Pre pa red by :

E r i c a H a n & L y m a r i M ora l e s
Masters in Public Policy, June 2007
John F. Kennedy School of Government
Harvard University

A R e p o r t f o r T h e G a l l u p O r ga n iz a t io n

U N D E R S TA N D I N G M U S L I M P O P U L A T I O N S :
W H A T L E A D E R S N E E D T O K N OW

E X E C U T I V E S U M M A RY

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Goal & Methodology
Context & Background

What Affects Favorability?

Selected Countries for

Analysis

Current State of the

Relationship

Demographics

Foreign Policy
Substance & Style

10

Culture, Values, &

Coexistence

12

Keys to Progress

14

Religion

16

Economics

18

Democracy & Legal Rights

20

Terrorism & Sacrifice

24

Success

26

U.S. Quality of Life

28

Conclusion

30

Acknowledgements

30

Endnotes

31

Report commissioned by:

Jim Clifton,
Gallup Chairman & CEO

Faculty Advisor:
Professor Joseph S. Nye

International Security Policy

PAC Seminar Leader:
Professor Monica Toft

APRIL 1 1 , 2007

The majority of people across eight predominantly Muslim nations say they have a
very unfavorable or somewhat unfavorable view of the United States. This negativity poses significant challenges for the
U.S., creating opposition to its international
initiatives and increasing support for terrorism. Leaders must understand and address these opinions, and the beliefs underlying them, in order to prevent tensions
between Western and Muslim societies
from escalating to even more dangerous
degrees.
Using 2005 data from the Gallup World
Poll, our analysis provides the foundation
for engaging these beliefs with targeted,
data-driven public diplomacy. Through an
in-depth examination of factors that distinguish people who have favorable and unfavorable views of the U.S., we provide evidence of what is attractive to Muslims
about the U.S. We also present recommendations to help leaders leverage these findings to improve the U.S. standing among
Muslim populations. Together with Gallup,
we provide policy-makers with the empirical evidence necessary to drive positive
change.
We look at respondents views on a number of subjects to determine how negativity
is affected by perspectives on U.S. and
Western actions in the international arena
(what we do) and how it is related to differences between cultures (who we are).
We also examine how demographic and
ethnic factors affect favorability.
Analyzing what we do, we find that
strongly negative opinions about the international policies and actions of the U.S.
and Western nations affect Muslims views
of the U.S. However, the finding that some
people who disagree with these actions still
hold favorable views of the U.S. suggests
there are additional factors at work.

Favorability of the U.S.

across 8 predominantly Muslim nations
Very favorable
6.1%
Very
unfavorable
37.5%

Somewhat
favorable
16.6%
Neither
21.8%

Somewhat
unfavorable
18.0%

Analyzing whether negativity is related to

who we are is a more complex task. To
identify underlying factors, we look not only
at views of the U.S., but also at what Muslims value and prioritize in their own lives
and societies. Encouragingly, respondents
views do not indicate that underlying values and principles are wholly incompatible.
However, most people in Muslim nations
perceive tension between Western and
Muslim cultures, and almost all respondents show considerable concern about
U.S. intentions in their region. Additionally,
respondents have mixed opinions on the
quality of Western legal systems, but they
admire Western achievements in science
and technology and in education.
Interestingly, demographic and ethnic factors only rarely relate to favorability. Few
consistent relationships exist with gender,
age, and education, and no patterns
emerge between Arab and non-Arab nations.
Given these findings, we assess that the
U.S. can improve its reputation among
Muslim populations by emphasizing common values and principles, offering assistance and advice where Western and U.S.
abilities are admired, and considering
whether foreign policies can be more effectively implemented and communicated to
people in Muslim nations. A detailed overview of findings and messages follows.
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E X E C U T I V E S U M M A RY
O V E RV I E W O F F IN D I N G S & M E S S AG E S
Demographics: Few consistent relationships exist between
favorability of the U.S. and demographic factors. In most
nations, men and women are equally likely to be favorable
toward the U.S. Exceptions occur in Pakistan, Turkey, and
Indonesia, where women are more likely to be favorable.
Across specific age groups, there are few large differences.
However, in Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Jordan, and Iran, younger
people are more likely to be favorable, while in Morocco,
older people are more likely to be more favorable. The relationship between education and favorability appears to be
related to a nation's overall education level. In the relatively
more educated nations of Jordan, Iran, and Lebanon, higher
favorability is associated with having more formal education.

Correlations between favorability of the U.S. and respect

for Arab/Islamic values suggest the U.S. should focus on
demonstrating acceptance of these values, rather than
promoting Western values. Leaders can also try to capitalize on the relationships between favorability and perception of Western concern for a better coexistence and optimism about near-term prospects for achieving it.

While targeting public diplomacy by gender may only be effective in Pakistan, Turkey, and Indonesia, younger people
might be influenced more broadly, especially in the nations
where they are already more likely to be favorable. Increasing education levels might also improve overall favorability.
Foreign policy substance and style: People in Muslim nations
are overwhelmingly negative about both the substance of
U.S. and Western foreign policies and the style of U.S. diplomatic relations. Large majorities believe that the U.S.-led
war in Iraq is unjustifiable and that Western nations are unfair in their positions toward Palestine and Arab/Muslim nations more broadly. In addition, people are much more likely
to associate negative traits with the U.S. than positive traits.
While favorability consistently correlates with more positive
views about U.S. actions in Iraq and U.S. international relations, we do not believe these are viable levers for public
diplomacy. Instead, we recommend that leaders recognize
the widespread negativity that exists and work to counter
commonly-held perceptions about the U.S. diplomatic style.

Recognize widespread negativity about U.S. and Western

foreign policies in U.S. decision-making and public comments on policies that impact Muslim nations
Demonstrate transparency, fairness, respect, and humility
in diplomatic relations

Culture, values, and coexistence: Respondents perceive tension between Western and Muslim cultures and demonstrate only moderate concern for achieving a better coexistence. People on average perceive that Western nations do
not respect their values, but nor do they perceive their own
nations as very open to Western culture. They also tend to
be pessimistic about prospects for a better understanding.

Express respect for Arab/Islamic values, rather than

promoting Western values
Stress U.S. concern for a better coexistence in relevant
policies and diplomatic relations
Highlight advancements toward a better understanding
whenever possible

Keys to progress: Respondents are divided about whether

attachment to spiritual and moral values is critical to the
progress of Muslim nations, but few agree that adopting
Western values or increasing democracy will help progress. However, respondents on average believe expanding democracy will be more helpful than adopting Western
values. Relative to other nations, people in Saudi Arabia
place more importance on Islamic values in achieving progress, while people in Morocco and Lebanon place more
importance on the role of democracy.
Given the diversity of opinions on what will drive progress
in Muslim nations, the U.S. should avoid explicitly linking
progress to Islamic values, democracy, and Western values and instead should aim to understand what Muslims
think will drive progress in their own nations.

Recognize that while respondents may not believe Islamic spiritual and moral values are critical to progress,
these values are an important part of their personal lives
Refrain from promoting the view that Muslim nations
should adopt Western values to achieve progress
Help strengthen existing democratic systems where appropriate and when invited

Religion: While people in Muslim nations view religion as

an essential component of their personal lives, most see it
as only one factor relevant to public life. Respondents in
all nations consider personal religion very important to
essential, and people in Jordan, Morocco, and Pakistan
also believe that religion should strongly influence law.
Although some religious beliefs consistently correlate with
favorability, we recommend the U.S. focus its messages on
respecting, rather than influencing, religious beliefs.
Page 2

Executive Summary

Demonstrate respect for the personal practice of Islam to

reduce the perception of a War on Islam
Emphasize common belief in freedom of religion while
recognizing that interpretations of this concept may differ
Encourage research to uncover common values between
sharia and rights-based legislation and explore how the
systems of law might be reconciled

Economics: People in Muslim nations see economic wellbeing as very important and expect it to improve. They
express admiration for Western economic opportunities, but
they do not indicate confidence in U.S. intentions in the region. People in Morocco, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia appear
to have particularly strong views on economic issues.
The U.S. should build on respondents economic optimism
and positive perceptions of the opportunities in the West to
improve views of U.S. intentions in the region. Specifically,
the U.S. should improve perceptions of its willingness to provide aid and assistance to Muslim nations.

Promote economic well-being, but be mindful of its secondary importance to religion

Build on economic optimism and admiration for Western
opportunities
Increase provision of U.S. aid and economic assistance to
Muslim nations

Democracy and legal rights: Respondents opinions on democracy and legal rights reveal both good and bad news for
the U.S. While people appear to value democracy and support legal freedoms, they do not tend to admire Western legal systems and are divided on whether systems in Western
nations are better than those in Muslim nations. People in
Lebanon and Morocco generally have more positive views of
democracy and Western legal systems than other nations.
Rather than solely promoting democracy, the U.S. should
aim to address the concerns of people in Muslim nations
about U.S. intentions in the region and to improve perceptions of the equality and fairness of Western legal systems.

Emphasize support for legal principles such as freedom of

speech rather than promoting specific U.S. practices
Emphasize U.S. concern for the equality of its own citizens,
including gender and minority rights
Demonstrate respect for political autonomy and diversity
in Muslim nations and emphasize U.S. commitment to
non-interference where credible
Create opportunities for Islamic scholars to research how
legal rights and freedoms relate to Islamic traditions

Terrorism and sacrifice: Most respondents consider the

attacks of September 11, 2001 unjustifiable, but they consider those attacks relatively more justifiable than attacks
on civilians in general. Respondents say they are generally
accepting of those who do not share their opinions, but
they hold more divergent views about whether it is justifiable to sacrifice ones life for ones beliefs.
The widespread disapproval of attacks on other civilians is
a sentiment worth leveraging. The U.S. can and should
emphasize the right of all civilians to live peacefully as a
common value it shares with people in Muslim nations.
Leaders should also recognize the relative permissibility of
acts of sacrifice in certain nations.

Reframe the Global War on Terrorism to emphasize the

common value of the right of all civilians worldwide to
live in peace
Be mindful of greater support for acts of sacrifice in
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Pakistan, and Lebanon

Success: People in Muslim nations tend to admire Western achievements in science and technology and in education, but not necessarily in films and music.
The U.S. should capitalize on Muslims admiration for
Western success in building advanced scientific and technological capabilities and good educational systems.

Increase efforts to share technical and scientific knowhow with Muslim nations
Support educational exchanges and offer assistance to
nations seeking to learn from Western systems
Establish American libraries in Muslim nations to demonstrate U.S. commitment to supporting education
Maintain relationships with Muslim alumni of American
schools and encourage them to share their experiences
Use U.S. radio and television broadcasts to engage Muslims in debate on topics meaningful to them, rather than
using them to promote Western films/music

U.S. quality of life:

life: People in Muslim nations tend to consider the U.S. a violent and morally decadent society, and
they generally do not perceive it to be an attractive tourist
destination. Despite consistently negative perceptions of
quality of life in the U.S., correlations suggest improving
these views may increase favorability.

Sponsor cultural exchange programs to increase the

number of Muslims with real-life experiences in the U.S.
Sponsor ambassador programs for Muslim-Americans to
visit Muslim nations and share their experiences


Page 3

T H E G OA L : D A TA - D R I V E N D I P L O M A C Y
Our goal is to provide recommendations for improving Muslim attitudes toward the U.S. We advocate a pull, rather
than push, approach to public diplomacy, based on empirical
evidence about what people in Muslim nations think about
their own lives, the U.S., and the world.
U.S. Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs Karen Hughes defines the mission of U.S. public
diplomacy as seeking to engage, inform, and help others
understand our policies, actions, and values, recognizing
that before we can seek to be understood, we must first
work to understand.1 Our analysis seeks to help U.S. leaders achieve this understanding, providing the empirical evidence necessary to truly know Muslim nations and cultures.
In providing this evidence, we encourage leaders to move
away from the type of one-way, one-size-fits-all public diplomacy that is generally perceived as self-serving propaganda
and move toward efforts that convey a genuine attempt to
foster mutual understanding.

To this end, we provide in-depth findings about the beliefs,

priorities, and concerns of people in Muslim nations, taking particular care to recognize what distinguishes people
in one nation from another.
We believe this information will help the U.S. maximize its
soft power, which, according to Joseph S. Nye, primarily
rests on its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home
and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen
as legitimate and having moral authority).2 Understanding which aspects of U.S. soft power are valuable in which
nations is critical for improving overall favorability.
Through an in-depth audit of public opinion data collected
by the Gallup Organization, we aim to help leaders truly
understand what is attractive to Muslim populations. Our
ultimate goal is to enable the U.S. to make real progress in
the battle for Muslim hearts and minds.

METHODOLOGY
To identify which factors are associated with more favorable
views of the U.S., we analyze opinions across a variety of
countries and issues. The eight predominantly Muslim nations at the heart of our analysis represent a variety of geographic, economic, political, religious, ethnic, and cultural
contexts. Four nations are Arab (Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco,
and Saudi Arabia), while four are non-Arab (Indonesia, Iran,
Pakistan, and Turkey). Four are outside the Middle East
(Indonesia, Morocco, Pakistan, and Turkey), and four have
Islamic Law (Iran, Jordan, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia). Together, populations in these nations comprise a significant
number of the worlds Muslims.
Our selected questions of interest address a broad spectrum
of political, personal, and cultural issues. We first examine
percentages and averages as a broad gauge of what people
think. We then examine how each question relates to ones
favorability of the U.S. on a 1to-5 scale from very unfavor-

able to very favorable (Q26). Specifically, we consider

whether the two factors are correlated, meaning they tend
to move together. We report that a particular view correlates with favorability only if the relationship is statistically
significant at the .05 level, and thus unlikely to result by
chance. We underscore that when a particular view correlates with favorability, it does not mean that view causes
favorability but rather that the two things tend to be associated with one another.
Understanding this, we analyze the correlations to identify
views that leaders can use as levers for public diplomacy
across several nations. To increase the number of people
holding these views, we recommend messages for the
daily and strategic communication that public diplomacy
requires, in order to improve overall favorability of the U.S.

G A L L U P S U RV E Y D E S I G N & L I M I TAT I O N S
Our analysis is made possible by the Gallup Organizations
Poll of the Muslim World conducted from August to October
2005 as part of the larger Gallup World Poll. In each country, Gallup conducted in-home face-to-face interviews, drawn
from a randomly selected national sample of approximately
1,000 adults ages 18 and older. For results based on these
samples, one can say with 95% confidence that the maximum error attributable to sampling and other random effects is 3 percentage points.

Despite the statistical soundness of these data, we recognize that survey responses are not necessarily facts, and
that respondents answers may be colored by any number
of factors, including recent current events, question wording, misinterpretation of the question, varied translations,
practical difficulties in conducting surveys, and response
bias. We ask that policy-makers keep these issues in
mind, recognizing both the complexity and the value of
aggregating opinions straight from the people.
Page 4

CONTEXT & BACKGROUND

The road to the current state of affairs between the West
and the Muslim World is a long one, beginning with crosscultural misunderstandings when Europeans colonized the
Muslim communities of Africa and continuing with the large
waves of Muslim immigration to Western Europe and North
America.3 The relationship entered a new and difficult chapter after the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001, in
which 19 hijackers killed more than 3,000 American civilians
in the name of Islam.4 Since 2001, a series of events have
heightened tensions between the Western and Muslim
worlds.
U.S. detentions at Guantanamo Bay: While the U.S.-led campaign to topple the Taliban in Afghanistan was generally accepted without backlash by people in Muslim nations, some
of the resulting consequences were not. During the Afghanistan campaign, the U.S. began to detain alleged terrorists at
the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and some of
these suspects remain at the facility to this day.5 Since
2001, the U.S. has detained nearly 800 people at the prison,
primarily Muslim men, and has released more than half without filing any charges.6 The long-term detentions at Guantanamo Bay and the U.S. refusal to grant detainees the protections afforded by the Geneva Convention have angered
Muslim populations and provided Islamic extremists with
ammunition to bolster their claim that the U.S. is waging a
war against Islam.7 In May 2005, a Newsweek report that
American interrogators at the facility flushed a copy of the
Quran down a toilet, though later retracted, sparked antiAmerican riots in Afghanistan and Pakistan, killing 17 people
and injuring dozens more.8
War in Iraq: The U.S.-led war in Iraq, launched in 2003 to
protect the world from an outlaw regime that threatens the
peace with weapons of mass murder, has for four years
created fodder for enemies of the United States.9 In April
2004, photos of Iraqi prisoners being tortured by American
soldiers at Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad inspired many Islamic clerics to fill their sermons with anti-American rhetoric.10 In January 2005, President Bush admitted that actions
by the administration made public diplomacy in (the) Muslim world difficult.11 Later that year, the Iraq Survey group,
an independent commission the President appointed, undermined the administrations stated rationale for war when it
confirmed that Saddam Hussein did not possess weapons of
mass destruction or any program to produce them at the
time the U.S. invaded Iraq.12
Indian Ocean Tsunami: The deadly tsunami which on December 26, 2004 devastated Indonesia afforded the U.S. a
unique opportunity to improve its image in the worlds most
populous Muslim country as well as neighboring nations.
While the U.S. was initially criticized for reacting too slowly,
President Bush eventually tripled the U.S. initial commitment to relief aid to $950 million.13 Private donations from

American
sources
MAJOR EVENTS CRITICAL
added another $1.5
TO U.S.-MUSLIM RELATIONS:
billion in aid.14 U.S.
diplomats to the region
Attacks of September 11, 2001
later credited such
efforts for improving
U.S.-led war in Afghanistan
opinions of the U.S.
among people across U.S. detentions at Guantanamo Bay
South and East Asia.15
U.S.-led war in Iraq
Incidents of U.S. torture at Abu
Events since 2005:
Ghraib Prison in Baghdad
Our data does not account for events occurring after the polls
U.S. relief efforts after the 2004
were conducted in late
Indian Ocean Tsunami
2005. Most notably,
the situation in Iraq
2006 Israel-Lebanon Conflict
has deteriorated significantly, resulting in
mounting casualties from deadly sectarian violence among
Iraqi Sunnis and Shiites and increasing perceptions of
U.S. mismanagement of the war. According to a National
Intelligence Estimate on terrorism declassified in September 2006, ''the Iraq conflict has become a cause clbre
for jihadists, breeding a deep resentment of U.S. involvement in the Muslim world, and cultivating supporters for
the global jihadist movement.''16 The report also concludes that terrorists are increasing in both number and
geographic dispersion.17
The U.S. also has been faulted for not responding appropriately to other conflicts in the Middle East. When in July
2006 Israel launched a deadly offensive against Hezbollah
in Lebanon, the Arab media harshly criticized the U.S. for
refusing to demand a cease-fire.18 One month later, a
New York Times editorial called the conflict an
unnecessary war with many losers and no real winners, not only for Lebanon, Israel and their supporters,
but also for Islamic and world public opinion.19
Events not directly related to the U.S. also have increased
tensions. When in February 2006 a Danish newspaper
published satirical cartoons of Islams Prophet Muhammad, people in Muslim nations held violent protests.20
Later in the same year, Pope Benedict XVI quoted a description of 14th century Islam as evil and inhumane,
sparking harsh criticism from Muslim leaders and fervent
demands for an apology.21
These events highlight increasing misunderstandings and
issues of contention between Muslim nations and the
West, impeding progress toward improved relations and a
peaceful coexistence.

Page 5

W H A T A F F E C T S F AV O R A B I L I T Y ?
A N ALYZ ING W HAT WE DO & W HO WE ARE
To determine what factors distinguish those with favorable
and unfavorable views of the U.S., our analysis focuses on
two broad categories framed from the U.S. perspective as
what we do and who we are. We set the stage by assessing the current state of the relationship by nation and
across demographic categories. Given these findings, we
focus the bulk of our analysis on examining viewpoints and
beliefs.
What we do:
do: Our analysis defines what we do as the
substance and style of foreign policies that affect Muslim
populations. Some questions relate to specific policies undertaken by the U.S., while others consider general positions
and actions associated with Western nations as a whole. An
additional series of questions considers a variety of attributes, both positive and negative, which might be associated
with the U.S. Opinions on these attributes provide insight
into respondents views about the style, rather than content,
of U.S. diplomatic relations and international interactions.

Who we are:
are: Questions in this section examine the assumptions underlying the hypothesis that negativity toward
the U.S. among Muslim populations stems from a clash of
cultures. Rather than limiting our analysis to questions
about the U.S., we also assess respondents views about
their own nations and their own lives in order to identify
sources of underlying conflict.
Specifically, the who we are section considers views on:
Culture, values, and coexistence

Keys to progress

Religion

Economics

Democracy and legal rights

Terrorism and sacrifice

Success, including science and technology, education,
and films and music
U.S. quality of life

Specifically, the what we do section considers views on:

Foreign policy substance

Foreign policy style

Together, these categories enable us to asses both political and personal factors that might affect favorability.

Source: University of Texas Libraries, http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/world_maps/muslim_distribution.jpg

Page 6

S E L E C T E D C O U N T R I E S F O R A N A LY S I S
INDONESIA

MOROCCO

Non-Arab
Region: Southeast Asia
Population: 245.5 million
% Muslim: 88%
Islamic Law? No
Type of Government: Republic; President & Vice President are elected
for five-year terms by direct vote of the citizenry
GDP: $935 billion
Ties to U.S.: Embassy & ambassador; no significant imports/exports

Arab
Region: North Africa
Population: 33.2 million
% Muslim: 98.7%
Islamic Law? Yes
Type of Government: Constitutional Monarchy; the hereditary monarch appoints the Prime Minister after legislative election
GDP: $147 billion
Ties to U.S.: Embassy & ambassador; no significant imports/exports

IRAN

PAKISTAN

Non-Arab
Region: Middle East
Population: 68.7 million
% Muslim: 89% Shia, 9% Sunni
Islamic Law? Yes
Type of Government: Theocratic Republic; Supreme Leader appointed
for life by the Assembly of Experts; President elected by popular vote
for a four-year term
GDP: $610.4 billion
Ties to U.S.: No diplomatic representation; no significant imports/exports

Non-Arab
Region: South Asia
Population: 165.8 million
% Muslim: 77% Sunni, 20% Shia
Islamic Law? No, but some provisions to accommodate Pakistans
status as an Islamic state
Type of Government: Federal Republic; President elected by an electoral college from the national parliament and provincial assemblies for
a five-year term
GDP: $427.3 billion
Ties to U.S.: Embassy & ambassador; 24.8% of exports, 6% of imports

SAUDI ARABIA

JORDAN
Arab
Region: Middle East
Population: 5.9 million
% Muslim: 92% Sunni, <2% Shia
Islamic Law? Yes
Type of Government: Constitutional monarchy; the monarch is hereditary; Prime Minister appointed by the monarch
GDP: $28.89 billion
Ties to U.S.: Embassy & ambassador; 26.2% of exports, 5.6% of imports

Arab
Region: Middle East
Population: 27 million
% Muslim: 100%
Islamic Law? Yes
Type of Government: Monarchy; the monarch is hereditary
GDP: $374 billion
Ties to U.S.: Embassy & ambassador; 16.8% of exports, 14.8% of
imports

TURKEY

LEBANON

Non-Arab
Region: Southeastern Europe and Southwestern Asia
Population: 70.4 million
% Muslim: 99.8% (Primarily Sunni)
Islamic Law? No
Type of Government: Republican parliamentary democracy; President
elected by the National Assembly for a single seven-year term.
GDP: $627.2 billion
Ties to U.S.: Embassy & ambassador; 6.7% of exports, 4.6% of imports

Arab
Region: Middle East
Population: 3.9 million
% Muslim: 59.7%
Islamic Law? No
Type of Government: Republic; President elected by the National
Assembly for a six-year term
GDP: $21.45 billion
Ties to U.S.: Embassy & ambassador; 5.3% of imports

Source: CIA World Factbook; https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html

Page 7

C U R R E N T S TA T E O F T H E R E L A T I O N S H I P
F AV O R A B I L I T Y O F T H E U. S.
While significant numbers of people in Muslim nations hold
unfavorable views of the U.S., sizeable favorable and neutral
populations do exist.
In the eight nations in this analysis, people with unfavorable
views of the U.S. far outnumber those with favorable views
(Q26). Anti-American sentiment is most prevalent in Saudi
Arabia, where 61% of respondents say they are very unfa-

There are also significant numbers of people who do not

voice a strong opinion of the U.S. one way or the other;
that is, they are neither unfavorable nor favorable toward the U.S. These populations are largest in Indonesia
(34%) and Pakistan (26%). In Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon,
Iran, and Morocco, this middle group makes up 18-20% of
the population. In Saudi Arabia, this number is 14%.

26. In general, what opinion do you have of the United States?

100
80
60
40
20
0
Saudi Arabia

Pakis tan
Very unfavorable

Jordan

Turkey

Som ewhat unfavorable

vorable toward the U.S., followed by Pakistan (54%), Jordan

(50%) and Turkey (43%). Combining the very unfavorable
and somewhat unfavorable categories, 79% of people in
Saudi Arabia hold negative views of the United States, followed by 65% in Pakistan, 65% in Jordan and 62% in Turkey.
Anti-Americanism is common, but less prevalent, in the other
nations: the combined percentage of very and somewhat
unfavorable is 51% in Iran, 49% in Lebanon, 42% in Morocco, and 36% in Indonesia.
In contrast to the large numbers of people who are unfavorable toward the U.S., only small percentages of people are
favorable toward the U.S. Only in Lebanon and Iran does the
percentage of people who say they are very favorable toward the U.S. reach double-digits, at 17% and 10% respectively. In Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey, less than 2%
hold very favorable views of the U.S. Combining both very
favorable and somewhat favorable, the percentages are
somewhat more encouraging. 39% of people in Lebanon fall
on the positive side of the spectrum, followed by 31% in Iran,
30% in Indonesia, and 30% in Morocco. However, it should
be noted that favorability of the U.S. in Lebanon is likely to
have since deteriorated as a result of the 2006 IsraelLebanon conflict.

Iran
Neither

Lebanon
Som ewhat favorable

Morocco

Indones ia

Very favorable

Overall, these numbers paint a bleak picture of the current

state of the relationship between the U.S. and Muslim nations. Such negativity creates an environment ripe for recruiting support for Islamic extremism and terrorist activities aimed at U.S. interests, citizens, and allies, and it also
impedes U.S. diplomatic efforts.
All hope, however, is not lost. The fact that some populations remain favorable or neutral toward the U.S. suggests
potential for the U.S. to attract new friends and dissuade
potential enemies. Although U.S. public diplomacy might
not be sufficient to change the attitudes of those who are
very unfavorable toward the U.S., it might effectively influence those who fall in the somewhat unfavorable,
neither, or somewhat favorable categories. In five of
eight nations, these groups make up more than half of the
population, with 82% in Indonesia, 66% in Morocco, 59%
in Iran, and 55% in both Lebanon and Turkey. They make
up 45% of the population in Jordan and Pakistan and 37%
of the population in Saudi Arabia. If the U.S. can successfully improve perceptions among these groups, it is likely
to improve overall favorability.

Page 8

DEMOGRAPHICS
Findings across demographic categories undermine the notion that those who dislike the U.S. are young, uneducated
males. They also provide evidence for crafting public diplomacy messages based on peoples views and beliefs.

D1. Percentage in each age group w ho are

"very" or "som ew hat unfavorable"
100
80
60

Gender: The common perception that men are more unfavorable toward the U.S. than women is the exception rather
than the rule. In five of eight nations (Saudi Arabia, Jordan,
Iran, Morocco, and Lebanon), the difference between the
percentages of men and women who hold unfavorable views
is very small and is within the statistical margin of error (3%)
(QD0). However, in Pakistan, Turkey, and Indonesia, the
percentage of men who are very or somewhat unfavorable toward the U.S. is greater than the corresponding percentage of women in that country.
D0. Percentage of m en and w om en w ho are
"very" or "som ew hat unfavorable"
100
80
60
40
20
0
Saudi

Pakist an

Tur key

Jor dan

Ir an

M en

Wo men

Mor occo

Lebanon

Indonesia

Ar abia

The resulting correlations confirm that in most nations, men

and women are equally likely to be favorable toward the U.S.
However, as mentioned above, exceptions occur in Pakistan,
Turkey, and Indonesia, where women are more likely to be
favorable toward the U.S. This suggests that targeting public
diplomacy messages by gender may be effective in these,
but not all, nations.

40
20
0
Saudi

Pakist an

Tur key

Jordan

Morocco

Ir an

Indonesia

Lebanon

Ar abia

A ge under 24

Age 25-34

A ge 35-44

Age 45-54

A ge o ver 55

the U.S. The opposite is true only in Morocco, where older

people are more likely to be more favorable. These data
indicate that the U.S. should consider targeting some messages to younger people, especially in nations where they
are already more likely to be favorable.
Education: The relationship between education and favorability appears to relate to a nation's overall education
level. People in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iran, and Lebanon
report the highest levels of education, with more than 50%
of respondents saying they have completed secondary
school or more (QD2, n/a Indonesia). Education levels are
much lower in Pakistan, Turkey, and Morocco, where less
than 37% of respondents report completing secondary
school or more. In the relatively more educated countries
of Jordan, Iran, and Lebanon, those with less education
tend to be more unfavorable. In the relatively less educated countries of Turkey and Pakistan, those who have
completed college or more are the most unfavorable.
D2. Percentage in each education level w ho are
"very" or "som ew hat unfavorable"
100
80
60
40

Age: Only small differences in favorability of the U.S. occur

among age groups, though older people are often more unfavorable than younger people. In Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Jordan, Iran, and Lebanon, the percentages of people ages 45to-54 and over age 55 who are very or somewhat unfavorable toward the U.S. are greater than the corresponding
percentages in younger age groups (QD1). Further, respondents in these categories demonstrate similar views to each
other, as differences between them fall within the margin of
error. However, an exception occurs in Morocco, where
those who are over age 55 have the lowest percentage of
very or somewhat unfavorable responses.
Consistent correlations between favorability and age exist in
Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Jordan, and Iran, where younger people are more likely than older people to be favorable toward

20
0
Saudi

Jor dan

Pakist an

Tur key

Iran

Morocco

Lebanon

Arabia

Complet ed pr imar y

Complet ed secondary

College gr ad or 4 year s post - secondar y

Correlations confirm that in Jordan, Iran, and Lebanon,

higher favorability correlates with having more formal education. As these nations are among the relatively more
educated countries, it is possible that increasing overall
education levels might improve overall favorability.
Although demographic factors relate to favorability in
some nations, the lack of consistent relationships support
the view that U.S. public diplomacy should appeal to peoples views and beliefs.
Page 9

F O R E I G N P O L I C Y S U B S TA N C E & S T Y L E
FINDINGS
People in Muslim nations are overwhelmingly negative about
both the substance of U.S. and Western foreign policies and
the style of U.S. diplomatic relations.
The situation in Iraq: Across Muslim nations, sizeable majorities believe that the U.S.U.S.-led war in Iraq is unjustifiable.
In all eight nations, respondents on average categorize the
ouster of Saddam Husseins government in Iraq by U.S. and
British forces as unjustifiable to some degree (Q13.05). In

four nations, more than half of respondents indicate they

agree with the most extreme option on the scale, that the
ouster of Saddam Husseins government cannot be justified
at all. That number is as high as 69% in Saudi Arabia, followed by 66% in Turkey, 53% in Pakistan, and 52% in Indonesia. Given the deterioration of the situation in Iraq since
2005, views probably have become even more negative.
When asked to judge the effects of the war as of 2005, more
than two-thirds of respondents in six of seven nations say
the conflict has done more harm than good(Q32 n/a Indonesia). The exception occurs in Iran, where 53% say the conflict has done more harm than good, 28% say it has done
more good than harm, and 11% say things are the same.
These more positive views may be related to that fact that
Iran, a majority Shia nation, has been empowered by the
emergence of a Shia-majority government in Iraq.

Consistent correlations between favorability and views

about Iraq exist in certain countries but not others. In Iran,
Lebanon, and Turkey, a more favorable view of the U.S.
correlates with more positive views on all three questions
on Iraq. Less consistent correlations exist in other nations.
In Jordan and Indonesia, those who are more favorable
toward the U.S. are more likely to consider Saddams
ouster justifiable. In Jordan and Pakistan, higher favorability correlates with the belief in 2005 that the U.S. invasion
of Iraq has done more good than harm, and in Morocco
and Pakistan, higher favorability correlates with the belief
that it would weaken Islamic fundamentalist organizations.
While these correlations suggest that improving perceptions of the situation in Iraq might help increase favorability of the U.S., there are two key hesitations. First, either
view might be causing the other; i.e. more positive views
about Iraq might cause greater favorability of the U.S. or
vice versa. Second, views on this topic tend to be strongly
held and difficult to influence.
The situation in Palestine: Respondents overwhelmingly
disagree that Western nations are fair in their stance toward Palestine, both in Middle Eastern and nonnon-Middle
Eastern nations alike. 87% or more of respondents in
each nation say they do not believe that Western nations
are fair in their stance toward Palestine (Q14.09). Morocco has the highest level of disagreement at 97%. People in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are the most positive
about the situation, but their disagreement remains strong
at 87% and 89% respectively. However, the lack of comparative questions with other specific policies makes it
difficult to determine how this issue ranks as a priority.
14.09 Western nations are fair in their
stance tow ard Palestine
100
80
60
40
20
0
Mor occo

Iran

Jor dan

Tur key Indonesia Lebanon Pakist an

Saudi
Arabia

Additionally, people in Muslim nations are generally pessimistic or unsure about whether the removal of former Iraqi
regime by U.S. and British forces will weaken activities of
Islamic fundamentalist organizations (Q33.04 n/a Indonesia, Saudi Arabia). The number of people who disagree is
substantial, from 42% in Turkey to 66% in Jordan. And interestingly, double-digit percentages (14%-36%) in all nations
except Lebanon (8%), home to the terrorist group Hezbollah,
say they cant say.

A gree

Disagree

Due to the overwhelming uniformity of opinion on this issue, few correlations exist with favorability of the U.S. Only
in Lebanon and Pakistan does a more favorable view correlate with more agreement that Western nations are fair
in their stance toward Palestine.

Page 10

W h a t W e D o : F o r e ig n P o l i c y S u b s t a n c e & S t y l e

Positions toward Arab/Muslim nations: People also hold

negative views of Western policies toward Arab/Muslim nations more broadly. In each nation, more than 85% of respondents disagree that Western nations are fair in their
stance toward Arab/Muslim nations (Q14.05). People in
Jordan and Morocco disagree most often (94%). Similarly,
more than 85% of respondents in each nation disagree that
Western nations take positions that support Arab causes in
international organizations (Q14.07). People in Turkey, a
non-Arab country, most often disagree (95%). For neither
question do views appear to differ between Arab and nonArab nations.

14.05 Western nations are fair in their stance

tow ard Arab/Muslim countries
100
80
60
40
20
0

Saudi
Arabia

Pakist an Lebanon

Turkey Indonesia Jordan

Agree

Iran

Style of international relations: Across Muslim nations,

people are much more likely to associate negative traits
with the U.S. than positive traits (Q27). In each country,
more than 50% of respondents say
TRAITS MOST OFTEN
ruthless, aggressive, arrogant,
APPLIED TO THE U.S.:
and conceited are statements
Ruthless
which apply to the U.S. The only
Conceited
exceptions are Turkey (34% say
aggressive applies), Indonesia
Aggressive
(46% say ruthless applies), and
Arrogant
Pakistan (49% say arrogant applies). In contrast, respondents
TRAITS LEAST OFTEN
rarely apply positive attributes to APPLIED TO THE U.S.:
the U.S. In each country, fewer
Trustworthy
than 20% say the U.S. treats other
Friendly
countries respectfully, fewer than
11% say it is friendly and fewer Treats other countries
than 10% say it is trustworthy.
respectfully
When looking across characteristics, some patterns emerge across nations. People in Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Iran are more likely to cite negative characteristics as applying to the U.S., while people in
Indonesia and Lebanon are more likely to cite positive
characteristics.

M orocco

Disagree

Few correlations exist between views of Western policies

toward Arab/Muslim nations and favorability of the U.S. Only
in Lebanon and Indonesia does a more favorable view of the
U.S. correlate with more agreement that Western nations
take a fair stance toward Arab/Muslim countries. Only in
Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Iran does a more favorable view
of the U.S. correlate with more agreement that Western nations take positions that support Arab causes. Because
Lebanon is 40% non-Muslim, some Lebanese respondents
may feel less personally affected by policies toward
Arab/Muslim countries.

Not surprisingly, those who are more favorable toward the

U.S. are less likely to apply negative traits and more likely
to apply positive traits. This relationship exists uniformly
for conceited, arrogant, ruthless, hypocritical and
adopts biased policies in world affairs, and in almost all
cases for aggressive, easily provoked, trustworthy,
and friendly. Interestingly, in Turkey, higher favorability
correlates with being more likely to cite aggressive.
While the correlations suggest levers for public diplomacy,
it is possible that overall favorability causes one to associate positive attributes with the U.S. Even so, it is important for the U.S. to recognize how its style is perceived by
Muslim populations and to incorporate this knowledge into
its diplomatic approach.

L E V E R S & M E S S AG E S F O R P U B L I C D I P L O M AC Y
While favorability consistently correlates with more positive
views about the situation in Iraq and the style of U.S. international relations, we underscore the overwhelming negativity
that exists across these categories.

ments or the other way around. While leaders might improve overall favorability by making changes to U.S. and
Western foreign policies, we recognize they may be unwilling to do so.

As views on foreign policies are difficult to influence without

changing the substance of foreign policy, we do not recommend messages based on correlations between favorability
and opinions on Iraq. Further, it is difficult to determine
whether more favorable views lead to more positive assess-

However, we assess there is much to be gained by recognizing the widespread negativity that exists and working to
counter commonly-held perceptions about the U.S. diplomatic style.

Recognize widespread negativity about U.S. and Western foreign policies in U.S. decision-making and public comments
on policies that impact Muslim nations
Demonstrate transparency, fairness, respect, and humility in diplomatic relations
Page 11

CULTURE, VALUES, & COEXISTENCE

FINDINGS
Respondents perceive tension between Western and Muslim
cultures and demonstrate only moderate concern for achieving a better coexistence.
Culture and values: People in Muslim nations on average
perceive that Western nations do not respect their values,
but nor do they perceive their own nations as very open to
Western culture. In each nation, the overwhelming majority
of people disagree that Western nations respect Arab/
Islamic values (Q14.01). People in Morocco are the most
positive on this issue (28% agree), while people in Turkey are
the most negative (10% agree).
14.01 Western nations respect
Arab/Islam ic values
100
80
60
40
20
0
Morocco

Pakist an

Lebanon

Indonesia

Jordan

Iran

Saudi

Tur key

Arabia

A gree

Disagree

When asked about Muslim attitudes toward Western culture,

respondents on average appear to perceive wariness. In
each of the eight nations, only small percentages agree that
Arab/Muslim nations are not apprehensive about the influence of Western culture and lifestyle, ranging from 13% in
Indonesia to 29% in Lebanon (Q15.04). However, a similar
question produces more varied results.
When asked
whether Arab/Muslim nations are open-minded towards the
Western culture, 16% of people in Indonesia agree compared to 68% in Morocco (Q15.01). These findings suggest
that most Muslim populations are concerned about the impact of Western culture on their society. These sentiments
may be the result of factors ranging from internal closemindedness to perceptions of cultural incompatibility and
disrespect.

tions more favorable toward the U.S. Further, perceptions

about whether Muslim nations are open-minded can work
both ways. In Indonesia, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia,
higher favorability correlates with more agreement, while
in Lebanon and Iran, higher favorability correlates with
less agreement. While U.S. leaders might improve favorability by improving perceptions of Western respect toward
Arab/Islamic values, it is also possible that respondents
personal views about the interaction of cultures may be
the causal variable, rather their views of Muslim perceptions more broadly.
Concern for a better coexistence: Respondents perceive
moderate concern among all parties for improving the relationship between Western and Muslim societies. People
in each nation on average perceive Western nations as
moderately concerned about creating a better coexistence
between cultures (Q17). On a 1-to-5 scale from do not
show any concern to show a lot of concern, responses
average from 1.90 to 3.13, with people in Turkey perceiving the least concern and people in Iran perceiving the
most concern. Looking at percentages by category, only in
Turkey do large percentages express extreme views on the
issue, with 45% saying that Western societies do not show
any concern. In other nations, 21% or fewer say the same,
with responses clustering around the middle of the scale.
In all nations except Indonesia and Iran, people on average say they are more personally concerned about improving the relationship than they perceive Western nations to
be (Q18). Even so, the overall level of personal concern is
relatively moderate, with average responses in all nations
but Morocco ranging from 2.90 to 3.34. In Morocco, the
average response is 4.0, suggesting a much higher level of
personal concern than in other nations.
17. / 18. View s about a better
coexistence/understanding betw een cultures
Turkey

3.01

2.62

2.95
2.79

Pakist an
Lebanon

Encouragingly, the most viable lever for public diplomacy in

this case is one which the U.S. might reasonably influence.
In Indonesia, Jordan, Morocco, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia,
those who agree that Western nations respect Arab/Islamic
values are more likely to be more favorable toward the U.S.
However, few consistent correlations exist between favorability and respondents perceptions of Muslim attitudes toward
Western culture. Only in Morocco and Saudi Arabia are
those who perceive less apprehension among Muslim na-

2.90

1.90

Jordan

3.34

2.84
2.93
2.98

Indonesia
Morocco

4.00

3.03
3.31

Saudi Ar abia

3.11
3.12
3.13

Iran
1

Not a lot of concer n

Per cept ion of West er n concer n

5
A lot of concer n

Per sonal concer n

Page 12

W h o W e A r e : C u l t u r e, V al u e s , & C o e x i s t e n c e

Respondents express divergent views about whether Muslim

nations are eager for a better relationship with the Western
world (Q15.02). In Morocco, 73% of people agree, while in
Iran, Turkey, and Indonesia, approximately 30% of people
hold this view. People in Pakistan, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and
Lebanon are more evenly divided, where 43%-46% agree.
15.02 Muslim nations are eager to have a better
relationship w ith the Western World
100

Views about the future: People in Muslim nations tend to

be pessimistic about the prospects for a better understanding between the West and the Arab/Muslim world.
When asked to rate on a scale from 1-to-5 whether a better understanding will probably never come to come
very soon, average responses range from 2.15 in Turkey
to 3.24 in Saudi Arabia (Q16). People in Turkey hold the
most pessimistic views, with 38% saying a better understanding will never come. People in Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Iran hold the most optimistic views.
16. A tim e for a better understanding betw een
the West and Arab/Muslim w orld w ill probably

80
60
7

40

Turkey

2.15

Lebanon

20

2.43

Jordan

2.47
2.90

Indonesia

Morocco

Pakist an

Jordan

Saudi

Lebanon

Iran

Turkey

Indonesia

Arabia

Pakist an

2.97

Iran

3.02

Morocco

Agree

Disagree

Favorability consistently correlates with perceptions of Western concern for a better coexistence. In all nations except
Iran, a more favorable view of the U.S. correlates with more
agreement that Western nations show more concern, rather
than less concern, for a better coexistence. In contrast, neither the perceived level of concern among Muslim nations
nor ones personal level of concern consistently predicts favorability. Further, the few correlations which exist run in
differing directions. In Saudi Arabia, those who are more
favorable toward the U.S. are more likely to agree that Muslim nations are eager to improve the relationship, while in
Pakistan those who are more favorable are less likely to
agree. In Saudi Arabia and Jordan, those who are more favorable are more likely to show personal concern for a better
coexistence, while in Indonesia those who are more favorable are less likely to show personal concern. These findings
suggest leaders should prioritize improving perceptions of
the level of concern Western nations show.

3.21

Saudi Ar abia

3.24
1

Never co me

Co me very so o n

In all nations except Pakistan and Iran, those who are

more favorable toward the U.S. are more likely to be optimistic about the prospects for a better coexistence. These
findings suggest gains could be made by providing tangible evidence that the relationship is improving.

COUNTRY SPECIFIC INSIGHTS

People in Morocco tend to be the most positive and optimistic about the interaction of Western and Muslim cultures while people in Turkey tend to be the most negative
and pessimistic. Interestingly, Iran, Saudi Arabia and
Pakistan, whose relationships with the U.S. have been
extensively examined and debated since 9/11, tend to fall
in the middle of the spectrum. The U.S. should recognize
that people in these nations may not always agree with
the official positions of their leaders.

L E V E R S & M E S S AG E S F O R P U B L I C D I P L O M AC Y
While people in Muslim nations perceive tension between
Western and Muslim cultures, correlations suggest several
areas in which leaders are wellwell-positioned to influence favorability. First, the relationship between favorability of the
U.S. and respect for Arab/Islamic values suggests the U.S.
should focus on demonstrating acceptance of Muslim values, rather than promoting Western values, as the route to
bringing the cultures closer together.

Second, leaders should attempt to capitalize on the consistent correlations between favorability and perception of
Western concern for a better coexistence and optimism
about the near-term prospects by emphasizing their high
level of concern about this issue and providing evidence of
progress toward a better understanding.

Express respect for Arab/Islamic values,

values rather than promoting Western values

Stress U.S. concern for a better coexistence in relevant policies and diplomatic relations

Highlight advancements toward a better understanding whenever possible

Page 13

KEY S TO PROGRESS
FINDINGS
Respondents are divided on whether attachment to spiritual
and moral values is critical to the progress of Muslim nations, but few agree that adopting Western values or increasing democracy will help progress.

15.08 Adopting Western values will help their progress

100
80
60
40

Islam and progress: Respondents are divided on whether

attachment to spiritual/moral values is critical to progress.
In most nations, around 50% of respondents agree with this
statement, including Lebanon (53%), Iran (51%), Jordan
(47%), and Pakistan (42%) (Q15.07). More people agree in
Saudi Arabia (59%), and fewer people agree in Turkey (37%),
Indonesia (28%), and Morocco (10%). The questions inclusion of the high bar of criticality may explain the lack of
agreement with this statement; respondents may have been
more likely to agree with a statement asking whether these
values would help or at least not prevent progress.
15.07 Attachment to their spiritual and moral values is critical
to their progress
100
80

20
0
Lebanon

Pakistan

Turkey

Agree

Morocco

Disagree

Iran

Don't Know

Saudi
Arabia

Jordan

Indonesia

Correlations between views on Western values and favorability toward the U.S. exist in Lebanon, Iran, and Saudi Arabia: those with more positive views of the U.S. are more
likely to agree that adopting Western values will help the
progress of Muslim nations. When interpreted in light of
the previous question on Islamic values, this may indicate
that favorables in Lebanon and Iran see Western values as
more helpful to progress than Islamic values, while those
in Saudi Arabia may see both sets of values as helpful and
therefore not incompatible.

60
40
20
0
Saudi
Arabia

Lebanon

Iran

Agree

Jordan

Pakistan

Disagree

Turkey

Indonesia Morocco

Don't Know

Correlations between views on Islamic values and progress

and views of the U.S. exist in four nations. In Lebanon, Iran,
Jordan, and Indonesia, those who are more favorable toward
the U.S. are less likely to say that attachment to spiritual and
moral values is critical to the progress of Muslim nations.
This may indicate these people are relatively more secular
than others in the country, and/or that they view things other
than spiritual/moral values as critical to progress. However,
policy-makers should be mindful of the high importance of
religion in Muslims personal lives, as will be discussed in
the religion section.

Democracy and progress: Sizeable minorities of respondents in each nation believe that increasing democracy
will help progress, and people in each nation believe democracy is more helpful than Western values. Respondents appear to distinguish democracy from Western
values, and in each nation, respondents are more likely to
cite that greater governmental democracy will help progress more than Western values (Q15.09, n/a Saudi Arabia). Roughly a majority of people in Lebanon (53%) and
Morocco (45%) associate democracy with progress, while
20-30% of respondents in all other nations agree that increasing democracy will help progress in Muslim nations.
15.09 Moving toward greater governmental democracy will
help their progress
100
80

Western values and progress: Despite mixed opinions on

whether Islamic values are critical to progress, respondents
consistently disagree that adopting Western values will help
progress. When asked whether adopting Western values will
help the progress of Muslim nations (note both the lower bar
of helping rather than being critical and the lack of a
definition of Western values), less than 35% of people in
each country agree (Q15.08). Respondents in Lebanon are
the most likely to agree with this statement (35%), while all
other nations are below 21%. Respondents in Indonesia are
least likely to agree (6%).

60
40
20
0
Lebanon

Morocco

Jordan

Agree

Pakistan

Disagree

Turkey

Indonesia

Iran

Don't Know

Page 14

W h o W e A r e : K e y s t o P r og r e s s

Once again, correlations between favorability and views of

progress exist in both Lebanon and Iran, where those who
are more favorable toward the U.S. are more likely to believe
that moving towards greater governmental democracy will
help the progress of Muslim nations. These correlations are
not wholly surprising, as both Lebanon and Iran already have
some democratic elements of government, but they further
indicate that people who are favorable toward the U.S. in
Lebanon and Iran believe that Western values, including
democracy, will be helpful to the progress of Muslim nations.

Given the lack of consensus on what will drive progress in

Muslim nations, we recommend further research and polling on this subject. Additionally, in subsequent sections,
we examine respondents views in more specific areas
including religion, economics, democracy and legal rights,
success, and U.S. quality of life in order to gain more information on what respondents believe will benefit their societies.

15.07 / 15.09 / 15.08 Comparative keys to progress in Muslim nations

100
80
60
40
20
0
Saudi Arabia

Indonesia

Iran

Jordan

Pakistan

Turkey

Morocco

Lebanon

A ttachment to spiritual and mo ral values is critical (15.07)

M o re demo cracy will help (15.09)
A do pting Western values will help (15.08)

L E V E R S & M E S S AG E S F O R P U B L I C D I P L O M AC Y
While the diversity of opinions on what will drive progress in
Muslim nations provide few clear levers for public diplomacy,
they reveal useful guidelines for messages to avoid.
Although higher favorability correlates with less support for
the role of Muslim values in progress in a number of nations,
we do not recommend that the U.S. use this as a public diplomacy lever for two reasons. First, overall opinions on this
issue are far from uniform. Second, although respondents
may not feel Islamic values are critical to progress, Muslims
strong attachment to religion indicates that Islamic values
are probably relevant in some way, or at least they should
not be forsaken in the name of progress. We therefore recommend the U.S. avoid explicitly linking or de-linking the
concepts of Islamic values and progress in its policies and
public comments.

We also recommend that the U.S. avoid promoting Western values and democracy as keys to progress. Although
these may be appropriate levers in some nations, widespread opposition to these views indicates it would not
increase overall favorability.
Although it should not explicitly link democracy and progress, the U.S. should consider what it can do to
strengthen democratic systems in nations like Lebanon
and Iran where views on democracy and Western values
appear to be related to favorability. However, the U.S.
must be careful to do this only when invited, in order to
avoid the perception of imposing its will on other nations.

Recognize that while respondents may not believe Islamic spiritual and moral values are critical to progress,
progress these values are an important part of their personal lives
Refrain from promoting the view that Muslim nations should adopt Western values to achieve progress
Help strengthen existing democratic systems where appropriate and when invited
Page 15

RELIGION
FINDINGS
While people in Muslim nations view religion as an essential
component of their personal lives, most see it as only one
factor relevant to public life.
Personal religion:
religion: Respondents on average say that personal
commitment to religion is very important to essential
essential and
is expected to increase. Respondents in each nation view
having an enriched religious/spiritual life as a very important to essential component of their personal lives
(Q9.03*, n/a Jordan). Respondents in almost all nations
rate religion as more essential than having a comfortable
economic life and having a democratically elected government. The only exceptions occur in Morocco and Lebanon,
where respondents rate economics higher than religion.

9.03 Importance of having an enriched religious/spiritual life

the U.S. This may also be true in Lebanon, where higher

favorability correlates with a less essential view of personal religion but not with future expectations. Higher
favorability correlates with future expectations on religious
commitment in Turkey and Jordan, though in different directions. In Turkey, higher favorability is associated with
the belief that religious commitment will decline, while in
Jordan it is associated with the belief that religious commitment will increase.
Religion and law: Respondents support freedom of religion, but most want sharia to inform legislation. Despite
relatively uniform support for freedom of religion, most
respondents want religion to play some sort of role in legal
structures. However, it should be emphasized that these
questions were not asked in Saudi Arabia. Taking both
questions into account, nations fall into three categories:

100

Support strong religious influence on law

Jordan, Morocco, Pakistan
Support some religious influence on law
Indonesia, Lebanon, Iran
Support separation of law and religion
Turkey

80
60
40
20
0
Saudi
Arabia

Morocco Lebanon

Turkey

Pakistan

Iran

Indonesia

Essential / Cannot live without it

Very important
Useful, but can live without it

Looking comparatively across nations, respondents in Saudi

Arabia, Morocco, and Lebanon place more importance on
personal religion than respondents in other countries. In
these three nations, a majority of respondents consider
having an enriched religious/spiritual life as essential/
cannot live without it, while people in Pakistan, Turkey, Iran,
and Indonesia are more likely to cite it as very important.
Respondents in each nation also expect commitment to
ones faith to increase over the course of the next few years
(Q10.04, n/a Saudi Arabia, Indonesia). However, the degree
of expectation varies by country; higher percentages of respondents in Jordan, Morocco, and Pakistan expect their
commitment to increase than in Lebanon, Turkey, and Iran.

When asked whether they would support including freedom of religion in a new constitution, a majority of respondents in each nation agree, but precise levels of support
range from 50-95% (Q28.01, n/a Saudi Arabia). Freedom
of religion was defined to respondents as allowing all
citizens to observe any religion of their choice and to practice its teachings and beliefs. However, respondents may
still interpret this differently based on their own nations
laws, for example, on converting from one religion to another. Strongest support for freedom of religion occurs in
Turkey (89%), Indonesia (89%), and Lebanon (95%). Nations with Islamic law or Islamic provisions in their legal
systems show somewhat lower levels of support: Pakistan
(72%), Iran (72%), Morocco (50%), and Jordan (50%).
28.01 Inclusion of freedom of religion in a new
constitution
100
80
60

Correlations between favorability of the U.S. and views on

personal religion exist, but are not consistent across nations.
In Iran, higher favorability correlates with a less essential
view of personal religion and the expectation that commitment to ones faith will decrease in the near-term. This may
indicate that less religious Iranians have better opinions of

40
20
0
Lebanon Indonesia Turkey
Agree

Iran
Disagree

Pakistan Morocco

Jordan

Don't Know

Page 16

W h o W e A r e : R e l ig i o n

Views on whether sharia should be a source of legislation

reflect beliefs similar to those on freedom of religion (Q31,
n/a Saudi Arabia). In Pakistan and Jordan, both nations with
strong religious influence on law, more than 50% of respondents support sharia as the only source of legislation. In
Morocco, 65% of respondents want sharia to be one but not
the sole source of law, and an additional 33% want it to the
sole source of law. Majorities in Iran, Indonesia, and Lebanon want sharia to be a source (but not the only source) of
legislation, while only in Turkey does a majority (57%) say
sharia should not be a source of legislation.
31. Shari'a as a source of legislation
100
80
60
40

non, where people who are more favorable toward the U.S.
are more likely to agree with the inclusion of freedom of
religion in a new constitution. These correlations may indicate that people in Muslim nations see the U.S. as pursuing anti-Islamic and anti-sharia policies rather than as
promoting freedom of religious practice. Combating this
image may prove to be an important goal for public diplomacy.
Religious extremism in the U.S.:
U.S.: Respondents do not view
religious extremism as common in the U.S. Although there
are no religion questions directly comparing Western and
Muslim nations, respondents do provide their opinions on
whether the statement religious extremism is common
applies to the U.S. (Q27.14). While the majority of people
in each nation do not agree with this statement, slightly
more than 40% of respondents in Saudi Arabia and Morocco agree that religious extremism is common in the U.S.
In each of the other nations, between 17-23% of respondents agree, except Turkey where 7% agree.

20
0
Pakistan

Jordan

Morocco

Indonesia

Iran

Lebanon

Turkey

Must be the only source

Must be a source, but not the only source
Should not be a source
Don't Know

Views on sharia correlate with favorability of the U.S. more

consistently than views on freedom of religion. In each nation except Morocco, those who are more favorable toward
the U.S. are more likely to believe that sharia should not be
a source of legislation. By contrast, correlations with views
of freedom of religion exist only in Morocco, Iran, and Leba-

In Saudi Arabia and Morocco, respondents views on their

own religion may be influencing their responses on this
question. The strength of personal religious beliefs in
these two nations (over 60% of people in each country rate
religion as essential) may lead to a greater perception of
conflict between Muslims and the U.S.
In each nation except Pakistan, higher favorability of the
U.S. correlates with being less likely to cite religious extremism is common as applying to the U.S. Although the
direction of causality is unclear, this may indicate that
negative feelings toward the U.S. are a reaction to perceived religious antagonism from Americans. The increasing influence of the Christian right in U.S. politics may be
one factor contributing to this perception.

L E V E R S & M E S S AG E S F O R P U B L I C D I P L O M AC Y
Although some religious beliefs consistently correlate with
favorability, we recommend that the U.S. focus its messages
on respecting, rather than influencing, religious beliefs.
Higher favorability of the U.S. consistently correlates with
less agreement that sharia should be a source of legislation.
However, given widespread support for sharia as a source of
law and the high personal importance placed on religious
values, public diplomacy rooted in these opinions is likely to

create, rather than prevent, negativity toward the U.S.

Public diplomacy messages instead should demonstrate
respect for Islam while building on beliefs common to the
U.S. and Muslim nations, such as support for freedom of
religion. The U.S. may also be able to counter perceptions
that religious extremism is common in the U.S. by avoiding
political rhetoric that is religious in tone.

Demonstrate respect for the personal practice of Islam to reduce the perception of a War on Islam
Emphasize common belief in freedom of religion while recognizing that interpretations of this concept may differ
Encourage research to uncover common values between sharia and rightsrights-based legislation and explore how the systems of law might be reconciled
Page 17

ECONOMICS
FINDINGS
People in Muslim nations see economic wellwell-being as very
important and expect it to improve. They express admiration for Western economic opportunities, but they do not
indicate confidence in U.S. intentions in the region.
Personal economics: Respondents see personal economic
wellwell-being as very important. Respondents in most countries rank having a comfortable economic life as very important, but secondary to having an enriched religious/spiritual
life (Q9.02*, n/a Jordan). Exceptions occur in Morocco and
Lebanon, where a majority of people indicate that personal
economic well-being is essential and rank it as a higher
priority than religion. The majority of people in Saudi Arabia
also rank economics as essential, but they place it lower
than religion. In each country, respondents rank both economics and religion higher than democracy.
9.02 Having a com fortable econom ic life
100

they indicate expectations that their respective economic

situations will remain the same, rather than decline.
Measures of economic optimism correlate with favorability
of the U.S. in different ways across nations. Only in Turkey do all three measures of optimism correlate with favorability: higher favorability correlates with more optimistic views of personal economic level, national economy,
and integration with the world economy.
In other nations, favorability correlates only with national
economic measures. In Lebanon, higher favorability correlates with more optimistic views of both the national economy and integration with the world economy. In Saudi
Arabia and Morocco, higher favorability correlates only
with a more optimistic view of the national economy.
These correlations may indicate that these respondents
believe that the U.S. economy has a positive impact on
their national economic situation.

80
60
40
20
0
Morocco Lebanon

Saudi
Arabia

Iran

Turkey

Pakistan Indonesia

Essential / Canno t live witho ut it

Very impo rtant
Useful, but can live witho ut it

Some surprising correlations exist between the importance

of personal economic well-being and favorability toward the
U.S. Given the U.S. pre-eminent economic standing, one
would assume that higher favorability would correlate with a
more essential view of economic well-being. However, this is
true only in Lebanon. People in Turkey, Indonesia, and Morocco who are more favorable toward the U.S. are more likely
to rate personal economic well-being as less essential. This
indicates that factors other than admiration of U.S. economic
success may be driving favorability in these nations.
Economic optimism:
optimism: Most respondents expect their personal
and national economic status to improve. Respondents in
all nations are optimistic, or at least believe the status quo
will be maintained, when asked whether three economic
factors will improve or decline in the next few years: family/
personal economic level (Q10.01, n/a Indonesia), the national economy (Q10.08, n/a Indonesia), and integration
with the world economy (Q10.05, n/a Indonesia, Saudi Arabia). People in Saudi Arabia and Morocco are the most optimistic about their personal and national financial futures.
Respondents in Turkey and Lebanon are not optimistic, but

In Iran and Jordan, higher favorability correlates with pessimism about the national economy. In Iran, higher favorability is associated with more pessimistic views of the national economy and of world economic integration, while in
Jordan it correlates only with a more pessimistic view of
the national economy. These correlations may indicate
the belief the U.S. economy has a negative impact on the
Iranian and Jordanian national economies and/or that
these respondents are unhappy with their own countrys
management of the national economy while admiring the
U.S. economy. U.S. and international sanctions on the
Iranian economy may also be a influential factor.
Comparative opportunities: Respondents believe that
Western nations offer better economic opportunities to
citizens than Muslim nations. Respondents in each country except Indonesia are more likely to agree that Western
nations offer good economic opportunities for their citizens than they are to agree that Muslim nations offer good

100

14.15 / 15.14 Agree that offer good economic opportunities for

their citizens

80
60
40
20
0
Lebanon Morocco

Jordan

Turkey

Western nations

Iran

Pakistan

Muslim nations

Saudi
Arabia

Indonesia

Page 18

Who We Are: Economics

economic opportunities for their citizens (Q14.15, 15.14).

People in Morocco, Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, and Iran rate
opportunities for Western citizens much better than those
for Muslim citizens. Respondents in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan see slightly better opportunities in the West, and people
in Indonesia rate the opportunities as largely the same.
Correlations exist with these comparative views in both
Saudi Arabia and Iran, but with differing implications. Respondents in Saudi Arabia think both Western and Muslim
nations offer good economic opportunities, and higher favorability toward the U.S. correlates with more favorable
views of the economic opportunities in both nations. In contrast, respondents in Iran think that the West offers better
economic opportunities than Muslim nations, and higher
favorability toward the U.S. correlates with more favorable
views of Western economic opportunities and less favorable
views of economic opportunities in Muslim nations. This
suggests that people in Saudi Arabia may think highly of
Western and Muslim national economies, while people in
Iran favor Western economies.
U.S. intentions: People believe that the U.S. is not serious
about improving the economic lot of people in the region.
Despite strong admiration for the Wests economic opportunities, few respondents agree that the U.S. is serious about
improving the economic lot of people in their region (Q33.01,
n/a Saudi Arabia). Fewer than 35% of respondents in each
nation agree with this statement.

Higher favorability toward the U.S. correlates in each nation with a more positive view of U.S. intentions in the region. Responses to an additional question provide further
evidence that perceptions of U.S. intentions and willingness to help other nations may influence favorability. A
majority of respondents in all nations disagree that Western nations care about poorer nations (Q14.03). However,
those who agree that Western nations care about poorer
nations are more likely to be favorable toward the U.S.
These findings suggest a relationship between higher favorability and more positive views of the U.S. intentions
and willingness to aid other nations.

COUNTRY SPECIFIC INSIGHTS

Saudi Arabia: Favorables believe economic opportunities
are good in Western and Muslim nations, and they are
more optimistic about their economic future. The U.S.
should emphasize how further integration can benefit
economies in Western and Muslim nations.
Iran: Favorables believe economic opportunities are good
in the West but not in Muslim nations, and they are more
pessimistic about their economic future. The U.S. should
show concern for improving economic opportunities for
Iranian citizens, despite tensions between governments.
Lebanon: Favorables believe economic opportunities are
good in the West and are more optimistic about the national economy and integration with the world economy.

L E V E R S & M E S S AG E S F O R P U B L I C D I P L O M AC Y
The U.S. should build on Muslims economic optimism and
positive perceptions of opportunities in the West to improve
views of U.S. intentions in the region. Specifically, the U.S.
should improve perceptions of its willingness to provide aid
and assistance to Muslim nations.
While correlations between importance of personal economic well-being and U.S. favorability exist in some countries, messages encouraging a more essential view of economics may be seen as undercutting the role of religion.
Further, messages de-emphasizing the role of economic
well-being are likely to be seen as hypocritical coming from
an economic power such as the U.S. Instead, messages
addressing economic issues should promote the importance
of the economic well-being of all citizens (especially in Morocco, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia), while being mindful of its
secondary role to religion in most nations.
The U.S. should capitalize on the widespread economic optimism when crafting public diplomacy messages. This may

provide the most leverage in Turkey, where despite the

overall view that economic factors will remain the same,
people who are favorable toward the U.S. are optimistic
about each of the economic measures (personal, national,
and integration with the world economy). Additionally, the
U.S. should build on the national economic optimism in
Morocco, Lebanon, and Saudi Arabia to try to improve its
favorability. However, optimistic messages may backfire
in Iran and Jordan, where higher favorability correlates
with more pessimistic views.
Although Muslims admire Western opportunities, the U.S.
must be careful to avoid communicating economic messages that may be perceived as promoting U.S. economic
dominance. Instead, the U.S. should use admiration of
Western opportunities to improve the perception of U.S.
economic intentions in the region by increasing the frequency and publicity of its provision of aid and economic
assistance to Muslim countries.

Promote economic wellwell-being, but be mindful of its secondary importance to religion

Build on economic optimism and admiration for Western opportunities
Increase provision of U.S. aid and economic assistance to Muslim nations
Page 19

DEMOCRACY & LEGAL RIGHTS

FINDINGS
Respondents opinions on democracy and legal rights reveal
both good and bad news for the U.S. While people appear to
value democracy and support legal freedoms, they do not
tend to admire Western legal systems and they are divided
about whether systems in Western nations are better than
those in Muslim nations.

9.04 Having a government that governs w isely

100
80
60
40

Importance of democracy:
democracy Most respondents believe democracy is very important, but they consider it a lower priority
than religion and economics. When asked the importance of
having a democratically elected government, respondents in
almost all nations deem it very important, but they rank it
as the third priority after religion and economics (Q9.05*,
n/a Jordan). However, views of democracy in Morocco and
Lebanon tend toward essential, and views in Saudi Arabia
tend toward useful.
9.05 Having a democratically elected government
100
80
60
40
20
0
M orocco

Lebanon

Iran

Turkey

Pakistan

Indonesia

Saudi
Arabia

20
0
M orocco

Lebanon

Iran

Turkey

Pakistan

Indonesia

Essential / Cannot live without it

Very important
Useful, but can live without it

Legal freedoms: People in Muslim nations tend to support

the inclusion of freedom of speech and freedom of religion
in a new constitution. In each nation (except Saudi Arabia,
where the question was not asked), roughly a majority of
respondents or more agree with the inclusion of freedom
of speech (defined as allowing all citizens to express their
opinion on the political, social, and economic issues of the
day) and freedom of religion (defined as allowing all citizens to observe any religion of their choice and to practice
its teachings and beliefs) in a new constitution in a new
country (Q28.01, 28.02, n/a Saudi Arabia).

Essential / Canno t live witho ut it

28.01 / 28.02 Agree w ith inclusion in a new constitution

Very impo rtant

Useful, but can live witho ut it

Correlations between favorability and views on the importance of democracy reveal some surprising relationships. In
Saudi Arabia and Iran, higher favorability toward the U.S.
correlates with a less essential view of democracy, but it
correlates with a more essential view of democracy in Pakistan. This may indicate that positive views of the U.S. in
Saudi Arabia and Iran are driven by factors other than democracy, while positive views in Pakistan are in part formed
by respondents admiration for U.S. democracy.

100
80
60
40
20
0
Lebanon Morocco Indonesia

Turkey

Freedom of speech

Respondents in some nations give similar ratings to a question on the importance of having a government that governs
wisely (9.04, n/a Jordan, Saudi Arabia). In Morocco, Lebanon, and Indonesia, views on democracy and views on wise
government are roughly the same. People in Iran, Turkey,
and Pakistan appear to assign less importance to having a
democratic government and more importance to having a
government that governs wisely. However, even in these
cases, the differential remains relatively small. These findings suggest that respondents in some nations may associate democracy with wise government, while others may not.

Iran

Jordan

Pakistan

Freedom of religion

However, support for freedom of speech is stronger and

more uniform across nations (agreement in each nation is
greater than 80%) than support for freedom of religion
(agreement ranges from 50-95%). This strong affinity for
freedom of speech relative to freedom of religion contrasts
to views in the U.S. where these freedoms are conventionally assumed to be equally important. Although these responses may indicate general support for these freedoms,
they should not necessarily be interpreted as indicating a
desire to implement these freedoms in their own nations,

Page 20

W h o W e A r e : D e m o c ra c y & L e g al R i g h t s

as the question referred to including the provisions in a new

constitution in a new country. However, these opinions appear to counter views that Muslims are unfavorable toward
the U.S. because they hate U.S. freedoms.
Few consistent correlations exist between favorability of the
U.S. and support for freedom of speech and religion. Higher
favorability correlates with more support for both freedoms
only in Morocco, though it also correlates with more support
for freedom of religion (but not freedom of speech) in Lebanon and Iran. However, higher favorability correlates with
less support for freedom of speech in Indonesia and Jordan.
Despite these varying correlations, the high level of support
for freedom of speech indicates a strongly held value that
the U.S. and Muslim nations have in common. Freedom of
religion also appears to be a common value, though policymakers should be mindful that opinions in Morocco and Jordan diverge somewhat from this norm.
Comparative judicial systems: Respondents believe that
both Muslim and Western judicial systems are unfair, and
nations are roughly evenly split on which type of system is
relatively more fair. Respondents opinions on whether
Western and Muslim nations have fair judicial systems vary
widely by country (Q14.11, 15.10). When asked whether
Western nations have fair judicial systems, less than a majority agrees in all countries except Morocco (67%) and Lebanon (56%). Levels of agreement in other nations range from
39% in Iran to 22% in Indonesia. When asked whether Muslim nations have fair judicial systems, even fewer respondents agree. Less than 50% of respondents in each nation
agree with this statement, except in Indonesia (56% agree).

sia (34 percentage points) and is smaller in Jordan (11

percentage points) and Saudi Arabia (14 percentage
points).
Correlations between favorability toward the U.S. and both
judicial questions exist in three nations. In Lebanon and
Iran, higher favorability correlates with more agreement
that Western nations have fair judicial systems and with
less agreement that Muslim nations do. In contrast,
higher favorability in Saudi Arabia correlates with more
agreement that both Muslim and Western nations have
fair judicial systems. This suggests that those who are
favorable toward the U.S. in Lebanon and Iran are dissatisfied with their own judicial systems but believe Western
ones are fair, while those who are favorable in Saudi Arabia think both sets of systems are fair. The attractiveness
of Western judicial systems in these nations suggests that
this might be an effective lever for public diplomacy.
Comparative gender rights: Respondents generally believe
that Western nations have more equality between the
sexes than Muslim nations. Although respondents in all
nations except Indonesia are more likely to agree that the
sexes enjoy equal legal rights in Western nations than in
Muslim nations, the strength of agreement varies widely by
country. Between 40-80% of respondents in each nation
agree that the sexes enjoy equal legal rights in Western
nations, while between 10-35% in each nation agree that
the sexes enjoy equal legal rights in Muslim nations, with
Indonesia as an outlier at 68%.

100

14.13 / 15.12 Agree that both sexes enjoy equal legal

rights

80
14.11 / 15.10 Agree that have fair judicial systems

100

60
40

80

20

60

0
Morocco Lebanon

40
20

Turkey

Jordan

Western nations

Saudi
Arabia

Iran

Pakistan Indonesia

Muslim nations

0
Morocco Lebanon

Iran

Western nations

Turkey

Pakistan

Muslim nations

Saudi
Arabia

Jordan Indonesia

Comparing respondents answers to the two questions, nations are almost evenly split on whether Western or Muslim
judicial systems are relatively more fair. Four nations think
Western judicial systems are more fair, but the size of the
differential varies by nation. Large percentage point gaps
exist in Morocco (50) and Lebanon (35), while smaller gaps
exist in Iran (16) and Turkey (13). Respondents in Pakistan
rate the two systems similarly (2 percentage points higher
agreement with Western nations having fair judicial systems). Respondents in the other three nations perceive
Muslim systems as relatively more fair than Western systems, but to varying degrees. The gap is greatest in Indone-

Consistent correlations between favorability of the U.S.

and perceptions of equal legal rights for both sexes exist
only in Morocco and Iran. In Morocco, higher favorability
correlates with more agreement that the sexes have equal
legal rights in Western nations and in Muslim nations. In
Iran, it correlates with more agreement that the sexes
have equal legal rights in Western nations and with less
agreement that the sexes have equal legal rights in Muslim nations. Additionally, in Pakistan and Lebanon, higher
favorability correlates with less agreement that the sexes
have equal legal rights in Muslim nations. And in Saudi
Arabia, higher favorability correlates with more agreement
that the sexes have equal legal rights in Western nations.
(section continues)
Page 21

DEMOCRACY & LEGAL RIGHTS

FINDINGS, CONTINUED
However, perceived differences in legal rights between the
sexes cannot necessarily be interpreted as a desire to equalize these rights. Although majorities in each nation agree
that women should have the same legal rights as men, sizeable minorities disagree with this statement in three nations
with Islamic law: Jordan (38%), Saudi Arabia (36%), and Morocco (28%) (Q32.01). Although the U.S. may not share
these views, it should be mindful of them when addressing
gender issues in these nations.
Perceptions of equality in the West:
West: Respondents are divided
on whether Western citizens enjoy equal legal rights, and
few believe Western nations treat minorities fairly. Respondents perceptions of equality of rights and duties in Western
nations reflects similar tendencies to views on gender equality: agreement rates range from 37% to 78% (Q14.08). People agree most often in Lebanon (78%), Indonesia (76%),
and Morocco (60%), while all other nations are below 50%.
14.08 Western nations have equality of their citizens regarding
rights and duties

100
80
60

Perceptions of equality in the West consistently correlate

with favorability in Lebanon, Morocco, and Jordan: those
who are more favorable toward the U.S. are more likely to
agree that citizens in Western nations have equality of
rights and duties and that Western nations treat fairly minorities in their societies. Correlations between higher
favorability and more agreement that Western citizens
have equal rights exist in Iran and Saudi Arabia, while in
Indonesia higher favorability correlates with more agreement that Western nations treat minorities fairly.
U.S. intentions in the region:
region: People in Muslim nations
believe that the U.S. is not serious about promoting democracy and will not allow for political autonomy in the
region. Few respondents believe the U.S. has genuine and
positive intentions in the region (Q33.02, n/a Saudi Arabia). When asked whether the U.S. is serious about
encouraging the establishment of democratic systems of
government in this region, less than 40% of respondents
in each nation agree, and in many cases this number is at
or below 20%. These numbers may indicate the belief that
the U.S. uses rhetoric about democracy promotion, but
that it either does not intend to follow its words with action
or that it has an underlying agenda. It should be noted
that this question was not asked in Saudi Arabia.

40
20

33.02 U.S. is serious about the establishm ent of

dem ocratic system s of governm ent in this region

0
Lebanon Indonesia Morocco

Jordan

Agree

Iran

Turkey

Disagree

Saudi
Arabia

Pakistan

80

The majority of respondents in each nation except Indonesia

disagree that Western nations treat fairly minorities living in
their societies (Q14.04). In Indonesia, more than 80% agree
that Western nations treat minorities fairly. Although respondents may have been thinking of different types of minorities
in response to this question (e.g., African-Americans, European Muslim immigrants), the uniformity of opinion indicates
that Muslims perceive minorities in the West are treated
unfairly even if they have formal equality of rights and duties.

100
80
60
40
20
0

Agree

Disagree

Saudi
Arabia

Iran

Jordan

60
40
20
0
Morocco

Jordan

Iran
Agree

Lebanon Pakistan
Disagree

Turkey

Indonesia

Can't Say

Respondents show even less agreement when asked

whether the U.S. will allow people in this region to fashion
their own political future as they see fit without direct U.S.
influence (Q33.03, n/a Saudi Arabia). Again, less than
40% of respondents in each nation agree, and most nations are at or less than 20%. In each nation except Turkey and Indonesia, fewer people agree that the U.S. will
allow for political autonomy than that the U.S. is serious
about encouraging democracy.

14.04 Western nations treat fairly minorities living in their

societies

Indonesia Lebanon Pakistan Morocco

100

Turkey

Page 22

W h o W e A r e : D e m o c ra c y & L e g al R i g h t s

100

33.03 The U.S. w ill allow people in this region to fashion

their ow n political future as they see fit w ithout direct
U.S. influence

80
60
40
20
0
Morocco

Jordan

Iran
Agree

Lebanon Pakistan
Disagree

Turkey

COUNTRY SPECIFIC INSIGHTS

Morocco: Respondents have the most essential view of
democracy and generally give high ratings to Western legal systems and rights (except treatment of minorities and
U.S. intentions) and low ratings to Muslim legal systems
and rights. Higher favorability correlates consistently with
more positive views of both Western and Muslim systems,
with more support for freedoms of speech and religion,
and with more positive views of U.S. intentions.

Indonesia

Can't Say

Taken together, these questions indicate deep mistrust of

U.S. intentions toward governments in the region. Respondents do not believe that the U.S. will seriously encourage
new democracies, but neither do they believe the U.S. will
avoid directly influencing political futures in the region.
Responses to both questions about U.S. intentions consistently correlate with favorability toward the U.S. In each
country except Iran, higher favorability of the U.S. is associated with more agreement that the U.S. is serious about establishing democratic systems in the region and that the U.S.
will allow people in the region to determine their own political future without U.S. influence. In Iran, higher favorability
correlates only with more agreement that the U.S. is serious
about establishing democracy. Given the low level of agreement, but the high number of correlations, trying to improve
perceptions of U.S. intentions toward regional politics may
be a key lever for increasing overall favorability.

Lebanon: Similar to Morocco, respondents have a more

essential view of democracy and generally give high ratings to Western legal systems and rights (except treatment of minorities and U.S. intentions) and low ratings to
Muslim legal systems and rights. Higher favorability correlates consistently with more positive views of Western
systems and more negative views of Muslim systems,
with more support for freedom of religion, and with more
positive views of U.S. intentions.
Iran: Though Iranians give lower ratings to democracy and
Western legal systems and rights than Morocco and Lebanon, correlations are similar to those in Lebanon.
Saudi Arabia: Respondents tend to view democracy as
closer to useful (the lowest option on the scale) than
essential (the highest option), and most rate the legal
systems and rights in Muslim nations more highly than
those in Western nations. Higher favorability correlates
with a less essential view of democracy, more positive
views of Western systems and rights, and more positive
views of Muslim judicial systems.

L E V E R S & M E S S AG E S F O R P U B L I C D I P L O M AC Y
Rather than solely promoting democracy, the U.S. should
aim to address Muslims concerns about U.S. intentions in
the region and to improve their perceptions of the equality
and fairness of Western legal systems.
More favorable opinions of the U.S. correlate consistently
with more positive views on U.S. intentions in the region and
better perceptions of equality in Western nations. Other factors also frequently correlate with higher favorability, though
with less consistency across nations, including more support
for legal freedoms, more agreement that Western judicial

systems are fair, and more agreement that both genders

have equal legal rights in Western nations.
These findings suggest that U.S. public diplomacy messages should focus on promoting underlying legal principles of freedom, legal rights, equality (though it must be
careful on gender issues), and democracy. However, the
U.S. should avoid advocating that nations should model
themselves after the U.S. specifically. Additionally, improving perceptions of U.S. legal systems, rights, and equality
might help to increase favorability toward the U.S.

Emphasize shared legal principles rather than promoting specific U.S. practices

Build on existing support for legal freedoms and democracy without specifically referencing systems in the U.S.

Demonstrate concern for fair judicial systems in both Muslim and Western societies
Emphasize U.S concern for the equality of its own citizens,
citizens including gender and minority rights
Demonstrate respect for political autonomy and diversity in Muslim nations and emphasize U.S. commitment to noninterference where credible
Create opportunities for Islamic scholars to research how legal rights and freedoms relate to Islamic traditions
Page 23

TERRORISM & SACRIFICE

FINDINGS
People in Muslim nations on average disapprove of acts
which might be defined as terrorism and say they are generally accepting of those who do not share their opinions. They
offer more divergent views about whether it is justifiable to
sacrifice ones life for ones beliefs.
Acts of terrorism: Most respondents consider the attacks of
September 11, 2001 unjustifiable, but they consider those
attacks relatively more justifiable than attacks on civilians in
general. Large majorities of people in Muslim nations consider the events of September 11th unjustifiable to some
degree (Q13.06). On a 1-to-5 scale from cannot be justified
at all to completely justifiable, average responses range
from 1.60 in Morocco to 2.67 in Jordan. Large majorities in
Morocco (67%), Lebanon (65%), Turkey (64%), and Indone13.06 / 13.07 Attacks of Sept. 11 & Other attacks
in w hich civilians are the target

Discord and sacrifice: People in Muslim nations on average say it is unjustifiable not to live in harmony with those
of other opinions and values and to sacrifice ones life for
ones beliefs. Still, people in Pakistan, Lebanon, Saudi
Arabia, and Jordan are relatively more supportive of both
actions than people in other nations. On a 1-to-5 scale
from cannot be justified at all to completely justifiable,
average responses about whether it is justifiable not to live
in harmony with those who do not share your opinions and
values range from 1.75 in Indonesia to 3.10 in Jordan
(Q13.02). Average responses about whether it is justifiable to sacrifice ones life for ones beliefs range from
1.65 in Iran to 3.38 in Jordan (Q13.04). Looking at per-

1.60

Morocco

1.25

Indonesia

1.28

1.65
1.82

Turkey

1.22
1.83

Lebanon

1.31
2.09

Pakist an

1.57
2.35

Iran

1.62
2.39

Saudi Ar abia

1.73
2.67

Jordan

2.09
1

Canno t be justified at all

Other attacks in which civilians are the target

justifiable view of the September 11th attacks in all nations, though exceptions occur in Pakistan and Jordan. In
Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Morocco, a more favorable
view also correlates with a less justifiable view of attacks
on other civilians. However, there are some puzzling exceptions to conventional wisdom. In Jordan, a more favorable view of the U.S. correlates with being more likely to
find justifiable both the attacks of September 11th and
attacks on other civilians. In Pakistan, the same counterintuitive correlation exists for attacks on other civilians.
While it is difficult to say what drives these views, they may
be related to the large number of Palestinian refugees in
Jordan and the historical tensions between Pakistan and
India and thus greater personal experience with terrorism.
In any case, views about September 11th and attacks on
civilians are likely strongly held and difficult to influence.

Co mpletely justifiable
Events o f September 11th

13.02 / 13.04 Not living in harm ony w ith others

& Sacrificing one's life for one's beliefs
1.57
1.75

Indonesia

sia (55%) say the attacks cannot be justified at all.

Smaller but sizeable groups say the same in Pakistan (49%),
Saudi Arabia (40%), Iran (29%), and Jordan (29%). Even so,
people in all nations on average rate the September 11th
attacks as more justifiable than attacks on civilians more
broadly (13.07). For the latter question, average responses
range from 1.22 in Turkey to 2.09 in Jordan. In this case,
the majority of people in all eight nations say attacks on civilians cannot be justified at all, ranging from 50% in Jordan
to 88% in Turkey. Across the board, people in Morocco, Turkey, Indonesia, and Lebanon are less likely to justify such
acts than people in Pakistan, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan.

2.06
2.23

Morocco

2.39
2.47

Turkey
1.65

Iran

2.55
2.80
2.68

Pakist an

3.38

Lebanon

3.00
3.26

Saudi Ar abia

3.03
3.38

Jordan

3.10
1

Canno t be justified at all

No t living in harmo ny with o thers

Consistent correlations exist between favorability and the

attacks of September 11th and other attacks on civilians,
but not always in the same direction. As one might expect,
being more favorable toward the U.S. correlates with a less

Co mpletely justifiable
Sacrificing o ne's life fo r o ne's beliefs

centages across categories, nations tend to fall into two

groups on these issues. People in Indonesia, Morocco,
Turkey, and Iran find both acts relatively less justifiable

Page 24

W h o W e A r e : T er r o r i s m & S a c r i f i c e

than people in other nations. In each of these four nations,

more than 50% of respondents lean toward unjustifiable on
the question of not living in harmony with others, ranging
from 53% in Iran to 79% in Indonesia. In Pakistan, Lebanon,
Saudi Arabia and Jordan, fewer than 43% lean toward the
unjustifiable end of the scale. There is a similar pattern on
the question of sacrificing ones life. In the first group of
nations (Iran, Indonesia, Turkey, and Iran), more than 50% of
respondents lean toward unjustifiable, now ranging from
58% in Turkey to 85% in Iran. Fewer than 40% in the other
four nations (Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, and Jordan)
do the same. In fact, 32% in Lebanon, 28% in Saudi Arabia,
24% in Jordan, and 21% in Pakistan consider sacrificing
ones life completely justifiable. Additionally it should be
underscored that people in these four nations on average
think it is more justifiable to sacrifice ones live than to not
live in harmony with those of other beliefs. While it is possible respondents may have been thinking of sacrificing ones
life in a military, patriotic or religious context, the consistent
pattern with the more general question about not living in
harmony with others suggests more overall support for martyrdom.
Views on these issues are not strong predictors of favorability of the U.S. Only in Lebanon does a more favorable view
of the U.S. correlate with less justifiable views of not living in
harmony with those of different opinions and values and of
sacrificing ones life for ones beliefs. In Turkey and Saudi
Arabia, this relationship exists only with views about sacrificing ones life. More puzzling are the findings in Iran and Jordan, where a more favorable view of the U.S. correlates with
a more justifiable view of both actions. In Morocco, a more
favorable view of the U.S. correlates with a more justifiable
view about sacrificing ones life. The inconsistency of these
correlations suggest that views on discord and sacrifice are
not likely to be viable levers for public diplomacy.

While these views are difficult to influence, the patterns

suggest different views across countries about whether
acts of terrorism and sacrifice are justifiable means with
which to address ones grievances. It should be underscored that such acts are relatively more acceptable in the
three nations most unfavorable to the U.S. (Saudi Arabia,
Pakistan, and Jordan). Despite significant negativity toward the U.S. in Turkey, support for terrorism and martyrdom in that country appears relatively low.

COUNTRY SPECIFIC INSIGHTS

Saudi Arabia:
Arabia People in Saudi Arabia are both the most
unfavorable toward the U.S. overall and are also among
the most likely to justify acts of terrorism, not living in harmony with others, and sacrificing ones life for ones beliefs. This suggests little public remorse for the actions of
the Saudi 9/11 hijackers and little public support for
Saudi Arabias declared allegiance to the U.S. in the
Global War on Terrorism. While favorables are less likely
to justify these acts, they are few in number.
Jordan: The consistent but counter-intuitive relationships
between favorability of the U.S. and Jordanian views on
terrorism and sacrifice suggest a unique dynamic in that
nation. The relative justifiability of terrorist acts may be
attributable to Jordans large population of displaced Palestinians. However, it should be noted that these data
were collected before the deadly bombings of three foreign-owned hotels in Amman attacks in which Jordanian
civilians were the victims. Jordanian outrage about these
incidents may have since altered opinions.
A note on the word jihad: The literal translation of the
word jihad is struggle, which many Muslims use to
refer to everyday challenges, rather than just political
struggle. U.S. leaders should limit references to jihad in
a political context unless quoting others.

L E V E R S & M E S S AG E S F O R P U B L I C D I P L O M AC Y
While views on terrorism and sacrifice provide few viable
levers for public diplomacy, broad findings reveal common
ground and useful insights about how different nations view
such acts.

it shares with people in Muslim nations. Reframing the

Global War on Terrorism in this way, rather than associating it with particular threats or enemies of the United
States, may help to increase favorability.

While those who are more favorable toward the U.S. are consistently more likely to disapprove of the attacks of September 11th, the U.S. should not expect to receive further sympathy as a result of that event. However, the widespread
disapproval of attacks on other civilians in general is a sentiment worth leveraging. The U.S. can and should emphasize
the right of all civilians to live peacefully as a common value

Further, this is an area in which leaders should recognize

the differences that exist across nations. The relative permissibility of acts of sacrifice in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Pakistan, and Lebanon must factor into the decision-making
process for policies which affect those nations.

Reframe the Global War on Terrorism to emphasize the common value of the right of all civilians worldwide to live in
peace
Be mindful of greater support for acts of sacrifice in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Pakistan, and Lebanon
Page 25

SUCCESS
FINDINGS
People in Muslim nations tend to admire Western achievements in science and technology and in education, but not
necessarily in films and music.

14.06 Western nations are willing to share their technological

know-how with less developed nations

100
80

Science and technology capabilities: Respondents believe

Western nations are more technologically advanced than
Muslim nations, but that they are not willing to share this
knowknow-how with poorer countries. People in each nation
strongly agree that Western nations are technologically advanced, but they disagree (moderately to strongly) that Muslim nations have promising scientific and technological futures (Q14.02, 15.06). This suggests that respondents believe that Muslim nations are currently at a comparative disadvantage and that the gap between Muslim and Western
nations will not shrink in the future.
14.02 / 15.06 Comparison of science/technology capabilities
100

60
40
20
0
Lebanon Indonesia Pakistan

Saudi
Arabia

Jordan
Agree

Iran

Turkey

Morocco

Disagree

A more favorable view of the U.S. consistently correlates

with perceptions of Western willingness to share knowhow. In Lebanon, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Turkey,
and Morocco (i.e., all nations except Pakistan and Iran),
those who are more favorable toward the U.S. are more
likely to agree that Western nations are willing to share
their technological know-how.

80
60
40
20
0
Morocco Indonesia

Turkey

Lebanon

Jordan

Saudi
Arabia

Iran

Pakistan

Agree that Western nations are technologically advanced

Agree that Muslim nations have promising futures

At least 65% of respondents in each nation agree that Western nations are technologically advanced (with six of eight
nations at or above 75%), but fewer than 40% in each nation
agree that Muslim nations have a promising future in terms
of science and technology (with both Turkey and Indonesia
below 20% agreement). In all nations, the gap between perceptions of Western capabilities and Muslim possibilities is
44-69 percentage points. People in Morocco and Lebanon
are the most likely to agree that Western nations are advanced (more than 90% agree in each). People in Iran and
Pakistan, nations possessing or assumed to be pursuing
nuclear capabilities, are the most likely to agree that Muslim
nations have promising futures (35-38%).
Nonetheless, Western nations are not perceived as willing to
share their technological know-how with less developed
countries (Q14.06). Fewer than 30% of respondents in each
nation agree, with five nations at or under 20%: Saudi Arabia
(20%), Jordan (17%), Iran (12%), Turkey (11%), and Morocco
(9%).

Correlations in individual nations provide additional insight

into this area. In Lebanon, higher favorability correlates
with more agreement that Western nations are technologically advanced, suggesting that perceptions of Western,
rather than Muslim, abilities may be more influential in
this nation. In Saudi Arabia, higher favorability correlates
with more positive views about both Western abilities and
Muslim future abilities, indicating that favorables in this
nation have positive perceptions of abilities and futures in
both societies. In Morocco, higher favorability correlates
with more agreement that Muslim nations have promising
futures. In Iran, higher favorability correlates with less
agreement that Muslim nations have promising futures in
Iran. This suggests that favorables in Morocco are optimistic about their technological future, while those in Iran
are more pessimistic on the subject. Overall, these correlations suggest that improving perceptions of willingness
to share know-how will be effective across nations, while
emphasis on Western abilities relative to Muslim future
capabilities should vary by nation.
Educational systems: People believe educational systems
in Western nations are better than those in Muslim nations. A majority of respondents in each nation agree that
Western educational systems are good, while less than
half of respondents in each nation except Jordan agree
that Muslim educational systems are good (Q14.14,
15.13). The differential ratings of the systems varies by
nation. Half of the nations show a large percentage point
gap favoring Western systems: Morocco (65), Turkey (49),
Iran (43), and Lebanon (32). Other gaps also favor Western systems but are less than 20 percentage points: Saudi
Page 26

Who We Are: Success

Arabia (18), Indonesia (18), Pakistan (9), and Jordan (2).

14.14 / 15.13 Agree that have good educational systems

100
80
60
40
20
0
Morocco

Turkey

Iran

Lebanon

Western nations

Saudi
Arabia

Indonesia Pakistan

Jordan

Muslim nations

Favorability correlates with views on the quality of education

systems in many nations, but the varying directions of the
correlations indicate differences among nations. In Lebanon
and Iran, higher favorability correlates with more agreement
that Western systems are good and less agreement that
Muslim systems are. This suggests that emphasizing how
insights from Western education can improve education in
Muslim nations may be effective in these nations. In Saudi
Arabia, higher favorability correlates with more agreement
that both Western and Muslim systems are good. This indicates that emphasizing the strength of education in both
Western and Muslim nations may be effective in Saudi Arabia. In Morocco and Jordan, higher favorability is associated
with more agreement that Muslim systems are good, while in
Jordan and Pakistan, it correlates with less agreement that
Muslim systems are good. Although the U.S. may not want
to directly comment on its perceptions of the quality of education in Muslim nations, it should be mindful of these perceptions when considering related policies.

Films and music: Respondents are divided on whether

Western nations produce enjoyable films and music. Contrary to conventional wisdom, respondents are split almost
exactly down the middle as to whether Western nations
produce enjoyable films and music (Q14.10). Agreement
rates in most nations range from 46% to 54%. People are
most likely to agree in Lebanon (67%), while people are
least likely to agree in Indonesia (37%) and Saudi Arabia
(36%). As the question asks about films and music together, it is not possible to test whether respondents have
different perceptions of the two. However, conventional
wisdom indicates that Muslims are less likely to object to
Western music than Western films.

14.10 Western nations produce enjoyable films and music

100
80
60
40
20
0
Lebanon

Iran

Jordan

Morocco

Pakistan

Agree

Disagree

Turkey

Indonesia

Saudi
Arabia

Western entertainment does not appear to be a strong

lever for increasing favorability. Higher favorability correlates with more agreement that Western nations produce
enjoyable films and music only in Lebanon and Iran.

L E V E R S & M E S S AG E S F O R P U B L I C D I P L O M AC Y
To improve its favorability in the Muslim world, the U.S.
should attempt to capitalize on Muslims admiration for the
success of Western nations in building advanced scientific
and technological capabilities and good educational systems.
tems However, admiration of Western abilities is not
enough; in order to translate these comparative advantages
into increased favorability, the U.S. should demonstrate willingness to share its expertise with Muslim nations. Although
this may not extend to all areas such as nuclear capabilities,
the U.S. may be able to increase favorability by sharing scientific and technological expertise in order to improve public
goods such as water and sanitation systems and the provi

sion of public health and medications in Muslim nations.

Additionally, the U.S. might share educational expertise by
further funding and sponsoring educational exchanges
and advisory services for Muslim educators.
Given varying opinions on Western nations films and music, we do not recommend using entertainment as a lever
for public diplomacy. However, it may be worthwhile to
conduct further research into whether these views differ
between films and music and whether they vary by age
and gender in order to develop more targeted messages
related to Western entertainment.

know--how with Muslim nations

Increase efforts to share technical and scientific know
Support educational exchanges and offer assistance to nations seeking to learn from Western systems
Establish American libraries in Muslim nations to demonstrate U.S. commitment to supporting education
Maintain relationships with Muslim alumni of American schools and encourage them to share their experiences
Use U.S. radio and television broadcasts to engage Muslims in debate on topics meaningful to them, rather than using
them to promote Western films and music
Page 27

U. S . Q UA L I T Y O F L I F E
FINDINGS
People in Muslim nations on average think poorly of the
quality of the life in the U.S. They tend to consider the U.S. a
violent and morally decadent society, and they generally do
not perceive it to be an attractive tourist destination.

peaceful to live in. Although the direction of causality is

unclear, the consistent correlations across countries indicate that addressing perceptions of violence in the U.S.
may be a helpful lever in public diplomacy.

Violence: Respondents on average think that the U.S. has

high rates of crime and that it is not peaceful to live in. In
each nation except Pakistan, majorities believe that the U.S.
has high rates of crime (Q27.01). Agreement is highest in
Morocco (79%) and Iran (76%) and is lowest in Pakistan
(42%).

Morality: Most respondents call the U.S. morally decadent.

Views on moral decadence in the U.S. are very similar to
those on crime rates: in each nation except Pakistan, a
majority of respondents agree that the term morally decadent applies the U.S. (Q27.11). Again, the highest levels
of agreement are found in Morocco (79%) and Iran (76%),
while the lowest are found in Pakistan (40%).

27.10 U.S. has high rates of crime

100
80

27.11 U.S. is morally decadent

60

100

40

80
60

20

40

0
Morocco

Iran

Saudi
Arabia

Lebanon

Jordan

Turkey Indonesia Pakistan

20
0

Agree

Disagree

Morocco

Iran

Saudi
Arabia

Lebanon

Jordan Indonesia Turkey

Agree

Further confirming this violent perception of U.S. society,

fewer than 18% of respondents in each nation cite the U.S.
as being peaceful to live in (Q27.09).

27.09 U.S. is peaceful to live in

100
80
60
40
20

Pakistan

Disagree

Favorability correlates with views on moral decadence in

all eight nations: higher favorability is associated with a
lower likelihood of agreeing that the U.S. is morally decadent. The similarity between responses to questions on
moral decadence and high rates of crime may indicate
that respondents believe there is a relationship between
these characteristics (i.e., moral decadence leads to high
crime rates) or that they are both caused by another underlying factor (i.e., favorability may cause these views
rather than these views having a causal impact on favorability toward the U.S.).

0
Lebanon

Iran

Jordan Indonesia Morocco Turkey

Agree

Pakistan

Saudi
Arabia

Disagree

Higher favorability consistently correlates with perceptions of

lower violence in the U.S. In each nation, people who are
more favorable toward the U.S. are less likely to agree that
the U.S. has high rates of crime. Additionally, in Iran, Jordan,
Indonesia, Morocco, and Turkey, higher favorability correlates with a greater likelihood of agreeing that the U.S. is

Tourism: Few respondents consider the U.S. an attractive

tourist destination. Fewer than 40% of respondents in
each nation agree that the U.S. is an attractive tourist destination. Higher agreement rates occur in Iran (37%), Indonesia (33%), Pakistan (32%), and Morocco (28%), while all
others are below 25%: Jordan (23%), Turkey (16%), Saudi
Arabia (14%), and Lebanon (12%).

Page 28

W h o W e A r e : U. S . Q u a l i t y o f L if e

Higher favorability toward the U.S. correlates with more

agreement that the U.S. is an attractive tourist destination in
Iran, Indonesia, Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon. Interestingly,
this list of nations is very similar to those where higher favorability correlates with more agreement that the U.S. is
peaceful to live in, though Lebanon is included and Morocco
is not.

27.01 U.S. is an attractive tourist destination

100

COUNTRY SPECIFIC INSIGHTS

Pakistan: People in Pakistan are less likely to agree that
the negative characteristics high rates of crime and
morally decadent apply to the U.S. This is surprising,
as respondents in Pakistan do not otherwise express
higher opinions of the U.S. than people in other nations.
These views may be affected by perceptions of crime
and moral decadence in their own country or by increased exposure to U.S. society, as Pakistanis may be
more likely to visit the U.S. than other Muslims.

80
60
40
20
0
Iran

Indonesia Pakistan Morocco Jordan

Agree

Turkey

Saudi
Arabia

Lebanon

Disagree

These findings may suggest a relationship between favorability and views about whether the U.S. is an attractive tourist
destination or it may indicate the presence of an underlying
causal variable. One possible underlying factor may be Muslims perceptions that minorities are not treated fairly in
Western societies (as mentioned in the section on democracy and legal rights), which may indicate a fear that Muslims will not be treated fairly when visiting Western nations
including the U.S.

Lebanon: Despite mostly positive views toward the U.S.

and Western nations in other areas, people in Lebanon
do not have positive views of U.S. quality of life. In fact,
people in Lebanon are the most likely to disagree that
the U.S. is an attractive place to visit. However, they are
the most likely to agree that the U.S. is peaceful to live
in, though less than 20% agree with this statement.
These contrasting views are somewhat surprising, given
the fairly large number of Lebanese-Americans.
Morocco: Similar to Lebanon, positive views toward the
U.S. and Western nations in other areas do not appear
to translate to positive views of U.S. quality of life. People in Morocco are the most likely to agree that the U.S.
has high rates of crime and is morally decadent and
less than 10% believe it is peaceful to live in. Additionally, only 28% consider it an attractive tourist destination.

L E V E R S & M E S S AG E S F O R P U B L I C D I P L O M AC Y
Despite consistently negative perceptions of quality of life in
the U.S., correlations suggest that improving these perceptions may increase favorability.
Respondents views on quality of life in the U.S. consistently
correlate with favorability in most nations: people who are
more favorable toward the U.S. are more likely to think it is
peaceful and an attractive place to visit, and they are less
likely to think it has high rates of crime and is morally decadent. In interpreting these correlations, however, it must be
noted that favorability levels may actually be driving these
views, rather than the other way around (i.e., having a negative view of the U.S. may make a respondent more likely to

assign negative characteristics to the U.S. and less likely

to assign positive ones). While public diplomacy might
improve perceptions of U.S. quality of life, targeting these
views may not be the most effective approach to increasing favorability.
Although it may be difficult for leaders to influence Muslims perceptions of violence and morality in the U.S., they
might try to promote the U.S. as an attractive tourist destination. In general, increasing the number of Muslims who
have direct interactions with Americans may improve their
views of U.S. quality of life.

Sponsor cultural exchange programs to increase the number of Muslims with real-life experiences in the U.S.
Sponsor ambassador programs for MuslimMuslim-Americans to visit Muslim nations and share their experiences

Page 29

CONCLUSION
This analysis uncovers a variety of factors that affect how
people in Muslim nations view the U.S., providing the foundation for datadata-driven public diplomacy.
While significant numbers of people in Muslim nations hold
unfavorable views of the U.S., sizeable favorable and neutral
populations do exist. People in Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Jordan, and Turkey are the most likely to have strongly negative
opinions of the U.S., while people in Iran, Lebanon, Morocco,
and Indonesia hold more varied views. However, the finding
that more than half of people in five nations are either favorable or neutral toward the U.S. indicates the U.S. has an opportunity to attract new friends and dissuade potential enemies.
In analyzing what affects favorability of the U.S., we find patterns both in terms of what we do and who we are, but
we find few consistent relationships with demographic and
ethnic factors. Although we find overwhelmingly negative
opinions on U.S. foreign policy substance and style, we do
not find an inherent conflict between Western and Muslim
cultures. Our findings reveal shared values across cultures,
from support for legal freedoms and equal rights to the right
of all civilians to live in peace without the threat of terrorism.
Additionally, respondents express admiration for U.S.
achievements in science and technology and in education.
However, people in Muslim nations express skepticism
about U.S. intentions in the region and apprehension about
the influence of Western culture on their societies.

U.S. leaders have much to gain by taking these findings

into account. By understanding what is attractive to Muslims about the U.S., they can target public diplomacy messages in ways that might increase these perceptions in the
overall population.
Our findings provide the empirical evidence needed to replace one-size-fits-all public diplomacy efforts with targeted strategies that are deliberately mindful of that which
makes each nation unique. Our levers and messages for
public diplomacy seek to bridge the gap from opinion to
action by providing suggestions for improving the U.S.
relationships with Muslim nations. Across all areas of
analysis, we underscore the importance of demonstrating
respect for cultural differences and diversity and of recognizing how the priorities of people in Muslim nations often
differ from those in the U.S. Rather than attempting to
align Muslim views with Western ones, leaders should
demonstrate their willingness to allow Muslim populations
to determine for themselves what is important to their societies and what will help their progress.
Recognizing what is at stake, we hope leaders will use this
analysis to inform policy decisions that affect people in
Muslim nations. Capitalizing on these insights is not only
in the U.S. national interest, but is also significant for the
entire international community. Improving U.S. favorability
among Muslims is a critical step in moving toward a more
peaceful coexistence among all cultures.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We are wholeheartedly grateful to Jim Clifton, chairman and
CEO of the Gallup Organization, for encouraging and enabling
this analysis. Mr. Clifton not only provided us with Gallups
data, but also with visionary direction about how important it is
for leaders to truly understand the world in which they serve.
We are highly indebted to Richard Burkholder, Director of International Polling at the Gallup Organization, who designed and
oversaw the execution of the polls used in this analysis. Richard,
and his survey partner Jihad Fakhreddine, provided valuable insights about the questionnaires and the process of administering
them. They also inspired us with their passion for the data and
the region.
We are also thankful to Gale Muller and Paul Scott of the Gallup
World Poll for supporting this project from inception to completion, providing answers to our every question, and reminding us
of the importance and value of the work at hand.

At the Kennedy School, our utmost respect and gratitude goes to

Professor Joseph S. Nye, who far exceeded the responsibilities of
a faculty advisor on this project. We have been inspired by his
expertise on public diplomacy and Muslim nations, and we have
been humbled by the time, energy, and patience he has given us
each step of the way.
Our deep appreciation goes to Professor Suzanne Cooper, without whom the quantitative components of this report would not
have been possible. She repeatedly opened her doors to us
throughout our statistical analysis process, providing us with the
guidance we needed to make the best use of the data.
Finally, we are much obliged to Professor Monica Toft for leading our International Security Policy PAC Seminar with resolve
and dedication. She provided us with valuable feedback from
start to finish and with the deadlines and discipline to keep us on
track.
Page 30

ENDNOTES
DataData-driven Diplomacy:
1 Karen Hughes, The Mission of Public Diplomacy, Testimony at confirmation hearing before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Washington, D.C., 22 July 2005, <http://www.state.gov/r/us/2005/49967.htm>
2 Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004), 11.
Context & Background:
3 Ali Asani, Course lectures on Understanding Islam and Contemporary Muslim Societies, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, SeptemberDecember 2006.
4 Sameh Abdelaziz , Muslim Image: Religious followers can't be defined by acts of extremists, The Atlanta Journal-Constitution, 9 January
2007, 11A, LexisNexis Academic, (7 April 2007).
5 Carol D. Leonnig and Julie Tate, Some at Guantanamo Mark 5 Years in Limbo; Big Questions About Low-Profile Inmates, The Washington Post, 16 January 2007, A01, LexisNexis Academic, (7 April 2007).
6 Ibid.
7 Michiko Kakutani, Waging a battle, losing a war, The New York Times, 4 November 2005, 33, LexisNexis Academic, (7 April 2007).
8 Joe Garofoli, Newsweek's gaffe -- damage is done; In post-Abu Ghraib era, retraction fails to defuse suspicions Quran was desecrated,
The San Francisco Chronicle, 17 May 2005, A1, LexisNexis Academic, (7 April 2007).
9 The White House, President Bush Addresses the Nation, 19 March 2003,
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030319-17.html> (7 April 2007).
10 Vivienne Walt, Iraqi Clerics Use Prison as Rally Cry, The Boston Globe, 8 May 2004, A1, LexisNexis Academic, (7 April 2007).
11 Agence France-Presse, Bush says Iraq hurt US cause with Muslims, 18 January 2005, LexisNexis Academic, (7 April 2007).
12 Report: No WMD Stockpiles in Iraq, CNN Online, 7 October 2004,
<http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/10/06/iraq.wmd.report/> (7 April 2007).
13 Elizabeth Becker, U.S. Nearly Triples Tsunami Aid Pledge, to $950 million, The New York Times, 10 February 2005, A3, LexisNexis
Academic, (7 April 2007).
14 Jacqueline Salmon, Some disasters compel us to give, The Washington Post, 6 November 2005, F01, LexisNexis Academic, (7 April
2007).
15 David Graham, Envoys say Tsunami relief aids U.S. image, The San Diego Union-Tribune, 21 May 2005, B6, LexisNexis Academic, (7
April 2007).
16 David E. Sanger, Waging the War on Terror: Report Belies Optimistic View, The New York Times, 27 September 2006, A16, LexisNexis
Academic, (7 April 2007).
17 Ibid.
18 Roula Khalaf, Rice 'new Middle East' comments fuel Arab fury over US policy, The Financial Times, 31 July 2006, LexisNexis Academic,
(7 April 2007).
19 One Month Later in Lebanon, The New York Times, 12 August 2006, A14, LexisNexis Academic, (7 April 2007).
20 Muhammad cartoon row intensifies, BBC Online, 1 February 2004, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4670370.stm> (7
April 2007).
21 Ian Fisher, Some Muslim Leaders Want Pope to Apologize for Remarks, The New York Times, 16 September 2006, A6, LexisNexis Academic, (7 April 2007).
Selected Countries for Analysis:
Map: Muslim Distribution (Sunni and Shia), Perry-Castaeda Library Map Collection, University of Texas Libraries, produced by the U.S.
Central Intelligence Agency, <http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/world_maps/muslim_distribution.jpg> (7 April 2007).
Country statistics: U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, <https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html> (7
April 2007).

STATISTICAL NOTES
n/a denotes a question was not asked in that nation.
*For question 9, we emphasize that useful, but can live without is the lowest option on the scale.
For questions 14, 15, and 27, disagree refers to people who did not cite the statement.

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AP P ENDIX 1: SELECT ED Q UEST I ONS F OR ANA LY SI S

EXACT WORDING AS READ TO RESPONDENTS
Q 26. In general, what opinion do you have of the United States?
[1= Very unfavorable, 2= Somewhat unfavorable, 3= neither unfavorable nor favorable, 4= Somewhat favorable, 5= Very favorable]
Q 9. Here are some aspects of life some people say are important to them. Please look at them and categorize them into three separate
categories: those that are essential and you cannot live without, those that are very important, and those that are useful but that you can
live without.
[1= Essential/cannot live without, 2= Very important, 3= Useful, but can live without]
9.02 Having a comfortable economic life
9.03 Having an enriched religious/spiritual life
9.04 Having a government that governs wisely
9.05 Having a democratically elected government
9.07 Being well-informed about world events
Q 10. I am going to read you a list of items. For each one please tell me whether you think it is likely to improve or increase over the
course of the next few years, to deteriorate or decline over the course of the next few years or to remain the same. Just your best estimate.
[1=Will improve or increase, 2=Will remain the same, 3=Will deteriorate or decline]
10.01. Family/Personal economic level
10.02 Opportunity to travel abroad to Europe and North America
10.04 Commitment to ones faith
10.05 Integration with the worlds economy
10.06 Interaction with Western civilization/culture
10.07 Control over what you wish to do in life
10.08 The national economy
10.09 The situation in Palestine
10.10 The situation in Iraq
10.11 The status of Arab/Muslim world in world arenas
10.12 The number of Arab countries that have democratically elected governments
Q 13. There are some acts people do in life. I will read out to you a number of these acts. I would like you to indicate to which extent it can
be morally justified?
[1=Cannot be justified at all, 5=Completely justifiable]
13.02 Not living in harmony with those who do not share your opinion or values
13.04 Sacrificing ones life for what one believes in
13.05 The ouster of Saddam Husseins government in Iraq by U.S. and British forces
13.06 The events of September 11th in the USA, that is the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon
13.07 Other attacks in which civilians are the target
Q 14. Some people say different things about different cultures. I have here a number of statements. Which ones do you associate with
Western nations?
[1= Agree, 2= Disagree, 3= Dont know, 4= Refused] [Multiple answers accepted]
14.01 Respect Arab/Islamic values
14.02 Technologically advanced
14.03 Care about poorer nations
14.04 Treat fairly minorities living in their societies
14.05 Fair in their stance towards Arab/Muslim countries
14.06 Willing to share their technological know how with less developed nations
14.07 Take positions that support Arab causes in international organizations
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Appendix 1: Selected Questions for Analysis

14.08 Equality of their citizens regarding rights and duties
14.09 Fair stance toward the situation in Palestine
14.10 Produce enjoyable films and music
14.11 Have fair judicial systems
14.12 Have high levels of corruption
14.13 Both sexes enjoy equal legal rights
14.14 Have good educational systems
14.15 Offer good economic opportunities for their citizens
Q 15. Which statements do you associate with Arab/Muslim nations?
[1= Agree, 2= Disagree, 3= Dont know, 4= Refused] [Multiple answers accepted]
15.01 Open minded towards the Western Culture
15.02 Eager to have better relationship with the Western World
15.03 Applies practical measures to improve the economic lot of their own people
15.04 Not apprehensive about the influence of Western culture and lifestyle
15.05 People are free in controlling their own lives and future
15.06 Technologically and scientifically their future is very promising
15.07 Attachment to their spiritual and moral values is critical to their progress
15.08 Adopting Western values will help their progress
15.09 Moving toward greater governmental democracy will help their progress
15.10 Have fair judicial systems
15.11 Have high levels of corruption
15.12 Both sexes enjoy equal legal rights
15.13 Have good educational systems
15.14 Offer good economic opportunities for their citizens
Q 16. The time for a better understanding between the West and the Arab/Muslim world will probably
[1= Never come, 5= Come very soon]
Q 17. For a better co-existence between Western societies and the Arab/Muslim world, I think that the Western societies:
[1= Do not show any concern, 5= Show a lot of concern]
Q 18. With respect to a better understanding between the Western and Arab/Islamic cultures, it is an issue that:
[1= Doesnt concern me at all, 5= Concerns me a lot]
Q 27. People have different views about different countries. I will read a set of statements, and would you tell me the countries to which
each statement applies. (Each statement could apply to one country, to several countries or to none.) (Country = U.S.)
[0= Does not apply, 1= Applies]
27.01 Attractive tourist destination
27.02 Aggressive
27.03 Conceited
27.04 Trustworthy
27.05 Friendly
27.06 Arrogant
27.07 Gets provoked easily
27.08 Ruthless
27.09 Peaceful to live in
27.10 High rates of crime
27.11 Morally decadent
27.12 Scientifically and technologically advanced

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27.13 Adopts biased policies in world affairs
27.14 Religious extremism is common
27.15 Hypocritical
27.16 Own citizens enjoy many liberties
27.17 Care about human rights in other countries
27.18 Treats other countries respectfully
Q 28. Suppose that someday you were asked to help draft a new constitution for a new country. As I read you a list of possible provisions
that might be included in a new constitution, would you tell me whether you would probably agree or not agree with the inclusion of each
of these provisions?
[1= Agree, 2= Disagree, 3= Do not know, 4= Refused]
28.01 Freedom of speech allowing all citizens to express their opinion on the political, social and economic issues of the day
28.02 Freedom of religion allowing all citizens to observe any religion of their choice and to practice its teachings and beliefs
Q 31. In general, which of these statements comes closest to your own point of view?
[1=Sharia must be the only source of legislation, 2=Sharia must be a source of legislation but not the only source, 3=Sharia should not
be a source of legislation]
Q 32. Some countries have also had discussions about the rights that a countrys government should guarantee to women. Please tell me
whether or not you generally agree with each of the following?
32.01 Women should have the same legal rights as men
Q 33. I will read out to you a set of statements, which you may or may not totally agree with. As I read them out, I would like you to indicate
whether you agree or disagree with each.
[1= Disagree, 2= Agree, 3= Cant say]
33.01 The U.S. is serious about improving the economic lot of people in this region
33.02 The U.S. is serious about the establishment of democratic systems of government in this region
33.03 The U.S. will allow people in this region to fashion their own political future as they see fit without direct U.S. influence
33.04 The removal of the former Iraqi regime by U.S. and British forces will weaken the activities of Islamic fundamentalist organizations
Q 32. Taking everything into consideration, do you think the coalition invasion of Iraq has done more harm than good or more good than
harm? [*Note question number repeated in Gallup questionnaire]
[1= More harm than good, 2= More good than harm, 3= The same, 4= Dont know, 5= Refused][3,4,5 not read as options]
[*Note: Scale recoded as: 1= More harm than good, 2= The Same, 3= More good than harm]
Q D0. Gender
[1=Female, 2=Male]
Q D1. Age: Please tell me your age.
[Open Ended]
Q D2. Education: What is the highest completed level of education?
[1=Completed primary school (maximum eight years of schooling), 2=Completed secondary school, and 3=Completed college or four years
of post-secondary school]

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