Title: Metaphysical issues of Consciousness.

Word Count: 3200

Defining Consciousness from view point of many philosophers

According to Thomos Nagel (1974), consciousness is what it is like to be
something. Many philosophers has given their view on what consciousness
is. For example, substance dualist such as Plato, Descartes and Eccles
believe the universe to consist of two fundamental kind stuff namely material
stuff and the stuff of consciousness (a substance associated with soul or
spirit or a non-material stuff). Property dualist such as Sperry and libet says
that consciousness is a special kind of property that is itself nonphysical, but
which emerges from physical systems such as brain (that is neural activities
in brain causes consciousness). By contrast, reductionist, such as crick
(1994) and Dennett (1991), believe consciousness nothing more but a state
or function of brain. 4
Well its really hard to stick to only one opinion of believing what
consciousness is and how can be defined? As number of question that pops
up when we examine any one of theories of above philosophers, like theory
related to Cartesian dualism is discussed in following section on mind-body
problem, apart from this if we take view point of property dualist they say
that its non-physical and arises from physical systems in brain, to them my
question is, how can then physical systems producing this effect is governed
and how is this controlled? (That is firing of neuron in brain).
As Scriven for one points out, conscious can mean something like (1)
awake or aware (in non-intentional sense of alert), or (2) having the
capacity to be awake or aware. That is, in sense (2) conscious is used to
distinguish beings capable of consciousness in sense (1).5 Consciousness
seems itself to be a capacity that comes and goes in being that have the
capacity to be conscious of, but what capacity is it? At first glance it seems
to be the capacity to be conscious of, or aware of things around, but is this
awareness1 or awareness2? When an animal is awake, it can be aware2 of
things, is it then conscious? We see people saying that person is in coma is
unconscious, but what is its state when person is not in coma? With what

respect to, one should define consciousness, aware1 or aware2? In the book
content and consciousness by Dennett he says that, what is subconscious,
clearly, is everything that happens in the brain except what crosses the
awareness line. To this, I would rather disagree in believing the definition of
sub-consciousness, that everything is sub-conscious that happens in brain
until it crosses awareness line, so then before awareness line everything is
not aware off, and of which one is not aware of, is not no more in conscious
state. Its quite confusing to define this way, as subconscious, I would rather
define this in terms of degree of consciousness. To conclude that there is
nothing called sub-consciousness, unconsciousness and super consciousness
and whatever, this all can be clubbed under the degree of consciousness or
the intensity of being conscious about, it may be conscious about self or
aware of surroundings. For example, even though if person is in deep sleep,
he/she woke up when some noise happens, so I can say that the degree of
consciousness was quite less. On other hand if person is in a coma then I can
say that he has nearly zero degree of consciousness or intensity is very less.
As Lashley says, No activity of mind is ever conscious.6 we are conscious of
thought we produce, but not of its production, or of how it was produced. The
consciousness Lashley is concerned with is clearly the capacity for being
aware of things around; we cannot say how we produce this thought, and
have no introspective access to the activity or process.
Here we will be looking in to Descartes view and arguments for it, and also
phenomenal concept of consciousness.
View of Descartes on mind-body problem
Lets start the approach toward consciousness from view point of dualism,
which is nothing but to classify the things in two different categories
Descartes theory: - Reality divides into two basic kind of substance. First is
ordinary matter whose essential feature is it is extended in space and any
instance of it has length, breadth, height, and occupies a determinate

position in space. He proposed second and radically different kind of

substance, a substance that has no spatial extension or spatial position, a
substance whose essential feature is the activity of thinking. This view is
known as Cartesian dualism. He saw it that the real you is not your material
body, but rather a non-spatial thinking substance, this non-physicalA mind is
in systematic causal interaction with your body and the desires and decision
of it causes your body to behave in purposeful ways. Thus its causal
connection with your body are what makes your body your, and not someone
else body.
Here are some arguments against the Cartesian dualism, if mind and
matter are different from each other in terms of it spatial existence. Then
how is it possible for mind to have any causal influence on body? As
Descartes was aware that ordinary matter in space behaves according to
Rigid laws that govern them, and one cannot get bodily momentum or
movement from nothing (mind defined as non-spatial).So intuitively it gets
clear that how is this utterly non spatial "thinking substance' has any kind of
influence on something that is matter. Descartes proposed a very subtle
material substance 'animal spirit' to convey the influence of mind on body,
but it leaves with same confusion that how can non spatial have influence on
something that is spatially defined. In any case, the basic division used by
Descartes is no longer plausible as it was in his day, this is because the
development of modern science forces to think that its neither useful nor
accurate to feature ordinary matter as that which has extension in space and
can be determined. Electron, for example, a tiny part of matter lacks
determined position in space (as known from theory of uncertainty
principle).difficulties with Cartesian dualism provides motive to consider less
radical form of sub. Dualism.
There are other arguments which tends to support dualism, that is the
existence of parapsychological phenomena such as telepathy and
telekinesis3, the point here is that such mental phenomena are real and

beyond purely physical explanation. I personally feel that such mental

phenomena are real (in particular for telepathy, as I have experienced this
phenomena). There is theoretical explanation that materialist can give for
mechanism of telepathy, for example. Thinking is an electrical activity within
the brain as neuron are fired are there is flow of electron. But according to
electromagnetic theory, such change in motion of electron will produce
electromagnetic waves radiating at the speed of light in all direction, and the
waves that will contain information about the electrical activity that produce
them. Thus such waves can subsequently have an effect on the electrical
activity of other brains that is occurred on their thinking. Calling it as simple
radio transmitter/receiver theory of telepathy. However this argument may
not be that strong to defend because the electromagnetic waves emitted by
the brain are much weaker (billions of times weaker than the ever present
background electromagnetic flux produced by radio station). This is one
reason why, in absence of systematic and repeatable evidence for the
existence of telepathy, one must doubt its possibility. Howsoever what I think
is that, the intensity of electromagnetic radiation can be increased when we
are deeply focused on it, so as to call this that such activity could be possible
when one does in meditation (where person is focused on only one thing and
is deeply concentrated upon).
Discussion on consciousness and its properties
Referring to the meaning of conscious what I think about how actually
consciousness can be understood is in reference of some or other things that
exist physically and has got distinct properties with it (meaning to say that- I
can see and experience what its liking raining outside of my house or seeing
rose, it can be even imagination involving your earlier experience).Lets not
take this form of imagination relating to higher state of consciousness that
one experience in hallucination or illusion kind of things, here it may not be
appropriate to call it as higher state of consciousness its just vaguely
interpreted to differ from hallucination ,illusion or any other activities.

As being conscious about something is inferred from that thing properties

so we can say that the material properties and properties defining conscious
are related. Thus conscious properties are identical to material properties, I
am convinced from reading book titled as thinking about consciousness by
David Papineau that concept of conscious properties has duality in it that is
two different concepts of looking toward conscious properties. This are
material concepts and phenomenal concepts. Going in detail what
material concept are ,this are the one which has to do with the physical
properties of activity consider for example that you have got hurt on your
knee, you see blood is flowing out and you feel pain due to it. Here material
properties are the one which you are able to describe well and other person
can understand by simply imagine that situation, but more over you cannot
actually give that same feeling of yours pain to that person and this is what
can be referred to as phenomenal concepts of conscious properties. The
general idea is that when we refer conscious properties through phenomenal
concepts, we think of mental properties, not as items in the material world
with specific properties, but in terms of what actually it is like to be (as in our
previous example phenomenal concept applies to ,what is like to have an
experience of pain ). We might say that the difference between the material
and phenomenal concepts is a difference at the level of sense, not reference.
As in standard case we have two terms which refer to same entity, but in
different ways. There may be many question regarding phenomenal
concepts, but lets assume that this different mode both point to the same
objective material property1.
(Ned block has recently coined some useful terminology. He uses the term
inflationist for philosophers who recognize an extra range of phenomenal
concepts. Not all materialists are inflationist as we will see further
philosophers, David Lewis and Daniel Denette, who dont agree up on
phenomenal concept and believe that conscious state are made of using
material concepts alone.)2

Jacksons Knowledge Argument

The best way to understand the phenomenal concept is from Frank Jacksons
knowledge argument (1982, 1986). He originally proposed that as a way
demonstrating the existence of distinctive phenomenal properties-that is the
conscious properties which cannot be just identified by material properties.
This can be understood from Jacksons famous thought experiment called
Mary thought experiment. Now here Mary is some future cognitive scientist.
She knows all about light waves, and reflectance property, rods and cones
and many area concerned with vision. She also has knowledge about all
different things around her only in terms of its properties, kind of
circumstance that produce different color experience and so on.
However, apart from this, Mary has had an unusual upbringing. She has
never seen any color herself, she has lived all her life inside house that too
painted black and white and with shades of grey. All her knowledge of color
vision is from book learning and none of her books contain any page with
color illustrations. She has a TV that too black and white. Then one day Mary
walks out of her house, and sees red rose. At this point Jackson observes that
she learns something new, something she didnt know before. She learns
what is like to see something red and experience it originally.
Jackson took this forward to say that Mary become acquainted with some
new property of red experience, the conscious feel of red experience of
seeing rose. If she learns about something new, Jackson argues that, this
must involve further features of red experience, the conscious feature, which
cannot therefore be identical with anything material.
For Daniel Dennett this introduction to learning new concepts seems not
possible, according to Dennett, Mary wont be learning anything new.
Whatever we understand by knowing what it is like, argues Dennett, Mary
already knows what it is like to see red.4 Dennett allows that ordinary people
learn something new from new experience, but Mary is no ordinary person as
she is supposed to know everything material about color experience and has

absolutely complete information, so she has nothing left to learn. However

this line of argument seems quite implausible. May be Dennett is looking in
the wrong place for relevant before-after experience.
The important point to Jacksons Mary experiment is that Marys new
experience will enable her henceforth to re-create this experience in
imagination, and in addition to classify new experience introspectively as of
the same kind. This is the most natural way of reading the expression
coming to know what something is like to be. That is someone who
undergoes new experience will able to imagine what the experience is like, in
a way they couldnt do before. Thus we can say that instead of learning new
concept Mary has acquired the ability to re-create same thing in her
imagination and feel the same experience which she did not had before. B
Zombie Thought Experiment
Zombies in philosophy are creatures who are exactly like us in all physical
respects but without conscious experiences. It is argued that if zombies are
so much as a bare possibility, then physicalism is false and some kind of
dualism is true, that is there is non-physical entity called consciousness.
Many hold that they are at least conceivable, and some that they are
possible. According to Descartes such possibility of having creature like this
did not work well, as he says that behind every behavior or every human
activity there is something non-spatial that exerts force up on it: an
immaterial mind, interacting with processes in the brain and the rest of the
body. If he is right, then possibility of world physically alike but lacking minds
would not be plausible, since without contribution made by mind behavior
wouldnt show up.
The simplest version of the conceivability argument for the possibility of
zombies goes:
1. Zombies are conceivable.

2. Whatever is conceivable is possible.

3. Therefore zombies are possible.
Clearly the argument is valid. However, both its premises are problematic.
They are unclear as stated, and controversial even when clarified. A key
question is how we should understand conceivable in this context. First, it is
sometimes objected that the conceivability of something does not
necessarily entail its possibility. Perhaps we can also conceive of water not
being H2O, since there seems to be no logical contradiction in doing so, but,
according to received wisdom from Kripke, that is really impossible. Perhaps,
then, some things just seem possible but really arent. Much of the debate
centers on various alleged similarities or dissimilarities between the mindbrain and water-H2O cases. Indeed, the entire issue of the exact relationship
between conceivability and possibility is the subject of an important
recently published anthology (Gendler and Hawthorne 2002).7
A much more widely supported approach to the mental is functionalism: the
view that mental states are not just a matter of behavior and dispositions,
but of the causal or other functional relations of sensory inputs, and
behavioral outputs. Since zombies would satisfy all the functional conditions
for full consciousness, functionalism entails that zombies are impossible.
Here is the interesting point by Daniel Dennett, he thinks that those who
accept the conceivability of zombies, have failed to imagine them thoroughly
enough: they invariably underestimate the task of imagination, and end up
imagining something that violates their own definition8. Given his broadly
functionalist model of consciousness, he argues, consciousness is not a
single wonderful separable thing but a huge complex of many different
informational capacities that individually arise for a wide variety of reasons.
Supposing that by an act of stipulate imagination you can remove
consciousness while leaving all cognitive systems intact is like supposing

that by an act of stipulate imagination, you can remove health while leaving
all bodily functions and powers intact. Health isn't that sort of thing, and
neither is consciousness.9

Discussing on existence of anything as an entity (whether negation of

everything can be called as entity)
Generally consciousness is referred to something that we are aware of and
that body exist in nature. Now the existence of any entity is based on its
properties and those properties are unique to it. I see that there is lots of
confusion whether something that is not a thing can be defined or not? To
address this question lets first understand that anything that we define has
got some or the other properties and that are unique to it. For example, for
defining a chair, simply one would say that the combination of wooden
planks in certain order and having four legs of wooden or anything else
defines the chair. But if I ask to define what is non-chair, it would simply
mean absence of chair and not as seeing non-chair as entity. Because, if we
see non-chair as an entity then it should have specific properties and that
should be unique to it. If someone says that non-duster, non-pen and so on
negation of some material body is what non-chair is then the person is
confusing himself in defining an entity, if he defines in such manner then
there would be endless definition of one thing and it would be contradictory
thus negation of some material body or anything say is not to be called as
entity.

Note:-

A. Here, discussing on non-material ontology, I have a doubt whether

consciousness/mind can be something non-material or not? The
confusion is yet to be clear
B. Note that there is plenty of evidence to support the hypothesis about
imaginative re-creation. Data from brain scans and other techniques
shows that imagination activates some of the same parts of our brain
as are activated by actual experience of the relevant type. Moreover,
studies of patients with brain lesion shows that damage to the relevant
areas can also destroy imaginative abilities.
REFERENCE:1. Referred from book (pg.49), to forestall one possible confusion, the
phenomenal concept that are talked do not mean to say any special nonmaterial ontology. In my view deployment of phenomenal concept is just as
much as the deployment of any other new concepts.
2. Page49 book (thinking abiut consciousness)
3. Referred from book (Matter and Consciousness by Paul M. Churchland
page no.17)
4. Referred from book (understanding consciousness by Max Velmans, page
no.7)
5. Referred from book (content and consciousness by Daniel Dennett, page
no.142)
6.refered from book(content and consciousness by Daniel Dennett, page
no.144),(authors reference- K.S.Lashley, The brain and Human
Behavior,vol.36,eds.H.C.Solomon, S.Cobb and W.Penfield,
Baltimore,1958,p.4)
7. http://www.iep.utm.edu/consciou/#SSH3b.iv

8. http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/ extract from para Can we really

imagine zombies? (1995, p. 322. For a related point see Marcus 2004)
9. Argument given by Daniel Dennett in .
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/ extract from para Can we really
imagine zombies?