I Essential His.

tories
I
I

B ~ z a n t i u mat War

Essential Histories

Byzantium at War

Routledge

lohn Haldon

Taylor &Franch-

Contents
Introduction
Chronology

19

Background to war

The political world of Byzantium

23

Warring sicks

Neighbours and enemies

29

Outbreak

Why and how did B p n t i u m fight wars?

36

The fighting

Crrganising for war

47

Portrait of a sald~er

Recruitment, discipline, and life on campaign

61

The w d d around war

War and peace

72

Portrajt of a civjlian

Metrios - a farmer

80

How the wars ended

Death of an empire

86

Conclusion and consequences

War; peace, and survival

90

Further reading

92

Byzantine rulers AD 527- 1 453

93

Index

94

Introduction
The Byzantine empire was not called by that
name In its own time, and indeed the term
'Byzantine' was used only to describe
inhabitantsof Constanttnople, ancient
Byzantion on the Bosphorus. The subjects of
the emperor at Constantinople referred to
themselves as Rhomaioi, Romans,kcause as
far as they were concaned Constantinople,
the clty of Constantine I, the flrst Christian
ruler of the Roman empire, had become the
capital of the Roman empire once Rome had
lost its o m preeminent position, and it was
the CMstian Roman empire that carried an
the traditions of Roman civilisation. In turn,
the latter was identified with civlIised society
as such, and Orthodox Christianity was both
the guiding religrow and spiritual force which
defend4 and protected that world, but war
also the guarantor ~f Gad's continuing
support. Orthodoxy means, literally, correct
belief, and this was what the Byzantines
believed was essential to their own survival.
Thus, from the modern historian's
perspective, 'Byzantine' might be paraphrased
by the more long-winded 'medievaleastern
RomanJempire, for that is, in historical terms,
what 'Bymntium' really meant.
In its long history, from the later
5th century, when the last vestiges af the
western hatf of the Roman emphe were
absorbed into barbarian successor kingdoms,
until the fall in battle of the last eastern
Roman emperor, Constantine XI (1448-531,
the empire was almost constantly at war.Its
strategic situation in the southern B a b n s
and Asia Minor made this inevitable. It was
constantly challenged by its more or its less
powerful neighbours - at first, the Persian
empire in the east, later the various Islamic
powers that arose in that region - and by its
northern neighbaurs, the Shvs, the A m s (a
Turkic people) in the 6th and 7th centuries,
the Bulgars from the end of the 7th to early

1lth centuries and, in the later 1lth and

12th centuries, the Hungarians, later the
Serbs and finally, after their conquests in
Greece and the southern Bakans, the
Ottoman Turks. Relations with the western
powers which arose from what remalned of
the western Roman empire during the 5th
century were complicated and tense, not least
because of the political competition between
the papacy and the Constantinopolitan
patriarchate, the two major sees - Alexandria,
Antioch and Jerusalem were far less powerful
after the 7th century Islamic conquests - in
the Christian world. Byzantium survived so
long partly because internally it was
well-organised, with an efficient fiscal and
military system; and partly because these
advantages, rooted in its late R m a n past,
lasted well into the 11th century. But as its
western and northern neighbours grew in
resources and political stability they were able

Gold nornosma of h s t m t i n e VI PO-797). R e m e

Leo 111 (7 t 7-74 I), ConstantineV (74 1-775) and Leo IV
('775780),seated. (Courtesy of Barber In*
of Fine
h,
University of Birmingham)

The Byzantine Imds

The Byzantine, or medieval eastern Roman,
empire was restricted for most af its
existence to the wuthern Balkans P& M a
Minor - very roughly modern Greecx and
modern Turkey.In the d d d e of the
5th century, after the succes of the emperm
Justlnian'szeconguaf 5 In the west, the
empire had been much more extensive,
including all of the north African coastal
regions horn the Atlantic to Egypt, dong
with south-eatem Spain, Italy and the
Balkam up to the Danube. But by the later
6th century the Italian lands were already
contested by the Lombard$, while the
VisIgoths of Spain smn expelled the imperial
administration from their lands. The near
eastern provinces in Syria, Imq and the
T r a m p d m region a h g with Egypt were all
Zost to Islam by the early a,
and north
Afrtca followed suit by the 4%. In a half
century of warfare, therefore, the empire last
some of its wedtble3t regions and much of
t h e revenue to sllpprt the govefmneht, ti-&
mling elite and vftal nee& such as the army.
. Much of the territory that remahed to
the emme was mountainous or arid, M that
the exploitable a m a wae really quite
-4
in exrent. Neverthdw, an efficient
(for
times) fiscal administration
@'tax rt!ghe mtraaed the mrs;rtfmum fn
manp'wa bml @culmaI resaurces, whtie a
heavy rdhnce on well-planned d p l o m q ,
an extensive network of ambassadors,
emissaries and spies, a wikngness to play &
neighborn and enemIes against one another,
and to spend substantial sums on 'subsf[lies3

&em3 a f t r i d e t , 'MecUtemmm' type

cUm&te, and were W the IT&& important
saurce of EvenUeS fax the govement. me
pattern of mkmmt war simm~ystrongy
differentiafed mst tawm'md cities were
concen-ted in the coastal regions, while the
~OWIWIUand plateaux were much mare
q ~ & ysPttled S
W mmi4eratioys
applied to the Balka3hs, too, and in Wtb we
this m a p h y a&ct@d mad s y s and
~
~mmunlatiom.
l k empi* nMed to take
these fidm into account m &at@c
planning and campaign arganisation, of
C O ~ for
, logistid considmtims - t h e
sources d manpaver, faod and &dm,
H W w k and weapons, h ~ f w
D move thw
@otmdJand how they were mmumed played a key role fa the mpW%ability to
spwive kn the dlffleult skrategir: sftwtion in
which it fauna iW.
h m l e s , whether large or Small, and
whether B-We
or hostffe forces, faced
m y pr6bIem when caarpaigntng in or
actass Asia Minm, tn particular tfre low
smtches of mad through relatively waterless
and exposed counby, and the mgh
motlntabous tetrain q M i i H n g masW

region3 fram central pkmm The complex

m
a
e wa ~ e ~ tMad
l wtm
c
was
partly rWded during the Byantlne period,
but tbe empire af&t the.6thcentury
devehpd a
of military mum homer
with r series of fortEed p s t s and military

baws-forth~samemte3~~~
FWQS of access and egress fordxab fme.
Strategic needs dwqed, of qW3e, and so
did~rOaasystm,wtOhmtes~tn
and out of use.
The Balkans pment a wged and
fragmented landscape falling broadly into
two m a :the coastal and riverhe plains (of
Tbr;Pce, of T h S 6 d y ~d ~f die %nuth
DanubEad am), which rnpmductfve and
fairly densely -pied;
aad the mountain
mges that datlllnate the whole regf~nand
represent about W W ' & of its a k a the
Mmifc Alps inthe west, sWhbg-frdm
north-east to south-wt; the southeply
Pindus r q e with which they merge, ~d
which together dominate w & m and
m m a l Greece; and the Balltan chain ik&

r4q(A&&

oWtm in Constarttin*
mkction)

(4th century).

I The east Roman empire in the middle of the 6th century

Introduction

The conquests of the empwnrJustiniw re-established

the eastern Roman empire as the dominam power in
the Mditerranean.

swtching from the Murava river as far as the

Black Sea coast, with the Rhodope r a w
forming an arc to the south, through
Macedonia towards the plain of Thrace. The
fragmented terrain has given dse ta a series
of Wet geopolitical units wpated by
ridges d highlands, fanning out along river
valleys t o w & the coastal areas.
A number of major routes served from
andent times to give access to the interior of
the B d h n ream or to pass through it from
north to south or west to east, The Balkans
are characterised by relatively narrow and
oftenquite high, easily canbmlled passes,
and this terrain was ideally suited to guerrilla
strategy - tough campaigning wnditiana,
arid dWicult access to some regions during
the winter. The structure of commmcations
and the effectiveness of Bymtlne political
authority demonstrate this, for there were no
obvious fDcal points in the ancient and
medieval perid in the south Balkan region
apaa from Thessalofild and Constantinople,
both on the edge of the peninsula and its
fragmented landscape.
Geography aected Iand use in the Balkans
as it did in Asia Minor. The uplands and
mountains, dom,inated by forest and
woodland, and the lower footbills by
woodland, saub and rough pasturage, were
suited to pastoral acdvlty only. Agriculture
was limited to the plains, dver vallm and
caa$tlands of Thessaly, Macedonla and the
Danube. The sea played an Important role,
since it surroundsthe Balkan peninsula apart
h m dong the northern boundary, and acted,
as it still d w s today, as w &dent means of
communication dong the heavily Indented
coastline and with more distant regions. The
disadvantage of relatively easy seaborne
access, however,w a s that it opened up tfie
s o u t h B & m peninsula to Invasion.
Otle of the factors that made the Roman
m y so successful and effldent was the
military road system, established for the most
part between the end of.the 2nd cenhlv BC

II

and the mlddle of the 2nd century AD. The

network also facilitated commerce, civilian
trafac and the movement of information. But
in the later 4th and 5th centuries the roads
went Into decline a reflection of economic
and soda1 changes across the empire m d the
consequences of these for local g w e m m and
town coundls. One result w a s a d d n e in the
use of wheeled vehiclm, which could not use
roads that were not properly maintained, and
a corresponding increzsse in dependence on
beasts of burden.
After the 6th century a Wted number
of key routes was kept up by means of
compulsory burdens imposed on local
communities.The fast post, consisting of
pad-animals, relay hones and light carts,
and the slow post, which provided ox-carts
and heavy vehicles, were amalgamated Into
a single system in the 6th or 7th century,
and continued to operate until the last years
of the empire. The imperial road systems in
both the Balkans and Anatolia were less
extensive than hitherto, but remained
nevertheless effective. But the costs of
maintenance and the probIem of
supervising upkeep meant that many routes
were hardly more than tracks or paths
usable only by pack-animals, with paved or
hard surfaces only near towns and fortresses,
Travel and bansport by water was usually
faster and much cheaper. This was espedally
so in the case of the long-distance
movement af bulk goods, such as grain, for
example. The expense of feeding
draught-oxen, drovers and carters, paying
tolls, together with the slow rate of
movement of ox-carts, added very
considerably to the price of the goods being
transported, generally well beyond the price
of ordhary subjects of the emperors. It was
really only the government and the army,
and to a certain extent the Church and a
few wealthy individuals, who could pay for
this. In contrast, shipping was much more
cost effective, shce large quantities of gods
could be transported in a single vessel,
handled by a small crew, ~elatiwly
Inexpensively, once the capital investment
in vessel and cargo had been made.

and so forth. And geographical factors w e ,

of mucourse, r.umhnw~hlto w a h w and the
strategic otganisation of the empire,

Introduction

adopted Orthodox Christianity in the last

y e w of the 5th centuy in order to gain
papal and imperial recognition and support
for his rule, where he also claimed, at least
nomWIy, to represent Roman rule. Roman
emperors considered the west not as 'lostJ,
but rather as temporarily outside direct
Lmgmial authority.
The emperor Justinian (527-65) used this
as the justffication for a series of remarlable
retonquats, aimed at restoring Rome's power
as it had been at its height - north Afrim
from the Vandals by 534, Italy from the
Ostrogoths by 552. But the plan was too
ambitious to have had army chance of
permanent success. And while the emperor
nevertheless came very close to achieving a
major part of his ori@naIaims, the probkms
that arose after his death illustrated the
problems hb polides brought with them.
Warfare with the Persfan empire in the east
meant that resources were always stretched to
the limit and there were never enough
soldiers for all fronts. Upon his death in 565
Justlnlanleft a vastIy expanded but perlIously
overstretchd empire, in bath financial and
military terms. Hls successors were faced with
the reality of dealing with new enemies, a
lack of ready cash, and internaI discontent
over high taxation and constant demands for
soldiers and the necessities to supprt them.
The Persian war was -new&, while in 568
the Germanic Iambad crossed &amtheir
homeland along t h e western Danube and
Dxava regson into Italy, in thet efforts to flee
the approaching Avars, a Turkic nomadic
power which was establishing a vast steppe
empire. The Lombds soon overran Roman
defensive positions in the north of the
peninsula, found@ a number of
independent chiefdoms in the centre and
south, while the Avars established themselves
as a major challenge to imperial power in the
nwthern Balkan region. Between the
mid-570sand the end of the reign of the
emperor Maurice (582-602))the empire was
able t o re-establish a precarious balance in
the east and along the Danube.
Maurice was deposed in 602 fDUawlng a
muthy of the Danube force, and the

13

cenMon Phokas was raised to the throne.

Phokas c602-10))popularly regarded in later
Byzantine sources as a tyrant, ruled until he
was overthrown In 610, when he was in turn
replaced by Heraclius, the son of the military
governor of Africa. Heraclius was crowned
emperor and ruled until 641.
But the emphe was unable to maintain its
defences against external pressure. Withfn a
few years the A m and Slws had overrun
much of the Balkans, while the Persians
occupied and set up thelr own provincial
governments in Syria and Egypt between 614
and 618,and continued to push rnto Ask
Minor. Italy was left to its own devices and
became Increasingly autonomous. In spite of
a great siege of Constantinople by a Persian
and an A v a d l a v army in 626, Herachus
proved an able strategist and by 628 had
utterly destroyed the Persian armies in the
east, restoring the situation at the end of
Maurice's reign. The regional dominance of
the Roman empire seemed assured. But w M e
the Danube remained nominally the frontier,
much of the Balkan region was no longer
under irnmal authority, except when an
army appeared. The financial situation d the
empire, whose resources were quite
exhaust& by the long wars, was desperate.
The origins of Idam lie in the northern
Arabian penlmula, where different farm of
Christianity, Judaism and Indlgenws beliefs
coexisted, in particular in the much-travelled
trading and cgravan communities of Mecca
and Medlna. Mohammed was hlmself a
respected and established merchant who had
several times accompanied the trade
caravans north to Roman Syria. Syria and
Palestine already had substantial papulatfom
of Arabs, both farmers and herdsmen, as well
as mercenary soldiers serving the empire as a
buffer ag2llnst the Persians. Although
Mohammed's preaching - a synthesis of his
mhlfefs with Judaic and Chrhtlan ideas met initiaIly with stiff resistance fram his
own clan, by 628-29 he had established his
authority over much of the peninsula and
begun to consider the future direction of the
new IsIamic community.On his death
(traditionally placed in 632) there followed a

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mch
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of aawp*m@me, aa* weEmaller
Rw' Bf E ~ v .
t&tmM scale9udtil,dy Qmmndnppk
md a few Aegean k&m& &maine'd. And 3P
TW-rnbd&wwWe
ffwtsbowms
,
amaslug State WBafZds
X
~
~
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cmed WtEh @me
-r&
~~t~
tQ
+m#iwl&ewi3 L
a
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taps* polwcal m
mam<a
court fed
ThtW a,
vsy ruu&h&, W e p W B f
b $dig w-,
rire 6 v W h t l of
m i l i q dwWpmant k the u
s
t
o
r
yd ' h e
Byantine mp- m n q h t and
m
t m dibry,-h,
and n & t of
~ n u n d e r J u ~ i n t h e & h
defensivemwtum, When Seijuk Tkklsh
m i b g ~w
a ~ , ~ i eM
t am * , e ~ '
cmtxq?M n m o q , 1 ~ 4 & d l i and
~n a
a major impem ftmk h Iff71WK
capwe
I
primW defegsiv~Wmm ia the 7th and
the &@WE
8tb tkntu~@%
W W l i W ,&avkty arrd
N,W a p W Wdd

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I0

E s d l a l Histories

t?lpnilum at War

I s i n r R w a n t i r~m rnl~ t m tin Aria

Minnr

Chronology
4 7 4 4 7 5 &no emperor in east
4 7 5 4 7 6 Basiliscus usurps power in east

Last western Roman emperor,

Rbrnulus Augustulus, dies
4 7 6 4 9 1 Zeno (restored)
491-518 Anastasios I emperor in east
493-526 Theoderic rules Ostmgothic
kingdom of Italy
c.503 Anastasios recognfses authority, as
representathe of the Romans, of
CIovis, king of the Franks
507-711 Kingdom of Visigaths in Spain

476

518-527 Justin I
527 Justhian I becomes emperor
533-534 Belisarius reconquers Africa
(pacification campleted in 540s)
534
B e W u s begins reconquest of Italy
(war lasts until 553)
537 Dedication of the new Church of the
Holy Wisdom (Hagia Sophia) in
Consiantinople
Persian Wng Chosroes 1 takes Antioch
540
in Syria
542+ Plague in the Byzantine world
550+ Avars establish ruIe over Slavs north
of Black Sea and Danube

552

Narses defeats ToHla and last

Oshogothic resistance in Italy
553+ Reconquest of south-east Spain
from Visigoths
558 Treaty with Avan and agreement to
pay 'subsidies'
562 'Fifty-year peace' signed with Persia
564-591 Wars with Persia
566+ Shvs begin to infiltrate across Danube
frontier; pressure on frontier fortresses
from Avars
568+ hrnbardc driven westward from
Danube, invade Italy.
572 Lombards besiege hvenna
577 Mafor invasion d Balkans led
by Avars
584, 586 AvardIav attacks an Thessaloniki

591402 Gradual success in pushing Avars

back aaoss Danube
2
Maurice overthrown, Phakas
prodaimed emperor
603 War with Persia; situation in
Balkans deteriorates
610 Phokas overthrown by Heraclius, son
of exarch of Africa at Carthage
611420s Central and northern Balkans lost
61MX9 Pwslans m p y Syria, Palestine
and Egypt
622 Mohammed leaves Mecca for Medina
(the 'Hijra')
622-627 Heraclius campaigns in east against

Persians
Combined AvarbSlav and Persian
siege of Constantinople fails
626428 Heracllus defeats Persian farces
in east
629 Peace with Persia
634+ Arabs begin raids into Palestine
634-646 Arab conquest and occupation of
Syria, Palestine, Mesopotamia, Egypt
(636 - battle of Gabithaflarmuk)
644-t. Beginning of long-term raids and
plundering expeditions against
Byzantine Asia Minor
655 Sea battle of Phoenix, Byzantines
defeated by Muslim fleet
662 Constans II leads expedition through
Balkans into Italy, rakes up residence
in Sicily
668 Constans assassinated; M i o i
proclaimed emperor in Sfdly, but
defeated by forces loyal to
626

Constantine IV
674-678 Arab blockade and yearly sieges of

Constantinople. First rem~deduse d

'liquid fw' (Greek fire), to destroy

Arab fleet
679680 Arrival of Bulgars on Danube;
defeat of Byzantine forces under
Constantine IV

20

Essential Histories Byzantium at War

Third council of C o ~ ~ ~ e r p l e
(sixth ecumenical mundl)
685-692 Truce between raBphate an'd
am
Bymntium (Arab civil war)
860
5 9 1 4 2 QuhWxt w Tmhn council
at Constant:inople
863
693 -tine
defeat at Sebastoujmlis
698 Carthage falls to Arabs; final lass
of *a
866
717-718 Siege af Constanthople; ko,
gerreml of Anatolikofl,
power
and aowned ills Lea IU
726730 Sku rwn&n& iconocIastk views af
same bishops Beginnings of

-81

iconoclast conboersy

739-740 Leo m d Constantine defeat Arab

column at AlEtoinon
Earthquake hits Carrstanthopie
ArtabWrrs, Leu's son-in-law, rebels
against C o n s m e V and s e b s
Corlstanthople
743-744 Artabasdos defeated
746+ Plague in Constanlhople
750 Ab&d revolution, removaI of
Umaypads ham power, capital of
Caliphate moved to Baghd~d
75&3-77& Cmstmtjlne launch@ major
expeditions against Bdgars and Arabs
792 Byzantines mder Canstantine VI
defeated by B u m at Markdlai
797 Constantine V I deposed by mother
Irene; Minded and dies
800 Coronation of Char1emagne by pope
in St Petm, Rome
tK)2
I ~ n de-d
e
by chief finance
nllnister Nikephorm (Nikaphoms T)
811 N3kephbms defeated and Wed by
forces under Khan Kmm after initially
successful campaign In Bulgaria
813 Bulga~victories over Byzantine forces
815 Leo V convenes q m d at
Corwantinople; i c o n ~ a s m
reintroduced as of8'dal palley
821-&2J k W o n of Thomag 'the Slav'
8%
Bq&mhg of Arab canquest of Sicily
and of Crete
M B Arab invasion of Asia Minor; siege
and sack of Amorion
843 Council held id Constantinople to
reaffirm acts of seventh ecumenical

739
741

council; empress regent Thewloxa and

chief courtiers restme images; end of
offlrif iconqdasm
M a r y actfviry in B-a
RW'
a!wA on Constantinaplei

~~~

MQ
r O~
cbiWS~fst~
Matot B p n t h e victory over Arabs at

P m n in b t o l i a

Conversion of B d g x Khan and

leaders. Council convoked by B a i l I
at Constantinaple to 'settle Phschism: Phstias deposed, Igmttos, hfs
p d e c e s m ~relnwed.
~
Bulpria
placed under CanstanWpolttan
ecclesiastical jwisdiction (contrary to
papal demands)
!&O+
Anal lms of Sicily; 3ulgar
expansionism under Tsar Symmn;
war wlth Byzantina
917 B u I p victory at river Achelo
922 Peace wWi Bulgars
923-944 Byzantine ranqua&afid erastward
e x ~ i o led
n by general
J o h ICourkouas
96861 Recovery of Crete under general
Nikephorw PhaW
96% Major Eyzmtine offmsiws in east,
creation of new frontref reghm
%5
Nikephorm I1 captures Tarsus
and Cyprus
969 Nikephoms I1 captures Akppa
and Anti&
96411576 Re* of John I Tdrrrhkes.
Continuation of eastern expansion;
defeat of B u l w with help of RIB'
allies under Svyatoslav: defeat of Rm'
at Silistra P7I)
975 JohnI invades Palestine, takes several
t o m s and fortresses, but withdraws
985+ B u e r resistance in westBalkans
leach to growth of Bulgarian emplre
under Tsar Samuel
989 Conversion af Vladimfr of Kiev
to Chlstbnity
9S1019 B a a II m s h a Bu@
redstance;
Bulgaria ~incorp0ma&d into emplre,
Danube new frontier in north
1022 Armeniarm territories annexed to empire
1034-1041 Michael l V takes first step in

debasement of gold mfmcy

Chronology

1054 Schism with papacy

1055 Seljuks take Baghdad; Norman power
in southern Italy expanding
1071 R o m o s IV defeated and caprured at
Mantzlkert by Seljuks; begIdng of
Turk occupation of cenwal Anatolia;
Normans take Bari
107& Major Petcheneg advances Into
Balkans; civil war within emplre
1081 Aldm Kamnenos rebels and defeab
Mkephmos UI and is crowned empror
10821084 Norman invasion of western
Balkan provinces
1091 SeIjuk-PWbeneg siege of
ConstantinopIe; defeat of Petchenegs
1097+ First crusade; Seljulcs defeated
109&1099 ]&em
c a w ; laLatin
plbdpalities and Kingdom of Jerlmlm
mtabkhed inP a l m e and Syria
1108 Alexios defeats Normans
under Bohemund
1111 Commercial privileges granted to Pisa
1130s Alllance with German empire against
Normans of southern Italy
1138-1142 Byzantine confrontation with
Crusader principality of Antloch
1143-1 180 Manuel I Komnenos:
pro-western politics becofne major
factor in Byzantine foreign policy
114G1148 Second crusade
1153 Treaty of Constam between
Prederidc I (Barbarossa) and papacy
against Byzantium
11551157 Successfd imperial campaign in
Italy; cammerdial and politlcaI
negotiations with Genoa
1158-1 159 I m m a l forces march
against Antloch
1160+ success^ imperial political
involvement In Italy against German
imperial interests; Manuel defeats
Hungarians and Serbs hBalkans and
rPaffinns immd pre-emlnence
1169-1170 C o m m treaties
~
with Pisa
and Oenoa
1171+ Byzantlnc-Venetian hosoluties inaease
1175-1176 Manuel plans crusade in east
1176 Defeat of imperial forces under
Manuel by Seljuk Suitan Kilidj M a n
at Myrlokephalan

21

1180 Manuel dies; strong anti-western

sentiment. in Cbnstantinople
1182 Massacre of westemers, especially
Itallan merchants and their
dependents, in Constantinople
1185 Normans sack Thessaloniki;
Andronhs Kornnenos deplsed
118h Rebellion fn Bulgaria, defeat of local
Byzantine troops, establishment of
second Bulgarian empire
1187 Defeat ofthird crusade at battle of
Horns of Hattln; Jerusalemretaken
by saladin
1192 ' h a t i e s with Genoa and Pisa
1203-1204 Fourth crusade, with Venetian
financial and naval support, marches
against Canstanthople; after the
caphw and sack of the city in 1204,
the W n empire is established, along
with several prlndpafltles atid
other tmitories under Latin or
Venetlan rule
1334-1205 Successor states in Nicaea, Epirus
and Trebkond established
1205 Latin emperor Baldwin I defeated
by Bulgrus
1259 Michael VIII succeeds to throne ln
empire of Nicaea; Nlcaean army
defeats combined Latin and Eplrot
army at battle of Pelagonia; fortress
town of Mlstra handed over to
Byzantines (Nicaea)
1261 During absence of main Latin auny
Nlcalean forces enter and seize
Constantimple
1265 Pope invites Charles of Artjou,
brother of Louis I X of Frame, to
support M m mllitarlly against
Manfred of Sidly and the
Hohenstaufen power in Italy
1266 Manfred of Skily defeated at battle of
Benevento by Charles of Anjou;
AngwIn p a , supporn P P ~ ~ Y J
evolve to Invade and conquer the
Byzarrtine empire
1274 Gregory X summons smnd council
of Lyons; qmentatlves ofByrantiae
Church present; union of the
Churches agreed, under threat af
papally-apprwed invasion led by

1 3 B 1&kivmwmdwi@~stnd
V
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Battle d XOSOVQ:,SerWB&d t~
WZ~IXIW
m-s,
sifi~
mp*
en&; ~$Icm%$ima
of s a y a t I
l393 'IWcs.apt~~
m~qi
h
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13% ~
0
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&&& a*%
t3tfamm thxWEbut b
&if&atm
Bt m p 1 4 3
139:$-14& &ay&l I UI*s
Cmshntbp&, bat am"qfWtWr.as?aa
w ~ ~ d & e a ~ 9

ImWofaffC~
2WrW2 Mmd ;ltams R m p to elisit
lnuhty2N f3atuxM
BWabGr t W h e W ~ & a ~
of HEWW in wndm
I*
M m t a l*9l+',m msfarlrne
la3 Gavmof ofw w bW4d
of J&n WI?Jh m b the &y *@I ta

venew
1430 ?lwWiMH-.*

<*&sudhd
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J r m w

@tWnrnWmM
18B C&III& &fWr&b
& ffm&iidChrcMfhMEy~?dby
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1444 H-caZsd
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~ & ' r l i b w k d r b a m a ; ~
WMfaW*
1'm
vm &&; m b B ~
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mw&b -11X4$rn
wmmtiw Mfstra in 1449
a451 ngI1 bemrna SdW
14% UTrlm of
p
r
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&
At 6 a m m g k
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Woman m y tb enter diy;
C s m r z n e %Ilthe l
amp&br8
d@d in &&Qhm& m d WpW
awes ideatifled.
$460 ~ ~ t o t h e T r z ~
1461 73-w
fahto tb@ mi$

au*

Background to war

The political world of Byzantium

The w$tbq
%man shk was a h c t u t e d 9s
a M m W y qf qdmtmistrative lemh at the
t p w &E emperor,u n m
m@+S
regxemWve, wmmded by a p&w md
hw&%id appat&aI 'tbe#nW. of W m
@ V m @ h r&d -Ybs't.
a&l~d
Id
goV&llmf was Mt?gatd
fwm the
erntu the w&MktnpwfMs, whose
p!&&Ur%~WHE -1
WtCllfd

&ums@p@bnsta the $bW @arbpr-e

~
~

-bL1CiB~fsfscal~w
Wd d& ,d8ocese MI di.yidm&
pmvhcf*
a pvinm, x e t t l ' t W wi% of
mB
judicial admlnlstratki. T h m were fuitha
divi&d into self-governing pieis or dvituth,
the! cities, each wkth its
or

~~~

h1nkdmd @hi&

mtglxx ,k
m m or leas

e&miv@ according to pgraphkd,

dwmqmphic and nther fbor~).

BWAIpr~ductiad a t e d t h e
@cMcqBylbW the dt&3wtm the hams of $
UWaC $lit@
of lambma. mal stanTs was
b g d y dekm&ed by m e 5 aeEati~nshlpto
~

whetker m e hrad held m.W* pdst in t%e

imperial b w e a u a ~and
, at what bQ and
so forth, although
d @onat vatiatlom were
i
mwkd. iffe C
M .@the kheo~ogid
s
p
s
w it reprented @amthe late 4th

mwv me Offietal r&@on#the batan

&ate) pByed a QntFal mle In the ewkornp

afth~K&rnanw~-~w~amaji?r
la
landowner as well 21s SEi k@dal
Influencing the moral and &Ma1 qshmd
the*
world, a d in & c t l q I m p i a l
wti@?xswliq.
pmmg* was f b t

14

Essential Histories Bpntium at War

the emperor was chosen by W,

that he had
to be Qrthadox, slnd that his mle was to

defend the hterests of OrthoRoxy and the

Nman i.e. CMstlan o i h @
(the
inhabited, dhrillsed - R o m a n world). The
p
m impbtions were such that heresy
was construed as treason, and opposition to
the (Orthodox) emperor d d effectiwly be
treated as. heresy. The late Roman state was
thus 0 cmnpla bureauQaq, rooted h'iand
imposed u p a series ofoverlapping mill
fcrrmatllcns strudmed by local variatiorms on
ess&tidly the same social rehtbns of
production across the whole central and east
Mediterranean and h h n world. Wal and
political tensions were exacerbated by
religious divhions, local economic
cmdidons, Imperial ~ H t i c s and
, the burden
placed upon the tax-payingpophtEcm as a
result ofthe State's needs in respect d ib
s a t i v e apparatus and, in partkular,

Itsarmies.
These structures wwe radically
tran5f~rmed&en
the Later 6th and early
9th centuries, and w the malt ofa number
of facton, the single must Imprtant being
the Islamic conquests, By 642 all df Egypt

and the middle-=stem proW&s had k e n

lost, Arab farces had penmated deep into
Asia Minor and Libya, and imperial form
had been withdrawn Into A s h mar, to be^
settled a m s the p v h c e s of the region as
tbe only available means of supporting
them. Within a period of w m 12 years,
therefore, the ern* Im sorneehhg over
half its t s a and three-quartersd iW
remums - a drastic 1- for an imperial $tats
which still had to mafntah and equip a
considerable army and an effective
administrative bureaucracy if it was to
s h v e at all. While many of the
dwelnpments which led to thfs
transfomatton were W tWn long &fort the
Jthanturg crisis, it: was this crnluflrture
that m&to bxing Wngs to a head and
promote the structural m p o w that
followd.
The changes that accompanied the
develqmmts of the 7th century affected all
area of s d a l , cultufal and e~nqmirlife.

There ~ c u m e da 'rur&sation' of sodety, a

result of the devastation, abandonment,
shrinkage or displacement of many dties in
M a mar as a &t
of invasions and raids.
The defensive pmperties of 'urbantsites,
their dhect relevance to militaryI
administrative or ecclesiastical needs, and sa
on, pfayed the key role fr~whether a city
wvived or nQt.Constantlnople became the
pse-emirrmt city ofthe empire.
The -a1
eUte w a s tramfomed as 'new
men' selected by the emperors on a mute
obviuusly rneritw~aticbasis increased in
number, and who were fni*
heavily
dependent on the emperor and an imperially
spsn~redpositions. Yet as a wsult of its
inmasing gdp an state pasitions a n d the
lands it accrued through the &wards
attached to such service, this elite m n
turned fnta m arkmaw,during the
8th and 9th centuries still very dependent
on the state, during the 10th and espchI1y
the 1lth inae&@y fndependent. The state
had to compete &ectIy with a &a1 grwp
whose enormous landed wealth and
e n m c k d pasition in the appaatum of
the state meant that It p e d a real threat to
central corrml of fMaI T P S D ~ .
The events of the 7th century dso
produced a reassertion of central state
power over late Roman tendencia to
decentrahthn. The state was both limited,
and in Its turn partly defined, by the name
af key economic relatimaships. T h i s i s
exemplified in the issue and circulation of
coin, the basic mechanism through which
the state converted agricuItura1 produce Into
transferable dtscal resources. Coin was Issued
chiefly to oil the whe@ of the state
machinery, and w d t h was appropriated
and wnsurnd through a tedisblbutive flscd
mechanism: the state issued gold in the
farm of salaries and h r g w e to
bureaucracy -and armies, who exchanged a
substantial portlon thereof for goods and
services In r n a i n t m g themselva. The
state could thus collect much of the coin it
put into circulation through tax, the more
>sosince fiscal policy pnemlly demanded
tax in gold and offered Gbange in bmze.

Background to war

There were perids when this system was

constrained by circumstances, resulting in
the ad hoe arrangements for supplying
soldiers and raising tax in kind, for example
(ain the 7th century), and it also varied by
region. But in a &ety in which soda1
status and advancement (including the
self-identity of the aristocracy) were
c o n n e d with the state, these
arrangements considerably hindered
economic activity not dhectly connected
with the state's activities. For the continued
power and attraction of the imperial
establishment at ConstmtinopIe, with its
court and hietarchigal system of precedence,
as well as the highly centralised fiscal
administrative structure, consumed the
whole attention of the Byzantine elite,
hindering the evolution of a more localised
aristocracy which might otherwise have
invested in the economy and m e t y of its
own localifies and towns, rather than in
the imperial system.

25

Church of the

at &phi, Greece
( 1 Ith mhry).Wc ~ i f ~ i o(AKG,
n . Min)

The growth in the powa of the elite was

stimulatd by two dmIopments. In fhe ffrst
place, there took place an incrtasfng
subordination of the p.easmtxy to both
private landtords and to holders of gxants of
state revenue. In the second place the state
conceded from the later 11th century the
right ta receive the rwenues from certain
public (Le. fiscal, ax taxed) dtsMcts or of
certain imperial estates with their tenants,
encouraging a pwcess of very gradual
allenation of the state's fiscal and jmidfc;tl
rlghts. By q l d t r n g the award by the
emperors of fiscal exemptions of varying
sorts, landlords -both secular and monastic
- were able to k q a larger proption of the
revenues extracted from their peaant
pmducers for themselves, as xent, while the
government's hold on the remaining -1
land of the empire was constantly

P m e w x ~~kdpaec
~ f II f8%~29j and CbkW@%
T h e m M ~imIsarbiw
,
Inam af fine Am.Unmsiw

Warring sides

Neighbours and enemies

We have already referred to the strategically
very awkward situation of the Byzantine
state, with enemies or ptenthl enemies on
M
y every front and with a constant
need to fight wan on more than one front at
a tlme. In the north and west the situation

was especially complex as a result of the

variety af neighbowing states and pohtlcal
powers. From its establishment in the 680s,
the Bulgar Khanate rapidly grew in power,
and until its extinction at the hands of the
emperor B a d LI, known as the 'Bulw-slayer'
(976-10251, represented a constant threat
to the security of imperia1 territory in the
Balkans. Throughout the 8th and
9th centuries and into the early
10th century, Bulgar power and Influence
grew, in spite of successful counter-attacks
undw the empaor fhnstantlne V in the
760s and 770s. The nadir of Byzantine
fortunes was probably the year 811, when
the Khan K m defeated and destroyed an
imperial army, kiMng the emperor
Nikephoros I. Conversion to Christianity
of elements of the r u h g elite in the 860s
was Intended to stabilise the situation in
favour of Byzantium; but the gradual
Byzantinisation of this elite only contributed
to the growth of an imperialistic BuIgar
politics which hoped to bring the two states
together under a Bulgar dynasty. But Bulgar
successes under the Christian Tsar Symeon in
the first 15 years of the 10th century were as
&ngerous; while the reassertion of 3u@r
imperial ideology under Tsar Samuel
inaugurated a conflict - after a relatiwiy
peaceful period In the middle d the
10th century - and led finally to the
eradication of Bulgar independence and the
recovery of much of the W h up to the
Danube in the early I lth century. In spite of
occasional rebellions, the region remained
firmly in Byzantine hands until just before

the fourth crusade in 1203-1204.The Latin

division of the empire after 12U4 resulted in
the rapid growth of local Balkan cultural
independence and the evolution of new
states the Serbian empire of Stefan m a n

being perhaps the most remarkable. Only the

arrlval of the Ottomans in the 14th century
put an end to this development.
Relations with Italy and the west were
similarly mrnplicated.As we have noted
already, Italy, north Africa and the
southeastern comer of the Iberfan peninsula
had been reconquered under Justinian, at
e n o m s cost, bm the Ostrogotks, Vandals
and Visigaths respectively. But the a p p m c e
of the Lambards In Italy (pursued by the
Avars, at Byzantine requat) soon resulted h
the fragmentationof imperial pasasions into
a number of distinct regions under Wtaq
commanders or duces. Impwfal tenitory In the
north-east and central regions was represented
by the exarch,an officer with military and
civil authority. But distance from
~ t a n t i r r o p l elocal
,
cultural differentiation
and political conditions, together with the
spiritual and politid power of the Popes in
Rome soon led to the gradual but inevitable
dimhution of imperial power. The &&ion
of the exarchate with the capture of Ravenna,
its capital at the hands af the Lombards in
751; increased papal dependence on the
Fmnks for support against the Lombards, and
hcreashgly autonomous and mutually
competing I d polities in the Italian
peninsula had led to the reduction of
imperial power to the regions of Calabria,
Brufflum and Sicily by the early 9th century.
Other political centres such as Naples
remained technically Bymnttne, but were
in pxactrce quite independent. Venice,
which grew in importance from the early
9th century, likewise remained nominally
an imperial tenitory.

30

Essent~alH~siories Byzant~umat War

The camnation by the p o p ofCSJIC~B

- &S ( k k a )
W a n emperor fn Rome in 8 B set the sml
on the p o I W arrd cultural separation OF
east Borne and the west. Cuttusal
~ ~ c eexprmd
s , in prtimlar tbmgh
eel-1mdcsa9 the W g l C
W W m Frmh, Byantlnes and the papacy
for bmkTim@,tnthe tmml and Msm
&Bans, becam Wreakixtglp a p p a h
c~mplleatedby dvdry within the
Church. Despite vmious ,attempas at
marriage aUuces between the Byzmtlne
anrt ParEaae$ m
e
mC
O
~
I
p~U&zal, cultural md.a4Uprmgth of
the wm world w ~ ~ I i m
any
d miow
remation af
Roman Imperial Iin the cmW W t e m h n bash,
Rpni3ne infhence Was s h ~ akfutthtx
blow by the h s d Sicily to Islamic h

the mat:-ad-

during the 9th aatuq. The wwkmiq $

we empi& in t~r4mi ww
I I I I ~ ~
mdJW 11th efpflqand t
L growth &f the
e
m rdwemt mhe~compli~lilwt
m r m : mritatum -em
itrrogae a d
ignomme am one4de were matched by
equally inaccurate artmims ofByzandne
ttwcherpmd effe@nmm the other.

Mthmgh the r m m EMmder

K a n ~ t ~ ~ d y ndu&rg
w y the
11th afid
IZth b w i m m W a rappfckkment
p 1 b & , including the ckwfeprryentof a
*oq p w e m hmn at atstantinoplc

(p-ted
by the e m p m Manuel I
(1143-&)), the c?@icf h#ven imperial
b m t s h cytwl&xg tradg a d
~ rn
~1alm
. mEr&ant
~
e~X E M n $ ~ r n , emqded
W I ~ ~ S c l r a l 5 u $ apnd
I ~V&&l
p ~ U & a l h3kigue and appoimhm, resulted
Pn the laundhing of the
cnrsade?fhe
sack of ChnstmtinopIe, and the partition of
tb ewem empire htea number sf Lath
kingdoms and pdndpazittw.

Warring sides

I Major Byzantine mutes in the Balkans

31

Warring sides
-

33

century had established an independent state

of their own, and who invaded the Balkans
from Italy during the reign of Alexios I in
the 1090s and early 12th century. EvenWy
defeated on this front, they nwertheiess
went on to establish one ofthe most
powerful states in the central Mediterranean,
the Nonaan kingdom of Sicily, and
presented a major threat to Byzantine
interests throughaut the century. Yei it was
not the Nonnans who played the key role in
divethe fourth avsade in 1203-1204
from ib offginal targets in the M u s h east
to Byzantium, but rather the republic of
Venice, and it was Venetian interests that
dictated the form taken by the p H t i c a l
fragmentation of the empire in the
period Immediately thereafter.
Until the extindon of the Sassanid
empire by the IsIamic armies in the 630s and
early 640s, the Pmian state had been the
main opponent of the Roman empire in the
east. Thereafter, the Umayyad (661-750)and
then Abbasid (751-1258)Caliphates posed a

constant threat to the empire. But this

complex history falls into several phases:
650+720s, when ArabIslamic invasions
wee a regular phenomenon aimed at the
destructlm of the east Roman state;
120s-750s, when a modus yivermdf had been
established, but in which Muslim attacks
remained a constant source of mnomlc and
political, dislmation; and thereafter until the
middle of the 1lth century, when the
collapse and fragmentation of Abbasid
authority made it possible for the empire to
re-establish a military and political
preeminence In the region. The inmasingly
important role of Wkic slave and mercenary
soldiers in the Caliphate from the 84% and
the eventual arrival of the Seljuk Turks in the
105[k, was to alter this picture drasticdly. A
combtnatlon of internal polltlcal dfssenslon
and a relatively minor military defeat at the
hands of the Seljuk Sultan Alp Aslan in
General view of the monaFtmy at Daphni, Greece
( I I tR century). (Authoh collection)

The e m ~ i r ec. AD 600

m T h 9 h b r d Wq d M y in %&and the
Slav I m m W h into the Balkans d ~ d r dbw d

Ramm pww inhtRem

~~

s p m , fm It m,0x1 Q i p h q ,

etstsand th!!qm@W,afidW&t
th% emplre dqen&&,But when these iW,
as they *fkn did, it nmw an amp, a #
r s & e : ~ a w f e ~ t h e ~ * ~ ~ &
~aiiminedand how tiley fought, that Is the
ofthi his^,

Outbreak

Why and how did Byzantium

fight wars?
B-ne
gmeraIsa d rulers were generally
fully aware of the m W m M p
the

~~

allocation and Pedi~Wm

ofmuEEles soldiers, q @ m , qulpmtrnt, U m t m k and
w bfib and the ability af the empire to
wmd OHhwtk d t a r y acftEan or M sMk
at Sb enemies. Wif;rmy Wbw&
md~drrtmgfr'o~tfIeBthto~e
11th ~rrtad@!4
make it apparent that a
2
t
i m b h m in resources b
-n
~ ~ i u
and Its emmi= was mogrt3sed G e n d s
were exhart* not to give battle in
~ r w ~ a ~mllditi~ns,
1 . e
bou* w might
lead to wasWaf Me and rwwxes; &deed
the domimm matif in these wow is that it
wa&the B p i a n t h e b who w a k mm@d to
-lwfeI
B use ddayhg tZL&cs, to
employ mbwhes and a h stcawms to
wen the odds stacked agabst them; but that
it was quite clm1ya main war a h POwin
w i t h u t hat4 ftght a dWBw bat&.
W&oq,cc.nlM k achieved fhbt&~a
m-m
of &laying wttia, rniatelllgent
eqlofWbh of memy weah&&s, the
h d s t a p e , sesdnsfl factof$, 2md diplomg~y.
Wars wew c o s t l ~and for a state whose W c
hwom@d d v d horn a @ d h m I groduffdon,
and which remained relative& StPlbh a$ well
srs M q milnd1e to bptb natrnal and
man-mMe dlsastm, they w e to be avoid&
ifat all pasale.
Another, clcbly reIate~,fadtor in in.pda1
mt&c tbhkhg was manpower: from a
Byzantine perspxtls$ they we~e&ways
0
~
t and strategy
n
~ as MfeU
~ a5 ~
diplod e d to takthis actor Into
mmmt ki dealing with ~ n e m i aOne
. way af
mnang the balance was tu r-ce
enemy
nurnTSer8: delay tKe memy &~KW
mtiJ they
could na longer stay in khrfield, d & q ~ n g
or removi@ m y passfble smms af
psmMws and mpplies, h
r example,
misleading them with Wse information

about BymIthe intentiom., @ e $ are

~ alI
wtoals w w tlre m~~~
recommend, Amiding WE, which was a
keymne pf - h e
s t r a t , wmld dm
W&&etbe p&sWlity that
e t e y host
mi##t be &'up38 by l k e h , run aut of water
a n d supplb, and su on.
Defence HIIS.
had to be the primary
canof B-dm
rulm and gene&
m
B y a n t h e mifit- EUsp~itbmwere
aciministetedupon a wn&tmt and
-HE@'
~&XM&ferdm$,
Wd ~~h
mais piupme w a s t a s ~ ~ ~ofV a l
t?~empite by d@a@g the ~t~
r&m@sawllable to the best effect. They
were, neessarlly, Menaive la orimtatbn, a
pint noted quite dearIy by the
mid-1WauhuyV M PfMm
~ Italy, rhe
ambassador Ciutprmd af Cfemana, with
r w r d to the p ~ ~ taken
m @sware
~onmrttinop~%
gt nig~,
m w e on an
u a a p x a memy-attack. The em&&
p h x d by +tine
writem and
p m m n t s on &e&ve md intelligent
diplonacy is nat just a qwWm of wlmrd
pa&emce informed by a C M W n &taste
fox the sheddiq of blot& to the comary,
the mnt2nued ed~te~ce
d the mte
d q m W upm the d q b p m t of a
~WphisticaWdiplomatic: arsenal The whole
history of Byantfnc foreign r&tiom and
both the t l m q and pr&ice of manine
dipfonraq reflect this. Mplaro~teyhad . b ~
r n f a r y edge, of muw: goad reIarr,w wtth
the variDu?J
pwp1a of # l steppe we#
essential to E ~ n t i r w
inteEHs in We
WWs and C%@SS, becw&a weapbrfi
mi$lt thereby be mated that cauld be
tum.ed an theenemies of the empire. Such
Contacts were alsa an ~~W source of
~ o ~ d c xof
nmum,
,
ant3 much effort was

q e n d e d in gathering idamatim that

might k bedwmt IQ the mp&eJsW m m .

Outbreak

Gomg to war was thus rarely the result of a

planned chdce made by emperors or their
advisers, for the empire was perpetually
threatened from m e quarter or another, and
was thus in a constant state ofmilitary
preparedness. The Werence between war and
peace in the frontier area$ became a matter,
not of the state of the empire as a whole in
relation to a par&uh neighbouring powq
but rather of the part of the emplre in which
one fwnd oneself. While -very
of former
tenitories was permanently on the ideological
agenda, efforts to impIement it reflected an ad
hac reaction to an unforeseen advantage
gained through victories in baffle and the
exploitation of favourable circumstances. In

37

red terms, the potential for the reconquest

and restoration of lost territories was werely
limited. Strategy was determined by the
interplay khwen resources and poIitical
beliefsftempered by ideological pragmatism:
most Byzantine warfare was fought not on the
trash of delivering a h o c k a t blow to the
enemy, but on that of attempting to reach or
maintain a state of parity or equilibrium,
though awtion, raid and cou11ter-raicI, and
destruction of the enemy's short-twm
potential. Members of the gowmment and
imperial court may have shared common
Street in IstanbuVCnnstarrtinople wrth traditional houses.
(Author's colleaion)

Outbreak

within Byzantine state and swkty, and at the

same time they also demonstrate particubdy
c h d y the m t to which the forelgn policies
and military strategy of a state can teflect
power relattons within the soriety as a whole.
Warfare for ideological reasons alone was
vety rare. Clearly, all defensive warfare could
be jusrifled on a range of such grounds - the
threat to the empire's territory and

population, the challenge to Orthodox rule

and God's appointed ruler, the ernperm at
Constanthople, challenges to Roman
sweretgnty, and so forth. Offensive or
aggressive warfare was, in the CMsttan
Roman empire, a little more difficult to
Iustlfy, but I t was readily accomplished. But
there is no doubt thai the domlnant element
in Byzantine military thinking throughout
the long history of the empire was defensive,
and necessarfly so in view of its strategic
situation. Byzantium sunived as long as it
did because it was able to defend itself,
intelligently exploit natural frontiers or
boundaries in the crisis years of the 7th and
8th centuries, and diplomatic and political
r&tionshi$ thereafter. And whatever the
specific details of the proms of its
political-historical withering away after
1204, the gradual demise of the Byzantine
empire went hand-in-handwith its declining
ability to muster the resources necessary to
defend itseIf. Strategy was, in practical terms,
a matter of pragmatic reaction to events in
the world around the empire, onIy loosely
informed by the political-ldeoiogicd
imperatives af the Christian Roman empire.
In this respect, the political and strategic
conditions of existence of the east Roman or
Bpzantine state rendered a grand strategy in
the narrower sense irrelevant - the sbategy
of the empire was based on maintaining the
conditions appropriate to political, cultural
and ideological survival.

Defensive warfare
Wars tan, crudely speaking, thus be divided
Into two broad categories, defensive and
ofknsive, although ii must k said at the

39

outset that pre-ernpdve attacks c d d a u n t

as both,and were kequently su justified.

Dtrfenslve fighting tmk several forms:

guerrilla tackia against enemy invaders; major
confrontations between field a m i s ' often
following a protracted period of manoeuvring
in which each side tried to outwit the other;
or a combhation of the two. The defensive
campaigns fought against the first lslamic
armies took this m,with the imperial
forces struggling to match the mobility and
speed of the Arab raiders, who were able ta
deprive the Roman commanders of the
Wtiatlve not simply by W e of their

fast-moving, hard-hi*
tactla, but alSO
because the t y p of warfm they prxtisd
made any notion of a reguIar front untmable.
The Arab Islamic conquests radically
altered the strategic and political geography
of the whole east Mediterranean region. The
complete failure of attempts to meet and
drive back the invaders in open battle
induced a major shift in strategy whereby
open co~ontationswith the Muslim armies
were avoided. The field armies were
withdrawn &st to north Syria-and
Mesopotamia, and shortly thereafter back to
the line of the Taurus and Anti-Taurus
ranges. By the mid-640sthe m i e s which
had operated in Syria, Palestine and
Mesopotamia had been withdrawn into
AnatoHa. The regions across which they were
based were determined by the ability of these
districts to provide for the soldiers In terms
of supplies and other requirements. The field
forces thus came to be quartered across Asia
M i n s r and Thrace, where they were now
referred to by the Greek term for these
districts, fhmata or 'themes'.
This distribution was intended both t~
meet logistical demands by providing each
arrny with an adequate hinterland from
which it muid lx supported and to meet the
strategic n
&
of defence. But it was a very
defensive strategy, and it meant that the
econamlc hinterland of the frontier incurred
substantial damage,subject as it was to
regular devastation. There resulted the
appearance by the 700s of a 'no-man's Iand'
between the settled and economically safer

40

By-wMium at War

MH'Wmies

The d m t and m e d i d fortrrss at h c w i n t h ,&EX&

wtrbffhg&tqra the Rkponneze. ( A W h c P l l M )

ems mt both side&Tbe nav~arrangmmtir

did pevent the &ztbHshm@nt~
ttre
of -anent
base$ h &id Wndr itkelf.
The rhmm at themes were at w mdy
groupings ofptWnceS a m a vrhm
~~t
armies were b a d . $7d m
~ ~ e athey
~ m
t acquired
s
a clear
gef&bgmpW
Mwtlv;and by the later
gtb c m w y s m e a
#f w a w&
as mWary ~ i ~ t r $ t i wem:
o n $et up On a
thematic bzW, shthugh the Kate Raman
provfncks mathx~.ed
td W&t. The number
ofthmata -and&
as the empire%
economk and pli.fical bituation Improved,
partly though the original large a l t a y
W i ~ beclag
s %@lit
up hm difkent
'pmMaI'
wd partly thrmgh the
m e mi y e w sr,f # e m mtury
and the &mpQslti0&d rmpetPd a u t M y
DVH
h&d inthe ~ t h m
Eawn5.
' h e W s a t i o n af r d m t and
f l t q ideutitim whl& resulted fmm these
m ~ ~ led
~ tota &sKin&ian
, $
between
me
-ma
MI-time S O I ~ F-~
Wld thP:l q s wmpetent or Well-~plW

millb&eelmmts h each theme @a.

In the 76th a mall elite fotre,bown as the
famumIdtheregimen&')m~estamhea
uader QnsTa~tInP V (741-251,which
qtmly WQlvPCI IW theEt1lte w fiivtEian
fm cAmpaign p q w ~It.
better pay and
&dplim than Wth the r q p h axid the
part-time provbndal units, and this was the
first step in a tendency t~ recruit mercenary
fo~aes,both &reign and ~ ~ o u
rn fa#
% ,
qmAl unit%
and tp serve f a th@ outatron of
8m
m
b
r ~rnplalgn@ gmup of-@?gm.
As irnpmial power rerowred in tt~&
9131
and
10th cenhuies, the ernpire &&&edits
militarystreih thg &st, and fie tole
and the proprtldn of such full-timed t s
bcarne ewer more lmp~rkmt.
~
~ detcmhsd by
v
sepml &mmtS. To be$& m~twqg
faces were tawheld and hratadlwkqtttte
WIUS
and &~%BuwS.~SS&, W l 5 & ~ r
-I@.
Where tMs poky d m W g and
fqtllsing hos& attacks at the bantier did
not work, i d forces woutd haas the
iamders, kwplng'trrrckof every m m w t
and the loca~arrofeac?agirrtp or group,
N
~w w
t and fp-wahg
~
the
maj~mm,m~at~~sk
watltbns whew mppIie3 mi*. Be rn& a

Outbreak

well as by the frontier p s e s through which

enemy forces had to pass, reinforced the 1-1
Wp.Although exposed to enemy action,
these posts were a constant threat to any
invading force. In addition, a series of
bontler districts was set up In the 8th and
9th cenMes as independent commands
along the frontier, complementing the annies
of the themes. Known as kleimmrchies
(kleisowarchiar),they emphasis& the highly
l o d k d pattern of defence.
The empire suffered many defeats,
especially in the earner period, but it abo
wimessed some major successes, particularly
where the invaders could be shadowed and
the imperial armies brought together at the
right time and place. Thew enmuntea
showed that the strategy operated by the
imperial forces could succeed, when the
almies were well led and adequate
intelligence of enemy movements was
available. But the war in the east was largely
a struggle between two equal pawers, with
the imperial side having the advantage of
geography and cornmunlcatlons tb offset the
superior numbers on the side of the
Caliphate. Only in the 10th century, when
the empire went over fully ta the offensive,
does this picture change. These defensive
arrangements were progressively allowed
to fall into disuse gs the empire went onto
the offensive after t?xmiddle of the
10th century. And when the empire's
situation changed for the worse, as a resuIt
of the appearance from the 1040s and
afkmva~dsof a host of new enemies, the lack
of an effeetive, deep defensive sbucture
pemltted the Selfuk Turks to conquer and
permanently occupy central Asia Minor a h
the battle of Matin 1071 with
virtually no opposition. The empire was
never %ah able to re-establish its power in
the region.

Pre-em~tiveattacks
Part of the impenla1 defensive strategy
entailed launching preemptive strikes
against the enemy, partly aimed at

41

containment, partly at the reasseaion of

Roman idmlagtcd power. Some of these
attacks were successful, some lew so. Among
the bleakest episodes in the history of the
empire is the attack Iaunched against the
Bulgm by the emperor Nkphoros I in 81 1,
which ended in both the death of the
empror and a crushing defeat. Nikephoros,
who had been the chief finance offlw of the
empress Eirene, came to the throne In 802
and appears to have wished to defeat the
Bulgars so ramprehensively that the Bulgar
khanate could be recovered for the emplre.
A n expedition in 809 had reached the BQar
capital at Pliska In north-eastBulgaria, and
sacked it. The expedition of 811 was
intended to establish a more permanent
RQman presence in the region. Nikepboros
~rderedthe assembly of a large force made
up from contingents from the Asia Minor
armies supplemented by troops horn the
European m t a and the Imperial guards
units, the tugmata. There was a ceremonfal
aspect to the whole affair, since the mperor
took victory for granted after the easy win in
809,and as well as the soldiers a large
number of courtiers and palace officials also
accompanied the expedition, k t the
imperial troops were eventually drawn into
an ambush, where during a night attack they
were utterly routed, The defeat was one of
the blackest days of imperial history, no less
of a catastrophe than the battle of
Adrianople in 378 at which the emperor
Valens had died fighting the Goths. The
Bulgar khan became the mast dangerous
enemy the empire had to face for the next
few years, and was able to lay siege to
Constantinople Itself in 813.

Offensive warfare
Given the empire's strategic problems noted
already, most fighting could be justified in
some way or other as 'defensive', even where
it was clearly aggmsively motivated. Such
were the wars waged In the later 10th and
early 11th centuries against the BuIgars and
the Rus', far example, when the justification

'ha

nmnira r

A n 7

The empimc.AD100e-I 180

and wmim with

h d ~ S l a v f c ~ ~ @ n g t b e

S a p f a n tMd#s

b f ~ t W a I i d ~ R ~
sthcenUrymeyhad$rolffPt3,~'be,aFl

t r i q m a n ~ ~ m ~ , ~ b y t h e w
n

ent&ng?heRkk%ahthedy

w,and ~

10th
lX3tdhg.ab-k

m hmtilitfes,
n e

r
0
n
.
W
rnh.the

p n * . m ~ h m * ~ c e f m a

the 'IpfWt!of the lQtfi,cen@q,

so thm
WPn]wpbdWS,Hfl
f9f& SUPpbrt
h946,,Pheir~timSmdm'se~
s ~ ~ r a a s o * t m ~ t o ~
968 he ambed 00 the ~rtnub-md
@p
deleated the M p v i a n fmcm~ni
against
hlm.h469heW@mtgmroXkv~
rep&emtttsckhBie~,W
~
e
d
~
L
~
~
~

- m ~ w ~ ~ B q p # a , h e
dqmMthk'mr,~

&

Bui&mInto m awn<&ihih

h n t e plaque of Sts Gmrge and Demetriss

( I Ifhcmtury),(Tmnees of rhe Wh M u m )

i3mm plaque of StTheodore ( I Ith century), Trustem

of the B*sh M m m )

Balkans up to the Danube, was peace

re-established, and the Balkans k c m e
once more an entirely Roman - from the
point of view of pnlltical and military
contrd - t&to~y.
A major shift in strategy followed these
successes as w d as successes against Islamic
powers In the east The establishmentof a
system of alliances m buffer state made the
d m a n c e of expensive standing forces,
wbich constituted a great dm411an the
b'easury, less necessary. F m u m k and
cultural M w c e could be mployd in
addittan ta the threat of military action to
maintain peace along the Darmbe, and
similar polides were applied in the east The
emperors pursued a foreign poIicy which

placed W t e r reliance on vassals and

neighbowing powers supplying troops, thus
hmlting the demand on the empire's own
resources. But in the 1040s and afterwards
thisstrategy broke down, largely because the
balance between diplomacy and military
strength was damaged by civil war and
provindal rebellion, in turn a reflection of
important shifts in the social and polltical
structure of the empire. The provincial ar
thematlc mllitlas had been neglected in
favour of full-time, regionally recruited
tngmnta, better suited to the sort of offensive
warfare the empire had been waglng since
the 950s; while reductions in the military

budget encouraged a greater dependence on

foreign mercenary troops, especially of
western Mghts - Franks, Germans and
k m m . In 1071 such an ariny of rnixd
Byimtine and foreign troops under the
emperor Romano$ IV suffered a defeat at the
hands of the Invading SeIjuk %ks near the

~WXSS
of M ~ n m m
ifl

A aiaor
m t a g m t ~ e r f r o m a mmtary
~ y
pmpedive. Yet the dvtl war and h t d
disruptran that hllawgd &we the ~w~
Rwks a
hand in m t m t Asfa Mlnar,
which was nwer again fully recwered.
Emfmm Mas 1onward s p t the
Wod ftrnn lhe 1until the 1180s
attempthg to rerover the Wttm but, tn
the end, witbout sums. The wars of the

p c d o d - w t v
westem tacbicsand p o p l y , but wirh

elements of a sHLl dearly Byzantine or east

Roman tactical organkition - contemparia
wntinue ta Fernark on the order, wh&on
and disdpllne with which the muluahnlc
and colourful Byzantine a w e s still fought.
Byzantfum went to war for many masons
In practh1 t e r m - perceived military threats
ta the hntkr, respnses to irchral invasion
and miding ham hostik nelghbours, as well
M IdfSOIoCJIcdlyd

v i t e d wars in which

jwstlficatb dqended on notions of what

terrltoria used ta be Roman and could be

legitlnmely Feewered,and on fdms abut

IdeoIoglcaA chatleto the C I w m n
Roman world W.The wars of remnquest

lrlthe1ater1Mhcmhuywerefngm
motivated and jW p d on the latter
grounds, for example, even though in
Byzmtium no notion af 'holy war' as such
wer r a y ew~lved.

The fighting

Organising for war

m a mm p m c l m n p in tactical
stmchmes o m the perlod b n the 6th to
the 11th century* and a@tn h m the later
11th to the 1% C m M e s and beyond.
Vdts of the mfddk?of the 6th p n q
~ ~ m ew a d~ M y theit m
m
~
l
ot&anlsaWn.The old& I M m en@ aukflW
foscen.cmMnued to mikt thmugh the
3rd md 4th mhlrim, divided into a k d
~
~
~~ o
r f l ~ dt trkmmllg
y , of
BQO and 1;oOo' man mpecthlyr dthough
under Constantine I (3ZQ3?), new WwW
wsa d ~ 1 1 m4en r e p l a d we

em% ~~'
llW&5W, dW Wiea cWWd ~ $ @
the 2nd m4 drdkmmxfes, M tb& numk
MWa150 th h* applied to the od*al
l ~ # W a ~ ? h e 4 tcentur)t,~partfrwn
h
these
pWrs units clled w~lntiones,0OrlgtpaIly
detachmentsfropa dw d t s fwmed fw B

pd-.wn
m w the p a C*
I M 1 wHch had been tumM'im
pmnWMt units inthelr own &ht: M
' a
tenq, wxWtbn, ww ap#ed in -the
$ t r 9 ~ ~ ~ d ~ n ~ ~
, x w & d at
tkm. Ntha~ghsame pf
The& -4
&ffWWm
Y
@
IlW
d th
6thIC&W$the p e t a l mfm most Wt$
u(casby*a thewOrdtn#mmswikiGre&
quimhit, aldthos m
Which shpky
m a t 'unit' # "numbea' (ofd&w),
Bpantltle tactia,and strategy had h
.adeptquickly ta h a s'iption@i~ow&tg
the &ab conquwts the d d I e of the
7th ,mtuty.hrmh alongmW
Mtm ate
m ~ h d W ~ M l W b m 'bt- -CL - sII6-g Wt U&t' EairaW
had tome w dodnate the ,warfateof the

penid, mu@ of whlch imtqlved s&ni&g

and M t ~ d - r ~rd&.
n But wMLe hzfantrqr
-&ued
to b n e e d , and played an
inr-t
prt inmany mmpQ?x, their
vahe a p w dmly ta have d&lhed,
sotlle'e%tat r e t l m i q &a1 factors, since
thq wme dram mostly from the porest of
the pfopindarl soldiery. The development &
infan* tacth after the p e r i dof the &st
Islamic cwqtle$@,d m Wlth the h i e
pro& of mounted -re,
therefore,
MeCtecl the &~tLglc~ f t t l a t i vjll~ wM&
~
the

imgw f m i d itself. Dmig the paidW m

the later 7th to the 9th or m1y 10th
tenmrfgs, the difkrenm wtrlch once d s t d
'btween the differ& types of klfmlq ma
were subject to a general I m l h g
aut of the difkrent am,into Ii&t amhy
and inbu. Only tiie tqpmt~at
Cmtanlin~glleseem to bwe prwldal a
hewf ldirvalq Ebro. It seems: to haw b&n
the f & p d U t yd Inca BfflWs In the
pmvhces td wthb&h field u n i t s a d to a m
them as each spedfk owmion requird. The
sizes &units on the battlefield varied
according to Pactid M there s m s m
have bwn no fixed aumber f a thedi&mt
fomtWm,withQpres recommend& for
the mallet iFlf&nt.yWts, the &&a, far
eXanrplE1rarlging from a3 few as 15Q ta $5

y as dm, SEveral i?ourrm1W d & p p

an cmipatgn a a single la@&Won,far
&ample, i3r *"m W%. M&t Wemea had two
m

h B f w ~ 01
5 &*
but thb &a
nat mean that they
the same &e w
could muster the m e n u m b d soldiers.
TRe p d n d armies w e orgm&l into
what we would P&& a@ as dsvEslons, brigade
and r#$rnmts - @ m i ,#mwgpl and &&.
The first- and last were alsa'&rlcts Qfthetr
&ma,w millmy region. Each W m had a
heifdqmms6 r base in a fortified town or
hrktess. Each t a a k h r was identified wkth a
particular locality fram which ib sp)I&n
were recruited. &h m u m + @ &m
m m a n d a of a muma, was aq impwant
figwe in tke military adminimnt@nof hh
themeJrqwmmk for the f a m e 5 and
Of t

s t r ~ ~ I t r ~ & @ i c & a s W ~ a S ~ # e
of the h a 1 pptltatian and th&
g ~ M and
s rhamls. HiS most Imp-t
r q m i h i i i t y before the rnfddie of the
1Pth C
H
w
i ,~QW~!W>,
Ckdhg wi.th
sai& into his territory a n d ihhmhig his

wperbn o f ~ e n e w m m ~ .
Ilrumimkt man-pt
ofthe kIktwy~jt+m%ykm
(1 Ith c m r y ) , foL3+.The
Michel It m e h s
i r i f o W f i M *outs and sp&
+hkr O m > o f
Thoma the %. Bblioteca Naciand,Madrid)

The fighting

During the course af the 10th century

the army evolved a much more offensive
tactical structure, the main causes being the
need to recruit more profeNslona1 soldiers,
and the need to operate effectively on
campaigns which demanded more than the
seasonally available theme armies. The main
changes were the htrodudon of a corps of
heavy cavalry armed with lances and maces,
which could operate effectively alongside
infanq, and which substantially enhanced
the aggressive power of the Byantine
cavalry, together with the rwlval of a corps
of disciplined, effective heavy infantry, able
to stand flrm in the line of battle, confront
enemy fnfanb?yand cavalry, much long
distances and function as garrison troops
away from their home territory an a
permanent bask. At the same tfme,the army
leadership developed new battlefield tactics,
so that c o a d e r s had a flexble yet
hard-hlttingforce at theh disposal that
could respond appmprhtely to a range of
different situations.
The remarbbte successes achieved by
Byzantine annies in the smmd half athe
10th century in particular, under a series of
very able commanders, and described in the
historical accounts of the period,
camborate the evidence of the tackIcal
beatises. In one tract a new formation of
infantry soldiers is d e l b e d , consisting of
troops wielding thick-stocked, long-necked
javelins or pikes, whose task it was to face
and turn back enemy heavy cavalry attacks.
Twenty years later the tactic had evolved
further, so that there were in each major
infantry unlt of 1,000 men 1W soldiers so
equipped, integrated with 400 ordinary
spearmen, 300 ruchea and 200 light
infantry (withslings and javelins). This
important change in the role of infantry
was reflected in the changed poli.tlcal and
military situation of the 10th century. In
the late 6th century cavalry began to
achieve a certain pre-eminence in military
organisatlon and tactia, whereas the
10th-century texts give infanq formations
equal or even preferential treatment.
Infantry became once more a key element in

49

the army, both in terms of numbers as well

as tactics, a dear contrast to the situation in
the preceding centuries. The new tactics
were embodied in a new formation, in

which infantry and cavalry worked together,

essenthlly a hollow square ar rectangle,
depending on the terrain, designed to cope
with encircling movements from hostile
cavalry, & a refuge for Byzantine mounted
units when forced to retreat, and as a means
of strengthening infantry cohesiveness and
morde. Infantry were no long= drawn up in
a deep line with a largely defensive role, hut
actively integrated into the offensive heavy
cavalry tactics of the period. And a very
important a s p 3 of the change was a focus
an the recrultmnt of good infantty from
war-like peoples within the empire,
especially Armenians. The demand for
uniformity in tactical function and therefore
equipment and weaponry meant that the
Bpntlne infantry of this periad w e e more
like their classical Roman predecessors than
anything in the intervening period.
New farmations bf cavalry appear, heady
m o u r e d troops armed from head to foot In
IampUar, mail and quilting, whose horses
were likewise protected. Face, neck, flanks
and forequarters were all to be covered with
amour to prevent enemy missiles and blows
from injuring the cavalryman's mount.
Known as kafaphraktol or kl&mpRomi, they
were relatively few in number due ta the
expense of rnaintaMng them, and wwe the
elite strike force In each field army, drawn
up in a broad-nosed wedge with their only
function to smash through the enemy heavy
mvlllry or infantry line, disrupt his
formatlan, and open it up to permit
Supporting horse- and foot-soldiersto exploit
the situation,Coaternporary writers, h t h
Byzantine and Arab, comment on the effects
of this fotrnatlon on their foes. The imperial
armies achieved a powerful reputation, to
the extent that by the 1030s the mere threat
of an imperial army marching inta northern
Syria was enough to keep the lmal Muslim
emirs in check. Yet white these successes
were the result of a combination of good
organisation and logistics,intelligent tactics,

we&-gmed, traiaed am$disdphed mldIwX

gprd good morale, ~e key always re@abW
the &mpetence and efftxWmes6 of f i e
~
~
bA r I ~l y i ~ ~~ l ~ a ds
g c d as its kadetshlp, howem, m-d
dthw* tactid oFder and trahing
mainly p Byanthe armies through
much ofthe empire's &tory an obvious
advantage, iarompeknt-offimewqe rhe
~ D f t h e ~ : d ~ c e o a t 4 e

cbkaua,a d inteltfgente eE fts leadm *as

m e of the mnst ~~~t~~
w e a k n a 03 the imprial mw m
r
n
attfie~levleI.~the~ddled
the 11th renturpI and in a context uf
shm+ted
Shtqgc p
m ancl internal
plitlm3 qmllict, this pFodwed SerbRs
psobiemsandledtotkk~~oft-he
~ ~ e n e s s d b o t h ~ W ~ . a i d
the p
~
~
As the demands of offensive M a r e
required tlw employment ofwer #maker
nudwzs of profedmf,mmmaq mfdiem,

32

hmial His&$

&pmlmat War

had only m e @ needed to coaffont it

themselves. Most of the Narfare they had
~ Winv~lved
I
in since the IOHkbad been
-st
light-arm&, WhIy mobiie enemies
such as 'kuh and Pechenep. And whereas
the Bpmtine heavy cavalry of the later 10th
century had been m e d with lama and
m a w , they had advmced at a trat, not a t
the charge, with the aim of simply rolling
over the enemy fswe facing them.

In spite of efforts under the emperors

of tbe bComnenr3s dynasty, many

lodigenam units were re-equipped end

bained In western style, so that the result
was an m y no different from any other
multi-~thnic,polyglot mercenary army in
it$ tactics and fbrmathns. The differenw
lay in the superior order and tactkal
dispositions of the imperial m p s , when
these were properly exploited by an able

LEFT Marchingorder for field amy in enemy territov

late 1 0th century. (Aud-ds collection)
Kf?
(a) advance xauts
@I v a n g M
(c I) mwlry centre dmsaon
(cl) d r y right wing
(d)w
r
y I& wing
(el)cavalry c e ~ s e c o r i dl i e
(d I)infamy centre
(d2) infantry ri& mng
(d3) infa* left wing
(dl) infantry

(4 bww*'train

m(g)

margud
mpemr & b u s e h ~ u
w
Ch) outridedank scouts

m-g
oms, and thfs is m
mdmt on mdsim~irl the kter pears of
thk 12th an-. By theomid& &f the
28* ~rntuty~
and fo'iImhgthe fall of
CanstanthmpIe ta the amleg of the hwth
atmde, W ~ ~yzantl~e
C
tedwiw term$,
titles; and m e 3 fur Q p s of unit mmuP3
to be employ& frl the shrhhhg Rrtltorks
of h e empire, W C s , m u r md mpnry
were no ~ ~ n t f m
Wm
e BftM
surroundin&cultures and
with
whom & ByWfines were &mWdp itt
@ace and war.

Strategy
Strategic dispositions evolved to meet the
needs of the moment. In the 6th cmtury
and up to the period of the Arab invasions
the units estabIished la garrisons along and
behind the frontier were called limitrmei,
frontier soldiers, usually comprised of the

M E $ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ GE"
A I V E A ~
&&&

,I

..-

mere &in be UttIe,dorrbtthat oh@ reawn fbt

the mpiTe's SUMvat fnm the 7th miuq

on was its &dive lqisttcal admlnistzation.

Theroadsystem,~ghbothpatIy
redwd in srope and m
d
e
d fn quality
when eompaxad witb &at of the Brwnrtn
p e d o d , ~ l a n ~ t ~ . l n
addition, the a d u l l p m9ha&ed-1
s)%Wnwas . M y #& into the w d k d +he
a m $ and althwgh the exact a d r n ~ l s t t a ~
and oqpnwti~ld
stmmlfawolved aver
the mod ln questton, the amngmmb for
suppIy9q h e mldien in efther p d m e ,w
lnarwereeffedtw. ~ ~ m ~ ~ 1 l a E v e
in either money at in W, dqpadhg u p f i
a numbscrfmtfhbla whet& theatg89 in
q u m m str#prw,en0q#l market
whether the agricuhtml or bther mswces'

~ b y t h e i n n y ~ ~ k e a n d
could be
what the prtkuk needs
of the m y a't that point in Sad were; md
how many &lien md mhgb nqkd tu
kfedand h ~ m e r w h a t I ; ~ h d t i d e .
T B e ~ d m a m ~ m U r e ~ d ~ f i s
*ion
WER wEU W i d e r s W r d ,am

w@k?kwrfttmsa3nu;esof~epeEiQd
~
O tb ~ ~R
m t m mSariot
w

bofh ~

to keep ~ c e ~ t i u
Q
f bqps
m for tm
1on B y a n f i n e mitory wd desdpmft~
af what happeaed whim tl& advice was
not mowed.
When a cam*
was @armedi h d &cal
d c i a l s IbW with the mtrd authorities
a& the a t m y m a d s deprtmmt ~lt
Cmmmttnopl~so that the right amount

&pcMly w m the emperof and W

h w h o 1 d were oa the q x d i t i , ~ nF,a& of
fhe q i o M t h m g h which the anmy
had to put aside adequate supplies aFe;rahI
meat (usually m ttte hwf) ,andail or wine
for the r q w numw of Ermps. Large

Wimq
wM& w a d
@netally be divided hta several smaller
m d ~ o f ~ ~ e s y % I t e ~ d e d ~ columns,
t h e eaehtakbga w a r e mte and
rims invozm. Tbe outlay w.9 o m Pay
Beading fara pmama$dfindemous m the
h m i e r -number'& as many as 20,DOr)of
heavy, m d actaunts from the 10#h wWy
more, and vety mx&onaIly as many as
show ju9t how heavy the burden mdd be,
Y

u2S

so m.
O L # B R A L PLAH

OF CAYlP

30,m; but the average theme fom might be

na more tim 3 , 0 0 0 4 , ~often
,
far fewer,
eonfmnting armies af the same giaR, or
shadowing larger forces until they a u l d I
x
ambushed or taken m h a full-sde battle.
Providing mums for such armies involved
a mmidmble mgmhational effort. In
addition to fwd, hand pack-anid
had to be provided, w q x m s and other Items
of mllltary quipment repiaced and, for
eqxdium imaded to take enemy
smngholds, wa$ons or caas carrying siege
mrrchery and artillery. While food and
suppues were genemfly providd by the
distrlctr through whi& the army p a w ,
weapons md other equipmant, as well as
mQunts and pack-mimdsI might
come hum mote cWmt pmvSnm. In a

latb-cenhrry account, for example, detailing

m e ofthe pqmatiom for an eqediton by
sea, some pmvinas wwe c o n m i s h e d to
produce a certain number of weapons: the
region of T h d a n i k i was ordered to & h e r
200,000a m , 3,800 havy infanby spears
and 'as many W
s ar psibIe';
the region ofHellas was asked to @uw.
1,QOO heavy infanby spews; while the
governor of Eurlpp~$fn Greece, and the
m-ets
of the themes of N i k q m h
and of the Peloponnese all undertook to
prwride ~ , 0 0 atrows
0
aad 3,000 heavy
infantry spears. The same doamwit sp&fteg
a b that other $crvemarsor offim were
cotnmissioned to levy thous;urds of nails
and similar itfrom their pmvincm for
ship c o m a i o n ,

W v E S&%M

of ditth and embanlotpent,a$ u b &

in I 0th)thcentury mirbry handbook (From G.Dennis,

Three Bmntine Military T h h , p. 3355, t OF)

mtr ,~M,
w
~
' w #
-Q
ro-. ~ h
*a>* N!wmw~'Mmww?
gdrmijha-wm
l~tath@Llaos.~ln~IteOf~~me

the c o u n ~ *in~Ada W I w
under the empon AI~X~QS
4 john A and
Mmud I Mmmenw in the pdod from the

w*

w heavy deI:eab, they lwwrtma

intq'dv

& R t a W the Gattodal

d the
~ ~ , * t e ~ ~ a a e n a e , o a

~ a l ~ i o n s , ~ ~ ~ ~ t I l e
OEenSlve. Tke la*w amm&mmts
m

~tm%yiheaq&eweteamajor,
tf not W major, mntrhmry famr to Ws.
Only whm the poWd ~d ecammie
edmonmmt Iriwhich the @impitem
to
s

I ~ ~ r n b e s r b I e r n ~ t a k, r ~ ~ ~
~didthema~Qw~maltstte
uitwatay hiaii.

BB

!3&ential Hlsto&~ 8yzantiurn .zrt War

Portrait of a soldier

Recruitment, discipline, and life

on campargn
Soldiers
There is n& doubt that the majority of
ardinary soldiers in the m y throughout the
Nstory of the empire were of fakly humble
status. The 'bgtter-off' mdhary soldiers
among the thematic m d e s in the 9th and
10th centuries appear to have held a relatively
high position in their communities, however,
partly~oftheirspecialfkmIandlegal
status: they were exempt h m exSa taxatlon
and a range of state fmposltions in t e r m s of
labour service or providing housing and
supplies for other soldiers, officers orm
iw
offldals, to which the ordinary population was
always subject; and they could bestow thdr
p q w t y without having to adhere strictly to
Rcrman inheritance law about the division of
property among heirs. Tfifs gave sotdim of ail
type, even when they were nat especially
well paid, an enhanced social prest@, set
them apmt somewhat from the otdiraary
ppulation, and gave them a sense of group
Identi9 and solidarity.
The sources for recruitment and length
of service for the p e r i d after the mlddle to
the end of the 6th century are not very
informative. Before that m e , it seems
that the baditional Roman regulations
probably applied, with a minimum
recruitment age of 18 years and a minimum
height requirement of about five feet six
inches. There i s reason to believe that the
-mum
age far recruibnent in the
9th and 10th centuries was still 18 and the
maximum 40. Service beyond the age of
48 was not unusual, however,and several
examples of soldiers who served beyond
that age are h o w n . Some sources suggest
that many officers stayed on long after
their useful carer was over, as a result,
adversely affecting the military effectiveness
d their unit.

There were important differences between

the requirements applied to recruits to
'professi~nal'units, such as the tagmatn, and
the provincial or thematic armies, with
many of the regulations governing
admission to the first group being wtaiDed
from the late Roman legislation, whereas
thematic soIdiers were required merely to
appear at the regular muster parade
appr~priatdyequipped with mount,
provisions for a certain number of days,
shield and spear. Some restrictions on
recruihnent also existed, prohibitions on the
enlisbnent of heretics were applied, at least
In theory. Priests and monks were forbidden
ro join the army, while those convicted of
adultery or similar crimes, those who had
already been dishonourably discharged, and
so forth, were technically disqualified from
eniisting. But it is impossible t~lulow to
what extent such regulations were observed.
It i s most likely that in the situation that
developed from the middle of the
7th century most of the forma1 regulations
of the Raman perid had become irrelevant.
The application of ofsuch regulations was in
any went not possible for forefgn units,
especially Muslims, Franks and others outside
the sphere of Byzantine religious-political
authority, nor to others, such as Armenians,
who may have belonged to aan-Orthodox
communities. The further away from
Constantinople, the more M y such
regulations are to have been ignored. By the
10th century the greater diversity in origins,
military value and contexts in which soldiers
for different types of unit were recruited must
have led to an equal diversity in their
conditions of enlistment and servfce, not just
between simple thematic soldiers and saIdim
of the imperial tagmfa but between foreign
units and the mercenary soldiers re&ted
for specific campaigns.

AUsoWm W d e t b e m ,
~ ~
W

main&&

t f
~
in thdrpwhm and hihe

ga-mmt-wt-az
~

~ ~ t u ! r s e s ~ o m o r a ~ ~ d
k 5 9 ~ ~ I n * ~ ~ * , ~ ~ f I g h
~
l
~
w
b
~
~
d

a t ~ W ~ t o k & ~ t o t h e
m.~ v e w a s ~ x t e d ~ a n a ~
t m & a a d h z ~ a & n f ~ ~ & ~
and three months, E
,
rn OasffraafIon of the unit tn quaWm - wheflyx

-*

wWmpkQX3u

qnaaee-,

qwttes*'Fbe nlmxber d
-CmM
~
t l W 9 t a i I y - @bIme
~ PYBs m,
and
0fWTs who p
wmwdlamto be away

cw!dhepm~3uttkpatdm
wiI&hm&enrles=-orta
*typesof
LdImiStbeg-,applied.
Mdiers Fe@v& EM? &ate bRn,&

whm

they~,rnererth&pqeWfbal
t h ~ ~ i l g t % & ~ 6 f i f ~
~ t M W ~ ~ a n t i t k e s t $ ~ s b ~

Imkaffefth~whof~fmthe~and
hr cb&empiEe # d.
Udl.*end d
the6tbotmkWeoPthe 7tbmtudaw

a ~
but@@~~s

f$#e 7th mtopr

prob&ly l w i F 5 mm@mam
~
d-Fkfor*w
t PM the d & w y M e & sfsfthe
~ d ~ t n t h e ~ t b b w a s
r&lmed Un t h e , s t a t e " s . ~ - a d

~
w

h m r t S , a h by the lam WIce-,

Enm-Imgbf&re, E$UW
in the majom of
thema* s
d
~ pmpty k

~
~
f ~ ~ n ~ w h i c h ~ ~ e s ~ ~ u l d i x ~
~
h
a
d
~
~
~
~
~
f
o
perrd,eq-t
and
mountwwhenth@y~~upforfhe
yea37 c % m p a m & ~ - - &
p---f63[10idbm
W

S o ~ , c o u l thlaM
d
dfflgari Ul#b-

and of his faith while serving the emperor.

The numbers entering monasteries among
the officers of he provinces was substantial
enough for an Arab historian to remark on
the fact, and to note that those who pursued
this life forfeited the continuation of their
cash salary, to which they were otherwise
entitled as bearers of an Imperial title.

There was no 'officer corps' in the Byzantine

army, although it is clear that the rnafortty of
men who commanded units beyond the
level of a squad or troop came fram the
wealthier elements in society, whether tn the
prwlnces or ln Constantlnople, and that
swvice at eourt in one of the palace units
functioned as a sort of training school. The
sources tell us quite a lot about the middle
and upper levels of officers, and unffl the
12th cemry it is clear that there was always
a substantial meritacc8tic element in
advanemerit. Sorial background and
education pIayed a role, but It was PWfectly
possible far an able and competent soldier or
lower-ranking officer to rise to high position.
In all aspects of Byzantine society social
connections and kinship always pIayed an
important role too, and t r W g and ability
were generaIIy mediated through personal
ties; for example, an df~cermfghf advance
h4 career through service iniWIy in the
retinue of an important officer, from where
he might receive a junior appointment in a
local regiment, rising through the variom
grades, or being transferred to a senlor
position elsewhere. Some careers developed
within f a r d i e s serving in the same unit there are s e w d examples of offlmsfsans
entering their father's unit as U p l e coopers
or soldlcrs before being promoted to junior
and then more senior officergrade; In other
cases, we hear of privileged young prwlndal
men sent to Constantinople where, with the

Gold hyperpymn of Alexi& 1 ( 1 08 1 - 1 1 1 8).

standing figure of the emperor: (Barber Insthk of R e
Universrty of B*mingham)

help of an influential relative or patron, they

were appointed to a junior post in the pards
before further promotion. In one case, which
was probably not untypfral, a young man
was appointed &st ta a mall corps af elite
guards In the palace, before receiving a
junior command at the capital, then a
middling pravinaiaI post, More being
promafed to a senior position, all h the
course of some 10 years or so.
By the middle of the 1lth century the
growth of a powerful provincial alstucracy
had brought some changes to this stntcture.
The pm4ncigI elite itself prvvidgd a major
wurce of recruits to the middle and sentor
offlea' posts In the empire, and during the
lam !Jthand 18th centuries came to
monopiise most key provincial miiitary
commands. The inmasing use of mercenaries
reduced at the =me time the importarnee and
status of the provin&l, thematic soldiery,
who blended back into the mass of the
peasanby barn which they were drawn,
thereby losing their dlstinctive social position.

Discipline and training

The Byantine army, at least as represented in
the m a t i v e histories and In the military
t r e a W , prided itself on its order and
dlscfpiine. Life in the army involved a wry
different mrt of daily routine from life In

clmntexts or from that in l a

disciphed and organid n-uring
armies. 14 6thantury military handbwk
makes
abundqntly clw.M
' Bpxduse~
but few brave m a , whereas care and mining
make effuAmt sddim,' not& the author.
Lev& of Wciplne varied and were a major
cameof conkern to mmmders and to thk
authors a f d the militarg treatises. 'Chere are
plenty of cases of mutiny and unresZ among
the prcwindal armies and the mamples d
trmp pazidchg when the mmmanrfe~
was
thought to have been killed ax injured bevidence of the variable p s y c h ~ l ~ @ d
cbndmon of the troops. The extent to which
proper diidplfne was acmalIy enfarted is not
rtey clear in the limited sounzes. Usually it
was the m& able commanders who were
most Uely to apply military dkipline
effectively, partly a dection of tb& prwnd
eh~facterand ability m inspire confidenea
among the saldia4 - a pioint PSo remgfikd
in the military treati$es.Financial pemsiy,
dtlltt~on the p;lrt of h
divlmMdunandas
or ~EIkea,or the government,was a &a1
ingredient in enroumghg w 1 d b to follow
ordm and accept the disclplbe necfot
e m v e IQhting.
Dfscipllne also v&& accwdhg ta the.
categories of mops. A s y e t M e certaifily
prevailed In elite unI@such as the imperial
tagmi3 aad in mi^ wMrh had a pwkicular

loyalty t6 th& commanding offica One

story mounts the tale of an M k e r who was
upbraidd by the emperor himself for hid
unkempt appearance while a t his p s t in the
palace. Dbdpline was probably least effective
h the militia-like thematic forces+but d e t
competent offims it
to haw e n
&ectivw maintained. There efisted an
offtcial d e of military discipline which is
frequently Included in the military
h a d b w b , and effective leaders seem m t h e
whak to have appUed it, Niltepbms I1 is
q m r b d to haw awarded pmMmmt to a
soldier for drapp5ng his M c 3 because he was
too tked to mntinue wrying it, When his
m
e
r Igrtrjred the osder, he too. w8s punished
severely, on the pun& that t h e Mt had
e n d m his comrades as well as himsdf,

wbik the latter had compounded the crime

and h k 3 m d m g a d the well-being of
the M e force. CanV in the
8th century, Mkphorrrs II,JohnI T W s k q
Basil U in the late 10th c
e
w and Rmnmm
IV in later 1were all regarded wlth
ilpprm as strfct dhckp~rians,as was
Alexios I in the late 11th centuq. Yet
discipline often broke d m
There an? some hi& in the mums a b u t
the exercise$ carried out by t h e mtdiers,
descriptions,com&fatetI by account3 of
similar m s e s in the tWal manuals md
lmaAdWphrs. Ntkepttms Phokas pat on a
series of military g a s and mock battles in
the hippdrorne at Cmstantinople fn the
964b - they were so realistic and frightthat a panic a c m d which claimed many
H m . But whatever the tefctbo~hxlidabout
the value osuch exercises, sensible
corrmmafldm appear generally to have been
aware of tbe limitations erf the different som
d troops under their command. The treatkw
on warfate often include quite simple, easily
xianapi tactical manmuwe$ for the great
bulk ofthe thematic Mmq, who were on
the whole not well equippi and pkntlally
uareliabIe. In.contrast the W-trained llnd
wellquipped heavy cavalq and elite units
were e x e e d tu imp1ern@ntquite complex
rnanaeums, frequently under enemy attack,
on the battlefieId Skills and mining,
discipline and morale went hand in hand.
The sort of exercise in pmirular skills
which cavalry trmpers had to
aut b
Nuseated Fn a la@ 6th-&ntury m a t l a

me

tmapf] shottld s k t rapidly, mount@ti

an his kame and at a mr&, to f i e front, to the
mr, to right stf$ %i IF@; he &mld pm3se
leaping ~ n t ahis horse. Whm rnumkd 4 at a
catttw he muld s h o t one q two e r w s rczn'idly
~ n put
d the smmg bow in Ib case ... rurd then
tuk the lance which he -c
Wt hi$ baeit,
With tke simng bow i n its tase he shoulftl hold
the Isncc in hi3 b i d , tRm quickly replace it on

hi3 back and h k the bow.

As well as these Individual s k i b wftb bow,
lance or ward, the troops were drilled in

Portrait of a soldier

forrnakian, so that, in larger or smallet badies,

they could be wheeled, moved from column
into h e and back again, form a square
against heavy r
r
a
w attack, form into a
wedge to break through an enemy formation,
and so forth. Success on the battlefield often
depended on the &ctiven@ss with whWl
such manoeuvres might be carded out,
although it was also admitted that things
should be kept as simple as possible to avoid
confusion or being caught unpreprd
mid-way t?mugh a manoeuvre there are
examples of batties in which one of the
reasons for the collapse of the imperid forces
appears to be due to such errors.

Life on campaign
As we haw seen, life as a soldier In the

Byzantine army must have varied

enormously from century to century as the
empire's fortunes changed, and depending
on the commanding officers, the type of
unit, and so forth. We have very little
evidence about individual soldiers, but there
is a good deal of information that can be
gleaned r ~ m
the wide range of written
sources about what the life of an ordinary
soldier must have been like. In what follows,
therefore, I will illustrate some of the issues
by inventing a 'typical' soldier.Although
thew is no text concerning our hypothetica1
soldier, we can build up a picture of some
events in his life k m several sources, so that
in the a m t below, all the things that
happened to him, the actions ascribed to
him or to others, the duties he carried out
and the fighting in which he was Involved,
can be found In medieval sources of the
period from the 7th to the 12th centuries,
and are all perfea1y compatible with the
actual htstorlcal context in which I will
situate Mm.
In this -on
we will follow the daily
routine of a typical cavalry b o p r on
campaign under the geneml Bar& Skim h
the Balkans in 971. The soldier's name was
Theodore, a fairly common and p q d a r name,
and o m shared by one athe most famous

65

soldia mints of the eastern Christian world,

St Theodore the recruit, one of the four patron
saints of soldim along with saints Ikmetrim,
Merkourios and George.
Theodore same from the village of
kitholmmi near tfie b t m s town of
Teourorallon in Tbmce. ' I h d r e was the mn
ofa saldier himself, and the w
s land was
subjea to the ,-s
the milimy semi& due
from those enrolled an the thematic m i U t q
senrice register. H s family was not well off,but
their neighbows, who were aIso hbIe to
rditary service, were pmitkd to contdmte
jointly to annlng and equipping a sfngle
mvaIry soldier. Theodore's skills M brought
hlm intu a unit of Iancers, medium cav*
armed also with bows and mace& where he
held the rank of aMmhos, commander of a
troop of 10 men, in a h d o n or squadron of
SO soldim. He sem& e M v e l y on a full-tlme
rather than a seasonal basis and a camoffered hlm the chance of a promotion, phaps
to second-in-#mmand of hls squadron.
In the spring of 970 the empire faced an
invasion from a large RuS' force deep into
imperial territory in Thrace, where they took
the lscal garrisons by surprise and were able
to sack the fortress of Philippoupolis (mad.
Plovdiv), before advancing along the road to
Constantinople. Since the emperor John had
most of his effective field units in the east,
where they were campaigning near Antiach,
he appointed Bareias Skleraa, together with
the paa-ikios Peter, both experienced
commanders, to take a medium-sized
force - numbering wme 10,000- and scout
the enemy dispositions in the occupied
territories. As a secondary objective they
were to exercise the troop and prevent enemy
raiders committing further depredations. At
the same time, spies - disguised in Bulgarian
and Rus' cwhlrne - were sent into enemy-held
territory to learn as much as they could about
the Rus' commander Svyatoslav's moments.
Svyatoslav soon learned of the actvandng
imperial column, and in response despatched
a force of both Rus' and Bulgar troops, with a
supporting detachment of Petchenegs wIth
whom he was tempamily allied, to drive the
Romans off.

Portrat of a soldier

with their baggage, were more than a mfle

along the side, with a v-shaped trench some
six to dght feet in depth.
Theodore's unit, like all units, had to set
up its own rotating watch within the ramp;
but the cammanding oRcer also needed to
set up a watch for the camp as a whole. Each
unit dong the perimeter provided soldiers
for tMs pabol, called the k e r h , and

through the use of a regularly changed

password had camptetete authority aver access
to and egress from the camp. Other units
had to b9 sent out to forage for supplies m d
foddw for the hams, and they were in turn
accompaniNl by supporting troops for
protection - it was important to pitch camp
and secure the immediate area before sunset
so that supplies could be got in as quickly as
possible. Leaving camp after sunset was
usually prohibited, except far the outer line
of pickets, groups of four men sent out to
cover the major approaches ta the camp
when it was clear that no enemy was yet in
the immediate vicinity.
The men were organised in tent-groups
of eight, called kmtoubmia, sharing a
hand-mill and basic cooking utensils as well
as a mall trwp of pack-animals. Soldiers
were h e d with two main varieties of bread:
simple baked loaves, and double-baked 'hard
tack', referrd to in late Roman times as
bucellatum and by the Byzantine as
paximadion or paximatian. In camconditions, It was norrrially the soldiers
themselves who milled and baked this. The
hard tack was more easily preserved over a
l o n p period, was easy to produce, and
demanded fairly simple milling and baking
skills. Hard tack could be baked in field
ovens - klibunol - ar simply laid In the ashes
of camp Ares, an advantage when speed was
essential, and this was the case during this
expedition - although the soldiers much
preferred the best such bread, baked in thin
ova1 loaves cooked h a field-oven, and h e n
dried in the sun. The rafion ger diem
Included two ia three pounds of bread and
either dried meat or cheese; wine was also
Iswed, but it Is not clear how often or in
what circumstances. The amount of meat

67

relative to the rest of the diet was often

minhal or absent aItagether, but would still
provide a reasonable amount of nutrition,
since andent strains of wheat and barley had
considerably w
e
t protein content than
modern strains, and it has been shown that
the bread ration of ancient and medieval
soldiers provided adequate nutrition for the
dur~ltionof a campaign season wen without
much meat.
The camp mutine was marked by the
trumpet signah for the evening me&, Iights
out and reveille; trumpet signals were also
employed to issue commands to the various
d t s and divisions to strike camp, assemble
in marching order and begin the march.
Leaving camp was always a dangerous time,
far as the troop5 defiled through the main
entmnres they were far a while a p e d to
archers or wen a rapid hit-and-run charge
from enemy horsemen. A particular order for
exiting camps was laid down and followed,
and once the army was out of the entrenched
area It would be drawn up for a whlle in a
defensive formation until the troops fell into
tho rnarchlng order for the day.
The speed at which armies moved varied
according to terrain, weather and the
number and types of troops. Unaccompanied
mounted troops could covu distances of up
to 40 or 50 miles per day, provided the
horses were fegdar1y rested and wdl
nourishad and watered. Small wit3 generally
maved more rapidly than large divisions,
wen up to 30 miles per day for infantry in
some contexts. Average marching speeds
were much slower: three miles per hour for
infantry on even terrain, two and a half on
brokenlhIUy ground. Mixed forces moved at
the speed of the slowest dement; but speed
also depended on the conditions of the roads
ot.tracks f6llowed, the breadth of the
column, and its length. The longer the
c a l m , the longer it toak for the rearmost
files to start moving off,which wouid thus
arrive at the next camp later than the
foremost groups, the delay between first and
last units belng proportional to the length
and breadth of the column. Thus a division
of 5,00[1 infanby, which is what Batdas

Illummnated m r i p t ofthe M t W y 0fId-dSwm

(I ltfi cmtuw],fsL l @ a T h e W W $ , a w a W
h b m e r frwn the: Wponmese,baing&d
in her

r - w by

p w i i rww,
~
~ladriq

m l y had at I& dispml, rnmhing at the

st#Wanw r;ate of about three miles
gmund, ordered me
per muf ever
~~BRcl~eashmwmpy4lga
(minimat) !xammefteswmid dm& o w a
b&dlcmetre distance. There would be a
gap of at 'khe very l a &but$3 minutes8if
notmqre, betwwmtbefmutdrear
elements. T h ~ s - marched
~ m
WeF a b r w ;tIQ% the na-I
w w tr-s &Ikmeii by Wpe:tbl
mgs on 'ttira cwnpaign, anPlm dMsim
d ~,m
aw~w~tlla
bisveetmdgd w
newly J x mW, d the whole army same
14 dmThe m o s t units wmM b! well
met one hour bhknd the van.
H m h g J e f t t i ~ emmp Theadme%unit was

p i a ~ i n t h e v a n ~ n , ~ a ~
af stoups deplapd wEP abed of t h d~u r n ,
aiid ahead of the mahimnthgmt c5f &vaW
a d I&intq
The baggage Want to which a
group of unit?#war rm@ed oh.a mtaHnna1
b d s fox ptectiun, was placed fn the centme,
unit8 patKded at some d k n w ,
anti
w h e t h e remain dowwldon eltlm
Qn6)mmBI~in@mlym~themy
cmtd march a m &WuaakrfrantIn a
g&w numbers in the wemy fox%he
mmged m lure the e m m y but oftheir
fomamn that auld& rapW'depioyed
mcampmtand withdraw fnag&dmdeq
illto battle o*
and far pasing tlimgh
narrow pms or acrosk Bvm another
e m i l g w g m m and ~ E C &tbe enmy to
pursue but, on the Wumprion that t h
formatzonwas 6.mplqd.
Byzantine t z q s were indeed lcaing, without
Gs the march p g r e w d some &'hearty dear plan ofo f k ox atder, It must
$mutsrmmedtQWmnthegenqalWt
haw peerad as though th 6 u m m h r d
the emmy-was mt far aw*, near the f&xss
WZ&~R$.
m,whkb -@ Mth
t@wndf ArWidupOIb (mad. LWlmqazJ.
difWdty to a v d be@ caqletely
The thrd diwfsimswere given separate fasb;
-two wen2 conmaied fn the Mug& wub and
,-lts
w& dmmled. Y& W p h b J
mining and l&rship td& and Skhos
w m d d terrain through which fke tMck led
finally &ml the prearranged qnd to k
in the &&im of the enemy, while he took
given fur the w h k h m to fall back
ammmd uf the W d s w d m &the army
M m h & T h w k I s d t , OW of tke t
w
MmseIf. laving the hpa divisim in
corps that lap in ambush, p q a d its& the
ambush with dminstrar&m,he h ~ e l f
order was given tb m m m absoLute1p s h ,
led a Bebx aad mmSm4 charge amst
to place all SupWnumetarj.baggage mimb
the faremost memy mW%,made up Of
with t b i r WdanYS W M the rear, tu
Pesheneg r h o m t d abchm, h Spae of

Portrait of a soldier

check their weapons, and to deploy into a

battle order approplate to the terrain. One
of the priests who accompanted the force
offered up a quick prayer - a standard
practice More battle. A5 the van division
approached, drew level with and then
withdrew beyond them, a single trumpet-call
ordered them to break cover and cfiarge into
the flank of the unsuspetbq enemy. Caught
inthe open In dose cmbat, the Bachmegs,
a war-Ue W C
p p l e fxom the Eurasian
steppe, had no chance ta &play at a
distance suitable fof the use of their arehery
and, aftet hing brought to a haIt - at which
paint the van d
m
i o
n about-faced and
counter-attackedin its turn - they mmed
and fled. me Rus' and B*m maps,
manwhile, who had bees hurrying to catch
them up, on the assumption that the

69

Romans had been routed, suddenly huud

themselves caught up in the panic. As he
rout Mame general and the Roman forces
pushed home their advantage, heavy
casualties were hfllaed on the
eehg
I
enemy mops. A contemporarpsource
remark that the Romans last some 550 men
and many woundad, as well as a large
number of horn, a dhect result of the
fearsome archery of the Pectrenegs. The
combined enemy force, homer, lost several
thousand. The short encounter wan an
hnpartant breathing space for the emperor
John, furnishing hlm also wlth vital
inbnnatiun about the rompwition, QhtIng
abilities and morale of the enemy.
After any mmmter with the memy the
mmmmding offlm held a muster to
establish casualties. Special* detailed S~ICE~TS

The world around war

War and peace

The medieval e a s t m ~Roman world was a
wriefy In which the virtues of peace were
exMled and war was condemned. Fighting
was M be avoided at dl a x . Yet the
3yzaaW ernplre neverthelw inherited the
military adminlsrratke s t r u ~ and,
s
in
many ways, the m3lftarlstlc ideolugy of the
non-Christiau Roman em*
at its height.
The tm&m which these tradimns
generated were resolved 4 a palitidreligious ideology or warid v i m which
melded Christian Ideals on the one hand,
with the jtfiaification of war as a ne%esary
evil on the other, waged primarily h defence
of the Raman world and OrhodIitetdly<correct beljef. From the 4th and 5th
waturies on ln the eastem Meditmanean
and B a h n regions t h i s blending of ideas
generated a unique culture, that could
adhere uareemedly to a paciffstic ideal, yet
nn the same p n d s could legitimate and
justify the maintenance af an efficient and
effective military appmatua
Thh attitude is neatly summBd up in the
intrductlon to a legal codification
promulgated by the emperors Leo 111 and
Consirmane V in the year 741:

Since Gad has put in QW kn& &s hphl

... we believe that &ere is nothi%
h i g h w gre@terthat we can do than to p w r n
in judgearmt strd justice and that thm we
m y be m d by His dmighty hand with
v&ary uw OW mmks (which b a thing rnm
preckw and k~)mwable
thm thz diadem which
authorliy

...

wewear)sndtkus t ~ r n a y ...k ~

Byzantine emperors muid jlustiv their

wars on the basis that they were fighting to
preserve peace, to extmd the territory of the
Christian world, and to defend God's Chosen

People for in Cbrlstian R m a n terms, the

mantle sf the Chosen People had been

transferred to the C h r h k with the

coming af Christ. There was always a tension
&tween the pacfim of early Christianity,
however, md the imperial Roman, but
Christian, need to fight to defwd the
empire%&mitorialintegrity, ar to recover

'lost' Christian lands.and peoples.

Christianity never evolved an ideologid
obligation to wage war against 'infidels'
presented in the t m s of Christian theology,
even if, at tima, and an m hd hoc basis,
individual.?.have smken md acted as though
such a justification could be made. The
13th canbn afSt Barrll spxWEaUy states that
those who tmk lLfe in warfare should abstaln
from communion far a period
As Christianity spread aaass the empire
during the 2nd and 3rd centmi&,
p a p a t i s m often won the day?and if seems
that comidaable numbers of ChrktIans
served in the imperial d m at t#s titxie.
This muM not banish prblltllar conflicts of
interest, however - military s&ce required
acceptance of the emperor cult, that h,the
emperor a$ a W - and a whok m g e of
pagan traditions and rmats. The result is
that the histmy of the fir$tthree centuries
of Wstianity, and the 3rd century in
particular, is MI af tales of penemtion and
martydam, as individual M t s refusxi to
conform to the cerernonlal and rimd
observances amciated with life in the army.
As a compromise sol.uttm,the 3rd-cenhry
Chrlstran thinker O@en argued that
Christians formed a special type of m y that
did not fight wafs fpr the emperor physically,
But instead prayed for the success of the
gate, which made possible their mntinued
existence and the expansion of their
community. This compromise was developed
G a response to the csilkisms made by
pagan mmmmtatoa about. Christian
Wrnmudtia and their pacifism. In the end,

The world amund war

it was the argument about the cantimed

existence of the Rornan state being the

necessary condition for the survival and

expansion of Christianity which won the
day, and led to the more pragmatic
compromise noted already.
The favour shown to Christianityby the
emperor Constantine I, and his deathkd
baptism, however, led during the course of
the 4th century to a substantive
r@formuhtionof imperial polftlcaI ideology,
and this changed the W t l o n dramatically.
The ChrdsWsatfan of the emperar cult
solved one of the most difficult issues at a
blow &I earthly emperor selected by G d to
lead the Christians, now consonant with the
Roman people - was clearly acceptable,
whems an emperor who was s u p w d to be
a divinity was not. TWOperspective$ evolved
horn this sltuatlon. The &st was the offidally

73

sanctianed view which encouraged suppart

for the state, as pmnified by the orthadox
emwtor, and all its undertakings. Lading
churchmen, wMIe a p r d n g their hope tbat
violent conOict could be avoided and that
bloodshed would not be n v ,went on
to state clearly that it was p&wwo&y for a
W t i a n to take up arms against the enemies
of the state. The Chrhtkmhticm of sadety
developed rapidIy thereafter, and as the
government became domlnatd by
Christians, x, by the end sf the 4th centmy
tt became impossible to obtain a government
p t without being a Christian.
The assodation between warfare and
CMstiartity, the struggle for survival of the
'chosen people', led by the emperor chosen

The walls d G&mtimpte (5th c m t u ~ ] .

(

d W 6 )

bp Gad, a t the bead of Ms m d m

e
quite WUdt*m W W t was thug alwut
Wading ChWiantv and the ChrlWm
empire- M the same time a Wrrt!h
r peace,
and a reget that War should be necessary,
were constant motifs in imperiaI and Church
I~WIOW,
TIWE w t castant
~
L t a qC T ~
a e h ~ a ~ e n ls yp p n r t w W B y z a n ~ t
u m i a &md. SmmdSM warfare without
W ' s help w&$hqmsibIe. A Me
6iMentu~ytext nates *at:

... W

W g~ m d~ thathis must

i m p m t a n f m & We l m o f W m d
jktiw buTM1q an W e , he dwuld s W e fa ulcln
errS fmoYGad, without which il fs impass&le

ib~aurarryplm,howwwelE~it
m a y s e e t r r , w w ~ Q however
~ y ~ ~
w&khe~bd#l~l@.

me i a k repeated throughout the

Byzmlir~sppW. Roman defeats were sean
the result nf G M ' F with
~ the mInam,
the
wpk,*,were
being punished
~ Q Kth& sins. 0dx when heWmms
rewmd W tbe path af tQ&teimn& and
~ ~ ~ t h & ~ h ~ W ~ k d d ~ d ~

aWmd Roman-anns, aid this idea underlies

much of the thhichg in thwachm of
PndMdds and groups in Byzantine politid

&tory and pW themy.

Thm w thus nu notion a f Holy W a as

~OmeWng
,@s

t~

b@ waged

under

against pmhlar
e m m l e a The Bpgantlne Setf*
was me
of a M v M CM*n state 6ghting t f k
f W e s ofd%rb&xFwith- fmagainst w h m it
h d w ~ ~ ~ t n k a n i ~ ~ a & t o
evblvea w b k panoply of defensive
twMtquw, amwhich M a w was &p
one demmt, and by no mmnewm-ily
s&c'~st-

t k e m g s t w ~ . @ t h f s ~ ~ ~ f

argue that &war

I wsrs 'holy wal,sincwlilll
enmy action tl-mhtw'edthe
&mi
Mi& of *the R~m21o~.
mew were &%kSbinswhen the natian
that sbldiers who fell inbattle might bp
r-ed
h hmwn, a notiun & $ ~ ~ ~ eat l h
the ded~~pment
of sfdamfc nottom ef Jihad,
af wM& ~ A E
3
y
a were qpie wm.
ThttS in t
b 10th
f ~ example,
r
tilg
s o l d i & - a p x O r NWph~rnSII - hmwn bJr
tsoe somewhat chllbg ep1thWas 'the white
death af the k a w ' , hgg&ed that this
m?@& be ae appmprfate way to emmmqp
wldi~ersto fight. h t the idea was rejected hy
the Church and was never @ally x & e d . It
map h m ken dement d fa& Wefraf
raurm but it W q cwtainlJ n w @en inp
o f f i a -@Ition. A payer to b~ said
b e e tha saldim mardied intb combat is
&ardd in two 1Qth-mrtury texts,and It
~ gives
t t ! a ig to d
g idea
& of Ulis c o r n d m of
IZhxisftan with wu& rn-

Loid JqusCkuhtRow W, haw mercy

C

'

us.
~

wW@ #o@t#&e &ai%fbrotrrfEriSh &Bur

&othH$, W$&nW awfi a d our

and

The w&M,m&uuar

bw w b k bwry, the mighty Lord or Wes,

&mu@ &e h m s s ~ o neftha immacuj@
Mother of God, TRY MotWt and N4l Ir
safrtts. h

m,

There t$ a mau of evidence, thmfom,

from the 4th century up to the very
Iat ym8 of the empireI for the pubtfc and
uffidal wmptance by both Church an$ COW,
as well as by the ordinary population, d the
wed to wage wslr; for the fact of divine
support for such warfge; and for the need to
malntain and rely an heavenly aid In waging
war.kthwgh the notion af 'holy war' inthe
.sense under6W by the Crusaders, or by
nan~Muslimsas typical of Islam, kicker&
Mefly lnta life fn the Byzantine world,
espedal1y fn the context:ofthe aggcesslve
fighung of the 10th century, It newt.
dedoped beyand this. The ways h whfch
&are on behalf d the CMstlan Roman
state w m u m k n t d dfdgo tbmugh
m
b
iW ~ U ~fO$
Q# ~
& a, p w wt &@
J3y=nXtna were alwayk com&uu6of the ne&

da-

75

fote$lWteW&ww,ariw!d~

gmwlIy became more p

a in a tfme of
piartkal and m 3 1 l t q mpasionhm such as
B e Ztlth centmy W e warhe c d d h.
therefor$, loss of life MI the Rmm
ddewsfn~dar~bewoi~~)r
minhi~ed,if at &U mibh. The eaperof
CPnHwtbe V'cIwamtiged ZE'noble" M s
wnpagqinto Bul@tb~in 772-73 h t l s e no
Wman WWFS
died; whlh by the time he
w;krglM hjo military ,handbookor term
C-900,the emperor Leo Vt clearly expr-,
*eida that wsu has to' he justiped fn
~ r ~wlfhc O aeo d t q and the
mtfnwd &pt%nce df ththa W m n wte. k
rong as m m fm,
hmem &me&,
were at sub, then 'WWWAS w p h b b
and lust. War with o t h a ' ~ a b CMstms
x
WAS, U wUwr to be avoided. Butmen this
W be fulittffdif the:
&IW~@;
rtrd
dth~~mam,wmat~w~jwttoa~&
by the d$@ded rulers of such Im&

76

kentiat Hiaorier

Beantrum at War

Warfare and east Roman society

Warfare was fm much of the Bpandue
world, throughit much of its htstoty, t h e

nostate of affairs. Its effect3 were

manifested in a number af ways. R,begin
with* the ofdlnary population of the m p h
was directly affected by hostile activity In
U s e areas most e x p o d to enemy attack,
they suffered t h e dc&~~ctfon
of 'their aaps
and dwangs, the theft or s h g h t a of thelr
livPSfmk, and H they were themselves
caught, posible &a# or enslavement. There
survive same short bur wmSiVe inscriptiom
fKlm the fiantier regions of Asla Minor,
dating to the middle Bpnkhe period,
which cammemorate hdividuah who died
of their wounds following a battle or rai4
other accounts tell of relatives carried off
tnta captivity w l W i n t h e ~ a n d a n
enemy attack and never seen Again. And the
litmte elite was ju$t as aware of these
aspects: w a r b e imposed its& upon many
facets of Byzadtim Iltmary dture, in saints'
lives, in speeches in praise of emperors, in
funeral mtions, in sermons and homilies to
church congregations, in private letters
addressed to individuaIs. Themes such as
death, loss of p q m y and so forth
frequently, and in some cases the temr
inspired by a stlddm enemy raid is
graphidly portrayed. Letters often bewail
the eff- of warfare, Mth teffermces to the
tears of q b e d children and widowed
mothers, the destruction of craps, h a m s ,
mmmttc mzx~munities,the enslavemeat or
death of populations, drivlrlg off of Uvstock
and se ferth.
The presence of Byzantine troaps was no
less aneraus, hmwer. The very existence of
an arrny brought with it the need to supply
and provision it, to supply mataids w d
h s t o ~ for
k it when it was on cam-,
to
pavide kdgings and billets for officers and
w1&&, and so on. There were m i v e and
burdensome logWcai demands wherever an
army ww present, not fustn question .of
dmmn&i made by the army on I
d
populations, but a h the fad that
govmment inmention into the local

economy often affected the eroflamic

equlllbrlwn of the a & e d dktrlcts. This
cauld either rake the form of f h h g artifidally
law prices for the sale of p l a c e to the army,
thus harming the producersrar of by sudden
heavy demand for c&ain pduce, thus
driving up prim for tho$e in the private
sector. The c i v h n rnuktlon might also be
compelled ta bake b&ad arid biscuits far the
troops as well as providing other supplies
and, In addition, they were subjected to
the plundehg and W n g of +he La
well- disciplined demenb af the army. Quite
apart horn this was the potential f
a conflict
betwen soldiers and civtllans, for the
outcome was seldom famuable to the l a m
Additional levies in @ a h were para-1.y
onemus, and there are kequent cornplaints
in the M t t e a dmmkntatian concerning
this and rklated burdens, u$uaIIy a result of
either special requirements for ptlcular
cmpaigns ar the normal opratlrmd
demands made by the tmops in a particuh
region. h addition to these demands,
provincial populations had to provide
remum and manpower for the
maintenance af the public pmt, the dromos,
with Its system d postirhg 3tatlons and
stables, stud ffums and breeding ranches,
mule-trahs and moclated requiremmts. The
pasta1 system served the nee& of both the
rnfitary and the fiscal administration of the
state. It helped with the movement of
mflitaty suppUes, was r e s p n s i e for the
rapid trmsit of courlea and impaial offids
Of all kin&, as well a$ important foreigners diplomatic officials w prisoners of war, far
exarnpIe. The households that were obligated
to carry out certain dutie for the past were,
like househol& that had to supprt a ~oldler,
released fmm the e x t r a m h a y S a t e
impositions, and this was
imprtmt
aspect af the smooth running of the
pmdurial postal system.
The nature of the burden which the
pmvincjf populaiion bore in suppart of the
army can be seen particularly clearly in a
seEfes d documents af the later lDth and
g ~ i d the
y I ltb centurp. It Consists of
Imprid grants of exemp~onh r n the

The world around war

billeting of saldiers,the provision of supplies

for various categories of troops in transit, the
provision of horses, mules and wagons for
the army, and the deuvery of charcoal and

timber far military purposes. Same accounts

in chronicles detail the sort of requirements
needed to mount major military expedltlons
- large numbers of draught-animals,wagons
and foodstuffs, for example, and increases in
demands for supplies of all h d s ; all were
pravided by requisitions from the local

77

peasantry who suffered considerably from

this form of indirect taxation.
Economic and demographic dlsruptlon
affected not just the people who lived in the
provinces or towns that suffered during
periods of fighting. It also directly threatened
the government's control over its resources
and the ability ofthe Chuxh to maintain Its
A S t h i e w r y mosaic from Argos, showing agrmhral
labour in September and October: (A~rthdscollection)

The world around war

79

emperor Miqhoms II Phoh. Other

members ofthe c u h d and galitid elite
composed letters in prabse aftheemprofs
The nega#ve a s p A was to some extent
deeds inwlu, w Wt the gl~ISflatim
of
balnnced by an a1tmmti.e set ofvim,
military deeds $lid of Wvidupl leadm or
hoWpulat approval and enthusiasm %I
emwas part af the mple production af
war could be mmuraged, and the e
m~ g o ~ i n ~ a n d ~ . & a n
aphted murt c m m d at C a m h n q L
vnfmtumteM~meansofachi~
s p m i d g to t
m d.
m~a
pmwlwls,
l
a divinely a p p d end, warfare could thus bg
acimqmiedby dssplaysof w a n d
given a very p i t l v e @w.
Such views wen?
pimners, hymns of m v i n g , the
not necessarily shared by the many thwmds
acdamdbfls reminding the mpems (and rhe
ofpasants and towqmp14 who suffered
aatvd who were h earshot] of their C
M
s
w
over the c e r l ~ .
duty to defhd Qftbodbqand the empire, dl
Ttle degree to whkh warfare was
were dmWd to achieve a p a r h b eon^^
fundamental to the fabric DE late Roman and
atout w
e and the mperrar'sduty m
Bpmtine society and hfstoilcal
Mend orthdaxy. Poets wae ~
i
m
~
deveIopment
is evident
in bur sources. The
to write and declaim verse accounts ofthe
physical appearance of the Byzantine
em-s
camge s m e g k s t l l and Wmy
counhyside, social vatues, cultrual att3tuda,
a&wmen& the p e t George of FWb thus
government &caI and administrative
compawda ~ ~ o f h u r 9 a t o r y ~ i r t t h e orgmhlon, themes In Mmtmand
ail
620s anla 630s a b u t tbe victories d the
thew dlffmnt asp% of cultural and
m ~ ~ u 5 ~ A v a r s r n d matma1
~ , life were directly Irrfhmkedby the
whlle in the 10th cenhuyTheod9s6w,tbe
beleaguered slttaafim of the medieval wt
m
n slmilarly p h dthe
R6state and it9 need to 0ght wars,
of the

Portrait of a civilian

Metrios - a farmer
which we often @me&s
qutte a lot of
Infurmatian,~areawxygmd~up
~ t ~ m d t b e ~ m to ~
~ ra*
e. U n W M y , less
9 m y~Inftlis
rm lxw thlm* d l m t l e v f b c e about
W-wwp e r C w Nld
chrillans, aid so we will ntwmmilp rely on a
war ha= a b d y been allwied b-inadiff
c&&n amount ofhypothesisin thh chapter.
O m of the pWems of I3y-m
A$ we saw in the prambus chapter, it is
history k the
that the writktin evidence,
Upan W h k h hl~k&aIl$ h v @ to T* fOr
clelrthatfbp!p~~euf~waS~y,
hawEedqe of pple's opinions and a W d c
If ever, w e ~ r n ea, c q t gmMp when a
was nearIyaWqsprodue& by D 3 m b 9 wf
m m m m oj the 1mJpopdation at ttge
rehklvely p r i smid
~ strata.
~
we thus
m'wffahg directly from memy attacks,
V g ~ e r y ~ @ W a f w R X t t . ~
Whether the
was e
w In &hting
the a m y ar not, wwhdg mmrinunlties or
p p k3 n ! x b n X S * aa%m,
s i m p 1 e ~m
- ug
~ lit ~
h u t their
Mhiduals Wt
s W at the hands of
wdrld.Of~,wecan@yto~
u m l y w pmrly disciplined mFdfm. In the
through the writiu@ of the e d m M
10th c q , mmberssda dmonastic
s ~ m ~ o f t h e v i w v s a n d ~ a f t b e cornmmlpon the island of
non-literate,m at b t mn-wrMqpart of
Gpmpd@eston in #e &&?ark were farced
smkIy, a n d w e e m a h workwtthrough the
b abmcba Wr h a @ lxm& bf the
4elztrrr: ( ' r e q u i s i t l ~af
) their
a ~ ~ t a k e n ~ ~ ~ p s a k o m Frequent
i n
tima
of what they thought and
a n i r r r a l m m d ~ p s b y p ~ ~ i the
ng~~f
why. PM maple, while W n g for a IlmiW
imperial fib&. T k r e are plnty of 8 t h ~
emmple?xA t m e saldlers, fm mame,
md u e & i &mdenhip, hi?Prim- Anna
CanlmBa, wriearly in the 12th centmy,
n~toflous(at last h the view of the Greek
premts a graphic description of the
of
$uunmHmtheir W & dlsdpMe 8 n d w r
warfare on the pravinca inthe yqrs Wre
kbavlauq were e&pWt.Ltyfeared by the
her father, the e f n p 3 M Al*s
I, bad rn,heK
ardlnaq
of the ~g~nWsi&;
3nd an
dew)wwed the mplre from its Wbles!
llth-c&hxymurce mountsthe tale d a
l d @I "ha had Wen rabW by a unit of
Armenen troops passing &tough. Bymn&e
C~~
wSp&olt& k&m@d, #lithe
writers tbemelves &en remaxked ran & fact
tem'tnrksorRmne wm shined with Wtuni.
$one SIdmhaabb pimeti by maw or 1that Raman i E m p B ewld p o d y
others were dndnm
@m their b m a or c d
dimipbed a d men tatrage lru-l
Wtnrpt
of= p h s of wrrr .,. m
t
d XWon trill as
691 W supplies w4en W e w e e nat
ar th~ugtitm k Wdquafk.
t h q 8 u ~ ~ s e e k r q ? g e ~ i ~f~~
~
di%m in
m m & M md ma
One wmnerhfiimr'umsup the g e d
attitude to sdldiefi w M he makes reference
TWe they W l yW n i M W Frt@ of their
ff&& ... m a s a n k a 0f&trs
~ ~ ~ ~t@?Vdpto %hetl:ouBles~rntpresence of soldiers'.
theit,d"g&m ... In h s e dqs no waik Ogfifi"
In the late 11th centmy theMbishop
was SpaEd its f,?an d - I a m m i o n .
Theophylact-of O W in the Bymatine
propinas of Bulgaria amplahed in the
B b k u e they tended to a& in large
$*met
terns a b u t & sppmsive wight
groups and Inspxific dmunstenc& abput
af the state demarrds on march tenants, He
The e f k b o f w a ' k md fighting an

individuals

am,

an l ~ r x l m m u nati ~

Portrait of a civilian

was especially concerned with the labour

demanded for the repair, maintenance or
construction of forWcations, but he was
equally vehement about speciaI
ConscrIptians for the army, wMch took men
away from an already weakened local
population. The oppressive demands af the
imperial fiscal officials was often such that
Theophylact remarks an the fllght of
considerable numbers of W e r s to the
forests, in order to escape such oppression.
While the situation seems to have worsened
-in the Iater 1lth century and afterwards,
these requisitions and demands and the
hardship they caused remained a major
burden on the rural population of the
Byzantine empire until its Iast years.
As in the eatlier chapter wMch portrayed
the life of a 'typical' soldier, therefore, I will
look at the dally We of an ordinary
Byzantine through t h e eyes and experimces
of an invented individual, based on a
composite derived &oma range of wusms
combined tagether to generate an
impressionistic account: all the events
described in what follows can be found in
medieval sources of the periml from the
7th to the 12th centuries. In this case, our
subject is called Metrios - there is a short
10th-cenh~ryaccount of a peasant farmer of
this name from Paphlagonia. We will assume
that he was a farmer of some means In his
community, the village of Katoryab in
Paphlagonia, and the time is the middle of
the 9th centmy. Although his village is
situated only three days' travel h m the
large coastal fartress town of Anmstrls, the
villagers rarely undertake t h i s journey, partly
because the road$ are not pzticulslrIy safe
there were always small bands d refugees
moving northwards from the most exposed
frontier zones and, whlk many of them
settled down inand around the smaller
toms and fortresses of the w o n , there
were always a few who fell into a life of
banditry and brigandage. There was also the
fact that Metrios could provide Iittle from his
land that mages much nearer the town
could not prduce, and so Ms markets would
have tended to be Imated much closer to his

81

home v i l l g . In spite of the distance from

the nearest active front, Katoryalta was
regularly aEfectedby the war, lying on one of
the major routes rn from Dorylaion and
Constantinople, a r a t e frequently used by
the army. This meant that the vflhgexs
would regularly have had ta provide
acmfnrnodaidon and h a r d for officers and
Imperial &kials
fiscal, rniIitary and others
- who would fresuently p through while
carqbq out their duties. AIthough the
dbdmtages of havlng to put up such
people was the cause of frequent -bung,
it
a h meant that the m
g
ewas never short of
news,since inevitably the attendants of the
official5 in question would be willing to pass
on gossip ta those with whom ti~eycame iato
-tact
in the
of their duties.
We enmuter Metrios at the beginning
af ad Important week. In the first place, it k
the feast ofthe patron saint of the village,
St Moados, and the villagers traditionally
have a fair, with a market and a great deal of
few* culminating in a liturgical
celebration irl the village church conducted
by the local bishop, who has tnvelled down
specially for the occasion. The fair attracts a
g o d number of villagers from the
neighbowing cemmuniiies who come both
to join in the festivities and to help any
relatives they map have many of the village
gfrls marry young men fmm neighbouing
settlements as welI as a sizeable numtrer of
traders and meKhants who came, often
considerable distances, wirh their traezS of
pad-mules to sell their wares ar buy g d s
that cannot be found elsewhere. It is P good
time for the Pillagers. They can buy goods
from the traders whom they only rarely see
in their Village, in Spite of its location on a ,,
major route; they can exchange gossip and
n m ; there i s the chance for the youngsters
to expand their social horlmm, and for t h e
y m g men and women to eye me another
up! By far the most interesting vlsitors to the
fair for most villagers are the baden,
especially those from far away, distant
provinces within the empire bringing the
luxury products of those regions - Puntic
cloths ham the won around Trebizond far

M ~ W ~ & h t h e ~ , s memd~e--pwae
o ~
hWe6n, ~ n g ~ I t d i d a t t h e t ~ t a e d ~ d ~ d i k y ~ r e t h e * ~
t h * * ~ ~ ~ m e . arldh&wtse.~~~-hi~sonbad
~
~
~
~
~
~
~ m a, P l l~ s bi m e d~ = ii m ~ ka m ~
e
~ = ~ w b t t r e ~ ~ t o t b ~e~ ~ i n ? o b i s ! o w ~ h g u w m t h e
-~*~tPdenaquldabaak
&sdedthewihge-~&eoMm
'mWwm0rQ-M~
~anda@roff@agBPm~oheElsual,@
unf-a~, thff krrx
in
oi
afwfaerrndhmdshowedkimfoh~~
Chb,Waa W m n d m s a pr13culady
p a a r t l e t s . m t w o ~ t 5 w ~ ~ ~
f l l l m t s o t t , andmadealotofema
the ou.th~u$e
Wch '-,as
a $m&ouse
~ ~ l n t e r m s O f ~ ~ 9 n d ' $ i f t sand
' W#jhdtef for the muIes.
~
~
e
~
.
~
~
m -5m
k thetoElrc3et
i seemed
~ a pIe858nt
escortand theilddfatonalpmmceofa , m
s o t t o i w
~ hoaded*wktw
o f ~ - g s P - w ~ U I R
hls~,~to~re11efofMetrfas~
vibge, the WMtanB had W e optfoa to
his m y parHdarly the m e t :the
w'adgetthgrid of the of8t.lal in
qmtatlon O f d d m I andOBicer9ftl
q4eSmsi w
as pBlbLe. rnatably,
be WMed to,prs1snghis stay to w
u
d
e

rn-,

thehh.

a,, *.
;

partfcuh, , w ; t s d y h weUhown. That

them1aeB8Cnd*~aswaas~~Bf
e v ~ m e h ~ w m s t3e
~ nadm,
~ ~&$'Wq
~
d oEve ,af
c~urchfwa~pwwatwytotheMrmd ~ ~ ~ % ~ T W % ~
t @ & W m m W @ ~ W t d & ~
&alX,rmwM~hetaokhn~~h
~ " ~ Q f l g a i n a , w ~ e o f f i m

~ ~ f a $ B f w ~ aaway
@ ~ d ,

hanwcmepwfit w h & dm c m t o
compartafhisnextpr%m,ammingtt
~ ~ , ~ a s Z r ~ t ~ & f a r h B S h o m $~' ad e ~ in e
m mdq (thepma&eb r n t b a ~ ~ ~ o# d ~ --a~m*b
n -, r
#mi, a fmwh@ man @ .crf auple sf
4
5
w w PrrrnXW
-25aw* on themgem to thewlJ1
XmMLmts in &I. The a w e inm~
&a
$f #WnttonMd pi* d
m
Mmmr, br.e&mp,%W!?d &rn nine to
Wed by
a e ha12 l&qy: m w , S wat the w0m.m
I2~ ' m m & t Wpbs part ~ ~ d d m w o u l d
ta ratldith &hi's mppliesmd ather
ln t4e g a u q tux at the back ,&* & ~ ' M
the a& aaf Mmw Wage]; thatterfng md
m w by the jfmemue, about
E f b c d qm a w dbwines6 or
12 nmuknwta ps a x l r l w d t&
~ ~
did
U& W ~ d E m ~d O f i t I c Q r n t - ~
prim and mud*
' m pd e @wing
Q a r t g & @ ~ o f ~ ~ 6 @ a s * ~ g h mI&erswka p w ? s e d W ~ a ~
9
me ccmgpxadm 1*&d
dM
thm W, w m 0-d fuEarnd*y W
~Mt &e a~t t w m~
~
P
g
r
a
~
e
o
f
~
~ ma
~&iMingd13
w
~
M~ W W h &~ i W k ~ W
.
~ ~ t ~ ~ * t 4 e ~ ~ s t t t h e ~ ~~~~t~
' d o f
wepenlade
&i!savi& wa'ju$twhat W e r Ehhyrnlos
~hikllmWwd,h~kb*~k
B t d m t ~ t t a ~ ,
~dtreabletubuyupapfeeeofwsteW
TSEe fair a p d the next day -the wh&e
W fa Q R ~ Clf
Q ~m @ W rartd wand hiS
mtraiqlMreQftheaa@wasfeU~MtIr
pmdW50xz, petham W W We $f tbe
stah a W g urm of dehghb and goads,
~ r w ~ # i t d a ; y ~ ~ i J .
tbhp sewat rnw-oncem twice ax-~arin
pbu&k& -,and
L a m &$aw&,
mfle-,
M W S ' iacwccI Whew!*hose
MWm i s probably fWy fy@Wof me&
miiitdq Wdce had
him 8 w - a f f a L d
of & slightly %Wer-aff Rpmth peasants
th&imW,&sta~?imeink&Hngthe~e d
q this &id,but the majority had I
m
W IW Md
land than he h d U d k M&w, wIro
d
m
1W--,
of
cmrse, whiie hi3 lmit wa3 In ComnrnqIe,
o
~
h
b
~ wMahe4#d
w
n
~
~
& them, The vIlh@prW, a
reaat.e*mm..for
such a humble
a

m=,

wp,

<

>.

m ~ , e , I 7 x h ~ & m t h e $ B u t h W*fmmhlsfathaandWptm@
In S* @ the pmwwe M-the s 9 l d i E % d
u n d k ~ ~ ~ t 1 4 t
the m t pmkd offMth rn Wuble, tapart
w m HUM b the ~ O U bfw mmy
fmm the M~i&g
prww ofthe ~ h * X
m&bs:rwlm hati &W of 'We? a@

&.

m ~ ~ ~ B m h e a n d $ t rhaiyeWadadau@tmWhoM#iedin
a t ~ ~ ~
~ ~ & r ~ & y s , ~ ~ h a d k i a e fdlilddm),
~ ~ e mmarly wre tenants of I d
kb &@
-W
- W RPbE
~
SU@$Xlg
h d a o * who
&&elF h @ ~
the armp in the aeigbkmriqg villages and
1-s
W$nraDy tu,t b taal$w.pn
~
wmelamta ES totheir otam homerin
t?le *&'C
w
i b@ fRqmlt!y ~u~
0
thele&wl~~&tt*rE&m
fairly hi& p3vate
&r *,mMknrer*,&
M@l%&twas rhe
hdd gn the Thursday
the+eaWet#fFlW9natlteIPfami&&
to Mmur.W mm#y d R Mokh, afm
~ t h d ~ t i ~ m d ~ ~ t
M m l P @ w f & f wheIdintH1vlltage
h m m l t f i e ~ ~ y ~ m $ d 3 ~ m d
fiqwe, ~ o q d e by
d mi& merryfh@
pmvhces, m the
situation of the
lmm&~arsdmW.
nrrd pornatton &an to wmmn as
a n ~ o s d t h e ~ i ~ landtardshcreamirentsa@&e
~ b y
t4e&irt9Al~ofhb~.wnpr~gcem ~ ~ m ~ ~ * r n t w f

Portrait of a civilian

Gold hyperpym of Isaac I1 { I 185-1 195).F h w s e the

emperor with the Archangel Michad. ( W e r Institute of
Frne A*, Un~versityof B~m~ngham)

maintain its awn machinery and the m y .

But in Metrios's time that was still a century
or so In the fume.
There were many other trades and
occupations, of course - the merchants and
baders we have already noted, the vrUage
craftsmen such as the smith, the prrtter and
the leathemorken, the townspeople of the
larger cities who had trades ranging from
gald- and silversmithlng to butcher, baker,
clothiers, fullers and dyers, cobblers, silk
importers and exporters, dairy traders, and
every other provider of f d s t u f f s , flnfshed
goo& and services we might expect to find
in a large town. UntJI the economic boom of
the later 10th and 1lth centuries, however,
such urban activity was limlted on the whoIe
to a few majar cities such as Constantinople,
Thessaloniki, Trebizond on the south-east
coast of the Black Sea, or AttaIeia on the

85

southern coast of the Asia Minor peninsula.

Yet a11 these developments were affected in
fundamental ways by the fact that war was a
normal state of affairs for inhabitants of
much of the Byzantine world, and for much
of the time. The presence of soldiers as
fighters, as peacekeepers, as oppressors and
as liberators was a part of this, and the
demands made by the army and the
government for its soldiers were, as we have
seen, the central pillar of the state's financial
system. Everything was based on the need to
recruit, supply, equip and organise soldiers,
and both the economy of the state - the
issue of gold coin, for example - and the
Iocal economies which comprised the empire
were directly affected by this fundamental
fact. The invented example of MeMos the
farmer gives some idea of the day-to-day
existence of the rural population of the
empire and the ways in which war or aspects
ofthe need to organise for war had become
an integral part of M y existence in
Byzantiurn.

How the wars ended

Death of an empire
Tbe Bpintfne mpim stmived formme
5W~~aPoutQOOina~whl&
g w in-gly
away from its kwWmn

In't-&-mm-m
had fcadtberwlves bmMy int&btW to the
V m M , who had hired them the $Wps and
~
Y
k
t
~
~
~
~
~
m
apr&dr
rsomey of the
needed far the
submmhl changes in ItsgqppMrfcalmt,
eqEaiml.Tfmel+rl&anshadbeenlw~
iM3utirnal~
g
~
a ~ Ana-sl d
foranoppa~tyto~einfhe
Inmdex
i t ~ a i n e d u n t f l t h e a r I y l 3 t h ~ ~ & e c m f u d sittlaaon at Cmslanttna~le
ta mmlidiltEtheir tradfng prmqgcs mct
r&o@b&ledwegdmt of the -eastem Roman
W h ~ l d c l v e r t h bf
e t~h e e 9 3 m
mpire#JteWan.By*mWeofthe
hWfkmna. The presem? at Venice of
Ilsh caw,M W ,w2 intmmii,rml
~ ~ ~ ~ m w t a f f h
AMim
e W h @ m , a pretender to,the imperial
Xmcen~-in~~Zrhad,thEtexd,to
*one, rendered the task of the Ven&
in
survive---to
changein waysthat
~aquWng
s &a&n t~ danstmlhqdefa&@
set up sulxtm'itiai c h d h g a to the empire and,
e q ,In 1203 the w d e r army arrived b&ze
mwe i m m 7to the ways in wMh it
the wdIlS of the Byaniine capital wid witbina
slim3 t h e had s u m fn
A l e
m r k d ~ ~ a b l eqtmon d .
~ ~ t u m l ~ s m d a n nV~ &~w enm pg m with his blind fithaIhat
d i i ~ t h e G m k ~
If,whmhfsm&Pll~amtmd~,
and whb had been brought out of p h n after
Medrterranem and south Balkan world, an
the one hand, and the ~
~
t Ian& e thedlatter fled the city Once hW&, Alevf central and western Europe had h m e
W found ft im@k to pay the p m i m i
inmasingly &ed across the 8th 9th .and
r-ds
M Ia the S W W n wupsen+ be
10th cmtufia. The fmtron w~~
as
fnund hinuelf Imfw@ly IsolW Ear1yln
wastern economk m q t h and p
o
w WXI
l2W he was
and mumiwd by Alex&$
I h w b s (M-s
b t rhtg M y exack*w
TPiIttary ~~n
&gan to be x:s~*riou
~.t h r x l g hthe new e m p m
~ e m f o r t k m e d l e v a l m t m a n m k h the prcrt>m
t h e ~ l l ~ m t U r y , w l t h ~ m m mmengthenedthp dekmes dw" ahIe ta
t h e m e hand md theGerman wnpem~oh
resWaninitkdcr~tsaderattask,theoiryfellcnn
the othw p~~~
serious threats to
12April.Thebwtytakenwasiwmme-an
Bpmtlne p N t I c a l aufkoriq*~ l xaud
~ l
eyewitness merbthat sp much bmty fmm a
~ h t h e ~ ~ a n d ~ s h t& c h
r i . t ~y h a~d n ~~b @gn ~ ~ w t I t e
~~e3awaf
t h wddThedtys
~
fullof p r d ~ u s
chauwmm--ismEtaZran crlmpnmdal cmtm such a Vmke mil
~bjwts,
ltflugmarid caenmdd
Wlw. The crusadirig wgvem&nt,#&ern
v&smm~
and &je&sl wWh M new& MQIY
fallen. to violent assault, was rnercikdy sacked
pseiudik& a u t Greek M
y and & W e s s ,
and the expamian &the &ljuk emlrBtes fn
aradpillaedEortlmedap.M u c h ~
M a Minor, transf~rmd&enadon and
occwpd, with hnumerabk artefacts ckmqed
suspicion into o p c m f k L
and p&w$ metal abj- d L d down or
--me bf the nmst s p e c k a h b b j a
~ r r a l t h r e a t n w ~ e n ~ l ~ h m stdm
u
t h e M d c P \ a p r l d t a the ear, btfipmtl$
~anWbesenitlV~e~.Thec&ptw
Christian wwl, and the Iht anlw#iV$
of QmtarrtiWQk in IzW atid the
bdicatian of the cbn@ Make of payet
esxab-t
of a tatin ern@& halls4 the
c&reinxhef~dt~Courth~ee
split between H B ~ w q for
Latin

~~

w;

I The empire in its last years

-

How the wars ended

was Thrace around Chnstantln~pk,a small

dbbict ar~und
ThWanild (smmmdedby
Wbian tenitory),and its lands in the
PeIoponnese and the northern Aegean isles.
Each region functioned as a mote or less
automous province, so that B)aantlm was

an empire in name and by tradition alone.

The civil wan had wredred the economy of
these districts, whi& could M y afford the
minimal taxe the e m p r s demanded.
Galata, the G e m trading centre on the
other side ofthe Gotdm Ham from
&nstanIinople, had an annual revenue seven
times as great as that of the impzrial dty iW.
Durjng the dvil wars, and as a result of
their f~&tingfor Kantakawenos, the
Ottomans hgan permanently to establish
t h d m In Europe. By the b@ning of the
15th century, and with the exception of some
limlbxl areas inthe Peloponnese and a few
Aegean islands, there remained no imperial
possessions in Greece. The advance of the
Ottomans in Europe led to the ultimate
extlnction of Byzantium. KivQ defeated and
subjugated bath Serbs and Bulgars by the end
of the 14th century, the Ottoman advance
caused considerable anxiety In IW west. A
ausade was organbed under the leadership of
the Hungarian kin.& Sigismund, but in 1396 at
the battle of Nicapalis his army was W v e l y
defeated. The Bymntines attempted to play
the different elements off against one another,
supporthg h t the western powers and then
the Ottomans. Some Byzantines espoused a
possible sohtion by arguing for a union of the
eastern and westem Churches, which would
bring with it the subadhation of
Canstantinople to m e . But the monasteries
and the ma1 population were Mtteriy hmtik
to such a compromise. It was @ven argued by
some that subjdon to the WIGwas
preferable to union with the hated tatins.
Neither party was able to assert itrelf
@ff&Wrely w l W the empire, with the result
that tRe western powers remained on the
whoIe apathetic to the plight of 'the Greek'.
In 1M1the Ottoman Sultan Bayezid began
preparations for the siege of CanstanrinopIe,
but the empire was wved at the last minute
by the appearance of Mongol forces under

89

T I W(Timur Lenk,h w n in Englfsh as

%rnburlanel), who invaded Asla Mhor and
crushed the Ottoman farces at the battle of
Ankara in 1402. The Byzantines w d the
opportunity to strengthen their control in the

Peloponnw, but the respite was of short

duration. Tirnur died soon after his victory
aver Bayellid, his empire broke up in
Internecine conflict, and Ottoman power
revived. The S u b s mns~lldated
their
control In h t o l i a , and set about expanding
their control of the B a I k a . The Byzantine
emperor JohnVUI travelled widely in Empe
In a vain attempt to gather support against
the Islamic threat. He even accepted the
union with the western Church at the councii
of Florence in 1439; and a last efbrt on the
part of the ernperor led to the m a d e wMch
ended in disaster at the battle of Varna in
Bulgaria In 1444. tn 1453 Mehmet II set about
the siege of Constantinople.
The defences of the city, although
suffering from lack of maintenance, remained
both impressive and powerful, and it took
several weeks of siege before the Ot-toman
forces, equipped with heavy a w e r y ,
Including camon, were able to effect some
serious breaches and challenge the small
gamlson. In spite of a valiant effort on the
part of the impertal troops and th& western
allies, who were mmiwly outnumbered, the
walk were finally breached by the elite
Janunits on 29 May 1453. The hst
emperor, Constantine XI,died fighting on
the ramp- wWe leading a counter-attack.
His body was rimer found. Later, Greek
legend had it that, like King Arthur of Britlsh
legend, he had not &dl and would one day
return to lead hls people to victory.
Constantinop1e, under ih Turkidsed name
Istanbul (from the Greek eii; tln polin inthe
city) became the new Ottoman capital. The
Aegean IsIands that remained to the empire
were soon absorbed under Ottoman rule. The
Byzantine principality in the southern
Peloponnese, the despotate of M o m , fell in
1460,and Ttebfiond, seat of the Grand
Komnenoi, felI to a Turkish army in 1461.
The east Roman empire - Wntium was
no more.

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Conclusion and cansequences

men whose W t y , amgame or ignaana?led

them to throw the lives d their sddiers away
In futile attacks m illcansidered actions. And
it seems often to have been the case that these
were the leadm who paid least attention to
the fundamental prinuples ofmnnaglng
soldiers, tl&pUne, Scohesion and spit
de corps,For with god lademhip usually came
good morale and W-cmfid@nm- crucial
ingredients fw succ&
ightin&& p W l y in
afl:emiwwatike.
Even with wdlequtppd, dsciplhed and
well-baed traops, the r a t ofn battle in the
medieval periodl as well a at other times, was,
in the end, unpredictable.The dtlmate arbiter
was a mmbmtlon of rhe soldiers' mode and
Aghting W,the qqraalIty of the IeaWsMp,
and gaod luck But as the aqmor Leo VI
points mi in his military handbook or m&u,
in the early 10th cmlmyI the d I f f e m
between the good general anri f i e bad p r a l
was that the good general understood this,
acted in a manner appropriate to the
circumstances, and made sure that Ua
dqmiti0ns cuuld cope with sudden sulprlses
or changes in the con&tt~maf battle. Anow
writer, this dme the son d a famous Byzantine
general, noted at the end af the 1lth century
that he h d never h o r n a diligent and alert
man wha had not been able to make his own
good fortune on the battlefield. And M e it
would be inmmct ta suggest that 3yimthe
defeats were due only to the Incompetmte ar
arrogance of commanding of&mI thb did
I l e ~ e f i e l pby
e ~ ~ hllpCWlIYt ~ d e .
The Byzantine world has attracted western
papular and srhoIarly attentlan, not only

91

because I t stood at the (3~&sroads

of east and
wt,bridging very diverse cultures, but

because it evoked a romantic lP6t medieval

Christian world which was bath wtem in
its forms yet western in Its cultural
significance. For some, it had been a bastian
sf Christianity against Uam; for others,
espdaUy h the 16th and 17th centuries, it
was a source of politically relevant
information a b u t the Ottomans who
threatened E w e at that m e . And it was to
Byzantine authors and texts that Iater
generations directed their attention in the
cantex3 d ~ ~ I national
n g self-awareness
as interest g t w in the pre-Renaissance and
ealp medieval antecedents ofthe formerly
Byzantine kinds, And while both mediwal
&lam and the Byimtlne world served tc
transmit the heritage of classical and Roman
dvilisation to the Renaissance and beyond, it
was in pmkuIar through collections of
Bpanttne manuscripts and books that many
texts were preserved, influencing in this way
the evolution and content of modern
classical scholarship.
Bymntium w w in a s
e
w always at war,
for as we have saen, it always had an enmy or
a potential memy nn one h t or mother,
This situation necm* infkted the &ole
history of the ernpire and determined inpart
at least its swhl s b u c t m and the way in
which the state as well as the @tical system
cwld evolve. Byantiurn made war against its
enmdes wer a perM of some 709 y w , from
the 7th to the 14th and 15th cenhlritx In this
sensel we might also asmt that war made
B y m t i m what it was.

Byzantine rulers

AD 527-1453
Justidan I
Justinian I1
Tiberius I1 Constantine
Maurice

Phokas
HeracHus
Constanthe In and Heraclonas
Constans I1
Constantine IV
Justinian II
Leontios
Tiberios m
Justhian 1l (restored)
PhiIippikas Bardanes
Anastasios I1
Theodosios 111
Leo 111
Constantine V
Artabasdos
Leow
Constantine VI
Eirene
Nikephoros I
Staurakios
Michael I
Leov
Michael I1
Theophilos
Michael III
Basil I
Leo VI

Alexander
Constanthe VII
Romanos lI
Nikephoros II Phokas
John I Tzimiskes
Basil I1
Constamhe VIII
Romanos 111 Argyrm
Michael I V the Paphlagonian
Michael V Kalaphates
Zoe and Theodora
Constantine IX Monomachos

Theodora (again)
Michael VI Stratiotikos
Isaac I Kamnenos
Constantine X Doukas
Eudakia
Romanos IV Diogenes
Eudakia (again)
Michael VII Doukas
Nikephoros III Botaneiates
Alexios I Komnenos

JohnIl K~mnenos
Manuel 1 Komnenos
Alexios U Komnenos
Andronikos I Komnenos
Isaac 11 AngeIos
Alexios I11 Angelos
Isaac I1 (restored) and
AIexios W Angelos
Alexios V Mourtzouphlos
Constantine (XI) hskafis
Theodore I Laskaris
John III Doukas Vatatzes

1203-1204
1204
1204 Wicaea)
1204-22
(Nicaea)
1222-54

(Nicaea)
Theodore I1 Laskaris
John I V Laskaris
Michael VIII Palaiologos
Andrordkos I1 PalaioIagos
Michael IX Palaiologos
Andronikos 111 Palaiologos
John V Palaiologos
JohnVl Kantakomenos
Andronikas IV Alaiologos
John VII PalaidIogos
Manuel II PaIaiologos
JohnVIII Palafologos
Constantine X I (XlI) Palaiologos

1254-58
(Nicaea)
1258-61
(Nicaea)
1259-82
1282-28
1294-1320
1328-41
1341-91
1341-54
1376-79
1390
1391-1425
1425-48
1448-53

The Grand Kornnenoi of Tmb'md (1203-1461)

or the semi-autonomousrulers of the Despotate of
Epkos (1205-1318) are not included.

94

Esswltial Histofins

Byrarrtium at War

Index

AbWd c&uphit@33

a,*

ACmmht'h
7 3 , q n,fa4m
AdgkmfhleC!tU&tbI 17+1,i17,B8
*41i,a~
Alma,4
86
~
&
F
8%
V
W m V, Bplmtine emperor S , 8 7
AIp Man, wjuk s w r l 3 3
h
d
r
s
r
*
rr,

F"8""88

Anbm W e CIW B
hrma~~tit@pmf&
&3 s s
hlbrdamlct 2 x u m @&$I?
14,IS, $941
m w m 44, 4 , I 33

-,-dm

w t a m y *elite

m
w m w a,60

Arm-

e,
-the

c m w p @ 65-71

-&,

-&
d 69-71
474,&, 51%

W aW,m
-%
h f s i 1416
fnfarmy
lParrP62

lq@tio s g , 7 & P ,

m ~ d - g *

IYlamQ camps

w
$2,53,6?'4

&&,SF, *7

Wandmrnmmdm 51,5& 63, & , S l

atganiwion and dWbution Wf42-55
rations 67
W~EKI&~
$1) ,?8, el
62-3
SOW MY^ r e t a w &I, @2-4

61-3
36-9, 53-5
W W 474449, $1.3

-*
mpns

warn

4'9,5?

tanwgn5 la. 38-41,76

&-m&
89
-Q
13-16,a,
34,456, %

A-

13,B

W W m t h e Vm, Byantine emperor 36

Corrsranttna XI. 3yzmine.empemr
Cmsbntine. son ofIImmbihs 27

Index

skylatzes %, %,47,48, 8,1,54-5,

mstory of*

5&9,66,6%9,7Q-1

Hmios Lwkas monastery 30

Hungary 32

95

Ottomans see Turks, Ottcmran

pdktn 72-3
ppav 29,% 88

Pechenegs 32,43,44,65,68,69

Persians 13,33
ideology, and w
e 98-9, %, 72-5
inheritan- law 61
Isaac I Komnenos, Byzantine empwor &5
Isaac Il, 3yzantine e m p r 85,M
Islam
Byzantine view of Mudim 38
origins and history 13-14
see also W i d Caliphate; Arab Islamic armies;

nlm

Jstanbd see Canstanttnople

Italy 13,29-30,32

John 1T,Bpntine emperor 44,64,65,69

John11, Bymnttne emperor 17,43
JohnVI Kantaaouzenos, Byzantine empmr 88
Johnmu,Byantine emperor 89
Justinlan, Byzantine emperor 13,16,29
Kalojan, B u I g a r h tFar 87
kahyhruktd 49

klelsoularchies 41
kIIbmqhoroi 49
IColoneia 12
Komnenw dynasty 26-8,JO, 87
Krum, Bulgar khan 29
land ownership 24,Z.S-6, 27-8, 62
Lam empire 86-8
L m Ill, Byzantine anperor 7, 14, 72
Leo IV,ByzmtLne empemr 7
Leo V, Byzantine empemr 26,46
Leo VI, Bymntine emperor 53,75,91
Limn05 78
literarue 76,79

Liutprand of Cremona 8,36

L b m M I3,29
32

~
~
o
f 88 S
i
~
manpower 36
ManWert, battle of (1071) 34,41, 45-6
Manuel I, Byzantine emperor 17,30,32,43,70
Maurice, -tine
emperor 13
medldne, battlefield 69-71
Mehmet Il, Ottoman sultan 16, 89
rnemmark 16,31,40,45,51,55,62,63
Mercenary Catalan Grand Company 88
11, Byzantine ernperor 27,48
Michael Ym, m n t i n e empetor 88
Michael Attitleiam 5 1
Michael Autorehm 87
Mohammed, founder of Idam 13-14

~~

rnmwteries 62-3

Mongols 88, 89
Mopswestia 5%9
Nicaea, empire of 87,88
Nimplis, battie of (1396) 89
Nikephom I, 3yzantlne em15,29,41
Nikephom ll Phokas, Byzantine emperor 4 2 4 4 , &,
74,79

PhWpptrptir 44,65
Phokas, Byantine emperor 13
PlRvcuv see PhflippupolIs
postal system 76

b
29
religion
emperor
32-3
see a h Christianitv; Islam
roads and routes 9,11,18,31
Roman empire, eastem see Byzantine e m p h
Rornan emplre, western 29-30
Ram05 W, Byzantine em16,27,45,51,64
rurilI lffe 81-5
'ruralisatfm' 24
RUS' 31,41-4,65,68-9
Samuel, Bulgar tsar 29,44
Sebfdarahlsar Koloneia
Seljuks see k k s , Lljuk
2R88
IS, 30,32-3,55

Siw

SQismund, king d Hungary 89

Stefan Umh IV Dushm, Serbian ruler 88
Svyaaav, RtLs' prlnce 43,44,65
Symeon, BuQu b r 29
tagmab 40,41,45,61

Tamburlane 89
taxation s& fiscal system
fhpnaata

chmderisti~
and establishment 39,40,42,48,
61,6Z,64
neglect and W e 45,51,55
Thecddc 12
Thedore I, Nicaean empwor 87
Theodore, St 45,65
Theododus?.he I)eacon 79
Thaophylact, archbishop of OMd 80-1
Thomas the Slav 47,48, 50
Thrace 39, 42, 44, 88
Timur Lenk 89
toamnai 48
Qade 81-2
transpoa I1
IRebIzond, empire of 87,89
kbmhets 5 5 9
bumpets 55

Turks
attornan 16, 17,34,88,89
Mjuk 16,33-4, 41, 43, 45, 88
Valens, Aqueduct of 8 9
Varanglanguard 31,51
m a , baffle of (1444) 89
v!nI~e8,29,30,32,33,86,87,88
wxil111tim 47

warfare
defensive 3941

e f f m on sod*
76
oHmdm 41-6
pre-emsbikes 41
pmPaI@a

79

reasons and justifications 36-9, 724