S. HRG.

11020

USVISIT: CHALLENGES AND STRATEGIES FOR

SECURING THE U.S. BORDER

HEARING
BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TERRORISM,
TECHNOLOGY AND HOMELAND SECURITY
OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION

JANUARY 31, 2007

Serial No. J1106

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary

(
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON

34148 PDF

2007

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

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COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont, Chairman
EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware
ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah
HERB KOHL, Wisconsin
CHARLES E. GRASSLEY, Iowa
DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
JON KYL, Arizona
RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York
LINDSEY O. GRAHAM, South Carolina
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
JOHN CORNYN, Texas
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island
TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
BRUCE A. COHEN, Chief Counsel and Staff Director
MICHAEL ONEILL, Republican Chief Counsel and Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE

ON

TERRORISM, TECHNOLOGY

AND

HOMELAND SECURITY

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California, Chairman

EDWARD M. KENNEDY, Massachusetts
JON KYL, Arizona
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware
ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah
HERB KOHL, Wisconsin
JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
CHARLES E. SCHUMER, New York
JOHN CORNYN, Texas
RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois
SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland
TOM COBURN, Oklahoma
JENNIFER DUCK, Chief Counsel
STEPHEN HIGGINS, Republican Chief Counsel

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CONTENTS
STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS
Page

Cornyn, Hon. John, a U.S. Senator from the State of Texas ...............................
prepared statement ..........................................................................................
Feinstein, Hon. Dianne, a U.S. Senator from the State of California .................
prepared statement ..........................................................................................
Kennedy, Hon. Edward M., a U.S. Senator from the State of Massachusetts,
prepared statement ..............................................................................................

3
107
1
109
111

WITNESSES
Barth, Richard C., Assistant Secretary, Office of Policy Development, Department of Homeland Security, Washington, D.C. .................................................
Bond, Phillip J., President and Chief Executive Officer, Information Technology Association of America (ITAA), Arlington, Virginia ..............................
Mocny, Robert A., Acting Director, USVISIT, Department of Homeland Security, Washington, D.C. .........................................................................................
Stana, Richard M., Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, Government Accountability Office, Washington, D.C. ..................................................
Verdery, C. Stewart, Jr., Partner and Founder, Monument Policy Group,
LLC, and Adjunct Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Washington, D.C. .................................................................................................

5
18
7
16
19

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Responses of Richard C. Barth and Robert A. Mocny to questions submitted
by Senators Cornyn, Kennedy, Sessions and Feinstein ....................................
Response of Phillip J. Bond to a question submitted by Senator Kennedy ........
Responses of Richard M. Stana to questions submitted by Senator Kennedy ...
Responses of C. Steward Verdery, Jr. to questions submitted by Senator
Kennedy ................................................................................................................

29
77
78
81

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

Barth, Richard C., Assistant Secretary, Office of Policy Development, and
Robert A. Mocny, Acting Director, USVISIT, Department of Homeland
Security, Washington, D.C., statement ..............................................................
Bond, Phillip J., President and Chief Executive Officer, Information Technology Association of America (ITAA), Arlington, Virginia, statement ...........
Clawson, Greg, Regional Manager, Motorola Enterprise Mobility Government
Business Solutions, statement ............................................................................
Koslowski, Rey, Associate Professor of Political Science and Public Policy,
Rockefeller College of Public Affairs and Policy, University at Albany, State
University of New York (SUNY), Albany, New York, statement .....................
Stana, Richard M., Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, Government Accountability Office, Washington, D.C., prepared statement ...............
Verdery, C. Stewart, Jr., Partner and Founder, Monument Policy Group,
LLC, and Adjunct Fellow, Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Washington, D.C., statement ..............................................................................

86
96
102
114
133
164

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USVISIT: CHALLENGES AND STRATEGIES

FOR SECURING THE U.S. BORDER
TUESDAY, JANUARY 31, 2007

U.S. SENATE,
TERRORISM, TECHNOLOGY AND
HOMELAND SECURITY,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, D.C.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:37 p.m., in room
SD226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Dianne Feinstein,
Chairman of the Subcommittee, presiding.
Present: Senators Feinstein, Kennedy, Cardin, and Cornyn.
SUBCOMMITTEE

ON

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DIANNE FEINSTEIN, A U.S.

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

Chairman FEINSTEIN. This meeting of the Subcommittee will

come to order.
Senator Kyl, who is the Ranking Member of the Subcommittee,
is not able to be present due to the press of other duties. I believe
he is on the floor. So the ranking position will be occupied fully and
completely by Senator Cornyn of Texas. We are delighted to have
you here.
The Subcommittee today will be dealing with a program that is
not without its controversy, namely, the USVISIT Program. I
have long been very concerned about the interplay between immigration and national security. I believe that we will not be able to
protect our Nation effectively until we can protect our borders. I do
believe we need to know who is coming in and out of our country.
The congressional mandate to create a system for tracking who
enters and leaves this country was first codified in 1996 with a
deadline of establishing a workable program by September 30,
1998. To the best of my knowledge, that is 8 years ago. Since that
time, Congress has extended the deadline over and over. Time and
time again, we have sacrificed our border security because of inaction or slow action by the Federal Government.
According to the 9/11 National Commission Staff Report on Terrorist Travel, prior to 9/11, no agency of the U.S. Government
thought of border security as a tool in the counterterrorism arsenal. 9/11 and its subsequent actions have made this goal a priority
and have exposed our countrys vulnerability. Yet over 5 years
later, the Federal Government has failed to devote sufficient time,
technology, personnel, and resources to making border security a
cornerstone of our national security policy.
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2
In 2003, 5 years after its first deadline in 1998, the Department
of Homeland Security created the USVISIT Program to implement
an automated system for documenting entry and exit by capturing
biometric information. USVISIT is an important program that has
done a decent job of monitoring the entry of the millions of visitors
into the United States. But there is so much more work to be done.
Today, over 10 years after the initial congressional mandate, we
do not have a reliable means of measuring who leaves our country.
We are here today to examine the challenges of implementing a
workable system.
DHSHomeland Securityhas essentially declared that the exit
program is dead as far as land borders are concerned. This is a serious problem. There are over 425 million border crossings at U.S.
borders every year. Because we do not know who is leaving the
country, we do not know who of these 425 million is overstaying
a visa versus who is playing by the rules. We do know that in 2004
there were 335.3 million crossing at land ports of entry. About 4.6
million people who crossed by land were eligible for USVISIT
screening. And we have no way of knowing whether any of those
4.6 million ever left the country. Think about that. We do not know
whether 4.6 million people here on a visa, whatever that visa is,
ever really followed the visa regulations and left the country.
I understand that the 4.6 million people subject to USVISIT
screening at land ports is only a fraction of the total number crossing each year. I also understand the argument that more US
VISIT-eligible persons come into our country via airports than by
land. This argument, though, does not convince me that we should
shelve the exit program at the land border. I think we have got to
take seriously that we have left a gaping hole in our countrys border. Anyone coming in by air or sea could leave undetected by way
of one of our 170 land ports of entry on more than 7,500 miles of
border with Canada and Mexico. By failing to address exits at all
ports, we are providing a blueprint to those who wish to harm the
United States. Without implementing a comprehensive exit and
entry system at all of our ports, we are leaving ourselves vulnerable to another attack.
The biggest problem here is that we still have not heard a sufficient explanation from the Department of Homeland Security as to
the challengesor I should say the failureto implement an exit
program at all ports. The New York Times reported that Homeland
Security claims that an exit program would cost tens of billions of
dollars to implement, but we have yet to see a breakdown of these
costs or a good-faith explanation of what is at stake here.
Homeland Security has failed to meet their June 2005 statutory
requirement to submit a report to Congress describing, one, the
status of biometric exit data systems already in use at ports of
entry; and, two, the matter in which USVISIT is to meet the goal
of a comprehensive screening system with both entry and exit biometric capability.
I must say I am very disappointed that the Department of Homeland Security, this huge Department, has failed to submit this report, and I call upon them to expedite this report to the Congress.
So today, I hope we can have a very candid, honest discussion of
how we can implement a workable entry-exit system.

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3
I would also like to just indicate that the National Sheriffs Association is represented here by their general counsel, Richard
Weintraub, and I want them to know that we are delighted to have
you join us in the audience.
[The prepared statement of Senator Feinstein appears as a submission for the record.]
And now, if I may, I would turn it over to the Ranking Member,
Senator Cornyn.
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN CORNYN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF TEXAS

Senator CORNYN. Thank you, Chairman Feinstein, and I appreciate very much your convening this hearing, and also Senator
Leahy for scheduling this hearing. This is an important program.
As we move forward with our debate about immigration reform
and how to solve our Nations immigration crisis, we all recognize
the importance of an immigration enforcement system that enhances the security of our citizens and visitors to the United
States. No enforcement system, however, should be adopted without assessing the impact it will have on legitimate travel and trade
to the United States. Our Nations security is paramount, to be
sure, but trade, especially with our partners on the Northern and
Southern borders, is critical to the health of our economy.
The USVISIT Program is one component of an overall border
and interior enforcement strategy. Since its inception in 2004, the
Department of Homeland Security has made significant progress in
phasing in implementation of the program at air, sea, and land
borders. And I want to specifically congratulate the Department. I
know they receive few kudos and more than a few arrows, but this
is one program that I think was very well implemented in consultation with local stakeholders. And it was an important part of the
rollout process to do that, and I think we should give credit where
credit is due.
But DHS must continue working hard to ensure that it continually receives the input of the public and interested stakeholders
on any expansion efforts, such as officials along the Texas border.
I remain concerned about the effect of the USVISIT program on
Southern border communities. According to DHS, the USVISIT
entry technology has been installed at most air and sea ports and
in secondary inspection areas at 154 land borders. The Texas border region already has felt the effects of increased security screening. Southern border businesses and officials are concerned with
the increased delays at border crossing checkpoints and the impact
of delays on the local economy. As we continue working toward additional security measures, we need to develop a quick and efficient
process to identify those who may be a threat to our national security, while allowing legitimate, law- abiding travelers to enter and
exit the United States in a timely manner.
One significant initiative to facilitate trade and travel on the
Southern border is the border crossing card. I have introduced yesterday a new bill, S. 422, which will actually permit Mexican nationals who hold laser visas and who have already undergone rigorous background screening by the State Department and the Department of Homeland Security to remain in the United States for

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4
an initial period of up to 6 months. The bill allows for expedited
entry into the U.S. while at the same time maintains the strong
border enforcement process. It also ensures that commerce on the
Southern border remains strong and viable, notwithstanding any
new enforcement measures that DHS will put into place.
Now, just a footnote to say that this legislation would merely establish parity with visitors from Canada, and I think it is an appropriate goal for this Nation ultimately, by the use of technology,
to treat all of our guests and lawful visitors exactly the same, without any discrimination.
DHS has indicated that the USVISIT entry process has been
beneficial, especially in terms of identifying criminals, people who
commit identity theft, and immigration violators. DHS, however,
also acknowledges that it needs additional resources and personnel
to improve the existing entry process. If we are going to be a welcoming Nation to lawful trade and traffic, we ought to make that
as easy as possible, consistent with security efforts, while we spend
whatever it takes to secure our borders against those who attempt
to enter our country in violation of our laws.
So we will need to continue to work with DHS to make sure that
it gets the help that it needs in order to make the system successful.
As Senator Feinstein has noted, DHS has recently announced it
would delay implementation of the exit procedures at land borders,
in part due to the potentially significant delays in the flow of crossborder traffic and the significant resources it will take to expand
existing infrastructure and systems communications that are needed for the USVISIT process to work effectively.
Of course, I share Senator Feinsteins concerns, but I do note
that at this point we have not thought far enough ahead to determine what it is we would actually do with that information if we
were to capture it and whether there would be sufficient ICE
agents necessary to actually enforce overstays. It is a significant
problem, but I think it needs to be addressed in the context of overall border security and immigration reform, and perhaps not as a
stand- alone issue.
DHS should continue to explore various strategies for improving
the ability to capture traveler biometrics and entry and exit information. With the movement to create a single, secure biometric and
machine-readable travel card, like the e-Passport, DHS should
work with industry leaders and stakeholders to determine how the
latest technologies, such as radio frequency identification technology, can best be incorporated into travel and entry-exit documents. DHS also needs to complete its law enforcement systems integration, which is a cornerstone of any successful law enforcement
strategy.
With these improvements and with the support of the Congress,
we will eventually be able to have an integrated entry-exit process
that protects our Nations security and facilitates legitimate travel
to and from the United States.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Senator Cornyn appears as a submission for the record.]
Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator.

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5
I would like to introduce the witnesses of panel one.
The first will be the Honorable Richard Barth, Assistant Secretary for the Office of Policy Development, Department of Homeland Security. He has been the Assistant Secretary for this office
since August 26th of 2006. He is the principal action officer for coordinating policy among DHS entities, as well as with State and
Federal agencies and foreign governments. Prior to this, Assistant
Secretary Barth was Corporate Vice President and Director, Homeland Security Strategy, for Motorolas Government Relations Office
in Washington.
The other witness is Robert Mocny, the Acting Director of US
VISIT, who is on the hot seat today. Mr. Mocny is Acting Director
of USVISIT. He is responsible for the day-to-day operations of
USVISIT, including managing the development and deployment of
the program. Over the course of his career, he has served in several
senior Federal Government positions related to U.S. immigration
policy and operations, including director of the Entry-Exit Project
and Acting Assistant Commissioner and Assistant Chief Inspector
with the former INS, Immigration and Naturalization Service.
Welcome, gentlemen. What we usually do at these hearings is
you will have a time limit of 5 minutes, and that way Senator
Cornyn, and I hope other members, will have a chance to ask you
additional questions. So please proceed.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD C. BARTH, ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
OFFICE OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. BARTH. Chairman Feinstein and Ranking Member Cornyn,

thank you for taking the time and inviting us here to discuss the
efforts of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to record the
exit of non-citizens as they leave the United States.
It is one of DHS missions to modernize and improve our immigration and border management systems, and biometric exit control is a key component of fully securing our Nations borders. Our
first priority, though, given that we do not have unlimited resources, is to fully implement ten-fingerprint collection of non-citizen travelers as visa-issuing ports around the world and upon
entry to the U.S. Secretary Chertoff has made it clear many times
that keeping terrorists out of the country is the priority as we
make decisions for the prudent, risk-based investment of the border
control dollars we have. Yet the challenge for border security is to
implement a well-planned exit solution to assist us in closing the
door on those individuals who pose an overwhelming risk of entering or remaining in the United States undetected.
As you can imagine, the deployment of a comprehensive exit solution poses significant challenges. First, we must address three
very different border environments: air, sea, and land. Second, the
United States has almost always had some form of entry inspection, and over time, infrastructure developed to support that entry
process. U.S. international airports have customs inspection booths
near the baggage claim areas for arriving international passengers.
Seaports serving international cruise lines provide terminal-based
customs inspection. The number of lanes processing vehicular traf-

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6
fic and pedestrian entry inbound is constantly expanding. But not
one of these ports was designed to accommodate exit control.
Unlike the entry process, there are only limited facilities to process international travelers as they leave the United States. In fact,
the aerial photograph that we have displayed over here, Chairman
Feinstein and Ranking Member Cornyn, I think vividly shows the
striking difference between entry and exit infrastructure at the
largest land border port of entrySan Ysidro, California, which I
will discuss in more detail in a moment. And, finally, an exit solution presents not only an infrastructure challenge but, equally important, a fundamental change in the business process of travelers
who are departing the United States.
Accordingly, DHS proposes a phased deployment of exit in the
three environments of air, land, and sea, with an initial focus on
air. We are beginning at airports primarily to focus on travelers
from countries of interest, 91 percent of whom arrive in the United
States via air. It is absolutely essential for us to know what travelers from these countries have complied with the terms of their
admission. We will, of course, work closely with our Government
and private sector partners to deploy the most viable option for air
exit. We are already in dialog with the airline industry on the options to deploy biometric exit at airports.
After deploying exit procedures at airports, we will begin deploying a solution to seaports based on the air solution. And this brings
us to our most significant challenge: deploying an exit solution at
the land border. Biometric confirmation of the departure of travelers via land ports is significantly more complicated and costly
than the air and sea environments. Using the aerial photograph of
San Ysidro, I would walk you through the two different variations
of the entry and exit. On the left is the entry, and on the right is
the exit from the U.S.
San Ysidro is the largest entry-exit land border port for travelers
entering or leaving the United States, with 25 lanes for vehicular
entry traffic and only about 4 for exit traffic. Simply duplicating biometric, biographic collection of data upon departure will not work.
It would require costly infrastructure improvements, land acquisition costs, and staffing for additional lanes of traffic over multiple
shifts.
I could go into the cost of wait times for the public to cross the
border, but in the interest of time, I will rely on the written testimony we have provided to give you those details.
As I said, while the challenges are significant, they are not insurmountable. There are ways to approach a land border exit solution,
and we intend to pursue them. We are closely monitoring technology solutions that could help resolve the land border challenges
without the extraordinary infrastructure investment that otherwise
would be required.
An interim solution for exit data collection at the land border
could also involve the cooperation of Canada and Mexico. Such cooperation could include agreements between our countries to share
data on an as-needed transactional basis between our systems. We
will explore that option to more quickly obtain good data on departing aliens.

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7
The Department takes seriously the issue of protecting the privacy of non-citizens travelers also. Our written testimony, again,
goes into some detail on attention to privacy as well as accessibility
issues.
In conclusion, a comprehensive exit solution for the United
States requires the administration and Congress to collaborate
closely on finding the best, cost-effective solutions for each environment. We will meet this challenge with a set of policies and processes that provide our decisionmakers with flexible solutions.
Thank you for this opportunity to testify, and we look forward to
answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Barth appears as a submission
for the record.]
Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Dr. Barth.
Mr. Mocny?
STATEMENT OF ROBERT A. MOCNY, ACTING DIRECTOR, US
VISIT, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. MOCNY. Chairman Feinstein, Ranking Member Cornyn,

thank you for inviting me to discuss the operations of the US
VISIT Program, which has just marked its third anniversary. In
those 3 years, USVISIT has significantly strengthened our Nations immigration and border security capabilities to a level that
simply did not exist before. I am proud of our dedicated team of
professionals who are working hard to solve some difficult challenges that face our Nation. And I am proud that many are supportive of the programs progress. For example, some governments
expressed apprehension when we first launched the program. Now
many of those same governments are seeking our expertise as they
work to establish their own biometrics-based border management
programs. USVISIT has clearly become the standard for the rest
of the world.
The background of USVISIT is our innovative use of biometrics,
which enhances our capacity to know definitively who is coming
into our country and to crack down on fraudulent document use.
With biometric identification technologies at its base, USVISIT
has revolutionized our ability to verify that travelers are who they
say they are and do not pose a risk to the United States.
USVISIT also provides immigration and law enforcement decisionmakers with critical information when they need it and where
they need it. But perhaps the best way to evaluate the success of
USVISIT is to look at what we have achieved against our four
goals, and those are: to enhance the security of our citizens and our
visitors, to facilitate legitimate travel and trade, to ensure the integrity of our immigration system, and to protect the privacy of our
visitors.
In terms of enhancing security, since January of 2004 we have
processed more than 76 million visitors and in that time have
intercepted approximately 1,800 immigration violators and people
with criminal histories based on the biometric alone. USVISIT
also provides the infrastructure for the State Departments BioVisa
Program, which consular officials use when they process a person
applying for a visa to the United States. Biometrics are also depriv-

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8
ing potential terrorists of one of their most powerful toolsthe
ability to use fraudulent or stolen identification documents to enter
the country. This means that biometrics also protect travelers by
making it virtually impossible for anyone else to claim their identifies should their travel documents be lost or stolen.
USVISIT also tracks and records changes in immigration status
and matches entry and exit records to determine overstays. ICE officials, Immigration and Customs Enforcement, have made more
than 290 arrests based on USVISIT overstay information. US
VISIT uses and maintains the Arrival and Departure Information
System, or ADIS, which has grown to be the definitive immigration
status system that provides overstay information for subsequent
action.
Regarding our second goal, facilitating legitimate travel and
trade, USVISITs biometric-based capabilities, while enhancing security, have not increased wait times at our ports of entry. US
VISIT has also strengthened the integrity of our immigration system, our third goal. We continue to work with the FBI to achieve
interoperability between their fingerprint data base and DHS. We
are piloting a program that will provide Federal, State, and local
law enforcement officers biometric-based access to criminal and immigration information.
We are also moving from a collection of a two-fingerprint to a
ten-fingerprint standard. This will help us collect more accurate
and actual information on those attempting to enter our country.
But we also recognize that keeping bad people out is not enough.
We must ensure that those few people who remain in the country
as a threat to our Nations security do not go undetected.
This brings me to perhaps our greatest challenge: the development of biometric exit procedures that address our goals of security
and facilitating legitimate travel and trade at those three very different environmentsair, sea, and land. Over the past 2 years, we
have been evaluating new and evolving technologies that allow us
to definitively know when a traveler has left the country. Through
pilot programs at 14 air and sea ports, we have learned that a
technology to record a travelers departure does, in fact, work. But
to be most effective, it has to be integrated into the existing travel
process. We have already reached out to the travel industry to
identify the best way to integrate exit procedures into the travelers
current airport experience.
The land border poses its own challenges. Assistant Secretary
Barth adequately explained those challenges, but you should know
that we have been pursuing possible solutions there as well. US
VISIT recently completed a test of radio frequency identification, or
RFID, technology at five land border ports of entry, proving that
vicinity-read RFID technology is a viable solution to meet the multiple challenges of the land border environment. But as cited in the
recent GAO report and our own findings, more work needs to be
done.
Finally, we are achieving our mission without compromising our
fourth goal of protecting the personal privacy of our visitors. Privacy is a part of everything that we do, and it is essential to our
mission. But USVISITs job is not done. Challenges remain, especially regarding the solution to exit procedures. We have proven

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9
the skeptics wrong in the past, and we believe we can do it again
going forward.
Thank you again for your support and for the opportunity to testify here today.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, both of you.
We appreciate it.
It is my understanding that at least a third of visa holders do
not leave the United States. So the looser the system we have, the
more visa holders we are going to have who do not leave, the more
you add to the numbers of undocumented, and the more you make
any reform of immigration more difficult. I think the economic arguments that are made really have to deal with that factor.
The numbers are only going to grow, so the importance of developing an exit program I think is really there. And I travel. I get
visas. The other governments know when we leave the country.
But the bigger you get, the harder it is going to be. And I think
you ought to develop some system. I have gone in and out of San
Ysidro. This is my backyard. There is no problem going out. And
you look at that photo, and that shows it right there. The lane
leaving the United States is vacant. Coming into the United States
is where there are a lot of cars. So, in a way, that to me countermands what you are saying. It seems to me we could have an exit
land program that would work.
Is it true that you have suspended work on an exit system, Mr.
Mocny?
Mr. MOCNY. No, Chairman Feinstein, we have not abandoned
exit in any way. In fact, we are pursuing both the air and sea exit
this very year and beginning to look at the challenges that we continue to face at the land borders. But we have notand I want to
correct the record that has been out there for some time. We have
not abandoned our move toward exit control.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. OK. GAO notes that Homeland Security
has discontinued testing of its radio frequency identification system
at the land borders. Is this true?
Mr. MOCNY. We concluded a proof of concept, and so we were
very clear to call it not a pilot or something that we were going to
put out there
Chairman FEINSTEIN. No, let memy question is very carefully
phrased. Have you discontinued testing of the radio frequency identification system?
Mr. MOCNY. Yes, maam.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. Now you can go ahead and answer the rest
of it.
Mr. MOCNY. Thank you. We had a proof of concept. It was always
designed to be put up and then brought down. The idea was to look
at what technologies might afford us to have a viable exit program
at the land borders. So we had a very clearly definedand one
thing with USVISIT is that we practice what I believe to be good
project management, which is we have a beginning and an end to
anything that we put out there to be able to evaluate that. So we
had a proof of concept with a beginning and an end portion to that,
with the idea to evaluate that and take it to its next level to see
where would we go with that. And what we identified was where
there were certain challenges with that proof of concept.

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Chairman FEINSTEIN. OK. Are you currently testing any alternative means of tracking who leaves the country?
Mr. MOCNY. We currently have the 14 air and sea pilots that we
have, but we do not have any testing at the land ports of entry.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. All right. So there is no testing going on.
So as I interpret all of that, effectively the exit program has been
stopped. Nothing is moving ahead, so I conclude it stopped. Am I
wrong?
Mr. BARTH. Chairman Feinstein, you are correct in concluding
that any physical activity by people to test systems, to implement,
to do something at the land borders is going on. There is nothing
there. You are correct. However, the planning to do something that
is efficacious, cost-effective, and real to plug the holes that we are
all in agreement need to be plugged for controlling our exit at the
borders is very actively underway.
When we hopefully in the very near future send to you our strategies for the 2007 spend plan and budgets, et cetera, you will be
able to see in a better level of detail the kinds of things we will
be doing to actively pursue air exit, air bio-exit technologies, and
implement them, actively pursue them at sea, and actively find the
technological solution that we truly believe is out there to solve the
problem that we see here.
We cannot doin our Departments completely agreement
throughout, we cannot do a mirror image of that and block up traffic going out of the country like it is blocked up there coming in
without costs that are astronomical. That border control station
you see there that is causing all that blockage is a very old
Chairman FEINSTEIN. The blockage is coming into the country,
sir.
Mr. BARTH. It is all coming in. And if we tried to put biometric
exit data capture going out, we would have to have a similar number of lanes, we would have to have similar staffing, and we would
see back-ups like you see coming in. And just to the point of the
costs of those buildings there that the U.S. Government owns, the
Congress has already approved and has half-funded a $500 million
upgrade and replacement of those facilities. So the cost of doing
that on the outbound lanes, we have a good data point. Maybe it
is only one, but it is a very good one. At your backyard to do what
we are doing incoming with biometric exit outgoing would cost
$500 million, not including the land acquisition costs and not including the staffing costs.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. You know, I guess I have been around here
for almost 15 years now. I mean, this to me is the typical bureaucratic argument: We cannot do it because it costs too much, therefore... I mean, we cannot even get a report that was due in 2005.
I guess what I want to say, that is in my State. I care about it.
I care about this issue. I think this is a soft underbelly of this country not to know that people ever leave. Virtually everybody that
came into this country to do us harm so far came in on a visa. We
have no way to know that people leave this country by way of a
land border. And that ought toI mean, how many employees does
Homeland Security have, 250,000? How manywhat?
Mr. BARTH. Not quite.

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Chairman FEINSTEIN. An awful lot. It would seem to me that if
this is a priorityand my view is to make it a priorityyou would
adjust priorities within this huge megalopolis of yours and be able
to deal with it.
So I have just got to tell you, I do not accept reasons, well, the
building is going to cost X and this is going to cost Y. You came
up here with something that shows that this could be done at San
Ysidro with some ease because there are no cars on the road leaving. And I will just leave it at that. I think this is a real national
security issue, and hopefully somehow that will get through. So
thank you very much.
Senator, your turn.
Senator CORNYN. Thank you, Senator Feinstein.
Gentlemen, I want to pick up on the matter of overstays. The latest statistic I have seen indicates that 45 percent of the illegal immigration in this country results not from people who have entered
illegally but from people who have entered legally and overstayed.
In other words, 55 percent have come across the border without a
visa; 45 percent have come in with a visa, but have simply overstayed.
And I guess that gets to my question, Mr. Mocny, to you. You indicate, if I heard you correctly in your statement, that ICEImmigration and Customs Enforcementhas arrested 290 people for
visa overstays. And so I guess the next question is obvious. That
is just a fraction of the number of people who come in legally but
overstay their visa.
Can you speak to what we need to do as a Nation to make sure
that we can actually deal with everyone who overstays their visa,
ultimately?
Mr. MOCNY. Well, I think having a viable exit program will begin
to address that. The information that we provide to the ICE agents
is culled from many different systems. It is corroborated by the biometric systems that we have at the 12 airports, and so we can
produce on a daily basis reports to ICE that have people who have
definitively been overstays and actually checked out with the biometric. That is called a confirmed overstay. That record is then
flagged for any time they may want to get another visa or try to
come back under the Visa Waiver Program. They would be prevented from doing so.
But we also have many unconfirmed overstays, and those are
people where this ADIS system, as I described earlier, sends an
automatic trigger to our unit, the Data Integrity Group, that culls
through that information and says this person is a possible or
unconfirmed overstay. We then have to go through many other
multiple systems to make a determination whether or not that person did, in fact, leave. And, of course, they go through I94 information, the boarding card that they get upon arrival. That is a separate system that we have to go into. And then they would have
to also consider the land border departure as well.
And so, clearly, this speaks to, in fact, why we have not abandoned exit. We believe that exit has to occur in order to close this
gap, but we do not have that. This is the first time in many years
that we have been able to actually make arrests on overstays based
on an automatic trigger of that persons immigration record. In the

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12
past it has been because of some work site enforcement and it was
later determined that they were an overstay. But this sends an
automatic signal to ICE.
I will grant you it is far from being as many as we would like
it to be, but it is much further than we have been before.
Senator CORNYN. Well, I will grant you both that birds have
come home to roost due to many, many, many, many years of neglect that no doubt preceded even the creation of the Department
of Homeland Security or your being hired by the Federal Government in your current position. But it strikes me that we have come
up with a comprehensive way to deal with the information. Lets
say we do get information that somebody has not left the country
at the expiration of the visa, so what? Collecting the information
does not keep unless we are going to actually have the people to
followup on the information and are going to have the ability to
communicate technology through the various data bases to give a
law enforcement person the information they need in order to apprehend that individual.
So I think what this points out is that there is a huge void we
have in other areas. Even if you had the exit system up and running 100 percent, the question is what you are going to do with
that information.
I want to ask Dr. Barthand I think, Mr. Mocny, you also mentioned the desire of the Department to go after a ten-fingerprint on
USVISIT. As I understand right now, it is an index finger on each
hand.
Mr. MOCNY. Correct.
Senator CORNYN. But as I understand from Secretary Chertoff,
the desire to go to ten fingerprints is to be able to try to get
matches with various partial prints that had been obtained in
places like safe houses in Afghanistan or Iraq or elsewhere around
the country to take advantage of all the fingerprint records that
may be available and then match those with people coming across
our border through the USVISIT Program. Do I have that about
right?
Mr. BARTH. Yes.
Mr. MOCNY. Yes, you have it very clear.
Senator CORNYN. And what are your estimates in terms of how
much of an improvement this will be in terms of our ability to
catch criminals and threats to our country by the use of ten fingerprints as opposed to just two?
Mr. BARTH. Let me just add one factor. Then I will have Bob answer your details here.
An additional feature of the ten-fingerprint system is that the
DHS data bases then will be able to be more easily aligned with
the significantly large FBI data bases which are based on ten fingerprints. So there is an added advantage there that you are not
just searching half of the universe, if you will, of available prints.
And the interoperability of those two systems is something that our
two Departmentsthe Justice Department and DHSare very actively pursuing so that when we do have DHS ten-print systems
fully set up, we will have a very good exchange of prints with the
FBI.
Senator CORNYN. Thank you very much.

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Madam Chairman, I think, you know, one of the things that we
have talked about in terms of comprehensive immigration reform
is the importance of work site verification and eliminating some of
the identity theft and document fraud at the work site, which, of
course, is most often the magnet that draws people to this country.
And I would just say I will leave this portion of the hearing even
more convinced that we are going to have to fill in a lot of different
gaps here and not just the exit program in order to make this system work.
Thank you very much.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Cornyn.
I would like to ask one quick question. Doesnt Customs and Border Protection require that land passengers submit their I94
forms to a Mexican or Canadian immigration inspector when they
leave the country?
Mr. MOCNY. I dont know if it is a requirement that they actually
have that as a requirement, but that is often what happens. So the
I94, the arrival card and the departure card the person gets when
they enter the U.S., is either surrendered at the airport to the airline check-in agent and at the land border often times is given to
a Canadian officer. The challenge we have with the Mexican border
is that for every port of entry we have on the Southern border,
there is not always a corresponding port of entry in Mexico. So
there is that additional challenge for us as well. But that does happen on a regular basis and very often on the Canadian border that
datathose cards are handed over.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. Well, I have one here. It says you must
surrender this permit when you leave the United States across the
Canadian border to a Canadian official, across the Mexican border
to a United States official. Why cant that be a starting point? Why
cant we require that when people leave? If they are leaving and
they have to give the U.S. official or the Canadian official the information
Mr. BARTH. I am not sure of the legal or regulatory basis for the
language on the card itself. However, it again comes back to an infrastructure problem that we have and have to fix. I think
Chairman FEINSTEIN. Well, why dont we try to fix it?
Mr. BARTH. Because I think in the first instance we have neither
the staff nor the facility to slow down the traffic and collect those
things as people leave the U.S.
Mr. MOCNY. That also does not get to the biometric capture at
this point. As you have the biographic informationand that is
helpful in some cases. We have the name of the individual. But we
cannot capture the biometric that way, and I think we are trying
to pursue technologies that would allow us to capture a biometric
as part of the exit. But that very well may mean work with Canada
in doing so. As Assistant Secretary Barth says, they have the infrastructure just 100 yards north of us, and we may be able to use
some of that. But that is a negotiation with Canada that we would
enter into and have discussions with them.
But as I saidand I think it is fair to noteat our 37-some ports
of entry on the Southern border, there is not always a corresponding port of entry into Mexico. So it just represents another
challenge for the program.

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14
Chairman FEINSTEIN. But at least where there is a will, something might be worked out. I appreciate that.
We are joined by Senator Kennedy. Senator, I understand you
would like to make a statement.
Senator KENNEDY. No, thank you. I will put it in the record,
Madam Chairman. I have just a couple of questions at an appropriate time.
[The prepared statement of Senator Kennedy appears as a submission for the record.]
Chairman FEINSTEIN. Yes, please go ahead.
Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very much. I apologize for being
late. I was going to ask about these exit systems of other countries.
How do they do it? And have you looked at other countries? Which
countries are doing it well? What are their systems? Are there lessons we ought to learn from those? I know Singapore, for example,
does it well. That is probably a unique situation given the size of
the country and the population. But, I mean, in Europe, they might
have had a system years ago, but because of the EU, it may be
somewhat different. But have you looked at other countries to see
what we might be able to learn from them?
Mr. MOCNY. We have, and that is certainly something that we
note to ourselves, that these countries have had departure control
for many, many years, and it is just something that we never had
here. So as they begin to modify some of their systemsyou have
departure control, passport control in France and Japan and Australia. They have always had that infrastructure in place, and the
challenge that we are faced today with is in a very, you know,
rapid fashion to stand up any kind of exit control absent that infrastructure. So they do it well, and it is useful information.
I will say that some countries are, in fact, beginning to look at
biometric exit, are doing away with the basic infrastructure, the
kind of hard brick and mortar, as it were, with personnel in place
because that does become very expensive. So we do look at many
countries across the world to try to learn from them as well.
Senator KENNEDY. Maybe you have gone over this, and if you
have, dont bother. But biometric, I mean, I think all of us are familiar with what happens with automobiles and going through the
tolls and all the rest. So you have got that capability, but how do
you know who is in the car? And that is obviously the problem.
Did you discuss in terms of the biometric some suggestions in
these areas? Mr. Barth. We did not go into that particular detail,
Senator, but it is safe to say that that poses the additional layer
of problem. If you have the driver and they merely have to come
up and put their finger on the biometric detector at the land point
of exit, that is one problem. Having everyone get out of the car and
have to approach the stand and put the finger on it just would create an impossible back-up at the border that we believe the technology will help us solve, just aswhatever it was-10 or 15 years
ago, EZPass just burst on the scene and you had to slow down to
5 miles an hour to get through it, but compared to the Route 95
toll booths, that was definitely an improvement. We will get to that
point sometime, and we believe at some time in the future we will
get to where the New Jersey Parkway is, which is you can speed
through at 55 miles an hour and capture the data you need.

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15
Senator KENNEDY. Just finally, in the next panel we are going
to hear some testimony about the use of
electronics, and I dont know whether you want to make any
comment or if you have got a reaction to it. I think people ought
to be able to make their presentation before people make maybe a
comment. But we are all friends here, and we are all trying to
learn. So if you have got some ideas or suggestions or comments,
it would be useful.
Mr. MOCNY. Thank you, Senator. We did provide in our written
testimony the concept of a bio-token, and that is the combination
of radio frequency identification with biometrics. So it is a very
nascent technology at this point. We have to look at the
ergonomics. If people are going to be leaving the country at 55
mph, we have to be careful about what device we give them to actually biometrically verify their departure.
So what we know is that technology is beginning to emerge, but
we have to factor in so many things such as the ergonomics, the
safety of it as well. So this is something that we are trying to pay
attention to. We are looking at it earnestly, and we believe, as the
Assistant Secretary says, it is not here now, but in the office in a
couple years time, it may very well present ourselves with a potential solution.
Senator KENNEDY. Thank you. Madam Chairman, if I could, I
will submit some additional questions, if I could.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. Absolutely.
Senator KENNEDY. Thank you very, very much.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much.
I thank you gentlemen. We look forward to great things happening. Thank you very much.
The next panel consists ofand I will begin while you all come
to the table, pleaseRichard Stana, the Director of Homeland Security and Justice Issues for the U.S. Government Accountability
Office. He is a 30-year veteran of GAO who has directed reviews
on a wide variety of complex military and domestic issues. Most recently, he directed GAOs work relating to immigration and border
security issues, and he is the author of the recent report on the
challenges of implementing an exit program at the land borders.
Phillip Bond is the president and CEO of Information Technology
Association of America. Mr. Bond directs the day-to-day operations
of the largest and oldest information technology trade association,
representing 325 leading software services, Internet, telecommunications, electronic commerce, and systems integration companies.
Stewart Verdery is the president of the Monument Policy Group.
He is the founder and president. This is a consulting firm in Washington that advises clients on issues relating to homeland security,
immigration, and technology. So, gentlemen, we are very interested
to hear from you, and if you could particularly -you have heard the
problem. If you could particularly concentrate your remarks as to
possible solutions, that would be appreciated. Mr. Stana, please.

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STATEMENT OF RICHARD M. STANA, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND
SECURITY AND JUSTICE ISSUES, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. STANA. Thank you, Chairman Feinstein, Senator Cornyn,

Senator Kennedy. I am pleased to be here today to discuss DHS
implementation of the USVISIT entry-exit program. As you know,
the USVISIT Program is designed to collect, maintain, and share
data on selected foreign nationals entering and exiting the country
at air, sea, and land ports of entry. Data is captured to learn and
verify visitors identities, screen information against watchlists,
and record arrival and departure. My prepared statement is based
on a report we did last month on the USVISIT implementation on
land ports of entry, and I would just like to make a few points
about that effort.
First, we found that DHS cannot currently implement a biometric USVISIT exit capability, as mandated by statute, without incurring a major physical and economic impact on land border ports.
Implementing a biometrically based exit recording system that mirrors entry would require more than $3 billion in new infrastructure
and could produce major traffic congestion because travelers would
have to stop their vehicles upon exit for processing. Technology
compatible to the land port environment is not currently available
to address this processing issue. The RFID technology tested at
land portsand you can see them on the picture board hanging on
gantries and on poles here at ports of entry, at Alexandria Bay,
New York, and Nogales, Arizonawas subject to numerous performance and reliability problems. In fact, it had a success rate of
only 14 percent in one test and provided no assurance that the person recorded as leaving the country is the same one who entered.
It is important to note that DHS has not yet provided to Congress
a statutorily mandated report which was due by June 2005 on its
plans to fully implement an exit-entry program.
Second, we found that DHS had not yet articulated how US
VISIT will strategically fit or incorporate other land border security
initiatives and mandates. It is important to know, for example, how
the new Secure Border Initiative, or SBI, will tie in with US
VISIT, especially given the interior enforcement goals of SBI and
the inability of the USVISIT system to generate comprehensive,
reliable, and accurate overstay data. It is also important to know
how the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative will work with US
VISIT.
Last, DHS deserves credit for installing the entry portion of US
VISIT at nearly all of the land ports, and this was done with minimal new construction or changes to existing facilities. But officials
at 12 of the 21 land ports we visited told us about USVISIT-related computer slowdowns and freezes that adversely affected processing times and could have compromised security. These problems
were not routinely reported to headquarters, in part because of the
lack of coordination between USVISIT and CBP.
A real challenge lies ahead because the introduction of technology to permit a ten-fingerprint scan and read e-passports could
increase inspection times and crowding, and thus affect port operations at aging and space-constrained facilities like those pictures
on the picture board. The left-hand side is San Ysidroit is a port

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17
right in your backyard, Senator Feinstein and on the right is the
Detroit-Windsor Tunnel. There is really no place to expand in the
tunnel.
In the limited time I have remaining, I would like to raise a few
other issues that members of the Committee may wish to consider
as you conduct oversight of the USVISIT Program.
First, technology is a tool, but not a cure for every border security problem. It is only one leg of a three-legged stool that includes
people, process, and technology. As good as technology might be, it
must fit in the port operational environment and facilitate, not
hamper, the inspection process. CBP inspectors told us that technology is unreliable at times or can overwhelm them with information. And when this happens, the inspection process can slow down.
Time pressures have resulted in information being ignored and security being compromised by hasty inspections. And keep in mind
that Ahmed Ressam, the Millennium Bomber, was stopped not by
technology but by an alert customs inspector who observed the subject and had a gut instinct that something was not quite right. We
do not want technology to force our inspectors to keep their eyes
off the traveler.
Second, the USVISIT Program cannot operate effectively in a
vacuum but, rather, needs to be integrated with other border security systems. Even an effective entry-exit system would be compromised if travelers could walk, drive, or sail in and out of the
country without detection between the ports. Controlling 7,500
miles of land border and 95,000 of coastline is no easy or inexpensive task. Fragmenting responsibility for border security programs
among several organizational components at DHS frankly is not
helpful.
Third, although various laws and mandates call for an entry-exit
system, there may be opportunities to help achieve the systems
goals in combination with other DHS programs. An effective entry
system is extremely important to prevent identified terrorists and
other criminals from entering the United States, but enhanced intelligence might also be needed to improve our watchlists. And an
effective exit control system would be helpful to identify those who
have overstayed their visas, but the feasibility of locating and removing millions of overstays who may not wish to be found is questionable, without increasing the modest number of ICE agents and
resources currently devoted to this task and implementing an effective work site enforcement or temporary worker program.
In closing, there is no question that securing our Nations borders is a vital task and deserves high priority. The challenges we
have found provide an opportunity for Congress to consider how
this task can best be accomplished.
This concludes my oral statement, and I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Stana appears as a submission
for the record.]
Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Stana.
Mr. Bond?

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STATEMENT OF PHILLIP J. BOND, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA (ITAA), ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA

Mr. BOND. Thank you, Chairman Feinstein, Senator Cornyn,

Senator Kennedy. On behalf of the membership of ITAA, it is a
privilege to be here. Let me get right to the point.
For this hearing, I was asked to discuss whether technology currently exists that can verify the identity of a foreign visitor leaving
this country, as mandated by Congress. The short answer is yes,
both proximity-and vicinity-read RFID technologies can help accomplish this task, but as with almost any technology, I have to
quickly add that it depends.
Let me talk briefly about the two and preface that by saying just
very generally the Co-Chair of the bipartisan RFID Caucus understands this well, but RFID simply means you have some information and a small antenna which transmits differing amounts of information to a receiver, which then reads that information via
radio wave. Two different basic approaches.
Proximity-read RFID systems have a very secure chip, a lot of information. These are the smart cards you read about for access to
buildings and so forth. They are commonly used and have advanced
computing powers. Very good at authenticating the user and ensuring that the person using the card is who they claim to be.
For the purpose of the exit program, DHS could issue all US
VISIT applicants a smart card upon entering. They would then authenticate their identity upon exiting by going through a reader
station. Officials located at the stations could verify that the person
is who they say they are by a visual matchor by a biometric match
which fingerprints. This may, as has been noted, slow traffic. It
may require significant investment, additional agents at point of
entry, or expansion of those. On the other hand, stopping the traffic to inspect the documents may be the answer if the national priority is 100 percent authentication. That technology would do that.
DHS would need, I think, to perform a cost/benefit analysis.
Alternatively, there is ultra-high frequency or vicinity-read
RFID. This could be attached to the I94 form when visitors enter.
These have a longer read rangethey are like the speed pass that
you are familiar with on some of the roadsand would provide
some flexibility in facilitating the flow of traffic while hopefully securing our borders.
Vicinity-read RFID technology transmits a unique number, kind
of like your license plate number on a car, and then you separately
dive into a secure data base to determine the connection between
the two.
With the UHF border solution, DHS could quickly read a high
volume of credentials while vehicles passed through. And as with
any type of exit program, presumably some visual inspections
would need to occur. Unlike the smart card or proximity-read option, it would keep the traffic moving and perhaps align with existing trusted traveled programs that we have today that use similar
technology.
However, the current generation of vicinity-read solutions, like
existing smart card products, do not independently tie a person to
an ID card through biometrics without some intervention, without

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checking visually or with some other biometric. The limitation in
this case is that it really only proves that the I94 left the country,
not the person that is supposed to be attached to that I94, which
is, of course, not the same thing.
I am aware of the pilot program that was mentioned and the results there are not satisfactory looking at the ultra-high frequency
vicinity-read. However, I also know that this kind of technology
works. It is in use on both our borders today with the NEXUS and
SENTRI programs. The DOD has used it. And as has been mentioned, there is technology on the horizon that would combine the
longer read, faster flow with the biometric capability. It is not here
yet, but it is on the horizon.
Proponents of the vicinity-read technology would say that implementing this through a phased approach would give significant
benefits in the near term, increasing dividends on security, and
commerce in the future while minimizing delays. That is the chief
advantage there. However, it is not up to me or my association to
pick winners in this space, and I think Government should be very
careful about picking winners and losers as well. As Senator
Cornyn I think alluded to earlier, Government should define the
mission, objectives, and requirements, and then go to the technology sector of the country and find what is best to fit the mission
and the objectives and the priorities that Congress in its oversight
helps to set.
If I can, with 12 seconds, I want to briefly just point out that
some folks very legitimately concerned about privacy have depicted
vicinity-read RFID as a privacy risk. I would submit that it is not
at all inherently secure and that those charges do not really hold
up to scrutiny because, again, it only transmits a number, like your
license plate, and unless you know which secure data base to go
to and how those numbers correspond to the personally identifiable
information, the risk is very, very small. In fact, in the 10 years
that these kind of technologies have been in use, I am not aware
of any identity theft problems that come from that operation.
I am over my time limit. Thank you, Chairman Feinstein.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Bond appears as a submission
for the record.]
Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Bond.
Mr. Verdery?
STATEMENT OF C. STEWART VERDERY, JR., PARTNER AND
FOUNDER, MONUMENT POLICY GROUP, LLC, AND ADJUNCT
FELLOW, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL
STUDIES, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Mr. VERDERY. Chairman Feinstein and Ranking Member Cornyn

and Senator Kennedy, it is nice to return to your Committee again
and talk about some of the issues that the country faces in securing
our borders and mixing policy, technology, and personnel to do so.
Not only must these programs protect us against terrorism, crime,
and illegal immigration, but also must welcome those and facilitate
the travel of those who contribute to our economic livelihood and
contribute to our public diplomacy efforts.
My written testimony goes into great depth about six priorities
for USVISIT in 2007 and moving forward. I am only going to

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20
touchon some of them. But, in order, they are airport exit, the
International Registered Traveler Program, land entry and exit,
transition from two- to ten-fingerprint capture, cooperation internationally, and how this would fit in with our employment
verification efforts. I have a great faith in the USVISIT Program
Office and the Office of Screening Coordination at the Department
to make the best use of the dollars that Congress gives them under
the authorities that they are operating under.
As you may know, I served as Assistant Secretary for Border and
Transportation Security Policy at DHS 2003 to 2005 working for
Tom Ridge and Asa Hutchinson. I was proud to help build the US
VISIT Program into what it is today. We spent many years, as you
mentioned in your opening statement, Madam Chairman, with no
deployment because people could not figure out how to build a system all at once. So Secretary Ridge made the tough decision to
build this in increments, and that is the way it has gone since, and
it has worked well with what has been built. The problem has been
the lack of progress in the last couple years on building additional
steps.
One reason for that fact is, of course, the budget for the program
has relatively been flat, between $330 million and $362 million a
year for the last 5 years, just enough to pay for ongoing operations
and the important interoperability work with the FBI systems. In
addition, the post-Ridge leadership has gone the extra mile to try
to coordinate USVISIT with other credentialing and screening
programs resulting in delays.
I was interested to see the GAO report that Mr. Stana released
last month. I thought it was a fascinating report. Some news stories picked this up as a huge bombshell. It was a development out
of left field no one had heard of. We had taken a shocking turn
away from monitoring departures of all foreigners leaving the countryexcept it is not so shocking and it is not a new development.
There has never been money in the budget that has been requested, and there has never been money in the budget that has
been enacted to do a land exit solution for the reasons that have
been discussed here related to infrastructure and personnel.
On air exit, I do believe that DHS and USVISIT have to end
2 years of deliberation and choose a system to deploy. They have
had a difficult time deciding whether to place this at the airport
check-in counter, at the TSA checkpoint, at the boarding gate, or
at some combination of the above. In my view, it ought to be at the
checkpoint where TSA screeners operate because they are used to
interacting with the public. You have a law enforcement presence
there. You have information technology connectivity there, and also
it is a natural funneling device to move people through a limited
number of locations as opposed to putting it at the counter or at
the gate. This, of course, would have to require coordination with
the airlines departure records to make sure that the person who
was exited biometrically at the checkpoint actually left the country.
Hopefully, once we have a robust exit system, this would change
some of our visa policies that have been deterring travel to the
United States. The overwhelming majority of people who want
visas, dont get them because we are not sure they are going to

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leave. Hopefully, with a robust exit system, we could expand the
Visa Waiver Program if countries meet the security criteria that
DHS has put forward, the new proposal that has been proposed, as
well as requiring those nationals to compile a sterling recordand
whatever percentage you want, 98 percent, 99 percentof on-time
dedicated departures. I think this is a way to both do the risk management of travel that we need to do and also make our country
more welcoming than it has been in several years.
The Discover America Partnership announced a report today endorsing the Visa Waiver Program enhancements that the President
has put forward, but also the exit requirement as a way to make
sure that people have actually left the country.
Another aspect of this would be the International Registered
Traveler Program. Frequent business travelers, whether they are
U.S. citizens returning to the country or foreigners coming to the
country, should not have to through robotic screening time after
time after time. The U.K. has deployed a system, their Project
IRIS. They are going to have a million people enrolled by the end
of the decade who have been enrolled, gone through a thorough
background check, and are able to skip immigration processing
with a random audit function, of course. It is a way to maximize
the attention on less known travelers.
On the land sideand it looks like I am running out of time
I do believe that the RFID solution that Secretary Bond mentioned
can work. The piloting that was done in the last couple years, the
results were not good, but I think it really will require a port-byport deployment with the kind of resources you need to put the
gantries in the right place. Programs are coming online with RFID
and travel documents, such as the Western Hemisphere Passport
Card, which will be unveiled later this year or perhaps next with
RFID. The Border Crossing Card that Mexicans travel with will
need to be retrofitted to include RFID. And this can work, and we
should not wait for a biometric, bio-token system which could be
several years down the road, which is the ultimate solution. We
should be able to do both at the same time.
As I mentioned, my written testimony also talks about the use
of biometrics from employment verification as part of the guest
worker program. Perhaps we can address that in written questions.
I thank you for the opportunity to be here, and I look forward
to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Verdery appears as a submission
for the record.]
Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you, gentlemen, very, very much.
Mr. Verdery, since you mentioned the Visa Waiver Program, as
you know, two terrorists entered the country on the Visa Waiver
Program: Mr. Moussaoui and the Shoe Bomber, Mr. Reid. As you
also know, there are 27 countries, there were 15 million people who
came in a year ago on Visa Waiver, and no one knows whether
they left or not.
You also know that there is great pressure to expand the program. The rejection rate of Visa Waiver is 3 percent. In other
words, if you are a country that rejects more than 3 percent of
thehas 3 percent or more of the visas to come here rejected, you
are not eligible. Well, these countries have like 20 percent rejec-

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tion, 25 percent rejection. I dont know whether you know or not,
but there are tens of thousands of Visa Waiver country passports
that are stolen, international travel documents, Geneva Convention
travel documents that are stolen, international drivers licenses
that are stolen. What do you think happens to those? People buy
them. They are in the country that is part of the Visa Waiver Program, and they come into this country, and we do not know who
they really are. Now, some of us have had a bill to tighten up passport fraud. Use a forged passport illegally, you know, it is a go-tojail card, which it should be in my view.
Having said that, I think, you know, we are with this dilemma.
The bigger these programs get, the more people come here and
stay, the more you swell the undocumented population, which creates this backlash in America which prevents us from doing a number of things to reform immigration.
Mr. Bond, you mentioned that there are systems that could provide the kind of exit program, and you mentioned coordinating
them with the I94 document. I am not asking you to declare a
winner and a loser in the competitive race for this, but what kind
of a system would be most practical, would be doable, and satisfy
verification simply that a visa holder has left the country?
Mr. BOND. Well, I think in the near term there is no perfect solution right now. You could attach RFID to the I94 and know that
the I94
Chairman FEINSTEIN. You could attachgo ahead.
Mr. BOND. RFID technology on the form.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. Right.
Mr. BOND. It could actually go on the form, and so you know
when the I94 has left. Now, if that were combined with random
testing of some leaving, the visitor who is getting ready to leave
thinks, well, there is some chance I may be pulled out and checked,
and so you have some additional security. Ultimately what they are
looking at is
Chairman FEINSTEIN. Is that costly to do that, to attach it to the
I94 form?
Mr. BOND. No. I think compared to some of the alternatives, that
would be considered a very low-cost factor.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. And so that would be a chip. Is that correct?
Mr. BOND. Yes.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. That essentially would have biometric
identifiers?
Mr. BOND. No. In this case, it would havecurrently, it would
just simply transmit a unique number, which then, when read on
the other end, that separately connects to a secure data base that
tells you what that number corresponds to. This is where I used
the example of your license plate. It does not really tell you anything, but when combined with the DMV data base, then you know
who that person is. That could be done today, but, again, if it is
attached to the form, it only tells you the form has left. If you combine it with some random testing, you get some more discipline in
the system perhaps.
They are looking at ways to use a biometric on the formand
this is where you heard concern about safety and ergonomicsso

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that it perhaps might have a biometric on the form so when my
thumb is read, that releases the identifier. So then I know that not
only is it the I94 but it is my I94 because it read my finger.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. Fascinating.
Mr. BOND. But that is not here today, I want to be clear about
that.
Mr. VERDERY. Senator, could I just jump in? Because, again, the
air side is a key. You do not need all this for the air side. You have
people there. You have connectivity.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. You do not need all this what?
Mr. VERDERY. You do not need these forms and this kind of
RFID. You have the person right there who can be fingerprinted.
So the air side, it is just a question of where you put itat the
checkpoint, at the counter, at the gate. You have the person right
in front of you, can put their fingerprints down, two, four, ten, or
whatever.
And then in terms of the visa waiver question, if people who
come in, fly in from France or Japan or a new country, South
Korea, and want to leave for a day trip to Mexico, that is fine. They
come back in. But they still would have to leave the U.S. by air,
exited, checked out. You would know they left within 90 days.
And if their country does not compile a sterling record, it is out.
It would solve the problem that you eloquently described.
Mr. STANA. Senator, can I add a note of caution to the RFID discussion?
Chairman FEINSTEIN. Please.
Mr. STANA. One of the things that concerns me about the discussion of using a card or a key fob and pressing your thumb to it as
you leave at X number of miles an hour is that I have witnessed
Border Patrol agents at Border Patrol stations and I have witnessed inspectors at the ports trying to take fingerprints. Taking
fingerprints is nothing that is easy, that you can just put your finger on a form while you are talking on the cell phone going through
a port at 35 miles an hour. Maybe technology will catch up, but
currently it is very difficult to get readable prints that would satisfy the biometric identity requirement of the law. Prints, you
know, are pressed too hard, or too soft; it could be raining outside,
or be foggy. As a result the technology does not pick up the print.
The cars glass could be tinted. You might hold the I84 too close
to your body. There is any number of reasons why it wont work
as planned. There might be a solution down the road, but right
now I think it is a bit optimistic.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. So come up with a better one.
Mr. STANA. Well, right nowwhat can we do right now, I guess
is your question. Right now there is no good solution, and unless
you want to embark on a $3 to $5 billion building programand
I do not think any of us want to do that. There might be something
downstream a little ways that we can rely on. Right now we might
be able to build somewhat on current trusted traveled programs,
but, again, you are basically keeping honest people honest. People
who enroll in those programs are not a threat. They are likely to
leave. But it is a start.
The other thing I would do is I would look to non-USVISIT,
non-trusted traveler programs to see if we can get there through

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different means. Senator Cornyn mentioned more effective work
site enforcement, beefing up ICE agents to search out visa
overstays. If you do the math, Senator, there are about 5 million
visa overstays in the United States12 million illegal alien times
roughly 40 percent estimated to be overstays, you get about 5 million overstays. ICE has between 200 and 300 agents out looking for
them right now. And if you consider the numbers, you would see
they are not going to get very far, and it explains the 200 apprehensions figure that Mr. Mocny mentioned a few minutes ago. So
that is one way we can do it.
We can beef up intelligence services to try to get our line of defense up so we do not let dangerous people in to begin with. We
only know to stop those on the watchlist, and there are ways we
can improve those lists. And then, of course, theres the work site.
If people are coming here to find work, fine. We can acknowledge
that and create a temporary worker program. Or we can enforce
the work site rules and reduce the size of that haystack, so to
speak.
But until a technology solution presents itself, I think we need
to take interim steps. But I would caution against taking a step
that would lead us to a large investment that would not ultimately
be the solution we are looking for.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. My time is up. Mr. Bond had wanted to respond. Do you mind, Senator?
Senator CORNYN. No.
Mr. BOND. Thank you, Chairman Feinstein. Just one additional
point. While I agree that the technology is not there today, you had
mentioned, Chairman Feinstein, your desire for at least a starting
point. And I guess if I could, I would say a common denominator
you may be hearing here is some combination of faster flowing vicinity read along with bringing some percentage of the folks out for
a real fingerprint biometric test so there is some discipline or decent chance of discipline in the system. But that might be a starting point for you and the Department to discuss.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. Just one quick comment. I think Mr. Stana
is right about the fingerprint. I think they are very difficult. You
have to have very trained people. They do take time, and I am not
sure that that is the right biometric indicator to use for this.
What piqued my interest was the I94 form that is simple, that
is a piece of paper, but that Canadian officials and Mexican officials at least at places collect. Maybe there is a way of temporarily
building on that.
Mr. BOND. That would let you know, as I said, that the form had
left. You do not have real correlation betweencertain correlation.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. We understand that. We understand it is
imperfect.
Mr. BOND. But it would be the starting point, right.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. I mean, China, you know, you go into
China, and you get a piece of paper, and you fill it out. It is in triplicate. And you give it out at various places, and when you leave,
you provide one piece of paper, too. They know you have left.
Mr. BOND. I think all I was trying to suggest is just as we do
at airports pull some people out for a little bit closer examination,

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you may do that with some percentage of the folks going across the
land borders.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. Thank you.
Sorry, Senator. Go right ahead.
Senator CORNYN. No problem. We have a former State elected official in Texas who likes to, when she is traveling around the State
on the stump, talk about the Yellow Pages test and her conviction
that Government should not do anything that you can find provided by a private party in the Yellow Pages. And I think there is
a lot of merit to that.
But I am struck by the fact that I can carry a card like this
around with me, provided by the financial services industry, and I
can transfer funds at a store, at a money machine, virtually anywhere in the world. And in the United States, in talking about the
various incremental changes we have made to try to adapt to a
post-9/11 environment, we have, for example, Mr. Stana, you mentioned the Secure Border Initiative, which is a huge project that
has been announced by the Department of Homeland Security. I
think, Mr. Verdery, you talked about the Western Hemisphere
Travel Initiative, which will require American citizens to have a
passport or passport equivalent just to go back and forth to Mexico
or back and forth to Canada, out of the country. We have the laser
visas that we issue to Mexican nationals. We have the port security
bill we passed late last year that requires workers at ports to carry
cards that will demonstrate they have gone through the appropriate background and security check. And we have this proliferation of programs and cards.
And what I worry about a little bit is that Government is just
so slow and we do things in such an incremental way that the wisdom perhaps of a program that seemed like exactly the thing we
needed to do 5 years ago after 9/11 has sort of been overcome by
subsequent events. I would be interested to know, and perhaps get
a comment from each of you, about whether there is anything that
you would recommend we do to reduce or minimize that problem
in order to address the concerns that we are talking about here
today.
Mr. Stana, do you have any thoughts?
Mr. STANA. Well, yes, I have a few thoughts.
First, you mentioned a number of programsSBI, WHTI, US
VISIT, and so on. There is an alphabet soup of border security programsNEXUS, SENTRI. If they are not well coordinated and
funded on a level where they complement each other, I think we
might be at a point where we are creating chains with a lot of
weak links. A great USVISIT Program is not going to be any good
if you can walk 2 miles down the border and cross without detection. So that is one point.
The second point is lets define what the goals are. What are we
trying to achieve here? If we are trying to achieve a criminal-and
terror-free country, then I would want to beef up entry, because I
think experience has shown that sometimes terrorists they do not
exit alive.
If I am looking for immigration control, I would
Senator CORNYN. If I could just interject there, the problem is
when they get in, not them leaving.

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Mr. STANA. Exactly.
Mr. BOND. Because they are going to do their damage, and we
Mr. STANA. They are going to do their damage and they do not
care if they leave. If you are looking for immigration control, there
are any number of programs and methods of getting at overstays
without a USVISIT system. The trick is identifying them.
I would point out we ran into this identification and location
issue with the old Alien Registration Program. I dont know if you
remember, but every January, aliens used to have to go to the post
office and fill out a card about their whereabouts. And many filled
it out, and many did not because they did not want to be found.
And that is the problem that ICE has now. Even when USVISIT
sends them the names of overstays, trying to find people who do
not want to be found is extremely difficult.
We all leave electronic fingerprints everywhere. You pointed at
your credit card, and somewhere, if you used it today, there is
going to be a record of you using it. If you do not want to be found,
you do not us the you do not use the card and those records will
not exist. So if we are trying to find overstays and if overstays is
the problem we are trying to address, you probably do not need a
USVISIT system or have to rely solely on a USVISIT system to
get there. You might find another way to at least start doing that.
But I would agree with the proposition that we ought to know
who is in the country and we ought to have some way to assure
our border security and our internal security, but maybe we do not
need to wait until the USVISIT technology is mature enough to
give us that assurance.
Senator CORNYN. Mr. Stana, your comments remind ofI think
I have seen or read about cell phones that are being marketed to
parents because they have the capacity to be tracked by global positioning systems so they can determine where their children are.
Mr. STANA. That is true. The same with the video surveillance
technology with cameras everywhere. I have been told that there
probably are not too many hours of the dayand those hours are
probably at home in your bedroom while you are asleepwhere
you are not recorded on some camera, either passing by an ATM
machine or being in a CVS pharmacy.
Senator CORNYN. I am not suggesting we issue cell phones to all
of our visitors when they come to the United States, but, clearly,
the technology exists if we can figure a way to direct it in a way
that is most constructive.
I know my time is up, but I would appreciate it, Madam Chairman, if Mr. Bond and Mr. Verdery could respond.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. Please, go ahead.
Senator CORNYN. Thank you.
Mr. BOND. Thank you. I will be very brief. I think that that, as
was alluded to here, Government should define the mission, the objectives, and the prioritized requirements so that you can get started, and then sit down with those folks in the Yellow Pages who are
the technology leaders, many of them in Texas and California, and
figure out what is possible, what is possible in the near term, what
really are longer-term considerations so you can begin to match the
technology with the prioritized requirements.
Senator CORNYN. Thank you.

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Mr. VERDERY. Senator, just a few points. One, I completely agree
with the need to synergize and look at these programs holistically.
There is a new office at the Department that started last year, the
Office of Screening Coordination. That is their exact job, to look at
these credentialing programs and find out where the gaps are,
where the benefits are in coordination. And they are trying to do
that.
I think in terms of the land systems, if you could get a system
where the Western Hemisphere Passport Card or a State-issued
passport card was online with RFID, you retrofitted the Border
Crossing Cards or laser visas with RFID, you have people with the
new e-Passportsit is a different kind of RFID, but it would still
probably workyou essentially have gotten to the point where
most people are coming in with an RFID capability that could be
tracked inbound and outbound; you have gotten far down the road
for the land borders.
The other question would be, as Mr. Stana mentioned, on the
entry side, the ten-print conversion that you have heard a lot about
is unfortunately moving rather slowly. This was announced in the
summer of 2005. Those machines are out there. They are being
tested, but we are not talking about full implementation now until
the end of 2008 at our consular posts and ports of entry. And they
are not the big giant, bulky ones you saw before. They are very
smooth and work well. So I think that is an entry security enhancement that is ready to go from a technology basis.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. Just by way of having a bit of discussion
here until we have the vote and can excuse the panel, I want to
go back to the national security implications. There is a lot of pressure on us economically, ease everything, let people come inlargely, a lot of businesses. I have had California companies, I have had
others come in to me. They run big operations. They want more
and more and more people.
On the other hand, you have to look at it as to whether we are
going to be a country that respects a border at all, and we have
always been a sieve. People have come, they have gone, and we
now find ourselves wanting to have some security, some knowledge,
with huge immigration problems that grow every year.
Senator Cornyn and I got interested in the last Congress in
something that is called the OTM, the Other than Mexican, who
comes across the Mexican border. And we see those numbers burgeoning, and we see more people appearing from Middle Eastern
countries who come into the country illegally through Mexicoall
of which sends a signal, you know, there could be a problem.
And I do not know how we sit here and just shrug our shoulders
and say, well, it does not appear to be doable, without trying different things. And I do not think the perfect should be the enemy
of the good. I think we probably do not worry about the fingerprint
on it, but just at least if you give in a piece of paper when you
leave, that is a record that that individual has left.
And so I am really interested in following this through and trying to get a continuum of technology where, for a modest investment up front, you can begin to get this correct accounting and
then build on it as the technology improves. So if anybody has any

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ideas, at least Iand I hope Senator Cornyn, toowould be interested in receiving them.
Would you like to make any further comment?
Senator CORNYN. Just one last comment, Senator Feinstein.
Thank you very much again for convening this hearing. This is important to me and my constituents in Texas and I submit, to the
Nation, for the reasons that you have mentioned and we have discussed here today. But I think there is also a risk that we need
to acknowledge, and that is, a false sense of security.
I am reminded of the recent raids by ICE on the Swift Meat
Packing Plant companies across the country. This is a company
that participated in a voluntary program, as you know, called Basic
Pilot to be able to verify that, in fact, their employees could legitimately work in the United States. So they were sort of the good
guys participating in it. But what they did not realize is that a
large percentage of their employees were using forged documents,
which Basic Pilot does not reveal. And so while it is true that they
werethat because they participated in the Basic Pilot program,
they were immunized from certain penalties that might otherwise
attach to those who hire people who cannot legally work in the
country, they suffered millions of dollars of business disruption because, in fact, they were under the false impression that if they
just complied like a good citizen with the Basic Pilot program that
they would be protected. And they were not.
So this is another way to look at this problem that we have got
to solve as we address all these other issues.
Chairman FEINSTEIN. I really agree with that, and this is really
about bringing order out of disorder. And I think it is worth it to
do it, and I think it makes it easier for us to do some of those
things like a guest worker program that you referred to, Mr. Stana,
because there is so much hyperbole. Peoples emotions swell so
greatly around this issue. And we cannot go out and represent to
anyone that our borders are enforced. We just cannot do it. And
that is a very terrible situation.
So my very strong view is that we have to walk before we run,
that we should work on, even if it is a paper system, whatever it
is, to try to bring about a continuum of order and have it cost-effective.
So, once again, any suggestions would be more than welcome,
and I really want to thank the witnesses for being here. I hope to
continue this conversation. I know Senator Cornyn, Senator Kyl,
and Senator Kennedy would like to as well.
Thank you very much. The vote has started, and the meeting is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:12 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
[Questions and answers and submissions for the record follow.]

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