Beyond Fragmentation and Interconnectivity

BEYOND FRAGMENTATION AND
INTERCONNECTIVITY
Innovation and the Public Sector

The functioning of the public sector gives rise to considerable debate. Not only the efficiency and
efficacy of the sector are at stake, but also its legitimacy. At the same time we see that in the
public sector all kinds of innovations are taking place. These innovations are not only
technological, which enable the redesign of all kinds of processes, like service delivery. The
emphasis can also be put on more organizational and conceptual innovations. In this series we
will try to understand the nature of a wide variety of innovations taking place in the public sector
of the 21st century and try to evaluate their outcomes. How do they take place? What are relevant
triggers? And, how are their outcomes being shaped by all kinds of actors and influences? And,
do public innovations differ from innovations in the private sector? Moreover we try to assess the
actual effects of these innovations, not only from an instrumental point of view, but also from a
more institutional point of view. Do these innovations not only contribute to a better functioning
of the public sector, but do they also challenge grown practices and vested interests? And what
does this imply for the management of public sector innovations?
Series Editors:
Prof. Dr. Victor J.J.M. Bekkers

Erasmus University, Rotterdam, The Netherlands
Prof. Jean Hartley

The University of Warwick, Coventry, United Kingdom
Prof. Sharon S. Dawes

University at Albany/SUNY, Albany, NY, USA
Volume 17
Recently published in this series
Vol. 16.
Vol. 15.
Vol. 14.
Vol. 13.
Vol. 12.
A.-V. Anttiroiko, S. J. Bailey and P. Valkama (Eds.), Innovative Trends in Public

Governance in Asia
A.-V. Anttiroiko, S.J. Bailey and P. Valkama (Eds.), Innovations in Public
Governance
A. Meijer, K. Boersma and P. Wagenaar (Eds.), ICTs, Citizens and Governance: After
the Hype!
D. Griffin, P. Trevorrow and E. Halpin (Eds.), Developments in e-Government A
Critical Analysis
V. Bekkers, H. van Duivenboden and M. Thaens (Eds.), Information and
Communication Technology and Public Innovation Assessing the ICT-Driven
Modernization of Public Administration
This series is a continuation of Informatization Developments and the Public Sector

(vols. 19, ISSN 0928-9038)
ISSN 1871-1073 (print)
ISSN 1879-8454 (online)
Beyoond Frragmen
ntation
n and
Intercconnecctivity
Pub
blic Govern
nance and the
t Search for Conneective Capaacity
y
Edited by
Meenno Fen
nger
Associa
ate Professor of Public Ad
dministration
n, Erasmus University
U
Rootterdam
and
Vicctor Bekk
kers
Professo
or of Public Administratio
A
on and Publiic Policy,
Dean of the Erasmus Graduate
G
Sch
hool for the Humanities,
H
So
ocial and Beehavioural Scciences, Erassmus Universsity Rotterdaam
Amstterdam Berrlin Tokyo Washington, DC
2012 The authors and IOS Press.

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system,
or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without prior written permission from the publisher.
ISBN 978-1-60750-997-4 (print)
ISBN 978-1-60750-998-1 (online)
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PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS
Beyond Fragmentation and Interconnectivity

H.J.M. Fenger and V.J.J.M. Bekkers (Eds.)
IOS Press, 2012
2012 The authors and IOS Press. All rights reserved.
Preface
Modern societies are populated by an abundance of formal and informal organizations,
representing a wide variety of interests and covering more or less segmented elements
of societal activities, issues and tasks. At the same time, these actors are connected
through a complex set of direct and indirect feedback loops. In short, modern societies
may be labeled as simultaneously fragmented and interconnected. Due to these
characteristics, modern societies sometimes even resemble the idea of organized
anarchies. This can be traced back in the governance of many serious societal
problems, like the fight against crime, the ageing of the population and the quality of
our environment. All kinds of different organizations, with diverging interests, views
and power resources, can be discerned, all dealing with these problems and challenges.
One of these actors is government. But government itself is a highly fragmented and
specialized actor as well. Therefore fragmentation is also an important feature of
government, which significantly affects its governance capacity.
The research program of the Department of Public Administration at Erasmus
University Rotterdam focuses specifically on the issues of fragmentation and
connective capacities. The program is called lost connections, linking capacities: on
the effectiveness, legitimacy and self-organization of new forms of governance and
public services. Building upon this research program, this book addresses the
challenges that a fragmented society and public sector provide. But attempts to
overcome the fragmentation and interconnectivity can be seen as a major driver for
innovation and modernization. Hence, we argue that many governance innovations try
to overcome the barriers of fragmentation, differentiation, specialization and
professionalization. In this book we do not only address the nature and backgrounds of
fragmentation and interconnectivity, but we also assess attempts to create new forms of
connective capacities. The central issue is how to establish connective governance
capacities in order to address the needs and wishes of society in more effective and
responsive way, without oversimplifying the complexity and ambiguity of these needs
and wishes.
This book is the product of the successful connective capacities of various
individuals. First, we would like to thank the authors who have provided us with their
useful contributions, thus progressing our ideas on connective capacities and public
governance. Moreover, we are indebted to Ren Karens who has taken care of the lastminute lay-out of the manuscript. Yneke, Karin and Lalita as ever were in control of all
logistic processes that are necessary for the fragmented process of writing a book with
many different authors from various countries. Finally, we are grateful to Arwin van
Buuren who has contributed valuable ideas in the initial stage of this project.
Rotterdam, 24 November 2011
Menno Fenger and Victor Bekkers
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vii
About the authors

John Alford is professor of Public Sector Management at the Australia and New
Zealand School of Governance (ANZSOG), on extended secondment from the
Melbourne Business School (MBS). Professor Alford leads the subject Delivering
Public Value in ANZSOG's Executive Master of Public Administration (EMPA), and
teaches in executive programs for public sector managers. He is responsible for
teaching development in ANZSOG, having conducted case teaching workshops at a
number of universities in Australia, New Zealand, Britain and the Netherlands. He has
written or supervised over 100 teaching cases set in government organisations. His
research focuses on strategic management in the public sector, performance monitoring
in government organisations, contracting and partnering, and client-organisation
relationships. He is a member of the editorial board of the American Review of Public
Administration. His recent book. Engaging public sector clients: From service delivery
to co-production (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) won the American Society for Public
Administration (ASPA)'s Best Book Award for 2011.
Jim Barry is a political sociologist, professor of Gender and Organisation Studies in the
Royal Docks Business School at the University of East London UK and Guest
Professor at Lule University of Technology Sweden. Holding Editorial Board
appointments, his research interests include gender, management, higher education,
social work, work-stress, work-stress, post-colonialism, identities, business ethics and
lone parenting & employment. He has published in Gender, Work and Organization,
Feministiche Studien, International Feminist Journal of Politics, Public Administration,
Human Relations, Organization, Public Management Review and the Journal of
Management Studies.
Victor Bekkers is professor of public administration and public policy at the
Departement of Public Administration at Erasmus University Rotterdam. He is also
dean of the Erasmus Graduate School for the Humanities, Social and Behavioural
Sciences. His research interests are focused on the question how the course, contents
and organization of policy processes in public administration change due to the
penetration of information and communication technology, including new media. He
has published numerous articles, books and book chapters on this subject. His articles
has appeared for instance in the International Review of Administrative Sciences,
Information Infrastructure and Policy, the Information Polity, Public Management
Review, The Information Society and Government Information Quarterly. His most
recent book publications are: Innovation in the public sector: Linking capacities and
leadership (2011) and Governance and democratic deficit (2007).
Elisabeth Berg is professor of sociology in the Department of Economy, Technology
and Society at Lule University of Technology, Sweden and Visiting Professor at the
University of East London, UK. Her research has involved gender and organisation in
academia and in social work in Sweden, England and Netherlands as well as
Information and communication technology in social work from a gender perspective.
She has published in Gender, Work and Organization, Feministiche Studien,
viii
Organization, International Journal of sociology and Social Policy, Public

Administration, Public Management Review and Information technology and People.
Lex Cachet got his Masters in Sociology from the University of Amsterdam and his
PhD from Leiden University (Policing and Social Control, 1990). He has been working
at Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam. First in the department of Sociology. Since 1985 as
an associate professor in the department of Public Administration. His research focuses
on policing, public safety and local government. Recently he co-authored books on
local safety policies in The Netherlands and Belgium, on changes in police systems in
five Wet-European countries and on the future of the mayors function in the
Netherlands. For more than a decade he was a member of the daily board of the Faculty
of Social Sciences, first as director of education, later on as vice-dean. He retired in
2011, but still is working in the Department of Public Administration. He also has been
active in local and regional politics.
John Chandler is a Reader in Work and Organization in the Royal Docks Business
School at the University of East London, UK. A sociologist, his research interests are in
the fields of public services management, identities, gender at work and social
movements. Recent research and publications have been on the theme of management
and managerialism in higher education and social care. He has published in the journals
Gender, Work and Organization, Feministiche Studien, International Feminist Journal
of Politics, Public Administration, Human Relations, Organization, Public Management
Review and the Journal of Management Studies.
Marleen Easton is sociologist and professor of security related issues at the department
of Public Administration at the Association University Ghent. She finished her Ph.D.
on the demilitarisation of the Belgian Gendarmerie in 2000 and runs her own research
group on 'Governing & Policing Security' (GaPS). Since 2007 GaPS is member of the
research group Governance of Security (www.gofs.be). GaPS has/is involved in more
than 30 research projects and the team has been publishing on topics such as
discretionary powers of police officers; police training; the implementation of
community oriented policing in multicultural neighborhoods; social disorder and
conflicts with the police in multicultural neighborhoods; blurring boundaries between
the police and social work in relation to youth; flows of administrative information in
local police forces; processes of radicalisation; monitoring recidivism, nodal
governance in relation to security phenomena in train stations and harbours;
transnational protection of the environment; blurring boundaries between the police and
the army; anti corruption and integrity policies in the public and private sector and
perception of corruption by citizens and various profession groups. As visiting
professor at Rhr University, she co-manages the international master on 'Criminology,
Governance & Police Studies' (www.macrimgov.eu).
Marion Ellison is Director of HOPES (How to Progress European Solidarity) Research
Network and lectures in European Social and Public Policy at Queen Margaret
University in Edinburgh. Her research interests and publications are located within the
fields of European social policy, governance, public services management and
citizenship with a focus upon comparative child care law, policy and professional social
work practice.
ix
Menno Fenger is associate professor of public administration at Erasmus University

Rotterdam. He finished his Ph.D. on the implementation of social policies in 2001.
From 2000 2006 he worked as assistent professor at the Department of Public
Administration, Erasmus University Rotterdam. In 2006, he was a visiting scholar at
the Center for European Studies, Harvard University. From 2006 tot 2008 he was a
senior policy advisor at the Dutch Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment. In 2008,
he returned to the Department of Public Administration, Erasmus University. In his
research, he focuses on the implementation of social policies, and on processes of
policy change in this policy domain. Moreover, he is interested in developments in the
new EU-member states. He published in various Dutch and English journals and books.
Gordon Hughes is Chair in Criminology at the Centre for Crime, Law and Justice,
School of Social Sciences, Cardiff University, Wales, UK. His most recent monograph
is The Politics of Community and Crime (2007, Palgrave/MacMillan) and his latest
journal article is 'Public safety regimes: negotiated orders and political analysis in
Criminology' (forthcoming, Criminology and Criminal Justice: An International
Journal, co-authored with Adam Edwards), . Recent research projects and reports
include the RSPCA-funded Status dogs, young people and criminalisation: towards a
preventative strategy (2011), and the Welsh Assembly Government-funded study of
youth crime prevention and community safety schemes in Wales entitled Evaluation of
the Safer Communities Fund, 2006-9 (2009). He is a leading member of the major EUfunded research project URBIS which is currently undertaking comparative Europeanwide research into urban security, safety and crisis management expertise and will aim
to develop an EU-wide training program for multi-level governance of public safety
(time-scale: November 2011-13).
Fien Gilleir graduated in 2003 as a social worker at the University College 'Karel de
Grote-Hogeschool ' in Antwerp. In 2006, she obtained a licentiate degree in
Criminology at the Ghent University. Since January 2007, she has been working as a
researcher at the research group Governing and Policing Security (GaPS) of the
Department of Business and Public Administration of University College Ghent where
she conducted scientific research about monitoring the effectiveness of alternative
sanctions'. Next to that, she has been occupied with the research project Nodal Police
in harbours. In particular she made an in depth-study of the case of illegal
transitmigrants in Belgian Seaports. At the moment she works on a PhD in
Criminology at Ghent University entitled Police discretion at the level of frontline
police officers in Belgium: a case study of the decision to take a suspect into custody.
Philip Marcel Karr is affiliated with the Netherlands School for Public Administration
(NSOB) in The Hague as senior researcher and lecturer and with the Amsterdam
University of Applied Sciences as programme manager and lecturer on urban
management. His research interests include the governance of hybrid organizations
between state, market and society (public/social enterprises, public services mutuals,
cooperatives, etc.), the use of new steering mechanisms to deal with wicked problems
(collaborative governance) and the changing relationship between citizens and
government through Web 2.0, especially the Open Data-movement. See for more
information www.hybridorganizations.com.
Erik-Hans Klijn is professor at the Department of Public Administration at Erasmus

University Rotterdam and visiting professor at the University of Birmingham (School
of Government and Society). His research and teaching activities focus on complex
decision-making and management in networks, institutional design and Public Private
Partnerships mainly in the area of environmental and housing policy. Recently his
research extended to branding and the impact of media on complex decision-making.
He published extensively in international journals and is author of the book Managing
Uncertainties in Networks together with Joop Koppenjan (2004, Routledge) and of
Branding in Governance and Public Management (Routledge, 2011) together with
Jasper Eshuis.
Peter Marks is assistant professor of Public Administration at Erasmus University
Rotterdam. He finished his Ph.D. on the association between games in 2002. From
January 2003 he has worked at the Department of Public Administration, Erasmus
University Rotterdam. His research interests are complexity theory application in
public administration and public security policies. He is currently working on a book
about the development of local security in the city of Rotterdam, as well as editor of a
book about the Case of Making Public Administration and Complexity Theory
(COMPACT) work.
Rebecca Moody is post-doc researcher at the Erasmus University Rotterdam at the
department of Public Administration. She finished her Ph.D. on the influence of
Geographical Information Systems on agenda setting and policy design. Furthermore
she has done research on the influence of social media in agenda setting issues, visual
culture and the influence of technologies for creation and distribution of the visual on
public policy making, which has been published in English journals.
Paul Ponsaers is full time senior professor at Ghent University, Faculty of Law,
department Penal Law and Criminology. He has a Licentiate degree in Sociology and a
Doctoral degree in Criminology. He started his scientific career as a scientific assistant
at the University of Leuven (KULeuven). After a journalistic period with the daily
news paper De Morgen, Paul worked as a head lecturer of Sociology of Law at the
University of Amsterdam. Afterwards, he became departmental manager of the Police
Policy Support Unit. This is where he set up several broad scientific projects such as:
registered crime statistics and the security monitor. Since 1998, Paul has been working
at Ghent University, where he teaches Police Sciences, Sociology of Law and Methods
and Techniques of Criminological Research. Paul Ponsaers is the co-director of the
interuniversity Research Unit Social Analysis of Security Research and promotor of the
associated research unit Governance of Security. He is also a member of the
international GERN network (Paris). Paul Ponsaers is president of the association vzw
Panopticon and member of the journal with the same name (Maklu), editor of the series
Cahiers Police Studies (Maklu), member of the redactional board of Orde van de Dag
(Kluwer) and president of the editorial board of the series Het Groene Gras (Boom
Juridical Publishers). He specializes in the fields of community (oriented) policing,
financial and economic crime, crime analysis and security policy. On these topics he
published several articles and (contributions in) books in national and international
journals and series.
xi
Ruth Post studied Public Administration at the Erasmus University Rotterdam

(graduated in 2008) and worked as an academic teacher at the department for one year.
Since October 2009 she is a PhD student at the same department. The central theme of
her research is the process of institutionalization of operational management in the
Dutch central government. Her PhD research is supervised by prof. Bekkers and dr.
Fenger. The project is implemented in cooperation with the directorate-general
Organisation and Operational Management of the Ministry of the Interior and
Kingdom Relations.
Ruth Prins works as a PhD-student at the department of Public Administration at
Erasmus University Rotterdam. Her PhD-research is about local mayors in public
safety governance. Besides her PhD research, she is an academic teacher in Public
Administration at Erasmus University Rotterdam. Ruth studied at Erasmus University
Rotterdam and received a master degree in Public Administration in 2007 (master
program Policy and Politics). In 2008 she graduated for the master program
Governance of Public Safety at the VU University Amsterdam. During her studies, she
worked as a research assistant at both universities.
Filip de Rynck is full professor in public administration at the University College Gent
(Belgium). He started his career as a practitioner in several positions in the local public
and non - profit sector. His Ph.D (KULeuven, 1995) dealt with policy-networks in
regional development in the Flanders region. He teaches at the University College since
1997. He presided several official advisory commissions for the Flemish government.
His research topics are: local government and especially government of cities and cityregions; citizen participation at the local level; local policy networks; architecture of
public administration in Belgium / Flanders with the focus on multi-level governance.
Peter Scholten is associate professor public policy and politics at the Erasmus
University of Rotterdam. His research, publications and teaching focus on issues of
governance in multicultural societies. He is involved in various international research
project on topics like the multi-level governance of migrant integration (VENIscholarship), research-policy dialogues on migration (DIAMINT), social media and
integration (UniteEurope), pre-entry integration measures (PROSINT) and local
migrant policies (AMICALL, IMPACIM). Peter has published in various international
journals and recently published his new book Framing Immigrant Integration: Dutch
research-policy dialogues in comparative perspective with Amsterdam University
Press. In addition, Peter is editor of Perspectives on Europe, the journal of the Council
for European Studies, fellow of the Montesquieu Institute, associate reseacher at the
Center for Migration Policy and Society (COMPAS) at Oxford University and member
of the board of the Center for History of Migrants.
Chris Skelcher is professor of Public Governance at INLOGOV (the Institute of Local
Government Studies) in the University of Birminghams School of Government and
Society. He is also the Director of Research and Knowledge Transfer for the College
of Social Sciences. During 2003-4 he was Public Service Fellow in Governance and
Performance at the ESRC/EPSRC Advanced Institute for Management Research. His
research and teaching concentrate on new forms of urban governance and their
implications for democracy. His publications include Working Across Boundaries:
Collaboration in Public Services (with Helen Sullivan, Palgrave, 2002) and a number of
xii
publications arising from his international collaborations with US and European

scholars. He is currently involved in a study of the durability and termination of
special purpose agencies (quangos), and is investigating cooperative behavior in public
private partnerships through computer-aided simulations.
Arie van Sluis is assistant professor in Public Administration at the Erasmus University
Rotterdam. His research interest is in police and policing in a broad sense and local
security policy from a comparative perspective. Currently he is working on a book
about the development of local security in the city of Rotterdam. Another project he is
working on is a comparative research of police systems in an number of western
Eurpoean countries, funded by the Research Program Police and Science form the
Dutch Police Academy. Arie van Sluis is married to Wilma Oostlander and they have a
daughter, Emma.
Martijn van der Steen is deputy dean and deputy director of the Netherlands School for
Public Administration (NSOB) in the Hague and director of its think tank. Martijn
studied public administration and history at Erasmus University Rotterdam and was
trained as a management consultant at Dutch firm Twijnstra Gudde. His research
interests include network management, the use of forecasting and scenarios in policy
making, and the relationship between the media and government. Martijn received a
PhD from Tilburg University for a study on the use narratives in the political debate
about ageing. He contributes to several of the NSOBs research projects with a focus on
strategic management and the role networks can play in the provision of public
services. He also is dean of the Master Class Regulation and Compliance, the Master
Class in Policy Analysis and dean of a tailor-made-in-house program for the
municipality of Amsterdam.
Mark van Twist joined the Netherlands School for Public Administration (NSOB) as
executive dean in 2004, having been a long time core faculty member. He is a professor
of Public Administration at Erasmus University (2009-present) and an ex officio
member of the Netherlands Court of Audit. He has held various academic positions at
Radboud University Nijmegen, Delft University of Technology and Erasmus
University. He has also been Director of Business Development at Berenschot, one of
the major public sector consultancies in the Netherlands. His research interests include
public-private partnerships, policy advice, major infrastructural projects and the role of
language and symbolism in public policy and management. He has published widely in
both academic and broad circulation media.
Joris Voets is senior researcher at the Public Management Institute, Katholieke
Universiteit Leuven (Belgium). Intergovernmental collaboration and the management
thereof (PhD 2008) are at the heart of his research, training and consultancy, applied to
various policy sectors like spatial planning and welfare. Different aspects are dealt
with, like collaborative performance, steering and coordination through
metagovernance, and the democratic quality of networks. He contributes on a regular
basis to international journals (like ARPA and PMR) and books.
xiii
Contents
Preface
About the Authors
v
vii
Introduction
Creating Connective Capacities in Public Governance: Challenges and
Contributions
Part I. Fragmentation and Connectivity: Explanations and Analyses

Fragmentation and Interconnection in Public Safety Governance in the
Netherlands, Belgium and England
Ruth Prins, Lex Cachet, Paul Ponsaers and Gordon Hughes
19
Beyond National Models of Integration? Rethinking Interconnectedness and

Fragmentation in Dutch and French Integration Policies
Peter Scholten
44
Situating Public Governance Within Complex Settings: The Experiences of

Social Services Managers in Sweden and Britain
Marion Ellison, Elisabeth Berg, Jim Barry and John Chandler
59
Nodal Security in the Ports of Rotterdam and Antwerp

Arie van Sluis, Peter Marks, Fien Gilleir and Marleen Easton
73
Part II. Fragmentation and Connectivity: Evaluating Solutions

Whole of Government in Theory and Practice: An Exploratory Account of
How Australian and Dutch Governments Deal with Wicked Problems in an
Integrated Way
Philip Marcel Karr, John Alford, Martijn van der Steen and
Mark van Twist
97
Visual Connections: The Power of the Visual in the Policy Process in Two
Dutch Cases
Rebecca Moody and Victor Bekkers
114
Shared Service Centres: An Ideal Solution for Fragmentation or a Fairytale?

Ruth Post
The Democratic Character of New Institutional Governance Arrangements:
Comparing Dutch and Belgian Experiences
Erik-Hans Klijn, Filip de Rynck, Chris Skelcher and Joris Voets
129
142
xiv
Conclusion
Beyond Fragmentation in Public Governance: The Search for Connective
Capacity
Victor Bekkers and Menno Fenger
167
Author Index
183
Introduction

IOS Press, 2012
doi:10.3233/978-1-60750-998-1-3
Creating Connective Capacities in Public

Governance: Challenges and Contributions
Governing contemporary societies has become a challenging task, almost on the verge
of the impossible. Social, cultural and religious heterogeneity has increased within
societies. As a consequence, the demands and preferences from citizens and their
representative organizations both formal and informal have exploded. Moreover, as
processes of modernization inevitable lead to specialization and fragmentation, the
number of organizations involved in governing modern societies has increased
remarkably as well (see Albert, 2001). The introduction of the ideas of new public
management (NPM) in the 1980s and 1990s has even further increased specialization
within central, regional and local government. An abundance of autonomous or semiautonomous governmental organizations have emerged. For instance, Van Thiel (2004)
shows that the number of quasi-autonomous non-governmental organizations
(quangos) in the Netherlands has grown from under 100 in the early 1900s to over 500
in the 200s, thus contributing to the fragmentation of the Dutch institutional landscape.
Simultaneously, the proliferation of new information and communication
technologies has lead to the redundancy of the constraints of time, space, matter and
energy (Heylighen, 2002). As a consequence, systems and subsystems are becoming
increasingly interdependent and interconnected. The consequences of changes or
developments within one domain or sector can have tremendous impact upon other
domains. For instance, the unexpected fast economic decline of the recent years shows
the interconnected character of our world economy, the financial sector, public sector
economics, consumption behavior and private investment strategies. It is almost
inconvincible, but undeniably true, that the solvability issues that overshadowed the
American mortgage market from 2007 through a complex chain of events have
triggered the debts crisis in European countries in 2011. Therefore, social and
economic systems have become increasingly instable and complex. Effects and sideeffects of actions at the individual, organization or government-level have become
increasingly unpredictable (see Castells, 1996).
This book analyses this apparently paradoxical situation of simultaneous
fragmentation and interconnectivity, and, more importantly, its impact on public
governance. As we stated in the introduction, public governance is an enormously
challenging task. In-depth insight in the backgrounds and consequences of processes of
interconnectivity and fragmentation in the public sector and their interrelatedness
provides a new perspective on the complexity of the governance. This book has three
important goals. It sets out to (1) assess, analyze and explain the assumption of
simultaneous interconnectivity and fragmentation in public governance; (2) analyze the
M. Fenger and V. Bekkers / Creating Connective Capacities in Public Governance
impact of fragmentation and interconnectivity on the governability of policy issues; (3)

analyze to what extent and under what conditions simultaneous interconnectivity and
fragmentation actually might contribute to public governance. In the remainder of this
chapter, we will explain what route we will take in this book to achieve these ambitious
goals. We will do so by first briefly introducing the backgrounds of fragmentation and
interconnectivity in modern societies. Second, we will describe how fragmentation and
interconnectivity are manifested in the public domain. Third, we will discuss some
examples of solutions that can be observed to deal with the challenges of simultaneous
fragmentation and interconnectivity in the public sector. Fourth, we will develop an
analytical framework that enables us to develop a systematical perspective on possible
solutions for the challenges of simultaneous fragmentation and interconnectivity in
issues of public governance. Finally, we will present the general outline of this book.
1. Functional differentiation and fragmentation

As we have seen in the introduction, one of the prominent challenges in public
governance is the seemingly ever-increasing number of actors that deals with a specific
policy problem. One of the explanations for this might be the process of increasing
specialization in society, which results in fragmentation (see Margetts, 2010). The issue
of fragmentation is closely connected to the idea of functional differentiation as an
important element in the process of modernization. The theory of functional
differentiation starts from the premise that there is a long-term evolution from
segmented systems, in which societies are based on territorial entities, on to stratified
systems, in which the national state and class differentiation are expressions, up to
functional differentiation. Functional differentiation assumes that societal spheres are
organized in subsystems, which fulfill certain social functions, such as the political,
legal, economic or educational systems (Faist, 2009: 14). Simplifying grossly, the
modernization of societies thus is a story of functional differentiation taking more and
more precedence over segmentation and stratification as main differentiating principles
of societies (Albert, 2001).
Buzan and Albert (2010) argue that the origins of functionalist thought can be
traced back to the works of Herbert Spencer (1966). According to them, Spencer
preceded many later modern theories of differentiation by shifting the attention from
the question of how some kind of homogeneity in the social world is established and
preserved, to the question of how society functions and evolves as heterogeneity.
Following Buzan and Albert (2010), we can state that at the heart of classical
sociological thought, starting with Spencer and Comte, and particularly developed
further by Durkheim and Weber, lies the thought that society as some kind of a whole
is differentiated. Using an over-simplifying image, functional differentiation expresses
an ongoing division of labor. Following Durkheim (1968) this assumes that
specialized parts of society, e.g. politics, law, the economy etc., fulfill functions for
society and thus allow for a more efficient reproduction of society than would be
possible without functional specialization. Although the diagnosis that society is
characterized by functional differentiation is accepted rather widely, the answers as to
what it is that holds societies together despite the centrifugal tendency of an ongoing
differentiation vary widely. Most scholars refer to some kind of common value system
or, more abstractly, some kind of community necessarily underlying a society.
Within functional differentiation theory, the question which functionally differentiated

realms of society can be identified is not yet answered, at least not definitely and
unanimously. Luhmann (in Harste, 2004) argues that a basal code (e.g. powerful/nonpowerful in the political system; legal/illegal in the legal system) according to which all
communication is processed and a symbolically generalized medium of communication
(e.g. power in the political system, money in the economic system) are necessities for
more or less independent subsystems. Luhmann himself identifies and analyses a
number of function systems in monographic works (the politics, the education, the
economy, the art, and the law of society), and quite some energy of contemporary
Luhmann-followers is spent on debates of whether other realms, such as the military or
war qualify for distinct, operatively closed function systems (see, for example, Harste,
2004).
But in contrast with some of the authors cited in this section, we claim that in
current societies, the frontiers between different systems and subsystems become
increasingly blurred. More and more, systems and subsystems, evolved from processes
of functional differentiation, become interconnected, as we will show in the next
section.
2. Interconnectivity in the network society

In his seminal work on the network society Manuel Castells (1996) argues that modern
societies become increasingly interconnected. As a result the consequences of changes
within one domain or sector can have tremendous impact upon other domains, which
causes surprises as actors are in many cases not aware of these connections. The
unexpected fast economic decline of recent months shows the interconnected character
of our world economy, the financial sector, public sector economics, consumption
behavior and private investment strategies.
Interconnectivity points thus to the interdependence and mutual influencing of
relatively autonomous parts within a specific system. It points to the (direct and
indirect) connections between systems by which outcomes of one system influence the
dynamics within another system. Interconnectivity can also be caused by actors who
spontaneously adapt their behavior due to events within other systems. Through
interconnectivity, energy and information are exchanged that cause developments
within one (part of a) system to have (intended or unintended, conscious or
unconscious) impact on other (parts of) systems. Important trends that feed the
interconnectivity of our society are:
x the internationalization of activities (both economic, financial, political and
cultural). That means that developments within one country or region are of
importance for developments in other countries. It also means that actors feel a
growing need for coordination on a international level.
x the informatization of our society in which everyone can take notice of events
and developments elsewhere and can adapt his behavior to these events.
Events within one sector on one spot can have a direct effect on another sector
on another spot because of the exposure of such an event by media, Internet
and personal communication channels.
x the technological development of our society that enables the fine-grained
division of tasks, the exchange of information, materials and energy about
x
x
x
x
organizational and managerial trends towards specialization and

differentiation which at the same time give rise to a desire for coordination
and integration at the level of the chain, network or process.
sociological trends within the networks people possess: these networks are not
only more extended, but also more varied which makes the chance of
interconnectedness with other networks much higher.
the trends behind the development of complex networks in which the
dispersion of resources between actors with highly different stakes and values
cause increasingly complicated interdependencies.
the increasing pressure on our available space which leads to an increasing
intertwinement of spatial functions and competition on the distribution of
scarce space.
So to sum up, we have two simultaneous and inevitable developments. The first is the
process of functional differentiation, resulting in an ever-increasing proliferation of
actors, systems and subsystems. The second is the process of increasing
interconnectivity between actors, systems and subsystems. As a result, more actors
develop more and quicker direct and indirect ties. Due to these simultaneous processes,
the consequences of a specific event within one (sub)system can be work out
disproportionally (due to positive feedback) or can dampen out (due to negative
feedback) in another (sub)system. These general societal trends also can be traced back
in the public sector, as will be shown in the next section.
3. Fragmentation, interconnectivity and public governance

The 1980s and the 1990s are widely considered as the heydays for the introduction of
new public management (NPM) reforms in many Western and continuing until well
into the 2000s newly industrialized countries. Although the label of NPM is used for
a wide variety of government reforms, some of which not even remotely resemble one
another, Dunleavy et al. (2005: 470) synthesize these reforms under three general
headings: (1) disaggregation; (2) competition; and (3) incentivizations. Disaggregation
refers to splitting up large public sector hierarchies into smaller, more or less
autonomous units with their own specializations, organizational structure, methos of
accuntabilit and leadership. Competition refers to the separation of purchasers and
providers in order to allow multiple different forms of provision to be developed and to
introduce competition among these different providers. Finally, incentivization refers to
the introduction of performance incentives both at the organizational and individual
levels.
Considering functional differentiation in the public sector, Verhoest et al. (2007:
327) define specialization as the creation of new public sector organizations with
limited objectives and specific tasks out of traditional core departments with many
tasks and different, sometimes conflicting objectives. This process of specialization
can be based on geography as well as different types of tasks, customers or processes.
Two forms of specialization can be distinguished: horizontal specialization and vertical
specialization. Horizontal specialization refers to the splitting of organizations at the
same administrative and hierarchical level. Vertical specialization refers to the transfer
of tasks, responsibility and authority to different hierarchical levels. A wide variety of
forms of vertical specialization is available, known under the labels of decentralization,
devolution, delegation, agencification, outsourcing and even privatization (ibidem).
After the late-twentieth centurys heydays of NPM, a growing discontent with its
consequences began to develop in the early 2000s. Dunleavy et al. (2005: 469) even go
as far as to proclaim The Crisis of New Public Management. To illustrate the
consequences of the process of functional differentiation within the public domain,
Dunleavy et al. (2005) discuss the case of New Zealand. According to these authors,
New Zealand, a country with about 3.5 million inhabitants and one of the pioneer
countries for NPM reforms, now has over three hundred separate central agencies and
forty tiny ministries to perform the tasks of government at the central level (see also
Boston, 1992).
One of the central points of criticism to NPM is that it failed to improve the service
delivery to citizens. Dunleavy et al. (2005: 475) state that NPM has increased the level
of institutional and policy complexity, which will ultimately have a considerable
negative influence on the level of social problem-solving. Three reasons may be given
for this. First, the NPM-reforms come with high transaction costs that are concentrated
in the early years, when the new arrangements and office-routines are not yet
optimized. Second, policy succession is rarely complete, so that the new regime inherits
preexisting arrangements and procedures, creating a suboptimal organizational
landscape. And finally - and perhaps most importantly the more difficult it is for
citizens to understand the internal state arrangements and to operate appropriate access
points to represent their interests politically and administratively, the more their
autonomous capabilities to solve policy problems may be eroded (Dunleavy et al.,
2005: 477). Christensen and Lagreid (2004) even speak of the Fragmented State that
NPM has created. They criticize the lack of political control and the problematic
implications of elevating professional autonomy to the most important feature of the
regulative function (ibidem: 14; see also Fenger and Bekkers, 2007).
These critical reflections on the impact of NPM have not been limited to the
academic literature. In many countries, large-scale evaluations have been conducted,
concluding that the benefits of NPM are at best partial and contested (Pollitt and
Bouckaert, 2004; Osborne, 2006). This has triggered political debates on the benefits
and drawbacks of large-scale reforms in for instance health-care, public transportation
and other public services. Moreover, it appears that in several OECD-countries some of
the NPM-reforms have been partially reversed or new forms of coordination and
integration have been established.
So the modernization of our society has at least for a long time led to an increasing
specialization of tasks. There are few if any societal functions which can be
reasonably controlled from a central point. No one is in charge because the necessary
resources are dispersed among many actors. One important exponent of the
interconnectivity of our society is the high interdependence of actors on each other to
realize their own goal. In this sense interconnectivity can be seen as the consequence of
fragmentation.
Interconnectivity, however, is also at the same time the cause and consequence of
the wish for more collaboration, integration and coordination on all levels. Establishing
means for integration and coordination can be seen as the consequence of
interconnectivity: it is necessary to invest in connective capacity due to the fact that
public problems can only be solved by joint or orchestrated efforts of conglomerates of
actors. At the same time the political and administrative desire for wholeness and
coherence can be seen as important drivers for interconnectivity. This points us to a
tragic paradox;: managerial reactions upon the phenomenon of interconnectivity cause
only more connections and thus a growing complexity for public managers. After all,
this wish for control and coordination is an important impetus for establishing means
that strengthen the mutual relationships between processes, organizations and systems.
Interconnectivity in governance contexts is multifaceted. We can think about
interconnectivity between:
x actors;
x resources (budgets, organizational capacity);
x policy processes and domains (decisions in one domain exclude choices within
another domain or make them easier or more difficult);
x governmental layers (the various levels of government depends on each other
both bottom-up and top-down);
x organizations within and between the public, private and societal domain.
4. Fragmentation and interconnectivity in public governance: turning the tide?

Several authors claim the specialization trend which was triggered by NPM appeared as
fragmentation which sometimes was so significant that existing, new and renewed
mechanisms of coordination had to be (re-) established (see for instance Verhoest et al.,
2007; Ling, 2002; Christensen & Lagreid, 2007; Gregory, 2003). Verhoest et al. (2007)
show that in four OECD-countries, a clear trajectory towards coordination and
reintegration may be observed (see also Talbor and Johnson, 2007). From their
analysis, they distinguish three general mechanisms of renewed coordination (see
Verhoest et al., 2007: 332):
Coordination by hierarchical mechanisms. This set of mechanisms consists of
instruments based on authority and dominance. They involve the formulation of
objectives and procedures, the re-allocation of tasks, responsibilities and authorities and
the introduction of direct means of control and accountability. The introduction of new
management techniques as well as the forms of structural reorganization may be used
for the creation of hierarchical coordination mechanisms.
Coordination by network mechanisms. This set of mechanisms is based on
interdependence and trust. Through the creation of network structures between
organizations, common knowledge, common values and common strategies are
exchanged and created. While most networks are expected to grow spontaneously
between organizations, governments may also intendedly create, take over and sustain
network structures, for instance by creating new forms of interdependencies between
actors (see Fenger and Klok, 2001) or by institutionalizing forms of policy learning
through systems of mutual visitations.
Coordination by market mechanisms. Usually, competition and market incentives
are believed to create rather that to combat fragmentation. But according to Verhoest et
al., governments can purposefully create and guard internal and quasi markets to foster
coordination among organization, for instance by organizing tenders that encompass
different elements of domains in a policy chain.
Theme
Component
Reintegration
Rollback of agencification
Joined-up governance
Re-governmentalization
Reinstating central processes
Radically squeezing production costs
Reengineering back-office function
Procurement concentration and specialization
Network simplification
Needs-Based Holism
Client-based or needs-based reorganization

One-stop provision
Interactive and ask once information seeking
Data warehousing
Agile government process
Digitization
Electronic service delivery

Zero touch technologies
Radical disintermediation
Active channel streaming
Facilitating isocratic administration and co-production
Moving toward open-book government
Table 1: The key components of digital-era governance (Dunleavy et al., 2005. p. 481)
Dunleavy et al. (2005) are even more specific in the tools and methods that may be
used to deal with the challenges of simultaneous fragmentation and interconnectivity.
They identify three themes for what the call digital-era governance that counter some
of the perceived drawbacks of NPM: (1) reintegration, aimed at putting back together
the elements that NPM and other forms of functional differentiation separated out; (2)
needs-based holism, aimed at simplifying and changing the relation between agemcies
and their clients; and (3) digitization, aimed at a transition to fully digital operations.
Table 1.1 presents an overview of the specific tools and methods that might be grouped
under these themes.
The preceding overview makes clear that the issues of fragmentation and
interconnectivity are not merely academic. In contrast, many countries struggle with the
challenges of fragmentation and interconnectivity and develop initiatives to manage
these. Instead of continuing the process of NPM-inspired reforms, many governments
are currently reflecting on the possibilities to create connective capacities. Building
upon the work of Dunleavy et al. (2005), we try to develop a framework that enables us
to classify and analyze the connective capacities that governments have developed or
are developing in answer to the challenges of fragmentation and interconnectivity in the
next section.
10
5. The quest for connective capacities

From the previous sections it might be concluded that governing modern societies is
challenged by the simultaneous occurrence of interconnectivity and fragmentation. As
we have seen, both processes are the inevitable products of processes of modernization
and progress. However, in everyday governance practices we see public sector
organizations attempting different strategies to deal with the challenges that occur from
the simultaneous occurrence of fragmentation and interconnectivity. In section 1.4 we
have discussed some empirical examples of these. Following the perspective we have
developed in the course of this chapter, we may distinguish four different approaches of
governments to deal with the challenges of simultaneous fragmentation and
interconnectivity.
On an abstract level, we assume that governments either choose to fight the
developments of fragmentation and interconnectivity, or might decide to take them for
granted and develop strategies that embrace these developments. This implies that we
can identify four different types of strategies: (1) strategies aimed at reducing
fragmentation while embracing interconnectivity; (2) strategies aimed at reducing
interconnectivity while embracing fragmentation; (3) strategies aimed at embracing
both interconnectivity and fragmentation; and (4) strategies aimed at reducing both
interconnectivity and fragmentation. Table 1.2 presents an overview of four strategies
of creating connective capacities that may be used by governments. In the remainder of
this section we will elaborate on each of these strategies.
Reducing interconnectivity
Embracing interconnectivity
Reducing fragmentation
Simplification
Integration
Embracing fragmentation
Isolation
Adaptation
Table 2: Four strategies for developing connective capacities
Simplification
A well-known and often used strategy of individuals as well as of public and private
organizations, is to try to reduce the complexity of fragmented and interconnected
issues. We might even say that every attempt to reflect on, talk about or act upon the
real world involves simplification. Heyman et al (2004: 358) therefore state that the
unknowable complexity of the world gives rise to simplifying strategies designed to
make rational action feasible, including the imposition of ideologies (), routinisation
and exclusion of the anomalous.
Organizational Strategies aimed at simplification usually involve three elements.
First, the organization attempts to translate the real-world complexity into a limited
number of categories. Second, the organization develops standardized routines for each
of the categories that have been defined in the previous step. Third, the organizations
implements procedures aimed at classifying a situation into one of the pre-defined
categories whenever it enters the organizational domain and applying the appropriate
procedures.
This approach reduces fragmentation because it pre-defines and limits the
perspectives and organizations that need to be involved in each situation. Heymans et
11
al. (2004) discuss the case of the health needs of adults with learning disabilities. The
organizations involved have developed routines that sequentially deal with a limited, pr-defined number of aspects of the health needs of this target groups. Therefore, the
number of organizations involved is limited to the organizations with which
coordination procedures and routines have been negotiated. It reduces the
interconnectivity and possible information overload by only focusing on the
information that is necessary to fill in pre-defined forms that trigger pre-defined
organization routines on a need-to-know basis.
The benefits of this approach are rather straightforward: it creates workable
shortcuts through the maze of fragmentation and interconnectivity. It therefore
increases efficiency and may contribute to an effective approach of situations that fit
well in the pre-defined categories. There are also some drawbacks. First, there is the
danger of forcing all situations into one of the pre-defined categories, making the
organizations, and the experts whose knowledge underpins their functioning,
systematically blind to situations that require tailor-made approaches. Second, as
fragmentation and interconnectivity tends to increase over time, the number of predefined classifications and routines tends to increase over time as well. A good
example of this is the case of the Dutch diagnose-treatment-combinations (dtcs) in
hospitals. To increase cost-transparency between hospitals, it was decided that hospitals
could only claim costs for integrated dtcs, instead of separately claiming the cost for
diagnosis (for instance X-ray), and treatment (for instance surgery and recovery).
Starting with a limited number of dtcs, initially this worked quite well. However, soon
hospitals stared refining existing dtcs and adding new ones, resulting in a system that
almost reflected the complex reality and therefore again needed simplification.
Isolation
A second group of strategies may be aimed at reducing the level of interconnectivity by
attempting to isolate parts of a system by introducing informational or organizational
boundaries. Strategies that use a form of isolation are often used to reduce complexity
in policy-making or implementation (see for instance Jervis, 1998). One of the most
prominent examples may be found in the discussions on the annual budgets in the
Netherlands, but in many other countries as well. The institutional setting of these
discussions is shaped by the budgetary chapters, referring to specific policy domains
under the responsibility of a single minister. These discussion for each chapter is
isolated from discussions on other chapters, thus reducing the political and social
complexity. In real-life, budget savings in one area (for instance innovation subsidies)
may have an impact on other policy areas (for instance unemployment benefits or
education), but these spill-over effects are often deliberately isolated.
The most important benefit of this approach is that it enables more or less rational
estimations of the impact of policy measures. Without isolating a system from other
systems, it is almost impossible to oversee all impacts. Through the strategy of
isolation, better analyses of the impacts of policy measures within the isolated (sub-)
system are possible. However, this strategy does not take into account the unintended
positive and negative effects of the interventions in other systems (see 6, 2010). The
unanticipated surprises caused by this strategy may be considered therefore as its most
important drawback.
12
Integration
Probably the most commonly used strategies, as we also have seen in the previous
section, involve attempts to (re-) integrate decoupled (organizational) units and thus
reducing fragmentation. As these strategies do not affect the ties or informational flows
of the units with other organizations, systems and subsystems we classify them as
strategies aimed at reducing fragmentation.
In our view, strategies of integration can be aimed either upwards or downwards in
the organizational structure. Upwards integration involves the transfer of tasks,
responsibilities and authorities of more or less independents agencies, organizational
units of private organizations to a new, higher level of authority. The integration takes
place because a high-placed administrative or political executive bears the
simultaneous responsibility for formerly separated subsystems. For instance, in 2010
the Dutch Department for Housing, Environmental Affairs and Spatial Planning has
been merged with the Department for Transportation and Water Management into the
new Department for Infrastructure and Environmental Affairs.
The intended benefits of these strategies are facilitating rational, efficient and
effective policy-making by reducing organizational redundancies or gaps. Moreover,
implementation errors often occur with the transfer of information or resources from
one organization to another. Upwards integrative strategies may reduce these errors and
thus contribute to more efficient and effective policy implementation. We think these
strategies have four drawbacks. Firstly, the fragmentation did not occur without a
reason. Functional differentiation enables specialization and perhaps qualitatively better
policies. Re-integration of organizational units partially obstructs the opportunities for
specialization. Secondly, although the inter-organizational fragmented policy-making
and implementation may be reduced by integrative strategies, they may have been
replaced by intra-organizational problems. Thirdly, integration assumes that high-level
executives are able to actually oversee all different aspects and perspectives and handle
accordingly. Given the complexity of real-life governance issues, we assume that this is
seldom the case. And finally, these strategies involve large-scale processes of
reorganizations which lead to high transactions costs.
Downwards integration takes place when all back-office fragmented systems come
together in micro-level integrated interactions between governmental officials and their
clients. One-stop provision or needs-based holism are tools that might be used to create
these forms of integration. For instance, modern police cars are equipped with diverse
information systems to uncover real-time information about a passing vehicle:
ownership data, criminal records of the owner, vehicle history, taxes owed by the
owner and so on. Rather than creating one integrated organization the back-office
fragmentation is integrated on the basis of concrete, specific needs at the micro-level.
Rather than combating interconnectivity, strategies that depart from downward
integration use the benefits of interconnectivity while trying to reduce fragmentation.
These strategies may contribute to efficient and effective policy-making and
implementation while avoiding some of the drawbacks of upwards integration:
specialization is still possible and time-consuming and expensive large-scale
reorganizations are not necessary. But there are also a few risks. First, the
implementation of these strategies is difficult. It requires routines and procedures to be
fine-tuned in such a manner that the right information is available at the right time.
These procedures not only are directed to one single organization but to a series of
interconnected organizations. Second, these strategies require street-level bureaucrats
13
to process the available information and act accordingly. This may be a challenging
task, especially in face-to-face interactions with clients.
Adaptation
Instead of trying to reduce fragmentation and interconnectivity, also a set of strategies
may be distinguished aimed at embracing these developments. For instance Verweij et
al. (2006) and Scott (1998) show how reduction of multiple perspectives and
information may lead to suboptimal policy designs. Verweij et al. therefore call for
clumsy solutions: policy designs that embrace and give way to multiple perspectives
on policy issues. Complexity theory, which has recently been introduced in the social
sciences (cf. Teisman et al., 2009) defines three principles for dealing with complex
issues: emergence, co-creation and self-organisation. In complexity theory, policy
designs should not be aimed at providing solutions, but facilitating conditions under
which these solutions may emerge, by the simultaneous competition of co-created
solutions form stakeholders involved in the policy issue. Variety and evolution are the
key mechanisms for dealing with complex and wicked issues, rather than analysis and
selection.
Recently, several authors claim that this approach is the only viable approach to deal
with complex issues. From this perspective, the benefits of this approach are that they
enable policy-making and implementation in a situation of simultaneous fragmentation
and interconnectivity without wasting resources in attempts to reduce interconnectivity
and fragmentation. Embracing these developments may in the end lead to better
solutions. Moreover, recent studies on the wisdom of the crowds (Surowiecki,2004)
claim that solutions that are co-created by the public are qualitatively better. The ideas
of Big Society, popularized by Philip Blond in the UK, also claim that policies that
are implemented through co-creation and self-organisation, have more support and are
more efficiently and effectively delivered. However, there is an important drawback to
this. Facilitating emergence, co-creation and self-organisation leaves open the direction
in which solutions may be found. Governments are dependent on the more or less
random (cf. Jervis, 1998) processes through which policy solutions are created and
implemented.
6. Outline of the book

After having briefly introduced the background of the crucial processes of
fragmentation and interconnectivity, we are able to set out the plan for the remainder of
this book. This book consists of two parts. The first part resolves around empirical
analyses of the processes of fragmentation, interconnectivity and their interrelatedness.
Therefore the chapters in this part deal with the sources and appearances of
fragmentation and interconnectivity in governance systems. In this part, we both take
into account different governance domains, and different elements of the process of
public governance.
In chapter 2, Ruth Prins, Lex Cachet, Paul Ponsaers and Gordon Huges show how
local safety governance has evolved from merely combating crime on the street-level
into a multi-actor arena aimed at the prevention of a wide variety of safety, physical
and social risks. This chapter clearly illustrates the backgrounds of interconnectivity
and fragmentation in the area of local safety and illustrates the consequences of these
14
developments for local safety governance in three countries: the Netherlands, Belgium
and the United Kingdom. In Chapter 3, Peter Scholten deconstructs the idea of national
models of integration. He argues that these discourse on national models obfuscates the
fragmented nature of policy-making and implementation in a multi-level policy arena.
He analyzes the development and discourses of integration policy in the Netherlands
and France. Chapter 4 assesses the complexity, fragmentation and interconnectivity in
the implementation of local welfare policies in the UK and Sweden. Marion Ellison,
Elisabeth Berg, Jim Barry and John Chandler show how an increasing amount of
regulations and perspectives have become integrated in welfare service delivery on the
local level, thus complicating the tasks of local managers. Finally, in chapter 5 Arie van
Sluis, Peter Marks, Fien Gilleir and Marleen Easton introduce the concept of nodality
as the inevitable geographic spot in which the fragmented streams of information and
resources come together. They show how safety policy in the harbors of Antwerp and
Rotterdam continuously involves managing interconnectivity and fragmentation.
The second part of the book focuses on the possibilities to manage the challenges of
interconnectivity and fragmentation in public governance. This part identifies and
analyses connective capacities that are developed to deal with interconnectivity and
fragmentation and reckon with its consequences and analyzes which arrangements and
practices are effective in dealing with the interconnected and fragmented character of
contemporary societies. This part seeks to fulfill the promises that are captured in the
title of this book: the creation of connective capacities amidst a situation of
interconnectivity and fragmentation.
Chapter 6 discusses the development, benefits and limitations of whole-ofgovernment approaches as connective capacities. Philip Karr, John Alford, Martijn
van der Steen and Mark van Twist start from the assertion that governance problems
often are wicked problems, characterized by multiple actors and multiple causal
relations. They show how joined-up governance in two policy domains in Australia and
the Netherlands works in practice and they identify the lessons that might be learned
from this. In chapter 7, Rebecca Moody and Victor Bekkers show how multiple streams
of written, oral and visual information might be used to develop integrative, visual
reconstructions of policy phenomena. They claim that these visual reconstructions may
highlight significantly different elements of processes of decision-making and
implementation. They do so by analyzing how visual reconstructions in two crisis
situations in the Netherlands have affected the evaluations of government performance.
In chapter 8, Ruth Post shows to what extend shared-services centers may help to
overcome the challenges of fragmentation and interconnectivity. She analyzes the
development of two shared-service centers in the area of operations management and
identifies the obstacles that may occur. In the final chapter of part two, Erik-Hans Klijn,
Filip de Rynck, Chris Skelcher and Joris Voets explore the connective capacities of
network approaches in fragmented and interconnected policy domains. They discuss
the experiences and effects of processes of interactive policy-making on regional
economic development in the Netherlands and Belgium. In the final chapter of the
book, we will reflect upon the potential of these strategies to indeed serve as connective
capacities.
15
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Collective Wisdom Shapes Business, Economies, Societies and Nations. Ney York, Anchor.
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Public Money & Management, 27 (1), pp. 53-60.
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Teisman et al. (eds.). Managing Complex Governance Systems. Dynamics, Self-organization and
Coevolution in Public Investments. New York, Routledge, pp. 1-16.
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Verweij, M. et al. (2006). The Case for Clumsiness. In: Verwey, M. and M. Thompson (eds.). Clumsy
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Part I
Fragmentation and Connectivity:
Explanations and Analyses

IOS Press, 2012
doi:10.3233/978-1-60750-998-1-19
19
Fragmentation and Interconnection in

Public Safety Governance in the
Netherlands, Belgium and England
Ruth Prins, Lex Cachet, Paul Ponsaers and Gordon Hughes
1. Introduction
Providing public safety is a traditional core task of the state. Maintaining public order,
providing safety and fighting crime have become specialized tasks of professional
peace keepers within the state apparatus (formalization of social control; Cachet, 1990;
Van den Broeck, 2007). During the main part of the twentieth century, security was
seen as a core function of the state, both normatively and empirically (Shearing and
Wood, 2003).
However, during the last decades of the 20thcentury, highly formalized state control
failed to adequately answer the challenges of public order problems, rapidly rising
crime rates and an even faster broadening of the notion of public safety. New actors
and organizations from both public and private spheres tried to fill the gap by helping
(local) governments to satisfy the need for public safety. We describe this trend as a
process of fragmentation. The state monopoly on formal control and enforcement
partially broke down and the object of governance was expanded far beyond traditional
crime and public order problems. However, both traditional as well as new providers of
public safety soon became aware of the need to cooperate with one-another and with
the public at large. This trend is referred to as the need for interconnection.
Cooperation on an operational level was primarily necessary due to the complexity of
the problems and the difficulty of dealing with this according to the former strict
division of labor between actors. On administrative and political levels, there was an
urgent need for more coordination of actors, goals and accountability.
This chapter deals with the seemingly contradictory trends of almost simultaneous
fragmentation and interconnection in the policy domain of (local) public safety
governance, which seem to be present in several European states. Public safety
governance is understood here as all the actions of relevant actors on the local level in
order to establish public safety on the municipality level. We limit our topic to public
safety governance addressing problems with social and public characteristics. Though
important and interesting, physical safety problems do not belong to the scope of this
book chapter.
The chapter generates insights in the manifestations and causes of fragmentation and
interconnection in local public safety governance by comparing attempts to govern
public safety on municipality level in the Netherlands, Belgium and England during the
20
R. Prins et al. / Fragmentation and Interconnection in Public Safety Governance
past two decades. This contributes to the overall theme of the book: understanding the
dual relationship of fragmentation and interconnection. The central question is What
are the manifestations of fragmentation and interconnection in local public safety
governance?
We will start with a general description of the simultaneous trends of
fragmentation and interconnection in public safety governance. This is followed by an
in-depth description of trends in public safety governance in the Netherlands, Belgium
and England with emphasis on the empirical manifestations of fragmentation and
interconnection. An over all analysis of the empirical manifestations of interconnection
and fragmentation in public safety governance will follow in the concluding section.
2. The challenges of fragmentation & interconnection

The almost simultaneous manifestations of fragmentation and interconnection
introduce new challenges into the policy domain of public safety governance. Before
describing their empirical manifestations in the Netherlands, Belgium and England, we
will map out these trends and challenges on a more general and theoretical level. This
general knowledge will be used to draw conclusions from the empirical manifestations
of fragmentation and interconnection in daily public safety governance.
Complex problems causing fragmentation
Over the years, problems endangering local public safety have changed. Modernity has
provided us with a certain amount of wealth and stability. Citizens are nowadays
assured of their most elementary needs such as food and shelter and focus more on
higher forms of security and safety (Inglehart and Baker, 2000). However modernity
also highlighted new fears, risks and problems (Pieterman, 2008). Processes of
modernization and globalization and technical developments created local public safety
problems with a complex character.
Furthermore, the range of issues considered as problems of public safety
broadened rapidly. Traditionally only crime and disturbances of public order were
addressed as matters of local public safety governance, nowadays (local) public safety
policies, actors and instruments focus on a wide variety of problems, such as the influx
of people from specific ethnic backgrounds, cybercrime, various forms of serious and
chronic nuisance, domestic violence, health risks such as (SARS, swine flue) and the
threat of radicalization among some citizens.
Traditionally, local authorities are held responsible for controlling the public safety
situation within the boundaries of their city or municipality. These new problems of
public safety offered a real challenge to the local administrative authorities and the
local police and highlighted their limited powers and capacities (Beck, 1992).
Complex, or wicked, problems cut across the jurisdictions of organizations and cross
the traditional boundaries between the private and the public sector (Koppenjan &
Klijn, 2006: 1). Given the changing character of public safety problems, traditional
actors are no longer capable of handling them effectively all by themselves. The monodisciplinary approach had to be changed into a multidisciplinary approach that paved
the way for new policing actors.
21
On the general level of the current provision of safety and security, one could qualify
this as de-coupling of policing and the state (Loader and Walker, 2001). (National)
Governments no longer hold a monopolistic position in handling public safety (Wood
and Dupont, 2006) and no longer are the police the sole responsible actor for fighting
crime and restoring public order. We now deliberately speak about public safety
governance (not government) settings in which various actors are dealing with public
safety issues. Policing is considered all explicit efforts to create visible agents of crime
control, whether by government or by non-governmental institutions (Bayley and
Shearing , 1996: 715).
Fragmentation in governing public safety
During the past two decades state power [for public order maintenance] is being
relinquished in various ways - outwards to burgeoning commercial markets in
policing and security, downwards to private organizations and municipal authorities
and to responsiblized consumers and citizens and upwards to new sites of
international police cooperation and transnational policing forms (Loader and Walker
2001:10 refer to Walker, 1999,). As a result, governing local public safety became
fragmented in terms of actors involved. In addition to local authorities, a lot of other
actors started to address public safety problems, such as other governmental actors,
quasi governmental actors and also citizens, societal organizations and private actors.
Before describing the entrance of various actors from outside the public sphere, we
look at fragmentation within the governmental apparatus itself. State intervention with
regard to public safety is now being fragmented. On the one hand, legal and political
power is increasingly shared with sub-national levels of government within the states
territorial boundaries (Loader and Walker, 2001:10). We can observe public safety
matters on the municipality level being addressed by governmental organizations from
the national (ministry of internal affairs), the regional (for example the police region
and the safety regions in the Netherlands) and the local level (mayor, aldermen, city
council). And local authorities are explicitly held responsible for the local situation
regarding public safety. Furthermore, public actors collaborate within quasigovernmental constructions such as the supra-local or regional level (Prins & Cachet,
2009). On the other hand, local public safety governance is also subjected to national
and regional policies, demands, objectives and measures.
Looking beyond the state apparatus, we are witnessing a pluralization of public
safety governance. Many agencies and agents are involved besides the traditional
police. Moreover, often more non-state than state actors are carrying out policing tasks
(Shearing and Wood, 2003). The traditional governments and their police are joined by
active involvement of civic actors. Citizens or civil organizations are actively
participating in public safety networks or could become involved with self-governance
by buying safety services from private security companies and in gated communities
(Van Caem, 2008). Actors from the private sector actively became involved in public
safety governance as well. Scholars mention the enormous expansion of private
security companies (Van Steden, 2007) and the marketization of policing (Crawford
in Wood and Dupont, 2006). Nowadays, actors from public and private sectors as well
as civic actors are actively involved in public safety governance. To some extent they
seem capable of effectively adressing public safety problems (Ruitenberg and
Helsloot, 2004).
22
Challenges of pluralization
In these pluralized settings of public safety governance, governments and other actors
all face the same challenge: effectively handling new, changing and complex problems
of public safety. When dealing with this challenge, difficulties come to the front, such
as inefficiencies in separately addressing the same problems, clashes between
organizations, uncertainties about organizational strategies and institutional
backgrounds (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2006) and fuzzy political-administrative
arrangements; who is responsible and who steers?
In networked settings, like public safety governance, actors are mutually dependent
in terms of resources, such as information, powers and instruments, for solving
problems (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2006). Actors are mutually dependent for achieving the
goal (governing public safety) which results in interaction patterns around policy
problems (ibid). The challenge of effectively and jointly addressing public safety
problems fuels the need for new forms of connection. After all, to achieve satisfactory
outcomes, these mutually dependent actors must cooperate (ibid). Fragmentation had
soon to be followed by interconnection.
Interconnection in public safety governance
We presume interconnection to be established in, at least, three different ways. First by
bringing about a kind of working consensus on the subject matter: policy and
management. Once consensus is established, personal or institutional leadership holds
substantive connective capacity. And last but not least there are the many new
(structural) arrangements, operational as well as political-administrative, bringing
together all those separate actors, approaches and interests, in a more or less concerted
approach.
First, on a policy or management level, actors started to harmonize the content of
their individual activities regarding public safety problems in both informal (practical
guidelines and soft policies) and formal (formal policy and law) ways. Common
priorities were set and actors designed their own policies more or less in accordance
with common schemes and timelines in order to coordinate, harmonize and to some
extent maximize their individual and common efforts. Plans, objectives, priorities and
activities of individual actors were organized in such a way that they would most
effectively address public safety. An example of this type of connection is the
integrated policy approach to public safety problems, that was once popular in
Belgium and especially in the Netherlands.
Various actors and public safety problems are united in the so called integral
safety policies. These policies form guidelines for actors from national, local, public,
civic or private backgrounds for pooling their resources in addressing prioritized
problems of public safety. Integrated safety policies deliberately combine various
objects of governance broadly referred to as societal and physical public safety
problems (IVR 1993).
Second, through individual leadership, whether of the innovating,
hierarchical/traditional or more personal kind, coordination, connection and steering
can be brought about in the fragmented field of public safety governance (Weber, 1978;
SMVP/CCV, 2010). After all, the complexity of public safety policies and the
complexity of organizations surrounding it ask for leaders who can pull the shifting
framework of local decision-making together, act as entrepreneurs in the highly
23
competitive environment and be the people whom the public can identify as responsible
for decisions affecting local areas (Reynaert en Steyvers in Ponsaers, 2005:109).
Leadership in public safety governance implies signaling fragmentation and initiating
solutions. This can be done by connecting actors and creating common structures or by
getting most out of cooperation within existing arrangements. In much public safety
governance settings, the mayor is the traditional and institutional leader. However,
leadership of multilevel worlds such as public safety governance is not necessarily
reserved for the mayor alone. We are also witnessing attempts from national
governments and cabinet ministers to stimulate or direct local public safety policies.
Third, various new arrangements in addressing public safety problems emerged on
both the operational level of public safety governance and the politico-administrative
level. After all, actors connected through policy content or by leaders have to
implement public safety policy by joint action. In these arrangements actors started to
cooperate closely in actively designing and implementing public safety policy together.
These arrangements on the operational level are characterized as multi-agency
partnerships (Garland, 2001; Hughes, 2007) and safety networks (Castells, 1996,
Koppenjan & Klijn, 2006, Teisman, 1992, Klijn, Koppenjan & Termeer, 1994, Terpstra
en Kouwenhoven, 2004). Public-private collaboration takes place and new practical
connections arise on local or regional level between, for example, private security
companies, the police, local governments and housing corporations and judicial actors.
C ivic actors also cooperate in these arrangements. Community policing (Punch, van
der Vijver, Zoomer, 2002) for example, claims to connect citizens, local society and
policing actors. In such arrangements the public is activated and encouraged to
contribute and actors are activated to work with the public (Van Os & Tops, 2009) in
addressing public safety problems.
In order to safeguard a necessary level of coordination in these arrangements,
(local) governmental actors are often being held responsible and accountable for
directing (steering, coordinating and monitoring) the development and implementation
of integral policies and the networked arrangements of daily public safety governance.
Conclusion
In this section we sketched the processes of fragmentation and interconnection on a
very general level and in an almost ideal typical fashion. In the next three sections we
will deal with empirical details. We describe the process of fragmentation and the
mechanisms for interconnection in each of the countries and compare them looking for
similarities as well as differences.
3. Community safety governance in the Netherlands

Introduction
Half a century ago, community safety governance in the Netherlands was a simple and
almost invisibly enacted task 1 . Policy or politics had no significance whatsoever for the
1 Still in line with Thorbecke, the great 19th century Dutch liberal statesmans dictum about the police: we
want a police that comes to our attention as little as possible.
24
governance of community safety. The number of actors involved was small and
political or societal debate about local safety almost nonexistent.
How different is todays picture. Safety and security occupy prominent places on
the local and national political as well as societal agendas. Community safety has
become a highly politicized issue. On the local level a large number of different actors
is involved in keeping the peace and controlling disorder or crime. Complexity reigns
all over. In this section we summarily sketch what happened during the last decades
and how it is today.
Change and stability
Traditionally, crime and disorder were no issues of importance. The authorities in
the Dutch system on the local level mayor, public prosecutor and the police could
easily cope with the total amount of crime and disorder. Full enforcement was the rule.
Safety governance was neither an issue in politics nor in policy. Police and the system
of criminal justice did what they had to do and nobody worried about it.
Rather unexpected and sudden Dutch society started to change during the second
half of the sixties. Crime and disorder began to rise rather fast. The formerly stable
societal order of the heavily pillarized Dutch society (Lijphart, 1966; Goudsblom,
1967) was contested. Traditional keepers of peace, law and order were not able to
adequately meet these new challenges. During the next years order problems kept
growing but fast rising crime rates soon became a more urgent problem during the
seventies and early eighties.
The rising crime tide effectively put an end to the fiction of full enforcement. From
now on authorities had to choose what to enforce and sanction and what not. It led to a
revolution. First in the juridical sphere, the introduction of the positive opportunity
principle (t Hart, 1994): enforce and prosecute only if a public interest is involved
and if there is a reasonable chance of success. Later on, much later, the choices that
needed to be made became part of more or less well considered policies (Commissie
Peper, 1981). Thus bringing political responsible authorities, like the mayor, back in.
System under pressure
During the late 19980s, Dutch authorities became aware that government on its own
never would be able to effectively handle the growing problems. As a consequence,
governance of local safety is no longer a monopoly of mayor, public prosecutor and the
police. Many other actors housing corporations, schools, neighborhood organizations,
storekeepers, welfare, community building and many other organizations or citizens are involved now. Nowadays horizontal relations between many actors dominate the
local safety scene (Hoogenboom, 2009). The hierarchy between the two local bosses
of the police mayor and public prosecutor - and the police force was no longer
suitable. However, one should remember that even in the Netherlands the shift from
command and control towards more horizontal kinds of steering and cooperation
sometimes met with considerable resistance.
We describe the developments along three lines. First there is the drastic
fragmentation of the field. Many new actors enter the scene. Then there is an increased
need for explicit and political accountable steering of all these actors. Policy and
politics enter the field. And at last, but not at least, new arrangements are introduced to
(re)connect all the actors that are involved in todays local governance of safety.
25
Solutions causing problems

The broad deployment of responsibilities for local safety among many actors is meant
to solve a problem. Especially the problem of overload of the police. A problem that
manifests itself in the Netherlands ever more urgent since the early 1980s. Other
organizations than police and criminal justice should share the burden. Sharing the
burden for the governance of local safety changed the scene from a closed and rather
orderly chain into an open and often highly variable and difficult to assess network.
Traditionally mayor and public prosecutor maintained local peace and order with the
help of the police and criminal justice. As part of the local administration the fire
brigade also played a role and so did building inspectorates and some other specialized
offices within the administration. The system mostly had a chainlike character: the
mayor giving instructions to the police, the police bringing offenders to the DA and
through the DAs office in the courts. The system was not open to newcomers. Nongovernmental actors didnt play a role at all.
Since the mid-eighties governance of community safety gradually expanded to
encompass many governmental, quasi-governmental and non-governmental actors.
Shopkeepers were forced to protect their premises, football stadiums had to procure
their own safety (police being present only as backup, if need might be), private
citizens were invited to make their homes burglarproof. Organizations entered into
stable cooperative relations with the police, to ensure safety in business parks, to bring
youthful offenders back on the right path, to prevent the deterioration of neighborhoods
or to solve conflicts between neighbors.
The resulting landscape is one of horizontally linked more or less autonomous
organizations. Networks encompassing many different types of organizations, where
hierarchy or hierarchical steering is almost lacking (Terpstra and Kouwenhoven, 2004).
Local government and the police however still occupy special positions within these
kinds of networks. Not in the least based on the polices legal possibilities to use
coercive power (Hoogenboom, 2009). However, local government cannot depend any
longer on traditional command and control steering. Most of the organizations involved
are autonomous vis--vis local government. Traditional kinds of steering must give
way to more governance oriented ones.
Ordering complexity: increased steering.
The fast rising demand for order maintenance and crime control made public safety
governance a strongly political activity (cf. Reiner, 1985). Choices had to be made
about what to do and what not to do. Political administrators now had to be accountable
for the choices that were made. The burden of choice could not be left to operational
executive police officers. Much that was left implicit in the past now had to become
explicit. In the Netherlands (and elsewhere, see for example Belgium) the need for
explicit and accountable choices led to the rise of an elaborate system of police and
safety planning or policy formation.
The notion of police and safety planning and policy was introduced during the
second half of the eighties (Commissie Peper, 1981). Both police and safety planning
gradually became more important. Police planning was stimulated by the 1994 police
reform, that introduced larger and more rationally steered police forces. From the early
1990s on, national government also helped local governments to develop local safety
26
policies of their own (IVR 1993 a.o.; Nota Veiligheidsbeleid, 1995, VER 2 and other
instruments etc.). Gradually large cities earlier than smaller cities and villages many
local governments introduced local safety policy plans, also known as integrated safety
policy plans (e.g. SGBO, 2000). At the same time however national government began
to introduce policy programs to strengthen its own steering of the police and (local)
safety. So the overall amount of planning and steering of police and safety in general
increased drastically. Tensions between national and local steering and control also
increased. We can observe these trends also in other Western-European countries
(Cachet, Van Sluis, et al, 2009; Cachet and Prins, 2010).
For a long time, police and police planning dominated the safety field. Only rather
recently the public prosecutors office and local government really became partners of
the police in the planning of community safety. Nowadays all parties are convinced that
the accountable authorities mayor and public prosecutor should be in the lead
regarding the development of policy plans .
Nevertheless it seems to be rather difficult to put an end to police leadership in the
governance of local safety. The police force still exclusively is the owner of a lot of
information needed in policy development processes. The police also first of all feel the
urgency of safety problems and the need to intervene.
Furthermore, policy development by police, public prosecutor and local government is
not in line. Drastic shifts in the timing of these policy cycles are needed to guarantee
adequate coordination between the separate policy cycles (De Pee, 2010). Improved
and more coordinated kinds of policy planning seem to be a necessary but not a
sufficient instrument to bring together the many organizations governmental as well
as non-governmental that are involved in the governance of local safety today.
That explains why we are not really surprised to see other mechanisms for bringing
together all these different actors in a joint effort to improve community safety. The
most important complementary mechanism is the development of new institutional
arrangements between actors.
Ordering complexity: new arrangements
Since long the system of public administration in the Netherlands is characterized by
three layers of government: national government, the provinces and local governments
(in 2010 431). As far as police and safety is concerned provincial governments never
played a role of any importance. National and local government both became more
important during the last decades. Nevertheless there can be serious doubts about the
integrative powers of these two levels of government versus the tremendous
fragmentation of the police and safety field, as we sketched earlier.
Traditional arrangements do not seem to be able to bridge effectively the gaps
between the many different actors that are nowadays involved in the development and
execution of community safety governance. Since the mid 1990s, many new
institutional arrangements have been introduced to steer and control the governance of
safety. Most of the formal legal arrangements are located on a supra-local or regional
level (Police region and Safety region). But there are or also many new arrangements
on the local level, that lack a strictly legal basis but are important nevertheless.
2
VER is short for Veiligheid Effect Rapportage (Safety Effect Report), a scan that is used to ex ante asses the
safety and security risks of intended developments in urban planning, housing and infrastructure.
27
Police regions were introduced in the Police Law 1993. Safety regions meant to cope
with crises and large accidents - were introduced rather recently. Although both are
based on specific laws and not on the Inter Urban Law the Dutch law on interurban
cooperation - they nevertheless share many characteristics with the Inter Urban Law
arrangements. Most important of these is their weak, indirect, democratic legitimacy.
Police and Safety regions are administered by mayors only 3 .
The 1993 Police Law leaves the police regions ample room for the internal
ordering of their region. Most regions are subdivided in a number of districts: each a
part of a large city, an entire middle-sized city or a number of adjoining smaller towns.
In a kind of district council the mayor(s), the district public prosecutor and the relevant
police chief coordinate their actions and policies. This is probably the most important
coordination device, although it is lacking a firm legal base. Decisions taken on the
district level may have a lot of consequences for the local governance of safety.
Insofar as the governance of local safety is dealt with the police have long been in
the lead, as we mentioned before. More recently we see the Police Act 1993 being used
to broaden the responsibilities for the governance of community safety. Police regions
do such by introducing mostly temporary but always informal arrangements within
which police, public prosecutor and local government take an equal share in policy
development and implementation on the local level.
In many police regions (temporary) committees within the police region provide
other examples of efforts to share responsibilities between police, public prosecutor and
especially local government. These committees are charged mostly with temporary but
important task within the region like for example drawing up proposals for reduction of
the number of districts, for redeploying manpower or for necessary cuts in
expenditures. These kinds of measures can have serious impact on the governance of
safety in each separate town. Therefore it is important to involve local government
early and actively in decision making processes that might lead to cuts in police
assistance or redistribution of police efforts. Informal arrangements help to smooth the
functioning of the formal police region and bring together the many actors that are
participating in the local safety networks (Huberts, 2004 ; Terpstra and Kouwenhoven,
2004).
On the local level itself there also is a need for new arrangements. After all the
fragmentation and increasing complexity of the governance of local safety is being felt
especially on that level. One way to do this is to bring them together in new and mostly
informal arrangements. Working closely together within an arrangement like the
judicial case consultation, as it is called in Rotterdam, on youthful offenders meant to
withhold them from a more serious criminal career by offering early and integrated
intervention (cf Doodkorte, 2004 ) - hopefully will breed trust and the willingness to
continue and intensify cooperation.
Working with so-called intervention teams in the city of Rotterdam is another
example of bringing together many different actors to execute jointly a complex
common task (see also Tops a.o., 2007). Intervention teams, introduced in 2001, consist
of representatives of various local authorities, such as the department of safety and
security, social care and employment and urban housing as well as the police. These
teams unexpectedly pay visits to local homes and buildings in order to signal and
3
only, while the Dutch mayor is not directly elected by the citizens, but appointed by the Home Office or
the national cabinet. During the past years however city councils influence on who is appointed increased
drastically, ensuring a minimum of democratic legitimacy for the appointed mayor.
28
address problems such as illegal housing, citizens illegally receiving governmental

support and violations of fire safety regulations. There is some critique on the violation
of private spheres, nevertheless local politicians and administrators considered this
instrument combining enforcement of law and social care effective and efficient. Over
the years, intervention teams have been expanded with more actors and consequentially
topics, such as tax agencies and private electricity companies.
Enhancing cooperation between multiple actors
Governmental organizations on different levels are involved in the development and
execution of local safety policies (Prins and Cachet, 2009). But many semigovernmental or even non-governmental or private actors are involved too. Bringing
them all together and steering and coordinating their actions in accordance with agreed
upon safety policies is a new and challenging governance task for local government.
Hierarchical top down steering will not do the job any longer due to the rather large
autonomy most organizations cherish. Local government now has to bring the many
different actors together, by convincing them, seducing them etcetera. Local
government is no longer totally in command.
In the Dutch consensual democracy it always has been rather difficult to have
decisions being made and even more important implemented. Neither policy nor
new arrangements guarantee that now in themselves. Nevertheless (local) governance
of security now needs direction (SMVP / CCV 2010; cf Prpper et al, 2004) more than
ever: leadership that brings together the many actors in a heavily fragmented field and
makes them work towards joint goals. In the Netherlands, like in many other countries,
a lot of people ask for strong and decisive leadership by local government and
especially the mayor to avoid standstill or deadlock (Karsten, Cachet and Schaap,
2010).
In many ways Dutch mayors now provide that kind of leadership. Unlike for
example in Engeland, Dutch mayors play a substantial instead of a merely symbolic
role. Some of them primarily use their own personal, charismatic, authority, like for
example former mayors in Rotterdam (Opstelten; cf Tops, 2007) and Maastricht
(Leers). Others use their traditional position as an elected official above political
parties. They also use traditional powers with respect to public order and safety Dutch
mayors have, based on many laws (Muller et al, 2007) but especially on the municipal
law (Gemeentewet). Direction also is exercised as a consequence of many new powers
that were attributed by national government to mayors, during the past decade (Sackers,
2010). And at this very moment Dutch government is considering a bill to give these
kinds of direction a formal basis in law.
Preliminary conclusions
The number of different actors involved in developing and executing local safety
policies increased tremendously. Increasing pressures due to a rather large increase in
order and safety problems certainly played a role. A general tendency in society and
public administration towards differentiation, division of labor and specialization also
contributed. Rather simple and easily manageable chains were replaced by complex,
difficult to survey and much more difficult manageable networks. This fragmentation
of law and order maintenance or governance of safety increased the need for wellconsidered ordering and steering of so many actors.
29
4. Community safety governance in Belgium

Introduction
From 1830 on, the year in which Belgium became independent, the problem of safety
was considered as a national task as well as a local one. This balance of power between
national and local policy was to a large extent the heritage of the Napoleonic period.
On the one hand, the existence of a municipal autonomy is a central theme in
Belgian history. Local democracy is considered important for the maintenance of
public order in terms of public tranquillity, safety and health. Municipal elections
culminate in the formation of a coalition, which translates itself in a majority that
delivers the mayor. In other words : mayors are not appointed by the crown (like in the
Netherlands), but are the emanation of local elections in Belgium. The mayor is
personally responsible for public order in the municipality. This is the reason why the
mayor personally is considered as the authority of the local police 4 .
On the other hand, national government is considered as responsible for safety and
public order throughout the country. In this context is mostly made reference to
interventions at the occasion of mass events, demonstrations and riots. In this respect,
national police forces (the gendarmerie national) acted in the past as the praetorian
guard of the state and the democratic regime. In relation to this task, mobility was a
crucial factor. National forces displaced themselves from their barracks at the border of
big cities to other (more rural) municipalities on the territory, to maintain public order.
After the police reform of 1998, this relation changed dramatically.
Tabel 1: Comparison of territories on which administrative and judicial authorities are competent
TERRITORY
ADMINISTRATIVE
AUTHORITIES
JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES
Country
Federal government
Council of Attorney-Generals
Region
Regional government
Attorney-General
Territory of the Court of Appeal

Province
Governor
Public Prosecutor
Territorial Jurisdiction
Pluri-municipality police zone
President of the Police Council
(Mono-)municipality police zone
Mayor
Apart from this dominant balance of power, some characteristics of the Belgian
institutional framework determine to a large extent the way safety governance gets its
shape.
Before the reform : of the municipal police; after the reform : of the local (zonal) police.
30
Lack of interconnection of traditional functions

The Napoleonic conception of safety, split up in administrative and judicial
functions, is still one of the fundamental features of the state organisation (see table 1).
The Belgian territory is divided differently according to both functionalities. It is
remarkable and particular that the levels of geographical aggregation do not coincide at
all. Consequently, the administrative and judicial authorities have no counterpart on the
same geographical scale. The smallest scale in this organisational framework is the
municipality.
Systematic consultation between administrative and judicial authorities is only installed
at the level of the police zone and at the national level. After the police reform of 1998,
the police system was redesigned at both levels.
At the federal level, the former supra-local branches of the gendarmerie national
and the criminal police were integrated in the federal police, in essence as supportunits for the whole police system. Important parts of this federal police were
deconcentrated to the level of a territorial jurisdiction (n=27). We can find here the
federal investigating police and the federal coordination of public order maintenance. It
is at federal level that the national security plan is developed, in the federal police
council, implying representatives of all administrative and judicial authorities. After the
drafting of the plan, the Ministers of Interior and of Justice give their approval and the
plan is submitted to Parliament.
At the local level, the municipal police was transformed in a local (zonal) police
(n=196), absorbing parts of the local branches of the former gendarmerie. The territory
of a police zone is in average an aggregation of three municipalities. In bigger cities a
zone is identical to the territory of the city (mono-municipal zones), in more rural areas
a zone contains more municipal territories (pluri-municipal zones). It is at this zonal
level that local security plans are developed, involving the mayor(s), the public
prosecutor, the chief of the local police and a delegate of the federal police. Zonal
security plans have to take into account the priorities set by the national security plan.
They can include new local priorities or exclude national priorities, as long as this
decision is substantiated.
Tabel 2: relation between local and federal plans
Integral safety
(sensu lato)
Police Security
(sensu stricto)
Federal Integral Safety

Plan
???
National Security Plan

Local (zonal) Security

Plan
Both security plans (local and national) have their legal base in the new law on the
integrated police (1998). A legal base on an integral safety policy, broader than mere
police matters, does not exist in Belgium (Ponsaers, 2001a). In spite of that, recent
governments took the initiative to draw federal integral safety plans after national
elections during the formation of a new coalition. These plans tried to cover a much
broader safety domain, outside the strict policing approach. On a local level such an
integral safety policy is neither legally based, nor often applied (Ponsaers, 2001b).
31
Local integral safety plans are exceptions, but exist. If they are formulated, they focus
on the municipality and not on the broader territory of the zone, voted by the municipal
council.
Fragmentation of the state
Since 1970 Belgium evolves more and more towards a federal state. A lot of former
national competences were delegated to the level of the three regional governments,
which do not have by necessity the same political composition as federal government.
Contradictory to the state-reform, at the occasion of the police-reform in 1998, the
political class didnt decide to install a regional police system, like the German system.
One of the scarce national competences remained the police, under supervision of the
federal Ministers of Interior and of Justice. Nevertheless, a lot of competences that are
interconnected with the broader problem of safety (such as traffic, environment,
medical and therapeutic care for drug users and minors) are situated at the regional
level. Political consultation between the federal and regional level is problematic. This
is one of the main reasons that local integral safety plans are difficult to develop,
dependening on parallel federal and regional steering.
Local patchwork of safety agencies
At the pure municipal level a patchwork of safety agencies developed during recent
years, relatively independently from the security infrastructure on the level of the police
zone (Ponsaers, 2005).
In first instance, the federal ministry of Interior concludes periodically so-called
safety and prevention contracts with different cities. These contracts provide substantial
additional funding for preventive measures and support for the development of local
integral safety measures.
Within the framework of these contracts, a multitude of new safety functions was
created. A number of these functions can be situated on the level of coordination,
policy support and evaluation. These functions are to a large extent created as an
interface between the local police force of the zone and departments within the
municipal administrations (such as infrastructure, social wellbeing, mobility,
neighbourhood development). Recently a few cities created the political mandate of
deputy mayor of integral safety. These experiments were considered as failures because
these deputies trespassed regularly their political competence and broke into the
competences of other deputy mayors.
Today these coordination functions are increasingly taken over by municipal
functionaries without political mandate and financed in the framework of the safety and
prevention contracts, but with a large degree of decision-making power, getting
political coverage by the mayor himself. Their job is considered as a transversal
function, running through the entire municipal administration. Nonetheless, in more
rural areas, it is the zonal police chief who stays in the centre of local safety leadership
(Bisschop et al., 2010).
Increased local functional surveillance
Besides that, most of these functions are executive jobs in public space (e.g. stewards,
animators, city guards, city coaches, municipal supervisors, etc.) (Verwee et al, 2007).
32
To a large extent, these functions are meant to increase local social cohesion and
control, which can be summarized as forms of functional surveillance on public
transport, social housing blocks, trade centres, public gardens, shopping malls, etc. Last
period, federal government tries to regroup this multitude of functions in one category,
the so-called community guards. To a certain degree, these guards execute tasks that
are considered as traditional tasks of the police, more precisely those of the officer on
the beat. The local (zonal) police attempts to get rid of these low-profile surveillance
activities, advocating that they do not represent central police tasks. In acting so, the
police decreases the opportunities to contact the local population, essential within a
community (oriented) policing (COP) approach, while COP is precisely considered as
the main and official vision on policing in Belgium (Vandevoorde et al, 2003). Some
observers argue in the meanwhile that these guards can be seen as the precursors of a
new form of municipal police.
Regional policies co-exist
The federal contract policy of the ministry of Interior is partly sustained on the regional
level. The regions of Brussels and Wallonia contract as well with cities in the
framework of safety and crime prevention. This is not the case in Flanders, where the
regional administration develops a city policy of its own, more directed towards
welfare, wellbeing, quality of life and liveability, resulting in a even more dominant
proliferation of new functions. Here we can find functions as mediators, street corner
workers, educators, therapists and social workers, situated in the broad domain of
safety.
This specific positioning in Flanders leads more frequently to frictions between the
police and these new functions, who are not eager to share their professional
information on clients or buddies with the police. Cooperation between these two
groups, more precisely on the level of information exchange, is manifestly hindered by
opposite professional ideologies. It is clear that two contradictory logics (federal and
regional) co-exist on local level.
The local level: bridge between traditional functions
In recent years, federal government developed an important new instrument for local
safety policy : the so-called Municipal Administrative Sanctions (MAS) (Devroe et
al, 2009). This system provides municipalities the opportunity to decree regulations on
the territory of the municipality (and thus not of the police zone) concerning forms of
social hinder and incivilities, in short of small forms of social disorder. MAS permits
municipalities to report these nuisances and to sanction them (mostly with a fine) in an
administrative way, which means that it is the municipal administration that can treat
these cases outside the penal court. In some cases the public prosecutor can intervene,
in others not. The reporting of the violations on the municipal regulations can be
realized by the police, but can also be handed over to municipal functionaries also
known as the community guards. Evaluation studies learn that in most of the cases the
workload in the framework of MAS is realised by the local police (90%). MAS is
massively implemented and applied during last years by municipalities, most
dominantly by bigger cities. Again the MAS-instrument functions as communicating
vessels between the local police and new municipal safety functions, which enlarges to
a large extent the fragmented picture of the local safety approach.
33
Preliminary conclusions
In Belgium, fragmentation and interconnection of the safety infrastructure on the local
level can be observed. Most of the time, these characteristics are articulated in relation
to the local police. At the same time, it is clear that there is an important
interconnection with federal and regional policy. In spite of the fact that the regional
level has no formal competences in the domain of security, the broader integral safety
approach is (partially) adopted and has important consequences on the development of
local safety networks and infrastructure. Formal co-ordination between federal and
regional operational arrangements is left to a large extent to the discretion of local
mayors.
It is clear that the problems related to this local texture dont situate themselves in
the heart of the organisations and in the hard core of the competences of administrative
and judicial authorities. Problems arise when safety is geared to other geographical
levels or other institutional settings (Ponsaers, 2010). The problem is not to realise the
regular security tasks, it becomes complicated when there is a shift between levels and
institutions.
It is precisely at the organisational boundaries and geographical limits that not
enough effort is invested to further operational cooperation, consultation and
information exchange. To handle safety is rather common, to hand it over is much more
problematic.
Local safety councils do exist on the level of police zones, but they only include
mayors, public prosecutors and police representatives. A larger co-ordination with
other actors in the field of the broad integral public safety is not formalised. This is also
the case on the intermediate level between the federal and zonal police, where so-called
co-ordinators (as well in relation to criminal matters, as administrative matters)
function exclusively inside the police-organisation
5. Community Safety Governance in England5
Introduction
Developments with regard to the governance of local public safety in England in the
past three decades point to both intense bouts of political inventiveness and
consequences which may be termed governmental instabilities (Hughes 2007,
Edwards and Hughes, 2009). In turn they are boldly illustrative of the simultaneous
centripetal and centrifugal processes in the late modern managerial state (Clarke and
Newman, 1997) or what we term fragmentation and interconnection in this book.
5 Note it is impossible to discuss whole of the UK nor indeed England and Wales as if they are synonymous
and illustrative of what is often (incorrectly) termed the Anglo-Saxon model of crime prevention and
community safety. Given the uneven processes of political devolution across the UK, comparative analysis of
community safety, youth justice and the preventive turn across localities is itself indicative of the dual
occurrence of fragmentation and interconnection in this burgeoning policy field (see Edwards and Hughes,
2009, Goldson and Hughes, 2010)
34
The crisis of traditional criminal justice approaches to crime and disorder

The last decades of the twentieth century witnessed a growing strain on the criminal
justice system. The combined crisis of the criminal justice systems and welfare states
responses to crime and disorder was captured by the following indicators:
x the increasing rate of recorded crime and the numbers of people passing
through the different parts of the system;
x overload combined with a crisis of efficiency (e.g. the declining clear-up rates
of the police, overloaded courts and the overcrowding of prisons);
x a growing awareness of extensive social and economic costs of crime; and,
crucially, the increasing recognition that formal processes of criminal justice
(i.e. detection, apprehension, prosecution, sentencing and punishment of
offenders) have only a limited effect on controlling crime (Hughes and
McLaughlin, 2002).
In response to the widespread acknowledgement of this crisis of criminal justice as
well as state-run social welfare approaches to crime and disorder, two preventive ways
of thinking, or logics, have come to the fore since the 1980s and become embedded in
much of the work of local community safety partnerships, namely situational crime
prevention and social crime prevention (Hughes, 1998, 2009). These two logics capture
a key problem which remains at the heart of crime prevention practice: what Crawford
(1998) has termed the tension between reducing opportunities through situational
measures as against social modes of intervention. Situational crime prevention chiefly
concerns designing out crime via opportunity reduction, such as the installation of
preventive technologies like CCTV and alley gates in both private and public spaces.
Social crime prevention, on the other hand, is focused chiefly on changing targeted
social environments and the motivations of offenders, and promoting community
development initiatives. Common to both elements of situational and social crime
prevention is their claim to be both less damaging and more effective than traditional
(reactive law and order) criminal justice approaches.
Community safety: the career of a free-floating signifier
Let us examine in brief the particular career of community safety in England since the
1980s. The origins of community safety in the 1980s are suggestive of the mixed
parentage of this signifier. We should note, for example, the very first appropriations
of the term by radical Metropolitan Police Authorities who formulated local
community safety plans as a counterweight to the perceived narrow and repressive
public police-driven notions of public safety. However, the real discursive turning point
at the national dimension in this decade was the Home Office Circular 8/84: this
document being the first explicit official recognition of the limits to 'go-it-alone',
policing and the capacity of constabularies to effectively prevent problems of crime
without drawing on the resources (including different expertises) of other key statutory
partners and the wider public. The technique of multi-agency, co-ordinated partnership
working (Hughes, 1998) was thus promoted as a means of overcoming isolated service
responses and in turn probable fragmentation of service delivery.
The next key discursive moment in this career was the 1991 Morgan Report
Delivering Safer Communities (Home Office, 1991) with its social democratic ambition
to conceptualise and manage holistically and inter-connectedly crime and disorder and
their deeper roots in sensibilities regarding local safety and through creative,
democratically sensitive partnership arrangements led by local authorities rather than
35
the police. This report reflected an emergent consensus amongst academics and policymakers that the ideal approach to prevention combines a package of both precipitating
factors and predisposing influences.
Equally importantly it gave the new approach a nationally-recognisable brand
name, community safety. However, its ambition to knock the police off its dominant
pedestal was never achieved in subsequent legislation and policy developments over
the subsequent twenty years.
Following the Morgan agenda which was widely and influentially, if unevenly and
in often fragmented ways, taken up locally, the third key moment was the Crime and
Disorder Act (CDA) in 1998. In retrospect the CDA helped inaugurate the New Labour
modernisation project associated with the three appeals to managerialism,
governance through partnership, and communitarianism (Hughes, 2007, Edwards and
Hughes, 2009). The effects of this central government project have continued to
resonate into the late 2000s. This period witnessed both linguistic turns and policy
decisions to shift the focus from community safety to crime and (eventually) disorder
reduction made tangible as locally calculable yet centrally defined, targeted
performance measures. This focus was further consolidated in subsequent years by the
much publicised flood of further crime and anti-social behaviour legislation alongside a
communitarian-inspired crusade around Respect and the drive for moral authoritarian
interventions against anti-social behaviour (see Hughes 2007: 119-25).
The broad verdict among many influential commentators on the possible
consequences of the post-CDA agenda was that of a guarded optimism, again as
expressed by Crawford in 2002:
recent developments potentially allow a fundamental shift in the way that crime
and its prevention are governed. They represent a maturing of community safety and its
movement into mainstream consciousness and service delivery The CDA begins a
long-overdue recognition that the levers and causes of crime lie far from the traditional
reach of the criminal justice systemthe new politics offers more plural
understandings of and social responses to crime, drawing together a variety of
organisations and stakeholders, in the public, voluntary and private sectors as well as
from among relevant community groups in ways which are problem-focused rather
than defined according to the means most readily available for their solution.
(Crawford 2002: 31-2).
Such optimism at the beginning of the 2000s was widely shared across much of the
criminological academy. However, we also need to note Crawfords own recognition of
community safety as sites of contradiction, ambiguity and ambivalence which this
author also shared at the time (McLaughlin et al. 2001; Hughes 1998; 2002; Edwards
and Hughes 2002). On may think of different occupational goals and ideologies and
uncertainty over the scope of community safety versus police-driven crime reduction,
for example. Much of the subsequent career of community safety has confirmed the
wisdom of this recognition of the contradictory and ambivalent tendencies associated
with local partnership working and their narrowly targeted focus on measurable crime
and disorder reduction (see Hughes 2007; Gilling 2007).
Crime control or social policy? Local public safety as a hybrid policy
Local public safety as a policy approach sits at the intersection of attempts by the state
to deliver welfare and security, and policing and control in local communities. It was
noted earlier that community safety emerged in the 1980s as a local government
36
strategy that sought to move beyond the traditionally police-driven agenda of crime
prevention. Apart from seeking to involve other social agencies in crime prevention
and in turn moving from single to multi-agency, or inter-connected activities,
community safety has also been associated with more aspirational claims. One
particular claim has been to generate greater participation and leadership or perhaps
more accurately attempted responsibilisation from residential communities in
promoting quality of life not just tackling those social harms classified as crimes
(Hughes, 2009). As a long-term outcome, community safety is often linked to the
communitarian ambition of replacing fragile, atomised, fearful and insecure
communities with ones confident enough to take responsibility for their own safety. At
the same time, in the national politics of the 1990s and 2000s in Britain, creating safer
communities has been a crucial component of the former, pre-2010, Labour
administrations promotion of policies that could be, tough on crime, tough on the
causes of crime. In this sense, community safety straddles the fault line of repressive
crime control (tough on crime) and more preventive, welfare-oriented, interventions
(tough on the causes of crime).
The local institutional architecture of community safety in England
In the discussion that follows the main features of the institutional infrastructure of
community safety are sketched in brief. As will be evident from the earlier discussion,
it is difficult to deny that there has been a highly prescriptive and directive central
government shaping of the contemporary preventive infrastructure in England. This is
indicative of a sovereign state strategy which stresses greater central control
(steering) alongside both the diffusion and probable fragmentation of responsibility
for the delivery of crime control and the promotion of safer communities (rowing) to
a wide array of agencies and groups, both public and private, voluntary and statutory in
character (Hughes, 2007).
Between 1998 and 2008 all 376 statutory partnerships in England and Wales were
legally obliged and empowered to:
x carry out audits of local crime and disorder problems;
x consult with all sections of the local community;
x publish three year crime and disorder reduction strategies based on the
findings of the audits;
x identify targets and performance indicators for each part of the strategy, with
specified time scales;
x publish the audit, strategy and the targets;
x report annually on progress against the targets.
Since 2009 community safety partnerships are no longer required to produce tri-annual
strategies but instead must produce annual strategic assessments of their shared local
priorities.
Most community safety partnerships (CSPs) have been characterised by very
similar formal organisational structures. For example, there is a formal
strategic/operational division; there are usually specific thematic or geographically
based action teams; the key statutory partners or responsible authorities are made up
of public agencies ranging from the local authority, police, fire brigade, police
authority, health and (since 2010) probation alongside co-opted agencies from both the
37
statutory and voluntary sector. The community is usually presented in the local
strategies as a spatial and moral concept, emphasising locality and belonging and unity
(albeit across consensual diversity in terms of life style, cultural identity etc). However,
there is also a common tendency to place certain groups outside the community due to
their anti-social activities, pointing to the key role of boundary and exclusion in
representations of community. In turn, the community is usually passively present in
terms of being consulted rather than an active participant in the planning and delivery
of community safety (Hughes 2009).
There continue to be ongoing reforms of community safety partnerships as the vehicles
for community safety at the time of writing this chapter which have the stated aim to
improve their performance at the local level. However, such partnership work remains
substantively determined by the evolving central government agenda of targeted,
evidence-based and measurable crime and disorder reduction, linked to specific
negotiated priorities.
The primary focus of community safety partnerships in terms of their stated
priorities since the CDA has thus been on crime and disorder reduction (rather than
more broadly defined harm reduction and safety promotion). On the surface this
suggests that they are primarily engaged in local crime control rather than social policy
work. However the actual outcomes of such control work may be preventive in
character rather than purely repressive and enforcement-oriented when examined in
terms of its problem-solving orientation and when studied empirically on the ground
(Hughes, 2007).
The centrally-propelled and Home Office-directed drive towards the
institutionalisation of community safety remains strikingly apparent across every local
government authority in England. Such processes have seen an ever increasing number
of multi-agency community safety teams managers, officers, project workers, police
secondees, drug action/substance misuse teams, anti-social behaviour units etc.
which now form an increasingly salient, if still fragile, part of local government
structures and processes.
As a relatively novel set of institutions and experts, community safety work is set
to remain a key feature of the local governance of crime, disorder and security in
England. However, there are major challenges that lie in wait, not least those associated
with innovations in the local policing of the terror threat and radicalisation;
additionally, tensions exist with regard to the nature and form of neighbourhood
policing and the uneasy, unstable and fragmented relations between such public
police initiatives and local government community safety multi-agency policy (see
Hughes and Rowe, 2007).
Unsettling the English nation as a unit of analysis
The negotiation of, and resistance to the central government policy agenda on local
public safety is apparent at the local sites of policy implementation. This finding alerts
us to the importance of the sub-national as brought to life in specific geo-historical
contexts and local practices and politics in situ, which at times results in new trends in
both fragmentation and inter-connectivity. For example, comparative, trans-local
research on English CSPs (Hughes and Gilling, 2004, Hughes, 2007, Hughes and
Follett, 2006) showed that the occupation and work of community safety managers was
often a tortuous process of bargaining between implacable, fragmented local partners,
38
especially with regard to the politically visceral and culturally emotive issue of
governing young peoples use of public space. In occupying this position, community
safety managers were not in a position to act as some simple interlocutor for the Home
Offices Respect agenda, or foot-soldier for the Governments Respect unit, if they
wanted to retain the involvement of those partners primarily concerned with the welfare
of children and young people. Such uneven contestation emphasises the local political
agency of community safety managers and the partnerships they co-ordinate, the
consequences of which cannot be articulated within the smooth narratives of disorder
that have predominated in both official and academic discourses (Edwards and Hughes,
2009).
Conclusion
The recent history of community safety as policy and practice in England and Wales
confirms the simultaneous processes of both fragmentation and interconnection
previously observed in the cases of Belgium and the Netherlands. There is no denying
that the terrain of local crime control has been reshaped in the last three decades across
Britain, not least given the rise to prominence of local multi-agency community safety
partnerships. The public police are no longer the sole arbiter of public safety and local
authorities have certainly joined the police in what we may term the dominant
duopoly for managing public safety today. At the same time, conflicts and power
struggles between agencies and authorities remain, both intra-locally and between local
and national government bodies.
6. Lessons learned; analysis and conclusions

Fragmentation and interconnection
Fragmentation manifests itself in many ways: being aware that repression alone seldom
is the solution, calling upon many (local) partners for help (horizontal), interventions or
support from other layers of government (top-down) or the introduction of many kinds
of new uniforms, i.e. new functions charged with maintaining specific types of local
peace and order. All three countries initially show a substantive degree of
fragmentation in local public safety governance. In the past decade however there
seems to be a trend towards somewhat more uniformity between local communities, not
in the least with local statutory powers and responsibilities.
Actors from various governmental layers, such as national/central government and
local authorities as well as regional, community or zonal representatives are in some
way involved in designing, implementing and or monitoring public safety policy.
However, fragmentation is not limited to the governmental sector. Actors from the
private sector and citizens got involved with local public safety policy as well. Take the
substantive growth of the private security companies in the Netherlands (van Steden,
2007) and the mix of governmental, civil and private actors in Englands community
safety partnerships that still have a limited role but gradually seem to become more
important. Furthermore, quasi-governmental forms of public safety governance are
being created. In the Netherlands, local public safety policy being more and more
designed and coordinated at a quasi governmental level, like police or safety regions.
39
It is evident that the governance of local security has become highly fragmented in
all the three countries during the past decades. And it is evident also that attempts to
reconnect actors involved in the governance of local security followed rather soon after
the initial fragmentation. Striking is national governments active involvement in
promoting and directing local public safety governance in terms of distribution of
responsibilities, setting priorities, funding, creating partnerships, imposing policies.
National government set priorities by means of federal safety and prevention contracts
in Belgium and British national government prescribes directives for contemporary
preventive infrastructure.
In addition to connection through steering by means of policy content, many formal
arrangements and structures were designed. For example the creation of institutional
arrangements such as the police regions and safety regions in the Netherlands, the
multi-municipality police-zones in Belgium or the community safety partnerships
(CSPs) in England. Through these arrangements, activities for designing and
implementing public safety governance are united. On a more operational and often
informal level, we find arrangements such as public safety networks or partnerships originated through top-down as well as bottom up and by formal as well as informal
initiatives in which many various actors commonly address public safety problems on
the local level. Furthermore, leaders (try to) play an important role for connecting
policy initiatives and various arrangements. In the Netherlands, local authorities - the
mayors especially are by law the nationally appointed focal actor for directing and
coordinating the design, implementation and evaluation of local public safety policy. In
Belgium, although not without difficulties, the mayor holds the same responsibilities.
Fragmentation followed by connected governance
Causes of fragmentation everywhere seem to be a combination of demand and supply.
Demand in the sense of a drastically increased concern about safety in a broad sense 6 .
Societal tolerance of disturbance, nuisance or risk has decreased strongly. Supply
contributes to fragmentation while traditional providers of safety like the police and
criminal justice systems cant meet fast rising demands any longer. As they become
overburdened, criticism of their outcomes increases and confidence in their abilities
decreases even faster. Soon authorities became under heavy pressure to do something
about it which made way for pluralized kinds of policing and public safety governance
involving various actors from governmental levels and backgrounds. On top of that
institutional historical developments are important. Contextual factors causing
fragmentation in governance settings, especially in Belgium.
Fragmentation of public safety governance and the fading away of the police
monopoly on social safety can be seen as examples of further differentiation and
specialization in a Durkheimian sense. But, as Durkheim and contemporary
functionalists like Robert Merton or Talcot Parsons showed us further differentiation
and specialization also does increase the need for (re)integration. Often of a new kind.
The shift towards new kinds of reconnection or integration is evident. In all three
countries we saw new integrative mechanisms at work: steering, leadership and
designing new (administrative) arrangements 7 .
6
Cf. the notion of securitization; Buzzan a.o. 1988.

The distinction between steering and the design of new arrangements parallels that between management of
networks versus designing (new) networks. See for example Klijn, 2005.
7
40
An important integrative mechanism is steering by plans and policy. Surprisingly

not only horizontal steering between local government and its many partners on that
level increases but vertical steering as well. National governments strengthened their
grip on policing and local security governance in a broader sense during the past
decades 8 . In this case we also saw a rather drastic increase in top down steering.
National governments initiated efforts to develop local safety policies. Subsequently
they also put limits on the freedom of local government to set its own goals and
priorities. This brings us to an interesting theoretical observation. Maybe the
contemporary governance paradigm emphasizes horizontal steering too strongly and
too one-sidedly. Of course we acknowledge like many others the increasing importance
of modern horizontal kinds of steering. But we also see at the same time an increase in
more traditional top down steering. In this case by national government. So we think
the often mentioned shift from traditional top down command and control steering
towards almost exclusively horizontal steering needs some rethinking. There still seems
to be more mixed steering than many presume.
As a second connective mechanism we mention many new arrangements semigovernmental, both formal and informal, kinds of order that bring together safety
actors and responsible authorities: Dutch police and safety regions, Belgian police
zones, safety councils and police councils and committees, British Criminal Justice
Boards and Community Safety Partnerships. We think it is likely that these new
arrangements and especially the more informal ones are badly needed to compensate
for the lack of integrative power of traditional governmental structures in a situation of
heavy fragmentation 9 . Third and last, leadership is an integrative mechanism we
observed. After all, all the activities of actors commonly providing social as well as
physical safety, fighting actual dangers as well as potential (risk) and both objective
and subjective safety problems (integral approach) have to be coordinated and
integrated on an more general and processual level. In two countries the Netherlands
and Belgium the mayor can play an important leading role in the governance of local
safety. And so some mayors in the Netherlands did in the past years. In England the
mayors role is more of a ceremonial kind. In Belgium there seem to be some doubts
whether mayors are able to fulfill their role as director of local safety satisfactorily. But
experiments with aldermen responsible for local safety were no success at all; neither in
Belgium nor in the Netherlands. Coordination on the level of a local government
official is found in many cities and municipalities in the Netherlands and Belgium. In
England CSPs are public officer driven and de facto led by them. Both mayor s and
civil servants can play an important role in bringing together and thus connecting all
the actors involved in contemporary local safety policies.
Connected governance seems to solve some of the new public safety problems
(soccer related vandalism, shoplifting, burglary), however also entails new challenges.
Problems of internal or mutual steering and tensions between local and central actors
both actively steering local public safety governance, emerge. Operational difficulties
in working together within arrangements for governing public safety come to the front,
such as barriers for information sharing or quit different timing of policy cycles.
Shifting balances of power challenge existing checks and balances. However, some
8 Cf. Cachet en Van Sluis et al. 2008 In this study of Western-European police systems we also found a
rather large increase in steering of the police altogether and especially in top down steering by national
government.
9 A study of the Dutch regional police system showed how the system is working mainly due to informal
practices and personal relations between key actors. Cf Huberts, 2004.
41
actors (police) still dominate, unintended or even necessarily, public safety governance.
Questions such as who is responsible for coordinating are frequently posted. As well as
questions of legitimacy and democratic control, such as what about the responsibility
for the actions of private security actors in these forms of connected governance?
Furthermore, local safety nowadays is a highly politicized field where many actors are
involved, each with their own interests, cultures and histories 10 .
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44

IOS Press, 2012
doi:10.3233/978-1-60750-998-1-44
Beyond National Models of Integration?

Rethinking Interconnectedness and
Fragmentation in Dutch and French
Integration Policies
Peter Scholten
1. Introduction
Immigrant integration is a multifaceted social issue that touches upon many
institutional areas of government policy. It relates to social labour market policies,
educational policies, housing policies, but also to more legal topics such as immigration
and naturalization and social cultural topics such as emancipation of women, religion
and national identity. Yet, most European countries nowadays have a firmly
institutionalized immigrant integration policy in place, which connects policies in
various domains in an effort to promote the incorporation of migrants into the host
society. In fact, the political, policy and public discourse on immigrant integration in
various countries even speaks of coherent and consistent national models of
integration, involving specifically national and historically rooted ways of thinking
about or framing immigrant integration. In addition, differences between the national
integration models of different countries often tend to be reified; take for instance the
sharp way in which the Dutch multicultural model has been juxtaposed against the
French color-blind Republican model.
These national models represent state-centric views of integration policies that are
anchored to perceptions of national identity and historically rooted views of the role of
the state. For instance, French policies would be based on a Republicanist model of
immigrant integration that focuses on the color-blind assimilation of migrants into the
French state (Weil, 1991; Brubaker, 1992; Ireland, 2004), British policies on a racerelations model with a modest conception of state intervention in preventing racial
tensions (Joppke, 2006; Favell, 1998; Bleich, 2003), German policies on a
differentialist model involving a denial of being an immigration country while
admitting third country nationals extensive rights (Green, 2003; Brubaker, 1992), and
in the Netherlands there would be a resilient multicultural model that would continue to
inform policy practices in spite of its rejection in formal policy discourse (Koopmans,
2003; Sniderman and Hagendoorn, 2005; Joppke, 2007).
The idea of national models of integration involves a high degree of
interconnectedness of integration policies on a national level, and fragmentation of
policies between countries. First of all, national models assume a strong degree of
P. Scholten / Beyond National Models of Integration?
45
coherency and consistency in problem framing. Often, such frames will connect the
issue of immigrant integration with broader social and political issues, such as national
identity and social cohesion. Some frames will stress equity in terms of migrants legal
position, others will stress the need for social-economic participation as a condition for
social-cultural integration, again other frames will stress that social-cultural adaptation
is a condition sine-qua-non for social-economic integration. Secondly, national models
assume a strong degree of institutional interconnectedness when it comes to immigrant
integration policies. A coherent and consistent frame should lead to clear and stable
institutional relations between actors involved in the immigrant integration policy
domain. This should be revealed in a clear institutional responsibility for a specific
government department for the coordination of integration policies, relatively
uncontested relations between other involved departments, and a clear and uncontested
division of labor between national and local governments.
This chapter will challenge the idea of national models of integration precisely
according to the two lines of problem framing and policy institutionalization. It will
show that immigrant integration policies are much more fragmented and much less
coherent and consistent then suggested by these models. It focuses on Dutch and
French integration policies as policies in these countries (a decentralized-unitary and a
centralized-unitary state respectively) can be expected to be more coherent and
consistent than in decentralized-federal states such as Germany. Furthermore, the
Netherlands and France are often positioned as two countries with (at least until
recently) sharply opposed models of integration: the Dutch with a more color-oriented
multiculturalist approach, and the French with a color-blind assimilationist or
Republicanist approach.
The analysis will focus both on whether there was a single dominant national
model of integration in these countries as well as whether institutional relations
between national and local governments were institutionalized in a coherent and
consistent manner. On a theoretical level, this will not only deepen our understanding
of what I will describe as the multi-level dynamics of immigrant integration policies,
but also contribute to a better understanding of how policies that deal with multifaceted
and often intractable policy issues like immigrant integration balance between
fragmentation and interconnectedness of these policies. On the one hand, these policies
constantly face the challenge of fragmentation in terms of policy framing, illustrated by
the fierce frame conflicts that have been raging over immigrant integration in most
countries. On the other hand, in order to develop effective policies and in order to
respond to the highly politicized sense of urgency in this domain, governments have to
develop interconnections not just between institutional policy domains but also
between government levels.
2. The multi-level dynamics of immigrant integration policies

The idea of national models of integration, inspired by historical-institutionalist
thinking, plays an important role in immigrant integration policies as well as in political
debates on these policies and in self-referential discourses in various countries. A key
trait of such national models is that policies are expected to be relatively stable over
fairly long periods of time, based on the assumption that the conditions that led to a
specific model are unlikely to change rapidly and that models themselves tend to
46
develop a certain path-dependency or resistance to change (Brubaker, 1992; Hollifield,

1997; Koopmans et.al., 2005). Bommes and Thrnhardt (2010) very convincing show
that, as they describe it, paradigms of migration are inherently bound national states.
They argue that these paradigms are national not just because of their context
dependency and insufficient clarifications on the conditions of generalisability, they are
national because the modes of presenting and questions are political constituted by the
nation states for which migration becomes a problem or a challenge (ibid, 10).
Similarly, Favell (2005, 47) shows that national models of integration are often the
product of the exclusively internal national political dynamics or self-sufficiency of
debates on immigrant integration in politics as well as in migration research.
Models are helpful in reducing complexity: it simplifies the otherwise highly
complex and contested matter of immigrant integration. They help to construct
international comparative studies to assess processes of convergence or divergence
between various European countries. Furthermore, when used as ideal-types, models
can, when confronted with specific periods, generate insight in a countrys history.
However, critics of the idea of national models of integration have argued that these
models are often not only taken as tools for international comparison or for
understanding historical periods (Bertossi and Duyvendak, 2009). When a model
begins to shape our understanding and beliefs about policies, the model becomes more
than just a model: the model is then taken as an accurate historical reconstruction of
policy rather than as a model of it. In social science literature, this has often led
instances where a model is blamed for the success or failure of a specific policy
approach (Duyvendak and Scholten, 2011). In addition, models tend to oversimplify
policies and overstress the alleged coherency and consistency of these policies (Bowen,
2007; Bertossi and Duyvendak, 2009).
In contrast to the historical-institutionalist approach of national models, this
chapter adopts a more neo-institutionalist approach, drawing attention to the process of
immigrant integration policy-making and to the role of narrative construction or
framing in these policy-making processes (Bleich, 2003; Scholten, 2011; Boswell,
Geddes and Scholten, 2011). Rather than stressing primarily how national models
structure policy-making and public discourse, this framing approach focuses on how
social meaning is attributed to immigrant integration by actors within specific
institutional settings. A frame thus becomes an inherently selective and normative way
of defining, interpreting and explaining as specific issue (Schn and Rein, 1994). A
frame helps making sense out of the complex social reality that is often associated with
issues as immigrant integration, they are tools for naming and framing the problem
and determining adequate paths for policy action. From this framing perspective, the
issue of whether there is one dominant frame or model of immigrant integration
becomes an empirical question, rather than an analytical assumption. However, even
then our understanding of these national models is enhanced by conceptualizing them
as socially constructed frames or discourses.
Processes of agenda setting, or the blocking of agenda access, will play a central
role in asserting or challenging the dominance of a specific frame. Hajer (1995) speaks
in this context of the formation of discourse coalitions which are actors that are held
together by a shared frame discourse and not necessarily by coordinated interaction.
This can include various types of actors, including politicians and policy-makers, as
well as academics, experts, interest groups, journalists, etc. Once a discourse becomes
dominant and is supported by a sufficiently large or strong group of actors, a discourse
can prove difficult to change. Challenging a discourse means also challenging the
47
beliefs and interests of the groups involved in the discourse coalition. Alternatively,
discourses tend to become taken-for-granted: even members of a discourse coalition
may be unaware of their tacit beliefs and the presence of alternative beliefs.
Besides the dynamics of policy framing, the idea of national models is also
increasingly challenged by the multi-level character of immigrant integration policies
(see also Borkert, Penninx and Zincone, 2011; Caponio and Zincone, 2011; Lahav and
Guiraudon, 2006; Favell & Martiniello, 2009), Various studies have drawn attention to
the specifically local dimension of migration policy-making (Borkert and Caponio,
2010, Penninx a.o., 2004). According to some sociologists, immigrant integration is in
itself primarily a local process, as natives and newcomers meet on this level, find work
on this level, go to school at this level, etc. In terms of policy-making, this means that
national models of integration may translated, reinterpreted or even transformed and
adapted to local circumstances in processes of policy implementation (Borkert and
Caponio, 2010). Furthermore, local politics may also trigger specifically local patterns
of immigrant policy-making; local political and economic circumstances as well as
specific local events and incidents may trigger specifically local policy responses.
Some local case studies have shown that this local dimension may produce local
immigrant policies that diverge strongly from specific national models of integration.
For instance, whereas national integration models have become increasingly
assimilationist and colour-blind (Brubaker, 2007), local policies often appear much
more lenient in terms of cooperation in direct of indirect ways with migrant
organizations (Simon, 2000), often for pragmatic reasons rather than ideological beliefs
(Poppelaars and Scholten, 2008).
Immigrant policies have evidently obtained a more multi-level character thereby
challenging the idea of exclusive and coherent national models of integration. The
divergent dynamics of agenda setting on these diverse levels can result in different
ways in framing immigrant integration. This can have important consequences for the
relation between policies on these levels; it challenges the idea that immigrant
integration policies are generally as coherent and consistent as in the discourse on
national models of integration (Bowen, 2007; Bertossi and Duyvendak, 2009).
Agenda dynamics and policy framing on the diverse levels can reinforce each other in
ways that would produce coherent and consistent policies, but can also induce conflicts
between policies on these levels.
Therefore, I will discuss institutional developments in the domain of immigrant
policies as well as developments in terms of the framing of immigrant integration
problems. Does the multi-level character of immigrant policies defy the idea of strongly
institutionalized national immigrant policy domains and national models of integration?
To what extent do institutional dynamics and framing dynamics cause institutional
fragmentation and possibly even policy conflicts between different policy frames? Or is
there evidence that the fall of national models of integration coincides with new
patterns of convergence, such as cross-nationally between cities or perhaps even the
rise of a European model of integration?
48
3. Beyond the Dutch model of integration

The Dutch multicultural model of integration
A key trait of the Dutch multicultural model would be its tendency to institutionalize
cultural pluralism in the belief that cultural emancipation of immigrant minorities is the
key to their integration into Dutch society (see also Duyvendak and Scholten 2009).
This would also reflect a rather uncontested acceptation of the transformation of Dutch
society into a multicultural society. In the latter respect, a connection is often made
with the peculiar Dutch history of pillarisation, referring to the period from the 1920s to
1960s when most of Dutch society was structured according to specific religious
(protestant, Catholic) or socio-cultural (socialist, liberal) pillars (Lijphart 1968).
A recent study by Sniderman and Hagendoorn (2007), When Ways of Life Collide:
Multiculturalism and its Discontents in the Netherlands, labels the Dutch approach in
terms of a multiculturalist model. The authors claim that the labeling of collective
identities has inadvertently deepened social-cultural cleavages in society rather than
bridging these differences. They take the Netherlands as their single exemplary case to
found their claims. They root the Dutch approach back to the history of pillarisation:
The Netherlands has always been a country of minorities thanks to the power of
religion to divide as well as unite (pp. 13). Also among some Dutch scholars, thinking
in terms of the Dutch multicultural model has acquired great resonance. Koopmans
(2006) roots the Dutch approach to immigrant integration clearly in the history of
pillarisation when ethno-cultural cleavages were stressed in a similar way in
multicultural policies. He claims that the application of this model on new immigrant
groups has had strong adverse effects, as multiculturalism offers new ethnic and
religious groups a formal and symbolic form of equality, which in practice reinforces
ethnic cleavages and reproduces segregation on a distinctly unequal basis (2006, 5).
Koopmans points in particular to the path-dependency in terms of policy practices.
Although formal policy discourse and public discourse seem to have changed, in their
actual way of dealing with ethno-cultural diversity the Dutch would have remained
accommodative: Outside the limited world of op-eds in high-brow newspapers, the
relation between Dutch society and its immigrants is still firmly rooted in its tradition
of pillarization () (O)rganizations and activities based on ethnic grounds are still
generously supported directly and indirectly by the government. Whether people
want it or not, ethnicity still plays an important role in public institutions and discourse
(Koopmans 2006, 4).
However, empirical studies of Dutch immigrant integration policies have revealed
that policies have been much more dynamic in terms of at least a series of frame-shifts
over the past three to four decades. Until well into the 1970s, a powerful belief that
migration would be temporary led to a no-policy frame, that in reality often involved
policies aimed at preventing immigrant integration and preserving group social
structures and cultural identities. The presence of migrants (both labour and colonial
migrants) was considered temporary. This was also manifest in the categorization of
migrants as guest-labourers or international commuters. Policies toward these
temporary groups were mainly ad-hoc, aimed at participation in the economic sphere
and retention of identity in the social-cultural sphere. This phase of denial was based on
a normative belief that the Netherlands was not and should not be a country of
immigration.
49
A first frame-shift took place in the end of the 1970s and early 1980s. In this period, a
Minorities Policy was developed, based on a multiculturalist problem frame. The policy
problem was reconceptualised in terms of participation but also social-cultural
emancipation of ethnic or cultural minorities. The causal story behind the Minorities
Policy expressed the idea that an amelioration of the social-cultural position of
migrants would also improve their social-economic position. Moreover, although the
Netherlands still not considered itself an immigration country, it did redefine the
imagined national community in terms of being a multicultural society.
Another policy frame-shift took place in the early 1990s, when the Minorities
Policy was reframed into an Integration Policy that stressed social-economic
participation of immigrants as citizens or allochthonous rather than emancipation of
minorities. Rather than categorizing migrants on a group level based on ethno-cultural
traits, migrants were categorized on an individual basis based on foreign descent. The
causal story about the relation between social-economic participation and socialcultural emancipation was now reversed, with social-economic improvement now
being considered a condition for a better position in the social-cultural sphere as well.
The normative perspective of being a multicultural society shifted to the background in
this period, with much more stress being put on the relation between immigrant
integration and maintaining a viable welfare state.
A third frame-shift took place after the turn of the millennia. Immigrant integration
was reframed as a problem of social-economic participation to a problem of socialcultural adaptation. Whereas the Integration Policy had stressed active citizenship, the
Integration Policy New Style, as it was labelled, stressed rather the common
citizenship of migrants, which meant that the unity of society must be found in what
members have in common (..) that is that people speak Dutch, and that one abides to
basic Dutch norms (TK 2003-2004, 29203, nr. 1, 8.). Persisting social-cultural
differences were now considered a hindrance to immigrant integration. Moreover, the
integration policy was more and more linked to a broader public and political concern
about the preservation of national identity and social cohesion in Dutch society: it was
just as much about the integration of the Dutch society as such as about the integration
of migrants in this society.
Finally, since 2011, Dutch policies appear to have entered another frame-shift.
Though assimilationist policy discourse persists, government is actually retreating from
the domain of immigrant integration. Integration is now primarily considered an
individual responsibility of the migrant himself. For instance, migrants increasingly
have to choose, pay for and make sure they pass civic integration programs themselves.
The role of government is increasingly confined to that of checking whether migrants
passed pre- and post-entry tests.
This analysis of Dutch policy discourse reveals that rather than there being one
Dutch multicultural model, Dutch integration policies have been characterized by the
rise and fall of various models. Almost once in every decade or so, a new policy
model emerged and another one was declared a failure. Policy dynamics was
characterized by a pattern of punctuated equilibrium, with periods of relative stability
when policy was based on one distinct problem frame, interrupted by frame-shifts that
led to very different ways of understanding immigrant integration. As far as policies
being interconnected, this would apply only for the episodes characterized by a specific
frame; however, in a perspective of long-term policy development, Dutch policies are
clearly characterized by fragmentation in terms of diverse models of integration rather
than by a single coherent and consistent model of integration.
50
Furthermore, this discontinuity also seems to involve strong inconsistencies in policies

conducted in various periods, especially on the social-cultural dimension (see also
Scholten and Duyvendak, 2011). Whereas the Ethnic Minorities Policy of the 1980s
clearly assumed a positive relation between social-cultural emancipation and
integration, this relationship is nowadays framed more and more negatively. Under the
Integration Policy New Style, social-cultural distinctiveness is assumed to be primarily
and obstacle to integration. This was aptly framed in a 2003 policy document that
renounced many of the policies that had been conducted thus far: one disregards that
not everything that is different is also valuable (..), with the cultivation of cultural
identities is impossible to bridge differences (TK 2003-2004, 29203, nr. 1: 8).
The discrepancy between national and local policies
Besides the dynamics of frame-conflicts and frame-shifts in national policies over the
past decades, the idea of a Dutch model of integration is also challenged by divergence
in the multi-level governance of immigrant integration policies. In fact, a central
argument in Dutch debates on multiculturalism is that even though multiculturalism has
been abandoned in formal policies, it has very much survived in policy practices,
especially at the local level. Beyond the Dutch case, a thesis has emerged in migration
studies that local policies are generally more accommodative towards ethnic
differences and group-specific measures than national policies. Local opportunity
structures would be more open for migrant groups than national opportunity structures,
for instance because policy-making would take place primarily behind-closed-doors
(Guiraudon, 1999) in relative insulation from broader (national) public and political
debates, and with a much greater proximity between local governments and local
migrant organizations. In the context of the rise of assimilationist or citizenshiporiented (colour-blind) policies throughout Europe, De Zwart (2005) has in this
context drawn attention to replacement strategies on the local level; the traditional
target group constructions and group-specific policies that characterized earlier
(multiculturalist) policies are formally abandoned but tend to re-emerge in actual policy
practices where formal target groups are replaced by others means of selecting policy
targets that are meant for the same groups without mentioning them explicitly.
It must be said that in the earliest periods, especially in the late 1970s and 1980s,
there was significant convergence. The policies of Amsterdam and, though less so,
Rotterdam, to a large extent followed suit with national policy developments; local and
national policies now defined immigrant settlement as a permanent phenomenon and
developed policies aimed at immigrant integration in which migrant organizations
obtained an important role. It is unclear whether there was in fact a top-down or a
bottom-up logic in this period of policymaking; rather, the seemingly coherent multilevel governance of integration in this period seems to be a consequence of a more or
less simultaneous realization that immigrant settlement was permanent, than a
consequence of policy coordination.
However, since the 1990s, the case-studies of Amsterdam and even more so
Rotterdam show signs of progressive divergence in relation to national policies. Both
cities have clearly become increasingly responsive to the specifically local
developments, including local problem developments as well as political developments
and focus-events. Already in the late 1980s, Rotterdam appears to have been an
important policy entrepreneur in the frame-shift towards a more social-economically
oriented Integration policy in the 1990s; this policy advocacy was a consequence of the
51
severe problem pressure the City of Rotterdam experienced in social-economic areas as

labour, housing and education, which it felt was not sufficiently addressed by the
national Ethnic Minorities Policy (Veenman, 2001). Furthermore, responding to the
gradual alleviation of many of the most immediate social problems in the economic
upsurge of the late 1990s, both cities adopted Diversity Policies that (at least for brief
period) celebrated cultural diversity of both cities (Maussen, 2003); this in contrast with
national developments in the Integration Policy of that period.
In terms of multi-level governance, the first decade of the 21st century marks a
period of not only national-local divergence, but also a period where policies at both
levels seem to have become increasingly contradictory and a period where the
differences between Amsterdams and Rotterdams policies also became more marked.
In response to the rise to power of the populist Liveable Rotterdam party in 2002,
Rotterdam adopted a assimilationist policy approach even before the assimilationist
turn on the national level (a.o. providing a stage to Pim Fortuyn would later play a key
role in national developments as well). Rotterdam clearly continued to be a policy
entrepreneur rather than a policy follower. Furthermore, much more than on the
national level where policies increasingly left assimilation to individual migrants
themselves, Rotterdam continued to play a very active role in projects aimed at
problems of migrants (especially Moroccans and Antilleans) and at promoting
interethnic contact (such as the project Welcome to Rotterdam). Furthermore, it went
much further than national policies in terms of promoting social mixing in specific
neighborhoods, with the renowned Rotterdam-law (Uitermark and Duyvendak, 2008).
In contrast, Amsterdam continued much of its Diversity Policy, in spite of the national
assimilationist turn. However, especially following the Van Gogh murder in 2004,
Amsterdam followed a much more pragmatic policy of keeping things together.
Especially by promoting diversity and interethnic contact, rather than accommodating
group demarcations in society, Amsterdam aimed to bond migrants and natives
together in a common Amsterdam community. Much more than being oriented at
specific groups, Amsterdams policies have become increasingly oriented at specific
problems (Kraal, 2001). The discrepancy between the national and local level, as well
as the growing differences between Amsterdam and Rotterdam, reveal an increasingly
local dimension of immigrant integration policymaking.
Both the policy dynamics over the past decades and the growing divergence
between national and local (and between different cities) policies challenge the idea of
a coherent and consistent Dutch multicultural model. However, it has been argued that
this dynamics is concentrated primarily on the level of discourse, whereas policy
practices would in fact be more path-dependent (Koopmans, 2006). This paper does
show, indeed, that local policies tend to be much specific or colour-oriented in their
policies than the national colour-blind citizenship approach would suggest
(Poppelaars and Scholten, 2008). However, such specific measures should not be
mistaken for multiculturalist policies. In fact, Rotterdams specific policies are clear
instances of problem-coping where local policymakers and practitioners target specific
problems of specific migrant groups in order to further individual integration and
assimilation rather than group emancipation. In fact, these policies have important
exclusionary effects rather than emancipatory effects (Van Eijk, 2010). In addition,
Amsterdams policies though formally negating the ethnic factor and avoiding
cooperation with migrant organizations, seem in practice very pragmatic in
accommodation of ethno-cultural factors on the street-bureaucrat level and in de-facto
cooperation with migrant organizations (Vermeulen and Stotijn, 2010). However, these
52
policies too are clearly not driven by a multiculturalist set of policy beliefs, but much
more pragmatic of nature and oriented at dialogue and interethnic contact rather than
cultural emancipation. In fact, the City of Amsterdam negates the existence of specific
communities within the city, instead focusing on the local identity (We, the people of
Amsterdam) as a binding factor.
This analysis of the Dutch case shows that the idea of a Dutch national model of
integration is challenged in at least two ways. First of all, whereas the presence of a
national model assumes a consistent and coherent policy model that connects various
policy domains under a single dominant policy frame, the analysis reveals that this
frame has been much more dynamic over time. Rather than there being one single
dominant model, the Dutch have witnessed a new model come and go once in about
every decade or so. Secondly, whereas these models suggest coherent and consistent
policies at the national and local level, this analysis showed that local policies
increasingly tend to follow a different logic of policymaking than on the national level.
The local level appears much more concerned with pragmatic problem coping and
instrumental concerns about problem resolution than local policies that are much more
driven by sharp politicization.
4. Beyond the French model of integration

The invention of the French Republic model
Even more than the Netherlands, France has been an experienced country of
immigration. During almost the entire twentieth century, France has experienced
significant immigration, though immigration has never really become part of its
founding myth (Tilly, Noiriel and De Laforcade, 1996). France has become
internationally renowned for its Republican model of immigrant integration,
characterized by assimilationism and individualism and its reluctance to define
immigrants in racial, ethnic, religious or cultural terms (Weil, 1991, Castles and Miller,
1993). This model stands for the strong French Republicanist tradition, dating back to
the age of the French revolution and Napoleon (Brubaker, 1992). It also has distinct
roots in the political field as well as in the scientific or intellectual field that both
played an important role in reproducing the Republican model (Favell 1998b; Schain
1999).
However, policy studies have shown that, like the Netherlands, France also
experienced a series of frame-shift over the past decades. Also in France, there was a
powerful belief until well in the 1970s that many immigrants would in fact return to
their home countries (Weil, 1991). Following the immigration stop in 1974 after the oil
crisis and the continuation of new immigration from (former) French colonies as
Algeria, the need for an integration policy emerged on the agenda in the early 1980s,
only several years after this had occurred in the Netherlands. In the early 1980s, a
model of incorporation was developed that had distinct multiculturalist traits. It
proclaimed a right to be different, droit la diffrence, for immigrant ethnic
minorities, or collectivities. This right to be different involved a separatist demand for
egalitarian treatment (Feldblum 1999, 33), calling for politics to create equality for
immigrant collectivities in various domains such as culture, religion, politics, labour,
53
welfare, etcetera. It also led to facilities for immigrant collectivities to set up classes in
their own language and culture so as to facilitate return migration rather than
integration (Weil, 1991; Brubaker, 2003). These were mostly framed as specific
elements of general state social policies (Favell 1998b). Also, in sharp contrast to the
Republican model, this politique dinsertion (ibid, 46-47) proclaimed the right to
association, involving immigrant associations in policy initiatives in diverse ways, such
as in the establishment of a National Council of Immigrant Populations in 1984. The
other side of the coin of this insertion politics was a pluralist image of French society.
Giscard dEstaing, and later also Mitterrand, both proclaimed that France had become a
pluralist society (Feldblum 1999, 33).
So, when France first elaborated a model of immigrant incorporation based on the
assumption that immigrants were permanent settlers, it deviated from the traditional
French Republican model. It chose for a more pragmatic approach that often involved
ethno-cultural accommodation and social-economic emancipation of these groups,
rather than the typical Republican assimilationism and individualism. In this sense,
France was in this early period remarkably similar to the US at that time and many
other West-European countries that mainly chose for multiculturalist approaches.
It was not until the second half of the 1980s that the traditional French Republican
model was revived in relation to immigrant integration. According to Brubaker, this
model was closely related to the founding myth of the French republic; it was a cultural
idiom that had powerful roots in French history (Brubaker 1992, 49). It reflected
various dimensions of the French revolution, as a bourgeois revolution that established
a bourgeois society, as a democratic revolution with a focus on active political
citizenship, as a national revolution based on civil equality for all French citizens and
as a bureaucratic revolution that established direct links between the citizen and the
state.
The focus of the French Republican model was on individual citizenship. First, it
was relatively inclusive, as citizenship was open for all born on French soil; ius soli.
This conception of the French staatsvolk contrasted sharply with other nations, such
as Germany, that defined their nation rather as a volksstaat based on ethnicity, culture
and descent, or ius sanguinis (Brubaker 1992). Citoyennet, or citizenship, was
therefore distinctly related to the traditional French conception of a strong central state,
and not to a conception of a French people as in Germany to the German volk.
Secondly, ethnicity, but also religion, culture and race, were considered irrelevant to
the citizenship frame. The French model was considered colour-blind (Weil, 1991;
Schain, 1999). Instead of a right to be different, it contained a right to be indifferent,
droit lindiffrence, or the right to be treated as equals. Regardless of ones
background, all persons that are assimilated through French institutions as education
and army (Schnapper, 1991), become French citizens. This was closely related to the
French principle of lacit, or the secular nature of the French public space. Culture,
religion and ethnicity belonged to the private space, whereas the public space should be
neutral, and colour-blind. Officially recognizing immigrant collectivities was therefore
considered at odds with French lacit. Finally, Brubaker observes that there has always
been some ambiguity to the nationalist traits of the French Republican model (Brubaker
1992, 112). The absence of an ethno-cultural conception of the French nation did not
mean that there was no nationalism. In fact, this nationalism manifested itself in the
strong emphasis that was put on the need for assimilation. Immigrant communities
were to be dissolved and integrated in to the French staatsvolk. However, this type of
nationalism also occasionally led to more exclusionist policies. For instance, it was
54
believed that specific non-Western migrants, such as Algerian Muslims, were

unassimilable. This exclusionist variant of nationalism became more prominent in the
1990s, when measures were implemented (such as the Pasqua Laws in 1993) that
restricted access to French citizenship. Whereas citizenship was first considered as an
instrument for assimilation, in the 1990s an approach emerged that stressed that
migrants had to be willing to acquire French citizenship (volont). This was a
response to criticism from exclusionists that French citizenship had become
desacralized: tre franais, cela se mrite.
In the course of the 1990s and after the turn of the Millennium, the French
Republican Model became increasingly contested. In a way that strongly resembles the
situation in the Netherlands after the turn of the Millennium, there was a growing
manifestation of conflict between at least three frames of integration: assimilationism
(the Republican Model), universalism (anti-discrimination policies) and
multiculturalism (de-facto multicultural practices on the local level). First of all, the
piecemeal development of a French anti-discrimination policy since the end of the
1997s involved a gradual emergence of a more universalist type of policy frame. A
shift in focus from assimilation to anti-discrimination involves a shift in focus from the
rights and obligations of migrants to integrate toward the responsibility of host society
to integrate migrants and to combat discrimination (Fassin, 2001: Guiraudon,
forthcoming). An anti-discrimination policy was proposed for the first time after the
1997 elections. This policy could generate bipartisan support in contrast to more
affirmative action measures or multicultural approaches (Guiraudon, forthcoming).
This anti-discrimination policy involved amongst others the collection of research on
discrimination, the establishment of a hotline to file discrimination complaints, and the
establishment of an advisory body GELD (Group dtudes et de lutte contre les
discriminations). Yet, no independent body was created for the handling of
discrimination complaints, as had been done in the UK (Commission for Racial
Equality) and in the Netherlands (Commission for Equal Treatment). The development
of this anti-discrimination policy was spurred in important ways by the EU Race
Directive that was passed in 2000, which was strongly inspired by the Dutch and UK
approaches to anti-discrimination. In this case, the European Commission played a
central role as a venue that can promote frame-shifts beyond the realm of national
politics and public debate, in this case obliging the French to adopt changes that would
have been difficult to achieve through the national political arena.
Another frame that increasingly surfaced, especially after the 2004 riots in the
suburbs of major cities throughout France, was a more multiculturalist frame that
involved a piecemeal de-facto recognition of the ethnic, cultural and religious character
of problems in these suburbs. The surburban riots revealed the difficulties of the French
color-blind approach in terms of directly addressing concrete social problems as
poverty, relative deprivation, spatial concentration, long-term unemployment and
discrimination. This was also manifested in the rise of political mobilisation on an
ethnic basis, which was distinctly at odds with the colour-blind Republican model
(Schain 1999: 210). Thus far, mobilization of migrants had taken place mainly through
institutions as political parties, unions and organisations that were not ethnically
exclusive, such as France Plus and SOS Racisme.
At the same time, the French Republican Model seems to be far from removed French
political and academic discourse. In fact, after the turn of the Millennium, there seems
to be a gradual return of assimilationism in a way that resembles developments in
many other European countries in this period (Joppke and Morawska, 2003). For
55
instance, French government announced an integration contract for newcomers in

France which strongly resembles the Dutch obligatory approach to the integration of
newcomers. Also, the High Council of Integration argued in 2004 that government
should break with the logic of guilt and discrimination and return to the original idea
of integration (c.f. Guiraudon, forthcoming). Clearly, far from being characterized by
one dominant Republican model, the French case at the beginning of the 21st century is
characterized rather by conflict between various frames, involving the traditional
Republican model as well as more multiculturalist and universalist frames.
The dcalage of national and local policies

Whereas a key difference between the Dutch and French cases lies in the fact that the
Dutch multiculturalist model now appears widely denounced whereas the French
Republican model has remained largely in tact, a key similarity lies in the fact that the
French case has experienced and is increasingly experiencing very similar frame
conflicts as in the Netherlands. Both countries have been struggling with striking a
balance between the many controversies and frame-differences on immigrant
integration on the one hand and the urge for a single coherent policy model on the
other.
Another similarity lies in the growing decoupling between the national discourse of
the French model and the social reality and policy practices in French suburbs. There
was a growing dcalage between the national Republican rhetoric and de-facto
multiculturalism on the local level. In response to concrete problem pressure from the
local level, governments adopted a more pragmatic approach to coping with problem
pressure. In many occasions this led to measures that were somewhat at odds with the
national Republican model. Favell (1998b: 184) described this as an increasingly sharp
dcalage between the highbrow Republican rhetoric of the centre the general
symbolic issues involved in the definition of citoyennet or lacit and the void of
appropriate and consistent discourse and methods at the local level.
The French Republican Model involved a sharp taboo on recognizing ethnic,
cultural and religious differences; therefore immigrant integration policies had to be
color-blind and generic policies rather than group-specific policies. However, at the
same time the implementation of government policies, especially at the local level,
demanded tools for targeting the specific problems of immigrants. In various creative
ways, government attempted to design policies in such a way that they would affect the
position of immigrants without implicitly recognizing immigrant groups. For instance,
the FAS (Fond daction sociale pour les travailleurs immigrs et leur familles) was
decentralized and connected to urban policy so as to avoid state recognition of
immigrant groups. This was a classical example of what has been described above as
replacement strategies, which means that recognizing ethnic or cultural groups is
effectively avoided by targeting the neighborhoods where ethnic and cultural groups
are concentrated rather than directly targeting the groups themselves (De Zwart, 2005).
Furthermore, as government experienced more and more problems with directing
concrete urban problems related to migration, there was a growing pragmatic need for
recognizing organisations on an ethnic basis, or for ethnic categorization. For instance,
one of the determining indicators for selecting Priority Urban Zones and Priority
Educational Zones was that at least 30% of the population in such a zone was foreign.
Another example of growing ethnic mobilization and state interference was the
56
involvement of government in setting up a representative body of French Muslims, the

CORIF. Though mostly not acknowledged in formal policy discourse, these practices
do imply a real shift toward a more multiculturalist approach in the level of policy
practices and have contribute to a rise of ethnic consciousness and ethnic mobilization
under the French color-blind approach.
5. Conclusions
Whereas policy discourses on immigrant integration tend to stress the consistency and
coherency of so-called national models of integration, this chapter has challenged the
claim that such models would adequately represent the empirics of policymaking on
multifaceted and intractable policy problems like immigrant integration. Instead, this
analysis has drawn attention to the difficulties for government policies in balancing
interconnections in terms of a single and coherent policy idea on the national level with
the fragmentation found in terms of conflicts on policy framing and discrepancies in the
logic of policymaking between different policy levels.
First of all, national models suggest that there is a single dominant policy frame
that effectively interconnects the various policy areas of relevance to immigrant
integration. However, both case studies revealed sharp frame conflicts and also frameshifts over time. The French Republican Model, once reinvented in the mid-1980s,
comes closest to ever becoming a dominant national policy discourse. However, this
Republican Model is also challenged by alternative frames, in particular in the area of
anti-discrimination policies that reveal a more egalitarianist frame that is at odds with
the Republicanist model. The Dutch case stands outs even much more clearly in terms
of discontinuity in problem frames over time: almost once in every decade or so, a new
policy frame emerged in the Netherlands. Moreover, the various frames adopted in the
Netherlands contradict with each other on essential parts, such as for instance the desire
to promote group emancipation in the 1980s and the perception of group structures and
cultural identities as obstacles to integration since the turn of the Millennium. So, rather
than being characterized by one single model, immigrant integration policymaking
seems driven by at least a multiplicity of discourses. This multiplicity characterized
policy dynamics over time, but also affects policy practices that often reveal a hybrid of
different policy models (sometimes from previous policy episodes); take for instance
the Dutch Integration Policy of the 1990s that was basically a hybrid of a socialeconomic approach aimed at individual integration and group-specific measures that
had been initiated under the Ethnic Minorities Policy of the 1980s.
Secondly, national models suggest that policies are also consistent and coherent
between various government levels. In fact, national models claim that local as well as
national policies should be clearly linked to broader national discourses on national
identity and social cohesion. However, both the Dutch and the French cases reveal a
growing gap or dcalage between policies on the local and the national level. Local
policies seem much more driven by a pragmatic need to cope with integration problems
and to find problem solutions, which seems to conflict with the sometimes more
symbolic character of integration policies formulated on the national level. In France,
government agencies and local governments have appeared very creative in coming up
with ways of evading the taboo on group-target policies. In the Netherlands, local
governments have become increasingly active in shaping their own local integration
57
policies, often reflecting specific local problem characteristics, local politics, local
policy histories and specific local incidents or focus-events. In both countries, this has
led to evident policy conflicts between the national and the local level.
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IOS Press, 2012
doi:10.3233/978-1-60750-998-1-59
59
Situating Public Governance within

Complex Settings: the Experiences of
Social Services Managers in Sweden and
Britain
Marion Ellison, Elisabeth Berg, Jim Barry and John Chandler
1. Introduction
The contested and complex nature of changes in public governance in Sweden and
Britain has been evidenced in recent years (Larsen, 2005; Sykes et al., 2005; Andersen
and Guillemard, 2006). In Britain, a simultaneous reliance on government by regulation
may be seen to have weakened the possibility of effective collaboration and
partnership, militating against effective governance within a differentiated polity. Here,
New Public Management may be regarded as restructuring policy networks despite
resistance to reform and gradual disengagement with forms of governance undermining
the established autonomous positions of public sector managers. These paradoxical
processes have given rise to new forms of governance, the rise of networks and
partnerships and the development of co-production and choice (Clarke and Newman
2009). In Sweden, the shift towards new public management with greater emphasis on
performance management, efficiency, accountability and decentralization became
firmly established in the mid-1990s (Christensen and Laegreid, 2007: 74-76, 83-84;
Holmberg and Henning 2003; Larrson 2002). In both settings there is growing evidence
that public services are no longer simply governed within economic structures or
processes but are managed within citizenship models, concepts of community and
social and cultural formations (Saks, 1999; Born and Jensen, 2005; Clarke and
Newman, 2009). Here, the contrasting historical characteristics of the Social
Democratic and Liberal Model of Welfare in Sweden and Britain respectively act as
a condensate for the differences between the two settings (Esping Andersen, 1990).
However, the import of distinct approaches to citizenship models and concepts of
community is clearly also relevant to the dynamics of new public governance and
management within the two settings. Located within todays complex social service
settings a more adequate understanding of the relationship between planning,
implementation and management of social services in Sweden and Britain requires a
more intricate and integrated analysis of policy implementation and social service
delivery (Osbourne, 2010; Pollit and Bouckaert, 2004; Christensen and Laegried 2007).
Drawing upon recent empirical research involving in- depth interviews with social
60
M. Ellison et al. / Situating Public Governance Within Complex Settings
service managers and social work practitioners in Sweden and Britain (England and
Scotland) the chapter critically examines the implications of the recent reconfiguration
of the role of the social service manager in Sweden and Britain focussing upon the dual
relationship between fragmentation and interconnectedness within new public
governance and management.
The notion of functional differentiation as a fundamental prerequisite to effective
governance has led to the emergence of new public management within distinct policy
regimes and cultural settings in Europe (Pillay, 2008). When framed through the lenses
of public governance theories the capacity of governments to implement public policies
effectively involves a complex interaction of agency, setting and power. (Pierre and
Peters, 2000; Ladeur, 2004; Newman, 2005). The recent re-positioning of governments
across Europe as enabling authorities steering public management systems within
increasingly fragmented but interdependent political systems has placed public sector
managers at the axiom of shifting forms of governance, managerialism, and
professional identities (Koch and Dixon, 2007; Rhodes, 1997). Clarke (2005) offers an
optimistic view arguing that there are active political and cultural discourses around
which people mobilise, organise and act (p. 22). Further, Newman (2003) reveals that
dilemmas experienced by public service managers in England encountering NPM were
personal but rooted in wider structural tensions and governance shifts (Newman,
2003, p. 6). A focal interest has been the changing function of management and a
series of problems related to fragmentation within management and leadership
functions have been identified (Wolmesjo, 2005; Bloomberg, 2004; Harlos, 2002).
Despite this, recent evidence reveals that social work managers in Sweden and Britain
value the benefits of more generalised knowledges and budget led practices of new
public management in facilitating transformative leadership and communication with
junior staff (Berg, and Barry, 2008). Here it is contended that approaches to leadership
within Public Sector Management are wrapped around a discourse over power and
control, often conceptualised in terms of a dualism of coercion and legitimacy
(Barry, Berg and Chandler, 2007).
This chapter explores the experiences of social service managers in Britain and
Sweden focusing on the consequences and impact of fragmentation and
interconnectivity on management and leadership patterns and effective collaboration
and partnership within the Social Service Sector as a whole. We argue that it is the
actions of social service managers, both as members of civil society and the public
sector, in shaping the processes, impacts and outcomes of change that are likely to be
critical in the future formations of connective capacities within governance. Three
specific research questions are raised in the chapter.
1. What are the central characteristics of new public governance and management
within the Social Service Sector in Sweden and Britain?
2. How has the reconfiguration of the social service management role impacted upon
chain, network and process dualisms? More specifically, what are the implications of
the shift from specialist to generalist management and from needs /rights led to budget
led practice on managerial practices and the dual relationship between fragmentation
and interconnectedness?
3. How have sociological trends relating to the actions of social service managers as
members of civil society and the public sector influenced and shaped processes,
61
impacts and outcomes of change. More specifically what is the import of social
movements and transformative leadership in the formation of connective capacities?
Adopting a tri-focal analysis, the chapter begins by discussing the central
characteristics of new public governance, management and professional identities
within the two settings before exploring the reconfiguration of the social service
management role, network and process dualisms. Here the impact of the shift from
specialist to generalist management and from needs led to budget led practice on
managerial practices will be discussed. Finally, the chapter will explore sociological
trends relating to the actions of social service managers, both as members of civil
society and the public sector, in shaping the processes, impacts and outcomes of
change. Here, the import of social movements, transformative leadership and the
formation of connective capacities are discussed. The chapter concludes by
synthesising key areas of the previous discussion, before critically examining the
import of the recent reconfiguration of the role of the social service manager in Sweden
and Britain and the dual relationship between fragmentation and interconnectedness.
2. Modernisation within the Public Sector in Sweden and the UK: Public
Governance and The Challenge of Transformational Leadership
Modern society does not integrate people as whole persons into its functional systems
but its functioning depends on the contrary on them not being integrated wholly,
requiring them instead to keep moving temporarily and spatially between different
functional systems in which they participate (Beck, in Hutton and Giddens, 2001)
The increasing significance of network governance as a feature of modern states is
illustrated by a burgeoning body of literature (Newman, 2005; Lorenz, 2001; Clarke,
2004Pierre, 2009). The connective capacity of new public governance has been
alluded to in recent studies. Steurer, 2007 has argued that new network based Public
Governance has supplanted new public management, which was essentially based on
markets. The connective capacities of this new form of governance are described as
operating at macro and micro level. Here, new forms of metagovernance founded upon
a plurality of highly autonomous self-governing networks and organizations offer a
connective governing capacity across fragmented political systems at a transnational
level (Srensen, 2006). The vision is to devise global solutions for global problems
through the common actions of governments, NGOs and citizens. The recent global
financial crises and the resultant economic schisms across the European Union alone
illustrate paradoxes inherent within a globalised capitalist economy. Here, the degree to
which new forms of metagovernance can overcome these increasingly intense forms of
fragmentation within European and global economies relies not only upon the
appropriateness of co-ordinated political and economic governance across states but
also upon levels of social solidarity at national and transnational level (Ellison, 2011).
The public/private duality of action within the public sphere mirrors this paradox. For
Habermas (1991) whilst the public sphere is coordinated by systems characterized by
means-end rationality with a focus on cognitive instrumental rationality and strategic
thinking, underpinning attempts to successfully influence the decisions of other actors
(e.g., in relations of domination) these actions are simultaneously defined by
62
communicatively mediated norms and values which emerge from meanings derived
from social experience itself 1 .
It may be argued that new public management itself attempted to bridge these two
spheres of action by introducing the means-end rationalities and ethics of the market to
the public sphere of social welfare defined largely by communicatively mediated norms
and values. It is perhaps ironic that new public governance with its focus on a plurality
of highly autonomous interdependent networks has the potential to connect
communicatively mediated norms and values derived from social experience to the
functions of systems within the public sector. As Torfing, Sorensen and Fotel, (2005)
argue governance networks contribute to the production of public purpose. Further,
utilizing Habermas theory of communicative action it may be argued that the challenge
of transformatory leadership for social service managers within complex contexts is to
bridge two concepts of rationality that shape knowledge and guide action.
For social services managers communicative rationality with its focus on mutual
understanding, conceived as a process of reaching agreement between speaking
subjects to harmonize interpretations of the world relies upon the ability to move
temporarily and spatially between different functional systems in which they
participate (ibid). As the analysis of data below reveals for social service managers
interviewed within Sweden and Britain new public governance characterised by
generalised knowledges and budget led practices within the two settings has facilitated
communication with social work practitioners. A number of recent studies 2 have
evidenced these connective capacities pointing to the increasingly prominent role of
public service leaders as proactive agents of state modernization who are
constituted as empowered but also be subjected to new strategies of control. Here the
central role of social work managers is to carry out the cultural work of responsibilizing
other staff in order to ensure the delivery of policy in a context where direct control by
government may be weak (Newman, 2005, pp. 717-718).
The devolution of decision making from politicians to autonomous social service
managers shaping the micro-politics of service delivery has facilitated the emergence of
this new connectivitys. Here social service managers draw upon cultural resources
including government discourses, to legitimate, negotiate and defend managerial power
within local and social forms of agency (Rose, 2005). Transformational leadership
emerges as a way of creating and sustaining new forms of connectivitys within the
public sphere. As the analysis below reveals, the capacity and scope for such
transformational leadership is mediated by broader political and economic contexts
within Sweden and Britain. Paradoxically, recent organizational and professional
reconfigurations within the public sphere across European societies have been
characterized by fragmentation (Lorenz, 2001; Adams, Domenelli and Payne, 2009;
Clarke, 2004; Ellison, 2007; Clarke and Newman 1997). Here, privatization is
associated with ideologies that call for the de-socialisation of services and the
transformation of the public sphere. At a micro level, the standardization of social
services has compounded this fragmentation as unified theories of social work are
atomised into component parts such as activation, counseling and protection (Lorenz,
1
Habermas, 1984: 8-22, 168-85)
Clarke and Newman (2009) Publics, Politics and Power, Remaking the Public in Public Services. Sage.
Barry, Berg and Chandler (2008) New public management and social work in Sweden and England in
International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy; Vol: 28: pp: 114-128. Emerald publishing group
63
2008) rendering them numerically measurable (Kessl and Otto, 2003). The
fragmentation of the theory and method of social work goes to the heart of the social
work role. The impact of this on professional identities has also been well documented
(Barry, Chandler and Berg, 2008; Clarke and Newman, 2005). In Britain the
restructuring of the social services has involved the process of redefining the workforce
and user groups (Farnsworth, 2006; Du Gay, 1996). Social work practice has been
subjected to disciplinary technologies, which characterize NPM. These technologies are
designed to inculcate new values, attitudes, self-understandings and priorities among
professionals (Clarke and Newman, 1997; Du Gay, 1996).
Within this context the capacity and scope for transformational leadership within
distinct settings is contingent upon the way in which rationalities between social
service managers practitioners and user groups are enacted, negotiated or contested
(Newman, 2005). The capacity to create, engage with and sustain connectivitys
between social work practitioners and social service managers ultimately has an impact
on social work practice and the lived experiences of user groups and the legitimacy of
the public realm and democratic governance itself. The nature and function of the
social work task itself brings to the fore wider connectivitys within the public realm
that in turn are implicit to these working relationships, professional identities within
civil society. As Jon Pierre (2009) argues:
The good news, . ..is that in a public administration system where many key decision
are made by autonomous managers, not politicians, it makes sense to move
accountability closer to service production and away from elected officials whose role
consists mainly of setting long-term goals and objectives . . . The bad news. . . is that
public administration is a creature of the state and, as such a pillar of democratic
governance. Market-based models of public service and accountability empower the
customer to voice preferences among service providers but NPM provides no
aggregation of preferences, no discourse on political objective, no deliberation and no
sense of the collective nature of political projects ( Pierre., 2009 p 604 ).
Operating within and for the public realm social service organizations lie at the axiom
of the relationship between the individual and society within European societies. The
analysis of the potential of new public governance in enabling connective capacities
within the public realm requires full cognizance of the way in which citizens and
welfare professionals have responded to the challenge of re-defined welfare states
across Europe in recent years. The emergence of these contested terrains (Ellison,
2007) raises fundamental questions about the relationship between fragmentation and
connectivity within the public sphere and more specifically for social services and the
social work task within and across complex settings in Europe. The current global
economic crises has brought immediacy to the need to re-invent connective capacities
within the public sphere. With professional social work theory and practice, integrative
social work aims to facilitate connectiveness by promoting integration and solidarity in
the society in which it operates (Adams, Dominelli and Payne, 2009). For Lorenz,
2008, only counter movements can aid the re-invention of connective capacities
within social work and begin to compensate for increasingly fragmented social and
economic terrains across European states.
64
there is a discernible tendency of the social professions arranging themselves

with organisational and methodological changes demanded by neoliberalism, such as
managerialism and methods of client activation, there is also a strong
countermovement that recognises the complexity of social and political relationships in
societies no longer inspired by the promises of modernity. Facing up to historical
contingency and cultural relativity emerges as a paradigmatic stance of a critical form
of professionalism. to be forged in transnational encounters and as a core reference
point for an emergent model of "European social work" that could become of
conceptual and methodological significance beyond the specific European context
(Lorenz, 2008; quoted in Ellison, 2011).
As figure 1 suggests for social service managers within Sweden and Britain, the
ability to locate reference points and create connective capacities for the creation of
emergent models of social work within and across interdependent public and private
domains is contingent upon the interaction between forces external to the profession
such macro-political and economic forces, variations in models of welfare and
government discourses relating transparency and surveillance and forces internal to the
profession. Here policy and law relating to social welfare within Sweden and Britain
impact upon professional identities. In both settings social work professionals are
bound by codes of codes of conduct governing the context of every-day dilemmas and
ethical engagement and collaborative protocols interpersonal / institutional.
Professional relationships are also impacted upon by perceptions of boundary
preservation with collaborative outside agencies and single agency professional
judgment and accountability (Adams, Dominelli, Payne, 2009) The complexity of
these intersecting variables within distinct welfare setting is summed up by Janet
Newman (2005). Figure 1 elucidates key domains within this process.
New Public Governance and Social Service Leadership in Sweden and Britain Between
The public sector in Sweden and Britain has undergone major shifts in recent years,
with the changing function of management and reconfiguration of professional roles.
Management and Leadership functions are of central concern (Lawler, 2005;
Wolmesjo, 2005; Blomberg, 2004; Holmberg and Henning, 2003; Harlow, 2002;
McLaughlin and Thorpe, 2000). Leadership has been defined as a dichotomy between
transaction and transformation (Rank and Hutchison, 2000;Newman, 2005). Here,
transactional leadership emphasises goals, tasks, results and rewards whilst
transformative leadership is based on charisma the leaders behaviour and closeness to
the staff where trust is built.
65
Figure 1: The Social Work Process as a Dynamic within Interdependent Public and Private Domains
The dilemmas contained within this dichotomy are contextualised within public, private
and societal domains. Within these complex contexts, professional identities are forged
within formal organisational cultures, which codify conduct within the context of
every-day dilemmas and ethical engagement with established collaborative protocols,
which in turn are interpersonal and institutional. Interagency working brings further
dimension to this complexity. Here dichotomies emerge between boundary
preservation with collaborative outside agencies and issues relating to single agency
professional judgement and accountability intervening in day-to-day decision making
protocols and interpersonal relationships. Here it is argued that NPM has instigated the
increasing proceduralisation of the social work task leading to changes, which threaten
the idea of a single code of professional ethics (Doel et al, 2009; Pugh 2007). Banks
(2001) has argued that ethical codes within social work should emerge from social
work practice. In both Sweden and the UK evidence based practice as emerged as a
way of connecting evidence gained within practice to social work theory and method.
In Sweden the state insisted upon this expanded knowledge base within social work
practice (Socialstyrelsen 2000). In the UK, ss figure 1 shows, the extent to which
these expanded knowledge basis have resulted in connectivitys between professional
social work and practice outcomes is contingent upon processes which are internal and
external to the profession. Social Service leadership is pivotal to these processes. At
66
organizational level operative functions are co-ordinated by social service managers

who have the capacity to filter and transform policies and implementation strategies
designed by the state. For social work professionals the perception and experience of
these external processes as they are filtered by social service managers influences
perceptions of practice and the construction of professional identity itself (Fournier,
2000). As the analysis below illustrates, in bestowing increased levels of autonomy,
New Public Governance has enhanced the transformative capacity of social service
managers. Critically however, as the analysis of the two settings also reveals this
capacity is contingent upon distinct differences between the two welfare models. Here
it is argued that differences between the neo-liberal welfare model (Britain) with its
early and complete acceptance of the principles of new public management and the
Social Democratic Model (Sweden) with its incremental approach to new public
management has impacted significantly upon the dynamics of new public governance
within the two settings. More broadly the dynamics of political governance within the
two settings is also of significance. Here it may be argued that, in Sweden the first
article of a written constitution, which proclaims that, all public power in Sweden
proceeds from the people 3 permeates public governance. This in contrast to Britain,
where, in the absence of a written constitution, the nature of public governance and the
relationship between the state and the people is more ambivalent. More specifically,
within social work professional practice, differences between needs/ resource led
approaches in the UK and rights/user led approaches in Sweden itself have a significant
impact on the transformative capacity of social service managers and upon subsequent
connective capacities within chain, network and process dualisms (Stark, 2009; Lorenz
2001; Adams, Dominelli and Payne, 2009). Whilst both settings evidence the benefits
of the increased autonomy of social service managers and of shifts from specialist to
generalist management the data suggests that differences between connective capacities
within the two settings is contingent upon factors within wider economic and political
domains. As the data below show, processes inherent within and between wider
economic and political domains impact directly upon organizational structures and
operative functions within the two settings.
The Restructuring of Social Services within Sweden and the UK

Both settings have been subjected to waves of organizational and governance reforms
in recent years 4 . In Sweden new public management was implemented incrementally
during the 1990s. These reforms were underpinned by principles, which underpinned
new public management in the UK. Here, reduced expenditure on social services, a
focus on market orientated efficiency and increased effectiveness utilizing a purchaser
provider model and the reconfiguration of management responsibilities and the
decentralization of social services (Hendersen and Seden, 2004; Couldhed and
Mullender, 2006). In Sweden the Social Service Act he Social Services Act
(Socialtjanstlagen) (2002) has secured the general aims and fundamental democratic
principles of Social Services in Sweden. All services provided under the Social
3
The Consitution of Sweden. Sveriges Riksdag (www.regeringen.se/sb/d/8589/a/85512)
4See; Larsson, T (2002) Sweden in Distributed Public Governance. Agencies, authorities and other public
bodies, Paris: OECD and Lorenz 2001, Social Work Responses to New Labour in Continental European
Countries. British Journal of Social Work (2001) 31, 595-6094
67
Services Act are based on free choice and autonomy. These services must be adapted to
your individual circumstances and your desire to change your social situation... If you
do not receive the support and assistance you want and have requested, you may appeal
the municipal authorities decision (Socialtjanstlagen, 2002, p.2 Socialstyrelsen and
Artikelnr, 2002, pp. 114-9). These fundamental democratic principles are central to the
principle of local self-governance embedded within The Instrument of the Government,
which forms part of the Swedish Constitution itself.
Article One: All public power in Sweden proceeds from the people.
Swedish democracy is founded on the free formation of opinion and on universal and
equal suffrage, it shall be realized through a representative and parliamentary polity and
through local self-governance. 5
The government offices of Sweden official website declares that
A living democracy is characterised by strong, well-functioning democratic
institutions, by the exercise of public power with respect for human rights, by everyone
having good opportunities for access, influence and demanding accountability, and an
independent, broad range of voluntary associations 6
The incremental approach to the implementation of new public management in Sweden
has led to a significant re-structuring of social services. Importantly however, as the
findings below reveal it may be argued that the principle of a living democracy and
the exercise of public power with respect for human rights do impact on the dynamics
of new public governance in Sweden. It is interesting also to note that principles of
accountability and the importance of the role of voluntary organizations are also
emphasized here. Principles, which have also underpinned the reorganization of social
services in Britain with its central focus on delivery through a mixed economy of
welfare and the imposition of new procedural processes and regulatory mechanisms
designed to ensure that social service professionals are accountable to the public. The
construction of accountability and the process of interagency working are in itself
subject to wider political and economic governance. The findings of this research
illuminate the import of wider political and economic forces and governance processes.
Exemplifying this whilst social service managers in both settings were comfortable
dealing with budgets and enjoyed the autonomy in developing relationships with
subordinates for social service managers within the British context the capacity to
develop these connectivitys to fulfill the social work task itself were limited by
budgetary constraints;
Q. What would happen if there was a deficit?
I cannot give the service they need, so the clients will be put into a queue to wait until
there are staff who can help them . . . .
Everything feels almost completely budget-driven. It feels very much, Finance first.
Clients last (British social services manager)
5
6
The Consitution of Sweden. Sveriges Riksdag (www.regeringen.se/sb/d/8589/a/85512)

www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/2184/a/15569
68
In contrast greater flexibility in the use of budgets in Sweden led to wider possibilities
I started too many projects this year, but my manager is very supportive and believes I
know what Im doing When asked if this would affect her clients adversely, she
replied, No, this is a political organisation and the deficit is shared by everyone
(Swedish Social Service Manager)
Here the organisation is referred to as a political organisation giving rise to greater
flexibility in negotiation practices. This is conducive to transformational management
giving breadth and creative scope to connective capacities. Whilst differences between
the two settings reflect a range of complex and intersecting social, historical, cultural
and political factors, it may be argued that broader questions of governance and
citizenship are crucial here. Notions of a living democracy and public power
proceeding from the people characterise the relationship between the state and the
individual in Sweden where local governance has historically been central to notions of
democratic accountability. The relationship between models of citizenship and the
connective capacity of new public governance is central here. As Figure One suggests
the form and extent of these connective capacities within complex settings is located
within processes emerging from inter-dependent public and private spheres. These
processes create conflicting pressures that are played out in the micro-politics of
service delivery (Newman. 2005, p.719) More broadly the potential of connective
capacities is intrinsically dependent upon intersecting processes within broader
governance regimes.
Any specific reform initiative or programme is likely to be cross cut by an
uncomfortable mix of different governance regimes, each with its distinctive
assumptions about the nature of power and authority and about the relationship
between government and governed, state and public sector . . . . . .Such a mix creates
conflicting pressures that are played out in the micro-politics of policy delivery
(Newman, 2005, ibid).
The potential of these connective capacities also relates to the implications for the
social work task itself. Here dichotomies between efficiency and effectiveness and
Communication are inherent in day-to-day dilemmas. The degree of resource flexibility
is not only more conducive to effective working relationship between social service
managers and social work practitioners but also to more holistic approaches to social
work delivery and the development of co-production and choice. Here whilst the
fragmentation of the social work task is characteristic of new public management levels
of resource and financial flexibility do at least enable social workers to respond more
appropriately to user groups in real-time. Critically by giving permission for deficits
and sharing resources within political organisations there is a sense in which welfare
can be connected to the aggregate needs of people within local contexts. Here the
notion of local democracy is embedded in the construction of welfare organizations as
political organizations. The extent to which these connective possibilities are
translated within service delivery requires further research, which focuses on the
experiences of welfare users and local communities within Sweden. The potential of
these connective capacities is therefore regarded as being relevant to constructions of
democracy and the legitimacy of the public realm itself.
69
The research also found that the connective capacitys generated by increased financial
autonomy were enhanced by the shift from specialized to generalized knowledges of
social service managers used in work with junior colleagues who they attempted to lead
rather than manage. This gave new possibilities for their role as transformational
leaders. As practitioners, social workers specialise and work within one or two systems.
When promoted however, the scope of knowledge and range of systems engaged in is
widened. Here middle managers become more generalist within modernised contexts
(Blomberg, 2004). The connective capacity generated by these generalist knowledges
enhances mediation between social service managers and social workers. Critically
however, the extent to which these connective capacities have broader significance for
social work practice itself is implicitly defined by degree of budgetary flexibility. As
Blomberg argues, a group is required to provide leadership that manages through
constantly reminding the practitioners to start from the clients needs, instead of
beginning with the financial framework, as this is more in keeping with the humanistic
principles of their work (Blomberg, 2004, p.6 quoted in Berg, Barry and Chandler,
2008). Differences alluded to above, reveal variations in the flexibility of budgets in the
two settings. Here, we find the critical link between wider issues of governance and
citizenship and variations in connective capacity within social work between Sweden
and Britain. The extent to which social service organisations are regarded as political
is contingent upon the degree to which social service managers regard their position as
limited to the interpretation and mediation of rules, legislation, policies and resources
from above or one which has more significant connective capacity to integrate,
through coordination, partnership and planning, a range of care services with the lives
of the human beings it helps (Adams, Dominelli and Payne, 2009). It may be argued
that integrative social work is contingent upon resource flexibility. New Public
Governance enhances the communication of budgetary matters between social service
managers and social work practitioners however this connective capacity can only be
given broader significance when there is flexibility in budgetary arrangements between
departments and across the financial year. It may be suggested that these more flexible
forms of financial management are more rational and also enable a more responsive
integrative social services. Importantly however more fundamental connectivitys
between the state and the individual are at stake here. Whilst, new public governance
does enable connective capacity within the organisational domain in each setting, the
degree to which it can connect public and private domains more broadly is contingent
upon models of citizenship, political governance, and the way in which wider economic
factors and political ideologies are filtered within the two contexts. It may be argued
that the public purpose of integrative social work is to connect citizens to the decision
making process of public organisations thereby bringing legitimacy to the public realm.
Implemented in its purist form in Britain, new public management has led to an
environment in which management decisions relating to social work practice and the
development of care services are based upon the avoidance of risk rather than the needs
of service users This environment is captured as an uneasy blame culture permeated
by litigation and consumerism (Parton, 1998). More fundamental connective capacity
relates to the democratic rights of citizens to influence decisions made within public
organisations. It is the realisation of this connective capacity contributes to the
legitimacy of the public realm itself.
70
3. Conclusion: Social movements, and Transformative leadership in the formation

of Connective Capacities in Sweden and Britain
The Integrative purpose of social work practice with its focus on reflects the location of
social service organizations at the axiom of the relationship between the government
and the governed. The distinct, historical, cultural, political and economic forces that
have forged the dynamics of new public governance have impacted upon the dynamics
of the connective capacities of social service managers in Sweden and Britain. Here,
the nature of power between the state and civil society and between the citizen and
public welfare organizations have impacted upon the day to day experiences of social
service managers.
Critically it may be argued that social service managers operate within the public
sector, which occupies a central role in mediating democratic civil society. The
significance of networks for the formation of new connective capacities cannot be
underplayed, as Pierre (2009) argues, The frontline of the public sector is today much
more open towards networks These networks facilitate connective capacity by creating
networks of actors who communicate information, collaborate, and persuade. The
import of this connective capacity for integrative social work practice and for broader
connectivitys between the citizen and public welfare and the state and the democratic
milieu of civil society itself in Sweden and Britain is mediated by broader dynamics of
national governance. Critically however, professional identities within social work
itself have historically been forged within civil society and are a product of a connected
private and public sphere. Here it may be argued that transformational leadership
involves cognizance of this dual relationship. As Lorenz, 2001 argues; The origins of
social work and particularly of social work education do not lie within state
structures but within the domain of civil society. The various starting positions were
concentrated in a band of middle-class concerns, religious renewal, philanthropy and
womens emancipation, working class and socialist ideas of self help and solidarity did
not normally translate into social work training. Nevertheless, these value positions did
create a space around social work within which the demands of the various state
systems could be modified and re-interpreted and a professional profile of social work
could develop across different value positions (Lorenz 1994, p. 173).
As this chapter has evidenced, the potential of connective capacities within new
public governance for social service managers in Sweden and Britain is forged within
distinct political, economic and governance regimes. Despite this, it may be argued that
by being embedded within the domain of civil society the historic origins of social
work across Europe illuminate the capacity of social work as a profession to respond to
rapidly changing political and economic conditions. The capacity of social service
managers to connect with social movements within civil society relies not only upon
the creation of spaces within which the demands of various forms of governance and
political contexts can be modified but also upon a willingness to engage with different
value positions within civil society. In this way it may be argued that social movements
in civil society act as a mirror to historical contingency and cultural relativity whilst
being forged in transnational encounters as a core reference point for an emergent
model of "European social work". For social service managers across Europe the
challenge will be to find innovative ways of working within increasingly restrictive
budgets. Here the capacity for transformational leadership may be shaped not simply by
national setting but rather by the development of social work models within broader
transnational settings.
71
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IOS Press, 2012
doi:10.3233/978-1-60750-998-1-73
73
Nodal Security in the Ports of Rotterdam

and Antwerp
Arie van Sluis, Peter Marks, Fien Gilleir and Marleen Easton
1. Introduction
Not so long ago if a police officer wanted to check on a suspect he would have to go
through printed papers with finger prints and mug shots. This sort of information would
be stacked in major storages. If somebody from a different department or another actor
wanted information that was stored by the police intelligence agency they had to travel
to look for this information. Luckily there was less criminal behavior in those days.
Imagine a customs officer in the port of Antwerp having to check all the printed papers
and call with the shipping companies to make an assessment whether a certain ship in
the port holds potentially hazardous material in one container amongst many. The
officer uses email and computers for risk analyses that are updated based on new input
all the time to get better profiles of certain ships and companies. Technology is
assisting the officer in his judgment and control.
Society has undergone a series of drastic changes and traditional methods of crime
control and prevention are no longer suited. In an increasingly fragmented society,
citizens, industry, ICT, police, public services, transportation companies, et cetera get
more interdependent. People, money and information circulate from one place to
another by means of different infrastructures, generating different flows that meet each
other in nodes (Castells 2000). The vulnerability of nodes and their vital role in the
network society offer interesting perspectives for criminal organizations and terrorist
groups. Information and knowledge have become the prime raw materials for the
creation of services. In a globalized world, the exchange of information occurs on a
worldwide scale. Because this information and knowledge can be digitized, ICT plays
an important role in this exchange. Modern security problems get more complex due to
their interconnectedness and are therefore increasingly of a wicked nature. Criminal
activities are no longer restricted to fixed locations and time (Beck 1999). Open
borders, freedom of mobility and computerization offer opportunities not only to
entrepreneurs and citizens, but also to criminal individuals, organizations or networks
(PIO 2005: 21-22).
In situations where many flows and nodes come together, like airports and major
seaports, a different role of the government may be justified. This new role has been
worked out in the concept of nodal security governance. Government or police need to
steer on area-bound and flow-oriented enforcement. Within nodal security governance
the different flows and nodes are the center of focus and interventions are at flows and
nodes to enhance the safety and security in these. Today, there is a broad spectrum of
74
A. van Sluis et al. / Nodal Security in the Ports of Rotterdam and Antwerp
supervisory authorities, whereby it is not yet clear who will or may take on the role of
director. Empirical studies show that the regular police are still the dominant actor in
the broad security networks that exist nowadays (Jones 2003). Other partners do need
the visible presence and support of the police (Terpstra 2009). Despite the
governmental deficit in the production of safety, government and the police are
indispensable in plural policing (Terpstra and Kouwenhoven 2004). Nodal security
governance has consequences for the role of police and/or (local) governments in their
cooperation with many actors, local, national and supranational, and vice versa.
In this chapter we intend to investigate the area-bound and flow-oriented enforcement
and governance in two different ports, that is Antwerp and Rotterdam. We are
particularly interested in the extent to which the different actors in the security network
position themselves with regards to other players in the field. Well focus on the
characteristics that are inherent to the nodal perspective, e.g. removal of borders,
increased mobility, et cetera, but also on the partners working together in mixed
combinations, diversity and intensity.
We will use several perspectives to describe and assess nodal security governance
First, we will explore the key concepts: nodal security, nodal strategies and nodal
security governance (Section 2). Next, we will describe the nodal orientation in the
ports of Rotterdam (Section 3) and Antwerp (Section 4). In these two sections we focus
on the key players, the nodal strategies they follow (if any) and the governance-like
structures that have been established, and we will assess how in these different ports
nodal security governance has been developed to counter the fragmentation in tackling
safety and security issues. Finally we draw the conclusions (Section 6).
The research for the port of Rotterdam is partly based on a research report by
Bekkers, Van Sluis and Siep (2006) commissioned by the Police and Science Program.
For this chapter we have updated the material, by doing additional literature research
into the general meaning and application of nodal practices in the Netherlands (see also
Sluis, et al. 2011), conducted a number of additional interviews with police officers,
customs, safety region Rijnmond as well as observations. The research for the port of
Antwerp is based on a research by Gilleir (2010). This research is based on a literature
study, which was complemented by numerous visits and interviews with people
working for the police, customs and the municipal autonomous port company and who
are strongly involved in the Antwerp port scene.
2. Interconnectedness in a fragmented society through nodal security enforcement

Nodal orientation
The nodal orientation implies being directed towards flows and nodes in order to stop
evil. Nodal security implies intensive control and monitoring of infrastructures and
flows of people, goods and money that move along these infrastructures. Action is
necessary where flows over the infrastructure arrive at certain places such as the nodes
in the infrastructure networks. Therefore controls are necessary at the nodes in
networks, in order to limit the mobility of evil and to identify it in time, by removing
anonymity and invisibility (PIO 2005: 8-79). Each flow, infrastructure and node brings
along specific applications for interventions that fit the characteristics of the flow,
infrastructure or node.
75
The various authorities must recognise the need to abandon a geographically based
working method. This requirement is not limited to mere geographical boundaries, but
many factors (simultaneously) play a role in a port. It is not only safety and security
that directs actions in the port, but also fiscal aspects, transport, trade, labour
organisation et cetera. All these factors have to be taken into consideration when
applying the nodal orientation.
Nodal strategies
In general two types of interventions can be applied: setting virtual traps at the access
or exit points of a flow, or moving with the flow within a specific infrastructure.
Examples of the first type are traffic controls at the access of a highway, or deployment
of iris scans on passengers at airports. Examples of the second type are traffic patrols
on highways, surfing the Internet in a search for child pornography, or tapping phones.
Applying either or both strategies usually involves the use of high tech detection
technology that should be linked to the characteristics of the flows and nodes. An
operational follow-up after a hit from the technology is essential to ensure that the
process is complete and effective.
The importance of intelligence requires a shift towards a more proactive style of
criminal investigation aimed at monitoring suspect movements in flows. Information
has to be sought out and utilized from various sources and linked to create intelligence,
for instance through the use of risk definitions, selection and interpretation based on
profiling. This requires not just static information, but also dynamic information, i.e.
actual information about what is going on in real time. Information is both an
instrument of and a condition for nodal security enforcement. The appropriate use of
information fits into the longer-term developmental model of working towards
intelligence-led enforcement, i.e. the systematic use and exploitation of information
and an improvement in the information warehouse. In order to build up a strategic
informational position, the exchange of information with the other parties involved and
the mutual adjustment of information strategies developed by others must be
considered. The quality and availability of information from various sources is crucial
in order to ensure effective interventions. The security partners need to collect and
combine both hard and soft information and develop adequate interventions.
Nodal security governance
There is a link between the nodal orientation and nodal security. Nodal orientation
implies being directed towards flows and nodes in order to stop evil, whilst nodal
security implies an orientation towards mutual cooperation between parties on nodes or
flows. However, the nodal orientation presupposes intensive cooperation with
stakeholders in order to be able to consult external databases. Both concepts are
interlinked and reinforce each other. Sparrow (2000) finds it desirable to start from the
perspective that police organisations, supervisors, inspectors and others who are
responsible for the preservation of law and order, use a social problem as the basis for
their work. He places the key duty of a particular company or organisation in a broader
context, namely a network of organisations that can all contribute to tackling a specific
problem. In this perspective, Sparrows view accords with the issue of nodal
orientation, whereby the need for systematic monitoring and checking of flows is
asserted.
76
Multi-nodal and infrastructural nodes have many different owners, public as well as
private, each of them with their own interests, duties, responsibilities and powers in
supervision, enforcement and investigation into suspect activities. Coproduction and
nodal security governance arrangements become relevant for steering and control,
because of this variety of actors and the need for horizontal arrangements. Within the
security networks public and private actors have to coproduce nodal security. The
police are only one node in a network that works to govern security (Shearing 2005:
58). Cooperation with other agencies, locally, nationally and internationally, is
inescapable. Nodal enforcement demands not only (inter)national cooperation, but also
local cooperation with a diversity of public and private parties.
A cooperative attitude from every supervisory authority means that the willingness
to share information must be present on the ground, there must be mutual respect
regarding each others work in relation to attaining a common goal, that of
guaranteeing a safe, crime free port. Nevertheless, Sparrow (2000) opts for a policy
whereby the effectiveness approaches take the upper hand over principles or dogma. In
that respect, techniques such as profiling and pattern recognition fit perfectly with this
vision. Sparrows view thus assumes a problem oriented approach, whereby knowledge
must be given substantial importance.
Nodal security governance and the relations with citizens
The tasks of the law enforcement agencies should be determined in close interaction
with administrative authorities and citizens, as this would increase the amount of
legitimacy that they have in contributing to solving social problems. Where community
policing and area-bound policing are connected with the existing political
administrative structures and the living environment of citizens, the flows and nodes
have no identifiable communities of citizens. The ports of Antwerp and Rotterdam are
clearly bounded areas with several flows going through these areas. Nodal security in
the ports of Antwerp and Rotterdam are thus area-bound and flow-oriented. Besides the
elements of focus of nodal orientation, security and governance successfully securing
at nodes and on flows within the local boundaries has certain implications for (the
relationship between) the securitizing partners.
Linking the various existing sources of information creates new information power
and intelligence about the whereabouts of people, thus opening doors for new and more
refined forms of control. In order to prevent this concentration of information from
being abused, a system of checks and balances must be put in place. It is important to
note that nodal policing is not just a technology-driven intervention, but is also
politically sensitive and requires effective democratic control. The fact that nonsuspects are monitored simply because they are moving within a particular flow will
have a negative impact on societal support for the police. Thus, a more developed
strategy for dealing with all the information that has been gathered and the implications
for privacy should be put in place.
3. Safety and security in the port of Rotterdam, The Netherlands

The port of Rotterdam is directly situated on the North Sea, with optimal 24/7 access, a
wide range of companies specializing in storage, transshipment, industrial processing
and auxiliary services on hand, and excellent hinterland connections via five different
77
modes of transport: rail, inland shipping, road, short sea/feeder and pipeline (Port of
Rotterdam 2009a; 2009b). Rotterdams entire port and industrial complex covers
10,500 hectares and stretches out 40 kilometers in length. The port of Rotterdam is a
very complex and dynamic multi-nodal and infrastructural node with worldwide links.
The port is also the gateway to a European market of more than 500 million consumers.
Goods that arrive in Rotterdam in the morning can be in, for example, Germany,
Belgium, France or Great Britain the same afternoon. One of the main advantages of
Rotterdam is its location on the estuary of the rivers Rhine and Maas. As a result,
efficient and economical transport by inland vessel is possible deep into the heart of
Europe.
More than 500 scheduled liner services connect Rotterdam with over 1,000 ports
worldwide. Many of the global container liner services only call at a limited number of
European ports. Rotterdam is one of these, often as first and/or last port of call in
Europe. From the port, feeder ships carry the containers by sea to smaller ports. It is a
port of call for 37,000 ocean and 130.000 inland vessels annually. As an international
transport hub, the port of Rotterdam handles over nine million containers and more
than 370 million tons of goods each year (Port of Rotterdam 2009a: 16). This makes
Rotterdam still by far the biggest seaport in Europe. No less than 350 million people in
the European hinterland depend on its trade. The port of Rotterdam generates some
10% of the Netherlands' Gross National Product, worth approximately 40 billion euro.
The port is a vulnerable area. One of our interviewees gives the following example:
Suppose someone embarks a ferry with a delivery truck. From the Internet he has
learned to make a bomb out of fertilizers. If he lets it explode in the Maasmond you will
have got many casualties. Success is guaranteed. The Botlek tunnel is a perfect object
for sabotage. If it is sabotaged, there will be a billion euro damage because there is
still no cross-channel connection.
To create a safer and securer port the actors in the port of Rotterdam security network
have defined five different flows, i.e. inland shipping, cargo, seagoing vessels, port
security and border control. In these flows a variety supervisory agents have to work
together in different constellations, diversity and intensity in an integrated approach
(Transport and Water Management Inspectorate, 2009). This initiative fits the Dutch
Inspection Reform Program (Vernieuwing Toezicht 2009) that aims for more
effectiveness in supervision with less inconvenience for the business sector.
Supervisory agencies will cooperate more closely by means of better information
exchange, coordinated inspection programs, joint risk analyses, alert supervision and
transfer of duties. Supervision is focused primarily on high-risk activities/companies
and based on earned trust based on information from and cooperation with the business
sector: companies with a good record are subject to fewer checks. This is called
horizontalized supervision. Mutual adjustment in advance, based on cooperation,
works better than controls afterwards. The most important partners in the port are
Customs, the Seaport Police, and the Harbormaster.
Customs: flows of goods
Dutch Customs is a unit within the Dutch Treasury. Customs is divided into four
regional units, the region Rotterdam being one of them. Customs in Rotterdam
78
supervise the import, transit and export of containers and mass goods in the port of
Rotterdam. Customs acts as the gatekeeper to the internal European market, but also, in
line with European regulations, Dutch customs have concentrated their activities on the
outside border in order to enhance the security of the flow of goods across the external
borders.
Customs will build systems for electronic data exchange (e-customs). Enforcement
agencies in the Netherlands aim at establishing just one desk to manage all the
necessary contacts between government and private enterprises with regard to
supervision. In the port of Rotterdam Customs has been allocated a directing role in
controlling the flow of goods, i.e. the supervision of cargo. This coordinating role fits
the strategic ambition of customs to become the co-director of safety in the flow of
goods. The control of goods should not be carried out one after another but together.
Nodal strategies
Customs has developed risk profiles to select potential risky shiploads, using an
electronic system called Prisma. All shipping companies are required to electronically
deliver shipload information. Every shipload gets a risk profile based on a combination
on the type of goods, the shipping company, the country of origin, the country of
destination and the route. Prisma automatically generates hits when a risky shipload is
indicated. These indicators are laid down in the Customs Act. A strategic ambition of
customs is to make a better use of human intelligence for risk analysis and risk finding,
for example by employing liaisons. A trained eye will always be necessary in addition
to hits generated by Prisma. Prisma is not only applied in Rotterdam but also in the rest
of the Netherlands. However, each country in the EU has its own system. In the future
the same indicators for risk profiling will be used in each country in the EU. The
private sector demands more uniformity too.
Customs moves with the flows of goods by monitoring ship movement, and it also
checks the access to the port with container scans. Following a hit in Prisma or when
annalists have doubts, based on intuition or experience, that the actual content of a
cargo may not match the registered one, a ship is scanned with X-ray equipment.
Customs can deploy a fixed scan, a mobile scan and drive through scans for trucks. A
scan may be followed by a physical inspection. Annually 40.000 to 50.000 containers
are scanned, which is about 2% of the non-EU flow. The percentages of hits and the
success ratios are not made public. However, statistics on captures and hits are shared
with other custom organizations in the EU, through established channel, based on
treaties. Forty nuclear detection gates check all transport that enters or exits the port for
the presence of nuclear material. In the near future trains will also be checked.
Logistics with regard to scanning are dealt with after preliminary consultation with
forwarders, shipping companies and other parties involved.
Cooperation
Due to the international and worldwide character of the flows of goods that pass the
port of Rotterdam, customs has developed intensive forms of cooperation with trade
and industry, other enforcement agencies, other customs organizations, European
member states and other private and public organizations. Cooperation, nationally and
internationally is a cornerstone for Customs. Intensifying cooperation is seen as
indispensable for ensuring a safe and incorruptible logistic chain and flow of goods
79
across external borders. In the years to come, the supervision of the flows of goods will
be the joint responsibility of the government and business sector.
Customs to Customs
The Container Security Initiative (CSI) is a project in which Dutch Customs was the
first mega-port to cooperate with their U.S. sister organizations (www.cpb.gov 2002a).
This project was launched in 2002 by the U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection (CBP). The purpose of the project was to increase security for container
cargo shipped to the United States. U.S. Customs want to have information about
containerized cargo 24 hours before departure to a U.S. port. Ships in Rotterdam with
risk full cargo with destination US are scanned or physically checked by Dutch
Customs. These are the so-called green lanes, in which U.S. Customs lean on the
Dutch way of controlling ships and vice versa. Such two-way green lanes are also
being developed in pilots between Rotterdam and Shanghai in China, in which safety
programs are mutually tested. Dialogue with Japan in these matters has recently been
started. These green lanes are based on a common framework from the World Customs
Organization (WCO) that sets criteria for safe and secure ports. Ports have to meet
these standards before green lanes can be established. On top of these criteria, Customs
in each country has its own criteria, sometimes more severe, like U.S. Customs.
Customs to business
Since 2008, companies in Europe can get the status of Authorised Economic Operator
(AEO). This An AEO status implies simplified customs procedures and a more flexible
control. In exchange those companies have to get their internal processes certified by
Customs. For this purposes their safety controls, integrity procedures and the
functioning of systems are periodically audited. Companies are not obliged to become
AEO-proof, but this status give them some benefits, because they have proved to be
reliable and compliant. The holder of an AEO certificate is subjected to less physical
inspection and document checks, receives priority treatment of consignments if
selected for controls, may request controls to be carried out at a certain place, and does
not have to meet the same criteria when applying for subsequent licenses.
Seaport police: flows of people
In the Rotterdam-Rijnmond area the Seaport Police performs the police tasks on the
water, wharves and terminals. They are responsible for safety and security in the port
of Rotterdam. The area they work in runs from Ridderkerk to the regional border in the
open sea, a good 300 square kilometers, 30% of which is water and 70% is land. In
summer, this patch is expanded with the recreation areas Haringvliet, Brielse Meer and
Grevelingen (Zeehavenpolitie, 2009).
The work of the Seaport Police is divided into three work processes: Border
Control, District Police and Investigation. Annually, well over 350,000 crew members
and passengers cross the Rotterdam border. Under the Schengen agreements,
Rotterdam is a "European external border", meaning that all crewmembers of ships
have to be checked. The District Police performs the specific police task on the water
and on land, where it checks on ocean vessels, inland waterway vessels, pleasure craft
and passenger vessels, but also it provides emergency response, rendering assistance in
80
the event of, and dealing with, collisions and accidents. It also gives considerable
attention to safety and security in the port area on and around wharves and terminals.
Another major task is enforcing environmental legislation both on land and on the
water. The Investigation Department of the Seaport Police focuses on port-related and
organized crime. Forms of crime it deals with include people smuggling, drug
smuggling, trafficking in weapons, and theft of and from containers. In many cases,
these are the work of international, organized criminal networks. To combat these
forms of crime, the Investigation Department cooperates with investigative agencies all
over the world.
The seaport police attitude towards the nodal orientation
The seaport police have written their own policy paper with a vision on police work in
the port (ZHP 2009). The seaport police have a crucial role in safety due to their 24
hours presence. For the seaport police a nodal orientation is indispensable, given the
complexity and the vulnerability of the infrastructure in the port area and the presence
of many parties with duties and responsibilities for safety and security and the link with
economy and environment. The seaport police aim at being a good network partner to
create a safe and secure port, because that is a good selling point for investors and
economic interests carry a heavy weight.
The seaport police claim a broad responsibility for safety and security, both
proactive and repressive. They have to focus on the totality of flows; people, goods,
shipping locations and destinations and on transfer points between sea shipping and
inland shipping and between inland shipping and truck traffic or railway traffic. The
seaport police also claim a directing role in the chain of supervision, control,
enforcement and investigation based on their duties on land. If they do not claim the
directing role, they get too dependent on others for their information and become too
restricted in their freedom to operate. In recent years the police have withdrawn on
their core task leaving a gap to be taken by other enforcement agencies with limited
powers. But many safety areas demand a tougher approach in the end, based on
criminal law. That is where the police need to come in again. There are too many
supervisory agencies, according to the Seaport Police, thus independent and strong
enforcement is necessary.
In order to prevent fragmentation in enforcement, the seaport police see the nodal
orientation as an opportunity to put the question of who is in charge and who supervise
on the agenda. For the seaport police it is a useful tool to position them in the
playground of the port area. It has opened their eyes for the possibilities that high tech
can offer in the near future. It contributes to the development of a vision for the midterm in which the interconnectivity of all kinds of flows and of different agencies is
taken into account.
Nodal strategies
Since 2002 the seaport police use the Expandable Integrated Maritime Shipping System
(Zeescheepvaart Uitbreidbaar Integraal Systeem - ZUIS). ZUIS is a unique system in
the world. All the information about seagoing vessels, country of departure and of
destination, its location and their crews is entered into this system. Information about
crew members is linked with a database on wanted persons. The system operates with
fixed parameters to create a risk assessment and to determine the appropriate type of
check for the vessel. There are four risk levels, the highest resulting in physical checks
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of vessels and their crews. The risk parameters can be altered, but only after
authorization on a very high level. Up till now this has not happened. Information is
being analyzed at the Expert Center Harbor (ExpertiseCentrum Haven, ECH), by
members of the Customs and the seaport police.
Every vessel that anchors in Rotterdam is checked. There is a stop at the
Parkhaven where vessels bunker fresh supplies. However, crew can disembark here
without being seen, which is a white spot in the Schengen treaty. Cameras are being
installed and the images will be checked.
Port Authorities
The Rotterdam Port Authority
The Rotterdam Port Authority (Het Havenbedrijf Rotterdam) is manager, operator and
developer of Rotterdams port and industrial area. They have two main objectives:
firstly, to promote the effective, safe and efficient handling of shipping in the port of
Rotterdam and the approach area off the coast, and secondly, the development,
construction, management and operation of the port area (Port of Rotterdam 2009b). As
manager and developer with regard to nautical matters, the Port Authority ensures that
the docks are maintained at the right depth, so that ships can enter the port and moor
safely. As developer and manager, the Port Authority ensures that sufficient space is
available for companies in the port. It is for this reason that the Port of Rotterdam
Authority supports the construction of Maasvlakte 2. The Port Authority also invests in
the improvement and construction of new roads, rail, inland waterway connections and
underground pipelines. As operator and developer of commercial activity in the port
and industrial complex, the Port Authority encourages sustainable economic
development. The main partners are companies established in the port or which provide
their services. The Port Authority also works closely with the State, the municipality of
Rotterdam, local authorities and interest groups (Port of Rotterdam 2009b).
Harbormaster Rotterdam
The Chief Harbormaster is in charge 24/7 of the public nautical and maritime tasks.
The Harbormaster is responsible for the swift, safe, clean and secure handling of
shipping. This involves the supervision of operational safety and environmental issues,
high-risk activities and compliance with relevant transport legislation. Within the Port
of Rotterdam Authority, the Chief Harbormaster is executing the Harbormasters
Covenant. This covenant gives the Harbormaster an autonomous position within the
Port Authority (www.harbourmaster.nl 2009). Based on the Covenant, the nautical
maritime-authority functions have been integrated into one person. The Port of
Rotterdam is well known for its high standards of nautical services, the safe and
smooth handling of shipping and a Vessel Traffic Guidance System of high quality.
The Division Harbormaster contributes a great deal to these high standards with its
over 570 specialists, 10 patrol vessels and 100% radar coverage
(www.harbourmaster.nl 2009).
All along the river and docks are radars that make it possible to follow every ship
in and around the port, also when it is moored or still parked outside in open sea. Ship
movement and position is visualized through the dynamic port chart (Dynamische
havenkaart). All ships get labeled based on the cargo of the ship, so one can distinguish
ships with petrochemical materials or gasoline, or normal and safe products. To date
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only seagoing vessels are visualized, because for visualizing inland going vessels they
need more information and also too many dots for every ship will appear on the
dynamic chart making them undistinguishable. All these activities are in coordination
and collaboration with the safety region that are situated in the same building.
Safety Region Rotterdam-Rijnmond
Since 1 July 2006, the area of Rotterdam-Rijnmond has a fully operational Safety
Region. The Regional Fire Service, GHOR (the organization that coordinates medical
aid in the event of emergencies and disasters), the Ambulance Service, and the joint
alarm centre for the police, fire and ambulance services have been brought together in
terms of organization as well as in terms of location. In addition, a full network
organization has been created involving the police, the Harbor Master's division,
DCMR (Environmental Protection Agency) and the water boards. This structure
facilitates an integrated approach that is preceded by an integrated risk profile in the
region. The aim is greater security by obtaining better insight into risks and effective
coordination of the emergency services. One of the tasks is to make sure that all actors
involved in the network wont act according to their own core business that may be
countering the actions of others. The safety region functions as a spider in the web of
the different organization in the network (VRR 2009a; 2009b).
In an interview the director of the safety region clarified the role of the safety
region in safety and security in the region: What we do here is build virtual
organizations, organize the network and facilitate all this through information
warehouse. Which means that I have a variety of co-thinkers and a lot of information,
hence I have made a connection between parts of the chain and a connection within the
fragmented chain. Everybody uses each others shared information and I keep it stored
in a central place. An example of this is that petrochemical companies used to have
their storage registered outside the perimeters in a small box attached to the fence. In
case of a fire the fire department would check this information so that they would know
what risks they could encounter on the premises of the company. Nowadays, the safety
region asks for a daily electronic dump of the material stored on the premises, and in
case of an emergency ambulance services and the fire department can, while rushing to
the scene, check with a PDA what they can expect on the premises. The information is
stored in a government controlled system which does not give this information to
others, because it could be abused for instance by neighboring companies to know what
the competition is doing. Furthermore, the daily updated information overwrites the
information of the previous day.
Cooperation
Expert Center Harbor
In the ECH the seaport police, the Royal Military Police, the Customs, the National
Crime Investigation Service, the Fiscal Information and Investigation
Service/Economic Investigation Service (FIOD/ECD) and the Social Intelligence and
Investigation Service (SIOD) work together to tackle crime in the port area of
Rotterdam by combining their knowledge and expertise, carrying out joint actions and
by the mutual rendering of support in order to increase the efficiency and effectiveness
of their joint efforts. ECH aims at adjustments of the activities of a range of agencies in
the port area and to prevent activities to overlap and it should facilitate the exchange of
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information between agencies. ECH is being managed by the seaport police. ECH is
also an important provider of information for the Hit and Run Cargo Team Rotterdam
(HARC). In this way it realizes the thought of just one desk where all the wanted
information for other agencies is accessible.
HARC
Since 1996, the Seaport Police has participated in HARC, consisting of officers from
the Investigation Department, the District Police, the Customs and the Fiscal
Intelligence and Investigation Service. Their aim is not only to arrest offenders and
return stolen property to its owners, but also to strip offenders of their assets, thus
preventing them from benefiting from such assets after serving their prison terms. The
investigation results are used to prevent any repetition. In these teams the customs, the
seaport police and the FIOD/ECD work together to fight the illegal import, transit and
export of drugs through the port of Rotterdam. HARC is also administered by the Port
Consultation and operates on a covenant.
Aquapol
AQUAPOL was founded in 2002 by the Dutch, German and Belgian water police. Cooperation with other enforcement and investigative agencies in the port of Rotterdam
and the mutual use of expertise within the legal norms is essential. Its areas of
responsibility are inland and maritime navigation, transport security on the waterways
and in the ports, and fighting crime. AQUAPOL aims to establish high-quality
international cooperation between its members, i.e. the police forces and inland
shipping inspectorates.
Maasvlakte-2
The seaport police participate in an integrated approach of safety in the new port area
Maasvlakte 2. The level of safety in the port and the surrounding area should be raised.
This project is based on recommendations from the Safety Region RotterdamRijnmond and an analysis of crime trends carried out by the Regional Information
Service of the police force Rotterdam-Rijnmond. The whole project consists of six
subprojects; camera surveillance on roads and waterways, the application of radar
surveillance linked with Automated Number Plate Recognition (ANPR), the exchange
of information between supervisory agencies, the establishment of one single
information center and a joint central emergency room.
Integrated Supervision of the Outside Borders
The Customs and the seaport police also cooperate in the Integrated Supervision of
Outside Borders (Gentegreerd Toezicht Buitengrens), which is part of a national
program. Its focus is mainly operational. It aims at joint training and joint surveillances
and patrols of customs and seaport police personnel and a better exchange of
information because of the short lines of communications in the field. Recently a
framework has been developed for an annual planning of activities. This project is still
in its early stages.
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Supervision of Port Security

The International Ship and Port Security (ISPS) Code for the security of vessels and
port facilities was agreed in the International Maritime Organization. In Europe the
ISPS Code was incorporated and somewhat refined in EU Regulation 725/2004, which
was implemented in the Port Security Act. Under the Port Security Act the mayors of
municipalities with a seaport are responsible for the supervision of compliance. The
Harbormaster of Rotterdam is appointed as Port Security Officer (PSO) with the
mandate of the mayors. The IVW acts as second-line supervisor of the mayor/PSO, and
the Seaport Police is mandated as co-supervisor on the Port Security Act. Their
authority in this respect is not based on law. This is strange because the Harbormaster
does not have any authority over the police, Customs or other organizations (Lensen
2005). The KLPD/DW manages the port security reporting centre where all national
reports that serve as the basis for threat analyses are received. The ISPS Code is aimed
at ships as well as port facilities. This supervision of vessels is carried out by the IVW,
which has integrated this activity in its port state and flag state inspections.
The exchange of information
The quality of information and the exchange of information with other law
enforcement agencies are crucial. The interventions by customs are dependent upon
reliable and quickly available information, supplied by other agencies. The exchange of
information between national custom agencies is laid down in international treaties that
regulate the powers and the responsibilities of the competent authorities and the mutual
rendering of assistance. Information exchange between customs agencies passes quite
easily through established channels. The Dutch Customs is legally prohibited to
exchange information about persons with sister organizations.
The exchange of information between customs and other law enforcement
agencies in the Netherlands however has legal restrictions, due to the need for checks
and balances. Each agency has its own powers with its own limitations that have to stay
untouched. Customs is primarily a controlling and supervising agency without powers
to do criminal investigations. When custom officers during inspections suspect a
criminal offense, they have to call in other agencies like the police. The exchange of
information raises problems, like the non-compatibility of systems and legal
restrictions on the linking of information systems that are applied to safeguard the
integrity of government. Especially the separation between supervising powers and the
power to investigate poses problems. The public prosecutor has to give permission for
the exchange of information between agencies for investigative purposes, or it has to be
legitimized by a covenant with guidelines for proper use of this information.
Information should be stored in one joint database, with authorized access for other
agencies.
The exchange of information within ECH
All the partners in the Expert Center Harbor collaborate closely to make inventories
and assess safety and security risks, within the legal limits on the exchange of
information. Cooperation and the exchange of information are based on the law and
covenants between the organizations that have been mutually agreed upon and that
determine the rules of the game. Information flows quite freely between the workers
in ECH, because mutual trust has grown due to the very short and informal lines of
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communication (Poortman 2009). However, once the need for information has been
established an official request has to be submitted to the owner of that information.
That is part of the underlying covenant.
ECH is administrated by the Port Consultation, in which all the ECH organizations
are represented at a high strategic level. The Port Consultation decides on which
project and activities the ECH has to carry out. Their decisions are based on so-called
weigh reports that contain operational information and are used to prioritize projects
and to allocate personnel accordingly.
All the organizations in the ECH use the same system to store information and
data, the so-called Basic Provision Investigation, in order to create a combined
knowledge and database for joined operations. The presence, accessibility and
combined variety of national and international information systems enable ECH to
carry out analyses as a basis for weigh reports and for the development of project
proposals. Before the Port Consultation takes a decision, the owner of that particular
information has to agree to use that information (De Gier and Helsdingen 2009). ECH
has proved to facilitate communication and the exchange of information between
agencies and the growth of mutual trust, to enable better capacity management and to
prevent activities to overlap, especially those of the customs and the seaport police
(Poortman 2009). It also facilitates the planning of activities for the mid-term and longterm. Planning, like covenants, reinforce the commitment and involvement and reduce
the freedom of engagement of the agencies involved.
Other nodal strategies at different nodes and flows
The port of Rotterdam is a node for many kind of different flows, including outside
pipelines. There is a European main vain pipeline in the port area near the Benelux
tunnel that is being monitored with cameras.
As from May all the bridges and tunnels that give access to the Botlek-Maasvlakte
are monitored with ANPR cameras 24/7. At the Maastunnel there are sometimes
ANPR controls in which many supervisory agencies participate and in which a variety
of databases is linked. The system can be turned on and switched off through the
regional system of camera surveillance.
With regard to camera surveillance the police work closely together with the Port
of Rotterdam Authority. All trajectories that involve camera are clustered in the ECH.
Seven different disciplines are brought together, with their own backgrounds and their
own information. Information is exchanged based on protocols and based on the
agreements in the Supervision Reform Program. The seaport police are signaling
supervisor, for example with regard to inland shipping, and other agencies are
coordinating. In these cases the seaport police draw up a report of their findings. The
seaport police do not object such a limited role but wants a more directive role for the
regular police activities in the totality of the enforcement chain.
A good nodal practice: illegal dumping of garbage in the port of Rotterdam.
The project of stopping illegal dumping of garbage in the port of Rotterdam, initiated
by the Seaport Police, concentrates on various types of garbage synthetics, white
goods and brown goods. The goal is to become the cleanest port in the Netherlands.
The project aims to establish cooperation and the exchange of information between the
many agencies involved in the import and export of garbage, especially synthetics,
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white goods and brown goods. By focusing on the flows and nodes in the garbage
transport chain, the parties involved hope to get a better picture of the risks and of
unusual (and punishable) behavior in the import and export of garbage through the
port. Supervisory agencies cooperate more closely by means of better information
exchange, coordinated inspection programs, joint risk analyses, alert supervision and
transfer of duties. Supervision is focused primarily on high-risk companies and based
on earned trust; companies with a good record are subject to fewer checks.
The project began with the creation of an inventory of the problems encountered
through a consultation of the available databases and the identification of the agencies
involved and their information resources, by making flow charts. Then it was
determined what information was needed, the way it should be delivered and by whom.
By combining information about flows, persons and acts with professional expertise
and previous incidents, risk profiles of persons and companies are created as a starting
point for aimed controls and supervision. These profiles are to be placed at the disposal
of all the partners in order to increase coherence in supervision and investigation. An
action program would be drafted up for this. In case consultations, specific targets are
to be set, their priority levels assessed, an agency put in charge and the means
employed to be decided on. A steering committee has been established as well as a
project team in which all the organizations involved are represented.
Assessment
The logic of area bounded policing does not stretch out to the port area. The most
important residents are industries, trade and commerce. The area is a mixed one with
public and private domains. Traditionally, the port of Rotterdam is dominated by
powerful private interests groups like the port of Rotterdam Authority that consider the
port as their own backyard where they are doing their business out of the public
spotlight without much interference from outside. Agencies that represent public
interests such as safety and security experience difficulties to get access to the fixed
and closed networks that exist in the port. Public interests have difficulties to get
accepted unless there is some sense of urgency.
The position of the regular police in the port differs from their position on land in
area bounded policing where their position is much stronger. However, the port area
does include land, and daily life has to go on and people have to go to work. The
regular public sector police have often difficulties to get accepted as an equal partner in
networks. On the other hand, the strength of the police in the port is their
independency and their power to act against consensus in port network if necessary.
Even though there may be some sort of shared vision on safety and security the parties
in the network still operate on their own accord. The police operate out of their own
vision, and other parties do the same. Each party does whatever it sees fit. The result is
fragmentation, because supervision is carried out by many supervisory agencies. This
situation creates a lack of transparency.
What the port and its vital infrastructure need most is an approach of safety and
security based on the port as a whole with private and public actors, instead as a
composition of sectors with different agencies pursuing their own particular interest.
The port of Rotterdam is in need of an integrated approach in which the police should
play a vital role, as director of safety and security. Safety and security are not always
equally important as economy and environment. In the next section we will see if this
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battle between economy and safety and security is also present in the Port of Antwerp,
Belgium.
4. Safety and security in the Port of Antwerp, Belgium

The port of Antwerp is the gateway to Europe, through which more than 182 million
tons of cargo flows in 2007 - a figure that is constantly on the increase. Antwerp is the
second largest port in Europe for international shipping freight and a world-class
container port. Every year 15,000 seagoing ships and more than 65,000 barges call at
Antwerp. Some 250 cargo trains are loaded and unloaded every day, while thousands
of trucks drive in and out the port. Vast quantities of liquids are also transported to and
from Antwerp through the extensive pipeline network. Antwerp ranks No. 12 in the
world for container cargo. A major advantage of using Antwerp is the number of
leading specialized container terminals within the port - both on the river and in the
dock areas (www.investinflanders.com, 2009).
Antwerp is a multifunctional port, where all types of cargo are loaded, unloaded,
stored and handled. Antwerp has a longstanding illustrious tradition as a center for
international commerce. Nowadays, this is even more so, as the port serves as a vital
link between international sea trading routes and Europe's multimodal transport
network. Antwerp is strategically positioned for companies seeking to capture 60
percent of the European Union's buying power as this 'mega market' is within a 500kilometre radius of the greater Antwerp area.
In Belgium no one seems to think much of the concept of nodal orientation
(Bakker and Miltenburg, 2007). For the intertwining of legal and illegal flows, the
significant scale of global networks and the development of critical infrastructures
confronts statically oriented supervisors with a number of challenges. Thinking in
terms of networking can create new possibilities for prevention, monitoring and
detection. Cooperation and exchange of information between the police and other law
and order maintenance and supervision authorities within the port of Antwerp is
important, due to its status as a world port.
Customs: flows of goods
Although customs have always been known for their fiscal authority involving cross
border transport of customs goods, they are increasingly involved with moves to create
a safer society. A number of legislative initiatives on security have arisen that greatly
changed the workings of the customs organisation in various areas. At the moment,
customs are busy with Business Process Reengineering (BPR), due to new community
legislation and the introduction of e-customs. BPR involves going back to the
beginning and inventing a better way of doing work (Hammer and Champy, 1994). Ecustoms is the automization of a number of ideas involving the introduction of
automized tools mostly at operational level but also partly at a tactical level. Their
adoption began on 1 January 2008 with the introduction of AEO (Van Cauwenberghe,
2007).
The basis for the transformation of the customs organisation lies in the fact that
they are confronted with increasingly large flows of goods and at the same time
increased societal needs for control in relation to security. The legislator, at a European
level in particular, is also demanding more controls. This transformation means that the
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emphasis increasingly lies on safety instead of fiscal inspection. This turnaround will
result in the abandonment of an inspection policy in favour of a facility policy.
In line with the approach of the Customs of Rotterdam the Antwerp Customs aims
for good working relation with commerce and trade companies in the port to reduce
logistic delays to a minimum. Electronic data trafficking is considered a prime
instrument for this, and Customs should have a directing role in this (Vlaams Instituut
voor de Logistiek, 2009).
Cooperation
Customs want to work out a direction to shape international cooperation. Entering into
covenants with other agencies (especially with government services) will mean that a
check must be made as to what extent the audits concerning the trust in cross border
goods traffic by customs, can play a role in risk analyses for, among others, the police.
Customs to Customs
June 2002 the Customs joined the Container Security Initiative (CSI) as the second
mega-port. This should increase security for container cargo with destination US. U.S.
Customs will place a small team of Customs inspectors in Antwerp equipped with U.S.
targeting databases. They will work jointly with Belgian Customs officers to target sea
containers that are bound for America. Belgian Customs officers, assisted by U.S.
Customs officers, will be responsible for screening any containers identified as a
potential risk. This should create so-called Secured Trade Lanes (www.cpb.gov,
2002b).
Customs to business
The implementation of Authorised Economic Operator (AEO) will not proceed without
difficulties. The AEO initiative has been prompted by European legislation but neither
the police, the Waterway police, the port captain service, nor the Federal Agency for
Nuclear Control have any need for this. There are indications that the current tendency
among the police does not immediately illustrate a willingness to accept an
authorisation certificate from customs officers. Also trade and commerce have
problems accepting the possibilities of AEO since they feel that Customs controls are
based more on distrust in companies than having no controls when a company builds
up trust (Vlaams Instituut voor de Logistiek, 2009).
The Waterway Police: flows of people
The task of the police force consists of suppressing the extent and impact of organised
and societal damaging crime (www.polfed-fedpol.be, 2009). The Waterway police
have been transferred to the state police just before the police reform of 2001, as result
of which they were merged with the federal police. Although the Federal judicial police
fulfil an important role in the development, coordination and support of policing
aspects of the integral and integrated strategy at the central boards level. The majority
of operational duties consist of investigative or judicial research at the district level.
The Waterway police are organized in a structural manner: a team works on thefts,
another team is actively busy with terrorism and port security, another team is
specialized in car crime and yet another follows up the phenomena of illegal
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immigration. The Waterway police are responsible for the task of protecting goods and
people and for the maintenance of law and order and safety in the port. In practice, this
function is translated into three large tasks. Firstly, supervision of compliance with
maritime and nautical regulations. Secondly, maritime border watch in its capacity as a
Schengen checkpoint. The SPNA is entitled to check seamen as well as passengers
arriving via maritime routes. The third task arises from the fact that the Waterway
police also carry out tasks in the port. This entails that the Waterway police, as port
police, are responsible for all first line police tasks within the whole port area.
The port is a large geographical area with transport displacement and security
problems. The port is a nodal point of different authorities: cities and communities,
districts, federal, European and international. By the assignment of the aforementioned
job responsibilities, a considerable degree of fragmentation has been prevented. The
alternative would have been that the police of Beveren, Zwijndrecht and Antwerp were
simultaneously active on this terrain, the result of which would have been considerable
fragmentation.
An advantage of the current range of duties is that one can gain a coherent insight
into security problems. The three duties lie very close to each other. This togetherness
becomes apparent in the framework of phenomena such as the illegal weapons trade
where border watch is of primordial importance. For some years now, in the framework
of waste transport the Waterway police have also worked on the IMPEL- TFS seaport
project. The Waterway police are also asked to cooperate with integrated control of
waste transport in certain districts. Despite the relatively recent history of this body, a
comprehensive network strategy regarding inspections to comply with the European
regulations concerning vigilance and control of waste material transfer is being worked
on (jsp.vlaamsparlement.be, 2005)
Municipal Autonomous Port Company
The autonomous port company is a public enterprise and supports the development of
the port of Antwerp. The Port Captain Service fulfils a regulating and inspection role.
The port captain services are a special inspection service (De Keulenaer, et.al., 2002).
Discussions are being organized by the municipal autonomous port company to
attain a better degree of cooperation in the field, especially in the framework of
information exchange. The importance of information led policing (ILP) is expressed
here as follows: from the moment that suspicious behaviour is established at a terminal,
the Waterway police will request that this be reported (via the port committee). The
Waterway police will enter these details in the national databank under soft
information. In this way the details are made accessible and can be linked to other
information already available. Not only is the available information well distributed in
this way, but it is also supplied by all kinds of partners in the security world.
The port companies are working hard on the Port Community Services Portal
project (PCSP). This plan aims to meet the actual information needs on water related
transport and flow of goods by attuning the various aspects of the communication
process and clustering these via a portal site. To date, the exchange of information with
chain role players is insufficiently organised, because each player is trying to optimise
their own piece of the chain. The PCSP has a crossroads databank that aims at the
achievement of better data exchange with the government (www.pcsp.be, 2009).
Various government institutions (Customs, Federal Agency for the Safety of the
Food Chain, FOD Economics General Board of Statistical and Economic
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Information, etc.) deliver their information to the so-called Intersection Database for
Cargo Information (KPDB). This came about due to the increasing demand for new
applications that can quickly combine very detailed information about the ship, the load
and the crew. The new database should speed up the information processing since all
parties only have to deliver one time and the stored information will be accessible for
everybody. This not only concerns information exchange with the port authorities but
also with other authorities and private services.
Cooperation between the key players in the port of Antwerp
In the police force the necessary capacity to conduct risk analyses is not always
available. Therefore, the choice is often made to collaborate with a privileged partner,
mainly customs, where risk analyses are conducted. However, there is currently a lack
of a complete, structured risk analysis. Mutual cooperation between both authorities on
the global level is evaluated very positively. Talks on a structural basis have been
nonexistent thus far, partly because of the fact that the task agreements are difficult to
describe. Until now, a transparent set of rules has also been lacking.
The bundling of information of all the supervisory authorities in the port could
facilitate multidisciplinary expertise. However, it remains to be seen whether such a
method could be implemented without the loss of, for example, protection of personal
data. Noteworthy in relation to this context is the existence of the Maritime Information
Crosspoint (M.I.K.) in Zeebrugge as an example of a form of cooperation between
customs, police and the military. This information center aims to monitor the sea and
although its physically located in Zeebrugge, it could just as well have been Antwerp.
Nevertheless, also this example of collaboration between several actors is lacking a
grounded formal structure.
The question also arises whether the role of the police as regards cross border
goods traffic should be prominent. The flowing quality of exchanges is characteristic of
a network society. The dynamics of mutual interaction have been highlighted by
Boutellier (2007). Within the fragmented order of the network perspective, various
social players, places and security regimes provide a differentiated image of safety.
Castelfranchi and Falcone (2000: 799) have stated that: a good theory of trust cannot
be completed without a theory of control. Given the existence of a network
community, trustworthiness is not guaranteed. This means that relationships need to be
arranged by contracts, covenants, transactions, but also through personal contact and
social capital.
Parties are gradually looking further than their own little islands and realize more
and more the potential surplus that lies in good information flows. With the
establishment of the local safety committee there is an institution that makes structured
talks between the various partners possible. In short, it seems that the idea that
cooperation is required is slowly increasing. However, to speak in terms of partnerships
would be to exaggerate the sophistication of the current deliberations structure.
The nature of the local committee meetings does not seem to have outgrown the
exploration stage: far less has a nodal strategy been jointly designed. Transparency and
well delineated task agreements between the various social players are significant for
the further expansion of a nodal strategy: if you do not respect the boundaries, security
nodes will combat each other rather than crime (Bakker and Miltenburg, 2007). All this
raises the question as to whether the introduction of nodal orientation will lead to
solutions, and more particularly to consolidated solutions (Mertens, 2006).
91
Nodal orientation
The nodal orientation is a view with implications regarding security for supervisory
and law and order maintenance authorities, but which can also lead (mainly) to
objections regarding principles inherent to a democratic, constitutional state. The police
as a policy executive authority are enclosed in the security logic as a consequence of
their societal task. The presence of numerous (complementary) partners makes it more
difficult to gain insight into who precisely will take the final directors role.
The information that is obtained from each of the partners was gathered from other
rationales. This does not necessarily allow for the unconditional use of such data in
security logic. It must not be forgotten that besides the security logic there are also
other factors which play a part in port life. A port can be seen as a nodal point where
various rationalities are present. Besides security rationality, there is also a fiscal
aspect, transport, commerce, labor organisation etc. These differing forms of logic will
not become reconciled right away. In light of the Belgian privacy legislation, the
unconditional usage of information is essentially problematic. Ultimately, it concerns
borders that are set by the constitutional state, namely the guarantee that the
government must provide for optimal freedom. A nodal policy can only become
reality providing a debate on legitimacy is conducted in advance.
Assessment
The port of Antwerp has become an essential critical infrastructure regarding safety
(Commission of the European Communities, 2006). It is unavoidable to systematically
monitor and inspect information, goods and people flows. Despite the development of a
number of initiatives in the port security arena with the objective of improving port
security, the Waterway police and the autonomous municipal port company have never
participated in the district security board. This raises the question as to what extent
certain major security risks are considered a priority. Furthermore, one can also pose
the question how far the current safety disposition is capable of dealing with such risks.
The monitoring of information, goods and people flows not only places demands
concerning adequate technological applications, but in addition also assumes that a
tuning of the activities of the miscellaneous establishments involved is required. A port
possesses a broad spectrum of supervisors. The splitting up of these supervisory
authorities does not make it easy to determine who will assume the directors role. The
effectiveness of a supervision network undoubtedly lies in its ability to adjust to new
security issues. The Customs are capable of extending their previously exclusive
attention to fiscal problems towards a wider orientation of security. However, the
question remains whether the police have also experienced such a reorientation.
The police are keen on the idea of cooperation with other departments. One prefers
complementarity to competition. Although the significance of transparency and well
defined task agreements between the various social players is great, so far it is a
voluntary cooperation: contacts between the various players have a rather informal
character and usually take place on an ad-hoc basis, which at the very least means a
guarantee for consolidated cooperation. A worked out legislative framework and
formal discussion structure which respects the individuality and objectives of every
institution could create more clarity.
In short, the current security disposition does not (yet) orient itself to (nodal)
aspirations nor would it be correct to speak in terms of partnerships. Within the current
92
constellation creating the impression that such an approach exists would be premature,
let alone that a nodal strategy has been designed. Still the need for formal cooperative
relationships is advocated and the intention to join hands exists. There is no doubt that
this nodal view will not and cannot develop out of a bottom-up movement on a purely
voluntary basis. It will be necessary to develop a directing policy that draws clear
frameworks in which one and other can be shaped. In other words, it is up to the policy
makers at varying levels to take their responsibility seriously.
5. Conclusions
The respective dispositions towards a nodal perspective are reflected in how the safety
and security in the port is approached. In Rotterdam different parties, both public and
private, try to find each other, for collaboration and cooperation, exchange information
and lean on each others expertise and intelligence. Several information warehouses are
being constructed and the parties deliver information that is accessible in for instance
cases of emergency. Privacy issues are more or less flexibly approached. In the port of
Rotterdam agreements and covenants are made for the exchange and usage of shared
information to tackle safety and security issues in several collaborations. Actors
coproduce nodal security arrangements relevant for steering and control. However, this
is still in the starting stages, and although most parties have similar views on safety and
security, actors still operate from their own perspective. That is, in their approach and
implementation of nodal security the missions and goals of the parties still prevail.
In Antwerp this systematic coproduction is missing. Parties do not really exchange
information and stick to their core tasks. The port forms a nodal point for governing
authorities, but there is a lack of clear, administrative direction and responsibility. The
presence of various social players means that there is a great deal of information
available that could be used to tackle new security challenges. Before a nodal
orientation can make an effective and efficient contribution to the goals of the
supervisors, it seems vital to first verify whether the unchecked passing of information
is possible without impacting on the protection of individual privacy. Privacy issues are
very essential and parties follow go-alone strategies to stay within the boundaries of
their jurisdiction, to safeguard the privacy of parties (Bruggeman 2009: 55). For this
reason safety and security in the port of Antwerp are still more or less dealt with in the
hierarchical governmental manner. Actors approach and execute safety and security
issues from their own mission and goals, but even more so from their own jurisdiction.
With nodal orientation a new term has been once again added to the police
repertoire. A clear and unambiguous definition is not yet available. Depending on how
one looks at things, one can detect flows, recognize patterns and discover regulations.
In a network perspective, this view has implications for safety and the conducting of
surveillance. Flows merge together in nodal points of infrastructural networks, such as
ports, which are connected to other large economic regions and form intersections
where monitoring and surveillance come together. In the port of Rotterdam certain
nodal practices are slowly surfacing: one can say that the nodal orientation is slowly
but surely developing: parties are collaborating more and more, especially in the
exchange and use of information. In the port of Antwerp the nodal orientation is more a
view than empirical reality.
93
All in all, nodal security governance is embraced in the ports to counter fragmentation
and help connect different actors and combine information in order to be able to
balance safety and security with the environmental and economic interests.
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Part II
Evaluating Solutions

IOS Press, 2012
doi:10.3233/978-1-60750-998-1-97
97
Whole of Government in Theory and

Practice: an Exploratory Account of how
Australian and Dutch Governments Deal
with Wicked Problems in an
Integrated Way
Philip Marcel Karr, John Alford, Martijn van der Steen and Mark van Twist
1. Introduction
All over the world governments experiment with new ways to address urgent societal
problems in a more cohesive, joined-up manner. 1 The main reason for this is that many
of the social problems citizens expect governments to address today can no longer be
tightly defined and their solution fairly readily identified. Challenges such as poverty,
global warming, immigration, ageing, drug trafficking and international terrorism are
wicked in character (cf. Rittel & Webber, 1973; APSC, 2007: 3-5), as there is neither
agreement on their nature nor on possible solutions. Wicked problems also cut across
neat boundaries and dichotomies. Tackling them therefore exceeds the problem-solving
capabilities of any individual actor.
Dealing with wicked problems is a complicated business, as there is no slick how
to-solution for doing so. They also defy the conventional problem solving approaches
of both traditional public administration and New Public Management (NPM). Wicked
problems pose a challenge to traditional public administration, as its focus on hierarchy
and system of control based on compliance, circumscribe governments ability to think
out of the box (cf. Head & Alford, 2008: 9). Traditional public administrations focus
on functional differentiation tends to create silos or stovepipes, which limit
governments ability to cope with wicked problems, that tend to transcend existing
institutional structures.
New Public Management (NPM) practices are ill-suited to deal with wicked problems
too (Christensen & Lgreid, 2007; Head & Alford, 2008: ibid.). NPM propagates
steering by performance and output indicators whereas when it comes to wicked
1
Such experiments have for example taken place in Australia (Blackman, Buick, Halligan and Marsh, 2010;
Australia, 2004; OFlynn and Wanna, 2008), Canada (Bakvis and Juillet, 2004; Peters, 1998), the
Netherlands (Bekke, Breed and de Jong, 2009; Geut, Van den Berg and Van Schaik, 2010; Van Twist, Van
der Steen, Karr and Peters, 2009), Norway (Christensen, Christensen, Lgreid and Midtb, 2010), the
United Kingdom (Clark, 2002; Bogdanor, 2005; Kavanagh and Richards, 2001; Ling, 2002; Paun, 2010) and
the United States (McGuire, 2006).
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P.M. Karr et al. / Whole of Government in Theory and Practice
problems only the desired outcome can be identified already from the outset. The
purchaser/provider and policy/delivery splits NPM propagates lead to fragmentation,
whereas dealing with wicked problems asks for an integrated perspective. A final
detrimental characteristic of NPM when it comes to dealing with wicked issues is its
tendency to favour competition between service-providers which undermines
cooperation between them.
Many governments have over the last fifteen years or so reacted to the need to deal
with wicked problems in a new manner that transcends traditional public administration
and NPM by adopting so-called joined-up or whole of government approaches to
policy-making (cf. 6, 2004; Hunt, 2005; Pollitt, 2003). These entail coming to new
ways of organizing by decoupling traditional governmental structures. It is hoped that
government will thereby become less static and more flexible or even fluid, so it can
organize itself around urgent, politically sensitive social problems and to deal with
them not in a fragmentary fashion but in a way that encapsulates all of its aspects.
Even though joined-up government and whole of government feature highly on the
political agenda already since the 1990s (Clark, 2002; Ling, 2002) both remain elusive
concepts. Despite the high profile and priority of these initiatives, there is little
systematic study into what precisely the essence of providing public services in an
integrated manner is and what its successes and limitations are (cf. Blackman et al.,
2010). There is a lack of research that goes beyond the rhetoric, although such studies
are now beginning to emerge (e.g. Blackman et al., 2010; Davies, 2009; Paun, 2010).
Joined-up government may sound catchy, inclusive and common-sense (Pollitt, 2003)
but it rather is an umbrella term instead of a coherent set of instruments and tools
(Christensen and Lgreid, 2007; Ling, 2002).
This makes it interesting to explore how joined-up government works in practice
and in different contexts. In this chapter we will do so by comparing how the
governments of Australia and the Netherlands try to deal with the wicked problems of
child abuse and immigration in an integrative way and how these approaches work out
in practice 2 . Based on this we formulate preliminary conclusions about the limitations
of dealing with wicked problems in a joined-up manner and develop ideas of what a
research agenda dealing with these issues could comprise.
2. Rationales for joining up

The coordination of government activity to overcome fragmentation and achieve
connectedness is a struggle as old as bureaucracy itself (Gulick, 1937). It is an eternal
and ubiquitous problem in public administration (6, 2004: 131) and as elusive yet
alluring as the philosophers stone (Mulgan, 2005: 187). Recently new approaches
have become en vogue to achieve horizontally and vertically co-ordinated thinking
and action (Pollitt, 2003: 35), as many of the problems governments face today have a
wicked character and hence need to be tackled in a concerted and connected effort of
all parties involved. Examples of such co-ordinated practices include the creation of
2 Of course, Australia and the Netherlands cannot totally be compared with each other as they differ in many
respects. Australia for example is a federal state, whereas the Netherlands have a unitary government. They
also have different political regimes (Westminster versus Rijnland-model). We will focus in this text on the
comparable practices they employ and not so much on contextual differences. We base our descriptions both
on primary and secondary sources (policy documents and evaluation studies) and in the Dutch case also on
data collected ourselves (cf. New Synthesis, 2011).
99
shared budgets or a pooling of accountability, as well as the establishment of crossdepartmental units or the appointment of cross-departmental ministers in an attempt to
join-up governmental institutions in order to deal with wicked problems in an
integrated whole of government approach.
Governments hope to achieve several goals through connecting individual
organizations by joining-up, for example (1) to stop policies from undermining each
other, (2) to make better use of scarce resources, (3) to create synergies by bringing
different key shareholders in a particular policy field or network together and (4) to
offer citizens seamless rather than fragmented public services (cf. Pollitt, 2003: ibid.).
In short, joined-up government seeks to produce connectedness and overcome
fragmentation by aligning the activities of separate organizations towards particular
goals of public policy. The technique used in doing this is to coordinate activities
across organizational boundaries without removing the boundaries themselves (cf. Ling,
2002: 616).
Fragmentation in the provision of public services is mainly due to two reasons, one
connected with the functional division of labour embedded in traditional public
administration and the other a result of the managerial reforms undertaken since the
1980s. The first rationale to employ whole of government approaches is to deal with
fragmentation due to departmentalism, a mix of political, policy and governmental
pathologies (Kavanagh and Richards, 2001: 1) of a government dominated by
functionally specialized departments. Such a functionalist approach has the advantage
of enabling the development of specific policy expertise on any given topic and of clear
accountability chains (Paun, 2010: 2), but can also lead to a situation in which civil
servants protect their own departmental interests and concentrate on operating in policy
silos (Kavanagh and Richards, 2001: 2; Mulgan, 2002).
A second rationale for joining up are the perverse effects of the New Public
Management (NPM) reforms of the 1980s and 1990s (Barzelay, 2001; Hood, 1991;
Lane, 2000). These have led to a pillarization of the public sector (Christensen and
Lgreid, 2007: 1060) through the fragmentation of delivery (Ling, 2002: 618),
especially by introducing a vast range of single-purpose organizations steered by
market-type mechanisms. Although intended to improve efficiency and responsiveness,
this step eventually has led to fragmentation, complexity and increased coordination
costs. In particular, the introduction of performance measurement has created
incentives to achieve individual aims rather than more system-wide objectives (De
Bruijn, 2007; cf. Ling, 2002: ibid.). Newly created specialised organizations have
proven to be effective in achieving single purposes, but lack the ability to integrate that
single issue into the broader perspective of the system.
A third rationale for joining-up lies in the broader development from government
towards governance (Pierre and Peters, 2000; Rhodes, 1997). As government lacks the
capability to deal with wicked problems singlehandedly, it has to rely on producing
services in networks (Castells, 2000; Kickert, Klijn and Koppenjan, 1997; Newman,
2005; Stoker, 1998), for example by means of co-production with other stakeholders
(Pestoff and Brandsen, 2007; Skelcher, Mathur and Smith, 2005; Alford, 2009).
Dealing with wicked problems asks governments to become increasingly connected
with other societal partners. In order to be able to do so they have to adapt their
structures, so that they are flexible enough for more collaboration.
100
In the following two paragraphs we will explore how Australian and Dutch government
dealt with the wicked problems of child abuse and of immigration and integration. We
will first characterize them as wicked problems and then describe the integrative
practices employed aimed at achieving closer connection between individual
governmental organizations.
3. Joining-up to combat child abuse

Child abuse as a wicked problem
Protecting children from physical, sexual or mental abuse has many of the features of a
wicked problem. First of all, its causes lie in a complex of factors and there is abundant
evidence that many child abusers were themselves abused as children, setting up a
cycle which is difficult to affect.
Second, in many cases it is difficult to detect, as abusive actions typically take
place in private. Complicating this is that the people most affected the children
themselves are either insufficiently articulate, or too scared, to report abuse
themselves. And even where people notify suspected cases, interpreting that data can
be tricky.
Third, solutions to child abuse involve major dilemmas. One solution is to remove
the child from its abusive parents, and place it in a state institution or with foster
parents. But there is evidence that separating children from their families is itself
psychologically damaging in the medium to long-term. The preferred alternative is to
leave the child with the family, and for social workers to work with abusive parents to
encourage a more functional family unit. But if the social workers have wrongly judged
the capacity of their clients to reform, the child will remain vulnerable, and may suffer
even worse harm.
Because of the wicked and complex character of child abuse, not one but several
governmental organizations try to tackle various aspects of the problem. This leads to
fragmentation but also acts as an incentive for connectedness as all links in the child
welfare chain rely on each other for making their work as a success.
The Australian approach
In Australia, the child protection function rests with the states rather than with the
federal government. Within each state, the relevant department is typically the one
responsible for human services, community services or family and childrens services.
Here we take the state of Victoria as an example. Victorias Department of Human
Services (DHS) is the statutory child protection authority, through its Child Protection
Service (CPS). Through a network of regional offices and funded non-government
agencies, DHS provides services for children at risk of harm, abuse or neglect,
including: investigation of child abuse; case management and support; placement and
prevention; home-based and residential care; and provision of advice to courts.
However, complicating the picture is the fact that DHS/CPS relies on the
participation of many other parties, governmental and non-governmental, in order to do
its work. This is not only the funding of agencies, as mentioned above, to provide child
protection services, but also the enlistment of other parties for related functions. One
function is the reporting of suspected child abuse or neglect. Any member of the public
101
can make such a report under the governing legislation, but certain professionals are
legally obliged to report where they suspect child abuse is occurring: medical
practitioners, nurses, teachers and police officers. Another is the application of legal
obligations. When offences occur, the police will be called in the first instance, and
may lay criminal charges or remove offenders. Then CPS will be notified and perform
follow-up functions. Also relevant is the Childrens Court, which has jurisdiction in
such cases, the Victorian Forensic Paediatric Medical Service and the Office of the
Child Safety Commissioner.
These and other factors led Victoria to establish an integrated approach to child
protection, following major reviews in 2002 (DHS, 2002) and 2005 (Office for
Children, 2005). The 2002 review led to the Department initiating a series of Family
Service Integration Projects (FSIPs), bringing together family services, child protection
workers and local services to identify families at risk and provide early intervention. A
subsequent independent evaluation found that this led to a reduction in notifications,
investigations and court protection applications (Allen Consulting Group, 2003).
However, its application was patchy, and more comprehensive reforms were made
following the Government White Paper of 2005. This entailed a strategy comprising
early intervention, clearer access for vulnerable families, stronger partnerships between
the parties involved, and integrated responses, embodied in the Child FIRST and
Integrated Family Services strategies.
The Dutch approach
In the Netherlands the Advice and Reporting Centre for Child Abuse (ARCAN) is the
central agency for requesting advice about or reporting child abuse and neglect. There
are 14 of these centres (one for each province and major urban region), which are part
of the local Youth Care Agencies (Bureaus Jeugdzorg). In confirmed cases of child
abuse the Council for Child Protection (Raad voor de Kinderbescherming), situated at
the Ministry for Justice, swings into action. The council will then request the court to
place the child under its supervision and will ask the youth care agency to designate a
guardian.
Over the last couple of years deficiencies in the child welfare sector have become a
major political issue after several appalling abuse cases went undetected. Especially the
tragic death of infant girl Savannah in 2004 at the hands of her overstressed parents led
to a political and societal outcry, as evaluations showed that it could have been
prevented if child welfare organizations had cooperated with each other. To prevent
any more cases like Savannahs a Government Commissioner for Youth Policy was
appointed in 2004. The Commissioners main task was to coordinate the activities of
organizations engaged in combating child abuse and to head Operatie Jong, a militarystyled operation aimed at radical interventions in the child welfare sector.
At the coalition talks following the 2006 elections, the leader of the left-leaning
ChristianUnion (CU), Andr Rouvoet, argued that the problems still persisted and that
further action was required. The coalition partners, next to CU also the Christian and
Social Democrats, decided that an innovative approach was needed and that Rouvoet
should, as well as being Deputy Prime Minister, also coordinate youth and family
policy in the newly created position of Programme Minister. As such a crossdepartmental minister he had his own budget (of 6.2bn in 2009) but no department or
staff of his own. His main task was to coordinate the youth and family-related policies
102
drawn up by the policy directorates of four different departments and to oversee better
cooperation between the child welfare organizations on the local level.
A comparison of both approaches
Child protection is a very difficult area to evaluate, since it entails dealing with a
wicked problem. In the Netherlands first assessments of the performance of the
Programme Minister for Youth and Family Policy draw a mixed picture. Some voices
criticize him for not managing to achieve more connectedness between the different
links in the child welfare chain whereas others conclude that it had always been a tall
order to do so within only one legislative period. Also, the fact that the Balkenende IVgovernment fell prematurely, which gave minister Rouvoet even less time to achieve
his goals, makes it difficult to assess scientifically whether the programme ministrys
integrative approach to bridging the fragmentation in the child welfare sector has to be
considered a success or a flop. Politics has already decided on this however, as the new
right-wing Dutch government abolished the post of Programme Minister for Youth and
Family after the 2010 elections. Now the child welfare portfolio is again fragmented
over several departments.
Also in Australia there is only limited evidence available about the success of
whole of government approaches to battling child abuse. However, data from Victoria
suggests that joined up services do lead to better outcomes. The previously mentioned
review of the FSIPs found not only a reduction in notifications, but also a 10%
reduction in investigations and a 17% reduction in court protection applications. There
is also evidence that the 2005 reforms, with their strong emphasis on joined up working,
have had some if not thoroughgoing success. A consultants survey in 2009 asked
managers in the services in question to indicate whether these services work as part of
a coherent system, with shared goals for children and families. A significantly higher
proportion felt this was more the case since the reforms than before them (KPMG,
2009). Among key benefits they perceived were improved processes and a more childcentred and family-focused approach.
It might be difficult to evaluate the successes of both approaches just now, but we
already have quite an idea of the challenges faced in trying to overcome fragmentation
by (re)connecting the different links in the child welfare chain. In Australia more than
two-thirds of managers surveyed agreed for example they had faced barriers in working
in childrens best interests. The most commonly cited were: parents and families
(whose co-operation the child protection staff required); workload pressures and
resources; and systems, processes and procedures (KPMG, 2009).
In the Netherlands we learnt from our interviews with civil servants working at the
Programme Ministry that incompatible IT and HR systems upheld fragmentation. Most
of the civil servants that worked for the Programme Minister also still worked for their
own ministers and departments. Because of this they not only had to work with
incompatible IT systems; some even told us they suffered from double binds and
confused loyalties.
In the Netherlands there also were challenges on the political level as the
Programme Minister found it complicated to exert his authority, even though he was
Deputy Prime Minister. He had to deal with bureaucratic politics as well as with turf
wars. The scope of his portfolio, which had looked so clear-cut on paper was rather
fuzzy in practice. He often had to negotiate with his cabinet colleagues about who
should take the lead in processes and he constantly had to defend his turf against other
103
ministers who tried to score points by tackling the same issues as him. The Programme
Minister also found that he lacked the political authority to force the organizations
working in the child welfare sector to cooperate with him and to collaborate with each
other. All he could do was to nudge them and hope that the persuasive force of his
arguments would eventually sway them into working together.
Interestingly enough there were no such political problems in the Victorian case,
where the mandate for working in a holistic fashion in combating child abuse was clear
and authoritative. It is an interesting question whether this was due to the fact that the
mandate was vested in a traditional Minister for Children in this case and whether the
Dutch programme minister was hampered in his attempts to overcome fragmentation
and create connectedness due to his status as an outsider in traditional Dutch
bureaucracy.
4. Joining-up for dealing with immigration and integration

Immigration and integration as a wicked problem
The immigration of migrants and their subsequent integration into society is a wicked
problem for many governments in the Western world. How it manifests itself, as well
as how it is tackled, differs greatly from country to country. In Australia illegal
immigration is the key issue, whereas the Netherlands rather struggle with the
integration of non-Western migrants, especially those from Muslim countries.
For Australia, illegal immigration has emerged as a growing problem since the
1990s. Australia is an attractive destination for migrants, many of them refugees from
political oppression or strife in countries such as Iraq or Afghanistan. An active peoplesmuggling industry has emerged to take advantage of these circumstances, utilizing
crowded boats of dubious seaworthiness in journeys through and from near neighbours
such as Indonesia and Malaysia.
This problem is a challenging one for the Australian government. For a start, it is
said to undermine Australias immigration system, in which immigration officials
assess applicants for entry on the basis of considered criteria such as entrants skills,
family reunions or, in the case of refugees, compassionate grounds. Illegal immigrants
are said by some, especially on the conservative side of politics, to be queue-jumpers
who displace legitimate applicants. Moreover, Australians adopt an ambivalent stance
toward illegal immigration, believing on the one hand that persons entering the country
must do so only with permission, but on the other generally that they should be treated
fairly and decently.
For the Netherlands, as part of the Schengen-zone, illegal immigration is a lesser
problem but there is a fierce debate about the integration of non-Western immigrants,
especially those from Muslim-countries. Right-wing populist politicians claim that the
lack of integration of this group poses a threat to Dutch democracy, connecting it with
other wicked social problems such as crime and the liveability of certain
neighbourhoods. Such criticisms have helped them to gain considerable power in
parliamentary elections since 2002 but have also contributed to a climate which is in
the eyes of some Islamophobic. Integration is now seen as one of the most crucial tasks
for Dutch government.
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The Australian approach

The agency with the primary responsibility for immigration into Australia is the
Department of Immigration and Citizenship (DIAC). It has established an Intelligence
Network to combat unauthorized arrivals, comprising onshore intelligence officers
deployed in its regional offices to collect, analyse and report on people smuggling and
irregular migration, and 30 offshore specialist compliance officers attached to key
overseas posts to identify and respond to immigration malpractice, working closely
with local police and immigration officials. DIAC also employs Airline Liaison
Officers at Australian international airports, to work with airlines and airport staff. In
addition, DIAC operates a series of detention centres, usually run by contractors, in
which apprehended illegal immigrants are held pending assessment and/or repatriation.
A number of other agencies have a major interest in preventing illegal entries, but
not from an immigration perspective. One is the Australian Customs Service, which is
responsible for border protection by overseeing lawful movement into and out of
Australia. It employs 5,500 staff, and performs passenger screening to highlight
individuals who may pose an immigration, security or quarantine threat.
Another is the Department of Defence, which is charged with exercising vigilance
about threats to Australias territory and if necessary deploying aerial or naval force.
The Customs Service has joined with Defence to establish the Border Patrol Command,
a partnership which operates as a single maritime surveillance, response and
interception agency, covering 15 million square kilometres of sea area. It guards
against unauthorised entry including people smuggling, but also a range of other issues,
such as illegal exploitation of natural resources, prohibited imports/exports, piracy, and
pollution threats. It relies on a Coastwatch Fleet operated by Customs, Royal
Australian Air Force surveillance aircraft, and Royal Australian Navy vessels.
Also involved are the Australian Federal Police and the Australian Quarantine
Inspection Service. Moreover, the Border Protection Command liaises with the
Australian Maritime Safety Authority in search and rescue. In addition, various
departments have a policy interest in border protection, including those for agriculture
and fisheries, attorney-general, environment, industry, and transport, as well as the
Prime Ministers Department. In all, around 20 federal government agencies are
involved in the area. On top of that, a number of agencies in the states play a role, such
as police or welfare services. Finally, the overseas connections necessitate liaison with
various government agencies, such as police, customs, foreign affairs, trade and
immigration, in countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, Sri Lanka and China
(especially Hong Kong).
These forms of connectedness are driven by three factors. One is interdependency: it is simply not possible for some of the agencies to perform their own
role without calling on the participation of other agencies. For example, DIAC cannot
interdict people-smugglers without the active participation of the Border Patrol
Command. Another is the economics of scope. Because of the vast distances involved,
it does not make sense for each of the agencies on its own to operate a maritime and
aerial surveillance service; hence they have established the Border Patrol Command to
serve multiple functions simultaneously. The third is what we might call policy interconnection: a number of agencies are concerned that the operational side of border
protection has policy implications which need managing. For instance, the AttorneyGenerals Department might be concerned about the human rights implications of the
105
operation of detention centres, and seek to bring policy prescriptions to bear on the
situation.
What makes the problem even more challenging is that it is quite difficult, or at
least costly, for the government to detect and interdict illegal immigrants. Australias
northern coastline spans 36,000 kilometres, with sparsely populated hinterlands
comprising largely arid deserts or tropical jungle. Intelligence about planned voyages
from places such as Indonesia is difficult for Australian officials to obtain in overseas
communities with different cultures. These and other complexities dictate that the
governments response to illegal immigration necessarily involves multiple agencies.
The Dutch approach
In the 1960s and 1970s the Netherlands (as many other industrialized Western
countries) attracted migrant workers, mainly from countries such as Turkey, Italy and
Morocco, to fulfil functions in its heavy industries. Whereas it was expected that they
would leave again after some years, many of these guest workers eventually decided to
stay in Holland for ever and to also bring their families into the country. This made it
not only necessary to develop an immigration policy but also a strategy for integrating
new citizens with diverse ethnical backgrounds into Dutch society. The post of junior
minister in the Justice Department was created to deal with the subject. For a long time,
however, integration remained a voluntary issue in what later became known as a
multiculturalist perspective in which there was room for more than one dominant
culture.
This changed at around the end of the 1990s, as, again like in many other countries,
society began to adopt a more critical perspective on immigration or, to be more
precise, the alleged lack of integration by non-Western migrants. This led in 2002, after
general elections in which integration and immigration was the key issue, to the
appointment of a Minister for Immigrants Affairs and Integration at the Justice
Department with the task to adopt a tougher stance on immigration and to make sure
that migrants conformed to Dutch culture. She did this by introducing the first
immigration law that contained a legal obligation to integrate.
After the parliamentary elections of 2007, the new ChristianSocial Democrat
coalition government committed itself to a less hostile stance on immigration, one of
the main issues of the Social Democrats election campaign. It appointed a Programme
Minister to deal with integration issues from a broader perspective. This was done in
the belief that integration was much more than only a legal issue but that it was
intrinsically linked with quality of life issues in inner-city communities. These entailed
high levels of unemployment, a Balkanization of society, problems with drugs, other
forms of criminality and antisocial behaviour and the deterioration of public spaces.
Because of these links with other topics, the Programme Minister was expected to look
at integration from a holistic perspective.
As the second biggest party in the coalition, the Social Democrats could demand
that they should be allowed to provide the new program minister. Her political
authority was strengthened by making her responsible too for greater quantities of
high-quality and affordable social housing, as these issues were seen as being closely
related to integration and liveability.
In 2007, Ella Vogelaar was sworn in as Programme Minister for Housing,
Communities and Integration (WWI). Just as her colleague Minister Rouvoet, she had
her own budget (of about 3.7bn in 2010) but no civil servants and department of her
106
own. She was made responsible for about a third of the policy directorates situated at
the Ministry for Spatial Planning and the Environment (which had in the past been
responsible for social housing). Even though they now were headed by a Programme
Minister, most of these directorates still more or less functioned along the lines of a
traditional department. In this respect Programme Minister Vogelaar did not differ
much from a more traditional minister without portfolio. But the newly established socalled Programme Directorate for Communities was another story. Its main task was to
come up with an integrated strategy to overcome fragmentation between various public
service providers and transform an indicated forty boroughs (the so-called
aandachtswijken) into communities where people had more opportunities and felt
safe. This was done by adopting an integrative perspective, meant to take all the
different problems of the boroughs into account, and by cooperating on the ground with
local governments as well as with the semi-public housing corporations.
A comparison of both approaches
Initiatives tackling illegal immigration are challenging to evaluate, since illegal entrants
of course seek to conceal their existence. It is also subject to factors which are quite
outside the control of DIAC or indeed the Australian government, such as the factors
driving demand for entry into Australia, or the anti-people-smuggling strategies of
other countries. The general picture is that joined up working has been more successful
in addressing information-asymmetry than in influencing factors outside Australias
control. There have been continuing fluctuations in the numbers of incursions into
Australian waters, but once they approach Australian territory they are almost
universally detected and interdicted, thanks to the co-ordinated approach led by the
Border Command. It should also be acknowledged that DIAC is building better
linkages with Indonesian and other Asian authorities to detect and anticipate attempts
to sail from those countries to Australia. But the greater geographic and jurisdictional
distance from them means that this is a slow process.
Not only are attempts to deal with illegal immigration difficult to evaluate, but the
same also applies to Dutch initiatives aimed at fostering integration and enhancing the
liveability in neighbourhoods. This is mostly due to the fact that all these efforts rather
relate to outcomes than to outputs, which makes it difficult (some might even argue
impossible) to assess their success by means of traditional evaluator models (such as
means-ends analyses). But in the public discussion the efforts undertaken by the
Programme Minister for WWI have mostly been criticized, especially by commentators
from the right who thought that dealing with immigration and integration in this
manner was too soft an approach.
The Programme Ministers attempt to overcome fragmentation in dealing with the
integration of migrants and other liveability questions in a holistic manner also
encountered several political and operational difficulties. On the political level she had
trouble exerting her authority. She first of all found it hard to persuade her cabinet
colleagues to help her achieve her goals. But she also found it hard to exert her
authority within her own department, where the more traditional directorates were
undermining the work of the Programme Directorate for Communities. They were
hesitant to share resources and claimed that they could tackle the quality of life issues
in communities much better than the Programme Directorate could. It seems that the
107
rhetoric of joined-up government was (again) no match to the power of fragmented

structures.
On the operational level problems arose for Vogelaar due to incompatible IT, HR
and financial systems. The Programme Directorate for Communities only had a small
own staff but worked with civil servants seconded by other directorates under the
purview of the minister as well as with civil servants from other departments. Because
of this they not only suffered from double binds and confused loyalties but also had to
work with incompatible IT systems. For example they simultaneously had to work with
two different e-mail accounts. This led to high transaction costs and disincentivized
collaboration. In general, all the systems that should facilitate working together in a
joined-up fashion in order to overcome fragmentation rather frustrated this noble goal,
which meant that (especially at the beginning) valuable time was lost.
Funding was a major problem as well. The coalition partners had failed to come to
an agreement on how to finance the agenda of Programme Minister Vogelaar. They
had planned to claim the necessary funds from their municipal and private partners in
the communities approach but those refused, which led to a lot of bad blood both at the
department and at these partners. Due to that political battle, which was only decided in
a hard-fought victory for the Programme Minister, the programme was left almost
entirely without funding for its first year of service. The Programme Minister was
seriously handicapped by decisions and unproductive actions by predecessors and
coalition negotiators: a crucial chapter of the Programme Ministries history proved to
have been written before the Ministry was actually operational. By the time Vogelaar
assumed office, much of her budgetary space had already vanished in a conflict she had
not been a part of herself. And her most crucial partners in the field the housing
corporations and municipalities were frustrated with the Programme, even before the
Programme Minister had taken any action or had taken any decision herself at all.
5. Conclusions, recommendations and issues for further research

In this chapter we tried to tackle the major lacuna in much of the literature on whole of
government: many of the texts already written on the subject are proclamations of the
necessity to tackle wicked societal problems by working together in a joined-up
manner but do not study what actually happens when this is attempted. In the ideal,
organizational fragmentation is overcome by introducing methods of connectedness: in
order to solve wicked issues (that share the fundamental characteristic that they are
hardly ever solved), government attempts to organize a connected approach.
Specialized organizations, various professionals, and sometimes even different
territorial entities, are set up to work coherently and coordinated on an issue that is
framed as a whole (in our cases immigration and integration and child abuse).
Functional differentiation is not set aside, but it is overcome through clever, intelligent
combinations in connective arrangements (such as program ministries, task forces,
project teams, bundled organizations, networks or sometimes specialized
departments/ministries). Such an approach holds on to the many promising elements of
territorial and functional differentiation and overcomes its downsides. This chapter
does not necessarily criticize that argument. We have merely extended the argument to
the level of practical and empirical analysis. So that it becomes possible to not only
have a debate on the theoretical soundness of the argument, and the likeliness of that
theoretical argument to produce positive practical results, but to assess the practical
108
implications of that theory where it has been put into practice. Our comparison of cases
from Australia and the Netherlands does not provide final/definitive answers to the
questions posed here, but it sets out a direction for further research. And this brief
analysis does provide us with some interesting observations. We will first sum op the
overall conclusions of the cases and then turn to the implications for further research.
Conclusions
It is rather difficult to come up with hard, quantitative assessments about the
effectiveness of cooperation in the cases we studied, as measuring the effectiveness of
whole of government approaches is no exact science. We therefore cannot say
definitively whether the connective approach has been successful in solving the wicked
issues, or if the approach has been more efficient and effective then the more
fragmented attempts that were made in earlier years. Where successes have been
achieved, it often is unclear whether the same could not have been reached by using
another approach, or against higher or lower costs. But our analysis is about something
different. The cases in which joined-up government were applied were wicked, which
makes resolving them difficult by definition. Therefore we should not focus on the
question whether a certain issue has definitely been resolved but rather on whether the
situation at hand has improved, beyond a point that could also have been achieved
otherwise. Joining up and connecting the various functions around a single wicked
issue is not about solutions, but about setting in motion a positive dynamic, the
emergence of promising initiatives, responding quickly to unexpected turns and making
progress on indicators that may appear only as the process moves along. This is an
important first conclusion for future attempts to evaluate collaborative ways of working
in government and to assess the effectiveness of interconnectivity. There is a need for a
different sort of evaluatory framework, as a simplistic means-ends assessment of such
practices does not work. It does not fit the question and says rather little about the
added value of working in a different manner. And that is more than just a conclusion
about measurement: performance measurement is also feedback that is being used to
allocate means in the organization and to set out strategies for problem solving. If
performance measurement is not aligned with connective approaches to wicked
problems, and if the wickedness of problems is not integrated into the measurement,
any attempt at connective organizing is doomed. It will not produce the expected
results and it cannot account for the means that have been spend.
However, with that said, there is much to be learned from the cases in this chapter.
We have identified several questions and topics in our case studies that had a strong
influence on the performance of the whole of government approaches we studied. We
see a difference between topics which are more political and topics that mainly are
operational. While it is common to think that political questions are more
consequential than operational issues, we found that they both influenced our cases to
more or less the same degree.
First of all, our cases suggest as well that it is important to use whole of
government approaches with prudence. Often expectations are high and collaboration is
announced as reform, innovation or a crucial step towards solving an urgent societal
problem. This high profile approach is often necessary, as cooperation will not develop
without it. Urgency and support, as well as political steering and attention, are needed
to be able to implement the organizational transformations that are necessary. Much
political capital and organizational capacity is needed in order to connect the
109
fragmented and institutionalized functional entities working on the issue. A sense of

urgency can provide and/or legitimate such an effort, and helps the connective
approach take flight. But the downside to all that attention is that expectations are
inevitably raised by the political attention and that the ability of government to solve
the wicked problem is overstated. Wicked issues are at play after all, which can by
definition only be resolved with difficulty. Most issues are on the agenda because they
have proven to be almost resistant to government intervention. They are intangible and
fuzzy and the possibility that all parties involved will be satisfied with how they are
dealt with is virtually nil. Our cases demonstrate this dilemma, especially the cases
from the Netherlands: much is achieved but many challenges still remain. Living
conditions of immigrants have improved and life in the boroughs is probably better
then it was four years ago, before the approach. But it has not solved the issue, at least
not to the level of the expectations that was raised. An air of disappointment surrounds
the practices we studied. This could easily lead to a situation in which whole of
government approaches are generically criticized, even though it was the overstretched
expectations that led to most of the disappointment about their performance.
One of the paradoxes of joining up seems to be that in order to connect the
previously fragmented parts of the whole, large amounts of political and organizational
capital are needed. That raises expectations beyond the level that can be matched by
actual performance of the connected arrangements. While the wicked nature of the
issues would imply very modest expectations of any governmental attempt at
intervention, the connective approach requires a high profile, a politicized strategy, the
promise of a once and for all solution and an air of increased effectiveness and
sometimes also efficiency. Bringing about connective governance arrangements is
therefore not only about appropriate organization, it also involves managing
expectations to a level that can reasonably be reached, and possibly even the
marketing of results and achievements of the approach
Reflection
Our cases show that joined-up government still is work in progress. There is much to
be learned, and most of that learning comes from doing. We therefore come up with
some reflections and practical recommendations for organizing connective approaches
to wicked issues.
First of all, it seems crucial to synchronize or homogenize the supporting functions
of the organizations working together with each other. Fragmentation implies that
organizations have organized their own set of supporting systems and attempts at
connecting processes often collided with the limited compatibility of the various
supporting systems. This concerned ICT, but also staff systems, access to e-mail
servers from other networks, contract forms, financial administration, accountability
procedures and even more mundane issues such as access to be able to work at
different government locations. To be prepared for any form of cooperation, we
advocate the creation of not one system per cooperation but rather plea for the
introduction of systems which are resilient and flexible enough to also accommodate
yet unknown forms of cooperation. In the short run, our cases demonstrate the
necessity to appoint so-called harbor masters or quarter masters whose responsibility
is to help to install new forms of organizational cooperation and to facilitate them to
find their ways in their new surroundings. In the long run, other systems will be
110
necessary, which should be resilient enough to also accommodate yet unforeseen forms
of cooperation between organizations.
Secondly, it is important not to overstress the importance of homogenizing
organizations. The whole point about collaboration and connection is that the cooperating organizations are different, and seek to realize benefits through dovetailing
those differences. The problem is not that organizations are different, or that they have
specialized in a particular functional or territorial domain. The problem is that such
specialization has evolved into a fragmented system that is unable to connect at a level
is necessary to address wicked issues that require an integral and coordinated approach.
It is crucial that they remain different, but it is just as crucial that they work together.
The Australian DIAC was not hindered by the mere fact that there are different
countries in the world, but that it was unable to integrate these other countries in its
approach. The key intervention in the Australian immigration case therefore was that
DIAC has managed to connect its neighboring countries with its own approach: it has
not synchronized immigration laws and it has not violated or adapted any territorial
integrity of its neighbors, but has simply managed to overcome that fragmentation
and connect the various entities into one specific arrangement. The same argument can
be made for the functional fragmentation in that same case. All actors involved have
not ceased any activities, nor have they been merged or integrated into new institutions.
What they have done however, is that they have begun to synchronized their activities
and connected their processes. And they have initiated learning cycles, so that the
inevitable loop-holes in the system can be closed down swiftly and effectively. New
tactics for illegal entry are developed every day, since human traffickers and other
parties have huge stakes in that activity. The connective effort has not managed to
prevent entering once and for all, but it has developed a means to make it more difficult
and to respond quickly to new tactics.
Working together requires an agreed mandate from those with political or
operational authority. At an inter-agency level within Australia, the goal of interdicting
illegal immigration had strong support in the political environment, and the Border
Patrol Command had powerful authorization. At the the inter-country level, Australia
cannot patrol outside its own waters without a proper mandate by its neighbors. So how
do such mandates come about? Mandates could draw on shared interests, but more
realistically it is likely to represent an accommodation or trade-off between different
interests, designed to capitalize on inter-dependent specializations. That requires for
organizations or leaders involved in building connective arrangements that they are
able to identify such inter-dependent specializations and trade-offs between interests.
They need to be able to build coalitions, between parties that are not necessarily after
the same goal. The cases in The Netherlands are rather bad examples of such coalitionbuilding. Partners in both the Centers for Youth and Family and in the immigration
and integration cases were dragged in to the collaboration. They were told to cooperate,
without much notion of their particular interests. It was only during the process of
collaboration that something of a connective spirit started to grow between the various
organizations. Collaboration requires effort from all organizations: not only in bringing
them together in one system, but also in keeping them motivated and committed to the
collaborative effort. These are two very different sides of the same coin.
Organizations will have to invest in organizational forms that allow them to remain
different, without missing the opportunities of working together. We argue here that
this is not so much an issue of the will to co-operate, but more than that an
111
organizational issue. The issue is not to stress the importance of collaboration, but to
build an organization that is resilient and fit to co-operate with other organizations.
Thirdly, we argue that working across boundaries does not necessarily save money,
even though that often is the credo surrounding many a partnership. Successful
collaboration across departmental boundaries not only takes time but also costs money.
Of course, money can be saved concerning supporting functions through economies of
scale and other synergies, for example by establishing Shared Service Centers or by
pooling. However, in the cases we studied, new ways of working and of collaborating
across departmental boundaries were entered into not to save money but rather to create
innovative ways of addressing urgent societal problems. Budgetary constraints are not
the ideal argument for setting up collaborative efforts, since they tend to lead to
resource-claiming rather than sharing behavior by agencies. Connective government
should be about providing more value for money and improving quality of services, not
about saving the tax-payer money. It is not about doing more with less, it is about
doing things differently.
Fourthly, the whole of government approach should be more than symbolic
politics and should go beyond the rhetoric. Promises about joined-up working and
organizing government around problems are easy to make. In the Netherlands, the
connective attempts were presented as political projects and political victories to
certain parties. Societal unrest can temporarily be eased in this manner but we see this
as a dangerous route to take. If government fails to suit its actions to its words, citizens
trust in its problem solving capacity may continue to drop. In that sense, it is risky to
organize around problems. If the approach fails, trust in government may be lower than
it currently is, as citizens get discouraged in the governments inability to break
through the organizational barriers it has organized for itself.
Issues for further scientific research
There also are some lessons to be drawn for further academic research on joined-up
government: (1) More attention should be paid to the practical effects of whole of
government. What are its beneficial and negative effects and under which conditions do
they manifest themselves? The conceptual debate which has so far been led should be
enriched by research on what happens in practice. And (2), which new ways of
evaluating the success of a policy program can be devised that account for the
difficulties of measuring in quantitative terms whether or not joined-up government has
helped in tackling a certain wicked issue? Our cases show that it is difficult to assess
the efficiency and effectivity of joined-up ways of working. It is obvious that this
should be done but it also is important to utilize the right tools, measurements and
indicators for the job. This point should be developed further.
The task for the future will be to keep on experimenting with innovative ways of
tackling wicked problems by cooperating across boundaries. Science can play an
important role in properly evaluating the advances that are being made and help
governments to understand and tackle the challenges of working in a joined-up manner.
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114

IOS Press, 2012
doi:10.3233/978-1-60750-998-1-114
Visual Connections: the Power of the

Visual in the Policy Process in Two Dutch
Cases
Rebecca Moody and Victor Bekkers
1. Introduction
More and more dimensions of contemporary societies are infused with visual
material. This is partly due to the increasing ubiquity of media and technologies,
which has enabled the creation and distribution of images in new and innovative
ways. Next to traditional ways such as television or photography we now see
innovations in technologies to create and distribute images, for example, youtube,
photobucket, mms and simulations or serious gaming. Such processes have led to the
emergence of the term visual culture that denotes this increasing importance of
visual material.
These developments in which the visual has been penetrating society deeper and
deeper have not let the policy process unaffected. In policy making, agenda-setting,
decision making and evaluation, images have become increasingly important. In
practices of e-government it becomes clear that citizens help co-produce these images
and that governments can demonstrate events to citizens through electronic channels.
As we will argue, this visual culture is a fragmented culture in nature, moving
forward chaotically and often through different groups and channels of
communication creating a fragmented society, producing a gap between different
groups in society, not at the least a gap between policy and its surrounding world.
Even though this culture is fragmented in nature, the visual itself has also the ability
to connect policy to its surroundings, using a language, a frame, that all understand.
Therefore we like to pose the question how, and under which conditions the emerging
visual culture, in two cases, can account for greater connectivity. To do so we will
explore and analyze what the influence of images and visual material is on the policy
process.
In order to understand the relation between images and the policy process it is
first important to understand the notion of visual culture and what it entails. This will
be discussed in section 2. The influence of visual culture and images on the policy
process then can be analysed through a process of framing, which will be elaborated
on in section 3. In order to analyze the case studies a theoretical framework will be
built and a framework for analysis will be derived from this. This will be done in
section 4. Next the case studies can be described and an analysis of them on the basis
R. Moody and V. Bekkers / Visual Connections: The Power of the Visual in the Policy Process
115
of the framework of analysis will follow in section 5. Finally some conclusions can be
drawn.
2. Visual Culture and visual technology

Pictures play a role in the functioning of nowadays society. We could even argue that
our daily life is shaped by all kinds of pictures which create a variety of new and
returning visual events. From the moment that we get up, go to work or school, until
we return to our homes. Hence, we live in and through images (Lester, 2003). We do
not only consume these images but increasingly we are producing these images. We
take photographs or make small films with our digital camera and mobile phone, put
them on youtube or send them to our friends with whom we twitter. We create our
own website or even blog. This omnipresent penetration of these visual events in our
daily life and work has been described in terms of an emerging visual culture.
A number of characteristics can be attributed to visual culture. First, textuality
does no longer play a dominant role in the way we communicate. This does not imply
the printed word has lost its significance. It only emphasizes that images have become
increasingly important. (Mitchell, 1994; Mirzoeff, 1999). A second characteristic
refers to the post modern character of visual culture. Visual culture is in essence very
(hyper) fragmented and disrupted (Mirzoeff, 1999:3). According to some scholars
nowadays society can be defined as an endless stream of divergent and convergent
(thus) multiple pictures with which people are confronted (Frissen, 1996; Castells,
1996). Thirdly, in nowadays society there is seems to be an overload of visual events
(Mirzoeff, 1999). There is an abundant stream of images that all try to catch our
attention by using their imaginary power (Mirzoeff, 1999). However, the question is
how these pictures come together in the mind of people, how they create meaningful
experiences, how they are read (Mirzoeff, 1999). This brings us to the fourth
characteristic. Visual culture also focuses our attention on how events are being
perceived. Through looking we negotiate social relationships and we give meaning to
things and events. To willfully look, or not, is to exercise choice and influence
(Sturken & Cartwright, 2001: 10). Visual culture refers to changes in looking
practices. However, these looking practices do not take place in a vacuum. They also
influence belief systems, social practices and power relations in a certain social and
political context (Sturken & Cartwright, 2001). Fifthly, there is a close link between
the emergence of this visual culture and the emergence of new, digital media. New
media are no longer perceived as mere channels of communication. They are
conceived as an infrastructure of the living environment that facilitates action,
interaction and give meaning and understanding through the creation and distribution
of visual events (Marcum, 2002). Unique for this infrastructure are four
characteristics stimulating the penetration of visual events. First, visual events are
linked and can therefore be shared more easily (Marcum, 2002:194). Secondly, we
can increasingly witness or experience events. They are no longer reported on.
Thirdly, there is interactivity. Digital photos and streaming videos are no longer fixed
entities. They can be split up in pieces (bites and bites) and changed, manipulated and
mixed with other photos and videos (Marcum, 2002:194). Fourthly, there is randomaccessibility. People have access to visual events and can create visual events at any
116
moment, just as they want. One is no longer depended on fixed broadcasting schemes.
As a result of these characteristics, visual culture is not static but dynamic. This is the
fifth characteristic. The dynamic nature of visual culture can best be understood by
the notion of real time. The internet and webcams present us a real time image of the
daily behavior in public squares, in kinder gardens, or give us a real time picture of
the military advance of the American troops when invading Iraq in 2003 (Mirzoeff,
1999). Through digitalized mass media local pictures can have a global impact,
because they can be globally shared.
3. Framing and the Policy Process

The emergence of a visual culture with its characteristics may have a profound impact
on the policy process. Priorly policy was often based on text and numbers, now visual
technologies are increasingly used to inform policy makers or the public, possible
creating connections between groups. On the basis of this information policy can be
made, evaluations can be conducted and the public can be informed on decisions. In
order to understand the impact of visual culture and the images the concept of framing
must be understood.
Framing is the process in which issues are defined and redefined with the aim to
obtain popular support (Snow et al., 1986). The process of framing of these issues
occurs when actors frame problems, solutions and results in a way others can
correspond with. In other words, they use a frame to connect with others. It is
important to understand that around a certain policy problem or solution actors
identify with one another within the meaning they have given to the problem or
solution through the image they use. This identification with a group occurs through a
process of frame alignment. Frames are the schemes of interpretation an individual
holds; this is how the individual interprets the occurrences in its surroundings. Frame
alignment refers to the process of getting the frames of individuals to connect. In this
way an individual can easily identify himself with a group; other members of the
group have the same frame and interpret all occurrences in the same way (Snow et al.,
1986). This means that in the arena actors will use images to frame their preferred
solution and try to have other actors identify with this frame.
When linking this concept of framing to the policy process and the impact of
visuality on this process we assume that the content of a policy program is being
considered as the result of an ongoing process of conflict, negotiation, exchange,
compromise and the exercise of coercive power between different actors or advocacy
coalitions (Sabatier, 1988). They have different interests and possess different
resources (e.g. competences, money, knowledge, information, technology, contacts)
from which they derive power. Furthermore, the interests they have color the way in
which they define a public problem as being relevant as well as what possible
measures have to be taken and implemented in order to deal with this problem.
Within this political approach of the policy process we recognize an arena
(Lasswell, 1936; Lowi, 1972; Allison, 1971; Crozier & Friedberg, 1980). The
shaping of policy program is a continuous battle between stakeholders that try to
protect their interest, their frames of references and their values. These stakeholders
meet each other in different arenas which can be closely or loosely coupled. In this
117
arena politics is just one of the relevant actors. There are many relevant actors, who
come not only from the public sector but also come from other societal domains
(private sector, civic society). In this arena groups can either connect with each other,
forming coalitions, or break connections and stand against eachother.
Reasoning from this political approach a policy program can be described as the
temporarily codification of the consensus between relevant stakeholders in an arena or
network, which also codifies the temporary power relations in this arena or network.
In this arena in which different actors try to convince one another and the public
of their values, norms and ideas for policy they use images to frame their ideas. They
can use images to tell their story.
When these images in the policy arena are used by different actors these images
need to be created and distributed. Actors in the arena can create their own images in
order to strengthen their cause or they can use images made by others. They can
choose between a range of technologies to create and distribute the image. Actors can
public a photograph, a film or a simulation. They can do so by broadcasting it on
television, publishing it in a newspaper or by uploading it on the internet. The
technology used for the creation and distribution of the image is important in itself.
The choice for a certain technology may be dependent on financial or technical
resources, since the creation of a simulation or animation might be difficult and
expensive. But the choice for a certain technology may also depend on the values the
actor attributes to the technology.
Summarizing the previous it can be stated that more and more dimensions of
contemporary societies are infused with visual material. These developments and
innovations in which the visual has been penetrating society deeper and deeper have
not let the policy process unaffected. In policy making, agenda-setting, decision
making and evaluation, images have become increasingly important. While we
assume that actors contest within a policy arena over different norms, values and
ideas on policy process they use these images to strengthen their point. They do so by
using the image to frame their problems, solutions, ideas and values in order to gain
public and political support.
4. Conceptual Framework
In order to analyze the influence of images on the policy process a conceptual
framework needs to be developed along which lines this influence can be assessed.
Since in this chapter we will assess the impact of the images used in two cases in
which a reconstruction was made of an incident the conceptual framework will be
limited so to analyse reconstructions.
Before looking at the image, the technology or the incident itself it is important to
understand that policy is not made in a vacuum. Therefore it is important to
understand that this occurs within a societal and political context. Furthermore it is
important to look at the national mood of a societal setting, within our research on
public policy making it is important to understand what issues are already on the
societal agenda, what the history of the issue is, how groups of people connect with
one another and what the political climate it. It is important to realize that all policy
processes occur within this context, and that the context might determine how certain
118
images are framed and received and how certain groups connect or disconnect with
each other.
Next to the context the arena itself must be looked at. There exist different actors
in a policy arena, these actors all might have different and possibly conflicting
interests (Orlikowski, 2000). In this arena they will battle each other while trying to
push their stakes forward in their attempt to obtain agenda status for their issue, or to
design policy in the way that it suits their interests. (Ostrom et al., 1994) For this
reason, in our research it is very important to define who the relevant actors in an
arena are and what their interests are. But the arena goes further than this, coalitions
between groups of actors might be made and actors might have histories with one
another, therefore also the interactions and relations between groups of actors are
important to distinguish.
We can now move to the image itself. In each of the two cases described a
reconstruction has been made of an incident. However, these different reconstructions
are very different in what they show, how they show it and how the image was
created. A process of framing occurs here while the sender tries to construct his
message in the form of an image. He will have to decide in which way he will show
his message, what the image will include, and what he will exclude, what he wants to
emphasize and what he wants to place to the background. The assumptions he makes
on how the image will be received are important as well. The frame the sender is
trying to create might be part of a larger, existing frame. Furthermore the sender or
creator of the image needs the technology to create the image. The choice for a certain
technology is important for the frame of the image. Each technology could have
advantages and disadvantages. First he will have to select which technologies are
accessible to him in terms of financial resources, access power and technical
knowledge. Secondly he will have to decide which technology suits his purpose best,
for example, if he would want to simulate something, a photograph is not the best
choice. This is dependent on the way he constructed the image, the frame used to
construct the image will for a large part determine which technology suits the senders
purpose best. Also the sender will have to anticipate how he will distribute the image.
The production technology used might limit his possibilities of distributing later. For
example, an animation is more difficult to distribute than a photographs, since more
media can distribute photographs. Finally the sender will have to take into account
how the technology is shaped, how people will view his image on the basis of the
chosen technology (Bijker, 1995). For example, most people consider a photograph as
a far more trustworthy source of representing reality than a drawing.
After the image is produced and distributed another process of framing occurs.
Before this point the framing which occurs only involves the sender of the image, he
decides which message he would want to send, how he will do so and how the image
is supposed to look. He makes assumptions on how the image will be received and
hopes the frame and the message he would want to send across is understood the same
way by the receivers. Now, after distributing the image a new process of framing
occurs this time on the side of the receivers. First of all the image is seen as a frame or
the image is seen as part of a larger frame. The issue the receiver sees might be linked
to issues in society the receiver is already familiar with and therefore connect the
receiver with the senders cause. The image and the frame going with it might put
forward new problems, alternatives and solutions in the eyes of the receiver.
119
The actors will use the image and the frame to convince other actors that they should
join their cause and push forward new ideas fitting their values. The different groups
of actors, all with their own interests, will interact with one another in an attempt to
push their ideas forward, they will use the frame connected to the image, and the
image itself to do so. In this way the image becomes a source of power used by actors
to influence others and to influence policy.
Making this more concrete, this should be understood in the following way. The
actors in the arena might have different views on how to handle a certain problem, the
definition of the problem may be a source of discussion but also the possible
solutions. They all would want to come to a policy which fits their individual interests
best. Therefore they interact with each other, and try to convince, manipulate or
persuade other actors that their idea is the best idea. The image then can be used to do
so, to convince, manipulate or persuade others.
Following this line of reasoning we can make an analysis for each case, this will be
done by analysing the variables mentioned above. An oversight of these can be found
in the table below.
Variable
Questions
Societal and political context
How do society and politics deal with this issue?
Policy arena
what are relevant actors and their interests?
Framing
who is the sender and what are his interests?

which technologies are used?
what is the function of the image in terms of
framing?
Distribution
how is the image distributed?

how is the image received in terms of framing?
Policy process
how has the image affected the policy process in

terms of content, course and outcome?
How has this contributed to or diminished
connections within society and policy?
Table 1. Framework for analysis
5. Methodology
This research involves a comparative case study. The advantage of the case study
method is that it recognizes the complex nature of social phenomena in a coherent and
integrated way. It acknowledges the complex and meaningful interaction between
relevant social processes and actors, instead of limiting the study of social phenomena
to a highly specific set of variables and the relations between them (Yin, 2003). In this
study, we compare two cases on the basis of their similarity. All these cases deal with
an unexpected negative event (fire, riots) and in each case a reconstruction of the
events is made. In order to compare these cases in terms of framing the cases are
120
selected on the basis of the reconstruction. The first case involved a fire in a Dutch
penitentiary at Schiphol, the second case deals with riots during a music event.
In order to analyze these cases we used and combined a variety of research
techniques in a process to which Yin (2003) refers as triangulation. First, we directly
observed and analysed the reconstructions and the reactions on the reconstructions
(in traditional media as well as online). Second document analysis was done on
relevant policy documents relating to the three cases. Third, we conducted semistructured, in-depth interviews with eleven relevant stakeholders.
On the basis of this information the cases will be described below, in the analysis
the framework for analysis will than be used to analyse the cases.
6. Two Reconstructions
The two case studies, a fire at a detention centre and riots at a beach party, will be
elaborated on below.
Fire at a Detention Centre
On October 27th 2005 a fire broke out in a detention centre at the Dutch city of
Schiphol. The detention centre was build to house foreign inmates who were seeking
asylum in the Netherlands. In the fire 11 inmates died and 15 people, inmates and
guards were wounded. Right after the fire there was some concern in the media on the
safety of inmates. It was emphasized that the inmates at Schiphol were not imprisoned
because of a criminal suit but because they were remaining in the Netherlands
illegally. At this point political and large societal attention was not yet present. The
government asked the Dutch Safety Board to examine the situation. The Dutch
Safety Board is an independent organisation with as mail purpose to investigate
incidents such as disasters. After investigating the fire the conclusions of the Dutch
Safety Board showed to cause a lot of upheaval, they accussed the organisation in
charge of the Dutch penitantiaries (Dienst Justitiele Inrichtingen), the organisation in
charge of government buildings (Rijksgebouwendienst) and the local government of
being negligent and of not abiding the rules for prevention of fire. The conclusion of
the report also cause serious political consequences, the minister of Housing, Spatial
Planning and the Environment, the minister of Justice and the mayor of the area
stepped down.
The reconstruction itself had the character of a documentary. Film images were
used together with animation. The animations were used to show the way the fire
spread and how the emergency services arrived and proceeded. The film images were
a compilation of images filmed right after the fire, showing the wreckages of what
were once cells. Music and a voice over accompanied the images.
The reconstruction received a large amount of criticism from different
organisations. These organisations felt that the reconstruction, however correct in the
facts, showed the incident as being very emotional, with the zooming in on personal
belongings of inmates and the setting of people being trapped like rats. They felt
that the reconstruction did not aim at reconstructing what happened but that the
reconstruction was trying to make a point, taking a stand. They claimed the
121
reconstruction was made in order to give the Dutch Safety Board standing and that
they used the reconstruction to follow their political opinion, i.e. that prisoners were
treated badly and that the government had been negligent, instead of showing the
facts. The reconstruction was seen as a non objective film to play into emotion.
Additionally the guards helping the prisoners were neither showed nor mentioned in
the reconstruction while they were wounded as well, therefore the film was seen as
only telling one side of the story. The Dutch Safety Board was accused of acting as a
public prosecutor instead of an independent research institute. They call the
reconstruction dramatized, overreacted and unfair.
The Dutch Safety Board responded to this criticism that it was their job to show
the Dutch public what had happened and what the emotional impact was. Not only did
they want to show the facts but also what such an incident had in terms of emotional
impact. They claimed the prisoners could not speak for themselves since they had
died and their next of kin was not able to speak to the Dutch public since all the
prisoners were foreigners. The Dutch Safety Board feared that the victims would stay
invisible because of their status as imprisoned asylum seekers, with the negative
connotation sometimes attributed to them.
In terms of impact on the policy making process, it can be stated that a debate
within politics would have occurred with or without the reconstruction, since there
was a report as well. However, originally it was not expected that the political impact
would be this large. All respondents agree that the reconstruction made a very large
impact in society, where citizens were originally not very interested in the fire, after
the reconstruction it became subject of public debate. This forced parliament to
discuss the issue. The reconstruction was therefore seen as the source of energy
behind the stepping down of the ministers.
In terms of policy the reconstruction and the impact it made had a large effect.
Even without the reconstruction the Ministry of Housing, Spatial Planning and the
Environment would have looked at fire prevention on the basis of the report. But
because the reconstruction caused so much unrest not only the Ministry was forced to
come up with measures right away, but was also able to receive financial resources to
do so.
A direct result of this was that a new policy program on government buildings
was made in which all government buildings were re-evaluated in terms of fire risks.
Additionally permits for buildings are looked at more elaborately.
Sunset Grooves Riots
The Sunset Grooves Riots took place in the Dutch city of Hoek van Holland where on
August 22nd 2009 a large dance event had been organized on the beach. There were
about 30.000 people present which were more than expected. Throughout the
festivities some fighting took place, but it was not until a group of hooligans
recognized two police officers until the riots started. The public attacked the two
officers and other officers who came to help them were attacked as well. The police
were forced to pull back through the emergency exit but the hooligans broke through
the fences and followed them, driving them towards the ocean. The police shot in the
air but were unable to control the situation, finally they shot at the public coming after
them. One person died and a number of people were wounded. As in the two previous
122
cases investigations were ordered. The Institute for Safety, Security and Crisis
Management investigated the role of the policy in their preparations, risk analysis and
briefing. The National Policy Internal Investigations Department investigated the
actions of the police officers who had shot their gun. These officers were formally
suspects but it was ruled that they acted in self defence. A special police team
investigated the citizens present at the time of the riots and identified 40 suspects of
public disturbance, violence and threatening of the policy.
Quickly after the incident a reconstruction was shown to the public. This
reconstruction consisted of a number of different types of images. First there were
animations of the site of the event which showed who (police and hooligans) were at
which location at which time. Secondly images were used that were shot by a Dutch
television company who was broadcasting the event. Thirdly images were used which
were filmed by the people with their mobile telephone who were present. Some of
these images were uploaded to YouTube by these people, others were provided to the
police later. These images were used later to identify suspects. Finally images from
bodycams were used. This was the first time these images were used for this. A
bodycam is a device connected to the collar of a police officers uniform, and it holds a
camera. Basically the camera sees what the officer sees.
According to all respondents the reconstruction offered a realistic view of what
had happened. But because of the live images an emotion could be seen as well,
panic among the people present at the event, and panic and despair when the police
officers were driven into the ocean. The reconstruction shows a very frightening
image of a trapped crew of police officers.
In society the reconstruction had a large impact. Where before the reconstruction
the riots already received a lot of attention, citizens were discussing whether the
police should have shot. On different internet fora opinions moved from the police
will never let us have any fun and just starts shooting at kids to these kids should
learn to behave. This discussion abruptly ended after the reconstruction. Everybody,
even those people who were critical of the police, now agreed that they had no other
choice than to shoot at the crowd attacking them.
In terms of policy the incident itself had a large impact as well, the mayor of
Rotterdam, who was responsible, was criticized and a number of other events were
cancelled or denied a permit. In the end on a larger scale it became clear that the riots
caused for municipalities to be more cautious in giving out permits for events and that
they analyze the risks of these events more carefully. The reconstruction helped doing
this according to respondents since the film showed the panic of the police officers
when they found out their would not get any assistance.
123
7. Analysis
When we combine these cases and look at them according the lines of the framework
of analysis we can see a number of similarities, but also differences. They are
summarized in table 2.
Schiphol fire
Sunset Grooves riots
Societal and political context
At first the public was not very

much interested in the fire.
After the reconstruction the
interest rose. The fact that the
fire took place in a penitentiary
might have attributed to this.
Respondents believe the public
would have been more invested
when the fire had occurred in
for example a hospital. The
government however took the
situation very seriously.
What is important here is the

connotation of the word
hooligan The Netherlands has
had problems with hooligans
related to soccerclubs. In
society two camps can be
discerned. First the camp
believing that the concern over
hooligans is overrated and that
the police is just preventing
people to have some fun. The
other group believes that these
hooligans should be dealt
with and that tough measures
should be taken.
Policy arena
Relevant actors are the public,

prisoners in general, political
parties, the Dutch Safety
Board the organisation in
charge of the Dutch
penitantiaries (Dienst Justitiele
Inrichtingen), the organisation
in charge of government
buildings (Rijksgebouwendienst) the Ministry of Housing,
Spatial Planning and the
Environment and the ministry
of Justice.
Relevant actors are the public,

the police, the Institute for
Safety, Security and Crisis
Management, the National
Policy Internal Investigations
Department and the
municipality of Rotterdam
framing
The image was made by the

Dutch Safety Board and they
aimed not only at showing what
had happened but also showing
what the impact was. Next to
animations, film was used. The
function of the reconstruction
was both showing forensic
evidence, but also a persuasive
story to give the victims a voice
and show the public how large
the impact of such a fire can be.
The image was made by the

Institute for Safety, Security
and Crisis Management and
had as a function to show what
had actually happened. The
idea was therefore to regard the
reconstruction as forensic
evidence.
Distribution
The reconstruction was shown

on television and is available
online. The reception of the
reconstruction shows two
views. Those who agree with
The reconstruction was

broadcasted on television and is
available online. The reception
of the reconstruction was as
aimed, it was viewed as
124
Policy process
the Dutch Safety Board and

claim that it is wise to show the
emotional impact in order to
understand the events. And
those who believe the factual
power of a reconstruction is
missing and the reconstruction
is more of a statement than a
real reconstruction since it is
seen as being one-sided, not
objective and over dramatized.
evidence. Furthermore the

police was pleased to find that
the reconstruction caused the
public to agree on the idea that
the shots fired were in self
defence.
In terms of the policy process it

can be found that the
reconstruction had a large
agenda setting capacity,
Ministers stepped down and a
parliamentary debate took
place. This resulted in new
policy programs such as the
evaluation of the safety of
government buildings and the
re-evaluation of permits. It also
made possible to financial
resources to implement these
programs were made available.
In terms of policy it can be seen

that the reconstruction directly
altered public opinion, which
now believe it was legitimate
for the policy to shoot. Direct
effects on policy were the
agenda setting of police
assistance in events, risk
analyzing of events, and the
giving out of permits for
events. These policies have
been more strictly applied. Also
a number of planned events
were cancelled.
Even though the reconstruction

did show an atmosphere of the
event and emotions of involved
citizens and police officers,
because these were filmed at
the time of the event and were
not staged they were not
received as being biased.
Table 2. Analysis of the cases
When taking the findings presented in the table into account we can see a number of
issues.
What stands out is that in both cases the reconstruction has had a direct
noticeable effect. In the case of the Schiphol fire the broadcasting of the
reconstruction caused public outrage on the way the Dutch deal with prisoners and
accounted for a parliamentary debate in which two Ministers stepped down and new
regulations for prevention of fire were demanded. This can be directly related to the
reconstruction. The Ministry would have assessed these issues but because of public
pressure following the reconstruction it had to be done directly and policy had to be
made right away. Where before the reconstruction the public was not that interested in
the case, after the reconstruction the gap between government performance and public
trust in this performance grew drastically. Making the fire and the surrounding issues
visible made sure the public and policy makers lost their connection, now the public
could see the fire, in the frame of the reconstruction the gap between policy makers
and the public grew. In the case of the Sunset Grooves riot the reconstruction had the
direct effect of changing public opinion, and publically legitimizing the shooting by
the police. Here we see that connections were strengthened and connections between
citizens, government and police restored.
125
In both cases the reconstruction has been made to increase transparency on what
actually happened during the incidents. The reconstructions were primarily made for
the public. Each reconstruction is backed by a very elaborate report of the
investigations which is mostly used to inform the (local) government of the exact
causes and nature of the incidents. All respondents agree that these kind of
reconstructions should be made to inform the public. A report is often too long so
citizens will not read the report, moreover, the reports are often written in specific
language, either very bureaucratic or very specialist. This makes it often difficult, if
not impossibile, for citizens to understand the situation. Therefore a reconstruction on
the basis of images increases transparency for citizens. This increased transparency,
regardless of the outcome of public opinion on the incidents itself can be seen as a
means to bridge the gap between citizens and government. The course of events, in a
visual reconstruction, has been made accessible and understandable for all parties.
Although this is seen as a mean to bridge the gap, in the case of the Schiphol fire it
shows that in practice connections have been broken, since transparency of what
happened outraged the public against policy makers and politicians.
The conflict which arose from the nature of the reconstruction of the Schiphol
fire shows that this transparency which was supposed to be increased by the
reconstruction does not suit everybody well. Organisations critical of the
reconstruction claim that the reconstruction does not provide for an objective way of
reporting, while it leaves parts out, especially those of the guards trying to save
inmates. Additionally it only gives a view of one side of the story, the story of a
failing government and does so by appealing to peoples emotions. In this way the
story is overdramatized according to these organizations and does not offer
transparency to the public but leads them to a pre-determined opinion. These critics
lost connection with other groups in the public. A discussion occurred on the
trustworthiness of the reconstruction causing different groups to hold different
opinions, the public as well as the political realm became more fragmented.
Even though the reconstruction of the Sunset Grooves riots also showed emotion
and set a very threatening atmosphere, all involved actors agree that the
reconstruction did make the incident transparent, and accounted for better
communication to the public. With the reconstruction the public could see what
happened. The reason why the emotions and the setting of the atmosphere was not
considered biased can be found in the fact that the images used were images shot at
the time of the incident and were therefore seen as reliable. Furthermore the case of
the Sunset Grooves can be seen as a case between two sides, the hooligans versus
the police, the reconstruction was seen as trustworthy and unbiased since images
made by both sides were shown.
Both reconstructions were made up out of images made by different
technologies. The reconstruction of the Sunset Grooves riots were made up out of
animation, bodycam images, images from mobile telephones and images from a
broadcasting company. The use of these images, and especially those images made by
the bodycams gave the reconstruction some of its standing and trustworthiness. The
public felt that they could identify with the police officers at the site, they could see
what the officers saw. The combinations of the bodycam images with the images
made with mobile telephones by the visitors of the event also attributed to the feeling
that the reconstruction was fair and unbiased, since the same event was shown
126
from different angles (from the eyes of the police, and from the eyes of the hooligans
so to say). For the Schiphol fire this was different, there were no images made during
the fire, so the reconstruction was based on photos and film made the day after and
the animations. This gave a number of people the feeling the reconstruction was
staged or framed to push public opinion into a certain direction. Others did not feel
this way and regarded the reconstruction a factual representation of the events and the
emotions belonging to this.
8. Conclusions
When we link our analysis of the cases to our main question: How and in which way
can visual culture in our cases account for greater connectivity between policy and its
surroundings? We find some important instances.
Before looking at these instances we must note that the situation in which both
instances occurred are very fragmentized in nature. They involve more than one
policy issue and can be discussed on the basis of different topics. Also they involve
different groups in society which all have an opinion and an agenda. This makes
connecting these groups, opinions and issues a very difficult task. How then can these
fragmented situations be transformed into situations with larger connectivity?
First of all when we look at the influence of the course of the policy process we
see that the course of the process directly changed following the reconstruction. In
both cases public opinion altered and issues discussed in the reconstruction were
placed on the political agenda. In the Sunset Grooves case public opinion changed
drastically, legitimizing police action, in the Schiphol fire case, the change in public
opinion and public awareness forced the Dutch parliament to discuss the case and its
implications, leading to two ministers stepping down and new policy. This can be
directly linked to the reconstruction since the reconstruction demanded fast action.
The images in these cases fuelled the public debate and influenced what was subject
of debate. Which aspects were discussed and how people felt about these subjects.
This public debate, in two cases led to a direct change in the course of the policy
process. This first conclusion shows us that the visual event, i.e. the reconstruction
does have an effect but that the effect does not necessarily lead to interconnectivity
and can also account for a larger gap. Where in the Sunset Grooves case the visual
event leads to more connectivity, in the Schiphol fire case it just creates and enlarges
a gap. What then are the conditions in which a visual event can lead to more and
better connections between policy making and its surrounding?
In terms of the content of the policy process it can be concluded that
reconstruction seemed to have an effect. In the Schiphol fire case a focus for the
safety of those the government was responsible stood out, this would, according to
respondents, have not been the case without the reconstruction. In the case of the
Sunset Grooves riots the content of the discussion changed right after broadcasting
the reconstruction. The public and government officials were convinced of the
legitimacy of police actions and the discussions on the support the police should have
gotten rose. Again here the images influenced which topics should be discussed and
how policy makers and the public should feel about these topics. The images can
therefore be seen as leading the debate, because they framed what went wrong and
127
consequenty was actions should be taken. It is clear that the visual event in both cases
accounted for not only which topics relating the incidents should be discussed, but
also in which direction this discussion would move. This structures the discussion and
the debate accounting for a situation in which all involved parties agree on the agenda
of the topics being debated. The fragmented character of the debate as we have seen
before, in the situation with only a written report on incidents, therefore has
diminished.
Finally in the outcome of the policy process only in the Schiphol fire case a direct
influence of the reconstruction can be found. This included a new policy program for
government buildings and the stepping down of two ministers. In the Sunset Groove
case there was the effect of cancellation of events and a stricter policy on permits, but
whether this can be attributed to the reconstruction remains ambiguously.
In terms of interconnectivity and the direct influence of visual events two issues
stand out and should be looked at further. It can be concluded that transparency of
what actually happened in the investigated cases increased. Also communication
between the government and the public had improved, the public could now see what
actually happened. On the other hand transparency decreases when the images or the
way the images are presented become subject of debate. When images are perceived
by some as being misleading, emotional or biased, it becomes difficult for citizens to
understand what they are supposed to see. This strengthens our hypothesis that the
framing of the image should be further researched since the frame held by the creator
of the image as well as the frame held by the receiver of the image can partially
account for the impact the frame has on policy making. This also shows that the
increase in transparency can account for stronger connections in society itself but also
between society and policy making. Not only does the debate and the agenda become
more connected and receive direction. Additionally more people in society become
part of this debate since they become able to see and understand what has actually
happened. The danger for this interconnectivity lies in the situation in which the
image itself is not trusted and seen as biased. In that case interconnectivity is lost and
the gap is enlarged. This leads us to the conclusion that visual events in essence to
have the power to increase interconnectivity, however, the content of the visual event,
and the frame attributed to this must be carefully evaluated since it can cause to
diminish interconnectivity. Not only the content of the visual event is important, the
technology on how to produce and distribute this event proves to be very significant
This leads us to our second point. Technology itself turns to be important as well,
images are regarded as more trustworthy if they are filmed live or in an animation,
while images made by film which are directed are seen as less trustworthy. The
technology used can account for more connectivity, strangely, this is directly
connected to the fragmented nature of visual culture. Film, as in the Schiphol fire case
had been made by one party (the Safety Board) and was filmed after the incident on a
location citizens are unable to go, is debated for its truthfulness. The reconstruction of
the Sunset Grooves riots however was a compilation of different images, bodycam
images by the police, YouTube uploads by visitors and animations made later. Not
only gave this all parties the idea that the reconstruction was balanced: looked at from
different sides (figuratively as well as literally) but the results also became checkable.
Citizens were able to look at the YouTube uploads themselves, finding even more
uploads supporting the reconstruction. The combination of different techniques
128
therefore proves to account for the most trust in the actual depiction of reality. The
fragmented nature of visual culture then becomes important for the interconnectivity
we try to achieve.
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doi:10.3233/978-1-60750-998-1-129
129
Shared Service Centres: an Ideal Solution

for Fragmentation or a Fairytale?
Ruth Post
1. Fragmentation within the Dutch Central Government

Ministerial responsibility is one of the fundamental building blocks of the Dutch
constitutional system. It has emerged into a doctrine that holds politically appointed
ministers responsible for almost all the actions by civil servants within his department.
This ministerial responsibility to some extent frustrates the smooth cooperation of civil
servants from various departments on complex, interconnected policy issues.
Moreover, in the daily operations of the departments, the ministers, managers and
employees are confronted with problems concerning several aspects of operational
management, like personnel, finance, ICT, facility management and public
procurement. For instance, when a new cabinet has been formed these problems
become available. Every new cabinet has different political priorities and in order to
realize the priorities, it is sometimes necessary to reorganize one or more directoratesgeneral of the ministries. Therefore, it is for example possible that two directoratesgeneral need to be merged into one or that one directorate-general need to be shifted
from one ministry to another. When the operational management processes and policies
are organized differently by every ministry (for example ICT systems), the integration
process of a particular directorate-general into a new ministry will take much longer.
One way of solving the problems, is to establish shared services centres (SSCs)
(Schulman et al, 1999; Bergeron, 2003). By establishing SSCs, the functions of
operational management are harmonized and standardized. This implies that no longer
all the eleven ministries are individually responsible for the execution of the personnel,
IT, finance and other operational management functions, but that the new SSC is
responsible for harmonized and standardized systems, procedures, routines and policies
for (parts of) the functions of operational management. Moreover, by reorganizing the
operational tasks, the problems concerning fragmentation in the field of operational
management will be reduced, and important efficiency gains will be achieved
(Bergeron, 2003).
Within the Dutch central government several initiatives have been taken to
establish shared service centres (see: Twist et. al, 2009; Janssen and Joha, 2006) and
Ulbrich (2006:191) concluded that: Since the late-1990s, the fast spreading shared
service concept has increasingly become popular as an organizational change
approach. Some of the initiatives to establish SSCs are successful, others not. Hence,
it is interesting to analyze to what extent and how they reduced the level of
fragmentation. To analyze the initiatives of the Dutch central government
130
R. Post / Shared Service Centres: An Ideal Solution for Fragmentation or a Fairytale?
systematically, two research questions are central in this chapter. On the one hand, it is
analyzed to what extent the level of fragmentation is decreased by establishing SSCs
and on the other hand, it is analyzed which factors explain the process of the
development of the SSCs. Furthermore, two cases are selected to analyze more into
depth the initiatives in which the involved actors tried to reduce the level of
fragmentation. The first case (salary administration and personnel registration) is
selected, because the involved actors established the SSC by managing several
challenges. Moreover, it is interesting as well to analyze a case in which the involved
actors did not establish the SSC. Therefore, the second case, the attempts to establish a
SSC for training and education, is selected.
Each case study consists of three parts. Firstly, background information is provided
of the establishment of the SSCs and an overview of the most important decisions. In
the second part of the case study, it is determined to what extent the ministries share
their operational management and to what extent the level of fragmentation is reduced.
In the third part of case study, the considerations, acts and challenges of the initiators
and the other involved actors of the SSC are analyzed and explained. For both cases,
approximately thirty-five interviews are held and relevant policy documents are
analyzed. In the end, conclusions are drawn to what extent the concept SSC is a
solution for fragmentation or a beautiful fairytale.
To analyze systematically the degree of fragmentation and factors that explain the
process, a theoretical framework is provided in the next section. Furthermore,
background information is provided in the third section and the analysis of the level of
fragmentation and the process of the development of the SSCs is provided in the fourth
and fifth section. Finally, the conclusions are drawn in the sixth part.
2. Analyzing the Functions and the Establishment of SSCs

In this section, an analytical framework is included (a) to determine to what extent the
tasks and responsibilities are shared and formalized and (b) to explain the
considerations, acts and challenges of the involved actors during the establishment of
the SSC.
The SSC as a Shared and Formalized Institution
First, I will start to analyze to what extent the SSCs are responsible for the tasks of the
involved ministries. This implies that it is analyzed to what extent the SSC is a shared
and formalized institution. Several authors (Boin and Goodin, 2007; Boin and
Christensen, 2008; DiMaggio and Powell (eds), 1991; Meyer and Rowan, 1991;
Powell, 1991; Selznick, 1949, 1983; Tolbert and Zucker, 1999) have analyzed to what
extent an organisation is a shared and formalized institution. Subsequently, Boin and
Christensen (2008:276) stated: the first challenge for an organization is the translation
of the formal goals into working practices. Stability of procedures and implementation
of the tasks are important for the degree of institutionalization (Tolbert and Zucker,
1999; Verhoest et al, 2004).
Concentrating on the formal part of the SSC as an institution, it is first necessary to
determine if the ministries have developed common and shared regulations concerning
(parts of) the functions of operational management (Tolbert and Zucker, 1999;
Mintzberg, 1993). Subsequently, it is analyzed if the shared regulations of the SSC
131
have a legal basis. If the regulations do not have a legal basis, the ministers or the
Parliament did not formally accept their tasks. Therefore, the tasks could easily change
and the SSC is more vulnerable for changes. Moreover, have the ministries developed
together an overarching decision-making procedure to realize changes in the field of
operational management? When all the ministries have established their own decisionmaking procedures and do not have an officially recognized commission of
representatives, the SSC is less institutionalized (Tolbert and Zucker, 1993; Mintzberg,
1993). By analyzing the common and shared regulations, the legal basis and the
decision-making procedures, it is determined to what extent the SSC is a shared and
formalized institution. At the moment the SSC is responsible for the tasks of all the
ministries concerning a specific function of the operational management, this function
is less fragmentized.
Explanations of the Considerations of the Initiators
In the third part of the research, explanations are provided for the considerations, acts
and challenges of the processes during the development of the SSCs. The involved
actors are dealing with conflicting challenges, which often stem from different
perspectives (see for example categories of Janssen and Joha, 2006). From a rational
point of view, the involved actors tried to reduce the level of fragmentation by
standardization and centralization of the tasks and responsibilities. However, is
decreasing the level of fragmentation the main motive of the involved actors or are
other motives present as well? Based on the literature, alternative factors are available
to explain the decision to establish a SSC. From a political point of view, the decision
to establish a SSC, is the result of an interaction process between different involved
actors, which all have different interests, strategies and positions. The perspectives
have their own logics and the two selected perspectives, a rational and political one, are
elaborated in the next part.
The Rational Perspective: Increasing Uniformity
The process of the establishment of the SSC is first explained from a rational point of
view (concerning uniformity and standardization). According to the main principles of
organizing (Fayol, 1949; Taylor, 1985; Mintzberg, 1993; Waldo, 1948), it is
continuously necessary to consider the structure and the organization of operational
management. Moreover, it is especially necessary to take into account the fragmentized
parts of operational management. Under what condition will the SSC functioning well?
What does this imply for the efficiency and effectiveness of the involved operational
tasks, processes, routines and procedures? Based on the logic of consequences (March,
1994) the involved actors search for opportunities how they can improve the level of
uniformity in order to achieve efficiency and efficacy. The costs and benefits of the
alternatives are analyzed as well as the consequences of the proposed changes. Will the
proposed SSC substantially overcome fragmentation, or will it just lead to rather
incremental benefits?
Political Perspective: Increasing Power
From a political point of view, alternative logics are available to explain the
considerations, acts and challenges of the involved actors during the establishment of
132
the SSCs. Based on this logic, it can be concluded that a SSC may also help to increase
the power, status, position of the initiators and thus help to enlarge their jurisdiction
(Pfeffer, 1992; Mintzberg, 1983; Rosenthal, 1988; Peters, 1995). Furthermore, Pfeffer
(1992) and Allison (1999) concluded that the decision to establish a SSC is taken in an
arena, consisting of actors that all have different interests, organizational positions,
resources and possibilities to exert power. Strategies are developed and an interaction
process is started to convince each other (Pfeffer, 1992; Allison, 1999). The outcomes
of the decisions are often based on exchange and compromise (Allison, 1999; Oliver,
1991). Simultaneously, the involved actors are continuously searching to find support
for a proposal (Allison, 1992; Sabatier, 1988). During the negotiations two questions
are central: (a) under what conditions is fragmentation political acceptable and
appropriate (in terms of the logic of appropriateness as been formulated by March
(1994)) and (b) who will win and who will lose, at the moment specific functions of
operational management will be shared into one SSC.
Next step is to provide some background information regarding the decision to
establish a SSC S&P administration and the attempts to establish a SSC education.
3. Some Background Information

SSC S&P administration
One of the first initiatives to establish a SSC within the Dutch central government was
the development of the SSC S&P administration. All the ministries used to be
responsible for their own S&P administration and the main reason to centralize the
administrations was to decrease the level of fragmentation and to organize the
processes more efficiently. 1 This initiative was far from easy. Before the idea
originated to develop a SSC for salary and personnel administration, the ministry of the
Interior Affairs was responsible for the coordination of the salary system. 2 However,
the system was considered as old and the involved actors concluded that the system
needed to be replaced. 3 Therefore, the ministry announced a public tender. After the
failure of two public tenders, the idea originated to combine a new salary and personnel
administration for all the ministries into one SSC. The cabinet decided to establish a
SSC S&P administration 4 after several consultations, meetings and study visits with the
involved ministries 5 .
In the following period the ministry of the Interior Affairs (responsible ministry)
found a supplier for the new S&P administration. However, the cooperation between
the responsible ministry and the supplier ended in October 2005, because both parties
1
Rapport Commissie van Rijn (2001) Investeren in mensen en kwaliteit: de arbeidsmarkt in de collectieve
sector; Interdepartementaal Beleidsonderzoek (2001) Rijk met Personeel: naar een effectiever
personeelsmanagement in de Rijksdienst
2
Kamerstuk 29 800 VII, nr 2, Vaststelling van de begrotingsstaten van het ministerie van Binnenlandse
Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties (VII) voor het jaar 2005, Memorie van Toelichting, baten-lastendienst IVOP
3
Kamerstuk 30 027, nr 1, Aanbesteding ICT component P-Direkt, Tweede Kamer
4
Kamerstuk 28 610, nr 2, Personeelsbrief 2003; Brief minister bij het kabinetsbesluit tot oprichting van een
Shared Service Center HRM van Personeelsregistratie en Salarisadministratie
5
Kabinetsstandpunt Vernieuwing HRM stelsel Rijk, februari 2003; Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en
Koninkrijksrelaties (2002) Haalbaarheidsstudie Shared Services Center HRM voor de Rijksdienst
133
could not agree on the content of the system and the price. 6 Although the cooperation
was ended, the responsible ministry still wanted to establish the SSC according to
several respondents. Together with the other ministries, they explored several
alternatives. After several meetings with the ministries, they all decided to split up the
establishment of the SSC into five no-regret projects (whether or not the SSC will be
established, these five projects are anyhow efficient to organize on a central level and
will decrease the level of fragmentation). 7 By the time the five no-regrets projects were
successfully implemented, the ministries agreed formally to establish the S&P
administration. 8 The successful implementation of the no-regret projects were
considered as important pillars which could function as the basis infrastructure for this
new SSC.
After blood, sweat and tears, the involved actors established the SSC. However,
other examples are available in which the involved actors did not establish the SSC.
One of the examples was the attempt to develop a SSC for education.
Attempts to Establish a SSC for education
Since 2000 three different interdepartmental academies have been developed for
lawyers, financial experts and communication experts within the Dutch central
government. The involved actors tried two times to bundle these three academies into
one SSC. Both attempts were seriously, but they nevertheless failed. The first major
attempt was in 2003. During the development of another SSC (Werkmaatschappij), the
idea originated, according to the respondents, to bundle the three academies as well.
However, the existing academies decided not to establish a SSC. The second major
attempt was in 2007. 9 By bundling the three fragmentized academies into one, the
processes could be organized more efficiently and the level of fragmentation could be
reduced (one education program and organization). This was the main line of reasoning
of the initiators. Besides economic reasons, the responsible secretary-general was
interested as well in developing a university for civil servants. An overall academy was
considered as a powerful status symbol for one central government, according to
several respondents. Subsequently, in the following period the existing academies
searched again for opportunities to centralize their academies into one SSC. However,
the involved respondents concluded, that it was not feasible to establish one SSC
education or to intensive the cooperation between the interdepartmental academies,
because their education program and teaching methods are too different.
4. SSC: To What Extent Is It Shared?

Before conclusions can be drawn to what extent the SSC is an appropriate solution for
fragmentation, it is first necessary to determine to what extent the SSC is really
functioning as a shared and formalized institution. By analyzing the common and
Kamerstuk 30 146, nr 4, Instellen P-Direkt als baten-lastendienst; brief minister over stand van zaken m.b.t.
oprichtingstraject van P-Direkt
7
Kamerstuk 30 146, nr 17, Instellen P-Direkt als baten-lastendienst
8
Kamerstuk 30 146, nr 21, Instellen P-Direkt als baten-lastendienst
9
Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties (2007) Nota Vernieuwing Rijksdienst, punt 100,
p 42, 2007
134
shared regulations, the legal basis and the decision-making procedures, I will be able to
determine to what extent the SSC is a shared and formalized institution
SSC S&P Administration
Since January 2009 one SSC S&P administration is established for all the ministries
(exception the ministry of Defense and the Parliament) and the systems concerning the
S&P administration are controlled and maintained by the SSC. The systems are part of
the application of the Portal, digital personnel files, personal information systems SAP
HR, and the salary system SAP Payroll. 10 The personnel and organization departments
of the ministries are responsible for the remaining tasks concerning the S&P
administration. Although some tasks are still organized by the personnel and
organization departments of every ministry, most tasks concerning the S&P
administration are standardized and centralized into one SSC S&P administration.
Furthermore, it is necessary to determine the legal basis of the tasks and
responsibilities. At the moment the tasks do not have a legal basis, the SSC is more
vulnerable for changes and is less institutionalized. As stated before, since 2009 the
SSC has a legal basis (ministrile regeling) and the tasks and responsibilities are further
elaborated in the formal charter of the tasks and responsibilities (organisatiebesluit) of
the ministry of Interior Affairs: The aim of P-Direkt (S & P administration) is to
establish an efficient and good functioning salary and personnel administration within
one shared service centre, based on a together developed salary and personnel system
of the Dutch central government (except the ministry Defence and the Parliament). 11
Concentrating on the formal part of the institution, it is finally necessary to
determine if the SSC has developed an overarching decision-making procedure, or that
every ministry still takes their own decisions regarding the S&P administration. At the
moment the SSC takes common and shared decisions for all the ministries, the SSC is
to a larger extent a shared organization. Since the establishment of the SSC, the
decisions concerning the S&P administration are taken in existing commissions, which
consist of representatives of every ministry (deputy secretaries-general, directors
personnel and organizations and several specialized commissions: standardization, HRexperts and ICT-experts). 12
Attempts to Establish a SSC for Education

Within the Dutch central government an overarching university is not present, which is
responsible for the education programs of civil servants. All the three major
interdepartmental academies (financial, communication and lawyers) are responsible
for their own program and have regulated their tasks and responsibilities differently.
The academy for financial specialists and communication specialists are respectively
part of the ministry of Finance and the ministry of General Affairs and the academy for
lawyers is a foundation. Subsequently, the involved actors have not developed an
overarching decision-making procedure. The changes concerning the organizational
structure and the content of the education program are arranged differently by every
10
Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, Jaarverslag P-Direkt 2009

Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties, Organisatiebesluit BZK 2009, artikel 3.19
12
Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksrelaties (2009) P-Direkt, Opdrachtgeverschap P-Direkt
en overlegstructuur,
11
135
academy. All the academies have internal and external boards which are responsible for
the changes of the education program.
A Preliminary Comparison
Based on the previous description, it can be concluded that the results of both cases
differ. The results of the indicators, common and shared regulations, legal basis and
decision-making procedures, show that the SSC S&P administration is a shared and
formalized institution. Consequently, because the tasks are organized into one SSC, the
function is less fragmentized compared to the previous situation (every ministry was
responsible for its own S&P administration). Although the tasks and responsibilities are
now centralized into a SSC, a new problem concerning fragmentation could arise
between the ministries and the SSC. Both institutions can create again their own
informal working practices. This implies, that concentrating on the formal side of the
institutions, it can be concluded that the function is less fragmentized. However, it is
possible, that by analyzing the actual working practices more into detail, other
conclusions will be drawn. Finally, a university that is responsible for one education
program and is organized by one SSC, is not established and therefore does not
function as one institution as well. All the three academies are functioning separately
from each other.
5. Explanations for the Establishment of SSCs
Now it is determined to what extent the SSC is a shared and formalized institution, it is
interesting to analyze the considerations, acts and challenges of the involved actors
during the establishment of the SSC. Therefore, in this section explanations are
provided for both cases, S&P administration and the function education. First, I start
analyzing the establishment of the S&P administration.
Explanations: SSC Salary Administration and Personnel Registration
Rational explanations SSC S&P administration
First of all, the decision to establish a SSC S&P administration is explained from a
rational point of view. The ministry of the Interior Affairs followed the logic of
consequences by diagnosing the problem that the salary system was not functioning
well anymore. They considered several alternatives and their consequences. Based on
these insights, they decided to find a new supplier for the system and announced a
public tender. However, several respondents concluded that the ministry of the Interior
Affairs did not find a new supplier, because the ministry was not able to bundle all the
different requests of the ministries concerning the new system.
After the failure of the public tender, the involved actors followed for the second
time the logic of consequences and considered several alternatives. One of the
alternatives was a combined new salary administration and personnel registration. In
order to understand the consequences of the alternative, feasibility and cost-benefits
studies are conducted. The results of the studies showed that at the moment the S&P
administration is standardized and centralized into one SSC, the processes will be
organized more efficiently, the quality of the HR domain will be improved and the cost
of the ownership will be reduced. The involved actors chose a combined S&P
136
administration and the supplier started to build a proto-type. Consequently, the same
problem rose again, because the supplier was not able to design the proto-type, which
fulfilled all the requirements of the ministries. Several respondents concluded that it
was not possible for the supplier to develop one uniform system. In 2005 the supplier
and the responsible ministry ended their cooperation, because it was for the supplier
not beneficial anymore.
After they ended the contract, the responsible ministry followed for the third time
the logic of consequences. First, the involved actors analyzed again the problem. Based
on the reports 13 the main causes of the collapse were: an unrealistic planning to
develop one central HR system for all the ministries within a short period, to consider
the project as one undivided process and too much optimism about the ICT applications
to support the changes of the process. Additionally, the unintended negative side
effects of the public private cooperation were not carefully taken into account. 14 The
responsible ministry considered, again, all the available alternatives and their
consequences. They decided to divide the process into two steps. By dividing the
process into two stages, the current systems of the ministries are not harmonized at the
same time, but step-by-step. 15
Hence, it can be concluded that rational considerations, focussing on the
consequences of fragmentation as well on the consequences of creating integration,
have played a substantial role in the discussion of the SSC.
Political Explanations SSC S&P administration
Not only considerations concerning costs and benefits have played a role to decide
whether or not a SSC should be established. The decision to establish it, took place in
arena, in which different actors, with different interests, organizational positions and
strategies did meet each other. This decision was based on series of negotiations and
compromises between the involved actors. In the next section this decision making
process is explained from a political point of view.
Involved actors
During the establishment of the SSC S&P administration two major players can be
distinguished. The first involved actor was the ministry of Finance, which was not
convinced that the ministry of the Interior Affairs was capable to realize a new salary
system, after the failure of two public announcements. The involved actors of the
ministry lost their patience, announced a public tender and contracted a specific ICT
system. 16 By choosing this system, the ministry of Finance obliged the other ministries
to switch to this specific system. Another important actor is the ministry of the Interior
Affairs. Before the cabinet agreed to establish one SSC, the responsible ministry had to
find a majority. A major component of their strategy was to organize meetings and
study visits for the other ministries. However, as several respondents concluded, was a
complicated factor, that the responsible ministry was not considered capable enough to
13
Kamerstuk 31 027, nr 1, Aanbesteding ICT-component P-Direkt; Kamerstuk 30 146, nr. 14, bijlage
Lessons learned P-Direkt: First Opinion inzake verbeterpunten van de oprichting van P-Direkt en bijlage
second opinion inzake lessons learned P-Direkt
14
Kamerstuk, 30146, nr 4, Instellen P-Direkt als baten-lastendienst
15
Kamerstuk, 30 146, nr 17, Instellen P-Direkt als baten-lastendienst
16
Kamerstuk 30 027, nr 1, Aanbesteding ICT component P-Direkt
137
realize a SSC S&P administration for all the ministries. Therefore, the ministry added
one important element to their strategy, namely: cost-benefit analysis.
Continuing the Realization of the SSC
In the following period had the ministry of the Interior Affairs to cope with several
problems and ignored several critical signals during the development of the SSC. First,
the ministry underestimated the implications and the consequences of the type of
contract with the supplier and was therefore too optimistic about realization of the
establishment of the SSC in a relatively short period. Moreover, the responsible
ministry forced the ministries to agree with the decision to establish a SSC S&P
administration without consensus, according to the involved respondents. Furthermore,
several respondents concluded that some ministries had problems with the
standardization process. Standardization is not only a rational process, but implies that
the involved actors are willing to give up their own system and to switch to a new
system. All these factors combined caused the ending of the contract with the supplier
of the overarching salary system.
After the involved actors ended the contract, it was, as all the involved respondents
concluded, not possible to find a majority that would continue with the same concept
and implementation plan. Therefore a new plan was developed. Only when the five noregret projects were successfully completed, further steps will be taken to establish one
SSC. According to several respondents, the responsible ministry explicitly hoped that
the five no-regret projects could be successful completed, so that the re start of the
whole project could be made. After finishing these five projects, the cabinet agreed
with the establishment of the SSC.
Based on this analysis, it can be concluded that several actors are involved during
the decision-making process, with all different interests, strategies and positions. At the
moment the involved actors ended the contract (ignoring critical signals,
underestimation of the implications of the standardization process and forced
decisions), it became evident that the goal of the ministry of the Interior Affairs
(establishment of the SSC) was not shared anymore by the other ministries. To still
realize their goal, the ministry adapted their strategy. In order to find a majority for a
new alternative, the responsible ministry proposed an alternative to divide the process
into two steps. This was the only alternative that was acceptable for the involved
ministries.
Explanations: function education
In the previous part, the considerations, acts and challenges are analyzed of the
involved actors during the establishment of the SSC S&P administration. Moreover, it
is interesting as well to analyze the considerations and the process of an attempt in
which the involved actors did not establish a SSC. First, I look at a set of rational
explanations that could be given, secondly I will show that political considerations
have played a role as well.
Rational explanations function education
From a rational point of view, explanations are available for the considerations, acts
and challenges of the involved actors of the two attempts to develop a SSC for
138
education. According to modern organizational design principles, it is necessary to

consider the optimal scale of the different academies. The involved actors were
convinced that the processes were too fragmentized and should be organized more
efficiently by bundling the academies. Based on this logic, the involved actors
concluded that it was appropriate to standardize the working processes of the
academies. However, the respondents concluded that standardization and centralization
was not a real option, due to the different functions of the involved academies (sharing
knowledge, recruitment and selection of new employees and providing classes for
employees) and the different nature of the working methods (how they determine their
education program and their organizational position).
Political explanations function education
Furthermore, other motives become evident, if the process is analyzed from a political
point of view. First, the interests of the different involved actors did not align. At the
time the three existing interdepartmental academies (financial, communication and
lawyers) have been developed, the involved actors of the academies and the involved
ministries, improved their status and power according to several respondents. As one of
the involved actors of an academy concluded: The academy improved our status and it
is very prestigious to have one and The academy is located in a nice and recognisable
building. Besides the interests of the academies (improving their status), the ministry
of the Interior Affairs tried two times to bundle the academies and had therefore
different interests in relation to the academies and the other involved ministries. At the
moment the ministry of the Interior Affairs become responsible for the new SSC
education (Rijksuniversiteit) their power, status and prestige will increase. As one of
the involved actors concluded: The development of the new SSC is a nice symbol of
status, an impressive academy, for the civil servants of the Dutch central government.
Therefore, the interests of the involved actors did not align.
In order to realize one SSC for education, the ministry of the Interior Affairs
developed its own strategy. Civil servants of the ministry organized meetings with the
representatives of the existing academies and they searched for opportunities to
increase their cooperation between the academies. In response to, the existing
academies also developed their own strategy. As one of the involved actors concluded:
The representatives (of the academies) are not convinced that the new SSC will
function well. At the time the involved actors of the ministry of the Interior Affairs
announced the idea that the academies could be organized into one SSC, one of the
representatives of the academies immediately concluded: Over my death body.
Another representative of an academy concluded: We felt the pressure to centralize
our academies, however We are conceited and we take our own route, and We still
search for opportunities. This shows that the academies improved their status, power,
position and identity by developing their own education program. At the same time, the
interest of the ministry of the Interior Affair was different. They considered one SSC
for education as a powerful status symbol for the Dutch central government.
Preliminary comparison: explanations SSC administration and the function education
In this section, the considerations, acts and challenges of the involved actors during the
establishment of the SSCs, have been analyzed.
139
On the one hand, the developments of the SSCs are explained from a rational point of
view. The involved actors diagnosed problems concerning their fragmentized functions
(S&P administrations and education). Following the logic of consequences they
considered alternatives and their consequences in terms of costs and benefit. Problems
with the standardization process of the fragmentized systems caused a delay for the
establishment of the SSC S&P administration. The development of the SSC education
failed, because the involved actors were not able to uniform the fragmentized education
program and their working methods, due their specific nature.
On the other hand, explanations are also provided from a political point of view.
The decisions, to establish a SSC S&P administration and to remain all the
interdepartmental academies, result from negotiations and compromises between the
different involved actors, which all have different interest, positions and strategies. The
ministry of the Interior Affairs developed strategies in order to realize the SSC S&P
and SSC education and in response to, the other ministries developed their own
strategies in order to prevent the establishment of the SSC (education) or cause a delay
(S&P administration). In the case of the S&P administration, the ministry of the
Interior Affairs adapted their strategy by proposing a new alternative. In the end, the
decision making process is a result of an interaction process of compromises and
results between the ministry of the Interior Affairs and the other ministries.
Based on the analysis of the previous parts, several conclusions can be drawn and they
are provided in the next section.
6. Shared Service Centres; a Solution for Fragmentation?

During the last ten years, several initiatives have been taken within the Dutch central
government to decrease the level of fragmentation by establishing SSCs. However, is
the level of fragmentation decreased by establishing SSCs and was avoiding
fragmentation the only motive of the initiators to establish SSCs, or can we distinguish
other motives as well? In this research two research questions are central. On the one
hand, it is analyzed to what extent the level of fragmentation is decreased by
establishing SSCs and on the other hand, it is analyzed which factors explain the
process of the development of the SSCs. Two cases studies have been conducted in
which the involved actors tried to reduce the level of fragmentation (salary
administration and personnel registration and education).
First, more than some of the other solutions in this volume, rather than combating
fragmentation and interconnectivity, the construction of SSCs embrace these
phenomena. This implies that the functional benefits of fragmentation and
interconnectivity are preserved. SSCs might be regarded as organizational procedures
aimed at smoothening the performance of in itself fragmented and interconnected
governance systems. In the case of the S&P administration, the level of fragmentation
of the S&P function is decreased, because almost all the systems concerning the S&P
administration of the ministries are standardized and centralized into one SSC S&P
administration. Furthermore, the level of fragmentation of the function education is not
decreased, because the involved actors did not establish the SSC education. Although
the tasks are now centralized into one SSC S&P administration, a new problem
concerning fragmentation could arise between the ministries and the SSC. Both
institutions can create again their own informal working practices. This implies, that
concentrating on the formal side of the institutions, I concluded that the function S&P
140
administration is less fragmentized. However, it is possible, that by analyzing the

working practices more into detail, other conclusions will be drawn. Therefore,
creating connective capacities obviously also implies creating new cleavages. Where
the cooperation between fragmented departments may benefit from the introduction of
SSCs, a new cleavage emerges between the primary policy-making process in
ministries and the operational management that is organized at a distance. This calls for
the introduction of new connections, this time between the primary process and
operational management. Therefore, the cases of SSCs simultaneously show the
possibilities and drawbacks of introducing connective capacities in fragmented and
interconnected governance systems.
Secondly, I concluded that the initiators of the establishment of the SSCs, in both
cases, intended to reduce the level of fragmentation of the involved functions. The
development of a more uniform and standardized, even centralized function, was one
of the most important reasons for the initiators to establish a SSC, given the costs of
fragmentation and the benefits of standardization and integration. However, based on
the research results, I showed that the involved actors had other motives as well to
establish the two SSCs. In the case of the establishment of the SSC education, the
ministry of the Interior Affairs also intended to enlarge their power. During the
establishment of the SSCs, or attempts to, the conflicting motives of the involved actors
became evident and caused several problems. As the initial design to establish the SSC
followed the logic of consequences (problem analysis, consideration of alternatives and
their consequences and decisions), the decision to establish a SSC or not, is in the end
determined in an arena, with different involved actors, which all have different
interests, positions and strategies. All the involved actors used different strategies in
order to realize or prevent the development of the SSC. From the perspectives of the
initiators, the process was more characterized by a nightmare instead of a fairytale,
because the involved actors have tried several times to prevent the realization of the
SSC. And in the case of the SSC education, these attempts were successful. Therefore,
the creation of connective capacities may not only be regarded as the development of
rational solutions for the challenges of fragmentation and interconnectivity. These
solutions themselves become part of political interactions by those with important
interests in the fragmented and interconnected status quo.
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IOS Press, 2012
doi:10.3233/978-1-60750-998-1-142
The Democratic Character of New

Institutional Governance Arrangements:
Comparing Dutch and Belgian Experiences
Erik-Hans Klijn, Filip de Rynck, Chris Skelcher and Joris Voets
1. Introduction: governance networks as solution and problem for fragmentation

In most European countries regional economic development is a policy issue managed
within networks of public, private and semi-private organizations. Besides government
actors (from national, regional and local government organizations), there are a range
of business and social interest groups that play a role in the decision making process.
Mostly these networks of actors involved in forming and implementing public policy or
service delivery are called governance networks. Governance networks can roughly be
defined as: more or less stable patterns of social relationships (= interactions,
cognitions and rules) between mutually dependent public, semi-public and private
actors, that arise and emerge around complex policy issues or policy programmes.
Governance networks are an expression of the dependency of public actors of a wide
variety of social actors to develop and implement public policy goals or service
delivery.
Forming and implementing policy trough governance networks: fragmentation and
connections
Governance networks emerge out of the necessity of public actors to achieve results in
a world where no one is in charge (Bryson and Crosby, 1992). It is a world where
fragmentation is dominant because we are dealing with wicked problems. And the
development of port and industrial areas, like the one we are dealing with here, are
precisely the kind of wicked problems that need governance networks to solve them.
Wicked problems are characterized by dissensus among participants about the nature of
the problem and the possible solutions. This for instance is clear with the extension of
the Rotterdam Harbour one of the two cases analyzed in this chapter. Should we
prioritize economic developments and promote the extension of the harbour or should
we prioritize nature conservation which is treathened by that same harbour extension.
So what we see because of this wicked character is that various actors are trying to
influence government decisions and thus become part of a network around policy
decisions. But the fragmentation of actors and strategies is also complicated by the fact
that these problems have various aspects which are dealt with in specialized agencies
both public (separate ministries with different sectoral interests) and private. And
E.-H. Klijn et al. / The Democratic Character of New Institutional Governance Arrangements
143
public initiators of governmental policy can not tackle the problem without the
cooperation of specialized groups and to respond to various societal groups that are
attracted by the issue.
Thus as an empirical phenomenon governance networks are the result of growing
interdependency, growing complexity and growing fragmentation in decision-making
in modern societies (see Rhodes, 1997; Castells, 2000; Koppenjan and Klijn, 2004).
The result is a loosely coupled set of actors that are engaged in decision-making about
the expansion of ports, service delivery for elderly, restructuring inner cities. Indeed,
the decision making in governance networks is primarily conducted through specially
organized arrangements and procedures. They are typical expressions of the increasing
co-production between government organizations, business entrepreneurs and other
social groupings (Agranoff and McGuire, 2003).
Governance networks as solution and problem: democratic legitimacy
So in that sense governance networks and the new institutional arrangements that
evolve along with them are both a solution and a problem for the problem of
fragmentation and connection. They clearly provide a solution for the fragmentation
problem that originates from the growing specialization and the need to develop
integral solutions to wicked policy problems. They connect actors who are otherwise
disconnected and they involve actors in decision-making that are crucial or important
for achieving outcomes either because their support is important or because they posses
indispensable resources. But they also are potential connections to achieve information
from various actors that is important to develop good policy solutions. So governance
networks and the institutional arrangements that are part of them are thus an answer to
fragmentation and create connections, not withstanding how difficult it is to manage
those connections in the complex policy making processes.
But governance networks also create a new problem of disconnection and that is
the disconnection of politics and especially representative institutions and the
disconnection to clear principles of democratic legitimacy. Governance networks
means the involvement of many actors and imply that they receive influence over
political decisions and authority, but also raises two questions:
x to what extent is this involvement a threat to the classical politicial legitimacy
by representative institutions?
x how is the involvement of these actors democratically legitimized?
The aim of this chapter is to look at two institutional arrangements that have been
designed and emerged (not everything is as planned as sometimes is suggested) in two
governance networks around economic developments. These are the networks around
developing the Gent Kanaalzone in Belgium and the development of the expansion of
the port of Rotterdam in The Netherlands. We are especially interested in the question
how these institutional arrangements reconnect actors and decision-making processes to
democratic criteria of decision-making and the classical representation institutions.
In the first section of this chapter an analytical framework for examining
institutional arrangements of governance networks is presented. This is followed by an
examination of the way that problems of democratic governance have been managed
empirically. Our empirical findings are based upon two longitudinal case studies
including the expansion of the shipping harbour Mainport Rotterdam, and the
development of the Canal Zone [Kanaalzone] in Gent. Both initiatives illustrate how
144
democratic decision making institutions developed over a period of more than 10 years.
The chapter concludes with a discussion of the implications of the analysis for both
policy makers and researchers.
2. The design of democratic governance institutions: A framework

Principles for the democratic governance of local economic development
Governance arrangements concern activities where both government actors are active
and where the decision making effects the redistribution of wealth for particular groups
and society as a whole. This means that these processes should be legitimized
democratically. We argue that there are three basic problems that should be resolved in
governance networks (Skelcher, 2005). These are:
x How to guarantee the legitimacy of the institution and its jurisdiction
x How consent for the policies and expenses of the institution can be ensured ex
ante
x How the accountability for the activities of the institution can be ensured ex
post
Traditionally these matters were addressed by incorporating these processes directly
into the accountability notions of the elected democratic organs. The solution of
representative democracy has for a long time been recognized as the best (or rather the
least undesirable) answer to these issues. This response entails electing representatives
who are formally responsible for political decision making within a particular area or
for a particular administrative unit (the demos). It is for us not relevant as to whether
this representative system functions better or worse than new sorts of multi-level or
multi-actor arrangements. Such an assessment depends upon the way in which the
representative demos functions and evolves, and varies from country to country (De
Rynck & Voets 2006; Hendriks 2002). It maybe that new arrangements are an attempt
to respond to declines in the democratic quality of the representative demos (Klijn &
Skelcher 2007). Irrespective of this the three basic demands of both old and new
arrangements are of relevance. The features of governance arrangements concerning
social economic developments, as well as for other policy fields (such as urban
planning) present challenges to the classic ways of ensuring democratic legitimacy and
support. Indeed they cut across the boundaries between government, business and civil
society and are characterized by inter-organizational cooperation between different
levels and departments within government. As a consequence a number of different
formal democratic decisions (from departments, local government and provinces)
within this field clash with one another.. We elaborate the three principles for
democratic governance, legitimacy, consent and accountability below.
Legitimacy: the mandate for actions and decisions
Governance arrangements must first resolves questions of legitimacy the political
mandate and capacity to function in a certain jurisdiction or with certain authority (see
also input legitimacy as it is defined by Scharpf 1997). Legitimacy can be understood
as both a formal or informal feature of a governance arrangement. The formal mandate
145
for authorization to function is inherent to the mandate of a governance arrangement

and it flows from the decision of a government organization to delegate authority to
such an institution.
Legitimacy through the inclusion of an important business or social interest group
(such as the chamber of commerce or a coalition of city groups) is a way to ensure the
legitimacy of a project. Individual business and social leaders can be mobilized by the
government to obtain support from the followers of such actors. The recruitment of
formal legitimacy through other parties may be apparent in unified expressions of
support for a new institution, the use of different logos and publicity material and
contributions of political, financial or human resources.
Informal legitimacy is more subtle and often more important in governance
networks and is expressed through the engagement of individuals, groups and
organizations that actively participate in the governance arrangement. Implementation
theory has shown that legitimacy is more dependent on the support of relevant actors
than of the formal mandate of actors in important positions (Pressman & Wildavsky
1974; Barret & Fudge 1981; Hjern & Porter 1981). The initiative must be experienced
as legitimate by the actors at the operational level, such as social interest groups or
organizations that are invited to deliver aspects of the development program to the
target group e.g small businesses or the unemployed. Informal legitimacy can be
recruited by making agreements wherein the governance arrangements are identified
(e.g declarations of intentions of the stakeholders) or prizes are granted (e.g as will be
seen in the Gent case a planning prize had been awarded). Such informal legitimacy is
more diffuse and therefore more difficult to measure as an aspect of legitimacy.
Formal legitimacy can be interpreted as the most meaningful from the perspective
of (representative) democracy.. By means of this formal legitimacy the connection
between the governance arrangement and their grass roots are reestablished. Formal
legitimacy is not only crucial to the initial creation of new institution but also, and
primarily, with respect to the results of the process. Informal legitimacy is more
concerned about the support for the operational implementation of a program and the
capacity for the arrangement to achieve the expected results (see output legitimacy as
defined by Scharpf 1997). Such legitimacy is more instrumental: it is primarily relevant
to the degree with which implementation agents or the receivers of policy outcomes
realize their expectations of a program.
Consent: possibilities for voice
The second element to consider in democratic institutional design is consent. Consent is
concerned with the processes wherein citizens (and the followers of partners to a
governance process) are able to voice their opinions about the proposals, policies and
decisions within the governance arrangement. A distinction between legitimacy and
consent is that legitimacy is about the mandate to undertake general decision making
and delivery activities, while consent is about the specific actions taken within the
governance arrangement. Governance institutional arrangements must be able to
answer three design questions with regard to consent:
a) which items were made the subject of accord?
b) how were the processes, for which accord were required, organized?
c) what is the status of the opinions of citizens and other stakeholders in
relationship to the prevailing institutions?
146
The first of these design questions concerns the issues for which accordance has been
requested. These sorts of arrangements are often privatized in order that the decision
making not be subject to classical political decision making procedures. In this respect
a mandate is given to an institution to be relatively autonomous in its actions, and
thereby be, among other things, quicker and more efficient and flexible in operations.
This is a very organizational perspective upon the requirements for guaranteeing both
the input and output stadiums of the policy process. Arrangements for economic
development are made with public goals in mind. The second question concerns the
mechanisms to express/deny accordance. In participation theory this is the questions
about the width of participation: how many actors (and subjects) are allowed in the
participation process (Berry at all, 1993) Representative democracy organizes this via
periodic elections. In addition some western countries attempt to include citizens and
other stakeholders with the policy making and implementation decisions. Examples of
these arrangements include forms of direct participation (referred to by various names
such as deliberative democracy, interactive decision making and participative
democracy) or forms of stakeholder/consumer assessments (e.g citizen forums,
consumer panels etc.).
Finally there is the third question regarding the status of the collected visions,
opinions and reactions from the various stakeholders. The contribution of a range of
opinions aims to promote variety in the problem formulation around a policy issue, but
also to expand the possibility to develop solutions. It is still necessary to make choices
among the variety in possibilities. In other words there must be a mechanism whereby
the initial variety generated in the decision making process is reduced. One choice is to
continually increase the consent demands upon stakeholders during the decision
making process, but the administrative organization responsible for the arrangement
should be allowed to maintain their decision authority. Alternatively the nature of the
governance arrangement can also require that detailed decisions must be accepted or
designed by the stakeholders, thereby to promote the realization of effective
implementation. The questions about veto rights are in essence typical of the
institutional design. These are generally not questions of legal regulations but rather
process agreements in the process design that has been formulated prior to the initiation
of the decision making process (De Bruijn et al. 1998; Koppenjan & Klijn 2004).
Accountability: responsibility to the outside world
Accountability, the final component of democratic design, has two dimensions: to take
accountability for something and be held accountable for it. The first dimension
concerns a process of explaining the decisions that were taken through the governance
arrangements and demonstrating performance to the relevant stakeholders. These
stakeholders are primarily the organizations that have participated in the governance
arrangement or have given the mandate to allow such an arrangement. The stakeholders
can also include other followers of the process or other concerned groups such as the
users of certain services or local economic and social interest organizations.
This process of accounting gives insight into the way in which the governance
arrangement maintains and gives form to relationships with other actors. Accountability
expressed in a (final) report wherein an overview is given of the decision making
process and the decisions that were taken within a governance arrangement is one
possibility. Another is reporting to a public hearing. The dramaturgy of accountability
has its own dynamic: where does the reporting take place, by who or whether questions
147
could be asked, how these events are communicated and the reports are prepared, what
is the impact of the operations.
A second aspect of accountability concerns the way in which the mandate of the
decision makers is confirmed, changed or ended. Representative democracy is a design
that resolves this problem through cyclical elections. The governance arrangement may
or may not include the organization of an election to appoint administrative leaders. If
elections are used, the question then becomes how should the electorate be described,
and which stakeholders are then included and excluded from the election process.
Governance arrangements usually have an informal character and the administrators
and managers are mostly appointed via forms of cooptation. A frequently used method
to establish membership of the administrative organ in the arrangements where no actor
has a majority include the nomination or appointment by a stakeholder (e.g the
chamber of commerce and civil action groups) or selection by the administrative organ
itself. Each has different implications for the process wherein the population and
members of the institution are required to demonstrate collective and individual
accountability.
It is essentially a question about how people are appointed through stakeholders,
the kind of mandate they are granted, which accountability they are required to take
internally.
Three democratic criteria and their indicators
The three principles elaborated above form a democratic triangle which can be used to
evaluate governance networks and their institutional arrangements. They provide a
measurement of how well the democratic anchorage in governance networks is
designed and thus also what connections have been made with both representational
democratic institutions and general principles of democratic process.
FORMAL
GIVING
ACCOUNT
BEING
HELD
ACCOUNTABLE
INFORMAL
ISSUES
ITY
BIL
TA
UN
CO
AC
LE
GI
TIM
AC
Y
Figure 1: The democratic triangle
MECHANISMS
CONSENT
STATUS
148
To apply the three principles in evaluating governance network arrangements we have

to translate them in specific questions that direct the evaluation. Table 1 provides those
evaluation questions that will be used to analyze the two cases in this chapter.
Democratic criteria
Indicators
Legitimacy
are representative institutions responsible for formal decisions?
Formal
Are responsibilities mandated from representative institutions to

governance arrangements?
Are there signs of formal recognitions of stakeholders of the
governance arrangements (thus ex ante legitimacy)?
Informal
are stakeholders engaged in the governance arrangement

do stakeholder support the overall idea and purpose of the
governance arrangement?
do they support the (preliminary) outcomes of the governance
arrangements?
can signs of agreements (like signed agreements, gentlemen
agreements etc) be recognized (thus ex post legitimacy)?
Consent
Items/
issues
which issues, both in terms of content and in terms of

characteristics (tactical or strategic for instance) are open to
consent?
what is the variety of the issues open to consent?
which information can be brought in?
Mechanisms
which mechanisms are chosen for procedures for consent (like

consent, majority etc.)?
which stakeholders are allowed to participate by these
mechanisms?
Status
what is the degree of influence of stakeholders in governance

arrangements?
how is this degree of influence arranged (formally)?
is there significant difference between stakeholders in this degree
of influence?
What mechanism are used to reduce variety of generated solutions
and ideas (related to the legitimacy question)?
Accountability
To take
accountability
(who and how
explanation of
decisions)
how are decisions communicated to the outside World (reports,

public hearings etc) and the constituencies of the stakeholder
organizations?
To be held
accountable
(how is
mandate
confirmed,
changed and
ended)
are stakeholders involved in governance arrangements visible and

accountable for the decisions that have been made?
are decisions transparent both in content and in process terms to

actors not directly involved in the institutional arrangement and to
the organization to which stakeholders belong?
how is accountability of official office holders (elected

representatives) arranged?
Table 1: Three democratic design principles and their indicators
149
3. Democratic steering in collaborative economic developments: Two cases

As said in the introduction we find a wide variety of governance arrangements in
governance networks in Europe. The motivations for setting up these institutional
arrangements are different. Sometimes the main motivation is to reach consent of
important actors with indispensible resources; sometimes the main motivation is to
involve citizens in decision-making processes. In the two cases that are presented in
this section both motives are clearly visible.
The framework that has been introduced in the previous section can now be
applied to empirical practices of administrative design. For purposes of illustration two
cases will be briefly analyzed in this article, one from the region of Flanders in
Belgium and the other from The Netherlands. Both cases have been selected because
they provide longitudinal information about the evolution of the economic
development. Longitudinal analyses are particularly important in this area of research
because governance forms beyond representative government often appear to operate in
a more flexible and adaptive institutional context (Lowndes & Skelcher 1998).
Case 1: The project Gent channel zone
The first case analysis concerns the long term development of an network arrangement
created for economic development, environmental policy and urban planning the
channel zone in the city of Gent (ROM-Gent), Flanders (Voets & De Rynck 2004; De
Rynck & Voets 2006; Voets & De Rynck, 2006). The urban development of the area
was conducted in an uncoordinated way for decades, and as a consequence there were
increasing tensions between different sorts of uses. The area played an important
economic role and provided valuable living areas in the channel villages. It was also the
source many environmental problems which became clearer in the 1990s, and thereby
demanded a more coordinated approach.
The project developed from bottom up and was initially a relatively informal and
interpersonal arrangement, but it became more formal over time (Voets & De Rynck
2004). The arrangement had established legitimacy with most participating actors from
its beginnings. The insight that the problems were connected to one another and that the
existing sector approach had failed and offered little assistance promoted the support
for another kind of arrangement.
The trajectory of the project can be distinguished by three main phases:
1. The initial phase (March 1993-October 1996)
2. Planning phase (December 1999- May 2007)
3. Implementation phase (June 2002 -)
150
Figure 2: Timeline of Gent channel zone
STRUCTURE
ACTORS
'02
'03
'04
target view
PERIOD UNDER ANALYSIS
'05
'06
'07
R5
PLANNING2
PLANNING1
R4
steering committee & project group

informal w orking groups
25
'01
steering committee & project group

formal w orking groups
20yy
R6
IMPLEMENTATION2
'00
strategic plan
'99
PLANNING3/
IMPLEMENTATION1
'98
draft strategic plan
'97
R3
START
INITIATION
planning group
10
'96
R2
R1
R0
'95
concept target view
ROUND
MARKER
'94
bottleneck note
ROUND
LABEL
'93
INCUBATION
ROUND
NUMBER
19xx
project proposal
TIME
steering committee, project office, PROVAG,

SRO, formal w orking groups, citizen groups
40
> 50
Initial phase: Seeking legitimacy for the sub regional planning process
The project came about organically. It entailed a number of actors in the area having a
similar problem perception, the support of consultants, and a range of organized
discussions with privileged witnesses/experts(?) and the development of a preliminary
process design. This was all summarized in report describing the existing problems.
This report was approved by the limited group of actors involved in the process and
legitimated the formal beginnings of the arrangement. The proposed approach was a
collaborative planning perspective which included working upon three aspects (vision
forming, daily action and stakeholder participation) simultaneously (Van den Broek
2001). On the basis of this formal legitimacy, studies were financed by the partners and
by the then Inter regional programs and the Euregio Scheldemond. In this period the
legitimacy of the arrangement was promoted by expanding the network of actors
involved, although in this phase it primarily concerned a small group of administrators
and urban planners.
The formal legitimacy and accordance for a number of options was then
strengthened by the approval of a concept goal, which included bringing together the
problem perceptions, as well as the values and interests of the different actors. These
were discussed and the first elements for establishing an integrated vision of the desired
development for the region emerged. Accordance flowed from the shared involvement
and engagement of the organizations and the unanimous support of the concept goal. In
order to maintain transparency around the matters of accountability and accordance a
two-part structure was given to the arrangement. The steering group consisted of those
responsible for policy and there was a project group consisting of administrators and
experts. These two-part structure flowed from perspectives of representative
democracy, with elected politicians considered to be the legitimate decision makers,
while administrators and experts were responsible for planning policy and
implementation.
151
Planning phase: expansion and depth

A number of new planning documents were developed during the planning phase. First
of all the concept aim was revised into a goal, this was done through research projects
in a number of work groups where new stakeholders were introduced. In addition the
accordance mechanism was adjusted by discontinuing the distinction between the
steering group and the project group. All the issues were to be now addressed in one
group. The accountability was a question of the representatives of the different
stakeholders: each actor maintained their authority and were encouraged to maintain
accountability among their own followers. In this way accountability was maintained.
Accordance was given through unanimous acceptance of the intention goals which
were accompanied by long term goals and a concrete action program. There was also a
range of core decisions undertaken including a plan of action regarding different
working methods. In this period there were also a number of activities undertaken
including an important change in plans for which the informal legitimacy of the
arrangement among the actors was promoted.
At the conclusion of this period the steering group proposed that the necessary
goals of the group required further depth. The result was a proposal for a strategic plan
in June 2002. This plan had a binding and direction giving aspect and was actualized
through a number of decisions. All of the involved actors were accord with the
document (including the local council of the three involved municipalities), with the
exception of the Flemish government. These increased the realization that the formal
and informal legitimacy in the area was in itself not enough to guarantee the support of
the Flemish government. The government rejected the proposal of the strategic plan
because a number of issues had not been researched to their satisfaction (primarily
through new legislation such as environmental reports, urban safety reports). This
increased the pressure on the arrangement to obtain legitimacy among the Flemish
government.
As a consequence a second planning period was undertaken and was pursued
parallel to the implementation phase. The steering group suggested that the proposal for
a strategic plan had not satisfactorily considered a number of changes such as the new
legislation and a more sustainable scenario regarding the economic development and
the assessment of the impact of the environmental legislation (e.g. recognition of
important bird life area).
The actualized strategic plan was adjusted after consultation with the involved
actors. In May 2007 this report was then unanimously approved by the members of the
steering group. In order to promote the legitimacy, accordance and accountability as
much as possible, the document was also presented to the Flemish government for
approval, as well as within the relevant organs of each of the steering group members.
The fact that the aim to obtain authentic approval was actually surrendered by the
Flemish government, demonstrated the continuing difficulties to extend the support for
the project from the local stakeholders and Flemish administrators to broader political
stakeholders. Nevertheless this official act of seeking approval can also be seen as
strengthening the formal legitimacy and accordance with the main options for the
region. It was sought with the hope that it would bring about more informal legitimacy
in the negotiations and actions taken among the Flemish actors around the channel area.
152
Implementation phase: identifying an adapted mix of democratic principles

Parallel revision of the strategic plan for the implementation phase was also undertaken
in order to maintain the legitimacy for the project among the other actors in the area.
For example a number of actions were undertaken in the implementation of the revised
visions such as a numerous evictions, the rebuilding of infrastructure and the
development of an industrial area. A vision for the design of the connecting areas was
also elaborated upon. A tension remained however between the speed of the
implementation and the expectations of a number of actors in the area.
An important step in the implementation was the definitive decision by the Flemish
government in July 2005 regarding the urban implementation plan (RUP) which
excluded the harbor region. This exclusion brought clarity around the role of the harbor
company as the regional coordinator. It conformed to the harbor decree and gave
commitment to a number of relocations that corresponded with the developed vision for
the economy, sustainability, connecting areas and infrastructure. Although the vision
that had been developed within the project had not been entirely translated in the RUP,
the central themes had been included and created legal security for the realization of a
number of the locations included in the project. In other words the legitimacy of the
project was strengthened by the RUP, although the elements that deviated from the
strategic plan indicated that the informal legitimacy for the project among some actors
had not been as strong as initially thought.
In this phase the governance arrangement itself was restructured in more formal
ways. The steering group was expanded and a number of new units were created such
as the official advise organ (SRO-Gent) for the Flemish government. A juridical
identity was also adopted in the form of a project business in the area (PROVAG)
which was to give greater structure to the regional development. This adjustment to the
structure was undertaken in order to provide an explicit mechanism for accordance and
accountability and to enable the stakeholders to coordinate the realization of the
implementation projects.
Figure 3: The structure of Project Gent Canal Area in 2007
Administrations (departments of federal, Flemish,
provincial and local governments)
Project Ghent Canal Area
Network Ghent Canal Area
Steering Committee Network Ghent Canal Area
(SRN) - chair: governor
Sub regional Consultative
Flemish
government
Body Ghent Canal Area

(SRO)
chair: govenor
Project Office
Ghent Canal
Area
Partners
Working Groups
Citizen Groups
canal villages
Cross-border
Deliberation
Terneuzen-Ghent
Project Association for

Additional Land Policy in the
Canal Area (PROVAG)
153
In 2003 the administrative design of the arrangement was adjusted further. This was to
respond to the new demands of the decision making and coordination of the
implementation and to realize the implementation more effectively. Changes included
expanding the steering group to a sub-regional network which included a number of
workgroups. In addition broader social participation was made possible as a response to
the increasing interest in the initiative. For example a number of residents groups were
organized to support the project and these were also represented in the Network Gent
Channel. In addition, delegations of employer and employees groups, as well as
democratic political parties were included within the Network. The revised structure
provided better mechanisms for legitimacy, accordance and accountability at a general
level. It also promoted these features within the different policy sectors affected by the
project.
These gradual changes from ROM-Gent to the Project Gent Channel zone (PGK)
occurred because of the concern of the project team to promote the democratic quality
of the process. They sought as much as possible to anticipate the complexity of the
issues and the different nature and capacities of the actors involved. The arrangement
that was developed with the residents groups in the villages along the channel is an
example of the careful considerations that were undertaken. On the other hand, there
was also a strategic motivation for these activities, not least the necessity of having to
ensure satisfactory to support among a variety of actors in order to realize the goals of
the project. Partnership agreements were used and the project bureau was financed by
all of the partners involved in the arrangement. The regular interaction with other
policy arenas about other themes ensured that the governance arrangement became
embedded in a broader negotiation context. This meant that there was more playing
room to enable the project to proceed. This was significant given the high degree of
mutual dependence among the actors in the concentrated institutional landscape which
ensured that all levels of the administration were included in the project activities. The
inter-dependency remained throughout the project although changed in level of degree
at various times. The maintenance of inter-dependency was a consequence of the active
management of the project management team. This aside the legitimacy of the project
remained dependent upon the accordance of political circuits at the level of the Flemish
governments. These were circuits with their own dynamic, they were separate from the
channel area, and could only be penetrated by the Gents region with varying success.
Case 2: The expansion of Mainport Rotterdam
The second case concerns the decision making process around the expansion of the
habor of Rotterdam during the period 1990-2004 (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2000; Teisman
& Klijn 2002; Van Gils & Klijn 2007). Rotterdam is one of the largest harbors of
Europe and is of significant importance for the Dutch economy. Expansion plans were
developed in the 1980s and came about in three different decision making phases
between 1990 and the early years of the new millennium. The expansion of the harbor
entailed themes about regional interests that cut across numerous municipal borders.
Conflicting values were prominent such as economic values versus environmental
demands. As a consequence different democratic arrangements were adopted over time
to address the complexity of the decision making processes.
ROM-Rijnmond arrangement was created during the period 1990-1995. The ROM
arrangement was a relatively loose cooperation between different public actors in the
region (2 ministries, the province, 15 mayors and a number of regional groups). The
154
aim was to develop an integral plan across the fields of economics and the
environment.
VERM arrangement was created during the period 1996-1997. This was a project group
created by the national government as an interactive decision making process. It was to
assess the necessity of the harbor expansion and also to identify how the range of
stakeholders involved in the expansion were to be included in the decision making
process.
The PMR arrangement was active during the period 1998-2004. This was a formal
project organization that was also created by the national government. It was to realize
the expansion of the harbor, to ensure that the necessary environmental compensations
were addressed, and to include private actors to ensure the realization of the project.
Figure 4: Timeline of the expansion of mainport Rotterdam
'94
'95
'96
'98
'99
'00
R2
'01
R3
VERM
ROM
Rijnmond
initiation
'97
'02
'03
'04
20yy
R4
IMPLEMENTATION
'93
R1
ROUND
LABEL
ROUND
MARKER
'92
negative decision
Coiuncil of State
(rejection PKB part 4)
ROUND
NUMBER
'91
PMR
'90
final report
VERM
19xx
proposal
maasvlakte II
TIJD
PERIOD UNDER ANALYSIS
Legitimacy and accordance in the ROM Rijnmond process

The initial ROM Rijnmond process began in 1990 and was primarily concerned with
the development of an integral urban plan for the Rijnmond region. This region
includes Rotterdam. One of the most important aspects of this project was the
development expansion of the Rotterdam harbor and was referred to as the Maas area
II. At the same time, the Ministry of Traffic and Infrastructure gave further advice
regarding the continued development of this project. It was conceived of as a project of
national importance. The legitimacy of this process was established through an explicit
accord between the concerned local municipalities, the provincial authorities and two
ministries (Ministry Traffic & Infrastructure VROM, Ministry Housing, Urban
Planning & Environment). This approach whereby regional integral urban planning was
legitimized by the national government was pursued in 11 regions including
Rijnmond. 1
Legitimacy was also attained by creating a project group in 1994 to articulate a
detailed plan for the Rotterdam harbor. The accordance mechanisms which entailed
presenting the participating organizations with the reports regarding the results from the
ROM process included the finding that a new expansion area was necessary to provide
1
In Flanders an analogy was made between the Dutch example and the ROM project in the Gent channel
zone, but this latter project attained its own distinct trajectory.
155
the required space for the Mainport Rotterdam. Accordance was expressed through a
new accord between the partners which was signed in 1993. A project team was
mandated to prepare a report about the implementation of the expansion of the harbor
via a new polder. This report was to be presented in 1995. This accordance was clearly
in correspondence with a section of the participating stakeholders (in particular it was
not the vision of the stakeholders with environmental interests). Given that the
expansion of the harbor was a national issue, the ROM leaders of the project decided
that the following phase of the negotiations should be undertaken by the national
government.
VERM: an interactive process without the desired impact
In April 1996 the cabinet came to the conclusion that a the usefulness and necessity
discussion regarding the expansion was required. The necessity of expansion of the
Rotterdam harbor was to be assessed, as well as alternative solutions. The coordination
was put in the hands of the Ministry of Traffic and Infrastructure. An important goal of
this process was reconciliation between economic values (the desire for an expanded
habor) and ecological values (maintaining nature). This goal legitimized the
involvement of the national government but it also changed the focus of the debate for
the local actors. It is increased the number of actors involved in the decision making
since the government had created a new interactive decision making process referred to
as VERM. VERM was legitimated by a formal decision from the cabinet and through
establishing a project group that included administrators from 4 different ministries
(VROM, V&W, LN&W, EZ). The project established legitimacy from other actors
(such as environmental groups, citizens and others) through setting up a broad range of
interactive processes. Round table conferences, workgroups and sound boards for
voicing opinions were all established and provided the opportunity for a large group of
actors to discuss the necessity of the expansion of the harbor. In addition a number of
research trajectories were began (zee Klijn 2003; Van Gils & Klijn 2007). The project
group VERM functioned as an organizer and process manager of all of these activities.
Although a larger number of the stakeholders and citizens were involved, the
administrators from the ministries, including from the top level of the Ministry of
Traffic and Infrastructure, remained skeptical. They would have preferred it that the
usual interest groups were consulted with rather than the citizens. One official made
reference to the idea that such activities created an element of fun rather than support.
The ministry also maintained the right to deviated from the findings of the interactive
process. Politicians and the parliament were also rarely included in the activities. In
interviews with the project group VERM that the exclusion of politicians was a
conscious decision since such actors had their own areas of responsibilities (Klijn 2003;
Van Gils & Klijn 2007). As a consequence the interactions and processes that
constituted the interactive features of the decision making process were very weakly
connected to the more formal decision making channels (see Klijn & Koppenjan 2000;
Klijn 2003). The accordance mechanisms created within the VERM project were
clearly not perfect. There was little trace of the inputs from the various actors involved
in the interactive process in the final decisions that were taken by the Ministry of
V&W. The final decision hardly deviated from the initial decision taken in the original
proposals that had been identified by the earlier project group in the Rotterdam
municipality (Klijn 2003).
156
PMR: classic polder model with satisfactory outcome

VERM was concluded in 1996 even though a difficult decision about the new polder
had still not been reached. The government decided to create a third decision-making
round in order to help the project proceed. In this decision making round it was the
concerned national ministries, the Rotterdam local council and the regional and
provincial governments that were included in the project group. The group was referred
to as PMR. It was responsible for the preparation of the urban decision for which the
expansion of the Rotterdam harbor was to obtain its form. They were also to identify
adequate compensation for the perceived environmental damage from the expansion
(they had a twofold aim).
In addition, a number of different interaction processes were established. Social
groups, business and other participants were invited to a consultation forum the Not
Government Parties. Negotiations also took place between public actors (BOM steering
negotiations Mainport) including the PMR leaders. The project bureau PMR was to
form the connection between the ONR and BOM. Since most of the administrators
within the BOM worked steadily further on expansion plans and continued to be wary
of external influences, the environmental organizations left the ONR in 1999. They
only returned to the discussions when modest attempts were made to establish
negotiations again in consultation with both the most important represented interests of
the ONR and BOM. This was part of an attempt to establish a link between these latter
two decision making arenas. In short although legitimacy was given to environmental
groups by inclusion in this sitting in the ONR, their legitimacy and that of the project
had to be continually fought for. The accordance of the environmental groups was only
given after further mutual consultation around the compensation plan which included
the participation of economic interest groups and the accordance of the municipality of
Rotterdam. Through the connection in the negotiations such outcomes were
incorporated into the final urban plan (PKB) (Van Gils & Klijn 2007).
Accordance was thus established in a rigid and difficult consultation process
between interest groups themselves and between the interest groups and the
government representatives. The different themes and interactions were conducted
alongside one another rather than that they were connected. There was also another
consultation round held simultaneously between private parties about the possibility of
a possible PPS arrangement for the realization of the Maasvlakte.
A study of the public private partnership was initiated but the accordance
mechanism had a traditional contracting out model rather than a partnership model.
This alternative was difficult because the private parties engagement required certainty
that they would obtain a contract. In addition, public actors had difficulty with letting
go of their control over the project. The result was a compromise whereby an
arrangement was made wherein the room for initiative and power remained by the
public actors. This corresponded with the legal tradition of the Ministry of Transport
and Infrastructure. The arrangement also made it possible for the Rotterdam Council to
maintain complete control over the developments around the harbor and the national
commission responsible for urban development agreements wanted to avoid a strong
private interest in the negotiations.
The problem of accordance was thus in general resolved by continuing with
negotiation processes between environmental groups, other private actors and public
actors about the compensation for loss of environmental values with the expansion of
the Rotterdam harbor (Gils and Klijn 2007). In this respect the institutional design of
157
the arrangement was typical of the ideal type of Dutch consensual decision making.
The parliament was also very positive about the attained result which indicated that
environmental and economic interests could be reconciled.
4. Two cases of regional development: a comparison

Both cases have clear similarities: complex harbor areas with difficult considerations
between different and conflicting spatial claims. The most primary function was the
economy but reconciled with, among other things, living, environmental and mobility
claims. Different government levels were involved in the decision making and private
parties also participated in the decision making processes. In both cases there was
active management from a governance arrangement.
Comparing the two cases: similarities and dissimilarities
If we compare the two cases on the democratic principles we see a wide variety of
mechanism, forms of legitimacy and accountability. We also see some striking
differences between the two cases. Table 2 shows the main characteristics of the cases.
Democratic principles
Legitimacy
Formal
Gentse Kanaalzone
Mainport Rotterdam
recognition of
stakeholders of the
institutional
arrangement
- recognition of stakeholders
no formal delegation of
responsibilities by
representative
institutions
recognition between
government institutions
by cooperation
agreements
- no formal delegation of responsibilities,

there is a formal assignment by parliament
- public organizations: agreement and
recognition of institutional arrangement
- legitimacy of other stakeholders: more
informal/voluntary and through membership
of the network
legitimacy from other

stakeholders from below
Informal
- membership of
stakeholders and
bilateral negotiations
express legitimacy of
stakeholders
- satakeholders support
arrangem ents (although
some criticsm abouit
lack of impact of some
of them)
- results are a bit
disappointing for some
of the stakeholders
- stakeholders are well engaged (in VERM

wide variety of stakeholders, in PMR a
limited number of well organized
stakeholders are member)
- in general stakeholders support
arrangement (although in VEREM there is
some criticism about depth)
- good support in PMR of outcomes by
main stakeholders (environmental groups,
harbor company, municipality etc)
more different staheoldeerLidmaatschap
stakeholders en bilateraal overleg
158
Democratic principles
Gentse Kanaalzone
Mainport Rotterdam
consent
- items: open in
principle all kind of
issues related to
kanaalzone
- items for consent determined by

parliament
Items/
issues
- issue= strategic (question whether

expansion harbor is useful)
issues: strategic and

operational
Mechanisms
- Consultation
procedures (in steering
groups and workshops)
consensus based with
sometimes veto power
- externally (outside
governance
arrangement) mutual
bargening, information
meetings
Status
- determined by process
rules
- in principle equal
acces of stakeholders
and of information
- no formal
arrangements of access
acountability
Giving account
- communication by
various documents
- accountability to
constituencies: more
incidental and ad hoc
and a bit personalized
Held
accountable
- consultation based on consensus (in

VERM; among wide range of stakeholders,
PMR: small number of stakeholders)
- externally (outside governance
arrangement): mutual bargening (with
central departments and politicians),
communication and information meeting
(citizens especially PMR)
- determined by combination of procedure

set beforehand by Legal rights
(environmental procedures) and obligations
(in assignments of parliament)
- in theory equal access (especially in the
VERM arrangement less so in PMR). In
practice more possibilities for well
organized stakeholders (especially in PMR)
-communication by formal documents (at

the end of each period) and a wide variety
of reports (but content mainly less about
process)
- accountability party formal partly informal
(ad hoc)
- Accountability partly
formal partly informal
- stakeholders to constituencies: ad
hoc/incidental
- Process not easily

accessible for non
stakeholders
-process not easily accessible for non

stakeholders (and in PMR only for well
organized stakeholders)
- permanent
memberships of
arrangements (no voting
procedures)
- permanent memberships of arrangements

(no voting procedures
- voluntary participation
on invitation
- voluntary participation of actors

- strong mandate of actors (especially in
PMR)
- restricted mandate of
actors
Table 2: Gentse Kanaalzone and Mainport Rotterdam evaluated by the three democratic principles
159
In general the arrangements are more similar than they are dissimilar which is a
surprising conclusion in itself since we are dealing with two different arrangements in
two different countries.
Seen from the principle of legitimacy we do not see very large differences between
the cases. Maybe that the informal legitimacy is a bit stronger in the VERM/PMR case
compared to the Gent case because the resulting outcomes receive fairly strong support
from the involved well organized stakeholders. And although the results were later
rejected by the court (that is the first attempt) the agreements in the PMR case are still
the basis under the current implementation process.
In the second principle consent we see also some similarities, although in the gent
case the issues at stake are both strategic and operational while the issues in Mainport
Rotterdam are largely strategic. Thye agenda is more open in the Gent case which fits
better the complex nature of the issues as becomes clear in the Mainport case where the
fixed nature of the questions in especially the VERM conflicts with the open process
character. We see similar consent mechanism in both cases, although consensus seems
to be slightly stronger in the Dutch case (which fits the generally acknowledged
consensual decision-making culture in The Netherlands) and the formal anchorage of
the consent mechanisms seem to be stringer in the Dutch case.
And the same picture in the accountability principles which are again fairly
similar. The mandate of actors in the Rotterdam case seems to be stronger than in the
Gent case.
Dynamics in the evolution of institutional arrangements of governance networks
It was significant that in both cases the governance arrangement for economic
development changed over time as a reaction to the changed framing of the problem
and the political arena in which it was situated. In both cases there was also needed for
a different connection between actors and between formal and informal responsibilities.
So governance arrangements in governance networks do have a flexible character and
trying to adjust the type of connections and the strength of the connections that are
being made.
In the Rotterdam case there was a shift from an initially technical dossier about
harbor expansion to a case of a national urban planning strategy of for large
(infrastructure) developments. This framing was adjusted through the decision to
include interest groups and private actors in the decision making process through an
adjusted mechanism for governance. The VERM clearly was an attempt to connect a
wide variety of stakeholders to the decision-making process. Interestingly in this way a
very wide consent was achieved in terms of access, but the possibilities to actually
influence decision-making processes were very limited. PMR was more an example of
a limited access of the process; only well organized groups, but with a much more
possibility to really influence the decision-making process. So in terms of connecting
many actors the VERM was better but in terms of making connections that really
resulted in consent the PMR was better. So we see that the governance arrangement
was adjusted in each of the phases which made different forms of legitimacy,
accordance and accountability possible.
In the Gent case the governance arrangement developed from the channel zone
project itself. This was initially an arrangement primarily of interest to local politicians
and administrators but which was steered with a certain sense of urgency. Despite the
fact that the Flemish level had the most influential authority and resources regarding
160
the area, the project group acted consistently with varying success to keep the
project on the agenda of Flemish politics. In the framework of their three track
approach to collaborative planning, much attention was devoted to ensuring
accordance, legitimacy and accountability. To the degree that the scope of the project
expanded (e.g. more themes) and changed (more towards implementation) there was
more need for political, administrative and social support and the structure of the
arrangement changed to respond to this. This conscious strategy was linked to a
flexible organizational structure that was revised at different points in time so as to
correspond with the new themes and functions of the network.
Arrangement: complex mechanisms for accordance, legitimacy and accountability
Arrangements are not only be about overcoming the differences between actors, their
constituents are also more complex (than traditional democratic arrangements) in terms
of legitimacy, accordance mechanisms and accountability. This applies to both of the
cases and was apparent in their use of a great variety of regulations and agreements to
ensure the inclusion of the three principles in their practices. Classical legitimacy and
accordance rules of the game originating from the usual decision making arrangements
existed alongside newly created ad hoc mechanisms. In this respect the new
arrangements around economic development processes corresponded to the processes
that they were to guide: they are complex (compare Ashbys classic rule of required
variety, Ashby, 1969). There were nevertheless some more dominant forms that were
adopted in the chosen arrangements such as voluntary accordance from the
participating parties, the inclusion of private actors and generally lighter forms of
organization (project groups, consultation procedures etc) as opposed to heavier
arrangements (such as separately created organizations, more formal procedures etc.).
In addition, connections were continually sought with the more formal decision making
procedures. These connections were sometimes well and less well arranged.
The different rules in the arrangements also can conflict with the one another. The
Rotterdam case for example demonstrated that the administrative structure can be
established with conflicting mechanisms for legitimacy, accordance and accountability.
The interactive process within the VERM was the public face of a dual arrangement
where the private face was actually the political administrative arena for the decision
making. The two very different institutional designs existed alongside one another. In
the end the interactive process, which in theory was to facilitate unified decision
making and thereby legitimacy and accordance, was undermined by the absence of
politicians. It was also undermined by the absence of a link with the
political/administrative process (Klijn 2003). In the Gent case there was a sub regional
arena that functioned as a negotiating and consultation platform of political,
administrative and social stakeholders. There was in other words a range of
representatives included in the arena including local parliamentarians. Such
parliamentarians as well as responsible implementing bodies were consistently included
in the arrangement through advice procedures as well as through the passage of official
documents and the request for political approval at various phases in the decision
making process. The sub regional arena devoted much energy to influencing Flemish
politics especially regarding certain decisions and the need for providing financial
resources. There were also existing bilateral contacts between stakeholders and the
Flemish political level, but these interventions appeared to be in line with what had
been agreed with at the subregional level. Extremely important channels for such good
161
contacts were the political parties, which had both access to politicians, administrators,
as well as social stakeholders (De Rynck & Voets 2005).
Arrangements connect different actors and different interests
Characteristic for the arrangements analyzed in this paper is that they not only, by their
very nature, connect different actors but also actors with conflicting material interests.
In the Rotterdam case it became apparent that the harbor interests of the harbor
company and the Rotterdam municipality were in sharp conflict with those of the
environmental interests and environmental groups and residents. Another problem was
the tensions between control of the developments from the Rotterdam municipality and
the Ministry V&W, and the need to include private actors who required a degree of
independence in their operations. The consequence of this was that besides the analysis
of the institutional design, it was also necessary to analyze the underlying interests and
the interaction between both. This two level analysis was relevant to researching
VERM where the political and administrative interests dominated the attempts to
pursue an interactive process. In the Gent case this was less problematic: there were
clear opposing interests, but the existing interdependencies between the stakeholders
(both public and private) appeared large enough to allow the subregional governance
arrangement to function. This is not to deny that the interest conflicts shifted partly to
the Flemish level, where the inter-cabinet work groups formed an autonomous decision
making circuit.
An important difference was the nature of the policy construction in the cases. The
Rotterdam case was a politically supported initiative through the national government,
and there was the clear goal of realizing an expanded harbor. By contrast the Gent case
was initiated by a group of local actors who from bottom up developed their vision and
then established coalitions and fought to convince the Flemish level of the need to
make decisions, and make financial support available for the infrastructure programs.
The story of the expansion of the Antwerp harbor has more similarities with the
Rotterdam case in terms of being a central policy priority.
Aside from the different interests there were also actors involved with entirely
different organizational and strategic capacities. In the Gent case it was shown that
there was some tension between professionals and non professionals. While at first
sight the Gent case had enough guarantee as democratic governance, it became
apparent that the degree to which a number of stakeholders could process the themes,
plans and actions satisfactorily and in time varied significantly. The smaller local
government and residents groups had some trouble understanding the often
bureaucratic documents and procedures satisfactorily. Comparable problems were also
observed during the VERM phase in Rotterdam when individual citizens and groups of
citizens clearly had less influence and access to certain arenas than other actors such as
administrators and ministries (see Klijn 2003).
5. Conclusion
This article has sought to evaluate two governance networks, those around the Gent
kanaalzone and the Mainport Rotterdam, and their institutional arrangements. These
institutional arrangements are meant to connect the various actors, their different
162
interests and the complexity of the process. But they also have a function of
reconnecting governance networks to democratic principles.
The analysis has shown that such complex arrangements are significant for policy
making and as policy making forms. Characteristic of these arrangements are arenas
wherein decision making takes place in consecutive decision making rounds over time
and within different institutional forms. As a consequence both practices and the rules
of the game within the decision making arenas also change over time. The case
analyses provided the possibility to operationalize the three democratic concepts of
legitimacy, accordance and accountability which are presented in the appendix to this
article. This analytical model can be used to examine the processes of decision making
although the various principles identified can also be refined into further sub-groups.
In the introduction to this article it was suggested that new forms of governance for
complex problems had brought about revived interest in institutional design. Though it
should be noted that design in the cases we examined was not expressed through
intentional considerations about the form of arrangements. Indeed, we found that such a
carefully and conscious consideration of the design processes in such complex
arrangements was limited. A consecutive phase in the trajectory of the process was
more often a consequence of contingent combinations of internal and external factors,
such as changes in the balance of interests. The impact of legitimacy, means to
demonstrate accordance, and accountability were generally the product of change and
not some other consciously rational explanation or motivation. Looking back it is
possible to identify a design in the process post hoc, but this is generally not the
design that actually steered the process. Further steps in the process design are
undoubtedly a consequence a consequence of the relationships and dynamic between
actors. The considerations regarding the three quality criteria of democracy are
primarily intuitively present in the way key decisions are taken by leading actors. The
Gent case illustrated that attention for the three democratic principles though
enforced- were implicitly present in the consideration of a number of choices about
design.
The relationship of these separate functional arrangements with the arena and the
institutions of representative democracy is the most intriguing aspect of the
comparative study. It was observed that the decision making within the policy network
did not replace the decision making in the representative arena. In the Netherlands it
was precisely the absence of politicians and the lack of a link with the representative
arena that created problems for legitimacy. This was in contrast to the experience in
Belgium where a permanent a link had been established with representative democracy.
In Belgium political and administrative figures played a key role in the decision making
procedures and negotiations within the policy network. This has been a well established
feature of the role of representative democracy in Belgium where it was accepted that
such key figures actively participate in the process. Experience in The Netherlands
would seem to indicate that the elected representatives and the reigning political culture
maintain greater distance from the negotiations between interest groups, experts and
administrators. This contributed to problems of legitimacy. Our analysis indicates that
that in both countries the arrangement examined created, out of necessity, new forms of
legitimacy, accordance and accountability. These new contributions cannot however be
understood as loose from the legitimacy, accordance and accountability that
representative institutions lend to these processes. Through continuous feedback with
the institutions of representative democracy the network arrangements and decisions
become embedded within the procedures of representative democracy. The links and
163
recruitment of such links with representative democratic institutions should therefore

be seen as essential to complex governance arrangements and their goals. When this
crucial element of the process design is left to the contingency of interests and of the
moment, the democratic legitimacy of the arrangements are vulnerable. It can be
pleasant and useful to function in the shadow of the representative hierarchy, but when
exposed to the full sun such arrangements are likely to get burnt.
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Conclusion

IOS Press, 2012
doi:10.3233/978-1-60750-998-1-167
167
Beyond Fragmentation in Public

Governance: the Search for Connective
Capacity
Victor Bekkers and Menno Fenger
1. Introduction
In the first chapter of this volume we have argued that fragmentation has become a
major characteristic of public administration and society. One the one hand
fragmentation is the result of the process of modernization and progress that has
evolved over centuries. Within the public sector, the ideas of the New Public
Management (NPM) movement has intensified it in the last decades. In this
perspective, fragmentation can be seen as the inevitable outcome of a process of
specialization in which rather autonomous organizations are involved in carrying out
specific tasks and dedicated functions. For instance, contemporary health care has its
roots in the medieval hospitals, which not only provided a minimal form protection and
care based on especially religious reasons - to sick people, but also to children who
lost their parents, to widows, to elderly people, or to mentally and physically disabled
persons as well to alcoholics, tramps and pilgrims. Some centuries later the medieval
hospitals have evolved into highly specialized institutions that provide highly
professional care, based on scientific knowledge, to well defined groups, which
increasingly are being considered as customers.
On the other hand, fragmentation is not only the product of all kinds of functional
considerations. Fragmentation is also based on specific normative considerations,
especially in the field of public administration. In order to prevent abuse of power due
to the concentration of resources in the hands of a single organization, forms of checks
and balances have been established. This is especially the case in rather decentralized
states. For instance, territorial decentralization refers to the allocation of power in terms
of the allocation of tasks, competencies, responsibilities and other resources among
different layers of government. Moreover, in some countries a sharp distinction is made
between the tasks that have to be fulfilled by government and the tasks which are
considered as societys responsibility. For instance, the ideas of Big Society which
have recently gained popularity in the UK, plea for a redistribution of responsibilities
between government and society. It is argued (besides all kind of financial cut back
considerations) that government should be a small organization, which only takes up a
limited number of vital tasks, while it is up to the society and all kinds of societal
groups based on their self-organizing capacities to provide specific public services.
168
V. Bekkers and M. Fenger / Beyond Fragmentation in Public Governance
At the same time we notice that fragmentation has been an important driver for
innovation and modernization, due to the need to overcome the barriers created by the
functional and normative fragmentation of the public sector. Fragmentation leads to
different dependencies and interdependencies, which have to be addressed in order to
develop policies and deliver services which effectively respond to the varied needs and
desires of citizens, companies and nongovernmental organizations (ngos). One could
even say that - in the end - the way in which governments deal with the unwanted
effects of fragmentation also influences the legitimacy of government. In part B of this
book we have described a number of strategies that have been used to overcome
fragmentation. This chapter sets out to assess the success of these strategies. In section
two we will reconsider the main findings of the chapters of Part B. In section three we
will go beyond these empirical findings and sketch a number of options that can be
followed when dealing with fragmentation. At the same time an assessment will be
made of the strong and weak points of these options.
2. Empirical findings
One of the major flagships of modernization in order to overcome a fragmented public
administration, when dealing with all kinds of wicked problems is the concept of
whole of government or joined-up government. This concept tries to improve the
horizontal and vertical coordination by connecting the parties involved through the
creation of a shared budget, specific competencies and responsibilities or by the
establishment of cross-departmental units. As a result citizens are offered rather
seamless services which actually address their specific needs. Joined-up government or
whole of government is being described by Karr, Alford, Van der Steen and Van
Twist as a rather logical reaction on New Public Management (NPM). One of the
perverse effects of NPM is that it, due to its focus on creating semi-autonomous, selfsupporting and accountable agencies, contributed to a vast range of single purpose
organizations which are steered by market-driven principles. In their chapter Karr and
his colleagues analyze Dutch and Australian examples of joined-up government in two
policy fields: child protection and immigration. What do they conclude? Did joined-up
government contributed to overcome fragmentation, especially if we compare these
initiatives with the old situation? They argue that it is difficult to establish the
effectiveness of the whole of government approach in Australia and the Netherlands
when looking at the two policy sectors. Functional differentiation is not set aside, but it
has been overcome through all kinds of clever and intelligent, rather light
combinations in order to achieve connectivity. They conclude that the concept of whole
of government should be seen as incentive to look for solutions thereby setting people
and organizations in motion. This may create a positive dynamic and stimulate the
emergence of initiatives, acknowledging the fact that parties are dealing with wicked
problems for which no grand design is available. These solutions have emerged
because the concept of whole of government worked as a sensitizing concept,
creating a sense of urgency. Hence, we can conclude that framing, i.e. using the
persuasive power of language, rhetoric and images, is an important strategy to
overcome fragmentation (Stone, 2003). In the slipstream of these imaginative concepts
or words new, more concrete and connective approaches, instruments etc. are being
developed. However, it is important to show that, despite its powerful framing, joined-
169
up government is more than just words. Concrete and visible results are still wanted
and needed.
In addition, Karr et al. show that it is also important, when these new connective
strategies, instruments and organization forms are emerging, that a number of
conditions have to be fulfilled in order to make them work. First, it is important that the
involved actors as well as politicians and citizens have realistic expectations about
the added value of a joined-up government approach, also due to fact that they still are
dealing with wicked, fuzzy, ill-defined and contingent problems. Secondly, it is
important that a joined-up approach is supported by a strong politicized strategy which
makes clear that the involved parties need to mobilize a considerable amount of their
own resources (money, staff, political support) in order to be successful. At the same
time this highly politicized profile may conflict with the need to have realistic
expectations. Thirdly, it is important that the accountability mechanisms of the
participating organizations are able to deal with this joined-up approach, which often
requires different accountability criteria. Fourthly, Karr et al. argue that there is a need
to to synchronize or homogenize the supporting functions of the organizations
involved, like ICT, personnel and administration. Fifthly, the authors warn not to
overstress the idea that joined-up government requires per definition a new,
homogeneous organization, thereby setting all kinds of differences (views, professional
attitudes, interests etc.) aside. The problem is not that the participating organizations
are different or that they fulfill specialized tasks in a well-defined domain. The problem
is that they have to work together, despite their differences. Sixthly, it is important that
the organizations that work together are able to give to the new, joined-up working
organization, an agreed mandate in order to provide the desired political and
operational authority and autonomy. Trust and political leadership seems to be
important in creating this coalition of the willing. Seventhly, when developing a
business case, the emphasis should be put on the improvement of the quality and
effectiveness of services, rather than on the money that may be saved by working
together. It appears that budget savings tend to be overestimated.
Another strategy in order to overcome the barriers of a fragmented society and
government is be found in the chapter of Klijn, De Rynck, Skelcher and Voets, who
discuss the governance approaches which are used to boost the economic development
of two harbor areas in Flanders and the Netherlands, while taking into account also all
kinds of living, environmental and mobility issues and claims. In the economic
development of the Ghent channel zone and the expansion of Mainport Rotterdam,
interactive network management and network governance strategies have been used to
establish and implement a shared vision between the involved public and private
stakeholders as well as citizens. Within these networks various negotiation and
consultation rounds were organized, dealing with different but also related themes and
issues. Have these network arrangements been successful? In order to answer this
question, Klijn et al. do not primarily focus on the outcomes themselves, but try to
understand the outcomes of these governance arrangements from a democratic
perspective. What is the democratic anchorage of these governance arrangements in
order to overcome fragmentation, thereby focusing on legitimacy, accordance and
accountability? This question also recognizes the idea that fragmentation has not only a
functional reason but very often has a normative reason. Therefore it is necessary to
assess the strategies that are used to overcome fragmentation from a more normative
point of view. As such it is important to think about creating connectivity from the
perspective of institutional design: how to incorporate specific democratic values and
170
principles in governance arrangements that try to overcome fragmentation? At the same

time Klijn et al. argue that this does not imply that in advance a pre-fixed design should
be developed. These issues emerge during a specific trajectory and are contingent upon
a number of internal and external factors, such as changes in the balance of interests
and the dynamics between the actors involved. Considerations regarding legitimacy,
accordance and accountability are very often implicit and intuitively present in the key
decisions that are taken by the leading actors. Moreover, Klijn et al. conclude that the
decision-making process within the two governance networks did not replace the
decision-making which took place in the formal institutions of representative
democracy. Classical legitimacy and accordance rules of the game originating from the
traditional representative decision-making arrangements existed alongside newly
created ad-hoc arrangements. However, the authors show that it is very important to
link the governance arena with the representative arena and the rules which guide
traditional political decision-making, in order to acquire legitimacy, accordance and
legitimacy. This does not imply that there will be not conflict. Essential in dealing with
these possible rule conflicts is that especially politicians play an intermediary role. If
they are absent, conflicts may occur.
In the contribution of Moody and Bekkers the emphasis is put on the role of
framing in order to overcome fragmentation. However, in their contribution it is not the
framing power of words and concepts that are put forward. They show in their
contribution how modern information and communication technology, especially the
visualization power of these technologies ( one picture does say more than 1000
words), can produce visualized transparency. This may help policy makers to get a
more sophisticated picture of what has happened when dealing with emergency
situations. Situations which are not only very complex and dynamic in their nature but
also involve the assistance of a large number of specialized and involved organizations.
Moody and Bekkers discuss two of these emergency situations: a fire in a detention
center and the riots during a beach party. Visual and other technologies were used to
reconstruct these emergency situations, not only to address the question who is
accountable for what, but also to improve relevant policies. Two elements seem to be
important, when talking about the connectivity potential of visual technologies.
The first element refers to a number of features that are related to the visual
technologies. Especially the transparency features of visual technology should be
mentioned. Visual technology contributes to what is called analytical transparency.
This refers to the possibility of getting a better understanding of the nature of specific
issues or the effects of specific measures, through the use of different perspectives on a
subject that are based on the combination of different but relevant data. For instance,
different CCTV cameras that are located in one shop, generate pictures from different
angles when they register a robbery. Consequently visualization can also increase
transparency, because it can integrate different data but also different perspectives in
one whole or sequence of pictures. For instance, in the development of visualized
scenarios, relevant data, stemming from different data bases, can be presented and
visualized in an integrated way, which can make things (again) easier to understand.
This is called integrative transparency. Simulations that show the effects of the
flooding of a river due to increased rainfall are examples of this. Visualization,
focusing on creating transparency, also facilitates communication. Although a picture
says more than a thousand words, people will have different interpretations which are
very often an incentive to communicate in order to create a shared understanding and to
develop a common grammar. Moreover, pictures very often stimulate our emotions,
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because they are often used to convince and persuade people. This may also trigger
communication and other forms of interaction, which helps to facilitate individual and
collective learning process about what has happened, or about how effective specific
policy measures and instruments actually are or might be.
This brings us to the second element to be mentioned. Visualization technologies
are used to produce coherent stories that help policy makers and the general public to
understand what has happened, thereby also framing what has happened and what
should have been done. These stories are based on the sophisticated linking of different
pictures and films (connectivity), but also of sounds and other digital material.
However, the quality of this linking process is depended on the appreciation of the
reconstruction that is produced and the dominant frame or story that is present in the
reconstruction. Visual reconstructions have the power to align the frames of people, or
of general stakeholders, when they are confronted with a reconstruction.
In the final chapter of part B, Post discusses the establishment of shared service
centers as a way of dealing with fragmentation in relation to different aspects of
operational management, like human resource management, financial or information
and ICT management. Due to the fact that each ministry is responsible for its own
operational management, it was quite difficult to develop more standardized and
harmonized forms of operational management policies that coherently deal with to
some extent common challenges. As a result shared services centers were established
as ways to achieve connectivity through the resurrection of a new central organization
which operates according to specific general routines and procedures. Post shows that
shared service centers as ways of institutionalizing connectivity can be understood
from a rational perspective, thereby pointing at the desired consequences of such
shared service centers: increasing uniformity. And indeed, when looking at the
outcomes of these shared services centers we see fragmentation has been overcome
through standardization and centralization. At the same time, the establishment of
shared service centers can also be understood from a political perspective, in which for
some of the involved stakeholders the establishment of shared service centers shift the
power balance between departments and their political superiors. In the case of the
Netherlands, especially the Ministry for the Interior, that is responsible for the
establishment of these shared service centers, uses this responsibility to enlarge its
power vis--vis other departments. Hence, the discussion regarding the necessity to
overcome the barriers of fragmentation can be seen as a policy window which can be
used by specific actors to create new or enlarge existing jurisdictions. Interconnectivity
can be seen as game in which some stakeholders win and some loose, which in the end
may lead to stalemate situation. As a result interconnectivity has an important
political connotation. This political perspective emphasizes the need to look beyond the
official and formal reasons to promote interconnectivity. It is also important to look at
the hidden motives and hidden interests. Furthermore, Post shows that these newly
established shared service centers again create their working practices which even add
to the existing fragmentation, especially if the involved ministries still have local units.
If this is the case, the shared service center is just another actor on top of or besides the
existing operational management units.
What do these findings regarding the use of all kinds of connective capacity
strategies, forms and instruments tell us about relevant issues that have to be
addressed? Some preliminary findings:
x Soft versus hard forms of connective capacities. It is interesting to see that
connective capacity not only is perceived as establishing new organizational
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forms, introducing new routines, procedures, new technologies and other

hard practices. Connective capacity is also created by making use of soft
instruments, in which the persuasive power of language, verbal concepts and
images play an important role.
The logic of consequence versus the logic of appropriateness. When looking at
the different chapters, we also notice that primarily the call for achieving
connective capacity not only refers to effective and efficient ways to
overcome fragmentation. Connective capacity also raises a number of
normative questions, which refer to the appropriateness of the type and form
of connective capacity that is being strived for. Connective capacity also
relates to specific values that go beyond efficiency, effectiveness or
coherence. Connectivity is also linked to specific democratic and professional
values which are at stake that also influence the legitimacy of the specific
forms of connectivity that are being introduced to overcome fragmentation.
Moreover it also relates to the position of citizen as client or as voter.
The rational versus the political call for connective capacity. As mentioned
before efficiency, effectiveness and coherence are often put forward to
legitimize the call for new arrangements that generate connective capacities.
However, these arrangements are not neutral, because in the establishment of
these new arrangements some stakeholders may win and others may lose.
Hence, the discussion about fragmentation and connective capacity also
represents an interesting policy window which specific actors may use to
strengthen their position.
Reduction of complexity versus the co-existence of the old and the new. It is
interesting to see that very often new arrangements are set up to reduce the
complexity which accompanies a fragmented public sector. On the other hand
we see that these new arrangements exist alongside the all kinds of old
coordination arrangements. They do not replace them, they just add a new
element to the existing degree of fragmentation. However, from a more
positive point of view, one could also argue that new arrangements and old
arrangements co-evolve in order to deal with fragmentation, and thus
substantially help to overcome fragmentation. This kind of co-evolution may
also help to create new synergies.
3. Refining strategies for dealing with fragmentation and interconnectivity

In chapter 1 we have identified four groups of strategies aimed at dealing with the
simultaneous occurrence of fragmentation and interconnectivity which are recalled in
table 12.1. Based on the empirical cases that have been discussed in the chapters in part
B of this volume, and supplemented by available literature, we can now reflect upon
the value of these strategies.
Reducing interconnectivity
Embracing interconnectivity
Reducing fragmentation
Simplification
Integration
Embracing fragmentation
Isolation
Adaptation
Table 12.1 Four strategies for developing connective capacities
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In this section we first will discuss some observations concerning the value of each of
these strategies as they have appeared from the chapters in this book and from other
sources. In addition, we will discuss two more insights that have come forward from
the chapters in this volume: (1) the discursive power of connective capacities; and (2)
the role of boundary scanning and boundary spanning in connective capacities.
Creating connective capacity through integration: the call for centralization

A rather classical strategy to deal with fragmentation is the centralization of decisionmaking power, thereby integrating the competences and responsibilities which were
allocated among different organizations or organizational levels and units, into one
unit. The creation of a new Department for Youth and Family as discussed in chapter
6 is a good example of this strategy. Through the creation of a new super-ordinated
decision-making layer, oversight is created. The negative effects of coordination by
mutual adjustment of the involved levels and layers are being eliminated, because there
is an ultimate decision-maker. Moreover, it is possible to deal with conflicting claims,
interests and different, sometimes even diverging information in a more abstract and
general way. This is the way in which a classical hierarchy deals with uncertainty and
the lack of information: by putting another layer, unit or level on top of the existing
layers or levels, thereby taking over the responsibilities for the work of others
(Mintzberg, 1979). Connective capacity is achieved by giving instructions (command),
by monitoring the actions that have been carried out as well monitoring if the results
that have been achieved are in accordance with the goals on which the instructions
were based (control). When looking at the examples that were given in chapter 6 we
see that when dealing with the complex and different issues of child protection, a single
unit has been created which has the authority to deal with these issues in an integrated
and comprehensive way. As is outlined in chapter 6 more in detail, this presupposes
that the unit has clear goals and criteria which help it to assess relevant alternatives in
terms of costs and benefits, and sufficient resources to do so (Allison, 1971). Also the
establishment of so-called shared service centers, as discussed in chapter 8, depart from
this idea: pooling resources and integrating similar (mostly supportive) tasks,
competences and responsibilities that were formerly carried out by separate
organizations or organizational units.
However, from the empirical chapters there are a number of drawbacks that can be
identified. The classical insights from Herbert Simon (1961), who showed that
coordination through the use of centralization and integration suffers from two dangers,
can be clearly traced back in the cases of joined-up government or shared services. The
first danger is the possibility of information overload, although the idea is that
centralization supports oversight. When confronted with unclear or unplanned
situations for which no instructions prevail, all the operational units or levels will
require guidance from hierarchically higher levels in these situations. As a result more
detailed instructions have to be given, which generates a new flow of information and
reporting. This becomes if even worse if the environment in which the organization
operates is complex and dynamic, for instance because it deals with wicked problems.
Hence, achieving connective capacity through centralization and integration only
works when the environment is rather stable and rather easy to comprehend
(Mintzberg, 1979). The second danger is that of the possibility of moral hazard which
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has been a rather intriguing element in the so-called principal-agent theory. One of the
challenges of the principal is how to know that the agent is really following his
instructions, thus conforming to the principals goals. How loyal or how compliant are
these agencies? Are they just cogwheels in a machinery, or do they have their own
goals, interests and strategies (Morgan, 1986)? Both dangers appear in the cases that
deal with centralized forms of connective capacity in this book. Specifically in the area
of services for youth and children, it appears almost impossible to prevent tragic cases
of childrens abuse, even though the reorganization and creation of integrated agencies
suggests so. And the development of shared services suffers from mistrust between
those responsible for the primary process at governmental departments and those
responsible for the shared services in another department. This mistrust partially is
created by principal-agent conflicts.
Creating connective capacity through standardization and routinization: the wish to
simplify
A second set of strategies is focused on the development of specific routines and
procedures in order to deal with fragmentation in specific circumstances. The
development of these routines and procedures are focused on the creation of connective
capacities in standardized cases in specific circumstances. In essence a process of
standardization takes place through which the coordination efforts that are needed are
limited and made predictable. This reaction is also a classical bureaucratic reaction: to
create standard operation procedures and standard operation programs which instruct
for instance policy makers or street level bureaucrats how to deal with cases that go
beyond the jurisdiction of the organization in which they work (Allison, 1971;
Mintzberg, 1979). To some extent cross-organizational units that work according to the
idea of joined-up government, operate in this way. Given the characteristics of for
instance a specific case of child abuse, the involved frontline professional knows which
other organizations have to be involved, who has to be approached, what actions are
need as well as what kind of information is needed in order to take the necessary
actions, which very often set a chain of collaborating organizations in motion. In order
to set the wheel in motion, protocols have often been developed to specify who does
what and how. Many examples may be found throughout this book. For instance,
chapter 5 shows how the harbor safety agency has control profiles depending on the
city of origin, the content of the cargo and the reputation of the carrier. These profiles
specify the safety issues that may be involved and the appropriate organizations to be
involved for many situations. The issue of harbor safety thus is simplified into applying
abstract profiles to specific situations.
At the same time this strategy has also a set of drawbacks. First, tt only works if a
specific case fits with the standard operating procedures, routines and programs that
have been developed. If a case does not fit, then organizations have difficulty to
establish the connectivity that is needed. Hence, a vital process in establishing this type
of connective capacity is the quality of the pigeon holing process that policy makers
or street level bureaucrats do. Mintzberg (1979: 352) describes the pigeon holing
process as a repertoire of standard programs - in effect as set of skills the involved
professionals stand ready use which are applied to predetermined situations that can
be seen as contingencies. In doing so the involved professionals categorize for instance
the clients needs in terms of contingency, which indicates what standard program to
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use (diagnosis) and to apply or execute the program. Hence pigeonholing simplifies
matters enormously.
The use of categories allow policy makers and street level professionals to move
through a world without making continuous decision at every moment, making use of a
well-stocked kit of well designed tools to handle problems that are comprehensible
(Perrow, 1970:58; Simon, 1977:98). Moreover, these standard categories have the
danger that acquire a life of their own (March & Olsen, 1989). They refer to a set of
rules which structure the way in which people see and interpret their environment.
Hence, cases can only be valid if they match with specific rules. This implies that
connectivity is only be seen as valuable, if a case or situation match with specific rules.
If a case does not match with the rules given, then the chance exists that connectivity is
not being created or is being avoided, due to non existence of specific rules. However,
it takes organizations some time to develop new programs which are able to deal with
new situations or to adapt the existing programs in such a way that these programs are
able to cover more variety. The ability to do so, also refers to the learning capacity of
these organizations. Especially bureaucratic organizations have a natural desire to
discipline or eliminate local variety, because they obstruct their operational smoothness
(Scott, 1998) Hence, there is limited flexibility, while incremental change is preferred
(Allison, 1971). This pitfall can be avoided, if the involved people have the discretion
to interpret these rules in their own as well as the authority to go beyond these rules,
just by not following the routines and procedures that are given (Lipsky, 1980 ). Hence,
the degree of discretion, the interpretation of this degree as well as the willingness to
use this discretion is also important to establish connective capacity. This brings us to
an alternative strategy of integrating information and other resources; not through
centralizing but through integrating resources on a need-to-know basis at the microlevel.
Connective capacity as street level coordination: taking the front-line serious
As we have seen in the various chapters in part B, connective capacity can also be
achieved by strengthening the decision levels which are confronted with the barriers of
organizational and societal fragmentation on a day-by-day, practical basis.
Coordination, and thus the ability to connect to other people and organizations, should
not take place at the top levels of the involved organizations but at the bottom; the
operational core of these organizations. This can be achieved by empowering the
employees and the managers that work in the front line. Working at the frontline
implies that professionals are confronted with the complex nature of specific societal
problems They have to deal with cases for which no general solution is available.
Moreover, unlike other actors theyre decision cannot be postponed or transferred to
other levels. In dealing with these cases professionals have to explore what is possible
and what is not possible, thereby making use of the knowledge, information,
experiences but also the competences and resources of professionals that work in other
organizations or organizational units. This calls for connective capacity through mutual
adjustment by involving other professionals, other policy makers or organizations at
the micro-level (Mintzberg, 1979). The advantage of this type of micro-level or streetlevel coordination is that the resources that are needed to deal with this specific
situation, come together at one spot and one specific moment: where and when it is
needed. The cases of port security (chapter 5) and integral safety governance (chapter
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2) show how standard operating procedures can be guided towards this micro-level
policy coordination, by-passing the necessities of large-scale organizational reforms.
However, this strategy implies that the involved policy makers or professionals
have the discretion to deal with these cases in their own way and the authority to
engage in a micro-level coordination process that fits the specific case with which they
are dealing. Besides autonomy, and thus the authority to handle it is also important
that the involved persons or organizational units that are operating at the street level,
have enough slack. Front line coordination through mutual adjustment costs
additional time, often involves extra spending as well as other resources. This implies
that organizations need to have the ability and the willingness to create additional
resources in order to achieve the connective capacity that is needed (Galbraith, 1973).
Connectivity through adaptive forms of self-governance
A number of the previous strategies deliberately try to design connective capacity by
setting up new organizations or by using new instruments. Another possibility is the
creation of connective capacity as the outcome of a process of self-governance of the
involved actors. This idea is based on the insight that, due to the existence of all kinds
of interdependencies, the involved actors try to define a wide range of possible
approaches and actions from which they can choose. Connective capacity is based on a
process of variation and selection of possible problem definitions and possible
solutions. Based on a shared understanding of the nature of the problem at hand, the
involved stakeholders try explore several ways to approach a problem. In this process
of trial and error, which can be seen as an individual and collective learning process in
which the appropriateness of the possible approaches are explored, a relevant approach
is selected.
Three elements are important in this approach. First, from an ecological point of
view, the type of problem definitions as well as possible solutions are not given nor
universal (Bekkers & Homburg, 2005; Teisman, Van Buuren & Gerrits, 2009). They
are locally defined. They are the outcome of the local blending and framing of all kinds
of developments in different (socio-cultural, political-administrative, technological,
economic) environments as well as the local blending of different views and interests
of the involved actors. This local blending of developments, issues and interests can be
seen as the specific answers that a network of actors defines to policy problems and
challenges which they themselves - define as relevant. Hence, it is interesting to see
what kind of frame regarding the need to overcome specific barriers and to find new
ways to achieve connectivity, is selected. What kind of frames survive and what kind
of frames are pushed aside? The process of variation and selection in which these
actors are involved, can be seen as process which takes place in networks that can be
considered as adaptive: searching for problem definitions and approaches that
recognize the specific, thus contingent, circumstances and characteristics of the
network environment in which they emerge. Hence, adaptivity is the second element
which is relevant (Teisman, Van Buuren & Gerrits, 2009).
The third element refers to the question to what extent these processes of selfgovernance should be seen as spontaneous processes, or, alternatively, to what extent
governments can stimulate these process of self-governance. For the latter, two options
may be discerned. First, self-governance in order to achieve connective capacity, can
be a process of meta-governance: to set up governance arrangements which try to
stimulate processes of self-governance. If the latter is the case, for instance government
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organizations create a level playing field in which processes of self-governance can

emerge (Fenger & Bekkers, 2007). The vital challenge is how to create and structure
such a level playing field. This involves the selection of relevant stakeholders and
positions, the design of formal institutional rules and the introduction of procedures to
guarantee effective and appropriate outcomes and enforcement of the rules. Moreover,
within systems of self-governance the issue of ow to deal with weak or unorganized
interests is easily overlooked? The absence of weak interests may lead to the exclusion
of specific frames. Chapter 9 shows the challenges involved with the institutional
design of decision-making networks, thereby deliberately connecting these networks to
formal, representative decision-making positions. This chapter illustrates the
limitations of the emergence of spontaneous forms of self-governance in democratic
states.
Second, self-governance aimed at achieving connective capacity can also be
approached as incentive steering. Governments can intervene in a specific network by
giving incentives which try to seduce the stakeholders to rethink their current positions
and viewpoints which might influence them to seek collaboration. A classical incentive
is to achieve connectivity by rewarding collaboration through giving subsidies for
shared action-plans, approaches or policy programs. . Another example of an incentive
is presenting an appealing vision in terms of framing and reframing which might
seduce the involved actors to look for ways to overcome fragmentation.
Several drawback can be mentioned. First, meta-governance and incentive steering
do not guarantee that connective capacity will be developed. It are interventions,
amidst many other interventions of other actors, that try to put forward the importance
of connective capacity without guaranteeing it. Hence, success cannot be guaranteed.
The second drawback is the degree of trust which is necessary for many forms of selfgovernance. There seems to be a relationship between effective forms of selfgovernance and high trust communities: high trust communities perform economically
better than low trust communities (Putnam, 2000). Hence, self-governance seems to
depend on the level of trust that the members of a community have in each other. As
such trust is closely related to the concept of social capital. Putnam (2000:21) defines
social capital as social networks and the norms of reciprocity and trust that arise from
them . Fukuyama (1999:14) defines it as the societys stock of shared values that
serves as the prerequisite for all the forms of group endeavor that take place in modern
society, including all kinds of self governance focused on the dealing with a broad
variety of societal and political challenges. The final drawback to be mentioned is the
role of government in self-organizing, due to the different roles that governments have.
Government may opt for a role in which it tries to stimulate and structure selforganizing arrangements, while at the same having rather well-defined interest
themselves (often also aimed at protecting weak interests). These interests may
conflict with taking up a rather procedural and distant role. Is government able to
separate these roles when being involved in processes of self-governance?
Connectivity through crowd sourcing
Closely related to the adaptive strategies of self-governance that have been discussed in
the previous section, are strategies that make use of the possibilities of the era of
interconnectivity have to offer. Internet, social media and web 2.0 technologies offer
interesting possibilities to overcome geographical, temporal and functional barriers and
boundaries. Due to the possibility to link knowledge, information, experiences and
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people it is not only possible to improve their access. The linking capacities of modern
network technologies make it is also possible to generate new knowledge, or even
create new intelligence, and thus establishing links between fragmented systems and
subsystems. Challenging existing bodies of knowledge, information, experiences and
perspectives, may imply the emergence of new knowledge. As such network
technologies, like social media, provide a platform which facilitates processes of
creative destruction in which new problem definitions and approaches can be explored
that are present on the internet. This process of creative destruction can take place in
specific loosely coupled communities that show a specific interest in a specific topic
like global warming. The internet itself or the communities on the internet can be seen
as the crowd, which resembles the idea of the wisdom of the crowds (Surowiecki,
2004). As stated in chapter 1, Surowiecki claims that the collective opinion of a group
is better able to deal with a problem than the opinion of single experts.
However, crowd sourcing as a way of exploring and exploiting the knowledge that
is present on the internet, does also encounter some problems . First, it only works well
when different perspectives and different bodies of knowledge are taken into
consideration. Variety is important, but also the quality of the varied perspectives needs
to be taken into account. However, research shows that discussions regarding specific
issues on the internet take place in rather closed groups or communities that are not
often open for people that represent other perspectives. Hence, a free and open
exchange of ideas does not take place, due to a process which is called the
balkanization of internet discussions, thereby contributing to polarization (Wright &
Street, 2007). Secondly, some people also doubt quality of the knowledge, which is
called commons knowledge (Lievrouw, 2011 ). Especially if this knowledge relates to
issues that require sophisticated professional knowledge and expertise in order to
understand the issue at hand (Keen, 2007).
Connectivity through isolation
The final strategy that has been introduced in the first chapter, is aimed at reducing the
ties within an interconnective network. Although we have not seen pure forms of this
strategy in the chapters in this volume, elements of this strategy may be distillated from
different chapters. For instance, the introduction of shared service centers, as discussed
in chapter 8, not only creates connective capacity between ministries, but also isolates
operations management from the primary processes of policy-making and
implementation.
This separation of functions may contribute to the construction of neutral, almost
Weberian bureaucracies, not hindered by practical issues as the registration of sick
leave, holidays or other operational issues. At the same time, chapter 8 clearly shows
the inevitable interconnectivity between operations management and primary process.
This underlines the drawbacks that already were mentioned in chapter 1. Although
isolation might appear as a good solution to reduce the level of interconnectivity, it is
merely aimed at combating the symptoms of interconnectivity than on reducing it.
As becomes clear in the various chapters in this volume, the underlying processes
of interconnectivity and fragmentation are inevitable. Although isolating parts of the
subsystem may be useful temporary solution to enhance the rationality of policymaking and reduce complexity, the underlying interdependencies and flows of
resources can hardly be stopped, thus enforcing a reality check upon the isolated
subsystems in the real world.
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Connective capacity through boundary scanning and spanning

In the previous sections we have elaborated on the four connective strategies that have
been developed in the first chapter of this volume. After having identified some of the
backgrounds and solutions of simultaneous fragmentation and interconnectivity, two
possible solutions may be added. First, as appears from several chapters in part B,
connective capacity not only depends on formal organizations, routines and procedures,
the power of appealing frames or the ability to creative productive ways of selfgovernance. Connective capacity be also be seen as an aspect of leadership, or even a
type of leadership. This is most notably in the cases of network governance (chapter 9)
and the construction of shared service centers (chapter 8), Hence, the personal factor
should also be taken into consideration. For instance, Voets and de Rynck (2011) show
that in order to set a complex economic development projects in harbor areas in which
many conflicting interests and views between different stakeholders have to be
reconciled, boundary management plays an important role in achieving innovative
approaches (see also chapter 9 in this book, in which Klijn et al. deal with the same
case from another theoretical perspective). Boundary management refers to two types
of activities. First, it refers to a process of scanning the environment in order to
understand what considerations, developments etc. are important to understand the
behavior and motives of the actors involved. Secondly, it refers to the ability of
managers in their role as boundary spanner, to change the (perceptions of) existing
routines and established interactions between the involved stakeholders, towards
reframing their existing relation and types of interaction, thereby creating policy
windows for new forms of collaboration or creating policy windows to explore new
ways of connectivity (Voets & De Rynck, 2011:158).
However, this is easier said than done. A number of drawbacks should be taken
into consideration (Voets & de Rynck, 2011:166-168). First, boundary scanning and
spanning leadership requires a specific combination of skills and capacities. It requires
a type of leadership that is able to tolerate and utilize high levels of complexity and
uncertainty, caused by the mere a boire of actors, interests, policies, relationships,
tiers and other contingencies. Secondly, it requires a specific drive, or even a passion:
the will to proceed. Personal conviction seems to be very important. Thirdly, these
boundary scanning and spanning activities in relation to the complexity of the networks
that are involved, may offer a challenge that is too big to be handled by one single
person. Hence, the success of these boundary management activities also depends of
having a team in which different people are able to fulfill different roles, which also
depends on the specific phase of a project (Voets & De Rynck, 2011:164). Based on
Agranoff (2003) the following roles can be distinguished:
The network operator: he/she is responsible for the daily management of the
network, taking care of all the administrative tasks and the day-to-day management;
The network champion: he/she is focused on building, maintaining and utilizing
connections with other actors at all the relevant (personal, professional and party
political levels);
The network promoter: he/she is considered to be the principal within the network,
having the authority (in moral terms not in terms of hierarchical power) to keep things
together. In doing so he expected to manage conflicts;
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The creative thinker: he/she delivers impeachable expertise, develops concepts,

models and produces tools to build groupware and to induce consensus. He actively
frames an reframes the mindsets of the actors involved;
The vision keeper: he/she repeatedly, within and outside the network, stresses and
explains the added value of the necessity of the collaboration that takes place within the
involved network of actors. He is a strong believer in the need to act as a collective
(Voets & De Rynck, 2011:168-172).
Framing connective capacity: the framing power of magic concepts
Finally, in the introduction of this book we same to have overlooked the importance of
symbolic management in overcoming the challenges of simultaneous fragmentation
and interconnectivity. Throughout the book, we see the important role of magic or
sensitizing concepts (cf. Pollitt & Hupe, 2011). Examples are whole of government,
joined-up government , e-government, governance, shared service centers or
innovation. Appealing concepts have a persuasive power of their own, because they
offer a frame that links or even unites people and organizations in such a way that a
common frame of reference may emerge. A common grammar or a common language
(Hajer & Law, 2006) is offered which helps people to discuss the negative effects of
fragmentation on the one hand, while on the other hand suggesting a solution to
overcome the barriers of fragmentation.
However, in order to achieve connective capacity, it are not only the words that
succeed (paraphrasing Wildavsky, 1973). The strength of a frame not only depends on
the rhetoric that is used. Increasingly the power of a frame depends on the pictures that
are used as well, due to the fact that we live in a mediated democracy in which politics
and political decisions are mediated by visual media like television but also social
media (cf. Bennett & Entman, 2001). Hence it is important to understand that the
emphasis on framing does not only depends on the linguistic turn to which Pollitt and
Hupe refer (2011) but also to the visual turn in politics and democracy (Mitchell, 1994,
2005). The importance of this visual turn is demonstrated in the chapter of Moody and
Bekkers.
Originally Murray Edelman (1967, 1977) was quite skeptical of the use of
language and rhetoric in politics in order to align ideas, people and resources, because
the concepts that are put forward were often used as myths. We regard the concept of
myth as a double-edged sword. On the one hand, myths are seductive tales containing
unfulfilled, or even unfulfillable promises that for example bureaucrats of politicians
use to legitimize intervention or application of specific technologies (Edelman, 1967,
1977). In Edelmans work, the emphasis is on the symbolic content of policy and
politics and how policy makers are involved in exploiting tales, symbols and language.
On the other hand, there is a more positive connotation of myths, which can, for
instance, be found in the work of March and Olsen (1989), but also in the work of
Lvi-Strauss (1987) and MacIntyre (1970). March and Olsen promote an institutional
approach of public administration that focuses on the rules that guide behavior and
interactions of individuals, groups and organizations in and around public
administration. By rules they mean the routines, procedures, conventions, roles,
strategies, organizational forms and technologies around which political activity is
constructed. These rules, and their embodiment into myths, function as a shared
frame of reference that enables individuals, groups and organizations to deal with
contradictions of politics that can never be fully resolved, and, in general, to integrate
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behavior in a sensible way: myths can be seen as a source of inspiration that actors can
use to enact social reality (Weick, 1969).
At the same time the power of these magical concepts to exploit and explore
connective capacity can only be effective, if it is followed up by concrete actions and
results in order to show that it are not hollow concepts. This is also necessary when
taking into account the observation that these magic concepts are often too abstract and
general. They hardly offer sets of direct prescriptions for specific practices. As a result
policy makers, politicians but also citizens overestimate or misinterpret their capacity
to generate effective approaches for specific problems and challenges (Pollitt & Hupe,
2011).
4. Outlook
In our complex world, in which fragmentation and interdependency prevail there is an
imminent drive to discuss the need for connective capacity, to set up new arrangements
to overcome fragmentation and to make use of new instruments and routines. However,
the cases which are presented in this book, show that the fight against fragmentation
and the struggle to achieve connective capacity is a battle that cannot be won.
Fragmentation and interconnectivity should be seen as a facts of life, or as the
inevitable conditions under which policy makers have to operate. It makes more sense
to explore how different kind of strategies, given a specific context, can be combined
as well as how old and new arrangements can be linked to each other. Moreover, it can
be argued that fragmentation and interconnectivity can be powerful incentives for
actors to get involved in processes of self- organization. These processes increasingly
are stimulated and facilitated by new technologies, which in themselves have a linking
capacities. Furthermore, it can be argued that in trying to overcome fragmentation and
interconnectivity, words, images and symbols are even more powerful than large-scale
formal reorganizations, the construction of new institutional arrangements or the use of
new forms and instruments.
Paraphrasing Auster (1983) we may introduce the concept of governance
entropy, which refers to the emergence of ever more chaotic, complex, fragmented and
interconnective systems of governance, thus challenging the governance capacity of
central actors. Entropy as a characteristic of current governance systems emphasizes
the need to anticipate or adapt this complexity, rather than trying to combat or reduce
it. This is the central lessons that can be concluded from the chapters in this volume.
At the same time the need to anticipate or adapt to this complexity may be an important
incentive for the involved organizations - public, semi-public as well as private to
innovate, to re-think and re-design their existing strategies in order to overcome
fragmentation as well as trying to explore new concepts, new technologies, new
organizations or new processes that are more capable of dealing with the fragmented
nature of the public sector and society in general. Hence, we could argue that the sheer
existence of fragmentation as such can be seen as major source of innovation and
modernization of public administration. Not surprisingly, many of these innovations
are aimed at the creation of connective capacity in public governance systems, as the
chapters in this volume have shown.
182
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IOS Press, 2012
183
Author Index
Alford, J.
Barry, J.
Bekkers, V.
Berg, E.
Cachet, L.
Chandler, J.
de Rynck, F.
Easton, M.
Ellison, M.
Fenger, M.
Gilleir, F.
Hughes, G.
Karr, P.M.
97
59
v, 3, 114, 167
59
19
59
142
73
59
v, 3, 167
73
19
97
Klijn, E.-H.
Marks, P.
Moody, R.
Ponsaers, P.
Post, R.
Prins, R.
Scholten, P.
Skelcher, C.
van der Steen, M.
van Sluis, A.
van Twist, M.
Voets, J.
142
73
114
19
129
19
44
142
97
73
97
142

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BEYOND FRAGMENTATION AND

Innovation and the Public Sector

Prof. Dr. Victor J.J.M. Bekkers

Prof. Jean Hartley

Prof. Sharon S. Dawes

A.-V. Anttiroiko, S. J. Bailey and P. Valkama (Eds.), Innovative Trends in Public

This series is a continuation of Informatization Developments and the Public Sector

Amstterdam Berrlin Tokyo Washington, DC

2012 The authors and IOS Press.