Imbong vs.

Comelec
Facts:
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are
assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following
GROUNDS:
The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.
According to the petitioners, notwithstanding its declared
policy against abortion, the implementation of the RH Law
would authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives,
intra-uterine devices and injectables which are abortives, in
violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which
guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the
life of the unborn from conception.35
The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to
protection against hazardous products. The petitioners posit
that the RH Law provides universal access to contraceptives
which are hazardous to one's health, as it causes cancer and
other health problems.36
The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The
petitioners contend that the RH Law violates the
constitutional guarantee respecting religion as it authorizes
the use of public funds for the procurement of
contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use of public funds
for purposes that are believed to be contrary to their beliefs
is included in the constitutional mandate ensuring religious
freedom.37

Provincial, City, or Municipal Health Officers, medical officers,

medical specialists, rural health physicians, hospital staff nurses,
public health nurses, or rural health midwives, who are specifically
charged with the duty to implement these Rules, cannot be
considered as conscientious objectors.40
It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of
mandatory sex education in schools should not be allowed as it is
an affront to their religious beliefs.41
While the petit10ners recognize that the guarantee of religious
freedom is not absolute, they argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy
the "clear and present danger test" and the "compelling state
interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to free exercise of
religion and the right to free speech.42
The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on
involuntary servitude. According to the petitioners, the RH
Law subjects medical practitioners to involuntary servitude
because, to be accredited under the PhilHealth program,
they are compelled to provide forty-eight (48) hours of pro
bona services for indigent women, under threat of criminal
prosecution,
imprisonment
and
other
forms
of
punishment.43
The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are covered
by PhilHealth, a medical practitioner would effectively be forced to
render reproductive health services since the lack of PhilHealth
accreditation would mean that the majority of the public would no
longer be able to avail of the practitioners services.44

It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious

objectors of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of
punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients
who seek advice on reproductive health programs to other doctors;
and 2] to provide full and correct information on reproductive
health programs and service, although it is against their religious
beliefs and convictions.38

The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the

law. It is claimed that the RH Law discriminates against the
poor as it makes them the primary target of the government
program that promotes contraceptive use. The petitioners
argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health
among the poor, the RH Law seeks to introduce
contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of
the poor.45

In this connection, Section 5 .23 of the Implementing Rules and

Regulations of the RH Law (RH-IRR),39 provides that skilled health
professionals who are public officers such as, but not limited to,

The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due

process clause of the Constitution. In imposing the penalty
of imprisonment and/or fine for "any violation," it is vague

because it does not define the type of conduct to be treated

as "violation" of the RH Law.46
In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law
violates the right to due process by removing from them (the
people) the right to manage their own affairs and to decide what
kind of health facility they shall be and what kind of services they
shall offer."47 It ignores the management prerogative inherent in
corporations for employers to conduct their affairs in accordance
with their own discretion and judgment.
The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a
person to explain a full range of family planning methods is
plainly to curtail his right to expound only his own preferred
way of family planning. The petitioners note that although
exemption is granted to institutions owned and operated by
religious groups, they are still forced to refer their patients
to another healthcare facility willing to perform the service
or procedure.48
The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's
family protected by the Constitution. It is contended that the
RH Law providing for mandatory reproductive health
education intrudes upon their constitutional right to raise
their children in accordance with their beliefs.49
It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who
will undergo reproductive health procedure, the RH Law forsakes
any real dialogue between the spouses and impedes the right of
spouses to mutually decide on matters pertaining to the overall
well-being of their family. In the same breath, it is also claimed that
the parents of a child who has suffered a miscarriage are deprived
of parental authority to determine whether their child should use
contraceptives.50
The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of nondelegation of legislative authority. The petitioners question
the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to
determine whether a product is non-abortifacient and to be
included in the Emergency Drugs List (EDL).51
The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision
under Section 26( 1 ), Article VI of the Constitution.52

The RH Law violates Natural Law.53

The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local
Government Units (LGUs) and the Autonomous Region of
Muslim Mindanao {ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law,
providing for reproductive health measures at the local
government level and the ARMM, infringes upon the powers
devolved to LGUs and the ARMM under the Local
Government Code and R.A . No. 9054.54

Issue: WON RH bill violates the constitutional mandate

prescribing one subject one title rule.

One Subject-One Title

The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law,
claiming that it violates Section 26(1 ), Article VI of the
Constitution,122 prescribing the one subject-one title rule.
According to them, being one for reproductive health with
responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the
constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true intent
- to act as a population control measure.123
To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is
not a birth or population control measure,124 and that the
concepts of "responsible parenthood" and "reproductive health" are
both interrelated as they are inseparable.125
Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law,
the Court sees it as principally a population control measure. The
corpus of the RH Law is geared towards the reduction of the
country's population. While it claims to save lives and keep our
women and children healthy, it also promotes pregnancypreventing products. As stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the
need to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized,
with access to information on the full range of modem family
planning products and methods. These family planning methods,
natural or modem, however, are clearly geared towards the
prevention of pregnancy.
For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is
to reduce the number of births in the country.

It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide prenatal and post-natal care as well. A large portion of the law,
however, covers the dissemination of information and provisions on
access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal,
affordable, and quality reproductive health care services, methods,
devices, and supplies, which are all intended to prevent pregnancy.
The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the
whole idea of contraception pervades the entire RH Law. It is, in
fact, the central idea of the RH Law.126 Indeed, remove the
provisions that refer to contraception or are related to it and the RH
Law loses its very foundation.127 As earlier explained, "the other
positive provisions such as skilled birth attendance, maternal care
including pre-and post-natal services, prevention and management
of reproductive tract infections including HIV/AIDS are already
provided for in the Magna Carta for Women."128

religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of

responsible parenthood.
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title
of a law must not be "so uncertain that the average person reading
it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on
inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring
to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really
embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of
the real subject or scope of the act."129
Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and
"responsible parenthood" which bears to the attainment of the goal
of achieving "sustainable human development" as stated under its
terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress
intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the
assailed legislation.

Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one
bill rule. In Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. v. The Commission on Elections
and Rep. Francis Joseph G Escudero, it was written:
It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not
require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment
language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all
the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently
complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the
general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as
here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this
Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical
construction of the rule "so as not to cripple or impede legislation."
[Emphases supplied]
In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law
shows that both "reproductive health" and "responsible
parenthood" are interrelated and germane to the overriding
objective to control the population growth. As expressed in the first
paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees
the human rights of all persons including their right to equality and
nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human
development, the right to health which includes reproductive
health, the right to education and information, and the right to
choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their

Aquino vs Comelec
Facts:
Republic Act No. 9716 is a well-milled legislation. The factual
recitals by both parties of the origins of the bill that became the law
show that, from the filing of House Bill No. 4264 until its approval
by the Senate on a vote of thirteen (13) in favor and two (2)
against, the process progressed step by step, marked by public
hearings on the sentiments and position of the local officials of
Camarines Sur on the creation of a new congressional district, as
well as argumentation and debate on the issue, now before us,
concerning the stand of the oppositors of the bill that a population
of at least 250,000 is required by the Constitution for such new
district.4
Petitioner Aquino III was one of two senators who voted against the
approval of the Bill by the Senate. His co-petitioner, Robredo, is the
Mayor of Naga City, which was a part of the former second district
from which the municipalities of Gainza and Milaor were taken for
inclusion in the new second district. No other local executive joined
the two; neither did the representatives of the former third and
fourth districts of the province.

Petitioners contend that the reapportionment introduced by

Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit constitutional
standard that requires a minimum population of two hundred fifty
thousand (250,000) for the creation of a legislative district. 5 The
petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic Act No. 9716
of the first and second districts of Camarines Sur is
unconstitutional, because the proposed first district will end up with
a population of less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
Issue:

entitled to at least a representative, with nothing mentioned about

population, a city must first meet a population minimum of 250,000
in order to be similarly entitled.
The use by the subject provision of a comma to separate the
phrase "each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand" from the phrase "or each province" point to no other
conclusion than that the 250,000 minimum population is only
required for a city, but not for a province. 26
Plainly read, Section 5(3) of the Constitution requires a 250,000
minimum population only for a city to be entitled to a
representative, but not so for a province.

Ruling:
Southern Hemisphere vs. Terrorism Act
We deny the petition.
We start with the basics. Any law duly enacted by Congress carries
with it the presumption of constitutionality.24 Before a law may be
declared unconstitutional by this Court, there must be a clear
showing that a specific provision of the fundamental law has been
violated or transgressed. When there is neither a violation of a
specific provision of the Constitution nor any proof showing that
there is such a violation, the presumption of constitutionality will
prevail and the law must be upheld. To doubt is to sustain. 25
There is no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes a
250,000 minimum population that must compose a legislative
district.
As already mentioned, the petitioners rely on the second sentence
of Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, coupled with
what they perceive to be the intent of the framers of the
Constitution to adopt a minimum population of 250,000 for each
legislative district.
The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article VI of the Constitution,
succinctly provides: "Each city with a population of at least two
hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative."
The provision draws a plain and clear distinction between the
entitlement of a city to a district on one hand, and the entitlement
of a province to a district on the other. For while a province is

Facts:
Before the Court are six petitions challenging the constitutionality
of Republic Act No. 9372 (RA 9372), An Act to Secure the State and
Protect our People from Terrorism, otherwise known as the Human
Security Act of 2007,1[1] signed into law on March 6, 2007.

Following the effectivity of RA 9372 on July 15, 2007, 2[2]

petitioner Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., a nongovernment organization, and Atty. Soliman Santos, Jr., a concerned
citizen, taxpayer and lawyer, filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition on July 16, 2007 docketed as G.R. No. 178552. On
even date, petitioners Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), National
Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno (NAFLU-KMU), and
Center for Trade Union and Human Rights (CTUHR), represented by
their respective officers3[3] who are also bringing the action in their
capacity as citizens, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
docketed as G.R. No. 178554.
Issue: WON the petitioners remedy is proper?

1
2
3

Ruling:
The petitions
fail.Petitioners
resort to certiorari
is improper

Petitioners
locus standi

Preliminarily, certiorari does not lie against respondents

who do not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Section 1,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is clear:

Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in

the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which
the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.5[11]

Section 1. Petition for certiorari.When any tribunal, board or officer

exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted
without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or
officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may
require. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

lack

Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive Secretary6[12]

summarized the rule on locus standi, thus:

Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a

personal and substantial interest in a case such that
the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as
a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged. The gist of the question on standing is
whether a party alleges such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that
concrete
adverseness
which
sharpens
the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends
for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.

Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with any modicum

of particularity how respondents acted without or in excess of their
respective jurisdictions, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The impropriety of certiorari as a remedy aside, the
petitions fail just the same.
In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is
limited by four exacting requisites, viz: (a) there must be an actual
case or controversy; (b) petitioners must possess locus standi; (c)
the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis
mota of the case.4[10]

[A] party who assails the constitutionality of a

statute must have a direct and personal interest.
It must show not only that the law or any
governmental act is invalid, but also that it
sustained or is in immediate danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely that it suffers thereby
in some indefinite way. It must show that it has been
or is about to be denied some right or privilege to
which it is lawfully entitled or that it is about to be

In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two requisites,
which are the most essential, renders the discussion of the last two
superfluous.

subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of

the statute or act complained of.
For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a
constitutional question, it must show that (1) it has
personally suffered some actual or threatened
injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of
the government, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to
the challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely to
be redressed by a favorable action. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)

Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of

being suspected communist fronts by the government, especially
the military; whereas individual petitioners invariably invoke the
transcendental importance doctrine and their status as citizens and
taxpayers.

While Chavez v. PCGG7[13] holds that transcendental public

importance dispenses with the requirement that petitioner has
experienced or is in actual danger of suffering direct and personal
injury, cases involving the constitutionality of penal legislation
belong to an altogether different genus of constitutional litigation.
Compelling State and societal interests in the proscription of
harmful conduct, as will later be elucidated, necessitate a closer
judicial scrutiny of locus standi.

Petitioners have not presented any personal stake in the outcome

of the controversy. None of them faces any charge under RA
9372.

G.R. No. 203335

Facts:
These consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of
Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012,
unconstitutional and void.
The Facts and the Case
The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the
cyberspace. Using his laptop or computer, a person can connect to
the internet, a system that links him to other computers and enable
him, among other things, to:
1. Access virtual libraries and encyclopedias for all kinds of
information that he needs for research, study, amusement,
upliftment, or pure curiosity;
2. Post billboard-like notices or messages, including pictures
and videos, for the general public or for special audiences
like associates, classmates, or friends and read postings
from them;
3. Advertise and promote goods or services and make
purchases and payments;
4. Inquire and do business with institutional entities like
government agencies, banks, stock exchanges, trade
houses, credit card companies, public utilities, hospitals, and
schools; and
5. Communicate in writing or by voice with any person
through his e-mail address or telephone.
This is cyberspace, a system that accommodates millions and
billions of simultaneous and ongoing individual accesses to and
uses of the internet. The cyberspace is a boon to the need of the
current generation for greater information and facility of
communication. But all is not well with the system since it could not
filter out a number of persons of ill will who would want to use
cyberspace technology for mischiefs and crimes. One of them can,
for instance, avail himself of the system to unjustly ruin the

reputation of another or bully the latter by posting defamatory

statements against him that people can read.
And because linking with the internet opens up a user to
communications from others, the ill-motivated can use the
cyberspace for committing theft by hacking into or surreptitiously
accessing his bank account or credit card or defrauding him
through false representations. The wicked can use the cyberspace,
too, for illicit trafficking in sex or for exposing to pornography
guileless children who have access to the internet. For this reason,
the government has a legitimate right to regulate the use of
cyberspace and contain and punish wrongdoings.
Notably, there are also those who would want, like vandals, to
wreak or cause havoc to the computer systems and networks of
indispensable or highly useful institutions as well as to the laptop or
computer programs and memories of innocent individuals. They
accomplish this by sending electronic viruses or virtual dynamites
that destroy those computer systems, networks, programs, and
memories. The government certainly has the duty and the right to
prevent these tomfooleries from happening and punish their
perpetrators, hence the Cybercrime Prevention Act.
But petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime
law for regulating undesirable cyberspace activities violate certain
of their constitutional rights. The government of course asserts that
the law merely seeks to reasonably put order into cyberspace
activities, punish wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the
system.

enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited

acts.

Respondents, through the OSG, counter that the doctrines of voidfor-vagueness and overbreadth find no application in the present
case since these doctrines apply only to free speech cases; and
that RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech.

For a jurisprudentially guided understanding of these

doctrines, it is imperative to outline the schools of thought on
whether the void-for-vagueness and overbreadth doctrines are
equally applicable grounds to assail a penal statute.

Respondents interpret recent jurisprudence as slanting

toward the idea of limiting the application of the two doctrines to
free speech cases. They particularly cite Romualdez v. Hon.

Issue: WON vagueness and over breadth doctrine is applicable to

penal statutes.

Sandiganbayan9[47] and Estrada v. Sandiganbayan.10[48]

Ruling:
Petitioners

assail

for

being

intrinsically

vague

and

The Court clarifies.

impermissibly broad the definition of the crime of terrorism [46]

under RA 9372 in that terms like widespread and extraordinary
fear and panic among the populace and coerce the government to
give in to an unlawful demand are nebulous, leaving law

9
8

10

At issue in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan was whether the

11

word intervene in Section 5 [49] of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt

clear and free from ambiguity respecting the definition of the crime
of plunder.

Practices Act was intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad. The

Court stated that the overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines
have special application only to free-speech cases, and are not
appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes.12[50] It added
that, at any rate, the challenged provision, under which the therein
petitioner was charged, is not vague.13[51]

The position taken by Justice Mendoza in Estrada relates these two

doctrines to the concept of a facial invalidation as opposed to an
as-applied challenge. He basically postulated that allegations that a
penal statute is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review
of its validity. The pertinent portion of the Concurring Opinion of
Justice Mendoza, which was quoted at length in the main Estrada

While in the subsequent case of Romualdez v. Commission on

decision, reads:

14

Elections, [52] the Court stated that a facial invalidation of criminal

statutes is not appropriate, it nonetheless proceeded to conduct a
vagueness analysis, and concluded that the therein subject election
15

offense [53] under the Voters Registration Act of 1996, with which
the therein petitioners were charged, is couched in precise
language.16[54]

The

two

Romualdez

cases

rely

heavily

on

the

Separate

17

Opinion [55] of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in the Estrada case,

where the Court found the Anti-Plunder Law (Republic Act No. 7080)

11
12
13
14
15
16
17

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a

vague statute and to one which is overbroad because
of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The
theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe
speech and no readily apparent construction suggests
itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a
single prosecution, the transcendent value to all
society of constitutionally protected expression is
deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad
statutes with no requirement that the person making
the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not
be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow
specificity." The possible harm to society in permitting
some unprotected speech to go unpunished is
outweighed by the possibility that the protected
speech of others may be deterred and perceived
grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory
effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes.
Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect
resulting from their very existence, and, if facial
challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State
may well be prevented from enacting laws against
socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law,

the law cannot take chances as in the area of free

speech.

petitioner's claim that this Court review the AntiPlunder Law on its face and in its entirety.

The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines

then have special application only to free
speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity
of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in
an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not
recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the
limited context of the First Amendment." In Broadrick
v. Oklahoma, the Court ruled that "claims of facial
overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving
statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only
spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if
entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked
against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be
applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has
been held that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is
the most difficult challenge to mount successfully,
since the challenger must establish that no set of
circumstances exists under which the Act would be
valid." As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a
litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is
vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who
engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed
cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as
applied to the conduct of others."

Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes

results in striking them down entirely on the ground
that they might be applied to parties not before the
Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. It
constitutes a departure from the case and controversy
requirement of the Constitution and permits decisions
to be made without concrete factual settings and in
sterile abstract contexts. But, as the U.S. Supreme
Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris

In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny,

overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools
developed for testing "on their faces" statutes
in free speech cases or, as they are called in
American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot
be made to do service when what is involved is a
criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the
established rule is that "one to whom application of a
statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the
statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be
taken as applying to other persons or other situations
in which its application might be unconstitutional." As
has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the
First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges
typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes
found vague as a matter of due process typically are
invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular
defendant." Consequently, there is no basis for

[T]he task of analyzing a

proposed
statute,
pinpointing
its
deficiencies, and requiring correction of
these deficiencies before the statute is
put into effect, is rarely if ever an
appropriate task for the judiciary. The
combination of the relative remoteness
of the controversy, the impact on the
legislative process of the relief sought,
and above all the speculative and
amorphous nature of the required lineby-line analysis of detailed statutes, . . .
ordinarily results in a kind of case that is
wholly
unsatisfactory
for
deciding
constitutional questions, whichever way
they might be decided.
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of
statutes has been described as "manifestly strong
medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a
last resort," and is generally disfavored. In determining
the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its
provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a
case must be examined in the light of the conduct with
which the defendant is charged.18[56] (Underscoring
supplied.)

18

The confusion apparently stems from the interlocking relation of

As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth

the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines as grounds for a facial or

doctrine assumes that individuals will understand what a statute

as-applied challenge against a penal statute (under a claim of

prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that behavior, even

violation of due process of law) or a speech regulation (under a

though some of it is protected.21[59]

claim of abridgement of the freedom of speech and cognate rights).

A facial challenge is likewise different from an as-applied challenge.

To be sure, the doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of
overbreadth do not operate on the same plane.
Distinguished

from

an

as-applied

challenge

which

considers only extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial

A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it

invalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its

lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence

flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to

must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its

the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very

application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it

existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from

violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the

constitutionally protected speech or activities.22[60]

parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it
leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government
muscle.19[57] The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a
governmental

purpose

to

control

or

prevent

activities

constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by

means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the
area of protected freedoms.20[58]

Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle 23[61] in his

concurring opinion that the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines,
as grounds for a facial challenge, are not applicable to penal laws.
A litigant cannot thus successfully mount a facial challenge
against

criminal

overbreadth grounds.

21
19

22

20

23

statute

on

either

vagueness

or

The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified

the court to consider third parties who are not before

it. As I have said in my opposition to the allowance of a
facial challenge to attack penal statutes, such a test
will impair the States ability to deal with crime. If
warranted, there would be nothing that can hinder an
accused from defeating the States power to prosecute
on a mere showing that, as applied to third parties, the
penal statute is vague or overbroad, notwithstanding
that the law is clear as applied to him. 27[65] (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)

by the aim to avert the chilling effect on protected speech, the

exercise of which should not at all times be abridged. 24[62] As
reflected earlier, this rationale is inapplicable to plain penal
statutes that generally bear an in terrorem effect in deterring
socially harmful conduct. In fact, the legislature may even forbid
and penalize acts formerly considered innocent and lawful, so long
as it refrains from diminishing or dissuading the exercise of
constitutionally protected rights.25[63]

It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the

overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge
The Court reiterated that there are critical limitations by which a

and, owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge,

criminal statute may be challenged and underscored that an on-its-

applicable only to free speech cases.

26

face invalidation of penal statutes x x x may not be allowed. [64]

By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily

[T]he rule established in our jurisdiction is, only
statutes on free speech, religious freedom, and other
fundamental rights may be facially challenged. Under
no case may ordinary penal statutes be
subjected to a facial challenge. The rationale is
obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal statute is
permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be
hampered. No prosecution would be possible. A strong
criticism against employing a facial challenge in the
case of penal statutes, if the same is allowed, would
effectively go against the grain of the doctrinal
requirement of an existing and concrete controversy
before judicial power may be appropriately exercised.
A facial challenge against a penal statute is, at best,
amorphous and speculative. It would, essentially, force

apply a facial type of invalidation in order to plot areas of protected

speech, inevitably almost always under situations not before the
court, that are impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad
regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed
for being substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only to
facts as applied to the litigants.

The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth

technique is that it marks an exception to some of the
usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a
particular
litigant
claims
that
a
statute
is
unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant
prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional

24
25
26

27

aspects of the law by invalidating its improper

applications on a case to case basis. Moreover,
challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the
rights of third parties and can only assert their own
interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give
way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of
third parties; and the court invalidates the entire
statute "on its face," not merely "as applied for" so
that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a
properly authorized court construes it more narrowly.
The factor that motivates courts to depart from the
normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the
"chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on
third parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The
Court assumes that an overbroad laws "very existence
may cause others not before the court to refrain from
constitutionally protected speech or expression." An
overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that
deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties. 28
[66] (Emphasis in the original omitted; underscoring
supplied.)

that is not specifically addressed to speech or speech-related

conduct. Attacks on overly broad statutes are justified by the
transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected
expression.33[71]

Since a penal statute may

only be assailed for being
vague
as
applied
to
petitioners,
a
limited
vagueness analysis of the
definition of terrorism in RA
9372 is legally impermissible
absent an actual or imminent
charge against them

While Estrada did not apply the overbreadth doctrine, it did not
In restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the

preclude the operation of the vagueness test on the Anti-Plunder

Court, in at least two cases, [67] observed that the US Supreme

Law as applied to the therein petitioner, finding, however, that

Court has not recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the

there was no basis to review the law on its face and in its entirety. 34

limited context of the First Amendment, 30[68] and that claims of

[72] It stressed that statutes found vague as a matter of due

facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving

process typically are invalidated only 'as applied' to a particular

statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken

defendant.35[73]

29

words.31[69] In Virginia v. Hicks,32[70] it was held that rarely, if ever,

will an overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or regulation

28
29
30

33

31

34

32

35

American jurisprudence36[74] instructs that vagueness challenges

that do not involve the First Amendment must be examined in light
of the specific facts of the case at hand and not with regard to the
statute's facial validity.

For more than 125 years, the US Supreme Court has evaluated
defendants claims that criminal statutes are unconstitutionally
vague, developing a doctrine hailed as among the most important
guarantees of liberty under law.37[75]

In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted under

the due process clause has been utilized in examining the
constitutionality of criminal statutes. In at least three cases, 38[76]
the Court brought the doctrine into play in analyzing an ordinance
penalizing the non-payment of municipal tax on fishponds, the
crime of illegal recruitment punishable under Article 132(b) of the
Labor Code, and the vagrancy provision under Article 202 (2) of the
Revised Penal Code. Notably, the petitioners in these three cases,
similar to those in the two Romualdez and Estrada cases, were
actually charged with the therein assailed penal statute, unlike in
the present case.

36
37
38