OSART Guidelines 2015
OSART Guidelines 2015
OSART Guidelines 2015
OSART Guidelines
2015 Edition
Reference Report for
IAEA Operational Safety Review Teams
(OSARTs)
OSART GUIDELINES
The following States are Members of the International Atomic Energy Agency:
AFGHANISTAN
ALBANIA
ALGERIA
ANGOLA
ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA
ARGENTINA
ARMENIA
AUSTRALIA
AUSTRIA
AZERBAIJAN
BAHAMAS
BAHRAIN
BANGLADESH
BARBADOS
BELARUS
BELGIUM
BELIZE
BENIN
BOLIVIA, PLURINATIONAL
STATE OF
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
BOTSWANA
BRAZIL
BRUNEI DARUSSALAM
BULGARIA
BURKINA FASO
BURUNDI
CAMBODIA
CAMEROON
CANADA
CENTRAL AFRICAN
REPUBLIC
CHAD
CHILE
CHINA
COLOMBIA
CONGO
COSTA RICA
CTE DIVOIRE
CROATIA
CUBA
CYPRUS
CZECH REPUBLIC
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC
OF THE CONGO
DENMARK
DJIBOUTI
DOMINICA
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
ECUADOR
EGYPT
EL SALVADOR
ERITREA
ESTONIA
ETHIOPIA
FIJI
FINLAND
FRANCE
GABON
GEORGIA
GERMANY
GHANA
GREECE
GUATEMALA
GUYANA
HAITI
HOLY SEE
HONDURAS
HUNGARY
ICELAND
INDIA
INDONESIA
IRAN, ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF
IRAQ
IRELAND
ISRAEL
ITALY
JAMAICA
JAPAN
JORDAN
KAZAKHSTAN
KENYA
KOREA, REPUBLIC OF
KUWAIT
KYRGYZSTAN
LAO PEOPLES DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC
LATVIA
LEBANON
LESOTHO
LIBERIA
LIBYA
LIECHTENSTEIN
LITHUANIA
LUXEMBOURG
MADAGASCAR
MALAWI
MALAYSIA
MALI
MALTA
MARSHALL ISLANDS
MAURITANIA
MAURITIUS
MEXICO
MONACO
MONGOLIA
MONTENEGRO
MOROCCO
MOZAMBIQUE
MYANMAR
NAMIBIA
NEPAL
NETHERLANDS
NEW ZEALAND
NICARAGUA
NIGER
NIGERIA
NORWAY
OMAN
PAKISTAN
PALAU
PANAMA
PAPUA NEW GUINEA
PARAGUAY
PERU
PHILIPPINES
POLAND
PORTUGAL
QATAR
REPUBLIC OF MOLDOVA
ROMANIA
RUSSIAN FEDERATION
RWANDA
SAN MARINO
SAUDI ARABIA
SENEGAL
SERBIA
SEYCHELLES
SIERRA LEONE
SINGAPORE
SLOVAKIA
SLOVENIA
SOUTH AFRICA
SPAIN
SRI LANKA
SUDAN
SWAZILAND
SWEDEN
SWITZERLAND
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC
TAJIKISTAN
THAILAND
THE FORMER YUGOSLAV
REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA
TOGO
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO
TUNISIA
TURKEY
UGANDA
UKRAINE
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES
UNITED KINGDOM OF
GREAT BRITAIN AND
NORTHERN IRELAND
UNITED REPUBLIC
OF TANZANIA
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
URUGUAY
UZBEKISTAN
VANUATU
VENEZUELA, BOLIVARIAN
REPUBLIC OF
VIET NAM
YEMEN
ZAMBIA
ZIMBABWE
The Agencys Statute was approved on 23 October 1956 by the Conference on the Statute of the
IAEA held at United Nations Headquarters, New York; it entered into force on 29 July 1957. The
Headquarters of the Agency are situated in Vienna. Its principal objective is to accelerate and enlarge the
contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world.
OSART GUIDELINES
2015 EDITION
REFERENCE REPORT FOR IAEA OPERATIONAL
SAFETY REVIEW TEAMS (OSARTs)
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FOREWORD
The IAEA works to provide a global nuclear safety and security framework for the protection
of people and the environment from the effects of ionizing radiation, the minimization of the
likelihood of accidents that could endanger life and property, and effective mitigation of the
effects of any such events, should they occur.
The strategic approach to achieving such a framework involves continual improvement in
four areas: national and international safety infrastructures; the establishment and global
acceptance of IAEA safety standards; an integrated approach to the provision for the
application of the safety standards; and a global network of knowledge and experience.
The IAEA Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) programme provides advice and
assistance to Member States to enhance the safety of nuclear power plants during
commissioning and operation. The OSART programme, initiated in 1982, is available to all
Member States with nuclear power plants under commissioning or in operation.
Conservative design, careful manufacture and sound construction are all prerequisites for the
safe operation of nuclear power plants. However, the safety of the plant also depends
ultimately on: sound management, policies, procedures, processes and practices; the
capability and reliability of commissioning and operating personnel; comprehensive
instructions; sound accident management and emergency preparedness; and adequate
resources. Finally, a positive attitude and conscientiousness on the part of all staff in
discharging their responsibilities is important to safety.
The OSART programme is based on the safety standards applicable to nuclear power plants.
IAEA safety standards reflect the consensus of Member States on nuclear safety matters. The
reports of the International Nuclear Safety Group identify important current nuclear safety
issues and also serve as references during an OSART review. The publication OSART
Guidelines provides overall guidance on the conduct of OSART missions for both the review
experts and their plant counterparts to ensure the consistency and comprehensiveness of the
operational safety review.
OSART reviews are performance oriented in that they accept different approaches to
commissioning and operational safety that represent good practices and may contribute to
ensuring a good safety performance for the operating organization. Recommendations are
made on items which are so far not covered by the safety standards, and proposed suggestions
might help to find more effective ways to ensure, and further enhance, plant safety.
Recognition is also given to the efforts made by the plant to develop and implement an action
plan for specific safety improvements identified prior to the IAEA mission. Commendable
good practices identified at plants are registered in an IAEA database, to which access is
provided to other plants to put in place operational safety improvements worldwide.
This publication updates OSART Guidelines (2005 Edition). The IAEA officer responsible
for this publication was V. Ranguelova of the Division of Nuclear Installation Safety.
EDITORIAL NOTE
This publication has been prepared from the original material as submitted by the contributors and has not been edited by the editorial
staff of the IAEA. The views expressed remain the responsibility of the contributors and do not necessarily represent the views of the
IAEA or its Member States.
Neither the IAEA nor its Member States assume any responsibility for consequences which may arise from the use of this publication.
This publication does not address questions of responsibility, legal or otherwise, for acts or omissions on the part of any person.
The use of particular designations of countries or territories does not imply any judgement by the publisher, the IAEA, as to the legal
status of such countries or territories, of their authorities and institutions or of the delimitation of their boundaries.
The mention of names of specific companies or products (whether or not indicated as registered) does not imply any intention to
infringe proprietary rights, nor should it be construed as an endorsement or recommendation on the part of the IAEA.
The IAEA has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third party Internet web sites referred to in this
publication and does not guarantee that any content on such web sites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.
CONTENTS
1.
INTRODUCTION .........................................................................................................1
1.1. Use of OSART guidelines ....................................................................................1
1.2. Objectives and benefits of OSART missions ........................................................2
2.
3.
4.
REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................... 53
ANNEX I: Standard structure and content of an advance information package for an IAEA
OSART mission ................................................................................................. 57
ANNEX II:OSART team code of conduct ............................................................................ 65
CONTRIBUTORS TO DRAFTING AND REVIEW ............................................................ 67
1. INTRODUCTION
One of the IAEAs safety review services is the Operational Safety Review Team (OSART)
programme. Established in 1982, the OSART programme has provided advice and assistance
to Member States for more than 30 years, in order to enhance the safety of nuclear power
plants during construction, commissioning and operation. It has also been greatly valued for
providing an opportunity for nuclear power plant operators in all countries to assist other
operators through the dissemination of information on best practices and lessons learned.
OSART reviews have taken place in all countries operating NPP. Each OSART mission is
conducted by a team of experts drawn from all regions of the world. Each of these experts has
extensive experience in nuclear power plant operation, and the cumulative nuclear experience
in a team often exceeds 300 years.
The OSART programme is the main approach to providing for better and wider application of
the IAEA safety standards, related to nuclear power plant operation, since the guidelines used
to review plant performance and programmes are based on these standards.
1.1. USE OF OSART GUIDELINES
These guidelines have been prepared to provide a basic structure and common terms of
reference, both across the various areas covered by an OSART mission and across all the
missions in the programme. As such, they are addressed - and should give guidance on how to
prepare for and conduct an OSART mission to:
The team members of the OSART mission;
The host nuclear power plant receiving the OSART mission;
The host country that has invited the OSART mission.
In particular, the reference documentation, given at the end of the document, will also prove
valuable reading for staff at the host nuclear power plant.
The OSART review is based on the documents that describe the plant and its structures,
systems and components; the organization, training and qualification of plant personnel;
written procedures applicable to the operation of the plant; interviews and discussions with
plant personnel; observations of plant material conditions, operating practices and work in the
field; and the records and reports of its operating history. The review focuses on performance
in various areas important to safety, managerial aspects of policy implementation, control of
activities, verification and correction, as well as document control. An OSART review may
also take place within a nuclear power project, at the critical commissioning phase when
many decisions are being taken that will affect operational safety throughout the life of the
plant (Pre-operational OSART).
Specific review guidelines are presented in Sections 4.1 to 4.15, covering the following
OSART review areas:
(1) Leadership and management for safety (LM)
(2) Training and qualification (TQ)
(3) Operations (OPS)
(4) Maintenance (MA)
(5) Technical support (TS)
(6) Operating experience feedback (OE)
1
The HPP is a plant staff member with good overall knowledge of the plant, its
programmes and staff, and with good English language skills;
The HPP main role is to act as liaison officer between the plant and the IAEA team.
However, the HPP is not a part of the IAEA review team;
During the three weeks of the mission, the HPP does not have any plant responsibilities;
The HPP participates in the OSART team meetings, and advises the OSART team
members when information may not be complete or correct;
In case of misunderstandings or issues needing further clarification, the HPP points the
OSART team towards the responsible or knowledgeable plant persons in specific areas
who could provide clarification and clear any misunderstandings.
Upon the return from the mission, the Team Leader prepares a report of the preparatory
meeting, copies of which will be sent for review and comment to plant/utility/regulatory
management that participated in the preparatory meeting. The final report will be circulated to
the same recipients.
2.3. PLANT PREPARATIONS FOR AN OSART MISSION
The plant needs to prepare an Advance Information Package (AIP) and send it to the IAEA
for distribution to the OSART team members at least one month prior to the mission. The
package should contain adequate information and data to ensure a good understanding of the
overall organizational structures and current operating practices. It should also include the
plant staff approach to operational safety, the key operational features and safety performance
indicators, as well as the organizational setup.
An important aspect of plant staff preparations for an OSART mission is the conduct of a
thorough self-assessment of the plant operational safety using as a basis the IAEA Safety
Standards. The results of the self-assessment should be included in the AIP in sufficient detail
for the IAEA team members to understand any challenges which the plant might currently be
facing. While the specific methodology used to conduct the self-assessment is left to plant
staff, the results of the self-assessment should contain the following key components:
For each review area, a description of how each individual expectation, as described in
Section 4, is met. This information shall typically be presented on 3 to 4 pages.
Specific gaps where performance or programmes do not fully meet IAEA Safety
Standards.
Where gaps are identified, an explanation of what corrective actions are being
taken/planned to close the gap, including budget commitments, staffing, document
preparation, increased or modified training, equipment purchases, etc.
While the contents of the AIP should cover essential plant operational safety information,
they should also be concise. All descriptions in the package should be in English, as this is the
OSART working language. An example of typical AIP content is given in Annex 1.
2.4. PREPARATION OF THE OSART MISSION
The following provides an overview of key preparations expected to be taken by the OSART
team and plant staff in the period between the OSART preparatory meeting and the
commencement date of the OSART mission:
9 months to 3 months before the OSART mission
The designated IAEA Team Leader assembles the mission team. The team will contain a
Deputy Team Leader from the IAEA and professionals from diverse backgrounds, and may
include new OSART reviewers, experienced reviewers, operators, and representatives of
Technical Support Organizations and Regulatory Authorities.
The IAEA ensures that the HPP identifies and communicates, to the IAEA and the OSART
team members, all the information that may be needed for team members to be granted plant
access. This information, and relevant forms which need to be completed, should be provided
to team members in sufficient time to allow for their completion, prior to arrival on site.
3 months to 2 weeks before the OSART mission
The Team Leader maintains contact with the HPP during this period to confirm that all
arrangements are progressing as planned, i.e., the plant has made arrangements for a hotel,
with the workspace and PC hardware needed for the OSART team members; the AIP has
been sent to the IAEA team members; the plant has received all the information necessary to
ensure that the OSART team members will have access to the plant; all logistical support
needed for the mission is ensured; and the team is made aware of initial arrangements
regarding collection from the airport and any initial (first day) activities.
1 day before the start of the OSART mission
One day prior to the start of the OSART mission, the OSART team will meet at the plant site.
During this day:
training is given to the OSART team members by plant staff to grant them escorted
access to the nuclear power plant.
a whole body count is completed for each member of the OSART team, according to
the relevant plant procedures.
the IAEA TL & DTL check that the Local-Area Network (LAN) to be used by the
OSART team is set up and that OSART common folders have been created, where all
the information needed to perform the OSART mission is uploaded.
the TL & DTL conduct the IAEA OSART team training.
Saturday
Sunday
Monday
Tuesday
Week 1
Travel
Travel
Training
Entrance
meeting
and plant
tour
Area
review
Area
review
Area
review
Week 2
Team
rest
Team
discussion
on
potential
issues
Area
review
Area
review
Area
review
Area
review
Area
review
Week 3
Drafting
issues for
Technical
Notes
Team rest
Finalise
Technical
Notes
following
discussion
with
counterpart
Exit
meeting
Travel
home
Complete
Whole
drafting
team
of
reviews
Technical
draft
Notes
Technical
Notes
Wednesday Thursday
Friday
Travel
home
On the first day of the mission (usually a Tuesday), an entrance meeting is held in the
morning. This meeting is attended by plant management, representatives from the nuclear
safety regulatory authority and other concerned authorities, the OSART team members and
their counterparts from the plant. In the afternoon, a plant tour is conducted in several groups,
with the aim of covering as many areas of the plant as possible.
On the second day of the mission, work starts usually with individual interviews, observations
and discussions with plant counterparts in each of the OSART review areas. At 16:00, the
OSART members prepare their daily notes and, at the end of the day, the OSART team holds
its daily meeting to exchange information on facts/concerns observed or identified during the
day. The plant HPP is invited to attend the OSART team daily meetings and, if needed,
provide additional clarification on some of the observations. In the course of the review, each
review member is expected to transform his/her observations into working notes, which
ultimately form the basis of the OSART team Technical Notes.
The last two days of the mission are reserved for completing the missions Technical Notes,
and for the team to reach consensus on all the recommendations, suggestions, self-identified
issues and good practices.
The exit meeting, during which each OSART reviewer presents the findings in his/her review
area, takes place in the morning of the last day of the mission. This meeting is attended by
plant management, the regulatory authority and any other concerned organizations, along with
plant staff. The dates of the OSART follow-up mission are also agreed between the OSART
TL and plant management. Upon completion of the exit meeting, a press conference may take
place, if so requested and organized by the plant.
2.5.3. The review
The OSART team uses the following sources to acquire the information needed to develop its
recommendations, suggestions and self-identified issues and to prepare the OSART mission
report. These are:
To be able to make informed assessments, reviewers are expected to cover each topic to the
extent necessary, based on the questions contained in each of the specific review areas
Working Notes Outlines (WNOs) which are available at the IAEA OSART collaboration
website. Review findings should be described and supported by accurate facts to the degree
required to make the significance of findings understandable. Formulation of
recommendations, suggestions and self-identified issues should be based on the identified
gaps as compared to IAEA Safety Standards. Similarly, good practices that are identified
during the process of the review, and should be documented for the benefit of other Member
States, are described in the OSART report in sufficient detail as to be readily understood.
It is expected that plant operational activities during the OSART mission will follow the
established work schedule, so that the team will be able to observe typical operational
activities.
Security issues are not in the scope of the OSART review, but synergy between safety and
security should be reviewed to ensure that security measures do not compromise safety. If
security-related issues are identified/observed by the team, they should be brought to the
attention of the plant manager.
9
Plant documents
Documents of general interest to the whole team, including the results of the plant selfassessment, are included in the Advance Information Package. In addition, during the review,
each expert may decide to review additional documents, specific to his area and used by the
plant.
Interviews
Interviews with plant personnel are used by the IAEA team to:
Gather additional information not covered by documentation;
Seek answers to questions, and thus perhaps satisfy possible IAEA concerns
arising out of the documentation review;
Assess plant staff understanding of their duties and responsibilities;
Assess plant staff competence, professionalism and commitment to nuclear
safety;
Provide the opportunity for all important information to be exchanged between
reviewers and counterparts, and therefore should be held at the working level, between
peers.
These interviews should be open discussions and not interrogations of the counterparts by the
reviewers. Properly conducted, these interviews are an important part of the OSART mission.
Direct observation
Direct observation of operational and work activities underway is one of the most important
aspects of the review process. A substantial part of the review period is spent at the plant
observing behaviours of staff in the field, including reviewing procedure use and work
practices. In addition, plant workers may be interviewed to gain an understanding of their
technical knowledge, skills, attitudes and morale. The observation of work should include
nuclear and industrial safety practices, use of procedures, drawings and instructions, use of
quality control measures, and supervision and management control of work. Section 3 of
these guidelines provides practical advice to reviewers on conducting observations.
Based upon the reviews of documentation, interviews and observations, the reviewer can then
assess performance. It may take several iterations through document review, interview and
observation to gain sufficient facts to complete an assessment.
2.5.4. Evaluation criteria
The focus of an OSART mission is on identifying gaps from IAEA Safety Standards, since
they represent the largest opportunities for safety improvement at the plant being reviewed.
Other publications such as INSAG reports and IAEA Safety Series Reports also provide
additional information relevant to the OSART review.
In the evening of each working day of the review, at the meeting called by the TL each expert
summarizes his/her concerns developed during the day, including perceived strengths and
weaknesses. This creates an opportunity for other team members to contribute their views,
further strengthening the experience base of the evaluation.
The OSART review thus provides an objective comparison of the observed plant safety
performance with the IAEA safety standards. This comparison may result in a
10
A copy of the Technical Notes should not be provided to the regulatory authority by the utility
if the Technical Notes will in turn be made public. The utility, however, is encouraged to let
the regulatory authority read the Technical Notes at the plant site.
The OSART Report
On completion of the OSART review, the TL will prepare the OSART Report, based on the
above Technical Notes. This is an official IAEA document, which summarizes the teams
main observations and conclusions, including all recommendations, suggestions, selfidentified issues and good practices. The report may also include encouragements for
improvements on concerns that do not fulfil the definitions for recommendations, suggestions
or self-identified issues. The report may also include good performances that do not fulfil the
definition of a good practice. Before the text is finalized, the utility and regulatory authority
concerned are given the opportunity to offer comments. This report is submitted through
official channels to the Member State which requested the OSART. Three copies each of the
printed report are sent to the countrys Permanent Mission to the United Nations in Vienna,
plant management and the regulatory body. The TL also sends electronic copies to both plant
management and the regulator.
The IAEA restricts initial distribution to in-house users and to the utility and regulatory
authority involved. The report is automatically derestricted after 90 days and published on the
IAEA OSART website, unless the Member State indicates otherwise. Most Member States in
the interest of improved transparency place the derestricted report on their official public
website.
2.6. THE OSART FOLLOW-UP
The OSART follow-up usually takes place 12-18 months after the original mission. The
duration of the follow-up mission is 4-5 days, depending on the number of issues identified
during the original OSART mission.
The TL determines the number of team members necessary for the mission, usually 1-3
members of the original OSART team, plus the TL and DTL. This number is also dependent
on the number of issues identified during the original OSART mission. The TL liaises with
the plant and agrees on dates, financing and the contact details of the plant HPP for the
follow-up mission.
Approximately three months prior to the follow-up mission, the IAEA produces the relevant
format of the Technical Notes for the plant to complete its responses, i.e. the word document
of the original report is amended by the addition:
12
This document is sent to the plant so that it may complete its responses. Once it has been sent
back to the IAEA, this document becomes the document used by the TL for the start of the
follow-up mission. This document is also sent one month in advance of the mission to all
follow-up OSART team members.
At the start of the mission, the team members agree to the review schedule with their
counterparts and proceed in determining the status of resolution of the issues in accordance
with the definitions of issue status, as indicated below. A team meeting is held each day and
the results of the review are discussed and agreed on where relevant. The HPP also
participates in this meeting.
An exit meeting is held on the last day of the mission, and this is an opportunity for each team
member to formally give the plant his/her findings on each issue.
Following the mission, the Team Leader ensures a full report is prepared in accordance with
the standard IAEA format, copies of which will be sent for review and comment to
plant/utility/regulatory management, as was the case with the original OSART Report. Three
copies each of the printed final report are sent to the countrys Permanent Mission to UN in
Vienna, plant management and the regulatory body. The TL also sends electronic copies to
both plant management and the regulator.
The IAEA assessment of the progress made with the resolution of OSART findings is made,
in accordance with the following definitions:
Issue resolved Recommendation
All necessary actions have been taken to deal with the root causes of the recommendation
rather than to just eliminate the facts identified by the team. A management review has been
carried out to ensure that actions taken have eliminated the root cause. Actions have also been
taken to check that it does not recur. Alternatively, the issue is no longer valid due to, for
example, changes in the plant organization.
Satisfactory progress to date Recommendation
Actions have been taken, including root cause determination, which lead to a high level of
confidence that the recommendation will be resolved within a reasonable timeframe,
subsequent to the follow-up mission. These actions might include budget commitments,
staffing, document preparation, increased or modified training, equipment purchases, etc. This
category implies that the recommendation could not reasonably have been resolved prior to
the follow-up visit, either due to its complexity or the need for long-term actions. This
category also includes recommendations, which have been resolved using temporary or
informal methods, or when resolution has only recently taken place and its effectiveness has
not been fully assessed.
Insufficient progress to date Recommendation
Actions taken or planned do not lead to the conclusion that the recommendation will be
resolved within a reasonable timeframe. This category includes recommendations in response
to which no action has been taken, barring recommendations that have been withdrawn.
13
Plant response/actions;
IAEA comments on plant response;
Conclusions on the status of resolution.
If a significant number of issues show insufficient progress, it will be recommended to the
Member State that an invitation be issued for another follow-up mission one year from then.
14
Is the work of sufficient complexity that a written procedure has been developed? For
many of the activities that are observed, a procedure has been developed by the utility to
ensure that specific steps are accomplished in a required manner, such that the end
product meets a minimum quality standard;
Does the work involve several departments or disciplines? Although single-discipline
observations can be productive, those that require the cooperative effort of several
elements of the plant organization often provide a more significant input to the teams
effort to evaluate the plant.
In selecting an activity to observe, the expert is looking for performance of an individual that
is representative of the utilitys ability to train its personnel and implement its policies and
procedures. With an appropriate selection of activities, the results of the observations will
provide an overall reflection of the utilitys performance. Care should be taken not to identify
the individual, or the time and location of the observation. This aids in focusing on the
symptomatic results rather than the individual.
3.3. CONDUCTING OBSERVATIONS
Preparation
Preparation is the key element of all phases of a review. The two most important parts of the
preparation phase are the determination of what and when. The what to observe can be
determined by establishing a liaison with the utility to ascertain what activities will be going
on during the period of the review. This will enable the expert to plan for specific activities
and to conduct the necessary research and study. Other activities will be observed as they
arise. The when to observe question is answered best by the earlier the better. By
conducting results-oriented observations in the first few days of an OSART, the reviewer
gains considerable insight into weaknesses within the organization. This then enables him to
properly direct his activities during the remainder of the OSART. The guiding principle for
preparation is for the reviewer to read the appropriate IAEA Safety Standards, procedures,
codes, regulations and similar documents, prior to observing the work activity.
Observation
Establishing good relationships with the individuals under observation is important. They
should understand that the purpose of the observation is not to criticize them personally, but
to look for possible improvements as well as good performance. Except in the case of an
immediate hazard to plant equipment or personnel safety, reviewers should not interfere with
plant evolutions. Questions are a necessary part of any observation, but should be asked at
appropriate times, when they do not adversely affect the performance of the individual being
questioned.
The expert should be looking, in a broad manner, at many items during the observation
process. The following illustrate the extent of the desired sphere of interest:
To what degree does the individual being observed understand the basic
objectives and policies of the utility regarding quality work and adherence
to procedures?
What training has the individual received that relates to his activities during
this observation?
What are the industrial safety and material conditions in all areas
encountered during this observation?
16
Subsequent to observing the work activity, the reviewer organizes his notes and commences
analysis of his observations. This process generally results in the need for follow-up action in
order to resolve unanswered questions. This follow-up may require a return to the physical
area of the plant to confirm initial conclusions or gather further information.
3.4. OBSERVATION TECHNIQUES
17
4. SPECIFIC GUIDELINES
4.1. LEADERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT FOR SAFETY
The safe and reliable conduct of a nuclear power plant implies the management of numerous
activities in various areas - including nuclear safety, health, the environment, security, quality,
industrial safety - and of social and economic elements. All these elements must be integrated
in a management system to ensure that safety is not compromised and remains the first
priority. Senior management shall establish, implement and continuously improve this
integrated management system, and shall determine and provide the competences and (human
and other) resources necessary to carry out the activities of the organization.
The integrated management system shall also describe responsibilities, lines of authority
within the organization, and interfaces with external organizations.
The Leadership and Management for Safety evaluation includes a review of the effectiveness
of the integrated management system in ensuring and enhancing safety.
During the review, appropriate attention should be paid to special features of local culture,
which may have a strong influence on management practices.
References
[SSR-2/2; GSR part 2; GSR part 4; GS-G-3.1; GS-G-3.5; NS-G-2.4; NS-G-2.8]
Expectations
The operating organization shall have the prime responsibility for safety in the operation of a
nuclear power plant. (SSR-2/2 Requirement 1).
The operating organization shall establish, implement, assess and continually improve an
integrated management system. (SSR-2/2 Requirement 2).
The structure of the operating organization, and functions, roles and responsibilities of its
personnel, shall be established and documented. (SSR-2/2 Requirement 3).
The operating organization shall be staffed with competent managers and sufficient qualified
personnel for the safe operation of the plant. (SSR-2/2 Requirement 4).
The operating organization shall establish and implement operational polices that give safety
highest priority. (SSR-2/2 Requirement 5).
The operating organization shall ensure that all activities that may affect safety are performed
by suitably qualified and competent persons. (SSR-2/2 Requirement 7).
The operating organization shall ensure that safety related activities are adequately analysed
and controlled to ensure that the risks associated with harmful effects of ionizing radiation are
kept as low as reasonably achievable. (SSR-2/2 Requirement 8).
18
The operating organization shall establish a system for continuous monitoring and periodic
review of the safety of the plant and of the performance of the operating organization. (SSR2/2 Requirement 9).
The operating organization shall establish and implement a programme to manage
modifications. (SSR-2/2 Requirement 10).
The operating organization shall ensure that a systematic assessment is carried out to provide
reliable confirmation that safety related items are capable of the required performance for all
operational states and for accident conditions. (SSR-2/2 Requirement 13).
The operating organization shall establish and maintain a system for the control of records
and reports. (SSR-2/2 Requirement 15).
The operating organization shall ensure that the implementation of safety requirements and
security requirements satisfies both safety objectives and security objectives. (SSR-2/2
Requirement 17).
The operating organization shall establish and implement a programme to ensure that safety
related risks associated with non-radiation-related hazards to personnel involved in activities
at the plant are kept as low as reasonably achievable. (SSR-2/2 Requirement 23).
The operating organization shall establish an operating experience programme to learn from
events at the plant, and events in the nuclear industry and other industries worldwide. (SSR2/2 Requirement 24).
Senior management shall give an overriding priority to achieving the fundamental safety
objective of protecting people and the environment against radiation risks. (GSR part 2
Requirement 3).
Senior management shall establish, implement and continuously improve an effective
integrated management system to ensure safety. (GSR part 2 Requirement 4)
Interactions with interested parties shall be integrated into the management system. (GSR part
2 Requirement 5).
The management system shall integrate all elements of management, including safety, health,
environmental, security, quality, as well as social and economic elements, so that safety is not
compromised. (GSR part 2 Requirement 6).
Application of the management system requirements shall be graded for each activity and
process relating to safety. (GSR part 2 Requirement 7).
The management system shall be documented. (GSR part 2 Requirement 8).
Senior management shall determine and provide the competences and resources necessary to
carry out the activities of the organization, so as to achieve safety and to enhance safety
performance. (GSR part 2 Requirement 9).
19
Processes and activities shall be developed and managed so as to achieve safety. (GSR part 2
Requirement 10).
The organization shall put in place arrangements with suppliers to specify, monitor and
control the supply of items, products and services that may affect safety. (GSR part 2
Requirement 11).
Measurement, assessment and evaluation of the management system shall be performed in
order to enhance safety performance. (GSR part 2 Requirement 12).
A graded approach shall be used in determining the scope and level of detail of the safety
assessment carried out in a particular State for any particular facility or activity, consistent
with the magnitude of the possible radiation risks arising from the facility or activity. (GSR
part 4 Requirement 1).
Evaluations
Agreed Working Note Outlines (available at http://www-ns.iaea.org/tech-areas/operationalsafety, in domain of OSART missions).
20
The operating organization shall ensure that effective programmes for maintenance, testing,
surveillance and inspection are established and implemented. (SSR-2/2 Requirement 31).
Evaluations
Agreed Working Note Outlines (available at http://www-ns.iaea.org/tech-areas/operationalsafety, in domain of OSART missions).
22
4.3. OPERATIONS
Operations involves activities that provide supervision of the operating group which controls
safe plant operation. The main function of operations is to run the plant safely and efficiently
while adhering to approved procedures, operational limits and conditions (OLCs) and other
regulatory requirements. Through its conduct of operations, the operating group has a direct
impact on the operation of the reactor and associated components and systems. While the
structure of the group varies according to the specific plant or utility, the group is normally
composed of shift crews and supporting staff, and is usually managed by an appointed head of
operations. The shift supervisor manages plant operations on each shift. In addition to this, for
the purpose of defining review responsibilities in these guidelines, operations covers
operations facilities, operator aids, work authorizations, fire protection and accident
conditions.
References
[SSR-2/2; NS-G-2.1; NS-G-2.2; NS-G-2.4; NS-G-2.5; NS-G-2.6; NS-G-2.8; NS-G-2.14; GSG-3.1; RS-G-1.1; SSG-3; SSG-25]
Expectations
The operating organization shall have the prime responsibility for safety in the operation of a
nuclear power plant. (SSR-2/2 Requirement 1).
The structure of the operating organization, and the functions, roles and responsibilities of its
personnel, shall be established and documented. (SSR-2/2 Requirement 3).
The operating organization shall be staffed with competent managers and sufficient qualified
personnel for the safe operation of the plant. (SSR-2/2 Requirement 4).
The operating organization shall establish and implement operational polices that give safety
the highest priority. (SSR-2/2 Requirement 5).
The operating organization shall ensure that the plant is operated in accordance with the set of
operational limits and conditions. (SSR-2/2 Requirement 6).
The operating organization shall ensure that all activities that may affect safety are performed
by suitably qualified and competent persons. (SSR-2/2 Requirement 7).
The operating organization shall ensure that safety related activities are adequately analysed
and controlled to ensure that the risks associated with the harmful effects of ionizing radiation
are kept as low as reasonably achievable. (SSR-2/2 Requirement 8).
The operating organization shall establish and implement a system for plant configuration
management to ensure consistency between design requirements, physical configuration and
plant documentation. (SSR-2/2 Requirement 10).
The operating organization shall make arrangements for ensuring fire safety. (SSR-2/2
Requirement 22).
The operating organization shall establish and implement a programme to ensure that safety
related risks associated with non-radiation-related hazards to personnel involved in activities
23
at the plant are kept as low as reasonably achievable (SSR-2/2 Requirement 23).
The operating organization shall establish an operating experience programme to learn from
events at the plant, and events in the nuclear industry and other industries worldwide (SSR2/2 Requirement 24).
The operating procedures shall be developed that apply comprehensively (for the reactor and
its associated facilities) for normal operation, anticipated operational occurrences and accident
conditions, in accordance with the policy of the operating organization and the requirements
of the regulatory body (SSR-2/2 Requirement 26).
The operating organization shall ensure that operations control rooms and control equipment
are maintained in a suitable condition. (SSR-2/2 Requirement 27).
The operating organization shall develop and implement programmes to maintain a high
standard of material condition, housekeeping and cleanliness in all working areas (SSR-2/2
Requirement 28).
The operating organization shall be responsible and shall make arrangements for all activities
associated with core management and with on-site fuel handling. (SSR-2/2 Requirement 30).
Evaluations
Agreed Working Note Outlines (available at http://www-ns.iaea.org/tech-areas/operationalsafety, in domain of OSART missions).
24
4.4. MAINTENANCE
Nuclear installations must be regularly inspected, tested and maintained in accordance with
approved procedures to ensure that structures, systems and components continue to be
available and to operate as intended, and retain their capability to meet the design objectives
and requirements of the safety analysis. The operating organization shall prepare and
implement a programme of maintenance, testing, surveillance and inspection of those
structures, systems and components which are important to safety.
For the purpose of these guidelines, maintenance covers in-service inspection, spare parts,
materials and outage management.
References
[SSR-2/2; GS-R-3; NS-G-2.1; NS-G-2.3; NS-G-2.4; NS-G-2.5; NS-G-2.6; NS-G-2.7; NS-G2.8; NS-G-2.11; NS-G-2.12; NS-G-2.14; GS-G-3.1; GS-G-3.5; SSG-3; SSG-25]
Expectations
The operating organization shall have the prime responsibility for safety in the operation of a
nuclear power plant (SSR-2/2 Requirement1).
The structure of the operating organization, and the functions, roles and responsibilities of its
personnel, shall be established and documented (SSR-2/2 Requirement 3).
The operating organization shall be staffed with competent managers and sufficient qualified
personnel for the safe operation of the plant (SSR-2/2 Requirement 4).
The operating organization shall establish and implement operational polices that give safety
the highest priority (SSR-2/2 Requirement 5).
The operating organization shall ensure that all activities that may affect safety are performed
by suitably qualified and competent persons. (SSR-2/2 Requirement 7).
The operating organization shall ensure that safety related activities are adequately analysed
and controlled to ensure that the risks associated with the harmful effects of ionizing radiation
are kept as low as reasonably achievable (SSR-2/2 Requirement 8).
The operating organization shall establish a system for continuous monitoring and periodic
review of the safety of the plant and of the performance of the operating organization (SSR2/2 Requirement 9).
The operating organization shall establish and implement a system for plant configuration
management to ensure consistency between design requirements, physical configuration and
plant documentation (SSR-2/2 Requirement 10).
The operating organization shall establish and implement a programme to manage
modifications (SSR-2/2 Requirement 11).
Systematic safety assessment of the plant, in accordance with regulatory requirements, shall
be performed by the operating organization throughout the plants operating lifetime, with
25
due account taken of operating experience and significant new safety related information from
all relevant sources (SSR-2/2 Requirement 12).
The operating organization shall ensure that an effective ageing management programme is
implemented to ensure that required safety functions of systems, structures and components
are fulfilled over the entire operating lifetime of the plant. (SSR-2/2 Requirement 14).
The operating organization shall establish and maintain a system for the control of records
and reports. (SSR-2/2 Requirement 15).
The operating organization shall establish and implement a radiation protection programme.
(SSR-2/2 Requirement 20).
The operating organization shall establish an operating experience programme to learn from
events at the plant, and events in the nuclear industry and other industries worldwide. (SSR2/2 Requirement 24).
The operating organization shall develop and implement programmes to maintain a high
standard of material condition, housekeeping and cleanliness in all work areas. (SSR-2/2
Requirement 28).
The operating organization shall ensure that effective programmes for maintenance, testing,
surveillance and inspection are established and implemented. (SSR-2/2 Requirement 31).
The operating organization shall establish and implement arrangements to ensure the effective
performance, planning and control of work activities during outages. (SSR-2/2 Requirement
32).
Evaluations
Agreed Working Note Outlines (available at http://www-ns.iaea.org/tech-areas/operationalsafety, in domain of OSART missions).
26
reliable confirmation that safety related items are capable of the required performance for all
operational states and for accident conditions (SSR-2/2 Requirement 13).
The operating organization shall ensure that an effective ageing management programme is
implemented to ensure that required safety functions of systems, structures and components
are fulfilled over the entire operating lifetime of the plant (SSR-2/2 Requirement 14).
The operating organization shall establish and maintain a system for the control of records
and reports (SSR-2/2 Requirement 15).
Where applicable, the operating organization shall establish and implement a comprehensive
programme for ensuring the long term safe operation of the plant beyond a timeframe
established in the license conditions, design limits, safety standards and/or regulations (SSR2/2 Requirement 16).
The operating organization shall ensure that the implementation of safety requirements and
security requirements satisfies both safety objectives and security objectives (SSR-2/2
Requirement 17).
The operating organization shall make arrangements for ensuring fire safety (SSR-2/2
Requirement 22).
The operating procedures shall be developed that apply comprehensively (for the reactor and
its associated facilities) for normal operation, anticipated operational occurrences and accident
conditions, in accordance with the policy of the operating organization and the requirements
of the regulatory body (SSR-2/2 Requirement 26).
The operating organization shall be responsible and shall make arrangements for all activities
associated with core management and with on-site fuel handling. (SSR-2/2 Requirement 30)
The operating organization shall ensure that effective programmes for maintenance, testing,
surveillance and inspection are established and implemented (SSR-2/2 Requirement 31).
A graded approach shall be used in determining the scope and level of detail of the safety
assessment carried out in a particular State for any particular facility or activity, consistent
with the magnitude of the possible radiation risks arising from the facility or activity (GSR
part 4 Requirement 1).
The responsibility for carrying out the safety assessment shall rest with the responsible legal
person; that is, the person or organization responsible for the facility or activity (GSR part 4
Requirement 3).
The possible radiation risks associated with the facility or activity shall be identified and
assessed (GSR part 4 Requirement 6).
All safety functions associated with a facility or activity shall be specified and assessed (GSR
part 4 Requirement 7).
It shall be determined in the safety assessment for a facility or activity whether adequate
measures are in place to protect people and the environment from the harmful effects of
ionizing radiation (GSR part 4 Requirement 9).
28
Human interactions with the facility or activity shall be addressed in the safety assessment,
and it shall be determined whether the procedures and safety measures that are provided for
all normal operational activities, in particular those that are necessary for implementation of
the operational limits and conditions, and those that are required in response to anticipated
operational occurrences and accidents, ensure an adequate level of safety (GSR part 4
Requirement 11).
Both deterministic and probabilistic approaches shall be included in the safety analysis (GSR
part 4 Requirement 15).
The safety assessment shall be periodically reviewed and updated (GSR part 4 Requirement
24).
Evaluations
Agreed Working Note Outlines (available at http://www-ns.iaea.org/tech-areas/operationalsafety, in domain of OSART missions).
29
The operating organization shall ensure that effective programmes for maintenance, testing,
surveillance and inspection are established and implemented. (SSR-2/2 Requirement 31).
Parties with responsibilities for protection and safety shall ensure that the principles of
radiation protection are applied for all exposure situations. (GSR part 3 Requirement 1).
Registrants and licensees shall be responsible for protection and safety in planned exposure
situations. (GSR part 3 Requirement 9).
Registrants and licensees and employers shall conduct monitoring to verify compliance with
the requirements for protection and safety. (GSR part 3 Requirement 14).
Registrants and licensees shall conduct formal investigations of abnormal conditions arising
in the operation of facilities or the conduct of activities, and shall disseminate information that
is significant for protection and safety. (GSR part 3 Requirement 16).
Registrants and licensees shall ensure the safety of radiation generators and radioactive
sources. (GSR part 3 Requirement 17).
Employers, registrants and licensees shall be responsible for the protection of workers against
occupational exposure. Employers, registrants and licensees shall ensure that protection and
safety is optimized and that the dose limits for occupational exposure are not exceeded (GSR
part 3 Requirement 21).
Workers shall fulfil their obligations and carry out their duties for protection and safety (GSR
part 3 Requirement 22).
Employers and registrants and licensees shall cooperate to the extent necessary for
compliance by all responsible parties with the requirements for protection and safety (GSR
part 3 Requirement 23).
Employers, registrants and licensees shall establish and maintain organizational, procedural
and technical arrangements for the designation of controlled areas and supervised areas, for
local rules and for monitoring of the workplace, in a radiation protection programme for
occupational exposure (GSR part 3 Requirement 24).
Employers, registrants and licensees shall be responsible for making arrangements for
assessment and recording of occupational exposure and for workers health surveillance (GSR
part 3 Requirement 25).
Employers, registrants and licensees shall provide workers with adequate information,
instruction and training for protection and safety (GSR part 3 Requirement 26).
Employers, registrants and licensees shall make special arrangements for female workers, as
necessary, for protection of the embryo or foetus and of breastfed infants. Employers,
registrants and licensees shall make special arrangements for protection and safety for persons
under 18 years of age who are undergoing training (GSR part 3 Requirement 28).
Relevant parties shall apply the system of protection and safety to protect members of the
public against exposure (GSR part 3 Requirement 30).
32
Relevant parties shall ensure that radioactive waste and discharges of radioactive material to
the environment are managed in accordance with the authorization (GSR part 3 Requirement
31).
The regulatory body and relevant parties shall ensure that programmes for source monitoring
and environmental monitoring are in place, and that the results from the monitoring are
recorded and are made available (GSR part 3 Requirement 32).
Evaluations
Agreed Working Note Outlines (available at http://www-ns.iaea.org/tech-areas/operationalsafety, in domain of OSART missions).
33
4.8. CHEMISTRY
Chemistry involves activities of chemical treatment to maintain the integrity of the barriers
retaining radioactivity, including fuel cladding and the primary circuit. Chemistry activities
have a direct impact in limiting all kinds of corrosion processes causing either direct breaches
of safety barriers or their weakening, so that failure could occur during a transient.
In addition, chemical treatment includes consideration of its effects on the out-of-core
radiation fields that in turn influence radiation doses to which workers are exposed, as well as
the external impact in case of a severe accident. Plant radiochemistry is included in the
chemistry considerations for the purpose of these guidelines.
References:
[SSR-2/2; GSR part 3; NS-G-2.3; NS-G-2.4; NS-G-2.11; GS-G-4.1; SSG-3]
Expectations:
The operating organization shall have the prime responsibility for safety in the operation of a
nuclear power plant (SSR-2/2 Requirement 1).
The structure of the operating organization, and the functions, roles and responsibilities of its
personnel, shall be established and documented (SSR-2/2 Requirement 3).
The operating organization shall be staffed with competent managers and sufficient qualified
personnel for the safe operation of the plant (SSR-2/2 Requirement 4).
The operating organization shall ensure that the plant is operated in accordance with the set of
operational limits and conditions (SSR-2/2 Requirement 6).
The operating organization shall ensure that all activities that may affect safety are performed
by suitably qualified and competent persons (SSR-2/2 Requirement 7).
The operating organization shall ensure that safety related activities are adequately analysed
and controlled to ensure that the risks associated with the harmful effects of ionizing radiation
are kept as low as reasonably achievable (SSR-2/2 Requirement 8).
The operating organization shall establish a system for continuous monitoring and periodic
review of the safety of the plant and of the performance of the operating organization (SSR2/2 Requirement 9).
The operating organization shall establish and implement a system for plant configuration
management to ensure consistency between design requirements, physical configuration and
plant documentation (SSR-2/2 Requirement 10).
The operating organization shall establish and implement a programme to manage
modifications (SSR-2/2 Requirement 11)
Systematic safety assessments of the plant, in accordance with regulatory requirements, shall
be performed by the operating organization throughout the plants operating lifetime, with due
account taken of operating experience and significant new safety related information from all
relevant sources (SSR-2/2 Requirement 12).
34
The operating organization shall ensure that an effective ageing management programme is
implemented to ensure that required safety functions of systems, structures and components
are fulfilled over the entire operating lifetime of the plant. (SSR-2/2 Requirement 14).
The operating organization shall establish and maintain a system for the control of records
and reports (SSR-2/2 Requirement 15).
The operating organization shall establish and implement a programme for the management
of radioactive waste. (SSR-2/2 Requirement 21).
The operating organization shall establish an operating experience programme to learn from
events at the plant, and events in the nuclear industry and other industries worldwide (SSR2/2 Requirement 24).
Operating procedures shall be developed that apply comprehensively (for the reactor and its
associated facilities) for normal operation, anticipated operational occurrences and accident
conditions, in accordance with the policy of the operating organization and the requirements
of the regulatory body (SSR-2/2 Requirement 26).
The operating organization shall establish and implement a programme to provide the
necessary support for chemistry and radiochemistry (SSR-2/2 Requirement 29).
The operating organization shall be responsible and shall make arrangements for all activities
associated with core management and with on-site fuel handling (SSR-2/2 Requirement 30).
Relevant parties shall ensure that radioactive waste and discharges of radioactive material to
the environment are managed in accordance with the authorization (GSR part 3 Requirement
31).
Evaluations
Agreed Working Note Outlines (available at http://www-ns.iaea.org/tech-areas/operationalsafety, in domain of OSART missions).
35
1
2
The integrated set of infrastructural elements necessary to provide the capability for performing a specified function
or task required in response to a nuclear or radiological emergency. These elements may include authorities and
responsibilities, organization, coordination, personnel, plans, procedures, facilities, equipment or training. [GSR Part 7]
36
The government shall ensure that a hazard assessment is performed to provide a basis for a
graded approach in preparedness and response for a nuclear or radiological emergency. (GSR
Part 7, Requirement 4)
Systematic safety assessments of the plant, in accordance with regulatory requirements, shall
be performed by the operating organization throughout the plants operating lifetime, with due
account taken of operating experience and significant new safety related information from all
relevant sources. (SSR-2/2 Requirement 12)
The safety assessment shall be periodically reviewed and updated. (GSR part 4, Requirement
24).
The government shall ensure that protection strategies are developed, justified and optimized
at the preparedness stage for taking protective actions and other response actions effectively
in a nuclear or radiological emergency. (GSR Part 7, Requirement 5).
The government shall ensure that arrangements are in place for emergency response
operations to be appropriately managed. (GSR Part 7, Requirement 6).
The government shall ensure that arrangements are in place for the prompt identification and
notification of a nuclear or radiological emergency, and for the activation of an emergency
response. (GSR Part 7, Requirement 7).
The government shall ensure that arrangements are in place for taking mitigatory actions in a
nuclear or radiological emergency. (GSR Part 7, Requirement 8).
The government shall ensure that arrangements are in place to assess emergency conditions
and to take urgent protective actions and other response actions effectively in a nuclear or
radiological emergency. (GSR Part 7, Requirement 9)
The government shall ensure that arrangements are in place to provide members of the public
who are affected or are potentially affected by a nuclear or radiological emergency with
information that is necessary for their protection, to warn them promptly and to instruct them
on actions to be taken (GSR Part 7, Requirement 10).
The government shall ensure that arrangements are in place to protect emergency workers and
to protect helpers in an emergency (GSR Part 7, Requirement 11).
The government shall ensure that arrangements are in place for the provision of appropriate
medical screening and triage, medical treatment, and longer term medical actions for those
people who could be affected in a nuclear or radiological emergency (GSR Part 7,
Requirement 12).
The government shall ensure that arrangements are in place and are implemented for the
termination of a nuclear or radiological emergency (GSR Part 7, Requirement 18).
The government shall ensure that any nuclear or radiological emergency and corresponding
emergency response are analysed in order to identify actions to be taken to prevent other
emergencies and to improve emergency arrangements (GSR Part 7, Requirement 19).
The government shall ensure that the overall organization for emergency preparedness and
response is clearly specified and staffed with sufficient personnel who are qualified and fit for
37
their intended duty. (GSR Part 7, Requirement 21) The structure of the operating
organization, and the functions, roles and responsibilities of its personnel, shall be established
and documented. (SSR-2/2 Requirement 3) The operating organization shall be staffed with
competent managers and sufficient qualified personnel for the safe operation of the plant
(SSR-2/2 Requirement 4).
The government shall ensure that arrangements are in place for the coordination of emergency
preparedness and response between the operating organization and local, regional and
national authorities, and, where appropriate, at international level (GSR Part 7, Requirement
22).
The government shall ensure that plans and procedures necessary for effective emergency
response are established. (GSR Part 7, Requirement 23) The operating organisation shall
prepare an emergency plan for preparedness for, and response to, a nuclear or radiological
emergency (SSR-2/2 Requirement 18).
The government shall ensure that adequate logistical support and facilities are provided to
enable emergency response functions to be performed effectively (GSR Part 7, Requirement
24).
The government shall ensure that personnel relevant for emergency response shall take part in
regular training, drills and exercises to ensure that they are able to perform their assigned
response functions effectively in a nuclear or radiological emergency (GSR Part 7,
Requirement 25).
The government shall ensure that a programme is established within integrated management
systems to ensure the availability and reliability of all supplies, equipment, communication
systems and facilities, plans, procedures and other arrangements necessary for effective
response in a nuclear or radiological emergency (GSR Part 7, Requirement 26).
The operating organization shall establish a system for continuous monitoring and periodic
review of the safety of the plant and of the performance of the operating organization (SSR2/2 Requirement 9).
Evaluations
Agreed Working Note Outlines (available at http://www-ns.iaea.org/tech-areas/operationalsafety, in domain of OSART missions).
38
39
The operating organization shall prepare an emergency plan for preparedness for, and
response to, a nuclear or radiological emergency (SSR-2/2 Requirement 18).
The operating organization shall establish, and shall periodically review and as necessary
revise, an accident management programme (SSR-2/2 Requirement 19).
The operating organization shall establish an operating experience programme to learn from
events at the plant, and events in the nuclear industry and other industries worldwide (SSR2/2 Requirement 24).
Operating procedures shall be developed that apply comprehensively (for the reactor and its
associated facilities) for normal operation, anticipated operational occurrences and accident
conditions, in accordance with the policy of the operating organization and the requirements
of the regulatory body (SSR-2/2 Requirement 26).
The operating organization shall ensure that effective programmes for maintenance, testing,
surveillance and inspection are established and implemented (SSR-2/2 Requirement 31).
The primary purposes of the safety assessment shall be to determine whether an adequate
level of safety has been achieved for a facility or activity, and whether the basic safety
objectives and safety criteria established by the designer, the operating organization and the
regulatory body in compliance with the requirements for protection and safety - as established
in the International Basic Safety Standards for Protection against Ionizing Radiation and for
the Safety of Radiation Sources - have been fulfilled (GSR part 4 Requirement 4).
The performance of a facility or activity in all operational states and, as necessary, in the postoperational phase shall be assessed in the safety analysis (GSR part 4 Requirement 14).
Data on operational safety performance shall be collected and assessed (GSR part 4
Requirement 19).
The safety assessment shall be periodically reviewed and updated (GSR part 4 Requirement
24).
Evaluations
Agreed Working Note Outlines (available at http://www-ns.iaea.org/tech-areas/operationalsafety, in domain of OSART missions).
40
An ISCA provides deeper insight into the drivers that shape organizational patterns of behaviours, safety
consciousness, and safety performance. By combining a safety culture assessment with an OSART mission, facilities
gain a snapshot-in-time of their operating safety performance and the cultural dimensions that influence these results.
By exploring the connection between OSART findings and safety culture findings, facilities can begin to identify and
systematically address systemic challenges to safety performance.
41
References
[SF-1 (3.14); GSR Part 2; GS-R-3; GS-G-3.1; GS-G-3.5 (2.32, 2.33, 2.34, Appendix I)]
Expectations
The prime responsibility for safety must rest with the person or organization responsible for
facilities and activities that give rise to radiation risks (SF-1 Principle 1).
Effective leadership and management for safety must be established and sustained in
organizations concerned with, and facilities and activities that give rise to, radiation risks (SF1 Principle 3).
Senior management shall ensure that the fundamental safety objective of protecting people
and the environment from the harmful effects of ionizing radiation is achieved without unduly
limiting the operation of facilities or the conduct of activities that give rise to radiation risks
(GSR Part 2 Requirement 1).
The senior management of the organization shall demonstrate leadership for safety. Senior
management shall advocate an approach to safety that encompasses all interactions between
humans, technology and the organization (GSR part 2 Requirement 2).
Managers at all levels in the organization shall demonstrate leadership for safety in the
application of the management system and in the fostering of a strong safety culture.
Managers at all levels in the organization shall demonstrate leadership for safety, including
the establishment and continuous improvement of the management system (GSR Part 2
Requirement 3).
Senior management shall establish, apply, maintain and continuously improve a management
system for ensuring safety (GSR Part 2 Requirement 4).
Senior management shall establish goals, strategies, plans, policies and objectives for the
organization that are consistent with the safety policy (GSR Part 2 Requirement 5).
Interactions with interested parties shall be integrated into the management system (GSR Part
2 Requirement 6).
The management system shall integrate all elements of management, including safety, health,
the environment, security, quality, as well as societal and economic elements, so that safety is
not compromised (GSR Part 2 Requirement 7).
The requirements for the management system shall be applied using a graded approach based
on the safety significance of each activity and process (GSR Part 2 Requirement 8).
42
Processes and activities shall be developed and managed to achieve the organizations goals
safely (GSR Part 2 Requirement 10).
Senior management shall determine and shall ensure the availability of the competences and
resources necessary to carry out the activities of the organization to ensure safety (GSR Part 2
Requirement 11).
The effectiveness of the management system shall be measured, assessed and improved so as
to enhance safety related performance (GSR Part 2 Requirement 13).
Senior management shall regularly commission independent assessments and selfassessments of safety culture and leadership for safety (GSR Part 2 Requirement 15).
The operating organization shall be staffed with competent managers and sufficient qualified
personnel for the safe operation of the plant (SSR-2/2 Requirement 4).
All safety barriers are designed, constructed, strengthened, breached or eroded by the action
or inaction of individuals. Human factors in the organization are critical for safe operation and
should not be separated from technical aspects. Ultimately, safety results from the interaction
of individuals with technology and with the organization. (GS-G-3.5, 2.32).
The concept of safety culture embraces this integration of individuals and technical aspects
(GS-G-3.5, 2.33).
In a strong safety culture, there should be a knowledge and understanding of human
behaviour mechanisms, and established human factor principles should be applied to ensure
the outcomes for safety of individualstechnologyorganization interactions. This could be
achieved by including experts on human factors in all relevant activities and teams (GS-G3.5, 2.34).
Evaluations
Agreed Working Note Outlines (available at http://www-ns.iaea.org/tech-areas/operationalsafety, in domain of OSART missions).
43
4.13. COMMISSIONING
Commissioning is the process during which, once they have been constructed, plant
structures, systems and components are tested and placed in operation, with the objective of
verifying that their design assumptions are valid. This process continues until the plant is at
full power and all required testing at this power level has been conducted. In order to meet the
expected performance criteria, the plant is verified as-built and pre-operational plant
adjustments are made. Commissioning also includes testing prior and subsequent to fuel
loading. It is therefore essential for safety that the commissioning programme and individual
system testing be designed in such a way that those design assumptions can be verified and
quality can be assured throughout the commissioning process.
The commissioning process provides the best scenario for preparing personnel and procedures
for the normal operation of the plant. Operating personnel in all disciplines are involved as
much as possible in commissioning activities, and the operating procedures are validated to
the extent practicable, with the participation of future operating staff.
During commissioning, an extensive amount of data is collected on structures, systems and
components. This baseline data will be the reference for subsequent operational testing in
order to prevent plant degradation.
The commissioning programme and its results are an important part of the licensing process
of the plant. Clear and well defined responsibilities and requirements for the operational,
commissioning and regulatory organizations are essential to satisfy the licensing requirements
for the plant in a timely manner.
The commissioning results greatly depend on the interfaces among the construction functions,
operations and designers. The boundaries of responsibility vary from site to site. The levels of
cooperation between these groups will influence the quality of commissioning.
Responsibility for the plant is eventually transferred to the operating organization. This could
be done gradually or in specified stages. A high quality and comprehensive handover is
necessary to ensure that the plant meets its design intent and adequate knowledge
management is established.
References
[SSR-2/2; GSR part 4; NS-G-2.3; SSG-3; SSG-28; Safety Reports Series No.65].
Expectations
The operating organization shall have the prime responsibility for safety in the operation of a
nuclear power plant (SSR-2/2 Requirement 1).
The structure of the operating organization, and functions, roles and responsibilities of its
personnel, shall be established and documented (SSR-2/2 Requirement 3).
The operating organization shall be staffed with competent managers and sufficient qualified
personnel for the safe operation of the plant (SSR-2/2 Requirement 4).
45
The operating organization shall ensure that the plant is operated in accordance with the set of
operational limits and conditions (SSR-2/2 Requirement 6).
The operating organization shall ensure that all activities that may affect safety are performed
by suitably qualified and competent persons (SSR-2/2 Requirement 7).
The operating organization shall establish and maintain a system for the control of records
and reports (SSR-2/2 Requirement 15).
The operating organization shall establish an operating experience programme to learn from
events at the plant, and events in the nuclear industry and other industries worldwide (SSR2/2 Requirement 24).
The operating organization shall ensure that a commissioning programme for the plant is
established and implemented (SSR-2/2 Requirement 25).
The safety assessment shall cover all the stages in the lifetime of a facility or activity in which
there are possible radiation risks (GSR part 4 Requirement 12).
Evaluations
Agreed Working Note Outlines (available at http://www-ns.iaea.org/tech-areas/operationalsafety, in domain of OSART missions).
46
47
The operating organization shall establish and implement a system for plant configuration
management to ensure consistency between design requirements, physical configuration and
plant documentation (SSR-2/2 Requirement 10).
The operating organization shall establish and implement a programme to manage
modifications (SSR-2/2 Requirement 11).
The operating organization shall establish and maintain a system for the control of records
and reports (SSR-2/2 Requirement 15).
The operating organization shall ensure that effective programmes for maintenance, testing,
surveillance and inspection are established and implemented (SSR-2/2 Requirement 31).
The operating organization shall prepare a decommissioning plan and shall maintain it
throughout the lifetime of the plant, unless otherwise approved by the regulatory body, to
demonstrate that decommissioning can be accomplished safely and in such a way as to meet
the specified end state (SSR-2/2 Requirement 33).
Exposure during decommissioning shall be considered to be a planned exposure situation, and
the relevant requirements of the Basic Safety Standards shall be applied accordingly during
decommissioning (GSR part 6 Requirement 1).
Safety shall be assessed for all facilities for which decommissioning is planned and for all
facilities undergoing decommissioning (GSR part 6 Requirement 3).
The licensee shall plan for decommissioning and shall conduct the decommissioning actions
in compliance with both the authorization for decommissioning and requirements derived
from the national legal and regulatory framework. The licensee shall be responsible for all
aspects of safety, radiation protection and protection of the environment during
decommissioning (GSR part 6 Requirement 6).
The licensee shall ensure that its integrated management system covers all aspects of
decommissioning (GSR part 6 Requirement 7).
The licensee shall select a decommissioning strategy that will form the basis for planning the
decommissioning. The strategy shall be consistent with the national policy on the
management of radioactive waste (GSR part 6 Requirement 8).
Responsibilities in respect of financial provisions for decommissioning shall be set out in
national legislation. These provisions shall include establishing a mechanism to provide
adequate financial resources for ensuring safe decommissioning and to ensure that they are
available when necessary (GSR part 6 Requirement 9).
Prior to execution of decommissioning actions, a final decommissioning plan shall be
prepared and shall be submitted to the regulatory body for approval (GSR part 6 Requirement
11).
The licensee shall implement the final decommissioning plan, including management of
radioactive waste, in compliance with national regulations (GSR part 6 Requirement 12).
48
49
Where the results of the PSA are to be used in support of the decision-making process, a
formal organizational framework and technical support for doing so should be established.
The details of the decision-making process will depend on the purpose of the particular PSA
application, the nature of the decision to be made and the PSA results to be used.
References
[SSR-2/2; GSR part 4; SSR-2/1; NS-G-2.3; NS-G-2.4; NS-G-2.12; NS-G-4.3; SSG-3; SSG-4;
SSG-25]
Expectations
The operating organization shall have prime responsibility for safety in the operation of a
nuclear power plant (SSR-2/2 Requirement 1).
The operating organization shall ensure that safety related activities are adequately analysed
and controlled to ensure that the risks associated with the harmful effects of ionizing radiation
are kept as low as reasonably achievable (SSR-2/2 Requirement 8).
The operating organization shall establish a system for continuous monitoring and periodic
review of the safety of the plant and of the performance of the operating organization (SSR
2/2 Requirement 9).
Systematic safety assessment of the plant, in accordance with the regulatory requirements,
shall be performed by the operating organization throughout the plants operating lifetime,
with due account taken of operating experience and significant new safety related information
from all relevant sources (SSR-2/2 Requirement 12).
The operating organization shall ensure that effective programmes for maintenance, testing,
surveillance and inspection are established and implemented (SSR-2/2 Requirement 31).
The operating organization shall establish and implement arrangements to ensure the effective
performance, planning and control of work activities during outages (SSR-2/2 Requirement
32)
50
A safety assessment shall be carried out for all applications of technology that give rise to
radiation risks; that is, for all types of facilities and activities (GSR part 4 Requirement 2).
The responsibility for carrying out the safety assessment shall rest with the responsible legal
person; that is, the person or organization responsible for the facility or activity (GSR part 4
Requirement 3).
The safety assessment has to include a safety analysis, which consists of a set of different
quantitative analyses for evaluating and assessing challenges to safety in various operational
states, anticipated operational occurrences and accident conditions, by means of deterministic
and also probabilistic methods (GSR part 4, 4.13).
The possible radiation risks associated with the facility or activity shall be identified and
assessed. (GSR part 4 Requirement 6)
All safety functions associated with a facility or activity shall be specified and assessed (GSR
part 4 Requirement 7).
It shall be determined in the safety assessment whether a facility or activity uses, to the extent
practicable, structures, systems and components of robust and proven design (GSR part 4
Requirement 10).
Human interactions with the facility or activity shall be addressed in the safety assessment,
and it shall be determined whether the procedures and safety measures that are provided for
all normal operational activities, in particular those that are necessary for implementation of
the operational limits and conditions, and those that are required in response to anticipated
operational occurrences and accidents, ensure an adequate level of safety (GSR part 4
Requirement 11).
The performance of a facility or activity in all operational states and as necessary in the postoperational phase shall be assessed in the safety analysis. (GSR part 4 Requirement 14)
Both deterministic and probabilistic approaches shall be included in the safety analysis (GSR
part 4 Requirement 15).
Any calculational methods and computer codes used in the safety analysis shall undergo
verification and validation (GSR part 4 Requirement 18).
Data on operational safety performance shall be collected and assessed (GSR part 4
Requirement 19).
The results and findings of the safety assessment shall be documented (GSR part 4
Requirement 20).
The operating organization shall carry out an independent verification of the safety
assessment before it is used by the operating organization or submitted to the regulatory body
(GSR part 4 Requirement 21).
The safety assessment shall be periodically reviewed and updated (GSR part 4 Requirement
24).
51
Evaluations
Agreed Working Note Outlines (available at http://www-ns.iaea.org/tech-areas/operationalsafety, in domain of OSART missions).
52
REFERENCES
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
53
55
Annex I
STANDARD STRUCTURE AND CONTENT OF AN ADVANCE INFORMATION
PACKAGE FOR AN IAEA OSART MISSION
The Advance Information Package (AIP) is prepared by the nuclear power plant (NPP) hosting
the OSART mission and is used to convey information relevant to the OSART team members
for the preparation of their review.
The package should contain adequate information and data to understand the overall
organizational structures and current operating practices. It should also include an overview of
the NPPs approach to operational safety, the key operational features and the organizational
setup. While the contents of the package should cover essential plant features, it should also be
compact. Many plants subsequently use the AIP for induction training of new employees.
The workload in preparing the package should be minimized. The compilation of information
should be based on and/or utilize existing documents such as routinely prepared reports,
procedures and training materials. Focus on the content is encouraged, with limited effort spent
on editing. The package should be in English as this is the OSART working language.
To the extent possible, the format of the AIP should follow the review areas as that of the
OSART Guidelines.
57
I-2.
Overall site and plant description, and which units are to be reviewed
Brief plant operating history
Current utility/plant organizational charts
Locations of major plant structures and buildings (schematic map of their layout)
Performance indicators.
Utility headquarters;
Industry organizations;
Regulatory authorities;
Main suppliers and sub-contractors;
Contractors supporting plant maintenance.
I-2.4. Self-assessment
58
For each review area, a description of how each individual area expectation is met;
Specific gaps where performance or programmes do not fully meet IAEA Safety
standards;
For each gap identified, an explanation of what corrective actions are being
taken/planned to close the gap, including budget commitments, staffing, document
preparation, increased or modified training, equipment purchases, etc.
philosophy,
I-4.3. Operations
I-4.4. Maintenance
Maintenance organization;
Overall programme for corrective and preventive maintenance;
Evaluation, analysis and trending of maintenance activities;
Typical outage programme/schedule;
Overview of maintenance facilities/workshops;
Brief description of in-service inspection programme;
List of major maintenance procedures;
Material condition strategy;
Work authorization programme;
Spare parts and material storage programme and facilities.
Technical support organization and structure, including interface with and support of
external organizations such as headquarters, international and national organizations,
manufacturers and other institutions;
Outline of surveillance test programme;
Plant modification philosophy, with a list of past and planned major modifications;
Temporary modification review process and current status;
Probabilistic safety analysis undertaken;
Periodic safety report findings and current status of the safety analysis report;
Overview of reactor physics;
New and spent fuel management;
Overview of computer-based systems important to safety.
60
I-4.8. Chemistry
I-4.13. Commissioning
Commissioning process;
Organization and management of commissioning;
Implementation of commissioning programme;
Control of plant configuration;
Use of PSA and OEF.
62
63
Annex II
OSART TEAM CODE OF CONDUCT
A.
B.
C.
D.
OSART teams are out in the plant, amongst both people and equipment, observing
important plant activities
Team members must be proactive and inquisitive, and be present during in-plant
activities that are important to nuclear and personnel safety. This may include backshift
and weekend observations.
E.
F.
G.
H.
65
I.
66
Bassing, G.
Depas, V
Fotedar, S.
Consultant, India
Gest, P.
Consultant, France
Henderson, N.
Consultant, UK
Ilieva, M.
Jiang, F.
Martynenko, Y
Misak, J
Noel, M.
Lipar, M.
Perryman, L.
Place, J.
Ranguelova, V.
Rycraft, H.
Vamos, G
Viasnys, P.
Zahradka, D
67
No. 23
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