Dutch East India Company

Commercial World of Mancherji Khurshedji and the Dutch East India Company: A Study of
Mutual Relationships
Author(s): Ghulam Ahmad Nadri
Source: Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 41, No. 2 (Mar., 2007), pp. 315-342
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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Modern Asian Studies 41, 2 (2007) pp. 315-342. 2007 Cambridge University Press
doi:10.1017/S0026749X05002271 Printed in the United Kingdom
Commercial World of Mancherji Khurshedji
and the Dutch East India Company:

A Study of Mutual Relationships
GHULAM AHMAD NADRI
Institute for the History ofEuropean Expansion (IGEER), L
Introduction
On April ist 1768, a Parsi servant of Mancherji Khurshedji, a mercha
-broker of the Dutch Company, came to Surat to whom another Parsi ser
of Dhanjishah, a merchant under the English protection, asked wher
he came and without any further argument he inflicted a blow with his
the first mentioned who then fell down and meanwhile he gave him
then the defender inflicted two
people witnessed this fight, and
was attacked with bamboos with
he was further beaten up till he
pricks with his knife to the offender, m

the Parsi who still had the knife in his
such force that the knife fell from his
fell down.1
What followed this tiny incident was something very seri
Mancherji was arrested and after a show of armed strength be

Surat's Governor and the Dutch, his house was brought under
Company's possession. It initiated a legal battle on the questio
rights and privileges of the Dutch Company at Surat and the le
of the exercise of its powers on the native merchants. The Com
claimed a legal right to send armed men either to provide sec
or if necessary to take possession of the property belonging
merchants under the Dutch protection. This claim was even m
Acknowledgements: This paper owes its present form to the generous com
that I received from Professor Dirk H.A. Kolff, who very patiently went thro
earlier drafts and gave his feedback. I have also benefited from the discussions
had with Dr.Jos Gommans when this paper was in the process. I am grateful t
of them. Professor M.N. Pearson has also been very kind to comment on an
draft of this paper. I am thankful to him.
Note: All references to the Dutch sources are from the National Archives, The
Hague, except wherever indicated.
SVOC 3238, Proceedings of the Dutch Council at Surat (hereafter Proceedings at
Surat), 3 April 1768, ff. 264b-265a.
00oo26-749X/o7/$7.50+ $o. 10
315
316 GHULAM AHMAD NADRI
justified in this case, as Mancherji had a huge outstandi

Company.
This episode gives feeling of a volatile environment at Surat and
merchants' susceptibility to it, in the second half of the eighteenth
century. It also reflects upon the commercial rivalry and tension among
the Parsis as a merchant community,2 the nature of relationship

between the Company and its Indian associates, as well as between
European Companies and the local administration.
This paper is an attempt to illuminate the multifaceted world of a
merchant and ship-owner Mancherji Khurshedji, whose career reveals
a great deal of dynamism and presents an interesting trajectory.
In 1750, when he was appointed as the second broker to succeed

Kishordas Wanmalidas, a Bania, he was already a leading merchant
of Surat and perhaps the richest among Parsis.3 Since then until his
death in the mid-178os, he combined his trading activities with that
of broking for the Dutch East India Company. During this long period,
he experienced immense prosperity, enjoyed political networking, and
association with the local authorities, suffered adversities by losing

fortunes, and finally on his death, he had a huge outstanding debt to
the Company. What follows here, is an attempt to explain his successes
and failures in the context of Surat's changing political economy.
Eighteenth-century Gujarat witnessed political uncertainty and
lawlessness of an unprecedented scale. Repeated extortions, first
under the late-Mughal regime and later under the Marathas, created
consternation among the people especially those in pursuit of

2 In the eighteenth century, the Parsis emerged as a dynamic community of
merchants and entrepreneurs which by all means made the best use of the prevailing
circumstances not only to survive but even to dominate the political economy of
Western India. The role of this community in the Surat's struggle for survival as the
commercial entrepot of Western India is as crucial as their contribution to the rise
of Bombay in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. A good deal of literature
is available on the various facets of the Parsi community at Surat and Bombay. See
for instance Dosabhai F. Karaka, History of the Parsis, 2 volumes (London: MacMillan,
1884); P.S.S. Pissurlencar, Portuguese Records on Rustumji Manochji, the Parsi Broker of
Surat (Nova Goa, 1933); Stephen M. Edwards, The Rise ofBombay; a Retrospect (Bombay,
1902). For an excellent analysis of the Parsi commercial activities in early eighteenthcentury India see David L. White, 'Parsis in the Commercial World of Western India,
1700-1750', The Indian Economic and Social History Review (Hereafter IESHR) Vol. 24,
No. 2 (1987), pp. 183-203.
3 In the list of leading merchants of Surat he appears as the one having a capital
of Rupees ioo,ooo (HRB 838, Memorie van Overgave, Jan Schreuder, 1750, Lettra B,
pp. 23-32). For his position among the Parsis of Surat, see Jivanji Jamshedji Modi,
'Anquetil Du Perron of Paris: India as seen by him (1755-60)',Journal of the Bombay
Branch ofRoyalAsiatic Society, Vol. XXIV (1917), PP. 341-2, 349-50.
COMMERCIAL WORLD OF MANCHERJI KHURSHEDJI 317
commerce.4 Affluent merchants were easy prey to the local reg

which, in their attempts to survive, acted as greedy wolves. S
owners, mainly Muslims, suffered not only from the Europeans, ch
English, who introduced new rules of the game, but also fr
mushroom growth of pirates along the Western Indian Ocean lit

Surat tended to lose accessibility to its interior, while coastal tr
remained no longer safe for ordinary merchants. Shipping along
ports of the Kathiawar peninsula, the Gulf of Cutch and Sind declin
and Surat became increasingly isolated from some of its favou
destinations.5
These adverse circumstances certainly affected the trading

networks, but did not altogether uproot them. The practitioners of
commerce knew very well how to adjust to the new conditions and
lacked no potential to tune their activities and if necessary, restructure
their scale and scope of operation. This resilience was undoubtedly the
greatest strength of the early modern Indian economic system. Some
did certainly succumb to the new pressure and lost their fortunes,
some went into hibernation anticipating that this uncongenial phase
would soon be over. There was still a considerable section of Surat's
mercantile community, which put up a brave face and did everyth

for its survival and active continuity. For such merchants protect
became a keyword and many of them individually and collective
as well, rushed for association with the prospective 'players'

power politics of Surat. The Dutch, and the English companie
having consistently played crucial roles in the commercial life o
Surat, and also being increasingly interested in its politics, w
deemed as protectors. Consequently, some leading merchants
Surat sought protection from either of these, which was eventua
' For an eyewitness account of these developments see, Ali Mohammad Kha
Mira't-i Ahmadi, Vol. 2, Syed Nawab Ali Edition (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 192
28). Ashin Das Gupta has illuminated the commercial life of Surat in the seventeen
and early-eighteenth centuries in his various essays. For the implications of politic
breakdown in Mughal north India in the early eighteenth century, see 'Trade a
Politics in Eighteenth-Century India', in The World of the Indian Ocean Merchant, 5
I8oo: Collected Essays ofAshin Das Gupta, Compiled by Uma Das Gupta (New De
Oxford University Press, 20oo 1), pp. 141-79; See also his seminal work on Surat,Ind
Merchants and the Decline of Surat, 170oo-750 (Universitat Heidelberg: Wiesbad
1979).
5 Traffic between Surat and Sind, for instance, declined ten times by the mid
eighteenth century. In a report on Sind, the Dutch authorities complained that
whereas earlier loo ships sailed between Sind and Surat, now only 1o might be seen
(VOC 2909, Louis Taillefert, to Jacob Mossel, Governor-General and his Council at
Batavia, Surat, 14 May 1757, pp. 10-14).
also granted.6 Protection did not necessarily imply

an unequal relationship; it was rather contractual a
mutual trust and cooperation. Whether it was formalis

declaration from the merchants, we do not know. Ap
merchants promised to behave themselves strictly
with the commercial interests of the Company wh
turn ensure protection and other facilities. Whereas
always invoked legal values to such arrangements, th
interpreted these as purely negotiable.7 The compani
growing competition and problems of logistics, also
other to secure this commitment from the leading me
city. Concomitantly both, the merchants and the Comp
from these complementarities. By 1750, however, a la
merchants did not throw in their lot with any of the
remained rather as free merchants. Mancherji Khurs
such merchant who carried on trade independently.
6 Merchants' choice was, however, not uniform and depended muc

mercial requirements. For some merchants, like Mulla Fakhruddin,
options were limited. As their interests directly clashed with those o
had to fall back on the local political elites (Michelguglielmo To

Blue Sea: Surat and its Merchant Class during the Dyarchic Era (1759-18oo)',
IESHR, Vol. XIX, Nos. 3 & 4 (1982), p. 267). Banias were won over by the
English, to the extent that there emerged, what Lakshmi Subramanian has called
the 'Anglo-Bania Order' (Lakshmi Subramanian, Indigenous Capital and the Imperial
Expansion, Surat, Bombay and the West Coast (New I)Delhi: ()xfi)rd University Press, 1996),
pp. 119-71; Also from the same author, 'Capital and Crowd in a Declining Asian Port
City: The Anglo-Bania Order and the Surat Riots of 1795', Modern Asian Studies
(Hereafter MAS), Vol. 19, No. 2 (1985), pp. 205-37; 'Banias and the British: the
Role of Indigenous Credit in the Process of Imperial Expansion in Western India
in the Second Half' of the Eighteenth Century', MAS , Vol. 21, No. 3 (1987),
pp. 473-50o. Her identification of three interest-groups namely Muslims, Banias and
the Dutch and its allies appears to be a bit problematic, though she is not unaware of
the fractured voice at least among the Banias in this regard. Even in the second half of
the eighteenth century some Parsis,Jews, and even Banias were equally enthusiastic
in seeking association with the Dutch, as the others were with the English. For a
criticism of the Anglo-Bania Order, see, Michelguglielmo Torri, 'Surat during the
Second Half of the Eighteenth Century: What Kind of Social Order?', MAS,Vol. 21,
No. 4 (1987), pp. 679-710, and 'Trapped Inside the Colonial Order: The Hindu
Bankers of Surat and their Business World during the Second Half of the Eighteenth
Century', MAS, Vol. 25, No. 2 (1991), pp. 367-401.

The only reference to the terms and conditions of such protection comes from the
statements of the Dutch authorities at Surat regarding the non-compliance of these by
their broker Mancherji Khurshedji (VOC 2967, Proceedings at Surat, 18 September

1758, David Kellij to Louis Taillefert, Surat, 13 September 1758) This also illustrates
how differently the two parties interpreted the implications of someone being in the
protection of the Company.
Intense commercial rivalries, coupled with the interplay of all kin

of tricks and intrigues in trade, to let the other one down, sometim
forced merchants to forge such association with the Company. P
more than the Muslims, were the archrivals of the Banias since
being free from all sorts of conventional or religious restrict
indulged in professions considered to be a domain of the B
especially the role of a broker to the Company.8 Being a promi

merchant of Surat, having ships and conducting large-scale tr
all along the Indian Ocean, Mancherji was naturally a comm

magnate to be reckoned with. His bitter experience in 1748 m
have given him initial motivation for the exercise of power, which
association with a company would entitle him to.9 It is also impo
to note that he was already close to the local Muslim governm

of Surat and quite rightly thought that an association with the
company would provide further scope to negotiate with the author

and use political connections to ensure his own security and protect
against his rivals.1'
Mancherji's position vis-a-vis the Company
In 1750, Jan Schreuder, Director of the Dutch establishmen
Surat, appointed him as the second broker to look after the Compan
interests together with Rudraram Raidas, the first broker." De

apprehensions among the Dutch authorities, on having two brok
" By the late 17th century, the Banias had come to dominate this profes
(Lakshmi Subramanian, Indigenous Capital and Imperial Expansion, p. 124)
challenge to this monopoly came from the Parsis who often competed wit
Banias for this position. Mancherji Khurshedji, replaced Kishordas Wanmal
Bania, as the second broker of the Company in 1750 and as has been reporte
Jan Schreuder, he had intense commercial rivalry with the then broker of the
Company, Rudraram Raidas (HRB 838, pp. 353-8; HRB 844, Memorie van Ove
Louis Taillefert, 1760, pp. 459-60).
9 For a brief analysis of political developments in the 1740s and the 175os
Mancherji's political activism see Michelguglielmo Torri, 'Mughal Nobles, In
Merchants and the Beginning of British Conquest in Western India: The C
Surat 1756-59', MAS, Vol. 32, No. 2 (1998), pp. 257-315.
"' He had many rivals from his own Parsi community as well. Dhanjishah Man
played active role in the castle revolution and remained politically and comme
dominant in the 176os and 177os, which adversely affected the fortunes of Man
Khurshedji (M. Torri, 'Surat during the Second Half of the Eighteenth Cen
pp. 691-93).
" Govindram Rudraram could assume official position of a broker only after his
father's death in 1762, and since then he is always referred to as the 'second' broker.
each from a rival sect or caste, it was never
the Company to have him as broker sinc
most appropriate and above all was a man o

Moreover, being close to the local authoriti
to the Company better than any one else, in n

power.
To Mancherji, this offer meant a long-term commitment and better

professional security. Being broker of the Company would entitle him
to all facilities, financial and logistical, that the Company offered

to the merchants under its protection. It would also guarantee the
Company's support in all kinds of legal, political, and commercial
disputes. Further, as a monopolist purchaser of Company imports,
he would enjoy control over a large network of merchants spread
over different parts of Surat and its interior. This would leave him
with considerable power to bargain both with the Company and
the merchants. From 1750 for more than three decades, Mancherji
remained at the helm of affairs and quite successfully used his position
as a broker to further his own commercial interests as well.
The activity of brokerage between buyers and sellers, although
inevitable in the conduct of trade, enjoyed no particular respectability
at least in the seventeenth century. Early European travellers an
Company servants have attributed all kinds of negative characteristics
to brokers.13 Serving as broker to the European Companies w

nevertheless, considered as a dignified position and in fact som
merchant families of Surat displayed their utmost desperation t
obtain it in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries su
as the house of Laldas Vithaldas Parekh and the Parsi family
Rustamji Manikji.14 The eighteenth-century brokers to the English

the Dutch Companies were different from their seventeenth-centu
He was thus neither a co-broker in the 1750s nor was he senior to Mancherji as Tor
has suggested (M. Torri, 'Mughal Nobles, Indian Merchants', pp. 263-4, 281-2).
12 VOC 2786, Proceedings at Surat, 17 January 1750, pp. 312-13; VOC 2930,
Louis Taillefert toJacob Mossel, Surat, 25 December 1758, ff. 13a-13b.
13 For a detailed discussion on the brokers, see AJ. Qaisar, 'The Role of Brokers
Medieval India', The Indian Historical Review, Vol. 1, No. 2 (New Delhi: Indian Counc
of Historical Research, 1974), pp. 220-46. For an analogous discussion on the r
of brokers in the sixteenth-century, see M.N. Pearson, 'Brokers in Western Ind
Port Cities: Their Role in Servicing Foreign Merchants', MAS, Vol. 22, No. 3 (198
PP. 455-72.
14 Ashin Das Gupta, 'The Broker in Mughal Surat, c. 1740', in Das Gupta, The
World of the Indian Ocean Merchant, pp. 399-4o09. See also 'The Merchants of Surat, c.
1700-1750', in the same collection, pp. 323-7.
predecessors in various respects. The range of activities, the natu

the contractual relationship, forms of remuneration, and the mo
operation all seem to have gone far beyond the conventional definit
of a broker. Mancherji, although referred to in our sources
'makelaar' (broker) or 'bediende' (employee/servant) of the Comp

hardly qualifies to be called as such. He was primarily a ship-ow
merchant and conducted trade on a large scale. As a broker to
Company, he was a principal buyer of merchandise from the Compa

He also negotiated with suppliers for the procurement of textile
at times his agency was used by the Company to make representatio
and negotiate on its behalf with the local authorities.
There had already been a great deal of discussion among the D

authorities on the position and functions of the brokers.'5 By 1
the brokers were conceived by them as 'factotum' or instrume
with which everything had to be done. Concerning the pos
and usefulness of the brokers for the Company, Jan Schreuder

outgoing Director (1750), writes in his report about Surat, 'they
brokers] have to be present when the goods were assessed for
at the time of sale they strike the bargain, and with the purc
[of textiles] they make contracts and also stand surety for mo
advanced [to the suppliers], if something goes wrong with the l
administration, they are the first ones to be called for advice
assistance], every request or proposal can be made and effected
through them, in sum everything the Company does at Surat happe
only through the channel of the brokers'.'6 It also appears from

report that the brokers essentially bought merchandise from
Company on behalf of others, and also provided suppliers to con
for the procurement of textiles. They enjoyed 1 V, per cent o
sales and 3'/4 per cent on purchases.17 The actual practice, howe
demonstrates that Mancherji and his colleague Rudraram Raida
neither always mediate between the Company and the buyers n
did they act as agents, buying on behalf of other merchants. T
did not even enjoy a fixed commission from both the parties o
transactions. They also bought commodities themselves, brough
the Dutch Company from other parts of Asia and Europe, primarily
15 Such details can be seen in the Memoirs of some of the Dutch Directors of Surat
Factory, which are also helpful in tracing the evolution of the institution of broking
over the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (HRB 836,Beschrijving van Suratta, Jan.
Schreuder, I75o; HRB 844, pp. 232-351).

16 HRB 836, item 252.
17 Ibid.

wholesale merchants and later sold them to other merchants who
possibly acted as retailers.'" Soon after the arrival of ships

forwarded to the Company, a price list that was discussed
meetings of the Council and if members agreed to it, a contra
then confirmed under the condition that the brokers would be obl
to collect all the contracted merchandise and pay to the Comp

within a given time. It is, however, strange that in the contr
of which some copies have survived in the archives, nowhere
quantity of merchandise thus sold, has been mentioned. It was perh
understood that Mancherji and his colleague undertook to c
whatever quantity the Company received. Theoretically the Com
lost every right to sell goods already contracted for with the brok
any other merchant. We have very few references where the Com
sold a part of merchandise already contracted, from its warehou
any other merchant. Once in 1759, Louis Taillefert sold about

canisters of castor sugar to a Bania merchant, probably under E
protection. He takes pride when he mentions in his memoir,
by doing so he taught a lesson to the brokers.'19 In 1772, when
Bosman, Director at Surat, tried to sell some merchandise, alr
sold to the brokers, to other merchants, he was severely oppose
condemned by his subordinate AJ. Sluijsken.2"
Neither was the Company obliged to sell all commodities
brokers, nor were the brokers under any compulsion to buy every
from the Company. The process was quite non-exclusive and e

had the right to select goods depending upon the logics of trad
have several references where the Company exercised its righ
retain certain commodities for sale at the next appropriate occ
especially if the prices were not up to the expectations. Broker
sometimes, did not contract for some goods if the sale prospects w
rather bleak. Merchandise thus left out of the contract, had to

disposed of to other merchants. Normally, it may be presumed,
arrangements were made with the help of the brokers. From
sale contracts for arrack, and other minor commodities, with
merchants of Surat, however, it is hard to deduce such an impr
The possibility of sales having taken place outside the networ
'X VOC 3068, Translation of what the Nawab demands from the Dutch (
p. 122, item VI; VOC 3549, Proceedings at Surat, 23 March 1779, ff. 234b-23
'" HRB 844, p. 281.
20 HRB 863, Justificatie van de Secunde, Sluijsken, A.J. Sluijsken to Jerem
Riemsdijk, Governor-General at Batavia, Surat, 23 November 1777, Bi1lagen,
B, Copia 4.
Mancherji or his partner Rudraram, cannot entirely be ruled ou

sale contracts concerning arrack, for instance, there is no refer
to broker or brokerage, although the buyers were mostly Parsi
possibly associates of Mancherji.2' It is a curious position wher
broker would interpose himself in such arrangements in order
ensure his commission, while the Company's interest would be b
served if the sales took place without him.
Mancherji, after contracting to buy merchandise, took advan

of the rather inexplicit nature of the terms of contract. He coll
them from the Dutch warehouse at his convenience, but quite o
did not do so, unless he found prospective buyers.22 The differ
between the purchase and sale prices constituted his profit. M
depended on his ability to bargain with the Company for low p
and sell them at higher prices. The brokers had to bear all r
of bad sale due to a large supply of goods by other Companies
merchants, and in the case of consequent fall in prices, had to s
losses.23 Compliance with the terms of the contract depended m
on the congenial trade atmosphere. Whenever there were trou
such as calamities, blockade of the city and consequent obstruct
in transportation of goods to the interior, there were no buyers
the merchandise and the brokers consequently were unable to co
these from the Company.24 It appears that the Company happ
to be the ultimate sufferer since in no way it was able to compe
brokers to abide by the terms of contract. The sense of indignation

the Dutch authorities, in this regard, is often reflected in the le
and resolutions where they accuse the brokers, especially Manch
to be in connivance with the local authorities, although they were n
21 Interestingly in a sale contract, we see for the first time in 1787, nam
actual buyers appearing with those of the brokers. This clearly indicates that
brokers enjoyed a brokerage of 1'/2 per cent on the sales. VOC 3805, Proceedi
Surat, 3 April 1787, pp. 10o6-8; VOC 3805, Proceedingsat Surat, 24 December
pp. 325-6.
22 VOC 3117, C.L. Senff to Van der Parra, Governor-General at Batavia, Sur
December 1764, ff. 154b-156a.
23 VOC 2842, Proceedings at Surat, 19 May 1753, pp. 169-70. As happened
1767, when they bought iron at Rs. 14/2 per loo lb. from the Company and late
to a large shipment of iron from Europe by the English and the Portuguese pric
down and they were forced to sell it at Rs. o10 per loo lb. (VOC 3207, C.L. Sen
Van der Parra, 3oJanuary 1767, ff. 14a- b).
24 VOC 3437, MJ. Bosman to Van der Parra, Surat, 25 December 1775, ff.
40a.
ignorant of the prevailing uncongenial climate

such non-compliances.25
Brokers were not the employees of the Comp
referred to as such in Dutch correspondence

the native employees of the Company (inla
however, no evidence to suggest that they w
a fixed salary on a permanent basis. The 1
(brokerage) and 3 per cent rabat26 that they
were rather allowances for undertaking to
and binding themselves for timely collection o
the Company. The brokers were also spoke

bringing in people who might conclude a c
of export goods, mostly textiles.27 In all c
suppliers, Mancherji (so also Rudraram R
son Govindram Rudraram) is one of the
explain what role Mancherji played in these
difficult to presume that he mediated betw
purveyors. Like the two brokers, the Company

two purveyors (leveranciers), almost on a regu
period under consideration. These purveyor
textiles required by the Company at prices off
upon by the Dutch authorities. Mancherji s

and surety to the contract. Apparently the
fixed commission on the Company's procur
They were possibly remunerated for their e
contracts, through a commission mutually agr

which sometimes was as high as 3 /4 per cent.2
could then recompense themselves by char

this amount, or even more. Consequently
that the brokers would henceforth get one
done through their help from the Company
contracts with the purveyors for the procurem
25 Louis Taillefert in fact found himself helpless to br

the better service of the Company because of his close
governors Safdar Khan and Ali Nawaz Khan (VOC 2

Mossel, Surat, 25 December 1758, ff. 1 la-15a).
26 A reduction if payments are made in cash immedi
merchandise or within a stipulated time.
27 HRB 836, item 252.
28 HRB 843, pp. 68-9; HRB 836, item 252.

29 HRB 843, pp. 68-70o.

reference is made to the broker's commission. From the rather obscure
nature of the evidence, it might be construed that the brokers had a

kind of informal agreement with the purveyors, which they deemed
unnecessary to disclose to the Company. Mancherji, therefore, could
exert his influence on the suppliers to procure textiles for his own
consignments or to persuade them, on behalf of the Company, to
supply certain textiles, which they were otherwise reluctant to deliver
owing either to scarcity of that stuff or to price rise.30
These merchants, it may be concluded, in their relation with the

Company acted rather as wholesale merchants. They first estimated
the total possible sale in a year, placed the demand before the
Company and finally bought the imported goods by undertaking to
pay to the Company at the prices agreed upon. At what prices they
then sold these goods to other merchants was none of the Company's
concern. Mancherji Khurshedji (as also his partner Rudraram Raidas)
was actually a 'merchandise-farmer' and not a broker in the sense it
is understood.
The institution of broking seems to have undergone a process

of evolution and over a period of time, numerous functions
were subsumed within that of a broker which originally meant
a simple mediator, who brought the buyers and sellers together
and earned a commission on transactions. It grew more and more
sophisticated and diversified incorporating multiple dimensions of
early-modern Asian commercial systems. The term 'broker' or
'makelaar', however, continued to be used in the contemporary
writings and no sophisticated term was coined which could be in tune
with the changing nature of the activity. Even the local Persian term
'dalal' is no more appropriate for this in the middle of the eighteenth
century. Another term, wakil (representative) comes a bit closer but
does not have the richness of meaning that would fit a profession like
that of Mancherji.31
30 In a report concerning the problems of textile trade at Surat, written in 1759,

Mancherji has been accused of procuring textiles first for his own ships so that they
depart to their respective destinations on time, rather than for the Company (VOC
2930, Louis Taillefert to Heeren XVII, Surat, 1759, ff. 4b-9b). On another occasion,
he has been applauded for persuading the purveyors to supply some textiles for which
they had some pretensions (VOC 2967, Louis Taillefert to Jacob Mossel, Surat, 12
April 1759, p. 1 17).
31 His English counterpart, Manikji Nowroji, was called as wakil (representative)
and Jagannathdas Parekh was referred to as the marfatia (agent) in the English
Company records. See Ashin Das Gupta, 'The Broker in Mughal Surat', pp. 406-8.
Being a native merchant of considerable credit and

to the local political elites, Mancherji was certainly v
for the Company. In him, the Dutch Company got a pr
of bulk merchandise and a trustworthy merchant who
always be invoked while negotiating with the political
as with the larger community of merchants, especially th

For nearly 35 years, he, together with Rudraram Raidas a
his son Govindram Rudraram, bought almost all major

from the Company.
Mancherji, in his new position, anticipated his comm
and the continuity of his trade on a large scale. It
apart from allowances, a considerable profit from the
to the merchants. It also entitled him to privilege
by ordinary merchants, like exemption from internal

could also use his new platform to safeguard his inter
commercial or political disputes.33 Moreover, to Man
means of spreading risks, which every affluent merchant
order to avoid sudden and complete ruin in an uncerta

environment. He could, therefore, combine his own tr
with that of farming the Company's imported merc
portfolio entrepreneur, presumably, he also invested a
in the war operations of his favourites like Safdar K
his son in law, Ali Nawaz Khan, expecting in retur
support which would ultimately yield commercial advanta

monetary dividends or at least immunity from arbitrary
which many of the affluent merchants were subjecte
Whereas, the English had already in 1738, abolished the broker

Jagannathdas, however, was still referred to in the Dutch record
the English in the 1750s. (Ibid., p. 406). The Dutch seem to have
who represented the Company to the political authorities at Surat
Marathas at Pune or Baroda, etc. as the Company's 'hoJganger' (a ma
the person of Mohammad Aref.
3 2 In times of need, the Company could also raise funds by borrow

the bankers and use his credentials as surety.
" In 1753, a batila (small ship) belonging to him was captured b

at Goa against which the Dutch wrote a protest letter to the Port
Surat, but to no avail, then it was decided to write a letter to the
in this matter (VOC 2823, Proceedings at Surat, 2 March, 1753
in 1760, when his ship Faiz Bahadur was detained at Bombay by th
of the complaints from some Parsi merchants having some finan
Mancherji, the Dutch intervened and wrote letters to the English as
the ship with its cargo to Surat and settle the claims there (VOC
at Surat, 6 November 1760, pp. 298-9).
1750s.34 He seems to have carried on his political associations w

the local governors as his serviceability to the Nawabs of Sura
acknowledged in 1786 by the then Nawab Qaim al Daulah.35 In
respect Mancherji comes quite close to the position of a 'portf
capitalist' a term that has been used by Sanjay Subrahmanyam
C.A. Bayly for the merchants who combined politics with trade.36
Mancherji and his Commercial World
Mancherji's early life is not known except that he was the son
a Parsi priest (Mobed) and he himself continued the legacy of
father as he was considered to be the leader of his sect called
Shahanshahi as against the Kadami sect led by Dastur Darab

perhaps, provides initial context for his association with t
administration. Being leader of a commercially vibrant com
at Surat, Mancherji, it may be presumed, must have been c
crises management, like negotiations in cases of dispute in
his community." As a merchant with considerable credit
quite active in the city's commercial life. We are short of infor
about his early trading activities and extent of his involve
3:4 VOC 2930, Louis Taillefert to Heeren XVII, Surat, 27 November 175
In a detailed report about the extortions from such merchants, Manche
is conspicuously absent. This may be attributed to his association with th
leadership at Surat (VOC 2863, Proceedings at Surat, 7 September 1754
13).
35 Mancherji provided interest-free loans to the earlier Nawabs in lieu of which

he got exemptions from customs (British Library, Factory Records: Surat (hereafter
FRS), No. 64, Proceedings of the English Council at Surat, 28 November 1786,
pp. 419-20).
36 See Sanjay Subrahmanyam and C.A. Bayly, 'Portfolio capitalists and the political
economy of early modern India', IESHR, Vol. 25, No. 4 (1988), pp. 401-24,
reproduced in Sanjay Subrahmanyam (ed.), Merchants, Markets and the State in Early
Modern India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990), pp. 242-65. I have preferred to
use the term portfolio entrepreneur, instead of 'portfolio capitalist' in order to convey
a closer meaning to the enterprise that Mancherji thought to indulge in, in the 1750s.
37 Both the sects were actively hostile to each other. See, J.J. Modi, 'Anquetil Du
Perron', pp. 349-50, 432.
38 In 1775, a Dutch traveler, John Splinter Stavorinus, notes that Mancherji and
Dhanjishah are the chiefs of the Parsis who dwell in and around Surat, both are chief
ecclesiastics or priests (of the Shahanshahi and Kadami sects respectively) and they
likewise settle disputes among them and all parties must submit to their decisions (J.S.
Stavorinus, Voyages to the East Indies, (tr.) Samuel Hull Wilcocke (Robinson, London,
1798), Vol. III, pp. 1-2).
various commercial practices. Like any affluent merchant
commercial enterprise seems to have been quite divers
carrying trade on a large scale, he also invested a part of

bottomry loans.39 Contest for power between Mian Ac
Khan, and ensuing civil war in the late 1740s perhap

him to seek protection from the Dutch in 1748.40
was subjected to imprisonment and extortions by his
especially the Marathas, and only after a strong show
and protest by the Dutch, was he set free and were Rs. 5
from him, given back.41 It is, however, a hard to determi
political party he chose to support was his personal cho

it went automatically to a party supported by the Compa
He, anyhow, entertained political connections with

and his successor Ali Nawaz Khan, Governors of Surat and also
exerted his influence to further his commercial interests at least in the
1750s.43. There are frequent complaints in the Dutch records about

his political influence and its exertion to dissuade other merchants
from buying directly from the Company. In a letter to Jacob Mossel,
the Governor-General at Batavia, Louis Taillefert complaints about
:'3 Bottomry is a form of commercial investment whereby one lends money to
others to carry on a sea-voyage, against an interest rate which was usually 9 per cent
per month but was mutually negotiable. In a collection of some Dutch documents
(mostly legal in nature) now preserved in the Tamil Nadu State Archives, Chennai,
India, fortunately, one reference survives that tells us that he together with Lala
Shiv Narain, invested Rupees 3oo as bottomry loan on the ship De Hope, going to
Mombassa, against an interest rate of 15i4 per cent (TNSA 1644, Doc. No. 32, pp.
127-9, dated 1o February 1749).
40 In 1748, he was granted protection for himself, his whole family, his
employees/servants, ships, goods, money, and everything belonging to him. He was

entitled to enjoy all the prerogatives, privileges, and benefits of a private or free
merchant. In return, he promised not only to be thankful to the Company forever,
and to obey the instructions of the Company, but also subjected everything belonging
to him to the laws, customary rights, and arbitrations of the Dutch Company (VOC
2967, Proceedings at Surat, 18 September 1758, David Kellij to Louis Taillefert,
Surat, 13 December 1758).
41 VOC 2724,Jan Schreuder to Van Imhoff, Governor-General at Batavia, Surat,
29 May 1748, pp. 84, 105-6, 116-17.
42 Despite all official pronouncements of maintaining complete neutrality, the
Dutch were, nevertheless, concerned with Surat's political affairs and at times had
to succumb to the intimidations from one of the contesting parties. Mancherji once
reported to have committed on behalf of the Company to support Safdar Khan, but
the Dutch Director declined invoking their pure commercial orientation and general
policy of neutrality (VOC 2842, J. de Roth to Jacob Mossel, Surat, 16 April 1754,
pp. 718-22).
43 J.J. Modi, 'Anquetil Du Perron', op.cit., pp. 341-2.
the merchants' reluctance to participate in public auctions an

buy anything directly from the Company. He writes, 'the Com
second [broker] Mancherji Khurshedji, has found opportunity to m
himself indispensable with the administration, and although he
no public office, he is so much penetrated in the governing of th
that he is commonly considered as one of the real administr
now since few years not a single merchant has dared to p
himself to buy anything from the Company outside their [br

channel, going their timidity so far that not only even at Com
public auctions no native [merchants] dares to bid if they ar
stimulated/urged upon by the brokers'.44 In another letter he
'the Company's brokers especially the second, Mancherji Khurs
have managed to insinuate and to make themselves indispe
with the city administration that by interposing [themselves]
have managed to build up their authority to the extent that they

become tyrants of the trade, and there is hardly any one merchan
the whole city who dares to make any contract to buy from or se
us'.45
His mercantile ventures were multiple and included that of overseas
trading, plying his ships on freight, apart from his main engagement
as 'broker' to the Company. As a merchant, he was involved in largescale export trade sending his merchandise, especially textiles, to
different parts of the Indian Ocean, such as Bombay, Bengal, Siam
in the east, Basra, Bandar Abbas in the Persian Gulf, and Mocha in
the Red Sea.46 While his own ships mostly sailed to Siam and Batavia,
he sent his goods to other destinations in the ships of Mannik Dada,
the Company's modi.47
Shipping was his chief enterprise and involved large investment and
high risks. This must have yielded enormous dividends. His ships not
only contained his own cargo but also from others who freighted their
goods to the planned destinations. We do not know the freight charges
for the East and Southeast Asian, most favourite destinations. Given
the amount of risks involved in it, and the high returns, this must have
44 VOC 29o09, Louis Taillefert toJacob Mossel, Surat, 14 May 1757, P. 17.
45 VOC 2930, Louis Taillefert toJacob Mossel, Surat, 25 December 1758, ff. 1 1a1 ib. VOC 2937, Louis Taillefert to Jacob Mossel, Surat, 15 April 1758, p. 64; VOC
2939, Louis Taillefert to Jacob Mossel, Surat, 14 April 1758, pp. 34-6.
46 VOC 2967, Proceedings at Surat, 18 September 1758.
47 Ibid. Between 1755-1758, we have some figures of his exported textiles mostly
in the ships of Manik Dada (VOC 2967, Proceedings at Surat, 18 September

1758).
provided him with sufficient means to con

He owned several ships, big and small, sui
as well as coastal shipping. In 1757, his

Siam via Malacca where his agents bought
Bahadur.48 In 1760, Faiz Bahadur sailed to
cargo consisting of his own goods as well a
to other merchants of Surat.49 In 1769, a
Bakhsh was sent to Batavia that also contai
Sluijsken, Second and in charge of the Wa
these voyages by entrusting the cargos to
responsible for the sale of merchandise an
goods. Normally, the nakhodas were trustwor
their responsibilities quite diligently. Bein
they sometimes fell prey to the temptations
cut means and that led, sometimes, to dis

however, generally submitted to the arbi
mostly merchants, nominated by both th
frequently sailed to Bhavanagar on the w
Cambay, and Thatta and Sind to the further
Cutch, also, carrying his own goods as well as

merchants buying from him.52 To ensure saf
of ships, he often requested the Dutch for
provided.
As an entrepreneur, he had to depend on an extensive network of

merchants who could be instrumental in disposing of the merchandise
in the interior. We have evidence regarding the advances he

received from such merchants or otherwise, their willingness to
buy merchandise from him.53 There was a group of rich merchants
associated with him and to whom he sold the merchandise. We
know that prior to English take-over of the Dutch establishme
48 TNSA 1654, DI)oc. No. 40, Surat, 1763; Doc. No. 55/PP- 91-2, Surat, 17
Another ship named Emmody sailed to Siam in 1760 (Ibid., Doc. No. 56).
49 VOC 3026, Proceedings at Surat, 6 November 176o, pp. 298-300.
" VOC 3268, MJ. Bosman, and AJ. Sluijsken, to Van der Parra, Sura
December 1769, ff. 7a-9a, 13b.

51 One such case can be found in a dispute between Mancherji, the owner
ship, and his nakhodas, Mokarram Abdul Rasool and Mohammad Shahid (TNS
Doc. Nos. 40 and 55, Surat, 1763).
52 VOC 2863, Proceedings at Surat, 1755, PP. 147, 176-7; VOC 3155, Procee
at Surat, 7 February 1764, PP. 79-80; VOC 3576, Proceedings at Surat, 6 O
1780, ff. 251a-251b.
5 VOC 3268, MJ. Bosman to Van der Parra, Surat, 15 December 1769, ff.
Surat in 1781, the duo, Nandram Bhatt and Kishandas Kisho

had extensive dealings with him and bought commodities to
amount of about four hundred thousand Rupees.54 Another merchan
Ratanji Gokul, and several other city merchants acted as buyer

merchandise in bulk from Mancherji.55 The brokers at other pl
such as Bhavanagar, Bombay and etc. are spoken of as his agents
possibly acted as reference persons to a large number of merch
engaged in local trade in imported goods like sugar, copper, iron
In a report about the textile trade at Surat it has been rema
that the small brokers in different parts of Gujarat are in fact
creation of the chief ones at Surat and are important links in
network extending into the interior. These agents not only facilitat
trade by rendering crucial services but also provided all kin

logistical and financial assistance. When the Dutch representati
visited Bhavanagar to explore the potentialities of trade in 1
local Banias and the agents of Mancherji, took care of the delega
and looked after their comfort and logistics and provided them
necessary information about the possibilities of trade.56 Such netwo

were also useful for gathering information regarding the prospects
sale and purchase. The Company's annual demand for goods from
headquarters at Batavia, depended, to a large extent, on the feed
the authorities received from the brokers. Mancherji, with the
of his local agents could estimate the extent of demand for impo
goods in a year and placed them before the Company. In times
uncertainties, commercial success depended much on the quick
reliable information about the incidents taking place in and ar
Gujarat. In 1766, when the Ghareek factory in the Persian
was taken over by one of the local Persian political groups led
Mir Mahanna, information about it reached the Company thro
the network of brokers. Narottamdas, a broker of the European
Muscat, wrote to Nanna Bhai and Basroorji, agents of Manc
at Bombay, who then immediately wrote a letter to their patr
5' FRS No. 59, Proceedings of the English Council at Surat, 18 July
pp. 156-7.
55 In 1780, Mancherji and his co-broker Govindram Rudraram sold copper
cloves to the amount of Rs. 165,000 and Rs. 225,ooo respectively to Nandram
and Kishandas Kishordas, while mace and nutmeg worth Rs. 6,ooo were sol
Ratanji Gokul (Ibid., p. 158).
56 VOC 3670, Report to the Director, ff. 38a-38b.
informing him about this incident.57 His

the 175os and 176os depended, to a large
and efficient network that he controlled.
Mancherji had to share his enterprise as an associate to the

Company, with his co-broker, Rudraram Raidas and later the latter's
son Govindram Rudraram. While each of them had his private trade
independent of the other, both jointly concluded contracts with the
Company to buy merchandise in bulk. Unfortunately, information
is not coming up about their mode of operation. Issues like the

sales management, creation of clientele of merchants, as well as
their proportional share in the total investment and benefits, remain

obscure. There might have been a kind of formal agreement between
them concerning joint ventures. As partnership trade was quite

rampant in the trading world of early modern India, the two men
appear to have had mutual understanding about sharing the profits
in proportion to their respective investment. It is remarkable that
despite all apprehensions among the Dutch authorities about their
mutual enmity and commercial rivalry, both displayed throughout
the 1750s, 1760s and 177os, extreme professional ethics and mutual
understanding transcending all barriers of caste and creed.58 This
represents a curious example of partnership trade where every
transaction had to be monitored and recorded for the final settlement
of accounts at the end of the year.
It is also very suggestive of a changed social and commercial

environment at Surat. Gone were perhaps the days when friendships
and enmity were based on religious and caste affiliations. If, Mancherji
had Dhanjishah Manjishah, a Parsi, and Jagannath, a Bania as
his rivals, he had Rudraram Raidas, another Bania, as his coentrepreneur. In the late eighteenthcentury Surat, interactions,
mainly commercial ones, were determined more through political
associations, although such associations were also initially motivated
by already existing professional jealousy and commercial rivalry
among the merchants. Once a merchant was declared under
57 VOC 3179, C.L. Senff to Van der Parra, Surat, io April 1766, ff. 413a-413b.
Govindram Rudraram also received letters from Narottamdas (Ibid., ff. 405a-406a).
58 This is in sharp contrast to the business partnership of the two Parsi merchants
and associates of the English Company, Dadabhai Manikji and Edul Dada, which
broke up in 1779. Both jointly contracted for the English procurements of exportgoods from 1767 to until 1779, when they quarreled and split and their fortunes
declined. See M. Torri, 'Surat during the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century',
p. 691.
protection of a Company, he had to lose all possible chances of

commercial dealings across party affiliations. We have refere
intense rivalry between Mancherji andJagannath, the English
who is often reported to have exerted his political influence t
the weavers of some villages around Surat, not to work for the D
Such intensity can also be seen in the episode quoted above in
Mancherji and his Parsi rival Dhanjishah Manjishah under the
protection. The Dutch attempt, in this case, to take posses

Mancherji's house was apparently a measure to protect him a
property.
Under such conditions, it is quite probable that the ord
merchants too might have been forced to choose their patro
to associate themselves with a particular network dominated by e
of the chief entrepreneurs at Surat. Jealousy and commercial

based on political affiliations at Surat, therefore infiltrated d
the lowest level of the network. The extent of exclusiveness or r
must have varied as one moved to the interior. Depending up

circumstances and trade logistics, such relations were, nevert
negotiable. Commercial networking and creation of clientele
among merchants as well as among consumers producers, cons
crucial aspects of the trading strategy of the European East
Companies. We find, therefore, principles of heredity frequ
invoked to forge long-term associations between the Compa
the native merchants, producers/consumers. Thus, the weav
particular villages or families are spoken of as working f
Dutch Company from generation to generation.59 A similar s

possessiveness can also be seen in the efforts of the Dutch aut
at Surat in 1794, to continue with the procurements of
despite financial difficulties, just to keep the weavers, dyer

others working for the Company.60 The authorities believed t
loss of these workmen to other 'nations' i.e. the English, Fren
Portuguese, could have more serious consequences for the Co
than the temporary loss in case the textiles had to be sold a
itself at a loss.
The principle of heredity though applied in normal circumstances,

as in the cases of the two purveyors and the modi, was not without
exception. Mancherji's adopted son Bahmanji Khurshedji, could not
59 VOC 3063, Proceedings at Surat, 5 August 1761, pp. 234-6.
60 Formalige Nederlandse Bezittingen in Voor-IndiX, No. 137, Proceedings at Surat,
15 February 1794, PP. 18-19.
make it to succeed him as the Company's brok

attributed to the utter failure of his house to
to the Company. A positive aspect of this kind
was the forging of convenient associations
for example, to the Dutch Company to carry o
capacity as individual merchants. Mancherj

scribe of the Dutch, and the Company's
easily manage their trade by providing supple

other.61
Mancherji and the Dutch Company: T
In a situation where the Company had al

subordinate factories from many parts o
served for more than one and a half centuries as collection and
distribution centres, the role of brokers became increasingly

By the mid-eighteenth century, it began to be debated amon
authorities as to what mode of operation was to be adopted
the Company commercially active in Gujarat. Being confined
meant greater dependence on the brokers. FromJan Schrcude
to A.J. Sluijsken (1792) every Director of the Dutch establis
at Surat had different views about the methods of operatin
Company's trade. Jan Schreuder (1745-50) and C.L. Senff

68) were in favour of conducting trade from Surat, with th
of rich merchants who, according to Senff, were willing to
large capital in buying from and procuring for the Company
were not rigid in their behaviour and tried to find solution
circumstances allowed them to do. Mancherji's relations w
Company, therefore, depended much on the role that he pl
the politics of Surat and the ensuing commercial environmen
It also depended on how much he could exert his influence an
the Company dependent on him or otherwise how much cont
respective Dutch Directors could exert and how far they co
him to the terms and conditions favourable to the Company
merchandise-farmer, Mancherji wanted to ensure that majo
were sold only to him on favourable terms. Throughout his t
"' In the 1 75os, they could annually send their goods comprising mainly t
overseas destinations in the ships owned by Manik Dada and Mancherji (V
Report from the Fiscaal, David Kelly to Louis Taillefert, Surat, 13 Decemb
broker, Mancherji exerted a sort of monopolistic rights over t

of merchandise by the Company. Without exception, and desp
attempts to open up to all the process of sales, he happened to
highest bidder and therefore major goods were always sold to h
the 175os and early 176os, he could exert his political influen
keep other merchants away from competing with him, while
other hand, apprehending extortions many merchants preferr
maintain a low profile and to avoid bidding for the Company's goo
Such merchants either advanced money to the broker to ensur

share in the purchased merchandise or later on bought from
These secondary buyers enjoyed certain privileges such as exem
from tolls on transportation of their merchandise to other pa
Gujarat. They also were entitled to facilities like convoys exten
the Company on the request of the brokers.
Initially, the Company could not force the brokers to co

themselves through a contract, to collect merchandise wi
specified time period. In cases where the brokers could not c
goods on time, the Company had to bear maintenance cos
share risks of loss by damage, theft, etc. until these were fi

weighed out.63 In the memoirs of Louis Taillefert, one can f
desperation to free the Company from its dependence on the brok
in particular on Mancherji.64 In 1764, when C.L. Senff assumed

of the Director, he tried to bring them under control and in orde
so he introduced new policies. He alleged that the brokers took

liberty from the previous Directors and bought goods at lower
He, therefore, tried to sell goods through public auction to which
of the rich merchants of Surat were invited. Subsequently, a
many merchants of Surat bidding for the merchandise, Mancherji
Rudraram happened to be the highest bidders. Senff also intro
the system of written contracts binding Mancherji to a definite t
frame for the collection of and payments for the merchandise. A
same time, he also introduced a method by which the brokers
obliged to pay to the Company for the merchandise weighed to
by the end of August every book-year. Mancherji, however, h
liberty not to commit himself with the collection within the stip
62 HRB 844, pp. 287-8; VOC 3328, M.J. Bosman to Van der Parra, Surat
December 1771, ff. 4b-5a.
63 VOC 3117, C.L. Senff to Van der Parra, Surat, 31 December 1764, ff
156a.
64 VOC 290o9, Louis Taillefert, to Jacob Mossel, Surat, 14 May 1757, pp. 10-14;
VOC 2930, Louis Taillefert to theHeerenXVII, Surat, 25 November 1758, ff. 1 la-15b.
time, especially if the sale prospects for some goods, es

did not justify him to do so.65 Despite all efforts, Senff c
the Company out of the problems of delayed payments

debts to the brokers, particularly to Mancherji.66 This in
the prospects of procurements of textiles, as the Compan
it difficult to advance money to the suppliers. In 1769, an
was introduced by which the brokers were obliged to
merchandise delivered to them at the end of every month
Every new method proved to be more a matter of co

account-keeping rather than actual solution to the prob
the debt to the brokers had gone up to Rupees 203
still growing.68 MJ. Bosman, the new Director, tried t

outstanding debt and he went to the extent that he f
to submit to the Company a written affidavit from th
buyers to pay money directly to the Company.69 Man
ceded his ship, Khuda Bakhsh, which had sailed to Bat
time, relinquished his share in the cargo together with
that, in favour of the Company.70 It seems that Manch
clear the debts and his ship, renamed as Wilhelmina,
in the possession of the Company in 1772.71 From a l
by AJ. Sluijsken to Governor-General at Batavia in 17
that Bosman had some private commercial interests and
hesitate to connive with the brokers particularly with
accomplish his personal ambitions.72 He was, therefor
exert pressure on the brokers to clear their debts to
before weighing goods out to them further. Mancherji too
and allegedly freed himself from the controls that C

tried to bring him under.73 He perhaps very well k
65 Ibid; VOC 3408, MJ. Bosman to Van der Parra, Surat, 2 Jan
89b-9oa.
"" In 1769, they were indebted to the Company by Rs. 203,904 (

Bosman to Van der Parra, Surat, 15 December 1769, ff. 7a-7b).
67 VOC 3354, MJ. Bosman to Van der Parra, Surat, 21 Decembe
58b.
68 VOC 3268, M.J. Bosman, and A.J. Sluijsken to Van der Parra, Surat, 15
December 1769, ff. 7a-7b.

69 VOC 3354, MJ. Bosman to Van der Parra, Surat, 21 December 1772, ff. 58b59a.
70 Ibid, ff. 7b-8b.

71 HRB 863,Justificatie van de Secunde, Sluijsken, Lettra E. Copia Memorie.
72 He seems to have invested an enormous amount of Rupees 17o,ooo on bottomry.
7 HRB 863,JustiJicatie van de Secunde, Sluijsken, Lettra E. Copia Memorie.
Company would not be able to find alternative means to dis

of the imported merchandise. The Dutch authorities too, and e
Sluijsken, could probably apprehend the implications of any attemp
eliminate these brokers. In 1778, Van de Graaff, Bosman's succe

even sought permission from his superiors, permitting broker
send some goods freight-free to Batavia, which would possibly e
them to clear their debts.74 Debts could be recovered only

further goods were delivered to them on credit, a proposition
was practically impossible for the Company. This was the dilem
the Dutch Company at Surat had to confront with. All effort
recover debts, therefore, went in vain and both the brokers remain
indebted to the Company for the rest of their life. Mancherji

particular, remained in trouble since the late 176os, as the Comp
debts increased day by day. His credentials suffered heavily also fro
political circumstances which adversely affected his fortunes. B

time he died, his house was greatly indebted to the Company an
credit fell so much that his nephew and adopted son was not all
to succeed him as the 'makelaar' of the Company.
Was it an error of judgement on his part to be associated with

VOC and seek its protection? It is true that the VOC was underg
a difficult phase in the middle of the eighteenth century; the f
was nevertheless unpredictable. Mancherji, quite rightly expec
good prospects from being associated with the Dutch who, unl
the English, had a purely commercial orientation and apparently
no political pretensions. In 175o, none could have anticipated
political changes that occurred in Surat in 1759 and the politica

the English came to play in the subsequent period. It was unfort
for him that his political connections were weakened when his polit
associates were overwhelmed by their rivals in the events lead
to the 'castle revolution' of 1759.75 Even this did not affec
fortunes so much, since up to 177o, he had no major difficult

conducting his trade affairs. Failure, I think, lies probably in
adverse commercial circumstances that prevailed in the 177os
178os. His adventure with the farming of merchandise in bulk
its subsequent sale to other merchants, a part of which he also
to other parts of Gujarat on his own account, went on quite we
long as the interior was safe and protected, and remained conne
74 VOC 3521, Van de Graaffto Reinier de Klerk, Governor-General and his Co

at Batavia, Surat, 28 December 1778, fft. 12b-13a.
75 HRB 844, PP. 367-70o.

with Surat. In the late 176os and onwards, the interior
more disconnected from Surat. Presence of Marathas in the suburbs
of the city and frequent blockades of routes leading to the interior, as
well as the Anglo-Maratha wars created a condition where merchan

were unable to transport their goods to different parts of Gujarat
The Deccan, which was the principal consumer of Japanese coppe
was already becoming inaccessible to Surat merchants since 1750s.7
On the other hand, the English, French and the Portuguese put severe
competition, by supplying to Surat commodities in which the Dut
had so far enjoyed a monopoly like copper, sugar, and of course spices.
Coupled with certain privileges, like exemption from local tolls an

other logistical supports, the English goods definitely had a premiu
over those of the others. The Dutch, on the other hand, were boun
to follow the dictates of their superiors at Batavia or at Amsterdam in

matters of prices and had never had the authority to play a little with
them even if the local circumstances required them to do so. Privile
is a logical corollary of power and quite often, it is obtained by exertin
it. Once power, political or economic, is lost, privilege always follow

it. The Dutch also experienced a similar metamorphosis in the pos
castle-revolution period. With the ascendancy of the English to pow
at Surat after the occupation of the Mughal fort in 1759, the privilege
7 V()C 3063, Jan I)rabbc to Van der Parra, Surat, 22 1)ecember 1761, pp. 934; VOC 3063, M.J. Bosman to Van der Parra, Surat, 5 February 1772, ft. 9a-9b
21b-22a; VOC 3437, MJ. Bosman to Van der Parra, Surat, 25 December 1775, f
39b-4oa, 57b-58a.
77 VOC 3o65,Jan l)rabbe to Van der Parra, 22 December 1761, pp. 167-8; V()C
3094,Jan Drabbe to Van der Parra, Surat, 12January 1763, PP. 59-60; VOC 3o9
Jan Drabbe to Van der Parra, Surat, 30 April 1763, PP. 53-4. Japanese copper w
one of the mainstays of the Company's trade at Surat and since the Dutch enjoye
sort of monopoly over its import, it was highly profitable. One finds references in t
Dutch correspondence about the problems in the Deccan and subsequent difficult
in the sale of copper. Total annual Dutch request at Surat forJapanese copper fro
Batavia consequently declined in the 176os and 1770s.
78 Large imports of Swedish copper and spices by the English and sugar main
from Mauritius, by the French, as well as by the Portuguese, adversely affected th
sale prospects of the Dutch Company at Surat (VOC 3122, Proceedings at Surat
18 March 1762, pp. 72-3; VOC 3122, Brieven van Souratta, C.L. Senff to Van d
Parra, 9 April 1764, pp. 3-4; VOC 3122, C.L. Senff to Van der Parra, 2o July 176
p. 23). In 1773-74, the poor sale profits, have been attributed to the continuou
troubles in the interior and to a large import of Swedish copper by the English wit
its deflationary consequences at Surat (VOC 3437, M.J. Bosman to Van der Par
Surat, 25 December 1775, ff. 57b-58a). Cf. Holden Furber,John Company at Wor
A Study of European Expansion in India in the late Eighteenth Century (Harvard Universi
Press, 1948), pp. 102-3.
like exemption from the local tolls, so far enjoyed by the Com
began to be challenged and even withdrawn. The Nawab of Su
probably at the instance of the English, imposed additional du
the early 1770s.79 While merchants under Dutch protection
pay duties on transporting what they bought from the Company

brokers, to the interior, their English counterparts were still exe
from this. The latter therefore had considerable advantages (in
of disposing of goods at competitively lower prices) over thos

bought from the Dutch.
Mancherji under these circumstances had to share the decli

fortunes of the Dutch Company. As its imports to Surat, esp
those of sugar, copper, and iron, quantitatively declined, Ma
also tended to lose his fortunes. With a limited supply of
Mancherji perhaps could not bargain with the Company in his
nor could he keep his clientele within his control any longer
quite probable that the merchants, already disappointed with
unsettled conditions in the interior, would have preferred to buy
the English at relatively cheaper prices. The scale and scope o

entrepreneurship as a buyer of merchandise in bulk did cert
suffer, but he was not by any means completely ruined. Even in 1
one finds him bidding for the commodities, although the ra

articles offered by the Company had become by now limited t
and camphor. Further, he was also persuaded to buy 20,000 lb.
and 1o,ooo lb. nutmegs from the Dutch but circumstances di
allow him to commit himself to collect and pay for them wi
specified time.80 In 1780 too, Mancherji (together with his col
bought almost all major merchandise, such as sugar, lead, tin,
tortoise-shells, and elephants-teeth to the amount of Rupees
lakhs for cash whereas for copper and spices he had to commit hi
for collection and payment within the stipulated time period.

this time he had to lure his buyers by giving a two per cent d
79 See the list of goods and duties imposed on them (VOC 3437, MJ. B
to Van der Parra, Surat, 25 December 1775, ff. 89a-91a). The problem arisi
of this imposition of additional tolls and further troubles on its pretext by t
administration, occupies considerable space in the Dutch correspondence. S
example, VOC 3437, MJ. Bosman to Van der Parra, Surat, 19 April 1772, f
156b.
80 VOC 3549, Proceedings at Surat, 23 March 1779, ff. 248a-248b.
81 FRS, No. 59, Proceedings of the English Council at Surat, 18 July 1781,
pp. 157-8.
on the net sale prices.82 Absence of a long

offered prices now, that characterised mos
1760s, clearly testifies not only to the wani
Mancherji but also to the dwindling state of
India Company.83 In 1781, when the Compa
India, including those at Surat, were taken ove

of the Anglo-Dutch war, his fortunes must ha
since for at least three years the Company did
How far he could continue with his privat

Despite all inconveniences, he seems to hav
and did not absolutely succumb to the conti
the 177os, he was actively involved in the h
fitting out his ships to as distant a desti

indebted to the Company was never perhap
a sign of weakness. It could have very w
exerting his influence on the creditor, i.e. the
the latter more and more dependent on him
happened to his ships and the wealth tha
running capital in the later years. From th
after his death and after the restoration of th

it appears that his family lost every thing. Hi
son Bahmanji, under severe pressure from t
with other creditors, left Surat for Colombo i
of Bahmanji his brother and a representativ
of the property left behind by Mancherji. The

two daughters, found herself in utter penury
subsistence asked Dutch intervention in sec
82 VOC 3576, Proceedings at Surat, 11 December 178

298a-298b.
13 VOC 3549, Proceedings at Surat, ff. 260b-261a.
84 On 14 June 1781, all the Dutch possessions at Su
English (VOC 3594, Van de Graaff to the Heeren XV
These were restored to the Dutch only on 15January
at Surat, 31 December 1784,f. 265a. Copy of a written

of receiving back the Factory). This also blocked the ch
Mancherji. By the time peace was concluded, and the

of the Dutch Company were restored to them and t
activities, he was no more alive.
85 In 1774, for instance, a ship belonging to him retu
of 200oo chests of silk, 37,00ooo lb. quicksilver, 14o,ooo000
and 10o,ooo000 lb. camphor (VOC 3408, Shipping List

cargo included some freight-goods from other mercha
of Rupees forty from Bahmanji.86 With much effort the latter

persuaded to provide subsistence comprising a monthly payme
Rupees thirty-five and in addition to this Rupees three hundr
marriage expenses for each of the daughters from the property of

deceased.87 We do not know how much wealth he left for his fa
but keeping in mind the range of his activities and the amoun
money Mancherji pumped into his business ventures, it must h
been considerably large. Perhaps as a form of investment he
extended interest-bearing loans to other merchants; many of
still had outstanding debts in the 179os.88 Such loans, neverthel
helped Bahmanji clear the debts of the Company and facilitate
return to Surat. Bahmanji at Surat seems to have regained the
glory of this house in the last decade of the century. Now under En
protection, Bahmanji Mancherji was the richest Parsi merchant

Surat, and held contracts for the English Company's procurem
for the years 1794-95.89
Conclusions
Mancherji's failure in the last phase of his life, may not hav
attributed to his own political reversals or that of the VOC, r
has to be explained in terms of a general economic and comm
recession all over Gujarat in the 7os and early 8os of the eigh
century. Despite political triumphs of the English, leading me
under the English Company's protection or having close assoc
with it, shared the same fate. An almost simultaneous collapse of
prominent commercial houses like that of Dhanjishah Manjis

Manikji Nowroji and Edul Dada, and ofJagannathdas Parekh
as similar others associated with the English Company, sugges
the reasons behind the 'temporary' failure of the house of Ma
8" VOC 3899, AJ. Sluijsken to Arnold Alting, Governor General at Batavi
15 December 1790, ff. 72b-73a; VOC 3899, Proceedings at Surat, 19July 17
21 Oa-21 2a.
87 VOC 2983, Proceedings at Surat, 3 May 1792, p. 111.

88 One such debtor was Kishordas Kishandas who in 1790 ha
debt of Rupees 6,811 1/, besides the interest on it (VOC 3899, A.J
Alting, Surat, 15 December 1790, ff. 40a-40b). A merchant ship
also owed a debt to the family (Ibid., ff. 41a-42a).
89 M. Torri, 'Surat during the Second Half of the Eighteenth Ce
must be explained beyond the framework

their political and commercial enterprises.9
From this modest scrutiny of document
archives, it can be inferred that Mancher
of his association with the Company, ac

monopolistic rights over its sales and purchases. Despite all
apprehensions and subsequent efforts, the Dutch authorities could not
steer the Company out of its dependence on the brokers, especially
on Mancherji. This does not, however, mean that it was always to
the disadvantage of the Company. To Mancherji the Company was
inevitable, in the same way as he was indispensable for the Company.
The Company provided him a platform to carry on his extensive

enterprise and assured him of necessary protection whenever his
interests were threatened from any corner. On the other hand, the
Company could manage to conduct trade, even if the conditions were
entirely uncongenial, through his agency. Each, therefore, served the
other and each happened to be mutually dependent on the other. This
curious position appears to be in sharp contrast to what was going
on between the English Company and its brokers in the middle of
the eighteenth century. The English, with a great deal of success,
could contain the authority of their broker, by defining and redefining
his position and by changing the nomenclature of the office from

broker to wakil and then to marfatia.i' This represents a position
quite unprecedented in the history of such relationships and perhaps a
major shift from the previous century, when the brokers, even though
inevitable for the Company, were never so dominating. In the context
of the 'eighteenth century' Mancherji's consistency in exerting his

near-monopolistic rights over the Company's sales and purchases is
exceptional and reflects upon his entrepreneurial potentials.
" The succession crises after the death of Peshwa Madhav Rao I, and consequent
wars in the mid-177os and early 178os, coupled with natural calamities in 1775
caused great devastation and dislocation in trade and production. See Torri, 'In the
Deep Blue Sea', pp. 267-99; 'Surat during the Second Half of the Eighteenth Century',
op. cit., pp. 692-3.
") Ashin Das Gupta, 'The Broker in Mughal Surat'. Even the English brokers in
Bengal who were rich merchants and played a crucial role in handling the Company's
investments, were totally at the mercy of the Company. They could be recruited,
removed and reinstated in the position whenever the authorities wanted. See Sushil
Chaudhuy, From Prosperity to Decline: Eighteenth Century Bengal (Manohar, New Delhi,
1999), PP. 49-65.

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Commercial World of Mancherji Khurshedji and the Dutch East India Company: A Study of

Commercial World of Mancherji Khurshedji

and the Dutch East India Company:

Institute for the History ofEuropean Expansion (IGEER), L

On April ist 1768, a Parsi servant of Mancherji Khurshedji, a mercha

of Dhanjishah, a merchant under the English protection, asked wher

pricks with his knife to the offender, m

What followed this tiny incident was something very seri

Mancherji was arrested and after a show of armed strength be

Surat), 3 April 1768, ff. 264b-265a.

316 GHULAM AHMAD NADRI

justified in this case, as Mancherji had a huge outstandi

the Parsis as a merchant community,2 the nature of relationship

In 1750, when he was appointed as the second broker to succeed

association with the local authorities, suffered adversities by losing

consternation among the people especially those in pursuit of

No. 2 (1987), pp. 183-203.

COMMERCIAL WORLD OF MANCHERJI KHURSHEDJI 317

commerce.4 Affluent merchants were easy prey to the local reg

owners, mainly Muslims, suffered not only from the Europeans, ch

English, who introduced new rules of the game, but also fr

mushroom growth of pirates along the Western Indian Ocean lit

and Surat became increasingly isolated from some of its favou

These adverse circumstances certainly affected the trading

would soon be over. There was still a considerable section of Surat's

mercantile community, which put up a brave face and did everyth

as well, rushed for association with the prospective 'players'

Surat sought protection from either of these, which was eventua

Politics in Eighteenth-Century India', in The World of the Indian Ocean Merchant, 5

Merchants and the Decline of Surat, 170oo-750 (Universitat Heidelberg: Wiesbad

318 GHULAM AHMAD NADRI

also granted.6 Protection did not necessarily imply

mutual trust and cooperation. Whether it was formalis

6 Merchants' choice was, however, not uniform and depended muc

had to fall back on the local political elites (Michelguglielmo To

Century', MAS, Vol. 25, No. 2 (1991), pp. 367-401.

their broker Mancherji Khurshedji (VOC 2967, Proceedings at Surat, 18 September

COMMERCIAL WORLD OF MANCHERJI KHURSHEDJI 319

Intense commercial rivalries, coupled with the interplay of all kin

indulged in professions considered to be a domain of the B

especially the role of a broker to the Company.8 Being a promi

all along the Indian Ocean, Mancherji was naturally a comm

to note that he was already close to the local Muslim governm

company would provide further scope to negotiate with the author

against his rivals.1'

Mancherji's position vis-a-vis the Company

In 1750, Jan Schreuder, Director of the Dutch establishmen

interests together with Rudraram Raidas, the first broker." De

320 GHULAM AHMAD NADRI

each from a rival sect or caste, it was never

the Company to have him as broker sinc

most appropriate and above all was a man o

to the Company better than any one else, in n

To Mancherji, this offer meant a long-term commitment and better

to all facilities, financial and logistical, that the Company offered

The activity of brokerage between buyers and sellers, although

inevitable in the conduct of trade, enjoyed no particular respectability

at least in the seventeenth century. Early European travellers an

Company servants have attributed all kinds of negative characteristics

to brokers.13 Serving as broker to the European Companies w