People vs.

Vera
Facts:
Respondent in this case is J. Jose Vera, judge of the 7th branch of the CFI of Manila who heard Marianos
application for probation in the criminal case.
On Nov 27,1936 Mariano filed an application for probation before the TC, under Act No. 4221 (Probation
Act), claiming he was innocent of the crime, that he had no criminal record & he would observe good
conduct in the future.
Judge Tuason of the CFI referred the application to the Insular Probation Office w/ recommended its
denial. After, this Judge Vera set the petition for hearing on April 5, 1937.
April 2, 1937 Fiscal of Manila filed an opposition to the granting of the probation. April 5,1937 private
prosecution (H&S Banking Corp) did the same, alleging Act No. 4221 (if it is not repealed by sec2, a.XV of
the consti) violated sec1, aIII of the consti. A supplementary provision was also filed by the private
prosecution elaborating on the Acts unconstitutionality as an undue delegation of legislative power to
the provincial boards of several provinces.
June 28, 1937 Judge Vera promulgated a resolution, concluding that Mariano was innocent, but denied
his petition for probation. Mariano filed 3 motions for reconsideration which were set for hearing on
July 31,1937. But this was postponed bec a motion for leave to intervene in the case as amicus curiae
signed by 33 lawyers was filed with the TC. (although 1 lawyer who signed the motion petitioned for
leave to withdraw his appearance since the motion was circulated at a banquet by Marianos counsel &
that he signed his name w/o mature deliberation & that he signed out of courtesy to the person who
invited him). Fiscal filed a motion for the issuance of an order of execution of judgment and to commit
Mariano to jail. Private prosecution also filed an opposition to the motion for leave to intervene as amici
curiae.
Aug 10, 1937 Judge Vera issued an order requiring all the parties, including the movants for intervention
as amici curiae to appear before the court on Aug 14. Fiscal moved for the hearing of his motion for
execution of judgment instead of the motion for leave to intervene w/c was opposed by Marianos
counsel, thus the Fiscal moved for the postponement of both hearings.
Judge Vera set the hearing for the motion for execution on Aug 21 but still considered the motion for
leave to intervene. Evidence as to the circumstances under w/c the motion for leave to intervene was
signed & submitted, was to be heard on Aug 19. BUT THENpetitioners (Ppl of Phils & H&S Banking
Corp) went to the SC on extraordinary legal process to put to what they alleged was an interminable
proceeding in the CFI since it fostered the campaign of Mariano for delay in the execution of the
sentence imposed by the SC, thus exposing the courts to criticism & ridicule bec of the apparent inability
of the judicial machinery to make effective a final judgment.
Scheduled hearing before the TC was thus suspended upon the issuance of a TRO by the SC on Aug 21.

Petitioners allege that Judge Vera acted w/o or in excess of his jurisdiction:
1. bec he lacks the power to place Mariano under probation since
a) sec 11, Act No.4221, the Act is made to apply only to provinces & doesnt state that it is applicable to
chartered cities like Manila
b) although sec37 of the Administrative Code says that in the absence of a special provision, the term
province may be construed to include Manila for the purpose of giving effect to laws of gen. application,
Act 4221 is not a law of gen. application
c) and even if Manila was considered to be a province, Act 4221 would still not apply since it does not
provide for the salary of a probation officer as required by sec11 of the Act
2. bec even if he originally had jurisdiction to entertain the application for probation, he acted w/o or in
excess of his jurisdiction by entertaining the motion for reconsideration & by failing to commit Mariano
to prison after he gave his June 28, 1937 resolution denying the application, since
a) his jurisdiction & power in probation proceedings is limited by Act 4221 to the granting or denying of
applications for probation
b) after he issued the order denying Marianos application, it became final & executory at the moment
of its rendition
c) no right of appeal exists in such cases
d) judge Vera lacks the power to grant a rehearing of said order or to modify or change the same
3. bec he found Mariano innocent w/c was a presumptuous finding but w/o foundation in fact or law &
is furthermore in contempt of this court and in violation of his oath to office as ad interim judge of first
instance
4. Bec respondent judge violated & continues to violate his duty, w/c became imperative when he
issued his June 28 order denying the application for probation, to commit Mariano to jail.
They also state that they have no other plain, speedy & adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
H&S Banking Corp also contends that Act 4221, w/c provides for a system of probation for persons 18
yrs of age or over who are convicted of a crime, is unconstitutional bec it violates sec 1, subsec (1), aIII of
the Consti w/c guarantees equal protection of the laws bec:
a) it confers upon the provincial board of each province the absolute discretion to make said law
operative or otherwise in their respective provinces
b) bec it constitutes an unlawful & improper delegation to the provincial boards of several provinces of
legislative power lodged by the Jones Law (sec8) in Phil. Legislature & the Consti (sec 1, aVI) in the
National Assembly

c) it gives the provincial boards the authority to enlarge the powers of the CFI in different provinces w/o
uniformity (w/c goes against sec2, aVIII Consti & sec 28 Jones Law)
Fiscal concurred w/ the allegations of private prosecution & further elaborated that probation is a
form of reprieve & therefore Act 4221 is an encroachment of the exclusive power of the Chief Executive
to grant pardons & reprieves.
Respondents allege as special defenses:
1. present petition doesnt state facts sufficient in law to warrant the issuance of the writ of certiorari or
of prohibition
2. the petition is premature bec the remedy sought by petitioners is the same remedy they ask before
the TC & was still pending resolution when this petition was filed
3. since petitioners raised the question as to the execution of judgment before the TC, the TC acquired
exclusive jurisdiction to resolve it under the theory that its resolution denying probation is unappeasable
4. the SC cannot exercise jurisdiction to decide on WON the excecution will lie, while the CFI has
assumed jurisdiction
5. Procedure of the petitioners in seeking to deprive the TC of its jurisdiction & elevate the proceedings
to the SC, impairs the authority & dignity of the TC
6. that if the SC has jurisdiction, the present action would not lie bec the resolution of the TC denying
probation is appealable; even though the Probabtion Law doesnt provide that an applicant may appeal
from resolution denying probation, it is a gen. rule that a final order, resolution or decision of an inferior
court is appealable to a superior court
7. Resolution of TC denying probation, being appealable, had not yet become final & executory since
Maraiano filed an alternative motion from reconsideration & new trial w/in the 15 day required period
8. Fiscal of Manila impliedly admitted that the TC resolution denying probation is not final &
unappealable
9. if the TC denying probation is unappealable, the accused can file an action for the writ of certiorari w/
mandamus; but before this writ of certiorari can lie, the accused must first file for reconsideration
specifying the error committed by the TC
10. that even if the TC resolution is not appealable, it still retains jurisdiction w/in a reasonable time to
correct or modify it in accordance w/ law & justice; that this power to alter or modify an order or
resolution is inherent in the courts and may be exercised either motu proprio or upon petition of the
proper party, the petition gin the latter case taking the form of a motion for reconsideration

11. That if the resolution of the TC is appealable, it cannot order execution of the same while it is on
appeal, for then the appeal would not be availing bec the doors of probation would be closed form the
moment the accused commences to serve his sentence
Issues:
1) WON the constitutionality of Act. No. 4221 has been properly raised
2) WON Act No. 4221 is not unconstitutional

a) Act 4221 encroches upon the pardoning power of the Executive

b) It constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power
c) It denies equal protection of the laws
Held:
1) Yes
2) Yes, Act No. 4221 is unconstitutional & void
Ratio:
SC noted that the TC, in passing on the merits of the application of Mariano & in denying the said
application, assumed the task not only of considering the merit of the application, but of passing upon
the culpability of the applicant, notwithstanding the final pronouncement of guilt by the SC.
Court said: Probation implies guilt by final judgment, While a probation court hearing a probation case
may look into the circumstances attending the commission of the offense, this does not authorize it to
reverse the findings & conclusions of the SC, either directly or indirectly.
1) The constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined by the
courts unless that question is properly raised & presented in appropriate cases & is necessary to a
determination of the case = the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented.
Constitutionality of an act may be raised in actions for prohibition & certiorari when the question of
constitutionality is necessary to a decision of the case (eg. Yu Cong Eng v Trinidad).
Code of Civil Procedure, sec516 The Phil. SC is granted concurrent jurisdiction in prohibition w/ CFI
over inferior tribunals or persons, & original jurisdiction over CFI, when such courts are exercising
functions w/o or in excess of their jurisdiction.
Both the petitioners & respondents are correct that a CFI sitting in probation proceedings is a court of
limited jurisdiction its jurisdiction in such proceedings is conferred exclusively by Act No. 4221.

Judge Vera passed on the question of constitutionality on the ground that private prosecutor, not being
a party whose rights are affected by the statute, may not raise the question.
As a general rule, only those who are parties to a suit may question the constitutionality of a statute
involved in a judicial decision. In criminal cases, the question may be raised for the first time at any stage
of the proceedings. And even if H&S Banking Corp is not the proper party to raise it, the People of the
Phils. is. The state can challenge the validity of its own laws.
Since Mariano has been at large for 4 yrs since his conviction and since many have applied for probation,
while some are already on probation, the instant case is of great importance & public policy demand
that its constitutionality be now resolved.
2) YES
a) Act encroaches on the pardoning power of the President? NO
Sec 21, Jones Law vests in the Gov-Gen the exclusive power to grant pardons
and reprieves and remit fines and forfeitures, w/c is not vested in the President. Framers of the
constitution provided that this power can only be exercised after conviction. This grant is exclusive & the
legislature cannot exercise this power or delegate it elsewhere.
The legislature may legally enact a probation law under its broad power to fix the punishment of any
and all penal offenses. And courts may be legally authorized by the legislature to suspend sentence by
the establishment of a system of probation. The Probation Act allows the modification in particular
cases of the penalties prescribed by permitting the suspension of the execution of the judgment. And
the punishment shall not be suffered as long as the conditions of the probation are followed. Thus, it
cannot be said that it comes in conflict with the power of the President to grant pardons & reprieves.
Probation & pardon are distinct & different. Probation is part of the judicial
power wherein the suspension of the sentence simply postpones the judgment of the court temporarily
or indefinitely, but the conviction & liability following it & civil disabilities remain & become operative
when judgment is rendered. A pardon is part of the executive power w/c exempts the person from the
punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed. Thus, the application of probation is a purely
judicial act & doesnt conflict w/ pardoning power.
* it is also diff .from reprieve (postpones the execution of the sentence to a certain day) & commutation
(changing the punishment assessed to a less punishment)
b) Does sec 11 of Act 4221, constitute an undue delegation of legislative power? YES
Sec. 11 This act shall apply only in those provinces in w/c the respective provincial boards have
provided for the salary of a probation officer.

The legislative neither must nor can transfer the power f making laws to anybody else, or place it
anywhere but where the people have. Thus, its power cannot be delegated to another body or
authority. But there is an exception, the central legislative body is permitted to delegate legislative
powers to local authorities. Such legislation is not a transfer of general legislative power but rather a
grant of the authority to prescribe local regulations.
BUT under the Probation Act, the provincial boards may be regarded as
administrative bodies endowed w/ the power to determine when the act should take effect in their
provinces. As a rule, an act of legislature is incomplete & invalid if it does not lay down any rule or
definite standard by w/c the administrative board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary
powers delegated to it and Act 4221 DOES NOT provide any standards or guides. The applicability &
application of the act is entirely placed in the hands of the provincial board. The legislature has not
made the operation of the Act contingent on specified facts or conditions to be ascertained by the
provincial board. It leaves the entire operation or non-operation of the law upon the provincial boards.
Though there is a right of local self-government & of leaving matters of purely local concern in the hands
of local authorities, matters of general legislation, like that w/c treats of criminals in general, and as
regards the general subject of probation, discretion may not be vested in a manner so unqualified &
absolute as provided in Act 4221. (bec .each province has the absolute power to determine WON the act
should take effect or operate in their provinces w/c is not allowed)
c) Does it violate the equal protection of laws? YES.The inequality is said to flow from the unwarranted
delegation of legislative. power (bec .the probation act may operate in one province & not in another).
Thus, Act 4221 creates a situation in w/c discrimination & equality are permitted.

Sec11 of the act, is inseparably linked w/ the other provisions of Act 4221 & its elimination would result
in the bare idealism of the system, devoid of any practical benefit to a large number of people.
Respondents argue that even w/o sec11, probation officers may be appointed in provinces under sec 10.
But the probation officers & administrative personnel referred to in sec10 (who are to act in the
central/probation office) are clearly NOT the probation officers required to be appointed for provinces
under sec11. Thus, the entire act was set aside.