CDL-AD(2016)036

Or. Engl.

Strasbourg, 12 December 2016

Opinion No. 868/2016

EUROPEAN COMMISSION FOR DEMOCRACY THROUGH LAW

(VENICE COMMISSION)

ALBANIA
AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF
FOR THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
ON THE LAW
ON THE TRANSITIONAL RE-EVALUATION
OF JUDGES AND PROSECUTORS
(THE VETTING LAW)
Adopted by the Venice Commission
at its 109th Plenary Session
(Venice, 9-10 December 2016)
on the basis of comments by
Mr Sergio BARTOLE (Substitute Member, Italy)
Mr James HAMILTON (Expert, Former Member, Ireland)
Mr Konstantin VARDZELASHVILI (Expert,
Former Substitute Member, Georgia)

This document will not be distributed at the meeting. Please bring this copy.
www.venice.coe.int

CDL-AD(2016)036

-2-

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.

Introduction ................................................................................................................. 3

II.

Background information and Preliminary Remarks ................................................. 4

III.

Assessment ................................................................................................................. 6

A.
B.
C.
D.

First question........................................................................................................... 6
Second question ..................................................................................................... 9
Third question ....................................................................................................... 11
Fourth question ..................................................................................................... 13

IV. Conclusions............................................................................................................... 16

-3-

I.

CDL-AD(2016)036

Introduction

1.
By a letter of 28 October 2016, the President of the Constitutional Court of Albania, Mr
Bashkim Dedja, requested an amicus curiae brief from the Venice Commission on the
conformity of Law no. 24/2016 on the Transitional Re-Evaluation of judges and Prosecutors in
the Republic of Albania1 (hereinafter, the Vetting Law) with international standards including
the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter, ECHR).
2.
The context of this request is a claim before the Constitutional Court of Albania
requesting the Vetting Law to be declared unconstitutional and incompatible with the ECHR.2
3.

The four questions addressed to the Venice Commission are as follows:

1) Given the fact that all the judges of the Constitutional Court are subject of the
law no. 84/2016 On the transitional re-evaluation of judges and prosecutors
in the Republic of Albania, might their participation in the examination of this
case be considered as a conflict of interest?
2) Does this law respect the fundamental principles of the rule of law and the
separation and balancing of powers? Is the independence of the judiciary
endangered by the involvement in the process of re-evaluation of judges and
prosecutors of the organs under the control of the executive power?
3) Is the law in conformity with Article 6 of the ECHR, regarding the respect of
the right to fair trial? Is the denial of the right of judges and prosecutors
subject to the law on re-evaluation to be addressed to domestic courts
contrary to Article 6?
4) Are the law provisions in relation to the background assessment of the
assessees contrary to Article 8 of the ECHR, as concerns the respect to
private and family life of judges and prosecutors?

4.
This is an amicus curiae brief for the Constitutional Court of Albania. As such, it does
not have the intention of taking a final stand on the issue of constitutionality of certain provisions
of the Vetting Law, but merely to provide the Constitutional Court with material as to the
compatibility of the relevant provisions of the Vetting Law with European standards, so as to
facilitate the Courts consideration of these provisions under the Constitution of Albania. It is the
Constitutional Court of Albania that has the final say on the binding interpretation of the
Constitution and the compatibility of national laws with this text.
5.
This amicus curiae brief is based on an English translation of the Vetting Law as well as
of the Constitution of the Republic of Albania. On 30 November 2016, the Venice Commission
received from the Constitutional Court a revised version of the English translation of the Vetting
Law3. The revised version which is slightly more accurate but does not contain substantial
changes was taken into account by the rapporteurs in the preparation of the present amicus
curiae brief. Errors may occur in this amicus curiae brief as a result of an incorrect or inaccurate
translation.

CDL-REF(2016)062
See, CDL-REF(2016)064, Constitution of Albania. See the arguments of the claimants in more detail under Title
II -Background information- of the present amicus curiae brief.
3
See, CDL-REF(2016)069.
2

CDL-AD(2016)036

-4-

6.
Mr Bartole, Mr Hamilton and Mr Vardzelashvili acted as rapporteurs for this amicus
curiae brief.
7.
This amicus curiae brief was drafted on the basis of the rapporteurs comments and
adopted by the Venice Commission at its 109th Plenary Session (Venice, 9-10 December
2016).
II. Background information and Preliminary Remarks
8.
In its Interim Opinion on the Draft Constitutional Amendments on the Judiciary of
Albania,4 the Venice Commission examined, among other issues, the transitional
qualification assessment of judges and prosecutors which provides for the process of vetting
(qualification assessment) of all sitting judges and prosecutors by specially created
Independent Qualification Commission. As indicated in the Interim Opinion, the necessity of
the vetting process is explained by an assumption that the level of corruption in the Albanian
judiciary is extremely high and the situation requires urgent and radical measures. After
having underlined that such radical solution would be ill-advised in normal conditions, since it
creates enormous tension within the judiciary and in particular, creates a risk of the capture
of the judiciary by the political force which controls the process, the Venice Commission
considered that a drastic remedy may be seen as appropriate in the Albanian context, as
long as it remains an extraordinary and a strictly temporary measure. The Interim Opinion
formulated a number of recommendations, including in particular, that the composition of the
Independent Qualification Commission and status of their members should guarantee their
genuine independence and impartiality and that judges should have the right to appeal to an
independent body.
9.
Following the recommendations by the Venice Commission in the Interim Opinion,
the Ad hoc Committee on Justice System Reform of the Albanian Parliament revised the
Draft Amendments and re-submitted them to the attention of the Venice Commission.5 The
Final Opinion on the Revised Draft Constitutional Amendments on the Judiciary 6 has been
adopted by the Venice Commission during its 106th March 2016 Plenary Session. In its Final
Opinion, the Venice Commission reiterated that the vetting process was not only justified but
necessary for Albania to protect itself from the scourge of corruption.7 It considered that the
revised Draft Amendments have taken on board most criticism formulated in the Interim
Opinion and welcomed in particular that the revised Draft Amendments created a separate
appellate body (the Specialized Qualification Chamber) within the High Court, which is a sort
of a specialized court (and not an Ad hoc extraordinary judge) as it is not created in a view of
a single specific case and it is supposed to stay in activity during the whole duration of the
vetting procedure.8 The Final Opinion recommended in particular that the mandate of the
vetting bodies should be reduced in length; judges of the appellate body, at the end of their
mandate, should be able to integrate automatically the judiciary and that the judges and
prosecutors undergoing vetting should enjoy the right to complain to the Constitutional Court
about violation of their fundamental rights, with some reasonable exceptions dictated by the
necessity of the vetting process.

CDL-AD(2015)045 Interim Opinion on the Draft Constitutional Amendments on the Judiciary of Albania
th
(Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 105 Plenary Session, Venice, 18-19 December 2015), paras. 97-135
(CDL-REF(2015)038).
5
See, CDL-REF(2016)008, Consolidated version of the revised Draft amendments.
6
CDL-AD(2016)009, Final Opinion on the Revised Draft Constitutional Amendments on the Judiciary of Albania
th
(adopted by the Venice Commission at its 106 Plenary Session, Venice, 11-12 March 2016).
7
Final Opinion, para. 52.
8
Final Opinion, para. 63.

-5-

CDL-AD(2016)036

10.
After the adoption of the Final Opinion, further amendments were introduced to the
Draft constitutional amendments which were finally adopted by the Parliament of Albania on
22 July 20169 with an overwhelming majority including the votes of the main opposition
party.
11.
In pursuance of Article 179 b) of the Constitution, the Parliament adopted, on 30
August 2016, Law no. 84/2016 On the Transitional re-evaluation of judges and prosecutors
in the Republic of Albania (the Vetting Law).10 According to Article 1 of the Vetting Law, its
purpose is to determine specific rules for the transitional re-evaluation of all assessees, in
order to re-establish the proper function of rule of law and true independence of the judicial
system, as well as the public trust and confidence in these institutions [] and, according to
Article 2, to provide for the organisation of the re-evaluation process in particular for all
judges and prosecutors (para. 1); the methodology, procedure and standards of the reevaluation process (para. 2); the organisation and functioning of the re-evaluation institutions
(para. 3); and the role of the International Monitoring Operation, other state organs and of
the public in the re-evaluation process (para. 4).
12.
By a request presented on 7 October 2016 to the Constitutional Court, the main
opposition party asked the Court to declare the Vetting Law incompatible with the
Constitution and the ECHR and requested the suspension of the Vetting Law and its
implementation until the final decision of the Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court
has provided to the Venice Commission a translation of the request made by the main
opposition party. The request by the President of the Constitutional Court to the Venice
Commission contains also a summary of the main arguments of the main opposition party
for upholding their claims of unconstitutionality.
13.

The arguments of the request may be summarised as follows:

-

The Vetting Law has displaced the control and investigation in the process of reevaluation of judges and prosecutors from the independent and impartial organs
created by the Constitutional Amendments (Public Commissioners, Independent
Qualification Commission and the Appeal Chamber) to the existing organs allegedly
under the control of the Government such as the High Inspectorate of the Declaration
and Audit of Assets and Conflict of Interest (HIDAACI), the Classified Information
Security Directorate (CISD), the School of Magistrates, the General Directorate for
the Prevention of Money Laundering (GDPML) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
The involvement of these governmental bodies in the re-evaluation process as
foreseen in the Vetting Law, violates the principles of separation and balancing of
powers and the independence of the judiciary;

The Vetting Law does not provide for any specific procedural regulation in order to
guarantee the basic elements of fair trial and respect for the fundamental rights of the
assessees. Articles 53 and 54 of the Vetting Law allow obtaining information from the
public, but do not meet the standard defined in Article (2) of the ANNEX to the
Constitution, i.e. the vetting bodies shall take into account information from the public
observing the principle of proportionality between privacy and the needs of the
investigation, and shall guarantee the right to a fair trial;

The Vetting Law violates the right to appeal of the assessees. Although the
Constitution provides for the constitutional authority of the Appeal Chamber,
considered as a judicial organ receiving appeals against the decisions given by the
Independent Qualification Commission and acting according to the rules applied by

See, CDL-REF(2016)064, Constitution of Albania.

CDL-REF(2016)062, Law no. 84/2016 On the Transitional re-evaluation of judges and prosecutors in the
Republic of Albania.
10

CDL-AD(2016)036

-6-

the Administrative Court of Appeal, the Appeal Chamber does not have jurisdiction
on matters provided by Article 131 of the Constitution (duties and competences of the
Constitutional Court) which includes the examination of complaints on violation of
fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution;
-

The Vetting Law violates the principle of legal certainty because the wording of its
provisions is unclear, ambiguous and contradictory. In particular, it is not clear in the
Vetting Law which institution will conduct the proficiency assessment of the judges of
the Constitutional Court, the judges of the High Court, the legal advisers of both
institutions, the General Prosecutor and his/her legal assistants.

14.
By decision of 25 October 2016, the Constitutional Court decided to suspend the
implementation of the Vetting Law and to request an amicus curiae brief from the Venice
Commission regarding the compatibility of the Law with the ECHR and the Constitution of
Albania, including the four questions indicated in paragraph 3 of the present brief.
15.
As stated above, the purpose of the present brief is not to take a final stand on the
issue of constitutionality of the Vetting Law and to substitute the present assessment to the
future judgment of the Constitutional Court. Therefore, for instance, the Venice Commission
is not requested to make an analysis of the Vetting Law in the light of the ordinary legislation
currently in force in the Republic of Albania in view of a coherent interpretation of the
provisions of the Law on the basis of the actual national legislative concepts and terminology
since this is the task of the Constitutional Court which is obviously well acquainted with the
Albanian legislative regulations, doctrines and culture. Moreover, the request of the
President of the Constitutional Court does not concern an evaluation of the Law in the light
of the differences between the first draft of the Constitutional Amendments,11 the second
draft which was the subject matter of the Final Opinion of the Venice Commission12 and the
final version of those amendments as adopted on 22 July 2016.13
III. Assessment
A. First question
Given the fact that all the judges of the Constitutional Court are subject of the law no. 84/2016
On the transitional re-evaluation of judges and prosecutors in the Republic of Albania, might
their participation in the examination of this case be considered as a conflict of interest?
16.
In the Amicus Curiae Opinion CDL-AD(2009)044 on the Law on the Cleanliness of
the Figure of High Functionaries of the Public Administration and Elected Persons of
Albania,14 the question submitted to the Venice Commission concerned the position of the
constitutional court judges who were potential subjects of the lustration law. Those judges
should, in the meantime, take part in the discussion and in the decision about the
constitutionality of this law. This was a similar but not identical question to the one currently
under examination. In that earlier case (2009), only some judges of the Constitutional Court
would potentially have been affected by the lustration law. Therefore, the possible conflict of
interest concerned the position of some constitutional judges only. A solution to the problem
thus created could have been found had the legislator chosen to provide for the temporary
replacement of Constitutional Court judges forced to disqualify themselves since not all
judges were potentially affected.
11

See, the Interim Opinion CDL-AD(2015)045 and CDL-REF(2015)038.

See, CDL-AD(2016)009 Final Opinion on the Revised Draft Constitutional Amendments on the Judiciary of Albania
and CDL-REF(2016)008 Consolidated version of the revised Draft amendments.
13
CDL-REF(2016)064 Constitution of Albania.
14
CDL-AD(2009)044 on the Law on the Cleanliness of the Figure of High Functionaries of the Public
th
Administration and Elected Persons of Albania, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 80 Plenary Session
(Venice, 9-10 October 2009).
12

-7-

CDL-AD(2016)036

17.
In the current case, however, all the constitutional judges, no matter who sits at the
Constitutional Court, will be the subject of the Vetting Law which provides for the reevaluation of every judge in Albania including the judges of the Constitutional Court (Art.
179(b)3 of the Constitution). At the same time, the Vetting Law does not provide for any
specific regulation of a possible conflict of interest requiring disqualification of judges.
Moreover, the Constitution of Albania states in its Article 179 that members of the
Constitutional Court shall continue their activity as members of the Constitutional Court, in
accordance with the previous mandate. This is a transitional provision of the Constitution
which provides for existing members of the Constitutional Court to serve out their existing
terms, thus applicable to the current situation.
18.
Therefore, the Constitutional Court has to choose between two alternatives, either it
has to exclude the possibility of a judicial review of the vetting legislation, since a regulation
of the conflict of interest is missing in the Vetting Law, or it has to recognise the basic
importance of the guarantees ensured by a functioning judicial review of legislation and to
deal consequently with the case submitted to its judgment.
19.
Despite the differences between the situation relating to the 2009 lustration law and
the current issue of conflict of interest, the following passage from the 2009 Opinion of the
Commission appears to be relevant and may be of some assistance:
If the Assembly does not provide for a solution by amending the CCL or the
Constitution, a solution must be found by the Court itself by way of interpretation
of the relevant norms. The authorization of the Court derives from the necessity
to make sure that no law is exempt from constitutional review, including laws that
relate to the position of judges. In search for a solution, one has to look at the
rationale of excluding a biased judge. The main rationale is the following: if there
is a leeway in deciding a case, the judge shall not be tempted to fill it in his/her
favour. In dealing with the constitutionality of the Law there may be some parts
involved where different opinions on the constitutionality are conceivable, while
others are clear, without any need for a value judgment.15
20.
In case the Court is asked to rule on a matter in which some of its members may
have, or be perceived to have, an interest, the Court is not absolved by the existence of such
an interest from its duty to rule on the issue raised. The Constitutional Court is obliged to
rule on the constitutionality of every law which is challenged before it. If it were to permit a
situation to arise in which it was precluded from doing so by virtue of disqualifications arising
from the possibility of any one or more of its members being the subject of an adverse
finding under the legislation, that obligation on the Court to make a decision could not be
fulfilled.
21.
The Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct 200216 envisage that such a situation
may arise and provide for such an eventuality. Under the heading Value 2, Impartiality,
having stated the general principle that a judge who is not impartial or may be perceived by
a reasonable observer not to be impartial should not take part in hearing a case, they go on
to say that disqualification of a judge shall not be required if no other tribunal can be
constituted to deal with the case. The Commentary on the Bangalore Principles by the UN
Office of Drugs and Crime17 explains this provision as follows:

15

CDL-AD(2009)044 on the Law on the Cleanliness of the Figure of High Functionaries of the Public
Administration and Elected Persons of Albania, para. 142.
16
Bangalore Principles of Judicial Conduct: https://www.unodc.org/pdf/corruption/corruption_judicial_res_e.pdf
17
UNODC, September 2007. https://www.unodc.org/documents/corruption/publications_unodc_commentarye.pdf

CDL-AD(2016)036

-8-

Doctrine of necessity
100. Extraordinary circumstances may require departure from the principle
discussed above. The doctrine of necessity enables a judge who is otherwise
disqualified to hear and decide a case where failure to do so may result in an
injustice. This may arise where there is no other judge reasonably available
who is not similarly disqualified, or if an adjournment or mistrial will cause
extremely severe hardship, or if a court cannot be constituted to hear and
determine the matter in issue if the judge in question does not sit. Such cases
will, of course, be rare and special. However, they may arise from time to time
in final courts that have few judges and important constitutional and appellate
functions that cannot be delegated to another judge.18
22.
This is certainly the case when there is only one court with constitutional jurisdiction
and/or there are limited number of judges and when disqualification may actually result in
denial of justice.
23.
In fact, it is not that difficult to envisage circumstances where such a problem may
arise. Challenges to taxation measures, for example, could have implications for the tax
liability of every individual judge. Such a situation arose in the Irish case of OByrne v
Minister for Finance,19 an action by the widow of a judge who sought a finding that the
deduction of income tax from the salary of judges amounted to an unconstitutional reduction
in judicial remuneration. In the High Court, Dixon J referred to an earlier finding of the United
States Supreme Court that jurisdiction could not be declined or renounced because of the
individual relation of the members of the court to the question, the plaintiff being entitled by
law to invoke the jurisdiction and there being no other tribunal to which under the law
recourse could be had in a matter of the kind.20
24.
Similar situation may arise if the constitutionality of legal norms regulating
constitutional court proceedings, requirements for office holders of the constitutional court,
grounds for resignation or disciplinary proceedings is challenged before the Constitutional
Court. In such cases, constitutional judges are not precluded from hearing the case.
25.
However, if there are grounds to believe that a judge considering the constitutionality
of the Vetting Law would fail the requirements established by this very law and thus appears
to be unfit for the office, not only the judge has a right but, in certain circumstances, may be
under the obligation to resign, for instance, if the judge concerned foresees his/her failure to
satisfy the background assessment due to inappropriate contacts with the members of the
organized crime. However, since there is a presumption that judges of the court are acting in
good faith, the judge should be allowed to evaluate constitutionality of the requirements
established by law.
26.
From a political point of view, the absence of a legislative regulation in the Vetting
Law of a possible conflict of interests requiring the disqualification of all the constitutional
judges could be interpreted as recognition of the constitutional necessity of preserving the
functionality of the judicial review of legislation. Moreover, also the parliamentary opposition,
which did not vote in favour of the Vetting Law but approved the constitutional revision which
remains the basis of the present transitional re-evaluation process, apparently accepts the
permanence of the competence of the Constitutional Court as they submitted the mentioned
request to the Court itself. As the Venice Commission considered in the 2009 Opinion, it
must be ensured that the Constitutional Court as guarantor of the Constitution can function
as a democratic institution: the possibility of excluding judges must not result in the inability
of the Court to take a decision. [] it follows that the judges of the Constitutional Court of
18

Ibid., paragraph 100.

OByrne v Minister for Finance [1959] IR 1, (1959)ILTR11.
20
Evans v Gore (1919) 253 US 245 at 248, per Van Devanter J.
19

-9-

CDL-AD(2016)036

Albania are not barred from ruling on this matter. The Constitutional Court could also take
into account the criteria used in the 2009 Opinion (see paragraph 19 of the present brief), i.e.
the margin of legal interpretation of the judge concerned in his/her function of judicial review
of legislation: a large margin, or a leeway in deciding the case may justify the
disqualification, whereas in case the constitutionality/unconstitutionality issue is rather clear
and the judicial adjudication does not involve any value judgment by the judge, then the
effective functioning of the Constitutional Court as a democratic institution should prevail.
B. Second question
Does this law respect the fundamental principles of the rule of law and the separation and
balancing of powers? Is the independence of the judiciary endangered by the involvement in
the process of re-evaluation of judges and prosecutors of the organs under the control of the
executive power?
27.
The request submitted by the parliamentary opposition to the Constitutional Court
claims that the Vetting Law violates the principle of separation and balancing of powers in
that it has displaced the control and investigation in the process of re-evaluation of judges
and prosecutors from the independent and impartial organs created by the Constitutional
amendments (Public Commissioners, Independent Qualification Commission and the Appeal
Chamber) to existing organs allegedly under the control of the Government such as the High
Inspectorate of the Declaration and Audit of Assets and Conflict of Interest (HIDAACI),
Classified Information Security Directorate (CISD), School of Magistrate, General Directorate
for the Prevention of Money Laundering (GDPML) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs.
28.
Those bodies are recognised as playing an active role in the process of re-evaluation
by the constitutional vetting institutions. If the process of vetting is conducted or controlled by
the executive, the entire process of vetting may be compromised. Therefore, it is important
to ensure that the involvement of the executive, in law and in practice, is limited to the
extend that is strictly necessary for the effective functioning of the vetting bodies.
29.
It appears from the constitutional and legislative provisions that the re-evaluation
bodies, i.e. the Independent Commission and the Appeal Chamber possess both the
characteristics of judicial bodies. Under Article 179 (b)6 both bodies operate and decide
independently and impartially. Under Article C of the Annex to the Constitution, during their
mandate, the members of the Independent Commission and Public Commissioner shall
have the status of a judge at the High Court (para. 3). Appeal Chamber shall function within
the Constitutional Court (Article 179(b)5 of the Constitution) and its members have the status
of judges of the Constitutional Court (Article C (3) of the Annex).
30.
Members of the Independent Commission and the Appeal Chamber are subject to an
annual disclosure of assets which will be made public, as well as constant monitoring of their
financial accounts and waiver of the privacy of their communications related to their work
(Articles C(4) of the Constitution).21 Article 28 of the Vetting Law provides for the monitoring
of their telecommunications. Article 16 sets out detailed provisions which establish
disciplinary liability for any improper or poor conduct by members of the re-evaluation
institutions, including provisions aimed at ensuring the independence and impartiality of their
members and Article 17 establishes procedures for their dismissal where they commit
disciplinary offences.
21

The fourth question put forth by the Constitutional Court examined below, concerns the right to respect for
private and family life of judges and prosecutors undergoing the vetting process and is not related to the rights
protected under Article 8 ECHR of the members of the vetting bodies. It should be noted, however, that such a
waiver of rights concerning the privacy of the work related communications is possible, provided that the
implementing law is carefully designed in order to define the scope of this waiver which should be in compliance
with the applicable European standards (CDL-AD(2015)045, para. 124). The Law should also provide clear
guidance when and to what extend it is permitted to carry out monitoring of the telecommunications of the
members of the vetting bodies.

CDL-AD(2016)036

- 10 -

31.
The Independent Commission is divided into panels which are described in Article C
as permanent. Both it and the Appeal Chamber are to operate with accountability, integrity
and transparency and with the objective of promoting an independent and competent system
of justice free from corruption. Article 4 of the Vetting Law provides further that both
institutions shall exercise their duties as independent and impartial institutions based on the
principles of equality before the law, constitutionality and lawfulness, proportionality and
other principles which guarantee the rights of assessees for a due legal process. In
addition, certain procedures established in administrative law and practice are to apply to
their activities.22 Article 27 of the Vetting Law (Guarantees of Impartiality) deals with
conflicts of interest by members of the re-evaluation institutions and decisions taken by
members of the institutions who have a conflict of interest amount to serious disciplinary
misconduct (para. 1).
32.
The system of appointment of the Independent Commission and the Appeal
Chamber are provided for in Article C of the Annex and in Article 6 of the Vetting Law. The
conditions for appointment to the Independent Commission and the Appeal Chamber seem
to be equivalent to those for judicial appointments and appear to be at least as rigorous as
those in place for appointments to permanent judicial office. The arrangements for making
the appointments appear to be designed to ensure so far as practicable the appointment of
suitably qualified candidates who meet the criteria. Procedures have been put in place to
allow for appointments by qualified majority in the Parliament with an anti-deadlock
mechanism. Other than the fact that these are not permanent institutions, it seems that the
intent of the constitutional and the legal provisions is to confer on them the essential
characteristics of courts of law. On the expiry of their terms of office any pending cases will
be thenceforth dealt with by the permanent judicial and prosecutorial institutions. These
points could be taken into account by the Constitutional Court while examining whether the
re-evaluation bodies have the characteristics of judicial bodies.
33.
As regards the involvement of other bodies, the text of the Vetting Law as submitted
to the Venice Commission does not seem to allow to draw the conclusion that the opinions
and reports prepared by the organs under government supervision such as HIDAACI, CISD
etc. are substituted for the final decisions of the Independent Commission and the Appeal
Chamber which are the institutions newly and expressly created in view of the
implementation of the vetting process.
34.
In accordance with the general principle of Article 4(2) of the Vetting Law which
provides that the Independent Commission and the Appeal Chamber are the institutions
which decide on the final evaluation of the assessee, the individual articles of the Vetting
Law shows that at all times the evaluation and assessment of any information or evidence
gathered by executive bodies, such as HIDAACI, CISD or GDPML, rests with the
Independent Commission and the Appeal Chamber. For instance, according to Article 33(5)
of the Vetting Law, upon completion of the audit, the general inspector of HIDAACI shall
prepare a reasoned detailed report for each assesse and shall rate his or her declarations.
However, it appears that the task of the HIDAACI is limited to the preparation of this report
and the re-evaluation process shall be conducted, on the basis of this asset assessment, by
the Independent Commission and the Appeal Chamber (Art. 4(1) ad (2)). Further, according
to Article 43(2) the relevant proficiency assessment body (which is, according to Article
3(10), the Inspectorate of the High Council of Justice and the relevant structure of the
General Prosecutors Office) reviews legal documents issued by the assessee and prepares
a detailed and reasoned report to be submitted to the Independent Commission which is in a
position to draw its own conclusions independently.

22

Articles 35-40 and 45-47 of the Administrative Procedure Code.

- 11 -

CDL-AD(2016)036

35.
The concern however remains that in certain circumstances, according to Article
39(2) concerning the background assessment, information collected as a result of the
background check shall not be disclosed if it endangers the safety of a source or is a result
of a condition from a foreign government. In this case, the re-evaluation institutions may
lack the possibility of independent re-evaluation and would only be able to rely on the
assessment/evaluation made by the National Security Authority. Thus, the rule of prohibition
of disclosure may only be possible if the information in question is favourable to the
assessee. Further, from the point of view of the independence of the judiciary, the
Constitutional Court could also consider the importance to ensure, during the proficiency
assessment (Articles 40-44 of the Vetting Law), that the legal opinions expressed by judges
and/or prosecutors, which may simply be considered as incorrect by the evaluators, do not
become the ground for negative result. It is essential that negative evaluation follows only in
cases of fundamental and serious errors and/or when there is clear and consistent pattern of
erroneous judgements that indicate lack of proficiency.
36.
In an overall assessment, however, it is quite normal and in line with European
standards that the evidence presented to a court of law is initially obtained by executive
bodies such as the police or prosecutor. Provided its evaluation, i.e. the assessment of its
veracity and the weight to be attached to it is a matter for judicial determination, this does not
amount to an interference with the judicial power.
37.
It should also be borne in mind that Article , para. 4, of the Annex expressly confers
on both the Independent Commission and the Appeal Chamber extensive powers to
investigate and verify matters themselves.23 According to paragraph 3 of the same Article,
official bodies shall cooperate with and disclose requested information to the Independent
Commission and Appeal Chamber and grant direct access to their databases. Moreover,
while Article 45 of the Vetting Law allows members of the Independent Commission and the
Appeal Chamber to investigate autonomously on all relevant facts, Article 57(4) puts forth
the principle that in the decision process of the Independent Commission, the conclusions
are drawn by the panel.
38.
In the view of the Venice Commission, the other bodies such as HIDAACI or CISD
which are involved in the vetting process seem to have instrumental and subservient
functions aimed at helping the new institutions to carry out their difficult mandate. Decisionmaking power in all cases appears to remain with the Independent Commission and Appeal
Chamber, established for this purpose in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution
as independent and impartial judicial bodies.
C. Third question
Is the law in conformity with Article 6 of the ECHR, regarding the respect of the right to fair trial?
Is the denial of the right of judges and prosecutors subject to the law on re-evaluation to be
addressed to domestic courts contrary to Article 6?

23

The evaluation institutions may interview people named in the declaration or others, and seek cooperation with
other state or foreign institutions to confirm the veracity and accuracy of the disclosure, have direct access to all
relevant government databases and files, if not classified as state secret, including the assessees personal files,
statistical data, files selected for evaluation, self-evaluations, opinions of supervisors, training records and
complaints, verification of complaints, disciplinary decisions against the assesse, property and land registers,
bank accounts, tax offices, car registration data bases, border control documentation as well as any other
relevant documents. They may order private individuals and companies to provide testimony or evidence in
accordance with the law.

CDL-AD(2016)036

- 12 -

39.
The answer to this question depends on the qualification of the Appeal Chamber
provided for by Article F of the Annex to the Constitution. The Venice Commission has
already set out in relation to the second question above details concerning the qualifications
for and methods of appointment to the independent Commission and the Appeal Chamber.
In the opinion of the Venice Commission, these rules are designed to secure that these reevaluation institutions will be independent and impartial tribunals and suitable to reach this
goal. In the Final Opinion on the constitutional amendments, the Appeal Chamber was
considered by the Venice Commission as a sort of a specialized court (para. 63 of the Final
Opinion) and its creation as an acceptable solution to the problem of the judicial guarantee
to the persons affected by the vetting procedure. The Final Opinion further considered that
the Specialised Qualification Commission (i.e. the Appeal Chamber) resembles a court in
many regards: its members are called judges,24 they function within the High Court25 and
they enjoy guarantees similar to those judges enjoy.
40.
In addition, according to Article 4(6) of the Vetting Law, if not provided differently in
the Constitution or by the Vetting Law, the re-evaluation institutions may apply also the
procedures provided in the Code of Administrative Procedures, or Law On the organization
and functioning of administrative courts and adjudication of administrative disputes. Many
procedural rules set out in the Vetting Law concerning the procedure before the Appeal
Chamber, are written on the basis of the qualification of that process as a judicial process
as far as they provide for the application or not- of rules concerning the adjudication of
administrative disputes (see, for instance, art. 62(3), 63(2) and 65(1) of the Vetting Law).
41.
Article of the Annex, in its second paragraph, expressly imposes on the
Independent Commission and the Appeal Chamber a duty to guarantee the right to a fair
trial. Moreover, although in the process of re-evaluation, a presumption for the disciplinary
measure of dismissal shall be established in some cases, which the assessee shall have the
burden to dispel,26 Article of the Annex provides clearly that this applies only for the
assessment and not for other proceedings, and in particular not for criminal proceedings.
42.
Both re-evaluation institutions are required to act with transparency which clearly
implies that hearings should be in public. Article 55 of the Vetting Law expressly provides for
a public hearing in accordance with the rules provided in the Administrative Procedure
Code.27 By virtue of Articles 57(1) and 66(2) respectively, the decisions of the Independent
Commission and the Appeal Chamber must be reasoned and in writing. In these respects,
the Constitutional Court has to ascertain that the relevant bodies act in compliance with
Article 6 ECHR28.
43.
The Venice Commission has already pointed to the investigation powers conferred
on the Independent Commission and the Appeal Chamber. While the Constitution does not
regulate the circumstances in which these powers are to be exercised, Article 49 of the
Vetting Law provides a mechanism for the re-evaluation institutions in order to establish
facts and circumstances in each case.

24

According to Article F of the Annex to the Constitution as adopted on 22 July 2016, the Appeal Chamber
shall consist of seven judges.
25
According to Article 179 b), para. 5, of the Constitution as adopted on 22 July 2016, Specialized Qualification
Commission (Appeal Chamber) shall () function within the Constitutional Court.
26
See Art. D (4) of the Annex concerning the Asset assessment; Art. DH (3) concerning the Background
assessment; and Art. E (3) and (4) concerning the Proficiency Assessment.
27
Since the Constitutional Court is undoubtedly well familiar with the Administrative Procedure Code, the present
brief does not contain any separate assessment on this Code.
28
See, para. 35 of the present amicus curiae brief.

- 13 -

CDL-AD(2016)036

44.
The constitutional text is silent as to whether an assessee may bring an individual
claim before the Constitutional Court. But in the absence of a prohibition in the
Constitution,29 there seems to be no reason to exclude such a possibility although the
potential scope of any such application is clearly limited as a result of Article A of the Annex
to the Constitution30 and as a result of the insertion of the re-evaluation process in the
constitutional text itself.
45.
Furthermore, if, according to Article F(3) of the Annex to the Constitution the Appeal
Chamber is not competent to call into question the constitutionality of the principles on which
the re-evaluation process as such is based and the criteria used in the law, there is no
provision in the Constitution and the Vetting Law which excludes the possibility of application
of Article 145 of the Constitution in the vetting process. This constitutional provision provides
that [w]hen judges find that a law comes into conflict with the Constitution () they suspend
the proceeding and send the case to the Constitutional Court. Accordingly, in case the
Appeal Chamber finds that the law it is about to apply is unconstitutional, it is competent to
refer the case to the Constitutional Court. In the absence of any limitation in the Constitution
and the Law, there seems to be nothing that would prevent the Constitutional Court to
consider such complaint.
46.
In conclusion, it appears that there are in the Constitution and the Vetting Law
sufficient elements for the Constitutional Court to conclude that the Appeal Chamber may be
considered as a specialised jurisdiction, whose creation by constitutional provisions could be
interpreted as a specification of the scope of Article 135 of the Constitution (the Courts) and
in particular, of its para. 2 (Specialised courts). The Venice Commission, which in its
opinions on the constitutional amendments approved the overall approach chosen by the
Albanian constituent, sees no reason to be more critical in this respect on the basis of the
provisions of the law.
D. Fourth question
Are the law provisions in relation to the background assessment of the assessees contrary to
Article 8 of the ECHR, as concerns the respect to private and family life of judges and
prosecutors?
47.
The background assessment is provided for in Article DH of the Annex to the
Constitution as well as in Chapter V of the Vetting Law. The purpose of the assessment is to
verify the declarations of the persons being assessed so as to determine whether they have
inappropriate contacts with persons involved in organised crime (Article 34 of the Vetting
Law).
48.
According to Article 5 of the Constitution, [t]he Republic of Albania applies
international law that is binding upon it, and Article 17 states the principle that the limitations
of the rights and freedoms adopted in conformity with the Constitution may not infringe the
essence of the rights and freedoms and in no case may exceed the limitations provided for
in the European Convention on Human Rights. In its Final Opinion on the Revised Draft

29

The Draft Constitution, as examined by the Venice Commission in the Final opinion on the revised
Constitutional Amendments on the Judiciary of Albania (CDL-AD(2016)009) (see CDL-REF(2016)008), in para. 2
in fine of its Article clearly states that the Constitutional Court shall not have competence to receive individual
complaints from assessees dismissed as a result of the assessment. This restriction was criticised by the Venice
Commission in the Final opinion (see para. 66). It appears that this restriction disappeared from the constitutional
text finally adopted, which is welcome.
30
This constitutional provision provides that to the extent necessary to carry out the re-evaluation the application
range of some articles of this Constitution, in particular provisions regarding privacy (), provisions related to
burden of proof () are partly limited in accordance with Article 17 of the Constitution. Article 17 concerns the
proportionate limitation of fundamental rights and freedoms by law for a public interest or for the protection of the
rights of others.

CDL-AD(2016)036

- 14 -

Constitutional Amendments on the judiciary,31 the Venice Commission, after having

observed that according to Article A of the Draft Annex, the application of some articles of
the Constitution, in particular the provisions regarding privacy, is limited in accordance with
Article 17 of the Constitution, considered that those limitations may be justified by the
present situation of the Albanian judiciary, which requires special legislative interventions. It
is up to the Albanian Constitutional Court to evaluate whether the Albanian legislation
contains sufficient safeguards to avoid overbroad interference with private communication.
49.
As to the background assessment, it can hardly be doubted that it would be grossly
improper for a judge or a prosecutor to have inappropriate contacts with persons involved in
organised crime. Having regard to the permitted limitations on the exercise of the right to
respect for private and family life contained in Article 8 ECHR, it seems clear that the
existence of inappropriate contacts between judges and organised criminals would be
contrary to the interests of national security, contrary to public safety, likely to encourage
rather than prevent disorder or crime, and likely to threaten rather than protect the rights and
freedoms of others. As a matter of fact, the vetting legislation is clearly aimed at ensuring the
safeguards of the rights through the re-establishment of the proper function of the rule of
law and true independence of the judicial system, as well as public trust and confidence in
these institutions. (Article 1 of the Vetting Law).
50.
The question therefore seems to be primarily one of whether the measures provided
for in Article DH and in the Vetting Law to investigate the possible existence of such
inappropriate contacts are disproportionate or overly intrusive on the private life of the
persons who are being assessed.
51.
The primary mechanism which is used is that of a background declaration which
each person assessed is required to make. The constitutional provision is silent as to what
exactly this declaration should contain and the matter is provided for in detail in the Vetting
Law. The form set out in Annex 3 of the Vetting Law requires each person who is assessed
to declare whether they have had either inappropriate or appropriate contacts with persons
involved in organised crime and to list those contacts.32 Even a single contact is required to
be declared. It would not be a particularly onerous task to complete this declaration unless
one was a judge or a prosecutor whose contacts with organised criminals had been
extensive.
52.
It is significant and an important safeguard against breach of the privilege against
self-incrimination that the background declaration may be used only for the purposes of the
assessment and may not be used in criminal proceedings (Article DH(2) in fine of the Annex
to the Constitution).
53.
In addition to the Background Assessment Declaration, a background assessment is
to be carried out. Although the body responsible for the carrying out of such an assessment
is not specified in the Annex to the Constitution, Article 36 of the Vetting Law provides that it
should be done by the re-evaluation institutions in collaboration with the National Security
31

CDL-AD(2016)009, para. 57.

The questions asked in the Background Assessment Declaration form, under the title 5 Data on Security
(Annex 3 to the Vetting Law) are as follows: a. Have you been involved in activities related to the organised
crime? b. Are you aware that one of family members has been involved in activities related to the organised
crime? c. Have you had inappropriate contacts in the form of meeting, telecommunication, or any other type of
wilful contact with one or more persons involved in the organised crime, not in compliance with the assumption of
office? . Have you had appropriate contacts with persons involved in the organised crime during the exercise of
the duties? d. Are you aware that one of family members has had inappropriate contacts with persons involved in
the organised crime? e. Did you accept or exchange favours, gifts or property with persons involved in the
organised crime? f. Are you aware that one of your related persons according to the Law On re-evaluation of
judges and prosecutors in the Republic of Albania has accepted or exchanged favours, gifts or property with
persons involved in the organised crime? g. During 10 recent years, have you been denied entry into any
EU/NATO state? gj. Did you seek political asylum in any state?
32

- 15 -

CDL-AD(2016)036

Authority. It further provides for a role for the State Intelligence Service and Internal
Intelligence and Complaint Service near the Ministry of Internal Affairs which together with
the National Security Authority will form a working group. Articles 37 and 38 of the Vetting
Law appear to give the working group the main role in conducting the background
assessment. Article 38 sets out detailed criteria for making an assessment.
54.
The use of such assessments for the purposes of the re-evaluation should be under
the supervision and control of the Independent Commission and subject to the appellate
control of the Appeal Chamber. While the Venice Commission does not see any objection to
the use of such a working group, some concerns may be formulated concerning the use of
working groups consisting only of security personnel on which no representative of the
Independent Commission itself appears to be included. Moreover, there may be also
concerns about Article 39(2) last sentence, that information is not to be disclosed if it
endangers the safety of a source or is the result of a condition from a foreign government.
This is reasonable but only on condition that the information is favourable to the assessee
(see paragraph 35 of the present brief).
55.
In any case, it is essential that all relevant material before the working group must be
available to the re-evaluation institutions (i.e. Independent Commission and the Appeal
Chamber).
56.
The Venice Commission recalls that according to Article of the Annex to the
Constitution, the re-evaluation institutions may have direct access to all relevant government
databases and files, if not classified as state secret, including the assessees personal files,
statistical data, files selected for evaluation, self-evaluations, opinions of supervisors,
training records and complaints, verification of complaints, disciplinary decisions against the
assesse, bank accounts, border control documentation, etc. as well as any other relevant
documents. According to para. 3 of the same Article, official bodies shall cooperate with and
disclose requested information to the Independent Commission and Appeal Chamber and
grant direct access to their databases.
57.
Moreover, Article 14 of the Vetting Law specifies that the rapporteur in each case is
to undertake all procedures for ensuring the evidence which is deemed necessary for the
decision-making process of the panel. In addition, Article 23 seems to envisage that the legal
advisers may be assigned a role in the activity of the working group through delegation. It is
essential that the rapporteur should have access to all the documents and material in the
possession or control of the working group and that s/he or his/her representative should be
able to observe meetings of the group. It may be that the use of these provisions could
secure effective control over the activities of the working group by the Independent
Commission.
58.
In conclusion, whether or not the re-evaluation institutions have the power to maintain
full control over the background assessments and to obtain access to all relevant material is
an important element to be taken into account by the Constitutional Court in its examination
of the Vetting Law. If the Court considers that the re-evaluation bodies have the power to
maintain full control over the background assessment process, then the legal provisions
concerning the background assessment of the persons subject to the re-evaluation process,
while they are undoubtedly obtrusive, could be considered as not representing an
unjustifiable interference with the private or family life of judges and prosecutors contrary to
Article 8 ECHR.

CDL-AD(2016)036

- 16 -

IV. Conclusions
59.
This is an amicus curiae brief for the Constitutional Court of Albania. As such, it does
not have the intention of taking a final stand on the issue of the constitutionality of certain
provisions of Albanian Law no. 84/2016 On the Transitional Re-Evaluation of Judges and
Prosecutors in the Republic of Albania, but merely to provide the Constitutional Court of
Albania with material as to the compatibility of the relevant provisions with European
standards, so as to facilitate the Courts consideration of these provisions under the
Constitution of Albania. It is the Constitutional Court of Albania that has the final say on the
binding interpretation of the Constitution and the compatibility of national laws with this text.
60.
The Constitutional Court has put four questions to the Venice Commission, related to
the compatibility of certain aspects of Law no. 84/2016 with the Constitution and Articles 6
and 8 ECHR as well as on whether the participation of the judges of the Constitutional Court,
who are themselves subject of the vetting procedure, in the examination of the
constitutionality of the Vetting Law may be considered as a conflict of interest which requires
their disqualification.
61.
Concerning the issue of conflict of interest and the possible disqualification of
constitutional judges, the Venice Commission underlines that all the constitutional judges,
according to the Constitution and the Vetting Law, will be the subject of the Vetting Law
which provides for the re-evaluation of every judge in Albania including the judges of the
Constitutional Court. Therefore, the possible conflict of interest may affect the position, not
only of one or some constitutional judges, but of all the constitutional judges sitting at the
Constitutional Court. Consequently, the disqualification of the constitutional judges because
of the existence of a conflict of interest would result in the total exclusion of the possibility of
judicial review of the Vetting Law in view of its conformity to the Constitution. This would
undermine the guarantees ensured by a functioning judicial review of legislation. This
situation could be considered by the Constitutional Court as an extraordinary circumstance
which may require departure from the principle of disqualification in order to prevent denial of
justice.
62.
As to the involvement of the organs allegedly under the control of the executive
power in the process of re-evaluation of judges and prosecutors with regard to the principle
of independence of the judiciary, the analysis of the text of the Vetting Law shows that,
despite the involvement of bodies, such as HIDAACI or CISD, in the investigation process
and the initial research for evidence, the evaluation and assessment of any information or
evidence gathered by those executive bodies rests with the Independent Commission and
the Appeal Chamber which possess both the characteristics of judicial bodies and have the
power to verify themselves the evidence gathered by the executive organs. On this basis, it
may be concluded that the system put in place by the Vetting Law does not as such seem to
amount to an interference with the judicial powers.
63.
As to whether the lack of possibility for judges and prosecutors undergoing the
vetting process to challenge the decisions given by the re-evaluation institutions before
domestic courts is in breach of Article 6 ECHR, the Venice Commission considers that the
answer to this question depends on the qualification of the Appeal Chamber in the
Constitution and the Vetting Law. For the Venice Commission, those legal texts provide
sufficient elements in order to conclude that the Appeal Chamber may be considered as a
specialised jurisdiction which presents judicial guarantees to the persons affected by the
vetting procedure. The rights and safeguards contained in the legislative and constitutional
scheme seem extensive.

- 17 -

CDL-AD(2016)036

64.
As to whether the provisions of the law concerning the background assessment are
contrary to Article 8 ECHR, it has to be taken into consideration that the background
assessment has the purpose to verify the declarations of the judges and prosecutors being
assessed with a view to determining whether they had inappropriate contacts with persons
involved in organised crime. As such, this is a legitimate aim in view of the second
paragraph of Article 8 ECHR (interests of national security, public safety, the prevention of
disorder or crime, or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others). For the Venice
Commission, the essential consideration is that the working group which has a main role in
the background assessment and is composed primarily of security personnel, functions
under the supervision and control of the re-evaluation bodies and that all the relevant
material before the working group should be available to them. The Venice Commission is of
the opinion that while the background assessment is undoubtedly obtrusive, it may not
necessarily be seen as an unjustifiable interference with the private or family life of judges
and prosecutors contrary to Article 8 ECHR.
65.
The Venice Commission remains at the disposal of the Constitutional Court of
Albania for any further assistance it may need.