Victoria v.

Inciong (1988)
Petitioners: SATURNO A. VICTORIA
Respondents: HON. AMADO G. INCIONG,
BROADCASTING COMPANY, INC. (FEBC)

DEPUTY

MINISTER,

AND

FAR

EAST

Ponente: Fernan
Topic: Work Enlightenment
FACTS:

Victoria was employed on March 17, 1956 by FEBC as a radio transmitter operator.
Sometime in July 1971, he and his co-workers organized FEBC Employees Association.
After registering their association with the then Department of Labor, they demanded
recognition of said association by the company but the latter refused on the ground that
being a non-profit, non-stock, non-commercial and religious corporation, it is not covered by
Republic Act 875, otherwise known as the Industrial Peace Act, the labor law enforced at
that time.
In conciliation meetings at the Department of Labor, the Director of Labor Relations
Edmundo Cabal advised the union members that the company could not be forced to
recognize them or to bargain collectively with them because it is a non-profit, noncommercial and religious organization.
Notwithstanding such advice, the union members led by Victoria as its president, declared a
strike and picketed the companys premises on September 6, 1972 for the purpose of
seeking recognition of the labor union.
As a countermeasure, the company filed a case for damages with preliminary injunction
against the strikers before the CFI Bulacan. Said court issued an injunction enjoining the
three-day-old strike staged against the company. The complaint was later amended seeking
to declare the strike illegal.
Upon the declaration of martial law on September 21, 1972 and the promulgation of
Presidential Decree No. 21 creating the National Labor Relations Commission, the ad hoc
National Labor Relations Commission took cognizance of the strike through "FEBC
Employees Association v. FEBC and Generoso Serino v. FEBC, both cases for
reinstatement due to FEBCs refusal to accept the union's offer to return to work during the
pendency of the case in the CFI.
On December 28, 1972, Arbitrator Flavio Aguas rendered a joint decision in the two cases
recognizing the jurisdiction of the CFI Bulacan. The dispositive portion stated: This Order
shall, however, be without prejudice to whatever decision the [CFI] Bulacan may promulgate
in Civil Case No. 750-V and to the requirements the existing order may need of people
working with the mass media of communications.
The decision of the arbitrator was successively appealed to the ad hoc NLRC, the Secretary
of Labor and the Office of the President of the Philippines, and was affirmed in all instances.
On April 23, 1975, CFI Bulacan rendered judgment, declaring that the strike admitted by the
defendants to have been declared by them is illegal inasmuch as it was for the purpose of
compelling the plaintiff-company to recognize their labor union which could not be legally
done because the plaintiffs were not covered by Republic Act 875.
On April 24, 1975, by virtue of the CFI decision, FEBC notified Victoria that he is dismissed
effective April 26, 1975.

Thereupon, Victoria filed a case before the NLRC against FEBC alleging violation of Article
267 of the Labor Code which requires clearance from the Secretary of Labor for every
shutdown of business establishments or dismissal of employees.
On February 27, 1976, the Labor Arbiter decided in Victorias favor declaring the dismissal
to be illegal, thereby ordering reinstatement with full backwages.
On appeal, the arbiters decision was affirmed by the NLRC.
On appeal to the Secretary of Labor, it was set aside. The Secretary ruled: We do not
agree with the [NLRC ruling] that an application for clearance to terminate [Victoria] is
mandatory on the part of [FEBC] before terminating [Victorias] services. We believe that
what would have been necessary was a report as provided for under Section 11 [f], Rule
XIV, Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code. Moreover, even if
an application for clearance was filed, this Office would have treated the same as a report.
Otherwise, it would render nugatory the Decision of the Arbitrator dated December 28, 1972
in Case Nos. 0021 and 0285 which was affirmed by the Commission, the Secretary of Labor
and the Office of the President of the Philippines, ordering his temporary reinstatement,
subject to whatever Decision the CFI Bulacan may promulgate in Civil Case No. 750-V. It
could be clearly inferred from said [NLRC] Decisions that if the strike is declared illegal, the
strikers will be considered to have lost their employment status under the then existing laws
and jurisprudence, otherwise strikers could stage illegal strike with impunity. Since the strike
was declared illegal, [FEBC] acted in good faith when it dispensed with the services of
[Victoria]. For failure of [FEBC] to file the necessary report and based on equitable
considerations, [Victoria] should be granted separation pay equivalent to one-half month
salary for every year of service.
Victoria insists that Article 267(b) (Note: repealed) of the Labor Code is very clear. It does
not make any distinction as to the ground for dismissal. Whether or not the dismissal sought
by the employer company is for cause, it is imperative that the company must apply for a
clearance from the Secretary of Labor.

ISSUES:

WoN a clearance from the Secretary of Labor is still necessary before Victoria can be
dismissed
o NO. In Madrigal & Company, Inc. v. Zamora, penned by Justice Abraham F.
Sarmiento promulgated on June 30, 1987, the Court ruled in agreement with the
findings of then Presidential Assistant for Legal Affairs Ronaldo Zamora that the
purpose in requiring a prior clearance from the Secretary of Labor in cases of
shutdown or dismissal of employees is to afford the Secretary ample opportunity to
examine and determine the reasonableness of the request.
o We agree with the Solicitor General. Technically speaking, no clearance was
obtained by Victoria from the then Secretary of Labor, the last step towards full
compliance with the requirements of law on the matter of dismissal of employees.
However, the rationale behind the clearance requirement was fully met. The
Secretary of Labor was apprised of FEBCs intention to terminate Victorias
services. This in effect is an application for clearance to dismiss Victoria from
employment. The affirmance of the restrictive condition in the dispositive portion of
the labor arbiter's decision (in the earlier two cases) by the Secretary of Labor and
the Office of the President of the Philippines signifies a grant of authority to dismiss
Victoria in case the strike is declared illegal by CFI Bulacan. Consequently and as
correctly stated by the Solicitor General, FEBC acted in good faith when it
terminated the employment of Victoria upon a declaration, of illegality of the strike

NOTES:

by CFI Bulacan. Moreover, the then Secretary of Labor manifested his conformity to
the dismissal, not once, but twice. In this regard, the mandatory rule on clearance
need not be applied.
The strike staged by the union in 1972 was a futile move. The law then enforced,
Republic Act 875 specifically excluded FEBC from its coverage. Even if the parties
had gone to court to compel recognition, no positive relief could have been obtained
since the same was not sanctioned by law. Because of this, there was no necessity
on the part of FEBC to show specific acts of Victoria during the strike to justify his
dismissal.
This is a matter of responsibility and of answerability. Victoria as a union
leader, must see to it that the policies and activities of the union in the
conduct of labor relations are within the precepts of law and any deviation
from the legal boundaries shall be imputable to the leader. He bears the
responsibility of guiding the union along the path of law and to cause the
union to demand what is not legally demandable, would foment anarchy
which is a prelude to chaos.
Victoria should have known and it was his duty to impart this imputed
knowledge to the members of the union that employees and laborers in nonprofit organizations are not covered by the provisions of the Industrial Peace
Act and the Court of Industrial Relations [in the case at bar, the CFI] has no
jurisdiction to entertain petitions of labor unions or organizations of said nonprofit organizations for certification as the exclusive bargaining
representatives of said employees and laborers.
As a strike is an economic weapon at war with the policy of the Constitution and the
law at that time, a resort thereto by laborers shall be deemed to be a choice of
remedy peculiarly their own, and outside of the statute, and as such, the strikers
must accept all the risks attendant upon their choice. If they succeed and the
employer succumbs, the law will not stand in their way in the enjoyment of the
lawful fruits of their victory. But if they fail, they cannot thereafter invoke the
protection of the law for the consequences of their conduct unless the right they
wished vindicated is one which the law will, by all means, protect and enforce.
We further agree with the Acting Secretary of Labor that what was required in the
case of petitioner's dismissal was only a report as provided under Section II [f] of
Rule XIV of the Rules and Regulations implementing the Labor Code which
provides:
Every employer shall submit a report to the Regional Office in accordance
with the form presented by the Department on the following instances of
termination of employment, suspension, lay-off or shutdown which may be
effected by the employer without prior clearance within five [5] days
thereafter:
xxx
xxx
xxx
[f] All other terminations of employment, suspension, lay-offs or shutdowns,
not otherwise specified in this and in the immediately preceding sections."
To hold otherwise would render nugatory the conditions set forth in the decision of
Labor Arbiter Aguas on the basis of which Victoria was temporarily reinstated.