February 2009, the thirtieth anniversary of the
Islamic Revolution in Iran, Iran launched its rst
domestically produced* [175] satellite Omid (meaning Hope) in to space.* [176] Iran's President
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad described the successful
launching of the Omid data-processing satellite as
a very big source of pride for Iran and said the
project improved Iran's status in the world.* [177]
The United States claimed Iran's activities could be
linked to the development of a military nuclear capability and that the activities were of great concern.* [178] The U.S. specically said it would
continue to address the threats posed by Iran, including those related to its missile and nuclear programs.* [179] Despite the U.S. saying it would
use all elements of its national power to deal with
Tehran's actions,* [180] Iran said the launch was a
step to remove the scientic monopoly certain world
countries are trying to impose on the world.* [181]
Iraqi National Security Advisor Muwafaq al-Rubaie
said Iraq was very pleased with the launch of Iran's
peaceful data-processing national satellite.* [182]
In March 2009, Richard N. Haass, President of the
Council on Foreign Relations, wrote that U.S. policy must be thoroughly multilateral and suggested
recognizing Iranian enrichment while getting Iran
to agree to limits on its enrichment. In return,
some of the current sanctions in place would be suspended. In addition, Iran should be oered assured
access to adequate supplies of nuclear fuel for the
purpose of producing electricity. Normalization of
political ties could be part of the equation,Haass
said.* [183] In October 2009, Ploughshares Fund
President Joseph Cirincione outlined ve persistent myths about Iran's nuclear program": that Iran
is on the verge of developing a nuclear weapon, that
a military strike would knock out Iran's program,
that we can cripple Iran with sanctions, that a
new government in Iran would abandon the nuclear
program, and that Iran is the main nuclear threat in
the Middle East.* [184]
In 2009, Independent U.S. Security Consultant
Linton F. Brooks wrote that in an ideal futureIran
has abandoned its plans for nuclear weapons due to
consistent international pressure under joint U.S.
Russian leadership. Iran has implemented the Ad-
146
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
ditional Protocol and developed commercial nuclear power under strict International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards using a fuel leasing
approach with fuel supplied by Russia and spent fuel
returned to Russia.* [185]
4.13. IRAN
Kazakhstan. We don't have any ocial information yet
regarding this kind of exchange between the two countries,Saidou said. I don't have any information; I
don't have any proof,Saidou said.* [195] An intelligence
report from an unknown country alleged that rogue employees of Kazakhstan were prepared to sell Iran 1,350
tons of puried uranium ore in violation of UN Security
Council sanctions.* [196] Russia said it had no knowledge
of an alleged Iranian plan to import puried uranium ore
from Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan denied the reports.* [197]
Such fabrications of news are part of the psychological warfare (against Iran) to serve the political interests
of the hegemonic powers,Iran said.* [198] Askar Abdrahmanov, the ocial representative of the Ministry for
Foreign Aairs of Kazakhstan, said the references to
the anonymous sources and unknown documents show
groundlessness of these insinuations.* [199]
147
against Iran that would damage regional stability and interfere with the ow of oil. But China will not stop Israel
if it decides to attack Iran. For all these reasons, Israel
and the Middle East need a country like China. Israel
needs China's power.* [203]
In March 2012, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi
said thatChina is opposed to any country in the Middle
East, including Iran, developing and possessing nuclear
weapons., adding that Iran nonetheless has the right to
pursue nuclear activities for peaceful purposes.* [204]
France See also: France and weapons of mass destruction
On 16 February 2006 French Foreign Minister Philippe
Douste-Blazy said No civilian nuclear programme can
explain the Iranian nuclear programme. It is a clandestine
military nuclear programme.* [205]
148
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
4.13. IRAN
land Mossad agents on the Iranian coast.* [227]
Netherlands
According to a Dutch newspaper, the Netherlands had
launched an operation to inltrate and sabotage the Iranian weapons industry, but ended the operation due to increasing fears of an American or Israeli attack on Iran's
nuclear facilities.* [228]
149
Indonesia, the world's most populous Muslim-majority
nation and a non-permanent member of the U.N. Security Council abstained from a vote in March 2008 on
a U.N. resolution to impose a third set of sanctions on
Iran.* [231] It was the only country out of the 10 nonpermanent members to abstain. Indonesian President
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono speaking at a joint news conference with Iran's President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in
Tehran in March 2008 said* [232]
"Iran's nuclear program is of a peaceful nature
and must not be politicized"
Muslim countries
Pakistan, which has the second largest Muslim popuThe A.Q. Khan network, established to procure equip- lation in the world is not a member of the Nuclear
ment and material for Pakistan's nuclear weapons pro- Non-Proliferation Treaty and already possesses nuclear
gram (gas-centrifuge-based programme), also supplied weapons.
Iran with critical technology for its uranium enrichment On 12 May 2006 AP published an interview with Pakprogram, and helped put Iran on a fast track toward istan's former Chief of Army Sta of Pakistan Army
becoming a nuclear weapons power.* [229]
General Mirza Aslam Beg In the AP interview, Beg detailed nearly 20 years of Iranian approaches to obtain conventional arms and then technology for nuclear weapons.
He described an Iranian visit in 1990, when he was Chief
of Army Sta.
They didn't want the technology. They
asked: 'Can we have a bomb?' My answer was:
By all means you can have it but you must make
it yourself. Nobody gave it to us.
World map with nuclear weapons development status represented by color.
Five nuclear weapons statesfrom the NPT
Other states known to possess nuclear weapons
States formerly possessing nuclear weapons
States suspected of being in the process of developing nuclear
weapons and/or nuclear programs
States which at one point had nuclear weapons and/or nuclear
weapons research programs
States that possess nuclear weapons, but have not widely adopted
them
150
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
On 21 April 2006, at a Hamas rally in Damascus, Anwar of the right of a country to expertise in the eld of nuclear
Raja, the Lebanon-based representative of the Popular energy for peaceful purposes.* [238]
Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a party that achieved
4.25% of the votes and holds 3 out the 132 seats in the
Palestinian Legislative Council following the election de- The Non-Aligned Movement
clared:
The Non-Aligned Movement has said that the present situation whereby Nuclear Weapon States monopolise the
"The Muslim, Iranian, ghting people now posright to possess nuclear weapons is highly discriminasess nuclear capabilities. My brother, the Iratory, and they have pushed for steps to accelerate the
nian representative sitting here, let me tell you
process of nuclear disarmament.* [125]
that we, the Palestinian people, are in favour of
Iran having a nuclear bomb, not just energy for
On 16 September 2006 in Havana, Cuba, all of the 118
peaceful purposes."* [234]
Non-Aligned Movement member countries, at the sumOn 3 May 2006 Iraqi Shia cleric Ayatollah Ahmad Husseini Al Baghdadi, who opposes the presence of US
forces in Iraq and is an advocate of violent jihad was interviewed on Syrian TV. In his interview he said:* [235]
"How can they face Iran? How come Israel
has 50 nuclear bombs? Why are they selective? Why shouldn't an Islamic or Arab country
have a nuclear bomb? I am not referring to the
Iranian program, which the Iranians say is for
peaceful purposes. I am talking about a nuclear
bomb."
"This Arab Islamic nation must obtain a nuclear
bomb. Without a nuclear bomb, we will continue to be oppressed,"
Iran has advanced biology and genetic engineering research programs supporting an industry that produces
world-class vaccines for both domestic use and export.* [241] The dual-use nature of these facilities means
that Iran, like any country with advanced biological research programs, could easily produce biological warfare
agents.
4.13. IRAN
According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, Iran is known
to possess cultures of the many biological agents for legitimate scientic purposes which have been weaponised
by other nations in the past, or could theoretically be
weaponised. Although they do not allege that Iran has
attempted to weaponise them, Iran possesses sucient
biological facilities to potentially do so.* [243]
4.13.3
Chemical weapons
151
stockpiled chemical weapons including blister, blood,
choking, and probably nerve agents, and the bombs and
artillery shells to deliver them. It further claimed that
during the rst half of 2001, Iran continued to seek production technology, training, expertise, equipment, and
chemicals from entities in Russia and China that could be
used to help Iran reach its goal of having indigenous nerve
agent production capability.* [246] However the certainty
of this assessment declined and in 2007 the U.S. Defense
Intelligence Agency limited its public assessment to just
noting that Iran has a large and growing commercial
chemical industry that could be used to support a chemical agent mobilization capability.* [247]
Iran is a signatory of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which bans chemical weapons, delivery systems, and
production facilities.* [2] Iran has reiterated its commitment to the CWC and its full support for the work of the
OPCW, in particular in view of the considerable suering
these weapons have caused to the Iranian people.* [248]
Iran has not made any declaration of a weapons stockpile
under the treaty.* [249]
Missiles
A Shahab-4 with a range of 2,000 km and a payload of
1,000 kg is believed to be under development. Iran has
stated the Shahab-3 is the last of its war missiles and
the Shahab-4 is being developed to give the country the
capability of launching communications and surveillance
satellites. A Shahab-5, an intercontinental ballistic missile with a 10,000 km range, has been alleged but not
proven to be under development.* [250]
Iran has 12 X-55 long range cruise missiles purchased
without nuclear warheads from Ukraine in 2001. The X55 has a range of 2,500 to 3,000 kilometers.* [251]
Iran's most advanced missile, the Fajr-3, has an unknown
range but is estimated to be 2,500 km. The missile is
radar evading and can strike targets simultaneously using
multiple warheads.* [252]
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ranges from 300 km to up to 2,000 km...Iranian experts
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4.13.7
External links
Organizations
CASMII The Campaign Against Sanctions and
Military Intervention in Iran
4.14 Iraq
The fth president of Iraq, Saddam Hussein,* [1] was internationally condemned for his use of chemical weapons
during the 1980s against Iranian and Kurdish civilians
during and after the IranIraq War. In the 1980s, Saddam
pursued an extensive biological weapons program and a
nuclear weapons program, though no nuclear bomb was
built.
Iran as a Pioneer Case for Multilateral Nuclear ArAfter the Persian Gulf War, the United Nations located
rangements. Cambridge, Mass.: Massachusetts Inand destroyed large quantities of Iraqi chemical weapons
stitute of Technology.
and related equipment and materials throughout the early
Europe's Iran Policy: Breaking out of the Spiral of 1990s, with varying degrees of Iraqi cooperation and ob*
Mistrust by Prof. Volker Perthes, head of the Ger- struction. [2] In response to diminishing Iraqi cooperaman Institute for International and Security Aairs tion with UNSCOM, the United States called for withdrawal of all UN and IAEA inspectors in 1998, resulting
in Berlin
in Operation Desert Fox. The United States and the UK
Iran needs nuclear energy, not weapons, Le Monde asserted that Saddam Hussein still possessed large hidden
diplomatique, November 2005 questions whether stockpiles of WMD in 2003, and that he was clandestinely
Iran's nuclear program was really clandestine as procuring and producing more. Inspections by the UN to
commonly claimed.
resolve the status of unresolved disarmament questions
4.14. IRAQ
161
4.14.1
162
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
triggers bound for Iraq were seized at Heathrow Airport. The Scott Report uncovered much of the secrecy
that had surrounded the Arms-to-Iraq aair when it became known.* [26] The British government also nanced
a chlorine factory that was intended to be used for manufacturing mustard gas.* [27]
4.14.2
IranIraq War
In 1980, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency led a report stating that Iraq had been actively acquiring chemical
weapons capacities for several years, which later proved
to be accurate.* [28] In November 1980, two months into
the IranIraq War, the rst reported use of chemical
weapons took place when Tehran radio reported a poison
gas attack on Susangerd by Iraqi forces.* [29] The United
Nations reported many similar attacks occurred the following year, leading Iran to develop and deploy a mustard
gas capability. By 1984, Iraq was using poison gas with
great eectiveness against Iranian human waveattacks. Chemical weapons were used extensively against
Iran during the IranIraq War.* [30]* [31] On January 14,
1991, the Defense Intelligence Agency said an Iraqi agent
described, in medically accurate terms, military smallpox
casualties he said he saw in 1985 or 1986. Two weeks
later, the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center reported that eight of 69 Iraqi prisoners of war whose blood
was tested showed a current immunity to smallpox, which
had not occurred naturally in Iraq since 1971; the same
prisoners had also been inoculated for anthrax. The assumption being that Iraq used both smallpox and anthrax
during this war* [32] All of this occurring while Iraq was
a party to the Geneva Protocol on September 8, 1931, the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on October 29, 1969,
signed the Biological Weapons Convention in 1972, but
did not ratify until June 11, 1991. Iraq has not signed to
the Chemical Weapons Convention.
The Washington Post reported that in 1984 the CIA secretly started providing intelligence to the Iraqi army during the Iran-Iraq War. This included information to target chemical weapons strikes. The same year it was conrmed beyond doubt by European doctors and UN expert missions that Iraq was employing chemical weapons
against the Iranians.* [33] Most of these occurred during
the IranIraq War, but WMDs were used at least once to
crush the popular uprisings against Kurds in 1991.* [20]
Chemical weapons were used extensively, with more
than 100,000 Iranian soldiers as victims of Saddam Hussein's chemical weapons during the eight-year war with
Iraq,* [34] Iran today is the world's second-most aicted
country by weapons of mass destruction, only after Japan.
The ocial estimate does not include the civilian population contaminated in bordering towns or the children
and relatives of veterans, many of whom have developed
blood, lung and skin complications, according to the Organization for Veterans. Nerve gas agents killed about
20,000 Iranian soldiers immediately, according to o-
4.14. IRAQ
States on Hussein's government changed rapidly, as it
was feared Saddam intended to attack other oil-rich nations in the region such as Saudi Arabia. As stories of
atrocities from the occupation of Kuwait spread, older
atrocities and his WMD arsenal were also given attention. Iraq's nuclear weapons program suered a serious
setback in 1981 when the Osiraq reactor, which would
have been capable of breeding weapons-usable nuclear
material, was bombed by Israel before it could be commissioned.* [15] David Albright and Mark Hibbs, writing
for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, disagree with
this view, however. There were far too many technological challenges unsolved, they say.* [39] An international
coalition of nations, led by the United States, liberated
Kuwait in 1991.* [40]
In the terms of the UN ceasere set out in Security Council Resolution 686, and in Resolution 687, Iraq was forbidden from developing, possessing or using chemical,
biological and nuclear weapons by resolution 686. Also
proscribed by the treaty were missiles with a range of
more than 150 kilometres. The UN Special Commission on weapons (UNSCOM) was created to carry out
weapons inspections in Iraq, and the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) was to verify the destruction of
Iraq's nuclear program.* [41]* [42]
163
in hospitals and microbiology/molecular biology research
laboratories. In hospitals, swabs from patients are placed
in dishes containing growth medium for diagnostic purposes. Iraq's hospital consumption of growth medium
was just 200 kg a year; yet in 1988, Iraq imported 39 tons
of it. Shown this evidence by UNSCOM, Taha admitted to the inspectors that she had grown 19,000 litres of
botulinum toxin;* [45] 8,000 litres of anthrax; 2,000 litres
of aatoxins, which can cause liver failure; Clostridium
perfringens, a bacterium that can cause gas gangrene; and
ricin. She also admitted conducting research into cholera,
salmonella, foot and mouth disease, and camel pox, a disease that uses the same growth techniques as smallpox,
but which is safer for researchers to work with. It was because of the discovery of Taha's work with camel pox that
the U.S. and British intelligence services feared Saddam
Hussein may have been planning to weaponize the smallpox virus. Iraq had a smallpox outbreak in 1971 and the
Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Center (WINPAC) believed the Iraqi government retained contaminated material.* [32]
164
UNSCOM access to certain sites like Baath Party headquarters.* [46] Although Ekus has said that he resisted
attempts at such espionage, many allegations have since
been made against the agency commission under Butler,
charges which Butler has denied.* [47]* [48]
In April 1991 Iraq provided its rst of what would be several declarations of its chemical weapons programs.* [49]
Subsequent declarations submitted by Iraq in June 1992,
March 1995, June 1996 came only after pressure from
UNSCOM.* [49] In February 1998, UNSCOM unanimously determined that after seven years of attempts to
establish the extent of Iraq's chemical weapons programs,
that Iraq had still not given the Commission sucient information for them to conclude that Iraq had undertaken
all the disarmament steps required by the UNSC resolutions concerning chemical weapons.* [49]
In August 1991 Iraq had declared to the UNSCOM biological inspection team that it did indeed have a biological weapons program but that it was for defensive purposes.* [49] Iraq then provided its rst biological weapons
declaration shortly after. After UNSCOM determined
such declarations to be incomplete, more pressure was
placed on Iraq to declare fully and completely.* [49] A
second disclosure of the biological weapons came in
March 1995. After UNSCOM's investigations and the
discovery of inreutable evidence, Iraq was forced to
admit for the rst time the existence of an oensive
biological weapons program.* [49] But Iraq still denied
weaponization. Further UNSCOM pressure resulted in a
third prohibited biological weapons disclosure from Iraq
in August 1995. Only after General Hussein Kamel alMajid, Minister of Industry and Minerals and former Director of Iraq's Military Industrialization Corporation,
with responsibility for all of Iraq's weapons programs,
ed Iraq for Jordan, Iraq was forced to reveal that its biological warfare program was much more extensive than
was previously admitted and that the program included
weaponization.* [49] At this time Iraq admitted that it had
achieved the ability to produce longer-range missiles than
had previously been admitted to.* [49] At this point Iraq
provides UNSCOM and IAEA with more documentation that turns out Hussein Kamel al-Majid had hidden
on chicken farm. These documents gave further revelation to Iraq's development of VX gas and its attempts to
develop a nuclear weapon.* [49] More declarations would
follow in June 1996 and September 1997. However, in
April and July 1998, the biological weapons team and
UNSCOM Executive Chairman assessed that Iraq's declarations were as yet unveriableand incomplete
and inadequate, seven years after the rst declarations
were given in 1991.* [49]
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
at impeding UNSCOM's work. Iraq is not disarming
, Ritter said on August 27, 1998, and in a second statement, Iraq retains the capability to launch a chemical
strike.In 1998 the UNSCOM weapons inspectors left
Iraq. There is considerable debate about whether they
werewithdrawn,expelledfrom the country by Iraqi
ocials (as alleged by George W. Bush in his axis of
evilspeech), or they chose to leave because they felt their
hands were tied suciently to see the mission as hopeless. According to Butler himself in his book Saddam
Deant, it was U.S. Ambassador Peter Burleigh, acting
on instructions from Washington, who suggested Butler
pull his team from Iraq in order to protect them from the
forthcoming U.S. and British airstrikes which eventually
took place from December 1619, 1998.
Between inspections: 1998-2003
In August, 1998, absent eective monitoring, Scott Ritter remarked that Iraq could reconstitute chemical biological weapons, long-range ballistic missiles to deliver
these weapons, and even certain aspects of their nuclear
weaponization program.* [50]
In June, 1999, Ritter responded to an interviewer, saying: When you ask the question, 'Does Iraq possess
militarily viable biological or chemical weapons?' the answer is no! It is a resounding NO. Can Iraq produce today chemical weapons on a meaningful scale? No! Can
Iraq produce biological weapons on a meaningful scale?
No! Ballistic missiles? No! It is 'no' across the board.
So from a qualitative standpoint, Iraq has been disarmed.
Ritter later accused some UNSCOM personnel of spying,
and he strongly criticized the Bill Clinton administration
for misusing the commission's resources to eavesdrop on
the Iraqi military.* [51] According to Ritter: Iraq today (1999) possesses no meaningful weapons of mass destruction capability.* [52]
In June 2000, Ritter penned a piece for Arms Control
Today entitled The Case for Iraq's Qualitative Disarmament.* [53] 2001 saw the theatrical release of his documentary on the UNSCOM weapons inspections in Iraq, In
Shifting Sands: The Truth About Unscom and the Disarming of Iraq. The lm was funded by an Iraqi-American
businessman who, unknown to Ritter, had received Oilfor-Food coupons from the Iraqi administration.* [54]
In 2002, Scott Ritter stated that, by 1998, 9095% of
Iraq's nuclear, biological and chemical capabilities, and
long-range ballistic missiles capable of delivering such
weapons, had been veried as destroyed. Technical 100%
verication was not possible, said Ritter, not because Iraq
still had any hidden weapons, but because Iraq' had preemptively destroyed some stockpiles and claimed they
had never existed. Many people were surprised by Ritter's turnaround in his view of Iraq during a period when
no inspections were made.* [55]
4.14. IRAQ
the Bush administration and maintained that it had provided no credible evidence that Iraq had reconstituted a
signicant WMD capability. In an interview with Time
in September 2002 Ritter said there were attempts to
use UNSCOM for spying on Iraq.* [56] According to the
New York Times and Washington Post media of Jan. 8,
1999, In March [1998], in a last-ditch attempt to uncover Saddam Hussein's covert weapons and intelligence
networks, the United States used the United Nations inspection team to send an American spy into Baghdad
to install a highly sophisticated electronic eavesdropping
system.* [57]* [58]
165
weapons to defend Iraq and the Arab nation.* [62]
The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in
Britain published in September 2002 a review of Iraq's
military capability, and concluded that Iraq could assemble nuclear weapons within months if ssile material from
foreign sources were obtained.* [63] However, IISS also
concluded that without such foreign sources, it would take
years at a bare minimum.
The time to Iraq obtaining a nuclear weapon with ssile
materials was viewed as being overly optimistic by some
critics (that is, by the Federation of American Scientists
and the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists).
166
shells, with chemical agents, that are still unaccounted
for.
In January 2003, United Nations weapons inspectors reported that they had found no indication that Iraq possessed nuclear weapons or an active program. Some former UNSCOM inspectors disagree about whether the
United States could know for certain whether or not Iraq
had renewed production of weapons of mass destruction.
Robert Gallucci said, If Iraq had [uranium or plutonium], a fair assessment would be they could fabricate a
nuclear weapon, and there's no reason for us to assume
we'd nd out if they had.Similarly, former inspector
Jonathan Tucker said, Nobody really knows what Iraq
has. You really can't tell from a satellite image what's going on inside a factory.However, Hans Blix said in late
January 2003 that Iraq had not genuinely accepted UN
resolutions demanding that it disarm.* [64] He claimed
there were some materials which had not been accounted
for. Since sites had been found which evidenced the
destruction of chemical weaponry, UNSCOM was actively working with Iraq on methods to ascertain for certain whether the amounts destroyed matched up with the
amounts that Iraq had produced.* [65]* [66] In the next
quarterly report, after the war, the total amount of proscribed items destroyed by UNMOVIC in Iraq can be
gathered.* [67] Those include:
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
totality doesn't amount to much, but which is
still prohibited ... We can't give Iraq a clean
bill of health, therefore we can't close the
book on their weapons of mass destruction.
But simultaneously, we can't reasonably talk
about Iraqi non-compliance as representing
a de-facto retention of a prohibited capacity
worthy of war.* [68]
Ritter also argued that the WMDs Saddam had in his possession all those years ago, if retained, would have long
since turned to harmless substances. He stated that Iraqi
Sarin and tabun have a shelf life of approximately ve
years, VX lasts a bit longer (but not much longer), and nally he said botulinum toxin and liquid anthrax last about
three years.* [69]* [70]
Legal justication
Main article: Legality of the Iraq War
On March 17, 2003, Lord Goldsmith, Attorney Gen-
4.14. IRAQ
it is plain that Iraq has failed so to comply. Most member governments of the United Nations Security Council
made clear that after resolution 1441 there still was no authorization for the use of force. Indeed, at the time 1441
was passed, both the U.S. and UK representatives stated
explicitly that 1441 contained no provision for military
action. Then-U.S. Ambassador John D. Negroponte was
quoted as saying:
There's no automaticityand this is a
two-stage process, and in that regard we have
met the principal concerns that have been expressed for the resolution [...] Whatever violation there is, or is judged to exist, will be dealt
with in the council, and the council will have an
opportunity to consider the matter before any
other action is taken.* [72]
The British ambassador to the UN, Sir Jeremy Greenstock, concurred:
We heard loud and clear during the negotiations the concerns about automaticity
and hidden triggers- the concern that on
a decision so crucial we should not rush into
military action; that on a decision so crucial
any Iraqi violations should be discussed by the
Council. Let me be equally clear in response,
as one of the co-sponsors of the text we have
adopted: there is noautomaticityin this Resolution.* [73]
The UN itself never had the chance to declare that Iraq
had failed to take its nal opportunityto comply as
the U.S. invasion made it a moot point. American President George W. Bush stated that Saddam Hussein had
48 hours to step down and leave Iraq.* [74] As the deadline approached, the United States announced that forces
would be sent to verify his disarmament and a transition
to a new government.
Coalition expanded intelligence
On May 30, 2003, Paul Wolfowitz stated in an interview with Vanity Fair magazine that the issue of weapons
of mass destruction was the point of greatest agreement
among Bush's team among the reasons to remove Saddam Hussein from power. He said, The truth is that
for reasons that have a lot to do with the U.S. government
bureaucracy, we settled on the one issue that everyone
could agree on, which was weapons of mass destruction
as the core reason, but, there have always been three fundamental concerns. One is weapons of mass destruction,
the second is support for terrorism, the third is the criminal treatment of the Iraqi people. Actually I guess you
could say there's a fourth overriding one which is the connection between the rst two.* [75]
167
In an interview with BBC in June 2004, David Kay, former head of the Iraq Survey Group, made the following
comment:Anyone out there holding as I gather Prime
Minister Blair has recently said the prospect that, in fact,
the Iraq Survey Group is going to unmask actual weapons
of mass destruction, [is] really delusional.
In 2002, Scott Ritter, a former UNSCOM weapons inspector heavily criticized the Bush administration and
media outlets for using the testimony of alleged former
Iraqi nuclear scientist Khidir Hamza, who defected from
Iraq in 1994, as a rationale for invading Iraq:
We seized the entire records of the Iraqi
Nuclear program, especially the administrative
records. We got a name of everybody, where
they worked, what they did, and the top of the
list, Saddam'sBombmaker[which was the title of Hamza's book, and earned the nickname
afterwards] was a man named Jafar Dhia Jafar, not Khidir Hamza, and if you go down the
list of the senior administrative personnel you
will not nd Hamza's name in there. In fact, we
didn't nd his name at all. Because in 1990, he
didn't work for the Iraqi nuclear program. He
had no knowledge of it because he worked as
a kickback specialist for Hussein Kamel in the
Presidential Palace.
He goes into northern Iraq and meets up
with Ahmad Chalabi. He walks in and says,
I'm Saddam's Bombmaker. So they call
the CIA and they say,We know who you are,
you're not Saddam's 'Bombmaker', go sell your
story to someone else.And he was released,
he was rejected by all intelligence services at
the time, he's a fraud.
And here we are, someone who the CIA
knows is a fraud, the US Government knows is
a fraud, is allowed to sit in front of the United
States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
and give testimony as a expert witness. I got
a problem with that, I got a problem with the
American media, and I've told them over and
over and over again that this man is a documentable fraud, a fake, and yet they allow
him to go on CNN, MSNBC, CNBC, and testify as if he actually knows what he is talking
about.* [76]
On June 4, 2003, U.S. Senator Pat Roberts announced
that the U.S. Select Committee on Intelligence that he
chaired would, as a part of its ongoing oversight of the
intelligence community, conduct a Review of intelligence
on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction. On July 9, 2004,
the Committee released the Senate Report of Pre-war
Intelligence on Iraq. On July 17, 2003, the British
168
Prime Minister Tony Blair said in an address to the U.S.
Congress, that history would forgive the United States and
United Kingdom, even if they were wrong about weapons
of mass destruction. He still maintained thatwith every
ber of instinct and convictionIraq did have weapons
of mass destruction.
On February 3, 2004, British Foreign Secretary Jack
Straw announced an independent inquiry, to be chaired
by Lord Butler of Brockwell, to examine the reliability of
British intelligence relating to alleged weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq.* [77] The Butler Review was published July 14, 2004.
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
sein had invaded a country, he had used
weapons of mass destruction, he had the capability of making weapons of mass destruction,
he was ring at our pilots. He was a state sponsor of terror. Removing Saddam Hussein was
the right thing for world peace and the security
of our country.
In a speech before the World Aairs Council of Charlotte,
NC, on April 7, 2006, President Bush stated that hefully
understood that the intelligence was wrong, and [he was]
just as disappointed as everybody elsewhen U.S. troops
failed to nd weapons of mass destruction in Iraq.* [78]
Intelligence shortly before the 2003 invasion of Iraq was
heavily used as support arguments in favor of military intervention, with the October 2002 C.I.A. report on Iraqi
WMDs considered to be the most reliable one available
at that time.* [79]
According to the CIA's report, all U.S. intelligence experts agree that Iraq is seeking nuclear weapons. There
is little question that Saddam Hussein wants to develop
nuclear weapons.Senator John Kerry (D-Mass.) - Congressional Record, October 9, 2002* [80]
4.14. IRAQ
pressed, but were incorporated in the work of
the Iraqi Survey Group, which led the ocial
search for Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.
The survey group's nal report in September
2004 15 months after the technical report
was written said the trailers were impracticalfor biological weapons production and
were almost certainly intendedfor manufacturing hydrogen for weather balloons.* [82]
General Tommy Franks was quoted as saying: I think
no one in this country probably was more surprised than I
when weapons of mass destruction were not used against
our troops as they moved toward Baghdad.* [83]
On February 6, 2004, U.S. President George W. Bush
named an Iraq Intelligence Commission, chaired by
Charles Robb and Laurence Silberman, to investigate
U.S. intelligence, specically regarding the 2003 invasion of Iraq and Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. On
February 8, 2004, Dr Hans Blix, in an interview on BBC
TV, accused the U.S. and UK governments of dramatising the threat of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, in
order to strengthen the case for the 2003 war against the
government of Saddam Hussein.
Iraq Survey Group
On May 30, 2003, The U.S. Department of Defense
briefed the media that it was ready to formally begin the
work of the Iraq Survey Group (ISG), a fact nding mission from the coalition of the Iraq occupation into the
WMD programs developed by Iraq, taking over from the
British-American 75th Exploitation Task Force.
Various nuclear facilities, including the Baghdad Nuclear
Research Facility and Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center, were found looted in the month following the invasion. (Gellman, May 3, 2003) On June 20, 2003, the
International Atomic Energy Agency reported that tons
of uranium, as well as other radioactive materials such as
thorium, had been recovered, and that the vast majority
had remained on site. There were several reports of radiation sickness in the area. It has been suggested that the
documents and suspected weapons sites were looted and
burned in Iraq by looters in the nal days of the war.* [84]
169
but probably with a dierent mix of capabilities to
that which previously existed. Saddam aspired to
develop a nuclear capabilityin an incremental fashion, irrespective of international pressure and the resulting economic risksbut he intended to focus on
ballistic missile and tactical chemical warfare (CW)
capabilities;"* [86]
3.Iran was the pre-eminent motivator of [Iraq's
WMD] policy. All senior level Iraqi ocials considered Iran to be Iraq's principal enemy in the region.
The wish to balance Israel and acquire status and inuence in the Arab world were also considerations,
but secondary.* [86]
4.The former Regime had no formal written strategy
or plan for the revival of WMD after sanctions. Neither was there an identiable group of WMD policy makers or planners separate from Saddam. Instead, his lieutenants understood WMD revival was
his goal from their long association with Saddam and
his infrequent, but rm, verbal comments and directions to them.* [86]
5.Saddam did not consider the United States a natural
adversary, as he did Iran and Israel, and he hoped
that Iraq might again enjoy improved relations with
the United States, according to Tariq 'Aziz and the
presidential secretary.* [86]
6. Evidence of the maturity and signicance of the pre1991 Iraqi Nuclear Program but found that Iraq's
ability to reconstitute a nuclear weapons program
progressively decayed after that date;
7. Concealment of nuclear program in its entirety, as
with Iraq's BW program. Aggressive UN inspections after Desert Storm forced Saddam to admit the
existence of the program and destroy or surrender
components of the program;
8. After Desert Storm, Iraq concealed key elements of
its program and preserved what it could of the professional capabilities of its nuclear scientic community;
On September 30, 2004, the U.S. Iraq Survey Group issued its Final Report.* [85] Among its key ndings were:
170
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
The report found that The ISG has not found evidence
that Saddam possessed WMD stocks in 2003, but [there
is] the possibility that some weapons existed in Iraq, although not of a militarily signicant capability.It also
concluded that there was a possible intent to restart all
banned weapons programs as soon as multilateral sanctions against it had been dropped, with Hussein pursuing WMD proliferation in the future: There is an extensive, yet fragmentary and circumstantial, body of evidence suggesting that Saddam pursued a strategy to maintain a capability to return to WMD after sanctions were
lifted...* [87] No senior Iraqi ocial interviewed by the
ISG believed that Saddam had forsaken WMD forever.
On October 6, 2004, the head of the Iraq Survey Group
(ISG), Charles Duelfer, announced to the U.S. Senate
Armed Services Committee that the group found no evidence that Iraq under Saddam Hussein had produced and
stockpiled any weapons of mass destruction since 1991,
when UN sanctions were imposed.* [88]
After he was captured by U.S. forces in Baghdad in 2003,
Dr. Mahdi Obeidi, who ran Saddam's nuclear centrifuge
program until 1997, handed over blueprints for a nuclear
centrifuge along with some actual centrifuge components,
stored at his home buried in the front yard awaiting
orders from Baghdad to proceed. He said,I had to maintain the program to the bitter end.In his book The Bomb
in My Garden, the Iraqi physicist explains that his nuclear
stash was the key that could have unlocked and restarted
Saddam's bombmaking program. However, it would require a massive investment and a re-creation of thousands
of centrifuges in order to reconstitute a full centrifugal
enrichment program.
In a January 26, 2004 interview with Tom Brokaw of
NBC news, Kay described Iraq's nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons programs as being in a rudimentarystage. He also stated that What we did nd, and
as others are investigating it, we found a lot of terrorist
groups and individuals that passed through Iraq.* [89]
In responding to a question by Brokaw as to whether Iraq
was agathering threatas President Bush had asserted
before the invasion, Kay answered:
Tom, an imminent threat is a political judgment. It's not a technical judgment. I think
Baghdad was actually becoming more dangerous in the last two years than even we realized. Saddam was not controlling the society
any longer. In the marketplace of terrorism and
of WMD, Iraq well could have been that supplier if the war had not intervened.
In June 2004, the United States removed 2 tons of lowenriched uranium from Iraq, sucient raw material for a
single nuclear weapon.* [90]
Demetrius Perricos, then head of UNMOVIC, stated that
the Kay report contained little information not already
Captured documents
Main article: Operation Iraqi Freedom documents
Operation Iraqi Freedom documents refers to some
48,000 boxes of documents, audiotapes and videotapes
that were captured by the U.S. military during the 2003
invasion of Iraq. Many of these documents seem to make
clear that Saddam's regime had given up on seeking a
WMD capability by the mid-1990s. Associated Press
reported, Repeatedly in the transcripts, Saddam and
his lieutenants remind each other that Iraq destroyed its
chemical and biological weapons in the early 1990s, and
shut down those programs and the nuclear-bomb program, which had never produced a weapon.At one 1996
presidential meeting, top weapons program ocial Amer
Mohammed Rashid, describes his conversation with UN
weapons inspector Rolf Ekeus:We don't have anything
to hide, so we're giving you all the details.At another
meeting Saddam told his deputies,We cooperated with
the resolutions 100 percent and you all know that, and
the 5 percent they claim we have not executed could take
them 10 years to (verify). Don't think for a minute that
we still have WMD. We have nothing.* [93] U.S. Congressman Peter Hoekstra called for the U.S. government
to put the remaining documents on the Internet so Arabic speakers around the world can help translate the documents.* [94]
4.14. IRAQ
On May 16, 2004, a 152 mm artillery shell was used as
an improvised bomb.* [97] The shell exploded and two
U.S. soldiers were treated for minor exposure to a nerve
agent (nausea and dilated pupils). On May 18 it was reported by U.S. Department of Defense intelligence ofcials that tests showed the two-chambered shell contained the chemical agent sarin, the shell beinglikelyto
have contained three to four liters of the substance (in the
form of its two unmixed precursor chemicals prior to the
aforementioned explosion that had not eectively mixed
them).* [96] Former U.S. weapons inspector David Kay
told the Associated Press that he doubted the shell or
the nerve agent came from a hidden stockpile, although
he didn't rule out that possibility.Kay also considered it
possible that the shell wasan old relic overlooked when
Saddam said he had destroyed such weapons in the mid1990s.* [98] It is likely that the insurgents who planted
the bomb did not know it contained sarin, according to
Brig. Gen. Mark Kimmitt, and another U.S. ocial conrmed that the shell did not have the markings of a chemical agent.* [98] The Iraq Survey Group later concluded
that the shell probably originated with a batch that was
stored in a Al Muthanna CW complex basement during
the late 1980s for the purpose of leakage testing.* [97]
In a July 2, 2004, article published by The Associated
Press and Fox News, it was reported that sarin gas warheads dating back to the last IranIraq War were found
in South Central Iraq by Polish Allies. The Polish troops
secured munitions on June 23, 2004,* [99] but it turned
out that the warheads did not in fact contain sarin gas but
were all empty and tested negative for any type of chemicalsand it transpired that the Poles had bought the shells
for $5,000 each.* [100]
171
These munitions meet the technical denition of weapons
of mass destruction, according to the commander of the
National Ground Intelligence Center. These are chemical weapons as dened under the Chemical Weapons
Convention, and yes ... they do constitute weapons of
mass destruction,Army Col. John Chu told the House
Armed Services Committee. The munitions addressed
in the report were produced in the 1980s, according to
Army Lt. Gen. Michael D. Maples. Badly corroded, they
could not currently be used as originally intended, though
agent remaining in the weapons would be very valuable
to terrorists and insurgents, Maples said.* [105]
On July 2008, 550 metric tonnes ofyellowcakethe last
major remnant of Saddam Hussein's nuclear program, a
huge stockpile of concentrated natural uranium, arrived
in Montreal as part of a top-secret U.S. operation. This
transport of the seed material for higher-grade nuclear enrichment, included a two-week airlift from Baghdad and
a voyage across two oceans. The Iraqi government sold
the yellowcake to a Canadian uranium producer, Cameco
Corp., in a transaction the ocial described as worth
tens of millions of dollars.* [106]
In October 2014, the New York Times reported that
U.S. servicemen had been exposed and injured during
the disposal and destruction of abandoned 4,990 chemical weapons that had been discovered in Iraq.* [107]
CBS News reported that the U.S. government had
concealed the injuries to the troops by chemical
weapons.* [108]* [109] US soldiers reporting exposure to
mustard gas and sarin allege they were required to keep
their exposure secret, sometimes declined admission to
hospital and evacuation home despite the request of their
commanders.* [109]
172
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
4.14.7
Media perception
Demetrius Perricos
Dodgy Dossier
In Shifting Sands: The Truth About Unscom and the
Disarming of Iraq
Iraqi biological weapons program
Iraqi chemical weapons program
Iraqi aluminum tubes
Mobile weapons laboratory
Oce of Special Plans
Operation Opera
Operation Rockingham
Project Babylon, a project with unknown objectives
commissioned by Iraqi president Saddam Hussein to
build a series of superguns
Yellowcake forgery
2. Once information is published, its subsequent correction does not alter people's beliefs unless they are suspicious about the motives underlying the events the
news stories are about.
3. When people ignore corrections, they do so irrespective of how certain they are that the corrections occurred.
A poll conducted between June and September 2003
asked people whether they thought evidence of WMD
had been discovered in Iraq since the war ended. They
were also asked which media sources they relied upon.
Those who obtained their news primarily from Fox News
were three times as likely to believe that evidence of
WMD had been discovered in Iraq than those who relied on PBS and NPR for their news, and one third more
likely than those who primarily watched CBS.
4.14.8
See also
Alexander Coker
At the Center of the Storm: My Years at the CIA
Corinne Heraud
Death of David Kelly
[10] Iraq Survey Group Final Report: Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)".
[11] Keeley, James F (2009), A list of bilateral civilian nuclear
co-operation agreements (PDF) 5, University of Calgary,
Canada, p. 595, retrieved 2013-02-03, Source: UNTS
10362.
4.14. IRAQ
173
[31] Fassihi, Farnaz (October 27, 2002). In Iran, grim reminders of Saddam's arsenal. The Star-Ledger. Retrieved 2006-06-09.
[32] Gellman, Barton (November 5, 2002). 4 Nations
Thought To Possess Smallpox. Washington Post. Retrieved 2006-04-28.
[33] Bruce W. Jentleson (1994). With Friends Like These:
Reagan, Bush, and Saddam, 1982-1990. W.W. Norton.
p. 76. ISBN 0-393-03665-0.
[34] Hughes, Paul (January 21, 2003). "'It's like a knife stabbing into me'". The Star. Retrieved 2006-06-10.
[35] The dishonest case for war on Iraq. November 15,
2007. Retrieved 2008-03-21.
[36] Hirst, David (March 22, 1988). The Kurdish victims
caught unaware by cyanide. The Guardian (London).
Retrieved 2006-06-09.
[37] Saddam Hussein is deant as his second trial begins in
high-prole Anfal case. SignOnSanDiego.com (Union
Tribune). August 21, 2006. Retrieved 2006-09-04.
[38] 1990: Iraq invades Kuwait. BBC. August 2, 1990.
Retrieved 2006-06-10.
[39] Albright, David; Mark Hibbs (March 1991). Iraq and
the bomb: Were they even close?". Bulletin of the Atomic
Scientists (Educational Foundation for Nuclear Science,
Inc.) 47 (2): 1625. Retrieved 2009-08-04.
[40] Kuwait (11/05)". US State Department. November 2005.
Retrieved 2006-06-10.
[41] Security Council Resolution 686 (PDF). The United
Nations. March 2, 1991. Retrieved 2006-06-10.
[42] Security Council Resolution 687 (PDF). The United
Nations. April 3, 1991. Retrieved 2006-06-10.
[43] The Inspections Maze. Christian Science Monitor.
2002. Archived from the original on February 13, 2006.
Retrieved 2006-04-28.
[44] Biological Warfare Annex B. Archived from the original on August 31, 2006. Retrieved 2006-09-05.
[45] Corbin, Jane (February 9, 2003). Iraqi bio-scientist
breaks silence. BBC One Panorama. Retrieved 200604-28.
174
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
4.14. IRAQ
175
[85] Iraq Survey Group Final Report. Global Security.org. [103] Warren Stroebel (June 22, 2006). New report oers
Retrieved 2006-04-29.
no evidence that Iraq stockpiled WMD. Knight-Ridder
Newspapers. Archived from the original on February 24,
[86] Iraq Survey Group Final Report. CIA. Retrieved 20112007. Retrieved 2006-08-09.
02-19.
[104] National Ground Intelligence Center Report Key Points
[87] Report concludes no WMD in Iraq. BBC News. Ocon the Recovery of Chemical Munitions in Iraq (PDF).
tober 7, 2004. Retrieved 2006-04-28.
Archived from the original (PDF) on Oct 10, 2010. Retrieved 2010-10-10.
[88]Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI
on Iraq's WMD - Chapter 1: Nuclear - Key Findings. [105] Munitions Found in Iraq Meet WMD Criteria, Ocial
Retrieved 2011-02-19.
Says. Retrieved 2011-11-30.
[89] Brokaw, Tom (January 26, 2004). David Kay: Exclu- [106] Uranium shipped to Montreal from Iraq in top secret
sive interview - Chemical, biological, nuclear programs
mission. CBC News. Associated Press. July 5, 2008.
'rudimentary'". NBC News. Retrieved 2006-04-29.
Retrieved 2008-07-05.
[90] U.S. Removes Two Tons of Uranium From Iraq. [107] New York Times US Intelligence on Chemical
FOXNews.com. July 7, 2004. Archived from the origWeapons.
inal on May 2, 2007. Retrieved 2006-04-28.
[108] CBSAmerican Soldiers Exposed to Chemical Weapons
[91] Pincus, Walter (December 14, 2003). U.N. inspector:
.
Little new in U.S. probe for Iraq arms. The Washington
Post. Retrieved 2006-04-28.
[109] US Casualties of Iraq Chemical Weapons. Archived
from NY Times story the original on 2014-10-22.
[92] Binder, Patrice; David Franz; Roque Monteleone-Neto;
Richard Spertzel; Raymond A. Zilinskas (December [110] Schneidmiller, Chris (27 April 2009). India Completes
2003). The Kay Report to Congress on the Activities
Chemical Weapons Disposal; Iraq Declares Stockpile.
of the Iraq Survey Group: Former Bioweapons InspecNuclear Threat Initiative. Retrieved 15 May 2015.
tors Comment. Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, and Science 1 (4): 239246. [111] Psychological Science Journal Information. Blackwellpublishing.com. Retrieved 5 August 2010.
doi:10.1089/153871303771861432. PMID 15040203.
[93] Documents Show Saddam's WMD Frustrations [112] http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/16/world/
cia-is-said-to-have-bought-and-destroyed-iraqi-chemical-weapons.
Associated Press March 21, 2006 Archived April 8, 2010
html?&_r=0
at the Wayback Machine
[94] Pete Hoekstra on MSNBC. Archived from the original [113] Misperceptions, the Media and the Iraq War at the
Wayback Machine (archived February 10, 2006), PIPA,
(WMV) on March 25, 2006. Retrieved 2006-04-29.
2 October 2003
[95] Mortar shells from Iraq had no chemical agents. Daily
Times. AP. 19 January 2004. Archived from the original
on 19 January 2005. Retrieved 18 August 2015.
4.14.10 External links
[96] Porteus, Liza (May 19, 2004). Tests Conrm Sarin in
Iraqi Artillery Shell. FOX News. Retrieved 2006-0429.
[97] Iraq's Chemical Warfare Program Annex F. Archived
from the original on June 23, 2005. Retrieved 2005-0629.
[98] Iraq Sarin Find Worries U.S.. CBS News. May 17,
2004. Retrieved 2006-04-29.
[99] Polish Troops Find Sarin Warheads. FOX News. July
2, 2004. Archived from the original on May 30, 2006.
Retrieved 2006-04-29.
[100] Pincus, Walter (July 3, 2004). Chemicals Not Found in
Iraq Warheads. The Washington Post: A21. Retrieved
2006-04-29.
[101] Lawmakers Cite Weapons Found in Iraq. washingtonpost.com. June 22, 2006. Retrieved 2009-08-01.
[102] De-classied Report (PDF). House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. June
21, 2006. Archived from the original (PDF) on June 28,
2006. Retrieved 2006-04-29.
176
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
4.15 Israel
Israel is widely believed to possess weapons of mass
destruction, and to be one of four nuclear-armed countries not recognized as a Nuclear Weapons State by the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).* [1] The US
Congress Oce of Technology Assessment has recorded
Israel as a country generally reported as having undeclared chemical warfare capabilities, and an oensive
biological warfare program.* [2] Ocially Israel neither
conrms nor denies possessing nuclear weapons.
4.15.1
Nuclear weapons
It is believed that Israel had possessed an operational nuclear weapons capability by 1967, with the mass production of nuclear warheads occurring immediately after the
Six-Day War.* [2] Although no ocial statistics exist, it
has been estimated that Israel possesses from 75 to as
many as 400 nuclear weapons.* [3]* [4]* [5]* [6] It is unknown if Israel's reported thermonuclear weapons are in
the megaton range. * [7] Israel is also reported to possess a wide range of dierent systems, including neutron
bombs, tactical nuclear weapons, and suitcase nukes.* [8]
Israel is believed to manufacture its nuclear weapons at
the Negev Nuclear Research Center.
4.15.2
In 2006, then Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert appeared to acknowledge that Israel had nuclear weapons
when he stated on German TV that Iran was aspiring to have nuclear weapons as America, France, Israel,
Russia.* [13]* [14]* [15] This admission was in contrast There are also speculations that a chemical weapons proto the long-running Israeli government policy of deliber- gram might be located at the Israel Institute for Biological
4.15. ISRAEL
Research (IIBR* [21]) in Ness Ziona.* [22]
190 liters of dimethyl methylphosphonate, a CWC schedule 2 chemical used in the synthesis of sarin nerve gas,
was discovered in the cargo of El Al Flight 1862 after it
crashed in 1992 en route to Tel Aviv. Israel insisted the
material was non-toxic, was to have been used to test lters that protect against chemical weapons, and that it had
been clearly listed on the cargo manifest in accordance
with international regulations. The shipment was from a
U.S. chemical plant to the IIBR under a U.S. Department
of Commerce license.* [23]
In 1993, the U.S. Congress Oce of Technology Assessment WMD proliferation assessment recorded Israel as
a country generally reported as having undeclared oensive chemical warfare capabilities.* [2] Former US deputy
assistant secretary of defense responsible for chemical
and biological defense Dr. Bill Richardson said in 1998
I have no doubt that Israel has worked on both chemical
and biological oensive things for a long time... There's
no doubt they've had stu for years.* [24]
4.15.4
Biological weapons
4.15.5
In literature
4.15.6
References
177
[4] Toukan, Abdullah, Senior Associate; Cordesman, Anthony H., Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy. Study on
a Possible Israeli Strike on Irans Nuclear Development
Facilities (PDF). Center for Strategic and International
Studies. Retrieved April 2, 2015.
[5] Brower, Kenneth S., A Propensity for Conict: Potential Scenarios and Outcomes of War in the Middle
East,Jane's Intelligence Review, Special Report no. 14,
(February 1997), 14-15.
[6] Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance. Arms
Control Association. Retrieved 2007-05-30.
[7] http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/03/31/
does-israel-really-have-a-thermonuclear-weapon/.
Missing or empty |title= (help)
[8] Hersh, Seymour M. The Samson Option: Israel's Nuclear
Arsenal and American Foreign Policy. New York: Random House, 1991. ISBN 0-394-57006-5 p.220
[9] Plushnick-Masti, Ramit (2006-08-25). Israel Buys 2
Nuclear-Capable Submarines. The Washington Post.
Retrieved 2010-05-20.
[10] http://www.scribd.com/doc/6088311/
Missile-Survey-Ballistic-and-Cruise-Missiles-of-Foreign-Countries
[11] Alon Ben-David (1 October 2009). Israel seeks sixth
Dolphin in light of Iranian 'threat'". Jane's Defence
Weekly. Retrieved 2009-11-03.
[12] John Pike.Israel Air Force - Israel. globalsecurity.org.
[13] Israeli PM in nuclear arms hint. BBC Online. 200612-12. Retrieved 2015-07-30.
[14] In a Slip, Israels Leader Seems to Conrm Its Nuclear
Arsenal. The New York Times. 2006-12-12. Retrieved
2015-07-30.
[15] Israeli PM admits to nuclear weapons. ABC Online.
2006-12-12. Retrieved 2015-07-30.
[16] Dawoud, Khaled (1999-12-02). Redening the bomb
. Al-Ahram Weekly. Retrieved 2006-07-02.
[17] Mohamed ElBaradei (27 July 2004). Transcript of
the Director General's Interview with Al-Ahram News
. International Atomic Energy Agency. Retrieved 200706-03.
[18] 43 nations to seek Middle East free of WMDs.
MSNBC.com. 2008-07-13. Retrieved 2011-09-06.
[19] United Nations Treaty Collection. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and
Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction. Accessed 14 January 2009.
[20] 1NIE on Israeli Chemical Weapons. scribd.com.
[21] IIBR, IL.
[22] Cohen, Avner.Israel and Chemical/Biological Weapons:
History, Deterrence, and Arms Control (PDF). Retrieved 2010-04-27.
178
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
4.15.7
External links
4.16 Japan
Bibliography of Israeli Nuclear Science Publications Beginning in the mid-1930s, the nation of Japan
conducted numerous attempts to acquire and develop
by Mark Gorwitz, June 2005
weapons of mass destruction. The 1943 Battle of
Israeli Nuclear Forces, 2002, Bulletin of the Atomic Changde saw Japanese use of both bioweapons and
Scientists, September/October 2002
chemical weapons, and the Japanese conducted a serious,
4.16. JAPAN
179
though futile, nuclear weapon program. After the end of NBC protection Troop.
World War II the nation was forced to cease all produc- In 1995, JGSDF admitted possession of sarin for samtion and abandoned their experiments.
ples.
Since World War II, Japan has become a nuclear-capable
state, said to a be a screwdrivers turnaway from nuclear weapons, having the capacity, the know-how, and 4.16.3 Nuclear weapons
the materials to make a nuclear bomb. Japan has consistently eschewed any desire to have nuclear weapons, and Main article: Japanese nuclear weapon program
no mainstream Japanese party has ever advocated acquisition of nuclear weapons or any weapons of mass deA Japanese program to develop nuclear weapons was construction. Such weapons are forbidden by the Japanese
ducted during World War II. Like the German nuclear
constitution.
weapons program, it suered from an array of problems,
and was ultimately unable to progress beyond the laboratory stage before the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and
4.16.1 Bioweapons
Nagasaki and the Japanese surrender in August 1945.
Main article: Unit 731
The postwar Constitution forbids the establishment of offensive military forces, and in 1967 it adopted the Three
During the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) and World Non-Nuclear Principles, ruling out the production, posWar II, Unit 731 and other Special Research Units of the session, or introduction of nuclear weapons.
Imperial Japanese Army conducted human experimen- While there are currently no known plans in Japan to
tation on thousands, mostly Chinese, Russian, American produce nuclear weapons, it has been argued that Japan
and other nationalities as well as some Japanese criminals has the technology, raw materials, and the capital to profrom the Japanese mainlands.* [1] In military campaigns, duce nuclear weapons within one year if necessary, and
the Japanese army used biological weapons on Chinese some analysts consider it a de facto nuclear state for this
soldiers and civilians.
reason.* [3] For this reason Japan is often said to be a
*
*
This employment was largely viewed as ineective, due screwdriver's turn [4] [5] away from possessing nuto inecient delivery systems. However, information has clear weapons.
surfaced in the last decade, which alleges a more active
Japanese usage. For example, rsthand accounts testify
the Japanese infected civilians through the distribution of 4.16.4 Delivery systems
plague-infested foodstus, such as dumplings and vegetaMain articles: M-V, Epsilon (rocket) and J-I
bles.
During Changde chemical weapon attack attacks, the
Japanese also employed biological warfare by intentionally spreading cholera, dysentery, typhoid, bubonic
plague, and anthrax. Other battles include: Kaimingye
germ weapon attack.
4.16.2
Chemical weapons
Solid fuel rockets are the design of choice for military applications as they can remain in storage for long periods,
and then reliably launch at short notice.
Lawmakers made national security arguments for keeping Japan's solid-fuel rocket technology alive after
ISAS was merged into the Japan Aerospace Exploration
Agency, which also has the H-IIA liquid-fuelled rocket,
in 2003. The ISAS director of external aairs, Yasunori
Matogawa, said, It seems the hard-line national security proponents in parliament are increasing their inuence, and they aren't getting much criticismI think we
re moving into a very dangerous period. When you consider the current environment and the threat from North
Korea, its scary.* [6]
Experiments involving chemical weapons were conducted on live prisoners (Unit 516). As of 2005, 60 years
after the end of the war, canisters that were abandoned by Toshiyuki Shikata, a government adviser and former lieuJapan in their hasty retreat are still being dug up in con- tenant general, indicated that part of the rationale for
struction sites, causing injuries and allegedly even deaths. the fth M-V Hayabusa mission was that the reentry and
In December 1993, Japan signed the Chemical Weapons landing of its return capsule demonstrated that Japan's
Convention, ratied it in 1995 and was thus a state party ballistic missile capability is credible.* [7]
upon entering into force in 1997.* [2]
At a technical level the M-V design could be weaponised
However, JSDF possess chemical weapons facilities and quickly (as an Intercontinental ballistic missile) although
some samples for protection which it said JGSDF Central this would be politically unlikely.* [8]
180
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
4.16.5
See also
1980.* [4] The United States and the United Kingdom assisted Libya in removing equipment and material from its
nuclear weapons program, with independent verication
by the IAEA.* [3]
Libya acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention effective 5 February 2004* [5] and began destroying its
chemical munitions later that year,* [6] but missed the
4.16.6 References
deadlines for converting one chemical weapons produc[1] AII POW-MIA Unit 731
tion facility to peaceful use and for destroying its stockpile of mustard agent.* [7] In October 2014, Libya asked
[2]Member states of the OPCW. OPCW. Retrieved 2010- for foreign assistance to transport its 850 tonnes stock09-17.
pile of precursor chemicals for making nerve gas out of
*
[3] John H. Large (May 2, 2005). THE ACTUAL Libya for destruction. [8] In February 2015, Libyan miliAND POTENTIAL DEVELOPMENT OF NUCLEAR tary sources told media that unidentied armed men have
WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY IN THE AREA OF captured large amounts of Libyas chemical weapons,
NORTH EAST ASIA (KOREAN PENINSULAR AND including mustard gas and sarin.* [9]* [10]
JAPAN)" (PDF). R3126-A1. Archived from the original
(PDF) on 2007-07-10.
[4] Nuclear Scholars Initiative 2010: Recap of Seminar
Four. CSIS. Retrieved 29 June 2010.
[7] Chester Dawson (28 October 2011).In Japan, Provocative Case for Staying Nuclear. Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 13 November 2011.
[8] William E. Rapp (January 2004).Paths Diverging? The
Next Decade in the US-Japan Security Alliance(PDF).
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College. p. 82.
Retrieved 29 October 2012. 119. Japan has the weapons
grade plutonium, technology for weaponization, and delivery means in the M-V-5 rocket, indigenous, solid fueled, 1800kg payload capacity, to go nuclear very rapidly
should it choose. This dramatic step, however, would require a complete loss of faith in the American nuclear umbrella
4.17 Libya
Libya possesses chemical weapons and ballistic missiles and previously pursued nuclear weapons under the
leadership of Muammar Gadda. On 19 December
2003, Gadda announced that Libya would voluntarily eliminate all materials, equipment and programs that
could lead to internationally proscribed weapons, including weapons of mass destruction and long-range
ballistic missiles.* [1]* [2]* [3] Libya signed the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1968 and ratied it
in 1975, and concluded a safeguards agreement with
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in
4.17. LIBYA
181
ated and was delegated to participate in its nuclear pro- gic decision to start the program with a new attitude.* [3]
gram, Project-706, in 1974.* [14]
Libya employed a large number of black market network,
In 1977, the Libyan technicians were departed to Pak- rst reeving the 20 pre-assembled centrifuges and compoistan but by the time Libyans joined the program, the nents for an additional* 200 centrifuges and related parts
martial law was taken in eect against Bhutto in response from foreign suppliers. [15] The pre-assembled rotors for
to end the political deadlock.* [14] Before Pakistan's A- centrifuges were used to install a completed single cenbomb project succeeded, Libya had been taken out of the trifuge at the Al Hashan site, which was rst successfully
equation as the new President General Zia-ul-Haq had tested in October 2000.
distrusted and strongly disliked Gadda.* [14] On immediate eects, Libyans were asked to leave the country
and the Libyan Intelligence made attempts to inltrate
Pakistan's high-powered research institutes, but such attempts were thwarted by ISI who intercepted and arrested
these Libyan agents.* [13]
With relations severed with Pakistan, Gadda normalized relations with India in 1978, and Gadda reached
a mutual understanding with India for civil nuclear cooperation, as part of as part of India's Atoms for Peace
program. With the Indian Prime minister Indira Gandhi
visiting Libya in 1984, a nuclear energy pact was signed
by Libya and India, but it is unclear how much interaction and cooperation took place.* [3]* [15] Throughout the
1980s, Libyan eorts continue to push for acquiring nuclear weapons from various sources. In an ingenious persuasion to uranium enrichment in 1978, Libya made an
eort to gain access to uranium ore, uranium conversion
facilities, and enrichment techniques that together would
have enabled Libya to produce weapons-grade uranium.
The approach failed in 1979, and in 1980 Libya decided
to pursue a plutonium-based pathway to nuclear weapons.
Libya imported 1,200 tons of uranium ore concentrate
from French-controlled mines in Niger without declaring
it to the IAEA, as required by its safeguards agreement.
In 1982, Libya attempted to enter in an agreement with
Belgium for purchasing a small plant for manufacturing
UF4 . At the time, Libya had no declared nuclear facilities
that required UF4 , and the purchase was refused.* [3]
In 1980, Libya began to build its nuclear infrastructure
from various nuclear black market sources. The centrifuges materials and expertise were provided by Swiss
national, Friedrich Tinner. Tinner's work on centrifuges
took place at the TNRF aimed at producing gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment. By the late 1980s, nancial constraints and economic sanctions were imposed by
the United States in the 1980s, further hampering the nuclear program. Work was completed by Tinner in 1992,
but Libya remained unable to produce an operating centrifuge.* [3] After the end of Cold War, Gadda bluntly
persuaded the U.S. President Bill Clinton to uplift the
sanctions by allowing the disarmament of its nuclear program.* [16]
In 1995, Gadda renewed calls for nuclear weapons and
pursued new avenues for nuclear technology procurement, while publicizing the NPT.* [17] In 1997, Libya received technical documentation and materials on gas centrifuges from various sources, as Libya had made a strate-
In 2000, Libya accelerated its eorts, still headed by Tinner. Libya received many documents on the design and
operation of centrifuges, but the program suered many
setbacks in evaluating these designs as they were too dicult to interpret and bring into operation. Libya ultimately
told IAEA investigators that it had no national personnel competent to evaluate these designs at that time, and
due to its extreme diculty, Libya would have had to ask
the supplier for help if it had decided to pursue a nuclear
weapon.* [3]
182
Dismantlement
Main article: Disarmament of Libya
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
weapons ingredients remain to be destroyed.* [29]
According to the New York Times, on February 2014, the
United States and Libya have discreetly destroyed what
both sides say were the last remnants of Col. Muammar al-Qadda's lethal arsenal of chemical arms. They
used a transportable oven technology to destroy hundreds
of bombs and artillery rounds lled with deadly mustard
agent.* [30]
4.17. LIBYA
183
[17] Joshua Sinai, Libya's Pursuit of Weapons of Mass Destruction,Nonproliferation Review 4, Spring-Summer
1997, p. 97.
[18] jack Kelley, Russian Nuke Experts Wooed,USA Today, 8 January 1992; Libya Denies Oers to Soviets,
Washington Post, 11 January 1992.
[19] Joseph Cirincione with Jon B. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Tracking Weapons of Mass
Destruction (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2002), p. 307.
[20] OPCW, Libya: Facts and Figures
[21] Libya's CW Capabilities (PDF). June 2011.
[22] Nuclear Threat Initiative, 30 September 2011, Senate
Delegation Positive About Security of Libyan WMD Materials
[9] Libya militias capture chemical weapons: army ocial [29] Barnes, Diane (11 September 2013). Destruction
of Libyan Chemical-Loaded Arms Remains on Hold.
. Asharq Al-Awsat. 21 February 2015.
Global Security Newswire (NTI). Retrieved 26 October
[10] Libya: Unidentied armed men attack chemical factory,
2013.
ee with chemical weapons. The North Africa Post. 23
[30] Libyas Cache of Toxic Arms All Destroyed. New
February 2015.
York Times. 2 February 2014. Retrieved 4 February 2014.
[11] et. al. The Program begins: 1968. NTI 2003. Re[31] Libya asks chemical weapons watchdog to remove stocktrieved 24 April 2013.
pile. Daily Times. 24 September 2014. Retrieved 27
[12] The Risk Report Volume 1 Number 10 (December 1995)
September 2014.
Page 1, 3-4. Libya Has Trouble Building the Most
Deadly Weapons. The Risk Report Volume 1 Number [32] Libyan Minister of Foreign Aairs Visits the OPCW
. OPCW. 5 February 2015.
10 (December 1995) Page 1, 3-4. Wisconsin Project reports. Retrieved 24 April 2013.
[33] Report: Chemical weapons in Libya 'seized by extremists'". i24news. 21 February 2015.
[13] Nazi, Nazir Naji (2010). Colonel Gadda's Libya and
his Nuclear ambitions. Nazir Nazi and Jang Group of
[34] Libyan Army ocial tells Arab paper that militias capMedia.
tured chemical weapons. The Jerusalem Post. 22 February 2015.
[14] Stengel, Richard (3 June 1985). Who has the Bomb?".
Time (magazine). pp. 7/13. Archived from the original
[35] Libya conict: Gadda forces 'launched Scud missile'".
on 3 June 1985. Retrieved 23 February 2011.
BBC News. 16 August 2011. Retrieved 25 September
2011.
[15] Pike, John E.Libyan nuclear programme. Global Security. Retrieved 8 December 2011.
[36] Gadha's Forces Fired 3 Scuds at Misrata: NATO.
[16] The Iraq War did not Force Gada's Hand | Brookings
DefenseNews. 23 August 2011. Retrieved 25 September
Institution
2011.
184
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
[37]Libyan Rebels Advance on Sirte Amid Protests Over Appointments. San Francisco Chronicle. 29 August 2011.
Retrieved 25 September 2011.
[38] Gadda missiles could be scrapped. IOL News. 22
September 2011. Retrieved 25 September 2011.
[39] Scud missile battery sits unguarded outside Tripoli.
TVNZ. 5 September 2011. Retrieved 25 September 2011.
4.17.5
See also
USAFE Commander General Roger Brady being shown a disarming procedure on a dummy at Volkel Air Base.
4.18 Netherlands
4.18.1
United
States-NATO
weapons sharing
nuclear
185
UK-U.S. Memorandum of Understanding of Use
of Nuclear Weapons. 1965. DEFE 24/691E28., Contained in an exchange of letters between
Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Pres Lyndon
B.Johnson, declassied 2002, and now in the UK
National Archives, London led as DEFE 24/691E28
4.18.3
On 20 February 2008, it was revealed that the Netherlands had conducted chemical warfare experiments with
nerve gas in the early 1950s. These experiments were
conducted by the TNO organization on the request of
the Defense Department. They consisted of the use of
sarin, tabun, soman, and a modied French gas called
Stof X (Substance X), which was more poisonous than
sarin. The experiments were carried out on animals in the
village of Harskamp and on the Vliehors bombing range,
located on the island of Vlieland. After 1956, the only experiments were those conducted jointly with France and
Belgium in the desert of Algeria, which utilized 6 kilograms of Stof X. The reason behind these experiments
was the fear of an attack by the Soviet Union.* [6]
4.18.4
Notes
2009-08-07
On February 11, 2013, the U.S. Geological Survey detected a magnitude 5.1 seismic disturbance,* [13] reported to be a third underground nuclear test.* [14] North
Korea has ocially reported it as a successful nuclear
4.18.5 References
test with a lighter warhead that delivers more force than
before, but has not revealed the exact yield. Multiple
Norris, Robert S.; Andrew Burrows; Richard Field- South Korean sources estimate the yield at 69 kilohouse (1994). Vol.5. British, French and Chinese tons, while the German Federal Institute for Geosciences
Nuclear Weapons. Nuclear Weapons Databook. and Natural Resources estimates the yield at 40 kilotons.* [15]* [16]* [17]
Oxford: Westview Press. ISBN 0-8133-1612-X.
[6] NRC newspaper, 19 feb. 2008
186
4.19.1
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
History
187
188
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
189
In December 2002, claiming North Korean noncompliance, the United States persuaded the KEDO
Board to suspend fuel oil shipments, which led to the
end of the Agreed Framework. North Korea responded
3. Pyongan Bukdo (North Pyongan) Province 4 Sites: by announcing plans to reactivate a dormant nuclear fuel
processing program and power plant north of Pyongyang.
North Korea soon thereafter expelled United Nations in Yongbyonsi 2 Sites Location of Yongbyon Nu- spectors and announced a unilateral withdrawalfrom
clear Research Center, and the facility's Experimen- the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
tal Test Explosion facility and two unidentied underground facilities. In addition, there is a gas- In 2007, a Bush administration ocial assessed that,
graphite reactor, HE test site, nuclear fuel fabrica- while there was still ahigh condencethat North Korea
acquired materials that could be used in a productiontion site, nuclear waste storage site
scaleuranium program, there is only amid-condence
Kusungsi Between 1997 and September 2002, ap- level such a production-scale uranium (rather than merely
proximately 70 test explosions of North Korean mu- plutonium) program exists.* [61]* [62]
nitions took place. Also, existence of underground
facility
Stockpile estimates and projections
Taechongun 200MWe Nuclear Energy Plant construction site. Location of unidentied underground Institute for Science and International Security For
facility and nuclear arms/energy related facilities 2013, the Institute for Science and International Security
known to exist
gives a mid-range estimate of 12 to 27 nuclear weapon
4. Pyongan Namdo (South Pyongan) Province 1 Site:
Pyongsungsi Location of National Science Academy
and extensive underground facility whose purpose is not
known.
equivalents, including plutonium and uranium stockpiles. By 2016, North Korea is projected to have 14 to 48
nuclear weapon equivalents. (For uranium weapons, each
weapon is assumed to contain 20 kilograms of weaponsgrade uranium.)* [4]
North Korea reportedly acquired the technology necessary to produce tabun and mustard gas as early as the
1950s.* [66] Since 1989 North Korea has been believed
to have the capability to indigenously produce nerve, blister, choking and blood chemical agents in bulk. Furthermore, North Korea has spent substantial resources in defensive measures such as extensive training in the use of
190
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
gas masks, suits, detectors and decontamination systems Early 2000s North Korea's ability to deliver weapons
for both the civilian populace and the military.
of mass destruction to a hypothetical target is somewhat
North Korea maintains at least eight industrial facilities limited by its missile technology. As of 2005, North Komissiles estimated as 900
that are capable of creating biochemical weaponry. The rea's total range with its Nodong
*
km
with
a
1,000
kg
payload,
[70]
enough to reach South
United States estimates North Korea's likely stockpile of
Korea,
and
parts
of
Japan,
Russia
and China. It is not
chemical weaponry from at least a few hundred tons, to
known
if
this
missile
is
capable
of
carrying the nuclear
*
at most a few thousand tons. [67]
weapons North Korea may have developed.
In 2009 the International Crisis Group reported that
the consensus expert view was that North Korea had a The BM25 Musudan is a North Korean designed
stockpile of about 2,500 to 5,000 tonnes of chemical intermediate-range ballistic missile with range capabiliweapons, including mustard gas, sarin (GB) and other ties of up to 1,550 miles (2,490 km), and could carry a
nerve agents.* [68] The South Korean government also es- nuclear warhead. As of 2010, Western sources had no
system had ever been tested,
timated the stockpile as about 2,500 to 5,000 tonnes in indication that the *missile
*
or
was
operational.
[72]
[73]
North Korea has also de*
2010. [65]
veloped the Taepodong-1 missile, which has a range of
North Korea may have also begun the production of bi- 2,500 km, but it is unlikely to have been deployed.* [70]
nary agents. Binary agents are toxic only when the two
missile, with
chemicals (normally physically separated) are combined. With the development of the Taepodong-2
*
an
expected
range
of
5,0006,000
km,
[74]
North KoBy creating binary agents, North Korea can increase their
rea
could
hypothetically
deliver
a
warhead
to almost
safety when handling hazardous material.* [67] North Koall
countries
in
Southeast
Asia,
as
well
as
the
western
rean military units conduct regular nuclear, biological,
side
of
North
America.
The
Taepodong-2
missile
was
and chemical (NBC) training exercises in a chemical enunsuccessfully tested on July 4, 2006. U.S. intelligence
vironment. North Korean chemical and biological warfare units are equipped with decontamination and detec- estimates that the weapon will not be operational for another 11 years. The Taepodong-2 could theoretically
tion equipment.* [67] In 2010, the Omaha World-Herald
reported that North Korea has chemical weapons which hit the western United States and other U.S. interests
in the Western hemisphere. The current model of the
could cause millions of casualties in South Korea, where
gas masks are only provided to the military and top gov- Taepodong-2 could not carry nuclear warheads to the
United States. Former CIA director George Tenet has
ernment ocials.* [69]
claimed that, with a light payload, Taepodong-2 could
reach western parts of Continental United States, though
with low accuracy. A few Taepodong-2 missiles may ex4.19.4 Delivery systems
ist, but launch procedures are lengthy and visible.* [70]
See also: Strategic Rocket Forces (North Korea) and
North Korean missile tests
191
rean vessel that the investigating nation believes is carrying weaponry.* [79] It has been suggested that the test
ring of missiles is an act of deance against the United
States national holiday, Independence Day.* [77]
Japan Ministry of Defense's analyst Takesada points out
that North Korea's desire of unication is similar to North
Vietnam, and warns of the possibility of North Korea's
compulsory merger with South Korea by threats of nuclear weapons, taking advantage of any possible decrease
in the U.S. military presence in South Korea, after North
Korea deploys several hundred mobile ICBMs aimed at
the United States.* [80]
Delivery systems
Canada
USA
(Alaska)
Russia
China
India
North
Korea
South
Korea
USA
(Hawaii)
Japan
Nodong, 1000 km
Taepodong-1, 2200 km
Guam
Musudan, 4000 km
Indonesia
Taepodong-2, 6000 km
Australia
Taepodong-1 three-stage technology demonstrator testbed. First stage was adapted from a Rodong1. Second stage was adapted from a Hwasong6. A satellite-delivery launch was attempted in
1998. The satellite failed, but the rst two stages
apparently functioned adequately. According to
some analysts, the Taepodong-1, if developed into
an ICBM platform, could have a range of nearly
6,000 km with a third stage and a payload of less
than 100 kg.* [86]* [87] The U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency estimates that the Taepodong-1 was
a test-bed, not intended or usable as a weapon.* [88]
The US National Air and Space Intelligence Center
made a similar assessment.* [89]
192
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
4.19.5
In April 2009 the United Nations named the Korea Mining and Development Trading Corporation (KOMID) as
North Korea's primary arms dealer and main exporter of
equipment related to ballistic missiles and conventional
weapons. The UN lists KOMID as being based in the
Central District, Pyongyang.* [91] However it also has ofces in Beijing and sales oces worldwide which facilitate weapons sales and seek new customers for North Korean weapons.* [92]
KOMID has sold missile technology to Iran* [93] and has
done deals for missile related technology with the Taiwanese.* [94] KOMID representatives were also involved
in a North Korean deal to mass-produce Kornet anti-tank
guided missiles for Syria* [95] and KOMID has also been
responsible for the sale of equipment, including missile
technologies, gunboats, and multiple rocket artilleries,
worth a total of over $100 million, to Africa, South America, and the Middle East.* [96]
North Korea's military has also used a company called
Hap Heng to sell weapons overseas. Hap Heng was based
in Macau in the 1990s to handle sales of weapons and
missile and nuclear technology to nations such as Pakistan and Iran. Pakistan's medium-range ballistic missile,
the Ghauri, is considered to be a copy of North Korea's
Rodong 1. In 1999, intelligence sources claim that North
Korea had sold missile components to Iran.* [97] Listed
directors of Hap Heng include Kim Song in and Ko Myong Hun.* [98] Ko Myong Hun is now a listed diplomat
in Beijing* [99] and may be involved in the work of KOMID.* [100]
A UN sanctions committee report stated that North Korea
operates an international smuggling network for nuclear
and ballistic missile technology, including to Myanmar
(Burma), Syria, and Iran.* [101]
Export partners
Many countries have bought North Korean ballistic missiles or have received assistance from North Korea to establish local missile production.
Yemen
Known to have bought Hwasong-5 missiles from
Pakistan
North Korean entities continued to provide assisthe DPRK in the 1990sa total of 15 missiles, 15
tance to Pakistan's ballistic missile program during
TELs with 15 HE warheads.* [108]
the rst half of 1999 in return for nuclear weapons
technology.* [102] Such assistance is critical to
Islamabad's eorts to produce ballistic missiles. Rejection by a potential export partner
In April 1998, Pakistan ight-tested the Ghauri
MRBM, which is based on North Korea's Nodong
Nigeria
In January 2004, the Nigerian government anmissile. Also in April 1998, the United States
nounced that North Korea had agreed to sell it
imposed sanctions against Pakistani and North
missile technology, but a month later Nigeria
Korean entities for their role in transferring Missile
rejected the agreement under U.S. pressure.* [109]
Technology Control Regime Category I ballistic
4.19.6
See also
4.19.7
References
193
[5] Military and Security Developments Involving the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (PDF) (Report). U.S.
Department of Defense. 2012. Retrieved 23 May 2013.
[7] North Korea Nuclear Test Conrmed by U.S. Intelligence Agency. Bloomberg. October 16, 2006. Retrieved October 16, 2006.
[8] North Korea's rst nuclear test Yield estimates section
[28] Washington Post,North 'bribed its way to nuclear statehood'", Japan Times, July 8, 2011, p. 4.
[29] North Korea Conrms It Has Nuclear Weapons. Fox
News. 11 February 2005. Retrieved 8 March 2013.
[9]Usher in a great heyday of Songun Korea full of condence in victory. The Pyongyang Times. January 6,
2007. p. 1.
[30] Traynor, Ian; Watts, Jonathan; Borger, Julian (20 September 2005). North Korea vows to abandon nuclear
weapons project. The Guardian (London). Retrieved
8 March 2013.
[12] North Korea's new nuclear test raises universal condemnation. NPSGlobal Foundation. May 25, 2009. Retrieved December 1, 2010.
194
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
[40] Glenn Kessler, Far-Reaching U.S. Plan Impaired N. Korea Deal: Demands Began to Undo Nuclear Accord, The
Washington Post, p. A20, September 26, 2008.
[42] N. Korea Says It Has Restarted Nuclear Facilities list [60] N Korea 'admits nuclear programme. BBC News.
October 17, 2002. Retrieved October 5, 2006.
. Fox News. Associated Press. April 25, 2009. Retrieved
April 25, 2009.
[61] Sanger, David E.; Broad, William J. (March 1, 2007).
U.S. Had Doubts on North Korean Uranium Drive. The
[43] Russia Today (April 26, 2009). North Korea: return of
New York Times. Retrieved March 1, 2007.
the nukes. RT. Retrieved May 22, 2009.
[44] N. Korea Says It Conducted 2nd Nuclear Test. Fox
News. Associated Press. May 25, 2009. Retrieved May
25, 2009.
[62] Kessler, Glenn (March 1, 2007). New Doubts on Nuclear Eorts by North Korea. The Washington Post.
Retrieved March 1, 2007.
[45] Joo, Seung-Hoo (2000). Gorbachev's Foreign Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula, 19851991: Power and Reform. E. Mellen Press. p. 205. ISBN 978-0-7734-78176.
[50] International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).. International Atomic Energy Agency. Retrieved November 5,
2012.
[51] Busch, Nathan E. (2004). No End in Sight: The Continuing Menace of Nuclear Proliferation. University Press of
Kentucky. p. 251. ISBN 978-0-8131-2323-3.
[70] Markus Schiller (2012). Characterizing the North Korean Nuclear Missile Threat (Report). RAND Corporation. ISBN 978-0-8330-7621-2. TR-1268-TSF. Retrieved January 19, 2013.
195
[73] http://www.isis-online.org/publications/dprk/
DPRKplutoniumFEB.pdf
[93] KOMID and Iran at the Wayback Machine (archived October 11, 2010)
[75] The North Korean Rocket Launch: International Reactions and Implications. James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. 27 April 2009. Retrieved 6 April
2014.
[76] Welcome to Missile Index Home Page. Missile.index.ne.jp. October 29, 1997. Retrieved March 1,
2012.
[77] North Korea missile tests defy UN. BBC News. July
4, 2009. Retrieved July 2, 2009.
[84] Eric Talmadge (April 26, 2012).Analysts say North Korea's new missiles are fakes. The Independent (London).
Retrieved April 29, 2012.
[85]
[86]
[87]
[88]
[89]
[90]
196
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
4.20 Pakistan
Pakistan began focusing on nuclear weapons develop North Korea: Problems, Perceptions and Proposals ment in January 1972 under Prime Minister Zulkar Ali
Bhutto, who delegated the program to the Chairman of
Oxford Research Group, April 2004
PAEC Munir Ahmad Khan with a commitment to have
Second nuclear test conducted by North Korea on the bomb ready by the end of 1976.* [10]* [11]* [12] Since
May 25, 2009
PAEC, consisting of over twenty laboratories and projects
under nuclear engineer, Munir Ahmad Khan* [13] was
Nuclear Files.org Information on the North Korean
falling behind schedule and having considerable dinuclear program including links to source docuculty producing ssile material, Abdul Qadeer Khan was
ments
brought from Europe by Zulkar Ali Bhutto at the end
Annotated bibliography for the North Korean nu- of 1974. As pointed out by Houston Wood, Professor
clear weapons program from the Alsos Digital Li- of Mechanical & Aerospace Engineering, University of
Virginia, Charlottesville, USA in his article on gas cenbrary
trifuges, "The most dicult step in building a nuclear
A.Q. Khan hand in North Korea bomb, by Venkate- weapon is the production of ssile material",* [14]* [15]
san Vembu, Daily News & Analysis, October 10, so this work in producing ssile material as head of
2006
the Kahuta Project was pivotal to Pakistan developing
the capability to detonate a nuclear bomb by the end of
The February 13 Action Plan and the Prospects 1984.* [16]* [17]
for the North Korean Nuclear Issue analysis by
Narushige Michishita, IFRI Proliferation Papers n The Kahuta Project started under the supervision of a
coordination board that oversaw the activities of ERL
17, 2007
and the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC).
North Korean International Documentation Project The Board consisted of Mr A G N Kazi (secretary genContains primary source documents related to the eral, nance), Mr Ghulam Ishaq Khan (secretary genDPRK's eorts to obtain nuclear technology dating eral, defence)* [18] and Mr Agha Shahi (secretary genback to the mid-1960s
eral, foreign aairs) and reported directly to Prime Minister Zulkar Ali Bhutto. Mr. Ghulam Ishaq Khan and
TIME Archives A Collection of stories regarding General Tikka Khan * [19] appointed military engineer,
North Korea's Nuclear Program
Major General Ali Nawab to the program. Eventually,
Chung Min Lee, The Evolution of the North Ko- the supervison passed to Lt General Zahid Ali Akbar in
rean Nuclear Crisis: Implications for Iran, Prolif- President General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq's Administration. Moderate uranium enrichment for the production of
eration Papers, Paris, IFRI, Winter 2009
ssile material was achieved at KRL by April 1978.* [20]
Norris, Robert S. and Kristensen, Hans M.,North Pakistan's nuclear weapons development was in response
Koreas nuclear program, 2005, Bulletin of the to neighboring India's development of its nuclear proAtomic Scientists, May/June 2005
gramme. Bhutto called a meeting of senior scientists and
4.20. PAKISTAN
197
goal to develop nuclear weapons received considerable in the 1960s by several ocials and senior scientists, Pakimpetus.* [24]
istan followed a strict non-nuclear weapon policy from
Finally, on 28 May 1998, a few weeks after India's 1956 until 1971, as PAEC under its chairman Ishrat Hussecond nuclear test (Operation Shakti), Pakistan deto- sain Usmani made no eorts to acquire nuclear fuel cypurposes of an active nuclear weapons pronated ve nuclear devices in the Ras Koh Hills in the cle for the
*
gramme.
[29]
Chagai district, Balochistan. This operation was named
Chagai-I by Pakistan, the underground iron-steel tunnel having been long-constructed by provincial martial
law administrator General Rahimuddin Khan during the
1980s. The last test of Pakistan was conducted at the
sandy Kharan Desert under the codename Chagai-II,
also in Balochistan, on 30 May 1998. Pakistan's ssile
material production takes place at Nilore, Kahuta, and
Khushab/Jauharabad, where weapons-grade plutonium
is rened. Pakistan thus became the seventh country
in the world to successfully develop and test nuclear
weapons.* [25] Although, according to a letter sent by
A.Q. Khan to General Zia, the capability to detonate a nuclear bomb using highly enriched uranium as ssile material produced at KRL had been achieved by KRL in
1984.* [16]* [17]
4.20.1
History
198
hold since 2009.
In 1965,* [33] amidst skirmishes that led up to the IndoPakistani War of 1965, Zulkar Ali Bhutto announced:
In the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, which was the second of four openly declared Indo-Pakistani wars and
conicts, Pakistan solicited Central Treaty Organization
(CENTO) assistance,* [36] but came under arms supply embargo in United Nations Security Council Resolution 211.* [37] Foreign minister (later Prime minister)
Zulkar Ali Bhutto aggressively began the advocating the
option of nuclear weapons programmesbut such attempts were dismissed by Finance minister Muhammad
Shoaib and chairman Ishrat Hussain Usmani.* [29] Pakistani scientists and engineers' working at IAEA became
aware of advancing Indian nuclear program towards making the bombs. Therefore, In October 1965, Munir Khan,
director at the Nuclear Power and Reactor Division of the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), met with
Bhutto on emergency basis in Vienna, revealing the facts
about the Indian nuclear programme and Bhabha Atomic
Research Centre in Trombay. At this meeting Munir
Khan concluded: a (nuclear) India would further undermine and threaten Pakistan's security, and for her survival, Pakistan needed a nuclear deterrent....
Understanding the sensitivity of the issue, Bhutto arranged a meeting with President Ayub Khan 11 December 1965 at Dorchester Hotel in London. Munir Khan
pointed out to the President that Pakistan must acquire
the necessary facilities that would give the country a nuclear weapon capability, which were available free of
safeguards and at an aordable cost, and there were no
restrictions on nuclear technology, that it was freely available, and that India was moving forward in deploying
it, as Munir Khan maintained. When asked about the
economics of such programme, Munir Ahmad Khan estimated the cost of nuclear technology at that time. Because things were less expensive, the then costs were not
more than US$150 million. After hearing the proposal
President Ayub Khan swiftly denied the proposal, saying
that Pakistan was too poor to spend that much money and
that, if Pakistan ever needed the atomic bomb, it could
somehow acquire it o the shelf.
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
of weapons-grade plutonium annually.* [28] PAEC selected a team ve senior scientists, including geophysicist
Dr. Ahsan Mubarak,* [28] who were sent to Sellaeld
to receive technical training.* [28] Later Mubarak's team
advised the government not to acquire the whole reprocessing plant, only key parts important to building
the weapons, while the plant would be built indigenously.* [28]
The PAEC in 1970 began work on a pilot-scale plant at
Dera Ghazi Khan for the concentration of uranium ores.
The plant had a capacity of 10,000 pounds a day.* [40] In
1989, Munir Ahmad Khan signed a nuclear cooperation
deal and, since 2000, Pakistan has been developing two
more nuclear power plants with an agreement signed with
China. Both these plants are of 300 MW capacity and
are being built at Chashma city of Punjab province. The
rst of these, CHASNUPP-I, began producing electricity
in 2000, and 'CHASNUPP-II', began its operation in fall
of 2011. In 2011, the board of governors of International
Atomic Energy Agency gave approval of Sino-Pak Nuclear Deal, allowing Pakistan legally to build the 300-MW
'CHASNUPP-III' and 'CHASNUPP-VI' reactors.* [41]
Development of nuclear weapons
Main articles: Bangladesh liberation war, Indo-Pakistani
War of 1971 and Project-706
The Indo-Pakistani War of 1971 was a crushing defeat for Pakistan, which led to it losing roughly 56,000
square miles (150,000 km2 ) of territory as well as losing millions of its citizens to the newly created state of
Bangladesh.* [42] In addition to the psychological setback for Pakistan,* [42] it had failed to gather any signicant material support or assistance from its key allies, the United States and the People's Republic of
China.* [43]* [44] Pakistan seemed to be isolated internationally, and in great danger; it felt that it could rely on
no one but itself.* [43] Prime Minister Zulqar Ali Bhutto
wasobsessedwith India's nuclear program.* [45]* [46]
At a United Nations Security Council meeting, Bhutto
drew comparisons between the Instrument of Surrender
Pakistan's weaker conventional weapon military in com- that ended the 1971 war, and the Treaty of Versailles,
parison to India and the Indian nuclear programme that which Germany was forced to sign in 1919. There,
started in 1967 promped Pakistan's clandestine develop- Bhutto vowed never to allow a repeat.
ment of nuclear weapons.* [38] Although Pakistan began
At the Multan meeting on 20 January 1972, Bhutto stated,
the development of nuclear weapons in 1972, Pakistan reWhat Raziuddin Siddiqui, a Pakistani, contributed for
sponded to India's 1974 nuclear test (see Smiling Buddha)
the United States during the Manhattan Project, could
with a number of proposals for a nuclear-weapon-free
also be done by scientists in Pakistan, for their own peozone to prevent a nuclear arms race in South Asia.* [39]
ple.* [47] Siddiqui was a Pakistani theoretical physicist
On many dierent occasions, India rejected the ofwho, in the early 1940s, worked on both the British nufer.* [39]
clear program and the Manhattan Project.* [48]
In 1969, after a long negotiation, the United Kingdom
In December 1972, Dr. Abdus Salam directed a seAtomic Energy Authority (UKAEA) signed a formal
cretly coded memo to Pakistani scientists working at the
agreement to supply Pakistan with a nuclear fuel reproInternational Centre for Theoretical Physics (ICTP) in
cessing plant capable of extracting 360 grams (13 oz)
Italy to report to the Chairman of the Pakistan Atomic
4.20. PAKISTAN
Energy Commission (PAEC), Munir Ahmad Khan, informing them about the program what was to be equivalent of the U.S. "Manhattan Project.* [49] In an eort
to instill a sense of pride, Salam noted that the heads of
the Manhattan Engineer District were theoreticians, and
informed the scientists at ICTP that a similar division was
being established at PAEC; this marked the beginning
of the Theoretical Physics Group(TPG).* [50]* [51]
Other theoreticians at Quaid-e-Azam University would
also join the TPG, then led by Salam who had done
ground-breaking work for TPG.* [52] Among them was
Riazuddin, Fayyazuddin, Masud Ahmad, and Faheem
Hussain who were the cornerstone of the TPG.* [53]* [54]
199
nium but parallel eorts were mounted toward weaponsgrade uranium after India's test, the Smiling Buddha, in
1974.* [69]
In 1983, Khan was convicted in absentia by the Court of
Amsterdam for stealing centrifuge blueprints, though the
conviction was overturned on a legal technicality.* [70]
A nuclear proliferation ring was established by Khan
through Dubai to smuggle URENCO nuclear technology
to KRL after founding the Zippe method for the gas centrifuge * [70]* [71]* [72]* [73]* [74]
Policy
Main article: Minimum Credible Deterrence (Pakistan)
Pakistan acceded to the Geneva Protocol on 15 April
1960. As for its Biological warfare capability, Pak-
200
istan is not widely suspected of either producing biological weapons or having an oensive biological programme.* [80] However, the country is reported to have
well developed bio-technological facilities and laboratories, devoted entirely to the medical research and applied
healthcare science.* [80] In 1972, Pakistan signed and
ratied the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
(BTWC) in 1974.* [80] Since then Pakistan has been a
vocal and staunch supporter for the success of the BTWC.
During the various BTWC Review Conferences, Pakistan's representatives have urged more robust participation from state signatories, invited new states to join the
treaty, and, as part of the non-aligned group of countries,
have made the case for guarantees for states' rights to engage in peaceful exchanges of biological and toxin materials for purposes of scientic research.* [80]
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
Modernisation and expansion
Protections
In May 2009, during the anniversary of Pakistan's rst
nuclear weapons test, former Prime Minister of Pakistan Nawaz Sharif claimed that Pakistan's nuclear security is the strongest in the world.* [83] According to Dr.
Abdul Qadeer Khan, Pakistan's nuclear safety program
and nuclear security program is the strongest program in
the world and there is no such capability in any other
country for radical elements to steal or possess nuclear
weapons.* [84]
4.20. PAKISTAN
A South Asia Zero-Missile Zone, in 1994.* [98]
India rejected all six proposals.* [99]* [100]
However, India and Pakistan reached three bilateral
agreements on nuclear issues. In 1989, they agreed not
to attack each other's nuclear facilities.* [101] Since then
they have been regularly exchanging lists of nuclear facilities on 1 January of each year.* [102] Another bilateral
agreement was signed in March 2005 where both nations
would alert the other on ballistic missile tests.* [103] In
June 2004, the two countries signed an agreement to set
up and maintain a hotline to warn each other of any accident that could be mistaken for a nuclear attack. These
were deemed essential risk reduction measures in view of
the seemingly unending state of misgiving and tension between the two countries, and the extremely short response
time available to them to any perceived attack. None of
these agreements limits the nuclear weapons programs of
either country in any way.* [104]
Disarmament policy
Pakistan has blocked negotiation of a Fissile Material
Cuto Treaty as it continues to produce ssile material
for weapons.* [105]* [106]
In a recent statement at the Conference on Disarmament,
Pakistan laid out its nuclear disarmament policy and what
it sees as the proper goals and requirements for meaningful negotiations:
A commitment by all states to complete veriable
nuclear disarmament;
Eliminate the discrimination in the current nonproliferation regime;
Normalize the relationship of the three ex-NPT nuclear weapon states with those who are NPT signatories;
Address new issues like access to weapons of mass
destruction by non-state actors;
Non-discriminatory rules ensuring every state's right
to peaceful uses of nuclear energy;
Universal, non-discriminatory and legally binding
negative security assurances to non-nuclear weapon
states;
A need to address the issue of missiles, including development and deployment of Anti-ballistic missile
systems;
Strengthen existing international instruments to prevent the militarisation of outer space, including development of ASATs;
201
Tackle the growth in armed forces and the accumulation and sophistication of conventional tactical
weapons.
Revitalise the UN disarmament machinery to
address international security, disarmament and
proliferation challenges.
Pakistan has repeatedly stressed at international forums
like the Conference on Disarmament that it will give up
its nuclear weapons only when other nuclear armed states
do so, and when disarmament is universal and veriable.
It rejects any unilateral disarmament on its part.* [107]
4.20.2 Infrastructure
Uranium
Pakistan's uranium infrastructure is based on the use
of gas centrifuges to produce highly enriched uranium
(HEU) at the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) at
Kahuta.* [4] Responding to India's nuclear test in 1974,
Munir Khan launched the uranium program, codename
Project-706 under the aegis of the PAEC.* [108] Physical
chemist, Dr. Khalil Qureshi, did most of the calculations as a member of the uranium division at PAEC,
which undertook research on several methods of enrichment, including gaseous diusion, jet nozzle and
molecular laser isotope separation techniques, as well as
centrifuges.* [109] Abdul Qadeer Khan ocially joined
this program in 1976, bringing with him centrifuge designs he mastered at URENCO, the Dutch rm where he
had worked as a senior scientist. Later that year, the government separated the program from PAEC and moved
the program to the Engineering Research Laboratories
(ERL), with A.Q. Khan as its senior scientist.* [110] To
acquire the necessary equipment and material for this
program, Khan developed a procurement ring. Electronic
materials were imported from the United Kingdom by
two liaison ocers posted to the High Commission of
Pakistan in London and Bonn Germany.* [111] The army
engineer and ex-technical liaison ocer, Major-General
Syed Ali Nawab discreetly oversaw KRL operations in
the 1970s including procuring the electronics that were
marked as common items.* [111]* [112] This ring
was also illicitly used decades later, in the late 1980s
and 90s to provide technology to Libya (under Muammar
Gadda), North Korea, and Iran.* [113] Despite these efforts, it is claimed Khan Research Laboratories suered
setbacks until PAEC provided technical assistance.* [114]
Although, A.Q. Khan disputes it and counter claims that
PAEC is merely trying to take credit for KRL's success
and that PAEC hindered progress at KRL after the two
programs had been separated by Bhutto in 1976.* [115]
In any case, KRL achieved modest enrichment of Uranium by 1978 and was ready to detonate an HEU uranium
bomb by 1984. In contrast PAEC was unable to enrich
202
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
any Uranium or produce weapons grade ssile material were only two logistic problems faced by PAEC. One
until 1998.
was that Pakistan did not want to be an irresponsible state
The uranium program proved to be a dicult, chal- and the PAEC under Munir Ahmed Khan did not divert
lenging and most enduring approach to scale up to spent fuel from the safeguarded KANUPP for reprocessindustrial levels to military-grade.* [116] Producing HEU ing at the New Labs. The second one was allocation of
as a ssile material is even more dicult and chal- resources.
lenging than extracting plutonium and Pakistan experimented with HEU as an implosion design as contrary to other nuclear states.* [117] Little and rudimentary knowledge was available of gas centrifuges at that
time, and HEU ssile material was only known to the
world for nuclear power usage; its military applications
for HEU were non-existent.* [118] Commenting on the
diculty, mathematician Tasneem Shah; who worked
with A.Q. Khan, was quoted in the book Eating Grass
that "hydrodynamical problem in centrifuge was simply
stated, but extremely dicult to evaluate, not only in
order of magnitude but in detailing also.* [116] Many
of Khan's fellow theorists were unsure about the feasibility of the enriched uranium on time despite Khan's
strong advocacy.* [116] One scientist recalled his memories in Eating Grass: No one in the world has used the
[gas] centrifuge method to produce weapon grade material.... [T]his was not going to work, he [A.Q. Khan] is
simply wasting time.* [116] Despite A.Q. Khan having diculty getting his peers to listen to him, he aggressively continued his research and the program was
made feasible in the shortest time possible.* [116] His efforts won him praise from Pakistan's politicians and military science circles, and he was now debuted as thefather of the uraniumbomb.* [116] On 28 May 1998, it
was the KRL's HEU that ultimately created the nuclear
chain reaction which led the successful detonation of
boosted ssion devices in a scientic experiment codenamed Chagai-I.* [116]
4.20. PAKISTAN
203
ballistic missiles.
The Plutonium electromagnetic separation takes place
at the New Laboratories, a reprocessing plant, which
was completed by 1981 by PAEC and is next to the
Pakistan Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology
(PINSTECH) near Islamabad, which is not subject to
IAEA inspections and safeguards.
In late 2006, the Institute for Science and International
Security released intelligence reports and imagery showing the construction of a new plutonium reactor at the
Khushab nuclear site. The reactor is deemed to be large
enough to produce enough plutonium to facilitate the
creation of as many as 40 to 50 nuclear weapons a
year.* [121]* [122]* [123] The New York Times carried A truck-mounted launch system (TEL) armed with 4 Babur cruise
the story with the insight that this would be Pakistan's missiles on display at the IDEAS 2008 defence exhibition in
third plutonium reactor,* [124] signalling a shift to dual- Karachi, Pakistan.
stream development, with Plutonium-based devices supplementing the nation's existing HEU stream to atomic
warheads. On 30 May 1998, Pakistan proved its plutonium capability in a scientic experiment and sixth nuclear test: codename Chagai-II.* [116]
Stockpile
204
The critical mass of a bare mass sphere of 90% enriched uranium-235 is 52 kg. Correspondingly, the critical mass of a bare mass sphere of plutonium-239 is 810
kg. The bomb that destroyed Hiroshima used 60 kg of
U-235 while the Nagasaki Pu bomb used only 6 kg of
Pu-239. Since all Pakistani bomb designs are implosiontype weapons, they will typically use between 1525 kg
of U-235 for their cores. Reducing the amount of U235 in cores from 60 kg in gun-type devices to 25 kg in
implosion devices is only possible by using good neutron
reector/tamper material such as beryllium metal, which
increases the weight of the bomb. And the uranium, like
plutonium, is only usable in the core of a bomb in metallic
form.
However, only 24 kg of plutonium is needed for the
same device that would need 2025 kg of U-235. Additionally, a few grams of tritium (a by-product of plutonium production reactors and thermonuclear fuel) can
increase the overall yield of the bombs by a factor of
three to four. The sixth Pakistan nuclear test, codename Chagai-II, (30 May 1998) at Kharan Desert was a
successful test of a sophisticated, compact, but powerful
bomb designed to be carried by missiles. A whole range
and variety of weapons using Pu-239 can be easily built,
both for aircraft delivery and especially for missiles (in
which U-235 cannot be used). So if Pakistan wants to be
a nuclear power with an operational weapon capability,
both rst and second strike, based on assured strike platforms like ballistic and cruise missiles (unlike aircraft),
the only solution is with plutonium, which has been the
rst choice of every country that built a nuclear arsenal.
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
sumed HEU. So it is safe to assume that between 1986
and 2005 (prior to the 2005 earthquake), KRL produced
1500 kg of HEU. Accounting for losses in the production
of weapons, it can be assumed that each weapon would
need 20 kg of HEU; sucient for 75 bombs as in 2005.
Pakistan's rst nuclear tests were made in May 1998,
when six warheads were tested under codename ChagaiI and Chagai-II. It is reported that the yields from these
tests were 12 kt, 30 to 36 kt and four low-yield (below 1
kt) tests. From these tests Pakistan can be estimated to
have developed operational warheads of 20 to 25 kt and
150 kt in the shape of low weight compact designs and
may have 300500 kt* [132] large-size warheads. The
low-yield weapons are probably in nuclear bombs carried
on ghter-bombers such as the Dassault Mirage III and tted to Pakistan's short-range ballistic missiles, while the
higher-yield warheads are probably tted to the Shaheen
series and Ghauri series ballistic missiles.* [132]
Second strike capability
According to a U.S. congressional report, Pakistan has
addressed issues of survivability in a possible nuclear conict through second strike capability. Pakistan has been
dealing with eorts to develop new weapons and at the
same time, have a strategy for surviving a nuclear war.
Pakistan has built hard and deeply buried storage and
launch facilities to retain a second strike capability in a
nuclear war.* [133] In January 2000, two years past after the atomic tests, U.S. intelligence ocials stated that
previous intelligence estimates overstated the capabilities of India's homegrown arsenal and understate those of
Pakistan.* [134] The United States Central Command
commander, General Anthony Zinni, a friend of Musharraf,* [134] told the NBC that longtime assumptions, that
India had an edge in the South Asian strategic balance of
power, were questionable at best. Don't assume that the
Pakistan's nuclear capability is inferior to the Indians,
General Zinni quoted to NBC.* [134]
4.20. PAKISTAN
205
Personnel
In 2010, Russian foreign ministry ocial Yuriy Korolev stated that there are somewhere between 120,000
to 130,000 people directly involved in Pakistan's nuclear
and missile programs, a gure considered extremely large
for a developing country.* [137]
206
son stated that Pakistan's threat of nuclear rst-use
deterred India from seriously considering conventional
military strikes.* [149] India is Pakistan's primary geographic neighbour and primary strategic competitor,
helping drive Pakistan's conventional warfare capability
and nuclear weapons development: The two countries
share an 1800-mile border and have suered a violent
historyfour wars in less than seven decades. The past
three decades have seen India's economy eclipse that of
Pakistan's, allowing the former to outpace the latter in
defence expenditure at a decreasing share of GDP. In
comparison to population, India is more powerful than
Pakistan by almost every metric of military, economic,
and political power and the gap continues to grow,a
Belfer Center for Science and International Aairs report
claims.* [150]
Theory of deterrence
Main articles: N-deterrence and Nuclear deterrence
The theory of N-deterrencehas been frequently being interpreted by the various government-in-time of effect of Pakistan. Although the nuclear deterrence theory was ocially adopted in 1998 as part of Pakistan's
defence theory,* [151] on the other hand, the theory has
had been interpreted by the government since in 1972.
The relative weakness in defence warfare is highlighted
in Pakistan's nuclear posture, which Pakistan considers its
primary deterrent from Indian conventional oensives or
nuclear attack. Nuclear theorist Brigadier-General Feroz
Hassan Khan adds: The Pakistani situation is akin to
NATO's position in the Cold War. There are geographic
gaps and corridors similar to those that existed in Europe ... that are vulnerable to exploitation by mechanized
Indian forces ... With its relatively smaller conventional
force, and lacking adequate technical means, especially in
early warning and surveillance, Pakistan relies on a more
proactive nuclear defensive policy.* [152]
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
ory of defense is not view to enter into a "nuclear race",
but to follow a policy of "peaceful co-existence" in the
region, it cannot remain oblivious to the developments
in South Asia.* [153] The Pakistan Government ofcials and strategists have consistently emphasised that
nuclear deterrence is intended by maintaining a balance
to safeguard its sovereignty and ensure peace in the region.* [154]
Pakistan's motive for pursuing a nuclear weapons development program is never to allow another invasion
of Pakistan.* [155] President Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq allegedly told the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in
1987 that, If your forces cross our borders by an inch,
we are going to annihilate your cities.* [156]
Pakistan has not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
According to the United States Department of Defense
report cited above, Pakistan remains steadfast in its refusal to sign the NPT, stating that it would do so only
after India joined the Treaty. Pakistan has responded to
the report by stating that the United States itself has not
ratied the CTBT. Consequently, not all of Pakistan's nuclear facilities are under IAEA safeguards. Pakistani ofcials have stated that signature of the CTBT is in Pakistan's best interest, but that Pakistan will do so only after
developing a domestic consensus on the issue, and have
disavowed any connection with India's decision.
The Congressional Research Service, in a report published on 23 July 2012, said that in addition to expanding
its nuclear arsenal, Pakistan could broaden the circumstances under which it would be willing to use nuclear
weapons.* [157]
Nuclear Command and Control
Pakistan further consolidated its nuclear weapons infrastructure by placing the Khan Research Laboratories and
the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission under the control of one Nuclear Defense Complex. In November
2009, Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari announced that
he will be replaced by Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gi-
4.20. PAKISTAN
lani as the chairman of NCA.* [159] The NCA consists of
the Employment Control Committee (ECC) and the Development Control Committee (DCC), both now chaired
by the Prime Minister.* [160] The Foreign minister and
Economic Minister serves as a deputy chairmen of the
ECC, the body which denes nuclear strategy, including the deployment and employment of strategic forces,
and would advise the prime minister on nuclear use. The
committee includes key senior cabinet ministers as well as
the respective military chiefs of sta.* [160] The ECC reviews presentations on strategic threat perceptions, monitors the progress of weapons development, and decides
on responses to emerging threats.* [160] It also establishes
guidelines for eective command-and-control practices
to safeguard against the accidental or unauthorised use
of nuclear weapons.* [160]
The chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Sta Committee is
the deputy chairman of the Development Control Committee (DCC), the body responsible for weapons development and oversight which includes the nation's military and scientic, but not its political, leadership.* [160]
Through DCC, the senior civilian scientists maintains a
tight control of scientic and ethical research; the DCC
exercises technical, nancial and administrative control
over all strategic organisations, including national laboratories and scientic research and development organisations associated with the development and modernisation of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems.* [160]
Functioning through the SPD, the DCC oversees the systematic progress of weapon systems to full the force
goals set by the committee.* [160]
Under the Nuclear Command Authority, its secretariat,
Strategic Plans Division (SPD), is responsible for the
physical protection and to ensure security of all aspects
of country's nuclear arsenals.* [161] The SPD functions
under the Joint Chiefs of Sta Committee at the Joint
Headquarters (JS HQ) and reports directly to the Prime
Minister.* [161] The comprehensive nuclear force planning is integrated with conventional war planning at the
National Security Council (NSC).* [161] According to
the ocials of Pakistan's military science circles, it is
the high-prole civic-military committee consisting the
Cabinet ministers, President, Prime minister and the four
services chiefs, all of whom who reserves the right to order the deployment and the operational use of the nuclear
weapons.* [161] The nal and executive political decisions on nuclear arsenals deployments, operational use,
and nuclear weapons politics are made during the sessions of the Defence Committee of the Cabinet, which
is chaired by the Prime minister.* [162] It is this DCC
Council where the nal political guideles, discussions
and the nuclear arsenals operational deployments are approved by the Prime minister.* [162] The DCC reafrmed its policies on development of nuclear energy and
arsenals through the country's media.* [162]
207
U.S. security assistance
From the end of 2001 the United States has provided material assistance to aid Pakistan in guarding its nuclear
material, warheads and laboratories. The cost of the program has been almost $100 million. Specically the USA
has provided helicopters, night-vision goggles and nuclear
detection equipment.* [163]
During this period Pakistan also began to develop a modern export control regulatory regime with U.S. assistance. It supplements the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration Megaports program at Port Qasim,
Karachi, which deployed radiation monitors and imaging
equipment monitored by a Pakistani central alarm station.* [164]
Pakistan turned down the oer of Permissive Action Link
(PAL) technology, a sophisticatedweapon releaseprogram which initiates use via specic checks and balances,
possibly because it feared the secret implanting ofdead
switches. But Pakistan is since believed to have developed and implemented its own version of PAL and U.S.
military ocials have stated they believe Pakistan's nuclear arsenals to be well secured.* [165]* [166]
Security concerns of the United States Since 2004
the U.S. government has reportedly been concerned
about the safety of Pakistani nuclear facilities and
weapons. Press reports have suggested that the United
States has contingency plans to send in special forces to
helpsecure the Pakistani nuclear arsenal.* [167]* [168]
Lisa Curtis of The Heritage Foundation giving testimony
before the United States House Foreign Aairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade concluded that preventing Pakistan's nuclear weapons and
technology from falling into the hands of terrorists should
be a top priority for the U.S.* [169] However Pakistan's
government has ridiculed claims that the weapons are not
secure.* [167]
Diplomatic reports published in the United States diplomatic cables leak revealed American and British worries
over a potential threat posed by Islamists. In February
2009 cable from Islamabad, former US Ambassador to
Pakistan Anne W. Patterson saidOur major concern is
not having an Islamic militant steal an entire weapon but
rather the chance someone working in [Pakistani government] facilities could gradually smuggle enough material
out to eventually make a weapon.* [170]
A report published by The Times in early 2010 states
that the United States is training an elite unit to recover
Pakistani nuclear weapons or materials should they be
seized by militants, possibly from within the Pakistani nuclear security organisation. This was done in the context
of growing Anti-Americanism in the Pakistani Armed
Forces, multiple attacks on sensitive installations over the
previous 2 years and rising tensions. According to former
U.S. intelligence ocial Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, U.S. con-
208
cerns are justied because militants have struck at several
Pakistani military facilities and bases since 2007. According to this report, the United States does not know
the locations of all Pakistani nuclear sites and has been
denied access to most of them.* [171] However, during a
visit to Pakistan in January 2010, the U.S. Secretary of
Defense Robert M. Gates denied that the United States
had plans to take over Pakistan's nuclear weapons.* [172]
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
robust regime that includes "multilayered mechanisms
and processes to secure our strategic assets, and have provided maximum transparency on our practices. We have
reassured the international community on this issue over
and over again and our track record since the time our
atomic bomb programme was made overt has been unblemished.* [181]
Nuclear weapons expert David Albright author of 'Peddling Peril' has also expressed concerns that Pakistan's
stockpile may not be secure despite assurances by both
Pakistan and U.S. government. He stated Pakistan has
had many leaks from its program of classied information and sensitive nuclear equipment, and so you have to
worry that it could be acquired in Pakistan,* [175]
A 2010 study by the Congressional Research Service ti- Strategic combat commands
tled 'Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Se Air Force Strategic Command (AFSC)
curity Issues' noted that even though Pakistan had taken
several steps to enhance Nuclear security in recent years
Army Strategic Forces Command (ASFC)
'Instability in Pakistan has called the extent and durability
of these reforms into question.'* [176]
Naval Strategic Forces Command (NSFC)
In April 2011, IAEA's deputy director general Denis
Flory declared Pakistan's nuclear programme safe and
secure.* [177]* [178] According to the IAEA, Pakistan is 4.20.3 Weapons development agencies
currently contributing more than $1.16 million in IAEA's
Nuclear Security Fund, making Pakistan as 10th largest National Engineering & Scientic Commission
(NESCOM)
contributor.* [179]
In response to a November 2011 article in The Atlantic
written by Jerey Goldberg highlighting concerns about
the safety of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program, the
Pakistani Government announced that it would train an
additional 8,000 people to protect the country's nuclear
arsenal. At the same time, the Pakistani Government
also denounced the article. Training will be completed
no later than 2013.* [180]
4.20. PAKISTAN
Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC)
209
Material Research Division.
Nuclear Track Detection Center (Solid State Nuclear Track Detection Center)
Land
Air
The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) is believed to have practised "toss-bombing" in the 1980s and 1990s, a method
of launching weapons from ghter-bombers which can
also be used to deliver nuclear warheads. The PAF has
two dedicated units (No. 16 Black Panthers and No. 26
Black Spiders) operating 18 aircraft in each squadron (36
aircraft total) of the JF-17 Thunder, believed to be the
preferred vehicle for delivery of nuclear weapons.* [187]
These units are major part of the Air Force Strategic
210
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
Sea
The Pakistan Navy was rst publicly reported to be considering deployment of nuclear weapons on submarines
in February 2001. Later in 2003 it was stated by Admiral
Shahid Karimullah, then Chief of Naval Sta, that there
were no plans for deploying nuclear weapons on submarines but if "forced to" they would be. In 2004, Pakistan Navy established the Naval Strategic Forces Command and made it responsible for countering and battling
naval-based weapons of mass destruction. It is believed
by most experts that Pakistan is developing a sea-based
variant of the Hatf VII Babur, which is a nuclear-capable
ground-launched cruise missile.* [191] With a stockpile
of plutonium, Pakistan would be able to produce a variety of miniature nuclear warheads which would allow it
to nuclear-tip the C-802 and C-803 anti-ship missiles as
well as being able to develop nuclear torpedoes, nuclear
depth bombs and nuclear naval mines.
Nuclear submarine In response to INS Arihant, India's rst nuclear submarine, the Pakistan Navy pushed
forward a proposal to build its own nuclear submarine as
a direct response to the Indian nuclear submarine program.* [192]* [193] Many military experts believe that
Pakistan has the capability of building a nuclear submarine and is ready to build such a eet.* [192] Finally in
February 2012, the Navy announced it would start work
on the construction of a nuclear submarine to better meet
the Indian Navy's nuclear threat.* [194] According to the
Navy, the nuclear submarine is an ambitious project,
and will be designed and built indigenously. However,
the Navy stressed that the project completion and trials would take anywhere from between 5 to 8 years to
build the nuclear submarine after which Pakistan would
join the list of countries that has a nuclear submarine.
*
[192]* [194]
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2014.
been destroyed in the way we have seen recently.... If
(Pakistan) had [atomic] capability before 1971, we [Pak[140] http://www.gwu.edu/~{}nsarchiv/NSAEBB/
istanis] would not have lost half of our country after a
NSAEBB114/index.htm
disgraceful defeat.Professor Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan
[141] China tested N-weapons for Pak: US insider The Times
[156] Hashimi, Shak H.The Nuclear Danger in South Asia
of India 6 September 2008
. Pakistan Link. Retrieved 22 July 2012.
[142] Mir, Hamid (3 May 2004). Interview of Dr. Samar
[157] Pakistan swelling nuclear arsenal to counter India, says
Mubarak Head of Pakistan Missile Program.. Hamid
US Congressional report. The Times Of India. 9 August
Mir, director of the Political Intelligence Directorate of
2012.
"The News International". Geo Television Network. Retrieved 13 May 2011.
[158] NTI, Nuclear Threat Initiatives (5 May 1994). Bare
All and Be Damned (PDF). Far Eastern Economic Re[143] US Report: China gifted nuclear bomb and Pakistan
view, 5 May 1994, Pg. 23; in NTI Nuclear and Missile
stole the technology. TheWorldReporter.com. 18
Database. p. 47. Retrieved 17 May 2012. The NCA
November 2009.
determines the state of readiness which has to be maintained at all times...and lays down in great detail the policy
[144] Report No. 2001/10: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation.
of how the various components will be placed, protected
Csis-scrs.gc.ca. 15 May 2008. Retrieved 21 August 2010.
and safeguarded
[145] Jawed Naqvi, New Delhi correspondents. (31 January
[159] Pakistani PM takes charge of nuclear weapons.
2001). No Nuclear arms for Pakistan: Li. Dawn
Reuters. 29 November 2009. Retrieved 29 November
Archives January 2001. Retrieved 23 December 2012.
2009.
[146] Research Library: Country Proles: Pakistan. NTI.
[160] IISS Report.The Nuclear control and Command in PakRetrieved 21 August 2010.
istan. IISS. Retrieved 2 March 2013.
[147] AFP: Reagan era envoy found Pakistan 'lied' on nukes [161] Khan, Feroz Hassan; Feroze Hassan Khan.Towards the
. Google. Retrieved 3 January 2014.
Operational Deterrent. Eating grass: the making of the
Pakistani bomb (google book). Stanford, California: Stan[148] https://fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL31900.pdf
ford University Press, (FH Khan). pp. 210390. ISBN
978-0804776011. Retrieved 21 March 2014.
[149] Narang, Vipin (January 2010). Pakistan's Nuclear Posture: Implications for South Asian Stability(PDF). Har[162] Abrar, Saeed. No diversion. The Nations, Pakistan.
vard Kennedy School, Belfer Center for Science and InterRetrieved 2 March 2013.
national Aairs Policy Brief. Retrieved 4 January 2013.
[150] Aguilar, Francisco, Randy Bell, Natalie, Black (July
2011).An Introduction To Pakistan's Military(PDF).
p. 8. Retrieved 4 January 2013.
[151] Abidi, Zawar Haider. Threat Reduction in South Asia
(PDF). Zawar Haider Abidi. p. 6/15. Retrieved 21 July
2012.
4.20. PAKISTAN
215
[167] Are Pakistan's nuclear weapons safe?, BBC, 23 January [188] Gishkori, Zahid. Boosting air defence: F-16s replace
2008
Americans at Jacobabad airbase. The Express Tribune.
Retrieved 3 January 2014.
[168] Obamas Worst Pakistan Nightmare, The New York
Times, 11 January 2009
[189]
[169] U.S. Policy and Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons: Containing [190] Pakistan Unveils Cruise Missile. Power Politics. 13
Threats and Encouraging Regional Security, The Heritage
August 2005. Retrieved 21 August 2010.
Foundation, 6 July 2007
[191] NTI, Nuclear Threat Initiatives (June 2011). Pakistan's
[170] Leigh, David (30 November 2010). WikiLeaks cables
Naval capabilities: Submarine system. Research: Subexpose Pakistan nuclear fears. The Guardian.
marine Proliferation by countries. NTI: Research: Submarine Proliferation by countries. Retrieved 2011.
[171] Elite US troops ready to combat Pakistani nuclear hijacks,
The Times, 17 January 2010
[192] Ansari, Usman (11 February 2012). Pakistani Navy
to Develop Nuclear-Powered Submarines: Reports.
[172] Elisabeth Bumiller, Gates Sees Fallout From Troubled
Defense News. Retrieved 13 August 2013.
Ties With Pakistan, The New York Times, 23 January
2010. Retrieved 24 January 2010.
[193] Ghosh, Palash (4 April 2012). India Joins Nuclear Submarine Community; Pakistan Alarmed. International
[173] Pakistan nuclear weapons at risk of theft by terrorists, US
Business Times. Retrieved 13 August 2013.
study warns, The Guardian, 12 April 2010
[174] Could terrorists get hold of a nuclear bomb?, BBC, 12 [194] Pakistan Navy to build nuclear submarine. ARY News.
10 February 2012. Retrieved 8 April 2012.
April 2010
[175] Ocial: Terrorists seek nuclear material, but lack ability
to use it, CNN, 13 April 2010
[176] Pakistans Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation and Security Issues, Congressional Research Service, 23 February
2010
[178] IAEA declared Pakistan's Nuke programme safe and secure, Tehran Times
[179] IAEA terms Pakistan's programme, safe and secure.
The News International. Retrieved 3 January 2014.
[180] Lustig, Robert H. (7 November 2011). Pakistan Announces Move to Increase Nuclear Security Jerey
Goldberg. The Atlantic. Retrieved 3 January 2014.
[181] Khan, Iftikhar A.World must accept Pakistan as nuclear
power: Gen Majid. Dawn Archives, 2010. Retrieved 3
December 2012.
[182] Anwar Iqbal (6 September 2013).Pakistan understands
importance of N-security: US. Dawn. Pakistan. Retrieved 3 January 2014.
[183] Design Characteristics of Pakistan's Ballistic Missiles
. NTI. Retrieved 4 July 2012.
[184] Salman Masood (25 April 2012). Pakistan Says It TestFires Nuclear-Capable Missile. The New York Times.
Retrieved 26 April 2012.
[185] Abbassi, Ansar (30 November 2011). Pakistan has developed smartest nuclear tactical devices. The News.
Retrieved 22 January 2012.
216
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
External links
4.20.7
References
4.21 Poland
4.22. ROMANIA
4.21.1
Chemical weapons
217
4.22 Romania
Poland ratied the Chemical Weapons Convention in August of 1995 and did not declare any oensive program
or chemical weapons stockpiles. In 2004 during the G8
Summit, the Polish-Russian agreement in the sphere of
chemical weapons destruction was reached. The chemical weapons agreement will assist Russia in disposing of
its lewisite stockpiles.
4.21.2
Biological weapons
Poland ratied the Biological Weapons Convention on 25 While Romania had a nuclear research program since
January 1973 and is not known to have conducted any 1949, for the rst decades, it focused on the usage of raactivity prohibited by the BWC.
dioactive isotopes in medicine and industry. The military program was started in 1978, together with the program for the rst power plant. The WMD research program (Programul Dunrea - Danube Program) was con4.21.3 Nuclear
ducted at the Mgurele Nuclear Research Institute, under
the strict supervision of the Securitate.* [2]
Poland has never possessed nuclear weapons. Formerly,
Poland was part of the Warsaw Pact. This meant that it According to Mihai Blnescu, the former director of
was equipped with aircraft (such as MiG-21, Su-7 and the research institute, the program had three departSu-22), as well as short range ballistic missiles (such as ments: one which dealt with the development of nuclear
R-300 Elbrus, 9K52 Luna-M and OTR-21 Tochka) that weapons, one for the development of medium-range miscould be used to deliver Soviet nuclear weapons. These siles and a third which dealt with chemical and biological
could and probably would be provided in time of war.* [1] weapons.* [2]
Prior to the end of the World War II, the Soviet Union The defection of Securitate general Ion Mihai Pacepa
maintained large amounts of troops on Polish territory. was, according to Lucia Hossu Longin, at least in part
These troops were equipped with nuclear weapons. In related to the order given to him by Ceauescu, to obtain
1991, Poland announced that they would remove the nu- the technology for a certain element needed in the develclear capable delivery systems from their weapons inven- opment of nuclear weapons.* [3]
tory. They decided to keep about 40 of the OTR-21
Tochka systems armed with conventional warheads for In July 1989, the Hungarian Foreign Minister Gyula Horn
self-defense.* [2] These launchers have now been com- accused Romania of posing military threats to Hungary,
pletely retired. In the 1970s there was an idea to develop through its nuclear program and a medium-range missiles
a hydrogen bomb which was kept secret from the Soviet development program. Horn claimed that high-level Romanian ocials announced that Romania is capable of
Union, however it was scrapped very quickly.
building such weapons, but the Romanian Government
denied such claims.* [4]
4.21.4
References
4.21.5
Bibliography
Luczak, Wojciech (July 1996). Poland's Atomic In 1989, Ceauescu claimed that Romania had the techAdventure. Air International 51 (1): pp. 1821. nology to build nuclear weapons, but that he remained
ISSN 0306-5634.
rmly resolved to ght against nuclear weapons.* [7]
218
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
4.22.3
4.22.4
4.23 Russia
Ukraine agreed to give up its weapons to Russia, in exchange for guarantees of Ukrainian territory from Russia, the UK and the USA, known as the Budapest Mem-
4.23. RUSSIA
219
After the Korean War, the Soviet Union transferred nuclear technology and weapons to the People's Republic
of China as an adversary of the United States and NATO.
According to Ion Mihai Pacepa,Khrushchevs nuclearproliferation process started with Communist China in
April 1955, when the new ruler in the Kremlin consented
to supply Beijing a sample atomic bomb and to help with
its mass production. Subsequently, the Soviet Union built
all the essentials of Chinas new military nuclear industry.* [17]
Russia is one of the ve Nuclear Weapons States
(NWS) under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT), which Russia ratied (as the Soviet Union) in
1968.
Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, a
number of Soviet-era nuclear warheads remained on the
territories of Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan. Under
the terms of the Lisbon Protocol to the NPT, and following the 1995 Trilateral Agreement between Russia,
Belarus, and the USA, these were transferred to Russia,
leaving Russia as the sole inheritor of the Soviet nuclear
arsenal. It is estimated that the Soviet Union had approximately 45,000 nuclear weapons stockpiled at the time of
its collapse.
The collapse of the Soviet Union allowed for a warm1. Land based Strategic Rocket Forces: 489 missiles
ing of relations with NATO. Fears of a nuclear holocarrying up to 1,788 warheads; they employ immocaust lessened. In September 1997, the former secrebile (silos), like SS-18 Satan, and mobile delivery
tary of the Russian Security Council Alexander Lebed
systems, like SS-27 Topol M.
claimed 100 suitcase sizednuclear weapons were unaccounted for. He said he was attempting to inventory
2. Sea based Strategic Fleet: 12 submarines carrying
the weapons when he was red by President Boris Yeltsin
up to 609 warheads; they should be able to emin October 1996.* [18] In 2005, Sergey Sinchenko, a legploy, in a near future, delivery systems like SS-N-30
islator from the Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc, said 250 nuBulava.
clear weapons were unaccounted for. When comparing
3. Strategic Aviation: 79 bombers carrying up to 884 documents of nuclear weapons transferred from Ukraine
to weapons received by Russia, there was a 250-weapon
cruise missiles.
discrepancy.* [19] Indeed, several US politicians have expressed worries and promised legislation addressing the
As of July 2009, Russia's strategic arsenal reportedly threat.* [20]
shrunk to 2,723 warheads, including: 367 ICBMs with
In 2002, the United States and Russia agreed to reduce
1,248 warheads, 13 SSBNs with 591 warheads and 76
their stockpiles to not more than 2,200 warheads each in
*
bombers with 884 warheads. [15]
the SORT treaty. In 2003, the US rejected Russian proposals to further reduce each nation's nuclear stockpiles
to 1,500. Russia, in turn, refused to discuss reduction of
Nuclear weapons in Russian military doctrine
tactical nuclear weapons.* [21]
Main article: Military doctrine of Russia
220
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
According to high-ranking Russian SVR defector Sergei Vladimir. These weapons were tested at several faciliTretyakov, a businessman told him that he keeps his own ties most often at Rebirth Island(Vozrozhdeniya) in
nuclear bomb at his dacha outside Moscow.* [24]
the Aral Sea by ring the weapons into the air above monkeys tied to posts, the monkeys would then be monitored
to determine the eects. According to Alibek, although
Nuclear sabotage allegations from Russia
Soviet oensive program was ocially ended in 1992,
Russia may be still involved in the activities prohibited
The highest-ranking GRU defector Stanislav Lunev de- by BWC.* [28]
scribed alleged Soviet plans for using tactical nuclear
In 1993, the story about the Sverdlovsk anthrax leak was
weapons for sabotage against the United States in the
published in Russia. The incident occurred when spores
event of war. He described Soviet-made suitcase nukes
of anthrax were accidentally released from a military faidentied as RA-115s (or RA-115-01s for submersible
cility in the city of Sverdlovsk (formerly, and now again,
weapons) which weigh from fty to sixty pounds. These
Yekaterinburg) 900 miles east of Moscow on April 2,
portable bombs can last for many years if wired to an elec1979. The ensuing outbreak of the disease resulted in
tric source. In case there is a loss of power, there is a
94 people becoming infected, 64 of whom died over a
battery backup. If the battery runs low, the weapon has a
period of six weeks.* [28]
transmitter that sends a coded message either by satellite or directly to a GRU post at a Russian embassy or
consulate..* [25]
Lunev was personally looking for hiding places for
weapons caches in the Shenandoah Valley area.* [25] He
said that it is surprisingly easy to smuggle nuclear
weapons into the USeither across the Mexican border or
using a small transport missile that can slip though undetected when launched from a Russian airplane.* [25] US
Congressman Curt Weldon supported claims by Lunev,
but Weldon said later the FBI discredited Lunev, saying that he exaggerated things.* [26] Searches of the areas identied by Lunev who admits he never planted
any weapons in the US have been conducted, but
law-enforcement ocials have never found such weapons
caches, with or without portable nuclear weaponsin the
US.* [27]
4.23.2
Biological weapons
4.23. RUSSIA
Novichok agents
Main article: Novichok agent
221
Disposal facilities
4.23.4
See also
4.23.5
References
[1] http://bos.sagepub.com/content/71/3/84.full.pdf
[2] Status of World Nuclear Forces. Federation of American Scientists. July 16, 2009. Retrieved 23 July 2009.
[3] Federation of American Scientists :: Status of World Nuclear Forces
[4] Russia prole. NTI.org. 2009. Retrieved 2010-09-17.
[5] Global Campaign to Destroy Chemical Weapons Passes
60 Percent Mark. OPCW. 8 July 2010 (Accessed 19 August 2010)
[6] Opening Statement by the Director-General to the Conference of the States Parties at its Sixteenth Session.
OPCW. 28 November 2011. Retrieved 1 May 2012.
[7] Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen, "Global nuclear
stockpiles, 1945-2006,Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
62, no. 4 (July/August 2006), 64-66.
222
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
4.23.6
External links
Nuclear program
Chemical Weapons in Russia: History, Ecology, Saudi Arabia has denied manufacturing nuclear weapons
Politics by Lev Fedorov, Moscow, Center of Eco- under its peaceful civilian nuclear program. Saudi Arabia has allegedly funded a military nuclear program and
logical Policy of Russia, 27 July 1994
received scientic assistance from various countries, including the United States and Pakistan. According to
History of the Russian Nuclear Weapons Program
Western media reports, Saudi Arabia also provided funds
for nuclear programs in the Arab world and was behind
The Arsenals of Nuclear Weapons Powers
providing nancial assistance to enable physics experi Nuclear pursuits, 2012
ments necessary for developing nuclear weapons.
223
224
4.24.2
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
Nuclear sharing with Arab States of atomic bomb projects and in return has the option to buy
the Persian Gulf nuclear programs ve to six nuclear warheads o the shelf.* [21]
4.24.3
Recent developments
In November 2013, a variety of sources told BBC Newsnight that Saudi Arabia had invested in Pakistani nuclear weapons projects and believes it could obtain nuclear bombs at will. Earlier in the year, a senior NATO
decision maker told Mark Urban, a senior diplomatic and
defense editor, that he had seen intelligence reporting that
nuclear weapons made in Pakistan on behalf of Saudi
Arabia are now sitting ready for delivery. In October
2013, Amos Yadlin, a former head of Israeli military intelligence, told a conference in Sweden that if Iran got
the bomb, the Saudis will not wait one month. They
already paid for the bomb, they will go to Pakistan and
bring what they need to bring.Since 2009, when King
Abdullah of Saudi Arabia warned visiting US special envoy to the Middle East Dennis Ross that if Iran crossed
the threshold, we will get nuclear weapons, the kingdom has sent the Americans numerous signals of its intentions. Gary Samore, who until March 2013 was President
Barack Obama's counter-proliferation adviser, told BBC
Newsnight: I do think that the Saudis believe that they
have some understanding with Pakistan that, in extremis,
they would have claim to acquire nuclear weapons from
Pakistan.* [22]
Response
According to the US based think-tank, the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, the BBC report on
possible nuclear sharing between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia is partially incorrect. There is no indication of the validity or credibility of the BBCs sources, nor does the article expand on what essentially constitutes an unveried
lead. Furthermore, if Pakistan were to transfer nuclear
warheads onto Saudi soil, it is highly unlikely that either
nation would face any international repercussions if both
nations were to follow strict nuclear sharing guidelines
similar to that of NATO.* [23] A research paper produced
by the British House of Commons Defence Select Committee states that as long as current NATO nuclear sharing
arrangements remain in place, NATO states would have
few valid grounds for complaint if such a transfer were to
occur.* [24]
2015
In May 2015, in response to The Sunday Times of London report that the Saudis hadtaken the 'strategic decision' to acquire 'o-the-shelf' atomic weapons from Pakistan,amid growing fears of a nuclear-armed Iran* [25]
a Saudi defense ocial dismissed it as speculation.* [26]
4.24.4
Missile capability
4.24.5
See also
225
4.24.6
References
[19] http://worldnews.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2012/02/10/
10369793-report-saudi-arabia-to-buy-nukes-if-iran-tests-a-bomb
[20] Saudi Arabia threatens to go nuclear if Iran does. Fox
News. 10 February 2012.
[21] Borger, Julian (11 May 2010). Pakistan's bomb and
Saudi Arabia. The Guardian (London).
[22] Mark Urban (6 November 2013).Saudi nuclear weapons
'on order' from Pakistan. BBC. Retrieved 7 November
2013.
[23] http://poniforum.csis.org/blog/
no-price-is-right-why-the-bbc-is-incorrect-about-a-saudi-arabia-p
[24] The future of NATO and European defence (PDF). Defence Select Committee (Report) (UK Parliament). 4
March 2008: Ev 80. Retrieved 2 April 2015.
[6] Bruce Riedel. Saudi Arabia: Nervously Watching Pakistan: For the Saudi Arabia Kingdom, Pakistan remains
a unique partner. Brookings 1775 Massachusetts Ave,
NW, Washington, DC 20036. Brookings Inc. Retrieved
14 December 2011.
[25] http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/world_news/
Middle_East/article1557090.ece
[27] http://web.archive.org/web/20080524155801/http:
//www.missilethreat.com/missilesoftheworld/id.3/
missile_detail.asp
[26] http://edition.cnn.com/2015/05/19/world/
saudi-pakistan-nuclear-report/
[28] Arabic:
Student's Graduation at the Strategic
Missile Force Center and Academy. Saudid.com. 10
May 2013. Archived from the original on 2013-11-26.
226
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
4.25.1
Nuclear weapons
The Republic of South Africa's ambitions to develop nuclear weapons began in 1948 after giving commission
to South African Atomic Energy Corporation (SAAEC),
the forerunner corporation to oversee nation's uranium
mining and industrial trade.* [1] In 1957, South Africa
reached an understanding with the United States after signing a 50-year collaboration under the U.S.sanctioned programme, the Atoms for Peace.* [1] The
treaty concluded the South African acquisition of a single nuclear research reactor and an accompanying supply of the Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) fuel, located in Pelindaba.* [1] In 1965, the American subsidiary,
the Allis-Chalmers Corporation, delivered the 20MW research nuclear reactor, SAFARI-1, along with ~90% HEU
fuel to South African nuclear authority.* [1] In 1967,
South Africa decided to pursue the plutonium capability
and constructed its own reactor, SAFARI-2 reactor also at
Pelindaba, that went critical using 606kg of 2% enriched
uranium fuel, and 5.4 tonnes of heavy water, both supplied by the United States.* [1]
227
The warheads were originally congured to be delivered from one of several aircraft types then in service
with the South African Air Force (SAAF), including the
Canberra B12 and the Hawker Siddeley Buccaneer. Concerns about the vulnerability of the aging aircraft to the
Cuban anti-aircraft defence network in Angola subsequently led the SADF to investigate missile-based delivery systems.* [8]
Main article: Jericho (missile) South African RSA According to the Nuclear Threat Initiative, in 1977 Israel
Series
traded 30 grams of tritium for 50 tonnes of South African
228
uranium and in the mid-1980s assisted with the development of the RSA-3 and RSA-4 ballistic missiles, which
are similar to Israeli Shavit and Jericho missiles.* [15]
Also in 1977, according to foreign press reports, it was
suspected that South Africa signed a pact with Israel that
included the transfer of military technology and the manufacture of at least six nuclear bombs.* [16]
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
South Africa ended its nuclear weapons programme in
1989. All the bombs (six constructed and one under construction) were dismantled and South Africa acceded to
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
when South African Ambassador to the United States
Harry Schwarz signed the treaty in 1991. On 19 August
1994, after completing its inspection, the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) conrmed that one partially completed and six fully completed nuclear weapons
had been dismantled. As a result, the IAEA was satised that South Africa's nuclear programme had been
converted to peaceful applications. Following this, South
Africa joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as a
full member on 5 April 1995. South Africa played a
leading role in the establishment of the African Nuclear
Weapon Free Zone Treaty (also referred to as the Treaty
of Pelindaba) in 1996, becoming one of the rst members
in 1997. South Africa also signed the Comprehensive
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 1996 and ratied it in 1999.
South African forces feared the threat of a "domino effect" in favour of communism, represented in southern
Africa by Cuban proxy forces in Angola and threatening
Namibia. In 1988 South Africa signed the Tripartite Accord with Cuba and Angola, which led to the withdrawal
of South African and Cuban troops from Angola and independence for Namibia. The pre-emptive elimination
of nuclear weapons was expected to make a signicant
contribution toward regional stability and peace, and also
to help restore South Africa's credibility in regional and
international politics.
4.25.4
Notes
[1] Executive release. South African nuclear bomb. Nuclear Threat Initiatives. Nuclear Threat Initiatives, South
Africa (NTI South Africa). Retrieved 13 March 2012.
229
[2] John Pike. Nuclear Weapons Program South Africa [21] McGreal, Chris (24 May 2010). Revealed: how Israel oered to sell South Africa nuclear weapons. The
. Globalsecurity.org. Retrieved 15 May 2011.
Guardian (UK). Retrieved 24 May 2010.
[3] Chaudhry, PhD (Political science), M.A. Separating Myth from Reality The Uranium Enrichment [22] McGreal, Chris (24 May 2010). The memos and
minutes that conrm Israel's nuclear stockpile. The
programme: Building Kahuta Research Laboratories
Guardian
(UK). Retrieved 24 May 2010.
(KRL)". Professor Mohammad Ali Chaudhry (professor
of Political Science). M.A. Chaudhry's article published [23] Kershner, Isabel (24 May 2010).Israel Denies It Oered
at the The Nation, 1999. Retrieved 5 March 2012.
South Africa Warheads. The New York Times.
[4] South Africa: Nuclear Case Closed?" (PDF). National
Security Archive. 19 December 1993. Retrieved 26 August 2008.
[26] African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty. Department of Foreign Aairs, Republic of South Africa. Retrieved 2006-07-28.
[7] Frank V. Pabian.South Africas Nuclear Weapon Program: Lessons For U.S. Non Proliferation Policy(PDF).
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies. p. 8.
Retrieved 8 December 2008.
[8] http://books.google.com/books?id=M7wIryQK6UkC&
pg=PA10
[9] http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?
option=com_content&view=article&id=5942:
book-review-how-sa-built-six-atom-bombs-&catid=57:
Book%20Reviews&Itemid=141
4.25.5 References
Joseph Cirincione, Jon B. Wolfsthal, Miriam Rajkumar. Deadly Arsenals: Nuclear, Biological, and
Chemical Threats. Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment For International Peace, 2005.
[10] Jericho
[11] Chris McGreal (7 February 2006). Brothers in arms
Israel's secret pact with Pretoria. The Guardian (London).
230
Israel conducted nuclear experiment in 1979
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
4.26.1 Background
4.26 Sweden
Fronticepiece of an 1946 edition of the Smyth Report, scanned
from original
During the nal phase of World War II, the Swedish Government saw value in the future of nuclear energy, especially the Allied interest in Swedens uranium-containing
black shale deposits. This led to suggestions that Sweden should establish state control over its natural resources, including uranium. Specically, such controls
would include export controls on uranium in collaboration with the American and British governments, exclusive Swedish controls over uranium ore, and a ban on
commercial mining of uranium.* [1]
FOA's old building in Ursvik, Sundbyberg. This building is now
a pre-school.
4.26. SWEDEN
4.26.2
Early studies
231
tinct from other nuclear weapon programs - traditionally solely state-run.* [8] When the anti-nuclear weapons
movement began to gain inuence during the late 1950s
and became stronger during the 1960s, the connection
between military and civilian nuclear research become
viewed with suspicion.
Physics-oriented defense research started in Sweden during World War II, and drew many outstanding Swedish
physicists to the Military Institute of Physics (MFI)
founded in 1941. Here the focus was on conventional
weapons. In 1945, MFI merged with two other organizations to form the Defense Research Institute (FOA)
in compliance with a 1944 proposal to reorganize the 4.26.4
Swedish defense research.* [4] Research at the FOA was
focused on such things as jet engines, rocket technology,
shaped charge systems, and radars.
4.26.3
Connection
between
nuclear
weapons program and civilian
use of nuclear energy
232
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
Plutonium ring
4.26. SWEDEN
233
Ministry and Commander-in-Chief avoided laying out
any concrete plans for nuclear weapons acquisition in
the 1954 report, even Swedens ocial military publications were openly advocating nuclear armament. Although two years earlier, Air Forces Chief Bengt Nordenskild had already advocated for Swedish possession
of nuclear weapons, his comments were understood to be
personal opinion and did not stoke much debate at the
time.* [19]
234
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
clear weapons, but to provide increased funding for defense research in nuclear weapons, and to give the term
nuclear weaponsa very broad interpretation.* [22]
4.26. SWEDEN
nuclear Sweden, which jeopardized the world with further nuclear proliferation. In 1956, the United States
and Sweden signed an agreement on civilian nuclear energy cooperation. The two parties agreed to exchange information regarding the construction, operation and development of research reactors. The Swedish government committed itself to providing the AEC with information regarding nuclear energy developments in Sweden.* [23] The deal also implied that the US nuclear umbrella would protect Sweden, and so there was no need
for any nuclear arms. In May 1956, the National Federation of Social Democratic Women in Sweden took
a stand against nuclear weapons, which heretofore had
not been a major public issue in Sweden.* [24] Swedlund's position became the focal point for an intense debate in the media during 1957. The FOA's chief director, Hugo Larsson, also helped to energize the debate with an interview in Dagens Eko in 1957, in which
he said that Sweden had the resources to build nuclear
weapons, which could be completed in 1963-1964.* [25]
Among the proponents of Swedish nuclear weapons program was Dagens Nyheter's chief editor, Herbert Tingsten, and former Social Democratic Defense Minister
Per Edvin Skld.* [26] Even the prospective leader of the
Liberal People's Party, Per Ahlmark, was an advocate
of Swedish nuclear weapons.* [27] Many of opponents of
Swedish nuclear weapons development were found on the
cultural left. The nuclear weapons issue would appear frequently in the press cultural pages. Meanwhile, among
the opponents were Inga Thorsson, Ernst Wigfors, and
sten Unden. The editor of Folket i bild, Per Anders
Fogelstrm, advocated against Swedish nuclear weapons
in the magazine, and published a book Instead of the
Atomic Bombtogether with Social Democratic student
politician, Roland Morell. In 1957, they launched a petition against Swedish nuclear weapons, that was signed by
95,000 people and was handed over to Tage Erlander in
February 1958.* [24]
The polls from the 1960s also reected a rising public indignation with nuclear weapons program. A grassroot movement - Aktionsgruppen mot svenska atomvapen, AMSA (the Action Group Against Swedish
Atomic Bombs) - was founded in the late 1950s, and
became very successful in its struggle against Swedish
nuclear weapon intentions.* [28] Being a member of the
U.N. Security Council, Sweden advanced a proposal for
a nuclear test moratorium in 1957. The international
disarmament discussions and the nonproliferation norms
emerging from the mid-1950s onwards and leading in
1968 to the NPT also aected the Swedish public debate
and strengthened the arguments against Swedish nuclear
weapons acquisition.* [28]
235
In July 1958, the FOA laid out two dierent research programs:* [29] - S-programunder the title Research
for Protection and Defense Against Atomic Weapons.
- L-programentitled Research for Preparation of
Data for the Design of Nuclear Explosive Devices.The
draft of the L-program was in essence an update of the
data collected for the Commander-in-Chief a year earlier.
The S-program, that emerged now for the rst time, was
described as a program to develop the knowledge about
nuclear weapons which required the creation of Swedish
defensive doctrine without nuclear weapons, which would
be adopted to ght a war in which a nuclear strike could
occur. Despite a completely dierent description of the
purpose, the S-program included similar activities as the
L-program, except it was stripped-down to around 75%
of the cost. The S-program t both the Chief's goal to
acquire nuclear weapons and the Social Democratic Government's ambivalence, which the FOA under its new
chief director, Martin Fehrm, had apparently realized.
Thus, with such a proposition, the Government could
fund almost all research activities necessary to pursue the
Swedish nuclear weapons program, yet it asserted not to
do so.
Regardless of the S-program's design, Swedlund decided
to get immediate approval for the L-program. In separate
discussions between the Chief and defense minister Sven
Andersson in Autumn 1958 regarding nuclear weapons
and the budget plan for the coming nancial years, Andersson made it clear that he favored the acquisition of nuclear weapons, but the split within the Social Democrats
was so stark that it was better to not bring up the matter for
discussion. Prime Minister Erlander's view was to study
the question within the committee of the party and to
come up with a proposition by the annual party congress
in 1960. Andersson attempted to persuade the Chief to
not request budgetary resources for the L-program, because they would likely be rejected. Despite Andersson
s suggestions, the Commander-in-Chief instead opted to
include funds for L-program in his scal year 1959/1960
budget proposal. Swedlunds diaries and other documents suggest that he had limited understanding of the
political game, not least within the parties, even though
his own statements in 1957 contributed to the creation of
nuclear weapons resistance. He also believed that many
of the senior politicians would be able to handle the issue
as he desired. His lack of exibility and belief that personal connections would overcome political opposition
ultimately killed his funding request for L-program.* [30]
While the L-program was left unfunded, FOA was given
a large allocation for scal year 1959/1960 forincreased
research in atomic-, missile-, countermeasure-, and other
areasin which the S-program was relevant.* [31]
236
4.26.9
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
Freedom of action and enhanced design. He emphasized, however, that he was uncertain
about the eect it would have on the nuclear weapons
defense research
4.26. SWEDEN
237
238
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
4.26.12
W48
4.26. SWEDEN
239
240
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
280 mm barrels. These artillery projectiles used a dierent design principal, linear implosion instead of a traditional spherical implosion bomb. Such designs sacriced
eciency and yield to reduce the payloads diameter.
Since Swedens plutonium supply was always a limiting
factor in its nuclear program, and cost-eectiveness was a
concern, it is unlikely that Sweden would have sacriced
multiple aerial bombs to build one battleeld device, especially when taking into account the reduced yield and
additional development expenses.
4.26.15
conventional forces.* [52] In order to prevent the elimination of nuclear striking ability by a surprise attack, the
Swedish Government outlined a system where the majority of warheads would be stored divided amongst heavily
defended caverns, and the rest would move between airbases. These plans were named as Ahasverus system
and can be compared to the idea of second-strike capability.* [53]
After the ardent nuclear advocate Nils Swedlund retired and turned the post of Commander-in-Chief over to
Torsten Rapp, some ocials in the Ministry of Defense
began to express doubts regarding the nuclear weapons
program. This can be understood in light of delays caused
by plutonium enrichment challenges and growing cost estimates. The rst skeptical views came from the Air
Force and were announced in 1961 by Air Chief of Sta
Stig Norn to his counterparts in other branches of the
military and to the elected Defense Chief of Sta, Carl
Eric Almgren in connection with the preparation work for
the 1962 report. As result, a special working group, the
nuclear explosive group, was formed under the leadership
of Colonel ke Mangrd. This group worked from June
1961 until February 1962 and conducted comprehensive
analyses of the consequences and the military value of
possession of nuclear weapons. Through inuence of the
Air Force, the 1962 report expressed a more ambivalent
position towards nuclear weapons than the 1957 report,
though it was still largely positive.* [54]
From the beginning, the Swedes dismissed the opportunity to acquire their own strategic nuclear forces that
could reach an adversary's major population centers, because Sweden had no strategic bombers. Instead, the
Swedish Government sought to develop tactical nuclear
weapons to be used against militarily signicant targets
in Sweden's neighboring countries, in the event of war.
The prime example of such a target could be enemy ports
on the Baltic Sea, another such target could be enemy air
bases.* [47] As most ports were located in close proximity to civilian population centers, they too would suer if
Swedish nuclear weapons were used. With this in mind,
the Ministry of Defense arrived at the conclusion that any
such use would have major political consequences, even It may seem paradoxical that the Air Force changed opinif the device employed was a tactical rather than strategic ion on nuclear weapons given the expansion of the relnuclear weapon.* [47]
ative importance of the US Air Force following AmerThe Swedish Government intended to possess tactical ica's adoption of nuclear weapons.* [55] At the time, hownuclear weapons primarily as a deterrent against attacks ever, the Air Force was facing an expensive acquisition of
on Sweden. Assuming the aggressor was not deterred, the Saab 37 Viggen, and feared that a full-scale nuclear
they would have been forced to make signicant tacti- weapons program would compete with it for resources.
cal adjustments due to the risk of being subject to nu- One of the points that Norn wanted to investigate was
clear attack. Much of the tactical adjustments would have what conventional forces Sweden could acquire if it delargely been the commitment of a larger amount of time cided not to develop nuclear weapons. It should be noted
and resources to the attack. In this respect, the posses- that it was the plan that the United States suggested Swesion of nuclear weapons would help to restore balance of den to follow in 1960.* [56] However, it remains unclear
4.26. SWEDEN
241
In March 1962, Sweden joined seven other neutral countries, members of the Eighteen Nation Disarmament
Committee, a predecessor to the Conference on Disarmament (CD). In 1968, Sweden signed the Nuclear nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and thereby publicly committed itself against acquisition of nuclear weapons. Shortly
after joining the NPT, Sweden became a founding member of the Zangger Committee, which was designed to
work out the exact denitions of the material and equipment to be restricted by the NPT. The Committee drafted
aTrigger Listofsource or special ssionable materialsand equipment or materials especially designed or
prepared for the processing, use, or production of ssile
4.26.17 The 1980 referendum
materials.* [63] In continuation, Sweden has occupied
an active position in generating of new agreements that
would control the export of the listed items to non-NPT
The debate among the major Swedish political parties states. These agreements and Trigger List have subseover the nuclear program had been intensied throughout quently constituted the rst major agreement on nuclear
the 1970s. In 1973, the ruling Center Party declared that export regulations.* [64]
it was against Sweden's nuclear power program, thereby
letting the coalition government to become a leader in The negotiations between the Soviet Union, Great
the anti-nuclear movement aimed at the program's com- Britain, and the US in August 1962 ended in an agreeplete elimination. The Three Mile Island accident in the ment to abandon all nuclear weapons tests in the atmoUnited States in 1979 undermined public condence in sphere, outer space, and underwater. Leaders of other
the safety of Sweden's nuclear program. The afore men- states were also encouraged to sign the treaty, which came
tioned political and societal divisions over the Swedish as a surprise to Sweden. After a brief time for consideranuclear program led to a referendum on the subject held tion, the Swedish government decided sign the Treaty dein 1980.* [58] The referendum was of a non-binding, spite their Freedom of action doctrine. In the meantime,
tests thus
advisorynature and there was no option to vote in fa- the Treaty did not prohibit underground nuclear
*
[65]
the
Freedom
of
action
could
be
maintained.
vor of nuclear energy. The referendum's result heavily
favored option two, 39.1 percent of the votes, and option After the CTBT entered into force in 1963, the FOA
three, 38.7 percent of the votes, with option three receiv- was assigned to build a seismographic complex to moning 18.9 percent of the 4.7 million votes cast, representing itor the compliance with the treaty. The Swedish nea 75.7 percent voter turnout.* [59] The 1980 referendum gotiators were quiet on the question of non-proliferation
induced the Swedish parliament to decide that Sweden's for years, particularly in view of the Swedish freedom
nuclear power program should bephased-outby 2010 of action doctrine. Until 1965, there was an ocial diand no further nuclear power plants should be built. That rective to not raise the issue. The situation changed in
decision made Sweden to be the rst out of ve countries early 1966. In March 1966, Undersecretary of the Dethat have approved a national nuclear phase-out policy: fense Department Karl Frithiofson in his speech before
the Royal Swedish Academy of War Sciences publicly
Belgium, Germany, Italy, and Spain.* [60]
242
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
announced that it was of no interest to Sweden to acquire Karl Frithiofson in his speech in March 1966 announced
nuclear weapons, which was a slight dierence from the that Sweden gave up its plans to acquire nuclear weapons,
Freedom of action doctrine.* [66]
which in its turn put the end to the freedom of action doctrine. In 1968, the doctrine was turned into defense investigation, and with the signature of the NPT in 1968 FOA
of dismantling of nuclear-weapons re4.26.19 Reasons to abandon nuclear pro- began the process
lated research.* [66]
gram
4.26. SWEDEN
taken on economical grounds, the licenses had recently
been extended until 2014, subject to certain conditions.
The reactors were mainly used for commercial materials testing purposes, isotope production, neutron source
for research purposes, medical applications and higher
education. They are currently under decommissioning.
*
[72] Foreign observers judged that Swedish nuclear capabilities reached a very advanced level and that, at the
end of its nuclear program, Sweden was technically capable of building a nuclear weapon within a short time.* [73]
4.26.21
After the nuclear weapons program: defense research and support for disarmament
243
By 1984, Sweden had signed and ratied the Antarctic
Treaty. The Treaty was established in 1961 to ban all
military activity in Antarctica. The Antarctic Treaty was
not, however, the rstnonarmamenttreaty that Sweden
signed. Previously it had participated in the establishment
of the Outer Space Treaty in 1967, which restricts the
placement of nuclear weapons or other types of weapons
of mass destruction in space.* [32] The 1986 Chernobyl
nuclear disaster evoked fears of radiation and safety. As a
reaction to it, the Social Democratic-led Swedish government set 1995/1996 as years to start the implementation
of a phase-out plan, including the shut-down of two nuclear reactors.* [76] Additionally, in 1999 and 2005 two
other nuclear reactors (Barsebck I and Barsebck II, respectively) were closed. In 1992, in order to improve
safety of Russian nuclear power plants, Sweden started
cooperating with Russia on nuclear safety, radiation protection, nonproliferation, and proper nuclear waste management.* [77]
Sweden has also been an active participant at various international nonproliferation and disarmament meetings
throughout the years. In 1998, Sweden was a founding
member of the "New Agenda Coalition" (NAC). NAC
called on the nuclear weapon states to commit to their disarmament obligations under Article VI of the NPT. At
the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the NAC proposed
the13 Stepsthereby breaking the meeting's deadlock.
The13 Stepsprovided a series of steps to meet the disarmament obligations contained in Article VI.* [32] Regarding the challenges of the phasing-out of nuclear en4.26.22 Sweden and non-proliferation ergy in Sweden, the International Energy Agency's (IEA)
movement
2004 review of Swedish energy policies called on Sweden to consider the costs of replacing nuclear power and
In 1974, a multilateral export control regime - the the potential implications for energy security, greenhouse
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) - was created as a suc- gas emissions, and economic growth.* [78]
cessor to the Zangger Committee. The NSG established
general guidelines on nuclear transfers and dual-use tech- However, regardless of potential risks associated with
nologies to further restrict the management of nuclear nuclear plants, the IEA's 2004 and 2008 reviews of
exports. Sweden as well as seven other states (Belgium, Swedish energy policy elicited that abolishing nuclear enCzechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Italy, ergy would be very dicult, as around 45% of electricthe Netherlands, Poland, and Switzerland), joined the ity in Sweden originates from nuclear power. It also assumed that in the post-Kyoto period targets for reducing
NSG between 1976 and 1977.* [32]
greenhouse gas emissions would be stricter.* [79] In the
In 1980, Prime Minister Olof Palme established the In- meantime, with years public opinion against nuclear endependent Commission on Disarmament and Security Is- ergy has diminished. In 2009, 62 percent of Swedes supsues, also known as the Palme Commission. The Com- ported a Swedish nuclear program. Only 19 percent was
mission favored the demilitarization of space, the elimi- against.* [80] As a result, the phase-out policy was abannation of chemical arms from Europe, and the reduction doned in early 2009.
of conventional weapons. The commission also advocated negotiations in Europe to reduce political tensions
among the states and political actors that could have a potential for military conict.* [74] In the early 1980s, Swe- 4.26.23 Documents from the nuclear
weapons program
den was one of 58 nations signatory to the Convention on
the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. In compliance with the Convention, Sweden adopted the Nuclear According to the Swedish rules of secrecy, classied docActivities Act and the Nuclear Activities Ordinance in uments can be released after 40 years. Many documents
1984. The Acts were designed to prevent unlawful deal- on the Swedish nuclear program's development phase
ings with nuclear material and thereby ensure the safety and most intensive periods had therefore been gradually
opened to public during the 1990s, and laid the foundaof nuclear activities.* [75]
244
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
tion for studies for such experts as Wilhelm Agrell and [9] Melin, Jan (2 April 2001). Svensk atombomb utvecklades trots frbud. Ny Teknik (in Swedish).
Thomas Jonter. Certain documents that are still classied can only be released after 70 years thus, these doc[10] Swedish plutonium to the United States. Swedish Rauments on the Swedish nuclear program are not publicly
diation Safety Authority. 2012-03-27.
available yet.
[11] Cole 1997, p. 233
4.26.24
4.26.25
See also
4.26.26
References
4.26. SWEDEN
245
4.26.27 Sources
246
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
Prawitz, Jan (2001), Det svenska spelet om nedrustningen (in Swedish), Totalfrsvarets forskningsinstiThe Syria le at the International Atomic Energy Agency
tut (FOI).
(IAEA) remains open, amid Syria's failure to respond to
the IAEA's questions about a facility, destroyed in 2007
Reiss, Without the Bomb, Interviews with Swedish
by Israel, that the IAEA concluded was very likely
ocers and ocials, in Arnett 1998.
a nuclear reactor, including the whereabouts the reactor's
nuclear fuel.* [6] In January 2015, it was reported that the
Wentzel, Viggo (1994), D21. Bits & bytes, Syrian government is suspected to be building a nuclear
Datasaabs historia, Datasaabs vnner, Linkping: plant in Al-Qusayr, Syria, allegedly with the aim of deHur det brjade, pp. 79, ISBN 91-972464-09.
veloping nuclear weapons.* [7]
4.26.28
Further reading
4.27.1 History
Following the Israeli occupation of the Golan Heights
during the 1967 Six-Day War, and South Lebanon in
1978, the Syrian government has regarded Israeli military power as a threat to Syrian security.* [8] Syria rst
acquired chemical weapons, from Egypt, in 1973 as a
military deterrent against Israel before launching the Yom
Kippur War.* [8] Despite the fact that Syrian ocials did
not explicitly declare the chemical weapons capability,
they implied it through speeches and in addition warned
of retaliations. Internal Syrian chemical weapons capability may have been developed alongside indirect Russian, German, Chinese and Indian technical and logistical
support.* [8]
4.26.29
External links
4.27. SYRIA
247
considered by the West as a potential consequence of the cylindersas abandoned chemical weaponsand told the
use of such weapons.* [12]
OPCW thatthe items did not belong tothem.* [24] On
14 June 2014, the Joint OPCW-UN Mission conrmed
that the cylinders contained sarin.* [24] On 7 July 2014,
4.27.2 Chemical weapons
the U.N. Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon informed the
U.N. Security Council about the ndings.* [24]
Main articles: Syria chemical weapons program and Use
In December 2013 investigative journalist Seymour
of chemical weapons in the Syrian civil war
Hersh controversially reported that multiple US intelligence agencies had allegedly produced top secret assessments in the summer of 2013, regarding Syrian rebel's
supposed chemical weapons capabilities. The alleged asSyria's chemical weapons program
sessments were said by Hersh to have concluded that the
Syria's chemical weapons program began in the 1970s Al-Nusra Front and Al-Qaeda in Iraq were capable of acwith weapons and training from Egypt and the Soviet quiring, producing, and deploying sarin gasin quantity
Union, with production of chemical weapons in Syria .* [25] A spokesman for the Director of National Intellibeginning in the mid-1980s. In September 2013 Syria gence replied that Hersh's report wassimply false.* [26]
joined the Chemical Weapons Convention (formally acceding on 14 October), and agreed to the destruction of
its weapons, to be supervised by the Organisation for the 4.27.3 Biological weapons
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, as required by the
considered not to have biological
Convention. Syria had been one of a handful of states Syria is *generally
*
weapons.
[8]
[9]
However,
there are some reports of an
which had not ratied the Convention, and joined after
active
biological
weapons
research
and production prointernational condemnation of the August 2013 Ghouta
gram.
According
to
NATO
Consultant
Dr Jill Dekker,
chemical attack, which Western states held the Syrian
Syria
has
worked
on:
anthrax,
plague,
tularemia, bogovernment responsible for (whilst Syria and Russia held
tulism,
smallpox,
aatoxin,
cholera,
ricin
and camelpox,
the Syrian rebels of the Syrian civil war responsible).
and
has
used
Russian
help
in
installing
anthrax
in missile
Prior to September 2013 Syria had not publicly admitwarheads.
She
also
stated
they
view
their
bio-chemical
ted to possessing chemical weapons, although Western
*
intelligence services believed it to hold a massive stock- arsenal as part of a normal weapons program. [27]
pile.* [13] In September 2013, French intelligence put the
Syrian stockpile at 1,000 tonnes, including Yperite, VX
4.27.4 Nuclear program
andseveral hundred tonnes of sarin.* [14] In October
2013, the OPCW found a total of 1,300 tons of chemiSyria is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
cal weapons.* [15] On 16 October 2013, the OPCW and
and maintains a civil nuclear program. On September
the United Nations formally established a joint mission to
6, 2007, Israel unilaterally bombed a site in Syria which
oversee the elimination of the Syrian chemical weapons
it believed had hosted a nuclear reactor under construcprogram by mid-2014.
tion. U.S. intelligence ocials claimed low condence
that the site was meant for weapons development.* [29]
Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has said the site in disSyrian opposition chemical weapons capability
cussion was justa military site under construction* [30]
*
The Syrian government claims that the opposition has the and that Syria's goal is a nuclear-free Middle East. [31]
capacity to launch large chemical attacks such as those Syria allowed the IAEA to visit the site on June 23, 2008,
seen at Ghouta. Sources such as the United States* [16] taking environmental samples that revealed the presence
and Human Rights Watch* [17] disagree, claiming there is of man-made uranium and other materials consistent with
no signicant evidence the opposition has any signicant a reactor. On May 24, 2011, IAEA Director General
Amano released a report which assessed that the dechemical weapons capability.
stroyed facility was a reactor, and the IAEA Board of
According to Syria, on 1 June 2013, the Syrian Army Governors voted 17-6 (with 11 abstentions) to report this
seized two cylinders holding the nerve agent sarin from as non-compliance to the UN Security Council.
Syrian opposition ghters in Hama.* [18] A Syrian military source told SANA, the ocial news agency in
Syria, that the Syrian Army seized two containers with Open nuclear programs
sarin together with automatic ries, pistols and homemade bombs (IEDs) in a rebel hideout in the al-Faraieh Syria is a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
neighborhood (also spelled Al-Faraya)* [19] of the city of Treaty and has repeatedly attempted to purchase small
Hama,* [20]* [21]* [22] which has been the scene of ght- research type nuclear reactors from China, Russia, Aring between government troops and armed opposition gentina, or other countries. Despite these purchases begroups.* [23] The Syrian government declared the two ing openly disclosed and IAEA monitored, international
248
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
pressure has caused all these reactor purchases to be cancelled. Syria has open and IAEA monitored nuclear research programs including a Chinese made non-reactor
miniature neutron source.* [28]
On November 26, 2008 the IAEA Board of Governors
approved technical aid for Syria despite Western allegations that the country had a secret atomic program that
could eventually be used to make weapons. China, Russia and developing nations, criticized Western political interferencethat they said undermined the IAEA's
programme to foster civilian atomic energy development.* [32] The top U.N. nuclear ocial also strongly rebuked Western powers for trying to deny the request, saying this shouldn't be done without evidence and merely on
Intelligence photo of the alleged reactor head and fuel channels
the existence of an investigation.* [33]
under construction
further claimed that the nuclear reactor was not yet operational and no nuclear material had been introduced into
it.* [35] Top U.S. intelligence ocials claimed that the
site was meant for weapons development.* [29]
Western press reports asserted that the Israeli air strike
followed a shipment delivery to Syria by a North Korean freighter, and that North Korea was suspected to be
supplying a reactor to Syria for a nuclear weapons program.* [36] On October 24, 2007 the Institute for Science
and International Security released a report which identied a site in eastern Syria's Deir ez-Zor Governorate
province as the suspected reactor. The report speculated
about similarities between the Syrian building and North
Korea's Yongbyon Nuclear Scientic Research Center,
but said that it was too early to make a denitive comparison.* [37] On October 25, 2007, Western media said
the main building and any debris from it following the air
strike had been completely dismantled and removed by
the Syrians.* [38]
After refusing to comment on the reports for six months,
the Bush administration briefed Congress and the IAEA
on April 24, 2008, saying that the U.S. Government was
convincedthat Syria had been building a covert nuclear reactorthat was not intended for peaceful purposes.* [39] The brieng included releases of satellite
photographs of the bombed site and overhead and ground
level intelligence photographs of the site under construction, including the alleged reactor vessel steel shell before concrete was poured and of the alleged reactor head
structure.* [40]
Reaction to allegations On June 23, 2008, IAEA inspectors were allowed to visit the Dair Alzour site (also
referred to as Al Kibar), and take samples of the debris. On November 19, 2008 an IAEA report stated
Bombing of alleged reactor On September 6, 2007, that a signicant number of natural uranium partiIsrael bombed an ocially unidentied site in Syria clesproduced as a result of chemical processing were
which it believed had been a nuclear reactor under con- found at the Al Kibar site;* [41] however, the IAEA did
struction.* [34] This was called Operation Orchard. It was not nd sucient evidence to prove Syria is developing
Intelligence photo of the alleged reactor vessel under construction
4.27. SYRIA
nuclear weapons.* [42] Some American nuclear experts
have speculated about similarities between the alleged
Syrian reactor and North Korea's Yongybon reactor* [43]
but IAEA Director General ElBaradei has pointed out
that there was uranium but it doesn't mean there was
a reactor.* [44] ElBaradei has shown dissatisfaction
with the United States and Israel for only providing the
IAEA with photos of the bombed facility in Syria,* [45]
and has also urged caution against prematurely judging
Syria's atomic program by reminding diplomats about
false U.S. claims that Saddam Hussein had weapons of
mass destruction.* [46] Russia, China, Iran, and nonaligned countries have also supported giving Syria nuclear
guidance despite pressure from the United States.* [46]
249
See also
4.27.8 References
[1] Smith-Spark, Laura; Cohen, Tom (September 14, 2013).
U.S., Russia agree to framework on Syria chemical
weapons. CNN. Retrieved 14 September 2013.
[2] Loveday Morris and Michael Birnbaum (October 31,
2013). Syria has destroyed chemical weapons facilities, international inspectors say. The Washington Post.
Retrieved October 31, 2013.
[3] Mike Corder (17 September 2011).Syria had ricin program: OPCW document. The Daily Star. Associated
Press. Retrieved 21 September 2013.
250
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
[8] M. Zuhair Diab (Fall 1997). Syria's Chemical and Biological Weapons: Assessing capabilities and motivations [28] Syria - Nuclear Weapons Programs at globalsecurity.org,
accessed October 24, 2007.
(PDF). The Nonproliferation Review 5 (1). Retrieved 28
August 2013.
[29] IAEA slams U.S. for withholding data on alleged Syrian
nuclear reactor
[9] MacFarquhar, Neil (2012-07-23). Syria Says Chemical
Arms Reserved for Attack From Abroad. New York
[30] Syria president denies building nuclear reactor. Agence
Times. Retrieved 2012-07-23.
France-Presse. 2008-04-27. Retrieved 2013-06-04.
[10] Syria Tested Chemical Weapons Systems, Witnesses
Say. Der Spiegel. 17 September 2012. Retrieved 18 [31] Daiji Sadamori,Assad: Syria Not Seeking to be Nuclear
State,Asahi Shimbun, 27 October 2006
September 2012.
[11] Report: Syria tested chemical weapons delivery systems
in August. Haaretz. 17 September 2012. Retrieved 18
September 2012.
[12] France warns of Syrian chemical weapons attack. Associated Press. 3 September 2012. Retrieved 18 September 2012.
[33] Nuclear Threat Initiative: ElBaradei Lashes Critics of Syrian Nuclear Aid Request. Globalsecuritynewswire.org. Retrieved 2013-06-04.
[34] 6 September 2007 Air strike at globalsecurity.org, accessed October 24, 2007.
[15] Spencer, Richard (29 October 2013). Syria: inspectors nd 1,300 tons of chemical weapons. Telegraph.
Retrieved 31 October 2013.
[41] IAEA: Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic (November 19, 2008)"
(PDF). Retrieved 2013-06-04.
[42] "''Xinhua'': IAEA nds insucient evidence for Syria's
nuclear weapons development. News.xinhuanet.com.
2008-11-20. Retrieved 2013-06-04.
4.28. TAIWAN
251
[43] Warrick, Joby (2008-11-19). Bombed Syrian Site Appears to Have Been Nuclear Reactor. Washington Post.
Retrieved 2008-11-19.
4.28 Taiwan
Not to be confused with People's Republic of China and
weapons of mass destruction.
The Republic of China (Taiwan) denies having any
weapons of mass destruction. There is no evidence
of Taiwan possessing any chemical or nuclear weapons
though it has pursued nuclear weapons in the past.
In 1967, a nuclear weapons program began under the aus[56] IAEA Refers Syria To Security Council, Voice of Amer- pices of the Institute of Nuclear Energy Research (INER)
at the Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology.
ica Editorial, June 17, 2011.
The Republic of China was able to acquire nuclear tech[57] Ballistic and Cruise Missile Threat (PDF). National Air nology from abroad (including a research reactor from
and Space Intelligence Center (Report) (Air Force Intelli- Canada and low-grade plutonium from the United States)
gence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency). April allegedly for a civilian energy system, but in actuality to
2009. NASIC-1031-0985-09. Retrieved 20 February
develop fuel for nuclear weapons.* [2]
2013.
During the 1970s, the Republic of China had an active program to produce plutonium using heavy water
reactors. However, after the International Atomic Energy
[59] Rice, Susan (2008-12-30). Shield S04B-08: Syria Agency found evidence of the Republic of China's efarranging to acquire CW equipment from two In- forts to produce weapons-grade plutonium, Taipei agreed
dian companies. WikiLeaks. WikiLeaks cable: in September 1976 under U.S. pressure to dismantle its
08STATE135048. Archived from the original on 2012- nuclear weapons program. A study by the Mitre Corpo12-03. Retrieved 2012-12-03.
ration in 1977 included Taiwan in a list of insecure
[58] US suspected Indian cos role in Iran N-plan. The Times
of India. December 19, 2010. Retrieved March 9, 2011.
252
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
nuclear threshold statesstates with the technical capability to develop nuclear weapons and the security motivations to seriously contemplate such an option. The other
states were Israel, South Africa, South Korea, and Yugoslavia.* [3] U.S. intelligence believed that the Republic
of China also had designed devices suitable for nuclear
testing.* [4] ROC successfully conducted its diminutive
nuclear test in southern Taiwan in the 1980s.* [5]
A secret program was revealed when Colonel Chang
Hsien-yi, deputy director of nuclear research at INER,
who was secretly working for the CIA, defected to the
U.S. in December 1987 and produced a cache of incriminating documents. General Hau Pei-tsun claimed that
scientists in Taiwan had already produced a controlled
nuclear reaction. Under pressure from the U.S., the program was halted.
During the 19951996 Taiwan Strait crisis, then Republic
of China President Lee Teng-hui proposed to reactivate
the program, but was forced to back down a few days later
after drawing intense criticism.* [6]
Current status
4.28.4 Ratication
treaties
of
international
There is no evidence that the ROC possesses any nuclear weapons or any programs to produce them, although
it does have the general technological ability to develop
the ability to enrich uranium or process plutonium. The
Republic of China's nuclear power plants use imported 4.28.5 See also
enriched uranium and are subject to International Atomic
China and weapons of mass destruction
Energy Agency inspection.
The People's Republic of China has announced that any
Republic of China possession of nuclear weapons is
grounds for an immediate attack. Attempts by ROC ofcials to form a dialogue with the PRC on the subject of
weapons of mass destructions have been rebued.
4.28.2
Chemical weapons
4.28.3
Missile technology
4.28.6 References
[1] http://www.china.org.cn/english/congress/228244.htm
[2] Roy, Denny (2003). Taiwan: A Political History. Cornell
University Press. ISBN 0-8014-8805-2.
[3] Report of the Nuclear Energy Policy Study Group,
Nuclear Power Issues and Choices (Cambridge, MA:
Ballinger Publishing Co., 1977), p. 284.
4.29. UKRAINE
253
[5] http://www.chinanews.com/2000-1-7/26/14868.html
[6] Albright, David; Gay, Corey (1 January 1998). Taiwan:
Nuclear nightmare averted. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. Retrieved 18 May 2015 via HighBeam Research.
(subscription required (help)).
[7] MND declines to conrm whether Taiwan has mediumrange missile.
[8] http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/a/npt/china/acc/
washington
[9] http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/taiwan_3.pdf?_=
1381971852
4.28.7
External links
Deployments by country, 1951-1977 The Bulletin Noting the changes in the world-wide security situation,
including the end of the Cold War, which have brought
of the Atomic Scientists, Nov/Dec 1999
about conditions for deep reductions in nuclear forces.
United States Secretly Deployed Nuclear Bombs In Conrm the following:
27 Countries and Territories During Cold War
1. The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of
America rearm their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with the principles of the Final Act of the Confer4.29 Ukraine
ence on Security and Cooperation in Europe, to respect
the independence and sovereignty and the existing bor4.29.1 Background information on Rus- ders of Ukraine.
On December 1 1991 Ukraine, the second most powerful republic in the USSR, voted overwhelmingly for independence, which ended any realistic chance of the Soviet
Union staying together even on a limited scale.* [1] More
than 90% of the electorate expressed their support for
the Declaration of Independence of Ukraine, and they
elected the chairman of the parliament, Leonid Kravchuk
to serve as the rst president of the country. At the meeting in Brest, Belarus on December 8, followed by the
Alma Ata meeting on December 21, the leaders of Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine formally dissolved the Soviet
Union and formed the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS).
254
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,
if Ukraine should become a victim of* [4] an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which
nuclear weapons are used.
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
ing by the spirit of the Sino-Ukrainian joint communiqu of 4 January 1992 on the establishment
of diplomatic relations, the Sino-Ukrainian joint
communiqu of 31 October 1992 and the SinoUkrainian joint statement of 6 September 1994,
China recognizes and respects the independence,
sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine, and
stands ready to further develop friendly and cooperative Sino-Ukraine relations on the basis of the Five
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.
255
External links
The Ukraine Crisis is Unsettling Decades-old Nuclear Weapons Agreements
Ukraine Votes to Quit Soviet Union : Independence:
More than 90% of Voters Approve Historic Break
with Kremlin. The President-elect Calls for Collective Command of the Country's Nuclear Arsenal
Russia, Ukraine, and the Breakup of the Soviet
Union
The United Kingdom possesses, or has possessed, a variety of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons. The United Kingdom
is one of the ve ocial nuclear weapon states under the
256
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
the incubation period had elapsed but none of the Many ex-servicemen have complained about suering
crew fell ill.* [8]
long term illnesses after taking part in tests on nerve
agents. It was alleged that before volunteering they
Operation Hesperus o Stornoway in 1953.
were not provided with adequate information about the
experiments and the risk, in breach of the Nuremberg
Operation Ozone o Nassau in 1954.
Code of 1947. Alleged abuses at Porton Down became the subject of a lengthy police investigation called
Operation Negation o Nassau in 1954-5.
Operation Antler, which covered the use of volunteers in
testing a variety of chemical weapons and countermeaThe programme was cancelled in 1956 when the British
sures from 1939 until 1989. An inquest was opened on 5
government renounced the use of biological and chemical
May 2004 into the death on 6 May 1953 of a serviceman,
weapons. It ratied the Biological and Toxin Weapons
Ronald Maddison, during an experiment using sarin. His
Convention in March 1975.
death had earlier been found by a private MoD inquest
to have been as a result of misadventurebut this was
quashed by the High Court in 2002. The 2004 hearing
4.30.2 Chemical weapons
closed on 15 November, after a jury found that the cause
of Maddison's death was application of a nerve agent
Main article: Chemical weapons and the United Kingdom
in a non-therapeutic experiment.
The UK was a signatory of the Hague Conventions (1899
and 1907) which outlawed the use of poison gas in war- 4.30.3 Nuclear weapons
fare. However, during the First World War, in retaliation
to the use of chlorine by Germany against British troops Main article: Nuclear weapons and the United Kingdom
from April 1915 onwards, British forces deployed chlo- The United Kingdom has four Vanguard class subrine themselves for the rst time during the Battle of Loos
on 25 September 1915. By the end of the war, poison gas
use had become widespread on both sides and by 1918 a
quarter of artillery shells were lled with gas and Britain
had produced around 25,400 tons of toxic chemicals.
Britain used a range of poison gases, originally chlorine
and later phosgene, diphosgene and mustard gas. They
also used relatively small amounts of the irritant gases
chloromethyl chloroformate, chloropicrin, bromacetone
and ethyl iodoacetate. Gases were frequently mixed, for
example white star was the name given to a mixture of
equal volumes of chlorine and phosgene, the chlorine
helping to spread the denser but more toxic phosgene.
Despite the technical developments, chemical weapons
suered from diminishing eectiveness as the war progressed because of the protective equipment and training
which the use engendered on both sides. See Use of poison gas in World War I.
After the war, the Royal Air Force dropped mustard gas
on Bolshevik troops in 1919, and Winston Churchill, secretary of state for war and air, suggested that the RAF use
it in Iraq in 1920 during a major revolt there. Historians
are divided as to whether or not gas was in fact used.* [9]
The UK ratied the Geneva Protocol on 9 April 1930.
The UK signed the Chemical Weapons Convention on 13
January 1993 and ratied it on 13 May 1996.
Despite the signing of the Geneva Protocol, the UK carried out extensive testing of chemical weapons from the
early 1930s onwards. In the Rawalpindi experiments,
hundreds of Indian soldiers were exposed to mustard gas
in an attempt to determine the appropriate dosage to use
on battleelds. Many of the subjects suered severe Each submarine carries up to sixteen Trident II D-5 missiles, which can each carry up to twelve warheads, for
burns from their exposure to the gas.* [10]
257
Freedom of Information request about the UK nuclear deThe UK permits the U.S. to deploy nuclear weapons from
terrent (PDF), Ministry of Defence, retrieved 2013-11-20
its territory, the rst having arrived in 1954.* [12] During
the 1980s nuclear armed USAF Ground Launched Cruise [12] Hans M. Kristensen (February 1978), History of the CusMissiles were deployed at RAF Greenham Common and
tody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons: July 1945
RAF Molesworth. As of 2005 it is believed that about
through September 1977, U.S. Department of Defense, retrieved 2006-05-23
110 tactical B61 nuclear bombs are stored at RAF Lakenheath for deployment by USAF F-15E aircraft.* [13]
[13] Hans M. Kristensen (February 2005), U.S. Nuclear
4.30.4
Radiological weapons
The United Kingdom tested a 1 kiloton bomb incorpo- 4.30.7 External links
rating a small amount of cobalt as an experimental radiochemical tracer at their Tadje testing site in Maralinga
Video archive of the UK's Nuclear Testing at
range, Australia on September 14, 1957.* [16]
sonicbomb.com
4.30.5
See also
4.30.6
References
FAS bulletin
The Nuclear Threat Initiative on the United Kingdom
Churchill's Anthrax Bombs - A Debate by Julian
Lewis and Professor RV Jones
The Plan that Never Was: Churchill and the 'Anthrax Bomb' by Julian Lewis
Nuclear Files.org Current information on nuclear
stockpiles in the United Kingdom
258
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
Land-based intercontinental
missiles, or ICBMs;
4.31.1
Nuclear weapons
ballistic
Currently, the United States nuclear arsenal is deployed In 2002, the United States and Russia agreed in the SORT
in three areas:
treaty to reduce their deployed stockpiles to not more
259
single warhead missiles. However, since the abandonment of the START II treaty, the U.S. is said to be considering retaining 500 warheads on 450 missiles.* [10] The
U.S. goal under the SORT treaty is to reduce from 1,600
warheads deployed on over 500 missiles in 2003 to 500
warheads on 450 missiles in 2012. The rst Minuteman
III were removed under this plan in 2007 while, at the
same time, the warheads deployed on Minuteman IIIs began to be upgraded from smaller W62s to larger W87s
from decommissioned Peacekeeper missiles.* [10]
In 2014, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists released a re- The number of deployed Minuteman ICBMs are schedport, stating that there are a total of 2,530 warheads kept uled to reduce to 400 by 2018.* [12]
in reserve, and 2,120 actively deployed. Of the warheads
actively deployed, the number of strategic warheads rests
at 1,920 (subtracting 200 bombs that are deployed, Heavy bomber group
but are not consideredstrategic). The amount of warheads being actively disabled rests at about 2,700 warheads, which brings the total United States inventory to
about 7,400 warheads.* [11]
Land-based ICBMs
The U.S. Air Force currently operates 450 ICBMs, located primarily in the northern Rocky Mountain states
and the Dakotas. These are all of the Minuteman III
ICBM variants. Peacekeeper missiles were phased out of
the Air Force inventory in 2005. All USAF Minuteman
II missiles have been destroyed in accordance with the
START treaty and their launch silos imploded and buried
then sold to the public. To comply with the START II
most U.S. multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, or MIRVs, have been eliminated and replaced with
260
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
the majority of weapons declared under START II rules. E120 biological bomblet, developed before the U.S. ratied the
Some Trident missiles are equipped with the W88 war- Biological Weapons Convention.
head.
The number of Deployed and Non-Deployed SLBMs on Negotiations for a legally binding verication protocol
the Ohio-Class SSBNs as of 2014 is 336. This will shrink to the BWC proceeded for years. In 2001, negotiations
ended when the Bush administration rejected an eort by
by 2018 to 280, 240 which will be deployed.* [12]
other signatories to create a protocol for verication, arguing that it could be abused to interfere with legitimate
biological research.
4.31.2
Biological weapons
In World War I, the U.S. produced its own chemical munitions, including phosgene and mustard gas. The U.S.
only created about 4% of the total chemical weapons produced for that war and just over 1% of the era's most effective weapon, mustard gas. (U.S. troops suered less
than 6% of gas casualties.) Although the U.S. had begun a
large-scale production of Lewisite, for use in an oensive
planned for early 1919, in fact, the U.S. never deployed
any chemical weapons.* [18]* [19]
Chemical weapons were not used by the Allies or Ger-
261
ical weapons by sinking ships laden with the weapons in
the deep Atlantic. The U.S. began to research safer disposal methods for chemical weapons in the 1970s, destroying several thousand tons of mustard gas by incineration and nearly 4,200 tons of nerve agent by chemical
neutralization.* [25]
The U.S. entered the Geneva Protocol in 1975 (the same
time it ratied the Biological Weapons Convention). This
was the rst operative international treaty on chemical
weapons to which the U.S. was party. Stockpile reductions began in the 1980s, with the removal of some outdated munitions and destruction of the entire stock of
BZ beginning in 1988. In 1990, destruction of chemical
agents stored on Johnston Atoll in the Pacic began, seven
years before the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
came into eect. In 1986, President Ronald Reagan began removal of the U.S. stockpile of chemical weapons
from Germany* [26] (see Operation Steel Box). In 1991,
President George H.W. Bush unilaterally committed the
U.S. to destroying all chemical weapons and renounced
the right to chemical weapon retaliation.
262
4.31.5
CHAPTER 4. COUNTRIES
References
[25] http://www.cma.army.mil/fndocumentviewer.aspx?
docid=003676901
[27] http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/11/us/
u-s-chemical-weapons/index.html
[6]
[7] U.S. nuclear forces, 2008 The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
[8] News article 3, May 2010
[12] http://www.defense.gov/documents/
Fact-Sheet-on-US-Nuclear-Force-Structure-under-the-New-START-Treaty.
* ^ Center for Nonproliferation Studies (2003).
pdf
[13]Belgium, Germany Question U.S. Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Europe,
Oliver Meier,
http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2005_06/Belgium_
Germany_Tactical.asp, June 2005
[14] US Navy Instruction Conrms Retirement of Nuclear
Tomahawk Cruise Missile.. Federation Of American
Scientists. Retrieved 24 October 2014.
[15] Committees on Biological Warfare, 1941-1948
[16] United States: Biological Weapons, https://fas.org/nuke/
guide/usa/cbw/bw.htm, Federation of American Scientists, October 19, 1998
[17] United States
[18] D. Hank Ellison (August 24, 2007). Handbook of Chemical and Biological Warfare Agents, Second Edition. CRC
Press. p. 456. ISBN 0-8493-1434-8.
[19] Hershberg, James G. (1993). James B. Conant : Harvard
to Hiroshima and the making of the nuclear age. Stanford,
Cal.: Stanford University Press. p. 47. ISBN 0-80472619-1.
[20] Is Military Research Hazardous To Veterans' Health?
Lessons Spanning Half A Century. December 8, 1994.
Report for the Committee On Veterans' Aairs
BW Agents. Iraq Prole. Nuclear Threat Initiative. Archived from the original on 2005-03-08.
Retrieved 2006-09-18.
263
Chapter 5
Treaties
5.1 List of weapons of mass de- 5.1.4 Chemical weapons
struction treaties
Main article: List of chemical arms control agreements
A variety of treaties and agreements have been enacted
to regulate the use, development and possession of var Brussels Convention on the Law and Customs of
ious types of weapons of mass destruction. Treaties
War (not adopted but relevant language incorpomay regulate weapons use under the customs of war
rated into Hague Convention)
(Hague Conventions, Geneva Protocol), ban specic
types of weapons (Chemical Weapons Convention, Bi Chemical Weapons Convention
ological Weapons Convention), limit weapons research
Geneva Protocol
(Partial Test Ban Treaty, Comprehensive Nuclear-TestBan Treaty), limit allowable weapons stockpiles and de Hague Convention
livery systems (START I, SORT) or regulate civilian
use of weapon precursors (Chemical Weapons Conven Strasbourg Agreement
tion, Biological Weapons Convention). The history of
weapons control has also included treaties to limit eec Treaty of Versailles
tive defense against weapons of mass destruction in order
Washington Naval Treaty
to preserve the deterrent doctrine of mutual assured destruction (Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty) as well as treaties
to limit the spread of nuclear technologies geographically
(African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty, Nuclear 5.1.5 Nuclear weapons
Non-Proliferation Treaty).
Non-proliferation
5.1.1
General
Non-Proliferation Treaty
5.1.2
Delivery systems
5.1.3
Antarctic Treaty
Biological weapons
Geneva Protocol
264
265
5.1.6
See also
Arms control
Nuclear arms race
Nuclear-free zone
Nuclear proliferation
Nuclear weapon
Nuclear warfare
Nuclear-weapon-free zone
International Atomic Energy Agency
Chapter 6
266
6.1. TEXT
267
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Anonymous: 577
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Radiological weapon Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radiological_weapon?oldid=678284464 Contributors: TwoOneTwo, ClaudeMuncey, The Anome, Miguel~enwiki, William Avery, Roadrunner, Maury Markowitz, Alan_d, Rsabbatini, Patrick, Eric119, Bon d'une
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A Chance, Dancter, Fleshwater, Honeplus, Mentisto, K7aay, Tjmayerinsf, Sluzzelin, Deadbeef, Inks.LWC, BenB4, JimCubb, Dragonnas, VoABot II, Midgrid, Cgingold, Hodja Nasreddin, Cromdog, Trumpet marietta 45750, Malinaccier, UnitedStatesian, Lamro, Falcon8765, Caltas, JabbaTheBot, RW Marloe, Francvs, Twinsday, ClueBot, Paulcmnt, Ahmed91981, TonyBallioni, Rhotel1, SkyLined,
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95
Nuclear proliferation Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nuclear_proliferation?oldid=678139760 Contributors: AxelBoldt, Trelvis,
LC~enwiki, DanKeshet, Alex.tan, Jkominek, Rmhermen, Roadrunner, Olivier, Edward, Patrick, Michael Hardy, Dante Alighieri,
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Chemical weapon proliferation Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chemical_weapon_proliferation?oldid=675412588 Contributors:
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List of missiles by country Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_missiles_by_country?oldid=679095727 Contributors: Rlandmann, Wernher, Riddley, Alan Liefting, Urhixidur, Karl Dickman, Darren Olivier, Loren36, RJHall, Joshbaumgartner, Andrew Gray,
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mathew, Nehakangri, Kashish Arora, Ellis.Donnie, Warrior Covert, Mustafa Ispahani, ParasVishwakarma, Squiver, 21lima and Anonymous: 232
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Monkbot, Mhhossein, Poiuytrewqvtaatv123321, MissPiggysBoyfriend and Anonymous: 389
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New yrk freethnkr and Anonymous: 408
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Mister Whitey, Sachin.loku, Wywin, Snint1, 069952497a, Pvh208, Acetotyce, Redd Foxx 1991, Fideliosr, Mophead64, Lucinator, Rolf
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Abattoir666, Monkbot, WC Jay, Bigmandane, Pistongrinder and Anonymous: 652
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Qwertyw123, Bob chasm, The Quixotic Potato and Anonymous: 473
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Anonymous: 24
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665224876 Contributors: Bogdangiusca, Rwendland, Sardanaphalus, Neelix, Biruitorul, Theeurocrat, Mazarin07, Nergaal, Addbot, Jarble,
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ArthurBot, Xqbot, Mynameinc, Full-date unlinking bot, Beyond My Ken, SD5bot, Charles Essie, Praemonitus, Limnalid, NPIHP and
Anonymous: 3
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Oneiros, JulieADriver, D6, Duja, Rich Farmbrough, Darren Olivier, Friism, Storm Rider, Doopokko, Andrew Gray, Ferrierd, Rwendland,
Zantastik, Evil Monkey, BlastOButter42, Pauli133, DV8 2XL, Gene Nygaard, GringoInChile, Alvis, TomTheHand, Toussaint, BD2412,
Rjwilmsi, Koavf, CalJW, John Z, Atrix20, OpenToppedBus, Niku, RussBot, Arado, Piet Delport, JD79, Grafen, Banes, Htonl, Blue
Danube, American2, Entro-p, Bondegezou, Carlosguitar, Nick-D, Matt Heard, Sardanaphalus, SmackBot, David Kernow, WikiuserNI,
Elminster Aumar, Compay~enwiki, Onebravemonkey, Flamarande, Ohnoitsjamie, Hmains, Chris the speller, Thom2002, Mikker, JelloB,
Britmax, Ohconfucius, John, Joelo, Fedallah, Ucla9030, JMK, Phase4, Cydebot, Tec15, PKT, Ideogram, AnAj, Corella, NJR ZA, Valerius Tygart, AttieHarmse, MartinBot, NeueSoutie, Jcronen1, Pekaje, RatSkrew, FuManChoo, Ybnana, Mallerd, NPguy, Gbawden, HushPuppyForYouWillSleep, Selerian, NiteSensor23, Victor Chmara, Fasettle, Plastikspork, CasualObserver'48, Niceguyedc, Rememberlands,
Socrates2008, Wdford, Jfunnyguy, DumZiBoT, Addbot, Mortense, Rock12321, Knight of Truth, LatitudeBot, Lihaas, Jarble, Drpickem,
Yobot, DiverDave, AnomieBOT, Statichazard, Leosls, Mattbondy, Keverich1, Truth or consequences-2, LilHelpa, .45Colt, ThePhantomCopyEditor, Mynameinc, Rohlg, Anotherclown, MerlLinkBot, Gnomsovet, Atomicgurl00, FrescoBot, Ironboy11, Andre Kritzinger, Killian441, Rbrausse, Plasticspork, Sh33pl0re, Rotblats09, Bluekey7, Rr parker, DiscipleOfKnowledge, Breein1007, RjwilmsiBot, EmausBot,
John of Reading, Whoop whoop pull up, ClueBot NG, Rgctobin, Jdanek007, Helpful Pixie Bot, Seergenius, Ian16th, Jeancey, RscprinterBot, FiveFourTwo, Aliwal2012, SD5bot, Khazar2, Limnalid, A. Pseudonym, Androgyne, Monkbot, WC Jay, Grandtheftautoboss52565
and Anonymous: 88
Swedish nuclear weapon program Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swedish_nuclear_weapons_program?oldid=674297207 Contributors: Maury Markowitz, Orlady, Qwertyus, Kolbasz, Wavelength, Welsh, JustAGal, Victuallers, DH85868993, Mild Bill Hiccup,
Niceguyedc, Kitchen Knife, Yobot, AnomieBOT, Cnwilliams, John of Reading, BG19bot, Mohamed CJ, Frze, BattyBot, ChrisGualtieri,
Hmainsbot1, Fortuna Imperatrix Mundi, DMattis and Anonymous: 7
Syria and weapons of mass destruction Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syria_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction?oldid=
677193508 Contributors: Boud, Tpbradbury, PBP, PFHLai, Rwendland, Geraldshields11, Woohookitty, Kosher Fan, Rjwilmsi, Jehochman, FayssalF, BananaLanguage, Gaius Cornelius, Danlaycock, Georgewilliamherbert, Evilbu, Ripcord.jones, Mebden, Paul Erik,
Sardanaphalus, SmackBot, C.Fred, Hmains, Jprg1966, Calbaer, Cydebot, Marokwitz, Andrewrutherford, Erxnmedia, Avaya1, SteveSims, Bongwarrior, KConWiki, Kimdime, Cjblair, DoorsAjar, TXiKiBoT, Littlealien182, NPguy, Flyer22, Martarius, ClueBot, VQuakr,
L.tak, Arjayay, Aitias, PCHS-NJROTC, Vanished User 1004, Addbot, Glane23, Jarble, Yobot, AnomieBOT, Metalhead94, JackieBot,
Yachtsman1, Venom087, Big Panda Bear, Coretheapple, Mynameinc, MerlLinkBot, Green Cardamom, Ironboy11, Supreme Deliciousness,
777sms, Atharv Pawar, Jerd10, Tbhotch, TjBot, EmausBot, Dewritech, GoingBatty, Greyshark09, Labnoor, ClueBot NG, Master Uegly,
Catlemur, David O. Johnson, Twillisjr, Widr, Guest2625, BG19bot, Kaltenmeyer, Darouet, FutureTrillionaire, Mor2, Katangais, Erlbaeko,
Slim0877, Fotoriety, BattyBot, AlAboud83, EuroCarGT, Ducknish, Mogism, Dhawk790, HistoricMN44, Dumbissmart:), ,
Rybec, Polyglotism, Rolf h nelson, Ugog Nizdast, Podiaebba, PLNR, Jianhui67, Limnalid, Rqasd, Ofthelion, Bucknastay, Fixuture, Information Collective, Sigg Ctable, AKS.9955, Nulla Taciti, Spooman1962, ElCommandanteVzl, Mcavusoglu, Queso.robusto and Anonymous: 72
Republic of China and weapons of mass destruction Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Taiwan_and_weapons_of_mass_
destruction?oldid=668427816 Contributors: Roadrunner, Gabbe, Ralmin, Jiang, Kaihsu, Stargoat, DocWatson42, Neutrality, Loren36,
Rwendland, Schaefer, Instantnood, LukeSurl, Koavf, Ground Zero, Chobot, Gaius Cornelius, Ilmaisin, Nlu, Fang Aili, Edrigu, Wikipeditor, Sardanaphalus, SmackBot, ILBobby, David Kernow, Jprg1966, Hibernian, Multivariable, Cybercobra, Noian, Judgesurreal777, RevolverOcelotX, Ideogram, Hcobb, Dylan Lake, Nat, Stephenchou0722, Long Live Chiang Kai-shek, Master of the Orchalcos, TaerkastUA,
Jkj115, ClueBot, Alexbot, Addbot, Lightbot, Jarble, MTWEmperor, Reenem, Citation bot, Bairh, Fusioned Capacity, Mynameinc, Taiwanrox8, Juno, Yghwtrrl, JEVNK, Full-date unlinking bot, Rotblats09, Dewritech, RenamedUser01302013, Sp33dyphil, ZroBot, Jenks24,
Djruwqqqs, Albert777MAX, Limnalid and Anonymous: 38
278
6.2 Images
File:2009_North_Korean_nuclear_test.png Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e8/2009_North_Korean_
nuclear_test.png License: Public domain Contributors: http://earthquake.usgs.gov/eqcenter/recenteqsww/Maps/10/130_40.php Original
artist: USGS
File:2inchMortarsPortonDown.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/bf/2inchMortarsPortonDown.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: This is photograph PD-CRO-70 from the collections of the Imperial War Museums (collection no.
2000-11-05) Original artist: Photographer: Porton Down ocial photographer
File:4_Babur_Cruise_Missiles_on_a_Truck_at_IDEAS_2008.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/ef/4_
Babur_Cruise_Missiles_on_a_Truck_at_IDEAS_2008.jpg License: CC BY-SA 3.0 Contributors: Own work Original artist: SyedNaqvi90
(talk) (Uploads)
File:703MUNSS061108.jpg
Source:
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/5c/B61_nuclear_
bomb_-_inert_training_version.jpg
License:
Public
domain
Contributors:
http://blogs.fas.org/security/2008/06/
usaf-report-most-nuclear-weapon-sites-in-europe-do-not-meet-us-security-requirements/ Original artist: Unknown, merely noted
as US Air Force.
File:A_BCV_(Bulk_Contamination_Vehicle.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/e2/A_BCV_%28Bulk_
Contamination_Vehicle.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: IWM H 25575 Original artist: Tanner A R (Lt) War Oce ocial
photographer
6.2. IMAGES
279
280
6.2. IMAGES
281
282
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/2/28/Groves_memo_30oct43_p1.GIF Li-
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/fc/Maple_Leaf_%28from_
6.2. IMAGES
283
Roundel_of_the_Royal_Canadian_Air_Force_(1946-
284
6.2. IMAGES
285
LGPL Contributors:
286
File:Trident_II_missile_image.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/99/Trident_II_missile_image.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: High Res image from Lockheed Martin NOTE: According to NTI, this image is a U.S. Department of
Defense photo, therefore is in the public domain. Also here, on US Navy web site Original artist: Unknown
File:U.S._Navy_Seabees_assigned_to_Naval_Mobile_Construction_Battalion_1_don_their_MCU-2P_gas_masks_at_the_
Naval_Construction_Battalion_Center_in_Gulfport,_Miss.,_Oct_081024-N-LD343-001.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.
org/wikipedia/commons/c/cf/U.S._Navy_Seabees_assigned_to_Naval_Mobile_Construction_Battalion_1_don_their_MCU-2P_gas_
masks_at_the_Naval_Construction_Battalion_Center_in_Gulfport%2C_Miss.%2C_Oct_081024-N-LD343-001.jpg License: Public
domain Contributors: http://www.defenseimagery.mil/imageRetrieve.action?guid=c64057b4be184cb527c164f3672784fd7ce88ec2&t=2
Original artist: MC2 Demetrius Kennon
File:USS_Enterprise_FS_Charles_de_Gaulle.jpg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/d/d7/USS_Enterprise_
FS_Charles_de_Gaulle.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: U.S. DefenseImagery photo VIRIN: 010516-N-6259P-003 Original artist:
U.S. Navy photo by Photographer's Mate Airman Doug Pearlman.
File:USS_Kentucky_(SSBN-737).jpg
Source:
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/0/08/USS_Kentucky_
%28SSBN-737%29.jpg License: Public domain Contributors: Source Original artist: U.S. Navy photo
File:US_and_USSR_nuclear_stockpiles.svg Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/b/bb/US_and_USSR_nuclear_
stockpiles.svg License: Public domain Contributors: Own work Source data from: Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen,Global nuclear stockpiles,
1945-2006,Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 62, no. 4 (July/August 2006), 64-66. Online at http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/c4120650912x74k7/
fulltext.pdf Original artist: Created by User:Fastfission rst by mapping the lines using OpenOce.org's Calc program, then exporting a