Crespo v. PB of NE - Case

G.R. No.
L-33237 April 15, 1988

GREGORIO T. CRESPO, in His Capacity as Mayor of Cabiao,
Nueva Ecija, Petitioner, vs. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF NUEVA
ECIJA and PEDRO T. WYCOCO, Respondents.
Bernardo P. Abesamis for petitioner.
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Cecilio F. Wycoco for respondents.

PADILIA, J.:
Petitioner was the elected Municipal Mayor of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija,
in the local elections of 1967. On 25 January 1971, an
administrative complaint was filed against him by private
respondent, Pedro T. Wycoco for harassment, abuse of authority
and oppression. 1 As required, petitioner filed a written
explanation as to why he should not be dealt with
administrdatively, with the Provincial Board of Nueve Ecija, in
accordance with Section 5, Republic Act No. 5185. 2
On 15 February 1971, without notifying petitioner or his counsel,

public respondent Provincial Board conducted a hearing of the
aforecited administrative case. During the hearing, private
respondent Pedro T. Wycoco was allowed to present evidence,
testimonial and documentary, ex parte, and on the basis of the
evidence presented, the respondent Provincial Board passed
Resolution No. 51 preventively suspending petitioner from his
office as municipal mayor of Cabiao, Nueva Ecija. 3
In this petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with

prayer for preliminary injunction, petitioner seeks to annul and
set aside Resolution No. 51 of public respondent Provincial Board,
preventively suspending him from office and to enjoin public
respondent from enforcing and/or implementing the order of
preventive suspension and from proceeding further with the
administrative case.
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According to petitioner, the order of preventive suspension

embodied in Resolution No. 51 issued by the Provincial Board is
arbitrary, high-handed, atrocious, shocking and grossly violative
of Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5185 which requires a hearing
and investigation of the truth or falsity of charges before
preventive suspension is allowed. In issuing the order of
preventive suspension, the respondent Provincial Board,
petitioner adds, has grossly violated the fundamental and
elementary principles of due process. 4
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On 3 May 1971, this Court issued a preliminary injunction. 5 We

agree with the petitioner that he was denied due process by
respondent Provincial Board.
In Callanta vs. Carnation Philippines, Inc.
this Court held:
It is a principle in American jurisprudence which, undoubtedly, is

well-recognized in this jurisdiction that one's employment,
profession, trade or calling is a "property right," and the wrongful
interference therewith is an actionable wrong. The right is
considered to be property within the protection of a constitutional
guaranty of due process of law. 7
Undoubtedly, the order of preventive suspension was issued

without giving the petitioner a chance to be heard. To controvert
the claim of petitioner that he was not fully notified of the
scheduled hearing, respondent Provincial Board, in its
Memorandum, contends that "Atty. Bernardo M. Abesamis,
counsel for the petitioner mayor made known by a request in
writing, sent to the Secretary of the Provincial Board his desire to
be given opportunity to argue the explanation of the said
petitioner mayor at the usual time of the respondent Board's
meeting, but unfortunately, inspire of the time allowed for the
counsel for the petitioner mayor to appear as requested by him,
he failed to appeal." 8
The contention of the Provincial Board cannot stand alone in the

absence of proof or evidence to support it. Moreover, in the
proceedings held on 15 February 1971, nothing therein can be

gathered that, in issuing the assailed order, the written
explanation submitted by petitioner was taken into account. The
assailed order was issued mainly on the basis of the evidence
presented ex parte by respondent Wycoco.
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In Azul vs. Castro,
this Court said:
From the earliest inception of instutional government in our

country, the concepts of notice and hearing have been
fundamental. A fair and enlightened system of justice would be
impossible without the right to notice and to be board. The
emphasis on substantive due process and other recent
ramifications of the due process clause sometimes leads bench
and bar to overlook or forget that due process was initially
concerned with fair procedure. Every law student early learns in
law school definition submitted by counsel Mr. Webster
in Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward (4 Wheat. 518)
that due process is the equivalent of law of the land which means
"The general law; a law which hears before it condemns, which
proceeding upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial ...
that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and
immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern
society.
A sporting opportunity to be heard and the rendition of judgment

only after a lawful hearing by a coldly neutral and impartial judge
are essential elements of procedural due process.
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We had occasion to emphasize in Santiago v. Santos (63 SCRA

392), which, unlike the case before us now, was only a summary
action for ejectment that:
In an adversary proceeding, fairness and prudence dictate that a
judgment, based only on plaintiffs evidence adduced ex parte and
rendered without hearing defendant's evidence, should be
avoided as much as possible. In order that bias may not be
imputed to the judge, he should have the patience and
circumspection to give the opposing party a chance to present his

evidence even if he thinks that the oppositor's proof might not be
adequate to overthrow the case for the plaintiff. A display of
petulance and impatience in the conduct of the trial is a norm of
conduct which is inconsistent with the "cold neutrality of an
impartial judge". 10
The petition, however, has become moot and academic. Records
do not show that in the last local elections held on 18 January
1988, petitioner was elected to any public office.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The preliminary

injunction issued by this Court on 3 May 1971 is LIFTED. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, Melencio-Herrera, Paras and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:

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G.R. No.

L-33237 April 15, 1988

chanrobles virtual law library

Cecilio F. Wycoco for respondents.

On 15 February 1971, without notifying petitioner or his counsel,

In this petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with

chanrobles virtual law library

According to petitioner, the order of preventive suspension

On 3 May 1971, this Court issued a preliminary injunction. 5 We

chanrobles virtual law library

In Callanta vs. Carnation Philippines, Inc.

this Court held:

It is a principle in American jurisprudence which, undoubtedly, is

Undoubtedly, the order of preventive suspension was issued

The contention of the Provincial Board cannot stand alone in the

proceedings held on 15 February 1971, nothing therein can be

In Azul vs. Castro,

chanroble s virtual law library

this Court said:

From the earliest inception of instutional government in our

chanrobles virtual law library

A sporting opportunity to be heard and the rendition of judgment

chanroble s virtual law library

We had occasion to emphasize in Santiago v. Santos (63 SCRA

circumspection to give the opposing party a chance to present his

chanrobles virtual law library

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The preliminary

chanrobles virtual law library

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