Identity in Difference Reading Nishida S

PACIFIC WORLD
Journal of the Institute of Buddhist Studies
Third Series Number 12

Fall 2010
Special Issue:
Buddhisms in Japan
TITLE
iii
Identity in Difference: Reading Nishidas

Philosophy through the Lens of Shin Buddhism
Daniel Friedrich
McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario

INTRODUCTION: THE NEED TO (RE)CONSIDER
NISHIDAS PHILOSOPHY THROUGH JDO SHINSH THOUGHT
[Nishidas] friends have recorded his remarks that if all other books were to
disappear, one could get by with only the Rinzai-roku and the Tannish,
and that there are sections in the Tannish that show the thrust of a master
swordsman.
Nishitani Keiji1
Nishida Kitar (, 18701945) is often described as Japans

first philosopher.2 As Japans first philosopher Nishida is alsomore
appropriatelyconsidered the founder of the Kyoto school of philosophy (Kyoto gakuha, ).3 Concerning Nishidas relationship with
other thinkers in the Kyoto school, James W. Heisig notes, Nishida was
without a doubt the most creative and, not surprisingly, the one about
whom the most has been written.4
Although Nishidas thought is typically described as being a Zen
philosophy, this essay seeks to reappraise Nishidas philosophy by
examining possible influences from his own Jdo Shinsh (True Pure
Land Buddhism, ) background and Jdo Shinsh thought in
general. In particular, this essay will argue that Nishidas concept of
the self-identity of absolute contradiction (zettai mujunteki jiko ditsu,
) may be better understood through Jdo Shinsh
doctrinal concepts rather than Zen concepts. Examining Jdo Shinsh
ideas of self and other through Jdo Shinsh doctrinal formulations
will shed new light on Nishidas idea of the self-identity of absolute
contradiction.
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I start with some general background for discussing how Nishida

has generally been studied as Zen philosophy. Then I go on to discuss
Jdo Shinsh influences in Nishidas life and in his philosophic project.
I will show that throughout his life Nishida on both personal and
professional levels was influenced by contacts with Shin Buddhists in
Kyoto and his reading of Shin Buddhist texts such as the Tannish.
Problems in Understanding Nishidas Thought as Zen Philosophy
One of the most common, albeit controversial, ways Nishidas
philosophy has been studied in the West is as the philosophy of Zen
Buddhism, Mahyna Buddhism, and/or Eastern philosophy. Bernard
Faure and Robert H. Sharf, among others, have argued that descriptions
of Nishidas philosophical project as being representative of Zen
Buddhism have dangerous implications.5 Given that there are a number
of similarities between Faure and Sharfs arguments, and Sharfs
concession that Faures work has rendered his arguments in this area
superfluous, the following paragraphs will present Faures argument
as well as some of the responses it has elicited.6 While the following
paragraphs are critical of Faures reading of Nishidas philosophy, I
agree with Faure that Nishidas philosophy is not an example of a Zen
philosophy, although for different reasons. Whereas Faure questions
the very existence of what is described as the Chan/Zen tradition,
this essay limits its questions to the description of Nishida as a Zen
philosopher.
Faure begins by questioning the notion that Nishidas philosophical
project had the goal of elucidating a Zen philosophy. Faure traces this
idea to Suzuki Daisetsus introduction in Nishidas first book, Zen no
kenky (An Inquiry into the Good, ),7 in which Suzuki claimed
Nishidas philosophic mission was to introduce Zen Buddhism to the
West.8 More recently, introducing his 1990 translation of Zen no Kenky,
Abe Masao states, As both a philosopher and a Zen Buddhist, Nishida
transformed Zen into philosophy for the first time in the history of this
religious tradition and, also for the first time, transformed Western
philosophy into a Zen-oriented philosophy.9 Faure notes that it
was not until late in Nishidas career, after he retired from teaching,
that Nishida explicitly identified his standpoint with Zen (and Pure
Land).10 The question, as asked by Faure, is whether Nishida actually
set out to explain Zen to the West and compare it with Western
spirituality or whether he was merely perceived as doing so?11
Friedrich: Identity in Difference
29
It is of interest here to note that Nishida does not explicitly refer to

Zen in An Inquiry into the Good. In spite of this, both Suzuki and Abe introduce An Inquiry into the Good as having a mission of introducing Zen
to the West. The closest Nishida comes to directly referencing Zen in
Inquiry into the Good is in the final paragraph when he states,Vedantic
teachings in India, Neo-Platonism, and the Gateway of the Holy pathtype of Buddhism [shdmon, ] refer to knowing God, whereas
Christianity and Pure Land Buddhism refer to loving and relying on
God.12 Nishidas use of the term shdmon complicates the idea that
Nishida wrote An Inquiry into the Good with the intention of introducing a Zen philosophy. Shdmon is a term that in the Japanese Buddhist
context is used predominantly in the Pure Land discourse of Hnen (
, 11331212) and Shinran (, 11731262) in conjunction with the
terms self-power/other-power (jiriki/tariki, ) to contrast
Pure Land Buddhism from other schools of Buddhism, but rarely vice
versa.13 In short, there is no reference to Zen Buddhism in An Inquiry
into the Good. Rather, Nishida uses Pure Land Buddhist terminology.
Thus even in this work, we see some influence from Jdo Shinsh that
needs to be explored further.
Responding to Faures questions as to whether Nishida actually set
out to provide Zen with a philosophic basis or if he is merely perceived
as having such a goal, as well as the claim that nowhere in An Inquiry
into the Good is Zen Buddhism explicitly referenced, Heisig surprisingly
argues, Ironically it is the lack of references to Zen in his [Nishidas]
writings that shows their importance.14 Heisig speculates that although Nishida gave up practicing zazen (seated meditation, ) at
the age of thirty-five, he continued to see his philosophic project as
being an unfolding of Zen within himself.15
While conceding Heisigs argument that Nishidas understanding
of pure experience (a term Nishida borrows from American philosopher William James) was in fact influenced by Nishidas understanding
of Zen, this does not require that one accept Nishidas philosophy as a
philosophic expression of Zen Buddhism. Heisig himself presents two
contradictory arguments concerning the idea that Nishida saw himself
as a Zen philosopher. On one hand, Heisig says that Nishida had an implicit goal of elucidating a rational foundation to Zen from outside of
Zen.16 On the other hand, Heisig argues that Nishidas use of Buddhist
terms does not necessarily imply that Nishida was giving a philosophic
explanation of Zen. Heisig states: Even where the occasional Buddhist
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term appears . . . it is reading too much into it to think that Nishida had
accomplished any kind of Buddhist-philosophical synthesis by using it.
It was his disciples, beginning with Nishitani, who developed Nishidas
intimations into philosophical ideas and related them to Buddhist
ideas.17 In this brief quotation Heisigperhaps inadvertentlyleads
us to consider to what extent Nishitanis development of Nishidas
ideas has influenced the study of Nishida. In other words, at present,
is Nishidas thought being understood through the lens of Nishitanis
ideas? Heisig notes that Nishida was diligent in his efforts to ensure
that Zen was not a grist for his scholarly career.18
More recently, another of Nishidas commentators, Robert J.J.
Wargo, makes clear that Nishida, although influenced by Zen, was not
seeking to provide a philosophic account of Zen experience. Wargo
explains: Nishidas aims are different. He is not out to translate the
content of enlightenment in academic terms or anything of the sort.
While it seems clear that he regards the religious experience as the
deepest and most meaningful of experiences, he is not attempting
to lead the reader to such an experience nor to relate accounts of
the experience to others. What he does try to do is give a precise
formulation of the structure of the world that takes into account
this kind of experience.19 Wargos understanding of Nishidas goals
provides a useful point from which to begin a reexamination of
Nishida. One can acknowledge that Zen Buddhism influenced Nishidas
philosophic project without claiming Nishidas philosophy is a Zen
Buddhist philosophy. This allows for and acknowledges the need to
explore other areas of influence on Nishidas philosophic project.
While not the focus of this essay, given the tremendous impact
Nishidas philosophy had at the time of the Japanese imperial campaign, it is imperative that studies of Nishidas work consider what if
any role Nishidas philosophy had in these efforts. In this vein, Faure
argues that the rhetoric of the Kyoto school, including that of Nishida,
has remained trapped in Orientalist and nativist structures.20 Nishida
often refers to the emperor and the imperial throne as being central to
the kokutai (national polity, ) of Japan. However, as Agustn Jacinto
Zavala claims, the imperial throne that Nishida locates at the center of
his philosophical project is mythical rather than historical.21 Nishidas
language, however, when talking about the role of the emperor, is at
best ambiguous. Consider the following passage from a lecture Nishida
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presented to Emperor Hirohito in January 1941, in celebration of the

New Year:
In the history of our country, the whole and the individual usually
did not stand in opposition. Rather, [history] has unfolded with the
imperial family (kshitsu []) as its center, while the individual
and the whole mutually self-negated. Certainly, there were times
when the power of the whole overshadowed that of the individual,
but each time we returned to the founding spirit of Japan (chkoku
no seishin []), and by maintaining the central presence
of the imperial family, we took a step forward into the new era and
created a new epoch. I said earlier that history moves on from the
present, which contains within itself the past and future, to another
present, which contains the past and the future. In the case of our
country, I think that the imperial family has been playing the role of
the present that encompasses within itself the past and the future.
For this reason, I think that for us to return to the original founding
spirit of Japan is not just to go back to ancient times but to take a step
forward into an ever-new era. I humbly submit that restoration of
the old ways (fukko []) ought to mean thoroughgoing renewal
(ishin []).22
In this passage, Nishida makes clear that he sees the imperial

family as being central to the identity of Japanese people. What is not
so clear is that the imperial family Nishida describes is not based in
history but rather in myth. Nishidas ambiguous word choice may also
have a more practical reason: many in the Japanese Army considered
Nishida and other members of the Kyoto school subversive. Nishida,
aware of the rather precarious position he was in, was thus perhaps
deliberately ambiguous. Nishida, as Yusa Michiko notes, questioned if
Emperor Hirohito was able to understand the aforementioned speech.23
Such comments are particularly troubling when read in light of
the escalation of the Pacific War in 1941, Japans continued efforts to
colonize East Asia, and the bombing of Pearl Harbor. While we cannot
blame Nishida for events he could not possibly have predicted, it is
important to acknowledge how this passage may be interpreted at
present. In this style, Faure notes that while Nishidas philosophy may
not be intrinsically nationalistic, he does question the readiness with
which this rhetoric [Nishidas use of Zen and other Buddhist sources]
can lend itself to appropriation by nationalistic ideologies.24 The ease
with which this appropriation occurs combined with Nishidas simplistic reductions, for example East versus West, lead Faure to conclude
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the ideological function of Nishidas work undermines the validity of

Nishida philosophy (Nishida tetsugaku []).25
Heisig concedes that Nishidas philosophy lent validity to the
question of the identity of the Japanese spirit.26 Heisig further concedes that Nishidas idea of the nation shared with the ideological
propaganda of the day important assumptions about the imperial
household and the special mission of the Japanese people vis--vis
the other peoples of Asia.27 Heisig, unlike Faure, sees Nishidas political philosophy as an aberration from his larger philosophical project,
which was not well attuned to historical realities. In Heisigs interpretation, therefore, Nishida is faulted for failing to realize or even ignoring his own limitations.28
While questions concerning Nishidas (and other members of the
Kyoto schools) nationalism and support of the Japanese imperial
campaign are intriguing, they tend only to focus on Nishidas political
philosophy, which as previously noted was not well attuned to historical
realities.29 This article is concerned with Nishidas philosophy as it
pertains to the relationship of self and other and the possibility that
Jdo Shinsh thought influenced Nishidas thought in this area.
Jdo Shinsh Themes and Influences in Nishidas Life and Philosophy
Shortly after the publication of An Inquiry into the Good, Nishida
published a short essay, Gutoku Shinran , in which he expressed his admiration for Shinran.30 The importance of this brief work,
as Dennis Hirota points out, is that in relation to the corpus of Nishida
writings this essay provides evidence of Nishidas lifelong interest in
Shinran and the importance of Shinran to his philosophy of religion.31
However, after the publication of this essay Nishida does not mention
Shinran again in his writings for nearly three decades (with the exception of brief mentions of Shinran and the Pure Land Buddhist tradition in his diaries and letters). Hirota, following Hase Sht, speculates
that this silence is due to Nishidas awareness of his inability to treat
Shinrans thought within the logic he developed in his middle period
based on the context of absolute nothingness.32
After nearly three decades of not mentioning Shinran in his philosophic writings, it is striking that Shinran occupies a central role in
Nishidas final completed essay, Basho-teki ronri to shky teki sekaikan (The Logic of Topos and the Religious Worldview,
).33 Takemura Makio notes that in this essay, Nishida
33
discusses with ease Zen, Jdo Shinsh, and Christianity. Takemura explains that upon closer examination he came to believe that the roots
of this essay were not found in Zen, but rather in Pure Land Buddhism.34
That Nishida would devote considerable energies to Pure Land
Buddhism when detailing his philosophy of religion shows the influence that Pure Land Buddhism had on his life. Nishidas family, as
Takemura points out, were followers of Pure Land Buddhism. The
house where Nishida was born was near Chraku Temple, a temple
of the tani sect of Pure Land Buddhism.35 In the very first sentence
of his Gutoku Shinran, Nishida notes that his mother was a devout
Pure Land Buddhist.36 Yusa, in her biography of Nishida, describes his
mother, Tosa, as a woman of iron will, a devout Pure Land Buddhist,
with a heart of gold. Nishida, according to Yusa, as a young child grew
up imbibing his mothers generosity and religious devotion through
her milk (which he did not give up until the age of three or four).37
Yusas use of language is more than poetic waxing, as Takemura details: When Nishida would pester his mother to breastfeed him, his
mother usually would say, If you can recite Rennyos Letters, I will
feed you. Then Nishida would easily recite one of Rennyos letters, rub
his mothers bosom, and then his mother, satisfied, would breastfeed
him.38 While this is highly anecdotal, and other similar stories substitute Tannish for Rennyos Letters, the point is that from a young age
Nishida was aware of, and on a basic level influenced by, Jdo Shinsh
teachings.
That Tannish is often substituted for Rennyos Letters in the above
stories is not surprising, given that in his later years Nishida would
express great interest in the Tannish. Takemura notes that there is
a genuine lack of consensus as to when Nishida first read Tannish:
some claim Nishida encountered it for the first time while enrolled as
a special student in the philosophy department of Tokyo University;
others claim he read it on his own. However, it is known that when
Nishida was teaching at the Fourth Higher School he would on occasion
skim through its pages.39
In spite of his family background and early exposure to Shin
thought, scholars have tended to focus on Nishidas philosophic
project almost exclusively as a philosophy of Zen. Jdo Shinsh, we
have already seen, was a salient presence in his childhood home.
Contrast this with Nishidas experience with Zenhe began serious
practice in 1897, was given the lay Buddhist name Sunshin in
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1901, and in 1905 ceased practicing Zen; from 1907 there is no mention
of Zen in Nishidas diary.40 In 1910, Nishida and his family moved to
Kyoto as Nishida had been appointed assistant professor of ethics at
Kyoto Imperial University (present-day Kyoto University). During his
first week in Kyoto Nishida and his family spent some time sightseeing.
Notable on the list of places Nishida and his family visited was the
Higashi-honganji , head temple of the Shinshu tani-ha
sect of Pure Land Buddhism.41 Absent from this list are
the famous Zen temples of Kyoto. Finally, after Nishidas death, his
ashes and bones were divided into thirds and buried at three sites: his
familys temple in Unoke (Jdo Shinsh), Tkeiji in Kamakura (Rinzai
Zen), and Myshinji in Kyoto (Rinzai Zen).42
From this we can conclude that Zen and Pure Land Buddhism both
occupied prominent roles in Nishidas life. The near exclusive focus on
the influence of Zen on Nishidas philosophy, or the idea that Nishida
had as his goal elucidating a Zen philosophy, thus ignores the impact
and influence that Jdo Shinsh thought and practice had on his life.
While acknowledging the influence of Zen on Nishidas thought,
particularly his early philosophic thought, there is an increasing recognition of a need to understand how Nishida uses Shinrans conceptions of Pure Land Buddhist thought in his philosophic project. At the
same time it is not the case that Nishidas thought is an example of
a Shin philosophy, any more than it is of a Zen philosophy. Rather,
Nishidas philosophy was influenced by his experiences of growing up
in a Pure Land Buddhist household, and Jdo Shinsh doctrinal concepts provide a useful hermeneutic lens for understanding Nishidas
philosophy because he himself made use of Shin concepts to understand Zen.
Shin Buddhist scholars, according to Heisig, have historically dismissed Nishidas thought for having disagreed with traditional interpretations of Shinran.43 In the rare instances when scholars have
documented a connection between Pure Land thought and Nishidas
philosophy, it has become all too common to simply note the connection in passing without further development. For example, Hirota,
explaining the dualism of self-power and other-power in Pure Land
Buddhism, states, Nishida Kitar sketches a broad vision of the advance of human knowledge as an overcoming of subjective delusions
and a move toward true knowledge that is also love, employing the dichotomy of self-power and other-power.44 After noting the connection
35
in this one sentence Hirota returns to his discussion of Shinran without probing further Nishidas understanding of Shinrans thought or
even explaining why the inclusion of Nishidas thought was necessary
in the scheme of Hirotas paper.
One final reason that may lead many scholars to avoid a sustained
discussion of Nishidas thought is the difficulty of reading Nishida. Ueda
Shizuteru has suggested that it is as if the 5,000 pages of Nishidas
writings were a single essay which took him a lifetime to write, so that
the conclusion of any particular published unit is a mere fiction, soon
to turn into the starting point for the next step in the argument.45
The Relationship of Self and Other as a Concept for Understanding Nishida
Nishidas philosophic project was influenced by a number of
sources, including Pure Land and Zen. Recognizing that there are few
works that have explored the influence of Jdo Shinsh thought on
Nishidas philosophy, this essay attempts to explore the relationship
of self (religious practitioner) and other (Amida Buddha) as it relates
to Nishidas concept of the self-identity of absolute contradiction.
The self-identity of absolute contradiction, according to Gereon
Kopf, is the key to understanding Nishidas philosophy.46 Nishida explains the self-identity of absolute contradiction as follows:
The self is that which acts. Action arises in, and from, a mutual relationship between things. Action presupposes a relationship of mutual
negation, wherein one negates the other and the other negates the
first. This mutual negation is simultaneously a mutual affirmation.
Each thing realizes its own uniqueness. That is, each thing becomes
itself. That two things stand opposed to each other and negate each
other means that they are mutually conjoined and compose one
form.47
Scholars have already noted the compatibility of this idea with general
Mahyna theories of non-duality. For example, Kopf explains the selfidentity of absolute contradiction means that the absolute is defined
by and expresses itself in its opposite the relative, and the transcendence in immanence.48 In other words, that which is absolute does not
exist apart from the relative, and the relative does not exist apart from
the absolute. This description seems to be rooted in and echoing the
well-known theory of the two truths.49
Although conforming to general Mahyna descriptions of
Buddhism, Nishida often refers to Pure Land doctrine and concepts
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when explaining the self-identity of absolute contradiction. It is therefore necessary to examine how Shin Buddhism explains the relationship between the absolute and the relative.
The Shin Buddhist tradition seems to have understood the relationship between religious practitioner and buddha in two radically different ways.50 First, Shinran believes that a person of shinjin is equal
to the buddhas. 51 Shinran makes this clear in a letter to Jshin when he
states: the person of true shinjin is said to be equal to the Buddhas. He
is also regarded as being the same as Maitreya, who is in [the rank of]
succession to Buddhahood.52 Similarly, Rennyo (, 14151499), the
eighth head priest of Jdo Shinsh, describes the relationship between
religious practitioners and buddha using the cryptic phrase butsu-bon
ittai (, the oneness of Buddhas mind and foolish beings).
However, Yuien-bo, the author of the Tannish, records that Shinran
gives himself as an example in order to make us realize that we are
in delusion, knowing nothing at all of the depths of our karmic evil or
the vastness of Amidas benevolence.53 Similarly in the Postscript
of the Kygyshinsh , Shinran, quoting Daochuo, describes a
process in which those who have been born first [in the Pure Land]
guide those who come later.54 Shinran throughout his writings argues,
Nirvana is attained without severing blind passions.55 In these statements, it becomes clear that within the Pure Land Buddhist tradition
we find two seemingly contradictory conceptions concerning the relationship of sentient beings with Amida, the Pure Land, and nirvana;
the first statement is that of equality, the second is one of inequality.
These contradictory understandings of the relationship between
sentient beings and buddha can be used to illuminate Nishidas explanation of the self-identity of absolute contradiction. For example,
Nishida states, That two things stand opposed to each other and
negate each other means that they are mutually conjoined and compose one form. Shinran maintains that sentient beings are both equal
and not equal to the buddhas. Nishida similarly argues that through
a process of mutual negation and affirmation, a unity between the
absolute and the relative is achieved and the uniqueness of both self
and other are maintained. The goal of this essay is to show in greater
detail how Jdo Shinsh doctrinal concepts are useful in elucidating
the meaning of Nishidas philosophy.
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Overview
The following sections expand on and seek to substantiate the claims
outlined above. The next section explores how Nishida conceived of
the relationship of self and other by examining Nishidas thought and
the Shin Buddhist influences on his thought. Recognizing that philosophic work does not occur in a vacuumthat there is no Archimedean
point from which philosophizing occursNishidas works will be read
in light of certain events in his life. Reading Nishidas philosophy in
this way will point to possible influences of Shinrans thought and Jdo
Shinsh religious experiences in Nishidas life.
In order to understand the significance of this aspect of Nishidas
philosophy more fully, we next focus on Shinran and Jdo Shinsh
thought concerning the relationship of self and other. The notion that
sentient beings are both equal to and different from buddhas will be
explored further. Additionally, a discussion of the metaphors Shinran
uses when describing Amida and the Pure Land path will be explored.
Special consideration will be given to the idea that the Pure Land path
is an intersubjective path. Intersubjectivity in this context is understood as the recognition that the individual grows in and through relationships with others. Furthermore, intersubjectivity maintains that
in recognizing the other, we need to see the other as both different
and alike.56 This theory will be especially useful in elucidating the
concept of butsu-bon ittai in that the oneness is not a mystical union between sentient beings and buddha, but rather a non-dual one in which
differences are maintained. Up until now, Shin Buddhist scholars have
largely ignored this concept, in part because the necessary hermeneutic tools have not been available. Thus, in this section the concept of
butsu-bon ittai will be read in light of feminist psychoanalyst Jessica
Benjamins theory of intersubjectivity, and doing so will help to clarify
the idea of oneness between sentient beings and buddha.
In the last section these twoShin thought and intersubjectivityare brought together, allowing us to reread Nishida in light of
Jdo Shinsh thought. This rereading and reconsideration of Nishidas
thought fills a lacuna present in both studies of Nishidas philosophy
and Shin Buddhist studies, giving sustained attention to Nishidas understanding and use of Pure Land Buddhist sources. This study also
contributes to the field of Buddhist studies more generally, exploring
the dynamics of the intersubjective relationship between religious
practitioner and buddha.57 Even more broadly, this study contributes
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to what James Heisig has described as a broadening of the map of

philosophy by exploring the understanding of a person in a philosophy
of non-being.58
SHIN BUDDHIST INFLUENCES ON NISHIDAS THOUGHT
It has been well documented that Nishida practiced Zen Buddhism
for a number of years. Nishidas relationship with Pure Land Buddhism,
however, has not been as well documented, particularly in Englishlanguage publications. Within Japanese publications, as Kopf reports,
recent years have seen renewed interest in how Nishidas thought can
be applied to post-modern issues, such as environmentalism.59 This
shift marks particularly exciting times for Nishida scholars as it comes
after decades of focus on the role of Nishida philosophy in Japanese
nationalism and militarism in the period leading up to and including
World War II.60 An additional part of this shift has been to reexamine
influences on Nishidas philosophy based on close readings of Nishidas
writings, both philosophic and personal correspondence. Of particular
interest to this essay has been the examination of Nishidas use of Shin
Buddhist sources.
Shin Buddhism was a constant presence during Nishidas formative years, and both Shin and Zen were present in Nishidas adult life
as well. While a number of works have examined the role of Zen in
Nishidas philosophic project, with the exception of recent Japanese
scholarship, an examination of the influence Shin Buddhism had on
Nishidas philosophy remains for the most part unexplored. Thus,
while acknowledging the role of Zen in Nishidas philosophy we will
focus here almost exclusively on Nishidas use of Shin Buddhism
in his writing and on possible Shin influences in Nishidas thought,
drawing largely on the work of Takemura Makio, professor of modern
Buddhist studies at Ty University, and Fujita Masakatsu, chair of the
Department of Japanese Philosophy at Kyoto University.
The following sections will show that Shin Buddhism had a larger
role than previous English-language studies have acknowledged. Doing
so will make clear not only the necessity of this reconsideration, but
also why Shin Buddhist thought is a better way to understand the key
concepts of Nishida philosophy, particularly the self-identity of absolute contradiction. We begin by exploring Nishidas early work, as
represented by An Inquiry into the Good (1911) and Gutoku Shinran
(1911). This is followed by an examination of Nishidas later work,
39
as represented by The Logic of Topos and the Religious Worldview

(1945). This allows us to understand Nishidas non-duality, particularly
as it relates to the relationship between the religious practitioner and
buddha.
Shin Buddhist Influences on Nishidas Early Works
Nishidas first book, An Inquiry into the Good, was published on
February 6, 1911. An Inquiry into the Good, as Yusa explains, was greeted
with enthusiasm among philosophical circles. For example, Takahashi
Satomi (, 18861964), then a graduate student at Tokyo
Imperial University, stated in a review that An Inquiry into the Good
marked the first time since the Meiji Restoration that a Japanese
thinker had offered the fruit of serious philosophical reflection.61
The staying power and popularity of this work, however, came in 1921
when popular author Kurata Hyakuz (, 18911943) described
Nishidas work as one that brings pure joy.60
Nishida wrote An Inquiry into the Good during a period of his life
when he was devoting much of his energy to Zen practice. In spite of
being devoted to Zen practice while writing it, Nishida does not refer
to Zen in this book. Ueda Shizuteru attempts an apology for Nishida, explaining that, given the nature of Nishidas philosophical project in An
Inquiry into the Good, he had to leave Zen behind if his philosophy was
to be truly a philosophy of Zen: The fact that Zen is able to become
non-Zen and engage in philosophy is a self-development of Zen which
is not-Zen, and therefore Zen. It is in the original nature of Zen to
empty itself and manifest various forms, engaging in all the activities
of daily life.63
Ueda argues that Nishidas philosophy is not a philosophy of Zen
Buddhism. It is, however, an expression of Zen containing the full force
of Nishidas enlightenment experience. Ueda further explains that Zen
is not philosophy in that the goal of Zen practice is engagement with
the world. Zen is not a philosophical discourse, and yet Nishidas philosophy, according to Ueda, bears the traces of Nishidas enlightenment. In Nishidas thought, Zen has been transformed into philosophy.
Nishida philosophy neither signifies the philosophical understanding
of Zen nor the entry of Zen thought into the realm of philosophy. Zen
has left itself behind to engage in philosophy while opening up the
field of philosophical inquiry within itself. Zen which demands that
thought be left behind has embarked on a creative task; not as Zen,
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but as thought.64 Nishida had thus successfully abandoned himself to

mu (nothingness, ), and realized the truth that all Zen practitioners
must realize, that one must leave behind all doctrines, even those of
Zen Buddhism.65
According to Ueda, Zen provided Nishida with the space to question
philosophy. However, Zen could not provide the answer to Nishidas
questions. Nishidas philosophy therefore became the embodiment of
his Zen experience.66 That is, Nishidas philosophy was not a manual
for how to achieve awakening, but rather Nishidas philosophy was
an expression of Zen awakening. It is for this reason that Nishida acknowledged that there was something of Zen in the background of
his thinking.67 Given this, there is no reason to question whether or not
Zen thought and experiences shaped Nishidas philosophy.
Nevertheless, it is also possible to raise the issue of Jdo Shinsh
thought and practice in both Nishidas philosophy and in Nishidas
experience of Zen. Even during the period of his life in which Nishida
was most devout in his Zen practice, Nishida remained interested in
the happenings within Jdo Shinsh intellectual circles. For example,
in January 1898, Nishida went to Kyoto to take part in the New
Year sesshin (intensive meditation retreat, ) at the Zen temple
Myshinji. On January 5, while still in Kyoto, Nishida visited a bookstore
where he purchased three books: Taikroku , which dealt with
issues of education; Mujint , the academic journal of the tani
school of Shin Buddhism; and a book containing autobiographies of
Zen monks, of which the title is unknown.68 Writing about Nishidas
experiences at this sesshin Yusa notes that Nishida was beginning to
question himself and his capabilities as a Zen practitioner. However, he
quickly reaffirmed his commitment to Zen practice, to the extent that
he took a few extra days in Kyoto, thus missing the school ceremony
that marked the beginning of a new term.69
Nishidas reason for buying Mujint, however, may not have been
an interest Pure Land Buddhism itself. Yamamoto Annosuke
, who Nishida knew from his days as a student at Tokyo Imperial
University, had published an article entitled Shky to risei (Religion
and Reason, ), and Nishida would publish his response to
this article in the June issue of Mujint. In his response Nishida criticizes Yamamoto for failing to consider religious experience in his
article.70 This biographical detail is worth noting: while Yamamotos
article does not explicitly address Shin Buddhism, Nishida was aware
41
ofand on occasion participated inthe discussions occurring in Shin

Buddhist academic circles.
Nishidas connections with Zen and Pure Land, however, were not
limited to an awareness of what was occurring in Shin Buddhist circles. Nishida came to understand Zens foundational concepts, such as
mu, through Shinrans thought. In a letter to Watsuji Tetsuro, Nishida
writes: Although I have a deep-seated longing for a religious life, a
merely formal religious life that denies humanity is not something that
I would embrace. I dont even think that such is the ideal of human existence. What I mean by nothingness (mu) is closer to the warm heart
that Shinran possessed, which acknowledges everyones freedom and
embraces every sinner (although I dont know whether Shinran actually
put it into words this way).71 Based on this letter, Takemura argues,
Nishida, in this passage, clearly explained mu through Shinran. Mu
is usually thought to originate in Zen; [however] for Nishida, in reality, this was not always so.72 Although this letter was written in 1930,
it shows that Shin Buddhism was more than an academic interest for
Nishida. Shin Buddhism was a hermeneutic device Nishida used to
make sense of his Zen practice.
In the fourth and final section of An Inquiry into the Good Nishida
discusses his ideas concerning religion. Here we find that Nishidas
basic philosophy of religion also shows the influence of Jdo Shinsh
thought. Earlier it was pointed out that Nishida describes two types of
Buddhism, the shdmon (gate of the path of sages) and the Pure Land
path, in this section of An Inquiry into the Good. It was noted that these
terms are used almost exclusively in Pure Land discourse to distinguish
Pure Land paths of awakening from other Buddhist paths. Takemura
notes that subtly imbedded within this paragraph is another phrase
that indicates Jdo Shinsh influence on Nishidas thought:73 In distinct individual phenomena, learning and morality are bathed in the
glorious light of other-power, and religion touches the limitless buddha
itself [mugen no Butsuda sono mono, ] extending
throughout the universe.74 Takemura argues that the phrase the limitless buddha itself corresponds with the religious thought of Kiyozawa
Manshi (, 18631903), a leading Shin Buddhist scholar during
the late nineteenth century. For example, Kiyozawa described religion
as being the limitless working of the inconceivable (zettai mugen no
miyy, ).75 Nishida does not cite Kiyozawas work in
An Inquiry to the Good. However, Fujita explains, Nishida was familiar
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with Kiyozawas work and in his dairies had expressed a basic agreement with Kiyozawas understanding of religion.76 Additionally, it is
worth mentioning that Nishida references Shinran twice in An Inquiry
into the Good, in conjunction with quotes from the Tannish.77 While this
number is not striking on its own, combined with the fact that Nishida,
as mentioned above, does not reference Dgen , Rinzai, or Zen thought
in An Inquiry into the Good, we once again see that at this stage in his life,
although practicing Zen Nishida was familiar with and continued to be
influenced by Shin Buddhism.
Nishida closes the fourth section of An Inquiry into the Good with a
chapter titled Knowledge and Love (Chi to ai, ), which was
originally published as an independent article in the August 1907 issue
of Seishinkai , a journal founded by Kiyozawa in 1901.78 The goal
of Seishinkai was promoting Kiyozawas religious ideals, namely the
need for spiritual reform.79 Yusa notes that Nishida wrote this chapter
while grieving the death of his second daughter, Yko, from bronchitis. She was five years old, and her death shook Nishida profoundly.80
Further, Yusa asserts that Nishida realized that by means of philo
sophy alone he could not find a reason for Ykos death, and that it
was Nishidas mother, sustained by her faith in Amida Buddha, who
consoled Nishida. As a result, Nishida threw himself into the ocean of
divine compassion.81 That Nishida would find solace in Shin Buddhism
suggests that Shin Buddhism, although not satisfying him intellectuallyas is evidenced by the fact that Nishida does not credit Shin as
functioning in his philosophic projectwas a pneumatic force, that is a
vital energy, in Nishidas life.
Shortly after the publication of An Inquiry into the Good, Nishida
published Gutoku Shinran (Foolish Stubble-Haired Shinran,
) in April 1911 as part of collection of essays compiled by the alumni
of tani University in commemoration of the six hundred fiftieth anniversary of Shinrans deathfurther indication that Nishida was actively involved in Shin intellectual circles at this time. Coincidentally,
1911 also marked the year Nishida began teaching part time at tani,
in addition to his position at Kyoto University.82
In Gutoku Shinran, Nishida places great emphasis on the role of
religious transformation. For example, Nishida writes: Every person,
no matter who he is, must return to the original body of his own naked
self; he must let go from the cliffs ledge and come back to life after perishing, or he cannot know them [wisdom and virtue]. In other words,
43
only the person who has been able to experience deeply what it is to
be foolish/stubble-haired can know wisdom and virtue.83 There are
a number of ways in which to interpret this paragraph. Those familiar
with Zen may find similar concepts within Nishidas writing, particularly the phrase let go from the cliffs ledge and come back to life after
perishing with the concept of shinjin datsuraku (, casting off
of body and mind).84 Shin Buddhists, on the other hand, may find this
phrase echoing the transformation that occurs upon the abandoning
of ones own efforts at enlightenment and entrusting in the workings
of Amida Buddhas primal vow.
This Nishida article gives two examples to explain his point, one
from Zen used to introduce the problem, and one from Shinrans writing to explain the effect and meaning of religious transformation.
Nishidas citation of Shinran is the oft-quoted passage from Tannish,
in which Shinran says: When I consider deeply the Vow of Amida,
which arose from five kalpas of profound thought, I realize that it was
entirely for the sake of myself alone! Then how I am filled with the
gratitude for the Primal Vow, in which Amida resolved to save me,
though I am burdened with such heavy karma.85 Nishida argues in this
quote one finds the fundamental significance of Shin Buddhism. That
is, no matter how evil a person is, he or she can be saved by the workings of Amida Buddha, and that at the moment of religious transformation one realizes that Amidas vow was made specifically for ones self
alone.86
One final consideration of Gutoku Shinran shows Nishida was interested in and influenced by Shin thought and scholarship. As Fujita
points out, Nishidas writing style in Gutoku Shinran is similar to
Kiyozawas style of writing in the Seishinkai.87
From the above, it is clear that Nishida was familiar with both
Zen and Pure Land texts. We also see that Nishida was influenced by
his contemporaries with ties to both Zen and Pure Land thinkers.
Based on this it is possible to conclude that Nishida was familiar with
both Zen and Pure Land religiosity. As Nishidas philosophic project
progressed, following the publication of An Inquiry into the Good and
Gutoku Shinran, Nishida would not make any explicit reference to
Shin Buddhism in his writing for thirty-four years, until The Logic of
Topos and the Religious Worldview (1945).
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Shin Buddhism and The Logic of Topos

The Logic of Topos is one of Nishidas most difficult works. Heisig
explains that in this essay Nishida sets out to summarize his philosophy
for himself.88 Heisig points out that Nishidas summary is not done for
the benefit of his readers. He elaborates: Rather than tie up the loose
ends of his thinking, as he may have intended to do, it [The Logic of
Topos] wraps up everything in a furoshikithe way he must have each
day for years when he set off for the university, tossing pencils and
papers and books in and joining the corners of the cloth into a knot for
carrying. The furoshiki is religion.89 What Heisig is saying here is that
Nishida came to see religion as the unifying force of his philosophy.
That Nishida would engage in an explicit discussion of religion is not
at all surprising when we consider that Nishidas goal from the very
beginning was to provide an explanation of the world that allowed for
religious experience. Nishidas writings, particularly his early and late
writings, reveal that Nishida often refers to Buddhism to explain key
philosophical concepts. Kopfs analysis of Nishidas use of Buddhist
sources reveals that Nishida refers to Tendai , Kegon , Zen,
Pure Land, and general Mahyna texts such as the Awakening of Faith
in Mahyna (Jpn. Daijkishinron, ). Kopf explains further
that Nishidas usage of the Tannish reflects a greater familiarity with
the text, he confines references to other text [sic] to occasional quotations to well-known passages such as Linji Yixuans (Japanese Rinzai
Gigen []) (810/15866/7) have a shit/take a piss [ashisny,
] and Dgens (12001253 []) to know the self is to forget
the self [jiko o narafu toifu wa, jiko o wa surrurunari,
].90 Regarding Nishidas use and familiarity with the Tannish, we have already noted that Nishida found
solace in it when mourning the death of his daughter, and it is the
only Buddhist text Nishida refers to in An Inquiry into the Good. Kopf
concludes, Nishida does not cite Buddhist ideas or texts to analyze,
interpret, or apply them, but to illustrate his own philosophy and to
claim the Buddhist tradition as his heritage.91
In The Logic of Topos, Nishida refers to Pure Land, Zen, general
Mahyna, and Christianity. In a letter to Hisamatsu Shinichi
, one of his first students at Kyoto University and a well-known
Zen Buddhist thinker, Nishida explained that in The Logic of Topos,
he had grappled with the roots of life and death . . . had spent some
time delineating the uniqueness of Buddhism as distinguished from
45
Christianity, and had touched on the excellent points of Buddhism.92

What is striking about Nishidas use of Buddhist sources when read
in conjunction with Kopfs description is not only that they highlight
the excellent points of Buddhism, but also reinforce Nishidas ideals
regarding the philosophy of religion.
While there is at present a growing consensus among scholars
that Nishidas thought in The Logic of Topos was influenced by Shin
Buddhism, there remains debate concerning how much influence.
Additionally, the claim that Nishidas interest in Pure Land was lifelong
has been questioned. Central to this debate are two terms, gyakutai
(inverse correspondence, ) and byjtei (everyday awareness,
), which as Kopf notes are characteristic of, and central to,
Nishidas very late philosophy, which he develops in the second half of
his Logic of Bassho [Topos].93 Kopf explains that these terms constitute
the most radical expressions of Nishidas non-dualism; the former term
[gyakutai] referring to the non-dualism between the absolute and the
relative, the latter [byjtei] the non-dualism between transcendence
and immanence.94 In other words, gyakutai refers to the relationship
between religious practitioner and the absolute. Byjtei refers to the
fact that religious truths are not external from the world, but rather
found in the mundane reality of life. While Nishida himself equates
byjtei with a number of well-known passages from the Zen tradition,
such as Rinzais have a shit/take a piss, a number of scholars have
argued that this term has roots in Shin Buddhism as well. Although
these two terms both seem to have similarities with both Pure Land
and Zen teaching, it is important to remember that these ideas represent Nishidas glossing of Pure Land and Zen texts, and not traditional
interpretations of either tradition. In short, byjtei and gyakutai are
Nishidas own ideas.95
Regarding the connection of byjtei and Shin Buddhist thought,
Takemura explains that of course byjtei is connected with Zen, but
it is also connected with Pure Land as well.96 Fujitas argument echoes
Takemuras argument; when Fujita first explains byjtei through
Rinzais remarks concerning relieving oneself, he notes that the idea of
byjtei is found in the Jdo Shinsh concept of jinen hni (natural working of the dharma, ).97 A connection has also been made between Shinrans thought and gyakutai. Surprisingly, this connection is
not made by Fujita or Takemura, but rather by Kosaka Kunitsugu, who
is usually reluctant to note a connection between Pure Land thought
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and Nishida philosophy. For example, Kosaka argues that Nishida was
not aware that his thought bore any resemblance to Pure Land thought
until it was pointed out to him by D. T. Suzuki and Mudai Risaku, another
of Nishidas students.98 It thus comes as a surprise to see that Kosaka
writes that the inspiration for gyakutai is found in the Tannish.99
Kosaka believes that the inspiration for this idea comes from Shinrans
oft-quoted phrase, Even a good person attains birth in the Pure Land,
so it goes without saying that an evil person will.97 Kosaka argues that
this phrase shows there is no limit to the Buddhas compassion.100
Thus, Kosaka suggests a correspondence between Nishidas non-dualism of absolute and relative (gyakutai) and the idea that Amidas vow
is made for the evil person.
Nishidas thought here resembles the well-known Shin Buddhist
concept of nishu jinshin (two aspects of [the] deep mind, ).
Nishu jinshin is the description of the realization that ones own person
is unable to awaken the aspiration for birth in the Pure Land due to
ones karmic evilness. Simultaneous with this realization is total entrusting and rejoicing in the fact that one has attained birth in the
Pure Land, brought about by the activity of Amida Buddhas primal
vow. Simply put, at the very moment one rejoices in the assurance of
birth in the Pure Land through the activity of Amida Buddha, one also
realizes that ones existence is controlled by samsaric delusions and
passions.101
Turning our attention to The Logic of Topos itself we see that,
not counting the sections devoted to Pure Land and Zen Buddhism,
the number of times Nishida explicitly refers to Pure Land and Zen
are nearly equal (17 Pure Land, and 18 Zen). What is most striking is
the language Nishida uses when discussing Pure Land and Zen. For example, when Nishida begins describing the logic of Zen Buddhism he
states, Regarding Zen Buddhism, which has exerted a great deal of
influence on Japanese culture, I must defer to specialists.100 Later in
this same section Nishida attempts to use Shinrans teaching to explain
his understanding of Zen. Nishida writes, The logic of paradox is not
irrationality. It is, in Shinrans words, to take as the discriminating
principal that which goes beyond discrimination.103 As shown above
regarding the concept mu, Nishida understood Zen through Shinrans
teaching. Perhaps realizing that he did not understand Zen in the
terms of Zen, Nishida defers to experts regarding Zen.
47
When discussing Pure Land Buddhism, however, Nishida appears

more confident. For example, describing what he believed to be authentic religion Nishida wrote, In authentic religion, one reaches
faith by way of a sharply honed will, not out of mere sentiment. One
embraces faith only after having completely exhausted ones resources. As the Pure Land parable of the white path between two
rivers teaches, sooner or later one has to choose between faith and
non-faith.105 Another example of Nishidas confidence can be found
when he states: Truly other-reliant religion can be explained by the
logic of topos alone; and once properly understood, this other-reliant
religion which centers on the compassionate vow of Amida can become
vitally relevant to contemporary scientific culture.106 From these two
quotes, we see that Nishida was confident when describing Pure Land
tradition. Nishida seems to understand the experience of shinjin as
being a complete entrusting that is brought about when one realizes
the failure of ones own power to bring about enlightenment. In the
first quote, Nishida refers to the well-known Pure Land parable of the
river of fire and the river of water, put forth by Shan-tao and quoted
by both Shinran and Hnen.
One also wonders if Nishidas statement that one embraces faith
only after having completely exhausted ones resources expressed
how Nishida felt while writing this essay. Yusa explains that in the
years preceding this essay Nishida mourned the death of many close
friends.107 Nishida began writing The Logic of Topos in 1945 as the
allied bombings of Japan were rapidly increasing. In fact, while Nishida
was writing this last essay, with the assistance of a hired laborer his
wife was digging a bomb shelter.108 No doubt more stressful than the
allied bombings was the death of Yayoi, Nishidas oldest daughter,
on February 14, a mere ten days after he began writing The Logic of
Topos. With all of this occurring, perhaps Nishida felt that not only
his own resources had been exhausted but the resources of those near
to him as well.
Nishidas Non-Duality: Identity and Difference
It is clear that there were a variety of influences on Nishidas
thought. We have seen that while Zen was influential on Nishidas
thought he often deferred to scholars when describing Zen, and that
he understood such foundational Zen concepts as mu through the lens
of Jdo Shinsh. In addition, terms central to Nishidas understanding
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of non-duality may have been inspired by Pure Land Buddhist sources.

This section offers a brief overview of Nishidas non-duality as it relates to his understanding of identity and difference. It is not a comprehensive understanding of Nishidas non-duality, but seeks to provide the foundation for rereading Nishidas non-duality through the
lens of Jdo Shinsh thought.
Earlier it was argued that the key to understanding Nishidas philosophic project is understanding the self-identity of absolute contradiction, the idea that the absolute is defined and expressed by its opposite, the relative. The self-identity of absolute contradiction represents
a late (1930) development of Nishidas philosophy, which reached its
fulfillment in The Logic of Topos. Kopf notes, Nowhere does Nishida
use this concept to maintain the balance between identity and difference as forcefully as in his last completed work.109
Although the self-identity of absolute contradiction was not put
forth in An Inquiry into the Good, it is possible to see the early roots of
this idea in this work. For example, when discussing the relationship
between God and the world, Nishida argues that individuality is an
offshoot of divinity and each persons development completes Gods
development.110 Nishida here does not say that at any moment in time
God is not fully developed, but rather, that though fully developed
God continues to develop from one moment to the next.111 In other
words, were it possible to freeze everything for a moment and examine
both God and the world, God would be seen as being fully developed,
yet if we froze another moment, God would be fully developed in that
moment as well. God for Nishida is never not fully developed and yet
always continuing to change.
Nishida makes clear that one enters into a relationship with the
absolute through mutually negating activities. It is for this reason
that Nishida describes the relationship as being one of inverse correspondence. As Heisig explains, this means that the more strongly two
things are opposed, the more closely they are related.112 It is through
this opposition that one discovers the relationship with the absolute.
According to Nishida, this action of the self-identity of absolute contradiction is found in the nenbutsu. He argues further that this relationship culminates in a state of existence described as being artless and
one with the working of the dharma.113 Through the negation of ones
own self-power and Amidas negation of absolute beingthat is, Amida
Buddha taking formsentient beings are able to enter into relationship
49
with Amida or become one with the working of the dharma. To be

one here does not mean that ones individuality is lost, but rather that
ones individuality is an expression of the dharma.
For Nishida the absolute is only absolute insofar as it can negate
itself. The negation of the absolute is what allows the relative to be
the expression and activity of the absolute. The absolute then does not
stand apart from the relative, as it is reflected in the relative, nor does
the absolute stand apart from the relative. Rather, they are inversely
correlated and are thus mutually defining, determining, and negating.
Throughout Nishidas life, even when he was devoting himself to
his Zen practice, Nishida was still aware of and participated in Shin
Buddhist intellectual circles. In addition, on more than one occasion
Nishida interpreted Zen Buddhism through Shinrans thought. Most
important for our purposes here is how Nishida conceived of the relationship between the absolute and the relative, as it regards God/
Amida/Buddha and the religious practitioner. In the following, it will
become clear that although using different terms, Nishidas explanation of this relationship is structurally similar to Pure Land Buddhist
discourse as regards self and other.
THE OTHER IN SHIN BUDDHISM
Addressing the role of the other in Shin Buddhism, or for that
matter in any school of Buddhism, may strike the reader as being odd
or even misguided. The Buddhist doctrine of no-self (Skt. antman;
Jpn. muga, ), it seems, would imply that there is no other as well.
However, in recent years both Kopf and Ziporyn have published a
number of articles and books in which they argue two points. First, the
role of the other is generally underdeveloped in both academic studies
of Buddhism and the tradition itself; second, the role of the otherat
least at the level of provisional truthis central to Mahyna Buddhist
paths of awakening.114 Similarly, Varghese J. Manimala argues the
Buddhist sangha (community) as kyamuni Buddha defined it was an
example of intersubjective existence. Manimala also suggests that in
the bodhisattva ideal we find the true nature of the intersubjective
person.115
Although Kopf, Manimala, and Ziporyn have all shown that intersubjectivity is an integral part of Buddhist paths of awakening, at present there are few if any works that have dealt with the role of the relation between the individual and others. Thus our next step is to explore
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the role of the other in Shin Buddhism, both philosophically and psychologically. Following Kopf, Manimala, and Ziporyn, this discussion of
otherness will be grounded in philosophic and psychoanalytic theories
of intersubjectivity.
Following a general overview of the theory of intersubjectivity
the recognition that an individual grows in and through relationships
with otherswe will then briefly look at the role of the self and other
in Mahyna Buddhism, particularly as developed in The Awakening
of Faith in Mahyna and the Huayan school (Kegon, ).116 This
will establish a basis for a detailed examination of intersubjectivity in
Shin Buddhism. Particular attention will be paid to the Shin Buddhist
path as presented by Shinran and Rennyo. In addition, traditional
Shin Buddhist scholarship concerning the role of self and other will be
analyzed.
Recognizing the Need for Multiple Subjects: Intersubjectivity
Intersubjectivity, simply put, is the philosophical and psychological theory that individuals are affected by other individuals (subjects).
Theories of intersubjectivity are rooted in the existential philosophies
of the twentieth century. The philosophic position generally referred
to as existentialism was first postulated by Sren Kierkegaard (1813
1855) and Friedrich Nietzsche (18441900), who emphasized the role of
the individual in their critiques of G. W. F Hegels (17701881) ration
alism. Existentialism reached its apex as a movement with Jean-Paul
Sartre (19051980), who transformed the phenomenological methods
of Martin Heidegger in such a way that it was no longer reclusive, but
rather became a starting point for activism.117
Existentialism has been used to describe the philosophies of
Karl Jaspers, Martin Heidegger (although he himself renounced this
label), Martin Buber, Simone de Beauvoir, Maurice Merleau-Ponty,
and Gabriel Marcel, among others. Traces of existentialism can also
be found in the post-structuralism and deconstruction movements
led by such notable figures as Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida. At
present, the influence of existentialism is found in a number of diverse
areas. For example, American philosopher Judith Butlers work has
been foundational in number of diverse areas, including literary criticism, gay and lesbian studies, and queer theory. Butlers work, as we
see below, has been instrumental in shaping Benjamins understanding
of intersubjectivity. Existentialism has also long been influential in the
51
fields of literary studies, philosophical anthropology, psychology, and

theology.
The breadth of existentialism is perhaps best understood in its
blurring of traditional academic and scholarly lines. For example, in
addition to citing Freud and other well-known psychoanalysts, Jessica
Benjamin, whose work on intersubjectivity we will be using to uncover
the meaning of the other in Buddhism, often cites philosophers such
as Butler, Derrida, Foucault, and Jrgen Habermas.118 Existentialism,
with its call for engagement with the world, in many ways can be understood as a return to Socratic ideas concerning what philosophy is.
Philosophy for Socrates disciples, as Pierre Hadot explains, was conceived both as a specific discourse linked to a way of life, and as a way
of life linked to a specific discourse.119 In other words, philosophic
discourses are informed by the world we live in while simultaneously
seeking to better understand or even transform the world.
Benjamins understanding of intersubjectivity fits this understanding
as it is grounded in her experiences as a practicing psychoanalyst,
while simultaneously being informed by philosophical understandings
of self and other. This understanding of intersubjectivity as having
roots in both philosophy and psychology will become important later
in this essay, when discussing both the philosophical and psychological
necessity of conceiving of the relationship of buddha and practitioner
as being both equal and not equal.
Benjamin explains that the intersubjective view maintains that
the individual grows in and through relationships with other subjects.
Most important, this perspective observes that the other whom the
self meets is also a self, a subject in his or her own right. It assumes that
we are able to recognize the other subject as different and yet alike, as
an other who is capable of sharing mental experience.120 Elaborating
on the meaning of intersubjectivity in a later work Benjamin explains
the other must be recognized as another subject in order for the self
to fully experience his or her subjectivity in the others presence.121
Describing the encounter between self and other as a relationship
of two subjects rather than a relationship between a subject (self) and
object (other) is not merely a matter of semantics. Benjamin explains
that when the other is seen as an object the other is an internalized
representation that does not exist in reality.122 When the other is described in terms of an object, the reality of other subjects is denied. The
other as an object is not capable of sharing an experience of recognizing
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ones self as both different and alike, since the other as object is wholly
other. Within this brief explanation of intersubjectivity, it is possible
to identify two fundamental characteristics of the intersubjective encounter: recognition and subjectivity.
Regarding the fundamental need for recognition, Benjamin explains, A person comes to feel that I am the doer who does, I am the
author of my acts, by being with a person who recognizes her acts, her
feelings, her intentions, her independence.123 Based on this need for
recognition it becomes clear that ones sense of self grows out of ones
relationship with an other. As Butler explains, the self never returns
to itself free of the Other . . . relationality becomes constitutive of who
the self is.124 In other words, relationships with others are internalized in that relationships not only connect us to others but also define
who we are or what we will become. Relationships are, therefore, constitutive, that is, they are essential to ones very being.
That recognition from another subject is necessary in establishing
ones understanding of self as subject leads to what Benjamin describes
as the paradox of recognition. Benjamin explains, at the very moment
of realizing our own independence, we are dependent upon another
to recognize it. At the very moment we come to understand the meaning of I, myself, we are forced to see the limitations of that self. At
the moment we realize that separate minds can share the same state,
we also realize these minds can disagree.125 In other words, the very
awareness that we are individuals is dependent upon an awareness of
our limitations. Throughout her work Benjamin provides a number of
examples showing that even in relationships of domination, where one
seeks control of the other, recognition and a sense of otherness must
be maintained, for if one subsumes the other into ones self, both self
and other cease to exist.
The intersubjective relationship does not seek to collapse the relationship of self and other into a unified understanding of self and
other, where the self is all that exists and the other is wholly other or
an object of the selfs psyche. Rather, intersubjective theory sees the
relationship between self and other, with its tension between sameness
and difference, as a continual exchange of influence. It focuses, not
on a linear movement from oneness to separateness, but on the paradoxical balance between them.126 In other words, self and other do not
exist in two wholly separate worlds, as self and other are not wholly
different. Nor are self and other undifferentiated; differences remain.
53
The boundary that separates self and other is, at best, fuzzy. While we
may have shared experiences with the other, that the other remains
an other is what makes these experiences so powerful. Benjamin explains, The fact that self and other are not merged is precisely what
makes experiences of merging have such high emotional impact. The
externality of the other makes one feel one is truly being fed, getting
nourishment from the outside, rather than supplying everything for
oneself.
In her later work Benjamin clarifies that in shared experience the
other, by necessity, remains an other. When self denies the externality
of the other through forced assimilation of the other, one is plunged
into unbearable aloneness . . . creating an identity that demands the
destructive denial of the different.127 Benjamin repeatedly shows how
the denial of difference can lead to abusive situations. Yet, even in relationships of domination, which seek to destroy the other, Benjamin
finds that the need for other subjects remains primary. Relationships
of domination, as Benjamin explains, depend on the other subject
recognizing the power the self wields through submission.128
Intersubjectivity, as presented by Benjamin, makes clear the necessity or other consciousness in forming identity. It is through our
relationships with others that we come to understand what it means
to be. Relationships not only affirm who we think we are but also by
necessity negate conceptions of who we are as well. Ones identity as a
unique individual occurs not in realization of sameness, nor in recognition that the other is different from ones self, but rather in the other
recognizing and confirming that the self is, the self does.
There are, therefore, both philosophic and psychological necessities for understanding the other as both similar to and different from
the self. This discussion, grounded in the feminist psychoanalytic project of Benjamin, will be the heuristic lens used in the following to explore the relationship of self and other in Mahyna Buddhism, with
particular emphasis on the Jdo Shinsh tradition.
Intersubjectivity in Early Mahyna Buddhist Thought
In the American context, Buddhist practice is often understood
and presented as a solitary endeavor. The impact and importance of
other subjects has often been downplayed or denied when describing
Buddhist paths towards awakening (satori, ). For example, in recent
years Jeff Shore, a longtime Rinzai Zen practitioner and professor of
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international Zen at Hanazono University, has spent his breaks from

teaching by traveling throughout Europe and North America teaching
what he claims to be the basic principles of Zen practice. Shore explains that at its most basic Buddhist practice is getting to the very
bottom of who and what we are.129 According to Shore, this process
is a solitary one: This does not require going somewhere else, nor
does it involve entering transcendent or blissful states of mind. Each
of you, right here and now has all you need. A teacher is not necessary
for this, nor are books. According to the records, Gotama Buddha sat
under a Bodhi tree and got to the bottom of himself. He did it on his
own. And thatnot some doctrine or dogmais the basis of Buddhist
practice.130 This way of talking about the Buddhas experience as solitary is very common in Buddhist teachings in the West and perhaps
represents a conflation with the concept of the pratyekabuddha, who
attains buddhahood during a time when no buddha or dharma exists
and also significantly does not teach others the path to buddhahood.
However, when we remember that the Buddha also visited a number
of teachers prior to sitting under the Bodhi tree, and that the Buddhas
consumption of milk gruel offered by Sujta signified the Buddhas rejection of ascetic practices and discovery of the Middle Way, we may
want to rethink such presentations of the Buddhist path. The Buddhas
rejection of asceticism and discovery of the Middle Way, as Hajime
Nakamura points out, are commonly associated with the Buddhas enlightenment.131 However, the statement that the Buddha did it on his
own loses some of its thrust upon considering the role of the Buddhas
teachers and Sujtas offering of milk in his enlightenment experience.
Shores argument that Gotama did it on his own, and that all
people can do the same, does seem to echo the teaching of the Buddha
before entering parinirva. In the Buddhas final teaching, recorded in
the Mahparinibbna-sutta, the Buddha encourages his followers to rely
on themselves in order to determine the true teaching of the dharma.132
However, Roger J. Corless argues the Buddha is not encouraging solitary practice, but rather, that in the time of the Buddhas absence
from the world the sangha is charged with preserving the dharma.
Corless explains, the monks and nuns are collectively their own lights
and refuges.133 It does not come as a surprise then that one of the few
practices shared by all Buddhists is the act of taking the triple refuge
(sankie, ).134 From this brief example and counter example, we
can first conclude that from the time of the historical Buddha to the
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present others have been an integral part of Buddhist paths of awakening. Second, we again see that with a few notable exceptions, Buddhist
scholars and teachers have had a tendency to downplay the role of self
and other.
However, things are not as nearly as neat as the above indicates.
Brook Ziporyn explains: [C]urrent reconstructions of the early (Pali)
Buddhist doctrine, especially as found in Abhidharmic dharma analysis, reveal an approach to consciousness that can be described as atomistic and empiricist, if not almost solipsistic. . . . The same can be said
for Indian Mahyna doctrine . . . in one way or another, most Indian
Mahyna schools deny the ultimate existence of other minds, either
because all minds are really manifestations of one essence (Tathgatagarbha, Suchness, and the like), or because the category of otherness
(like sameness) belongs to the realm of those delusions dispelled by
an insight into Emptiness.135 Alterity, that is, a state of being other, in
Abhidharmic thought is thus understood as being an example of the
conventional truth of this world. Any sense of alterity, like a sense of
self, thus fades away when one realizes the ultimate truth of emptiness
(Skt. nyat; Jpn. k, ).136
Both Kopf and Ziporyn argue that in Indian Mahyna Buddhism,
with the introduction of the bodhisattva ideal, we find the beginnings
of Buddhist theories of intersubjectivity.137 Simply put, the bodhi
sattva ideal is rejection of individual enlightenment in favor of universal enlightenment. The denial of individual enlightenment usually
occurs through a series of vows often taking the form of If X occurs
and Y does not follow, then I will not attain universal enlightenment.
Perhaps one of the most well-known vows is the that of Amida Buddha
(Amida Butsu, ), then Dharmkara Bodhisattva (Hz Bosatsu,
), who vowed: If, when I attain Buddhahood, sentient beings
in the lands of the ten directions who sincerely and joyfully entrust
themselves to me, desire to be born in my land, and think of me even
ten times should not be born there, may I not attain perfect enlightenment. Excluded, however are those who commit the grave offenses
and abuse the Right Dharma.138 The bodhisattva vows are thus an act
of great compassion. However, they also seem to introduce a binary
understanding of self and other into the Buddhist discourse. Early
Mahyna Buddhist discourse, as Ziporyn argues above, is somewhat
solipsistic when it comes to understandings self and other. In order
to better understand the role of self and other, consideration must be
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given to the meaning of identity in Mahyna discourse. For this we

turn our attention to Chinese Buddhism, as Ziporyn claims it was in
this context that understandings of provisional truth came to be seen
as equal with ultimate.139
Issues of identity and difference in many ways took center stage
in Chinese Buddhist discourse. Leading monks in both the Tiantai and
Huayan schools devoted considerable amounts of energy to elucidating and explaining the nature of identity and difference. These understandings of identity and difference not only represent the sinification
of Buddhism, but also became foundations for nearly all understandings of Buddhism that developed in China, Korea, and Japan.140
The Awakening of Faith in Mahyna is a seminal text for Chinese
and Japanese Mahyna Buddhist thought. Reading the names of individuals who have written commentaries on the Awakening of Faith
is in many ways a whos who of early East Asian forms of Buddhism.
For example, Hui-yan (, 523592), an early Chinese Pure Land
Buddhist thinker, wrote a commentary on The Awakening of Faith that
would inspire commentaries by such leading figures as Wnhyo (,
617686), a prolific writer and popularizer of Mahyna Buddhism in
Korea, and Fa-tsang (, 643712), the third patriarch of the Chinese
Huayan school.141 Jacqueline I. Stone, in her landmark study of original
enlightenment (hongaku, ), notes that The Awakening of Faith is the
most influential early source for the term original enlightenment.142
The Awakening of Faith explains that original enlightenment means
the essence of Mind is grounded on the Dharmakya.143 In other
words, from the very beginning, sentient beings have the essential
seeds for enlightenment, and through practice, this knowledge is
made manifest. Enlightenment, as conceived in The Awakening of Faith,
is paired with delusion. The author of The Awakening of Faith makes this
clear by stating, Independent of the unenlightened mind, there are
no independent marks of true enlightenment itself that can be discussed.144 Stone explains that in The Awakening of Faith, original enlightenment is posited in distinction to actualized enlightenment; it
represents the inherence of suchness in the deluded mind and thus
the ever-present possibility of transforming that mind into the mind
of awakening.145 Original enlightenment as inherent potential for
actualized enlightenment can thus be seen as maintaining a tension
between identity and difference, between original enlightenment and
actualized enlightenment.
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The tension between the inherent potential for enlightenment and

actualized enlightenment was in no way static. Stone notes that the
hongaku thought that shaped the medieval Japanese Tendai experience was radically different from the hongaku thought found in The
Awakening of Faith. She explains that in medieval Japan hongaku is
equated with suchness itself and assigned an absolute meaning; it is
no longer merely an abstract principal but the actual, true aspect of all
things (ji jiss []).146 This conflation of potential enlightenment
to suchness itself raises a whole host of questions, including: why is
practice necessary if all sentient beings are already inherently enlightened, and what differentiates a sentient being from a buddha? In order
to answer these questions we must examine the Huayan and Tian-tai
thought in regards to understandings of identity and difference.147
Identity and Difference in Huayan Buddhism
Huayan thought, as Paul Williams notes, is less philosophy than
the systematic explanation of the dharmadhtu [hkkai, ], the
world of visionary experience and magic.148 Williamss description of
the dharmadhtu as being a world of visionary experience and magic
seems to point towards the recognition that humans spatial and temporal understandings of the world are not adequate when attempts are
made at understanding the dharmadhtu. However, before examining
the systematic explanation of the dharmadhtu it is necessary to first
make clear what is meant by the term dharmadhtu. Edward Conze explains that in Mahyna discourses, dharmadhtu is defined as being
the absolute dharma. Conze then goes on to list definitions for dharma
in Buddhist contexts: (1) transcendental reality that is the absolute
truth; (2) the order of the law of the universe; (3) a truly real event;
(4) objective data whether true or untrue; (5) characteristic, quality,
or attribute; (6) moral law; and (7) Buddhas teachings of the above.
Dhtu, as Conze explains, means the realm of, essence of, [and] source
of.149 With the above explanation, it is apt to say that by studying the
dharmadhtu, we are studying reality itself.
The image of reality, as presented in the Avatasaka-stra (Ch.
Huayan ching; Jpn. Kegon-ky, ), is filled with exceedingly rich
imagery. As David L. McMahan explains, the ordinary world seems
but a colorless after-image of the lustrous mythical worlds [the sutra]
presents.150 This overwhelming imagery, according to McMahan, is a
variation of emptiness discourse while further implying that although
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the pure lands may be far away, to one with a pure mind even the
ordinary defiled world is itself a pure land.151 In the final section of
the Avatasaka-stra, upon entering Vairocana Buddhas (Birushana
Butsu, ) Tower, Sudhana, the pilgrim, is confronted with
a series of visually overwhelming images. The narrator of the sutra
explains, [Sudhana] also looked inside, [and he saw] numerous, hundreds and thousands of beautiful, fabulous towers. Each tower was
similarly ornamented, very vast and very beautiful. Each tower was
vast as all of space, containing all other towers, yet each tower was distinct. All towers were inside one tower.152 Attempting to understand
this imagery can be a very frustrating and humbling experience. One
quickly finds that everyday spatial and temporal understandings of the
world are simply not equipped to aid in comprehending a world containing multiple towers of infinity. However, what is perhaps the most
surprising attribute about the world of these towers is that it is the
very world in which we find ourselves.
Given the above, one quickly sees why Huayan thinkers focused on
the systematic explanation of the dharmadhtu. One example of this
explanation is Tu-shuns (, 557640) Meditation on the Dharmadhtu
(Ch. I fa-chieh; Jpn. Ikkan hkai, ). Tu-shuns Meditation is helpful in that it begins by explaining the world of our everyday consciousness and then methodologically advances in four steps to an understanding of the world as the Avatasaka-stra presents it. Tu-shuns
four meditations are the dharmadhtu of (1) shih (Jpn. ji, ), (2) li (Jpn.
ri, ),153 (3) non-obstruction of li against shih (Ch. li-shih wu-ai; Jpn. ji ri
muge, ), and (4) non-obstruction of shih against shih (Ch. shihshih wu-ai; Jpn. ji ji muge, ).154
The first dharmadhtu, shih, is the dharmadhtu of particulars or
events. This understanding, one that is ultimately rendered untenable,
creates distinctions and distance between particulars. Individual particulars are seen as being wholly other from all other particulars. All
particulars in this understanding are rendered as individual things
devoid of any similarity and therefore alienated from one another in
an autistic state of existence.
The second dharmadhtu, li, is the realm of suchness, or as Chang
translates it, immanent reality (tathat).155 Li, according to Chang, is
the invisible controller of all events. He goes on to describe li as the
all-inclusive and many-sided principal for all existence.156 However,
as Peter N. Gregory points out, understandings of li as immanent
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reality, although accurate, reflect a shift to a more ontological nature

in Huayan doctrine that Tu-shun had not anticipated. For Tu-shun, li
pointed towards the inherent emptiness of all dharmas, not an underlying nature of all things. It was with Cheng-kuang (, 738839)
that li was understood as an underlying principle for all existence.157
Whether one understands li as signifying the emptiness of all dharmas
or as an underlying principle, that li and shih are connected becomes
clear. This connection leads to the third meditation.
The third dharmadhtu, the non-obstruction of li against shih,
makes clear the relationship of the one expressed in the many, thereby
expanding upon the realization that li and shih are linked. In this meditation, the dynamic relationship between li and shih is made clear. Li
is the formational basis for all particulars (shih). One also finds there
is a certain amount of tension between li and shih, given that shih
can hide li.158 For Tsung-mi (, 781841), the fifth patriarch of the
Huayan tradition, the non-obstruction of li against shih is central in
that it makes clear that li brings shih to completion.159 Perhaps the best
way to understand this principal is to place it in the context of dependent origination (Skt. prattyasamutpda; Jpn. engi, ). In that, li and
shih are distinct and not-distinct, interdependent and separate. While
these statements describing li and shih appear to be contradictory, they
make sense when understood in the context of the non-obstruction of
li against shih, where any li is an expression of shih and vice versa, and
yet shih is not li.
The fourth dharmadhtu, that of the non-obstruction of shih against
shih, is often described as the dharmadhtu of all in one. Within
every particular are all other particulars. As Chang explains this is the
only dharmadhtu that really exists, the previous three are all teaching methods leading up to and culminating in this final meditation.
However, as Gregory makes clear, from the time of Tsung-mi meditation on the third dharmadhtu was central, thus signaling a shift in
the Huayan metaphysical understanding of the world.160 This fourth
dharmadhtu is perhaps the most difficult of all the meditations on the
dharmadhtu to understand. That within one phenomenon all other
phenomena are present and complete seems to be simply impossible.
Within the Avatasaka-stra, this dharmadhtu is presented using descriptive language that simply overwhelms the senses. The mutual interpenetration of all phenomena as presented in this meditation is the
worldview of an advanced bodhisattva. It is the world as illustrated by
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Indras net (a net with a jewel tied in at every knot, each jewel reflecting all the other jewels in the net), where each and every shih reflects
all other shih ad infinitum.
Tu-shuns Meditation is one of many attempts by Huayan thinkers to explicate the meaning of the dharmadhtu. Perhaps the most
well-known attempt is Fa-tsangs Treatise on the Golden Lion (Ch. ChinShih-Tzu Chang; Jpn. Kin Shishi Sh, ), delivered at the request
of Empress Wu (, 625705). Williamss summary of Fa-tsangs
teachings is especially illuminating regarding how Huayan thinkers
approached issues of identity and difference. Williams writes,
[P]henomena are nothing more than noumenon in a particular form,
and form does not in itself exist, so all phenomena are identical.
Moreover, noumenon cannot in itself be divided. One piece of gold
and another piece of gold, as gold, are not different. The difference
lies in spatial separation, and that is something to do with shape or
form, not gold qua gold. Since a phenomenon is only a noumenon,
and since between any two instantiations of noumenon there is,
as noumenon, no difference, so each phenomenon is in fact the same
as any other phenomena. Furthermore, since each instantiation of
noumenon is noumenon itself (noumenon cannot be divided), so each
phenomenon is also all phenomena. Hence there is mutual identity
and interpenetration. Second, since the dharmadhtu is a totality
of interdependent elements, and according to Mdhyamika teaching each entity lacks inherent existence and only is in terms of an
infinite network of casual interrelationships so, if any entity were
taken away, the entire Universe would collapse. This means that each
entity is a cause for the totality. Moreover the totality is, of course, a
cause for each entity.161
From this we can surmise that for Fa-tsang, and likely the larger
Huayan tradition as a whole, self and other are not inherently different, nor are they entirely the same. Self and other are different as a
result of not only spatial separation, but also as a result of causes and
conditions that bring self and other into existence through cycles of
birth and death. The reality of otherness is important in that if otherness is subsumed into the self, the entire universe collapses, including
the self.
All too often lost amid the complex philosophy of the Huayan
school is the emphasis on teachers on the Buddhist paths of awakening. McMahans work is a notable exception to this, given that his focus
is not on how Huayan Buddhism developed in China, but rather on how
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the Gaavyha-stra itself functions. McMahan describes Sudhanas

encounter with teachers, fifty-two in all, as being a dramatization or
symbolically charged visionary representation of a specific Buddhist
teaching.162 The variety of teachers whom Sudhana meets is simply
outstanding. Twenty of the teachers Sudhana meets are women, all of
whom have vastly different lifestyles and social classes: a prostitute,
healer, nun, even the Buddhas mother is a teacher of Buddhist practices
for Sudhana. Other teachers Sudhana meets include mathematicians,
ascetics, kings, perfumers, goldsmiths, children, and bodhisattvas.
Sudhanas meeting with these teachers is quite formulaic,
as Sudhana first asks each teacher to explain his or her practice.
Following Sudhanas inquiry, each teacher explains his or her practice and then, with the exception of the final two teachers, plead[s]
ignorance regarding the most profound way and send[s] him on to the
next teacher.163 The Gaavyha-stra thus emphasizes not only the
need for teachers (others), but also the fact that teachers may be those
whom we least expect them to be.
Both philosophically and textually others are central to the Huayan
tradition. Philosophically, given that a myriad of causes and conditions
are responsible for shaping all existence, others are both the same as
and different from the self. Textually, the Avatasaka-stra emphasizes
the role of teachers as an integral part of Buddhist paths of awakening. Williamss observation that according to Huayan thought when an
entity is destroyed the entire universe collapses can be seen as applying analogously to the relation between self and other, thus highlighting the importance of others to Huayan thought and practice. Within
the context of medieval Japanese Buddhism, Huayan thought, that of
the Tiantai school, and the teachings of The Awakening of Faith were
the dominant intellectual milieu from which Shin Buddhism arose.
Therefore if we are too explore how the role of others has been understood by Shin Buddhists we must explore possible sources our authors
were drawing upon.
The Necessity of Others in Shin Buddhist Paths of Awakening
Not only are others important for psychological well-being, they
are also central to Buddhist paths of awakening. Yet others are not
wholly other, given that our relationships are constitutive of who
we are and what we will become. Thus, it is the relationship of sameness and difference between self and other that is necessary both for
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psychological well-being and for Buddhist paths of awakening. This

section begins the process of reconsidering the role of concrete others
on the Shin Buddhist path. It argues that the relationship between
Amida Buddha and sentient beings is one of both duality and non
duality, in that sentient beings are seen as both equal and not equal to
the tathgatas. As we shall see, the doctrine of equality and inequality is
inextricably linked with Shinrans conceptions of both Amida Buddha
and the Pure Land, which are characterized by philosophies of duality and non-duality. This examination will first explore how Shinran
conceived of equality and inequality. It will then conclude with a discussion of Rennyos concept of the unity of the individual and Amida
Buddha.
Before entering into Shinrans and Rennyos ideas, we must note
that discussing the relationship between religious practitioner and
Amida Buddha in terms of self and other presents a number of difficulties. First, there is a well-developed discourse of otherness within
Shin Buddhism, but it is not the kind of otherness we have discussed to
this point. Notably, although Shinran often encourages Jdo Shinsh
adherents to trust in the other-power (tariki, ) of Amidas vow,
this understanding of other-power differs from an other as opposed to
self. As Stone explains, The Other on whom Shinran taught his followers to rely is not Other as opposed to self but an Other in which
self/other distinctions are dissolved. At the moment of relinquishing
utterly all self-calculation, one is seized by the compassionate working
of Amidas vow, never to be let go; such a person has in that moment
become one with Amida, equal to Tathgatas.164 Through entrusting
in Amidas vow, the dichotomy of self and other is overcome. While this
understanding of Shin Buddhism seems to characterize many presentations of Shin Buddhism in English, it will be shown to be quite limited
and divorced from the medieval context in which it was written.
First, let us examine typical understandings of the other in Shin
Buddhist scholarship. Generally, a sense of otherness is rendered as
being an immature understanding of Shinrans teaching. For example,
Hirota often describes the Shin Buddhist path as beginning with a duality that ultimately reaches a state of maturity and fulfillment in nonduality. Hirota argues that the Pure Land path begins with an initial engagement characterized by a dualistic understanding of Amida Buddha
and the Pure Land.165 As ones faith matures and shinjin is realized, the
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dualisms of this initial engagement dissolve as one comes to understand the non-duality of the Pure Land path.166
However, some scholars have recently acknowledged the role of
concrete others as a form of dualism that is part of the Shin Buddhist
path to awakening. James Dobbins, a leading Shin Buddhist historian,
has noted that while Shinran does present a non-dual understanding
of the relationship between religious practitioner and Amida Buddha
or the Pure Land, Shinran also teaches a dualistic understanding of the
Pure Land path: There is indisputable evidence that Shinran himself
never actually abrogated this dualistic understanding. At the level of
day-to-day interchanges with his companions he frequently treated
the Pure Land as an otherworldly place where one would be born after
death. For instance, in one of his letters Shinran wrote to a disciple
that, because he himself was advanced in years, he would pass away
first, be born in the Pure Land, and be waiting for his disciple there.167
Shinrans explanation of the Pure Land path as dualistic, as Dobbins
goes on to explain, was fundamental to Pure Land discourse at the
practiced level of religion no matter how important nondualism was
at the idealized level of doctrine.168 That Shinran continued to teach
ideas of dualism suggests that dualistic understandings of the Pure
Land path are far more than immature understandings of the Pure
Land path. Recognizing Shinranss emphasis on the Pure Land as being
otherworldly and Amida as other prompts a reconsideration of issues
of identity and difference in Shin Buddhist thought. This reconsideration must also address arguments that understandings of duality on
the Shin Buddhist path are signs of an immature faith.169
Statements in Shinrans writings demonstrate his idea of the
Pure Land path as one of both duality and non-duality. Of particular
interest to us here is how Shinran describes the relationship between
religious practitioner and Amida Buddha. An examination of Rennyos
writings also reveals a conception of Pure Land Buddhism as both dual
and non-dual.
Shinran on the Relationship between
Religious Practitioner and Amida Buddha
Shinrans conception of the Shin Buddhist path of awakening describes the relationship between religious practitioner and Amida
Buddha in two fundamentally different waysboth in terms of duality and in terms of non-duality. Shin Buddhist scholarship has tended
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to place emphasis on the non-dual aspects of this relationship.

However, Shinran used various ideas to explain the relationship of religious practitioner and Amida Buddha. That scholars have tended to
focus on the aspect of non-duality has led to a distorted understanding of Shin Buddhist paths of awakening. Using the lens of intersubjectivity will help to highlight the need for others, without denying
the role and importance of non-duality, on Shin Buddhist paths of
awakening. Shinrans conception of the relationship of practitioner
and Amida Buddha becomes clear when viewed through the lens of
intersubjectivity.
Let us look at some examples of Shinrans statements regarding
identity and non-identity of religious practitioner and Amida Buddha.
Reading the Lamp for the Latter Ages (Mattsh, ), a collection of
letters written towards the end of Shinrans life (1251 and 1262), one
often finds Shinran explaining that practitioners who have attained
shinjin are equal to the tathgatas (shobutsu to hitoshi, ) or
equal to Maitreya (Miroku Bosatsu, ). For example, Shinran
writes in a letter to Jshin : The Buddhas in the ten quarters rejoice in the settling of this mind and praise it as being equal to the
hearts and minds of all Buddhas. Thus, the person of true shinjin is said
to be equal to the Buddhas. He is also regarded as being the same as
Maitreya, who is in [the rank of] succession to Buddhahood.170
In another letter to Jshin, written approximately three months
later, Shinran begins with a statement that is almost identical to the one
quoted above. The Garland Sutra [Avatasaka-stra] states that those
who attained true shinjin are already certain to become Buddhas and
therefore are equal to the Tathagatas. Although Maitreya has not yet
attained Buddhahood, it is certain that he will, so he is already known
as Maitreya Buddha. In this manner, the person who has attained true
shinjin is taught to be equal to the Tathagatas.171 Equal (hitoshi,
) in these passages means that one is assured of enlightenment that
comes with rebirth in the Pure Land. Equal here does not mean the
same as (onaji, ). In other words, it is not the case that religious
practitioner + shinjin = buddha. Rather, equal means that one is assured of enlightenment at some point in the future. Sentient beings
must experience death and rebirth in Amidas Pure Land where, freed
from delusions, they can attain supreme enlightenment.172 Equality
with the buddhas changes and is transformed over time. Sentient
beings are the same as Maitreya in that both must go through the cycle
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of birth and death once more. To say sentient beings are the same as
Maitreya means that it is certain that both will attain buddhahood.
Maitreya and sentient beings must transmigrate through the cycles of
birth and death once more before attaining buddhahood.
However, at the end of the second letter above, Shinran makes
clear that one should not think of ones self-power as being equal to the
tathgatas. Shinran writes, To think in self-power that one is equal to
the Tathagatas is a great error. But it is because of the shinjin of Other
Power that you rejoice; how can self-power enter into it? Please consider this fully.173 Shinran believes that blind passions and delusions
are so strong that it is impossible to entrust in the activity of the vow
through ones own calculation (hakarai, ). It is only through
the calculation (onhakarai, ) of Amida Buddha that shinjin is
attained and enlightenment is ensured. One is fundamentally different
from buddhas in that blind passions still shape the way one acts and
views the world.
Shinrans understanding of identity as being one of change where
the religious practitioner is transformed from a state of delusion to a
state of buddhahood is centered in Mahyna Buddhist thought, particularly the thought of Chih-i (, 538597), the founder and systematizer of the Tiantai school in China, who put forth the doctrine
of the six identities. The doctrine of the six identities clarifies not only
the relationship of identity and difference, but that of doctrine and
practice as well. The six identities, as explained by Neil Donner, are:
1. Identity in principle. This affirms inherent Buddhahood.
2. Verbal identity. Here intellectual understanding that we are
Buddhas is gained.
3. Identity of religious practice. Here behavior and mental state are
brought into correspondence with the prior verbal formulations.
The Mo-ho chi-kuan [Jpn. Maka shikan, ] compares this to the
practice of archery, in which one begins by aiming at large targets,
then gradually reduces the target size until finally one can hit the
hundredth part of a hair.
4. Identity of resemblance. Ones thoughts and evaluations approach
what has been expounded in the stras of previous Buddhas.
5. Identity of partial truth. Ignorance weakens and wisdom becomes
increasingly prominent.
6. Ultimate identity. Buddhahood, the final fruit.174
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Chih-is six stages suggest a number of different kinds of identity

and that identity with the buddhas is dynamic rather than static.175
While Shinran does not describe the six identities in his writing, he
would have been influenced byif not aware ofthe six identities
given the role of the Mo-ho chi-kuan in medieval Tendai thought and
practice.176
For Shinran, the issue of fundamental difference remains as long as
one is a sentient being. Yet, Shinran also finds truth in the present life as
well. Truth for Shinran represents the formless taking form at various
points throughout history. This becomes clear in Shinrans construction of the Pure Land lineage. For example in the Tannish (A Record in
Lament of Divergences, ), Shinran is recorded as having said: If
Amidas Primal Vow is true, kayamunis teachings cannot be false.
If the Buddhas teaching is true, Shan-taos commentaries cannot be
false. If Shan-taos commentaries are true, can Hnens words be lies?
If Hnens words are true, then surely what I say cannot be empty.177
Shinrans teachings in this paragraph are true not because Shinran
himself utters them, but rather their truth is found in that they are in
accordance with the teachings of those who came before Shinran.
Although textual analysis of Shinrans teachings with those of
Shan-tao and Hnen reveals a number of differences and non-traditional readings of texts, Eisho Nasu has argued that Shinrans methodology and reading of texts would not have been disputed or unusual in
the context of medieval Japanese Buddhism.178 Similarly, Corless, in his
examination of the Pure Land lineage, argues that unlike Zen, which
places a great deal of importance on the student-teacher relationship
of its lineage, Shin Buddhism emphasizes a textual lineage. Corless
explains further, Shinrans texts do not really support or transmit
anything; they are marshaled as evidence in support of one point, the
supreme efficacy of Amidas Hongan [primal vow]and although that
point is, from a Buddhological standpoint, peripheral or even mistaken, it is both central and clear for Shinran.179 The truth of Amidas
vow for Shinran is expressed in various ways at different times in history; issues of historicity are really non-issues for Shinran. While there
are significant differences between Shinrans, Hnens, and Shan-taos
teachings, these differences are historical. Amidas vow is trans-historical and thus provides the necessary link for one to be equal with the
buddhas. This uniting is the activity of the vow, not the calculation of
the religious practitioner.
67
That the unifying experience of shinjin is so powerful is due to the

fact that it brings one into relationship with that which is other. The
power of the unifying experience of shinjin is that one comes to feel
that the primal vow, to use Shinrans words quoted previously, was
made for myself alone. That Amidas vows are made for all sentient
beings means that potentially all sentient beings are equal to the buddhas. Shinran makes clear, however, that this equality is not brought
about by ones own doing, but is rather the working of Amidas primal
vow.
The Shin Buddhist path as put forth by Shinran comes out of the
realization that sentient beings and Amida Buddha are fundamentally
different. Sentient beings existence in the world is characterized by
blind passions and delusions that are so strong one is unable to escape
the cyclic nature of life and death. Shinran clearly believed that the
only way one could awaken shinjin and become equal to the buddhas
was through the working of the buddhas. Equality for Shinran is found
in inequality. That is, through the working of Amida Buddhas vow one
is made to be equal to the buddhas. For Shinran, Amida Buddha is fundamentally other in that Amida Buddha and the primal vow are alone
true and real. Sentient beings are made to be one with the buddhas
only through the working of the buddhas.
As we have seen, Shinran conceives of the relationship between
Amida Buddha and religious practitioner as both equal and not equal.
Equality within Shin Buddhism refers to the fact that the practitioner is assured of enlightenment, and in that respect is equal with the
tathgatas. The practitioner, however, is also at the same time fundamentally apart from Amida Buddha because the practitioner still
has to go through another cycle of birth and death before attaining
buddhahood.
The religious practitioner and Amida Buddha are therefore separate. Amida Buddha is beyond form, yet Amida is capable of manifesting form so that Amida Buddha becomes present to all living beings
of the worldwherever they are, whatever point in history at which
they exist, and whatever their capacities for religious practiceand
to dispel their ignorance and awaken them to what is true and real.180
Yet, in meeting sentient beings precisely wherever they are, Amida is
fundamentally part of this world; there is nowhere Amida is not present. As Oka Ryoji explains: Amida Buddha is not somewhere outside of
this universe manifesting his limitless light of wisdom. Shinran saw the
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entire universe as consisting of Amida Buddhas light of wisdom. It is

not a question of where the light of wisdom originates. Shinrans view is
that because the entire universe is Amidas light of wisdom, everything
in the universe is grasped by this light of wisdom and is made to live
because of this fundamental unity with this light.181 Amida Buddha is
thus simultaneously formless, as Amida is suchness, in that all forms
are Amidas light which surrounds all forms and brings them into unity
with Amida Buddha. In this way there is not a single form that is apart
Amida Buddha, which in this formulation is suchness itself.
However, although Shinran saw the entire universe as being the
manifestation of Amidas form, he also believed that one is apart from
Amida Buddha as well. It is, perhaps, for this very reason that Shinran
emphasizes the otherness of Amida Buddha. Given that forms are by
their very nature filled with delusion, the entire universe is also filled
with delusion. The reality of Amida, for Shinran, is not in the form
Amida takes but rather the formless. Shinran in the Jdo wasan explains:
The majestic light, transcending form, is beyond description;
Thus Amida is called Buddha of Inexpressible Light.
All the Buddhas praise this light
The cause by which Amidas Buddhahood was fulfilled.182
Within this hymn, we see that Amida Buddha has gone beyond form
and is beyond sentient beings capabilities for expression, thus all the
buddhas praise the light of Amida Buddha. However, sentient beings
can only realize Amida Buddha as form, given the delusions that characterize sentient beings existence. Shinran explains that Amida by
necessity has to take form. In a Ks wasan written in praise of Hnen,
Shinran writes:
Amida Tathagata, manifesting form in this world,
Appeared as our teacher Genk;
The conditions for teaching having run their course,
He returned to the Pure Land.183
Shinran here clearly believes that Amida Buddha, realizing the necessity of taking form in the world, appeared as Hnen. The form that was
made manifest ceased to be in the world, but the teaching remained,
and perhaps even for some of those who were to follow the Pure Land
path at present Shinran has come to be seen as Amida.
In Shinrans thought the absolute, that is, suchness, takes form. In
taking form, the absolute is able to encounter sentient beings in the
midst of their delusions. Shinran and many other Buddhist thinkers
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felt that the age of mapp (end of the dharma, ) was at hand. Thus it
was no longer possible to realize awakening through practice; one had
to rely on the power of a buddha to bring about awakening. Hnens
appearing in the world as Amida was the formless taking form as a concrete other that Shinran and others could identify with suchness and
thus attain shinjin, assuring birth in the Pure Land. In other words, for
Shinran, Pure Land soteriology is characterized by the formless manifesting form, enlightenment in the midst of delusion.
Rennyo and the Unity of Buddha and Foolish Beings
As the Shin Buddhist tradition developed in Japan, new doctrines
and new hermeneutic devices were used in order to better understand
the relationship between Amida Buddha and sentient beings. Among
Hnens disciples, Shinran was not the only one to put pen to paper
as a means of preserving Hnens teachings.184 Also, in the centuries
following Shinrans death new leaders of the fledgling Jdo Shin movement read and incorporated ideas from Hnens disciples as a means
of understanding Shin Buddhism. One example of this is the doctrine
of kih ittai (unity of individual and dharma [i.e., buddha], )
which was influential for Rennyos teaching. Rennyo was fond of reading the Anjin ketsujsh (Notes on Firm Faith, ), a text of unknown authorship that has its origins in the Seizan Branch of the
Jdo-sh , in which the doctrine of kih ittai is put forth. Rennyo
often alluded to the Anjin ketsujsh in his teachings and described it as
being a fundamental text for the Shin tradition.185
Although Rennyo never mentions kih ittai specifically in his letters,
many scholars have noted a connection between kih ittai and Rennyos
understanding of the relationship between the person of shinjin and
Amida Buddha, particularly when Rennyo writes, the Buddhas mind
and the mind of the ordinary being become one (busshin to bonshin to
hitotsu ni naru ).186
Rennyos doctrine, commonly referred to as butsubon ittai (unity of
buddha and foolish beings, ), although inspired by the doctrine of kih ittai found in the Anjin ketsujsh, is as Nait Chik points
out fundamentally different from kih ittai. Naito explains, kih ittai
represents a fundamental state of unity between the religious practitioner and the dharma. Ki and h , the practitioner and the
dharma, cannot be separated from one another: although they seem
different they are the same. Naito explains this as the difference
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between steam and ice; visually we see them as being different, yet
fundamentally ice and steam are the same.187 In contrast, butsubon
ittai understands the relationship between practitioner and buddha as
fundamentally distinct.188 Naito elaborates on this by explaining each
character in this phrase individually. Butsu refers to the mind of the
tathgatas, which is true, clear, and real.189 Bon describes the mind
of sentient beings, which is controlled by the delusions of worldly desires.190 Ittai refers to a state of unity where sentient beings are
in a continual process of becoming buddha. In this world, although
butsu and bon appear to be one they are fundamentally different, and
yet butsu and bon are not two. Naito explains: The salvational power
(chikara ) and working of Amida Tathagata cannot be distinguished
from ourselves. We ourselves are the locus (ba ) for the operating of
Amida Tathagatas salvational power and working.191 In other words,
Naito argues, the working of Amida Buddha in the world cannot be
separated from sentient beings. Sentient beings, however, are not the
same as Amida Buddha, nor do they cease being sentient beings in this
relationship. Particularly important is that this understanding does
not deny the reality of sentient beings in the world. Although sentient
beings are the locus of Amidas work, sentient beings still suffer in the
world of samsara. This understanding of unity is representative of East
Asian understandings. Consider for example Ziporyns explication of
the meaning of one in early Chinese thought: [A] one or a unity
is conceived not as a homogenous or abstract mathematical unit but,
rather, as an indivisible harmony of diverse elements. . . . [I]t signifies
a holistic harmony between two identifiably different elements that
nonetheless are virtually present in one another due to the inseparability and reciprocal determination that follows from their foundational holistic relation.192
Read in this way, the doctrine of butsubon ittai implies that the relationship between sentient beings and Amida Buddha can be characterized as not one, not two, but both one and two. In other words,
sentient beings are the locus of Amida Buddhas work in the world and
exist in a relationship of mutual determination that is shinjin. From
the perspective of the religious practitioner, Amida Buddha is wholly
other, true and real; sentient beings suffer due to the fact our very
being is characterized by innumerable passions and cravings. From the
perspective of Amida Buddha, sentient beings are not separate from
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Amida Buddha as they are the locus for the operating of Amida Buddha
in this world.
Using the lens of intersubjectivity opens up for us the issues of
otherness within Shin Buddhism. Shin Buddhist thought conceives of
the relationship of religious practitioner and Amida Buddha as being
fundamentally different. Due to blind passions and delusions, the religious practitioner is destined to a life of samsaric wanderings. However,
as an other Amida Buddha vows to save all sentient beings, thereby assuring that through entrusting in Amidas primal vow sentient beings
will attain buddhahood. Because of this assurance, sentient beings are
equal to the buddhas. However, as long as sentient beings existence
remains characterized by the wanderings and delusions of samsara
they are fundamentally different from the buddhas. This relationship
is intersubjective in that upon realizing the difference between their
present states of existence and enlightenment, sentient beings also realize what it means that enlightenment is assured by Amida Buddhas
primal vow.
(RE-)READING NISHIDAS PHILOSOPHY THROUGH SHIN THOUGHT
Nishidas philosophy was influenced by both traditional and
contemporaneous Shin thought, and, as exemplified by Shinran and
Rennyo, Shin thought conceives of the relationship between Amida
Buddha and the religious practitioner as being both equal and not
equal. For these reasons Shin thought provides a useful hermeneutic
for understanding Nishidas non-dualism, allowing us to bring into dialogue Shin ideas of the relation between Amida and religious practitioner and Nishidas understanding of the relationship between absolute
and relative.
(Re-)Reading193
As discussed previously, Nishida conceives of the relationship between absolute and relative through the phrase the self-identity of
absolute contradiction. Nishida uses this term to explain that the absolute is included in and expressed by its opposite, the relative. For
Nishida this relationship is dynamic in that absolute and relative are,
as we have already seen, mutually defining and determining. From the
very beginning of his philosophic writings to his final completed work,
Nishida sought to show that all phenomena/forms exist in a unity with
God,194 while simultaneously arguing that at times, when seen from
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one angle, Gods spirit is unknowable.195 In other words, although sentient beings are one with the absolute (God, Amida Buddha, etc.), they
are differentiated from the absolute in that sentient beings view of
reality is askew and truth is hidden.
Given this difference and the compassionate desire of that which
is absolute to enter into relationship with all that is relative, Nishida
argues, the absolute is only absolute insofar as it contains its own
negation.196 Nishida explains this qua Shin Buddhist soteriology. The
formless that is suchness, through self-negation, takes on form; Amida
Buddha, arising out of suchness, itself takes form in this world. Amida
Buddhas self-negation is so strong that Amida saves sentient beings
even by manifesting himself as a devil.197 Sentient beings, or that
which is relative, although existing in a unity with the absolute, are
incapable of self-negation; they therefore must rely on the activity of
the absolute in order to enter fully into relationship with the absolute.
Nishida derives his understanding of negation from Shinrans
explication of Amidas calculation and the practitioners entrusting.
For example, as the idea that Shinran would be able to attain enlightenment through his own calculations was abandoned, Shinran came to
entrust in the activity of Amida Buddha, and thus realized that Amidas
primal vow was entirely for [Shinrans] sake alone.198 It was through
Amida as suchness taking form that Shinran was able to awaken the
mind of shinjin. The transcendent thus not only identifies with its opposite but takes form and expresses itself as that which is immanent.
Through the nenbutsu sentient beings become expressions of
Amida Buddhas primal vow in that they effortlessly reach a state of
existence described as being artless and one with the working of the
dharma (jinen hni).199 Nishida goes on to explain that through becoming one with the working of the dharma sentient beings are able to
act with true compassion, which means to act without regard for the
I and in accordance with the working of Amida Buddhas primal vow,
being one with the working of the dharma.
The entire universe is for Nishida the expression of suchness itself.
The formless negates itself and takes form. Shinran understood this as
Amida appearing in this world as Hnen at a time when it was no longer
possible, according to Shinran, for sentient beings to awaken aspiration for enlightenment on their own. Eshinnis letters also make clear
that Shinran viewed Hnen and other select individuals in this way.200
Nishida expressed this relationship as the self-identity of absolute
73
contradiction, where the distance between the absolute is contained in

and expressed by the relative. Absolute and relative do not stand diametrically opposed. Rather, as Nishida argues in the final paragraph of
The Logic of Topos, the absolute and relative, as Pure Land and this
world respectively, reflect each other. Nishida explains: Just as the
congregation centered around the Buddha on this shore sees the Pure
Land, so this shore is seen by the congregation of the other shore. The
world of human beings (shaba []) reflects the Pure Land (jdo [
]), and the Pure Land reflects the world of humanity. Clear mirrors
mirror each other. This suggests the intrinsic identity of the Pure Land
and the human world.201
Nishidas description of how the Pure Land and world relate in this
paragraph echoes much of the above discussion. The Pure Land, as
Nishida explains above, is not known apart from this world. This world
mirrors the Pure Land and the Pure Land mirrors this world. Nishida
seems to be suggesting here that ones experience of the Pure Land is
intersubjective. One can only understand the experience of birth in
the Pure Land through the experiences of this world. Whether it be the
realization of Amidas light breaking into ones everyday existence or
Amida taking form in this world to teach, the way in which one views
the Pure Land is shaped by ones experiences of this world. Our experiences of this world are shaped by those around us. Thus, much
like Shinran came to believe that Hnen was the form taken by Amida
Buddha in this world, Nishida allows in his philosophy for the absolute
to manifest itself as form in this world. Nishida believed it is this abilitythe ability of the absolute to willingly take on formto cease being
absolute that makes something absolute. While much of the above is
common to general Mahyna Buddhist thought, when we read this
in light of what has been presented above, we can speculate that
Nishidas introduction to these ideas came from Jdo Shinsh. When
we consider that Nishida grew up in a home where Shin Buddhism was
a constant presence, that he had professional ties with a number of
influential Shin thinkers, and that he came to understand foundational
Zen Buddhist concepts through the lens of Shin Buddhism, it seems to
follow that Shin Buddhism may have been the wellspring from which
Nishida drew when developing the above ideas.
The purpose of placing Nishidas ideas into a Jdo Shinsh context has not been to argue that Nishidas philosophy is a Pure Land
theology, but rather to show the resonance between Nishidas ideas
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and Jdo Shinsh doctrinal concepts. While these concepts may not be
unique to Jdo Shinsh, it is through Jdo Shinsh that Nishida learned
about them, and by an understanding of how Jdo Shinsh uses and
talks about such concepts as self/other and non-duality Nishidas ideas
become more intelligible.
As is well known, Nishida wanted to explain the entire world. With
this as his goal, Nishida drew from a wide variety of sources. This, then,
is both the strength and weakness of Nishidas philosophy. It is the
strength, as Kopf explains, because in Nishidas philosophy one finds
a network of terminology, which, when developed carefully, provides
a model for an intercultural philosophy.202 It is a weakness in that
Nishidas philosophy is at times at best ambiguous, and sources are
cut off from the socio-historical context within which they developed.
Conclusions and Opportunities for Future Studies
The study of Nishidas philosophy and its relationship to Buddhism
is messy at best. In the past scholars have tended to see Nishidas philosophy as the philosophy of Zen Buddhism, thus giving a distorted
vision of both Zen and Nishidas philosophy. For example, Steve Odins
The Social Self in Zen and American Philosophy, while an exemplary model
of how comparative philosophy ought to look, deals very little with
Zen and more with the philosophy of the Kyoto school philosophers in
conversation with the Chicago school of American pragmatism, particularly the thought of George Herbert Mead.203 While Odins project of
dialoging the thought of the Kyoto school with American pragmatism is
welcome, the equation of Kyoto school philosophy with Zen Buddhism
is problematic, as is the equation of Meads pragmatism with American
philosophy. Simply put, Odin does not differentiate how or where the
thought of the Kyoto school is different from Zen Buddhism.
While the Shin tradition and Nishidas philosophy do have a
number of commonalities, in essence they are fundamentally different.
As indicated by the quote from Wargo above showed, Nishida was not
interested in leading others to religious awakening; rather, he wanted
to provide an explanation of the world that allowed for religious experience beyond the role of superstition. Shinran and Rennyo set
out to explain a religious path that would lead others to awakening;
whether the path was rational by philosophic standards, frankly, did
not concern them.
75
I believe that future studies of Nishida philosophy will need to

continue to separate Nishidas philosophy from the field of Buddhist
studies. While Nishida was clearly influenced by and drew upon a
number of Buddhist sources, the true genius in Nishidas philosophy
is found more in the hermeneutic that he was struggling to develop.
Nishida may have created one of many philosophies of religion,
and it is perhaps in the context of philosophy of religion that he
will eventually be studied in the United States. In Japan, the study
of Nishidas philosophy is currently being shaped by a number of
individuals. With Kyoto University now having a Department of
Japanese Philosophy, it seems Nishida studies have for the time being
found a home. This home is significantly positioned apart from both
the fields of religious studies and European and American philosophy,
and is perhaps even in the midst of a revival as a philosophic movement
given the focus of a number of recent Japanese publications. The future
of Nishida studies thus looks bright throughout the world. At present
a number of individuals in the United States, Europe, and Japan are
at work on not only sourcebooks of Japanese philosophy, but on
developing increasingly nuanced philosophic positions based on the
groundbreaking work of Nishida.
Regarding the study of the other within Buddhist paths of awakening, it is clear that more studies need to be done. This study has
examined mainly founder figures and traditional Buddhist sources.
It would be welcome to read how both medieval and contemporary
Buddhists describe their faith, with an eye toward whether others are
important in what they both say and do. It was noted above that in the
American Buddhist context, Buddhism has often been presented as a
solitary pursuit. One wonders, therefore, whether American Buddhists
too consider others as integral parts of the Shin Buddhist path.
Additionally there is a need to delve deeper into traditional Buddhist
texts to look at how the role of others is conceptualized. Ideally, these
studies would look not only at the text itself but also at the socio-historical context within which these texts developed. Textual understandings as we have seen are not static. Scholars have documented
how such seemingly basic Buddhist concepts such as nothingness,
suchness, or the idea of a buddha have changed quite dramatically as
the Buddhist tradition has developed. It is my opinion that the role
of others has been conceptualized in a number of ways throughout
Buddhist discourse. Employing the idea of intersubjectivity as it has
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been developed in modern philosophy and psychotherapy has allowed

us to understand both the extent to which Pure Land thought played a
key role in the development of Nishidas philosophy and the necessity
of others in Shin Buddhist paths of awakening.
notes
1. Nishitani Keiji, Nishida Kitar, trans. Yamamoto Seisaku and James W. Heisig
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 26.
2. This description is problematic, as John C. Maraldo argues that it is
dependent upon a rather narrow definition of philosophy. Maraldo notes
that both critics (Nakamura Yjir) and supporters (Takahashi Satomi, Funayama
Shinichi, and Shimomura Torar) have described Nishidas work as being
the first example of Japanese philosophy. However, Maraldo argues that
describing Nishida as Japans first philosopher implies a double closure:
premodern, indeed pre-Nishida Japanese (and Asian) thought was excluded
from the title of philosophy, strictly speaking; and philosophy in Japan after
him was bound to take a stance toward him, be it emulation, inspiration,
outspoken criticism or silent rejection. Maraldo continues by calling for a
broader understanding of philosophy that is constantly in a state of translation. Trans-lation, as Maraldo explains, describes a continual process of
transference and transposition, incorporation and expulsion, creation and
destruction, writing and rewriting. Maraldo concludes by arguing that at
present Japan has a long philosophic history, which includes figures such as
Kkai, Dgen, and Shinran. See John C. Maraldo, Tradition, Textuality, and
the Trans-lation of Philosophy: The Case of Japan, in Japan in Traditional and
Postmodern Perspectives, ed. Charles Wei-hsun Fu and Steven Heine (Albany:
State University of New York Press, 1995), 228, 233, and 239240.
3. On the development, naming, and membership of the Kyoto school, see
James W. Heisig, Philosophers of Nothingness: An Essay on the Kyoto School
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2001), 37.
4. Ibid., 32.
5. See, for example, Bernard Faure, Chan Insights and Oversights: An Epistemological
Critique of the Chan Tradition (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993),
5288; Bernard Faure, The Kyoto School and Reverse Orientalism, in Japan
in Traditional and Postmodern Perspectives, ed. Charles Wei-Hsun Fu and Steven
Heine (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), 245281; Robert H.
Sharf, The Zen of Japanese Nationalism, in Curators of the Buddha, ed. Donald
S. Lopez, Jr. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 107160; Robert H.
Sharf, Whose Zen? Zen Nationalism Revisited, in Rude Awakenings: Zen, the
Kyoto School and the Question of Nationalism, ed. James W. Heisig and John C.
Maraldo (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995), 4051.
77
6. Sharf, The Zen of Japanese Nationalism,144.

7. Nishida Kitar, Zen no kenky (An Inquiry into the Good) (Tokyo:
Kodokan, 1911).
8. Faure, Chan Insights and Oversights, 84.
9. Abe Masao, introduction to An Inquiry into the Good, by Nishida Kitar, trans.
Abe Masao and Christopher Ives (New Haven, NY: Yale University Press, 1990),
xii. There are two translations of Zen no kenky available in English. The
first, A Study of the Good, trans. V. H. Viglielmo (Tokyo: Ministry of Education,
1960), contains Suzukis introduction. The second translation by Abe Masao
and Christopher Ives (cited above) contains Abes introduction rather than
Suzukis. For the Japanese see Nishida Kitar, Nishida Kitar zensh, 19 vols.
(Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1948; repr. 1988), 1:3200.
11. Ibid.
12. Nishida Kitar, An Inquiry into the Good, trans. Abe Masao and Christopher
Ives (New Haven, NY: Yale University Press, 1990), 176.
13. I thank Professor Eisho Nasu of the Institute of Buddhist Studies for
pointing this out.
14. Heisig, Philosophers of Nothingness, 38.
15. Ibid., 39.
16. Ibid., 38.
17. Ibid., 52.
18. Ibid., 29.
19. Robert J. J. Wargo, The Logic of Nothingness: A Study of Nishida Kitar (Honolulu:
University of Hawaii Press, 2005), 3.
21. Agustn Jacinto Zavala, The Return of the Past, in Rude Awakenings: Zen,
the Kyoto School and the Question of Nationalism, ed. James W. Heisig and John C.
Maraldo (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1995), 142.
22. Nishida Kitar, A New Years Lecture to the Emperor: On the Philosophy of
History, trans. Yusa Michiko; quoted in Yusa Michiko, Zen and Philosophy: An
Intellectual Biography of Nishida Kitar (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press,
2002), 318.
23. Yusa, Zen and Philosophy, 311.
25. Ibid., 84.
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27. Ibid., 9899.
28. Ibid., 99.
29. For more on questions of nationalism and imperialism in the Kyoto school
see James Heisig and John C. Maraldo, eds., Rude Awakenings: Zen, the Kyoto
School and the Question of Nationalism (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press,
1994). Recently, David Williams has argued that questions of nationalism in
projects of the Kyoto school are an example of how the Allied gaze has
been used to frame understandings of Japan. Williams argues that in the
Kyoto school one finds the first examples of post-White philosophy, and that
questioning the Kyoto school on grounds of nationalism is a tactic to maintain
both philosophic and academic hegemony. Williams arguments fall apart in
that he fails to consider that a number of Japanese works have questioned
the role of nationalism in the Kyoto school. In fact, eight Japanese authors
contributed to Rude Awakenings, and every author draws upon Japanese
sources in either critiquing or defending the Kyoto school. See David Williams,
Defending Japans Pacific War: The Kyoto School Philosophers and Post-White Power
(New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004).
30. Nishida Kitar zensh, 1:407409. For an English translation see Dennis
Hirota, Nishidas Gutoku Shinran, Eastern Buddhist 18, no. 2 (1995): 242244.
31. Ibid., 231.
32. Ibid., 239.
33. Nishida Kitar zensh 7:371464. For English translation see Nishida Kitar,
The Logic of Topos and the Religious Worldview I, trans. Yusa Michiko, The
Eastern Buddhist 19, no. 1 (1986): 129, and Nishida Kitar, The Logic of Topos
and the Religious Worldview II, trans. Yusa Michiko The Eastern Buddhist 20,
no. 2 (1987), 81119.
34. Takemura Makio , Nishida Kitar to Bukky Zen to Shinsh no kontei
wokiwameru(Tokyo:Daito
Shuppansha, 2002), 47.
35. Ibid., 48.
36. Nishida Kitar zensh 1:407; Hirota, Nishidas Gutoku Shinran, 242.
38. Takemura, Nishida Kitar, 49.
39. Ibid., 50.
79
42. Ibid., 337.

43. Heisig, Philosophers of Nothingness, 278. Heisig cites the work of Takeda
Rysei as being one of the few works from a Jdo Shinsh perspective that is
not dismissive of Nishidas understanding of Shinran. See for example Takeda
Rysei, Shinran Jdoky to Nishida Tetsugaku (Kyoto:
Nagata Bunshodo, 1991).
44. Dennis Hirota, Images of Reality in the Shin Buddhist Path, in Toward
a Contemporary Understanding of Pure Land Buddhism: Creating a Shin Buddhist
Theology in a Religiously Plural World, ed. Dennis Hirota (Albany: State University
of New York Press, 2000), 48.
46. Gereon Kopf, Between Identity and Difference: Three Ways of Reading
Nishidas Non-Dualism, Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 31, no. 1 (2004): 83.
47. Nishida, The Logic of Topos and the Religious Worldview I, 3.
48. Kopf, Between Identity and Difference, 83.
49. For an in-depth study of the two truths theory see Paul L. Swanson,
Foundations of Tien-tai Philosophy (Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1989).
50. References to buddha are to the cosmological buddha (which is without
features or form), not the historical Buddha, kyamuni. When references
to kyamuni Buddha are made either the name or the particle the will
precede the word Buddha.
51. Shinjin has often been translated as faith. This essay, following the
precedent set by the Shin Buddhism Translation Series, leaves the term
untranslated. As Ueda Yoshifumi explains, the concept of faith stands on
the duality of God (creator) and man (created), shinjin is the oneness of
Buddha and man, or mans becoming a buddha (Ueda Yoshifumi, Response
to Thomas P. Kasulis Review of Letters of Shinran, Philosophy East and West
46, no. 3 [1981]: 507). In other words, faith, according to Ueda, is predicated
on the notion of dualism, whereas shinjin is representative of a non-dual
relation between buddha and sentient being. Challenging Ueda, Takeda Rysei,
a member of the advisory board to the Shin Buddhism Translation Series, has
argued that shinjin ought to be translated as faith given that both faith and
shinjin are relational concepts, and that by not translating shinjin the Shin
Buddhism Translation Series has committed itself to an exclusive position
that prevents a dialogue among religions from occurring. See Takeda Rysei
, Shinrans View of Faith, in Shinran Jdoky to Nishida Tetsugaku
(Kyoto: Nagata Bunshd, 1991), 74.
52. Jdo Shinsh Hongwanji-Ha, The Collected Works of Shinran, 2 vols. (Kyoto:
Jdo Shinsh Hongwanji-Ha, 1997), 2:532; Shinsh Shgy Zensho Hensansho
, Shinsh shgy zensho , 5 vols. (Kyoto:
80
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yagi Kbundo, 1940), 1:667.

53. Collected Works of Shinran, 1:679; Shinsh shgy zensho, 2:792.
56. Jessica Benjamin, The Bonds of Love: Psychoanalysis, Feminism and the Problem
of Domination (New York: Pantheon Books, 1998), 20.
57. See Brook Ziporyn, Evil and/or/as The Good: Omnicentrism, Intersubjectivity
and Value Paradox (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2000).
58. James W. Heisig, Non-I and Thou: Nishida, Buber, and the Moral Con
sequences of Self-Actualization, Philosophy East and West 50, no. 2 (2000): 180.
59. Gereon Kopf, On the Brink of Postmodernity: Recent Japanese-Language
Publications of the Philosophy of Nishida Kitar, Japanese Journal of Religious
Studies 30, nos. 12 (2003): 134.
60. Kopf, On the Brink of Postmodernity, 134.
62. Ibid., 130.
63. Ueda Shizuteru, Zen and Philosophy in the Thought of Nishida Kitar,
trans. Mark Unno, Japanese Religions 18, no. 2 (July 1993): 187. The first
sentence of Uedas quotation may represent a formulation of the logic of
sokuhi , found in the Diamond Sutra and often employed by D. T. Suzuki
as A is not A therefore it is A, which Nishida identified later in his career as
being synonymous with his logic of the self-identity of absolute contradiction.
However, as Gereon Kopf has shown, the logic of sokuhi that Nishida employed
is fundamentally different from the logic expressed in the Diamond Sutra. See
Gereon Kopf, Critical Comments on Nishidas Use of Chinese Buddhism,
Journal of Chinese Philosophy 32, no. 2 (June 2005): 318321.
64. Ueda, Zen and Philosophy in the Thought of Nishida Kitar, 188.
65. Thomas Kasulis, Zen Action/Zen Person (Honolulu: University of Hawaii
Press, 1981), 59.
66. Ueda, Zen and Philosophy in the thought of Nishida Kitar, 166. The
reader will recall that both Faure and Sharf have questioned the construction
of the Zen tradition that Ueda and Kasulis are using; see supra, note 5.
67. Ueda, Zen and Philosophy in the Thought of Nishida Kitar, 168.
69. Yusa, Zen and Philosophy, 55. Nishida was at this time a middle school
English teacher in Kanazawa.
70. Takemura, Nishida Kitar, 50; Yusa, Zen and Philosophy, 55.
81
71. Nishida Kitar, Letter no. 595, 4 January 1930, NKZ 18:396-398, trans.
Yusa Michiko, quoted in Yusa, Zen and Philosophy, 246.
73. Ibid., 52.
74. Nishida Kitar zensh, 1:199; Nishida, An Inquiry into the Good, 176 (modified).
76. Fujita Masakatsu , Kiyozawa Manshi to Nishida Kitar
, in Kiyozawa Manshi: Sono hito to shis
, ed. Fujita Masakatsu and Yasutomi Shinya (Kyoto:
Hzkan, 2002), 120.
77. Nishida first uses Shin Buddhism to explain what the true religious
experience is. Nishida writes, Shinran is quoted in the Tannish: The
nembutsu chanted in the heart to increase works leading to rebirth in the
pure land is a practice based on ones own efforts. The second quotation
comes when Nishida explains the unity of absolute and relative. Reflection
is the route along which we attain a profound unity. (Shinran declares in the
Tannish, If even a good person attains rebirth in the Pure Land, how much
more so does an evil person.). Nishida, An Inquiry into the Good, 150, 170.
78. Fujita, Kiyozawa Manshi to Nishida Kitar, 132133.
79. Thomas Kirchner, The Life of Manshi Kiyozawa, in December Fan: The
Buddhist Essays of Manshi Kiyozawa, trans. Nobuo Haneda (Kyoto: Higashi
Honganji, 1984), 87.
81. Ibid., 87.
82. Ibid., 127.
83. Hirota, Nishidas Gutoku Shinran, 243; Nishida Kitar zensh, 1:408.
84. Nakamura Sichi , Zenyaku Shbgenz ikkan
(Tokyo: Seishin Shob, 1971), 2.
86. This quote seems to have intrigued not only Nishida but other members of
the Kyoto school as well. Nishitani Keiji (19001990), the third major
figure of the Kyoto school after Nishida and Tanabe Hajime (18851962),
took up this passage in his article The Problem of Time in Shinran, trans.
Dennis Hirota, The Eastern Buddhist 11, no. 1 (1978): 1326.
87. Fujita, Kiyozawa Manshi to Nishida Kitar, 134.
89. Ibid., 100.
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90. Kopf, Critical Comments on Nishidas Use of Chinese Buddhism, 314.

91. Ibid., 326.
93. Kopf, Nishidas use of Chinese Buddhism, 322. Kopf notes that Nishida
first use of gyakutai occurs in The Logic of Topos, while Nishida first use of
byjtei occurred in Philosophical Essays, volume 3 (Tetsugaku ronbunsh daisan
), See Kopf, Nishidas use of Chinese Buddhism, 328n52.
94. Kopf, Critical Comments on Nishidas Use of Chinese Buddhism, 322.
97. Fujita Masakatsu , Gendai shis toshite no Nishida Kitar
(Tokyo: Kdansha, 1998), 208.
98. Kosaka Kunitsugu , Nishida tetsugaku to shky
(Tokyo: Daito Shuppansha, 1994), 306.
99. Kosaka, Nishida tetsugaku to shky, 252.
101. Kosaka, Nishida tetsugaku to shky, 252.
102. On the history and development of nishu jinshin see Rysh Yata, An
Examination of the Historical Development of the Concept of Two Aspects of
Deep Belief, Part 1 and Part 2, trans. David Matsumoto, Pacific World, n.s., 3
(2001): 157175 and Pacific World, n.s., 4 (2002): 237257.
103. Nishida, The Logic of Topos and the Religious Worldview II, 105.
104. Ibid., 106.
105. Ibid., 92. Shinran quotes the Pure Land parable of the white path between
two rivers in the Kygyshinsh; see Collected Works of Shinran, 1:8990; Shinsh
shgy zensho, 2:221222.
108. Ibid., 330.
109. Kopf, Three Ways of Reading Nishidas Non-Dualism, 83.
110. Nishida, An Inquiry into the Good, 170.
111. Nishida uses the term God as a signifier for the highest of absolutes.
At other times, Nishida interchangeably refers to the absolute as the Buddha,
Amida Buddha, dharma, and absolute nothingness.
83
114. Gereon Kopf, Beyond Personal Identity (Richmond, Surrey: Curzon, 2001),
5354; Brook Ziporyn, Evil and/or/as The Good, 199201. Both Kopf and Ziporyn
have published arguments that show the necessity of the role of the Other
in Buddhist thought that are similar to those cited here, see for example
Gereon Kopf, In the Face of the Other, in The Couch and the Tree, ed. Anthony
Molino (New York: North Point Press, 1998), 276289; Brook Ziporyn, What
Is the Buddha Looking At? The Importance of Intersubjectivity in the Tientai Tradition as Understood by Chih-li, in Buddhism in the Sung, ed. Peter N.
Gregory and Daniel A. Getz, Jr. (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1999),
442476; and, Brook Ziporyn, Being and Ambiguity (Chicago: Open Court, 2004)
293294.
115. Varghese J. Manimala, Being, Person and Community (New Delhi:
Intercultural Publications, 1991), 182.
116. Given that Shinran was originally ordained as a Tendai monk, it may
strike the reader as being apropos to explore intersubjectivity and issues of
identity and difference in Tiantai; however, these issues have previously been
explored in great detail. Tiantai and Tendai notions of intersubjectivity that
may have influenced Shinrans thought will be discussed in the section on
Jdo Shinsh conceptions of identity and difference. Although beyond the
scope of this essay, for an excellent account of intersubjectivity in Tibetan
Buddhism see B. Allan Wallace, Intersubjectivity in Indo-Tibetan Buddhism,
Journal of Consciousness Studies 8, nos. 57 (2001): 209230.
117. W. T. Jones and Robert J. Fogelin, A History of Western Philosophy: The
Twentieth Century to Quine and Derrida, 3rd ed. (New York: Harcourt Brace
College Publishers, 1997), 359.
118. Notably absent in much of Benjamins work and the present discussion
is the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas. Benjamin makes clear that she disagrees with any psychological or philosophic theory that conceives of the
Other as transcendent and ineffable. Benjamin, as will become clear in the
ensuing discussion, notes the philosophic and psychological necessity for a
relationship between self and other as interdependent. While Benjamin would
most likely agree with Levinas concerning the danger of subsuming the Other
to the self, Levinass focus on the Other as transcendent and ineffable is ultimately untenable for theories of intersubjectivity. On Benjamins rejection
on an ineffable other, see Jessica Benjamin, Shadow of the Other: Intersubjectivity and Gender in Psychoanalysis (New York: Routledge, 1998), 94. An excellent
overview of Levinass philosophy regarding Otherness is Colin Davis, Levinas:
An Introduction (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1996), 3462.
Levinass most well-known and often quoted work regarding the Other is
Emmanuel Levinas, Time and the Other, trans. R. A. Cohen (Pittsburgh: Duquesne
84
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University Press, 1987).

119. Pierre Hadot, What Is Ancient Philosophy?, trans. Michael Chase (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2002), 23.
120. Benjamin, Bonds of Love, 1920.
121. Jessica Benjamin, Like Subjects, Love Objects: Essays on Recognition and Sexual
Difference (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 30.
122. Ibid., 28.
124. Judith Butler, Undoing Gender (New York: Routledge, 2004), 148.
126. Ibid., 49.
127. Jessica Benjamin, Shadow of the Other, 96.
128. Benjamin, Like Subjects, Love Objects, 185.
129. Jeff Shore, Basics of Zen Practice, Hanazono Daigaku Bungakubu Kenky
Kiyou 36 (March 2004): 3.
130. Shore, Basics of Zen Practice, 3.
131. Hajime Nakamura, Gotama Buddha (Los Angeles: Buddhist Books
International, 1977), 63.
132. Edward J. Thomas, The Life of the Buddha: As Legend and History (New York:
Barnes and Noble, 1951), 146.
133. Roger J. Corless, The Vision of Buddhism (New York: Paragon House, 1989),
13. Corlesss emphasis here on the word collectively is done in response to
the all too common presentation of Buddhist practice as solitary.
134. Richard F. Gombrich explains that the words of the Triple Refuge (I take
refuge in the Buddha, I take refuge in the dharma, and I take refuge in the
sangha), when said with intention, are the means by which one becomes a
Buddhist. See Richard F. Gombrich, Precept and Practice: Traditional Buddhism in
the Rural Highlands of Ceylon (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 65.
135. Ziporyn, Evil and/or/as the Good, 199.
136. Paul Williams and Anthony Tribe, Buddhist Thought: A Complete Introduction
to the Indian Tradition (New York: Routledge, 2000), 93.
137. Kopf, Beyond Personal Identity, 97; Ziporyn, Evil and/or/as the Good, 200.
138. Inagaki Hisao and Harold Stewart, trans., The Larger Sutra on Amityus,
in The Three Pure Land Sutras, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: Numata Center for Buddhist
Translation and Research, 2003), 16.
85

140. Dan Lusthaus postulates a number of reasons both historical and epistemological to account for the marked differences between Sinitic forms of
Mahyna Buddhism and Indo-Tibetan forms of Buddhism. One of the most
striking reasons is the development of a Chinese Buddhist shift from psychology to meta-psychology, whereas in the Indo-Tibetan traditions we find a
shift from psychology to logico-epistemology. See for example Dan Lusthaus,
Buddhist Phenomenology: A Philosophical Investigation of Yogcra Buddhism and
the Cheng Wei-shih lun (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), 356373.
141. Kenneth K. Tanaka, The Dawn of Chinese Pure Land Buddhism: Ching-ying Huiyans Commentary on the Visualization Sutra (Albany: State University of New
York Press, 1990), 21.
142. Jacqueline I. Stone, Original Enlightenment and the Transformation of Japanese
Buddhism (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1999), 5.
143. Yoshito S. Hakeda, trans., The Awakening of Faith: Attributed to Avaghosha
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 43.
144. Hakeda, The Awakening of Faith, 48.
145. Stone, Original Enlightenment, 6.
146. Ibid., 37.
147. Stone notes that the Japanese hongaku thought is indebted not only to
the specific category of original enlightenment set forth in the Awakening
of Faith and developed in its commentaries, but more broadly to the great
totalistic systems of Chinese Buddhist thought, especially those of Hua-yen
and Tien-tai. See Stone, Original Enlightenment, 6.
148. Paul Williams, Mahyna Buddhism: The Doctrinal Foundations (New York:
Routledge, 1989), 127.
149. Edward Conze, Buddhist Thought in India: Three Phases of Buddhist Philosophy
(Ann Arbor: Ann Arbor Paperbacks University of Michigan Press, 1967), 92
106.
150. David L. McMahan, Empty Vision: Metaphor and Visionary Imagery in
Mahyna Buddhism (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), 112.
151. Ibid., 117.
152. Takakusu Junjir , Watanabe Kaigyoku et al., eds.,
Taish Shinsh Daizoky , vol. 10, no. 279 (Tokyo: Taish
Issaiky Kankkai, 19241934), 432a.
153. Both shih and li have numerous English translations. Depending on context
shih has been translated as thing, event, matter, the particular,
the concrete, and phenomenon. Translations for li include principle,
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Pacific World
universal truth, reason, the abstract, the law, noumenon,

judgment, and knowledge. It should be noted that phenomenon and
noumenon are problematic in this context given their connection with the
philosophy of Immanuel Kant, where the noumenon is unknowable.
154. Garma C. C. Chang, The Buddhist Teaching of Totality: The Philosophy of Hwa
Yen Buddhism (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1971),
141171.
155. Ibid., 142.
156. Ibid., 143.
157. Peter N. Gregory, Tsung-Mi and the Sinification of Buddhism (Honolulu:
University of Hawaii Press, 2002), 6768.
158. Chang, The Buddhist Teaching of Totality, 144.
159. Gregory, Tsung-Mi and the Sinification of Buddhism, 188189.
160. Ibid., 68.
161. Williams, Mahyna Buddhism, 133.
162. McMahan, Empty Vision, 122.
163. Ibid., 122.
164. Stone, Original Enlightenment, 87.
165. Hirota, Images of Reality in the Shin Buddhist Path, 50.
166. Ibid., 56.
167. James C. Dobbins, Letters of the Nun Eshinni: Images of Pure Land Buddhism in
Modern Japan (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2004), 71.
168. Ibid., 72.
169. Presentations of non-duality in Buddhist scholarship, characterizing
dualistic understandings of the world as immature, are perhaps part of a
larger trend in both doctrine and scholarship that tries to portray Buddhism
as a rational religion. Although beyond the scope of this essay, there are a
number of historical reasons for the presentation of a rationalized form of
Buddhism. Gerard Clinton Godart notes that during the Meiji period (1858
1912) Buddhism in Japan faced a number of challenges, including (1) decreasing
popularity among the intellectual elite; (2) anti-Buddhist sentiment during the
Meiji Restoration, in which a rising nationalism characterized Buddhism as a
threat due to its foreign origins; (3) scholarly treatments, both Japanese and
European, of Mahyna Buddhism as inauthentic; and (4) a general perception
that Buddhism was no longer a credible explanation of the world (Gerard
Clinton Godart, Tracing the Circle of Truth: Inoue Enry on the History of
Philosophy and Buddhism, Eastern Buddhist 36, nos. 12 [2004]). In response
87
to this Inoue Enry (18581919), a Jdo Shinsh priest and founder

of the Tetsugakkan (which later became Ty University ),
coined the term Buddhist philosophy (bukky tetsugaku ). The goal
of Buddhist philosophy, as Godart explains, was to separate the philosophical
parts and the religious parts that exist in Buddhism; additionally, Inoue
interpreted Buddhism as a religion based on philosophy (Godart, Tracing
the Circle of Truth, 111112). While the categories of Buddhist philosophy
are no longer used in Japanese academia, Inoues legacy and formulation of
Buddhism seems to survive at present given the history of Buddhist studies in
the United States. For more see Godart, Tracing the Circle of Truth. For more
on the history of Buddhism during the Meiji era see James Edward Ketelar,
Of Heretics and Martyrs in Meiji Japan: Buddhism and Its Persecution (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 4386. An excellent overview of themes
and challenges that have shaped the field of Buddhist studies is Jacqueline I.
Stone, Buddhism, in Nanzan Guide to Japanese Religions, ed. Paul L. Swanson
and Clark Chilson (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 2006), 3864.
172. Collected Works of Shinran, 2:182183.
174. Neil Donner, Sudden and Gradual Intimately Conjoined: Chih-is Tientai View, in Sudden and Gradual: Approaches to Enlightenment in Chinese Thought,
ed. Peter N. Gregory (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), 204.
175. Donner, Sudden and Gradual Intimately Conjoined, 204.
176. Stone, Original Enlightenment, 45. For more on medieval Tendai methodology and its influence on Shinran, see Eisho Nasu, Rely on the Meaning, Not
on the Words: Shinrans Methodology and Strategy for Reading Scriptures
and Writing the Kygyshinsh,in Discourse and Ideology in Medieval Japanese
Buddhism, ed. Richard K. Payne and Taigen Daniel Leighton (London and New
York: Routledge, 2006).
178. Nasu, Rely on the Meaning, Not on the Words.
179. Roger Corless, Who Was Shinrans Teacher?: A Comparison of Lineage
Authentication in Zen and Shin, The Pure Land, n.s., nos. 1314 (1997): 217.
180. Yoshifumi Ueda and Dennis Hirota, Shinran: An Introduction to His Thought
(Kyoto: Hongwanji: International Center, 1989), 112.
181. Oka Ryoji, Amida Buddha and the Pure Land, in Beyond Comparison:
Religious Pluralism and Religious Truth, Shinrans Thought in the Contemporary
World III, ed. Takeda Rysei (Kyoto: Rykoku Daigaku Bukkyo Bunka Kenkyjo,
88
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1997), 7172.
184. Concerning the development of Japanese Pure Land Buddhism following Hnens death, see Mark L. Blum, The Origins and Development of Pure Land
Buddhism: A Study and Translation of Gynens Jdo Hmon Genrush (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2002). It is interesting to note that Gynen does not
include Shinran in his survey of Pure Land Buddhism. Blum notes a number
of reasons why Gynen would not have included Shinran in his survey: (1)
Shinran had a low profile among Hnens senior disciples; (2) Gynens hermeneutic categories would have deemphasized Shinrans uniqueness in that
he would share the position of Ksai and Gyk; (3) Shinran had disdain for
contemplative practices; and (4) Shinran rejected monastic life (Blum, Origins
and Development of Pure Land Buddhism, 4144).
185. Minor L. Rogers and Ann T. Rogers, Rennyo: The Second Founder of Shin
Buddhism (Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1991), 9293.
186. Rogers and Rogers, Rennyo, 184; Shinsh shgy zensho, 3:439. On the
connection of kih ittai and Jdo Shinsh doctrine, see Rogers and Rogers,
Rennyo, 184n25.
187. Nait Chik , Anjin rondai o manabu (Kyoto:
Hongwanji Shuppansha, 2004), 193.
188. Ibid., 315.
189. Ibid., 313.
190. Ibid., 314.
191. Ibid., 319.
193. Though not explicitly cited, the work of Thomas Kasulis has been influential
in formulating my approach and reading of the work of Shinran, Renny,
and Nishida. In particular, see Thomas Kasulis, Philosophy as Metapraxis,
in Discourse and Practice, ed. Frank Reynolds and David Tracy (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1992), 169195; and Thomas Kasulis, Intimacy
or Integrity: Philosophy and Cultural Difference (Honolulu: University of Hawaii
Press, 2002).
194. Nishida, An Inquiry into the Good, 163.
195. Ibid., 165.
196. Nishida, The Logic of Topos and the Religious Worldview I, 19.
89

200. Dobbins, Letters of the Nun Eshinni, 147.
201. Ibid., 119.
202. Kopf, Nishidas use of Chinese Buddhism, 326.
203. Steve Odin, The Social Self in Zen and American Philosophy (Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1996).
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What are some of the problems in understanding Nishida's thought as Zen philosophy?

What are some of the problems in understanding Nishida's thought as Zen philosophy?

What are some of the Jodo Shinshu influences in Nishida's life and philosophic project?

What are some of the Jodo Shinshu influences in Nishida's life and philosophic project?

PACIFIC WORLD

Journal of the Institute of Buddhist Studies

Third Series Number 12

Identity in Difference: Reading Nishidas

McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario

Nishida Kitar (, 18701945) is often described as Japans

I start with some general background for discussing how Nishida

Friedrich: Identity in Difference

It is of interest here to note that Nishida does not explicitly refer to

Friedrich: Identity in Difference

presented to Emperor Hirohito in January 1941, in celebration of the

In this passage, Nishida makes clear that he sees the imperial

the ideological function of Nishidas work undermines the validity of

Friedrich: Identity in Difference

Friedrich: Identity in Difference

Friedrich: Identity in Difference

to what James Heisig has described as a broadening of the map of

Friedrich: Identity in Difference

as represented by The Logic of Topos and the Religious Worldview

but as thought.64 Nishida had thus successfully abandoned himself to

Friedrich: Identity in Difference

ofand on occasion participated inthe discussions occurring in Shin

Friedrich: Identity in Difference

Shin Buddhism and The Logic of Topos

Friedrich: Identity in Difference

Christianity, and had touched on the excellent points of Buddhism.92

Friedrich: Identity in Difference

When discussing Pure Land Buddhism, however, Nishida appears

of non-duality may have been inspired by Pure Land Buddhist sources.

Friedrich: Identity in Difference

with Amida or become one with the working of the dharma. To be

Friedrich: Identity in Difference

fields of literary studies, philosophical anthropology, psychology, and

Friedrich: Identity in Difference

international Zen at Hanazono University, has spent his breaks from

Friedrich: Identity in Difference

given to the meaning of identity in Mahyna discourse. For this we

Friedrich: Identity in Difference

The tension between the inherent potential for enlightenment and

Friedrich: Identity in Difference

reality, although accurate, reflect a shift to a more ontological nature

Friedrich: Identity in Difference

the Gaavyha-stra itself functions. McMahan describes Sudhanas

psychological well-being and for Buddhist paths of awakening. This

Friedrich: Identity in Difference

to place emphasis on the non-dual aspects of this relationship.

Friedrich: Identity in Difference

Chih-is six stages suggest a number of different kinds of identity

Friedrich: Identity in Difference

That the unifying experience of shinjin is so powerful is due to the

entire universe as consisting of Amida Buddhas light of wisdom. It is

Friedrich: Identity in Difference

Friedrich: Identity in Difference

Friedrich: Identity in Difference