DE LIMA v.

REYES
G.R. No. 209330; 11 January 2016
Leonen, J.
FACTS:
Dr. Gerardo Ortega (Dr. Ortega) or "Doc Gerry," was a veterinarian and anchor of several
radio shows in Palawan. He was shot dead around 10:30am inside the Baguio Wagwagan
Ukay-ukay in San Pedro, Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. After a brief chase with police
officers, Marlon Recamata was arrested. On the same day, he made an extrajudicial
confession admitting that he shot Dr. Ortega. He also implicated Rodolfo "Bumar" Edrad
(Edrad), Dennis Aranas, and Armando "Salbakotah" R. Noel, Jr. Subsequently, Edrad
executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay before the Counter-Terrorism Division of the NBI where
he alleged that it was former Palawan Governor Mario Joel Reyes (former Governor Reyes)
who ordered the killing of Dr. Ortega. And the following day, DOJ Sec. Leila De Lima issued
Department Order No. 091 creating a special panel of prosecutors (First Panel) to conduct
preliminary investigation.
Dr. Patria Gloria Inocencio-Ortega (Dr. Inocencio-Ortega), Dr. Ortega's wife, subsequently
filed a Supplemental Affidavit-Complaint implicating former Governor Reyes as the
mastermind of her husband's murder. Former Governor Reyes' brother, Coron Mayor Mario
Reyes, Jr., former Marinduque Governor Jose Carreon, former Provincial Administrator Atty.
Romeo Seratubias, Marlon Recamata, Dennis Aranas, Valentin Lesias, Arturo D. Regalado,
Armando Noel, Rodolfo Edrad, and several John and Jane Does were also implicated.
Upon conclusion of the First Panel preliminary investigation, the Resolution was issued
dismissing the Affidavit-Complain. Inocencio-Ortega filed a Motion to Re-Open Preliminary
Investigation, which, among others, sought the admission of mobile phone communications
between former Governor Reyes and Edrad. While the Motion to Re-Open was still pending,
Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration Ad Cautelam of the
Resolution. Both Motions were denied by the First Panel in the Resolution.
De Lima issued DO No. 710 creating a new panel of investigators (Second Panel) to conduct
a reinvestigation of the case, "in the interest of service and due process" as well as to
address the offer of additional evidence denied by the Forst Panel in its Resolution. This
revoked the previous DO. To the dismay of Governor Reyes, he argued that the parties were
already afforded due process and that the evidence to be addressed by the reinvestigation
was neither new nor material to the case. It did not prevent the Second Panel from issuing a
Resolution, finding probable cause and recommending the filing of informations for all of the
accused including Reyes. In his Supplemental Petition, Reyes averred that the RTC could
not proceed with the prosecution of his case because the Resolution was void. Contrary to
RTC, CA ruled that DO No. 710 was null and void and reinstated the First Panels
Resolution.
Petitioners contend that De Lima acted within her authority when she issued DO No. 710.
According to them, her issuance was a purely executive function and not a quasi-judicial
function that could be the subject of a petition for certiorari or prohibition. In their
submissions, they point out that under RA 10071 and the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal, the
Secretary of Justice has the power to create a new panel of prosecutors to reinvestigate a

case to prevent a miscarriage of justice. First Panel "appeared to have ignored the rules of
preliminary investigation" when it refused to receive additional evidence that would have
been crucial for the determination of the existence of probable cause. They assert that
respondent was not deprived of due process when the reinvestigation was ordered since he
was not prevented from presenting controverting evidence to Dr. Inocencio-Ortega's
additional evidence. Petitioners, as well, contend that since the Information had been filed,
the disposition of the case was already within the discretion of the trial court.
On the other hand, Reyes argues that De Lima had no authority to order motu proprio the
reinvestigation of the case since Dr. Inocencio-Ortega was able to submit her alleged new
evidence to the First Panel when she filed her Motion for Partial Reconsideration. He argues
that all parties had already been given the opportunity to present their evidence before the
First Panel so it was not necessary to conduct a reinvestigation. Further, opportunity to
present their evidence before the First Panel so it was not necessary to conduct a
reinvestigation. While De Limas discretion to create a new panel of prosecutors was not
"unbridled," however, the 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal requires that there be compelling
circumstances for her to be able to designate another prosecutor to conduct the
reinvestigation. Also, the Second Panel's Resolution was void since the Panel was created
by a department order that was beyond De Limas authority to issue. He further argues that
the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case since the Information filed by the
Second Panel was void.

ISSUES:
(1) Is the issuance of DO No. 710 an executive function beyond the scope of a
petition for certiorari or prohibition?
(2) Is the Secretary of Justice authorized to create motu proprio another panel of
prosecutors in order to conduct a reinvestigation of the case?
(3) Is the Petition for Certiorari already been rendered moot by the filing of the
information in court?
HELD:
(1) The determination by the Department of Justice of the existence of probable
cause is not a quasi-judicial proceeding. However, the actions of the Secretary of
Justice in affirming or reversing the findings of prosecutors may still be subject to
judicial review if it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion. In a preliminary
investigation, the prosecutor does not determine the guilt or innocence of an
accused. The prosecutor only determines "whether there is sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent
is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial." Considering that "full
discretionary authority has been delegated to the executive branch in the
determination of probable cause during a preliminary investigation," the functions of
the prosecutors and the Secretary of Justice are not ministerial, thus, prosecutors
may be subject of a petition for certiorari or prohibition under Rule 65.
(2) Yes. Under existing laws, rules of procedure, and jurisprudence, the Secretary
of Justice is authorized to issue DO No. 710. Section 4 of RA 10071 also gives the
Secretary of Justice the authority to directly act on any "probable miscarriage of
justice within the jurisdiction of the prosecution staff, regional prosecution office, and

the provincial prosecutor or the city prosecutor." Accordingly, the Secretary of Justice
may step in and order a reinvestigation even without a prior motion or petition from a
party in order to prevent any probable miscarriage of justice. It is clear that the
Secretary of Justice issued DO No. 710 because she had reason to believe that the
First Panel's refusal to admit the additional evidence may cause a probable
miscarriage of justice to the parties. The Second Panel was created not to overturn
the findings and recommendations of the First Panel but to make sure that all the
evidence, including the evidence that the First Panel refused to admit, was
investigated. Therefore, the Secretary of Justice did not act in an "arbitrary and
despotic manner,'by reason of passion or personal hostility.
(3) Yes. The filing of the information and the issuance by the trial court of the
respondent's warrant of arrest has already rendered this Petition moot. Once
information is filed in court, the court acquires jurisdiction of the case and any motion
to dismiss the case or to determine the accused's guilt or innocence rests within the
sound discretion of the court. trial court has already determined, independently of any
finding or recommendation by the First Panel or the Second Panel, that probable
cause exists for the issuance of the warrant of arrest against respondent. Probable
cause has been judicially determined. Jurisdiction over the case, therefore, has
transferred to the trial court. A petition for certiorari questioning the validity of the
preliminary investigation in any other venue has been rendered moot by the issuance
of the warrant of arrest and the conduct of arraignment. CA should have dismissed
the Petition for Certiorari filed before them when the trial court issued its warrant of
arrest. Since the trial court has already acquired jurisdiction over the case and the
existence of probable cause has been judicially determined, a petition for certiorari
questioning the conduct of the preliminary investigation ceases to be the "plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy" provided by law. Inasmuch as this Petition for Review
is an appeal from a moot Petition for Certiorari, it must also be rendered moot.