Caltex (Phil.) Inc. v. Philippine Labor Organizations, Caltex Chapter

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-4758. May 30, 1953.]


CALTEX
[PHIL.]
INC. , petitioner, vs .
PHILIPPINE
ORGANIZATIONS, CALTEX CHAPTER , respondent.

LABOR

Ross, Selph, Carrascoso & Janda for petitioner .


Baltazar M. Villanueva for respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. EMPLOYEE AND LABORERS; STRIKES; DECISION OF COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS DECLARING STRIKE ILLEGAL; LABORERS NEW DEMANDS AND
CONSEQUENT STRIKE NOT A VIOLATION OF DECISION. If after the decision of the
Court of Industrial Relations declaring a strike illegal, new demands or matters arise not
connected with, or similar to, the demands in the former case, and the laborers struck
anew, the new strike cannot be held as a violation of the decision.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION MAKING NEW DAMAGES; LACK
OF SERVICE. Where the new demands or matters were brought before the Court of
Industrial Relations in a motion for reconsideration, the court may entertain such
motion as an application by an interested party for the reopening of the question
involved in the decision under section 17 of Commonwealth Act No. 103 as amended,
even if the motion for reconsideration was not served upon the company, or if served
there was no proof of service.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; REJECTION OF DEMANDS DOES NOT MAKE STRIKE ILLEGAL. If
the demands of the laborers cannot be granted for being unjust and unreasonable, the
only consequence should be rejection of the demands, but not the illegality of the strike
or the punishment of the workers who presented them, for this would be in effect to
outlaw altogether an effective means for securing better working conditions.
DECISION
PARAS , C.J :
p

In the course of the proceedings in Case No. 112-V of the Court of Industrial
Relations, involving an industrial dispute between the Philippine Labor Organizations,
Caltex Chapter, hereinafter referred to as the Union, and Caltex (Philippines), Inc.,
hereinafter referred to as the Company, that court issued an order on January 2, 1948
containing the following directive:
"The laborers involved in these cases, pending the nal determination of
same, are enjoined not to stage strike or walk out from their employment without
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authority from and without rst submitting their grievances to the court. The
respondent companies are likewise enjoined not to lay off, dismiss, discharge or
admit any employees or laborers in their employments during the pendency of
these cases without beforehand notifying and obtaining the authority of the court.
The controversial points involved in the petitions will be heard separately by this
court at the opportune time."

On February 13 and 15, 1950, the Union presented certain demands on the
Company which became the subject of negotiations between the parties. On March 1,
1950, a strike was declared by the Union, a matter which the Company submitted to the
Court of Industrial Relations in Case No. 112-V(10). After hearing, the Court of Industrial
Relations, thru Presiding Judge Arsenio C. Roldan, rendered a decision dated July 31,
1950, holding as follows:
"1. The prohibition from declaring a strike during the determination of the
dispute, issued in a pending case before the Court, refers to a strike over the same
or similar demands or dispute or matters directly connected with them in the
pending case only, and a strike thus declared while there is such order, is a
violation of this injunction and, therefore, illegal;
"2. Prohibition not to declare strike during the determination of the dispute
in a pending case before the Court does not prohibit a strike for new demands;
"3. The strike declared by the members of the petitioning union, workers of
the respondent company, on March 1, 1950, was not a violation of the order given
by the Court of Industrial Relations on January 2, 1948;
"4. The strike declared by the members of the petitioning union, workers of
the respondent company, on March 1, 1950, was illegal, not only because the
purpose was trivial, unjust or unreasonable but because there was no good
purpose at all.
"5. The company did not dismiss the laborers Concha, Silva, Algozo and
Punzal as they abandoned their work, and, therefore, the of cials of the
management can not be held in contempt of Court; and
"6. As this strike was illegal, the Company is authorized to dismiss those
responsible therefor, and may rehire such of the striking employees and laborers
and/or new labor force as in its discretion it may see fit."

The Union led a motion for reconsideration. Under date of January 31, 1951, the
Court of Industrial Relations in banc issued a resolution reversing the decision of Judge
Roldan insofar as it declared the strike illegal and insofar as it authorized the Company
to discharge the workers responsible for the strike. This resolution was by a three-totwo vote.
On March 20, 1951, the Company led an urgent petition, followed on the next
day by an urgent amended petition, praying that the motion for reconsideration led
against the decision dated July 31, 1950 of Judge Roldan, be denied, because said
decision had become nal and unappealable on August 17, 1950, in view of the fact
that, although the motion for reconsideration was led by the Union on the last day of
the reglementary period, no copy thereof was served upon the adverse party and no
proof of service was shown. This amended urgent petition was denied by the Court of
Industrial Relations in banc in its unanimous order of April 20, 1951. The Company has
filed the present petition for review on certiorari, praying that judgment be rendered:
"(a) reversing and setting aside the resolution of the Court of Industrial
Relations modifying the decision of July 31, 1950, the latter having become nal
and unappealable;
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"(b) but should this court be of the opinion that the decision had not
become nal and unappealable, petitioner prays that this Honorable Court render
judgment reversing and setting aside the resolution of the Court of Industrial
Relations which modi ed the decision of July 31, 1950, and af rming the said
decision.

The contention of the Company that the decision of the Trial Judge of July 31,
1950 had become nal and unappealable, is without merit. Assuming that copy of the
motion for reconsideration led by the Union was not served upon the Company, or if it
was served no proof of service was presented, the Court of Industrial Relations could
entertain said motion for reconsideration as an application by an interested party for
the reopening of a question involved in the decision under section 17 of
Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended. (Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 68
Phil. 444.)
There is neither merit in the company's contention that the strike staged by the
Union on March 1, 1950 was in violation of the directive of the Court of Industrial
Relations of January 2, 1948, hereinabove quoted. From the very decision of July 31,
1950, it is clear that the strike was motivated by new demands or matters not
connected with or similar to the demands or disputes involved in the case in which the
order of January 2, 1948 were issued, and therefore could not have been, as correctly
held by Judge Roldan, violative of the directive against strikes.
The important question that arises is whether the strike held on March 1, 1950,
was illegal. On this we agree with the resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations in
banc. It is noteworthy that on February 13, 1950, the Union sent a letter to the Company,
containing fourteen demands referring to wage differentials, retirement and insurance
bene ts, free medical treatment and hospitalization with pay, Christmas bonus, bonus
to drivers, vacation and sick leave, overtime pay, reinstatement of certain employees,
gratuity to pre-war employees and backpay during the Japanese occupation. It appears
also that in the second letter of February 15, 1950, the Union gave the manager of the
Company forty-eight hours to decide on the demands, with the admonition that the
Union would declare a strike. The resolution of the Court of Industrial Relations in banc
of January 31, 1951 found that "among the factors that motivated the declaration of
the strike was the failure of the respondent to meet the petitioner's demands." These
demands, if granted, would certainly tend to improve the conditions of the laborers and
employees affected, and cannot be said to be trivial, much less illegal. But whether the
same are unreasonable or unjust is a matter to be decided after proper consideration.
If said demands cannot be granted for being unjust or unreasonable, the only
consequence, in the appropriate words of the Court of Industrial Relations in banc,
should "be their rejection and not the punishment of the workers who presented them."
To make the legality or illegality of strikes dependent solely on whether the demands of
laborers may or may not be granted, is in effect to outlaw altogether an effective means
for Securing better working conditions.
Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Industrial Relations now under review is
hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner. So ordered.

Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Tuason, Jugo and Bautista Angelo, JJ., concur.

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