THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 137761. April 6, 2000]

GABRIEL LAZARO and the heirs of FLORENCIA PINEDA and EVA

VIERNES, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and Spouses JOSE and
ANITA ALESNA, respondents. brando
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Failure to pay docket and other lawful fees within the prescribed period is a ground for
the dismissal of an appeal. This rule cannot be suspended by the mere invocation of
"the interest of substantial justice." Procedural rules may be relaxed only in
exceptionally meritorious cases.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 assailing two Resolution, dated July
31, 1998 and December 28, 1998, both promulgated by the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 60094. In the first Resolution, the CA ruled:
[1]

"For resolution is a motion to reconsider this Court's Resolution dismissing

the appeal for failure of appellants [herein private respondents] to pay the
prescribed docketing fees pursuant to Section 4, Rule 41 of the 1997
Rules on Civil Procedure.
"x x x x x x x x x
"Copy of the judgment appealed from was received by appellants on
December 16, 1997 and their notice of appeal was filed on December 19,
1997.
"The motion for reconsideration of this Court's Resolution was filed on
time, but the attached official receipt No. 2768290 evidencing payment of
the required docketing fees was dated June 26, 1998, almost six (6)
months after the last day to file notice of appeal. However, appellants
prayed that this Court's June 17, 1998 resolution be set aside, lifted, and
this appeal reinstated, citing interest of substantial justice.

"In the light of the foregoing, appellants' June 26, 1998 motion is
hereby GRANTED."
[2]

In its second Resolution, the CA denied reconsideration in this wise:

"For all the foregoing, there being no cogent or compelling reason to
warrant reconsideration of this court's resolution dated July 31, 1998, the
motion of appellees is hereby DENIED." micks
[3]

The Facts
Before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya (Branch 27),
Spouses Jose and Anita Alesna, private respondents herein, filed a civil action for
annulment of title, reconveyance and damages (with prayer for preliminary injunction)
against Petitioners Gabriel Lazaro and the heirs of Florencia Pineda and Eva Viernes.
[4]

After trial, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners. Thereafter, the private
respondents filed a Notice of Appeal before the trial court.
[5]

In a Resolution dated June 17, 1998, the CA dismissed the appeal for failure of herein
private respondents to pay the required docket fees within the prescribed period.
Thereafter, it issued its first assailed Resolution dated July 31, 1998 granting their
Motion for Reconsideration and reinstating the appeal.
[6]

Subsequently, the petitioners also filed their own Motion for Reconsideration assailing
the said Resolution. As earlier stated, the CA denied their Motion.
Hence, this Petition.

[7]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In reinstating the appeal despite the failure of herein private respondents to pay the
docket fees within the prescribed period, the Court of Appeals invoked "the interest of
substantial justice." It did not elaborate however. No specific circumstance or any other
explanation was cited in support of its ruling. nigella
Issue
In their memorandum, petitioners submit for the consideration of the Court this lone
question: "x x x [H]as the respondent appellate court acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction, and/or with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned Resolutions
dated July 31, 1998 and December 28, 1998"?
[8]

This Court's Ruling

The Petition is meritorious.

Main Issue: Timely Payment of CA Docket Fees

The Rules of Court, as amended, specifically provides that appellate court docket and
other lawful fees should be paid within the period for taking an appeal. Hence, Section 4
of Rule 41 reads:
"Section 4. Appellate court docket and other lawful fees. -- Within the
period for taking an appeal, the appellant shall pay to the clerk of the
court which rendered the judgment or final order appealed from, the full
amount of the appellate court docket and other lawful fees. Proof of
payment of said fees shall be transmitted to the appellate court together
with the original record or the record on appeal."
[9]

Contrary to the submission of private respondents that the aforecited rule is merely
directory, the payment of the docket and other legal fees within the prescribed period is
both mandatory and jurisdictional. Section 1 (c), Rule 50 of the Rules of Court provides:
"Failure of the appellant to pay the docket and other fees as provided in Section 4 of
Rule 41" is a ground for the dismissal of the appeal. Indeed, it has been held that failure
of the appellant to conform with the rules on appeal renders the judgment final and
executory. Verily, the right to appeal is a statutory right and one who seeks to avail of
that right must comply with the statute or the rule.
[10]

[11]

In the present case, the private respondents failed to pay the required docket fees
within the reglementary period. In fact, the Court notes that they paid the fees only after
the CA had dismissed the appeal, or six months after the filing of the Notice of Appeal.
Clearly, existing jurisprudence and the Rules mandate that the appeal should be
dismissed. Sc
The appellate court nonetheless reinstated the appeal "in the interest of substantial
justice." But as earlier observed, it did not cite any specific circumstance or any other
explanation in support of its ruling. For their part, private respondents failed to offer a
satisfactory explanation why they paid the docket fees six months after the prescribed
period. Indeed, neither they nor the Court of Appeals showed fraud, accident, mistake,
excusable negligence, or any other reason to justify the suspension of the aforecited
rule.
[12]

We must stress that the bare invocation of "the interest of substantial justice" is not a
magic wand that will automatically compel this Court to suspend procedural rules.
"Procedural rules are not to be belittled or dismissed simply because their nonobservance may have resulted in prejudice to a party's substantive rights. Like all rules,
they are required to be followed except only for the most persuasive of reasons when
they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with the
degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the procedure prescribed." The
Court reiterates that rules of procedure, especially those prescribing the time within
which certain acts must be done, "have oft been held as absolutely indispensable to the
prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of business. x x
[13]

x The reason for rules of this nature is because the dispatch of business by courts
would be impossible, and intolerable delays would result, without rules governing
practice x x x. Such rules are a necessary incident to the proper, efficient and orderly
discharge of judicial functions." Indeed, in no uncertain terms, the Court held that the
said rules may be relaxed only in "exceptionally meritorious cases." In this case, the
CA and the private respondents failed to show that this case is one such exception.
[14]

[15]

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Court of Appeals' assailed

Resolutions, dated July 31, 1998 and December 28, 1998, are SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya (Branch 27) in Civil
Case No.4058 is declared FINAL and EXECUTORY. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

[Synopsis/Syllabi]

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 112869. January 29, 1996]

KELLY R. WICKER and ATTY. ORLANDO A. RAYOS, petitioners,

vs. HON. PAUL T. ARCANGEL, as Presiding Judge of the RTC,
Makati, Branch 134, respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari, assailing the orders dated December 3,

1993 and December 17, 1993 of respondent Judge Paul T. Arcangel of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 134 of Makati, finding petitioners guilty of direct
contempt and sentencing each of them to suffer imprisonment for five (5) days
and to pay a fine of P100.00.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Kelly Wicker, with his wife Wynee Dieppe and the Tectonics Asia Architects
and Engineering Co., brought suit in the Regional Trial Court of Makati against
the LFS Enterprises, Inc. and others, for the annulment of certain deeds by
which a house and lot at Forbes Park, which the plaintiffs claimed they had
purchased, was allegedly fraudulently titled in the name of the defendant LFS
Enterprises and later sold by the latter to codefendant Jose Poe. The case,
docketed as Civil Case No. 14048, was assigned to Branch 134 formerly
presided over by Judge Ignacio Capulong who later was replaced by
respondent Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
It appears that on November 18, 1993, Wickers counsel, Atty. Orlando A.
Rayos, filed a motion seeking the inhibition of respondent judge from the
consideration of the case. The motion alleged in pertinent part:
[1]

1. That before the Acting Presiding Judge took over, defendant LFS Enterprises, Inc.
was able to maneuver the three (3) successive postponements for the presentation for
cross-examination of Mrs. Remedios Porcuna on her 10 August 1992 Affidavit, but
eventually, she was not presented;

2. Meantime, Judge [Ignacio] Capulong who had full grasp of this case was eased out
of his station. In one hearing, the Acting Presiding Judge had not yet reported to his
station and in that set hearing, counsel for defendant LFS Enterprises, Inc. who must
have known that His Honor was not reporting did not likewise appear while other
counsels were present;
3. Plaintiffs have information that the Acting Presiding Judge was personally recruited
from the south by Atty. Benjamin Santos and/or his wife, Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos,
one time member of the Judicial and Bar Council, against whom plaintiff Kelly R.
Wicker filed Administrative Case No. 3796, and although said case was dismissed,
nevertheless, plaintiffs feel that it was the reason for Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos
relief;
4. Plaintiffs have reason to doubt the partiality and integrity of His Honor and to give
a fighting chance for plaintiffs to prove their case, since this will be the last case to
recover the partnership property, plaintiffs feel that His Honor inhibit himself and set
this case for re-raffle;
5. This move finds support in the Rules of Court and jurisprudence that in the first
instance that a litigant doubts the partiality and integrity of the Presiding Judge, he
should immediately move for his inhibition.
The motion was verified by Kelly Wicker.
Considering the allegations to be malicious, derogatory and
contemptuous, respondent judge ordered both counsel and client to appear
before him on November 26, 1993 and to show cause why they should not be
cited for contempt of court.
[2]

In a pleading entitled Opposition to and/or Comment to Motion to Cite for

Direct Contempt Directed Against Plaintiff Kelly R. Wicker and his Counsel,
Atty. Rayos claimed that the allegations in the motion did not necessarily
express his views because he merely signed the motion in a representative
capacity, in other words, just lawyering, for Kelly Wicker, who said in a note to
him that a young man possibly employed by the Court had advised him to
have the case reraffled, when the opposing counsel Atty. Benjamin Santos
and the new judge both failed to come for a hearing, because their absence
was an indication that Atty. Santos knew who the judge may be and when he
would appear. Wickers sense of disquiet increased when at the next two
hearings, the new judge as well as Atty. Santos and the latters witness, Mrs.
Remedios Porcuna, were all absent, while the other counsels were present.
[3]

Finding petitioners explanation unsatisfactory, respondent judge, in an

order dated December 3, 1993, held them guilty of direct contempt and
sentenced each to suffer imprisonment for five (5) days and to pay a fine of
P100.00.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which respondent judge
denied for lack of merit in his order of December 17, 1993. In the same order
respondent judge directed petitioners to appear before him on January 7,
1994 at 8:30 a.m. for the execution of their sentence.
In their petition before this Court, Kelly Wicker and Atty. Orlando A. Rayos
contend that respondent judge committed a grave abuse of his discretion in
citing them for contempt. They argue that when a person, impelled by
justifiable apprehension and acting in a respectful manner, asks a judge to
inhibit himself from hearing his case, he does not thereby become guilty of
contempt.
[4]

In his comment, respondent judge alleges that he took over as Acting

Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134 by virtue of
Administrative Order No. 154-93 dated September 2, 1993 of this Court and
not because, as petitioners alleged, he was personally recruited from the
South by Atty. Santos and/or his wife, Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos; that he
assumed his new office on October 11, 1993 and started holding sessions on
October 18, 1993; that when all male personnel of his court were presented to
petitioner Kelly Wicker he failed to pick out the young man who was the
alleged source of the remarks prompting the filing of the motion for inhibition;
that he was not vindictive and that he in fact refrained from implementing the
execution of his order dated December 3, 1993 to enable petitioners to avail
themselves of all possible remedies; that after holding petitioners in contempt,
he issued an order dated December 8, 1993 inhibiting himself from trying Civil
Case No. 14048; that Atty. Rayos claim that he was just lawyering and acting
as the vehicle or mouthpiece of his client is untenable because his (Atty.
Rayos) duties to the court are more important than those which he owes to his
client; and that by tendering their profuse apologies in their motion for
reconsideration of the December 3, 1993 order, petitioners acknowledged the
falsity of their accusations against him; and that the petitioners have taken
inconsistent positions as to who should try Civil Case No. 14048 because in
their Motion for Inhibition dated November 18, 1993 they asked that the case
be reraffled to another sala of the RTC of Makati, while in their petition dated
November 29, 1993, which they filed with the Office of Court Administrator,
petitioners asked that Judge Capulong be allowed to continue hearing the
case on the ground that he had a full grasp of the case.
[5]

In reply to the last allegation of respondent judge, petitioners claim that

although they wanted a reraffle of the case, it was upon the suggestion of
respondent judge himself that they filed the petition with the Court
Administrator for the retention of Judge Capulong in the case.
What is involved in this case is an instance of direct contempt, since it
involves a pleading allegedly containing derogatory, offensive or malicious
statements submitted to the court or judge in which the proceedings are
pending, as distinguished from a pleading filed in another case. The former
has been held to be equivalent to misbehavior committed in the presence of
or so near a court or judge as to interrupt the proceedings before the same
within the meaning of Rule 71, 1 of the Rules of Court and, therefore, direct
contempt.
[6]

It is important to point out this distinction because in case of indirect or

constructive contempt, the contemnor may be punished only [a]fter charge in
writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the accused to be heard by
himself or counsel, whereas in case of direct contempt, the respondent may
be summarily adjudged in contempt. Moreover, the judgment in cases of
indirect contempt is appealable, whereas in cases of direct contempt only
judgments of contempt by MTCs, MCTCs and MeTCs are appealable.
[7]

Consequently, it was unnecessary in this case for respondent judge to

hold a hearing. Hence even if petitioners are right about the nature of the case
against them by contending that it involves indirect contempt, they have no
ground for complaint since they were afforded a hearing before they were held
guilty of contempt. What is important to determine now is whether respondent
judge committed grave abuse of discretion in holding petitioners liable for
direct contempt.
We begin with the words of Justice Malcolm that the power to punish for
contempt is to be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive
principle. Only occasionally should it be invoked to preserve that respect
without which the administration of justice will fail. The contempt power ought
not to be utilized for the purpose of merely satisfying an inclination to strike
back at a party for showing less than full respect for the dignity of the court.
[8]

[9]

Consistent with the foregoing principles and based on the

abovementioned facts, the Court sustains Judge Arcangels finding that
petitioners are guilty of contempt. A reading of the allegations in petitioners
motion for inhibition, particularly the following paragraphs thereof:
2. Meantime, Judge Capulong who had full grasp of this case was eased out of his
station. In one hearing, the Acting Presiding Judge had not yet reported to his station

and in that set hearing, counsel for defendant LFS Enterprises, Inc. who must have
known that His Honor was not reporting did not likewise appear while other counsels
were present;
3. Plaintiffs have information that the Acting Presiding Judge was personally recruited
from the south by Atty. Benjamin Santos and/or his wife, Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos,
one time member of the Judicial and Bar Council, against whom plaintiff Kelly R.
Wicker filed Administrative Case No. 3796, and although said case was dismissed,
nevertheless, plaintiffs feel that it was the reason for Atty. Ofelia Calcetas-Santos
relief;
leads to no other conclusion than that respondent judge was beholden to the
opposing counsel in the case, Atty. Benjamin Santos, to whom or to whose
wife, the judge owed his transfer to the RTC of Makati, which necessitated
easing out the former judge to make room for such transfer.
These allegations are derogatory to the integrity and honor of respondent
judge and constitute an unwarranted criticism of the administration of justice in
this country. They suggest that lawyers, if they are well connected, can
manipulate the assignment of judges to their advantage. The truth is that the
assignments of Judges Arcangel and Capulong were made by this Court, by
virtue of Administrative Order No. 154-93, precisely in the interest of an
efficient administration of justice and pursuant to Sec. 5 (3), Art. VIII of the
Constitution. This is a matter of record which could have easily been verified
by Atty. Rayos. After all, as he claims, he deliberated for two months whether
or not to file the offending motion for inhibition as his client allegedly asked
him to do.
[10]

In extenuation of his own liability, Atty. Rayos claims he merely did what he
had been bidden to do by his client of whom he was merely a mouthpiece. He
was just lawyering and he cannot be gagged, even if the allegations in the
motion for the inhibition which he prepared and filed were false since it was
his client who verified the same.
To be sure, what Wicker said in his note to Atty. Rayos was that he had
been told by an unidentified young man, whom he thought to be employed in
the court, that it seemed the opposing counsel, Atty. Santos, knew who the
replacement judge was, because Atty. Santos did not show up in court on the
same days the new judge failed to come. It would, therefore, appear that the
other allegations in the motion that respondent judge had been personally
recruited by the opposing counsel to replace Judge Capulong who had been
eased out were Atty. Rayos and not Wickers. Atty. Rayos is thus understating
his part in the preparation of the motion for inhibition.

Atty. Rayos, however, cannot evade responsibility for the allegations in

question. As a lawyer, he is not just an instrument of his client. His client came
to him for professional assistance in the representation of a cause, and while
he owed him whole-souled devotion, there were bounds set by his
responsibility as a lawyer which he could not overstep. Even a hired gun
cannot be excused for what Atty. Rayos stated in the motion. Based on Canon
11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Rayos bears as much
responsibility for the contemptuous allegations in the motion for inhibition as
his client.
[11]

Atty. Rayos duty to the courts is not secondary to that of his client. The
Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins him to observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and [to] insist on similar
conduct by others and not [to] attribute to a Judge motives not supported by
the record or have materiality to the case.
[12]

[13]

After the respondent judge had favorably responded to petitioners profuse

apologies and indicated that he would let them off with a fine, without any jail
sentence, petitioners served on respondent judge a copy of their instant
petition which prayed in part that Respondent Judge Paul T. Arcangel be
REVERTED to his former station. He simply cannot do in the RTC of Makati
where more complex cases are heared (sic) unlike in Davao City. If nothing
else, this personal attack on the judge only serves to confirm the
contumacious attitude, a flouting or arrogant belligerence first evident in
petitioners motion for inhibition belying their protestations of good faith.
Petitioners cite the following statement in Austria v. Masaquel:

[14]

Numerous cages there have been where judges, and even members of the Supreme
Court, were asked to inhibit themselves from trying, or from participating in the
consideration of a case, but scarcely were the movants punished for contempt, even if
the grounds upon which they based their motions for disqualification are not among
those provided in the rules. It is only when there was direct imputation of bias or
prejudice, or a stubborn insistence to disqualify the judge, done in a malicious,
arrogant, belligerent and disrespectful manner, that movants were held in contempt of
court.
It is the second sentence rather than the first that applies to this case.
Be that as it may, the Court believes that consistent with the rule that the
power to cite for contempt must be exercised for preservative rather than
vindictive principle we think that the jail sentence on petitioners may be
dispensed with while vindicating the dignity of the court. In the case of
petitioner Kelly Wicker there is greater reason for doing so considering that

the particularly offending allegations in the motion for inhibition do not appear
to have come from him but were additions made by Atty. Rayos. In addition,
Wicker is advanced in years (80) and in failing health (suffering from angina),
a fact Judge Arcangel does not dispute. Wicker may have indeed been the
recipient of such a remark although he could not point a court employee who
was the source of the same. At least he had the grace to admit his mistake
both as to the source and truth of said information. It is noteworthy Judge
Arcangel was also willing to waive the imposition of the jail sentence on
petitioners until he came upon petitioners description of him in the instant
petition as a judge who cannot make the grade in the RTC of Makati, where
complex cases are being filed. In response to this, he cited the fact that the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines chose him as one of the most outstanding
City Judges and Regional Trial Court Judges in 1979 and 1988 respectively
and that he is a 1963 graduate of the U.P. College of Law.
In Ceniza v. Sebastian, which likewise involved a motion for inhibition
which described the judge corrupt, the Court, while finding counsel guilty of
direct contempt, removed the jail sentence of 10 days imposed by the trial
court for the reason that
[15]

Here, while the words were contumacious, it is hard to resist the conclusion,
considering the background of this occurrence that respondent Judge in imposing the
ten-day sentence was not duly mindful of the exacting standard [of] preservation of
the dignity of his office not indulging his sense of grievance sets the limits of the
authority he is entitled to exercise. It is the view of the Court that under the
circumstances the fine imposed should be increased to P500.00.
The same justification also holds true in this case.
WHEREFORE, the order of December 3, 1993 is MODIFIED by
DELETING the sentence of imprisonment for five (5) days and INCREASING
the fine from P 100.00 to P200.00 for each of the petitioners.
SO ORDERED