Rule 1.

02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law
or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
AC 6968: Atty. Dizon vs. Atty. Lambino (August 9, 2006)
The killing during a rumble on December 8, 1994 of University of the Philippines (UP) graduating student
Dennis Venturina, the chairperson of the UP College of Public Administration Student Council, drew the
then Chancellor of UP Diliman Roger Posadas to seek the assistance of the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI).
Acting on the request of Chancellor Posadas, Atty. Orlando Dizon, then Chief of the Special Operations
Group (SOG) of the NBI, together with his men, repaired to the Office of Col. Eduardo Bentain, head of
the UP Security Force on December 12, 1994.
As two student-suspects in the killing, Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag, were at the time in the
office of Col. Bentain, Atty. Dizon requested to take them into his custody. Atty. Marichu Lambino, Legal
Counsel of UP Diliman, who repaired to the Office of Col. Bentain, advised against Atty. Dizons move,
however, he not being armed with a warrant for their arrest
In the main, Atty. Dizon invoked Section 1 (a) of Republic Act 157 (The NBI Charter) which empowers the
NBI to undertake investigations of crimes and other offenses against the laws of the Philippines, upon its
own initiative and as public interest may require and to make arrests. The invocation does not impress.
Said section does not grant the NBI the power to make warrantless arrests. The NBI Charter clearly
qualifies the power to make arrests to be in accordance with existing laws and rules.
By persisting in his attempt to arrest the suspected students without a warrant, Atty. Dizon violated
Rule 1.02 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

AC 5161: Ting-Dumali vs. Torres (April 14, 2004)

See also for Canon 10
It also bears noting that the respondent was consulted regarding the falsification of
complainants signature in the Extrajudicial Settlement dated 17 March 1995 involving
Lot 1603, which contains a purported waiver by the complainant of her right over the
property. Marcelina admitted that she signed complainants name in that document. Such
act of counterfeiting the complainants signature to make it appear that the complainant
had participated in the execution of that document is tantamount to falsification of a
public document.
Instead of advising Marcelina to secure a written special power of attorney and against
committing falsification, he presented such document to the Registry of Deeds to secure a
new title for the lot in favor of Marcelina and his wife. He himself, therefore, may also be
held liable for knowingly using a falsified document to the damage of the complainant
and her other co-heirs. Notably, he also admitted in an affidavit dated 22 May 1995 that
he prepared the legal documents for the transfer of Lot 1603.
Respondent did not advise his wife and his sisters-in-law from doing acts which are
contrary to law. He must have kept in mind the first and foremost duty of a lawyer,

which is to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, uphold the

Constitution, and obey the laws of the land. The Code of Professional Responsibility
underscores the primacy of such duty by providing as its canon that a lawyer shall
uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for law and
legal processes. For a lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to
which society has entrusted the administration of law and the dispensation of
justice. As such, he should make himself more an exemplar for others to emulate. He
should not, therefore, engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct.
He makes himself unfit to remain in the profession who commits any such
unbecoming act or conduct. (citing: RUBEN E. AGPALO, LEGAL ETHICS 61 (6th ed.
1997); Comments of the IBP Committee that drafted the Code of Professional
Responsibility, pp. 1-2 (1980)
The respondent allowed Marcelina to commit a crime by giving false testimony in court,
and he never corrected the same despite full knowledge of the true facts and
circumstances of the case. Moreover, in knowingly offering in evidence such false
testimony, he himself may be punished as guilty of false testimony.
Moreover, under Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer owes
candor, fairness, and good faith to the court. He shall not do any falsehood, nor consent
to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any
artifice. This Rule was clearly and openly violated by the respondent when he
permitted Marcelina to falsely testify that she had no siblings aside from Felicisima
and when he offered such testimony in the petition for reconstitution of the title
involving Lot 1605.
The respondent must have forgotten that as an attorney he is an officer of the court called
upon to assist in the administration of justice. Like the court itself, he is an instrument to
advance its cause. For this reason, any act on his part that obstructs and impedes the
administration of justice constitutes misconduct and justifies disciplinary action against
him (Citing People v. Jardin).
AC 8010: Stemmerick vs. Mas (June 16, 2009)
By advising complainant that a foreigner could legally and validly acquire real estate in
the Philippines and by assuring complainant that the property was alienable, respondent
deliberately foisted a falsehood on his client. He did not give due regard to the trust and
confidence reposed in him by complainant. Instead, he deceived complainant and misled
him into parting with P400,000 for services that were both illegal and unprofessional.
Moreover, by pocketing and misappropriating the P3.8 million given by complainant for
the purchase of the property, respondent committed a fraudulent act that was criminal in
nature.
Respondent spun an intricate web of lies. In the process, he committed unethical act after
unethical act, wantonly violating laws and professional standards

For all this, respondent violated not only the lawyers oath and Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. He also transgressed the following provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.02. A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system
A lawyer who resorts to nefarious schemes to circumvent the law and uses his legal
knowledge to further his selfish ends to the great prejudice of others, poses a clear
and present danger to the rule of law and to the legal system. He does not only
tarnish the image of the bar and degrade the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession, he also betrays everything that the legal profession stands for.
AC 5955: Hegna vs. Paderanga (September 8, 2009)
Respondent violated the Lawyers Oath, which mandates that he should support the
Constitution, obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities
therein, and do no falsehood or not consent to the doing of any in court. Further, he has
also failed to live up to the standard set by law that he should refrain from counseling or
abetting activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal
system. Respondents act of non-registration of the deeds of sale to avoid paying tax may
not be illegal per se; but, as a servant of the law, a lawyer should make himself an
exemplar for others to emulate. The responsibilities of a lawyer are greater than those of a
private citizen. He is looked up to in the community. Respondent must have forgotten that
a lawyer must refrain from committing acts which give even a semblance of impropriety
to the profession (Citing AC 6383: Tan vs. Robiso).
GR 116600: People vs. Landicho (July 3, 1996)
(The Court ordering accuseds counsel to show cause why he shouldnt be in violation of
Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of CPR)
We note that while the accused were already fugitives from Justice, Atty. Renato dela
Cruz nevertheless, was in constant touch with them as he was able to procure their
signatures for their supplemental petition before the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
28210, and in their Magkaanib na Sinumpaang Salaysay. In the latter, the four accused
subscribed to it and swore before Atty. dela Cruz as notary public in Makati, Metro
Manila, on 20 August 1992, and he entered such act in his notarial register as Doc. No.
263; Page No. 54; Book No. III; Series of 1992. Yet, despite full knowledge that his
clients were fugitives from Justice and that bench warrants of arrest and warrants
of arrest had been issued against his clients, Atty. dela Cruz made no effort to
persuade them to surrender. A lawyer is absolutely prohibited from counseling or
abetting activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal
system. Hence, lest the general public venture the thought that lawyers approve of

their clients' degeneration into outlaws, Atty. dela Cruz must explain his action, or
rather, inaction which, in effect, aided the accused in making a mockery of our
judicial and penal systems.

CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO

THE COURT.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a
paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or
authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered inoperative by
repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been proved.
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them
to defeat the ends of justice.
AC 4947: Yap-Paras vs. Paras (Feb. 14, 2005)
In the recent case of Bergonia v. Merrera (AC 502 4), we ruled:
Candor in all their dealings is the very essence of a practitioners honorable
membership in the legal profession. Lawyers are required to act with the highest
standard of truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the conduct of litigation and in
their relations with their clients, the opposing parties, the other counsels and the
courts. They are bound by their oath to speak the truth and to conduct themselves
according to the best of their knowledge and discretion, and with fidelity to the
courts and their clients. x x x
In the instant case, it is clear to the Court that respondent violated his lawyers oath as
well as the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates upon each lawyer, as his
duty to society and to the courts, the obligation to obey the laws of the land and to do no
falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court. Respondent has been deplorably
lacking in the candor required of him as a member of the Bar and an officer of the
court in his acts of applying for the issuance of a free patent over the properties in
issue despite his knowledge that the same had already been sold by his mother to
complainants sister. This fact, respondent even admitted in the comment that he filed
before this Court when he alleged that the said properties were public land under the
Forestal Zone when the mother of the respondent ceded to Aurora Yap some portions of
entire occupancy of the Parases. Moreover, respondent committed deceit and falsehood in
his application for free patent over the said properties when he manifested under oath that
he had been in the actual possession and occupation of the said lands despite the fact that
these were continuously in the possession and occupation of complainants family, as
evidenced no less by respondents own statements in the pleadings filed before the IBP.

AC 3808: Magdaluyo vs. Nace (Feb. 2, 2000)

Clearly, respondent violated the prohibition in the Code of Professional Responsibility
against engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. He was, indeed,

less than sincere in asserting two conflicting rights over a portion of land that, in all
probability, he knew not to be his. What made matters worse was his participation in
bringing such claims to court, knowing them to be contradictory and therefore
cannot both be true, though both could be totally false. In this he is guilty of
consenting to if not actual commission of a falsehood before a court, again in
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
As a lawyer, respondent is bound by his oath to do no falsehood or consent to its
commission and to conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge
and discretion. The lawyer's oath is a source of obligations and violation thereof is a
ground for suspension, disbarment, or other disciplinary action. Respondent's acts are
clearly in violation of his solemn oath as a lawyer that this Court will not tolerate.
AC 5624: Florido vs. Florido (Jan. 20, 2004)
The issue to be resolved is whether or not the respondent can be held administratively
liable for his reliance on and attempt to enforce a spurious Resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
In his answer to the complaint, respondent claims that he acted in good faith in invoking
the Court of Appeals Resolution which he honestly believed to be authentic. This,
however, is belied by the fact that he used and presented the spurious resolution several
times. As pointed out by the Investigating Commissioner, the assailed Resolution was
presented by respondent on at least two occasions: first, in his Petition for Issuance of
Writ of Habeas Corpus docketed as Special Proc. Case No. 3898, which he filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City; and second, when he sought the assistance of
the Philippine National Police (PNP) of Tanjay City to recover custody of his minor
children from complainant. Since it was respondent who used the spurious Resolution, he
is presumed to have participated in its fabrication.
Candor and fairness are demanded of every lawyer. The burden cast on the judiciary
would be intolerable if it could not take at face value what is asserted by counsel. The
time that will have to be devoted just to the task of verification of allegations submitted
could easily be imagined. Even with due recognition then that counsel is expected to
display the utmost zeal in the defense of a clients cause, it must never be at the expense
of the truth
Moreover, the records show that respondent used offensive language in his pleadings in
describing complainant and her relatives. A lawyers language should be forceful but
dignified, emphatic but respectful as befitting an advocate and in keeping with the dignity
of the legal profession. The lawyers arguments whether written or oral should be
gracious to both court and opposing counsel and should be of such words as may be
properly addressed by one gentlemen to another. By calling complainant, a sly
manipulator of truth as well as a vindictive congenital prevaricator, hardly measures
to the sobriety of speech demanded of a lawyer.

AM No. RTJ-00-1528: Tolentino vs. Cabral (March 28, 2000)

Counter-charges against complainant; See also for Rule 11
We find the countercharges against complainant to be meritorious. First, complainant is
guilty as charged of misrepresenting the contents of respondent judges order of June 19,
1995, which constitutes violation of Canon 10, Rule 10.02, by declaring in his Motion for
Clarification:
. . . The admission that a court aide tampered with or altered the draft of
subject order which change is indicative of inexcusable negligence, fraud
and falsification committed by that aide prejudicial to our rights . . . .
The allegation that respondent admitted tampering with or altering the records is
obviously an attempt by complainant either to obtain a favorable action by
misleading the trial court or to badger, annoy, and cast disrepute to the respondent
judge
Complainant should be reminded that lawyers have an obligation to the court as well as
to the opposing party to make only truthful statements in their pleadings. For his violation
of this duty, complainant committed a breach of Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. In addition, he likewise committed a violation of Canon 11
of Rule 11.03 by threatening respondent judge that if his motions were not granted,
respondent judge would be administratively charged. To be sure, the threat made
against respondent judge was not a threat to do him bodily harm. Nonetheless, it
was a threat. Needless to say, disrespectful, abusive and abrasive language, offensive
personalities, unfounded accusations, or intemperate words tending to obstruct,
embarrass, or influence the court in administering justice or to bring it into
disrepute have no place in a pleading.
AC 6442: Macias vs. Selda (Oct. 21, 2004)
All members of the legal profession made a solemn oath to, inter alia, do no falsehood
and conduct [themselves] as [lawyers] according to the best of [their] knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [their] clients. These
particular fundamental principles are reflected in the Code of Professional Responsibility,
specifically:
Canon 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
Court, nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by an artifice.
When respondent executed his affidavit of May 22, 2000 retracting his reason for
withdrawing as counsel for Norma T. Lim, he acknowledged, under oath, his
misrepresentation. He misled the court in clear violation of his oath as lawyer and
failed to abide by the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Candor towards the courts is a cardinal requirement of the practicing lawyer. In fact, this
obligation to the bench for candor and honesty takes precedence. Thus, saying one thing
in his Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for Private Protestee and another in his subsequent
affidavit is a transgression of this imperative which necessitates appropriate punishment.
G.R. 157659: Mallari vs. GSIS (Jan. 25, 2010)
He thus deliberately abused court procedures and processes, in order to enable himself to
obstruct and stifle the fair and quick administration of justice in favor of mortgagee and
purchaser GSIS.
His conduct contravened Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, by which he was enjoined as a lawyer to observe the rules of procedure
and xxx not [to] misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. By his dilatory moves, he
further breached and dishonored his Lawyers Oath
We stress that the petitioners being the party litigant himself did not give him the license
to resort to dilatory moves. His zeal to defend whatever rights he then believed he had
and to promote his perceived remaining interests in the property already lawfully
transferred to GSIS should not exceed the bounds of the law, for he remained at all times
an officer of the Court burdened to conduct himself with all good fidelity as well to the
courts as to [his] clients. His true obligation as a lawyer should not be warped by any
misplaced sense of his rights and interests as a litigant, because he was, above all, bound
not to unduly delay a case, not to impede the execution of a judgment, and not to misuse
Court processes. Consequently, he must be made to account for his misconduct as a
lawyer.
AC 7054: Que vs. Revilla, Jr. (December 4, 2009)
The records also reveal that the respondent committed willful, intentional and deliberate
falsehood in the pleadings he filed with the lower courts
First, in the petition for annulment of judgment filed before the RTC, Branch 101,
Quezon City, the respondent cited extrinsic fraud as one of the grounds for the annulment
sought Yet, in paragraph 35 of the same petition, the respondent alleged that no second
motion for reconsideration or for new trial, or no other petition with the CA had been
filed, as he believed that the decisions rendered both by the MeTC and the RTC are
null and void. These conflicting claims, no doubt, involve a fabrication made for the
purpose of supporting the petition for annulment. Worse, it involved a direct and
unsubstantiated attack on the reputation of a law office colleague, another violation we
shall separately discuss below.
Second, the respondent employed another obvious subterfuge when he filed his second
petition for annulment of title, which was an unsuccessful attempt to circumvent the rule
that only the Solicitor General may commence reversion proceedings of public lands on

behalf of the Republic of the Philippines. This second petition, filed by a private party
and not by the Republic, showed that: (a) the respondent and his clients requested that
they be represented by the Solicitor General in the proceedings; (b) the Republic of the
Philippines was simply impleaded in the amended petition without its consent as a
plaintiff; and (c) the respondent signed the amended petition where he alone stood as
counsel for the plaintiffs. In this underhanded manner, the respondent sought to
compel the Republic to litigate and waste its resources on an unauthorized and unwanted
suit.
Third, the respondent also committed falsehood in his motion for reconsideration of the
order dismissing his petition for annulment of judgment where he misrepresented to the
court and his clients what actually transpired in the hearing of June 28, 2002
For these acts, we find the respondent liable under Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 the Code of
Professional Responsibility for violating the lawyers duty to observe candor and fairness
in his dealings with the court.
AM RTJ-04-1884: Canada vs. Suerte (Feb. 23, 2008)
Dishonesty is defined as the disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in
principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive
or betray. This is a grave offense that carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the
service, even for the first offense, with forfeiture of retirement benefits except accrued
leave credits and perpetual disqualification from re-employment in government service
Violation of the fundamental tenets of judicial conduct embodied in the new Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, the Code of Judicial Conduct and the
Canons of Judicial Ethics constitutes a breach of Canons 1 and 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR). Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR further enjoins a
lawyer from engaging in unlawful, dishonest or deceitful conduct. Similarly, Rule 10.01
of Canon 10 states that a lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing
of any in court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
These rules are broad enough to cover dishonesty of a lawyer both in his
professional or private capacity.
AC 5715: Rosal vs. Vera (Feb. 14, 2005)
There is no showing that respondent had ill motive against the complainant for him to
fabricate said complaint for estafa against the latter. Neither was there any indication that
respondent had any personal interest in filing said estafa case against the complainant.
Thus, the allegation that respondent had falsified the complaint for estafa case is bereft of
merit.

The assertion of complainant in her reply that respondent misled the court considering
there was no such appeal filed before the DOJ cannot be given credence as she failed to
substantiate the same. She did not submit any proof, like a certification from the said
office, confirming her allegation.
Complainant should have laid all possible clear and convincing evidence to show that her
imputations against the respondent are true, but she failed to do the same.

CANON 11 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT

DUE TO THE COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST
ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.
Rule 11.01 - A lawyer shall appear in court properly attired.
Rule 11.02 - A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language
or behavior before the Courts.
Rule 11.04 - A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the
record or have no materiality to the case.
AC 6567: Saberon vs. Larong (April 16, 2008)
This Court finds respondent guilty of simple misconduct for using intemperate language
in his pleadings
To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to
use strong language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients.
However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such
enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language
abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing
but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive.
On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all
offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation
of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is
charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyers language
even in his pleadings must be dignified...
True, utterances, petitions and motions made in the course of judicial proceedings have
consistently been considered as absolutely privileged, however false or malicious they
may be, but only for so long as they are pertinent and relevant to the subject of inquiry.
The test of relevancy has been stated, thus:
x x x. As to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary to make alleged defamatory
matters privileged the courts favor a liberal rule. The matter to which the privilege does
not extend must be so palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of the
controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its relevancy and impropriety. In order that
matter alleged in a pleading may be privileged, it need not be in every case material to the
issues presented by the pleadings. It must, however, be legitimately related thereto, or so
pertinent to the subject of the controversy that it may become the subject of inquiry in the
course of the trial x x x.
AC 7399: Pobre vs. Defensor-Santiago (August 25, 2009)

No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts should be
allowed to erode the peoples faith in the judiciary. In this case, the lady senator clearly
violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Senator Santiago should have known, as any perceptive individual, the impact her
statements would make on the peoples faith in the integrity of the courts As Senator
Santiago alleged, she delivered her privilege speech as a prelude to crafting remedial
legislation on the JBC. This allegation strikes the Court as an afterthought in light of the
insulting tenor of what she said. We quote the passage once more:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am
homicidal. I am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am
not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a
country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice
Artemio Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer
interested in the position [of Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by
idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the Supreme
Court of idiots x x x. (Emphasis ours.)
A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily show that her statements
were expressions of personal anger and frustration at not being considered
for the post of Chief Justice
To be sure, Senator Santiago could have given vent to her anger without indulging in
insulting rhetoric and offensive personalities.
Lest it be overlooked, Senator Santiagos outburst was directly traceable to what she
considered as an unjust act the JBC had taken in connection with her application
for the position of Chief Justice. But while the JBC functions under the Courts
supervision, its individual members, save perhaps for the Chief Justice who sits as the
JBCs ex-officio chairperson, have no official duty to nominate candidates for
appointment to the position of Chief Justice. The Court is, thus, at a loss to understand
Senator Santiagos wholesale and indiscriminate assault on the members of the
Court and her choice of critical and defamatory words against all of them
The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on Senator/Atty.
Santiago for what otherwise would have constituted an act of utter disrespect on her part
towards the Court and its members. The factual and legal circumstances of this case,
however, deter the Court from doing so, even without any sign of remorse from her.
Basic constitutional consideration dictates this kind of disposition.
AC 5921: Lacurom vs. Jacoba (March 10, 2006)
No doubt, the language contained in the 30 July 2001 motion greatly exceeded the vigor
required of Jacoba to defend ably his clients cause. We recall his use of the following
words and phrases: abhorrent nullity, legal monstrosity, horrendous mistake, horrible
error, boner, and an insult to the judiciary and an anachronism in the judicial process.

Even Velasco-Jacoba acknowledged that the words created a cacophonic picture of total
and utter disrespect.
Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen, to
criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts
and judges. However, even the most hardened judge would be scarred by the scurrilous
attack made by the 30 July 2001 motion on Judge Lacuroms Resolution. On its face, the
Resolution presented the facts correctly and decided the case according to supporting law
and jurisprudence. Though a lawyers language may be forceful and emphatic, it should
always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use
of unnecessary language is proscribed if we are to promote high esteem in the courts and
trust in judicial administration.
AC 5332: Uy vs. Depasucat (July 29, 2003)
However, respondents went overboard by further stating in the Manifestation that
complainant had in fact confessed to Bribery and Telling On of judges, after the judges
allegedly refused to give in to their demands, by using illegally taped conversations-both
actual and/or by telephone. It belied their good intention and exceeded the bounds
of propriety, hence not arguably protected; it is the surfacing of a feeling of
contempt towards a litigant; it offends the court before which it is made. A lawyer
shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the
Courts. It must be remembered that the language vehicle does not run short of
expressions which are emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory,
illuminating but not offensive. It has been said that a lawyers language should be
dignified in keeping with the dignity of the legal profession.
G.R. 159486-88: Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan (Nov. 25, 2003)
See also for Canon 13
It should be clear that the phrase partisan political activities, in its statutory context,
relates to acts designed to cause the success or the defeat of a particular candidate or
candidates who have filed certificates of candidacy to a public office in an election. The
taking of an oath of office by any incoming President of the Republic before the Chief
Justice of the Philippines is a traditional official function of the Highest Magistrate. The
assailed presence of other justices of the Court at such an event could be no different
from their appearance in such other official functions as attending the Annual State of the
Nation Address by the President of the Philippines before the Legislative Department.
The Supreme Court does not claim infallibility; it will not denounce criticism made
by anyone against the Court for, if well-founded, can truly have constructive effects
in the task of the Court, but it will not countenance any wrongdoing nor allow the
erosion of our peoples faith in the judicial system, let alone, by those who have been
privileged by it to practice law in the Philippines.

Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that the lawyer should
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial officers and, indeed,
should insist on similar conduct by others. In liberally imputing sinister and devious
motives and questioning the impartiality, integrity, and authority of the members of the
Court, Atty. Paguia has only succeeded in seeking to impede, obstruct and pervert the
dispensation of justice.
The attention of Atty. Paguia has also been called to the mandate of Rule 13.02 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibiting a member of the bar from
making such public statements on a case that may tend to arouse public opinion for
or against a party. Regrettably, Atty. Paguia has persisted in ignoring the Courts
well-meant admonition.
On the 7th September 2003 issue of the Daily Tribune, Atty. Paguia wrote to say What is the legal effect of that violation of President Estradas right to due process of
law? It renders the decision in Estrada vs. Arroyo unconstitutional and void. The
rudiments of fair play were not observed. There was no fair play since it appears that
when President Estrada filed his petition, Chief Justice Davide and his fellow justices had
already committed to the other party - GMA - with a judgment already made and waiting
to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing.
After the justices had authorized the proclamation of GMA as president, can they be
expected to voluntarily admit the unconstitutionality of their own act?
Unrelentingly, Atty. Paguia has continued to make public statements of like nature.
Re: Letter dated 21 Feb. 2005 of Atty. Soreda (July 22, 2005)
Atty. Sorredas imputation of manipulation in the assignment and raffle of cases is utterly
baseless and at best a mere figment of his imagination.
Unfounded accusations or allegations or words tending to embarrass the court or to bring
it into disrepute have no place in a pleading. Their employment serves no useful purpose.
On the contrary, they constitute direct contempt of court or contempt in facie curiae and a
violation of the lawyers oath and a transgression of the Code of Professional
Responsibility
Atty. Sorreda, as a citizen and as an officer of the court, is entitled to criticize the rulings
of this Court, to point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed with error. But,
certainly, this does not give him the unbridled license to insult and malign the Court and
bring it into disrepute. Against such an assault, the Court is duty-bound to act to
preserve its honor and dignity and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal
profession
Here, Atty. Sorreda has transcended the permissible bounds of fair comment and
constructive criticism to the detriment of the orderly administration of justice. Free

expression, after all, must not be used as a vehicle to satisfy ones irrational
obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade and even destroy this Court and its
magistrates.
GR 159286: Tacardon vs. Ang (April 5, 2005)
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that "A lawyer shall
observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers x x x." Rule
11.03 thereof mandates that "A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the courts." Impoliteness is a vice that every
member of the Bar must avoid. Intimidations do not suit his role as an officer of the
court. While criticism of judicial conduct is not forbidden and zeal in advocacy is in
fact encouraged, every lawyer must always act within the limits of propriety and
good taste and with deference to the courts before which he pleads.
AM RTJ-02-1719: Tiongco vs. Savillo (March 31, 2006)
However, complainant admitted that he only concluded that respondent judge is a BarFlunker, not because petitioner (complainant) has taken the pains to dig into the records
of the Judicial and Bar counsel [sic] to gain such information, but only because of
respondent judges deportment, swaggering style of manner and speech.
Complainants use of intemperate and unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of
respect a lawyer owes to the courts. Complainant violated Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides that a lawyer shall observe and maintain the
respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and, more specifically, Rule 11.03,
which mandates that a lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing
language or behavior before the Courts.
It is true that lawyers can criticize the courts it is their right as citizens and their duty as
officers of the court to avail of such right. But, as held in In Re: Almacen (142 Phil.
353, 371 (1970), it is [a] cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona
fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety.
The Court notes that in Tiongco v. Aguilar, where complainant was found guilty of
violating Canon 11 and fined P5,000, the Court concluded:
That Atty. Tiongco had exceeded the bounds of decency and propriety in
making x x x the scurrilous characterizations of the respondent judge is, indeed, all
too obvious. Such could only come from anger, if not hate, after he was not given
what he wanted. Anger or hate could only come from one who seems to be of that
frame of mind whereby he considers as in accordance with law and justice whatever
he believes to be right in his own opinion and as contrary to law and justice
whatever does not accord with his views (Montecillo vs. Gica, 60 SCRA 234, 238
[1974]).

Rule 11.05 - A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper
authorities only.
AC 7006: Re: Suspension of Atty. Bagabuyo (October 9, 700)
See also for Canon 13
Instead of availing himself only of judicial remedies, respondent caused the publication
of an article regarding the Order granting bail to the accused in the August 18, 2003 issue
of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily. The article, entitled Senior prosecutor lambasts
Surigao judge for allowing murder suspect to bail out, reads:
SENIOR state prosecutor has lashed at a judge in Surigao City for
allowing a murder suspect to go out on bail.
Senior state prosecutor Rogelio Bagabuyo lambasted Judge
Manuel Tan of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 29 based in
Surigao City for ruling on a motion that sought a bailbond for Luis Plaza
who stands charged with murdering a policeman . . . .
Plaza reportedly posted a P40-thousand bail bond.
Bagabuyo argued that the crime of murder is a non-bailable
offense. But Bagabuyo admitted that a judge could still opt to allow a
murder suspect to bail out in cases when the evidence of the prosecution is
weak.
But in this murder case, Bagabuyo said the judge who previously
handled it, Judge F[lori]pinas B[uy]ser, described the evidence to be
strong. B[uy]ser inhibited from the case for an unclear reason.
xxx
Bagabuyo said he would contest Tans decision before the Court
of Appeals and would file criminal and administrative charges of certiorari
against the judge.
Bagabuyuo said he was not afraid of being cited in contempt by
Judge Tan.
This is the only way that the public would know that there are
judges there who are displaying judicial arrogance. he said.
Respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 when he admittedly caused the holding
of a press conference where he made statements against the Order dated November
12, 2002 allowing the accused in Crim. Case No. 5144 to be released on bail.
Respondent also violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated that Judge Tan was
displaying judicial arrogance in the article entitled, Senior prosecutor lambasts
Surigao judge for allowing murder suspect to bail out, which appeared in the August
18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily. Respondents statements in the
article, which were made while Crim. Case No. 5144 was still pending in court, also
violated Rule 13.02 of Canon 13, which states that a lawyer shall not make public
statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion
for or against a party.

In regard to the radio interview given to Tony Consing, respondent violated Rule 11.05 of
Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for not resorting to the proper
authorities only for redress of his grievances against Judge Tan. Respondent also violated
Canon 11 for his disrespect of the court and its officer when he stated that Judge Tan was
ignorant of the law, that as a mahjong aficionado, he was studying mahjong instead of
studying the law, and that he was a liar.
The Court is not against lawyers raising grievances against erring judges but the
rules clearly provide for the proper venue and procedure for doing so, precisely
because respect for the institution must always be maintained.

CANON 13 - A LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS OF HIS CAUSE

AND REFRAIN FROM ANY IMPROPRIETY WHICH TENDS TO INFLUENCE,
OR GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF INFLUENCING THE COURT.
Rule 13.01 - A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor
seek opportunity for cultivating familiarity with Judges.
Rule 13.02 - A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a
pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.
Rule 13.03 - A lawyer shall not brook or invite interference by another branch or
agency of the government in the normal course of judicial proceedings.
GR 157384: Bildner & Ilusorio vs. Ilusorio (June 5, 2009)
The highly immoral implication of a lawyer approaching a judgeor a judge evincing a
willingnessto discuss, in private, a matter related to a case pending in that judges sala
cannot be over-emphasized. The fact that Atty. Singson did talk on different occasions to
Judge Reyes, initially through a mutual friend, Atty. Sevilla, leads us to conclude that
Atty. Singson was indeed trying to influence the judge to rule in his clients favor. This
conduct is not acceptable in the legal profession. Canon 13 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility enjoins it.
In the Matter of Alleged Improper Conduct of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Badoy
(Jan. 16, 2003)
Justice Badoy tramples upon the foregoing judicial norms. We see no reason why he
should rush to the GMA-7 Broadcast Station just to inform the public about the loss of a
Resolution. This is an internal office incident which should not be reported to the
whole nation. His claim that the Resolution might have been stolen and sold by
someone (using his name) for a fee is a wild conjecture. Not only did his conduct give
an image that he could not manage his work effectively, but it also indicated that he
had corrupt personnel. Moreover, it dragged innocent parties as possible culprits.
Justice Badoys aberrant behavior deserves administrative sanction. As the Chairman of
the Division hearing the plunder case against the former President of the Philippines, he
should have been more circumspect in his actuation. A short pause for reflection might
have yielded a better judgment. The loss of the Resolution, being an internal matter,
could have been addressed inside his own chamber. That he brought it to the arena of
public opinion is pure vanity. It cannot be countenanced. If lawyers are prohibited
from making public statements in the media regarding a pending case to arouse
public opinion for or against a party, with more reason should judges be prohibited
from seeking publicity. Judges are not actors or politicians who thrive by publicity.
Publicity undermines the dignity and impartiality of a judge. Thus, at no time
should he be moved by a desire to cater to public opinion to the detriment of the
administration of justice.
The fact that Justice Badoy, just three (3) weeks prior to the ambulance incident, was
strictly ordered by Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., to cease and desist from holding

press conferences, issuing press statements, or giving interviews to the media on any
matter or incident related to the issues subject of the controversy all the more punctuates
his indiscretion.
As we mentioned earlier, judges are subject to human limitations. Imbedded in their
consciousness is the complex of emotions, habits and convictions. Aware of this
actuality, it behooves them to regulate these deflecting forces and not to let them loose,
either to their own detriment or to that of the courts they serve. This is the high price
they have to pay as occupants of their exalted positions.
AC 4500: Flores vs. Chua (April 30, 1999)
On the third ground (Ground III, III-A and III-B) that respondent Chua caused the
publication of new reports and paid advertisement/notice about the issuance of a decision
by the Securities ad Exchange Commission, there is sufficient evidence to sustain
complainant's charges.
Undeniably, respondent Chua did not act as counsel for any of the parties in the SEC
case, although it is safe to say that he represented some of the protagonist in other matters
or cases. It is likewise undenied that the decision of the SEC hearing officer in Case No.
3328 was favorable to respondent Chuas clients. Respondent Chua, being a lawyer,
should have known that the said decision was appealable. When he published the
decision, he courted a possible sanction for contempt. Here, we cannot excuse him
from such misconduct for it behooves him to even exert earnest efforts towards the
settlement of family disputes and certainly he should be the last to exacerbate and
complicate the controversial situation in which family members are embroiled. By
his publication, respondents has violated the canons of professional ethics and
professional responsibility, particularly Canon 19, 27, 3.01, 13.02, 1.03 and 1.04.
AM 08-8-11-CA: Re: Letter of Judge Vasquez, Jr. (September 9, 2008)
In his testimony before the Panel, Chairman Sabio admits that he called up Justice Sabio
on May 30, 2008 from Davao City, in response to a request for help from a member of
the Board of Trustees of Meralco. Notwithstanding the fact that Chairman Sabio called to
relay to Justice Sabio the rightness of the GSIS cause and asked him to help GSIS
and that Justice Sabio allegedly told his brother that he would act in accordance with his
conscience, the same still constituted a violation of Canon 13 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for lawyers, which provides that:
A lawyer shall x x x refrain from any impropriety which tends to
influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the Court.
As they were both members of the Bar, it is incomprehensible to this Court how the
brothers can justify their improper conversation regarding the Meralco case. As the
Panel observed in its Report:
Ironically, both of them found nothing wrong with brother Camilos effort to
influence his younger brothers action in the Meralco case, because both believe that our

Filipino culture allows brother-to-brother conversation, even if the purpose of one is to

influence the other, provided the latter does not agree to do something illegal.

From the first assignment on Rule 71 (Not exactly on point but may be helpful in
theory)
G.R. No. 76562: ROGER B. PATRICIO vs. HON. ENRIQUE P. SUPLICO (April 22,
1991)
-Comparison between direct-indirect contempt; direct contempt per se.

The petition was written by twenty (20) active law practitioners in Capiz Province in
fulfillment of what they evidently considered their social, civic and legal duty to rid the
courts of undesirable magistrates, and assist in the restoration of the people's faith in the
judiciary and the Rule of Law. It was addressed exclusively to the officials who were the
appropriate and competent parties to act thereon. The petition was not attended by any
publicity whatsoever. Absent any evidence of malice or other improper motive on the part
of the authors, the petition is prima facie not actionable upon the theory either that it is
libelous or contumacious. Indeed, given the particular circumstances and conditions of
the case, the petition in question may be regarded as a similar one was so considered
by this Court some fifty years ago as merely an exercise of a consititutional right to
petition government for redress of a legitimate grievance.
BRIDGES V. CALIFORNIA: 314 U.S. 252 (1941)
-interference with the orderly administration of justice

For these reasons, we are convinced that the judgments below result in a curtailment of
expression that cannot be dismissed as insignificant. If they can be justified at all, it must
be in terms of some serious substantive evil which they are designed to avert. The
substantive evil here sought to be averted has been variously described below. It appears
to be double: disrespect for the judiciary, and disorderly and unfair administration of
justice. The assumption that respect for the judiciary can be won by shielding judges from
published criticism wrongly appraises the character of American public opinion. For it is
a prized American privilege to speak one's mind, although not always with perfect good
taste, on all public institutions. And an enforced silence, however limited, solely in the
name of preserving the dignity of the bench would probably engender resentment,
suspicion, and contempt much more than it would enhance respect
The basis for punishing the publication as contempt was, by the trial court, said to be its
"inherent tendency," and, by the Supreme Court, its "reasonable tendency," to interfere
with the orderly administration of justice in an action then before a court for
consideration. In accordance with what we have said on the "clear and present danger"
cases, neither "inherent tendency" nor "reasonable tendency" is enough to justify a
restriction of free expression. But even if they were appropriate measures, we should find
exaggeration in the use of those phrases to describe the facts here.
CRAIG V. HARNEY: 331 US 337 (1947)
-threat to the administration of the court must be imminent

The vehemence of the language used is not alone the measure of the power to punish for

contempt. The fires which it kindles must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely,
threat to the administration of justice. The danger must not be remote or even probable; it
must immediately imperil
The editorial challenged the propriety of the court's procedure, not the merits of its ruling.
Any such challenge, whether made prior or subsequent to the final disposition of a case,
would likely reflect on the competence of the judge in handling cases. But, as we have
said, the power to punish for contempt depends on a more substantial showing. Giving
the editorial all of the vehemence which the court below found in it, we fail to see how it
could in any realistic sense create an imminent and serious threat to the ability of the
court to give fair consideration to the motion for rehearing.